The authors/submitters alone is responsible for
what is expressed
DID YOU KNOW
FROM THE WEBSITE WWW.MEXICA-MOVEMENT.ORG
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"Latino" denies us our true Nican Tlaca (Indigenous) identity and heritage. It keeps us slaves to European interests and Spaniard culture. Collectively, we have no Latin genealogy, Latin blood group, Latin history, or a common Latin culture of food or mythology. The "Latino" labeling of our people is a colonialist-racist act of Genocide---an attempt to "kill off" our people's true identity, history, independence, and our rights to our land and its wealth. Notice how this is not about "Latino Americans" in the U.S. This is about all of the "Spanish speaker" European Spaniards and their colonies of Nican Tlaca and Africans in the "Americas". What they are in fact doing is separating us from our Anahuac Heritage (Mexican and "Central American" Nican Tlaca identity and history) and enslaving us to their needs. THE CONCEPT OF HISPANIC is even more racist than "Latino" because it completely denies us our true Nican Tlaca heritage by not even referring to our colonized condition of being in "Latin America". We now become direct possessions of Spaniards. This is an attempt (successful so far) to actively reactivate the Spanish colonial empire through their colonials on our land. The media is their main tool in this parasitic renewed colonialist machine of the European Spaniards.
A side note: A
Mixed-blood is not a Criollo or a European.
Spaniards, Europeans, And Their Squatter
Descendants On Our Land Who Force Their Eurocentric, Racist, &
Anti-Indigenous "Hispanic" & "Latino" Labels On Our People!
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1) THEFT OF OUR
LAND was the initial crime of the
Europeans. We did not ever give up the ownership of our land, nor
did we ever invite Europeans onto our lands.
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THE LYNCHING OF SO CALLED NEGROES. (BLACK PEOPLE)
1885. . . . .184 1895. . . . .171 1886. . . . .138 1896. . . . .131 1887. . . . .122 1897. . . . .166 1888. . . . .142 1898. . . . .127 1889. . . . .176 1899. . . . .107 1890. . . . .127 1900. . . . .115 1891. . . . .192 1901. . . . .135 1892. . . . .235 1902. . . . .96 1893. . . . .200 1903(to Sept. 14, eight and a half months). . . . .76 1894. . . . .190 Total lynchings. Whites. Negroes. In the South. In the North. 1900. . . . . . . 115 8 107 107 8 1901. . . . . . . 135 26 107 121 14 1902. . . . . . . . 96 9 86 87 9 1903(to Sept. 14). . . . .76 13 63 66 10 Causes Assigned. 1900 1901.* 1902.† 1903. Murder 39 39 37 32 Rape 18 19 19 8 Attempted rape 13 9 11 5 Race prejudice 10 9 2 3 Assaulting whites 6 - 3 3 Threats to kill 5 - 1 - Burglary 4 1 - - Attempt to murder 4 9 4 6 Informing 2 - - - Robbery 2 “Theft” 12 1 - Complicity in murder 2 6 3 5 Rape and murder - - - 1 Suspicion of murder 2 3 1 3 Suspicion of robbery 1 - - - No offence 1 - - - Arson 2 4 - - Suspicion of arson 1 - - - Aiding escape of murderer 1 - 1 - Insulting a white woman - 1 - - Cattle and horse stealing - 7 1 - Quarrel over profit-sharing - 5 - - Suspicion of rape - 1 - - Suspicion of rape and murder - 1 - - Unknown offences 2 6 - 4 Mistaken identity - 1 1 3 NOTE.—The lynchings in the various States and Territories in 1900 were as follows: Alabama 8 New York 0 Arkansas 6 Nevada 0 California 0 North Carolina 3 Colorado 3 North Dakota 0 Connecticut 0 Ohio 0 Delaware 0 Oregon 0 Florida 9 Pennsylvania 0 Georgia 16 Rhode Island 0 Idaho 0 South Carolina 2 Illinois 0 South Dakota 0 Indiana 3 Tennessee 7 Iowa 0 Texas 4 Kansas 2 Vermont 0 Kentucky 1 Virginia 6 Louisiana 20 West Virginia 2 Maine 0 Wisconsin 0 Maryland 1 Washington 0 Massachusetts 0 ! Wyoming 0 Michigan 0 Arizona 0 Minnesota 0 District of Columbia 0 Mississippi 20 New Mexico 0 Missouri 2 Utah 0 Montana 0 Indian Territory 0 Nebraska 0 Oklahoma 0 New Jersey 0 Alaska 0 New Hampshire 0 * In 1901 one Indian and one Chinaman lynched. † In 1902 one Indian lynched. From these tables certain facts may be deduced. The first is that, in the year of which an analysis is given (1900), over nine-tenths of the lynchings occurred in the South, where only about one-third of the population of the country were, but where nine- tenths of the negroes were; secondly, that, of these lynchings, about nine-tenths were of negroes and one-third were in the three States where the negroes are most numerous; thirdly, that, while the lynchings appear to be diminishing at the South, the ratio, at least, is increasing at the North. It further appears that, though lynching began as a punishment for assault on white women, it has extended until less than one-fourth of the instances are for this crime, while over three-fourths of them are for murder, attempts at murder, or some less heinous offence. This may be accounted for, in part, by the fact that the murders in the South partake somewhat of the nature of race-conflicts. Over 2,700 lynchings in eighteen years are enough to stagger the mind. Either we are relapsing into barbarism, or there is some terrific cause for our reversion to the methods of mediaevalism, and our laws are inefficient to meet it. The only gleam of light is that, of late years, the number appears to have diminished. To get at the remedy, we must first get at the cause. Time was when the crime of assault was unknown throughout the South. During the whole period of slavery, it did not exist, nor did it exist to any considerable extent for some years after Emancipation. During the War, the men were away in the army, and the negroes were the loyal guardians of the women and children. On isolated plantations and in lonely ! neighbor hoods, women were as secure as in the streets of Boston or New York. Then came the period and process of Reconstruction, with its teachings. Among these was the teaching that the negro was the equal of the white, that the white was his enemy, and that he must assert his equality. The growth of the idea was a gradual one in the negro’s mind. This was followed by a number of cases where members of the negro militia ravished white women; in some instances in the presence of their families.*[A] The result of the hostility between the Southern whites and Government at that time was to throw the former upon their own acts for their defence or revenge, with a consequent training in lawless punishment of acts which should have been punished by law. And here lynching had its evil origin. It was suggested some time ago, in a thoughtful paper read by Professor Wilcox, that a condition something like this had its rise in France during the religious wars. The first instance of rape, outside of these attacks by armed negroes, and of consequent lynching, that attracted the attention of the country was a case which occurred in Mississippi, where the teaching of equality and of violence found one of its most fruitful fields. A negro dragged a woman down into the woods, and tying her, kept her bound there a prisoner for several days, when he butchered her. He was caught and was lynched. With the resumption of local power by the whites came the temporary and partial ending of the crimes of assault and of lynching. As the old relation, which had survived even the strain of Reconstruction, dwindled with the passing of the old generation from the stage, and the “New Issue” with the new teaching took its place, the crime broke out again with renewed violence. The idea of equality began to percolate more extensively among the negroes. In evidence of it is the fact that since the assaults began again they have been chiefly directed against the plainer order of people, instances of ! attacks on women of the upper class, though not unknown, being of rare occurrence.*[B] Conditions in the South render the commission of this crime peculiarly easy. The white population is sparse, the forests are extensive, the officers of the law distant and difficult to reach; but, above all, the negro population has appeared inclined to condone the fact of mere assault. Twenty-five years ago, women went unaccompanied and unafraid throughout the South, as they still go throughout the North. To-day, no white woman, or girl, or female child, goes alone out of sight of the house except on necessity; and no man leaves his wife alone in his house, if he can help it. Cases have occurred of assault and murder in broad day, within sight and sound of the victim’s home. Indeed, an instance occurred not a great while ago in the District of Columbia, within a hundred yards of a fashionable drive, when, about three o’clock of a bright June day, a young girl was attacked within sight and sound of her house, and when she screamed her throat was cut. So near to her home was the spot that her mother and an officer, hearing her cries, reached her before life was extinct. For a time, the ordinary course of the law was, in the main, relied on to meet the trouble; but it was found that, notwithstanding the inevitable infliction of the death penalty, several evils resulted therefrom. The chief one was that the ravishing of women, instead of diminishing, steadily increased. The criminal, under the ministrations of his preachers, usually professed to have “gotten religion,” and from the shadow of the gallows called on his friends to follow him to glory. So that the punishment lost to these emotional people much of its deterrent force, especially where the real sympathy of the race was mainly with the criminal rather than with his victim. Another evil was the dreadful necessity of calling on the innocent victim, who, if she survived, as she rarely did, was already bowed to the earth by shame, to relate in public! the sto ry of the assault--an ordeal which was worse than death. Yet another was the delay in the execution of the law. With these, however, was one other which, perhaps, did more than all the rest together to wrest the trial and punishment from the Courts and carry them out by mob-violence. This was the unnamable brutality with which the causing crime was, in nearly every case, attended. The death of the victim of the ravisher was generally the least of the attendant horrors. In Texas, in Mississippi, in Georgia, in Kentucky, in Colorado, as later in Delaware, the facts in the case were so unspeakable that they have never been put in print. They could not be put in print. It is these unnamable horrors which have outraged the minds of those who live in regions where they have occurred, and where they may at any time occur again, and, upsetting reason, have swept from their bearings cool men and changed them into madmen, drunk with the lust of revenge. Not unnaturally, such barbarity as burning at the stake has shocked the sense of the rest of the country, and, indeed, of the world. But it is well for the rest of the country, and for the world, to know that it has also shocked the sense of the South, and, in their calmer moments, even the sense of those men who, in their frenzy, have been guilty of it. Only, a deeper shock than even this is at the bottom of their ferocious rage—the shock which comes from the ravishing and butchery of their women and children. It is not necessary to be an apologist for barbarity because one states with bluntness the cause. The stern underlying principle of the people who commit these barbarities is one that has its root deep in the basic passions of humanity; the determination to put an end to the ravishing of their women by an inferior race, no matter what the consequence. For a time, a speedy execution by hanging was the only mode of retribution resorted to by the lynchers; then, when this failed of its purpose, a more savage method was essayed, born of a! savage fury at the failure of the first, and a stern resolve to strike a deeper terror into those whom the other method had failed to awe. The following may serve as an illustration. Ten or twelve years ago, the writer lectured one afternoon in the early spring in a town in the cotton-belt of Texas--one of the prettiest towns in the Southwest. The lecture was delivered in the Court-house. The writer was introduced by a gentleman who had been a member of the Confederate Cabinet and a Senator of the United States, and the audience was composed of refined and cultured people, representing, perhaps, every State from Maine to Texas. Two days later, the papers contained the account of the burning at the stake in this town of a negro. He had picked up a little girl of five or six years of age on the street where she was playing in front of her home, and carried her off, telling her that her mother had sent him for her; and when she cried, he had soothed her with candy which, with deliberate prevision, he had bought for the purpose. When she was found, she was unrecognizable. With her little body broken and mangled, he had cut her throat and thrown her into a ditch. A strong effort was made to save him for the law, but without avail: the people had reverted to the primal law of vengeance. Farmers came from fifty miles to see that vengeance was exacted. They had resolved to strike terror into the breasts of all, so that such a crime could never occur again. This was, perhaps, the second or third instance of burning in the country. Of late, lynching at the stake has spread beyond the region where it has such reason for existence as may be given by the conditions that prevail in the South. Three frightful instances by burning have occurred recently in Northern States, in communities where some of these conditions were partly wanting. The horror of the main fact of lynching was increased, in two of the cases, by a concerted attack on a large element of the negro population which was wholly i! nnocent. Even the unoffending negroes were driven from their homes, a consequence which has never followed in the South, where it might seem there was more occasion for it. It thus appears that the original crime, and also the consequent one in its most brutal form, are not confined to the South, and, possibly, are only more frequent there because of the greater number of negroes in that section. The deep racial instincts are not limited by geographical bounds. These last-mentioned lynchings were so ferocious, and so unwarranted by any such necessity, real or fancied, as may be thought to exist at the South by reason of the frequency of assault and the absence of a strong police force, that they not unnaturally called forth almost universal condemnation. The President felt it proper to write an open letter, commending the action of the Governor of Indiana on the proper and efficient exercise of his authority to uphold the law and restore order in his State. But who has ever thought it necessary to commend the Governors of the Southern States under similar circumstances? The militia of some of the Southern States are almost veterans, so frequently have they been called on to protect wretches whose crimes stank in the nostrils of all decent men. The Governor of Virginia boasted, a few years ago, that no lynching should take place during his incumbency, and he nearly made good his boast; though, to do so, he had to call out at one time or another almost the entire force of the State. Editorials in some of the Eastern papers note with astonishment recent instances where law-officers in the South have protected their prisoners or eluded a mob. The writers of these editorials know so little of the South that one is scarcely surprised at their ignorance. But men are hanged by law for this crime of assault every few months in some State in the South. A few years ago, Sheriff Smith, of Birmingham, protected a murderer at the cost of many lives; a little later, Mayor Prout, of Roanoke, defended a n! egro rav isher and murderer, and, though the mob finally succeeded in their aim, six men were killed by the guards before the jail was carried. These are only two of the many instances in which brave and faithful officers have, at the risk of their lives, defended their charges against that most terrible of all assailants—a determined mob.* *The following table is from the Chicago Tribune. The number of legal executions in 1900 was 118, as compared with 131 in 1899, 109 in 1898, 128 in 1897, 122 in 1896, 132 in 1895, 132 in 1894, 126 in 1893, and 107 in 1892. The executions in the several States and Territories were in 1900 as follows: Alabama 4 New York 3 Arkansas 0 Nevada 0 California 5 North Carolina 9 Colorado 0 North Dakota 1 Connecticut 1 Ohio 1 Delaware 0 Oregon 1 Florida 1 Pennsylvania 15 Georgia 14 Rhode Island 0 Idaho 2 South Carolina 3 Illinois 0 South Dakota 0 Indiana 0 Tennessee 4 Iowa 0 Texas 18 Kansas 0 Vermont 0 Kentucky 0 Virginia 7 Louisiana 6 West Virginia 0 Maine 0 Wisconsin 0 Maryland 3 Wyoming 0 Massachusetts 0 Washington 2 Michigan 0 Arizona 4 Minnesota 0 District of Columbia 3 Mississippi 1 New Mexico 0 Missouri 3 Utah 0 Montana 3 Indian Territory 0 Nebraska 0 Oklahoma 0 New Jersey 4 Alaska 0 New Hampshire 0 There were 80 hanged in the South and 39 in the North, of whom 60 were whites, 58 were blacks, and one a Chinaman. The crimes for which they were executed were: murder, 113; rape, 5; arson, 1. Thus, of the 119 hangings, about two-thirds (80) were in the South and one-third (39) in the North; about one-half (60) of the entire number were of whites, and one-half (58) were of blacks. So, the South appears to have done its part in the matter of punishing by law as well as by violence. For a time, the assaults by negroes were confined to young women who were caught alone in solitary and secluded places. The company even of a child was sufficient to protect ! them. Th en the ravishers grew bolder, and attacks followed on women when they were in company. And then, not content with this, the ravishers began to attack women in their own homes. Sundry instances of this have occurred within the last few years. As an illustration, may be cited the notorious case of Samuel Hose, who, after making a bet with a negro preacher that he could have access to a white woman, went into a farmer’s house while the family, father, mother, and child, were at supper; brained the man with his axe; threw the child into a corner with a violence which knocked it senseless, and ravished the wife and mother with unnamable horrors, butchered her and bore away with him the indisputable proof of having won his wager. He was caught and was burnt. Another instance, only less appalling, occurred two years ago in Lynchburg, Virginia, where the colored janitor of a white female school, who had been brought up and promoted by the Superintendent of Schools, and was regarded as a shining example of what education might accomplish with his race, entered the house of a respectable man one morning, after the husband, who was a foreman in a factory, had gone to his work; and ravished the wife, and then putting his knee on her breast, coolly cut her throat as he might have done a calf’s. There was no attempt at lynching; but the Governor, resolved to preserve the good name of the commonwealth, felt it necessary to order out two regiments of soldiers, in which course he was sustained by the entire sentiment of the State. These cases were neither worse nor better than many of those which have occurred in the South in the last twenty years, and in that period hundreds of women and a number of children have been ravished and slain. Now, how is this crime of assault to be stopped? For stopped it must be, and stopped it will be, whatever the cost. One proposition is that separation of the races, complete separation, is the only remedy. The theory appears Utopian. Colonization has been! the dre am of certain philanthropists for a hundred years. And, meantime, the negroes have increased from less than a million to nine millions. They will never be deported; not because we have not the money, for an amount equal to that spent in pensions during three years would pay the expenses of such deportation, and an amount equal to that paid in six years would set them up in a new country. But the negroes have rights; many of them are estimable citizens; and even the body of them, when well regulated, are valuable laborers. It might, therefore, as well be assumed that this plan will never be carried out, unless the occasion becomes so imperative that all other rights give way to the supreme right of necessity. It is plain, then, that we must deal with the matter in a more practicable manner, accepting conditions as they are, and applying to them legal methods which will be effective. Lynching does not end ravishing, and that is the prime necessity. Most right- thinking men are agreed as to this. Indeed, lynching, through lacking the supreme principle of law, the deliberateness from which is supposed to come the certainty of identification, fails utterly to meet the necessity of the case even as a deterrent. Not only have assaults occurred again and again in the same neighborhood where lynching has followed such crime; but, a few years ago, it was publicly stated that a negro who had just witnessed a lynching for this crime actually committed an assault on his way home. However this may be, lynching as a remedy is a ghastly failure; and its brutalizing effect on the community is incalculable. The charge that is often made, that the innocent are sometimes lynched, has little foundation. The rage of a mob is not directed against the innocent, but against the guilty; and its fury would not be satisfied with any other sacrifices than the death of the real criminal. Nor does the criminal merit any consideration, however terrible the punishment. The real injury is to the perpetrators of the crime ! of destr oying the law, and to the community in which the law is slain.[C] It is pretty generally conceded that the “law’s delay” is partly responsible for the “wild justice” of mob vengeance, and this has undoubtedly been the cause of many mobs. But it is far from certain if any change in the methods of administration of law will effect the stopping of lynching; while to remedy this evil we may bring about a greater peril. Trial by jury is the bed-rock of our liberties, and the inherent principle of such trial is its deliberateness. It has been said that the whole purpose of the Constitution of Great Britain is that twelve men may sit in the jury-box. The methods of the law may well be reformed; but any movement should be jealously scanned which touches the chief barrier of all liberty. The first step, then, would appear to be the establishment of a system securing a reasonably prompt trial and speedy execution by law, rather than a wholesome revolution of the existing system. Many expedients have been suggested; some of the most drastic by Northern men. One of them proposed, not long since, that to meet the mob--spirit, a trial somewhat in the nature of a drum-head court-martial might be established by law, by which the accused may be tried and, if found guilty, executed immediately. Others have proposed as a remedy emasculation by law; while a Justice of the Supreme Court has recently given the weight of his personal opinion in favor of prompt trial and the abolishment of appeals in such cases. Even the terrible suggestion has been made that burning at the stake might be legalized! These suggestions testify how grave the matter is considered to be by those who make them. But none of these, unless it be the one relating to emasculation, is more than an expedient. The trouble lies deeper. The crime of lynching is not likely to cease until the crime of ravishing and murdering women and children is less frequent than it has been of late. And this crime, which is will-nigh wholly con! fined to the negro race, will not greatly diminish until the negroes themselves take it in hand and stamp it out. From recent developments, it may be properly inferred that the absence of this crime during the period of Slavery was due more to the feeling among the negroes themselves than to any repressive measures on the part of the whites. The negro had the same animal instincts in Slavery that he exhibits now; the punishment that follows the crime now is as certain, as terrible, and as swift as it could have been then. So, to what is due the alarming increase of this terrible brutality? To the writer it appears plain that it is due to two things: first, to racial antagonism and to the talk of social inequality, from which it first sprang, that inflames the ignorant negro, who has grown up unregulated and undisciplined; and, secondly, to the absence of a strong restraining public opinion among the negroes of any class, which alone can extirpate the crime. In the first place, the negro does not generally believe in the virtue of women. It is beyond his experience. He does not generally believe in the existence of actual assault. It is beyond his comprehension. In the next place, his passion, always his controlling force, is now, since the new teaching, for the white woman.*[D] That there are many negroes who are law-abiding and whose influence is for good, no one who knows the worthy members of the race, those who represent the better element, will deny. But while there are, of course, notable exceptions, they are not often of the “New Issue,” nor even generally among the prominent leaders: those who publish papers and control conventions. As the crime of rape had its baleful origin in the teaching of equality and the placing of power in the ignorant negroes’ hands, so its perpetration and increase have undoubtedly been due in large part to the same teaching. The intelligent negro may understand what social equality truly means; but to the ignorant and brutal young negro, it ! signifie s but one thing: the opportunity to enjoy, equally with white men, the privilege of cohabiting with white women. This the whites of the South understand; and if it were understood abroad, it would serve to explain some things which have not been understood hitherto. It will explain, in part, the universal and furious hostility of the South to even the least suggestion of social equality. A close following of the instances of rape and lynching, and the public discussion consequent thereon, has led the writer to the painful realization that even the leaders of the negro race--at least, those who are prominent enough to hold conventions and write papers on the subject--have rarely, by act or word, shown a true appreciation of the enormity of the crime of ravishing and murdering women. Their discussion and denunciation have been almost invariably and exclusively devoted to the crime of lynching. Underlying most of their protests is the suggestion, that the victim of the mob is innocent and a martyr. Now and then, there is a mild generalization on the evil of lawbreaking and the violation of women; but, for one stern word of protest against violating women and cutting their throats, the records of negro meetings will show many against the attack of the mob on the criminal. And, as to any serious and determined effort to take hold of and stamp out the crime that is blackening the entire negro race to- day, and arousing against them the fatal and possibly the undying enmity of the stronger race, there is, with the exception of the utterances of a few score individuals like Booker Washington, who always speaks for the right, Hannibal Thomas and Bishop Turner, hardly a trace of such a thing. A crusade has been preached against lynching, even as far as England; but none has been thought of against the ravishing and tearing to pieces of white women and children. Happily, there is an element of sound-minded, law-abiding negroes, representative of the old negro, who without parade stand for good order! , and do what they can to repress lawlessness among their people. But for this class and the kindly relations which are preserved between them and the whites, the situation in the South would long since have become unbearable. These, however, are not generally among the leaders, and, unfortunately, their influence is not sufficiently extended to counteract the evil influences which are at work with such fatal results. One who reads the utterances of negro orators and preachers on the subject of lynching, and who knows the negro race, cannot doubt that, at bottom, their sympathy is generally with the “victim” of the mob, and not with his victim. Until the negroes shall create among themselves a sound public opinion which, instead of fostering, shall reprobate and sternly repress the crime of assaulting women and children, the crime will never be extirpated, and until this crime is stopped the crime of lynching will never be extirpated. Lynching will never be done away with while the sympathy of the whites is with the lynchers, and no more will ravishing be done away with while the sympathy of the negroes is with the ravisher. When the negroes shall stop applying all their energies to harboring and defending negroes, no matter what their crime so it be against the whites, and shall distinguish between the law-abiding negro and the law-breaker, a long step will have been taken. Should the negroes sturdily and faithfully set themselves to prevent the crime of rape by members of that race, it could be stamped out. Should the whites set themselves against lynching, lynching would be stopped. The remedy then is plain. Let the negroes take charge of the crime of ravishing and firmly put it away from them, and let the whites take charge of the crime of lynching and put it away from them. It is time that the races should address themselves to the task; for it is with nations as with individual men; whatsoever they sow that shall they also reap. It is the writer’s belief that the arrest and ! the prom pt handing over to the law of negroes by negroes, for assault on white women, would do more to break up ravishing, and to restore amicable relations between the two races, than all the resolutions of all the Conventions and all the harangues of all the politicians. It has been tried in various States to put an end to lynching by making the county in which the lynching occurs liable in damages for the crime. It is a good theory; and, if it has not worked well, it is because of the difficulty of executing the provision. Could some plan be devised to array each race against the crime to which it is prone, both rape and lynching might be diminished, if not wholly prevented. The practical application of such a principle is difficult, but, perhaps, it is not impossible. It is possible that in every community negroes might be appointed officers of the law, to look exclusively after lawbreakers of their own race. The English in the East manage such matters well, under equally complicated and delicate conditions. For example, in the Island of Malta, where the population are of different classes among whom a certain jealousy exists, there are several classes of police: the naval police, the military police, and the civil or municipal police. To each of these is assigned more especially the charge of one of the three classes of whom the population of the Island is composed. Again, in Hong Kong, where the situation is even more delicate, there are several classes of police: the English, the Chinese, and the Indian police. Only the first are empowered to make general arrests; the others have powers relating exclusively to the good order of the races to which they belong, though they may in all cases be called in to assist the English police. Somewhat in the same way, the negroes might be given within their province powers sufficiently full to enable them to keep order among their people, and they might on the other hand be held to a certain accountability for such good order. It might even be ! required that every person should be listed and steadily kept track of, as is one in Germany at present. The recent vagrant laws of Georgia, where there are more negroes than in the entire North, are an attempt in this direction. In the same way, the white officials charged with the good order of the county or town might be given enlarged powers of summoning posses, and might be held to a high accountability. For example, ipso facto forfeiture of the official bond and removal from office, with perpetual disability to hold any office again, might be provided as a penalty for permitting any persons to be taken out of their hands. Few ravishings by negroes would occur if the more influential members of the race were held accountable for the good order of their race in every community; and few lynchings would occur, at least after the prisoners were in the hands of the officers of the law, if those officers, by the mere fact of relinquishing their prisoners should be disqualified from ever holding office again. These suggestions may be as Utopian as others which have been made; but if they cannot be carried out, it is because the ravishings by negroes and the murders by mobs have their roots so deep in racial instincts that nothing can eradicate them, and in such case the ultimate issue will be a resort to the final test of might, which in the last analysis underlies everything. |
WHERE THE NATIVE AMERICANS GOT THE NAME INDIANS
It was stated by Russell Means that he was given
documents
from scholars in Turin, Italy (the true home of the Shroud of Turin) that
the Native people of this continent were called "Indians", not because of so
called confusion between this land and India, but because the early
explorers to this continent saw the spiritual nature of the Original Man
living here and wrote back to Italy and Spain and said "these people are
Indios (In-Dios)" meaning, In God or with God.
Please share this little known fact with the Universal Zulu Nation. Respect
due, Bro. Ernie Panicciolio
That Phoebe Fraunces a Black women saved George Washington's life on the eve
of the Revolutionary War. The British had a agent Irishman name Thomas Hickey,
who was George Washingtons bodyguard who had an intimate friendship with Fraunces and gave her
a dish of poisoned peas to served Washington when he came for dinner. She became suspicious of the Irishmans
actions and warned Washington, who threw away the peas into the yard, where some chickens ate the peas and fell dead
. For Hickey assassination attempt on Washington's life, he was hanged before a crowed of 20,000 in
New York City. Both Miss Fraunces and her father, Black Sam were officially recognized by the Continental
Congress for their service to the fledging country and given a sum of money. When George became Americas
President, he appointed Fraunces White House steward.
That President Ulysses Grant was probably the first and only American President to be arrested, and that it was a Black
District of Columbia policeman by the name of Officer William West who performed the deed in
the 19th century. Officer West book the President for violating the district speeding law and for professionalism as an officer of the law,
the President later on promoted Officer West to a mounted policeman. President Grant not want to be in the public eye as someone who is above the law.
HISTORY LINKS
Noontide Press Moors Paper Writing :: Book Reports :: American ... KKK SITES
Moroccan African Moors Mulims First to America? Islam in America
Muslim Legacy in Early Americas - W. Africans, Moors tribal Terrorism
American History From About African-Amercian History The African African Americans Indians
The African-American Mosaic Exhibition (Library of Congress) Native Americans
The Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History America's West - Development & History
American Indian Genealogy and Media Sites by Phil Konstantin American Indian History Resources
On This Date in North American Indian History by Phil Konstantin African Americans - Black Indians
American President: Presidential History Resources American President
The North Star: A Journal of African-American Religious History THE SLAUGHTER
Black Indians (Afro-Native Americans) American Women's History: A Research Guide
Documents For The Study Of American History American Military History LYNCHINGS
American History, Page 1, Spanish Conquest of Native America American History Sites
Europe blackantiquity
African Presence in the Americas 1492 - 1992
The 1700's
http://www.phoenixmasonry.org/masonicmuseum/fraternalism/red_men.htm
http://www.abaris.net/freemasonry/marin_red_men.htm
The African Presence in the Americas many centuries before Columbus
http://www.abaris.net/freemasonry/marin_red_men.htm
Colonization: African-American Mosaic Exhibition
http://freepages.history.rootsweb.com/~shannara/Emblems/emblemidx.htm
Colonization Civil Rights AFRO-AMERICAN ALMANAC - African-American History Resource
Our Shared History, African American Heritage African American History: Welcome
www.martygrant.com/gen/origins.htm
Hitchhiker's
Guide to American History
Popular Songs in American History
VODOUN
American Cultural History - Decade 1920-1929 Center for History of Physics Home Page
The Avalon Project : Chronology of American History Money in North American History
American History Government
African American History - Black History Resources - Academic Info
Colonial American History Social Studies Resources Historical Text Archive BLACK INDIANS
The Journal of the Moorish Paradigm First Nations Histories
LATIN AMERICA-COLONIAL ECONOMIC HISTORY NEVADA-19TH-CENTURY MINING HISTORY
Civil War American History 1860 1865 Timeline Battle Map Maps of Native American Nations, History, Info
Bibliography II NATIVE AMERICANS A History of RACISM
1499 Amerigo Vespucci and Alonso de Hojeda sail for South America and reach mouth of Amazon
1502 Vespucci, after second voyage, concludes South America is not part of India and names it Mundus Novus.
1513 Balboa crosses Isthmus of Panama and reaches Pacific for the first time, but believes it to be part of the Indian Ocean.
1513 Ponce de Leon, searching for the "fountain of youth" reaches and names Florida.
1519 Cortes enters Tenochtitlan (Mexico City); Domenico de Pineda explores Gulf of Mexico from Florida to Vera Cruz.
1522 Andagoya discovers Peru
1523 Jamaica founded.
1531 Pizarro invades Peru, conquers Incas.
1535 Lima founded.
1536 Buenos Aires founded.
1538 Bogota founded.
1539 First printing press in New World set up in Mexico City.
1540 Grand Canyon discovered.
1541 De soto discovers Mississippi River; Coronado explores from New Mexico across Texas, Oklahoma, and eastern Kansas.
1549 Jesuit missionaries arrive in South America.
1551 Universities founded in Lima and Mexico City;
1565 ST. Augustine founded (razed by Francis Drake in 1586).
1567 Rio de Janeiro founded.
1605 Santa Fe, New Mexico founded (date in dispute; some say 1609).
A Lesson in
Black History
The Statue of Liberty
It is hard to believe that after my many years of schooling (secondary and
post) the following facts about the Statue of Liberty were never taught.
Hundreds of thousands (if not millions) of people including myself have
visited the Statue of Liberty over the years but yet I'm unable to find one
person who knows the true history behind the Statue...amazing!
Yes, amazing that so much important Black history (such as this) is hidden
from us (Black and White). What makes this even worse is the fact that the
current twist on history perpetuates and promotes white supremacy at the
expense of Black Pride!
During my visit to France I saw the original Statue of Liberty. However,
there was a difference...the statue in France is BLACK!!!!!!
"Ya learn something new everyday!"
The Statue of Liberty was originally a Black woman. But, as memory serves,
it was because the model was Black. In a book called "The Journey of The
Songhai People," as Dr. Jim Haskins (a member of the National Education
Advisory Committee of the Liberty-Ellis Island Committee, professor of
English at the University of Florida, and prolific Black author) points out
that is what stimulated the original idea for that 151 foot statue in the
harbor. He says that the idea for the creation of the statue initially was
to acknowledge the part that Black soldiers played in the ending of Black
African Bondage in the United States.
It was created in the mind of the French historian Edourd de Laboulaye,
Chairman of the French Anti-Slavery Society, who, together with sculptor
Frederic Auguste Bartholdi, proposed to the French government that the
people of France present to the people of the United States through the
American Abolitionist Society, the gift of a Statue of Liberty in
recognition of the fact that Black soldiers won the Civil War in the United
States. It was widely known then that it was Black Soldiers who played the
pivotal role in winning the war, and this gift would be a tribute to their
prowess.
Suzanne Nakasian, director of the Statue of Liberty, Ellis Island
Foundations' National Ethnic Campaign said that the Black Americans' direct
connection to Lady Liberty is unknown to the majority of Americans, BLACK
or WHITE.
When the statue was presented to the US. Minister to France in 1884, it is
said that he remonstrated that the dominant view of the broken shackles
would be offensive to the U.S. South because the statue was a reminder of
Blacks winning their freedom. It was a reminder to a beaten South of the
ones who caused their defeat, their despised former captives.
Documents of Proof:
1.) You may go and see the original model of the Statue of Liberty, with
the broken chains at her feet and in her left hand. Go to the Museum of the
City of NY, Fifth Avenue and 103rd Street (212) 534-1672 or call the same
number and dial ext. 208 and speak to Peter Simmons and he can send you
some documentation.
2.) Check with the N. Y. Times magazine, part II May 18, 1986.
3.) The dark original face of the Statue of Liberty can be seen in the N.
Y. Post June 17, 1986, also the Post stated the reason for the broken
chains at her feet.
4.) Finally, you may check with the French Mission or the French Embassy at
the U.N. or in Washington, D.C. and ask for some original French material
on the Statue of Liberty, including the Bartholdi original model. You can
call (202) 944-6060 or 6400.
Please pass this information along! Be sure to send it to people with
children! Open a dialog and discuss it with your friends! Let this be the
beginning of your quest for the Truth about American History past and
present!
ORIGINS
OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT
The contests herein give a historical development of
Police forces in the U.S.
19th Century
Organized polices forces as we know them today are a comparatively recent thing in U.S. history. Until the middle of the 19th century, the cities were usually guarded by what was called the “watch system”, meaning a handful of men who patrolled the streets during the night, sometimes calling out the time and the state of the weather. The night watch system was noted for disorganization and inefficiency. Little was expected of it and it wasn’t considered an important service to deserve much money or attention. Watchmen were notorious for falling asleep or being drunk on the job.
1838
The first major change in this system came when Boston introduced a “DAY” watch, composed of six men, to compliment its night watch.
1844
New York City created a “Day and Night Police”, the first to combine both day and night watches into a single force. This was the forerunner of the modern city police, and its example was followed by many cities;
1851 Chicago
1852 Cincinnati and New Orleans
1854 Philadelphia and Boston
1857 Baltimore and Newark
By the 1870’s, virtually every major city in the U.S. had created an organized police force along the lines that are still the basis of most police organizations in this country.
The usual answer given by liberal police historians stresses the increasing population density and ethnic diversity in the cities that came with the beginning of massive immigration from the 1830’s onward. This explanation only scratches the surface and is basically misleading. Although increasing population and ethnic diversity were important features of this period, there is no reason why, in themselves, they should call forth greatly increased use of police force.
The basic social process going on from the 1830’s to the 1860’s was the beginning of industrial capitalism in the United States, and the emergence of the typical class structure that industrial capitalism creates. Before this time, of course there were poor people in the cities: but capitalist industrialization dramatically increased their numbers, their visibility, and their militancy, and therefore increased the problems of “social control.”
Regional Police Department: Northeast/Midwest
Immigration from the American countryside and from overseas (at this time mainly from Ireland and Germany) provided a steady supply of cheap labor for the growing factories of the industrial Northeast and Midwest. Between 1810 and 1870, the number of factory workers in the U.S.; as a whole increased from about 75 thousand to about 2.5 million. This early industrial work force was subject to harsh exploitation in the factories and grim living conditions in the growing slums of the industrial cities.
Militant conflict between workers and owners began on a large scale with the first stirrings of a significant American Labor Movement. At the same time, rioting in the cities was common and rates of crime were high. The wealthy and powerful began to define working people and the unemployed poor as the “dangerous classes” and to demand more effective means of controlling and disciplining them. They had an example available over seas since England had undergone the process of capitalist industrialization somewhat earlier, they also were the first to develop modern police forces, and most of the early U.S. police departments took their basic form from the London police , created in 183?
The development of the police was somewhat different in the south and southwest. In the south, the early urban police forces were designed mainly to control slave and free blacks in the cities, and in the southwest the early police were developed in connection with the subordination of Mexicans and Native Americans, rather than an immigrant industrial working class.
Brutality and unpredictability in behavior.
Although these early police forces were designed as instruments of class domination, they were generally ineffective instruments and were usually regarded as such. There were two main reasons for this;
1. The early police were sometimes to close to the
Classes and communities they were suppose to
Be controlling
2. When they were not, they relied almost entirely
On the most primitive method of control, BRUTE FORCE
Although designed to intimidate and control the “dangerous classes”, the police were usually recruited at least partly from those classes and were therefore unreliable often as enforcers of the interests of property and power. It’s doubtful that the police forces of many cities ever consistently represented the interests of the poor, but they were sometimes sympathetic with them to a significant extent. This became especially clear during some of the labor violence of the 1880’s, when several local police forces refused to intimidate strikers, and military troops had to be called in.
The development of the National Guard system, which took place between 1877 and 1892, was one result of this unreliability of the local police. Originally officered mainly by business and professional men, and sometimes directly subsidized by wealthy industrialists, the National Guard was specifically designed to be a more direct and therefore more reliable instrument of the wealthy and propertied.
Bell
did not invent telephone, US rules
Scot accused of finding fame by stealing Italian's ideas
Rory Carroll in Rome
Monday June 17, 2002
The Guardian
Italy hailed the redress of a historic injustice yesterday after the
US Congress recognised an impoverished Florentine immigrant as the
inventor of the telephone rather than Alexander Graham Bell.
Historians and Italian-Americans won their battle to persuade
Washington to recognise a little-known mechanical genius, Antonio
Meucci, as a father of modern communications, 113 years after his
death.
The vote by the House of Representatives prompted joyous claims in
Meucci's homeland that finally Bell had been outed as a perfidious
Scot who found fortune and fame by stealing another man's work.
Calling the Italian's career extraordinary and tragic, the resolution
said his "teletrofono", demonstrated in New York in 1860, made him
the inventor of the telephone in the place of Bell, who had access to
Meucci's materials and who took out a patent 16 years later.
"It is the sense of the House of Representatives that the life and
achievements of Antonio Meucci should be recognised, and his work in
the invention of the telephone should be acknowledged," the
resolution stated.
Bell's immortalisation in books and films has rankled with
generations of Italians who know Meucci's story. Born in 1808, he
studied design and mechanical engineering at the Academy of Fine Arts
in Florence, and as a stage technician at the city's Teatro della
Pergola developed a primitive system to help colleagues communicate.
In the 1830s he moved to Cuba and, while working on methods to treat
illnesses with electric shocks, found that sounds could travel by
electrical impulses through copper wire. Sensing potential, he moved
to Staten Island, near New York City, in 1850 to develop the
technology.
When Meucci's wife, Ester, became paralysed he rigged a system to
link her bedroom with his neighbouring workshop and in 1860 held a
public demonstration which was reported in New York's Italian-
language press.
In between giving shelter to political exiles, Meucci struggled to
find financial backing, failed to master English and was severely
burned in an accident aboard a steamship.
Forced to make new prototype telephones after Ester sold his machines
for $6 to a secondhand shop, his models became more sophisticated. An
inductor formed around an iron core in the shape of a cylinder was a
technique so sophisticated that it was used decades later for long-
distance connections.
Meucci could not afford the $250 needed for a definitive patent for
his "talking telegraph" so in 1871 filed a one-year renewable notice
of an impending patent. Three years later he could not even afford
the $10 to renew it.
He sent a model and technical details to the Western Union telegraph
company but failed to win a meeting with executives. When he asked
for his materials to be returned, in 1874, he was told they had been
lost. Two years later Bell, who shared a laboratory with Meucci,
filed a patent for a telephone, became a celebrity and made a
lucrative deal with Western Union.
Meucci sued and was nearing victory - the supreme court agreed to
hear the case and fraud charges were initiated against Bell - when
the Florentine died in 1889. The legal action died with him.
Yesterday the newspaper La Repubblica welcomed the vote to recognise
the Tuscan inventor as a belated comeuppance for Bell, a "cunning
Scotsman" and "usurper" whose per- fidy built a communications
empire.
From:
EIngram517
Startling Facts.....
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
These facts are very interesting. Here are
a few of the things learned
at the Black Think Tank this week.
Facts:
1. The first Americans or native Americans going back to
13,000 BC were
black! Look up the Folsom people who
lived in Arizona.
2. Best reason to stop our use of the term African
American and say
Black. A white person who was born in Africa, who moves
to America is an
African American and qualifies for financial aid, etc., but will get the
jobs/pay privileges afforded to whites.
3. Look up the Slavery Law of 1665 (which stayed
in effect until 1968)
and the Maryland Doctrine of Exclusion (1638): both laws
state that
blacks must be excluded from the benefits afforded whites and
that
blacks must remain noncompetitive with whites, except in
sports and
entertainment.
4. Two white men: Bill Gates and Larry Elision,
combined have more
wealth than the combined wealth of all 36 million
blacks in America.
Civil Rights did not change the economic landscape or the
balance of power
in America.
5. Asians received 80% of all government
minority set aside contracts.
Hello!!!!!!!
6. Blacks eat more fish than whites by a
four to one margin. For every
dollar whites spend on fish, blacks spend nine
dollars on fish. Fish
sold wholesale for will retail at $2.50 --$3.00.
Guess what business we
should be in as Blacks?
7. There are no black owned national cable or
major network television
stations. The black woman who owns our only black owned radio
stations,
plans to sell to white owners after hearing the deal
Bob Johnson
received for selling BET. (Cathy Hughes is from OMAHA, ya'll!)
8. There are no black owned companies on the Wall
Street Stock Exchange
where blacks own the majority or controlling interest of the stock.
9. 96% of all black inmates are men.
10. Over the next two years 440,000 black inmates will be
released from
prison. The State has no place to put them as they
reenter society.
Halfway house business!
11. In 1860, 98% of all Blacks in America worked
for White people.2001,
98% of all Blacks in America still work for white
people.
12. In 1860, blacks in America had a combined net
worth of half of one
percentage point. Guess what in 2001, after Civil
Rights, Jesse Jackson,
Oprah, Shaq, NAACP, and Urban League, our combined net worth
is half a
percentage point.
13. For every dollar earned by a Jewish person, that dollar
touches
12-18 Jewish hands before it leaves their community. For
every dollar
earned by a black person it leaves the community soon as he
or she earns
it.
14. Last week in Washington, DC black teenagers where
arrested and
booked for eating McDonalds on the metro subway. Cops cited
the recent
5-4 court decision as the permission to arrest lawbreakers
even for minor
offenses.
15. 67% of all hate crimes in America are against blacks. After we
get
through being pleased that we have carpet in our office, a
secretary, our
name on the door and make six figures, we do not own anything. What
will
happen if you miss six months of work without pay? All we have left
our
children is debt not an inheritance. You cannot pass
welfare or food
stamps onto our kids as a nest egg! We are not even in the
race. By the
way, the word "race" hit the English language in the
16th century when
Europeans held a contest to see who will win the race
to gather the most wealth through exploitation of
blacks.
You must read Powernomics by Claude
Anderson. This is our blueprint to
create wealth, not just have a job,
but be a business owner, so you can
hire people, be listed on the stock
exchange, develop businesses to meet
our needs.
African Spirituality
and its Influences on
Christianity
Howard University- Blackburn Center / Room 148
Tony Browder s book. Nile Valley Contributions to Civilization, is
about
correcting some of the misconceptions so the reader, in fact, can be
introduced to a Nile Valley civilization in order to understand its
role as
the parent of future civilizations.
These events are free and open to the public and are
sponsored by NCOBRA, UBIQUITY and IKG.
For information call 301-853-2465.
Click Here:
http://www.auser.org/tour.html"
African Centered Tour of Chocolate City
BOOKS by Anthony Browder3
1) From The Browder Files
2) Nile Valley Contributions To Civilization
3) Survival Strategies For African Americans
Washington, D.C. is significant because it was the first city, built
in
modern times, which was laid out on paper before construction began.
The
layout and design of the city was based on plans of city planning and
temple
orientation which were first developed in ancient Kemet (Egypt) andÂ
incorporated in the building of many cities in Europe. The founding
fathers
of the United States borrowed many aspects of Nile Valley symbolism
and
philosophy and incorporated them into the very fabric of the creation
of this
nation. Their intention was to recreate the spiritual essence of Egypt
in the
Americas. The African origins of architecture, symbolism and temple
orientation are discussed during the tour. Also established is the
African
origins of Masonry and the Masonic influence on the development of the
United
States and the District of Columbia.
The African Centered Tour of Washington, D.C. was designed by Tony
Browder in
1986, after his travel to Egypt and realization that many symbols of
ancient
Africa were perpetuated in Washington, D.C. architecture. His tour,
designed
in part to 'instill a sense of self-worth in black Americans about
their
heritage', underscores the architectural and symbolic relationships
between
the Nation's Capital and ancient Egypt.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
The sites visited include:
DISCOVER AMERICA'S BEST KEPT SECRETS IN AN AFRICAN CENTERED TOUR OF
WASHINGTON, D.C.
The sites visited include:
Meridian Hill Park
Scottish Rite Temple
The House of the Temple
Lafayette Park
The White House
The Lincoln Memorial
The Washington Monument
L'Enfant Plaza
The Library of Congress
The Capitol
This tour will reveal:
The Egyptian Origins of Architecture & Masonry
Sacred Architecture & Symbolism
The True Meaning of the Washington Monument
The Spiritual Significance of 16th Street
Masonic Influences on the Design of Washington, D.C.
A Symbolic Interpretation of Numbers
The Library of Congress & the African Origins of Mankind
Recommended Reading
RECOMMENDED READING. YOU CAME INTO THIS WORLD WITH ALL THAT YOU NEEDED
TO
KNOW IN ORDER TO FULFILL YOUR PURPOSE IN THIS LIFE BUT THE YEARS OF
BULL SHIT
HAVE TAKEN OVER YOUR MIND. THIS LIST WILL...
http://www.fearkiller.com/new_page_1.index.htm
THE BILLS OF RIGHTS
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.
No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.
The electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate;--The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;--the person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President. The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration.
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each state, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislatures.
When vacancies happen in the representation of any state in the Senate, the executive authority of such state shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, that the legislature of any state may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex.
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a state, but in no event more than the least populous state; they shall be in addition to those appointed by the states, but they shall be considered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to be electors appointed by a state; and they shall meet in the District and perform such duties as provided by the twelfth article of amendment.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive department or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.
No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened.
1788
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS
NO 1: Introduction
by Alexander Hamilton
-
AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficiency of the
subsisting federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on
a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject
speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing
less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the
parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many
respects the most interesting in the world. It has been frequently
remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this
country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important
question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of
establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether
they are forever destined to depend for their political
constitutions on accident and force. If there be any truth in the
remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be
regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a
wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve
to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind.
This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of
patriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all considerate and
good men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice
should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests,
unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the
public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be wished than
seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations
affects too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local
institutions, not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects
foreign to its merits, and of views, passions, and prejudices little
favorable to the discovery of truth.
Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new
Constitution will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the
obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist
all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and
consequence of the offices they hold under the State establishments;
and the perverted ambition of another class of men, who will either
hope to aggrandize themselves by the confusions of their country, or
will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the
subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies than from
its union under one government.
It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this
nature. I am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve
indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (merely because
their situations might subject them to suspicion) into interested or
ambitious views. Candor will oblige us to admit that even such men may
be actuated by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted that
much of the opposition which has made its appearance, or may hereafter
make its appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least,
if not respectable- the honest errors of minds led astray by
preconceived jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed and so
powerful are the causes which serve to give a false bias to the
judgment, that we, upon many occasions, see wise and good men on the
wrong as well as on the right side of questions of the first magnitude
to society. This circumstance, if duly attended to, would furnish a
lesson of moderation to those who are ever so much persuaded of
their being in the right in any controversy. And a further reason
for caution, in this respect, might be drawn from the reflection
that we are not always sure that those who advocate the truth are
influenced by purer principles than their antagonists. Ambition,
avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, and many other
motives not more laudable than these, are apt to operate as well
upon those who support as those who oppose the right side of a
question. Were there not even inducements to moderation, nothing could
be more ill-judged than that intolerant spirit which has, at all
times, characterized political parties. For in politics as in
religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and
sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution.
And yet, however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we
have already sufficient indications that it will happen in this as
in all former cases of great national discussion. A torrent of angry
and malignant passions will be let loose. To judge from the conduct of
the opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude that they will
mutually hope to evince the justness of their opinions, and to
increase the number of their converts by the loudness of their
declamations and the bitterness of their invectives. An enlightened
zeal for the energy and efficiency of government will be stigmatized
as the offspring of a temper fond of despotic power and hostile to the
principles of liberty. An over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to the
rights of the people, which is more commonly the fault of the head
than of the heart, will be represented as mere pretence and
artifice, the stale bait for popularity at the expense of the public
good. It will be forgotten, on the one hand, that jealousy is the
usual concomitant of love, and that the noble enthusiasm of liberty is
apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust.
On the other hand, it will be equally forgotten that the vigor of
government is essential to the security of liberty; that, in the
contemplation of a sound and well-informed judgment, their interest
can never be separated; and that a dangerous ambition more often lurks
behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people than
under the forbidding appearance of zeal for the firmness and
efficiency of the government. History will teach us that the former
has been found a much more certain road to the introduction of
despotism than the latter, and that of those men who have overturned
the liberties of republics, the greatest number have begun their
career by paying an obsequious court to the people; commencing
demagogues, and ending tyrants.
In the course of the preceding observations, I have had an eye, my
fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all
attempts, from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a
matter of the utmost moment to your welfare, by any impressions
other than those which may result from the evidence of truth. You
will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected from the general
scope of them, that they proceed from a source not unfriendly to the
new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I own to you that, after
having given it an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion it
is your interest to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the safest
course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I affect
not reserves which I do not feel. I will not amuse you with an
appearance of deliberation when I have decided. I frankly
acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will freely lay before you
the reasons on which they are founded. The consciousness of good
intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not, however, multiply
professions on this head. My motives must remain in the depository
of my own breast. My arguments will be open to all, and may be
judged of by all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which
will not disgrace the cause of truth.
I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following
interesting particulars:- The utility of the UNION to your political
prosperity- The insufficiency of the present Confederation to preserve
that Union- The necessity of a government at least equally energetic
with the one proposed, to the attainment of this object- The
conformity of the proposed Constitution to the true principles of
republican government- Its analogy to your own State constitution- and
lastly, The additional security which its adoption will afford to
the preservation of that species of government to liberty, and to
property.
In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a
satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made
their appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention.
It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove
the utility of the UNION, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved on the
hearts of the great body of the people in every State, and one,
which it may be imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is, that we
already hear it whispered in the private circles of those who oppose
the new Constitution, that the thirteen States are of too great extent
for any general system, and that we must of necessity resort to
separate confederacies of distinct portions of the whole. *001 This
doctrine will, in all probability, be gradually propagated, till it
has votaries enough to countenance an open avowal of it. For nothing
can be more evident, to those who are able to take an enlarged view of
the subject, than the alternative of an adoption of the new
Constitution or a dismemberment of the Union. It will therefore be
of use to begin by examining the advantages of that Union, the certain
evils, and the probable dangers, to which every State will be
exposed from its dissolution. This shall accordingly constitute the
subject of my next address.
- PUBLIUS
NO 2: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
by John Jay
-
WHEN the people of America reflect that they are now called upon
to decide a question, which, in its consequences, must prove one of
the most important that ever engaged their attention, the propriety of
their taking a very comprehensive, as well as a very serious, view
of it, will be evident.
Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of
government, and it is equally undeniable, that whenever and however it
is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural
rights, in order to vest it with requisite powers. It is well worthy
of consideration therefore, whether it would conduce more to the
interest of the people of America that they should, to all general
purposes, be one nation, under one federal government, or that they
should divide themselves into separate confederacies, and give to
the head of each the same kind of powers which they are advised to
place in one national government.
It has until lately been a received and uncontradicted opinion, that
the prosperity of the people of America depended on their continuing
firmly united, and the wishes, prayers, and efforts of our best and
wisest citizens have been constantly directed to that object. But
politicians now appear, who insist that this opinion is erroneous, and
that instead of looking for safety and happiness in union, we ought to
seek it in a division of the States into distinct confederacies or
sovereignties. However extraordinary this new doctrine may appear,
it nevertheless has its advocates; and certain characters who were
much opposed to it formerly, are at present of the number. Whatever
may be the arguments or inducements which have wrought this change
in the sentiments and declarations of these gentlemen, it certainly
would not be wise in the people at large to adopt these new
political tenets without being fully convinced that they are founded
in truth and sound policy.
It has often given me pleasure to observe, that independent
America was not composed of detached and distant territories, but that
one connected, fertile, wide-spreading country was the portion of
our western sons of liberty. Providence has in a particular manner
blessed it with a variety of soils and productions, and watered it
with innumerable streams, for the delight and accommodation of its
inhabitants. A succession of navigable waters forms a kind of chain
round its borders, as if to bind it together; while the most noble
rivers in the world, running at convenient distances, present them
with highways for the easy communication of friendly aids, and the
mutual transportation and exchange of their various commodities.
With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice, that Providence
has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united
people- a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the
same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same
principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs,
and who, by their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side
by side throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established
general liberty and independence.
This country and this people seem to have been made for each
other, and it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an
inheritance so proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united to
each other by the strongest ties, should never be split into a
number of unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties.
Similar sentiments have hitherto prevailed among all orders and
denominations of men among us. To all general purposes we have
uniformly been one people; each individual citizen everywhere enjoying
the same national rights, privileges, and protection. As a nation we
have made peace and war; as a nation we have vanquished our common
enemies; as a nation we have formed alliances, and made treaties,
and entered into various compacts and conventions with foreign states.
A strong sense of the value and blessings of union induced the
people, at a very early period, to institute a federal government to
preserve and perpetuate it. They formed it almost as soon as they
had political existence; nay, at a time when their habitations were in
flames, when many of their citizens were bleeding, and when the
progress of hostility and desolation left little room for those calm
and mature inquiries and reflections which must ever precede the
formation of a wise and well-balanced government for a free people. It
is not to be wondered at, that a government instituted in times so
inauspicious, should on experiment be found greatly deficient and
inadequate to the purpose it was intended to answer.
This intelligent people perceived and regretted these defects. Still
continuing no less attached to union than enamored of liberty, they
observed the danger which immediately threatened the former and more
remotely the latter; and being persuaded that ample security for
both could only be found in a national government more wisely
framed, they, as with one voice, convened the late convention at
Philadelphia, to take that important subject under consideration.
This convention, composed of men who possessed the confidence of the
people, and many of whom had become highly distinguished by their
patriotism, virtue, and wisdom, in times which tried the minds and
hearts of men, undertook the arduous task. In the mild season of
peace, with minds unoccupied by other subjects, they passed many
months in cool, uninterrupted, and daily consultation; and finally,
without having been awed by power, or influenced by any passions
except love for their country, they presented and recommended to the
people the plan produced by their joint and very unanimous councils.
Admit, for so is the fact, that this plan is only recommended, not
imposed, yet let it be remembered that it is neither recommended to
blind approbation, nor to blind reprobation; but to that sedate and
candid consideration which the magnitude and importance of the subject
demand, and which it certainly ought to receive. But this (as was
remarked in the foregoing number of this paper) is more to be wished
than expected, that it may be so considered and examined. Experience
on a former occasion teaches us not to be too sanguine in such
hopes. It is not yet forgotten that well-grounded apprehensions of
imminent danger induced the people of America to form the memorable
Congress of 1774. That body recommended certain measures to their
constituents, and the event proved their wisdom; yet it is fresh in
our memories how soon the press began to team with pamphlets and
weekly papers against those very measures. Not only many of the
officers of government, who obeyed the dictates of personal
interest, but others, from a mistaken estimate of consequences, or the
undue influence of former attachments or whose ambition aimed at
objects which did not correspond with the public good, were
indefatigable in their efforts to persuade the people to reject the
advice of that patriotic Congress. Many, indeed, were deceived and
deluded, but the majority of the people reasoned and decided
judiciously; and happy they are in reflecting that they did so.
They considered that the Congress was composed of many wise and
experienced men. That, being convened from different parts of the
country, they brought with them and communicated to each other a
variety of useful information. That, in the course of the time they
passed together in inquiring into and discussing the true interests of
their country, they must have acquired very accurate knowledge on that
head. That they were individually interested in the public liberty and
prosperity, and therefore that it was not less their inclination
than their duty to recommend only such measures as, after the most
mature deliberation, they really thought prudent and advisable.
These and similar considerations then induced the people to rely
greatly on the judgment and integrity of the Congress; and they took
their advice, notwithstanding the various arts and endeavors used to
deter them from it. But if the people at large had reason to confide
in the men of that Congress, few of whom had been fully tried or
generally known, still greater reason have they now to respect the
judgment and advice of the convention, for it is well known that
some of the most distinguished members of that Congress, who have been
since tried and justly approved for patriotism and abilities, and
who have grown old in acquiring political information, were also
members of this convention, and carried into it their accumulated
knowledge and experience.
It is worthy of remark that not only the first, but every succeeding
Congress, as well as the late convention, have invariably joined
with the people in thinking that the prosperity of America depended on
its Union. To preserve and perpetuate it was the great object of the
people in forming that convention, and it is also the great object
of the plan which the convention has advised them to adopt. With
what propriety, therefore, or for what good purposes, are attempts
at this particular period made by some men to depreciate the
importance of the Union? Or why is it suggested that three of four
confederacies would be better than one? I am persuaded in my own
mind that the people have always thought right on this subject, and
that their universal and uniform attachment to the cause of the
Union rests on great and weighty reasons, which I shall endeavor to
develop and explain in some ensuing papers. They who promote the
idea of substituting a number of distinct confederacies in the room of
the plan of the convention, seem clearly to foresee that the rejection
of it would put the continuance of the Union in the utmost jeopardy.
That certainly would be the case, and I sincerely wish that it may
be as clearly foreseen by every good citizen, that whenever the
dissolution of the Union arrives, America will have reason to exclaim,
in the words of the poet: "Farewell! A Long Farewell to All My
Greatness."
- PUBLIUS
NO 3: The Same Subject Continued
by John Jay
-
IT IS not a new observation that the people of any country (if, like
the Americans, intelligent and well-informed) seldom adopt and
steadily persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting
their interests. That consideration naturally tends to create great
respect for the high opinion which the people of America have so
long and uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing
firmly united under one federal government, vested with sufficient
powers for all general and national purposes.
The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons which
appear to have given birth to this opinion, the more I become
convinced that they are cogent and conclusive.
Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it
necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their
safety seems to be the first. The safety of the people doubtless has
relation to a great variety of circumstances and considerations, and
consequently affords great latitude to those who wish to define it
precisely and comprehensively.
At present I mean only to consider it as it respects security for
the preservation of peace and tranquillity, as well as against dangers
from foreign arms and influence, as from dangers of the like kind
arising from domestic causes. As the former of these comes first in
order, it is proper it should be the first discussed. Let us therefore
proceed to examine whether the people are not right in their opinion
that a cordial Union, under an efficient national government,
affords them the best security that can be devised against hostilities
from abroad.
The number of wars which have happened or will happen in the world
will always be found to be in proportion to the number and weight of
the causes, whether real or pretended, which provoke or invite them.
If this remark be just, it becomes useful to inquire whether so many
just causes of war are likely to be given by United America as by
disunited America; for if it should turn out that United America
will probably give the fewest, then it will follow that in this
respect the Union tends most to preserve the people in a state of
peace with other nations.
The just causes of war, for the most part, arise either from
violations of treaties or from direct violence. America has already
formed treaties with no less than six foreign nations, and all of
them, except Prussia, are maritime, and therefore able to annoy and
injure us. She has also extensive commerce with Portugal, Spain, and
Britain, and, with respect to the two latter, has, in addition, the
circumstance of neighborhood to attend to.
It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe
the laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears
evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one
national government than it could be either by thirteen separate
States or by three or four distinct confederacies.
Because when once an efficient national government is established,
the best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also
will generally be appointed to manage it; for, although town or
country, or other contracted influence, may place men in State
assemblies, or senates, or courts of justice, or executive
departments, yet more general and extensive reputation for talents and
other qualifications will be necessary to recommend men to offices
under the national government,- especially as it will have the
widest field for choice, and never experience that want of proper
persons which is not uncommon in some of the States. Hence, it will
result that the administration, the political counsels, and the
judicial decisions of the national government will be more wise,
systematical, and judicious than those of individual States, and
consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations, as
well as more safe with respect to us.
Because, under the national government, treaties and articles of
treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded
in one sense and executed in the same manner,- whereas adjudications
on the same points and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or
four confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent; and that,
as well from the variety of independent courts and judges appointed by
different and independent governments, as from the different local
laws and interests which may affect and influence them. The wisdom
of the convention, in committing such questions to the jurisdiction
and judgment of courts appointed by and responsible only to one
national government, cannot be too much commended.
Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt
the governing party in one or two States to swerve from good faith and
justice; but those temptations, not reaching the other States, and
consequently having little or no influence on the national government,
the temptation will be fruitless, and good faith and justice be
preserved. The case of the treaty of peace with Britain adds great
weight to this reasoning.
Because, even if the governing party in a State should be disposed
to resist such temptations, yet, as such temptations may, and commonly
do, result from circumstances peculiar to the State, and may affect
a great number of the inhabitants, the governing party may not
always be able, if willing, to prevent the injustice meditated, or
to punish the aggressors. But the national government, not being
affected by those local circumstances, will neither be induced to
commit the wrong themselves, nor want power or inclination to
prevent or punish its commission by others. So far, therefore, as
either designed or accidental violations of treaties and the laws of
nations afford just causes of war, they are less to be apprehended
under one general government than under several lesser ones, and in
that respect the former most favors the safety of the people.
As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and
unlawful violence, it appears equally clear to me that one good
national government affords vastly more security against dangers of
that sort than can be derived from any other quarter.
Because such violences are more frequently caused by the passions
and interests of a part than of the whole; of one or two States than
of the Union. Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by
aggressions of the present federal government, feeble as it is; but
there are several instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked
by the improper conduct of individual States, who, either unable or
unwilling to restrain or punish offenses, have given occasion to the
slaughter of many innocent inhabitants.
The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering on
some States and not on others, naturally confines the causes of
quarrel more immediately to the borderers. The bordering States, if
any, will be those who, under the impulse of sudden irritation, and
a quick sense of apparent interest or injury, will be most likely,
by direct violence, to excite war with these nations; and nothing
can so effectually obviate that danger as a national government, whose
wisdom and prudence will not be diminished by the passions which
actuate the parties immediately interested.
But not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the
national government, but it will also be more in their power to
accommodate and settle them amicably. They will be more temperate
and cool, and in that respect, as well as in others, will be more in
capacity to act advisedly than the offending State. The pride of
states, as well as of men, naturally disposes them to justify all
their actions, and opposes their acknowledging, correcting, or
repairing their errors and offenses. The national government, in
such cases, will not be affected by this pride, but will proceed
with moderation and candor to consider and decide on the means most
proper to extricate them from the difficulties which threaten them.
Besides, it is well known that acknowledgments, explanations, and
compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong
united nation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by
a State or confederacy of little consideration or power.
In the year 1685, the state of Genoa having offended Louis XIV.,
endeavored to appease him. He demanded that they should send their
Doge, or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their senators, to
France, to ask his pardon and receive his terms. They were obliged
to submit to it for the sake of peace. Would he on any occasion either
have demanded or have received the like humiliation from Spain, or
Britain, or any other powerful nation?
- PUBLIUS
NO 4: The Same Subject Continued
by John Jay
-
MY LAST paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the
people would be best secured by union against the danger it may be
exposed to by just causes of war given to other nations; and those
reasons show that such causes would not only be more rarely given, but
would also be more easily accommodated, by a national government
than either by the State governments or the proposed little
confederacies.
But the safety of the people of America against dangers from foreign
force depends not only on their forbearing to give just causes of
war to other nations, but also on their placing and continuing
themselves in such a situation as not to invite hostility or insult;
for it need not be observed that there are pretended as well as just
causes of war.
It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature,
that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of
getting any thing by it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make war
when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for purposes and
objects merely personal, such as a thirst for military glory,
revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts to
aggrandize or support their particular families or partisans. These
and a variety of other motives, which affect only the mind of the
sovereign, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctified by
justice or the voice and interests of his people. But, independent
of these inducements to war, which are more prevalent in absolute
monarchies, but which well deserve our attention, there are others
which affect nations as often as kings; and some of them will on
examination be found to grow out of our relative situation and
circumstances.
With France and with Britain we are rivals in the fisheries, and can
supply their markets cheaper then they can themselves, notwithstanding
any efforts to prevent it by bounties on their own or duties on
foreign fish.
With them and with most other European nations we are rivals in
navigation and the carrying trade; and we shall deceive ourselves if
we suppose that any of them will rejoice to see it flourish; for, as
our carrying trade cannot increase without in some degree
diminishing theirs, it is more their interest, and will be more
their policy, to restrain than to promote it.
In the trade to China and India, we interfere with more than one
nation, inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advantages which
they had in a manner monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves
with commodities which we used to purchase from them.
The extension of our own commerce in our own vessels cannot give
pleasure to any nations who possess territories on or near this
continent, because the cheapness and excellence of our productions,
added to the circumstance of vicinity, and the enterprise and
address of our merchants and navigators, will give us a greater
share in the advantages which those territories afford, than
consists with the wishes or policy of their respective sovereigns.
Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on the
one side, and Britain excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the
other; not will either of them permit the other waters which are
between them and us to become the means of mutual intercourse and
traffic.
From these and such like considerations, which might, if
consistent with prudence, be more amplified and detailed, it is easy
to see that jealousies and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the
minds and cabinets of other nations, and that we are not to expect
that they should regard our advancement in union, in power and
consequence by land and by sea, with an eye of indifference and
composure.
The people of America are aware that inducements to war may arise
out of these circumstances, as well as from others not so obvious at
present, and that whenever such inducements may find fit time and
opportunity for operation, pretenses to color and justify them will
not be wanting. Wisely, therefore, do they consider union and a good
national government as necessary to put and keep them in such a
situation as, instead of inviting war, will tend to repress and
discourage it. That situation consists in the best possible state of
defence, and necessarily depends on the government, the arms, and
the resources of the country.
As the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole, and
cannot be provided for without government, either one or more or many,
let us inquire whether one good government is not, relative to the
object in question, more competent then any other given number
whatever.
One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and
experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may
be found. It can move on uniform principles of policy. It can
harmonize, assimilate, and protect the several parts and members,
and extend the benefit of its foresight and precautions to each. In
the formation of treaties, it will regard the interest of the whole,
and the particular interests of the parts as connected with that of
the whole. It can apply the resources and power of the whole to the
defence of any particular part, and that more easily and expeditiously
than State governments or separate confederacies can possibly do,
for want of concert and unity of system. It can place the militia
under one plan of discipline, and, by putting their officers in a
proper line of subordination to the Chief Magistrate, will, as it
were, consolidate them into one corps, and thereby render them more
efficient than if divided into thirteen or into three or four distinct
independent companies.
What would the militia of Britain be if the English militia obeyed
the government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the government
of Scotland, and if the Welsh militia obeyed the government of
Wales? Suppose an invasion; would those three governments (if they
agreed at all) be able, with all their respective forces, to operate
against the enemy so effectually as the single government of Great
Britain would?
We have heard much of the fleets of Britain, and the time may
come, if we are wise, when the fleets of America may engage attention.
But if one national government had not so regulated the navigation
of Britain as to make it a nursery for seamen- if one national
government had not called forth all the national means and materials
for forming fleets, their prowess and their thunder would never have
been celebrated. Let England have its navigation and fleet- let
Scotland have its navigation and fleet- let Wales have its
navigation and fleet- let Ireland have its navigation and fleet- let
those four of the constituent parts of the British empire be under
four independent governments, and it is easy to perceive how soon they
would each dwindle into comparative insignificance.
Apply these facts to our own case. Leave America divided into
thirteen or, if you please, into three or four independent
governments- what armies could they raise and pay- what fleets could
they ever hope to have? If one was attacked, would the others fly to
its succor, and spend their blood and money in its defence? Would
there be no danger of their being flattered into neutrality by its
specious promises, or seduced by a too great fondness for peace to
decline hazarding their tranquillity and present safety for the sake
of neighbors, of whom perhaps they have been jealous, and whose
importance they are content to see diminished. Although such conduct
would not be wise, it would, nevertheless, be natural. The history
of the states of Greece, and of other countries, abounds with such
instances, and it is not improbable that what has so often happened
would, under similar circumstances, happen again.
But admit that they might be willing to help the invaded State or
confederacy. How, and when, and in what proportion shall aids of men
and money be afforded? Who shall command the allied armies, and from
which of them shall he receive his orders? Who shall settle the
terms of peace, and in case of disputes what umpire shall decide
between them and compel acquiescence? Various difficulties and
inconveniences would be inseparable from such a situation; whereas one
government, watching over the general and common interests. and
combining and directing the powers and resources of the whole, would
be free from all these embarrassments, and conduce far more to the
safety of the people.
But whatever may be our situation, whether firmly united under one
national government, or split into a number of confederacies,
certain it is, that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as
it is; and they will act towards us accordingly. If they see that
our national government is efficient and well administered, our
trade prudently regulated, our militia properly organized and
disciplined, our resources and finances discreetly managed, our credit
re-established, our people free, contented, and united, they will be
much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our
resentment. If, on the other hand, they find us either destitute of an
effectual government (each State doing right or wrong, as to its
rulers may seem convenient), or split into three or four independent
and probably discordant republics or confederacies, one inclining to
Britain, another to France, and a third to Spain, and perhaps played
off against each other by the three, what a poor, pitiful figure
will America make in their eyes! How liable would she become not
only to their contempt, but to their outrage; and how soon would
dear-bought experience proclaim that when a people or family so
divide, it never fails to be against themselves.
- PUBLIUS
NO 5: The Same Subject Continued
by John Jay
-
QUEEN Anne, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch
Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the Union
then forming between England and Scotland, which merit our
attention. I shall present the public with one or two extracts from
it: "An entire and perfect union will be the solid foundation of
lasting peace: It will secure your religion, liberty, and property;
remove the animosities amongst yourselves, and the jealousies and
differences betwixt our two kingdoms. It must increase your
strength, riches, and trade; and by this union the whole island, being
joined in affection and free from all apprehensions of different
interest, will be enabled to resist all its enemies." "We most
earnestly recommend to you calmness and unanimity in this great and
weighty affair, that the union may be brought to a happy conclusion,
being the only effectual way to secure our present and future
happiness, and disappoint the designs of our and your enemies, who
will doubtless, on this occasion, use their utmost endeavors to
prevent or delay this union."
It was remarked in the preceding paper, that weakness and
divisions at home would invite dangers from abroad; and that nothing
would tend more to secure us from them than union, strength, and
good government within ourselves. This subjects is copious and
cannot easily be exhausted.
The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in general
the best acquainted, and it gives us many useful lessons. We may
profit by their experience without paying the price which it cost
them. Although it seems obvious to common sense that the people of
such an island should be but one nation, yet we find that they were
for ages divided into three, and that those three were almost
constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars with one another.
Notwithstanding their true interest with respect to the continental
nations was really the same, yet by the arts and policy and
practices of those nations, their mutual jealousies were perpetually
kept inflamed, and for a long series of years they were far more
inconvenient and troublesome than they were useful and assisting to
each other.
Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four
nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not similar jealousies
arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead of their being "joined
in affection" and free from all apprehension of different "interests,"
envy and jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and affection,
and the partial interests of each confederacy, instead of the
general interests of all America, would be the only objects of their
policy and pursuits. Hence, like most other bordering nations, they
would always be either involved in disputes and war, or live in the
constant apprehension of them.
The most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies cannot
reasonably suppose that they would long remain exactly on an equal
footing in point of strength, even if it was possible to form them
so at first; but, admitting that to be practicable, yet what human
contrivance can secure the continuance of such equality? Independent
of those local circumstances which tend to beget and increase power in
one part and to impede its progress in another, we must advert to
the effects of that superior policy and good management which would
probably distinguish the government of one above the rest, and by
which their relative equality in strength and consideration would be
destroyed. For it cannot be presumed that the same degree of sound
policy, prudence, and foresight would uniformly be observed by each of
these confederacies for a long succession of years.
Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and happen it
would, that any one of these nations or confederacies should rise on
the scale of political importance much above the degree of her
neighbors, that moment would those neighbors behold her with envy
and with fear. Both those passions would lead them to countenance,
if not to promote, whatever might promise to diminish her
importance; and would also restrain them from measures calculated to
advance or even to secure her prosperity. Much time would not be
necessary to enable her to discern these unfriendly dispositions.
She would soon begin, not only to lose confidence in her neighbors,
but also to feel a disposition equally unfavorable to them. Distrust
naturally creates distrust, and by nothing is good-will and kind
conduct more speedily changed than by invidious jealousies and
uncandid imputations, whether expressed or implied.
The North is generally the region of strength, and many local
circumstances render it probable that the most Northern of the
proposed confederacies would, at a period not very distant, be
unquestionably more formidable than any of the others. No sooner would
this become evident than the Northern Hive would excite the same ideas
and sensations in the more southern parts of America which it formerly
did in the southern parts of Europe. Nor does it appear to be a rash
conjecture that its young swarms might often be tempted to gather
honey in the more blooming fields and milder air of their luxurious
and more delicate neighbors.
They who well consider the history of similar divisions and
confederacies will find abundant reason to apprehend that those in
contemplation would in no other sense be neighbors than as they
would be borderers; that they would neither love nor trust one
another, but on the contrary would be a prey to discord, jealousy, and
mutual injuries; in short, that they would place us exactly in the
situations in which some nations doubtless wish to see us, viz.,
formidable only to each other.
From these considerations it appears that those gentlemen are
greatly mistaken who suppose that alliances offensive and defensive
might be formed between these confederacies, and would produce that
combination and union of wills, of arms, and of resources, which would
be necessary to put and keep them in a formidable state of defence
against foreign enemies.
When did the independent states, into which Britain and Spain were
formerly divided, combine in such alliance, or unite their forces
against a foreign enemy? The proposed confederacies will be distinct
nations. Each of them would have its commerce with foreigners to
regulate by distinct treaties; and as their productions and
commodities are different and proper for different markets, so would
those treaties be essentially different. Different commercial concerns
must create different interests, and of course different degrees of
political attachment to and connection with different foreign nations.
Hence it might and probably would happen that the foreign nation
with whom the Southern confederacy might be at war would be the one
with whom the Northern confederacy would be the most desirous of
preserving peace and friendship. An alliance so contrary to their
immediate interest would not therefore be easy to form, nor, if
formed, would it be observed and fulfilled with perfect good faith.
Nay, it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe,
neighboring nations, acting under the impulse of opposite interests
and unfriendly passions, would frequently be found taking different
sides. Considering our distance from Europe, it would be more
natural for these confederacies to apprehend danger from one another
than from distant nations, and therefore that each of them should be
more desirous to guard against the others by the aid of foreign
alliances, than to guard against foreign dangers by alliances
between themselves. And here let us not forget how much more easy it
is to receive foreign fleets into our ports, and foreign armies into
our country, than it is to persuade or compel them to depart. How many
conquests did the Romans and others make in the characters of allies,
and what innovations did they under the same character introduce into
the governments of those whom they pretended to protect.
Let candid men judge, then, whether the division of America into any
given number of independent sovereignties would tend to secure us
against the hostilities and improper interference of foreign nations.
- PUBLIUS
NO 6: Concerning Dangers From War Between the States
by Alexander Hamilton
-
THE three last numbers of this paper have been dedicated to an
enumeration of the dangers to which we should be exposed, in a state
of disunion, from the arms and arts of foreign nations. I shall now
proceed to delineate dangers of a different and, perhaps, still more
alarming kind- those which will in all probability flow from
dissensions between the States themselves, and from domestic
factions and convulsions. These have been already in some instances
slightly anticipated; but they deserve a more particular and more full
investigation.
A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously
doubt that, if these States should either be wholly disunited, or only
united in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which they
might be thrown would have frequent and violent contests with each
other. To presume a want of motives for such contests as an argument
against their existence, would be to forget that men are ambitious,
vindictive, and rapacious. To look for a continuation of harmony
between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties in the same
neighborhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human
events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.
The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable. There are
some which have a general and almost constant operation upon the
collective bodies of society. Of this description are the love of
power or the desire of preeminence and dominion- the jealousy of
power, or the desire of equality and safety. There are others which
have a more circumscribed though an equally operative influence within
their spheres. Such are the rivalships and competitions of commerce
between commercial nations. And there are others, not less numerous
than either of the former, which take their origin entirely in private
passions; in the attachments, enmities, interests, hopes, and fears of
leading individuals in the communities of which they are members.
Men of this class, whether the favorites of a king or of a people,
have in too many instances abused the confidence they possessed; and
assuming the pretext of some public motive, have not scrupled to
sacrifice the national tranquillity to personal advantage or
personal gratification.
The celebrated Pericles, in compliance with the resentment of a
prostitute, *002 at the expense of much of the blood and treasure of
his countrymen, attacked, vanquished, and destroyed the city of the
Samnians. The same man, stimulated by private pique against the
Megarensians, *003 another nation of Greece, or to avoid a prosecution
with which he was threatened as an accomplice in a supposed theft of
the statuary of Phidias, *004 or to get rid of the accusations
prepared to be brought against him for dissipating the funds of the
state in the purchase of popularity, *005 or from a combination of all
these causes, was the primitive author of that famous and fatal war,
distinguished in the Grecian annals by the name of the Peloponnesian
war; which, after various vicissitudes, intermissions, and renewals,
terminated in the ruin of the Athenian commonwealth.
The ambitious cardinal, who was prime minister to Henry VIII.,
permitting his vanity to aspire to the triple crown, *006 entertained
hopes of succeeding in the acquisition of that splendid prize by the
influence of the Emperor Charles V. To secure the favor and interest
of this enterprising and powerful monarch, he precipitated England
into a war with France, contrary to the plainest dictates of policy,
and at the hazard of the safety and independence, as well of the
kingdom over which he presided by his counsels, as of Europe in
general. For if there ever was a sovereign who bid fair to realize the
project of universal monarchy, it was the Emperor Charles V., of whose
intrigues Wolsey was at once the instrument and the dupe.
The influence which the bigotry of one female, *007 the petulance of
another, *008 and the cabals of a third, *009 had in the contemporary
policy, ferments, and pacifications, of a considerable part of Europe,
are to topics that have been too often descanted upon not to be
generally known.
To multiply examples of the agency of personal considerations in the
production of great national events, either foreign or domestic,
according to their direction, would be an unnecessary waste of time.
Those who have but a superficial acquaintance with the sources from
which they are to be drawn, will themselves recollect a variety of
instances; and those who have a tolerable knowledge of human nature
will not stand in need of such lights, to form their opinion either of
the reality or extent of that agency. Perhaps, however, a reference,
tending to illustrate the general principle, may with propriety be
made to a case which has lately happened among ourselves. If Shays had
not been a desperate debtor, it is much to be doubted whether
Massachusetts would have been plunged into a civil war.
But notwithstanding the concurring testimony of experience, in
this particular, there are still to be found visionary or designing
men, who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace
between the States, though dismembered and alienated from each
other. The genius of republics (say they) is pacific; the spirit of
commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of men, and to
extinguish those inflammable humors which have so often kindled into
wars. Commercial republics, like ours, will never be disposed to waste
themselves in ruinous contentions with each other. They will be
governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of mutual
amity and concord.
Is it not (we may ask these projectors in politics) the true
interest of all nations to cultivate the same benevolent and
philosophic spirit? If this be their true interest, have they in
fact pursued it? Has it not, on the contrary, invariably been found
that momentary passions, and immediate interests, have a more active
and imperious control over human conduct than general or remote
considerations of policy, utility, or justice? Have republics in
practice been less addicted to war than monarchies? Are not the former
administered by men as well as the latter? Are there not aversions,
predilections, rivalships, and desires of unjust acquisitions, that
affect nations as well as kings? Are not popular assemblies frequently
subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of
other irregular and violent propensities? Is it not well known that
their determinations are often governed by a few individuals in whom
they place confidence, and are, of course, liable to be tinctured by
the passions and views of those individuals? Has commerce hitherto
done any thing more than change the objects of war? Is not the love of
wealth as domineering and enterprising a passion as that of power or
glory? Have there not been as many wars founded upon commercial
motives since that has become the prevailing system of nations, as
were before occasioned by the cupidity of territory or dominion? Has
not the spirit of commerce, in many instances, administered new
incentives to the appetite, both for the one and for the other? Let
experience, the least fallible guide of human opinions, be appealed to
for an answer to these inquiries.
Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republics; two of
them, Athens and Carthage, of the commercial kind. Yet were they as
often engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as the neighboring
monarchies of the same times. Sparta was little better than a
well-regulated camp; and Rome was never sated of carnage and conquest.
Carthage, though a commercial republic, was the aggressor in the
very war that ended in her destruction. Hannibal had carried her
arms into the heart of Italy and to the gates of Rome, before
Scipio, in turn, gave him an overthrow in the territories of Carthage,
and made a conquest of the commonwealth.
Venice, in later times, figured more than once in wars of
ambition, till, becoming an object to the other Italian states, Pope
Julius II. found means to accomplish that formidable league, *010
which gave a deadly blow to the power and pride of this haughty
republic.
The provinces of Holland, till they were overwhelmed in debts and
taxes, took a leading and conspicuous part in the wars of Europe. They
had furious contests with England for the dominion of the sea, and
were among the most persevering and most implacable of the opponents
of Louis XIV.
In the government of Britain the representatives of the people
compose one branch of the national legislature. Commerce has been
for ages the predominant pursuit of that country. Few nations,
nevertheless, have been more frequently engaged in war; and the wars
in which that kingdom has been engaged have, in numerous instances,
proceeded from the people.
There have been, if I may so express it, almost as many popular as
royal wars. The cries of the nation and the importunities of the
representatives have, upon various occasions, dragged their monarchs
into war, or continued them in it, contrary to their inclinations, and
sometimes contrary to the real interests of the state. In that
memorable struggle for superiority between the rival houses of Austria
and Bourbon, which so long kept Europe in a flame, it is well known
that the antipathies of the English against the French, seconding
the ambition, or rather the avarice, of a favorite leader, *011
protracted the war beyond the limits marked out by sound policy, and
for a considerable time in opposition to the views of the court.
The wars of these two last-mentioned nations have in a great measure
grown out of commercial considerations,- the desire of supplanting and
the fear of being supplanted, either in particular branches of traffic
or in the general advantages of trade and navigation.
From this summary of what has taken place in other countries,
whose situations have borne the nearest resemblance to our own, what
reason can we have to confide in those reveries which would seduce
us into an expectation of peace and cordiality between the members
of the present confederacy, in a state of separation? Have we not
already seen enough of the fallacy and extravagance of those idle
theories which have amused us with promises of an exemption from the
imperfections, weaknesses, and evils incident to society in every
shape? Is it not time to awake from the deceitful dream of a golden
age, and to adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of our
political conduct that we, as well as the other inhabitants of the
globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and
perfect virtue?
Let the point of extreme depression to which our national dignity
and credit have sunk, let the inconveniences felt everywhere from a
lax and ill administration of government, let the revolt of a part
of the State of North Carolina, the late menacing disturbances in
Pennsylvania, and the actual insurrections and rebellions in
Massachusetts, declare---!
So far is the general sense of mankind from corresponding with the
tenets of those who endeavor to lull asleep our apprehensions of
discord and hostility between the States, in the event of disunion,
that it has from long observation of the progress of society become
a sort of axiom in politics, that vicinity, or nearness of
situation, constitutes nations natural enemies. An intelligent
writer expresses himself on this subject to this effect:
"NEIGHBORING NATIONS [says he] are naturally enemies of each other,
unless their common weakness forces them to league in a
CONFEDERATIVE REPUBLIC, and their constitution prevents the
differences that neighborhood occasions, extinguishing that secret
jealousy which disposes all states to aggrandize themselves at the
expense of their neighbours." *012 This passage, at the same time,
points out the EVIL and suggests the REMEDY.
- PUBLIUS
NO 7: The Subject Continued and Particular Causes Enumerated
by Alexander Hamilton
-
It is sometimes asked, with an air of seeming triumph, what
inducements could the States have, if disunited, to make war upon each
other? It would be a full answer to this question to say- precisely
the same inducements which have, at different times, deluged in
blood all the nations in the world. But, unfortunately for us, the
question admits of a more particular answer. There are causes of
differences within our immediate contemplation, of the tendency of
which, even under the restraints of a federal constitution, we have
had sufficient experience to enable us to form a judgment of what
might be expected if those restraints were removed.
Territorial disputes have at all times been found one of the most
fertile sources of hostility among nations. Perhaps the greatest
proportion of wars that have desolated the earth have sprung from this
origin. This cause would exist among us in full force. We have a
vast tract of unsettled territory within the boundaries of the
United States. There still are discordant and undecided claims between
several of them, and the dissolution of the Union would lay a
foundation for similar claims between them all. It is well known
that they have heretofore had serious and animated discussion
concerning the rights to the lands which were ungranted at the time of
the Revolution, and which usually went under the name of crown
lands. The States within the limits of whose colonial governments they
were comprised have claimed them as their property, the others have
contended that the rights of the crown in this article devolved upon
the Union; especially as to all that part of the Western territory
which, either by actual possession, or through the submission of the
Indian proprietors, was subjected to the jurisdiction of the king of
Great Britain, till it was relinquished in the treaty of peace.
This, it has been said, was at all events an acquisition to the
Confederacy by compact with a foreign power. It has been the prudent
policy of Congress to appease this controversy, by prevailing upon the
States to make cessions to the United States for the benefit of the
whole. This has been so far accomplished as, under continuation of the
Union, to afford a decided prospect of an amicable termination of
the dispute. A dismemberment of the Confederacy, however, would revive
this dispute, and would create others on the same subject. At present,
a large part of the vacant Western territory is, by cession at
least, if not by any anterior right, the common property of the Union.
If that were at an end, the States which made the cession, on a
principle of federal compromise, would be apt, when the motive of
the grant had ceased, to reclaim the lands as a reversion. The other
States would no doubt insist on a proportion, by right of
representation. Their argument would be, that a grant, once made,
could not be revoked; and that the justice of participating in
territory acquired or secured by the joint efforts of the Confederacy,
remained undiminished. If, contrary to probability, it should be
admitted by all the States, that each had a right to a share of this
common stock, there would still be a difficulty to be surmounted, as
to a proper rule of apportionment. Different principles would be set
up by different States for this purpose; and as they would affect
the opposite interests of the parties, they might not easily be
susceptible of a pacific adjustment.
In the wide field of Western territory, therefore, we perceive an
ample theatre for hostile pretensions, without any umpire or common
judge to interpose between the contending parties. To reason from
the past to the future, we shall have good ground to apprehend, that
the sword would sometimes be appealed to as the arbiter of their
differences. The circumstances of the dispute between Connecticut
and Pennsylvania, respecting the land at Wyoming, admonish us not to
be sanguine in expecting an easy accommodation of such differences.
The articles of confederation obliged the parties to submit the matter
to the decision of a federal court. The submission was made, and the
court decided in favor of Pennsylvania. But Connecticut gave strong
indications of dissatisfaction with that determination; nor did she
appear to be entirely resigned to it, till, by negotiation and
management, something like an equivalent was found for the loss she
supposed herself to have sustained. Nothing here said is intended to
convey the slightest censure on the conduct of that State. She no
doubt sincerely believed herself to have been injured by the decision;
and States, like individuals, acquiesce with great reluctance in
determinations to their disadvantage.
Those who had an opportunity of seeing the inside of the
transactions which attended the progress of the controversy between
this State and the district of Vermont, can vouch the opposition we
experienced, as well from States not interested as from those which
were interested in the claim; and can attest the danger to which the
peace of the Confederacy might have been exposed, had this State
attempted to assert its rights by force. Two motives preponderated
in that opposition: one, a jealousy entertained of our future power;
and the other, the interest of certain individuals of influence in the
neighboring States, who had obtained grants of land under the actual
government of that district. Even the States which brought forward
claims, in contradiction to ours, seemed more solicitous to
dismember this State, than to establish their own pretensions. These
were New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. New Jersey and
Rhode Island, upon all occasions, discovered a warm zeal for the
independence of Vermont; and Maryland, till alarmed by the
appearance of a connection between Canada and that State, entered
deeply into the same views. These being small States, saw with an
unfriendly eye the perspective of our growing greatness. In a review
of these transactions we may trace some of the causes which would be
likely to embroil the States with each other, if it should be their
unpropitious destiny to become disunited.
The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of
contention. The States less favorably circumstanced would be
desirous of escaping from the disadvantages of local situation, and of
sharing in the advantages of their more fortunate neighbors. Each
State, or separate confederacy, would pursue a system of commercial
policy peculiar to itself. This would occasion distinctions,
preferences, and exclusions, which would beget discontent. The
habits of intercourse, on the basis of equal privileges, to which we
have been accustomed since the earliest settlement of the country,
would give a keener edge to those causes of discontent than they would
naturally have independent of this circumstance. We should be ready to
denominate injuries those things which were in reality the justifiable
acts of independent sovereignties consulting a distinct interest.
The spirit of enterprise, which characterizes the commercial part of
America, has left no occasion of displaying itself unimproved. It is
not at all probable that this unbridled spirit would pay much
respect to those regulations of trade by which particular States might
endeavor to secure exclusive benefits to their own citizens. The
infractions of these regulations, on one side, the efforts to
prevent and repel them, on the other, would naturally lead to
outrages, and these to reprisals and wars.
The opportunities which some States would have of rendering others
tributary to them by commercial regulations would be impatiently
submitted to by the tributary States. The relative situation of New
York, Connecticut, and New Jersey, would afford an example of this
kind. New York, from the necessities of revenue, must lay duties on
her importations. A great part of these duties must be paid by the
inhabitants of the two other States in the capacity of consumers of
what we import. New York would neither be willing nor able to forego
this advantage. Her citizens would not consent that a duty paid by
them should be remitted in favor of the citizens of her neighbors; nor
would it be practicable, if there were not this impediment in the way,
to distinguish the customers in our own markets. Would Connecticut and
New Jersey long submit to be taxed by New York for her exclusive
benefit? Should we be long permitted to remain in the quiet and
undisturbed enjoyment of a metropolis, from the possession of which we
derived an advantage so odious to our neighbors, and, in their
opinion, so oppressive? Should we be able to preserve it against the
incumbent weight of Connecticut on the one side, and the cooperating
pressure of New Jersey on the other? These are questions that temerity
alone will answer in the affirmative.
The public debt of the Union would be a further cause of collision
between the separate States or confederacies. The apportionment, in
the first instance, and the progressive extinguishment afterwards,
would be alike productive of ill-humor and animosity. how would it
be possible to agree upon a rule of apportionment satisfactory to all?
There is scarcely any that can be proposed which is entirely free from
real objections. These, as usual, would be exaggerated by the
adverse interest of the parties. There are even dissimilar views among
the States as to the general principle of discharging the public debt.
Some of them, either less impressed with the importance of national
credit, or because their citizens have little, if any, immediate
interest in the question, feel an indifference, if not a repugnance,
to the payment of the domestic debt at any rate. These would be
inclined to magnify the difficulties of a distribution. Others of
them, a numerous body of whose citizens are creditors to the public
beyond the proportion of the State in the total amount of the national
debt, would be strenuous for some equitable and effective provision.
The procrastinations of the former would excite the resentments of the
latter. The settlement of a rule would, in the meantime, be
postponed by real differences of opinion and affected delays. The
citizens of the States interested would clamor; foreign powers would
urge for the satisfaction of their just demands, and the peace of
the States would be hazarded to the double contingency of external
invasion and internal contention.
Suppose the difficulties of agreeing upon a rule surmounted, and the
apportionment made. Still there is great room to suppose that the rule
agreed upon would, upon experiment, be found to bear harder upon
some States than upon others. Those which were sufferers by it would
naturally seek for a mitigation of the burden. The others would as
naturally be disinclined to a revision, which was likely to end in
an increase of their own incumbrances. Their refusal would be too
plausible a pretext to the complaining States to withhold their
contributions, not to be embraced with avidity; and the non-compliance
of these States with there engagements would be a ground of bitter
discussion and altercation. If even the rule adopted should in
practice justify the equality of its principle, still delinquencies in
payments on the part of some of the States would result from a
diversity of other causes- the real deficiency of resources; the
mismanagement of their finances; accidental disorders in the
management of the government; and, in addition to the rest, the
reluctance with which men commonly part with money for purposes that
have outlived the exigencies which produced them, and interfere with
the supply of immediate wants. Delinquencies, from whatever causes,
would be productive of complaints, recriminations, and quarrels. There
is, perhaps, nothing more likely to disturb the tranquillity of
nations than their being bound to mutual contributions for any
common object that does not yield an equal and coincident benefit. For
it is an observation, as true as it is trite, that there is nothing
men differ so readily about as the payment of money.
Laws in violation of private contracts, as they amount to
aggressions on the rights of those States whose citizens are injured
by them, may be considered as another probable source of hostility. We
are not authorized to expect that a more liberal or more equitable
spirit would preside over the legislations of the individual States
hereafter, if unrestrained by any additional checks, than we have
heretofore seen in too many instances disgracing their several
codes. We have observed the disposition to retaliation excited in
Connecticut, in consequence of the enormities perpetrated by the
Legislature of Rhode Island; and we reasonably infer that, in
similar cases under other circumstances, a war, not of parchment,
but of the sword, would chastise such atrocious breaches of moral
obligation and social justice.
The probability of incompatible alliances between the different
States or confederacies and different foreign nations, and the effects
of this situation upon the peace of the whole, have been
sufficiently unfolded in some preceding papers. From the view they
have exhibited of this part of the subject, this conclusion is to be
drawn, that America, if not connected at all, or only by the feeble
tie of a simple league, offensive and defensive, would by the
operation of such jarring alliances, be gradually entangled in all the
pernicious labyrinths of European politics and wars; and by the
destructive contentions of the parts into which she was divided, would
be likely to become a prey to the artifices and machinations of powers
equally the enemies of them all. Divide et impera *013 must be the
motto of every nation that either hates or fears us. *014
- PUBLIUS
NO 8: The Effects of Internal War in Producing Standing Armies
and Other Institutions Unfriendly to Liberty
by Alexander Hamilton
-
ASSUMING it therefore as an established truth that the several
States, in case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might
happen to be formed out of the wreck of the general Confederacy, would
be subject to those vicissitudes of peace and war, of friendship and
enmity with each other, which have fallen to the lot of all
neighboring nations not united under one government, let us enter into
a concise detail of some of the consequences that would attend such
a situation.
War between the States, in the first period of their separate
existence, would be accompanied with much greater distresses than it
commonly is in those countries where regular military establishments
have long obtained. The disciplined armies always kept on foot on
the continent of Europe, though they bear a malignant aspect to
liberty and economy, have, notwithstanding, been productive of the
signal advantage of rendering sudden conquests impracticable, and of
preventing that rapid desolation which used to mark the progress of
war prior to their introduction. The art of fortification has
contributed to the same ends. The nations of Europe are encircled with
chains of fortified places, which mutually obstruct invasion.
Campaigns are wasted in reducing two or three frontier garrisons, to
gain admittance into an enemy's country. Similar impediments occur
at every step, to exhaust the strength and delay the progress of an
invader. Formerly, an invading army would penetrate into the heart
of a neighboring country almost as soon as intelligence of its
approach could be received; but now a comparatively small force of
disciplined troops, acting on the defensive, with the aid of posts, is
able to impede, and finally to frustrate, the enterprises of one
much more considerable. The history of war, in that quarter of the
globe, is no longer a history of nations subdued and empires
overturned, but of towns taken and retaken; of battles that decide
nothing; of retreats more beneficial than victories; of much effort
and little acquisition.
In this country the scene would be altogether reversed. The jealousy
of military establishments would postpone them as long as possible.
The want of fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one State open to
another, would facilitate inroads. The populous States would, with
little difficulty, overrun their less populous neighbors. Conquests
would be as easy to be made as difficult to be retained. War,
therefore, would be desultory and predatory. PLUNDER and devastation
ever march in the train of irregulars. The calamities of individuals
would make the principal figure in the events which would characterize
our military exploits.
This picture is not too highly wrought; though, I confess, it
would not long remain a just one. Safety from external danger is the
most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of
liberty will after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent
destruction of life and property incident to war, the continual effort
and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, will compel
nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and security
to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and
political rights. To be more safe, they at length become willing to
run the risk of being less free.
The institutions chiefly alluded to are STANDING ARMIES and the
correspondent appendages of military establishments. Standing
armies, it is said, are not provided against in the new
Constitution; and it is therefore inferred that they may exist under
it. *015 Their existence, however, from the very terms of the
proposition, is, at most, problematical and uncertain. But standing
armies, it may be replied, must inevitably result from a dissolution
of the Confederacy. Frequent war and constant apprehension, which
require a state of as constant preparation, will infallibly produce
them. The weaker States or confederacies would first have recourse to
them, to put themselves upon an equality with their more potent
neighbors. They would endeavor to supply the inferiority of population
and resources by a more regular and effective system of defence, by
disciplined troops, and by fortifications. They would, at the same
time, be necessitated to strengthen the executive arm of government,
in doing which their constitutions would acquire a progressive
direction towards monarchy. It is of the nature of war to increase the
executive at the expense of the legislative authority.
The expedients which have been mentioned would soon give the
States or confederacies that made use of them a superiority over their
neighbors. Small states, or states of less natural strength, under
vigorous governments, and with the assistance of disciplined armies,
have often triumphed over large states, or states of greater natural
strength, which have been destitute of these advantages. Neither the
pride nor the safety of the more important States or confederacies
would permit them long to submit to this mortifying and adventitious
superiority. They would quickly resort to means similar to those by
which it had been effected, to reinstate themselves in their lost
preeminence. Thus we should, in a little time, see established in
every part of this country the same engines of despotism which have
been the scourge of the Old World. This, at least, would be the
natural course of things; and our reasonings will be the more likely
to be just, in proportion as they are accommodated to this standard.
These are not vague inferences drawn from supposed or speculative
defects in a Constitution, the whole power of which is lodged in the
hands of a people, or their representatives and delegates, but they
are solid conclusions, drawn from the natural and necessary progress
of human affairs.
It may, perhaps, be asked, by way of objection to this, why did
not standing armies spring up out of the contentions which so often
distracted the ancient republics of Greece? Different answers, equally
satisfactory, may be given to this question. The industrious habits of
the people of the present day, absorbed in the pursuits of gain, and
devoted to the improvements of agriculture and commerce, are
incompatible with the condition of a nation of soldiers, which was the
true condition of the people of those republics. The means of revenue,
which have been so greatly multiplied by the increase of gold and
silver and of the arts of industry, and the science of finance,
which is the offspring of modern times, concurring with the habits
of nations, have produced an entire revolution in the system of war,
and have rendered disciplined armies, distinct from the body of the
citizens, the inseparable companions of frequent hostility.
There is a wide difference, also, between military establishments in
a country seldom exposed by its situation to internal invasions, and
in one which is often subject to them, and always apprehensive of
them. The rulers of the former can have no good pretext, if they are
even so inclined, to keep on foot armies so numerous as must of
necessity be maintained in the latter. These armies being, in the
first case, rarely, if at all, called into activity for interior
defence, the people are in no danger of being broken to military
subordination. The laws are not accustomed to relaxations, in favor of
military exigencies; the civil state remains in full vigor, neither
corrupted, nor confounded with the principles or propensities of the
other state. The smallness of the army renders the natural strength of
the community an overmatch for it; and the citizens, not habituated to
look up to the military power for protection, or to submit to its
oppressions, neither love nor fear the soldiery; they view them with a
spirit of jealous acquiescence in a necessary evil, and stand ready to
resist a power which they suppose may be exerted to the prejudice of
their rights. The army under such circumstances may usefully aid the
magistrate to suppress a small faction, or an occasional mob, or
insurrection; but it will be unable to enforce encroachments against
the united efforts of the great body of the people.
In a country in the predicament last described, the contrary of
all this happens. The perpetual menacings of danger oblige the
government to be always prepared to repel it; its armies must be
numerous enough for instant defence. The continual necessity for their
services enhances the importance of the soldier, and proportionably
degrades the condition of the citizen. The military state becomes
elevated above the civil. The inhabitants of territories, often the
theatre of war, are unavoidably subjected to frequent infringements on
their rights, which serve to weaken their sense of those rights; and
by degrees the people are brought to consider the soldiery not only as
their protectors but as their superiors. The transition from this
disposition to that of considering them masters, is neither remote nor
difficult; but it is very difficult to prevail upon a people under
such impressions to make a bold or effectual resistance to usurpations
supported by the military power.
The kingdom of Great Britain falls within the first description.
An insular situation, and a powerful marine, guarding it in a great
measure against the possibility of foreign invasion, supersede the
necessity of a numerous army within the kingdom. A sufficient force to
make head against a sudden descent, till the militia could have time
to rally and embody, is all that has been deemed requisite. No
motive of national policy has demanded, nor would public opinion
have tolerated, a larger number of troops upon its domestic
establishment. There has been, for a long time past, little room for
the operation of the other causes, which have been enumerated as the
consequences of internal war. This peculiar felicity of situation has,
in a great degree, contributed to preserve the liberty which that
country to this day enjoys, in spite of the prevalent venality and
corruption. If, on the contrary, Britain had been situated on the
continent, and had been compelled, as she would have been, by that
situation, to make her military establishments at home coextensive
with those of the other great powers of Europe, she, like them,
would in all probability be, at this day, a victim to the absolute
power of a single man. 'Tis possible, though not easy, that the people
of that island may be enslaved from other causes; but it cannot be
by the prowess of an army so inconsiderable as that which has been
usually kept up within the kingdom.
If we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an
advantage similar to that of an insulated situation. Europe is at a
great distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to
continue too much disproportioned in strength to be able to give us
any dangerous annoyance. Extensive military establishments cannot,
in this position, be necessary to our security. But if we should be
disunited, and the integral parts should either remain separated,
or, which is most probable, should be thrown together into two or
three confederacies, we should be, in a short course of time, in the
predicament of the continental powers of Europe- our liberties would
be a prey to the means of defending ourselves against the ambition and
jealousy of each other.
This is an idea not superficial or futile, but solid and weighty. It
deserves the most serious and mature consideration of every prudent
and honest man of whatever party. If such men will make a firm and
solemn pause, and meditate dispassionately on the importance of this
interesting idea; if they will contemplate it in all its attitudes,
and trace it to all its consequences, they will not hesitate to part
with trivial objections to a Constitution, the rejection of which
would in all probability put a final period to the Union. The airy
phantoms that flit before the distempered imaginations of some of
its adversaries would quickly give place to the more substantial forms
of dangers, real, certain, and formidable.
- PUBLIUS
NO 9: The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard
Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
by Alexander Hamilton
-
A FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty
of the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection.
It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of
Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at
the distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the
rapid succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a state
of perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. If
they exhibit occasional calms, these only serve as short-lived
contrasts to the furious storms that are to succeed. If now and then
intervals of felicity open to view, we behold them with a mixture of
regret, arising from the reflection that the pleasing scenes before us
are soon to be overwhelmed by the tempestuous waves of sedition and
party rage. If momentary rays of glory break forth from the gloom,
while they dazzle us with a transient and fleeting brilliancy, they at
the same time admonish us to lament that the vices of government
should pervert the direction and tarnish the lustre of those bright
talents and exalted endowments for which the favored soils that
produced them have been so justly celebrated.
From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics
the advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not only against
the forms of republican government, but against the very principles of
civil liberty. They have decried all free government as inconsistent
with the order of society, and have indulged themselves in malicious
exultation over its friends and partisans. Happily for mankind,
stupendous fabrics reared on the basis of liberty, which have
flourished for ages, have, in a few glorious instances, refuted
their gloomy sophisms. And, I trust, America will be the broad and
solid foundation of other edifices, not less magnificent, which will
be equally permanent monuments of their errors.
But it is not to be denied that the portraits they have sketched
of republican government were too just copies of the originals from
which they were taken. If it had been found impracticable to have
devised models of a more perfect structure, the enlightened friends to
liberty would have been obliged to abandon the cause of that species
of government as indefensible. The science of politics, however,
like most other sciences, has received great improvement. The efficacy
of various principles is now well understood, which were either not
known at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients. The regular
distribution of power into distinct departments; the introduction of
legislative balances and checks; the institution of courts composed of
judges holding their offices during good behavior; the
representation of the people in the legislature by deputies of their
own election: these are wholly new discoveries, or have made their
principal progress towards perfection in modern times. They are means,
and powerful means, by which the excellences of republican
government may be retained and its imperfections lessened or
avoided. To this catalogue of circumstances that tend to the
amelioration of popular systems of civil government, I shall
venture, however novel it may appear to some, to add one more, on a
principle which has been made the foundation of an objection to the
new Constitution; I mean the ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT within which
such systems are to revolve, either in respect to the dimensions of
a single State, or to the consolidation of several smaller States into
one great Confederacy. The latter is that which immediately concerns
the object under consideration. It will, however, be of use to examine
the principle in it application to a single State, which shall be
attended to in another place.
The utility of a Confederacy, as well to suppress faction and to
guard the internal tranquillity of States, as to increase their
external force and security, is in reality not a new idea. It has been
practiced upon in different countries and ages, and has received the
sanction of the most approved writers on the subjects of politics. The
opponents of the plan proposed have, with great assiduity, cited and
circulated the observations of Montesquieu on the necessity of a
contracted territory for a republican government. But they seem not to
have been apprised of the sentiments of that great man expressed in
another part of his work, not to have adverted to the consequences
of the principle to which they subscribe with such ready acquiescence.
When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, the
standards he had in view were of dimensions far short of the limits of
almost every one of these States. Neither Virginia, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, nor Georgia can by any means
be compared with the models from which he reasoned and to which the
terms of his description apply. If we therefore take his ideas on this
point as the criterion of truth, we shall be driven to the alternative
either of taking refuge at once in the arms of monarchy, or of
splitting ourselves into an infinity of little, jealous, clashing,
tumultuous commonwealths, the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord,
and the miserable objects of universal pity or contempt. Some of the
writers who have come forward on the other side of the question seem
to have been aware of the dilemma; and have even been bold enough to
hint at the division of the larger States as a desirable thing. Such
an infatuated policy, such a desperate expedient, might, by the
multiplication of petty offices, answer the views of men who possess
not qualifications to extend their influence beyond the narrow circles
of personal intrigue, but it could never promote the greatness or
happiness of the people of America.
Referring the examination of the principle itself to another
place, as has been already mentioned, it will be sufficient to
remark here that, in the sense of the author who has been most
emphatically quoted upon the occasion, it would only dictate a
reduction of the SIZE of the more considerable MEMBERS of the Union,
but would not militate against their being all comprehended in one
confederate government. And this is the true question, in the
discussion of which we are at present interested.
So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in
opposition to a general Union of the States, that he explicitly treats
of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC as the expedient for extending the sphere of
popular government, and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with
those of republicanism.
"It is very probable" (says he) *016 "that mankind would have been
obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a
single person, had they not contrived a kind of constitution that
has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the
external force of a monarchical, government. I mean a Confederate
Republic.
"This form of government is a convention by which several smaller
states agree to become members of a larger one, which they intend to
form. It is a kind of assemblage of societies that constitute a new
one, capable of increasing, by means of new associations, till they
arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the
security of the united body.
"A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may
support itself without any internal corruptions. The form of this
society prevents all manner of inconveniences.
"If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority,
he could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in
all the confederate states. Were he to have too great influence over
one, this would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that which
would still remain free might oppose him with forces independent of
those which he had usurped, and overpower him before he could be
settled in his usurpation.
"Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate
states, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into
one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. The state
may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy
may be dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sovereignty.
"As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys the
internal happiness of each; and with respect to its external
situation, it is possessed, by means of the association, of all the
advantages of large monarchies."
I have thought it proper to quote at length these interesting
passages, because they contain a luminous abridgment of the
principal arguments in favor of the Union, and must effectually remove
the false impressions which a misapplication of other parts of the
work was calculated to make. They have, at the same time, an
intimate connection with the more immediate design of this paper;
which is, to illustrate the tendency of the Union to repress
domestic faction and insurrection.
A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised between
a confederacy and a consolidation of the States. The essential
characteristic of the first is said to be, the restriction of its
authority to the members in their collective capacities, without
reaching to the individuals of whom they are composed. It is contended
that the national council ought to have no concern with any object
of internal administration. An exact equality of suffrage between
the members has also been insisted upon as a leading feature of a
confederate government. These positions are, in the main, arbitrary;
they are supported neither by principle nor precedent. It has indeed
happened, that governments of this kind have generally operated in the
manner which the distinction, taken notice of, supposes to be inherent
in their nature; but there have been in most of them extensive
exceptions to the practice, which serve to prove, as far as example
will go, that there is no absolute rule on the subject. And it will be
clearly shown, in the course of this investigation, that as far as the
principle contended for has prevailed, it has been the cause of
incurable disorder and imbecility in the government.
The definition of a confederate republic seems simply to be "an
assemblage of societies," or an association of two or more states into
one state. The extent, modifications, and objects of the federal
authority are mere matters of discretion. So long as the separate
organization of the members be not abolished; so long as it exists, by
a constitutional necessity, for local purposes; though it should be in
perfect subordination to the general authority of the union, it
would still be, in fact and in theory, an association of states, or
a confederacy. The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an
abolition of the State governments, makes them constituent parts of
the national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation
in the Senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive and
very important portions of sovereign power. This fully corresponds, in
every rational import of the terms, with the idea of a federal
government.
In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of twenty-three CITIES or
republics, the largest were entitled to three votes in the COMMON
COUNCIL, those of the middle class to two, and the smallest to one.
The COMMON COUNCIL had the appointment of all the judges and
magistrates of the respective CITIES. This was certainly the most
delicate species of interference in their internal administration; for
if there be any thing that seems exclusively appropriated to the local
jurisdictions, it is the appointment of their own officers. Yet
Montesquieu, speaking of this association, says: "Were I to give a
model of an excellent Confederate Republic, it would be that of
Lycia." Thus we perceive that the distinctions insisted upon were
not within the contemplation of this enlightened civilian; and we
shall be led to conclude, that they are the novel refinements of an
erroneous theory.
- PUBLIUS
NO 10: The Same Subject Continued
by James Madison
-
AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed
Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency
to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular
governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character
and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to the dangerous
vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan
which, without violating the principles to which he is attached,
provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and
confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been
the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere
perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from
which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious
declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American
constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot
certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable
partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the
danger on this side, as was wished and expected. Complaints are
everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens,
equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and
personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the
public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that
measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of
justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force
of an interested and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may
wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence of known
facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It
will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that
some of the distresses under which we labor have been erroneously
charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found,
at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of
our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing and
increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private
rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other.
These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness
and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public
administrations.
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting
to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by
some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the
rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate
interests of the community.
There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one,
by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the
one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence;
the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same
passions, and the same interests.
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that
it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to
fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could
not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to
political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish
the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it
imparts to fire its destructive agency.
The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be
unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is
at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As
long as the connection subsists between his reason and his
self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal
influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the
latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of
men, from which the rights or property originate, is not less an
insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of
these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection
of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the
possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately
results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views
of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into
different interests and parties.
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and
we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity,
according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal
for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and
many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an
attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for preeminence
and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have
been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind
into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them
much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to cooperate for
their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall
into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents
itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been
sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most
violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of
factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property.
Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed
distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those
who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed
interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed
interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in
civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by
different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and
interfering interests forms the principal task of modern
legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the
necessary and ordinary operations of the government.
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his
interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably,
corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body
of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet
what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many
judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single
persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And
what are the different classes of legislators but advocates and
parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed
concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors
are parties on one side and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to
hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be,
themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other
words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall
domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by
restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be
differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and
probably by neither with a sole regard to justice and the public good.
The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property
is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet
there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and
temptation are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules of
justice. Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior
number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets.
It is vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to
adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to
the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.
Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without
taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely
prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in
disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.
The inference to which we are brought is, that the causes of faction
cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means
of controlling its effects.
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by
the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its
sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may
convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its
violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is
included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other
hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both
the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public
good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at
the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular
government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are
directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum by which this
form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it
has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption
of mankind.
By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two
only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a
majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having
such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number
and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes
of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to
coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be
relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the
injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in
proportion to the number combined together, that is, in proportion
as their efficacy becomes needful.
From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure
democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of
citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can
admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or
interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the
whole; a communication and concert result from the form of
government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to
sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is
that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and
contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security
or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in
their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic
politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have
erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in
their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly
equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and
their passions.
A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of
representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises
the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in
which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both
the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from
the Union.
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a
republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the
latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly,
the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over
which the latter may be extended.
The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine
and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of
a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true
interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice
will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the
public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be
more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people
themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect
may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of
sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other
means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of
the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive
republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of
the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by
two obvious considerations:
In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the
republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain
number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that,
however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number,
in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the
number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion
to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in
the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit
characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the
former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater
probability of a fit choice.
In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a
greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it
will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with
success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and
the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to
center in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most
diffusive and established characters.
It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there
is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie.
By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the
representative too little acquainted with all their local
circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you
render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to
comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal
Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great
and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local
and particular to the State legislatures.
The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and
extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of
republican than of democratic government; and it is this
circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to
be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the
society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests
composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more
frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller
the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the
compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they
concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere and
you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it
less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive
to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive
exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover
their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides
other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a
consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is
always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose
concurrence is necessary.
Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a
republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of
faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic,- is enjoyed by
the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist
in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and
virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and to
schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of
the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments.
Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater
variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to
outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the
increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this
security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed
to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust
and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it
the most palpable advantage.
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their
particular States, but will be unable to spread a general
conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may
degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy;
but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must
secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A
rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division
of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less
apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of
it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint
a particular country or district, than an entire State.
In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we
behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to
republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and
pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing
the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists.
- PUBLIUS
NO 11: The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commerce and a Navy
by Alexander Hamilton
-
THE importance of the Union, in a commercial light, is one of
those points about which there is least room to entertain a difference
of opinion, and which has, in fact, commanded the most general
assent of men who have any acquaintance with the subject. This applies
as well to our intercourse with foreign countries as with each other.
There are appearances to authorize a supposition that the
adventurous spirit, which distinguishes the commercial character of
America, has already excited uneasy sensations in several of the
maritime powers of Europe. They seem to be apprehensive of our too
great interference in that carrying trade, which is the support of
their navigation and the foundation of their naval strength. Those
of them which have colonies in America look forward to what this
country is capable of becoming, with painful solicitude. They
foresee the dangers that may threaten their American dominions from
the neighborhood of States, which have all the dispositions, and would
possess all the means, requisite to the creation of a powerful marine.
Impressions of this kind will naturally indicate the policy of
fostering divisions among us, and of depriving us, as far as possible,
of an ACTIVE COMMERCE in our own bottoms. This would answer the
threefold purpose of preventing our interference in their
navigation, of monopolizing the profits of our trade, and of
clipping the wings by which we might soar to a dangerous greatness.
Did not prudence forbid the details, it would not be difficult to
trace, by facts, the workings of this policy to the cabinets of
ministers.
If we continue united, we may counteract a policy so unfriendly to
our prosperity in a variety of ways. By prohibitory regulations,
extending, at the same time, throughout the States, we may oblige
foreign countries to bid against each other, for the privileges of our
markets. This assertion will not appear chimerical to those who are
able to appreciate the importance of the markets of three millions
of people- increasing in rapid progression, for the most part
exclusively addicted to agriculture, and likely from local
circumstances to remain so- to any manufacturing nation; and the
immense difference there would be to the trade and navigation of
such a nation, between a direct communication in it own ships, and
an indirect conveyance of its products and returns, to and from
America, in the ships of another country. Suppose, for instance, we
had a government in America, capable of excluding Great Britain
(with whom we have at present no treaty of commerce) from all our
ports; what would be the probable operation of this step upon her
politics? Would it not enable us to negotiate, with the fairest
prospect of success, for commercial privileges of the most valuable
and extensive kind, in the dominions of that kingdom? When these
questions have been asked, upon other occasions, they have received
a plausible, but not a solid or satisfactory answer. It has been
said that prohibitions on our part would produce no change in the
system of Britain, because she could prosecute her trade with us
through the medium of the Dutch, who would be her immediate
customers and paymasters for those articles which were wanted for
the supply of our markets. But would not her navigation be
materially injured by the loss of the important advantage of being her
own carrier in that trade? Would not the principal part of its profits
be intercepted by the Dutch, as a compensation for their agency and
risk? Would not the mere circumstance of freight occasion a
considerable deduction? Would not so circuitous an intercourse
facilitate the competitions of other nations, by enhancing the price
of British commodities in our markets, and by transferring to other
hands the management of this interesting branch of the British
commerce?
A mature consideration of the objects suggested by these questions
will justify a belief that the real disadvantages to Britain from such
a state of things, conspiring with the prepossessions of a great
part of the nation in favor of the America trade, and with the
importunities of the West India islands, would produce a relaxation in
her present system, and would let us into the enjoyment of
privileges in the markets of those islands and elsewhere, from which
our trade would derive the most substantial benefits. Such a point
gained from the British government, and which could not be expected
without an equivalent in exemptions and immunities in our markets,
would be likely to have a correspondent effect on the conduct of other
nations, who would not be inclined to see themselves altogether
supplanted in our trade.
A further resource for influencing the conduct of European nations
towards us, in this respect, would arise from the establishment of a
federal navy. There can be no doubt that the continuance of the
Union under an efficient government, would put it in our power, at a
period not very distant, to create a navy which, if it could not vie
with those of the great maritime powers, would at least be of
respectable weight if thrown into the scale of either of two
contending parties. This would be more peculiarly the case in relation
to operations in the West Indies. A few ships of the line, sent
opportunely to the reinforcement of either side, would often be
sufficient to decide the fate of a campaign, on the event of which
interests of the greatest magnitude were suspended. Our position is,
in this respect, a most commanding one. And if to this consideration
we add that of the usefulness of supplies from this country, in the
prosecution of military operations in the West Indies, it will readily
be perceived that a situation so favorable would enable us to
bargain with great advantage for commercial privileges. A price
would be set not only upon our friendship, but upon our neutrality. By
a steady adherence to the Union, we may hope, erelong, to become the
arbiter of Europe in America, and to be able to incline the balance of
European competitions in this part of the world as our interest may
dictate.
But in the reverse of this eligible situation, we shall discover
that the rivalships of the parts would make them checks upon each
other, and would frustrate all the tempting advantages which nature
has kindly placed within our reach. In a state so insignificant our
commerce would be a prey to the wanton intermeddlings of all nations
at war with each other; who have nothing to fear from us, would with
little scruple or remorse supply their wants by depredations on our
property as often as it fell in their way. The rights of neutrality
will only be respected when they are defended by an adequate power.
A nation, despicable by its weakness, forfeits even the privilege of
being neutral.
Under a vigorous national government, the natural strength and
resources of the country, directed to a common interest, would
baffle all the combinations of European jealousy to restrain our
growth. This situation would even take away the motive to such
combinations, by inducing an impracticability of success. An active
commerce, an extensive navigation, and a flourishing marine would then
be the offspring of moral and physical necessity. We might defy the
little arts of the little politicians to control or vary the
irresistible and unchangeable course of nature.
But in a state of disunion, these combinations might exist and might
operate with success. It would be in the power of the maritime
nations, availing themselves of our universal impotence, to
prescribe the conditions of our political existence; and as they
have a common interest in being our carriers, and still more in
preventing our becoming theirs, they would in all probability
combine to embarrass our navigation in such a manner as would in
effect destroy it, and confine us to a PASSIVE COMMERCE. We should
then be compelled to content ourselves with the first price of our
commodities, and to see the profits of our trade snatched from us to
enrich our enemies and persecutors. That unequalled spirit of
enterprise, which signalizes the genius of the American merchants
and navigators, and which is in itself in inexhaustible mine of
national wealth, would be stifled and lost, and poverty and disgrace
would overspread a country which, with wisdom, might make herself
the admiration and envy of the world.
There are rights of great moment to the trade of America which are
rights of the Union- I allude to the fisheries, to the navigation of
the Western lakes, and to that of the Mississippi. The dissolution
of the Confederacy would give room for delicate questions concerning
the future existence of these rights; which the interest of more
powerful partners would hardly fail to solve to our disadvantage.
The disposition of Spain with regard to the Mississippi needs no
comment. France and Britain are concerned with us in the fisheries,
and view them as of the utmost moment to their navigation. They, of
course, would hardly remain long indifferent to that decided
mastery, of which experience has shown us to be possessed in this
valuable branch of traffic, and by which we are able to undersell
those nations in their own markets. What more natural than that they
should be disposed to exclude from the lists such dangerous
competitors?
This branch of the trade ought not to be considered as a partial
benefit. All the navigating States may , in different degrees,
advantageously participate in it, and under circumstances of a greater
extension of mercantile capital, would not be unlikely to do it. As
a nursery of seamen, it now is, or, when time shall have more nearly
assimilated the principles of navigation in the several States, will
become, a universal resource. To the establishment of a navy, it
must be indispensable.
To this great national object a NAVY, union will contribute in
various ways. Every institution will grow and flourish in proportion
to the quantity and extent of the means concentrated towards its
formation and support. A navy of the United States, as it would
embrace the resources of all, is an object far less remote than a navy
of any single State or partial confederacy, which would only embrace
the resources of a single part. It happens, indeed, that different
portions of confederated America possess each some peculiar
advantage for this essential establishment. The more southern States
furnish in greater abundance certain kinds of naval stores- tar,
pitch, and turpentine. Their wood for the construction of ships is
also of a more solid and lasting texture. The difference in the
duration of the ships of which the navy might be composed, if
chiefly constructed of Southern wood, would be of signal importance,
either in the view of naval strength or of national economy. Some of
the Southern and of the Middle States yield a greater plenty of
iron, and of better quality. Seamen must chiefly be drawn from the
Northern hive. The necessity of naval protection to external or
maritime commerce does not require a particular elucidation, no more
than the conduciveness of that species of Commerce to the prosperity
of a navy.
An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will
advance the trade of each by an interchange of their respective
productions, not only for the supply of reciprocal wants at home,
but for exportation to foreign markets. The veins of commerce in every
part will be replenished, and will acquire additional motion and vigor
from a free circulation of the commodities of every part. Commercial
enterprise will have much greater scope, from the diversity in the
productions of different States. When the staple of one fails from a
bad harvest or unproductive crop, it can call to its aid the staple of
another. The variety, not less than the value, of products for
exportation contributes to the activity of foreign commerce. It can be
conducted upon much better terms with a large number of materials of a
given value than with a small number of materials of the same value;
arising from the competitions of trade and from the fluctuations of
markets. Particular articles may be in great demand at certain
periods, and unsalable at others; but if there be a variety of
articles, it can scarcely happen that they should all be at one time
in the latter predicament, and on this account the operations of the
merchant would be less liable to any considerable obstruction or
stagnation. The speculative trader will at once perceive the force
of these observations, and will acknowledge that the aggregate balance
of the commerce of the United States would bid fair to be much more
favorable than that of the thirteen States without union or with
partial unions.
It may perhaps be replied to this, that whether the States are
united or disunited, there would still be an intimate intercourse
between them which would answer the same ends; but this intercourse
would be fettered, interrupted, and narrowed by a multiplicity of
causes, which in the course of these papers have been amply
detailed. A unity of commercial, as well as political, interests,
can only result from a unity of government.
There are other points of view in which this subject might be
placed, of a striking and animating kind. But they would lead us too
far into the regions of futurity, and would involve topics not
proper for a newspaper discussion. I shall briefly observe, that our
situation invites and our interests prompt us to aim at an ascendant
in the system of America affairs. The world may politically, as well
as geographically, be divided into four parts, each having a
distinct set of interests. Unhappily for the other three, Europe, by
her arms and by her negotiations, by force and by fraud, has, in
different degrees, extended her dominion over them all. Africa,
Asia, and America, have successively felt her domination. The
superiority she has long maintained has tempted her to plume herself
as the Mistress of the World, and to consider the rest of mankind as
created for her benefit. Men admired as profound philosophers have, in
direct terms, attributed to her inhabitants a physical superiority and
have gravely asserted that all animals, and with them the human
species, degenerate in America- that even dogs cease to bark after
having breathed awhile in our atmosphere. *017 Facts have too long
supported these arrogant pretensions of the Europeans. It belongs to
us to vindicate the honor of the human race, and to teach that
assuming brother, moderation. Union will enable us to do it.
Disunion will add another victim to his triumphs. Let Americans
disdain to be the instruments of European greatness! Let the
thirteen States, bound together in a strict and indissoluble Union,
concur in erecting one great American system, superior to the
control of all transatlantic force or influence, and able to dictate
the terms of the connection between the old and the new world!
- PUBLIUS
NO 12: The Utility of the Union in Respect to Revenue
by Alexander Hamilton
-
THE effects of Union upon the commercial prosperity of the States
have been sufficiently delineated. Its tendency to promote the
interests of revenue will be the subject of our present inquiry.
The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and acknowledged by
all enlightened statesmen to be the most useful as well as the most
productive source of national wealth, and has accordingly become a
primary object of their political cares. By multiplying the means of
gratification, by promoting the introduction and circulation of the
precious metals, those darling objects of human avarice and
enterprise, it serves to vivify and invigorate the channels of
industry, and to make them flow with greater activity and copiousness.
The assiduous merchant, the laborious husbandman, the active mechanic,
and the industrious manufacturer,- all orders of men, look forward
with eager expectation and growing alacrity to this pleasing reward of
their toils. The often-agitated question between agriculture and
commerce has, from indubitable experience, received a decision which
has silenced the rivalship that once subsisted between them, and has
proved, to the satisfaction of their friends, that their interests are
intimately blended and interwoven. It has been found in various
countries that, in proportion as commerce has flourished, land has
risen in value. And how could it have happened otherwise? Could that
which procures a freer vent for the products of the earth, which
furnishes new incitements to the cultivation of land, which is the
most powerful instrument in increasing the quantity of money in a
state- could that, in fine, which is the faithful handmaid of labor
and industry, in every shape, fail to augment that article, which is
the prolific parent of far the greatest part of the objects upon which
they are exerted? It is astonishing that so simple a truth should ever
have had an adversary; and it is one, among a multitude of proofs, how
apt a spirit of ill-informed jealousy, or of too great abstraction and
refinement, is to lead men astray from the plainest truths of reason
and conviction.
The ability of a country to pay taxes must always be proportioned,
in a great degree, to the quantity of money in circulation, and to the
celerity with which it circulates. Commerce, contributing to both
these objects, must of necessity render the payment of taxes easier,
and facilitate the requisite supplies to the treasury. The
hereditary dominions of the Emperor of Germany contain a great
extent of fertile, cultivated, and populous territory, a large
proportion of which is situated in mild and luxuriant climates. In
some parts of this territory are to be found the best gold and
silver mines in Europe. And yet, from the want of the fostering
influence of commerce, that monarch can boast but slender revenues. He
has several times been compelled to owe obligations to the pecuniary
succors of other nations for the preservation of his essential
interests, and is unable, upon the strength of his own resources, to
sustain a long or continued war.
But it is not in this aspect of the subject alone that Union will be
seen to conduce to the purpose of revenue. There are other points of
view, in which its influence will appear more immediate and
decisive. It is evident from the state of the country, from the habits
of the people, from the experience we have had on the point itself,
that it is impracticable to raise any very considerable sums by direct
taxation. Tax laws have in vain been multiplied; new methods to
enforce the collection have in vain been tried; the public expectation
has been uniformly disappointed, and the treasuries of the States have
remained empty. The popular system of administration inherent in the
nature of popular government, coinciding with the real scarcity of
money incident to a languid and mutilated state of trade, has hitherto
defeated every experiment for extensive collections, and has at length
taught the different legislatures the folly of attempting them.
No person acquainted with what happens in other countries will be
surprised at this circumstance. In so opulent a nation as that of
Britain, where direct taxes from superior wealth must be much more
tolerable, and, from the vigor of the government, much more
practicable, than in America, far the greatest part of the national
revenue is derived from taxes of the indirect kind, from imposts,
and from excises. Duties on imported articles form a large branch of
this latter description.
In America, it is evident that we must a long time depend for the
means of revenue chiefly on such duties. In most parts of it,
excises must be confined within a narrow compass. The genius of the
people will ill brook the inquisitive and peremptory spirit of
excise laws. The pockets of the farmers, on the other hand, will
reluctantly yield but scanty supplies, in the unwelcome shape of
impositions on their houses and lands; and personal property is too
precarious and invisible a fund to be laid hold of in any other way
than by the imperceptible agency of taxes on consumption. If these
remarks have any foundation, that state of things which will best
enable us to improve and extend so valuable a resource must be best
adapted to our political welfare. And it cannot admit of a serious
doubt, that this state of things, must rest on the basis of a
general Union. As far as this would be conducive to the interests of
commerce, so far it must tend to the extension of the revenue to be
drawn from that source. As far as it would contribute to rendering
regulations for the collection of the duties more simple and
efficacious, so far it must serve to answer the purposes of making the
same rate of duties more productive, and of putting it into the
power of the government to increase the rate without prejudice to
trade.
The relative situation of these States; the number of rivers with
which they are intersected, and of bays that wash their shores; the
facility for communication in every direction; the affinity of
language and manners; the familiar habits of intercourse;- all these
are circumstances that would conspire to render an illicit trade
between them a matter of little difficulty, and would insure
frequent evasions of the commercial regulations of each other. The
separate States or confederacies would be necessitated by mutual
jealousy to avoid the temptations to that kind of trade by the lowness
of their duties. The temper of our governments, for a long time to
come, would not permit those rigorous precautions by which the
European nations guard the avenues into their respective countries, as
well by land as by water; and which, even there, are found
insufficient obstacles to the adventurous stratagems of avarice.
In France, there is an army of patrols (as they are called)
constantly employed to secure their fiscal regulations against the
inroads of the dealers in contraband trade. Mr Neckar computes the
number of these patrols at upwards of twenty thousand. This shows
the immense difficulty in preventing that species of traffic, where
there is an inland communication, and places in a strong light the
disadvantages with which the collection of duties in this country
would be encumbered, if by disunion the States should be placed in a
situation, with respect to each other, resembling that of France
with respect to her neighbors. The arbitrary and vexatious powers with
which the patrols are necessarily armed, would be intolerable in a
free country.
If, on the contrary, there be but one government pervading all the
States, there will be, as to the principal part of our commerce, but
ONE SIDE to guard-the ATLANTIC COAST. Vessels arriving directly from
foreign countries, laden with valuable cargoes, would rarely choose to
hazard themselves to the complicated and critical perils which would
attend attempts to unload prior to their coming into port. They
would have to dread both the dangers of the coast, and of detection,
as well after as before their arrival at the places of their final
destination. An ordinary degree of vigilance would be competent to the
prevention of any material infractions upon the rights of the revenue.
A few armed vessels, judiciously stationed at the entrances of our
ports, might at a small expense be made useful sentinels of the
laws. And the government having the same interest to provide against
violations everywhere, the cooperation of its measures in each State
would have a powerful tendency to render them effectual. Here also
we should preserve, by Union, an advantage which nature holds out to
us, and which would be relinquished by separation. The United States
lie at a great distance from Europe, and at a considerable distance
from all other places with which they would have extensive connections
of foreign trade. The passage from them to us, in a few hours, or in a
single night, as between the coasts of France and Britain, and of
other neighboring nations, would be impracticable. This is a
prodigious security against a direct contraband with foreign
countries; but a circuitous contraband to one State, through the
medium of another, would be both easy and safe. The difference between
a direct importation from abroad, and an indirect importation
through the channel of a neighboring State, in small parcels,
according to time and opportunity, with the additional facilities of
inland communication, must be palpable to every man of discernment.
It is therefore evident, that one national government would be able,
at much less expense, to extend the duties on imports, beyond
comparison, further than would be practicable to the States
separately, or to any partial confederacies. Hitherto, I believe, it
may safely be asserted, that these duties have not upon an average
exceeded in any State three percent. In France they are estimated to
be about fifteen percent., and in Britain they exceed this
proportion. *018 There seems to be nothing to hinder their being
increased in this country to at least treble their present amount. The
single article of ardent spirits, under federal regulation, might be
made to furnish a considerable revenue. Upon a ratio to the
importation into this State, the whole quantity imported into the
United States may be estimated at four millions of gallons; which, at
a shilling per gallon, would produce two hundred thousand pounds. That
articlewould well bear this rate of duty; and if it should tend to
diminish the consumption of it, such an effect would be equally
favorable to the agriculture, to the economy, to the morals, and to
the health of the society. There is, perhaps, nothing so much a
subject of national extravagance as these spirits.
What will be the consequence, if we are not able to avail
ourselves of the resource in question in its full extent? A nation
cannot long exist without revenues. Destitute of this essential
support, it must resign its independence, and sink into the degraded
condition of a province. This is an extremity to which no government
will of choice accede. Revenue, therefore, must be had at all
events. In this country, if the principal part be not drawn from
commerce, it must fall with oppressive weight upon land. It has been
already intimated that excises, in their true signification, are too
little in unison with the feelings of the people, to admit of great
use being made of that mode of taxation; nor, indeed, in the States
where almost the sole employment is agriculture, are the objects
proper for excise sufficiently numerous to permit very ample
collections in that way. Personal estate (as has been before
remarked), from the difficulty in tracing it, cannot be subjected to
large contributions, by any other means than by taxes on
consumption. In populous cities, it may be enough the subject of
conjecture, to occasion the oppression of individuals, without much
aggregate benefit to the State; but beyond these circles, it must,
in a great measure, escape the eye and the hand of the tax-gatherer.
As the necessities of the State, nevertheless, must be satisfied in
some mode or other, the defect of other resources must throw the
principal weight of public burdens on the possessors of land. And
as, on the other hand, the wants of the government can never obtain an
adequate supply, unless all the sources of revenue are open to its
demands, the finances of the community, under such embarrassments,
cannot be put into a situation consistent with its respectability or
it security. Thus we shall not even have the consolations of a full
treasury, to atone for the oppression of that valuable class of the
citizens who are employed in the cultivation of the soil. But public
and private distress will keep pace with each other in gloomy concert;
and unite in deploring the infatuation of those counsels which led
to disunion.
- PUBLIUS
NO 13: The Same Subject Continued with a View to Economy
by Alexander Hamilton
-
AS CONNECTED with the subject of revenue, we may with propriety
consider that of economy. The money saved from one object may be
usefully applied to another, and there will be so much the less to
be drawn from the pockets of the people. If the States are united
under one government, there will be but one national civil list to
support; if they are divided into several confederacies, there will be
as many different national civil lists to be provided for- and each of
them, as to the principal departments, coextensive with that which
would be necessary for a government of the whole. The entire
separation of the States into thirteen unconnected sovereignties is
a project too extravagant and too replete with danger to have many
advocates. The ideas of men who speculate upon the dismemberment of
the empire seem generally turned towards three confederacies- one
consisting of the four Northern, another of the four Middle, and a
third of the five Southern States. There is little probability that
there would be a greater number. According to this distribution,
each confederacy would comprise an extent of territory larger than
that of the kingdom of Great Britain. No well-informed man will
suppose that the affairs of such a confederacy can be properly
regulated by a government less comprehensive in its organs or
institutions than that which has been proposed by the convention. When
the dimensions of a State attain to a certain magnitude, it requires
the same energy of government and the same forms of administration
which are requisite in one of much greater extent. This idea admits
not of precise demonstration, because there is no rule by which we can
measure the momentum of civil power necessary to the government of any
given number of individuals; but when we consider that the island of
Britain, nearly commensurate with each of the supposed confederacies,
contains about eight millions of people, and when we reflect upon the
degree of authority required to direct the passions of so large a
society to the public good, we shall see no reason to doubt that
the like portion of power would be sufficient to perform the same
task in a society far more numerous. Civil power, properly organized
and exerted, is capable of diffusing its force to a very great extent;
and can, in a manner, reproduce itself in every part of a great empire
by a judicious arrangement of subordinate institutions.
The supposition that each confederacy into which the States would be
likely to be divided would require a government not less comprehensive
than the one proposed, will be strengthened by another supposition,
more probable than that which presents us with three confederacies
as the alternative to a general Union. If we attend carefully to
geographical and commercial considerations, in conjunction with the
habits and prejudices of the different States, we shall be led to
conclude that in case of disunion they will most naturally league
themselves under two governments. The four Eastern States, form all
the causes that form the links of national sympathy and connection,
may with certainty be expected to unite. New York, situated as she is,
would never be unwise enough to oppose a feeble and unsupported
flank to the weight of that confederacy. There are other obvious
reasons that would facilitate her accession to it. New Jersey is too
small a State to think of being a frontier, in opposition to this
still more powerful combination; nor do there appear to be any
obstacles to her admission into it. Even Pennsylvania would have
strong inducements to join the Northern league. An active foreign
commerce, on the basis of her own navigation, is her true policy,
and coincides with the opinions and dispositions of her citizens.
The more Southern States, from various circumstances, may not think
themselves much interested in the encouragement of navigation. They
may prefer a system which would give unlimited scope to all nations to
be the carriers as well as the purchasers of their commodities.
Pennsylvania may not choose to confound her interests in a
connection so adverse to her policy. As she must at all events be a
frontier, she may deem it most consistent with her safety to have
her exposed side turned towards the weaker power of the Southern,
rather than towards the stronger power of the Northern, Confederacy.
This would give her the fairest chance to avoid being the Flanders
of America. Whatever may be the determination of Pennsylvania, if
the Northern Confederacy includes New Jersey, there is no likelihood
of more than one confederacy to the south of that State.
Nothing can be more evident than that the thirteen States will be
able to support a national government better than one half, or one
third, or any number less than the whole. This reflection must have
great weight in obviating that objection to the proposed plan, which
is founded on the principle of expense; an objection, however,
which, when we come to take a nearer view of it, will appear in
every light to stand on mistaken ground.
If, in addition to the consideration of a plurality of civil
lists, we take into view the number of persons who must necessarily be
employed to guard the inland communication between the different
confederacies against illicit trade, and who in time will infallibly
spring up our of the necessities of revenue; and if we also take
into view the military establishments which it has been shown would
unavoidably result from the jealousies and conflicts of the several
nations into which the States would be divided, we shall clearly
discover that a separation would be not less injurious to the economy,
than to the tranquillity, commerce, revenue, and liberty of every
part.
- PUBLIUS
NO 14: An Objection Drawn from the Extent of Country Answered
by James Madison
-
WE HAVE seen the necessity of the Union, as our bulwark against
foreign danger, as the conservator of peace among ourselves, as the
guardian of our commerce and other common interests, as the only
substitute for those military establishments which have subverted
the liberties of the Old World, and as the proper antidote for the
diseases of faction, which have proved fatal to other popular
governments, and of which alarming symptoms have been betrayed by
our own. All that remains, within this branch of our inquiries, is
to take notice of an objection that may be drawn from the great extent
of country which the Union embraces. A few observations on this
subject will be the more proper, as it is perceived that the
adversaries of the new Constitution are availing themselves of the
prevailing prejudice with regard to the practicable sphere of
republican administration, in order to supply, by imaginary
difficulties, the want of those solid objections which they endeavor
in vain to find.
The error which limits republican government to a narrow district
has been unfolded and refuted in preceding papers. I remark here
only that it seems to owe its rise and prevalence chiefly to the
confounding of a republic with a democracy, applying to the former
reasonings drawn from the nature of the latter. The true distinction
between these forms was also adverted to on a former occasion. It
is, that in a democracy, the people meet and exercise the government
in person; in a republic, they assemble and administer it by their
representatives and agents. A democracy, consequently, will be
confined to a small spot. A republic may be extended over a large
region.
To this accidental source of the error may be added the artifice
of some celebrated authors, whose writings have had a great share in
forming the modern standard of political opinions. Being subjects
either of an absolute or limited monarchy, they have endeavored to
heighten the advantages, or palliate the evils of those forms, by
placing in comparison the vices and defects of the republican, and
by citing as specimens of the latter the turbulent democracies of
ancient Greece and modern Italy. Under the confusion of names, it
has been an easy task to transfer to a republic observations
applicable to a democracy only; and among others, the observation that
it can never be established but among a small number of people, living
within a small compass of territory.
Such a fallacy may have been the less perceived, as most of the
popular governments of antiquity were of the democratic species; and
even in modern Europe, to which we owe the great principle of
representation, no example is seen of a government wholly popular, and
founded, at the same time, wholly on that principle. If Europe has the
merit of discovering this great mechanical power in government, by the
simple agency of which the will of the largest political body may be
concentrated, and its force directed to any object which the public
good requires, America can claim the merit of making the discovery the
basis of unmixed and extensive republics. It is only to be lamented
that any of her citizens should wish to deprive her of the
additional merit of displaying its full efficacy in the
establishment of the comprehensive system now under her consideration.
As the natural limit of democracy is that distance from the
central point which will just permit the most remote citizens to
assemble as often as their public functions demand, and will include
no greater number than can join in those functions; so the natural
limit of a republic is that distance from the center which will barely
allow the representatives to meet as often as may be necessary for the
administration of public affairs. Can it be said that the limits of
the United States exceed this distance? It will not be said by those
who recollect that the Atlantic coast is the longest side of the
Union, that during the term of thirteen years, the representatives
of the States have been almost continually assembled, and that the
members from the most distant States are not chargeable with greater
intermissions of attendance than those from the States in the
neighborhood of Congress.
That we may form a juster estimate with regard to this interesting
subject, let us resort to the actual dimensions of the Union. The
limits, as fixed by the treaty of peace, are: on the east the
Atlantic, on the south the latitude of thirty-one degrees, on the west
the Mississippi, and on the north an irregular line running in some
instances beyond the forty-fifth degree, in others falling as low as
the forty-second. The southern shore of Lake Erie lies below that
latitude. Computing the distance between the thirty-first and
forty-fifth degrees, it amounts to nine hundred and seventy-three
common miles; computing it from thirty-one to forty-two degrees, to
seven hundred and sixty-four miles and a half. Taking the mean for the
distance, the amount will be eight hundred and sixty-eight miles and
three fourths. The mean distance from the Atlantic to the
Mississippi does not probably exceed seven hundred and fifty miles. On
a comparison of this extent with that of several countries in
Europe, the practicability of rendering our system commensurate to
it appears to be demonstrable. It is not a great deal larger than
Germany, where a diet representing the whole empire is continually
assembled; or than Poland before the late dismemberment, where another
national diet was the depositary of the supreme power. Passing by
France and Spain, we find that in Great Britain, inferior as it may be
in size, the representatives of the northern extremity of the island
have as far to travel to the national council as will be required of
those of the most remote parts of the Union.
Favorable as this view of the subject may be, some observations
remain which will place it in the light still more satisfactory.
In the first place it is to be remembered that the general
government is not to be charged with the whole power of making and
administering laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to certain
enumerated objects, which concern all the members of the republic, but
which are not to be attained by the separate provisions of any. The
subordinate governments, which can extend their care to all those
other objects which can be separately provided for, will retain
their due authority and activity. Were it proposed by the plan of
the convention to abolish the governments of the particular States,
its adversaries would have some ground for their objection; though
it would not be difficult to show that if they were abolished the
general government would be compelled, by the principle of
self-preservation, to reinstate them in their proper jurisdiction.
A second observation to be made is that the immediate object of
the federal Constitution is to secure the union of the thirteen
primitive States, which we know to be practicable; and to add to
them such other States as may arise in their own bosoms, or in their
neighborhoods, which we cannot doubt to be equally practicable. The
arrangements that may be necessary for those angles and fractions of
our territory which lie on our northwestern frontier, must be left
to those whom further discoveries and experience will render more
equal to the task.
Let it be remarked, in the third place, that the intercourse
throughout the Union will be facilitated by new improvements. Roads
will everywhere be shortened, and kept in better order; accommodations
for travellers will be multiplied and meliorated; an interior
navigation on our eastern side will be opened throughout, or nearly
throughout, the whole extent of the thirteen States. The communication
between the Western and Atlantic districts, and between different
parts of each, will be rendered more and more easy by those numerous
canals with which the beneficence of nature has intersected our
country, and which art finds it so little difficult to connect and
complete.
A fourth and still more important consideration is, that as almost
every State will, on one side or other, be a frontier, and will thus
find, in a regard to its safety, an inducement to make some sacrifices
for the sake of the general protection; so the States which lie at the
greatest distance from the heart of the Union, and which, of course,
may partake least of the ordinary circulation of its benefits, will be
at the same time immediately contiguous to foreign nations, and will
consequently stand, on particular occasions, in greatest need of its
strength and resources. It may be inconvenient for Georgia, or the
States forming our western or northeastern borders, to send their
representatives to the seat of government; but they would find it more
so to struggle alone against an invading enemy, or even to support
alone the whole expense of those precautions which may be dictated
by the neighborhood of continual danger. If they should derive less
benefit, therefore, from the Union in some respects than the less
distant States, they will derive greater benefit from it in other
respects, and thus the proper equilibrium will be maintained
throughout.
I submit to you, my fellow-citizens, these considerations, in full
confidence that the good sense which has so often marked your
decisions will allow them their due weight and effect; and that you
will never suffer difficulties, however formidable in appearance, or
however fashionable the error on which they may be founded, to drive
you into the gloomy and perilous scene into which the advocates for
disunion would conduct you. Hearken not to the unnatural voice which
tells you that the people of America, knit together as they are by
so many cords of affection, can no longer live together as members
of the same family; can no longer continue the mutual guardians of
their mutual happiness; can no longer be fellow-citizens of one great,
respectable, and flourishing empire. Hearken not to the voice which
petulantly tells you that the form of government recommended for
your adoption is a novelty in the political world; that it has never
yet had a place in the theories of the wildest projectors; that it
rashly attempts what it is impossible to accomplish. No, my
countrymen, shut your ears against this unhallowed language. Shut your
hearts against the poison which it conveys; the kindred blood which
flows in the veins of American citizens, the mingled blood which
they have shed in defence of their sacred rights, consecrate their
Union, and excite horror at the idea of their becoming aliens, rivals,
enemies. And if novelties are to be shunned, believe me, the most
alarming of all novelties, the most wild of all projects, the most
rash of all attempts, is that of rending us in pieces, in order to
preserve our liberties and promote our happiness. But why is the
experiment of an extended republic to be rejected, merely because it
may comprise what is new? Is it not the glory of the people of
America, that, whilst they have paid a decent regard to the opinions
of former times and other nations, they have not suffered a blind
veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the
suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own
situation, and the lessons of their own experience? To this manly
spirit, posterity will be indebted for the possession, and the world
for the example, of the numerous innovations displayed on the American
theatre, in favor of private rights and public happiness. Had no
important step been taken by the leaders of the Revolution for which a
precedent could not be discovered, no government established of
which an exact model did not present itself, the people of the
United States might, at this moment, have been numbered among the
melancholy victims of misguided councils, must at best have been
laboring under the weight of some of those forms which have crushed
the liberties of the rest of mankind. Happily for America, happily, we
trust, for the whole human race, they pursued a new and more noble
course. They accomplished a revolution which has no parallel in the
annals of human society. They reared the fabrics of governments
which have no model on the face of the globe. They formed the design
of a great Confederacy, which it is incumbent on their successors to
improve and perpetuate. If their works betray imperfections, we wonder
at the fewness of them. If they erred most in the structure of the
Union, this was the work most difficult to be executed; this is the
work which has been new modelled by the act of your convention, and it
is that act on which you are now to deliberate and to decide.
- PUBLIUS
NO 15: Concerning the Defects of the Present Confederation
in Relation to the Principle of Legislation
for the States in Their Collective Capacities
by Alexander Hamilton
-
IN THE course of the preceding papers, I have endeavored, my
fellow-citizens, to place before you, in a clear and convincing light,
the importance of Union to your political safety and happiness. I have
unfolded to you a complication of dangers to which you would be
exposed, should you permit that sacred knot which binds the people
of America together to be severed or dissolved by ambition or by
avarice, by jealousy or by misrepresentation. In the sequel of the
inquiry through which I propose to accompany you, the truths
intended to be inculcated will receive further confirmation from facts
and arguments hitherto unnoticed. If the road over which you will
still have to pass should in some places appear to you tedious or
irksome, you will recollect that you are in quest of information on
a subject the most momentous which can engage the attention of a
free people, that the field through which you have to travel is in
itself spacious, and that the difficulties of the journey have been
unnecessarily increased by the mazes with which sophistry has beset
the way. It will be my aim to remove the obstacles from your
progress in as compendious a manner as it can be done, without
sacrificing utility to despatch.
In pursuance of the plan which I have laid down for the discussion
of the subject, the point next in order to be examined is the
insufficiency of the present Confederation to the preservation of
the Union." It may perhaps be asked what need there is of reasoning or
proof to illustrate a position which is not either controverted or
doubted, to which the understandings and feelings of all classes of
men assent, and which in substance is admitted by the opponents as
well as by the friends of the new Constitution. It must in truth be
acknowledged that, however these may differ in other respects, they in
general appear to harmonize in this sentiment, at least, that there
are material imperfections in our national system, and that
something is necessary to be done to rescue us from impending anarchy.
The facts that support this opinion are no longer objects of
speculation. They have forced themselves upon the sensibility of the
people at large, and have at lengthy extorted from those, whose
mistaken policy has had the principal share in precipitating the
extremity at which we are arrived, a reluctant confession of the
reality of those defects in the scheme of our federal government,
which have been long pointed out and regretted by the intelligent
friends of the Union.
We may indeed with propriety be said to have reached almost the last
stage of national humiliation. There is scarcely any thing that can
wound the pride or degrade the character of an independent nation
which we do not experience. Are there engagements to the performance
of which we are held by every tie respectable among men? These are the
subjects of constant and unblushing violation. Do we owe debts to
foreigners and to our own citizens contracted in a time of imminent
peril for the preservation of our political existence? These remain
without any proper or satisfactory provision for their discharge. Have
we valuable territories and important posts in the possession of a
foreign power which, by express stipulations, ought long since to have
been surrendered? These are still retained, to the prejudice of our
interests, not less than of our rights. Are we in a condition to
resent or to repel the aggression? We have neither troops, nor
treasury, nor government. *019 Are we even in a condition to
remonstrate with dignity? The just imputations on our own faith, in
respect to the same treaty, ought first to be removed. Are we entitled
by nature and compact to a free participation in the navigation of the
Mississippi? Spain excludes us from it. Is public credit an
indispensable resource in time of public danger? We seem to have
abandoned its cause as desperate and irretrievable. Is commerce of
importance to national wealth? Ours is at the lowest point of
declension. Is respectability in the eyes of foreign powers a
safeguard against foreign encroachments? The imbecility of our
government even forbids them to treat with us. Our ambassadors
abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty. Is a violent and
unnatural decrease in the value of land a symptom of national
distress? The price of improved land in most parts of the country is
much lower than can be accounted for by the quantity of waste land
at market, and can only be fully explained by that want of private and
public confidence, which are so alarmingly prevalent among all
ranks, and which have a direct tendency to depreciate property of
every kind. Is private credit the friend and patron of industry?
That most useful kind which relates to borrowing and lending is
reduced within the narrowest limits, and this still more from an
opinion of insecurity than from the scarcity of money. To shorten an
enumeration of particulars which can afford neither pleasure nor
instruction, it may in general be demanded, what indication is there
of national disorder, poverty, and insignificance that could befall
a community so peculiarly blessed with natural advantages as we are,
which does not form a part of the dark catalogue of our public
misfortunes.
This is the melancholy situation to which we have been brought by
those very maxims and councils which would now deter us from
adopting the proposed Constitution; and which, not content with having
conducted us to the brink of a precipice, seem resolved to plunge us
into the abyss that awaits us below. Here, my countrymen, impelled
by every motive that ought to influence an enlightened people, let
us make a firm stand for our safety, our tranquillity, our dignity,
our reputation. Let us at last break the fatal charm which has too
long seduced us from the paths of felicity and prosperity.
It is true, as has been before observed, that facts, too stubborn to
be resisted, have produced a species of general assent to the abstract
proposition that there exist material defects in our national
system; but the usefulness of the concession, on the part of the old
adversaries of federal measures, is destroyed by a strenuous
opposition to a remedy, upon the only principles that can give it a
chance of success. While they admit that the government of the
United States is destitute of energy, they contend against
conferring upon it those powers which are requisite to supply that
energy. They seem still to aim at things repugnant and irreconcilable;
at an augmentation of federal authority, without a diminution of State
authority; at sovereignty in the Union, and complete independence in
the members. They still, in fine, seem to cherish with blind
devotion the political monster of an imperium in imperio. This renders
a full display of the principal defects of the Confederation
necessary, in order to show that the evils we experience do not
proceed from minute or partial imperfections, but from fundamental
errors in the structure of the building, which cannot be amended
otherwise than by an alteration in the first principles and main
pillars of the fabric.
The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing
Confederation is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or
GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as
contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of which they consist. Though
this principle does not run through all the powers delegated to the
Union, yet it pervades and governs those on which the efficacy of
the rest depends. Except as to the rule of apportionment, the United
States has an indefinite discretion to make requisitions for men and
money; but they have no authority to raise either, by regulations
extending to the individual citizens of America. The consequence of
this is, that though in theory their resolutions concerning those
objects are laws, constitutionally binding on the members of the
Union, yet in practice they are mere recommendations which the
States observe or disregard at their option.
It is a singular instance of the capriciousness of the human mind,
that after all the admonitions we have had from experience on this
head, there should still be found men who object to the new
Constitution, for deviating from a principle which has been found
the bane of the old, and which is in itself evidently incompatible
with the idea of GOVERNMENT; a principle, in short, which, if it is to
be executed at all, must substitute the violent and sanguinary
agency of the sword to the mild influence of the magistracy.
There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league
or alliance between independent nations for certain defined purposes
precisely stated in a treaty regulating all the details of time,
place, circumstance, and quantity; leaving nothing to future
discretion; and depending for its execution on the good faith of the
parties. Compacts of this kind exist among all civilized nations,
subject to the usual vicissitudes of peace and war, of observance
and non-observance, as the interests or passions of the contracting
powers dictate. In the early part of the present century there was
an epidemical rage in Europe for this species of compacts, from
which the politicians of the times fondly hoped for benefits which
were never realized. With a view to establishing the equilibrium of
power and the peace of that part of the world, all the resources of
negotiations were exhausted, and triple and quadruple alliances were
formed; but they were scarcely formed before they were broken,
giving an instructive but afflicting lesson to mankind, how little
dependence is to be placed on treaties which have no other sanction
than the obligations of good faith, and which oppose general
considerations of peace and justice to the impulse of any immediate
interest or passion.
If the particular States in this country are disposed to stand in
a similar relation to each other, and to drop the project of a general
DISCRETIONARY SUPERINTENDENCE, the scheme would indeed be
pernicious, and would entail upon us all the mischiefs which have been
enumerated under the first head; but it would have the merit of being,
at least, consistent and practicable. Abandoning all views towards a
confederate government, this would bring us to a simple alliance
offensive and defensive; and would place us in a situation to be
alternate friends and enemies of each other, as our mutual
jealousies and rivalships, nourished by the intrigues of foreign
nations, should prescribe to us.
But if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous situation;
if we still will adhere to the design of a national government, or,
which is the same thing, of a superintending power, under the
direction of a common council, we must resolve to incorporate into our
plan those ingredients which may be considered as forming the
characteristic difference between a league and a government; we must
extend the authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens,- the
only proper objects of government.
Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to
the idea of a law, that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other
words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience. If there be no
penalty annexed to disobedience, the resolutions or commands which
pretend to be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more than advice
or recommendation. This penalty, whatever it may be, can only be
inflicted in two ways: by the agency of the courts and ministers of
justice, or by military force; by the COERCION of the magistracy, or
by the COERCION of arms. The first kind can evidently apply only to
men; the last kind must of necessity, be employed against bodies
politic, or communities, or States. It is evident that there is no
process of a court by which the observance of the laws can, in the
last resort, be enforced. Sentences may be denounced against them
for violations of their duty; but these sentences can only be
carried into execution by the sword. In an association where the
general authority is confined to the collective bodies of the
communities that compose it, every breach of the laws must involve a
state of war; and military execution must become the only instrument
of civil obedience. Such a state of things can certainly not deserve
the name of government, nor would any prudent man choose to commit his
happiness to it.
There was a time when we were told that breaches, by the States,
of the regulations of the federal authority were not to be expected;
that a sense of common interest would preside over the conduct of
the respective members, and would beget a full compliance with all the
constitutional requisitions of the Union. This language, at the
present day, would appear as wild as a great part of what we now
hear from the same quarter will be thought, when we shall have
received further lessons from that best oracle of wisdom,
experience. It at all times betrayed an ignorance of the true
springs by which human conduct is actuated, and belied the original
inducements to the establishment of civil power. Why has government
been instituted at all? Because the passions of men will not conform
to the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint. Has it been
found that bodies of men act with more rectitude or greater
disinterestedness than individuals? The contrary of this has been
inferred by all accurate observers of the conduct of mankind; and
the inference is founded upon obvious reasons. Regard to reputation
has a less active influence, when the infamy of a bad action is to
be divided among a number, than when it is to fall singly upon one.
A spirit of faction, which is apt to mingle it poison in the
deliberations of all bodies of men, will often hurry the persons of
whom they are composed into improprieties and excesses, for which they
would blush in a private capacity.
In addition to all this, there is, in the nature of sovereign power,
an impatience of control, that disposes those who are invested with
the exercise of it, to look with an evil eye upon all external
attempts to restrain or direct its operations. From this spirit it
happens, that in every political association which is formed upon
the principle of uniting in a common interest a number of lesser
sovereignties, there will be found a kind of eccentric tendency in the
subordinate or inferior orbs, by the operation of which there will
be a perpetual effort in each to fly off from the common center.
This tendency is not difficult to be accounted for. It has its
origin in the love of power. Power controlled or abridged is almost
always the rival and enemy of that power by which it is controlled
or abridged. This simple proposition will teach us, how little
reason there is to expect, that the persons intrusted with the
administration of the affairs of the particular members of a
confederacy will at all times be ready, with perfect good-humor, and
an unbiased regard to the public weal, to execute the resolutions or
decrees of the general authority. The reverse of this results from the
constitution of human nature.
If, therefore, the measures of the Confederacy cannot be executed
without the intervention of the particular administrations, there will
be little prospect of their being executed at all. The rulers of the
respective members, whether they have a constitutional right to do
it or not, will undertake to judge of the propriety of the measures
themselves. They will consider the conformity of the thing proposed or
required to their immediate interests or aims; the momentary
conveniences or inconveniences that would attend its adoption. All
this will be done; and in a spirit of interested and suspicious
scrutiny, without that knowledge of national circumstances and reasons
of state, which is essential to a right judgment, and with that strong
predilection in favor of local objects, which can hardly fail to
mislead the decision. The same process must be repeated in every
member of which the body is constituted; and the execution of the
plans, framed by the councils of the whole, will always fluctuate on
the discretion of the ill-informed and prejudiced opinion of every
part. Those who have been conversant in the proceedings of popular
assemblies; who have seen how difficult it often is, where there is no
exterior pressure of circumstances, to bring them to harmonious
resolutions on important points, will readily conceive how
impossible it must be to induce a number of such assemblies,
deliberating at a distance from each other, at different times, and
under different impressions, long to cooperate in the same views and
pursuits.
In our case, the concurrence of thirteen distinct sovereign wills is
requisite, under the Confederation, to the complete execution of every
important measure that proceeds from the Union. It has happened as was
to have been foreseen. The measures of the Union have not been
executed; the delinquencies of the States have, step by step,
matured themselves to an extreme, which has, at length, arrested all
the wheels of the national government, and brought them to an awful
stand. Congress at this time scarcely possess the means of keeping
up the forms of administration, till the States can have time to agree
upon a more substantial substitute for the present shadow of a federal
government. Things did not come to this desperate extremity at once.
The causes which have been specified produced at first only unequal
and disproportionate degrees of compliance with the requisitions of
the Union. The greater deficiencies of some States furnished the
pretext of example and the temptation of interest to the complying, or
to the least delinquent States. Why should we do more in proportion
than those who are embarked with us in the same political voyage?
Why should we consent to bear more than our proper share of the common
burden? These were suggestions which human selfishness could not
withstand, and which even speculative men, who looked forward to
remote consequences, could not, without hesitation, combat. Each
State, yielding to the persuasive voice of immediate interest or
convenience, has successively withdrawn its support, till the frail
and tottering edifice seems ready to fall upon our heads, and to crush
us beneath its ruins.
- PUBLIUS
NO 16: The Same Subject Continued in Relation to the Same Principle
by Alexander Hamilton
-
THE tendency of the principle of legislation for States, or
communities, in their political capacities, as it has been exemplified
by the experiment we have made of it, is equally attested by the
events which have befallen all other governments of the confederate
kind, of which we have any account, in exact proportion to its
prevalence in those systems. The confirmations of this fact will be
worthy of a distinct and particular examination. I shall content
myself with barely observing here, that of all the confederacies of
antiquity, which history has handed down to us, the Lycian and Achaean
leagues, as far as there remain vestiges of them, appear to have
been most free from the fetters of that mistaken principle, and were
accordingly those which have best deserved, and have most liberally
received, the applauding suffrages of political writers.
This exceptional principle may, as truly as emphatically, be
styled the parent of anarchy: It has been seen that delinquencies in
the members of the Union are its natural and necessary offspring;
and that whenever they happen, the only constitutional remedy is
force, and the immediate effect of the use of it, civil war.
It remains to inquire how far so odious an engine of government,
in its application to us, would even be capable of answering its
end. If there should not be a large army constantly at the disposal of
the national government it would either not be able to employ force at
all, or, when this could be done, it would amount to a war between
parents of the Confederacy concerning the infractions of a league,
in which the strongest combination would be most likely to prevail,
whether it consisted of those who supported or of those who resisted
the general authority. It would rarely happen that the delinquency
to be redressed would be confined to a single member, and if there
were more than one who had neglected their duty, similarity of
situation would induce them to unite for common defence. Independent
of this motive of sympathy, if a large and influential State should
happen to be the aggressing member, it would commonly have weight
enough with its neighbors to win over some of them as associates to
its cause. Specious arguments of danger to the common liberty could
easily be contrived; plausible excuses for the deficiencies of the
party could, without difficulty, be invented to alarm the
apprehensions, inflame the passions, and conciliate the good-will even
of those States which were not chargeable with any violation or
omission of duty. This would be the more likely to take place, as
the delinquencies of the larger members might be expected sometimes to
proceed from an ambitious premeditation in their rulers, with a view
to getting rid of all external control upon their designs of
personal aggrandizement; the better to effect which it is presumable
they would tamper beforehand with leading individuals in the
adjacent States. If associates could not be found at home, recourse
would be had to the aid of foreign powers, who would seldom be
disinclined to encouraging the dissensions of a Confederacy, from
the firm union of which they had so much to fear. When the sword is
once drawn, the passions of men observe no bounds of moderation. The
suggestions of wounded pride, the instigations of irritated
resentment, would be apt to carry the States against which the arms of
the Union were exerted, to any extremes necessary to avenge the
affront or to avoid the disgrace of submission. The first war of
this kind would probably terminate in a dissolution of the Union.
This may be considered as the violent death of the Confederacy.
Its more natural death is what we now seem to be on the point of
experiencing, if the federal system be not speedily renovated in a
more substantial form. It is not probable, considering the genius of
this country, that the complying States would often be inclined to
support the authority of the Union by engaging in a war against the
non-complying States. They would always be more ready to pursue the
milder course of putting themselves upon an equal footing with the
delinquent members by an imitation of their example. And the guilt
of all would thus become the security of all. Our past experience
has exhibited the operation of this spirit in its full light. There
would, in fact, be an insuperable difficulty in ascertaining when
force could with propriety be employed. In the article of pecuniary
contribution, which would be the most usual source of delinquency,
it would often be impossible to decide whether it had proceeded from
disinclination or inability. The pretence of the latter would always
be at hand. And the case must be very flagrant in which its fallacy
could be detected with sufficient certainty to justify the harsh
expedient of compulsion. It is easy to see that this problem alone, as
often as it should occur, would open a wide field for the exercise
of factious views, of partiality, and of oppression, in the majority
that happened to prevail in the national council.
It seems to require no pains to prove that the States ought not to
prefer a national Constitution which could only be kept in motion by
the instrumentality of a large army continually on foot to execute the
ordinary requisitions or decrees of the government. And yet this is
the plain alternative involved by those who wish to deny it the
power of extending its operations to individuals. Such a scheme, if
practicable at all, would instantly degenerate into a military
despotism; but it will be found in every light impracticable. The
resources of the Union would not be equal to the maintenance of an
army considerable enough to confine the larger States within the
limits of their duty; not would the means ever be furnished of forming
such an army in the first instance. Whoever considers the populousness
and strength of several of these States singly at the present
juncture, and looks forward to what they will become, even at the
distance of half a century, will at once dismiss as idle and visionary
any scheme which aims at regulating their movements by laws to operate
upon them in their collective capacities, and to be executed by a
coercion applicable to them in the same capacities. A project of
this kind is little less romantic than the monster-taming spirit which
is attributed to the fabulous heroes and demigods of antiquity.
Even in those confederacies which have been composed of members
smaller than many of our counties, the principle of legislation for
sovereign States, supported by military coercion, has never been found
effectual. It has rarely been attempted to be employed, but against
the weaker members; and in most instances attempts to coerce the
refractory and disobedient have been the signals of bloody wars, in
which one half of the confederacy has displayed its banners against
the other half.
The result of these observations to an intelligent mind must be
clearly this, that if it be possible at any rate to construct a
federal government capable of regulating the common concerns and
preserving the general tranquillity, it must be founded, as to the
objects committed to its care, upon the reverse of the principle
contended for by the opponents of the proposed Constitution. It must
carry its agency to the persons of the citizens. It must stand in need
of no intermediate legislation; but must itself be empowered to employ
the arm of the ordinary magistrate to execute its own resolutions. The
majesty of the national authority must be manifested through the
medium of the courts of justice. The government of the Union, like
that of each State, must be able to address itself immediately to
the hopes and fears of individuals; and to attract to its support
those passions which have the strongest influence upon the human
heart. It must, in short, possess all the means, and have a right to
resort to all the methods, of executing the powers with which it is
intrusted, that are possessed and exercised by the governments of
the particular States.
To this reasoning it may perhaps be objected, that if any State
should be disaffected to the authority of the Union, it could at any
time obstruct the execution of its laws, and bring the matter to the
same issue of force, with the necessity of which the opposite scheme
is reproached.
The plausibility of this objection will vanish the moment we
advert to the essential difference between a mere NON-COMPLIANCE and a
DIRECT and ACTIVE RESISTANCE. If the interposition of the State
legislatures be necessary to give effect to a measure of the Union,
they have only NOT TO ACT, or to ACT EVASIVELY, and the measure is
defeated. This neglect of duty may be disguised under affected but
unsubstantial provisions, so as not to appear, and of course not to
excite any alarm in the people for the safety of the Constitution. The
State leaders may even make a merit of their surreptitious invasions
of it on the ground of some temporary convenience, exemption, or
advantage.
But if the execution of the laws of the national government should
not require the intervention of the State legislatures, if they were
to pass into immediate operation upon the citizens themselves, the
particular governments could not interrupt their progress without an
open and violent exertion of an unconstitutional power. No omissions
nor evasions would answer the end. They would be obliged to act, and
in such a manner as would leave no doubt that they had encroached on
the national rights. An experiment of this nature would always be
hazardous in the face of a constitution in any degree competent to its
own defence, and of a people enlightened enough to distinguish between
a legal exercise and an illegal usurpation of authority. The success
of it would require not merely a factious majority in the legislature,
but the concurrence of the courts of justice and of the body of the
people. If the judges were not embarked in a conspiracy with the
legislature, they would pronounce the resolutions of such a majority
to be contrary to the supreme law of the land, unconstitutional, and
void. If the people were not tainted with the spirit of their State
representatives, they, as the natural guardians of the Constitution,
would throw their weight into the national scale and give it a decided
preponderancy in the contest. Attempts of this kind would not often be
made with levity or rashness, because they could seldom be made
without danger to the authors, unless in cases of a tyrannical
exercise of the federal authority.
If opposition to the national government should arise from the
disorderly conduct of refractory or seditious individuals, it could be
overcome by the same means which are daily employed against the same
evil under the State governments. The magistracy, being equally the
ministers of the law of the land, from whatever source it might
emanate, would doubtless be as ready to guard the national as the
local regulations from the inroads of private licentiousness. As to
those partial commotions and insurrections, which sometimes disquiet
society, from the intrigues of an inconsiderable faction, or from
sudden or occasional ill-humors that do not infect the great body of
the community, the general government could command more extensive
resources for the suppression of disturbances of that kind than
would be in the power of any single member. And as to those mortal
feuds which, in certain conjunctures, spread a conflagration through a
whole nation, or through a very large proportion of it, proceeding
either from weighty causes of discontent given by the government or
from the contagion of some violent popular paroxysm, they do not
fall within any ordinary rules of calculation. When they happen,
they commonly amount to revolutions and dismemberments of empire. No
form of government can always either avoid or control them. It is in
vain to hope to guard against events too mighty for human foresight or
precaution, and it would be idle to object to a government because
it could not perform impossibilities.
- PUBLIUS
NO 17: The Subject Continued and Illustrated by Examples
to Show the Tendency of Federal Governments Rather to Anarchy
Among the Members Than Tyranny in the Head
by Alexander Hamilton
-
AN OBJECTION, of a nature different from that which has been
stated and answered, in my last address, may perhaps be likewise urged
against the principle of legislation for the individual citizens of
America. It may be said that it would tend to render the government of
the Union too powerful, and to enable it to absorb those residuary
authorities, which it might be judged proper to leave with the
States for local purposes. Allowing the utmost latitude to the love of
power which any reasonable man can require, I confess I am at a loss
to discover what temptation the persons intrusted with the
administration of the general government could ever feel to divest the
States of the authorities of that description. The regulation of the
mere domestic police of a State appear to me to hold out slender
allurements to ambition. Commerce, finance, negotiation, and war
seem to comprehend all the objects which have charms for minds
governed by that passion; and all the powers necessary to those
objects ought, in the first instance, to be lodged in the national
depository. The administration of private justice between the citizens
of the same State, the supervision of agriculture and of other
concerns of a similar nature, all those things, in short, which are
proper to be provided for by local legislation, can never be desirable
cares of a general jurisdiction. It is therefore improbable that there
should exist a disposition in the federal councils to usurp the powers
with which they are connected; because the attempt to exercise those
powers would be as troublesome as it would be nugatory; and the
possession of them, for that reason, would contribute nothing to the
dignity, to the importance, or to the splendor of the national
government.
But let it be admitted, for argument's sake, that mere wantonness
and lusts of domination would be sufficient to beget that disposition;
still it may be safely affirmed, that the sense of the constituent
body of the national representatives, or, in other words, the people
of the several States, would control the indulgence of so
extravagant an appetite. It will always be far more easy for the State
governments to encroach upon the national authorities, than for the
national government to encroach upon the State authorities. The
proof of this proposition turns upon the greater degree of influence
which the State governments, if they administer their affairs with
uprightness and prudence, will generally possess over the people; a
circumstance which at the same time teaches us that there is an
inherent and intrinsic weakness in all federal constitutions; and that
too much pain cannot be taken in their organization, to give them
all the force which is compatible with the principles of liberty.
The superiority of influence in favor of the particular
governments would result partly from the diffusive construction of the
national government, but chiefly from the nature of the objects to
which the attention of the State administrations would be directed.
It is a known fact in human nature, that its affections are commonly
weak in proportion to the distance or diffusiveness of the object.
Upon the same principle that a man is more attached to his family than
to his neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the community at
large, the people of each State would be apt to feel a stronger bias
towards their local governments than towards the government of the
Union; unless the force of that principle should be destroyed by a
much better administration of the latter.
This strong propensity of the human heart would find powerful
auxiliaries in the objects of State regulation.
The variety of more minute interests, which will necessarily fall
under the superintendence of the local administrations, and which will
form so many rivulets of influence, running through every part of
the society, cannot be particularized, without involving a detail
too tedious and uninteresting to compensate for the instruction it
might afford.
There is one transcendent advantage belonging to the province of the
State governments, which alone suffices to place the matter in a clear
and satisfactory light,- I mean the ordinary administration of
criminal and civil justice. This, of all others, is the most powerful,
most universal, and most attractive source of popular obedience and
attachment. It is that which, being the immediate and visible guardian
of life and property, having its benefits and its terrors in
constant activity before the public eye, regulating all those personal
interests and familiar concerns to which the sensibility of
individuals is more immediately awake, contributes, more than any
other circumstance, to impressing upon the minds of the people,
affection, esteem, and reverence towards the government. This great
cement of society, which will diffuse itself almost wholly through the
channels of the particular governments, independent of all other
causes of influence, would insure them so decided an empire over their
respective citizens as to render them at all times a complete
counterpoise, and, not infrequently, dangerous rivals to the power
of the Union.
The operations of the national government, on the other hand,
falling less immediately under the observation of the mass of the
citizens, the benefits derived from it will chiefly be perceived and
attended to by speculative men. Relating to more general interests,
they will be less apt to come home to the feelings of the people; and,
in proportion, less likely to inspire an habitual sense of obligation,
and an active sentiment of attachment.
The reasoning on this head has been abundantly exemplified by the
experience of all federal constitutions with which we are
acquainted, and of all others which have borne the least analogy to
them.
Though the ancient feudal systems were not, strictly speaking,
confederacies, yet they partook of the nature of that species of
association. There was a common head, chieftain, or sovereign, whose
authority extended over the whole nation; and a number of
subordinate vassals, or feudatories, who had large portions of land
allotted to them, and numerous trains of inferior vassals or
retainers, who occupied and cultivated that land upon the tenure of
fealty or obedience to the persons of whom they held it. Each
principal vassal was a kind of sovereign within his particular
demesnes. The consequences of this situation were a continual
opposition to authority of the sovereign, and frequent wars between
the great barons or chief feudatories themselves. The power of the
head of the nation was commonly too weak, either to preserve the
public peace, or to protect the people against the oppressions of
their immediate lords. This period of European affairs is emphatically
styled by historians, the times of feudal anarchy.
When the sovereign happened to be a man of vigorous and warlike
temper and of superior abilities, he would acquire a personal weight
and influence, which answered, for the time, the purposes of a more
regular authority. But in general, the power of the barons triumphed
over that of the prince; and in many instances his dominion was
entirely thrown off, and the great fiefs were erected into independent
principalities or States. In those instances in which the monarch
finally prevailed over his vassals, his success was chiefly owing to
the tyranny of those vassals over their dependents. The barons, or
nobles, equally the enemies of the sovereign and the oppressors of the
common people, were dreaded and detested by both; till mutual danger
and mutual interest effected a union between them fatal to the power
of the aristocracy. Had the nobles, by a conduct of clemency and
justice, preserved the fidelity and devotion of their retainers and
followers, the contests between them and the prince must almost always
have ended in their favor, and in the abridgement or subversion of the
royal authority.
This is not an assertion founded merely in speculation or
conjecture. Among other illustrations of its truth which might be
cited, Scotland will furnish a cogent example. The spirit of
clanship which was, at an early day, introduced into that kingdom,
uniting the nobles and their dependents by ties equivalent to those of
kindred, rendered the aristocracy a constant overmatch for the power
of the monarch, till the incorporation with England subdued its fierce
and ungovernable spirit, and reduced it within those rules of
subordination which a more rational and more energetic system of civil
polity had previously established in the latter kingdom.
The separate governments in a confederacy may aptly be compared with
the feudal baronies; with this advantage in their favor, that from the
reasons already explained, they will generally possess the
confidence and good-will of the people, and with so important a
support, will be able effectually to oppose all encroachments of the
national government. It will be well if they are not able to
counteract its legitimate and necessary authority. The points of
similitude consist in the rivalship of power, applicable to both,
and in the CONCENTRATION of large portions of the strength of the
community into particular DEPOSITS, in one case at the disposal of
individuals, in the other case at the disposal of political bodies.
A concise review of the events that have attended confederate
governments will further illustrate this important doctrine; an
inattention to which has been the great source of our political
mistakes, and has given our jealousy a direction to the wrong side.
This review shall form the subject of some ensuing papers.
- PUBLIUS
NO 18: The Subject Continued with Farther Examples
by Alexander Hamilton & James Madison
-
AMONG the confederacies of antiquity, the most considerable was that
of the Grecian republics, associated under the Amphictyonic council.
From the best accounts transmitted of this celebrated institution,
it bore a very instructive analogy to the present Confederation of the
American States.
The members retained the character of independent and sovereign
states, and had equal votes in the federal council. This council had a
general authority to propose and resolve whatever it judged
necessary for the common welfare of Greece; to declare and carry on
war; to decide, in the last resort, all controversies between the
members; to fine the aggressing party; to employ the whole force of
the confederacy against the disobedient; to admit new members. The
Amphictyons were the guardians of religion, and of the immense
riches belonging to the temple of Delphos, where they had the right of
jurisdiction in controversies between the inhabitants and those who
came to consult the oracle. As a further provision for the efficacy of
the federal powers, they took an oath mutually to defend and protect
the united cities, to punish the violators of this oath, and to
inflict vengeance on sacrilegious despoilers of the temple.
In theory, and upon paper, this apparatus of powers seems amply
sufficient for all general purposes. In several material instances,
they exceed the powers enumerated in the articles of confederation.
The Amphictyons had in their hands the superstition of the times,
one of the principal engines by which government was then
maintained; they had a declared authority to use coercion against
refractory cities, and were bound by oath to exert this authority on
the necessary occasions.
Very different, nevertheless, was the experiment from the theory.
The powers, like those of the present Congress, were administered by
deputies appointed wholly by the cities in their political capacities;
and exercised over them in the same capacities. Hence the weakness,
the disorders, and finally the destruction of the confederacy. The
more powerful members, instead of being kept in awe and subordination,
tyrannized successively over all the rest. Athens, as we learn from
Demosthenes, was the arbiter of Greece seventy-three years. The
Lacedaemonians next governed it twenty-nine years; at a subsequent
period, after the battle Leuctra, the Thebans had their turn of
domination.
It happened but too often, according to Plutarch, that the
deputies of the strongest cities awed and corrupted those of the
weaker; and that judgment went in favor of the most powerful party.
Even in the midst of defensive and dangerous wars with Persia and
Macedon, the members never acted in concert, and were, more or fewer
of them, eternally the dupes or the hirelings of the common enemy. The
intervals of foreign war were filled up by domestic vicissitudes,
convulsions, and carnage.
After the conclusion of the war with Xerxes, it appears that the
Lacedaemonians required that a number of the cities should be turned
out of the confederacy for the unfaithful part they had acted. The
Athenians, finding that the Lacedaemonians would lose fewer
partisans by such a measure than themselves, and would become
masters of the public deliberations, vigorously opposed and defeated
the attempt. This piece of history proves at once the inefficiency
of the union, the ambition and jealousy of its most powerful
members, and the dependent and degraded condition of the rest. The
smaller members, though entitled by the theory of their system to
revolve in equal pride and majesty around the common center, had
become, in fact, satellites of the orbs of primary magnitude.
Had the Greeks, says the Abbe Milot, been as wise as they were
courageous, they would have been admonished by experience of the
necessity of a closer union, and would have availed themselves of
the peace which followed their success against the Persian arms, to
establish such a reformation. Instead of this obvious policy, Athens
and Sparta, inflated with the victories and the glory they had
acquired, became first rivals and then enemies; and did each other
infinitely more mischief than they had suffered from Xerxes. Their
mutual jealousies, fears, hatreds, and injuries ended in the
celebrated Peloponnesian war; which itself ended in the ruin and
slavery of the Athenians who had begun it.
As a weak government, when not at war, is ever agitated by
internal dissensions, so these never fail to bring on fresh calamities
from abroad. The Phocians having ploughed up some consecrated ground
belonging to the temple of Apollo, the Amphictyonic council, according
to the superstition of the age, imposed a fine on the sacrilegious
offenders. The Phocians, being abetted by Athens and Sparta, refused
to submit to the decree. The Thebans, with others of the cities,
undertook to maintain the authority of the Amphictyons, and to
avenge the violated god. The latter, being the weaker party, invited
the assistance of Philip of Macedon, who had secretly fostered the
contest. Philip gladly seized the opportunity of executing the designs
he had long planned against the liberties of Greece. By his
intrigues and bribes he won over to his interests the popular
leaders of several cities; by their influence and votes, gained
admission into the Amphictyonic council; and by his arts and his arms,
made himself master of the confederacy.
Such were the consequences of the fallacious principle on which this
interesting establishment was founded. Had Greece, says a judicious
observer on her fate, been united by a stricter confederation, and
persevered in her union, she would never have worn the chains of
Macedon; and might have proved a barrier to the vast projects of Rome.
The Achaean league, as it is called, was another society of
Grecian republics, which supplies us with valuable instruction.
The Union here was far more intimate, and its organization much
wiser, than in the preceding instance. It will accordingly appear,
that though not exempt from a similar catastrophe, it by no means
equally deserved it.
The cities composing this league retained their municipal
jurisdiction, appointed their own officers, and enjoyed a perfect
equality. The senate, in which they were represented, had the sole and
exclusive right of peace and war; of sending and receiving
ambassadors; of entering into treaties and alliances; of appointing
a chief magistrate or praetor, as he was called, who commanded their
armies, and who, with the advice and consent of ten of the senators,
not only administered the government in the recess of the senate, but
had a great share in its deliberations, when assembled. According to
the primitive constitution, there were two praetors associated in the
administration; but on trial a single one was preferred.
It appears that the cities had all the same laws and customs, the
same weights and measures, and the same money. But how far this effect
proceeded from the authority of the federal council is left in
uncertainty. It is said only that the cities were in a manner
compelled to receive the same laws and usages. When Lacedaemon was
brought into the league by Philopoemen, it was attended with an
abolition of the institutions and laws of Lycurgus, and an adoption of
those of the Achaeans. The Amphictyonic confederacy, of which she
had been a member, left her in the full exercise of her government and
her legislation. This circumstance alone proves a very material
difference in the genius of the two systems.
It is much to be regretted that such imperfect monuments remain of
this curious political fabric . Could its interior structure and
regular operation be ascertained, it is probable that more light would
be thrown by it on the science of federal government, than by any of
the like experiments with which we are acquainted.
One important fact seems to be witnessed by all the historians who
take notice of Achaean affairs. It is, that as well after the
renovation of the league by Aratus, as before its dissolution by the
arts of Macedon, there was infinitely more of moderation and justice
in the administration of its government, and less of violence and
sedition in the people, than were to be found in any of the cities
exercising singly all the prerogatives of sovereignty. The Abbe Mably,
in his observations on Greece, says that the popular government, which
was so tempestuous elsewhere, caused no disorders in the members of
the Achaean republic, because it was there tempered by the general
authority and laws of the confederacy.
We are not to conclude too hastily, however, that faction did not,
in a certain degree, agitate the particular cities; much less that a
due subordination and harmony reigned in the general system. The
contrary is sufficiently displayed in the vicissitudes and fate of the
republic.
Whilst the Amphictyonic confederacy remained, that of the
Achaeans, which comprehended the less important cities only, made
little figure on the theatre of Greece. When the former became a
victim to Macedon, the latter was spared by the policy of Philip and
Alexander. Under the successors of these princes, however, a different
policy prevailed. The arts of division were practiced among the
Achaeans. Each city was seduced into a separate interest; the union
was dissolved. Some of the cities fell under the tyranny of Macedonian
garrisons; others under that of usurpers springing out of their own
confusions. Shame and oppression erelong awakened their love of
liberty. A few cities reunited. Their example was followed by
others, as opportunities were found of cutting off their tyrants.
The league soon embraced almost the whole Peloponnesus. Macedon saw
its progress; but was hindered by internal dissensions from stopping
it. All Greece caught the enthusiasm and seemed ready to unite in
one confederacy, when the jealousy and envy in Sparta and Athens, of
the rising glory of the Achaeans, threw a fatal damp on the
enterprise. The dread of the Macedonian power induced the league to
court the alliance of the kings of Egypt and Syria, who, as successors
of Alexander, were rivals of the king of Macedon. This policy was
defeated by Cleomenes, king of Sparta, who was led by his ambition
to make an unprovoked attack on his neighbors, the Achaeans, and
who, as an enemy to Macedon, had interest enough with the Egyptian and
Syrian princes to effect a breach of their engagements with the
league. The Achaeans were now reduced to the dilemma of submitting
to Cleomenes, or of supplicating the aid of Macedon, its former
oppressor. The latter expedient was adopted. The contests of the
Greeks always afforded a pleasing opportunity to that powerful
neighbor of intermeddling in their affairs. A Macedonian army
quickly appeared. Cleomenes was vanquished. The Achaeans soon
experienced, as often happens, that a victorious and powerful ally
is but another name for a master. All that their most abject
compliances could obtain from him was a toleration of the exercise
of their laws. Philip, who was now on the throne of Macedon, soon
provoked by his tyrannies, fresh combinations among the Greeks. The
Achaeans, though weakened by internal dissensions and by the revolt of
Messene, one of its members, being joined by the AEtolians and
Athenians, erected the standard of opposition. Finding themselves,
though thus supported, unequal to the undertaking, they once more
had recourse to the dangerous expedient of introducing the succor of
foreign arms. The Romans, to whom the invitation was made, eagerly
embraced it. Philip was conquered; Macedon subdued. A new crisis
ensued to the league. Dissensions broke out among its members. These
the Romans fostered. Callicrates and other popular leaders became
mercenary instruments for inveigling their countrymen. The more
effectually to nourish discord and disorder the Romans had, to the
astonishment of those who confided in their sincerity, already
proclaimed universal liberty *020 throughout Greece. With the same
insidious views, they now seduced the members from the league, by
representing to their pride the violation it committed on their
sovereignty. By these arts this union, the last hope of Greece, the
last hope of ancient liberty, was torn into pieces; and such
imbecility and distraction introduced, that the arms of Rome found
little difficulty in completing the ruin which their arts had
commenced. The Achaeans were cut to pieces, and Achaia loaded with
chains, under which it is groaning at this hour.
I have thought it not superfluous to give the outlines of this
important portion of history; both because it teaches more than one
lesson, and because, as a supplement to the outlines of the Achaean
constitution, it emphatically illustrates the tendency of federal
bodies rather to anarchy among the members, than to tyranny in the
head.
- PUBLIUS
NO 19: The Subject Continued with Farther Examples
by Alexander Hamilton & James Madison
-
THE EXAMPLES of ancient confederacies, cited in my last paper,
have not exhausted the source of experimental instruction on this
subject. There are existing institutions, founded on a similar
principle, which merit particular consideration. The first which
presents itself is the Germanic body.
In the early ages of Christianity, Germany was occupied by seven
distinct nations, who had no common chief. The Franks, one of the
number, have conquered the Gauls, established the kingdom which has
taken its name from them. In the ninth century Charlemagne, its
warlike monarch, carried his victorious arms in every direction; and
Germany became a part of his vast dominions. On the dismemberment,
which took place under his sons, this part was erected into a separate
and independent empire. Charlemagne and his immediate descendants
possessed the reality, as well as the ensigns and dignity of
imperial power. But the principal vassals, whose fiefs had become
hereditary, and who composed the national diets which Charlemagne
had not abolished, gradually threw off the yoke and advanced to
sovereign jurisdiction and independence. The force of imperial
sovereignty was insufficient to restrain such powerful dependents;
or to preserve the unity and tranquillity of the empire. The most
furious private wars, accompanied with every species of calamity, were
carried on between the different princes and states. The imperial
authority, unable to maintain the public order, declined by degrees
till it was almost extinct in the anarchy, which agitated the long
interval between the death of the last emperor of the Suabian and
the accession of the first emperor of the Austrian lines. In the
eleventh century the emperors enjoyed full sovereignty: In the
fifteenth they had little more than the symbols and decorations of
power.
Out of this feudal system, which has itself many of the important
features of a confederacy, has grown the federal system which
constitutes the Germanic empire. Its powers are vested in a diet
representing the component members of the confederacy; in the emperor,
who is the executive magistrate, with a negative on the decrees of the
diet; and in the imperial chamber and the aulic council, two judiciary
tribunals having supreme jurisdiction in controversies which concern
the empire, or which happen among its members.
The diet possesses the general power of legislating for the
empire; of making war and peace; contracting alliances; assessing
quotas of troops and money; constructing fortresses; regulating
coin; admitting new members; and subjecting disobedient members to the
ban of the empire, by which the party is degraded from his sovereign
rights and his possessions forfeited. The members of the confederacy
are expressly restricted from entering into compacts prejudicial to
the empire; from imposing tolls and duties on their mutual
intercourse, without the consent of the emperor and diet; from
altering the value of money; from doing injustice to one another; or
from affording assistance or retreat to disturbers of the public
peace. And the ban is denounced against such as shall violate any of
these restrictions. The members of the diet, as such, are subject in
all cases to be judged by the emperor and diet, and in their private
capacities by the aulic council and imperial chamber.
The prerogatives of the emperor are numerous. The most important
of them are: his exclusive right to make propositions to the diet;
to negative its resolutions; to name ambassadors; to confer
dignities and titles; to fill vacant electorates; to found
universities; to grant privileges not injurious to the states of the
empire; to receive and apply the public revenues; and generally to
watch over the public safety. In certain cases, the electors form a
council to him. In quality of emperor, he possesses no territory
within the empire, nor receives any revenue for his support. But his
revenue and dominions, in other qualities, constitute him one of the
most powerful princes in Europe.
From such a parade of constitutional powers, in the
representatives and head of this confederacy, the natural
supposition would be, that it must form an exception to the general
character which belongs to its kindred systems. Nothing would be
further from the reality. The fundamental principle on which it rests,
that the empire is a community of sovereigns, that the diet is a
representation of sovereigns, and that the laws are addressed to
sovereigns, renders the empire a nerveless body, incapable of
regulating its own members, insecure against external dangers, and
agitated with unceasing fermentations in its own bowels.
The history of Germany is a history of wars between the emperor
and the princes and states; of wars among the princes and states
themselves; of the licentiousness of the strong, and the oppression of
the weak; of foreign intrusions, and foreign intrigues; of
requisitions of men and money disregarded, or partially complied with;
of attempts to enforce them, altogether abortive, or attended with
slaughter and desolation, involving the innocent with the guilty; of
general imbecility, confusion, and misery.
In the sixteenth century, the emperor, with one part of the empire
on his side, was seen engaged against the other princes and states. In
one of the conflicts, the emperor himself was put to flight, and
very near being made prisoner by the elector of Saxony. The late
king of Prussia was more than once pitted against his imperial
sovereign; and commonly proved an overmatch for him. Controversies and
wars among the members themselves have been so common, that the German
annals are crowded with the bloody pages which describe them. Previous
to the peace of Westphalia, Germany was desolated by a war of thirty
years, in which the emperor, with one half of the empire, was on one
side, and Sweden, with the other half, on the opposite side. Peace was
at length negotiated, and dictated by foreign powers; and the articles
of it, to which foreign powers are parties, made a fundamental part of
the Germanic constitution.
If the nation happens, on any emergency, to be more united by the
necessity of self-defence, its situation is still deplorable. Military
preparations must be preceded by so many tedious discussions,
arising from the jealousies, pride, separate views, and clashing
pretensions of sovereign bodies, that before the diet can settle the
arrangements, the enemy are in the field; and before the federal
troops are ready to take it, are retiring into winter quarters.
The small body of national troops, which has been judged necessary
in time of peace, is defectively kept up, badly paid, infected with
local prejudices, and supported by irregular and disproportionate
contributions to the treasury.
The impossibility of maintaining order and dispensing justice
among these sovereign subjects, produced the experiment of dividing
the empire into nine or ten circles or districts; of giving them an
interior organization, and of charging them with the military
execution of the laws against delinquent and contumacious members.
This experiment has only served to demonstrate more fully the
radical vice of the constitution. Each circle is the miniature picture
of the deformities of this political monster. They either fail to
execute their commissions, or they do it with all the devastation
and carnage of civil war. Sometimes whole circles are defaulters;
and then they increase the mischief which they were instituted to
remedy.
We may form some judgment of this scheme of military coercion from a
sample given by Thuanus. In Donawerth, a free and imperial city of the
circle of Suabia, the Abbe de St. Croix enjoyed certain immunities
which had been reserved to him. In the exercise of these, on some
public occasions, outrages were committed on him by the people of
the city. The consequence was that the city was put under the ban of
the empire, and the Duke of Bavaria, though director of another
circle, obtained an appointment to enforce it. He soon appeared before
the city with a corps of ten thousand troops, and finding it a fit
occasion, as he had secretly intended from the beginning, to revive an
antiquated claim, on the pretext that his ancestors had suffered the
place to be dismembered from his territory, *021 he took possession of
it in his own name, disarmed, and punished the inhabitants, and
reannexed the city to his domains.
It may be asked, perhaps, what has so long kept this disjointed
machine from falling entirely to pieces? The answer is obvious: The
weakness of most of the members, who are unwilling to expose
themselves to the mercy of foreign powers; the weakness of most of the
principal members, compared with the formidable powers all around
them; the vast weight and influence which the emperor derives from his
separate and hereditary dominions; and the interest he feels in
preserving a system with which his family pride is connected, and
which constitutes him the first prince in Europe;- these causes
support a feeble and precarious Union; whilst the repellent quality
incident to the nature of sovereignty, and which time continually
strengthens, prevents any reform whatever, founded on a proper
consolidation. Nor is it to be imagined, if this obstacle could be
surmounted, that the neighboring powers would suffer a revolution to
take place, which would give to the empire the force and preeminence
to which it is entitled. Foreign nations have long considered
themselves as interested in the changes made by events in this
constitution; and have, on various occasions, betrayed their policy of
perpetuating its anarchy and weakness.
If more direct examples were wanting, Poland, as a government over
local sovereigns, might not improperly be taken notice of. Nor could
any proof more striking be given of the calamities flowing from such
institutions. Equally unfit for self-government and self-defence, it
has long been at the mercy of its powerful neighbors; who have
lately had the mercy to disburden it of one third of its people and
territories.
The connection among the Swiss cantons scarcely amounts to a
confederacy; thought it is sometimes cited as an instance of the
stability of such institutions. They have no common treasury; no
common troops even in war; no common coin; no common judicatory; nor
any other common mark of sovereignty.
They are kept together by the peculiarity of their topographical
position; by their individual weakness and insignificancy; by the fear
of powerful neighbors, to one of which they were formerly subject;
by the few sources of contention among a people of such simple and
homogeneous manners; by their joint interest in their dependent
possessions; by the mutual aid they stand in need of, for
suppressing insurrections and rebellions, an aid expressly stipulated,
and often required and afforded; and by the necessity of some
regular and permanent provision for accommodating disputes among the
cantons. The provision is, that the parties at variance shall each
choose four judges out of the neutral cantons, who, in case of
disagreement, choose an umpire. This tribunal, under an oath of
impartiality, pronounces definitive sentence, which all the cantons
are bound to enforce. The competency of this regulation may be
estimated by a clause in their treaty of 1683, with Victor Amadeus
of Savoy; in which he obliges himself to interpose as mediator in
disputes between and cantons, and to employ force, if necessary,
against the contumacious party.
So far as the peculiarity of their case will admit of comparison
with that of the United States, it serves to confirm the principle
intended to be established. Whatever efficacy the union may have had
in ordinary cases, it appears that the moment a cause of difference
sprang up, capable of trying its strength, it failed. The
controversies on the subject of religion, which in three instances
have kindled violent and bloody contests, may be said, in fact, to
have severed the league. The Protestant and Catholic cantons have
since had their separate diets, where all the most important
concerns are adjusted, and which have left the general diet little
other business than to take care of the common bailages.
That separation had another consequence, which merits attention.
It produced opposite alliances with foreign powers: of Berne, at the
head of the Protestant association, with the United Provinces; and
of Luzerne, at the head of the Catholic association, with France.
- PUBLIUS
NO 20: The Subject Continued with Farther Examples
by Alexander Hamilton & James Madison
-
THE United Netherlands are a confederacy of republics, or rather
of aristocracies of a very remarkable texture, yet confirming all
the lessons derived from those which we have already reviewed.
The union is composed of seven coequal and sovereign states, and
each state or province is a composition of equal and independent
cities. In all important cases, not only the provinces but the
cities must be unanimous.
The sovereignty of the Union is represented by the States-General,
consisting usually of about fifty deputies appointed by the provinces.
They hold their seats, some for life, some for six, three, and one
year; from two provinces they continue in appointment during pleasure.
The States-General have authority to enter into treaties and
alliances; to make war and peace; to raise armies and equip fleets; to
ascertain quotas and demand contributions. In all these cases,
however, unanimity and the sanction of their constituents are
requisite. They have authority to appoint and receive ambassadors;
to execute treaties and alliances already formed; to provide for the
collection of duties on imports and exports; to regulate the mint,
with a saving to the provincial rights; to govern as sovereigns the
dependent territories. The provinces are restrained, unless with the
general consent, from entering into foreign treaties; from
establishing imposts injurious to others, or charging their
neighbors with higher duties than their own subjects. A council of
state, a chamber of accounts, with five colleges of admiralty, aid and
fortify the federal administration.
The executive magistrate of the union is the stadtholder, who is now
an hereditary prince. His principal weight and influence in the
republic are derived from this independent title; from his great
patrimonial estates; from his family connections with some of the
chief potentates of Europe; and, more than all, perhaps, from his
being stadtholder in the several provinces, as well as for the
union; in which provincial quality he has the appointment of town
magistrates under certain regulations, executes provincial decrees,
presides when he pleases in the provincial tribunals, and has
throughout the power of pardon.
As stadtholder of the union, he has, however, considerable
prerogatives.
In his political capacity he has authority to settle disputes
between the provinces, when other methods fail; to assist at the
deliberations of the States-General, and at their particular
conferences; to give audiences to foreign ambassadors, and to keep
agents for his particular affairs at foreign courts.
In his military capacity he commands the federal troops, provides
for garrisons, and in general regulates military affairs; disposes
of all appointments, from colonels to ensigns, and of the
governments and posts of fortified towns.
In his marine capacity he is admiral-general, and superintends and
directs every thing relative to naval forces and other naval
affairs; presides in the admiralties in person or by proxy; appoints
lieutenant-admirals and other officers; and establishes councils of
war, whose sentences are not executed till he approves them.
His revenue, exclusive of his private income, amounts to three
hundred thousand florins. The standing army which he commands consists
of about forty thousand men.
Such is the nature of the celebrated Belgic confederacy, as
delineated on parchment. What the characters which practice has
stamped upon it? Imbecility in the government; discord among the
provinces; foreign influence and indignities; a precarious existence
in peace, and peculiar calamities from war.
It was long ago remarked by Grotius, that nothing but the hatred
of his countrymen to the house of Austria kept them from being
ruined by the vices of their constitution.
The union of Utrecht, says another respectable writer, reposes an
authority in the States-General, seemingly sufficient to secure
harmony, but the jealousy in each province renders the practice very
different from the theory.
The same instrument, says another, obliges each province to levy
certain contributions; but this article never could, and probably
never will, be executed; because the inland provinces, who have little
commerce, cannot pay an equal quota.
In matters of contribution, it is the practice to waive the articles
of the constitution. The danger of delay obliges the consenting
provinces to furnish their quotas, without waiting for the others; and
then to obtain reimbursement from the others, by deputations, which
are frequent, or otherwise, as they can. The great wealth and
influence of the province of Holland enable her to effect both these
purposes.
It has more than once happened, that the deficiencies had to be
ultimately collected at the point of the bayonet; a thing practicable,
though dreadful, in a confederacy where one of the members exceeds
in force all the rest, and where several of them are too small to
meditate resistance; but utterly impracticable in one composed of
members, several of which are equal to each other in strength and
resources, and equal singly to a vigorous and persevering defence.
Foreign ministers, says Sir William Temple, who was himself a
foreign minister, elude matters taken ad referendum, by tampering with
the provinces and cities. In 1726, the treaty of Hanover was delayed
by these means a whole year. Instances of a like nature are numerous
and notorious.
In critical emergencies, the States-General are often compelled to
overleap their constitutional bounds. In 1688, they concluded a treaty
of themselves at the risk of their heads. The treaty of Westphalia, in
1648, by which their independence was formally and finally recognized,
was concluded without the consent of Zealand. Even as recently as
the last treaty of peace with Great Britain, the constitutional
principle of unanimity was departed from. A weak constitution must
necessarily terminate in dissolution, for want of proper powers, or
the usurpation of powers requisite for the public safety. Whether
the usurpation, when once begun, will stop at the salutary point, or
go forward to the dangerous extreme, must depend on the
contingencies of the moment. Tyranny has perhaps oftener grown out
of the assumptions of power, called for, on pressing exigencies, by
a defective constitution, than out of the full exercise of the largest
constitutional authorities.
Notwithstanding the calamities produced by the stadtholdership, it
has been supposed that without his influence in the individual
provinces, the causes of anarchy manifest in the confederacy would
long ago have dissolved it. "Under such a government," says the Abbe
Mably, "the Union could never have subsisted, if the provinces had not
a spring within themselves, capable of quickening their tardiness, and
compelling them to the same way of thinking. This spring is the
stadtholder." It is remarked by Sir William Temple, "that in the
intermissions of the stadtholdership, Holland, by her riches and her
authority, which drew the others into a sort of dependence, supplied
the place."
These are not the only circumstances which have controlled the
tendency to anarchy and dissolution. The surrounding powers impose
an absolute necessity of union to a certain degree, at the same time
that they nourish by their intrigues the constitutional vices which
keep the republic in some degree always at their mercy.
The true patriots have long bewailed the fatal tendency of these
vices, and have made no less than four regular experiments by
extraordinary assemblies, convened for the special purpose, to apply a
remedy. As many times has their laudable zeal found it impossible to
unite the public councils in reforming the known, the acknowledged,
the fatal evils of the existing constitution. Let us pause, my
fellow-citizens, for one moment, over this melancholy and monitory
lesson of history; and with the tear that drops for the calamities
brought on mankind by their adverse opinions and selfish passions, let
our gratitude mingle an ejaculation to Heaven, for the propitious
concord which has distinguished the consultations for our political
happiness.
A design was also conceived of establishing a general tax to be
administered by the federal authority. This also had its adversaries
and failed.
This unhappy people seem to be now suffering from popular
convulsions, from dissensions among the states, and from the actual
invasion of foreign arms, the crisis of their destiny. All nations
have their eyes fixed on the awful spectacle. The first wish
prompted by humanity is, that this severe trial may issue in such a
revolution of their government as will establish their union, and
render it the parent of tranquillity, freedom, and happiness: The
next, that the asylum under which, we trust, the enjoyment of these
blessings will speedily be secured in this country, may receive and
console them for the catastrophe of their own.
I make no apology for having dwelt so long on the contemplation of
these federal precedents. Experience is the oracle of truth; and where
its responses are unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred.
The important truth which it unequivocally pronounces in the present
case, is that a sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over
governments, a legislation for communities, as contradistinguished
from individuals, as it is a solecism in theory, so in practice it
is subversive of the order and ends of civil polity, by substituting
violence in place of law, or the destructive coercion of the sword
in place of the mild and salutary coercion of the magistracy.
- PUBLIUS
NO 21: Further Defects of the Present Constitution
by Alexander Hamilton
-
HAVING in the three last numbers taken a summary review of the
principal circumstances and events which have depicted the genius
and fate of other confederate governments, I shall now proceed in
the enumeration of the most important of those defects which have
hitherto disappointed our hopes from the system established among
ourselves. To form a safe and satisfactory judgment of the proper
remedy, it is absolutely necessary that we should be well acquainted
with the extent and the malignity of the disease.
The next most palpable defect of the subsisting Confederation is the
total want of a SANCTION to its laws. The United States, as now
composed, have no powers to exact obedience, or punish disobedience to
the resolutions, either by pecuniary mulcts, by a suspension of
divestiture of privileges, or by any other constitutional mode.
There is no express delegation of authority to them to use force
against delinquent members; and if such a right should be ascribed
to the federal head, as resulting from the nature of the social
compact between the States, it must be by inference and
construction, in the face of that part of the second article, by which
it is declared, "that each State shall retain every power,
jurisdiction, and right, not expressly delegated to the United
States in Congress assembled." There is, doubtless, a striking
absurdity in supposing that a right of this kind does not exist, but
we are reduced to the dilemma either of embracing that supposition,
preposterous as it may seem, or of contravening or explaining away a
provision, which has been of late a repeated theme of the eulogies
of those who oppose the new Constitution; and the want of which, in
that plan, has been the subject of much plausible animadversion, and
severe criticism. If we are unwilling to impair the force of this
applauded provision, we shall be obliged to conclude, that the
United States afford the extraordinary spectacle of a government
destitute even of the shadow of constitutional power to enforce the
execution of its own laws. It will appear, from the specimens which
have been cited, that the American Confederacy, in this particular,
stands discriminated from every other institution of a similar kind,
and exhibits a new and unexampled phenomenon in the political world.
The want of a mutual guaranty of the State governments is another
capital imperfection in the federal plan. There is nothing of this
kind declared in the articles that compose it; and to imply a tacit
guaranty from considerations of utility would be a still more flagrant
departure from the clause which has been mentioned, than to imply a
tacit power of coercion from the like considerations. The want of a
guaranty, though it might in its consequences endanger the Union, does
not so immediately attack its existence as the want of a
constitutional sanction to its laws.
Without a guaranty the assistance to be derived from the Union in
repelling those domestic dangers, which may sometimes threaten the
existence of the State constitutions, must be renounced. Usurpation
may rear its crest in each State, and trample upon the liberties of
the people, while the national government could legally do nothing
more than behold its encroachments with indignation and regret. A
successful faction may erect a tyranny on the ruins of order and
law, while no succor could constitutionally be afforded by the Union
to the friends and supporters of the government. The tempestuous
situation from which Massachusetts has scarcely emerged evinces that
dangers of this kind are not merely speculative. Who can determine
what might have been the issue of her late convulsions, if the
malcontents had been headed by a Caesar or by a Cromwell? Who can
predict what effect a despotism, established in Massachusetts, would
have upon the liberties of New Hampshire or Rhode Island, of
Connecticut of New York?
The inordinate pride of State importance has suggested to some minds
an objection to the principle of a guaranty in the federal government,
as involving an officious interference in the domestic concerns of the
members. A scruple of this kind would deprive us of one of the
principal advantages to be expected from union, and can only flow from
a misapprehension of the nature of the provision itself. It could be
no impediment to reforms of the State constitutions by a majority of
the people in a legal and peaceable mode. This right would remain
undiminished. The guaranty could only operate against changes to be
effected by violence. Towards the preventions of calamities of this
kind, too many checks cannot be provided. The peace of society and the
stability of government depend absolutely on the efficacy of the
precautions adopted on this head. Where the whole power of the
government is in the hands of the people, there is the less pretence
for the use of violent remedies in partial or occasional distempers of
the State. The natural cure for an ill-administration, in a popular or
representative constitution, is a change of men. A guaranty by the
national authority would be as much levelled against the usurpations
of rulers as against the ferments and outrages of faction and sedition
in the community.
The principle of regulating the contributions of the States to the
common treasury by QUOTAS is another fundamental error in the
Confederation. Its repugnancy to an adequate supply of the national
exigencies has been already pointed out, and has sufficiently appeared
from the trial which has been made of it. I speak of it now solely
with a view to equality among the States. Those who have been
accustomed to contemplate the circumstances which produce and
constitute national wealth must be satisfied that there is no common
standard or barometer by which the degrees of it can be ascertained.
Neither the value of lands, nor the numbers of the people, which
have been successively proposed as the rule of State contributions,
has any pretension to being a just representative. If we compare the
wealth of the United Netherlands with that of Russia or Germany, or
even of France, and if we at the same time compare the total value
of the lands and the aggregate population of that contracted
district with the total value of the lands and the aggregate
population of the immense regions of either of the three
last-mentioned countries, we shall at once discover that there is no
comparison between the proportion of either of these two objects and
that of the relative wealth of those nations. If the like parallel
were to be run between several of the American States, it would
furnish a like result. Let Virginia be contrasted with North Carolina,
Pennsylvania with Connecticut, or Maryland with New Jersey, and we
shall be convinced that the respective abilities of those States, in
relation to revenue, bear little or no analogy to their comparative
stock in lands or to their comparative population. The position may be
equally illustrated by a similar process between the counties of the
same State. No man who is acquainted with the State of New York will
doubt that the active wealth of King's County bears a much greater
proportion to that of Montgomery than it would appear to be if we
should take either the total value of the lands or the total number of
the people as a criterion!
The wealth of nations depends upon an infinite variety of causes.
Situation, soil, climate, the nature of the productions, the nature of
the government, the genius of the citizens, the degree of
information they possess, the state of commerce, of arts, of
industry,- these circumstances and many more, too complex, minute,
or adventitious to admit of a particular specification, occasion
differences hardly conceivable in the relative opulence and riches
of different countries. The consequence clearly is that there can be
no common measure of national wealth, and, of course, no general or
stationary rule by which the ability of a state to pay taxes can be
determined. The attempt, therefore, to regulate the contributions of
the members of a confederacy by any such rule, cannot fail to be
productive of glaring inequality and extreme oppression.
This inequality would of itself be sufficient in America to work the
eventual destruction of the Union, if any mode of enforcing a
compliance with its requisitions could be devised. The suffering
States would not long consent to remain associated upon a principle
which distributes the public burdens with so unequal a hand, and which
was calculated to impoverish and oppress the citizens of some
States, while those of others would scarcely by conscious of the small
proportion of the weight they were required to sustain. This, however,
is an evil inseparable from the principle of quotas and requisitions.
There is no method of steering clear of this inconvenience, but by
authorizing the national government to raise its own revenues in its
own way. Imposts, excises, and, in general, all duties upon articles
of consumption, may be compared to a fluid, which will, in time,
find its level with the means of paying them. The amount to be
contributed by each citizen will in a degree be at his own option, and
can be regulated by an attention to his resources. The rich may be
extravagant, the poor can be frugal; and private oppression may always
be avoided by a judicious selection of objects proper for such
impositions. If inequalities should arise in some States from duties
on particular objects, these will, in all probability, be
counterbalanced by proportional inequalities in other States, from the
duties on other objects. In the course of time and things, an
equilibrium, as far as it is attainable in so complicated a subject,
will be established everywhere. Or, if inequalities should still
exist, they would neither be so great in their degree, so uniform in
their operation, nor so odious in their appearance, as those which
would necessarily spring from quotas, upon any scale that can possibly
be devised.
It is a signal advantage of taxes on articles of consumption, that
they contain in their own nature a security against excess. They
prescribe their own limit; which cannot be exceeded without
defeating the end proposed.- that is, an extension of the revenue.
When applied to this object, the saying is as just as it is witty,
that, "in political arithmetic, two and two do not always make
four." If duties are too high, they lessen the consumption; the
collection is eluded; and the product to the treasury is not so
great as when they are confined within proper and moderate bounds.
This forms a complete barrier against any material oppression of the
citizens by taxes of this class, and is itself a natural limitation of
the power of imposing them.
Impositions of this kind usually fall under the denomination of
indirect taxes, and must for a long time constitute the chief part
of the revenue raised in this country. Those of the direct kind, which
principally relate to land and buildings, may admit of a rule of
apportionment. Either the value of land, or the number of the
people, may serve as a standard. The state of agriculture and the
populousness of a country have been considered as nearly connected
with each other. And, as a rule, for the purpose intended, numbers, in
the view of simplicity and certainty, are entitled to a preference. In
every country it is a herculean task to obtain a valuation of the
land; in a country imperfectly settled and progressive in improvement,
the difficulties are increased almost to impracticability. The expense
of an accurate valuation is, in all situations, a formidable
objection. In a branch of taxation where no limits to the discretion
of the government are to be found in the nature of things, the
establishment of a fixed rule, not incompatible with the end, may be
attended with fewer inconveniences than to leave that discretion
altogether at large.
- PUBLIUS
NO 22: The Same Subject Continued and Concluded
by Alexander Hamilton
-
IN ADDITION to the defects already enumerated in the existing
federal system, there are others of not less importance, which
concur in rendering it altogether unfit for the administration of
the affairs of the Union.
The want of a power to regulate commerce is by all parties allowed
to be of the number. The utility of such a power has been
anticipated under the first head of our inquiries; and for this
reason, as well as from the universal conviction entertained upon
the subject, little need be added in this place. It is indeed evident,
on the most superficial view, that there is no object, either as it
respects the interest of trade or finance, that more strongly
demands a federal superintendence. The want of it has already operated
as a bar to the formation of beneficial treaties with foreign
powers, and has given occasions of dissatisfaction between the States.
No nation acquainted with the nature of our political association
would be unwise enough to enter into stipulations with the United
States, by which they conceded privileges of any importance to them,
while they were apprised that the engagements on the part of the Union
might at any moment be violated by its members, and while they found
from experience that they might enjoy every advantage they desired
in our markets, without granting us any return but such as their
momentary convenience might suggest. It is not, therefore, to be
wondered at that Mr. Jenkinson, in ushering into the House of
Commons a bill for regulating the temporary intercourse between the
two countries, should preface its introduction by a declaration that
similar provisions in former bills had been found to answer every
purpose to the commerce of Great Britain, and that it would be prudent
to persist in the plan until it should appear whether the American
government was likely or not to acquire greater consistency. *022
Several States have endeavored, by separate prohibitions,
restrictions, and exclusions, to influence the conduct of that kingdom
in this particular, but the want of concert, arising from the want
of a general authority and from clashing and dissimilar views in the
State, has hitherto frustrated every experiment of the kind, and
will continue to do so as long as the same obstacles to a uniformity
of measures continue to exist.
The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States,
contrary to the true spirit of the Union, have, in different
instances, given just cause of umbrage and complaint to others, and it
is to be feared that examples of this nature, if not restrained by a
national control, would be multiplied and extended till they became
not less serious sources of animosity and discord than injurious
impediments to the intercourse between the different parts of the
Confederacy. "The commerce of the German empire *023 is in continual
trammels from the multiplicity of the duties which the several princes
and states exact upon the merchandises passing through their
territories, by means of which the fine streams and navigable rivers
with which Germany is so happily watered are rendered almost useless."
Though the genius of the people of this country might never permit
this description to be strictly applicable to us, yet we may
reasonably expect, from the gradual conflicts of State regulations,
that the citizens of each would at length come to be considered and
treated by the others in no better light than that of foreigners and
aliens.
The power of raising armies, by the most obvious construction of the
articles of the Confederation, is merely a power of making
requisitions upon the States for quotas of men. This practice, in
the course of the late war, was found replete with obstructions to a
vigorous and to an economical system of defence. It gave birth to a
competition between the States which created a kind of auction for
men. In order to furnish the quotas required of them, they outbid each
other till bounties grew to an enormous and insupportable size. The
hope of a still further increase afforded an inducement to those who
were disposed to serve to procrastinate their enlistment, and
disinclined from them engaging for any considerable periods. Hence,
slow and scanty levies of men, in the most critical emergencies of our
affairs; short enlistments at an unparalleled expense; continual
fluctuations in the troops, ruinous to their discipline and subjecting
the public safety frequently to the perilous crisis of a disbanded
army. Hence, also, those oppressive expedients for raising men which
were upon several occasions practiced, and which nothing but the
enthusiasm of liberty would have induced the people to endure.
This method of raising troops is not more unfriendly to economy
and vigor than it is to an equal distribution of the burden. The
States near the seat of war, influenced by motives of
self-preservation, made efforts to furnish their quotas, which even
exceeded their abilities; while those at a distance from danger
were, for the most part, as remiss as the others were diligent, in
their exertions. The immediate pressure of this inequality was not
in this case, as in that of the contributions of money, alleviated
by the hope of a final liquidation. The States which did not pay their
proportions of money might at least be charged with their
deficiencies; but no account could be formed of the deficiencies in
the supplies of men. We shall not, however, see much reason to
regret the want of this hope, when we consider how little prospect
there is that the most delinquent States will ever be able to make
compensation for their pecuniary failures. The system of quotas and
requisitions, whether it be applied to men or money, is, in every
view, a system of imbecility in the Union, and of inequality and
injustice among the members.
The right of equal suffrage among the States is another
exceptionable part of the Confederation. Every idea of proportion
and every rule of fair representation conspire to condemn a principle,
which gives to Rhode Island an equal weight in the scale of power with
Massachusetts, or Connecticut, or New York; and to Delaware an equal
voice in the national deliberations with Pennsylvania, or Virginia, or
North Carolina. Its operation contradicts the fundamental maxim of
republican government, which requires that the sense of the majority
should prevail. Sophistry may reply, that sovereigns are equal, and
that a majority of the votes of the States will be a majority of
confederated America. But this kind of logical legerdemain will
never counteract the plain suggestions of justice and common-sense. It
may happen that this majority of States is a small minority of the
people of America; *024 and two thirds of the people of America could
not long be persuaded, upon the credit of artificial distinction and
syllogistic subtleties, to submit their interests to the management
and disposal of one third. The larger States would after a while
revolt from the idea of receiving the law from the smaller. To
acquiesce in such a privation of their due importance in the political
scale would be not merely to be insensible to the love of power, but
even to sacrifice the desire of equality. It is neither rational to
expect the first, nor just to require the last. The smaller States,
considering how peculiarly their safety and welfare depend on union,
ought readily to renounce a pretension which, if not relinquished,
would prove fatal to its duration.
It may be objected to this, that not seven but nine States, or two
thirds of the whole number, must consent to the most important
resolutions; and it may be thence inferred that nine States would
always comprehend a majority of the Union. But this does not obviate
the impropriety of an equal vote between States of the most unequal
dimensions and populousness; nor is the inference accurate in point of
fact; for we can enumerate nine States which contain less than a
majority of the people; *025 and it is constitutionally possible that
these nine may give the vote. Besides, there are matters of
considerable moment determinable by a bare majority; and there are
others, concerning which doubts have been entertained, which, if
interpreted in favor of the sufficiency of a vote of seven States,
would extend its operation to interests of the first magnitude. In
addition to this, it is to be observed that there is a probability
of an increase in the number of States, and no provision for a
proportional augmentation of the ratio of votes.
But this is not all: what at first sight may seem a remedy, is, in
reality, a poison. To give a minority a negative upon the majority
(which is always the case where more than a majority is requisite to a
decision) is, in its tendency, to subject the sense of the greater
number to that of the lesser. Congress, from the non-attendance of a
few States, have been frequently in the situation of a Polish diet,
where a single VOTE has been sufficient to put a stop to all their
movements. A sixtieth part of the Union, which is about the proportion
of Delaware and Rhode Island, has several times been able to oppose an
entire bar to its operations. This is one of those refinements
which, in practice, has an effect the reverse of what is expected from
it in theory. The necessity of unanimity in public bodies, or of
something approaching towards it, has been founded upon a
supposition that it would contribute to security. But its real
operation is to embarrass the administration, to destroy the energy of
the government, and to substitute the pleasure, caprice, or
artifices of an insignificant, turbulent, or corrupt junto, to the
regular deliberations and decisions of a respectable majority. In
those emergencies of a nation, in which the goodness or badness, the
weakness or strength, of its government is of the greatest importance,
there is commonly a necessity for action. The public business must, in
some way or other, go forward. If a pertinacious minority can
control the opinion of a majority, respecting the best mode of
conducting it, the majority, in order that something may be done, must
conform to the views of the minority; and thus the sense of the
smaller number will overrule that of the greater, and give a tone to
the national proceedings. Hence, tedious delays; continual negotiation
and intrigue; contemptible compromises of the public good. And yet, in
such a system, it is even happy when such compromises can take
place: for upon some occasions things will not admit of accommodation;
and then the measures of government must be injuriously suspended,
or fatally defeated. It is often, by the impracticability of obtaining
the concurrence of the necessary number of votes, kept in a state of
inaction. Its situation must always savor of weakness, sometimes
border upon anarchy.
It is not difficult to discover, that a principle of this kind gives
greater scope to foreign corruption, was well as to domestic
faction, than that which permits the sense of the majority to
decide; though the contrary of this has been presumed. The mistake has
proceeded from not attending with due care to the mischiefs that may
be occasioned by obstructing the progress of government at certain
critical seasons. When the concurrence of a large number is required
by the Constitution to the doing of any national act, we are apt to
rest satisfied that all is safe, because nothing improper will be
likely to be done; but we forget how much good may be prevented, and
how much ill may be produced, by the power of hindering the doing what
may be necessary, and of keeping affairs in the same unfavorable
posture in which they may happen to stand at particular periods.
Suppose, for instance, we were engaged in a war, in conjunction with
one foreign nation, against another. Suppose the necessity of our
situation demanded peace, and the interest or ambition of our ally led
him to seek the prosecution of war, with views that might justify us
in making separate terms. In such a state of things, this ally of ours
would evidently find it much easier, by his bribes and intrigues, to
tie up the hands of government from making peace, where two thirds
of all the votes were requisite to that object, than where a simple
majority would suffice. In the first case, he would have to corrupt
a smaller number; in the last, a greater number. Upon the same
principle, it would be much easier for a foreign power with which we
were at war to perplex our councils and embarrass our exertions.
And, in a commercial view, we may be subjected to similar
inconveniences. A nation, with which we might have a treaty of
commerce, could with much greater facility prevent our forming a
connection with her competitor in trade, though such a connection
should be ever so beneficial to ourselves.
Evils of this description ought not to be regarded as imaginary. One
of the weak sides of republics, among their numerous advantages, is
that they afford too easy an inlet to foreign corruption. An
hereditary monarch, though often disposed to sacrifice his subjects to
his ambition, has so great a personal interest in the government and
in the external glory of the nation, that it is not easy for a foreign
power to give him the equivalent for what he would sacrifice by
treachery to the state. The world has accordingly been witness to
few examples of this species of royal prostitution, though there
have been abundant specimens of every other kind.
In republics, persons elevated from the mass of the community, by
the suffrages of their fellow-citizens, to stations of great
preeminence and power, may find compensations for betraying their
trust, which, to any but minds animated and guided by superior virtue,
may appear to exceed the proportion of interest they have in the
common stock, and to overbalance the obligations of duty. Hence it
is that history furnishes us with so many mortifying examples of the
prevalency of foreign corruption in republican governments. How much
this contributed to the ruin of the ancient commonwealths has been
already delineated. It is well known that the deputies of the United
Provinces have, in various instances, been purchased by the emissaries
of the neighboring kingdoms. The Earl of Chesterfield (if my memory
serves me right), in a letter to his court, intimates that his success
in an important negotiation must depend on his obtaining a major's
commission for one of those deputies. And in Sweden the parties were
alternately bought by France and England in so barefaced and notorious
a manner that it excited universal disgust in the nation, and was a
principal cause that the most limited monarch in Europe, in a single
day, without tumult, violence, or opposition, became one of the most
absolute and uncontrolled.
A circumstance which crowns the defects of the Confederation remains
yet to be mentioned,- the want of a judiciary power. Laws are a dead
letter without courts to expound and define their true meaning and
operation. The treaties of the United States, to have any force at
all, must be considered as part of the law of the land. Their true
import, as far as respects individuals, must, like all other laws,
be ascertained by judicial determinations. To produce uniformity in
these determinations, they ought to be submitted, in the last
resort, to one SUPREME TRIBUNAL. And this tribunal ought to be
instituted under the same authority which forms the treaties
themselves. These ingredients are both indispensable. If there is in
each State a court of final jurisdiction, there may be as many
different final determinations on the same point as there are
courts. There are endless diversities in the opinions of men. We often
see not only different courts but the judges of the same court
differing from each other. To avoid the confusion which would
unavoidably result from the contradictory decisions of a number of
independent judicatories, all nations have found it necessary to
establish one court paramount to the rest, possessing a general
superintendence, and authorized to settle and declare in the last
resort a uniform rule of civil justice.
This is the more necessary where the frame of the government is so
compounded that the laws of the whole are in danger of being
contravened by the laws of the parts. In this case, if the
particular tribunals are invested with a right of ultimate
jurisdiction, besides the contradictions to be expected from
differences of opinion there will be much to fear from the bias of
local views and prejudices, and from the interference of local
regulations. As often as such an interference was to happen, there
would be reason to apprehend that the provisions of the particular
laws might be preferred to those of the general laws; for nothing is
more natural to men in office than to look with peculiar deference
towards that authority to which they owe their official existence. The
treaties of the United States, under the present Constitution, are
liable to the infractions of thirteen different legislatures, and as
many different courts of final jurisdiction, acting under the
authority of those legislatures. The faith, the reputation, the
peace of the whole Union, are thus continually at the mercy of the
prejudices, the passions, and the interests of every member of which
it is composed. Is it possible that foreign nations can either respect
or confide in such a government? Is it possible that the people of
America will longer consent to trust their honor, their happiness,
their safety, on so precarious a foundation?
In this review of the Confederation, I have confined myself to the
exhibition of its most material defects, passing over those
imperfections in its details by which even a great part of the power
intended to be conferred upon it has been in a great measure
rendered abortive. It must be by this time evident to all men of
reflection, who can divest themselves of the prepossessions of
preconceived opinions, that it is a system so radically vicious and
unsound, as to admit not of amendment but by an entire change in its
leading features and characters.
The organization of Congress is itself utterly improper for the
exercise of those powers which are necessary to be deposited in the
Union. A Single assembly may be a proper receptacle of those
slender, or rather fettered, authorities, which have been heretofore
delegated to the federal head; but it would be inconsistent with all
the principles of good government, to intrust it with those additional
powers which, even the moderate and more rational adversaries of the
proposed Constitution admit, ought to reside in the United States.
If that plan should not be adopted, and if the necessity of the
Union should be able to withstand the ambitious aims of those men
who may indulge magnificent schemes of personal aggrandizement from
its dissolution, the probability would be that we should run into
the project of conferring supplementary powers upon Congress, as
they are now constituted; and either the machine, from the intrinsic
feebleness of its structure, will moulder into pieces, in spite of our
ill-judged efforts to prop it; or, by successive augmentations of
its force and energy, as necessity might prompt, we shall finally
accumulate, in a single body, all the most important prerogatives of
sovereignty, and thus entail upon our posterity one of the most
execrable forms of government that human infatuation ever contrived.
Thus we should create in reality that very tyranny which the
adversaries of the new Constitution either are, or affect to be,
solicitous to avert.
It has not a little contributed to the infirmities of the existing
federal system, that it never had a ratification by the PEOPLE.
Resting on no better foundation than the consent of the several
legislatures, it has been exposed to frequent and intricate
questions concerning the validity of its powers, and has, in some
instances, given birth to the enormous doctrine of a right of
legislative repeal. Owing its ratification to the law of a State, it
has been contended that the same authority might repeal the law by
which it was ratified. However gross a heresy it may be to maintain
that a party to a compact has a right to revoke that compact, the
doctrine itself has had respectable advocates. The possibility of a
question of this nature proves the necessity of laying the foundations
of our national government deeper than in the mere sanction of
delegated authority. The fabric of American empire ought to rest on
the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. The streams of
national power ought to flow immediately from that pure, original
fountain of all legitimate authority.
- PUBLIUS
NO 23: The Necessity of a Government at Least
Equally Energetic with the One Proposed
by Alexander Hamilton
-
THE necessity of a Constitution, at least equally energetic with the
one proposed, to the preservation of the Union, is the point at the
examination of which we are now arrived.
This inquiry will naturally divide itself into three branches- the
objects to be provided for by the federal government, the quantity
of power necessary to the accomplishment of those objects, the persons
upon whom that power ought to operate. Its distribution and
organization will more properly claim our attention under the
succeeding head.
The principal purposes to be answered by union are these- the common
defence of the members; the preservation of the public peace, as
well against internal convulsions as external attacks; the
regulation of commerce with other nations and between the States;
the superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial, with
foreign countries.
The authorities essential to the common defence are these: to
raise armies; to build and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for the
government of both; to direct their operations; to provide for their
support. These powers ought to exist without limitation, because it is
impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national
exigencies, or the correspondent extend and variety of the means which
may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances that endanger
the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no
constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which
the care of it is committed. This power ought to be co-extensive
with all the possible combinations of such circumstances; and ought to
be under the direction of the same councils which are appointed to
preside over the common defence.
This is one of those truths which, to a correct and unprejudiced
mind, carries its own evidence along with it; and may be obscured, but
cannot be made plainer by argument or reasoning. It rests upon
axioms as simple as they are universal; the means ought to be
proportioned to the end; the persons, from whose agency the attainment
of any end is expected, ought to possess the means by which it is to
be attained.
Whether there ought to be a federal government intrusted with the
care of the common defence is a question in the first instance, open
for discussion; but the moment it is decided in the affirmative, it
will follow that that government ought to be clothed with all the
powers requisite to complete execution of its trust. And unless it can
be shown that the circumstances which may affect the public safety are
reducible within certain determinate limits, unless the contrary of
this position can be fairly and rationally disputed, it must be
admitted, as a necessary consequence, that there can be no
limitation of that authority which is to provide for the defence and
protection of the community, in any matter essential to its
efficacy- that is, in any matter essential to the formation,
direction, or support of the NATIONAL FORCES.
Defective as the present Confederation has been proved to be, this
principle appears to have been fully recognized by the framers of
it, though they have not made proper or adequate provision for its
exercise. Congress have an unlimited discretion to make requisitions
of men and money; to govern the army and navy; to direct their
operations. As their requisitions are made constitutionally binding
upon the States, who are in fact under the most solemn obligations
to furnish the supplies required of them, the intention evidently
was that the United States should command whatever resources where
by them judged requisite to the "common defence and general
welfare." It was presumed that a sense of their true interests, and
a regard to the dictates of good faith, would be found sufficient
pledges for the punctual performance of the duty of the members to the
federal head.
The experiment has, however, demonstrated that this expectation
was ill-founded and illusory; and the observations, made under the
last head, will, I imagine, have sufficed to convince the impartial
and discerning that there is an absolute necessity for an entire
change in the first principles of the system; that if we are in
earnest about giving the Union energy and duration, we must abandon
the vain project of legislating upon the States in their collective
capacities; we must extend the laws of the federal government to the
individual citizens of America; we must discard the fallacious
scheme of quotas and requisitions, as equally impracticable and
unjust. The result from all this is that the Union ought to be
invested with full power to levy troops; to build and equip fleets;
and to raise the revenues which will be required for the formation and
support of an army and navy, in the customary and ordinary modes
practiced in other governments.
If the circumstances of our country are such as to demand a compound
instead of a simple, a confederate instead of a sole, government,
the essential point which will remain to be adjusted will be to
discriminate the OBJECTS, as far as it can be done, which shall
appertain to the different provinces or departments of power, allowing
to each the most ample authority for fulfilling the objects
committed to its charge. Shall the Union be constituted the guardian
of the common safety? Are fleets and armies and revenues necessary
to this purpose? The government of the Union must be empowered to pass
all laws, and to make all regulations which have relation to them. The
same must be the case in respect to commerce, and to every other
matter to which its jurisdiction is permitted to extend. Is the
administration of justice between the citizens of the same State the
proper department of the local governments? These must possess all the
authorities which are connected with this object, and with every other
that may be allotted to their particular cognizance and direction. Not
to confer in each case a degree of power commensurate to the end would
be to violate the most obvious rules of prudence and propriety, and
improvidently to trust the great interests of the nation to hands
which are disabled from managing them with vigor and success.
Who so likely to make suitable provisions for the public defence
as that body to which the guardianship of the public safety is
confided; which, as the center of information, will best understand
the extent and urgency of the dangers that threaten; as the
representative of the WHOLE, will feel itself most deeply interested
in the preservation of every part; which, from the responsibility
implied in the duty assigned to it, will be most sensibly impressed
with the necessity of proper exertions; and which, by the extension of
its authority throughout the States, can alone establish uniformity
and concert in the plans and measures by which the common safety is to
be secured? Is there not a manifest inconsistency in devolving upon
the federal government the care of the general defence, and leaving in
the State governments the effective powers by which it is to be
provided for? Is not a want of co-operation the infallible consequence
of such a system? And will not weakness, disorder, and undue
distribution of the burdens and calamities of war, an unnecessary
and intolerable increase of expense, be its natural and inevitable
concomitants? Have we not had unequivocal experience of its effects in
the course of the revolution which we have just accomplished.
Every view we may take of the subject, as candid inquirers after
truth, will serve to convince us, that it is both unwise and dangerous
to deny the federal government and unconfined authority, as to all
those objects which are intrusted to its management. It will indeed
deserve the most vigilant and careful attention of the people to see
that it be modelled in such a manner as to admit of its being safely
vested with the requisite powers. If any plan which has been, or may
be, offered to our consideration, should not, upon a dispassionate
inspection, be found to answer this description, it ought to be
rejected. A government, the constitution of which renders it unfit
to be trusted with all the powers which a free people ought to
delegate to any government, would be an unsafe and improper depositary
of the NATIONAL INTERESTS. Wherever THESE can with propriety be
confided, the coincident powers may safely accompany them. This is the
true result of all just reasoning upon the subject. And the
adversaries of the plan promulgated by the convention ought to have
confined themselves to showing, that the internal structure of the
proposed government was such as to render it unworthy of the
confidence of the people. They ought not to have wandered into
inflammatory declamations and unmeaning cavils about the extent of the
powers. The POWERS are not too extensive for the OBJECTS of federal
administration, or, in other words, for the management of our NATIONAL
INTERESTS; not can any satisfactory argument be framed to show that
they are chargeable with such an excess. If it be true, as has been
insinuated by some of the writers on the other side, that the
difficulty arises from the nature of the thing, and that the extent of
the country will not permit us to form a government in which such
ample powers can safely be reposed, it would prove that ought to
contract our views, and resort to the expedient of separate
confederacies, which will move within more practicable spheres. For
the absurdity must continually stare us in the face of confiding to
a government the direction of the most essential national interests,
without daring to trust it to the authorities which are indispensable
to their proper and efficient management. Let us not attempt to
reconcile contradictions, but firmly embrace a rational alternative.
I trust, however, that the impracticability of one general system
cannot be shown. I am greatly mistaken, if any thing of weight has yet
been advanced of this tendency; and I flatter myself that the
observations which have been made in the course of these papers have
served to place the reverse of that position in as clear a light as
any matter still in the womb of time and experience can be susceptible
of. This, at all events, must be evident, that the very difficulty
itself, drawn from the extent of the country, is the strongest
argument in favor of an energetic government; for any other can
certainly never preserve the Union of so large an empire. If we
embrace the tenets of those who oppose the adoption of the proposed
Constitution, as the standard of our political creed, we cannot fail
to verify the gloomy doctrines which predict the impracticability of a
national system pervading entire limits of the present Confederacy.
- PUBLIUS
NO 24: The Subject Continued with an Answer
to an Objection Concerning Standing Armies
by Alexander Hamilton
-
TO THE powers proposed to be conferred upon the federal
government, in respect to the creation and direction of the national
forces, I have met with but one specific objection, which, if I
understand it right, is this,- that proper provision has not been made
against the existence of standing armies in time of peace; an
objection which, I shall now endeavor to show, rests on weak and
unsubstantial foundations.
It has indeed been brought forward in the most vague and general
form, supported only by bold assertions, without the appearance of
argument, without even the sanction of theoretical opinions, in
contradiction to the practice of other free nations, and to the
general sense of America, as expressed in most of the existing
constitutions. The propriety of this remark will appear the moment
it is recollected that the objection under consideration turns upon
a supposed necessity of restraining the LEGISLATIVE authority of the
nation, in the article of military establishments, a principle unheard
of, except in one or two of our State constitutions, and rejected in
all the rest.
A stranger to our politics, who was to read our newspapers at the
present juncture, without having previously inspected the plan
reported by the convention, would be naturally led to one of two
conclusions: either that it contained a positive injunction, that
standing armies should be kept up in time of peace; or that it
vested in the EXECUTIVE the whole power of levying troops, without
subjecting his discretion, in any shape, to the control of
legislature.
If he came afterwards to peruse the plan itself, he would be
surprised to discover that neither the one nor the other was the case;
that the whole power of raising armies was lodged in the
Legislature, not in the Executive; that this legislature was to be a
popular body, consisting of the representatives of the people
periodically elected; and that instead of the provision he had
supposed in favor of standing armies, there was to be found, in
respect to this object, an important qualification even of the
legislative discretion, in that clause which forbids the appropriation
of money for the support of an army for any longer period than two
years- a precaution which, upon a nearer view of it, will appear to be
a great and real security against the keeping up of troops without
evident necessity.
Disappointed in his first surmise, the person I have supposed
would be apt to pursue his conjectures a little further. He would
naturally say to himself, it is impossible that all this vehement
and pathetic declamation can be without some colorable pretext. It
must needs be that this people, so jealous of their liberties, have,
in all the preceding models of the constitutions which they have
established, inserted the most precise and rigid precautions on this
point, the omission of which, in the new plan, has given birth to
all this apprehension and clamor.
If, under this impression, he proceeded to pass in review the
several State constitutions, how great would be his disappointment
to find that two only of them *026 contained an interdiction of
standing armies in time of peace; that the other eleven had either
observed a profound silence on the subject, or had in express terms
admitted the right of the Legislature to authorize their existence.
Still, however, he would be persuaded that there must be some
plausible foundation for the cry raised on this head. He would never
be able to imagine, while any source of information remained
unexplored, that it was nothing more than an experiment upon the
public credulity, dictated either by a deliberate intention to
deceive, or by the overflowings of a zeal too intemperate to be
ingenuous. It would probably occur to him that he would be likely to
find the precautions he was in search of in the primitive compact
between the States. Here, at length, he would expect to meet with a
solution of the enigma. No doubt, he would observe to himself, the
existing Confederation must contain the most explicit provisions
against military establishments in time of peace; and a departure from
this model, in a favorite point, has occasioned the discontent which
appears to influence these political champions.
If he should now apply himself to a careful and critical survey of
the articles of Confederation, his astonishment would not only be
increased, but would acquire a mixture of indignation, at the
unexpected discovery, that these articles, instead of containing the
prohibition he looked for, and though they had, with jealous
circumspection, restricted the authority of the State legislatures
in this particular, had not imposed a single restraint on that of
the United States. If he happened to be a man of quick sensibility, or
ardent temper, he could now no longer refrain from regarding these
clamors as the dishonest artifices of a sinister and unprincipled
opposition to a plan which ought at least to receive a fair and candid
examination from all sincere lovers of their country! How else, he
would say, could the authors of them have been tempted to vent such
loud censures upon that plan, about a point in which it seems to
have conformed itself to the general sense of America as declared in
its different forms of government, and in which it has even superadded
a new and powerful guard unknown to any of them? If, on the
contrary, he happened to be a man of calm and dispassionate
feelings, he would indulge a sigh for the frailty of human nature, and
would lament that, in a matter so interesting to the happiness of
millions, the true merits of the question should be perplexed and
entangled by expedients so unfriendly to an impartial and right
determination. Even such a man could hardly forbear remarking that a
conduct of this kind has too much the appearance of an intention to
mislead the people by alarming their passions, rather than to convince
them by arguments addressed to their understandings.
But however little this objection may be countenanced, even by
precedents among ourselves, it may be satisfactory to take a nearer
view of its intrinsic merits. From a close examination it will
appear that restraints upon the discretion of the legislature in
respect to military establishments in time of peace would be
improper to be imposed, and if imposed, from the necessities of
society, would be unlikely to be observed.
Though a wide ocean separates the United States from Europe, yet
there are various considerations that warn us against an excess of
confidence or security. On one side of us, and stretching far into our
rear, are growing settlements subject to the dominion of Britain. On
the other side, and extending to meet the British settlements, are
colonies and establishments subject to the dominion of Spain. This
situation and the vicinity of the West India Islands, belonging to
these two powers, create between them, in respect to their American
possessions and in relation to us, a common interest. The savage
tribes on our Western frontier ought to be regarded as our natural
enemies, their natural allies, because they have most to fear from us,
and most to hope from them. The improvements in the art of
navigation have, as to the facility of communication, rendered distant
nations, in a great measure, neighbors. Britain and Spain are among
the principal maritime powers of Europe. A future concert of views
between these nations ought not to be regarded as improbable. The
increasing remoteness of consanguinity is every day diminishing the
force of the family compact between France and Spain. And
politicians have ever with great reason considered the ties of blood
as feeble and precarious links of political connection. These
circumstances combined admonish us not to be too sanguine in
considering ourselves as entirely out of the reach of danger.
Previous to the Revolution, and ever since the peace, there has been
a constant necessity for keeping small garrisons on our Western
frontier. No person can doubt that these will continue to be
indispensable, if it should only be against the ravages and
depredations of the Indians. These garrisons must either be
furnished by occasional detachments from the militia, or by
permanent corps in the pay of the government. The first is
impracticable; and if practicable, would be pernicious. The militia
would not long, if at all, submit to be dragged from their occupations
and families to perform that most disagreeable duty in times of
profound peace. And if they could be prevailed upon or compelled to do
it, the increased expense of a frequent rotation of service, and the
loss of labor and disconcertion of the industrious pursuits of
individuals, would form conclusive objections to the scheme. It
would be as burdensome and injurious to the public as ruinous to
private citizens. The latter resource of permanent corps in the pay of
the government amounts to a standing army in time of peace, a small
one, indeed, but not the less real for being small. Here is a simple
view of the subject that shows us at once the impropriety of a
constitutional interdiction of such establishments, and the
necessity of leaving the matter to the discretion and prudence of
the legislature.
In proportion to our increase in strength, it is probable, nay, it
may be said certain, that Britain and Spain would augment their
military establishments in our neighborhood. If we should not be
willing to be exposed, in a naked and defenceless condition, to
their insults and encroachments, we should find it expedient to
increase our frontier garrisons in some ratio to the force by which
our Western settlements might be annoyed. There are, and will be,
particular posts, the possession of which will include the command
of large districts of territory, and facilitate future invasions of
the remainder. It may be added that some of those posts will be keys
to the trade with the Indian nations. Can any man think it would be
wise to leave such posts in a situation to be at any instant seized by
one or the other of two neighboring and formidable powers? To act this
part would be to desert all the usual maxims of prudence and policy.
If we mean to be a commercial people, or even to be secure on our
Atlantic side, we must endeavor, as soon as possible, to have a
navy. To this purpose there must be dock-yards and arsenals; and for
the defence of these, fortifications, and probably garrisons. When a
nation has become so powerful by sea that it can protect its
dock-yards by its fleets, this supersedes the necessity of garrisons
for that purpose; but where naval establishments are in their infancy,
moderate garrisons will, in all likelihood, be found an
indispensable security against descents for the destruction of the
arsenals and dock-yards, and sometimes of the fleet itself.
- PUBLIUS
NO 25: The Subject Continued with the Same View
by Alexander Hamilton
-
IT MAY perhaps be urged that the objects enumerated in the preceding
number ought to be provided for by the State governments, under the
direction of the Union. But this would be, in reality, an inversion of
the primary principle of our political association, as it would in
practice transfer the care of the common defence from the federal head
to the individual members: a project oppressive to some States,
dangerous to all, and baneful to the Confederacy.
The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian nations in
our neighborhood do not border on particular States, but encircle
the Union from Maine to Georgia. The danger, though in different
degrees, is therefore common. And the means of guarding against it
ought, in like manner, to be the objects of common councils and of a
common treasury. It happens that some States, from local situation,
are more directly exposed. New York is of this class. Upon the plan of
separation provisions, New York would have to sustain the whole weight
of the establishments requisite to her immediate safety, and to
mediate or ultimate protection of her neighbors. This would neither be
equitable as it respected New York nor safe as it respected the
other States. Various inconveniences would attend such a system. The
States, to whose lot it might fall to support the necessary
establishments, would be as little able as willing, for a considerable
time to come, to bear the burden of competent provisions. The security
of all would thus be subjected to the parsimony, improvidence, or
inability of a part. If the resources of such part becoming more
abundant and extensive, its provisions should be proportionally
enlarged, the other States would quickly take the alarm at seeing
the whole military force of the Union in the hands of two or three
of its members, and those probably amongst the most powerful. They
would each choose to have some counter-poise, and pretences could
easily be contrived. In this situation, military establishments,
nourished by mutual jealousy, would be apt to swell beyond their
natural or proper size; and being at the separate disposal of the
members, they would be engines for the abridgement or demolition of
the national authority.
Reasons have been already given to induce a supposition that the
State governments will too naturally be prone to a rivalship with that
of the Union, the foundation of which will be the love of power; and
that in any contest between the federal head and one of its members
the people will be most apt to unite with their local government.
If, in addition to this immense advantage, the ambition of the members
should be stimulated by the separate and independent possession of
military forces, it would afford too strong a temptation and too great
a facility to them to make enterprises upon, and finally to subvert,
the constitutional authority of the union. On the other hand, the
liberty of the people would be less safe in this state of things
than in that which left the national forces in the hands of the
national government. As far as an army may be considered as a
dangerous weapon of power, it had better be in those hands of which
the people are most likely to be jealous than in those of which they
are least likely to be jealous. For it is a truth, which the
experience of ages has attested, that the people are always most in
danger when the means of injuring their rights are in the possession
of those of whom they entertain the least suspicion.
The framers of the existing Confederation, fully aware of the danger
to the Union from the separate possession of military forces by the
States, have, in express terms, prohibited them from having either
ships or troops, unless with the consent of Congress. The truth is,
that the existence of a federal government and military establishments
under State authority are not less at variance with each other than
a due supply of the federal treasury and the system of quotas and
requisitions.
There are other lights besides those already taken notice of, in
which the impropriety of restraints on the discretion of the
national legislature will be equally manifest. The design of the
objection, which has been mentioned, is to preclude standing armies in
time of peace, though we have never been informed how far it is
designed the prohibition should extend: whether to raising armies as
well as to keeping them up in a season of tranquillity or not. If it
be confined to the latter it will have no precise signification, and
it will be ineffectual for the purpose intended. When armies are
once raised what shall be denominated "keeping them up," contrary to
the sense of the Constitution? What time shall be requisite to
ascertain the violation? Shall it be a week, a month, a year? Or shall
we say they may be continued as long as the danger which occasioned
their being raised continues? This would be to admit that they might
be kept up in time of peace, against threatening or impending
danger, which would be at once to deviate from the literal meaning
of the prohibition, and to introduce an extensive latitude of
construction. Who shall judge of the continuance of the danger? This
must undoubtedly be submitted to the national government, and the
matter would then be brought to this issue, that the national
government, to provide against apprehended danger, might in the
first instance raise troops, and might afterwards keep them on foot as
long as they supposed the peace or safety of the community was in
any degree of jeopardy. It is easy to perceive that a discretion so
latitudinary as this would afford ample room for eluding the force
of the provision.
The supposed utility of a provision of this kind can only be founded
on the supposed probability, or at least possibility, of a combination
between the executive and the legislative, in some scheme of
usurpation. Should this at any time happen, how easy would it be to
fabricate pretences of approaching danger! Indian hostilities,
instigated by Spain or Britain, would always be at hand.
Provocations to produce the desired appearances might even be given to
some foreign power, and appeased again by timely concessions. If we
can reasonably presume such a combination to have been formed, and
that the enterprise is warranted by a sufficient prospect of
success, the army, when once raised, from whatever cause, or on
whatever pretext, may be applied to the execution of the project.
If, to obviate this consequence, it should be resolved to extend the
prohibition to the raising of armies in time of peace, the United
States would then exhibit the most extraordinary spectacle which the
world has yet seen, that of a nation incapacitated by its Constitution
to prepare for defence, before it was actually invaded. As the
ceremony of a formal denunciation of war has of late fallen into
disuse, the presence of an enemy within our territories must be waited
for, as the legal warrant to the government to begin its levies of men
for the protection of the State. We must receive the blow, before we
could even prepare to return it. All that kind of policy by which
nations anticipate distant danger, and meet the gathering storm,
must be abstained from, as contrary to the genuine maxims of a free
government. We must expose our property and liberty to the mercy of
foreign invaders, and invite them by our weakness to seize the naked
and defenceless prey, because we are afraid that rulers, created by
our choice, dependent on our will, might endanger that liberty, by
an abuse of the means necessary to its preservation.
Here I expect we shall be told that the militia of the country is
its natural bulwark, and would be at all times equal to the national
defence. This doctrine, in substance, had like to have lost us our
independence. It cost millions to the United States that might have
been saved. The facts which, from our own experience, forbid a
reliance of this kind, are too recent to permit us to be the dupes
of such a suggestion. The steady operations of war against a regular
and disciplined army can only be successfully conducted by a force
of the same kind. Considerations of economy, not less than of
stability and vigor, confirm this position. The American militia, in
the course of the late war, have, by their valor on numerous
occasions, erected eternal monuments to their fame; but the bravest of
them feel and know the liberty of their country could not have been
established by their efforts alone, however great and valuable they
were. War, like most other things, is a science to be acquired and
perfected by diligence, by perseverance, by time, and by practice.
All violent policy, as it is contrary to the natural and experienced
course of human affairs, defeats itself. Pennsylvania, at this
instant, affords an example of the truth of this remark. The Bill of
Rights of that State declares that standing armies are dangerous to
liberty, and ought not to be kept up in time of peace. Pennsylvania,
nevertheless, in a time of profound peace, from the existence of
partial disorders in one or two of her counties, has resolved to raise
a body of troops; and in all probability will keep them up as long
as there is any appearance of danger to the public peace. The
conduct of Massachusetts affords a lesson on the same subject,
though on different ground. That State (without waiting for the
sanction of Congress, as the articles of the Confederation require)
was compelled to raise troops to quell a domestic insurrection, and
still keeps a corps in pay to prevent a revival of the spirit of
revolt. The particular constitution of Massachusetts opposed no
obstacle to the measure; but the instance is still of use to
instruct us that cases are likely to occur under our government, as
well as under those of other nations, which will sometimes render a
military force in time of peace essential to the security of the
society, and that it is therefore improper in this respect to
control the legislative discretion. It also teaches us, in its
application to the United States, how little the rights of a feeble
government are likely to be respected, even by its own constituents.
And it teaches us, in addition to the rest, how unequal parchment
provisions are to a struggle with public necessity.
It was a fundamental maxim of the Lacedaemonian commonwealth, that
the post of admiral should not be conferred twice on the same
person. The Peloponnesian confederates, having suffered a severe
defeat at sea from the Athenians, demanded Lysander, who had before
served with success in that capacity, to command the combined
fleets. The Lacedaemonians, to gratify their allies, and yet
preserve the semblance of an adherence to their ancient
institutions, had recourse to the flimsy subterfuge of investing
Lysander with the real power of admiral, under the normal title of
vice-admiral. The instance is selected from among a multitude that
might be cited to confirm the truth already advanced and illustrated
by domestic examples; which is, that nations pay little regard to
rules and maxims calculated in their very nature to run counter to the
necessities of society. Wise politicians will be cautious about
fettering the governments with restrictions that cannot be observed,
because they know that every breach of the fundamental laws, though
dictated by necessity, impairs that sacred reverence which ought to be
maintained in the breast of rulers towards the constitution of a
country, and forms a precedent for other breaches where the same
plea of necessity does not exist at all, or is less urgent and
palpable.
- PUBLIUS
NO 26: The Subject Continued with the Same View
by Alexander Hamilton
-
IT WAS a thing hardly to be expected that in a popular revolution
the minds of men should stop at that happy mean which marks the
salutary boundary between POWER and PRIVILEGE, and combines the energy
of government with the security of private rights. A failure in this
delicate and important point is the great source of the inconveniences
we experience, and if we are not cautious to avoid a repetition of the
error, in our future attempts to rectify and ameliorate our system, we
may travel from one chimerical project to another; we may try change
after change: but we shall never be likely to make any material change
for the better
The idea of restraining the legislative authority, in the means of
providing for the national defence, is one of those refinements
which owe their origin to a zeal for liberty more ardent than
enlightened. We have seen, however, that it has not had thus far an
extensive prevalency; that even in this country, where it made its
first appearance, Pennsylvania and North Carolina are the only two
States by which it has been in any degree patronized; and that all the
others have refused to give it the least countenance; wisely judging
that confidence must be placed somewhere; that the necessity of
doing it, is implied in the very act of delegating power; and that
it is better to hazard the abuse of that confidence than to
embarrass the government and endanger the public safety by impolitic
restrictions on the legislative authority. The opponents of the
proposed Constitution combat, in this respect, the general decision of
America; and instead of being taught by experience the propriety of
correcting any extremes into which we may have heretofore run, they
appear disposed to conduct us into others still more dangerous, and
more extravagant. As if the tone of government had been found too
high, or too rigid, the doctrines they teach are calculated to
induce us to depress or to relax it, by expedients which, upon other
occasions, have been condemned or forborne. It may be affirmed without
the imputation of invective, that if the principles they inculcate, on
various points, could so far obtain as to become the popular creed,
they would utterly unfit the people of this country for any species of
government whatever. But a danger of this kind is not to be
apprehended. The citizens of America have too much discernment to be
argued into anarchy. And I am much mistaken, if experience has not
wrought a deep and solemn conviction in the public mind, that
greater energy of government is essential to the welfare and
prosperity of the community.
It may not be amiss in this place concisely to remark the origin and
progress of this idea, which aims at the exclusion of military
establishments in time of peace. Though in speculative minds it may
arise from a contemplation of the nature and tendency of such
institutions, fortified by the events that have happened in other ages
and countries, yet as a national sentiment, it must be traced to those
habits of thinking which we derive from the nation from whom the
inhabitants of these States have in general sprung.
In England, for a long time after the Norman Conquest, the authority
of the monarch was almost unlimited. Inroads were gradually made
upon the prerogative, in favor of liberty, first by the barons, and
afterwards by the people, till the greatest part of its most
formidable pretensions became extinct. But it was not till the
revolution in 1688, which elevated the Prince of Orange to the
throne of Great Britain, that English liberty was completely
triumphant. As incident to the undefined power of making war, an
acknowledge prerogative of the crown, Charles II. had, by his own
authority, kept on foot in time of peace a body of 5,000 regular
troops. And this number James II. increased to 30,000; who were paid
out of his civil list. At the revolution, to abolish the exercise of
so dangerous an authority, it became an article of the Bill of
Rights then framed, that "the raising or keeping a standing army
within the kingdom in time of peace, unless with the consent of
Parliament, was against law."
In that kingdom, when the pulse of liberty was at its highest pitch,
no security against the danger of standing armies was thought
requisite, beyond a prohibition of their being raised or kept up by
the mere authority of the executive magistrate. The patriots, who
effected that memorable revolution, were too temperate, too
well-informed, to think of any restraint on the legislative
discretion. They were aware that a certain number of troops for guards
and garrisons were indispensable; that no precise bounds could be
set to the national exigencies; that a power equal to every possible
contingency must exist somewhere in the government: and that when they
referred the exercise of that power to the judgment of the
legislature, they had arrived at the ultimate point of precaution
which was reconcilable with the safety of the community.
From the same source, the people of America may be said to have
derived an hereditary impression of danger to liberty, from standing
armies in time of peace. The circumstances of a revolution quickened
the public sensibility on every point connected with the security of
popular rights, and in some instances raised the warmth of our zeal
beyond the degree which consisted with the due temperature of the body
politic. The attempts of two of the States to restrict the authority
of the legislature in the article of military establishments are of
the number of the instances. The principles which had taught us to
be jealous of the power of an hereditary monarch were by an
injudicious excess extended to the representatives of the people in
their popular assemblies. Even in some of the States, where this error
was not adopted, we find unnecessary declarations that standing armies
ought not be kept up, in time of peace, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE
LEGISLATURE. I call them unnecessary, because the reason which had
introduced a similar provision into the English Bill of Rights is
not applicable to any of the State constitutions. The power of raising
armies at all, under those constitutions, can by no construction be
deemed to reside anywhere else, than in the legislatures themselves;
and it was superfluous, if not absurd, to declare that a matter should
not be done without the consent of a body, which alone had the power
of doing it. Accordingly, in some of those constitutions, and among
others, in that of this State of New York, which has been justly
celebrated, both in Europe and America, as one of the best of the
forms of government established in this country, there is a total
silence upon the subject.
It is remarkable, that even in the two States which seem to have
meditated an interdiction of military establishments in time of peace,
the mode of expression made use of is rather cautionary than
prohibitory. It is not said that standing armies shall not be kept up,
but that they ought not to be kept up in time of peace. This ambiguity
of terms appears to have been the result of a conflict between
jealousy and conviction; between the desire of excluding such
establishments at all events, and the persuasion that an absolute
exclusion would be unwise and unsafe.
Can it be doubted that such a provision, whenever the situation of
public affairs was understood to require a departure form it, would be
interpreted by the legislature into a mere admonition, and would be
made to yield to the necessities or supposed necessities of the State?
Let the fact already mentioned, with respect to Pennsylvania,
decide. What then (it may be asked) is the use of such a provision, if
it cease to operate the moment there is an inclination to disregard
it?
Let us examine whether there be any comparison, in point of
efficacy, between the provisions alluded to and that which is
contained in the new Constitution, for restraining the
appropriations of money for military purposes to the period of two
years. The former, by aiming at too much, is calculated to effect
nothing; the latter, by steering clear of an imprudent extreme, and by
being perfectly compatible with a proper provision for the
exigencies of the nation, will have a salutary and powerful operation.
The legislature of the United States will be obliged, by this
provision, once at least in every two years, to deliberate upon the
propriety of keeping a military force on foot; to come to a new
resolution on the point; and to declare their sense of the matter,
by a formal vote in the face of their constituents. They are not at
liberty to vest in the executive department permanent funds for the
support of an army, if they were even incautious enough to be
willing to repose in it so improper a confidence. As the spirit of
party, in different degrees, must be expected to infect all
political bodies, there will be, no doubt, persons in the national
legislature willing enough to arraign the measures and criminate the
views of the majority. The provision for the support of a military
force will always be a favorable topic for declamation. As often as
the question comes forward, the public attention will be roused and
attracted to the subject, by the party in opposition; and if the
majority should be really disposed to exceed the proper limits, the
community will be warned of the danger, and will have an opportunity
of taking measures to guard against it. Independent of parties in
the national legislature itself, as often as the period of
discussion arrived, the State legislatures, who will always be not
only vigilant but suspicious and jealous guardians of the rights of
the citizens against encroachments from the federal government, will
constantly have their attention awake to the conduct of the national
rulers, and will be ready enough, if any thing improper appears, to
sound the alarm to the people, and not only to be the VOICE, but, if
necessary, the ARM of their discontent.
Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great community require time
to mature them for execution. An army, so large as seriously to menace
those liberties, could only be formed by progressive augmentations;
which would suppose, not merely a temporary combination between the
legislature and executive, but a continued conspiracy for a series
of time. Is it probable that such a combination would exist at all? Is
it probable that it would be preserved in, and transmitted along
through all the successive variations in a representative body,
which biennial elections would naturally produce in both houses? Is it
presumable, that every man, the instant he took his seat in the
national Senate or House of Representatives, would commence a
traitor to his constituents and to his country? Can it be supposed
that there would not be found one man, discerning enough to detect
so atrocious a conspiracy, or bold or honest enough to apprise his
constituents of their danger? If such presumptions can fairly be made,
there ought at once to be an end of all delegated authority. The
people should resolve to recall all the powers they have heretofore
parted with out of their own hands, and to divide themselves into as
many States as there are counties, in order that they may be able to
manage their own concerns in person.
If such suppositions could even be reasonably made, still the
concealment of the design, for any duration, would be impracticable.
It would be announced, by the very circumstance or augmenting the army
to so great an extent in time of profound peace. What colorable reason
could be assigned, in a country so situated, for such vast
augmentations of the military force? It is impossible that the
people could be long deceived; and the destruction of the project, and
of the projectors, would quickly follow the discovery.
It has been said that the provision which limits the appropriation
of money for the support of any army to the period of two years
would be unavailing, because the Executive, when once possessed of a
force large enough to awe the people into submission, would find
resources in that very force sufficient to enable him to dispense with
supplies from the acts of the legislature. But the question again
recurs, upon what pretence could he be put in possession of a force of
that magnitude in time of peace? If we suppose it to have been created
in consequence of some domestic insurrection or foreign war, then it
becomes a case not within the principles of the objection; for this is
levelled against the power of keeping up troops in time of peace.
Few persons will be so visionary as seriously to contend that military
forces ought not to be raised to quell a rebellion or resist an
invasion; and if the defence of the community under such circumstances
should make it necessary to have an army so numerous as to hazard
its liberty, this is one of those calamities for which there is
neither preventative nor cure. It cannot be provided against by any
possible form of government; it might even result from a simple league
offensive and defensive, if it should ever be necessary for the
confederates or allies to form an army for common defence.
But is an evil infinitely less likely to attend us in a united
than in a disunited state; nay, it may be safely asserted that it is
an evil altogether unlikely to attend us in the latter situation. It
is not easy to conceive a possibility that dangers so formidable can
assail the whole Union, as to demand a force considerable enough to
place our liberties in the least jeopardy, especially if we take
into our view the aid to be derived from the militia, which ought
always to be counted upon as a valuable and powerful auxiliary. But in
a state of disunion (as has been fully shown in another place), the
contrary of this supposition would become not only probable, but
almost unavoidable.
- PUBLIUS
NO 27: The Subject Continued with the Same View
by Alexander Hamilton
-
IT HAS been urged, in different shapes, that a Constitution of the
kind proposed by the convention cannot operate without the aid of a
military force to execute its laws. This, however, like most other
things have been alleged on that side, rests on mere general
assertion, unsupported by an precise or intelligible designation of
the reasons upon which it is founded. As far as I have been able to
divine the latent meaning of the objectors, it seems to originate in a
presupposition that the people will be disinclined to the exercise
of federal authority in any matter of an internal nature. Waiving
any exception that might be taken to the inaccuracy or
inexplicitness of the distinction between internal and external, let
us inquire what ground there is to presuppose that disinclination in
the people. Unless we presume at the same time that the powers of
the general government will be worse administered than those of the
State government, there seems to be no room for the presumption of
ill-will, disaffection, or opposition in the people. I believe it
may be laid down as a general rule that their confidence in and
obedience to a government will commonly be proportioned to the
goodness or badness of its administration. It must be admitted that
there are exceptions to this rule; but these exceptions depend so
entirely on accidental causes, that they cannot be considered as
having any relation to the intrinsic merits or demerits of a
constitution. These can only be judged of by general principles and
maxims.
Various reasons have been suggested, in the course of these
papers, to induce a probability that the general government will be
better administered than the particular governments: the principal
of which reasons are that the extension of the spheres of election
will present a greater option, or latitude of choice, to the people;
that through the medium of the State legislatures- which are select
bodies of men, and which are to appoint the members of the national
Senate- there is reason to expect that this branch will generally be
composed with peculiar care and judgment; that these circumstances
promise greater knowledge and more extensive information in the
national councils, and that they will be less apt to be tainted by the
spirit of faction, and more out of the reach of those occasional
ill-humors, or temporary prejudices and propensities, which, in
smaller societies, frequently contaminate the public councils, beget
injustice and oppression of a part of the community, and engender
schemes which, though they gratify a momentary inclination or
desire, terminate in general distress, dissatisfaction, and disgust.
Several additional reasons of considerable force, to fortify that
probability, will occur when we come to survey, with a more critical
eye, the interior structure of the edifice which we are invited to
erect. It will be sufficient here to remark, that until satisfactory
reasons can be assigned to justify an opinion, that the federal
government is likely to be administered in such a manner as to
render it odious or contemptible to the people, there can be no
reasonable foundation for the supposition that the laws of the Union
will meet with any greater obstruction from them, or will stand in
need of any other methods to enforce their execution, than the laws of
the particular members.
The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedition; the dread
of punishment, a proportionably strong discouragement to it. Will
not the government of the Union, which, if possessed of a due degree
of power, can call to its aid the collective resources of the whole
Confederacy, be more likely to repress the former sentiment and to
inspire the latter, than that of a single State, which can only
command the resources within itself? A turbulent faction in a State
may easily suppose itself able to contend with the friends to the
government in that State; but it can hardly be so infatuated as to
imagine itself a match for the combined efforts of the Union. If
this reflection be just, there is less danger of resistance from
irregular combinations of individuals to the authority of the
Confederacy than to that of a single member.
I will, in this place, hazard an observation, which will not be
the less just because to some it may appear new; which is, that the
more the operations of the national authority are intermingled in
the ordinary exercise of government, the more the citizens are
accustomed to meet with it in the common occurrences of their
political life; the more it is familiarized to their sight and to
their feelings, the further it enters into those objects which touch
the most sensible chords and put in motion the most active springs
of the human heart, the greater will be the probability that it will
conciliate the respect and attachment of the community. Man is very
much a creature of habit. A thing that rarely strikes his senses
will generally have but little influence upon his mind. A government
continually at a distance and out of sight can hardly be expected to
interest the sensations of the people. The inference is, that the
authority of the Union, and the affections of the citizens towards it,
will be strengthened, rather than weakened, by its extension to what
are called matters of internal concern; and will have less occasion to
recur to force, in proportion to the familiarity and comprehensiveness
of its agency. The more it circulates through those channels and
currents in which the passions of mankind naturally flow, the less
will it require the aid of the violent and perilous expedients of
compulsion.
One thing, at all events, must be evident, that a government like
the one proposed would bid much fairer to avoid the necessity of using
force than the species of league contended for by most of its
opponents, the authority of which should only operate upon the
States in their political or collective capacities. It has been
shown that in such a Confederacy there can be no sanction for the laws
but force; that frequent delinquencies in the members are the
natural offspring of the very frame of the government; and that as
often as these happen, they can only be redressed, if at all, by war
and violence.
The plan reported by the convention, by extending the authority of
the federal head to the individual citizens of the several States,
will enable the government to employ the ordinary magistracy of
each, in the execution of its laws. It is easy to perceive that this
will tend to destroy, in the common apprehension, all distinction
between the sources from which they might proceed; and will give the
federal government the same advantage for securing a due obedience
to its authority which is enjoyed by the government of each State,
in addition to the influence on public opinion which will result
from the important consideration of its having power to call to its
assistance and support the resources of the whole Union. It merits
particular attention in this place, that the laws of the
Confederacy, as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its
jurisdiction, will become the SUPREME LAW of the land; to the
observance of which all officers, legislative, executive, and
judicial, in each State, will be bound by the sanctity of an oath.
Thus the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the respective
members, will be incorporated into the operations of the national
government as far as its just and constitutional authority extends;
and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws. *027
Any man who will pursue, by his own reflections, the consequences of
this situation, will perceive that there is good ground to calculate
upon a regular and peaceable execution of the laws of the Union, if
its powers are administered with a common share of prudence. If we
will arbitrarily suppose the contrary, we may deduce any inferences we
please from the supposition; for it is certainly possible, by an
injudicious exercise of the authorities of the best government that
ever was, or ever can be instituted, to provoke and precipitate the
people into the wildest excesses. But though the adversaries of the
proposed Constitution should presume that the national rulers would be
insensible to the motives of public good, or to the obligations of
duty, I would still ask them how the interests of ambition, or the
views of encroachment, can be promoted by such a conduct?
- PUBLIUS
NO 28: The Same Subject Concluded
by Alexander Hamilton
-
THAT there may happen cases in which the national government may
be necessitated to resort to force, cannot be denied. Our own
experience has corroborated the lessons taught by the examples of
others nations; that emergencies of this sort will sometimes arise
in all societies, however constituted; that seditions and
insurrections are, unhappily, maladies as inseparable from the body
politic as tumors and eruptions from the natural body; that the idea
of governing at all times by the simple force of law (which we have
been told is the only admissible principle of republican
government), has no place but in the reveries of those political
doctors whose sagacity disdains the admonitions of experimental
instruction.
Should such emergencies at any time happen under the national
government, there could be no remedy but force. The means to be
employed must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief. If it
should be a slight commotion in a small part of a State, the militia
of the residue would be adequate to its suppression; and the natural
presumption is that they would be ready to do their duty. An
insurrection, whatever may be its immediate cause, eventually
endangers all government. Regard to the public peace, if not to the
rights of the Union, would engage the citizens to whom the contagion
had not communicated itself to oppose the insurgents; and if the
general government should be found in practice conducive to the
prosperity and felicity of the people, it were irrational to believe
that they would be disinclined to its support.
If, on the contrary, the insurrection should pervade a whole
State, or a principal part of it, the employment of a different kind
of force might become unavoidable. It appears that Massachusetts found
it necessary to raise troops for repressing the disorders within
that State; that Pennsylvania, from the mere apprehension of
commotions among a part of her citizens, has thought proper to have
recourse to the same measure. Suppose the State of New York had been
inclined to re-establish her lost jurisdiction over the inhabitants of
Vermont, could she have hoped for success in such an enterprise from
the efforts of the militia alone? Would she not have been compelled to
raise and to maintain a more regular force for the execution of her
design? If it must then be admitted that the necessity of recurring to
a force different from the militia, in cases of this extraordinary
nature, is applicable to the State governments themselves, why
should the possibility, that the national government might be under
a like necessity, in similar extremities, be made an objection to
its existence? Is it not surprising that men who declare an attachment
to the Union in the abstract should urge as an objection to the
proposed Constitution what applies with tenfold weight to the plan for
which they contend; and what, as far as it has any foundation in
truth, is an inevitable consequence of civil society upon an
enlarged scale? Who would not prefer that possibility to the unceasing
agitations and frequent revolutions which are the continual scourges
of petty republics?
Let us presume this examination in another light. Suppose, in lieu
of one general system, two, or three, or even four Confederacies
were to be formed, would not the same difficulty oppose itself to
the operations of either of these Confederacies? Would not each of
them be exposed to the same casualties; and when these happened, be
obliged to have recourse to the same expedients for upholding its
authority which are objected to in a government for all the States?
Would the militia, in this supposition, be more ready or more able
to support the federal authority than in the case of a general
union? All candid and intelligent men must, upon due consideration,
acknowledge that the principle of the objection is equally
applicable to either of the two cases; and that whether they have
one government for all the States, or different governments for
different parcels of them, or even if there should be an entire
separation of the States, there might sometimes be a necessity to make
use of a force constituted differently from the militia, to preserve
the peace of the community and to maintain the just authority of the
laws against those violent invasions of them which amount to
insurrections and rebellions.
Independent of all other reasonings upon the subject, it is a full
answer to those who require a more peremptory provision against
military establishments in time of peace, to say that the whole powers
of the proposed government is to be in the hands of the
representatives of the people. This is the essential, and, after
all, only efficacious security for the rights and privileges of the
people, which is attainable in civil society. *028
If the representatives of the people betray their constituents,
there is then no resource left but in the exertion of that original
right of self-defence which is paramount to all positive forms of
government, and which against the usurpations of the national rulers
may be exerted with infinitely better prospect of success than against
those of the rulers of an individual state. In a single state, if
the persons intrusted with supreme power become usurpers, the
different parcels, subdivisions, or districts of which it consists,
having no distinct government in each, can take no regular measures
for defence. The citizens must rush tumultuously to arms, without
concert, without system, without resource, except in their courage and
despair. The usurpers, clothed with the forms of legal authority,
can too often crush the opposition in embryo. The smaller the extent
of the territory, the more difficult will it be for the people to form
a regular or systematic plan of opposition, and the more easy will
it be to defeat their early efforts. Intelligence can be more speedily
obtained of their preparations and movements, and the military force
in the possession of the usurpers can be more rapidly directed against
the part where the opposition has begun. In this situation there
must be a peculiar coincidence of circumstances to insure success to
the popular resistance.
The obstacles to usurpation and the facilities of resistance
increase with the increased extent of the state, provided the citizens
understand their rights and are disposed to defend them. The natural
strength of the people in a large community, in proportion to the
artificial strength of the government, is greater than in a small, and
of course more competent to a struggle with the attempts of the
government to establish a tyranny. But in a confederacy the people,
without exaggeration, may be said to be entirely the masters of
their own fate. Power being almost always the rival of power, the
general government will at times stand ready to check the
usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same
disposition towards the general government. The people, by throwing
themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If
their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the other
as the instrument of redress. How wise will it be in them by
cherishing the union to preserve to themselves an advantage which
can never be too highly prized!
It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system,
that the State governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford
complete security against invasions of the public liberty by the
national authority. Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under
pretences so likely to escape the penetration of select bodies of men,
as of the people at large. The legislatures will have better means
of information. They can discover the danger at a distance; and
possessing all the organs of the civil power, and the confidence of
the people, they can at once adopt a regular plan of opposition, in
which they can combine all the resources of the community. They can
readily communicate with each other in the different States, and unite
their common forces for the protection of their common liberty.
The great extent of the country is a further security. We have
already experienced its utility against the attacks of a foreign
power. And it would have precisely the same effect against the
enterprises of ambitious rulers in the national councils. If the
federal army should be able to quell the resistance of one State,
the distant States would have it in their power to make head with
fresh forces. The advantages obtained in one place must be abandoned
to subdue the opposition in others; and the moment the part which
had been reduced to submission was left to itself, its efforts would
be renewed, and its resistance revive.
We should recollect that the extent of the military force must, at
all events, be regulated by the resources of the country. For a long
time to come, it will not be possible to maintain a large army; and as
the means of doing this increase, the population and natural
strength of the community will proportionably increase. When will
the time arrive that the federal government can raise and maintain
an army capable of erecting a despotism over the great body of the
people of an immense empire, who are in a situation, through the
medium of their State governments, to take measures for their own
defence, with all the celerity, regularity, and system of
independent nations? The apprehension may be considered as a
disease, for which there can be found no cure in the resources of
argument and reasoning.
- PUBLIUS
NO 29: Concerning the Militia
by Alexander Hamilton
-
The power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its
services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents
to the duties of superintending the common defence, and of watching
over the internal peace of the Confederacy.
It requires no skill in the science of war to discern that
uniformity in the organization and discipline of the militia would
be attended with the most beneficial effects, whenever they were
called into service for the public defence. It would enable them to
discharge the duties of the camp and of the field with mutual
intelligence and concert- an advantage of peculiar moment in the
operations of an army; and it would fit them much sooner to acquire
the degree of proficiency in military functions which would be
essential to the usefulness. This desirable uniformity can only be
accomplished by confiding the regulation of the militia to the
direction of the national authority. It is, therefore, with the most
evident propriety, that the plan of the convention proposes to empower
the Union, "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the
militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the
service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively the
appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."
Of the different grounds which have been taken in opposition to
the plan of the convention, there is none that was so little to have
been expected, or is so untenable in itself, as the one from which
this particular provision has been attacked. If a well-regulated
militia be the most natural defence of a free country, it ought
certainly to be under the regulation and at the disposal of that
body which is constituted the guardian of the national security. If
standing armies are dangerous to liberty, an efficacious power over
the militia, in the body to whose care the protection of the State
is committed, ought, as far as possible, to take away the inducement
and the pretext to such unfriendly institutions. If the federal
government can command the aid of the militia in those emergencies
which call for the military arm in support of the civil magistrate, it
can the better dispense with the employment of a different kind of
force. If it cannot avail itself of the former, it will be obliged
to recur to the latter. To render an army unnecessary will be a more
certain method of preventing its existence than a thousand
prohibitions upon paper.
In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling forth the
militia to execute the laws of the Union, it has been remarked that
there is nowhere any provision in the proposed Constitution for
calling out the POSSE COMITATUS, to assist the magistrate in the
execution of his duty, whence it has been inferred that military force
was intended to be his only auxiliary. There is a striking incoherence
in the objections which have appeared, and sometimes even from the
same quarter, not much calculated to inspire a favorable opinion of
the sincerity of fair dealing of their authors. The same persons who
tell us in one breath that the powers of the federal government will
be despotic and unlimited inform us in the next that it has not
authority sufficient even to call out the POSSE COMITATUS. The latter,
fortunately, is as much short of the truth as the former exceeds it.
It would be as absurd to doubt that a right to pass all laws necessary
and proper to execute its declared powers would include that of
requiring the assistance of the citizens to the officers, who may be
intrusted with the execution of those laws, as it would be to
believe that a right to enact laws necessary and proper for the
imposition and collection of taxes would involve that of varying the
rules of descent and of the alienation of landed property, or of
abolishing the trial by jury in cases relating to it. It being
therefore evident that the supposition of a want of power to require
the aid of the POSSE COMITATUS is entirely destitute of color, it will
follow that the conclusion which has been drawn from it, in its
application to the authority of the federal government over the
militia, is as uncandid as it is illogical. What reason could there be
to infer that force was intended to be the sole instrument of
authority, merely because there is a power to make use of it when
necessary? What shall we think of the motives which could induce men
of sense to reason in this manner? How shall we prevent a conflict
between charity and judgment?
By a curious refinement upon the spirit of republican jealously,
we are even taught to apprehend danger from the militia itself, in the
hands of the federal government. It is observed that select corps
may be formed, composed of the young and ardent, who may be rendered
subservient to the views of arbitrary power. What plan for the
regulation of the militia may be pursued by the national government is
impossible to be foreseen. But so far from viewing the matter in the
same light with those who object to select corps as dangerous, were
the Constitution ratified, and were I to deliver my sentiments to a
member of the federal legislature from this State on the subject of
a militia establishment, I should hold to him, in substance, the
following discourse:
"The project of disciplining all the militia of the United States is
as futile as it would be injurious, if it were capable of being
carried into execution. A tolerable expertness in military movements
is a business that requires time and practice. It is not a day, or
even a week, that will suffice for the attainment of it. To oblige the
great body of the yeomanry, and of the other classes of citizens, to
be under arms for the purpose of going through military exercises
and evolutions, as often as might be necessary to acquire the degree
of perfection which would entitle them to the character of a
well-regulated militia, would be a real grievance to the people, and a
serious public inconvenience and loss. It would form an annual
deduction from the productive labor of the country, to an amount
which, calculating upon the present numbers of the people, would not
fall far short of the whole expense of the civil establishments of all
the States. To attempt a thing which would abridge the mass of labor
and industry to so considerable an extent would be unwise; and the
experiment, if made, could not succeed, because if would not long be
endured. Little more can reasonably be aimed at, with respect to the
people at large, than to have them properly armed and equipped; and in
order to see that this be not neglected, it will be necessary to
assemble them once or twice in the course of a year.
"But though the scheme of disciplining the whole nation must be
abandoned as mischievous or impracticable, yet is a matter of the
utmost importance that a well-digested plan should, as soon as
possible, be adopted for the proper establishment of the militia.
The attention of the government ought particularly to be directed to
the formation of a select corps of moderate extent, upon such
principles as will really fit them for service in case of need. By
thus circumscribing the plan, it will be possible to have an excellent
body of well-trained militia ready to take the field whenever the
defence of the State shall require it. This will not only lessen the
call of military establishments, but if circumstances should at any
time oblige the government to form an army of any magnitude that
army can never be formidable to the liberties of the people while
there is a large body of citizens, little, if at all, inferior to them
in discipline and the use of arms, who stand ready to defend their own
rights and those of their fellow-citizens. This appears to me the only
substitute that can be devised for a standing army, and the best
possible security against it, if it should exist."
Thus differently from the adversaries of the proposed Constitution
should I reason on the same subject, deducing arguments of safety from
the very sources which they represent as fraught with danger and
perdition. But how the national legislature may reason on the point is
a thing which neither they nor I can foresee.
There is something so far-fetched, and so extravagant in the idea of
danger to liberty from the militia that one is at a loss whether to
treat it with gravity or with raillery; whether to consider it as a
mere trial of skill, like the paradoxes of rhetoricians; as a
disingenuous artifice to instil prejudices at any price; or as the
serious offspring of political fanaticism. Where, in the name of
common-sense, are our fears to end if we may not trust our sons, our
brothers, our neighbors, our fellow-citizens? What shadow of danger
can there be from men who are daily mingling with the rest of their
countrymen, and who participate with them in the same feelings,
sentiments, habits, and interests? What reasonable cause of
apprehension can be inferred from a power in the Union to prescribe
regulations for the militia, and to command its services when
necessary, while the particular States are to have the sole and
exclusive appointment of the officers? If it were possible seriously
to indulge a jealousy of the militia upon any conceivable
establishment under the federal government, the circumstance of the
officers being in the appointment of the States ought at once to
extinguish it. There can be no doubt that this circumstance will
always secure to them a preponderating influence over the militia.
In reading many of the publications against the Constitution, a
man is apt to imagine that he is perusing some ill-written tale or
romance, which, instead of natural and agreeable images, exhibits to
the mind nothing but frightful and distorted shapes-
-
Gorgons, hydras, and chimeras dire;
-
discoloring and disfiguring whatever it represents, and transforming
every thing it touches into a monster.
A sample of this is to be observed in the exaggerated and improbable
suggestions which have taken place respecting the power of calling for
the services of the militia. That of New Hampshire is to be marched to
Georgia, of Georgia to New Hampshire, of New York to Kentucky, and
of Kentucky to Lake Champlain. Nay, the debt due to the French and
Dutch are to be paid in militiamen instead of louis d'ors and
ducats. At one moment there is to be a large army to lay prostrate the
liberties of the people; at another moment the militia of Virginia are
to be dragged from their homes five or six hundred miles, to tame
the republican contumacy of Massachusetts; and that of Massachusetts
is to be transported an equal distance to subdue the refractory
haughtiness of the aristocratic Virginians. Do the persons who rave at
this rate imagine that their art or their eloquence can impose any
conceits or absurdities upon the people of America for infallible
truths?
If there should be an army to be made use of as the engine of
despotism, what need of the militia? If there should be no army,
whither would be the militia, irritated by being called upon to
undertake a distant and hopeless expedition, for the purpose of
riveting the chains of slavery upon a part of their countrymen, direct
their course, but to the seat of the tyrants, who had meditated so
foolish as well as so wicked a project, to crush them in their
imagined intrenchments of power, and to make them an example of the
just vengeance of an abused and incensed people? Is this the way in
which usurpers stride to dominion over a numerous and enlightened
nation? Do they begin by exciting the detestation of the very
instruments of their intended usurpations? Do they usually commence
their career by wanton and disgustful acts of power, calculated to
answer no end, but to draw upon themselves universal hatred and
execration? Are suppositions of this sort the sober admonitions of
discerning patriots to a discerning people? Or are they the
inflammatory ravings of incendiaries or distempered enthusiasts? If we
were even to suppose the national rulers actuated by the most
ungovernable ambition, it is impossible to believe that they would
employ such preposterous means to accomplish their design.
In times of insurrection, or invasion, it would be natural and
proper that the militia of a neighboring State should be marched
into another, to resist a common enemy, or to guard the republic
against the violence of faction or sedition. This was frequently the
case, in respect to the first object, in the course of the late war;
and this mutual succor is, indeed, a principal end of our political
association. If the power of affording it be placed under the
direction of the Union, there will be no danger of a supine and
listless inattention to the dangers of a neighbor, till its near
approach had superadded the incitements of self-preservation to the
too feeble impulses of duty and sympathy.
- PUBLIUS
NO 30: Concerning Taxation
by Alexander Hamilton
-
IT HAS been already observed that the federal government ought to
possess the power of providing for the support of the national forces;
in which proposition was intended to be included the expense of
raising troops, of building and equipping fleets, and all other
expenses in any wise connected with military arrangements and
operations. But these are not the only objects to which the
jurisdiction of the Union, in respect to revenue, must necessarily
be empowered to extend. It must embrace a provision for the support of
the national civil list; for the payment of the national debts
contracted, or that may be contracted; and, in general, for all
those matters which will call for disbursements out of the national
treasury. The conclusion is that there must be interwoven, in the
frame of the government, a general power of taxation, in one shape
or another.
Money is, with propriety, considered as the vital principle of the
body politic, as that which sustains its life and motion, and
enables it to perform its most essential functions. A complete
power, therefore, to produce a regular and adequate supply of it, as
far as the resources of the community will permit, may be regarded
as an indispensable ingredient in every constitution. From a
deficiency in this particular, one of two evils must ensue: either the
people must be subjected to continual plunder, as a substitute for a
more eligible mode of supplying the public wants, or the government
must sink into a fatal atrophy, and, in a short course of time,
perish.
In the Ottoman or Turkish empire, the sovereign, though in other
respects absolute master of the lives and fortunes of his subjects,
has no right to impose a new tax. The consequence is that he permits
the bashaws or governors of provinces to pillage the people without
mercy; and, in turn, squeezes out of them the sums of which he
stands in need, to satisfy his own exigencies and those of the
state. In America, from a like cause, the government of the Union
has gradually dwindled into a state of decay, approaching nearly to
annihilation. Who can doubt that the happiness of the people in both
countries would be promoted by competent authorities in the proper
hands, to provide the revenues which the necessities of the public
might require?
The present Confederation, feeble as it is, intended to repose in
the United States as unlimited power of providing for the pecuniary
wants of the Union. But proceeding upon an erroneous principle, it has
been done in such a manner as entirely to have frustrated the
intention. Congress, by the articles which composed that compact (as
has already been stated), are authorized to ascertain and call for any
sums of money necessary, in their judgment, to the service of the
United States; and their requisitions, if conformable to the rule of
apportionment, are in every constitutional sense obligatory upon the
States. These have no right to question the propriety of the demand;
no discretion beyond that of devising the ways and means of furnishing
the sums demanded. But though this be strictly and truly the case,
though the assumption of such a right would be an infringement of
the articles of Union, though it may seldom or never have been
avowedly claimed, yet in practice it has been constantly exercised,
and would continue to be so, as long as the revenues of the
Confederacy should remain dependent on the intermediate agency of
its members. What the consequences of this system have been is
within the knowledge of every man the least conversant in our public
affairs, and has been amply unfolded in different parts to these
inquiries. It is this which has chiefly contributed to reduce us to
a situation, which affords ample cause both of mortification to
ourselves, and of triumph to our enemies.
What remedy can there be for this situation, but in a change of
the system which has produced it- in a change of the fallacious and
delusive system of quotas and requisitions? What substitute can
there be imagined for this ignis fatuus in finance, but that of
permitting the national government to raise its own revenues by the
ordinary methods of taxation authorized in every well-ordered
constitution of civil government? Ingenious men may declaim with
plausibility on any subject; but no human ingenuity can point out
any other expedient to rescue us from the inconveniences and
embarrassments naturally resulting from defective supplies of the
public treasury.
The more intelligent adversaries of the new Constitution admit the
force of this reasoning; but they qualify their admission by a
distinction between what they call internal and external taxation. The
former they would reserve to the State governments, the latter,
which they explain into commercial imposts, or rather duties on
imported articles, they declare themselves willing to concede to the
federal head. This distinction, however, would violate the maxim of
good sense and sound policy, which dictates that every POWER ought
to be in proportion to its OBJECT; and would still leave the general
government in a kind of tutelage to the State governments,
inconsistent with every idea of vigor or efficiency. Who can pretend
that commercial imposts are, or would be, alone equal to the present
and future exigencies of the Union? Taking into the account the
existing debt, foreign and domestic, upon any plan of extinguishment
which a man moderately impressed with the importance of public justice
and public credit could approve, in addition to the establishments
which all parties will acknowledge to be necessary, we could not
reasonably flatter ourselves, that this resource alone, upon the
most improved scale, would even suffice for its present necessities.
Its future necessities admit not of calculation or limitation; and
upon the principle, more than once adverted to, the power of making
provision for them as they arise ought to be equally unconfined. I
believe it may be regarded as a position warranted by the history of
mankind, that, in the usual progress of things, the necessities of a
nation, in every stage of existence, will be found at least equal to
its resources.
To say that deficiencies may be provided for by requisitions upon
the States, is on the one hand to acknowledge that this system
cannot be depended upon, and on the other hand to depend upon it for
every thing beyond a certain limit. Those who have carefully
attended to its vices and deformities as they have been exhibited to
experience, or delineated in the course of these papers, must feel
invincible repugnancy to trusting the national interests in any degree
to its operation. Its inevitable tendency, whenever it is brought into
activity, must be to enfeeble the Union, and sow the seeds of
discord and contention between the federal head and its members, and
between the members themselves. Can it be expected that the
deficiencies would be better supplied in this mode than the total
wants of the Union have heretofore been supplied in the same mode?
It ought to be recollected that if less will be required from the
States, they will have proportionally less means to answer the demand.
If the opinions of those who contend for the distinction which has
been mentioned were to be received as evidence of truth, one would
be led to conclude that there was some known point in the economy of
national affairs at which it would be safe to stop and to say: Thus
far the ends of public happiness will be promoted by supplying the
wants of government, and all beyond this is unworthy of our care or
anxiety. How is it possible that a government half supplied, and
always necessitous, can fulfil the purposes of its institution, can
provide for the security, advance the prosperity, or support the
reputation of the commonwealth? How can it ever possess either
energy or stability, dignity or credit, confidence at home or
respectability abroad? How can its administration be any thing else
than a succession of expedients temporizing, impotent, disgraceful?
How will it be able to avoid a frequent sacrifice of its engagements
to immediate necessity? How can it undertake or execute any liberal or
enlarged plans of public good?
Let us attend to what would be the effects of this situation in
the very first war in which we should happen to be engaged. We will
presume, for argument's sake, that the revenue arising from the impost
duties answers the purposes of a provision for the public debt and
of a peace establishment for the Union. Thus circumstanced, a war
breaks out. What would be the probable conduct of the government in
such an emergency? Taught by experience that proper dependence could
not be placed on the success of requisitions, unable by its own
authority to lay hold of fresh resources, and urged by
considerations of national danger, would it not be driven to the
expedient of diverting the funds already appropriated from their
proper objects to the defence of the State? It is not easy to see
how a step of this kind could be avoided; and if it should be taken,
it is evident that it would prove the destruction of public credit
at the very moment that it was becoming essential to the public
safety. To imagine that at such a crisis credit might be dispensed
with, would be the extreme of infatuation. In the modern system of
war, nations the most wealthy are obliged to have recourse to large
loans. A country so little opulent as ours must feel this necessity in
a much stronger degree. But who would lend to a government that
prefaced its overtures for borrowing by an act which demonstrated that
no reliance could be placed on the steadiness of its measures for
paying? The loans it might be able to procure would be as limited in
their extent as burdensome in their conditions. They would be made
upon the same principles that usurers commonly lend to bankrupt and
fraudulent debtors- with a sparing hand and at enormous premiums.
It may perhaps be imagined that, from the scantiness of the
resources of the country, the necessity of diverting the established
funds in the case supposed would exist, though the national government
should possess an unrestrained power of taxation. But two
considerations will serve to quiet all apprehension on this head:
one is that we are sure the resources of the community, in their
full extent, will be brought into activity for the benefit of the
Union; the other is that whatever deficiencies there may be can
without difficulty be supplied by loans.
The power of creating new funds upon new objects of taxation, by its
own authority, would enable the national government to borrow as far
as its necessities might require. Foreigners, as well as the
citizens of America, could then reasonably repose confidence in its
engagements; but to depend upon a government that must itself depend
upon thirteen other governments for the means of fulfilling its
contracts, when once its situation is clearly understood, would
require a degree of credulity not often to be met with in the
pecuniary transactions of mankind, and little reconcilable with the
usual sharp-sightedness of avarice.
Reflections of this kind may have trifling weight with men who
hope to see realized in America the halcyon scenes of the poetic or
fabulous age; but to those who believe we are likely to experience a
common portion of the vicissitudes and calamities which have fallen to
the lot of other nations, they must appear entitled to serious
attention. Such men must behold the actual situation of their
country with painful solicitude, and deprecate the evils which
ambition or revenge might, with too much facility, inflict upon it.
- PUBLIUS
NO 31: The Same Subject Continued
by Alexander Hamilton
-
IN DISQUISITIONS of every kind, there are certain primary truths, or
first principles, upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend.
These contain an internal evidence which, antecedent to all reflection
or combination, commands the assent of the mind. Where it produces not
this effect, it must proceed either from some defect or disorder in
the organs of perception, or from the influence of some strong
interest, or passion, or prejudice. Of this nature are the maxims in
geometry, that "the whole is greater its parts; things equal to the
same are equal to one another; two straight lines cannot enclose a
space; and all right angles are equal to each other. Of the same
nature are these other maxims in ethics and politics, that there
cannot be an effect without a cause; that the means ought to be
proportioned to the end; that every power ought to be commensurate
with its object; that there ought to be no limitation of a power
destined to effect a purpose which is itself incapable of
limitation. And there are other truths in the two latter sciences
which, if they cannot pretend to rank in the class of axioms, are
yet such direct inferences from them, and so obvious in themselves,
and so agreeable to the nature and unsophisticated dictates of
common-sense, that they challenge the assent of a sound and unbiased
mind, with a degree of force and conviction almost equally
irresistible.
The objects of geometrical inquiry are so entirely abstracted from
those pursuits which stir up and put in motion the unruly passions
of the human heart, that mankind, without difficulty, adopt not only
the more simple theorems of the science, but even those abstruse
paradoxes which, however they may appear susceptible of demonstration,
are at variance with the natural conceptions which the mind, without
the aid of philosophy, would be led to entertain upon the subject. The
INFINITE DIVISIBILITY of matter, or in other words, the INFINITE
divisibility of a FINITE thing, extending even to the minutest atom,
is a point agreed among geometricians, though not less
incomprehensible to common-sense than any of those mysteries in
religion, against which the batteries of infidelity have been so
industriously levelled.
But in the sciences of morals and politics, men are found far less
tractable. To a certain degree, it is right and useful that this
should be the case. Caution and investigation are a necessary armor
against error and imposition. But this untractableness may be
carried too far, and may degenerate into obstinacy, perverseness, or
disingenuity. Though it cannot be pretended that the principles of
moral and political knowledge have, in general, the same degree of
certainty with those of the mathematics, yet they have much better
claims in this respect than, to judge from the conduct of men in
particular situations, we should be disposed to allow them. The
obscurity is much oftener in the passions and prejudices of the
reasoner than in the subject. Men, upon too many occasions, do not
give their own understandings fair play; but, yielding to some
untoward bias, they entangle themselves in words and confound
themselves in subtleties.
How else could it happen (if we admit the objectors to be sincere in
their opposition) that positions so clear as those which manifest
the necessity of a general power of taxation in the government of
the Union should have to encounter any adversaries among men of
discernment? Though these positions have been elsewhere fully
stated, they will perhaps not be improperly recapitulated in this
place, as introductory to an examination of what may have been offered
by way of objection to them. They are in substance as follows:
A government ought to contain in itself every power requisite to the
full accomplishment of the objects committed to its care, and to the
complete execution of the trusts for which it is responsible, free
from every other control but a regard to the public good and to the
sense of the people.
As the duties of superintending the national defence and of securing
the public peace against foreign or domestic violence involve a
provision for casualties and dangers to which no possible limits can
be assigned, the power of making that provision ought to know no other
bounds than the exigencies of the nation and the resources of the
community.
As revenue is the essential engine by which the means of answering
the national exigencies must be procured, the power of procuring
that article in its full extent must necessarily be comprehended in
that of providing for those exigencies.
As theory and practice conspire to prove that the power of procuring
revenue is unavailing when exercised over the States in their
collective capacities, the federal government must of necessity be
invested with an unqualified power of taxation in the ordinary modes.
Did not experience evince the contrary, it would be natural to
conclude that the propriety of a general power of taxation in the
national government might safely be permitted to rest on the
evidence of these propositions, unassisted by any additional arguments
or illustrations. But we find, in fact, that the antagonists of the
proposed Constitution, so far from acquiescing in their justness or
truth, seem to make their principal and most zealous effort against
this part of the plan. It may therefore be satisfactory to analyze the
arguments with which they combat it.
Those of them which have been most labored with that view seem in
substance to amount to this: "It is not true, because the exigencies
of the Union may not be susceptible of limitation, that its power of
laying taxes ought to be unconfined. Revenue is an requisite to the
purposes of the local administrations as to those of the Union; and
the former are at least of equal importance with the latter to the
happiness of the people. It is, therefore, as necessary that the State
governments should be able to command the means of supplying their
wants, as that the national government should possess the like faculty
in respect to the wants of the Union. But an indefinite power of
taxation in the latter might, and probably would in time, deprive
the former of the means of providing for their own necessities; and
would subject them entirely to the mercy of the national
legislature. As the laws of the Union are to become the supreme law of
the land, as it is to have power to pass all laws that may be
NECESSARY for carrying into execution the authorities with which it is
proposed to vest it, the national government might at any time abolish
the taxes imposed for State objects upon the pretence of an
interference with its own. It might allege a necessity of doing this
in order to give efficacy to the national revenues. And thus all the
resources of taxation might by degrees become the subjects of
federal monopoly, to the entire exclusion and destruction of the State
governments."
This mode of reasoning appears sometimes to turn upon the
supposition of usurpation in the national government; at other times
it seems to be designed only as a deduction from the constitutional
operation of its intended powers. It is only in the latter light
that it can be admitted to have any pretensions to fairness. The
moment we launch into conjectures about the usurpations of the federal
government, we get into an unfathomable abyss, and fairly put
ourselves out of the reach of all reasoning. Imagination may range
at pleasure till it gets bewildered amidst the labyrinths of an
enchanted castle, and knows not on which side to turn to extricate
itself from the perplexities into which it has so rashly adventured.
Whatever may be the limits or modifications of the powers of the
Union, it is easy to imagine an endless train of possible dangers; and
by indulging an excess of jealousy and timidity, we may bring
ourselves to a state of absolute skepticism and irresolution. I repeat
what I have observed in substance in another place, that all
observations founded upon the danger of usurpation ought to be
referred to the composition and structure of the government, not to
the nature or extent of its powers. The State governments, by their
original constitutions, are invested with complete sovereignty. In
what does our security consist against usurpation from that quarter?
Doubtless in the manner of their formation, and in a due dependence of
those who are to administer them upon the people. If the proposed
construction of the federal government be found, upon an impartial
examination of it, to be such as to afford, to a proper extent, the
same species of security, all apprehensions on the score of usurpation
ought to be discarded.
It should not be forgotten that a disposition in the State
governments to encroach upon the rights of the Union is quite as
probable as a disposition in the Union to encroach upon the rights
of the State governments. What side would be likely to prevail in such
a conflict, must depend on the means which the contending parties
could employ towards insuring success. As in republics strength is
always on the side of the people, and as there are weighty reasons
to induce a belief that the State governments will commonly possess
most influence over them, the natural conclusion is that such contests
will be most apt to end to the disadvantage of the Union; and that
there is greater probability of encroachments by the members upon
the federal head than by the federal head upon the members. But it
is evident that all conjectures of this kind must be extremely vague
and fallible: that it is by far the safest course to lay them
altogether aside, and to confine our attention wholly to the nature
and extent of the powers as they are delineated in the Constitution.
Every thing beyond this must be left to the prudence and firmness of
the people; who, as they will hold the scales in their own hands, it
is to be hoped, will always take care to preserve the constitutional
equilibrium between the general and the State governments. Upon this
ground, which is evidently the true one, it will not be difficult to
obviate the objections which have been made to an indefinite power
of taxation in the United States.
- PUBLIUS
NO 32: The Same Subject Continued
by Alexander Hamilton
-
ALTHOUGH I am of opinion that there would be no real danger of
consequences which seem to be apprehended to the State governments
from a power in the Union to control them in the levies of money,
because I am persuaded that the sense of the people, the extreme
hazard of provoking the resentments of the State governments, and a
conviction of the utility and necessity of local administrations for
local purposes, would be a complete barrier against the oppressive use
of such a power, yet I am willing here to allow, in its full extent,
the justness of the reasoning which requires that the individual
States should possess an independent and uncontrollable authority to
raise their own revenues for the supply of their own wants. And making
this concession, I affirm that (with the sole exception of duties on
imports and exports) they would, under the plan of the convention,
retain that authority in the most absolute and unqualified sense;
and that an attempt on the part of the national government to
abridge them in the exercise of it, would be a violent assumption of
power, unwarranted by any article or clause of its Constitution.
An entire consolidation of the States into one complete national
sovereignty would imply an entire subordination of the parts; and
whatever powers might remain in them, would be altogether dependent on
the general will. But as the plan of the convention aims only at
partial union or consolation, the State governments would clearly
retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and
which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United
States. This exclusive delegation, or rather this alienation, of State
sovereignty, would only exist in three cases: where the Constitution
in express terms granted an exclusive authority to the Union; where it
granted in one instance an authority to the Union, and in another
prohibited the States from exercising the like authority; and where it
granted an authority to the Union, to which a similar authority in the
States would be absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant.
I use these terms to distinguish this last case from another which
might appear to resemble it, but which would, in fact, be
essentially different; I mean where the exercise of a concurrent
jurisdiction might be productive of occasional interferences in the
policy of any branch of administration, but would not imply any direct
contradiction or repugnancy in point of constitutional authority.
These three cases of exclusive jurisdiction in the federal
government may be exemplified by the following instances: The last
clause but one in the eighth section of the first article provides
expressly that Congress shall exercise "exclusive legislation" over
the district to be appropriated as the seat of government. This
answers to the first case. The first clause of the same section
empowers Congress "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and
excises"; and the second clause of the tenth section of the same
article declares that "no State shall, without the consent of
Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except
for the purpose of executing its inspection laws." Hence would
result an exclusive power in the Union to lay duties on imports and
exports, with the particular exception mentioned; but this power is
abridged by another clause, which declares that no tax or duty shall
be laid on articles exported from any State; in consequence of which
qualification, it now only extends to the duties on imports. This
answers to the second case. The third will be found in that clause
which declares that Congress shall have power "to establish an UNIFORM
RULE of naturalization throughout the United States." This must
necessarily be exclusive, because if each State had power to prescribe
a DISTINCT RULE, there could not be a UNIFORM RULE.
A case which may perhaps be thought to resemble the latter, but
which is in fact widely different, affects the question immediately
under consideration. I mean the power of imposing taxes on all
articles other than exports and imports. This, I contend, is
manifestly a concurrent and coequal authority in the United States and
in the individual States. There is plainly no expression in the
granting clause which makes that power exclusive in the Union. There
is no independent clause or sentence which prohibits the States from
exercising it. So far is this from being the case, that a plain and
conclusive argument to the contrary is to be deduced from the
restraint laid upon the States in relation to duties on imports and
exports. This restriction implies an admission that, if it were not
inserted, the States would possess the power it excludes; and it
implies a further admission, that as to all other taxes, the authority
of the States remains undiminished. In any other view it would be both
unnecessary and dangerous; it would be unnecessary, because if the
grant to the Union of the power of laying such duties implied the
exclusion of the States, or even the subordination in this
particular there could be no need of such a restriction; it would be
dangerous, because the introduction of it leads directly to the
conclusion which has been mentioned, and which, if the reasoning of
the objectors be just, could not have been intended; I mean that the
States, in all cases to which the restriction did not apply, would
have a concurrent power of taxation with the Union. The restriction in
question amounts to what lawyers call a NEGATIVE PREGNANT- that is,
a negation of one thing, and an affirmance of another; a negation of
the authority of the States to impose taxes on imports and exports,
and an affirmance of their authority to impose them on all other
articles. It would be mere sophistry to argue that it was meant to
exclude them absolutely from the imposition of taxes of the former
kind, and to leave them at liberty to lay others subject to the
control of the national legislature. The restraining or prohibitory
clause only says, that they shall not, without the consent of
Congress, lay such duties; and if we are to understand this in the
sense last mentioned, the Constitution would then be made to introduce
a formal provision for the sake of a very absurd conclusion, which is,
that the States, with the consent of the national legislature, might
tax imports and exports, and that they might tax every other
article, unless controlled by the same body. If this was the
intention, why not leave it, in the first instance, to what is alleged
to be the natural operation of the original clause, conferring a
general power of taxation upon the Union? It is evident that this
could not have been the intention, and it will not bear a construction
of the kind.
As to a supposition of repugnancy between the power of taxation in
the States and in the Union, it cannot be supported in the sense which
would be requisite to work an exclusion of the States. It is,
indeed, possible that a tax might be laid on a particular article by a
State which might render it inexpedient that thus a further tax should
be laid on the same article by the Union; but it would not imply a
constitutional inability to impose a further tax. The quantity of
the imposition, the expediency or in expediency of an increase on
either side, would be mutually questions of prudence; but there
would be involved no direct contradiction of power. The particular
policy of the national and of the State systems of finance might now
and then not exactly coincide, and might require reciprocal
forbearances. It is not, however, a mere possibility of
inconvenience in the exercise of powers, but an immediate
constitutional repugnancy that can by implication alienate and
extinguish a preexisting right of sovereignty.
The necessity of a concurrent jurisdiction in certain cases
results from the division of the sovereign power; and the rule that
all authorities, of which the States are not explicitly divested in
favor of the Union, remain with them in full vigor, is not a
theoretical consequence of that division, but is clearly admitted by
the whole tenor of the instrument which contains the articles of the
proposed Constitution. We there find that, notwithstanding the
affirmative grants of general authorities, there has been the most
pointed care in those cases where it was deemed improper that the like
authorities should reside in the States, to insert negative clauses
prohibiting the exercise of them by the States. The tenth section of
the first article consists altogether of such provisions. This
circumstance is a clear indication of the sense of the convention, and
furnishes a rule of interpretation out of the body of the act, which
justifies the position I have advanced and refutes every hypothesis to
the contrary.
- PUBLIUS
NO 33: The Same Subject Continued
by Alexander Hamilton
-
THE residue of the argument against the provisions of the
Constitution in respect to taxation is ingrafted upon the following
clause. The last clause of the eighth section of the first article
of the plan under consideration authorizes the national legislature
"to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into execution the powers by that Constitution vested in the
government of the United States, or in any department or officer
thereof"; and the second clause of the sixth article declares, "that
the Constitution and the laws of the United States made in pursuance
thereof, and the treaties made by their authority shall be the supreme
law of the land, any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to
the contrary notwithstanding."
These two clauses have been the source of much virulent invective
and petulant declamation against the proposed Constitution. They
have been held up to the people in all the exaggerated colors of
misrepresentation as the pernicious engines by which their local
governments were to be destroyed and their liberties exterminated,
as the hideous monster whose devouring jaws would spare neither sex
nor age, nor high nor low, nor sacred nor profane; and yet, strange as
it may appear, after all this clamor, to those who may not have
happened to contemplate them in the same light, it may be affirmed
with perfect confidence that the constitutional operation of the
intended government would be precisely the same, if these clauses were
entirely obliterated, as if they were repeated in every article.
They are only declaratory of a truth which would have resulted by
necessary and unavoidable implication from the very act of
constituting a federal government, and vesting it with certain
specified powers. This is so clear a proposition, that moderation
itself can scarcely listen to the railings which have been so
copiously vented against this part of the plan, without emotions
that disturb its equanimity.
What is a power, but the ability or faculty of doing a thing? What
is the ability to do a thing, but the power of employing the means
necessary to its execution? What is a LEGISLATIVE power, but a power
of making LAWS? What are the means to execute a LEGISLATIVE power, but
LAWS? What is the power of laying and collecting taxes, but a
legislative power, or a power of making laws, to lay and collect
taxes? What are the proper means of executing such a power, but
necessary and proper laws?
This simple train of inquiry furnishes us at once with a test by
which to judge of the true nature of the clause complained of. It
conducts us to this palpable truth, that a power to lay and collect
taxes must be a power to pass all laws necessary and proper for the
execution of that power; and what does the unfortunate and calumniated
provision in question do more than declare the same truth, to wit,
that the national legislature, to whom the power of laying and
collecting taxes had been previously given, might, in the execution of
that power, pass all laws necessary and proper to carry it into
effect? I have applied these observations thus particularly to the
power of taxation, because it is the immediate subject under
consideration, and because it is the most important of the authorities
proposed to be conferred upon the Union. But the same process will
lead to the same result, in relation to all other powers declared in
the Constitution. And it is expressly to execute these powers that the
sweeping clause, as it has been affectedly called, authorizes the
national legislature to pass all necessary and proper laws. If there
is any thing exceptionable, it must be sought for in the specific
powers upon which this general declaration is predicated. The
declaration itself, though it may be chargeable with tautology or
redundancy, is at least perfectly harmless.
But SUSPICION may ask, Why then was it introduced? The answer is,
that it could only have been done for greater caution, and to guard
against all cavilling refinements in those who might hereafter feel
a disposition to curtail and evade the legitimate authorities of the
Union. The Convention probably foresaw, what it has been a principal
aim of these papers to inculcate, that the danger which most threatens
our political welfare is that the State governments will finally sap
the foundations of the Union; and might therefore think it
necessary, in so cardinal a point, to leave nothing to construction.
Whatever may have been the inducement to it, the wisdom of the
precaution is evident from the cry which has been raised against it;
as that very cry betrays a disposition to question the great and
essential truth which it is manifestly the object of that provision to
declare.
But it may be again asked, Who is to judge of the necessity and
propriety of the laws to be passed for executing the powers of the
Union? I answer, first that this question arises as well and as
fully upon the simple grant of those powers as upon the declaratory
clause; and I answer, in the second place, that the national
government, like every other, must judge, in the first instance, of
the proper exercise of its powers, and its constituents in the last.
If the federal government should overpass the just bounds of its
authority and make a tyrannical use of its powers, the people, whose
creature it is, must appeal to the standard they have formed, and take
such measures to redress the injury done to the Constitution as the
exigency may suggest and prudence justify. The propriety of a law,
in a constitutional light, must always be determined by the nature
of the powers upon which it is founded. Suppose, by some forced
constructions of its authority (which, indeed, cannot easily be
imagined), the Federal legislature should attempt to vary the law of
descent in any State, would it not be evident that, in making such
an attempt, it had exceeded its jurisdiction, and infringed upon
that of the State? Suppose, again, that upon the pretence of an
interference with its revenues, it should undertake to abrogate a
land-tax imposed by the authority of a State; would it not be
equally evident that this was an invasion of that concurrent
jurisdiction in respect to this species of tax, which its Constitution
plainly supposes to exist in the State governments? If there ever
should be a doubt on this head, the credit of it will be entirely
due to those reasoners who, in the imprudent zeal of their animosity
to the plan of the convention, have labored to envelop it in a cloud
calculated to obscure the plainest and simplest truths.
But it is said that the laws of the Union are to be the supreme
law of the land. But what inference can be drawn from this, or what
would they amount to, if they were not to be supreme? It is evident
they would amount to nothing. A LAW, by the very meaning of the
term, includes supremacy. It is a rule which those to whom it is
prescribed are bound to observe. This results form every political
association. If individuals enter into a state of society, the laws of
that society must be the supreme regulator of their conduct. If a
number of political societies enter into a larger political society,
the laws which the latter may enact, pursuant to the powers
intrusted to it by its constitution, must necessarily be supreme
over those societies, and the individuals of whom they are composed.
It would otherwise be a mere treaty, dependent on the good faith of
the parties, and not a government, which is only another word for
POLITICAL POWER AND SUPREMACY. But it will not follow from this
doctrine that acts of the larger society which are not pursuant to its
constitutional powers, but which are invasions of the residuary
authorities of the smaller societies, will become the supreme law of
the land. These will be merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to
be treated as such. Hence we perceive that the clause which declares
the supremacy of the laws of the Union, like the one we have just
before considered, only declares a truth, which flows immediately
and necessarily from the institution of a federal government. It
will not, I presume, have escaped observation, that it expressly
confines this supremacy to laws made pursuant to the Constitution;
which I mention merely as an instance of caution in the convention;
since that limitation would have been to be understood, though it
had not been expressed.
Though a law, therefore, laying a tax for the use of the United
States would be supreme in its nature, and could not legally be
opposed or controlled, yet a law for abrogating or preventing the
collection of a tax laid by the authority of the State (unless upon
imports and exports), would not be the supreme law of the land, but
a usurpation of power not granted by the Constitution. As far as an
improper accumulation of taxes on the same object might tend to render
the collection difficult or precarious, this would be a mutual
inconvenience, not arising from a superiority or defect of power on
either side, but from an injudicious exercise of power by one or the
other, in a manner equally disadvantageous to both. It is to be
hoped and presumed, however, that mutual interest would dictate a
concert in this respect which would avoid any material
inconvenience. The inference from the whole is, that the individual
States would, under the proposed Constitution, retain an independent
and uncontrollable authority to raise revenue to any extent of which
they may stand in need, by every kind of taxation, except duties on
imports and exports. It will be shown in the next paper that this
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION in the article of taxation was the only
admissible substitute for an entire subordination, in respect to
this branch of power, of the State authority to that of the Union.
- PUBLIUS
NO 34: The Same Subject Continued
by Alexander Hamilton
-
I FLATTER myself it has been clearly shown in my last number that
the particular States, under the proposed Constitution, would have
COEQUAL authority with the Union in the article of revenue, except
as to duties on imports. As this leaves open to the States far the
greatest part of the resources of the community, there can be no color
for the assertion that they would not possess means as abundant as
could be desired for the supply of their own wants, independent of all
external control. That the field is sufficiently wide will more
fully appear when we come to advert to the inconsiderable share of the
public expenses for which it will fall to the lot of the State
governments to provide.
To argue upon abstract principles that this coordinate authority
cannot exist, is to set up supposition and theory against fact and
reality. However proper such reasonings might be to show that a
thing ought not to exist, they are wholly to be rejected when they are
made use of to prove that it does not exist contrary to the evidence
of the fact itself. It is well known that in the Roman republic the
legislative authority, in the last resort, resided for ages in two
different political bodies- not as branches of the same legislature,
but as distinct and independent legislatures, in each of which an
opposite interest prevailed: in one the patrician; in the other, the
plebeian. Many arguments might have been adduced to prove the
unfitness of two such seemingly contradictory authorities, each having
power to annul or repeal the acts of the other. But a man would have
been regarded as frantic who should have attempted at Rome to disprove
their existence. It will be readily understood that I allude to the
COMITIA CENTURIATA and the COMITIA TRIBUTA. The former in which the
people voted by centuries, was so arranged as to give a superiority to
the patrician interest; in the latter, in which numbers prevailed, the
plebeian interest had an entire predominancy. And yet these two
legislatures coexisted for ages, and the Roman republic attained to
the utmost height of human greatness.
In the case particularly under consideration, there is no such
contradiction as appears in the example cited; there is no power on
either side to annul the acts of the other. And in practice there is
little reason to apprehend any inconvenience; because, in a short
course of time, the wants of the States will naturally reduce
themselves within a very narrow compass; and in the interim, the
United States will, in all probability, find it convenient to
abstain wholly from those objects to which the particular States would
be inclined to resort.
To form a more precise judgment of the true merits of this question,
it will be well to advert to the proportion between the objects that
will require a federal provision in respect to revenue, and those
which will require a State provision. We shall discover that the
former are altogether unlimited, and that the latter are circumscribed
within very moderate bounds. In pursuing this inquiry, we must bear in
mind that we are not to confine our view to the present period, but to
look forward to remote futurity. Constitutions of civil government are
not to be framed upon a calculation of existing exigencies, but upon a
combination of these with the probable exigencies of ages, according
to the natural and tried course of human affairs. Nothing,
therefore, can be more fallacious than to infer the extent of any
power, proper to be lodged in the national government, from an
estimate of its immediate necessities. There ought to be a CAPACITY to
provide for future contingencies as they may happen; and as these
are illimitable in their nature, it is impossible safely to limit that
capacity. It is true, perhaps, that a computation might be made with
sufficient accuracy to answer the purpose of the quantity of revenue
requisite to discharge the subsisting engagements of the Union, and to
maintain those establishments which, for some time to come, would
suffice in time of peace. But would it be wise, or would it not rather
be the extreme of folly to stop at this point, and to leave the
government intrusted with the care of the national defence in a
state of absolute incapacity to provide for the protection of the
community against future invasions of the public peace, by foreign war
or domestic convulsions? If, on the contrary, we ought to exceed
this point, where can we stop, short of an indefinite power of
providing for emergencies as they may arise? Though it is easy to
assert, in general terms, the possibility of forming a rational
judgment of a due provision against probable dangers, yet we may
safely challenge those who make the assertion to bring forward their
data, and may affirm that they would be found as vague and uncertain
as any that could be produced to establish the probable duration of
the world. Observations confined to the mere prospects of internal
attacks can deserve no weight; though even these will admit of no
satisfactory calculation: but if we mean to be a commercial people, it
must form a part of our policy to be able one day to defend that
commerce. The support of a navy and of naval wars would involve
contingencies that must baffle all the efforts of political
arithmetic.
Admitting that we ought to try the novel and absurd experiment in
politics of tying up the hands of government from offensive war
founded upon reasons of state, yet certainly we ought not to disable
it from guarding the community against the ambition or enmity of other
nations. A cloud has been for some time hanging over the European
world. If it should break forth into a storm, who can insure us that
in its progress a part of its fury would not be spent upon us? No
reasonable man would hastily pronounce that we are entirely out of its
reach. Or if the combustible materials that now seem to be
collecting should be dissipated without coming to maturity, or if a
flame should be kindled without extending to us, what security can
we have that our tranquillity will long remain undisturbed from some
other course or from some other quarter? Let us recollect that peace
or war will not always be left to our option; that however moderate or
unambitious we may be, we cannot count upon the moderation, or hope to
extinguish the ambition of others. Who could have imagined at the
conclusion of the last war that France and Britain, wearied and
exhausted as they both were, would so soon have looked with so hostile
an aspect upon each other? To judge from the history of mankind, we
shall be compelled to conclude that the fiery and destructive passions
of war reign in the human breast with much more powerful sway than the
mild and beneficent sentiments of peace; and that to model our
political systems upon speculations of lasting tranquillity, is to
calculate on the weaker springs of the human character.
What are the chief sources of expense in every government? What
has occasioned that enormous accumulation of debts with which
several of the European nations are oppressed? The answer plainly
is, wars and rebellions, the support of those institutions which are
necessary to guard the body politic against these two most mortal
diseases of society. The expenses arising from those institutions
which are relative to the mere domestic police of a state, to the
support of its legislative, executive, and judicial departments,
with their different appendages, and to the encouragement of
agriculture and manufactures (which will comprehend almost all the
objects of state expenditure), are insignificant in comparison with
those which relate to the national defence.
In the kingdom of Great Britain, where all the ostentatious
apparatus of monarchy is to be provided for, not above a fifteenth
part of the annual income of the nation is appropriated to the class
of expenses last mentioned; the other fourteen fifteenths are absorbed
in the payment of the interest of debts contracted for carrying on the
wars in which that country has been engaged, and in the maintenance of
fleets and armies. If, on the one hand, it should be observed that the
expenses incurred in the prosecution of the ambitious enterprises
and vainglorious pursuits of a monarchy are not a proper standard by
which to judge of those which might be necessary in a republic, it
ought, on the other hand, to be remarked that there should be as great
a disproportion between the profusion and extravagance of a wealthy
kingdom in its domestic administration, and the frugality and
economy which in that particular become the modest simplicity of
republican government. If we balance a proper deduction from one
side against that which it is supposed ought to be made from the
other, the proportion may still be considered as holding good.
But let us advert to the large debt which we have ourselves
contracted in a single war, and let us only calculate on a common
share of the events which disturb the peace of nations, and we shall
instantly perceive, without the aid of any elaborate illustration,
that there must always be an immense disproportion between the objects
of federal and state expenditures. It is true that several of the
States, separately, are encumbered with considerable debts, which
are an excrescence of the late war. But this cannot happen again, if
the proposed system be adopted; and when these debts are discharged,
the only call for revenue of any consequence, which the State
governments will continue to experience, will be for the mere
support of their respective civil lists, to which, if we add all
contingencies, the total amount in every State ought to fall
considerably short of two hundred thousand pounds.
In framing a government for posterity as well as ourselves, we
ought, in those provisions which are designed to be permanent, to
calculate, not on temporary, but on permanent causes of expense. If
this principle be a just one, our attention would be directed to a
provision in favor of the State governments for an annual sum of about
two hundred thousand pounds; while the exigencies of the Union could
be susceptible of no limits, even in imagination. In this view of
the subject, by what logic can it be maintained that the local
governments ought to command, in perpetuity, an EXCLUSIVE source of
revenue for any sum beyond the extent of two hundred thousand
pounds? To extend its power further, in exclusion of the authority
of the Union, would be to take the resources of the community out of
those hands which stood in need of them for the public welfare, in
order to put them into other hands which could have no just or
proper occasion for them.
Suppose, then, the convention had been inclined to proceed upon
the principle of a repartition of the objects of revenue, between
the Union and its members, in proportion to their comparative
necessities; what particular fund could have been selected for the use
of the States, that would not either have been too much or too littletoo
little for their present, too much for their future wants? As to
the line of separation between external and internal taxes, this would
leave to the States, at a rough computation, the command of two thirds
of the resources of the community to defray from a tenth to a
twentieth part of its expenses; and to the Union, one third of the
resources of the community, to defray from nine tenths to nineteen
twentieths of its expenses. If we desert this boundary and content
ourselves with leaving to the States an exclusive power of taxing
houses and lands, there would still be a great disproportion between
the means and the end; the possession of one third of the resources of
the community to supply, at most, one tenth of its wants. If any
fund could have been selected and appropriated, equal to and not
greater than the object, it would have been inadequate to the
discharge of the existing debts of the particular States, and would
have left them dependent on the Union for a provision for this
purpose.
The preceding train of observation will justify the position which
has been elsewhere laid down, that "A CONCURRENT JURISDICTION in the
article of taxation was the only admissible substitute for an entire
subordination, in respect to this branch of power, of State
authority to that of the Union." Any separation of the objects of
revenue that could have been fallen upon, would have amounted to a
sacrifice of the great INTERESTS of the Union to the POWER of the
individual States. The convention thought the concurrent
jurisdiction preferable to that subordination; and it is evident
that it has at least the merit of reconciling an indefinite
constitutional power of taxation in the Federal government with an
adequate and independent power in the States to provide for their
own necessities. There remain a few other lights, in which this
important subject of taxation will claim a further consideration.
- PUBLIUS
NO 35: The Same Subject Continued
by Alexander Hamilton
-
BEFORE we proceed to examine any other objections to an indefinite
power of taxation in the Union, I shall make one general remark; which
is, that if the jurisdiction of the national government, in the
article of revenue, should be restricted to particular objects, it
would naturally occasion an undue proportion of the public burdens
to fall upon those objects. Two evils would spring form this source:
the oppression of particular branches of industry; and an unequal
distribution of the taxes, as well among the several States as among
the citizens of the same State.
Suppose, as has been contended for, the federal power of taxation
were to be confined to duties on imports, it is evident that the
government, for want of being able to command other resources, would
frequently be tempted to extend these duties to an injurious excess.
There are persons who imagine that they can never be carried to too
great a length; since the higher they are, the more it is alleged they
will tend to discourage an extravagant consumption, to produce a
favorable balance of trade, and to promote domestic manufactures.
But all extremes are pernicious in various ways. Exorbitant duties
on imported articles would beget a general spirit of smuggling;
which is always prejudicial to the fair trader, and eventually to
the revenue itself: they tend to render other classes of the community
tributary, in an improper degree, to the manufacturing classes, to
whom they give a premature monopoly of the markets; they sometimes
force industry out of its more natural channels into others in which
it flows with less advantage; and in the last place, they oppress
the merchant, who is often obliged to pay them himself without any
retribution from the consumer. When the demand is equal to the
quantity of goods at market, the consumer generally pays the duty; but
when the markets happen to be overstocked, a great proportion falls
upon the merchant, and sometimes not only exhausts his profits, but
breaks in upon his capital. I am apt to think that a division of the
duty, between the seller and the buyer, more often happens than is
commonly imagined. It is not always possible to raise the price of a
commodity in exact proportion to every additional imposition laid upon
it. The merchant, especially in a country of small commercial capital,
is often under a necessity of keeping prices down in order to make a
more expeditious sale.
The maxim that the consumer is the payer, is so much oftener true
than the reverse of the proposition, that it is far more equitable
that the duties on imports should go into a common stock, than that
they should redound to the exclusive benefit of the importing
States. But it is not so generally true as to render it equitable,
that those duties should form the only national fund. When they are
paid by the merchant they operate as an additional tax upon the
importing State, whose citizens pay their proportion of them in the
character of consumers. In this view they are productive of inequality
among the States; which inequality would be increased with the
increased extent of the duties. The confinement of the national
revenues to this species of imposts would be attended with inequality,
from a different cause, between the manufacturing and the
non-manufacturing States. The States which can go farthest towards the
supply of their own wants, by their own manufactures, will not,
according to their numbers or wealth, consume so great a proportion of
imported articles as those States which are not in the same
favorable situation. They would not, therefore, in this mode alone
contribute to the public treasury in a ratio to their abilities. To
make them do this it is necessary that recourse be had to excises, the
proper objects of which are particular kinds of manufactures, New York
is more deeply interested in these considerations than such of her
citizens as contend for limiting the power of the Union to external
taxation may be aware of. New York is an importing State, and is not
likely speedily to be, to any great extent, a manufacturing State. She
would, of course, suffer in a double light from restraining the
jurisdiction of the Union to commercial imposts.
So far as these observations tend to inculcate a danger of the
import duties being extended to an injurious extreme it may be
observed, conformably to a remark made in another part of these
papers, that the interest of the revenue itself would be a
sufficient guard against such an extreme. I readily admit that this
would be the case, as long as other resources were open; but if the
avenues to them were closed, HOPE, stimulated by necessity, would
beget experiments, fortified by rigorous precautions and additional
penalties, which, for a time, would have the intended effect, till
there had been leisure to contrive expedients to elude these new
precautions. The first success would be apt to inspire false opinions,
which it might require a long course of subsequent experience to
correct. Necessity, especially in politics, often occasions false
hopes, false reasoning, and a system of measures correspondingly
erroneous. But even if this supposed excess should not be a
consequence of the limitation of the federal power of taxation, the
inequalities spoken of would still ensue, though not in the same
degree, from the other causes that have been noticed. Let us now
return to the examination of objections.
One which, if we may judge from the frequency of its repetition,
seems most to be relied on, is, that the House of Representatives is
not sufficiently numerous for the reception of all the different
classes of citizens, in order to combine the interests and feelings of
every part of the community, and to produce a due sympathy between the
representative body and its constituents. This argument presents
itself under a very specious and seducing form, and is well calculated
to lay hold of the prejudices of those to whom it is addressed. But
when we come to dissect it with attention, it will appear to be made
up of nothing but fair-sounding words. The object it seems to aim at
is, in the first place, impracticable, and in the sense in which it is
contended for, is unnecessary. I reserve for another place the
discussion of the question which relates to the sufficiency of the
representative body in respect to numbers, and shall content myself
with examining here the particular use which has been made of a
contrary supposition, in reference to the immediate subject of our
inquiries.
The idea of an actual representation of all classes of the people,
by persons of each class, is altogether visionary. Unless it were
expressly provided in the Constitution, that each different occupation
should send one or more members, the thing would never take place in
practice. Mechanics and manufacturers will always be inclined, with
few exceptions, to give their votes to merchants, in preference to
persons of their own professions or trades. Those discerning
citizens are well aware that the mechanic and manufacturing arts
furnish the materials of mercantile enterprise and industry. Many of
them, indeed, are immediately connected with the operations of
commerce. They know that the merchant is their natural patron and
friend; and they are aware, that however great the confidence they may
justly feel in their own good sense, their interests can be more
effectually promoted by the merchant than by themselves. They are
sensible that their habits in life have not been such as to give
them those acquired endowments, without which, in a deliberative
assembly, the greatest natural abilities are for the most part
useless; and that the influence and weight, and superior
acquirements of the merchants render them more equal to a contest with
any spirit which might happen to infuse itself into the public
councils, unfriendly to the manufacturing and trading interests. These
considerations, and many others that might be mentioned, prove, and
experience confirms its, that artisans and manufacturers will commonly
be disposed to bestow their votes upon merchants and those whom they
recommend. We must therefore consider merchants as the natural
representatives of all these classes of the community.
With regard to the learned professions, little need be observed;
they truly form no distinct interest in society, and, according to
their situation and talents, will be indiscriminately the objects of
the confidence and choice of each other, and of other parts of the
community.
Nothing remains but the landed interest; and this, in a political
view, and particularly in relation to taxes, I take to be perfectly
united, from the wealthiest landlord down to the poorest tenant. No
tax can be laid on land which will not affect the proprietor of
millions of acres as well as the proprietor of a single acre. Every
landholder will therefore have a common interest to keep the taxes
on land as low as possible; and common interest may always be reckoned
upon as the surest bond of sympathy. But if we even could suppose a
distinction of interest between the opulent landholder and the
middling farmer, what reason is there to conclude, that the first
would stand a better chance of being deputed to the national
legislature than the last? If we take fact as our guide, and look into
our own senate and assembly, we shall find that moderate proprietors
of land prevail in both; nor is this less the case in the senate,
which consists of a smaller number, than in the assembly, which is
composed of a greater number. Where the qualifications of the electors
are the same, whether they have to choose a small or a large number,
their votes will fall upon those in whom they have most confidence;
whether these happen to be men of large fortunes, or of moderate
property, or of no property at all.
It is said to be necessary, that all classes of citizens should have
some of their own number in the representative body, in order that
their feelings and interests may be the better understood and attended
to. But we have seen that this will never happen under any arrangement
that leaves the votes of the people free. Where this is the case,
the representative body, with too few exceptions to have any influence
on the spirit of the government, will be composed of landholders,
merchants, and men of the learned professions. But where is the danger
that the interests and feelings of the different classes of citizens
will not be understood or attended to by these three descriptions of
men? Will not the landholder know and feel whatever will promote or
insure the interest of landed property? And will he not, from his
own interest in that species of property, be sufficiently prone to
resist every attempt to prejudice or encumber it? Will not the
merchant understand and be disposed to cultivate, as far as may be
proper, the interests of the mechanic and manufacturing arts, to which
his commerce is so nearly allied? Will not the man of the learned
profession, who will feel a neutrality to the rivalships between the
different branches of industry, be likely to prove an impartial
arbiter between them, ready to promote either, so far as it shall
appear to him conducive to the general interests of the society?
If we take into the account the momentary humors or dispositions
which may happen to prevail in particular parts of the society, and to
which a wise administration will never be inattentive, is the man
whose situation leads to extensive inquiry and information less likely
to be a competent judge of their nature, extent, and foundation than
one of whose observation does not travel beyond the circle of his
neighbors and acquaintances? Is it not natural that a man who is a
candidate for the favor of the people, and who is dependent on the
suffrages of his fellow-citizens for the continuance of his public
honors, should take care to inform himself of their dispositions and
inclinations, and should be willing to allow them their proper
degree of influence upon his conduct? This dependence, and the
necessity of being bound himself, and his posterity, by the laws to
which he gives his assent, are the true, and they are the strong
chords of sympathy between the representative and the constituent.
There is no part of the administration of government that requires
extensive information and a thorough knowledge of the principles of
political economy so much as the business of taxation. The man who
understands those principles best will be least likely to resort to
oppressive expedients, or to sacrifice any particular class of
citizens to the procurement of revenue. It might be demonstrated
that the most productive system of finance will always be the least
burdensome. There can be no doubt that in order to a judicious
exercise of the power of taxation, it is necessary that the person
in whose hands it is should be acquainted with the general genius,
habits, and modes of thinking of the people at large, and with the
resources of the country. And this is all that can be reasonably meant
by a knowledge of the interests and feelings of the people. In any
other sense the proposition has either no meaning, or an absurd one.
And in that sense let every considerate citizen judge for himself
where the requisite qualification is most likely to be found.
- PUBLIUS
NO 36: The Same Subject Continued
by Alexander Hamilton
-
WE HAVE seen that the result of the observations, to which the
foregoing number has been principally devoted, is, that from the
natural operation of the different interests and views of the
various classes of the community, whether the representation of the
people be more or less numerous, it will consist almost entirely of
proprietors of land, of merchants, and of members of the learned
professions, who will truly represent all those different interests
and views. If it should be objected that we have seen other
descriptions of men in the local legislatures, I answer that it is
admitted there are exceptions to the rule, but not in sufficient
number to influence the general complexion or character of the
government. There are strong minds in every walk of life that will
rise superior to the disadvantages of situation, and will command
the tribute due to their merit, not only from the classes to which
they particularly belong, but from the society in general. The door
ought to be equally open to all; and I trust, for the credit of
human nature, that we shall see examples of such vigorous plants
flourishing in the soil of federal as well as of State legislation;
but occasional instances of this sort will not render the reasoning,
founded upon the general course of things, less conclusive.
The subject might be placed in several other lights that would all
lead to the same result; and in particular it might be asked, What
greater affinity or relation of interest can be conceived between
the carpenter and blacksmith, and the linen manufacturer or
stocking-weaver, than between the merchant and either of them? It is
notorious that there are often as great rivalships between different
branches of the mechanic or manufacturing arts as there are between
any of the departments of labor and industry, so that, unless the
representative body were to be far more numerous than would be
consistent with any idea of regularity or wisdom in its deliberations,
it is impossible that what seems to be the spirit of the objection
we have been considering should ever be realized in practice. But I
forbear to dwell any longer on a matter which has hitherto worn too
loose a garb to admit even of an accurate inspection of its real shape
or tendency.
There is another objection of a somewhat more precise nature that
claims our attention. It has been asserted that a power of internal
taxation in the national legislature could never be exercised with
advantages, as well form the want of a sufficient knowledge of local
circumstances, as from an interference between the revenue laws of the
Union and of the particular States. The supposition of a want of
proper knowledge seems to be entirely destitute of foundation. If
any question is depending in a State legislature respecting one of the
counties, which demands a knowledge of local details, how is it
acquired? No doubt from the information of the members of the
county. Cannot the like knowledge be obtained in the national
legislature from the representatives of each State? And is it not to
be presumed that the men who will generally be sent there will be
possessed of the necessary degree of intelligence to be able to
communicate that information? Is the knowledge of local circumstances,
as applied to taxation, a minute topographical acquaintance with all
the mountains, rivers, streams, highways, and by-paths in each
State; or is it a general acquaintance with its situation and
resources, with the state of its agriculture, commerce,
manufactures, with the nature of its products and consumptions, with
the different degrees and kinds of its wealth, property, and industry?
Nations in general, even under governments of the more popular kind,
usually commit the administration of their finances to single men or
to boards composed of a few individuals, who digest and prepare, in
the first instance, the plans of taxation, which are afterwards passed
into laws by the authority of the sovereign or legislature.
Inquisitive and enlightened statesmen are deemed everywhere best
qualified to make a judicious selection of the objects proper for
revenue; which is a clear indication, as far as the sense of mankind
can have weight in the question, of the species of knowledge of
local circumstances requisite to the purposes of taxation.
The taxes intended to be comprised under the general denomination of
internal taxes may be subdivided into those of the direct and those of
the indirect kind. Though the objection be made to both, yet the
reasoning upon it seems to be confined to the former branch. And
indeed, as to the latter, by which must be understood duties and
excises on articles of consumption, one is at a loss to conceive
what can be the nature of the difficulties apprehended. The
knowledge relating to them must evidently be of a kind that will
either be suggested by the nature of the article itself, or can easily
be procured from any well-informed man, especially of the mercantile
class. The circumstances that may distinguish its situation in one
State from its situation in another must be few, simple, and easy to
be comprehended. The principal thing to be attended to, would be to
avoid those articles which had been previously appropriated to the use
of a particular State; and there could be no difficulty in
ascertaining the revenue system of each. This could always be known
from the respective codes of laws, as well as from the information
of the members from the several States.
The objection, when applied to real property or to houses and lands,
appears to have, at first sight, more foundation, but even in this
view it will not bear a close examination. Land-taxes are commonly
laid in one of two modes, either by actual valuations, permanent or
periodical, or by occasional assessments, at the discretion, or
according to the best judgment, of certain officers whose duty it is
to make them. In either case, the EXECUTION of the business, which
alone requires the knowledge of local details, must be devolved upon
discreet persons in the character of commissioners or assessors,
elected by the people or appointed by the government for the
purpose. All that the law can do must be to name the persons or to
prescribe the manner of their election or appointment, to fix their
numbers and qualifications and to draw the general outlines of their
powers and duties. And what is there in all this that cannot as well
be performed by the national legislature as by a State legislature?
The attention of either can only reach to general principles; local
details, as already observed, must be referred to those who are to
execute the plan.
But there is a simple point of view in which this matter may be
placed that must be altogether satisfactory. The national
legislature can make use of the system of each State within that
State. The method of laying and collecting this species of taxes in
each State can, in all its parts, be adopted and employed by the
federal government.
Let it be recollected that the proportion of these taxes is not to
be left to the discretion of the national legislature, but is to be
determined by the numbers of each State, as described in the second
section of the first article. An actual census or enumeration of the
people must furnish the rule, a circumstance which effectually shuts
the door to partiality or oppression. The abuse of this power of
taxation seems to have been provided against with guarded
circumspection. In addition to the precaution just mentioned, there is
a provision that "all duties, imposts, and excises shall be UNIFORM
throughout the United States.
It has been very properly observed by different speakers and writers
on the side of the Constitution, that if the exercise of the power
of internal taxation by the Union should be discovered on experiment
to be really inconvenient, the federal government may then forbear the
use of it, and have recourse to requisitions in its stead. By way of
answer to this, it has been triumphantly asked, Why not in the first
instance omit that ambiguous power, and rely upon the latter source?
Two solid answers may be given. The first is, that the exercise of
that power, if convenient, will be preferable, because it will be more
effectual; and it is impossible to prove in theory, or otherwise
than by the experiment, that it cannot be advantageously exercised.
The contrary, indeed, appears most probable. The second answer is,
that the existence of such a power in the Constitution will have a
strong influence in giving efficacy to requisitions. When the States
know that the Union can apply itself without their agency, it will
be a powerful motive for exertion on their part.
As to the interference of the revenue laws of the Union, and of
its members, we have already seen that there can be no clashing or
repugnancy of authority. The laws cannot, therefore, in a legal sense,
interfere with each other; and it is far from impossible to avoid an
interference even in the policy of their different systems. An
effectual expedient for this purpose will be, mutually to abstain from
those objects which either side may have first had recourse to. As
neither can control the other, each will have an obvious and
sensible interest in this reciprocal forbearance. And where there is
an immediate common interest, we may safely count upon its
operation. When the particular debts of the States are done away,
and their expenses come to be limited within their natural compass,
the possibility almost of interference will vanish. A small land-tax
will answer the purpose of the States, and will be their most simple
and most fit resource.
Many spectres have been raised out of this power of internal
taxation, to excite the apprehensions of the people: double sets of
revenue officers, a duplication of their burdens by double
taxations, and the frightful forms of odious and oppressive poll
taxes, have been played off with all the ingenious dexterity of
political legerdemain.
As to the first point, there are two cases in which there can be
no room for double sets of officers: one, where the right of
imposing the tax is exclusively vested in the Union, which applies
to the duties on imports; the other, where the object has not fallen
under any State regulation or provision, which may be applicable to
a variety of objects. In other cases, the probability is that the
United States will either wholly abstain from the objects
preoccupied for local purposes, or will make use of the State officers
and State regulations for collecting the additional imposition. This
will best answer the views of revenue, because it will save expense in
the collection, and will best avoid any occasion of disgust to the
State governments and to the people. At all events, here is a
practicable expedient for avoiding such an inconvenience; and
nothing more can be required than to show that evils predicted do no
necessarily result from the plan.
As to any argument derived from a supposed system of influence, it
is a sufficient answer to say that it ought not to be presumed; but
the supposition is susceptible of a more precise answer. If such a
spirit should infest the councils of the Union, the most certain
road to the accomplishment of its aim would be to employ the State
officers as much as possible, and to attach them to the Union by an
accumulation of their emoluments. This would serve to turn the tide of
State influence into the channels of the national government,
instead of making federal influence flow in an opposite and adverse
current. But all suppositions of this kind or invidious, and ought
to be banished from the consideration of the great question before the
people. They can answer no other end than to cast a mist over the
truth.
As to the suggestion of double taxation, the answer is plain. The
wants of the Union are to be supplied in one way or another; if to
be done by the authority of the federal government, it will not be
to be done by that of the State government. The quantity of taxes to
be paid by the community must be the same in either case; with this
advantage, if the provision is to be made by the Union- that the
capital resource of commercial imposts, which is the most convenient
branch of revenue, can be prudently improved to a much greater
extent under federal than under State regulation, and of course will
render it less necessary to recur to more inconvenient methods; and
with this further advantage, that as far as there may be any real
difficulty in the exercise of the power of internal taxation, it
will impose a disposition to greater care in the choice and
arrangement of the means; and must naturally tend to make it a fixed
point of policy in the national administration to go as far as may
be practicable in making the luxury of the rich tributary to the
public treasury, in order to diminish the necessity of those
impositions which might create dissatisfaction in the poorer and
most numerous classes of the society. Happy it is when the interest
which the government has in the preservation of its own power,
coincides with a proper distribution of the public burdens, and
tends to guard the least wealthy part of the community from
oppression!
As to poll taxes, I, without scruple, confess my disapprobation of
them; and though they have prevailed from an early period in those
States *029 which have uniformly been the most tenacious of their
rights, I should lament to see them introduced into practice under the
national government. But does it follow because there is a power to
lay them, that they will actually be laid? Every State in the Union
has power to impose taxes of this kind; and yet in several of them
they are unknown in practice. Are the State governments to be
stigmatized as tyrannies, because they possess this power? If they are
not, with what propriety can the like power justify such a charge
against the national government, or even be urged as an obstacle to
its adoption? As little friendly as I am to the species of imposition,
I still feel a thorough conviction that the power of having recourse
to it ought to exist in the federal government. There are certain
emergencies of nations, in which expedients, that in the ordinary
state of things ought to be forborne, become essential to the public
weal. And the government, from the possibility of such emergencies,
ought ever to have the option of making use of them. The real scarcity
of objects in this country, which may be considered as productive
sources of revenue, is a reason peculiar to itself, for not
abridging the discretion of the national councils in this respect.
There may exist certain critical and tempestuous conjunctures of the
State, in which a poll tax may become an inestimable resource. And
as I know nothing to exempt this portion of the globe from the
common calamities that have befallen other parts of it, I
acknowledge my aversion to every project that is calculated to
disarm the government of a single weapon, which in any possible
contingency might be usefully employed for the general defence and
security. I have now gone through the examination of such of the
powers proposed to be vested in the United States, which may be
considered as having an immediate relation to the energy of the
government; and have endeavored to answer the principal objections
which have been made to them. I have passed over in silence those
minor authorities, which are either too inconsiderable to have been
thought worthy of the hostilities of the opponents of the
Constitution, or of too manifest propriety to admit of controversy.
The mass of judiciary power, however, might have claimed an
investigation under this head, had it not been for the consideration
that its organization and its extent may be more advantageously
considered in connection. This has determined me to refer it to the
branch of our inquiries upon which we shall next enter.
- PUBLIUS
NO 37: Concerning the Difficulties Which the Convention
Must Have Experienced in the Formation of a Proper Plan
by James Madison
-
IN REVIEWING the defects of the existing Confederation, and
showing that they cannot be supplied by a government of less energy
than that before the public, several of the most important
principles of the latter fell of course under consideration. But as
the ultimate object of these papers is to determine clearly and
fully the merits of this Constitution, and the expediency of
adopting it, our plan cannot be complete without taking a more
critical and thorough survey of the work of the convention, without
examining it on all its sides, comparing it in all its parts, and
calculating its probable effects.
That this remaining task may be executed under impressions conducive
to a just and fair result, some reflections must in this place be
indulged, which candor previously suggests.
It is a misfortune, inseparable from human affairs, that public
measures are rarely investigated with that spirit of moderation
which is essential to a just estimate of their real tendency to
advance or obstruct the public good; and that this spirit is more
apt to be diminished than promoted, by those occasions which require
an unusual exercise of it. To those who have been led by experience to
attend to this consideration, it could not appear surprising, that the
act of the convention, which recommends so many important changes
and innovations, which may be viewed in so many lights and
relations, and which touches the springs of so many passions and
interests, should find or excite dispositions unfriendly, both on
one side and on the other, to a fair discussion and accurate
judgment of its merits. In some, it has been too evident from their
own publications, that they have scanned the proposed Constitution,
not only with a predisposition to censure, but with a predetermination
to condemn; as the language held by others betrays an opposite
predetermination or bias, which must render their opinions also of
little moment in the question. In placing, however, these different
characters on a level, with respect to the weight of their opinions, I
wish not to insinuate that there may not be a material difference in
the purity of their intentions. It is but just to remark in favor of
the latter descriptions, that as our situation is universally admitted
to be peculiarly critical, and to require indispensably that something
should be done for our relief, the predetermined patron of what has
been actually done may have taken his bias from the weight of these
considerations, as well as from considerations of a sinister nature.
The predetermined adversary, on the other hand, can have been governed
by no venial motive whatever. The intentions of the first may be
upright, as they may on the contrary be culpable. The views of the
last cannot be upright, and must be culpable. But the truth is, that
these papers are not addressed to persons falling under either of
these characters. They solicit the attention of those only, who add to
a sincere zeal for the happiness of their country, a temper
favorable to a just estimate of the means of promoting it.
Persons of this character will proceed to an examination of the plan
submitted by the convention, not only without a disposition to find or
to magnify faults; but will see the propriety of reflecting, that a
faultless plan was not to be expected. Nor will they barely make
allowances for the errors which may be chargeable on the fallibility
to which the convention, as a body of men, were liable; but will
keep in mind, that they themselves also are but men, and ought not
to assume an infallibility in rejudging the fallible opinions of
others.
With equal readiness will it be perceived, that besides these
inducements to candor, many allowances ought to be made for the
difficulties inherent in the very nature of the undertaking referred
to the convention.
The novelty of the undertaking immediately strikes us. It has been
shown, in the course of these papers, that the existing
Confederation is founded on principles which are fallacious; that we
must consequently change this first foundation, and with it the
superstructure resting upon it. It has been shown, that the other
confederacies which could be consulted as precedents have been
vitiated by the same erroneous principles, and can therefore furnish
no other light than that of beacons, which give warning of the
course to be shunned, without pointing out that which ought to be
pursued. The most that the convention could do in such a situation,
was to avoid the errors suggested by the past experience of other
countries, as well as of our own; and to provide a convenient mode
of rectifying their own errors, as future experience may unfold them.
Among the difficulties encountered by the convention, a very
important one must have lain in combining the requisite stability
and energy in government, with the inviolable attention due to liberty
and to the republican form. Without substantially accomplishing this
part of their undertaking, they would have very imperfectly
fulfilled the object of their appointment, or the expectation of the
public; yet that it could not be easily accomplished, will be denied
by no one who is unwilling to betray his ignorance of the subject.
Energy in government is essential to that security against external
and internal danger, and to that prompt and salutary execution of
the laws which enter into the very definition of good government.
Stability in government is essential to national character and to
the advantages annexed to it, as well as to that repose and confidence
in the minds of the people, which are among the chief blessings of
civil society. An irregular and mutable legislation is not more an
evil in itself than it is odious to the people; and it may be
pronounced with assurance that the people of this country, enlightened
as they are with regard to the nature, and interested, as the great
body of them are, in the effects of good government, will never be
satisfied till some remedy be applied to the vicissitudes and
uncertainties which characterise State administrations. On
comparing, however, these valuable ingredients with the vital
principles of liberty, we must perceive at once the difficulty of
mingling them together in their due proportions. The genius of
republican liberty seems to demand on one side, not only that all
power should be derived from the people, but that those intrusted with
it should be kept in dependence on the people, by a short duration
of their appointments; and that even during this short period the
trust should be placed not in a few, but a number of hands. Stability,
on the contrary, requires that the hands in which power is lodged
should continue for a length of time the same. A frequent change of
men will result from a frequent return of elections; and a frequent
change of measures from a frequent change of men: whilst energy in
government requires not only a certain duration of power, but the
execution of it by a single hand.
How far the convention may have succeeded in this part of their
work, will better appear on a more accurate view of it. From the
cursory view here taken, it must clearly appear to have been an
arduous part.
Not less arduous must have been the task of marking the proper
line of partition between the authority of the general and that of the
State governments. Every man will be sensible of this difficulty, in
proportion as he has been accustomed to contemplate and discriminate
objects extensive and complicated in their nature. The faculties of
the mind itself have never yet been distinguished and defined, with
satisfactory precision, by all the efforts of the most acute and
metaphysical philosophers. Sense, perception, judgment, desire,
volition, memory, imagination, are found to be separated by such
delicate shades and minute gradations that their boundaries have
eluded the most subtle investigations, and remain a pregnant source of
ingenious disquisition and controversy. The boundaries between the
great kingdom of nature, and, still more, between the various
provinces, and lesser portions, into which they are subdivided, afford
another illustration of the same important truth. The most sagacious
and laborious naturalists have never yet succeeded in tracing with
certainty the line which separates the district of vegetable life from
the neighboring region of unorganized matter, or which marks the
termination of the former and the commencement of the animal empire. A
still greater obscurity lies in the distinctive characters by which
the objects in each of these great departments of nature have been
arranged and assorted.
When we pass from the works of nature, in which all the delineations
are perfectly accurate, and appear to be otherwise only from the
imperfection of the eye which surveys them, to the institutions of
man, in which the obscurity arises as well from the object itself as
from the organ by which it is contemplated, we must perceive the
necessity of moderating still further our expectations and hopes
form the efforts of human sagacity. Experience has instructed us
that no skill in the science of government has yet been able to
discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three great
provinces- the legislative, executive, and judiciary; or even the
privileges and powers of the different legislative branches. Questions
daily occur in the course of practice, which prove the obscurity which
reigns in these subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts in
political science.
The experience of ages, with the continued and combined labors of
the most enlightened legislators and jurists, has been equally
unsuccessful in delineating the several objects and limits of
different codes of laws and different tribunals of justice. The
precise extent of the common law, and the statute law, the maritime
law, the ecclesiastical law, the law of corporations, and other
local laws and customs, remains still to be clearly and finally
established in Great Britain, where accuracy in such subjects has been
more industriously pursued than in any other part of the world. The
jurisdiction of her several courts, general and local, of law, of
equity, of admiralty, etc., is not less a source of frequent and
intricate discussions, sufficiently denoting the indeterminate
limits by which they are respectively circumscribed. All new laws,
though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the
fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less
obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and
ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.
Besides the obscurity arising from the complexity of objects, and
the imperfection of the human faculties, the medium through which
the conceptions of men are conveyed to each other adds a fresh
embarrassment. The use of words is to express ideas. Perspicuity,
therefore, requires not only that the ideas should be distinctly
formed, but that they should be expressed by words distinctly and
exclusively appropriate to them. But no language is so copious as to
supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as
not to include many equivocally denoting different ideas. Hence it
must happen that however accurately objects may be discriminated in
themselves, and however accurately the discrimination may be
considered, the definition of them may be rendered inaccurate by the
inaccuracy of the terms in which it is delivered. And this unavoidable
inaccuracy must be greater or less, according to the complexity and
novelty of the objects defined. When the Almighty himself
condescends to address mankind in their own language, his meaning,
luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful by the cloudy
medium through which it is communicated.
Here, then, are three sources of vague and incorrect definitions:
indistinctness of the object, imperfection of the organ of conception,
inadequateness of the vehicle of ideas. Any one of these must
produce a certain degree of obscurity. The convention, in
delineating the boundary between the federal and State
jurisdictions, must have experienced the full effect of them all.
To the difficulties already mentioned may be added the interfering
pretensions of the larger and smaller States. We cannot err in
supposing that the former would contend for a participation in the
government, fully proportioned to their superior wealth and
importance; and that the latter would not be less tenacious of the
quality at present enjoyed by them. We may well suppose that neither
side would entirely yield to the other, and consequently that the
struggle could be terminated only by compromise. It is extremely
probable, also, that after the ratio of representation had been
adjusted, this very compromise must have produced a fresh struggle
between the same parties, to give such a turn to the organization of
the government, and to the distribution of its powers, as would
increase the importance of the branches, in forming which they had
respectively obtained the greatest share of influence. There are
features in the Constitution which warrant each of these suppositions;
and as far as either of them is well founded, it shows that the
convention must have been compelled to sacrifice theoretical propriety
to the force of extraneous considerations.
Nor could it have been the large and small States only, which
would marshal themselves in opposition to each other on various
points. Other combinations, resulting from a difference of local
position and policy, must have created additional difficulties. As
every State may be divided into different districts, and its
citizens into different classes, which give birth to contending
interests and local jealousies, so the different parts of the United
States are distinguished from each other by a variety of
circumstances, which produce a like effect on a larger scale. And
although this variety of interests, for reasons sufficiently explained
in a former paper, may have a salutary influence on the administration
of the government when formed, yet every one must be sensible of the
contrary influence, which must have been experienced in the task of
forming it.
Would it be wonderful if, under the pressure of all these
difficulties, the convention should have been forced into some
deviations from that artificial structure and regular symmetry which
an abstract view of the subject might lead an ingenious theorist to
bestow on a Constitution planned in his closet or in his
imagination? The real wonder is that so many difficulties should
have been surmounted, and surmounted with a unanimity almost as
unprecedented as it must have been unexpected. It is impossible for
any man of candor to reflect on this circumstance without partaking of
the astonishment. It is impossible for the man of pious reflection not
to perceive in it a finger of that Almighty hand which has been so
frequently and signally extended to our relief in the critical
stages of the revolution.
We had occasion, in a former paper, to take notice of the repeated
trials which have been unsuccessfully made in the United Netherlands
for reforming the baneful and notorious vices of their constitution.
The history of almost all the great councils and consultations held
among mankind for reconciling their discordant opinions, assuaging
their mutual jealousies, and adjusting their respective interests,
is a history of factions, contentions, and disappointments, and may be
classed among the most dark and degraded pictures which display the
infirmities and depravities of the human character. If, in a few
scattered instances, a brighter aspect is presented, they serve only
as exceptions to admonish us of the general truth; and by their lustre
to darken the gloom of the adverse prospect to which they are
contrasted. In revolving the causes from which these exceptions
result, and applying them to the particular instances before us, we
are necessarily led to two important conclusions. The first is, that
the convention must have enjoyed, in a very singular degree, an
exemption from the pestilential influence of party animosities- the
disease most incident to deliberative bodies, and most apt to
contaminate their proceedings. The second conclusion is that all the
deputations composing the convention were satisfactorily
accommodated by the final act, or were induced to accede to it by a
deep conviction of the necessity of sacrificing private opinions and
partial interests to the public good, and by a despair of seeing
this necessity diminished by delays or by new experiments.
- PUBLIUS
NO 38: The Subject Continued and the Incoherence
of the Objections to the Plan Exposed
by James Madison
-
IT IS not a little remarkable that in every case reported by ancient
history, in which government has been established with deliberation
and consent, the task, of framing it has not been committed to an
assembly of men, but has been performed by some individual citizen
of preeminent wisdom and approved integrity.
Minos, we learn, was the primitive founder of the government of
Crete, as Zaleucus was of that of the Locrians. Theseus first, and
after him Draco and Solon, instituted the government of Athens.
Lycurgus was the lawgiver of Sparta. The foundation of the original
government of rome was laid by Romulus, and the work completed by
two of his elective successors, Numa and Tullius Hostilius. On the
abolition of royalty the consular administration was substituted by
Brutus, who stepped forward with a project for such a reform, which,
he alleged, had been prepared by Tullius Hostilius, and to which his
address obtained the assent and ratification of the senate and people.
This remark is applicable to confederate governments also. Amphictyon,
we are told, was the author of that which bore his name. The Achaean
league received its first birth from Achaeus, and its second from
Aratus.
What degree of agency these reputed lawgivers might have in their
respective establishments, or how far they might be clothed with the
legitimate authority of the people, cannot in every instance be
ascertained. In some, however, the proceeding was strictly regular.
Draco appears to have been intrusted by the people of Athens with
indefinite powers to reform its government and laws. And Solon,
according to Plutarch, was in a manner compelled, by the universal
suffrage of his fellow-citizens, to take upon him the sole and
absolute power of new-modelling the constition. The proceedings
under Lycurgus were less regular; but as far as the advocates for a
regular reform could prevail, they all turned their eyes towards the
single efforts of that celebrated patriot and sage, instead of seeking
to bring about a revolution by the intervention of a deliberative body
of citizens.
Whence could it have proceeded that a people, jealous as the
Greeks were of their liberty, should so far abandon the rules of
caution as to place their destiny in the hands of a single citizen?
Whence could it have proceeded, that the Athenians, a people who would
not suffer an army to be commanded by fewer than ten generals, and who
required no other proof of danger to their liberties than the
illustrious merit of a fellow-citizen, should consider one illustrious
citizen as a more eligible depositary of the fortunes of themselves
and their posterity, than a select body of citizens, from whose common
deliberations more wisdom, as well as more safety, might have been
expected? These questions cannot be fully answered, without
supposing that the fears of discord and disunion among a number of
counsellors exceed the apprehension of treachery or incapacity in a
single individual. History informs us, likewise, of the difficulties
with which these celebrated reformers had to contend, as well at the
expedients which they were obliged to employ in order to carry their
reforms into effect. Solon, who seems to have indulged a more
temporizing policy, confessed that he had not given to his
countrymen the government best suited to their happiness, but most
tolerable to their prejudices. And Lycurgus, more true to his
object, was under the necessity of mixing a portion of violence with
the authority of superstition, and of securing his final success by
a voluntary renunciation, first of his country, and then of his
life. If these lessons teach us, on one hand, to admire the
improvement made by America on the ancient mode of preparing and
establishing regular plans of government, they serve not less, on
the other, to admonish us of the hazards and difficulties incident
to such experiments, and of the great imprudence of unnecessarily
multiplying them.
Is it an unreasonable conjecture, that the errors which may be
contained in the plan of the convention are such as have resulted
rather from the defect of antecedent experience on this complicated
and difficult subject, than from a want of accuracy or care in the
investigation of it; and, consequently, such as will not be
ascertained until an actual trial shall have pointed them out? This
conjecture is rendered probable, not only by many considerations of
a general nature, but by the particular case of the Articles of
Confederation. It is observable that among the numerous objections and
amendments suggested by the several States, when these articles were
submitted for their ratification, not one is found which alludes to
the great and radical error which on actual trial has discovered
itself. And if we except the observations which New Jersey was led
to make, rather by her local situation, than by her peculiar
foresight, it may be questioned whether a single suggestion was of
sufficient moment to justify a revision of the system. There is
abundant reason, nevertheless, to suppose that immaterial as these
objections were, they would have been adhered to with a very dangerous
inflexibility, in some States, had not a zeal for their opinions and
supposed interests been stifled by the more powerful sentiment of
self-preservation. One State, we may remember, persisted for several
years in refusing her concurrence, although the enemy remained the
whole period at our gates, or rather in the very bowels of our
country. Nor was her pliancy in the end effected by a less motive,
than the fear of being chargeable with protracting the public
calamities, and endangering the event of the contest. Every candid
reader will make the proper reflections on these important facts.
A patient who finds his disorder daily growing worse, and that an
efficacious remedy can no longer be delayed without extreme danger,
after coolly revolving his situation, and the characters of
different physicians, selects and calls in such of them as he judges
most capable of administering relief, and best entitled to his
confidence. The physicians attend; the case of the patient is
carefully examined; a consultation is held; they are unanimously
agreed that the symptoms are critical, but that the case, with
proper and timely relief, so far from being desperate, that it may
be made to issue in an improvement of his constitution. They are
equally unanimous in prescribing the remedy, by which this happy
effect is to be produced. The prescription is no sooner made known,
however, than a number of persons interpose, and, without denying
the reality or danger of the disorder, assure the patient that the
prescription will be poison to his constitution, and forbid him, under
pain of certain death, to make use of it. Might not the patient
reasonably demand, before he ventured to follow this advice, that
the authors of it should at least agree among themselves on some other
remedy to be substituted? And if he found them differing as much
from one another as from his first counsellors, would he not act
prudently in trying the experiment unanimously recommended by the
latter, rather than be hearkening to those who could neither deny
the necessity of a speedy remedy, nor agree in proposing one?
Such a patient and in such a situation is America at this moment.
She has been sensible of her malady. She has obtained a regular and
unanimous advice from men of her own deliberate choice. And she is
warned by others against following this advice under pain of the
most fatal consequences. Do the monitors deny the reality of her
danger? No. Do they deny the necessity of some speedy and powerful
remedy? No. Are they agreed, are any two of them agreed, in their
objections to the remedy proposed, or in the proper one to be
substituted? Let them speak for themselves. This one tells us that the
proposed Constitution ought to be rejected, because it is not a
confederation of the States, but a government over individuals.
Another admits that it ought to be a government over individuals to
a certain extent, but by no means to the extent proposed. A third does
not object to the government over individuals, or to the extent
proposed, but to the want of a bill of rights. A fourth concurs in the
absolute necessity of a bill of rights, but contends that it ought
to be declaratory, not of the personal rights of individuals, but of
the rights reserved to the States in their political capacity. A fifth
is of opinion that a bill of rights of any sort would be superfluous
and misplaced, and that the plan would be unexceptionable but for
the fatal power of regulating the times and places of election. An
objector in a large State exclaims loudly against the unreasonable
equality of representation in the Senate. An objector in a small State
is equally loud against the dangerous inequality in the House of
Representatives. From this quarter, we are alarmed with the amazing
expense, from the number of persons who are to administer the new
government. From another quarter, and sometimes from the same quarter,
on another occasion, the cry is that the Congress will be but a shadow
of a representation, and that the government would be far less
objectionable if the number and the expense were doubled. A patriot in
a State that does not import or export, discerns insuperable
objections against the power of direct taxation. The patriotic
adversary in a State of great exports and imports, is not less
dissatisfied that the whole burden of taxes may be thrown on
consumption. This politician discovers in the Constitution a direct
and irresistible tendency to monarchy; that is equally sure it will
end in aristocracy. Another is puzzled to say which of these shapes it
will ultimately assume, but see clearly it must be one or other of
them; whilst a fourth is not wanting, who with no less confidence
affirms that the Constitution is so far from having a bias towards
either of these dangers, that the weight on that side will not be
sufficient to keep it upright and firm against its opposite
propensities. With another class of adversaries to the Constitution
the language is that the legislative, executive, and judiciary
departments are intermixed in such a manner as to contradict all the
ideas of regular government and all the requisite precautions in favor
of liberty. Whilst this objection circulates in vague and general
expressions, there are but a few who lend their sanction to it. Let
each one come forward with his particular explanation, and scarce
any two are exactly agreed upon the subject. In the eyes of one the
junction of the Senate with the President in the responsible
function of appointing to offices, instead of vesting this executive
power in the Executive alone, is the vicious part of the organization.
To another, the exclusion of the House of Representatives, whose
numbers alone could be a due security against corruption and
partiality in the exercise of such a power, is equally obnoxious. With
another, the admission of the President into any share of a power
which must ever be a dangerous engine in the hands of the executive
magistrate, is an unpardonable violation of the maxims of republican
jealousy. No part of the arrangement, according to some, is more
inadmissible than the trial of impeachments by the Senate, which is
alternately a member both of the legislative and executive
departments, when this power so evidently belonged to the judiciary
department. "We concur fully," reply others, "in the objection to this
part of the plan, but we can never agree that a reference of
impeachments to the judiciary authority would be an amendment of the
error. Our principal dislike to the organization arises from the
extensive powers already lodged in that department." Even among the
zealous patrons of a council of state the most irreconcilable variance
is discovered concerning the mode in which it ought to be constituted.
The demand of one gentleman is, that the council should consist of a
small number to be appointed by the most numerous branch of the
legislature. Another would prefer a larger number, and considers it as
a fundamental condition that the appointment should be made by the
President himself.
As it can give no umbrage to the writers against the plan of the
federal Constitution, let us suppose, that as they are the most
zealous, so they are also the most sagacious, of those who think the
late convention were unequal to the task assigned them, and that a
wiser and better plan might and ought to be substituted. Let us
further suppose that their country should concur, both in this
favorable opinion of their merits, and in their unfavorable opinion of
the convention; and should accordingly proceed to form them into a
second convention, with full powers, and for the express purpose of
revising and remoulding the work of the first. Were the experiment
to be seriously made, though it required some effort to view it
seriously even in fiction, I leave it to be decided by the sample of
opinions just exhibited, whether, with all their enmity to their
predecessors, they would, in any one point, depart so widely from
their example, as in the discord and ferment that would mark their own
deliberations; and whether the Constitution, now before the public,
would not stand as fair a chance for immortality, as Lycurgus gave
to that of Sparta, by making its change to depend on his own return
from exile and death, if it were to be immediately adopted, and were
to continue in force, not until a BETTER, but until ANOTHER should
be agreed upon by this new assembly of lawgivers.
It is a matter both of wonder and regret, that those who raise so
many objections against the new Constitution should never call to mind
the defects of that which is to be exchanged for it. It is not
necessary that the former should be perfect: it is sufficient that the
latter is more imperfect. No man would refuse to give brass for silver
or gold, because the latter had some alloy in it. No man would
refuse to quit a shattered and tottering habitation for a firm and
commodious building, because the latter had not a porch to it, or
because some of the rooms might be a little larger or smaller, or
the ceiling a little higher or lower than his fancy would have planned
them. But waiving illustrations of this sort, is it not manifest
that most of the capital objections urged against the new system lie
with tenfold weight against the existing Confederation? Is an
indefinite power to raise money dangerous in the hands of the
federal government? The present Congress can make requisitions to
any amount they please, and the States are constitutionally bound to
furnish them; they can emit bills of credit as long as they will pay
for the paper; they can borrow, both abroad and at home, as long as
a shilling will be lent. Is an indefinite power to raise troops
dangerous? The Confederation gives to Congress that power also; and
they have already begun to make use of it. Is it improper and unsafe
to intermix the different powers of government in the same body of
men? Congress, a single body of men, are the sole depositary of all
the federal powers. Is it particularly dangerous to give keys of the
treasury, and the command of the army, into the same hands? The
Confederation places them both in the hands of Congress. Is a bill
of rights essential to liberty? The Confederation has no bill of
rights. Is it an objection against the new Constitution, that it
empowers the Senate, with the concurrence of the Executive, to make
treaties which are to be the laws of the land? The existing
Congress, without any such control, can make treaties which they
themselves have declared, and most of the States have recognized, to
be the supreme law of the land. Is the importation of slaves permitted
by the new Constitution for twenty years? By the old it is permitted
forever.
I shall be told, that however dangerous this mixture of powers may
be in theory, it is rendered harmless by the dependence of Congress on
the States for the means of carrying them into practice; that
however large the mass of powers may be, it is in fact a lifeless
mass. Then, say I, in the first place, that the Confederation is
chargeable with the still greater folly of declaring certain powers in
the federal government to be absolutely necessary, and at the same
time rendering them absolutely nugatory; and, in the next place,
that if the Union is to continue, and no better government be
substituted, effective powers must either be granted to, or assumed
by, the existing Congress; in either of which events, the contrast
just stated will hold good. But this is not all. Out of this
lifeless mass has already grown an excrescent power, which tends to
realize all the dangers that can be apprehended from a defective
construction of the supreme government of the Union. It is now no
longer a point of speculation and hope, that the Western territory
is a mine of vast wealth to the United States; and although it is
not of such a nature as to extricate them from their present
distresses, or for some time to come, to yield any regular supplies
for the public expenses, yet must it hereafter be able, under proper
management, both to effect a gradual discharge of the domestic debt,
and to furnish, for a certain period, liberal tributes to the
federal treasury. A very large proportion of this fund has been
already surrendered by individual States; and it may with reason be
expected that the remaining States will not persist in withholding
similar proofs of their equity and generosity. We may calculate,
therefore, that a rich and fertile country, of an area equal to the
inhabited extent of the United States, will soon become a national
stock. Congress have assumed the administration of this stock. They
have begun to render it productive. Congress have undertaken to do
more: they have proceeded to form new States, to erect temporary
governments to appoint officers for them, and to prescribe the
conditions on which such States shall be admitted into the
Confederacy. All this has been done; and done without the least
color of constitutional authority. Yet no blame has been whispered; no
alarm has been sounded. A GREAT AND INDEPENDENT fund of revenue is
passing into the hands of a SINGLE BODY of men, who can RAISE TROOPS
to an INDEFINITE NUMBER, and appropriate money to their support for an
INDEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME. And yet there are men, who have not only
been silent spectators of this prospect, but who are advocates for the
system which exhibits it; and, at the same time, urge against the
new system the objections which we have heard. Would they not act with
more consistency, in urging the establishment of the latter, as no
less necessary to guard the Union against the future powers and
resources of a body constructed like the existing Congress, than to
save it from the dangers threatened by the present impotency of that
Assembly?
I mean not, by any thing here said, to throw censure on the measures
which have been pursued by Congress. I am sensible they could not have
done otherwise. The public interest, the necessity of the case,
imposed upon them the task of overleaping their constitutional limits.
But is not the fact an alarming proof of the danger resulting from a
government which does not possess regular powers commensurate to its
objects? A dissolution or usurpation is the dreadful dilemma to
which it is continually exposed.
- PUBLIUS
NO 39: The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles:
An Objection in Respect to the Powers of the Convention Examined
by James Madison
-
THE last paper having concluded the observations which were meant to
introduce a candid survey of the plan of government reported by the
convention, we now proceed to the execution of that part of our
undertaking.
The first question that offers itself is, whether the general form
and aspect of the government be strictly republican. It is evident
that no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people
of America; with the fundamental principles of the Revolution; or with
that honorable determination which animates every votary of freedom,
to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for
self-government. If the plan of the convention, therefore, be found to
depart from the republican character, its advocates must abandon it as
no longer defensible.
What, then, are the distinctive characters of the republican form?
Were an answer to this question to be sought, not by recurring to
principles, but in the application of the term by political writers,
to the constitutions of different States, no satisfactory one would
ever be found. Holland, in which no particle of the supreme
authority is derived from the people, has passed almost universally
under the denomination of a republic. The same title has been bestowed
on Venice, where absolute power over the great body of the people is
exercised, in the most absolute manner, by a small body of
hereditary nobles. Poland, which is a mixture of aristocracy and of
monarchy in their worst forms, has been dignified with the same
appellation. The government of England, which has one republican
branch only, combined with an hereditary aristocracy and monarchy,
has, with equal impropriety, been frequently placed on the list of
republics. These examples, which are nearly as dissimilar to each
other as to a genuine republic, show the extreme inaccuracy with which
the term has been used in political disquisitions.
If we resort for a criterion to the different principles on which
different forms of government are established, we may define a
republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government
which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great
body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their
offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good
behavior. It is essential to such a government that it be derived from
the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable
proportion, or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of
tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of
their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans, and claim for
their government the honorable title of republic. It is sufficient for
such a government that the persons administering it be appointed,
either directly or indirectly, by the people; and that they hold their
appointments by either of the tenures just specified; otherwise
every government in the United States, as well as every other
popular government that has been or can be well organized or well
executed, would be degraded from the republican character. According
to the constitution of every State in the Union, some or other of
the officers of government are appointed indirectly only by the
people. According to most of them, the chief magistrate himself is
so appointed. And according to one, this mode of appointment is
extended to one of the coordinate branches of the legislature.
According to all the constitutions, also, the tenure of the highest
offices is extended to a definite period, and in many instances,
both within the legislative and executive departments, to a period
of years. According to the provisions of most of the constitutions,
again, as well as according to the most respectable and received
opinions on the subject, the members of the judiciary department are
to retain their offices by the firm tenure of good behavior.
On comparing the Constitution planned by the convention with the
standard here fixed, we perceive at once that it is, in the most rigid
sense, conformable to it. The House of Representatives, like that of
one branch at least of all the State legislatures, is elected
immediately by the great body of the people. The Senate, like the
present Congress, and the Senate of Maryland, derives its
appointment indirectly from the people. The President is indirectly
derived from the choice of the people, according to the example in
most of the States. Even the judges with all other officers of the
Union, will, as in the several States, be the choice, though a
remote choice, of the people themselves. The duration of the
appointments is equally conformable to the republican standard, and to
the model of State constitutions. The House of Representatives is
periodically elective, as in all the States; and for the period of two
years, as in the State of South Carolina. The Senate is elective,
for the period of six years; which is but one year more than the
period of the Senate of Maryland, and but two more than that of the
Senates of New York and Virginia. The President is to continue in
office for the
