All Laws

U.S. SUPREME COURT AND OTHER HIGH COURT CITATIONS PROVING THAT NO LICENSE IS NECESSARY FOR NORMAL USE OF AN AUTOMOBILE ON COMMON WAYS

“The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horsedrawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but a common right which he has under his right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Under this constitutional guaranty one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his inclination along the public highways or in public places, and while conducting himself in an orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing another’s rights, he will be protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct.”

Thompson v.Smith, 154 SE 579, 11 American Jurisprudence, Constitutional Law, section 329, page 1135 “The right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, is a common right which he has under the right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right, in so doing, to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day, and under the existing modes of travel, includes the right to drive a horse drawn carriage or wagon thereon or to operate an automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary purpose of life and business.” –

Thompson vs. Smith, supra.; Teche Lines vs. Danforth, Miss., 12 S.2d 784 “… the right of the citizen to drive on a public street with freedom from police interference… is a fundamental constitutional right” -White, 97 Cal.App.3d.141, 158 Cal.Rptr. 562, 566-67 (1979) “citizens have a right to drive upon the public streets of the District of Columbia or any other city absent a constitutionally sound reason for limiting their access.”

Caneisha Mills v. D.C. 2009 “The use of the automobile as a necessary adjunct to the earning of a livelihood in modern life requires us in the interest of realism to conclude that the RIGHT to use an automobile on the public highways partakes of the nature of a liberty within the meaning of the Constitutional guarantees. . .”

Berberian v. Lussier (1958) 139 A2d 869, 872, See also: Schecter v. Killingsworth, 380 P.2d 136, 140; 93 Ariz. 273 (1963). “The right to operate a motor vehicle [an automobile] upon the public streets and highways is not a mere privilege. It is a right of liberty, the enjoyment of which is protected by the guarantees of the federal and state constitutions.”

Adams v. City of Pocatello, 416 P.2d 46, 48; 91 Idaho 99 (1966). “A traveler has an equal right to employ an automobile as a means of transportation and to occupy the public highways with other vehicles in common use.”

Campbell v. Walker, 78 Atl. 601, 603, 2 Boyce (Del.) 41. “The owner of an automobile has the same right as the owner of other vehicles to use the highway,* * * A traveler on foot has the same right to the use of the public highways as an automobile or any other vehicle.”

Simeone v. Lindsay, 65 Atl. 778, 779; Hannigan v. Wright, 63 Atl. 234, 236. “The RIGHT of the citizen to DRIVE on the public street with freedom from police interference, unless he is engaged in suspicious conduct associated in some manner with criminality is a FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT which must be protected by the courts.” People v. Horton 14 Cal. App. 3rd 667 (1971) “The right to make use of an automobile as a vehicle of travel long the highways of the state, is no longer an open question. The owners thereof have the same rights in the roads and streets as the drivers of horses or those riding a bicycle or traveling in some other vehicle.”

House v. Cramer, 112 N.W. 3; 134 Iowa 374; Farnsworth v. Tampa Electric Co. 57 So. 233, 237, 62 Fla. 166. “The automobile may be used with safety to others users of the highway, and in its proper use upon the highways there is an equal right with the users of other vehicles properly upon the highways. The law recognizes such right of use upon general principles.

Brinkman v Pacholike, 84 N.E. 762, 764, 41 Ind. App. 662, 666. “The law does not denounce motor carriages, as such, on public ways. They have an equal right with other vehicles in common use to occupy the streets and roads. It is improper to say that the driver of the horse has rights in the roads superior to the driver of the automobile. Both have the right to use the easement.”

Indiana Springs Co. v. Brown, 165 Ind. 465, 468. U.S. Supreme Court says No License Necessary To Drive Automobile On Public Highways/Streets No License Is Necessary Copy and Share Freely YHVH.name 2 2 “A highway is a public way open and free to any one who has occasion to pass along it on foot or with any kind of vehicle.” Schlesinger v. City of Atlanta, 129 S.E. 861, 867, 161 Ga. 148, 159;

Holland v. Shackelford, 137 S.E. 2d 298, 304, 220 Ga. 104; Stavola v. Palmer, 73 A.2d 831, 838, 136 Conn. 670 “There can be no question of the right of automobile owners to occupy and use the public streets of cities, or highways in the rural districts.” Liebrecht v. Crandall, 126 N.W. 69, 110 Minn. 454, 456 “The word ‘automobile’ connotes a pleasure vehicle designed for the transportation of persons on highways.”

-American Mutual Liability Ins. Co., vs. Chaput, 60 A.2d 118, 120; 95 NH 200 Motor Vehicle: 18 USC Part 1 Chapter 2 section 31 definitions: “(6) Motor vehicle. – The term “motor vehicle” means every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways…” 10) The term “used for commercial purposes” means the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit. “A motor vehicle or automobile for hire is a motor vehicle, other than an automobile stage, used for the transportation of persons for which remuneration is received.”

-International Motor Transit Co. vs. Seattle, 251 P. 120 The term ‘motor vehicle’ is different and broader than the word ‘automobile.’”

-City of Dayton vs. DeBrosse, 23 NE.2d 647, 650; 62 Ohio App. 232 “Thus self-driven vehicles are classified according to the use to which they are put rather than according to the means by which they are propelled” – Ex Parte Hoffert, 148 NW 20 “

The Supreme Court, in Arthur v. Morgan, 112 U.S. 495, 5 S.Ct. 241, 28 L.Ed. 825, held that carriages were properly classified as household effects, and we see no reason that automobiles should not be similarly disposed of.”

Hillhouse v United States, 152 F. 163, 164 (2nd Cir. 1907). “…a citizen has the right to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon…” State vs. Johnson, 243 P. 1073; Cummins vs. Homes, 155 P. 171; Packard vs. Banton, 44 S.Ct. 256; Hadfield vs. Lundin, 98 Wash 516, Willis vs. Buck, 263 P. l 982;

Barney vs. Board of Railroad Commissioners, 17 P.2d 82 “The use of the highways for the purpose of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common and fundamental Right of which the public and the individual cannot be rightfully deprived.”

Chicago Motor Coach vs. Chicago, 169 NE 22; Ligare vs. Chicago, 28 NE 934; Boon vs. Clark, 214 SSW 607; 25 Am.Jur. (1st) Highways Sect.163 “the right of the Citizen to travel upon the highway and to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business… is the usual and ordinary right of the Citizen, a right common to all.” –

Ex Parte Dickey, (Dickey vs. Davis), 85 SE 781 “Every Citizen has an unalienable RIGHT to make use of the public highways of the state; every Citizen has full freedom to travel from place to place in the enjoyment of life and liberty.” People v. Nothaus, 147 Colo. 210. “No State government entity has the power to allow or deny passage on the highways, byways, nor waterways… transporting his vehicles and personal property for either recreation or business, but by being subject only to local regulation i.e., safety, caution, traffic lights, speed limits, etc. Travel is not a privilege requiring licensing, vehicle registration, or forced insurances.”

Chicago Coach Co. v. City of Chicago, 337 Ill. 200, 169 N.E. 22. “Traffic infractions are not a crime.” People v. Battle “Persons faced with an unconstitutional licensing law which purports to require a license as a prerequisite to exercise of right… may ignore the law and engage with impunity in exercise of such right.”

Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham 394 U.S. 147 (1969). U.S. Supreme Court says No License Necessary To Drive Automobile On Public Highways/Streets No License Is Necessary Copy and Share Freely YHVH.name 3 “The word ‘operator’ shall not include any person who solely transports his own property and who transports no persons or property for hire or compensation.”

Statutes at Large California Chapter 412 p.83 “Highways are for the use of the traveling public, and all have the right to use them in a reasonable and proper manner; the use thereof is an inalienable right of every citizen.” Escobedo v. State 35 C2d 870 in 8 Cal Jur 3d p.27 “RIGHT — A legal RIGHT, a constitutional RIGHT means a RIGHT protected by the law, by the constitution, but government does not create the idea of RIGHT or original RIGHTS; it acknowledges them. . . “ Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 1914, p. 2961. “Those who have the right to do something cannot be licensed for what they already have right to do as such license would be meaningless.”

City of Chicago v Collins 51 NE 907, 910. “A license means leave to do a thing which the licensor could prevent.” Blatz Brewing Co. v. Collins, 160 P.2d 37, 39; 69 Cal. A. 2d 639. “The object of a license is to confer a right or power, which does not exist without it.”

Payne v. Massey (19__) 196 SW 2nd 493, 145 Tex 273. “The court makes it clear that a license relates to qualifications to engage in profession, business, trade or calling; thus, when merely traveling without compensation or profit, outside of business enterprise or adventure with the corporate state, no license is required of the natural individual traveling for personal business, pleasure and transportation.”

Wingfield v. Fielder 2d Ca. 3d 213 (1972). “If [state] officials construe a vague statute unconstitutionally, the citizen may take them at their word, and act on the assumption that the statute is void.” –

Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham 394 U.S. 147 (1969). “With regard particularly to the U.S. Constitution, it is elementary that a Right secured or protected by that document cannot be overthrown or impaired by any state police authority.” Donnolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 US 540; Lafarier vs. Grand Trunk R.R. Co., 24 A. 848; O’Neil vs. Providence Amusement Co., 108 A. 887. “The right to travel (called the right of free ingress to other states, and egress from them) is so fundamental that it appears in the Articles of Confederation, which governed our society before the Constitution.”

(Paul v. Virginia). “[T]he right to travel freely from State to State … is a right broadly assertable against private interference as well as governmental action. Like the right of association, it is a virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed by the Constitution to us all.” (U.S. Supreme Court,

Shapiro v. Thompson). EDGERTON, Chief Judge: “Iron curtains have no place in a free world. …’Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty, and the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory of any State is a right secured by the Constitution.’

Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274, 21 S.Ct. 128, 45 L.Ed. 186. “Our nation has thrived on the principle that, outside areas of plainly harmful conduct, every American is left to shape his own life as he thinks best, do what he pleases, go where he pleases.” Id., at 197.

Kent vs. Dulles see Vestal, Freedom of Movement, 41 Iowa L.Rev. 6, 13—14. “The validity of restrictions on the freedom of movement of particular individuals, both substantively and procedurally, is precisely the sort of matter that is the peculiar domain of the courts.” Comment, 61 Yale L.J. at page 187. “a person detained for an investigatory stop can be questioned but is “not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest.”Justice White, Hiibel “Automobiles have the right to use the highways of the State on an equal footing with other vehicles.”

Cumberland Telephone. & Telegraph Co. v Yeiser 141 Kentucy 15. “Each citizen has the absolute right to choose for himself the mode of conveyance he desires, whether it be by wagon or carriage, by horse, motor or electric car, or by bicycle, or astride of a horse, subject to the sole condition that he will observe all those requirements that are known as the law of the road.”

Swift v City of Topeka, 43 U.S. Supreme Court says No License Necessary To Drive Automobile On Public Highways/Streets No License Is Necessary Copy and Share Freely YHVH.name 4 Kansas 671, 674. The Supreme Court said in U.S. v Mersky (1960) 361 U.S. 431: An administrative regulation, of course, is not a “statute.” A traveler on foot has the same right to use of the public highway as an automobile or any other vehicle.

Cecchi v. Lindsay, 75 Atl. 376, 377, 1 Boyce (Del.) 185. Automotive vehicles are lawful means of conveyance and have equal rights upon the streets with horses and carriages.

Chicago Coach Co. v. City of Chicago, 337 Ill. 200, 205; See also: Christy v. Elliot, 216 Ill. 31; Ward v. Meredith, 202 Ill. 66; Shinkle v. McCullough, 116 Ky. 960; Butler v. Cabe, 116 Ark. 26, 28-29. …automobiles are lawful vehicles and have equal rights on the highways with horses and carriages. Daily v. Maxwell, 133 S.W. 351, 354.

Matson v. Dawson, 178 N.W. 2d 588, 591. A farmer has the same right to the use of the highways of the state, whether on foot or in a motor vehicle, as any other citizen.

Draffin v. Massey, 92 S.E.2d 38, 42. Persons may lawfully ride in automobiles, as they may lawfully ride on bicycles. Doherty v. Ayer, 83 N.E. 677, 197 Mass. 241, 246;

Molway v. City of Chicago, 88 N.E. 485, 486, 239 Ill. 486; Smiley v. East St. Louis Ry. Co., 100 N.E. 157, 158. “A soldier’s personal automobile is part of his ‘household goods[.]’

U.S. v Bomar, C.A.5(Tex.), 8 F.3d 226, 235″ 19A Words and Phrases – Permanent Edition (West) pocket part 94. “[I]t is a jury question whether … an automobile … is a motor vehicle[.]”

United States v Johnson, 718 F.2d 1317, 1324 (5th Cir. 1983). Other right to use an automobile cases: –

EDWARDS VS. CALIFORNIA, 314 U.S. 160 –

TWINING VS NEW JERSEY, 211 U.S. 78 – WILLIAMS VS. FEARS, 179 U.S. 270, AT 274 – CRANDALL VS. NEVADA, 6 WALL. 35, AT 43-44 – THE PASSENGER CASES, 7 HOWARD 287, AT 492 – U.S. VS. GUEST, 383 U.S. 745, AT 757-758 (1966) –

GRIFFIN VS. BRECKENRIDGE, 403 U.S. 88, AT 105-106 (1971) – CALIFANO VS. TORRES, 435 U.S. 1, AT 4, note 6 –

SHAPIRO VS. THOMPSON, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) – CALIFANO VS. AZNAVORIAN, 439 U.S. 170, AT 176 (1978) Look the above citations up in American Jurisprudence. Some citations may be paraphrased.

Akhnaton’s Adept Lesson #502

Our God

The Divine CONSTITUTION Of Moorish America

Act 1 – The Grand Sheik and the Chairman of Moorish America are in power to make law and enforce laws with the assistance of the Prophet and the Grand Body of Moorish America. The Assistant Grand Sheik is toassist the Grand Sheik in all affairs if he lives according to Love, Truth, Peace, Freedom and Justice, and it is known before the citizens of Moorish America.

ACt-1 above is the entirety of The Divine Constitution of a Holy People. A Constitution is the fundamental and organic law representing the Nation State and descendant character of recognized peoples. All lawful constitutions contain three basic components e.g. (1) The Form of Government, (2)
Principles for which it stands and (3) Citizens and natural members of the State. (These 3 elements of organic law will be explained on the following page). They are the constitutional rudiments are key factors for the Moorish Americans to be on familiar terms with how Noble Drew Ali was divinely sent as he indeed “Prepared a table before us in the very presence of our enemy.” The Constitution of a nation is therefore the fundamental force from which all its citizens derives their just powers to be free, protected, and guided. These autonomous and natural laws empowers the Moorish to nationalize the land, air and waterways upon which their flag can stand, their prosperity can live in autonomy and peace, its government to be sovereign in defense of its principles.

As an Angel of The Great God sent to bring His people the everlasting gospel, Noble Drew Ali introduced The Divine Constitution while the Moorish Americans were still students of his organization, The Moorish Science Temple of America, Inc (MSTA). The complete compilation of organic words expressed in Act-1 composes the whole Constitution of Moorish America intact. The Divine Constitution of the Moorish is the world‟s 2nd shortest amass of constitutional laws of any government on earth to date, save the United States. Our Divine Constitution is the supreme natural laws empowering the Moorish American People as an independent and sovereign nation. The Divine Constitution of the Moorish American Nation is also known as a “Divine Covenant” between The Father God Allah, through His Prophet and The clean and pure Nation. Thereby creating an a Holy allegiance between God and Man.

The Holy Prophet Noble Drew Ali instructed the Moorish Americans: “In order for you to be good Moorish Leaders you must study The Divine Constitution and Holy Koran. These tools are His main footprints He left clearly cut, for the Moorish to follow, to be assured their Prophet went this way.” Often the words Constitution and Government are used interchangeably to communicate the name of an instrument containing the fundamental laws and security of a state. Nevertheless the free national Constitution of every family attached to the human family of nations consists of these three elements:

(1) Theocracy is the true form of Government for the Moorish Peoples. A Theocratic Government is governed by The Great God and Universal Order and Guidance of the written Gospels. Our Forefathers are the founders of the world’s first religious Creed. All officials of this form of Government must be Divine Ministers who are authorized representative of the laws, principles and state. Beware and advised, the clean and pure nation of Moorish Americans is not a Republic, Democratic, Monarchy, Dictatorship nor any of the other 71 forms of government. There are Seven Postulates
articulated in the Constitution of this divinely prepared Government: They are

(1) The Grand Sheik, (2) The Chairman, (3) The Prophet, (4) The Grand Body,
(5) The Assistant Grand Sheik, (6) The Five Principles and (7) The Citizens of Moorish America. The Grand National Emblem, (Crescent-Moon (Last Quarter) and Five-Pointed Open Green Star) illustrates the maximum God Status to be “As above so below” because the Moorish are indeed the Star. The 3step-ladder of Salvation (Belief, Faith and Fruition) personifies the Moorish return-climb from a Human State to their rightful status of The Great God as
one. Theocracy is the true form of Government for the Moorish Americans.

(2) Principles: There are five principles of the Moorish Peoples. These principles are Love, Truth, Peace, Freedom and Justice (L, T, P, F, & J). These employ the undeniable doctrine of the Great God and Man are in fact one. L, T, P, F, & J are the sacred values, holy philosophy and true tools of life of every Moorish Citizen. Often revealed as the “Five Highest Principles known to man” these pentagrams are also proudly displayed on the Five-pointed Open Green Star centered in The Moorish Flag. The Five pointed open Green Star has represented the Moorish since the fall of man. It is the open pentagram that makes “Our Flag is over 100,000 years old” and should not be confused with the flag of present day Morocco who exchanged the divine Principles of L, T, P, F, & J for the Five Pillars of Islam in 1492. Since then Morocco has not recognized their Moorish Forefathers as those named among the Faithful.

(3) Citizen: Citizens are members of an established government, State or political community. Citizens are they who have established or submitted themselves to the protection, promotions and general welfare of their individual and collective rights. The Moorish American Government recognizes its Citizens by their
Nationality, also referred to as their free national name. They are “the Moorish Americans, Descendants of the ancient Moabites whom inhabited the northwestern and southwestern shores of Africa.” Citizens are the true family stones, made of every man, Woman, Son and Daughter who goes towards the building of their pyramid-Nation bearing their one free national name. Moorish American Citizenship can be acquired by national descendant birth and naturalization.

The reason this lesson is being handed down to the Moorish at this time is because their eyes are more open today and subject to see their principles and national worth for the first time since a 400 year slumber. Yet they must first come to the realization that, other than the Siddis of India who are largely enslaved nationals from the east coast of Africa but known as “The Untouchables”, the Moorish Americans remains the only nation of people totally detached from the Human Family of Nations. Ironically true Arabian history will reflect the same Muslims that enslaved the Moors of East Africa and sold them into the Royalties of India are the same who orchestrated the West African Slave Trade by selling Moors to the nations of Europe. This may not seem like such a national catastrophic illness until their symptoms of expendability are duly considered. Some of the genocidal side effects of being nationless mean they have no power to be a man or woman; all their contributions to humanity are accredited to the controlling Government in which they exist. Their children are not legally their own but classified as wards of the prevailing Corporation. To add to their generations of unconscious existence the Moorish that have been denationalized have no opulence, future or hope. In order to have hope for the future one must have memory of national accomplishments and worldly contributions. This level of hope is called “Freedom.” But the NBC is as low as any Moor can be buried because the Negro has never had a memory of freedom and there can be no independence to attain. What he accepts as riches are mere offerings at the whims of established citizens. Worst still, in their present state of nationless, the Moorish cannot receive any help from other nations for their respect and fear of instigating acts of aggression by interfering with the property of another recognized government. This is why the Kingdom of Morocco and Saudi Arabia has never come to the rescue of the Moorish they enslaved to the Americas.

A Divine Warning by The Prophet For The Nations:

The citizens of all free national governments, according to their national constitution are all of one family bearing one free national name. This is where the citizens of Moorish America, who are of one family bearing our one free National Name of Moorish American received the authority to live according to The Divine Constitution of our free National Government. Natural Citizens are not confined to non-governmental organizations but are duty bound to proclaim their free national name, to be recognized by their government in which they must live. Only then can we, The Moorish American Nation, be truly free, a whole ancient people with Constitution de jure and accepted intact by the nations of the earth.

Those who fail to recognize the free national name of their constitutional government are classed as undesirables and are subject to all the inferior names, abuses and mistreatments that the citizens care to bestow upon them. Since 1929 the body of Moorish peoples whom, like their NBC equivalents, has not proclaimed their free national status, according to their Constitutional Government and have found themselves subjected to the same fraternal abuses and judicial mistreatments. Because they have failed to proclaim themselves as a clean and pure nation and live within the jurisdiction of their constitutional government they are drawing all the mistreatments and evils down upon themselves. The unproclaimed Moorish cannot be distinguished or protected from other persons subjected to the assumable jurisdiction of the 14th Amendment. This is why all NBC and Negro Masons alike haave no rule of their women and children.

And it is a sin for any group of people to violate the national constitutional laws of a free national government and cling to the names and principles that deludes to slavery. Being NBC, Chattel or otherwise Nationless and stirring comatosed outside of the constitutional fold of government are sins before Allah and crimes before the laws of nature and man. Those who fancy themselves safe while under the oaths, pledges and memberships of various religious organizations, Secret Societies and personal Republics are still in violations of the national constitutional laws of all free national governments. Too often groups not proclaiming your free national name before your Constituted Government have been mislead like bleeding lambs to the courts of lions. They pride themselves in mastering the judicial laws of known slave masters and finding comfort in the exchange of slave cabins on the same plantation. Meanwhile being unprotected by their free national Constitution leaves legal trails of Paper Terrorism, jail terms and failures. They fail to acknowledge there is only one way and one way only for a people to obtain and sustain a free national status.

Unless you are a fervent student of Constitutional Law balanced with a good understanding of Metaphysics you may need to apply a more direct study to this constitutional Saving Powers brought expressly to free the rejected Moorish Peoples. It is not too widely known The Divine Constitution alone has the power to emancipate all „Persons (property e.g. Negroes, Blacks & Colored People et al)‟ currently licensed under the assumable jurisdiction of the United States 14th & 15th Amendments and into the true citizenry of their own free national government. The 65 words compiling The Divine Constitution of Moorish America is the most powerful instrument ever written in the history of the Human Family for the ultimate deliverance of a Nation. Albeit the Moorish Peoples must elevate their thoughts from the stagnant graves of mental slavery, accepted nationless existence and self hatred in order to take their rightful status in the affairs of men. Still, due to the magnanimous blow from the setting maul, it may take the prosperities of the mighty Moorish another generation or two before they can decipher their unalienable birthrights and national advantages of freedom nourished from the breast of their Divine Constitution. It is about the year 2011 and the Moorish American Nation is just beginning to come into their own as a people. From here the wise will find it only to be a breakfast fight. It is up to the will of the Moorish People to open their eyes as a nation to the infinite force of The Greatest Constitution ever written for the nations of the earth. No nation can declare a free national status without first declaring validity of their national Constitution.

It has been over eight decades since The Holy Prophet Noble Drew Ali introduced the Divine Constitution and By- Laws to the Moorish Americans. These organic and fundamental laws of a constituted government were to insure the peace, stability and prosperity of his Moorish American Nationals. But they were still suffering from the excess of four centuries of innumerable psychic blows that distorted their retention, ability to reason then systematically trained not to think for themselves. This was a very „Black Age of the Moorish‟ and in classes of national psychic phenomena’s is often referred as Post Traumatic Slave Syndromes (PTSS) which Drew Ali later describes as “Mental Slavery.” If the Moorish People had clearly understood and applied the saving powers held deep inside their one free national name; indeed they would have united and proclaimed themselves as a clean and pure Nation by the year 2000. In order for the reader to unveil the grasp the fully unsung self-burial of the Moorish Peoples they must understand it is the self-preservative nature of the mind to camouflage it thoughts to equal that of the outside threat. Often when traumatized the soul simply wills itself to shut down and refuse its normal actions of thinking, reasoning and understanding. Especially when the treat of death is enforced 24-7 for centuries. Each reader is hereby requested to have a clear conception of the urgency of the importunate demise of the Moorish Peoples. Understand why they stand as a people divided and seek enjoyment in today’s self-destructions.

As a nation, the powers of this Divine Constitution have never been known among the Moorish. Unbeknownst they are a sleeping giant, it was the Moorish brothers themselves who re-enslaved their people by keeping this Divine Covenant and By-Laws buried in the secrecy of memberships, feigned Adept Chambers of the MSTA, NBC Masonic Lodges and corporate businesses under another man’s government. Rarely would a potential Moorish leader delved into the national inner meaning of their great Divine Constitution. In fact, one group of Moorish Americans actually voted out Noble Drew Ali’s Divine Constitution & By-Laws and replaced them with their “Rules And Regulations Of 1934.” Under the 1934 Laws a lone Supreme Grand Legal Advisor and Moderator had complete power of law for the MSTA. From there a successorship of 5 Masonic Leaders prevented the Moorish from receiving the Master Grip of their Divine Constitution. However, these I-HURT-BUT-CANNOT-TELL- YOU-THE-TRUTHS largely stem from the muffled fact of being too afraid to think as a nation thinks. Meanwhile for 80 years the Leaders boasted of attainments in things that are of no worth but where it is a shame to be ignorant, they had no understanding. Truth is: No people can ever be free while under the constitution of another government. This is why Noble Drew Ali said “Just because you were born here does not make you a citizen. Every conscious Moor must now open their EYE OF A NATION in order to see their salvation is still in the saving powers brought by their Angel of Allah. Those who cannot see themselves as a nation are also blind to why Noble Drew Ali “Brought the Moorish everything it takes to save a nation but we must TAKE it and save ourselves.”

There are innumerable judicial accounts resting dormant in this boundless document still awaiting the commands of the Moorish Peoples e.g. Marriage Laws, Rights to Travel, Treaties, Divine Rights to be fruitful, Ancestral Linkage, Government supported Commercial Codes, security and freedom to name a few.

 

POWERS OF A FREE NATIONAL CONSTITUTION

* The Constitution of a people gives them sovereign powers to be recognized a nation.
* The Constitution of a People authorizes all official stations of their government e.g. Grand Sheik, Chairman, Divine Minister, Mufti and Secretary. Beware: Those who claim these National Titles without being duly authorized by the Constitution of a Free National Government are fraudulent imitators, while remaining within the confines of organizations incorporated within the State jurisdiction of another government.
* The Constitution of a people empowers every individual Citizen to be a man, a woman, a Son, a Daughter and Family to live the pure and clean life accordingly.
* The Constitution of a people empowers them to rule all Organizations, Inherent Systems of Education, Publications, Guidance, Protections, Magistrates and Subjects under their Jurisdiction.
* The Constitution gives power to establish national laws of Security & guidance of it citizens and to encourage peace and harmony with all nations of the earth.
* The Constitution of a people expresses the autonomy and character through its government.
* The Constitution of a people gives power to make laws and enforce laws according to the Civic, Religious and Political needs of the People.
* The National and Divine Constitution gives electoral powers to every Knowledgeable and faithful citizen within their government to protect The Prophet and the Grand Body and all stations and to make it known they live according to Love, Truth, Peace, freedom and Justice.
* The Divine Constitution of the Moorish American Government contains the only force necessary to redeem all of its true Citizens from centuries of Denationalized Slave Names and subsequent Mental Slavery to be redeemed from the Shallow Graves of Roman Yoke and Laws; Yea, from every Congressional institution, Prison Facility and Military Installations to Social Abode.
* Only through their National Constitution will the Moorish free themselves and make right all the wrongs of every political contract, judicial suppression of Human Rights and restore the indigenous recognition of the Moorish Peoples. These Laws of Government can and will accredit all accomplishments, restore the Contributions and life sums accrued during the times of slavery.

Noble Drew Ali, The Last Prophet

Founding Father & Framer of The Divine Constitution

January 8, 1886 to July 20, 1929

Thru: Dr. Akhnaton Pert M Hru Tutankhamun Bey, GNC

 

The Government owns and runs your Church and its Doctrines. Most churches in America are organized as 501c3 tax-exempt religious organizations. The First Amendment clearly states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances”. To read the Bill Of Rights: Click Here

Anything that the US Government deems “legal” can’t be spoken of unfavorably by “churches” desiring to keep the sacred exemption of Mister 501c3. It is more important to hold onto that earthly “pearl-of-great price” than to seek the heavenly one. The church is NOT supposed to be part of the Government or answerable to it.

Ephesians 5:24-25 Therefore as the church is subject unto Christ, so let the wives be to their own husbands in every thing.
25 Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ also loved the church, and gave himself for it;
We see that Christ is the head of the church (congregation) not man.

501(c)3 Exposed

The First Amendment clearly places the church outside the jurisdiction of the civil government: Congress shall make NO LAW respecting an establishment of religion, nor prohibiting the free exercise thereof.’Religion cannot be free if you have to pay the government, through taxation, to exercise it. Since churches aren’t taxable in the first place, why do so many of them go to the IRS and seek permission to be tax-exempt? It occurs out of:

• Ignorance (“We didn’t know any better”)
• Bandwagon logic (“Everyone else is doing it “)
• Professional advice (many attorneys and CPAs recommend it)Does the law require, or even encourage, a church to organize as a 501c3?

To answer that question let’s turn to what the IRS itself has to say.

Churches Need Not Apply

In order to be considered for tax-exempt status by the IRS, an organization must fill out and submit IRS Form 1023 and 1024. However, note what the IRS says regarding churches and church ministries, in Publication 557 Some organizations are not required to file Form 1023. These include:

Churches, inter church organizations of local units of a church, conventions or associations of churches, or integrated auxiliaries of a church, such as a men’s or women’s organization, religious school, mission society, or youth group. These organizations are exempt automatically if they meet the requirements of section 501(c)(3).

• When a church accepts the 501c3 status, that church:
• Waives its freedom of speech
• Waives its freedom of religion
• Waives its right to influence legislators and the legislation they craft.
• Waives its constitutionally guaranteed rights.
• Is no longer free to speak to the vital issues of the day.
• It’s controlled with fear, if it doesn’t following IRS guidelines it will lose its tax-exempt status.
• Becomes a State-Church. One need not look far to see that the church’s acceptance of the 501c3, and its significant restrictions, has had devastating consequences to not only the church, but to the entire nation.

Churches are “Automatically Tax-Exempt”

According to IRS Code 508(c)(1)(A):

Special rules with respect to section 501c3 organizations.

(a) New organizations must notify secretary that they are applying for recognition of section 105c3 status.
(c) Exceptions
(1) Mandatory exceptions. Subsections (a) and (b) shall not apply to –
(A) churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches.

This is referred to as the “mandatory exception” rule. Thus, we see from the IRS’ own publications, and the tax code, that it is completely unnecessary for any church to apply for tax-exempt status. In the IRS’ own words, a church “is automatically tax-exempt.”

Colossians 1:18 And he is the head of the body, the church: who is the beginning, the firstborn from the dead; that in all things he might have the preeminence.

Precepts to Colossinas 1:18:

John 11:25 Jesus said unto her, I am the resurrection, and the life: he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live:

(Christ is also the head of the church, which is his body. He is also head of the body, the church; and He is the beginning, the firstborn from the dead. We see again that Christ is the head of the Church.)

Who came up with the 501(c)(3)?

Most churches in America have organized as “501c3 tax-exempt religious organizations.” This is a fairly recent trend that has only been going on for about fifty years. Churches were only added to section 501c3 of the tax code in 1954. House Resolution 235 was designed to revise the IRS code to remove restrictions placed on churches and non-profit organizations in 1954 by then-Senator Lyndon Johnson.

Prior to 1954, churches and non-profit organizations had no such restrictions on their freedom of speech or their right to speak out in favor or against political issues or candidates. The history of Johnson’s IRS gag order is instructive. It began with what some historians believe to be a fraudulent election of Johnson to the Senate in 1948. It has been maintained by both conservative and liberal historians that Lyndon Johnson’s election to the Senate in 1948 was won by massive voter fraud.

Known as “Landslide Lyndon,” this aspiring politician was “elected” by only 87 votes. His challenger, Coke Stevenson, challenged his election and presented credible evidence that hundreds of votes for Johnson had been faked. Johnson, however, was successful in blocking Stevenson’s effort by the clever use of “cooperative” court injunctions.

In 1954, Johnson was facing re-election to the Senate and was being aggressively opposed by two non-profit anti-Communist groups that were attacking Johnson’s liberal agenda. In retaliation, Johnson inserted language into the IRS code that prohibited non-profits, including churches, from endorsing or opposing candidates for political office. In effect, Senator Johnson used the power of the go-along Congress and the IRS to silence his opposition. Unfortunately, it worked. Some in Johnson’s staff claimed that Johnson never intended to go after churches, only the two “nonprofits” in Texas. Nevertheless, his sly amendment to the tax code affected every church in America, and it is a violation of the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

The legislation proposed by Rep. Jones in the 109th Congress is designed to overturn Johnson’s vindictive gag order that now penalizes churches, churches that dare speak out against government policies and politicians that the churches may deem to be immoral or bad for America. There is no reason for this gag order to remain in effect, but Congress apparently thinks it must perpetuate bad public policy simply because it exists. Organizations like Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, People For The American Way, and The American Civil Liberties Union continue to claim that this Johnson gag order must be upheld to protect “church/state separation.” This is irrational and fails to take into account the entire history of religious freedom in the United States.

Throughout our nation’s history-both before and after the American Revolution-our nation’s pastors freely spoke out on the political and moral issues of the day. It was their duty and their right under the Constitution to preach against immorality and corruption in the political and the moral realm. Historian James H. Hutson, writing in Religion and the Founding of the American Republic, notes: “Preachers seemed to vie with their brethren in other colonies in arousing their congregations against George III.” And, as Hutson discovered, the House of Representatives sponsored church services in its chambers for nearly 100 years.

These services only ended when convenient transportation was available to take Members of Congress home for the weekend. It is interesting to observe that our Founding Fathers and our first elected officials didn’t have any notion of “church/state separation,” so vehemently endorsed by Americans United and other modernist groups. Our Founders valued religion and wrote the First Amendment to protect the free expression of religious beliefs-and the freedom to speak out on the moral issues-including those involving politics and politicians.

The disservice that Lyndon Johnson did to religious freedom has yet to be undone, but in the current session of Congress, H.R. 235 must be passed-to undo Johnson’s vengeful action against his political opponents. We need to finally exorcise our public policies of the sad legacy of Landslide Lyndon.

What are the results when a church incorporates and surrenders itself to the jurisdiction of the state?

1) The Church is no longer considered a real institution, but it goes through a transformation and becomes a fictitious (state created) person or institution.
2) The Church comes under the jurisdiction of the state and therefore surrenders its headship to the state.
3) The Church’s chief officers become official representatives of the state by virtue of their corporate charter.
4) The Church must open its books and all practices to the investigation of the state. This would include:
a. Church membership roles;
b. Christian school record;
c. Regulations on all functions of the church and any of its ministries;
d. Church financial records, including all tithing records (names, addresses and amounts);
e. Ministers and churches in courts of law are considered wards of the state by virtue of their charter, including all church members
(adults and children). The Transformation of the Church (From Reality to Fiction) by Kenneth Talbot, Ph.D.

501(c)(3) Christian churches, ministries, and organizations may NOT do the following:

“We are going to first of all equip them with the information they need to know, uh…. about what they can say and what they cannot say in the church, uh… that would violate there 501(c)(3) statues with the IRS.” – Congressman Emmanual Cleaver

501(c)(3) Christian churches, ministries, and organizations may NOT do the following:

1. Expose conspiracies.

2. Criticize the New World Order

3. Say or publish anything negative about ANY politician, Republican or Democrat.

4. Criticize government agencies and bureaus – the IRS, FBI, BATF, CIA, EPA, DEA, OSHA, DOJ, etc.

5. Criticize an institution of government such as the White House, the Congress, the Federal Reserve Board (even though this is a PRIVATE corporation) or the Supreme Court.

6. Encourage citizens to call or write their congressman, senator, governor, mayor, or other public official.

7. Criticize any proposed or pending bill or legislation that would take away the rights and freedoms of the people.

8. Make disparaging remarks about, or criticize, any other faith group, cult, or religion.
9. Expose or criticize the New Age Movement.

10. Support or encourage a law-abiding citizen’s militia (even though this is constitutional).

11. Support or encourage the Second Amendment, the right of the people to keep and bear arms.

12. Discourage young women from getting an abortion, or endorse the pro-life movement.

13. Teach that abortion, especially partial birth abortion, is murder and is the killing of innocent babies.

14. Identify homosexuality as a sin and an abomination to God.

15. Express an opinion on any subject or issue.

16. Appeal to peoples’ emotions by employing an evangelization method (such as “fire and brimstone” preaching) not considered a “reasoned approach” by the IRS.

17. Discuss or identify threats to Christianity.

18. Discuss subjects or topics the IRS deems “sensationalist.”
19. Criticize well-known public figures or institutions the IRS deems “worthy,” such as the super-rich elite, international bankers,the Hollywood movie industry, etc.

20. Publish or broadcast information on any topic without giving credence to the opposing viewpoints of Christ’s enemies.

21. Publish and offer books, tapes, or products that expose the elitist plot against humanity and God.

22. Criticize the Pope or the Vatican, or contrast the New Catholic Catechism with the truths found in the Holy Bible. (Note: only liberal churches are permitted by the IRS to criticize the Catholic Church).

23. Criticize the United Nations or such globalist groups as the Council on Foreign Relations, the Bilderbergers, and the Trilateral Commission.

24. Criticize the Masonic Lodge, the Order of Skull & Bones, or other Secret societies.

25. Highlight or otherwise bring attention to immorality of public officials or corruption in government.

26. Complain of government wrongdoing or injustice, such as happened at Waco, Ruby Ridge, and elsewhere.
27. Criticize the Jewish ADL or other Jewish lobby groups.

28. Say anything positive about the “religious right” or the “patriot movement.”

29. Support home schooling, home churches, or unregistered churches.

30. Spend money on missionary projects or charitable causes not approved by the IRS.

31. Promote or encourage alternative healthcare (herbs, vitamins, etc.).

32. Expose false teachings of any kind by anyone.

33. Support or encourage persecuted Christians suffering under anti-Christian regimes in Red China, Cuba, Russia, Israel, Saudi Arabia,the United States, and elsewhere.

34. Ordain a pastor whose training or qualifications are not approved by the IRS.

35. Advocate or teach any Bible doctrine that is politically or religiously incorrect, or is inconsistent with any “public policy” (abortion, feminism, gay rights, etc.) currently being enforced by the IRS.
Additional requirements for 501c3 churches are found in the Department of the Treasury Internal Revenue Service Publication 1826 (9-94) Cat. no. 21096G, churches must:

36. Have a recognized creed and “IRS approved form of worship.”

37. Have “IRS approved code of doctrine and discipline”.

38. Have ordained ministers educated in “state accredited colleges.”

39. Pastor must answer to the IRS as to “daily activities of the church.”

40. The IRS must be privy to “all financial transactions” of the church.

41. Pastor must supply “names of all donors” – make books, records available.

42. Be neutral on political issues.

43. Be engaged in activities furthering exclusively public purposes.

44. Open its services to the public.

45. Submit names of all church workers; pastors, teachers, clerks, counselors, educational directors, office help, associates, and maintenance personnel.
46. Not publicly oppose licensing of church ministries.

47. Give unlimited submission to civil magistrates pertaining to all laws – federal, state, and local – including public policy.

48. May only use “IRS approved” fundraising methods.

49. Pastor will be “called to account over any stand taken against the tax system.”

50. Church “must advocate and support racial integration.” (Multiculturalism)

51. May NOT engage in activities “opposing pornography.”

52. May NOT support legislation saying “children belong to parents” rather than “the state.”

53. May NOT form a Political Action Committee nor support legislation “opposing lotteries and gambling activity.”

54. May not “oppose the public school system.”

55. May “not publicly declare” we are to “obey God rather than the government.”

56. May Not advocate support of the United States or state constitutions as the supreme law of the land. (Public policy takes precedence.)

1 John 2:15-17 Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world. If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him.

16 For all that is in the world, the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father, but is of the world.

17 And the world passeth away, and the lust thereof: but he that doeth the will of God abideth for ever.

Conclusion

We have been heavily deceived by the 501c3 corporations masquerading as churches out there. Trust in the Most High so his children can become a nation once again.
—Thawada Israelites Unite

When Thomas Jefferson crafted the Declaration of Independence, he pointed to “certain unalienable rights” with which we were endowed by our “Creator.”

What did he mean when he wrote the phrase “unalienable rights,” and what rights are “unalienable”?

Jefferson understood “unalienable rights” as fixed rights given to us by our Creator rather than by government. The emphasis on our Creator is crucial, because it shows that the rights are permanent just as the Creator is permanent.

Jefferson’s thought on the source of these rights was impacted by Oxford’s William Blackstone, who described “unalienable rights” as “absolute” rights–showing that they were absolute because they came from him who is absolute, and that they were, are, and always will be, because the Giver of those rights–Jefferson’s “Creator”–was, and is, and always be.

Moreover, because we are “endowed” with them, the rights are inseparable from us: they are part of our humanity.

In a word, the government did not give them and therefore cannot take them away, but the government still strains at ways to suppress them.

To protect fundamental, individual rights, James Madison helped include the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. The intent was to remove them from government’s reach.

The “unalienable rights” explicitly protected by the Bill of Rights include, but are not limited to, the rights of free speech and religion, the right to keep and bear arms, self-determination with regard to one’s own property, the right to be secure in one’s own property, the right to a trial by a jury of one’s peers, protection from cruel and unusual punishment, and so forth.

Among the “unalienable rights” implicitly protected in the Bill of Rights are freedom of conscience–how can one have freedom of speech or religion without freedom of conscience?–and the right to self-defense. As Associate Justice Samuel Alito wrote in the majority decision for McDonald v. Chicago (2010): “Self-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from ancient times to the present day, and in [District of Columbia v. Heller (2008)], we held that individual self-defense is a central component of the Second Amendment right.”

“Unalienable rights” are ours to keep, by virtue of our Creator. So said Thomas Jefferson through the Declaration of Independence, and he was seconded by James Madison through the Bill of Rights.

A “central component” of our “unalienable rights” is the right to keep and bear arms.

Follow AWR Hawkins on Twitter @AWRHawkins.

By Anaidah El – A Living Widow
March 14, 2011 ccy 1431 mcy

As I research Admiralty, Commerce, and Merchant Law, I am constantly running into requirements that stress the use of a Notary.

In researching the office of the Notary I find that the Corporate United States and its many sub-division states have initiated statutes regarding the Notary Process.

I find this very interesting for two more outstanding reasons, I am sure there are more:

1. Merchant Law is ancient and from a Moorish perspective encompassed all areas of our life, from the most elaborate, drafting Writs to recording of groceries and receipts
   for household items.
2. The Merchant Laws, all Laws of Commerce are ancient.

One theory I have heard/read is; because the Europeans have codified Merchant/Commerce Laws, therefore, they have copyrights.

That is fraud!

No one can take ancient laws add to or subtract from it. No one can take ownership of something that they did not create, they can make claim however, it is up to us Moors, as the true gatekeepers, to correct these types of misconceptions and reclaim the laws of their ForeMothers and ForeFathers.

This is the same process that is used to claim the live human being. Does it make it valid or lawful? No.

What has also come to my attention is the fact that although all sub-divisions of the Corporate UNITED STATES, which are enclaves, doing business as (dba) THE STATE OF <>, each have slightly different views and rules that they allow for the Notary Process. This ought make one wonder; for what purpose would public servants have requirements for implementing the Notary function in the first place? …..mmmmm

Keep in mind that all statutes apply ONLY to public servants, and NEVER to the People. If we keep the above in mind, public servants are now directing the Notary on what they will allow them to do for the People, or NOT do. Which impairs the Rights (birth rights) of the People.

That is Treason!

If we look closer at the Notary function, it is a for hire process, one that the People can do themselves, just as they can present themselves in lawful matters.
The Notary function now has a fee attached to it and in some cases that fee can be, or become very expensive.

You need a notary to do the following for each issue:

1. Validate that you are who you say you are
2. Validate that you are telling the truth
3. Validate that you did in fact mail items related to a dispute
4. Provide a certificate that they have performed the exact same process
5. Provide a certificate of Dishonor
6. Validate that your witnesses are who they say they are
7. Validate that your witnesses are honorable
8. Validate that your witnesses have done what they say they have done

This is a very rough and elementary list of some of the things a Notary may be able to do for you based on the Corporate enclave statutes, of which they all have a fee attached.
In some cases the charge is per signature as well as function performed. Is this another way to impair the activity of the People? I would say yes!

I want to make clear – STATUTES APPLY TO PUBLIC SERVANTS ONLY !!!

Go through not just the Corporate enclave near you, but others on this continent and review their position on the Notary process.

Is it a tool to impair the activity of the People? All Notaries are authorized by and for the corporate enclave – they are subject to the corporation first and if the corporation feels that they are not operating in THEIR best interest, they will remove the Notary from office – so who does this alleged public servant work for?

Has anyone ever wondered where the office of the “Notary Public” came from?

Have you ever wondered, as a Moor, who has authorized everyone else to be on this continent,and going back even further understanding that We Moors created the Europeans using part of our own DNA, how is it that today we go to Europeans to validate/authenticate who we are and our honor?

Is that even lawfully possible? How can the created validate/authenticate the creator?

I decided to investigate the office of the “Notary Public” because I wondered as Moors, what did our ancient ForeMothers and ForeFathers do? Did they even use a Notary Public?

The answer is No! – as the Supreme being, our signature, seal, and/or thumb print is the Supreme authority in all matters, all else is inferior. There are no Notaries on the Treaties, the Declaration of Independence, The Articles of Confederation or Association, or the Constitution which we authored – wrote—Notarized.

In fact, in some cases when an inferior is used to validate who we are and/or our honor within a honor process, it indicates that we really do not know who we are. We must ask ourselves how can a species that we created and authorized to be on this continent specifically, authenticate who we are AND our honor?

In brief this is what I have found:

A Notary Public traditionally stems from scrivener notary practice. In what is called Ancient Rome, which we should know there is no
such thing as Ancient Rome, therefore they can only be talking about our Ancestors, the scriba, Latin plural scribae, which was a public notary or clerk, see also scrivener.

A scrivener or scribe was traditionally a person who could read and write. This usually indicated secretarial and administrative duties such as dictation and keeping business, judicial, and history records for kings, nobles, temples, and cities. Scriveners later developed into public servants, accountants, lawyers, and petition writers, etc.

Scribble etymology medieval Latin scibillare, from Latin scribere, to write.

So the term Notary Public is a new title meaning one who can read and write, of which, our ancestors were master readers and writers in every capacity.

Do you think our ForeMothers and ForeFathers employed someone to read and write for them? If so who would have written the many Treaties and ancient text, the Articles of Confederation and Association, Declaration of Independence, and Constitution for them?

I think we need to exert our authority – we are and have always been the Master Readers and Writers – we need to act accordingly.

The authors/submitters alone is responsible for what is expressed

International law is the body of legal rules that apply between sovereign states and such other entities as have been granted international personality by sovereign states. Concerning labour law, the most important entity is International Labour Organization.

The rules of international law are of a normative character; that is, they prescribe standards of conduct. They distinguish themselves, however, from moral rules by being, at least potentially, designed for authoritative interpretation by an independent judicial authority and by being capable of enforcement by the application of external sanctions. These characteristics make them legal rules.

The law-creating processes of international law are the forms in which rules of international law come into existence; i.e., treaties, rules of international customary law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. It is the merit of article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice

International law means public international law as distinct from private international law or the conflict of laws, which deals with the differences between the municipal laws of different countries.

International law forms a contrast to national law. While international law applies only between entities that can claim international personality, national law is the internal law of states that regulates the conduct of individuals and other legal entities within their jurisdiction.

International law can be universal, regional or bilateral. Although there is some duplication between universal and regional labour law, the practical value of regional law lies mainly in the possibility it offers to establish standards which are more progressive than worldwide standards for dealing with the special problems of the region concerned; to secure greater uniformity of law within a region; or to provide more extensive reciprocal advantages. Bilateral law has a different purpose. Mainly, it determines the conditions of entry and of employment in each contracting country for the nationals of the other. This chapter deals only with universal and regional labour law.

The sources – instruments by which states and other subjects of international law, such as certain international organizations – of international law are international agreements. The agreements assume a variety of form and style, but they are all governed by the law of treaties, which is part of customary international law.

A treaty, the typical instrument of international relations, is defined by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as an “agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation”.

Some multilateral agreements set up an international organization for a specific purpose or a variety of purposes. They may therefore be referred to as constituent agreements. The United Nations Charter (1945) is both a multilateral treaty and the constituent agreement of the United Nations. An example of a regional agreement that operates as a constituent agreement is the charter of the Organization of American States (Charter of Bogotá), which established the organization in 1948. The constitution of an international organization may be part of a wider multilateral treaty. The Treaty of Versailles (1919), for example, contained in Part I the Covenant of the League of Nations and in Part XIII the constitution of the International Labour Organization.

The term supranational is of recent origin and is used to describe the type of treaty structure developed originally by six western European states: France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. The first treaty was that of Paris, signed in 1951, establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC); the second, the Rome treaty, signed in 1957, establishing the European Economic Community (EEC); the third, the Rome treaty of the same date establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). A clause in the ECSC treaty provides for the complete independence of the members of the executive organ from the governments that appoint them.

Treaties, however, are not the only instruments by which international agreements are concluded. There are single instruments that lack the formality of a treaty called agreed minute, memorandum of agreement, or modus vivendi; there are formal single instruments called convention, agreement, protocol, declaration, charter, covenant, pact, statute, final act, general act, and concordat; finally there are less formal agreements consisting of two or more instruments, such as “exchange of notes” or “exchange of letters.” (See United Nations, Definition of Key Terms Used in the UN Treaty Collection)

OTHER TYPES OF LAW LINKS
www.texasnationalpress.com/expose/copyrightname.shtml
usa-the-republic.com/jurisprudentia/defeated-arguments.html

What is Law? There are all types of Law. There is Universal Law that deal with The Supreme Force whom set this whole Universe(s) into a system of Chaos, that became Law out of nothing like Darkness of Nothing to Light, Something. Something meaning giving you Sun, Moons, Stars, Planets, Nebulas, Milkey ways, Gasses, Water, Winds, Fires, Beings from different planets and a mind to even question if there is a Supreme Force, A God, or Gods and Goddesses, Elohiems, Neterus and Life beyond Earth. Everything in Life is base on Mathematics. You cannot do anything in Life without Mathematics. You sleep, walk, talk, think, eat, and run all to Mathematic and Mathematics is Law.

So What is Law and how many Laws there is??? According to The Black Laws Dictionary Vol. 2, Law is Orders. A system of principles and rules which of human conduct, being the aggregate of those commandments and principles which are either prescribe or recognized by the governing power in an organized jural society as it will in relation to the conduct of the members of such society, and which it undertakes to maintain and sanction and to use as the criteria of the actions of such members. I Afika Bambaataa can also say that this can also be true dealing with the Governing Laws of The Universe(s) and its members, (Beings from all over the Universe(s) whom also follow what Laws of Their meaning or thinking of Their Supreme Force, Gods or Goddesses or their selves of what ever state of Being that they are in as Life.

Hold on this might get al little deep for you but we try to keep common sense in what we are saying with an open mind. Law is that which is laid down, ordained, or established. A rule or method according to which phenomena or actions co-exists or follows each other. So how many types of Law there is? So many that I could not put them all in this article. Many of your who are reading this article, I am not going to let you off easy and give you many of the answers, that is why you must research this yourselves. Look up the law that suits you. Universal Laws, Earth Laws, International Laws, Dimensional Laws, Mathematical Laws, Gravity Law, God (The Supreme Force Laws, under world Laws, Lucifer (Satan) Laws, Your Laws etc.

Classification Subject Matter Law thats either public or private. There is Constitutional Laws, Administrative Law, Criminal Law. There is Law of Citations, Law of evidence, Martial Law, as well as The Prophets of The Bible, The Qu Ran, The Book Coming Forth By Day and many Ancient Text Laws or Religious Laws. Laws rule you all even if you know it or not.

There is even Laws of War, Laws of the Streets, Drug Laws, and Air Space Laws, Law of the Seas, Oceans and Land laws. We can do nothing without Laws. Even Savages who think they have no laws still are under some type of laws. There is Spiritual Laws, Local Laws, Corporate Laws, Personal Laws or Indigenous Laws. What Laws are you following?

The laws of Common Sense, Common Laws, Bankruptcy Law, Case Law, Maritime Law, Military Law, Municipal Laws Moral Law, Organic Law, Penal Law, Revenue Law, Written Law or straight up Natural Law. Do you Humans still think your not run by laws??? Do Extraterrestrials, Space Beings, Angels, Demons, whatever think all of you beings on Earth and beyond, on Stars, Planets, Subterranean Worlds, Dimensional all think that all of your can get away from law. Life is Law, Birth is Law, and Death is Law so called time that always was and Law also runs forever. That why is so important for all to study some type of laws especially when the laws are controlling and studying you. Laws can make you a slave and guess what there are Slave-servitude laws. Laws of the Matrix. Go watch all The 4 Matrix movies again 15 times each and really study the movie.

How Many Laws there is??? Magic Laws, Witchcraft Laws, the Laws of Science, and the laws of health, Roman law, Foreign Laws, Absolute Law of Nature. There is so much laws that there is even Laws to govern Laws. So Sisters and Brothers, Humans of Earth, Beings of other places in the Universe(s) and Beyond, I don’t care where you are at in whatever world your come from. STUDY THE LAWS OR THE LAWS WILL STUDY YOU.

Amen Ra

“Explanation of ZIP Code Address Purpose”

(Version 910816Z; rev. 081991)

by

W. C. Updegrave

c/o 300 Adams Street, Esterly

Reading, Pennsylvania

zip code exempt (DMM 122.32)

It is this writer’s opinion, both as a result of study, e.g. of page 11 of the National Area ZIP Code Directory; of 26 USC 7621; of Section 4 of the Federal Register, Volume 51, Number 53, of Wednesday, March 19, 1986, Notices at pages 9571 through 9573; of Treasury Delegation Order (TDO) 150-01; of the opinion in United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 308, 98 S.Ct.2d 2357, 57 L.Ed.2d 221 (1978); of 12 USC 222; of 31 USC 103; and as a result of my actual experience, that a ZIP Code address is presumed to create a “Federal jurisdiction” or “market venue” or “revenue districts” that override State boundaries, taking one who uses such modes of address outside of a State venue and its constitutional protections and into an international, commercial venue involving admiralty concerns of the “United States”, which is a commercial corporation domiciled in Washington, D.C.

More specifically, looking at the map on page 11 of the National ZIP Code Directory, e.g. at a local post office, one will see that the first digit of a ZIP Code defines an area that includes more than one State. The first sentence of the explanatory paragraph begins: “A ZIP Code is a numerical code
that identifies areas within the United States and its territories for purposes of …” [cf. 26 CFR 1.1-1(c)]. Note the singular possessive pronoun “its”, not “their”, therefore carrying the implication that it relates to the “United States” as a corporation domiciled in the District of Columbia (in the singular sense), not in the sense of being the 50 States of the Union (in the plural sense). The map shows all the States of the Union, but it also shows D.C., Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, making the explanatory statement literally correct.

Properly construed, ZIP Codes can only be applicable in Federal territories and enclaves that may be located within the 50 States of the Union, and to the “United States” and District of Columbia and its territories — cf. Piqua Bank v. Knoup, 6 Ohio 342, 404 (1856) and U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63 (1936) to the effect that “in every state there are two governments; the state and the United States.” Therefore, ZIP Code addresses are for the corporate “United States” and its agents, for example, a customs and duty collector at New York harbor, when they move out into the States of the Union to perform functions delegated to
the “United States” by the National/Federal Constitution, or the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, or a U.S. Congressman.

But, by propaganda, misleading information and seditious syntax, government has gotten nearly everyone in the 50 States of the Union to use ZIP modes of address, and that creates a PRESUMPTION or a PREJUDICIAL ADMISSION that one is in such a Federal venue, or that one is such a government agent.

In general, it is well settled in law that Income Tax Statutes apply only to corporations and to their officers, agents, and employees acting in their official capacities, e.g. from Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 44 L.Ed.2d 1, 95 S.Ct. 1538 (1975): “… However, all ‘income tax statutes’
apply only to state created creatures known as corporations no matter whether state, local, or federal.” Since corporations act only through their officers, employees, etc., the income tax statutes reach out to them when acting in their official capacities, but not as individuals. This is the real purpose for Identifying Numbers — cf. 26 CFR 301.6109-1(d) & (g) and 26 USC 6331(a) and 26 CFR 301.6331-1, Part 4.

Use of a ZIP Code address is tantamount to the admission of being a “citizen of the United States” who does not necessarily have the protections of the first eight Amendments to the Constitution (in the Bill of Rights) when proceeded against by Federal or State authority — Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 20 S.Ct. 448 (1900), but, “All the provisions of the constitution look to an indestructible union of indestructible states”, Texas vs White, 7 Wall. 700; U.S. v. Cathcart, 25 F.Case No. 14,756; In re Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Case No. 18,273 (65 C.J. Section 2) — not known to be overturned.

Also available from the same author:

“Brief of Law for ZIP Code Implications,” by W. C. Updegrave, c/o 300 Adams Street Esterly, Reading, NON-DOMESTIC, Pennsylvania (11 pages plus “Appendix of Unused Data and Quotes”)

# # #

“My Continuing Objection to Mail Sent with a
National Area ZIP Code Mode of Address”

by

W. C. Updegrave
c/o 300 Adams Street, Esterly
Reading, Pennsylvania
zip code exempt (DMM 122.32)

1. In spite of my repeated demands that you correct the way in which you send mail to me, you insist and persist, over my most strenuous objections and contrary to my repeated NOTICES to you, to continue to send my mail with a National Area ZIP Code, which is both unnecessary, even by the application of Domestic Mail statutes and regulations, and is, in fact, an unlawful and fraudulent attempt to define me into an alien and foreign venue and jurisdiction that are, as a matter of fact, contrary to the Federal and State Constitutions and the case law that has developed on this issue. Briefly put, on the basis of my studies, such an address can only properly apply to Federal enclaves within the States of the Union, and perhaps to 14th Amendment citizens of the United States. For this reason alone, you are either making a mistaken or a fraudulent presumption as to my status. How would you prefer to be classified: as one who made an error? or one who has committed acts of fraud? If it is
   fraudulent, then you are also engaged in a conspiracy against me and mine. All such mail is reviewed without prejudice but not accepted.
2. My use of the term “without prejudice, UCC 1-207” in connection with my signature on this document, or any prior document or instrument, indicates that I have exercised the remedy provided for me in the Uniform Commercial Code, Article I, Section 207, whereby I have reserved my natural and common law right not to be compelled to perform under any contract, commercial agreement, or bankruptcy that I did not enter knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally, and reserved all other Uniform Commercial Code and common law remedies. It also indicates that I do not intend to ratify any fraudulently induced contract by continued acceptance of the benefits thereof. Furthermore, it notifies all administrative agencies of government that I do not and will not accept the liability associated with the compelled benefit of any unrevealed contract, commercial agreement or bankruptcy.
3. Briefly put, Domestic Mail Manual (DMM) Section 111.2 and the copyrighted (hence, “private” and not governmental at all) NATIONAL AREA ZIP CODE DIRECTORY, page 11, both identify the term “United States” by using the third person, singular, personal pronoun “its”, which relates only to the “United States” at the District of Columbia, its territories and ceded enclaves, its agents and its “citizens”. In this context, the term “citizen of United States” has a very restricted definition —
   cf. 26 C.F.R. 1.1-1(c) and 301.6109(g); 42 U.S.C. 1981 & 1982; 26 U.S.C. 3121(e); 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9) & (10); etc. It is to be noted that in DMM 111.2, the term “United States” is used, but none of the fifty states as the States in the Union is mentioned; therefore, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius (mention of one thing implies the exclusion of others) becomes applicable. The 1789 Federal/National Constitution always makes a distinction between the “States in the Union” and the “United States”, the former always being referenced in the plural, and the latter sometimes being so referenced. The “United States” has no venue or jurisdiction within unceded territories inside the “States in the Union” (e.g. see Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 221, 223 (1845); New Orleans v. U.S., 35 U.S.
   (10 Pet.) 662, 737 (1836); 4 U.S.C. 72; 48 U.S.C. Chapters 2 and 3, “The Alaska and Hawaii Omnibus Acts”; 18 U.S.C., Appendix, FRCrP Rules 1 and 54(c); etc.) except where a man or a corporation can be presumed to be a “citizen of the United States” (see 26 C.F.R. 1.1-1(a), (b) and (c)), or a “Federal citizen”, or a “National citizen” (see U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982), stating that National (“United States”) citizenship mandates Social Security participation, but the issues of jurisdiction and venue were not raised in that case, and it was argued on narrow and inappropriate statutory grounds — cf. the dissent in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 65 L.Ed.2d 555, 100 S.Ct. 2502 (1980), pages 30-31 especially).

“All legislation is prima facie territorial.”

[American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.]
[213 U.S. 347, 356-357 (1909)]

“Legislation is presumptively territorial and confined to limits over which the law-making power has jurisdiction.”

[New York Central R.R. Co. v. Chisholm]
[268 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1925)]

… [T]he “canon of construction which teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States ….”

[U.S. v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 222]
[70 S.Ct. 10 (1949)]

• Without getting into the several definitions of the term “citizen”, which the courts generally construe to mean a mere civil status for one who is politically involved, McCafferty vs Guyer, 59 Pa. 109, 126-127 (Agnew dissent), etc., but sometimes the term is limited to a representative of a city in Parliament, or one who is involved in the conduct and policy making of a civil government, the following is certain authority on the subject for those who are in that category. Persons who are “citizens of the United States” do not necessarily have all the protections of the first eight amendments to the U.S. Constitution when proceeded against by federal and state authorities (e.g., see Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 20 S.Ct. 448 (1900)). One of the elements that can lead to such presumptions, by inference, is the acceptance of mail with a ZIP code mode of address. In Hooven & Allison v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 671-672 (1944), the U.S. supreme Court has ruled that there are three recognized meanings for the term “United States”, to wit:

  The term “United States” may be used in any one of several senses. It may be merely the name of a sovereign occupying the position analogous to that of other sovereigns in the family of nations. It may designate the territory over which the sovereignty of the United States extends, or it may be the collective name of the states which are united by and under the Constitution.6

  See Langdell, “The Status of our New Territories,” 12 Harvard Law Review 365, 371; see also Thayer, “Our New Possessions,” 12 Harvard Law Review 464; Thayer, “The Insular Tariff Cases in the Supreme Court,” 15 Harvard Law Review 164; Littlefield, “The Insular Cases,” 15 Harvard Law Review 169, 281.

• The map on page 11 of the ZIP CODE DIRECTORY indicates that ZIP code denominators combine more than one of the States of the Union, hence they define a special venue related to revenue districts established, for example, by 26 U.S.C. 7621(a) and (b), and those are the only legitimate purposes for such a mode of address. For instance, the ZIP codes that denominate certain areas in the States of New York and Pennsylvania all use a fivedigit ZIP code, the first numeral of which begins with a “1”, e.g. “19600”. On page 15, ibid., a list is given of state abbreviations with two capital letters, to be used in conjunction with ZIP codes.
• Contrary to popular belief, “citizenship of the United States” arises from the so-called 14th Amendment, and did not exist before that fraudulent enactment was foisted on the unsuspecting free men (see Utah v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936 (1975); Dyett v. Turner, 439 P.2d 266, 272 (1968); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 et seq. (1947); Ex Parte Knowles, 5 Cal. 300 (1855); Van Valkenberg v. Brown, 43 Cal. 43, 47 (1872); U.S. v. Anthony, 24 Fed. Case No. 14,459 at 830 (1873); Cory et al. v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 349-350, 17 Am. Rep. 738 (1874); Sharon v. Hill, 26 Fed. Reporter 337 at 343-344; State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144, 152; Arver v. U.S., 245 U.S. 366, 388-89 (1917); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 509 (1938)). In fact, such statutory provisions as 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1982, now codified in the same title of the U.S. Codes as the Social Security Act (so called), still clearly make a distinction between “citizen of the United States” and “white state citizen”. It is also clear from various other authorities that there is a distinction between state citizenship for whites and 14th Amendment citizenship of the United States, since even such a
  distinction can be drawn from the language of the infamous 14th Amendment itself. In Cory v. Carter, supra, quoting and basing its analysis on the opinion in the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, the court, with respect to the First Section, said:

  “… [I]t overturns the Dred Scott decision by making all persons born within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United States. That its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of the negro can admit of no doubt.” … It recognizes and establishes a “distinction between citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a State.”

  [emphasis added]

  However, with reference to the second clause, that same opinion continues:

  This clause does not refer to citizens of the States. It embraces only citizens of the United States. It leaves out the words “citizen of the State,” which is so carefully used, and used in contradistinction to citizens of the United States, in the preceding sentence. It places the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States under the protection of the Federal Constitution, and leaves the privileges and immunities of citizens of a State under
  the protection of the State constitution. This is fully shown by the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36.

  [emphasis added]

• There are lots of reasons to believe, e.g. by an examination of 42 U.S.C. 1982 (which distinguishes between “citizens of the United States” and “white state citizens”), that Taney’s dicta in the Dred Scott case was not really overturned by the 14th Amendment, and lots of authorities to show that it was never validly adopted or ratified and that, in fact, the 14th Amendment did not repeal any part of the original 1789 Constitution for the United States of America.

  Therefore, please state concisely, with supporting points, rationale and authority: What are the underlying presumptions by which you send me mail using such a mode of address?

  # # #

But, those three meanings are simply evidence of the word games that the courts, legislatures and bureaucrats have played with the minds and rights of the freemen in this country. See also the clear admission in Ex Parte Knowles, 5 Cal. 300 (1855).

U.S. Supreme Court
U.S. v. BUTLER, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)
297 U.S. 1
UNITED STATES
v.
BUTLER et al.
No. 401.

Argued Dec. 9, 10, 1935.
Decided Jan. 6, 1936.

[297 U.S. 1, 13]Messrs. Homer S. Cummings, Atty. Gen., and Stanley F. Reed, Sol. Gen., of Washington, D.C., for the United States.

Messrs. George Wharton Pepper, of Philadelphia, Pa., and Edward R. Hale and Bennett Sanderson, both of Boston, Mass., for respondents.

[297 U.S. 1, 53]
Mr. Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case we must determine whether certain provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 1933,1 conflict with the Federal Constitution.

Title 1 of the statute is captioned ‘Agricultural Adjustment.’ Section 1 (7 U.S.C.A. 601) recites that an economic emergency has arisen, due to disparity between the prices of agricultural and other commodities, with consequent destruction of farmers’ purchasing power and breakdown in orderly exchange, which, in turn, have affected transactions in agricultural commodities with a national public interest and burdened and obstructed the normal currents of commerce, calling for the enactment of legislation. [297 U.S. 1, 54] Section 2 (7 U.S.C.A. 602) declares it to be the policy of Congress:

‘To establish and maintain such balance between the production and consumption of agricultural commodities, and such marketing conditions therefor, as will reestablish prices to farmers at a level that will give agricultural commodities2 a purchasing power with respect to articles that farmers buy, equivalent to the purchasing power of agricultural commodities in the base period.’

The base period, in the case of cotton, and all other commodities except tobacco, is designated as that between August, 1909, and July, 1914

The further policies announced are an approach to the desired equality by gradual correction of present inequalities ‘at as rapid a rate as is deemed feasible in view of the current consumptive demand in domestic and foreign markets,’ and the protection of consumers’ interest by readjusting farm production at such level as will not increase the percentage of the consumers’ retail expenditures for agricultural commodities or products derived therefrom, which is returned to the farmer, above the percentage returned to him in the base period.

Section 8 (48 Stat. 34) provides, amongst other things, that, ‘In order to effectuate the declared policy,’ the Secretary of Agriculture shall have power

‘(1) To provide for reduction in the acreage or reduction in the production for market, or both, of any basic agricultural commodity, through agreements with producers or by other voluntary methods, and to provide for rental or benefit payments in connection therewith or upon that part of the production of any basic agricultural commodity required for domestic consumption, in such amounts as the Secretary deems fair and reasonable, to [297 U.S. 1, 55] be paid out of any moneys available for such payments. …

‘(2) To enter into marketing agreements with processors, associations of producers, and others engaged in the handling, in the current of interstate or foreign commerce of any agricultural commodity or product thereof, after due notice and opportunity for hearing to interested parties. …

‘(3) To issue licenses permitting processors, associations of producers, and others to engage in the handling, in the current of interstate or foreign commerce, of any agricultural commodity or product thereof, or any competing commodity or product thereof.’

It will be observed that the Secretary is not required, but is permitted, if, in his uncontrolled judgment, the policy of the act will so be promoted, to make agreements with individual farmers for a reduction of acreage or production upon such terms as he may think fair and reasonable.

Section 9(a), 48 Stat. 35 enacts:

‘To obtain revenue for extraordinary expenses incurred by reason of the national economic emergency, there shall be levied processing taxes as hereinafter provided. When the Secretary of Agriculture determines that rental or benefit payments are to be made with respect to any basic agricultural commodity, he shall proclaim such determination, and a processing tax shall be in effect with respect to such commodity from the beginning of the marketing year therefor next following the date of such proclamation. The processing tax shall be levied, assessed, and collected upon the first domestic proc ssing of the commodity, whether of domestic production or imported, and shall be paid by the processor.’

The Secretary may from time to time, if he finds it necessary for the effectuation of the policy of the act, readjust the amount of the exaction to meet the require- [297 U.S. 1, 56] ments of subsection (b). The tax is to terminate at the end of any marketing year if the rental or benefit payments are discontinued by the Secretary with the expiration of that year.

Section 9(b), 7 U.S.C.A. 609(b), fixes the tax ‘at such rate as equals the difference between the current average farm price for the commodity and the fair exchange value,’ with power in the Secretary, after investigation, notice, and hearing, to readjust the tax so as to prevent the accumulation of surplus stocks and depression of farm prices.

Section 9(c), 7 U.S.C.A. 609(c), directs that the fair exchange value of a commodity shall be such a price as will give that commodity the same purchasing power with respect to articles farmers buy as it had during the base period, and that the fair exchange value and the current average farm price of a commodity shall be ascertained by the Secretary from available statistics in his department.

Section 12(a), 7 U.S.C.A. 612(a), appropriates $100,000,000 ‘to be available to the Secretary of Agriculture for administrative expenses under this title (chapter) and for rental and benefit payments;’ and Section 12(b), 7 U.S.C.A. 612(b), appropriates the proceeds derived from all taxes imposed under the act ‘to be available to the Secretary of Agriculture for expansion of markets and removal of surplus agricultural products. … Administrative expenses, rental and
benefit payments, and refunds on taxes.’

Section 15(d), 7 U.S.C.A. 615(d), permits the Secretary, upon certain conditions, to impose compensating taxes on commodities in competition with those subject to the processing tax.

By section 16 (see 7 U.S.C.A. 616) a floor tax is imposed upon the sale or other disposition of any article processed wholly or in chief value from any commodity with respect to which a processing tax is to be levied in amount equivalent to that of the processing tax which would be payable with respect to the commodity from which the article is processed if the processing had occurred on the date when the processing tax becomes effective. [297 U.S. 1, 57] On July 14, 1933, the Secretary of Agriculture, with the approval of the President, proclaimed that he had determined rental and benefit payments should be made with respect to cotton; that the marketing year for that commodity was to begin August 1, 1933; and calculated and fixed the rates of processing and floor taxes on cotton in accordance with the terms of the act.

The United States presented a claim to the respondents as receivers of the Hoosac Mills Corporation for processing and floor taxes on cotton levied under sections 9 and 16 of the act. The receivers recommended that the claim be disallowed. The District Court found the taxes valid and ordered them paid. 3 Upon appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the order. 4 The judgment under review was entered prior to the adoption of the amending act of August 24, 1935,5 and we are therefore concerned only with the original act.

First. At the outset the United States contends that the respondents have no standing to question the validity of the tax. The position is that the act is merely a revenue measure levying an excise upon the activity of processing cotton-a proper subject for the imposition of such a tax-the proceeds of which go into the federal Treasury and thus become available for appropriation for any purpose. It is said that what the respondents are endeavoring to do is to challenge the intended use of the money pursuant to Congressional appropriation when, by con ession, that money will have become the property of the government and the taxpayer will no longer have any interest in it. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 , 43 S.Ct. 597, is claimed to foreclose litigation by the respondents or other taxpayers, as such, looking to restraint of the expenditure of government funds. That case might be an authority [297 U.S. 1, 58] in the petitioners’ favor if we were here concerned merely with a suit by a taxpayer to restrain the expenditure of the public moneys. It was there held that a taxpayer of the United States may not question expenditures from its treasury on the ground that the alleged unlawful diversion will deplete the public funds and thus increase the burden of future taxation. Obviously the asserted interest of a taxpayer in the federal government’s funds and the supposed increase of the future burden of taxation is minute and indeterminable. But here the respondents who are called upon to pay moneys as taxes, resist the exaction as a step in an unauthorized plan. This circumstance clearly distinguishes the case. The government in substance and effect asks us to separate the Agricultural Adjustment Act into two statutes, the one levying an excise on processors of certain commodities; the other appropriating the public moneys independently of the first. Passing the novel suggestion that two statutes enacted as parts of a single scheme should be tested as if they were distinct and unrelated, we think the legislation now before us is not susceptible of such separation and treatment.

The tax can only be sustained by ignoring the avowed purpose and operation of the act, and holding it a measure merely laying an excise upon processors to raise revenue for the support of government. Beyond cavil the sole object of the legislation is to restore the purchasing power of agricultural products to a parity with that prevailing in an earlier day; to take money from the processor and bestow it upon farmers6 who will reduce their acreage for [297 U.S. 1, 59] the accomplishment of the proposed end, and, meanwhile, to aid these farmers during the period required to bring the prices of their crops to the desired level.

The tax plays an indispensable part in the plan of regulation. As stated by the Agricultural Adjustment Administrator, it is ‘the heart of the law’; a means of ‘accomplishing one or both of two things intended to help farmers attain parity prices and purchasing power.’ 7 A tax automatically goes into effect for a commodity when the Secretary of Agriculture determines that rental or benefit payments are to be made for reduction of production of that commodity. The tax is to cease when rental or benefit payments cease. The rate is fixed with the purpose of bringing about crop reduction and price raising. It is to equal the difference between the ‘current average farm price’ and ‘fair exchange value.’ It may be altered to such amount as will prevent accumulation of surplus stocks. If the Secretary finds the policy of the act will not be promoted by the levy of the tax for a given commodity, he may exempt it. Section 11. The whole revenue from the levy is appropriated in aid of crop control; none of it is made available for general governmental use. The entire agricultural adjustment program embodied in title 1 of the act is to become inoperative when, in the judgment of the President, the national economic emergency ends; and as to any commodity he may terminate the provisions of the law, if he finds them no longer requisite to carrying out the declared policy with re pect to such commodity. Section 13, see 7 U.S.C.A. 613.

The statute not only avows an aim foreign to the procurement of revenue for the support of government, but by its operation shows the exaction laid upon processors to be the necessary means for the intended control of agricultural production. [297 U.S. 1, 60] In these aspects the tax, co-called, closely resembles that laid by the Act of August 3, 1882 (22 Stat. 314), entitled ‘An Act to Regulate Immigration,’ which came before this court in the Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 , 5 S.Ct. 247. The statute directed that there should be levied, collected, and paid a duty of 50 cents for each alien passenger who should come by vessel from a foreign port to one in the United States. Payment was to be made to the collector of the port by the master, owner, consignee, or agent of the ship; the money was to be paid into the Treasury, was to be called the immigrant fund, and to be used by the Secretary of the Treasury to defray the expense of regulating immigration, for the care of immigrants, and relieving those in distress, and for the expenses of effectuating the act.

Various objections to the act were presented. In answering them the court said ( 112 U.S. 580 , page 595, 5 S.Ct. 247, 252):

‘But the true answer to all these objections is that the power exercised in this instance is not the taxing power. The burden imposed on the ship-owner by this statute is the mere incident of the regulation of commerce-of that branch of foreign commerce which is involved in immigration. …

‘It is true, not much is said about protecting the ship-owner. But he is the man who reaps the profit from the transaction. … The sum demanded of him is not, therefore, strictly speaking, a tax or duty within the meaning of the constitution. The money thus raised, though paid into the treasury, is appropriated in advance to the uses of the statute, and does not go to the general support of the government.’

While there the exaction was sustained as an appropriate element in a plan within the power of Congress ‘to regulate commerce with foreign nations,’ no question was made of the standing of the shipowner to raise the ques- [297 U.S. 1, 61] tion of the validity of the scheme, and consequently of the exaction which was an incident of it.

It is inaccurate and misleading to speak of the exaction from processors prescribed by the challenged act as a tax, or to say that as a tax it is subject to no infirmity. A tax, in the general understanding of the term, and as used in the Constitution, signifies an exaction for the support of the government. The word has never been thought to connote the expropriation of money from one group for the benefit of another. We may concede that the latter sort of imposition is constitutional when imposed to effectuate regulation of a matter in which both groups are interested and in respect of which there is a power of legislative regulation. But manifestly no justification for it can be found unless as an integral part of such regulation. The exaction cannot be wrested out of its setting, denominated an excise for raising revenue, and legalized by ignoring its purpose as a mere instrumentality for bringing about a desired end. To do this would be to shut our eyes to what all others than we can see and understand. Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 37 , 42 S.Ct. 449, 21 A.L.R. 1432.

We conclude that the act is one regulating agricultural production; that the tax is a mere incident of such regulation; and that the respondents have standing to challenge the legality of the exaction.

It does not follow that, as the act is not an exertion of the taxing power and the exaction not a true tax, the statute is void or the exaction uncollectible. For, to paraphrase what was said in the Head Money Cases, supra, 112 U.S. 580 , page 596, 5 S.Ct. 247, 252, if this is an expedient regulation by Congress, f a subject within one of its granted powers, ‘and the end to be attained powers, within that power, the act is not void because, within a loose and more extended sense than was used in the constitution,’ the exaction is called a tax. [297 U.S. 1, 62] Second. The government asserts that even if the respondents may question the propriety of the appropriation embodied in the statute, their attack must fail because article 1, 8 of the Constitution, authorizes the contemplated expenditure of the funds raised by the tax. This contention presents the great and the controlling question in the case. 8 We approach its decision with a sense of our grave responsibility to render judgment in accordance with the principles established for the governance of all three branches of the government.

There should be no misunderstanding as to the function of this court in such a case. It is sometimes said that the court assumes a power to overrule or control the action of the people’s representatives. This is a misconception. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land ordained and established by the people. All legislation must conform to the principles it lays down. When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate, the judicial branch of the government has only one duty; to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former. All the court does, or can do, is to announce its considered judgment upon the ques- [297 U.S. 1, 63] tion. The only power it has, if such it may be called, is the power of judgment. This court neither approves nor condemns any legislative policy. Its delicate and difficult office is to ascertain and declare whether the legislation is in accordance with, or in contravention of, the provisions of the Constitution; and, having done that, its duty ends. 9

The question is not what power the federal government ought to have, but what powers in fact have been given by the people. It hardly seems necessary to reiterate that ours is a dual form of government; that in every state there are two governments; the state and the United States. Each state has all governmental powers save such as the people, by their Constitution, have conferred upon the United States, denied to the states, or reserved to themselves. The federal union is a government of delegated powers. It has only such as are expressly conferred upon it and such as are reasonably to be implied from those granted. In this respect we differ radically from nations where all legislative power, without restriction or limitation, is vested in a parliament or other legislative body subject to no restrictions except the discretion of its members.

Article 1, 8, of the Constitution, vests sundry powers in the Congress. But two of its clauses have any bea ing upon the validity of the statute under review.

The third clause endows the Congress with power ‘to regulate Commerce … among the several States.’ Despite a reference in its first section to a burden upon, and an obstruction of the normal currents of, commerce, the act under review does not purport to regulate transactions in interstate or foreign10 commerce. Its stated pur- [297 U.S. 1, 64] pose is the control of agricultural production, a purely local activity, in an effort to raise the prices paid the farmer. Indeed, the government does not attempt to uphold the validity of the act on the basis of the commerce clause, which, for the purpose of the present case, may be put aside as irrelevant.

The clause thought to authorize the legislation, the first, confers upon the Congress power ‘to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States. …’ It is not contended that this provision grants power to regulate agricultural production upon the theory that such legislation would promote the general welfare. The government concedes that the phrase ‘to provide for the general welfare’ qualifies the power ‘to lay and collect taxes.’ The view that the clause grants power to provide for the general welfare, independently of the taxing power, has never been authoritatively accepted. Mr. Justice Story points out that, if it were adopted, ‘it is obvious that under color of the generality of the words, to ‘provide for the common defence and general welfare’, the government of the United States is, in reality, a government of general and unlimited powers, notwithstanding
the subsequent enumeration of specific powers.’ 11 The true construction undoubtedly is that the only thing granted is the power to tax for the purpose of providing funds for payment of the nation’s debts and making provision for the general welfare.

Nevertheless, the government asserts that warrant is found in this clause for the adoption of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The argument is that Congress may appropriate and authorize the spending of moneys for the ‘general welfare’; that the phrase should be liberally [297 U.S. 1, 65] construed to cover anything conducive to national welfare; that decision as to what will promote such welfare rests with Congress alone, and the courts may not review its determination; and, finally, that the appropriation under attack was in fact for the general welfare of the United States.

The Congress is expressly empowered to lay taxes to provide for the general welfare. Funds in the Treasury as a result of taxation may be expended only through appropriation. Article 1, 9, cl. 7. They can never accomplish the objects for which they were collected, unless the power to appropriate is as broad as the power to tax. The necessary implication from the terms of the grant is that the public funds may be appropriated ‘to provide for the general welfare of the United States.’ These words cannot be meaningless, else they would not have been used. The conclusion must be that they were intended to limit and define the granted power to raise and to expend money. How shall they be construed to effectuate the intent of the instrument?

Since the foundation of the nation, sharp differences of opinion have persisted as to the true interpretation of the phrase. Madison asserted it amounted to no more than a reference to the other powers enumerated in the subsequent clauses of the same section; that, as the United States is a government of limited and enumerated powers, the grant of power to tax and spend for the general national welfare must be confined to the enumerated legislative fields committed to the Congress. In this view the phrase is mere tautology, for taxation and appropriation are or may be necessary incidents of the exercise of any of the enumerated legislative powers. Hamilton, on the other hand, maintained the clause confers a power separate and distinct from those later enumerated is not restricted in meaning by the grant of them, and Congress consequently has a substantive power to tax and to ap- [297 U.S. 1, 66] propriate, limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the general welfare of the United States. Each contention has had the support of those whose views are entitled to weight. This court has noticed the question, but has never found it necessary to decide which is the true construction. Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries, espouses the Hamiltonian position. 12 We shall not review the writings of public men and commentators or discuss the legislative practice. Study of all these leads us to conclude that the reading
advocated by Mr. Justice Story is the correct one. While, therefore, the power to tax is not unlimited, its confines are set in the clause which confers it, and not in those of section 8 which bestow and define the legislative powers of the Congress. It results that the power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.

But the adoption of the broader construction leaves the power to spend subject to limitations.

As Story says: ‘The Constitution was, from its very origin, contemplated to be the frame of a national government, of special and enumerated powers, and not of general and unlimited powers.’ 13

Again he says: ‘A power to lay taxes for the common defence and general welfare of the United States is not in common sense a general power. It is limited to those objects. It cannot constitutionally transcend them.’ 14

That the qualifying phrase must be given effect all advocates of broad construction admit. Hamilton, in his [297 U.S. 1, 67] well known Report on Manufactures, states that the purpose must be ‘general, and not local.’ 15 Monroe, an advocate of Hamilton’s doctrine, wrote: ‘Have Congress a right to raise and appropriate the money to any and to every purpose according to their will and pleasure? They certainly have not.’ 16 Story says that if the tax be not proposed for the common defense or general welfare, but for other objects wholly extraneous, it would be wholly indefensible upon constitutional principles. 17 And he makes it clear that the powers of taxation and appropriation extend only to matters of national, as distinguished from local, welfare.

As elsewhere throughout the Constitution the section in question lays down principles which control the use of the power, and does not attempt meticulous or detailed directions. Every presumption is to be indulged in favor of faithful compliance by Congress with the mandates of the fundamental law. Courts are reluctant to adjudge any statute in contravention of them. But, under our frame of government, no other place is provided where the citizen may be heard to urge that the law fails to conform to the limits set upon the use of a granted power. When such a contention comes here we naturally require a showing that by no reasonable possibility can the challenged legislation fall within the wide range of discretion permitted to the Congress. How great is the extent of that range, when the subject is the promotion of the general welfare of the United States, we need hardly remark. But, despite the breadth of the legislative discretion, our duty to hear and to render judgment remains. If the statute plainly violates the stated principle of the Constitution we must so declare. [297 U.S. 1, 68] We are not now required to ascertain the scope of the phrase ‘general welfare of the United States’ or to determine whether an appropriation in aid of agriculture falls within it. Wholly apart from that question, another principle embedded in our Constitution prohibits the enforcement of the Agricultural adjustment Act. The act invades the reserved rights of the states. It is a statutory plan to regulate and control agricultural production, a matter beyond the powers delegated to the federal government. The tax, the appropriation of the funds raised, and the direction for their disbursement, are but parts of the plan. They are but means to an unconstitutional end.

From the accepted doctrine that the United States is a government of delegated powers, it follows that those not expressly granted, or reasonably to be implied from such as are conferred, are reserved to the states or to the people. To forestall any suggestion to the contrary, the Tenth Amendment was adopted. 18 The same proposition, otherwise stated, is that powers not granted are prohibited. None to regulate agricultural production is given, and therefore legislation by Congress for that purpose is forbidden.

It is an established principle that the attainment of a prohibited end may not be accomplished under the pretext of the exertion of powers which are granted.

‘Should congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are prohibited by the constitution; or should congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a de- [297 U.S. 1, 69] cision come before it, to say, that such an act was not the law of the land.’ McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,

‘Congress cannot, under the pretext of executing delegated power, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the federal government. And we accept as established doctrine that any provision of an act of Congress ostensibly enacted under power granted by the Constitution, not naturally and reasonably adapted to the effective exercise of such power, but solely to the achievement of something plainly within power reserved to the states, is invalid and cannot be enforced.’ Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 17 , 45 S.Ct. 446, 449, 39 A.L.R. 229.

These principles are as applicable to the power to lay taxes as to any other federal power. Said the court, in McCulloch v. Maryland, supra, 4 Wheat. 316, 421: ‘Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.’

The power of taxation, which is expressly granted, may, of course, be adopted as a means to carry into operation another power also expressly granted. But resort to the taxing power to effectuate an end which is not legitimate, not within the scope of the Constitution, is obviously inadmissible.

‘Congress is not empowered to tax for those purposes which are within the exclusive province of the states.’ Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 199.

‘There are, indeed, certain virtual limitations, arising from the principles of the Constitution itself. It would undoubtedly be an abuse of the (taxing) power if so exercised as to impair the separate existence and independent self-government of the States, or if exercised for ends [297 U.S. 1, 70] inconsistent with the limited grants of power in the Constitution.’ Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 541.

In the Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 , 42 S.Ct. 449, 21 A.L.R. 1432, and in Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 , 42 S.Ct. 453, this court had before it statutes which purported to be taxing measures. But their purpose was found to be to regulate the conduct of manufacturing and trading, not in interstate commerce, but in the states- matters not within any power conferred upon Congress by the Constitution- and the levy of the tax a means to force compliance. The court held this was not a constitutional use, but an unconstitutional abuse of the power to tax. In Linder v. United States, supra, we held that the power to tax could not justify the regulation of the practice of a profession, under the pretext of raising revenue. In United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 , 56 S.Ct. 223, we declared that Congress could not, in the guise of a tax, impose sanctions for violation of state law respecting the local sale of liquor. These decisions demonstrate that Congress
could not, under the pretext of raising revenue, lay a tax on processors who refuse to pay a certain price for cotton and exempt those who agree so to do, with the purpose of benefiting producers.

Third. If the taxing power may not be used as the instrument to enforce a regulation of matters of state concern with respect to which the Congress has no authority to interfere, may it, as in the present case, be employed to raise the money necessary to purchase a compliance which the Congress is powerless to command? The government asserts that whatever might be said against the validity of the plan, if compulsory, it is constitutionally sound because the end is accomplished by voluntary co- operation. There are two sufficient answers to the contention. The regulation is not in fact voluntary. The farmer, of course, may refuse to comply, but the price of such refusal is the loss of benefits. The amount offered is intended to be sufficient to exert pressure on him to [297 U.S. 1, 71] agree to the proposed regulation. 19 The power to confer or withhold unlimited benefits is the power to coerce or destroy. If the cotton grower elects not to accept the
benefits, he will receive less for his crops; those who receive payments will be able to undersell him. The result may well to financial ruin. The coercive purpose and intent of the statute is not obscured by the fact that it has not been perfectly successful. It is pointed out that, because there still remained a minority whom the rental and benefit payments were insufficient to induce to surrender their independence of action, the Congress has gone further, and, in the Bankhead Cotton Act, used the taxing power in a more directly minatory fashion to compel submission. This progression only serves more fully to expose the coercive purpose of the so-called tax imposed by the present act. It is clear that the Department of Agriculture has properly described the plan as one to keep a nonco-operating minority in line. This is coercion by economic pressure. The asserted power of choice is illusory.

In Frost & Frost Trucking Company v. R.R. Commission, 271 U.S. 583 , 46 S.Ct. 605, 47 A.L.R. 457, a state act was considered which provided for supervision and regulation of transportation for hire by automobile on the public highways. Certificates of convenience and necessity were to be obtained by persons desiring to use the highways for this purpose. The regulatory [297 U.S. 1, 72] commission required that a private contract carrier should secure such a certificate as a condition of its operation. The effect of the commission’s action was to transmute the private carrier into a public carrier. In other words, the privilege of using the highways as a private carrier for compensation was conditioned upon his dedicating his property to the quasi public use of public transportation. While holding that the private carrier was not obliged to submit himself to the condition, the commission denied him the privilege of using the highways if he did not do
so. The argument was, as here, that the carrier had a free choice. This court said, in holding the act as construed unconstitutional: ‘If so, constitutional guaranties, so carefully safeguarded against direct assault, are open to destruction by the indirect, but no less effective, process of requiring a surrender, which, though in form voluntary, in fact lacks none of the elements of compulsion. Having regard to form alone, the act here is an offer to the private carrier of a privilege, which the state may grant or deny, upon a condition which the carrier is free to accept or reject. In reality, the carrier is given no choice, except a choice between the rock and the whirlpool-an option to forego a privilege which may be vital to his livelihood or submit to a requirement which may constitute an intolerable burden.’ 271 U.S. 583 , page 593, 46 S.Ct. 605, 607, 47 A.L.R. 457.

But if the plan were one for purely voluntary co-operation it would stand no better so far as federal power is concerned. At best, it is a scheme for purchasing with federal funds submission to federal regulation of a subject reserved to the states.

It is said that Congress has the undoubted right to appropriate money to executive officers for expenditure under contracts between the government and individuals; that much of the total expenditures is so made. But appropriations and expenditures under contracts for proper [297 U.S. 1, 73] governmental purposes cannot justify contracts which are not within federal power. And contracts for the reduction of acreage and the control of production are outside the range of that power. An appropriation to be expended by the United States under contracts calling for violation of a state law clearly would offend the Constitution. Is a statute less objectionable which authorizes expenditure of federal moneys to induce action in a field in which the United States has no power to intermeddle? The Congress cannot invade state jurisdiction to compel individual action; no more can it purchase such action.

We are referred to numerous types of federal appropriation which have been made in the past, and it is asserted no question has been raised as to their validity. We need not stop to examine or consider them. As was said in Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Mellon, supra ( 262 U.S. 447 , page 487, 43 S.Ct. 597, 601): ‘As an examination of the acts of Congress will disclose, a large number of statutes appropriating or involving the expenditure of moneys for nonfederal purposes have been enacted and carried into effect.’

As the opinion points out, such expenditures have not been challenged because no remedy was open for testing their constitutionality in the courts.

We are not here concerned with a conditional appropriation of money, nor with a provision that if certain conditions are not complied with the appropriation shall no longer be available. By the Agricultural Adjustment Act the amount of the tax is appropriated to be expended only in payment under contracts whereby the parties bind themselves to regulation by the federal government. There is an obvious difference between a statute stating the conditions upon which moneys shall be expended and one effective only upon assumption of a contractual obligation to submit to a regulation which otherwise could not be enforced. Many examples pointing the distinction might be cited. We are ref rred to appropriations in aid [297 U.S. 1, 74] of education, and it is said that no one has doubted the power of Congress to stipulate the sort of education for which money shall be expended. But an appropriation to an educational institution which by its terms is to become available only if the beneficiary enters into a contract to teach doctrines subversive of the Constitution is clearly bad. An affirmance of the authority of Congress so to condition the expenditure of an appropriation would tend to nullify all constitutional limitations upon legislative power.

But it is said that there is a wide difference in another respect, between compulsory regulation of the local affairs of a state’s citizens and the mere making of a contract relating to their conduct; that, if any state objects, it may declare the contract void and thus prevent those under the state’s jurisdiction from complying with its terms. The argument is plainly fallacious. The United States can make the contract only if the federal power to tax and to appropriate reaches the subject-matter of the contract. If this does reach the subject-matter, its exertion cannot be displaced by state action. To say otherwise is to deny the supremacy of the laws of the United States; to make them subordinate to those of a state. This would reverse the cardinal principle embodied in the Constitution and substitute one which declares that Congress may only effectively legislate as to matters within federal competence when the states do not dissent.

Congress has no power to enforce its commands on the farmer to the ends sought by the Agricultural Adjustment Act. It must follow that it may not indirectly accomplish those ends by taxing and spending to purchase compliance. The Constitution and the entire plan of our government negative any such use of the power to tax and to spend as the act undertakes to authorize. It does not help to declare that local conditions throughout the nation have created a situation of
national concern; for this [297 U.S. 1, 75] is but to say that whenever there is a widespread similarity of local conditions, Congress may ignore constitutional limitations upon its own powers and usurp those reserved to the states. If, in lieu of compulsory regulation of subjects within the states’ reserved jurisdiction, which is prohibited, the Congress could invoke the taxing and spending power as a means to accomplish the same end, clause 1 of section 8 of article 1 would become the instrument for total subversion of the governmental powers reserved to the individual states.

If the act before us is a proper exercise of the federal taxing power, evidently the regulation of all industry throughout the United States may be accomplished by similar exercises of the same power. It would be possible to exact money from one branch of an industry and pay it to another branch in every field of activity which lies within the province of the states. The mere threat of such a procedure might well induce the surrender of rights and the compliance with federal regulation as the price of continuance in business. A few instances will illustrate the thought.

Let us suppose Congress should determine that the farmer, the miner, or some other producer of raw materials is receiving too much for his products, with consequent depression of the processing industry and idleness of its employees. Though, by confession, there is no power vested in Congress to compel by statute a lowering of the prices of the raw material, the same result might be accomplished, if the questioned act be valid, by taxing the producer upon his output and
appropriating the proceeds to the processors, either with or without conditions imposed as the consideration for payment of the subsidy.

We have held in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 , 55 S.Ct. 837, 97 A.L.R. 947, that Congress has no power to regulate wages and hours of labor in a local business. If the petitioner is right, this very end may be accomplished by [297 U.S. 1, 76] a propriating money to be paid to employers from the federal treasury under contracts whereby they agree to comply with certain standards fixed by federal law or by contract.

Should Congress ascertain that sugar refiners are not receiving a fair profit, and that this is detrimental to the entire industry, and in turn has its repercussions in trade and commerce generally, it might, in analogy to the present law, impose an excise of 2 cents a pound on every sale of the commodity and pass the funds collected to such refiners, and such only, as will agree to maintain a certain price.

Assume that too many shoes are being manufactured throughout the nation; that the market is saturated, the price depressed, the factories running half time, the employees suffering. Upon the principle of the statute in question, Congress might authorize the Secretary of Commerce to enter into contracts with shoe manufacturers providing that each shall reduce his output, and that the United States will pay him a fixed sum proportioned to such reduction, the money to make
the payments to be raised by a tax on all retail shoe dealers on their customers.

Suppose that there are too many garment workers in the large cities; that this results in dislocation of the economic balance. Upon the principle contended for, an excise might be laid on the manufacture of all garments manufactured and the proceeds paid to those manufacturers who agree to remove their plants to cities having not more than a hundred thousand population. Thus, through the asserted power of taxation, the federal government, against the will of individual
states, might completely redistribute the industrial population.

A possible result of sustaining the claimed federal power would be that every business group which thought itself underprivileged might demand that a tax be laid on its vendors or vendees, the proceeds to be appropriated to the redress of its deficiency of income. [297 U.S. 1, 77] These illustrations are given, not to suggest that any of the purposes mentioned are unworthy, but to demonstrate the scope of the principle for which the government contends; to test the principle by its applications; to point out that, by the exercise of the asserted power, Congress would, in effect, under the pretext of exercising the taxing power, in reality accomplish prohibited ends. It cannot be said that they envisage improbable legislation. The supposed cases are no more improbable than would the present act have been deemed a few years ago.

Until recently no suggestion of the existence of any such power in the federal government has been advanced. The expressions of the framers of the Constitution, the decisions of this court interpreting that instrument and the writings of great commentators will be searched in vain for any suggestion that there exists in the clause under discussion or elsewhere in the Constitution, the authority whereby every provision and every fair, implication from that instrument may be subverted, the independence of the individual states obliterated, and the United States converted into a central government exercising uncontrolled police power in every state of the Union, superseding all local control or regulation of the affairs or concerns of the states.

Hamilton himself, the leading advocate of broad interpretation of the power to tax and to appropriate for the general welfare, never suggested that any power granted by the Constitution could be used for the destruction of local self-government in the states. Story countenances no such doctrine. It seems never to have occurred to them, or to those who have agreed with them, that the general welfare of the United States ( which has aptly been termed ‘an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States,’) might be served by obliterating the constituent members of the Union. But to this fatal conclu- [297 U.S. 1, 78] sion the doctrine contended for would inevitably lead. And its sole premise is that, though the makers of the Constitution, in erecting the ederal government, intended sedulously to limit and define its powers, so as to reserve to the states and the people sovereign power, to be wielded by the states and their citizens and not to be invaded by the United States, they nevertheless by a single clause gave power to the Congress to tear down the barriers, to invade the states’ jurisdiction, and to become a parliament of the whole people, subject to no restrictions save such as are self-imposed. The argument, when seen in its true character and in the light of its inevitable results, must be rejected.

Since, as we have pointed out, there was no power in the Congress to impose the contested exaction, it could not lawfully ratify or confirm what an executive officer had done in that regard. Consequently the Act of 1935, 30, adding section 21(b) to Act of May 12, 1933 (7 U.S.C.A. 623( b), does not affect the rights of the parties.

The judgment is affirmed.
Mr. Justice STONE (dissenting).
I think the judgment should be reversed.

The present stress of widely held and strongly expressed differences of opinion of the wisdom of the Agricultural Adjustment Act makes it important, in the interest of clear thinking and sound result, to emphasize at the outset certain propositions which should have controlling influence in determining the validity of the act. They are:

1. The power of courts to declare a statute unconstitutional is subject to two guiding principles of decision which ought never to be absent from judicial consciousness. One is that courts are concerned only with the power to enact statutes, not with their wisdom. The other is that while unconstitutional exercise of power [297 U.S. 1, 79] by the executive and legislative branches of the government is subject to judicial restraint, the only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint. For the removal of unwise laws from the statute books appeal lies, not to the courts, but to the ballot and to the processes of democratic government.

2. The constitutional power of Congress to levy an excise tax upon the processing of agricultural products is not questioned. The present levy is held invalid, not for any want of power in Congress to lay such a tax to defray public expenditures, including those for the general welfare, but because the use to which its proceeds are put is disapproved.

3. As the present depressed state of agriculture is nation wide in its extent and effects, there is no basis for saying that the
   expenditure of public money in aid of farmers is not within the specifically granted power of Congress to levy taxes to ‘provide for the … general welfare.’ The opinion of the Court does not declare otherwise.

4. No question of a variable tax fixed from time to time by fiat of the Secretary of Agriculture, or of unauthorized delegation of legislative power, is now presented. The schedule of rates imposed by the secretary in accordance with the original command of Congress has since been specifically adopted and confirmed by act of Congress, which has declared that it shall be the lawful tax. Act of August 24, 1935, 49 Stat. 750, 7 U. S.C.A. 602 et seq. That is the tax which the government now seeks to collect. Any defects there may have been in the manner of laying the tax by the secretary have now been removed by the exercise of the power of Congress to pass a curative statute validating an intended, though defective, tax. United States v. Heinszen & Co., 206 U.S. 370 , 27 S.Ct. 742, 11 Ann.Cas. 688; Graham & Foster v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409 , 51 S.Ct. 186; cf. Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15 , 51 S.Ct. 324. The Agricultural Adjustment Act as thus amended de- [297 U.S. 1, 80] clares that none of its provisions shall fail because others are pronounced invalid.

It is with these preliminary and hardly controverted matters in mind that we should direct our attention to the pivot on which the decision of the Court is made to turn. It is that a levy unquestionably with n the taxing power of Congress may be treated as invalid because it is a step in a plan to regulate agricultural production and is thus a forbidden infringement of state power. The levy is not any the less an exercise of taxing power because it is intended to defray an expenditure for the general welfare rather than for some other support of government. Nor is the levy and collection of the tax pointed to as effecting the regulation. While all federal taxes inevitably have some influence on the internal economy of the states, it is not contended that the levy of a processing tax upon manufacturers using agricultural products as raw material has any perceptible regulatory effect upon either their production or manufacture. The tax is unlike the penalties which were held invalid in the Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 , 42 S.Ct. 449, 21 A.L.R. 1432, in Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 , 42 S.Ct. 453, in Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 17 , 45 S.Ct. 446, 39 A.L.R. 229, and in United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 , 56 S.Ct. 223, because they were themselves the instruments of regulation by virtue of their coercive effect on matters left to the control of the states. Here regulation, if any there be, is accomplished not by the tax, but by the method by which its proceeds are expended, and would equally be accomplished by any like use of public funds, regardless of their source.

The method may be simply stated. Out of the available fund payments are made to such farmers as are willing to curtail their productive acreage, who in fact do so and who in advance have filed their written undertaking to do so with the Secretary of Agriculture. In saying that this method of spending public moneys is an invasion of the reserved powers of the states, the Court does not assert [297 U.S. 1, 81] that the expenditure of public funds to promote the general welfare is not a substantive power specifically delegated to the national government, as Hamilton and Story pronounced it to be. It does not deny that the expenditure of funds for the benefit of farmers and in aid of a program of curtailment of production of agricultural products, and thus of a supposedly better ordered national economy, is within the specifically granted power. But it is declared that state power is nevertheless infringed by the expenditure of the proceeds of the tax to
compensate farmers for the curtailment of their cotton acreage. Although the farmer is placed under no legal compulsion to reduce acreage, it is said that the mere offer of compensation for so doing is a species of economic coercion which operates with the same legal force and effect as though the curtailment were made mandatory by act of Congress. In any event it is insisted that even though not coercive the expenditure of public funds to induce the recipients to curtail production is itself an infringement of state power, since the federal government cannot invade the domain of the states by the ‘purchase’ of performance of acts which it has no power to compel.

Of the assertion that the payments to farmers are coercive, it is enough to say that no such contention is pressed by the taxpayer, and no such consequences were to be anticipated or appear to have resulted from the administration of the act. The suggestion of coercion finds no support in the record or in any data showing the actual operation of the act. Threat of loss, not hope of gain, is the essence of economic coercion. Members of a long-depressed industry have undoubtedly been tempted to curtail acreage by the hope of resulting better prices and by the proffered opportunity to obtain needed ready money. But there is nothing to indicate that those who accepted benefits were impelled by fear of lower prices if they did not accept, or that at any stage in the operation [297 U.S. 1, 82] of the plan a farmer could say whether, apart from the certainty of cash payments at specified times, the advantage would lie with curtailment of production plus c mpensation,
rather than with the same or increased acreage plus the expected rise in prices which actually occurred. Although the Agricultural Adjustment Act was put into operation in June, 1933, the official reports of the Department of Agriculture show that 6,343,000 acres of productive cotton land, 14 per cent. of the total, did not participate in the plan in 1934, and 2,790,000 acres, 6 per cent. of the total, did not participate in 1935. Of the total number of farms growing cotton, estimated at 1,500,000, 33 per cent. in 1934 and 13 per cent. in 1935 did not participate.

It is significant that in the congressional hearings on the bill that became the Bankhead Act, 48 Stat. 598, 7 U.S.C.A. 701 et seq., as amended by Act of June 20, 1934, 48 Stat. 1184, 7 U.S.C.A. 725, which imposes a tax of 50 per cent. on all cotton produced in excess of limits prescribed by the Secretary of Agriculture, there was abundant testimony that the restriction of cotton production attempted by the Agricultural Adjustment Act could not be secured without the coercive provisions of the Bankhead Act. See Hearing before Committee on Agriculture, U.S. Senate, on S. 1974, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.; Hearing before Committee on Agriculture, U.S. House of Representatives, on H.R. 8402, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. The Senate and House Committees so reported, Senate Report No. 283, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3; House Report No. 867, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3. The Report of the Department of Agriculture on the administration of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (February 15, 1934 to December 31, 1934), p. 50, points out that the Bankhead Act was passed in response to a strong sentiment in favor of mandatory production control ‘that would prevent non-cooperating farmers from increasing their own plantings in order to capitalize upon the price advances that had resulted from the reductions made by contract [297 U.S. 1,83] signers.’ 1 The presumption of constitutionality of a statute is not to be overturned by an assertion of its coercive effect which rests on nothing more substantial than groundless speculation.

It is upon the contention that state power is infringed by purchased regulation of agricultural production that chief reliance is placed. It is insisted that, while the Constitution gives to Congress, in specific and unambiguous terms, the power to tax and spend, the power is subject to limitations which do not find their origin in any express provision of the Constitution and to which other expressly delegated powers are not subject.

The Constitution requires that public funds shall be spent for a defined purpose, the promotion of the general welfare. Their expenditure usually involves payment on terms which will insure use by the selected recipients within the limits of the constitutional purpose. Expenditures would fail of their purpose and thus lose their constitutional sanction if the terms of payment were not such that by their influence on the action of the recipients the permitted end would be attained. The power of Congress to spend is inseparable from persuasion to action over which Congress has no legislative control. Congress may not command that the science of agriculture be taught in state universities. But if it would aid the teaching of that science by grants to state institutions, it is appropriate, if not necessary, that the grant be on the condition, incorporated in the Morrill Act, 12 Stat. 503, 7 U.S.C.A. 301 et seq., 26 Stat. 417, 7 U.S.C.A. 321 et seq., that it be used for the intended purpose. Similarly it would seem to be compliance with the Constitution, not violation of it, for the government to take and the university to give a contract that the grant would be so used. It makes no dif- [297 U.S. 1, 84] ference that there is a promise to do an act which the condition is calculated to induce. Co dition and promise are alike valid since both are in furtherance of the national purpose for which the money is appropriated.

These effects upon individual action, which are but incidents of the authorized expenditure of government money, are pronounced to be themselves a limitation upon the granted power, and so the time-honored principle of constitutional interpretation that the granted power includes all those which are incident to it is reversed. ‘Let the end be legitimate,’ said the great Chief Justice, ‘let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.’ McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421. This cardinal guide to constitutional exposition must now be rephrased so far as the spending power of the federal government is concerned. Let the expenditure be to promote the general welfare, still if it is needful in order to insure its use for the intended purpose to influence any action which
Congress cannot command because within the sphere of state government, the expenditure is unconstitutional. And taxes otherwise lawfully levied are likewise unconstitutional if they are appropriated to the expenditure whose incident is condemned.

Congress through the Interstate Commerce Commission has set aside intrastate railroad rates. It has made and destroyed intrastate industries by raising or lowering tariffs. These results are said to be permissible because they are incidents of the commerce power and the power to levy duties on imports. See Minnesota Rate Case 1913, 230 U.S. 352 , 33 S.Ct. 729, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1151, Ann.Cas. 1916A, 18; Houston, E . & W.T.R. Co. v. U.S. (Shreveport Rate Case), 234 U.S. 342 , 34 S.Ct. 833; Board of Trustees of University of Illinois v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 , 53 S.Ct. 509. The only conclusion to be drawn is that re- [297 U.S. 1, 85] sults become lawful when they are incidents of those powers but unlawful when incident to the similarly granted power to tax and spend.

Such a limitation is contradictory and destructive of the power to appropriate for the public welfare, and is incapable of practical application. The spending power of Congress is in addition to the legislative power and not subordinate to it. This independent grant of the power of the purse, and its very nature, involving in its exercise the duty to insure expenditure within the granted power, presuppose freedom of selection among divers ends and aims, and the capacity to impose such conditions as will render the choice effective. It is a contradiction in terms to say that there is power to spend for the national welfare, while rejecting any power to impose conditions reasonably adapted to the attainment of the end which alone would justify the expenditure.

The limitation now sanctioned must lead to absurd consequences. The government may give seeds to farmers, but may not condition the gift upon their being planted in places where they are most needed or even planted at all. The government may give money to the unemployed, but may not ask that those who get it shall give labor in return, or even use it to support their families. It may give money to sufferers from earthquake, fire, tornado, pestilence, or flood, but may not impose conditions, health precautions, designed to prevent the spread of disease, or induce the movement of population to safer or more sanitary areas. All that, because it is purchased regulation infringing state powers, must be left for the states, who are unable or unwilling to supply the necessary relief. The government may spend its money for vocational rehabilitation, 48 Stat. 389, but it may not, with the consent of all concerned, supervise the process which it undertakes to aid. It may spend its money for the suppression of the boll weevil, but may [297 U.S. 1, 86] not compensate the farmers for suspending the growth of otton in the infected areas. It may aid state reforestation and forest fire prevention agencies, 43 Stat. 653 (see 16 U.S.C.A. 471, 499 note, 505, 515, 564 et seq.), but may not be permitted to supervise their conduct. It may support rural schools, 39 Stat. 929 (20 U.S.C.A. 11 et seq.), 45 Stat. 1151 (20 U.S.C.A. 15a to 15c), 48 Stat. 792 (20 U.S.C.A. 15d to 15g), but may not condition its grant by the requirement that certain standards be maintained. It may appropriate moneys to be expended by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation ‘to aid in financing agriculture, commerce and industry,’ and to facilitate ‘the exportation of agricultural and other products.’ Do all its activities collapse because, in order to effect the permissible purpose in myriad ways the money is paid out upon terms and conditions which influence action of the recipients within the states, which Congress cannot command? The answer would seem plain. If the expenditure is for a national public purpose, that purpose will not be thwarted because payment is on condition which will advance that purpose. The action which Congress induces by payments of money to promote the general welfare, but
which it does not command or coerce, is but an incident to a specifically granted power, but a permissible means to a legitimate end. If appropriation in aid of a program of curtailment of agricultural production is constitutional, and it is not denied that it is, payment to farmers on condition that they reduce their crop acreage is constitutional. It is not any the less so because the farmer at his own option promises to fulfill the condition.

That the governmental power of the purse is a great one is not now for the first time announced. Every student of the history of government and economics is aware of its magnitude and of its existence in every civilized government. Both were well understood by the framers of the Constitution when they sanctioned the grant of the spending power to the federal government, and both were recognized by Hamilton and Story, whose views of the [297 U.S. 1, 87] spending power as standing on a parity with the other powers specifically granted, have hitherto been generally accepted.

The suggestion that it must now be curtailed by judicial fiat because it may be abused by unwise use hardly rises to the dignity of argument. So may judicial power be abused. ‘The power to tax is the power to destroy,’ but we do not, for that reason, doubt its existence, or hold that its efficacy is to be restricted by its incidental or collateral effects upon the states. See Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533; McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 , 24 S.Ct. 769, 1 Ann.Cas. 561; compare Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 , 54 S.Ct. 599. The power to tax and spend is not without constitutional restraints. One restriction is that the purpose must be truly national. Another is that it may not be used to coerce action left to state control. Another is the conscience and patriotism of Congress and the Executive. ‘It must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts.’ Justice Holmes, in Missouri, Kansas & Texas R. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 , 24 S. Ct. 638, 639.

A tortured construction of the Constitution is not to be justified by recourse to extreme examples of reckless congressional spending which might occur if courts could not prevent-expenditures which, even if they could be thought to effect any national purpose, would be possible only by action of a legislature lost to all sense of public responsibility. Such suppositions are addressed to the mind accustomed to believe that it is the business of courts to sit in judgment on the wisdom of legislative action. Courts are not the only agency of government that must be assumed to have capacity to govern. Congress and the courts both unhappily may falter or be mistaken in the performance of their constitutional duty But interpretation of our great charter of government which proceeds on any assumption that the responsibility for the preservation of our institutions is the exclusive [297 U.S. 1, 88] concern of any one of the three branches of government, or
that it alone can save them from destruction is far more likely, in the long run, ‘to obliterate the constituent members’ of ‘an indestructible union of indestructible states’ than the frank recognition that language, even of a constitution, may mean what it says: that the power to tax and spend includes the power to relieve a nationwide economic maladjustment by conditional gifts of money.

Mr. Justice BRANDEIS and Mr. Justice CARDOZO join in this opinion.

Footnotes

[ Footnote 1 ] May 12, 1933, c. 25, 48 Stat. 31 (see 7 U.S.C.A. 601 et seq.).

[ Footnote 2 ] Section 11 (48 Stat. 38) denominates wheat, cotton, field corn, hogs, rice, tobacco, and milk, and its products, ‘basic agricultural commodities,’ to which the act is to apply. Others have been added by later legislation.

[ Footnote 3 ] Franklin Process Co. v. Hoosac Mills Corp. (D.C.) 8 F.Supp. 552.

[ Footnote 4 ] Butler et al. v. United States (C.C.A.) 78 F.(2d) 1.

[ Footnote 5 ] Public No. 320, 74th Congress, 1st Sess. (7 U.S.C.A. 602 et seq.).

[ Footnote 6 ] U.S. Department of Agriculture, Achieving A Balanced Agriculture, p. 38: ‘Farmers should not forget that all the processing tax money ends up in their own pockets. Even in those cases where they pay part of the tax, they get it all back. Every dollar collected in processing taxes goes to the farmer in benefit payments.’
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, The Processing Tax, p. 1: ‘Proceeds of processing taxes are passed to farmers as benefit payments.’

[ Footnote 7 ] U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Adjustment, p. 9.

[ Footnote 8 ] Other questions were presented and argued by counsel, but we do not consider or decide them. The respondents insist that the act in numerous respects delegates legislative power to the executive contrary to the principles announced in Panama Refining Company v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 , 55 S.Ct. 241, and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 , 55 S.Ct. 837, 97 A.L.R. 947; that this unlawful delegation is not cured by the amending act of August 24, 1935 (7 U.S.C.A. 602 et seq.); that the exaction is in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, since the legislation takes their property for a private use; that the floor tax is a direct tax and therefore void for lack of apportionment amongst the states, as required by article 1, 9; and that the processing tax is wanting in
uniformity and so violates article 1, 8, cl. 1, of the Constitution.

[ Footnote 9 ] Compare Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 544 , 43 S.Ct. 394, 24 A.L.R. 1238; Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 , 43 S.Ct. 597.

[ Footnote 10 ] The enactment of protective tariff laws has its basis in the power to regulate foreign commerce. See Board of Trustees of University of Illinois v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 58 , 53 S.Ct. 509.

[ Footnote 11 ] Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (5th Ed.) vol. I, 907.

[ Footnote 12 ] Loc. cit. chapter XIV, passim.

[ Footnote 13 ] Loc. cit. 909.

[ Footnote 14 ] Loc. cit. 922.

[ Footnote 15 ] Works, vol. III, p. 250.

[ Footnote 16 ] Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. II, p. 167.

[ Footnote 17 ] Loc. cit. p. 673.

[ Footnote 18 ] The Tenth Amendment declares: ‘The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.’

[ Footnote 19 ] U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Agricultural Adjustment, p. 9. ‘Experience of cooperative associations and other groups has shown that without such Government support, the efforts of the farmers to band together to control the amount of their product sent to market are nearly always brought to nothing. Almost always, under such circumstances, there has been a noncooperating minority, which, refusing to go along with the rest, has stayed on the outside and tried to benefit
from the sacrifices the majority has made. … It is to keep this noncooperating minority in line, or at least prevent it from doing harm to the majority, that the power of the Government has been marshaled behind the adjustment programs.’

[ Footnote 1 ] Whether coercion was the sole or the dominant purpose of the Bankhead Act, or whether the act was designed also for revenue or other legitimate ends, there is no occasion to consider now.

Optical character readers (OCRs) and barcodes sorters (BCSs) increase the speed, efficiency, and accuracy of processing your mail while keeping postal operating costs down. These computerized mail processing machines are located in post offices across the nation and are programmed to “read” and
sort up to 36,000 pieces of mail per hour. That’s 10 pieces every second. But if your mail isn’t technically compatible, you’ll miss the related benefits. So what type of mail is considered technically compatible? “Machinable” mail is the right size and shape to speed with ease through the equipment. “Readable” mail is quickly and accurately read, coded, and sorted by the equipment. Processing Equipment The OCR Each piece of mail passes by the computer’s scanner for a quick read of the delivery address. Then the OCR’s printer sprays on a delivery point barcode for that address. Next, the mailpiece zooms on to one of the OCR’s sorting channels reserved for the proper delivery area. From there, the barcoded mail is fed to BCSs for fast final separations — right down to the letter carriers who deliver it. The OCR is easily confused by sloppy handwriting, highly stylized characters, extraneous printing, and incorrectly placed address information. The Barcode Sorter As the barcode on your mailpiece shoots past the scanner, it is quickly read and sent to the appropriate channel for delivery.

Automation Requirements Size Make sure that your letter mail is the proper size. Mailpieces smaller than the dimensions below are not mailable. Letter mail larger than the dimensions is mailable but must bypass the OCR and be processed through slower and less efficient manual methods. Dimensions Minimum Maximum Height 3 1/2 6 1/8
Length 5 11 1/2 Thickness .007 1/4 * * Card stock thickness should not exceed .0095. Address Location The OCR looks for the address within a rectangular space on each mailpiece, called the OCR read area. All lines of the address should fall within the OCR read area for the best results. No portion of the return address should appear in the OCR read area.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

TREASURY ORDER 150-01

DATE: September 28, 1995

SUNSET REVIEW: September 28, 2000

SUBJECT: Regional and District Offices of the Internal Revenue Service

Under the authority given to the President to establish and alter internal revenue districts by Section 7621 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and vested in the Secretary of the Treasury by Executive Order 10289 (approved September 17, 1951, as amended) as made applicable to Section 7621 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended (as previously contained in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954) by Executive Order 10574 (approved November 5, 1954); under the authority vested in the Secretary of the Treasury by 31 U.S.C. §§321 (a), (b) and Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1952 as made applicable to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, by Section 7804(a) of such Code; and under the authority vested in the Secretary of the Treasury by Sections 7801(a) and 7803 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended; the following internal revenue districts and regions are established or continued as described in this Order. When fully implemented, this Order establishes fewer internal revenue regions and districts than designated in previous Orders.

1. Regions . Four regions are established which shall be identified as Northeast Region, headquartered at New York, New York; Southeast Region, headquartered at Atlanta, Georgia; Midstates Region, headquartered at Dallas, Texas; and Western Region, headquartered at San Francisco, California. The head of each regional office shall bear the title “Regional Commissioners identified by the region name. The geographic areas and internal revenue districts within each region are shown in the Attachment to this Order.

2. Districts. Thirty-three districts are established. Each shall be known as an internal revenue district and shall be identified by the names listed in the Attachment. The head of each district office shall be titled ~Director” identified by the district name as specified in the Attachment. The geographic areas within each district are
shown in the Attachment.

3. U.S. Territories and Insular Possessions. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall, to the extent of authority vested in the Commissioner, provide for the administration of the United States internal revenue laws in the U.S. territories and insular possessions and other areas of the world.

4. Implementation. The district and regional organization described above shall be implemented on dates determined by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Until such dates, the existing offices are authorized to continue. Effective immediately, the Commissioner is authorized to effect such transfers of functions, personnel, positions, equipment and funds as may be necessary to implement the provisions of this Order.

5. Other Offices. This Order affects only the regional and district offices subject to this Order and does not affect service centers or other offices in existence within the Internal Revenue Service.

6. Effect On Prior Treasury Orders.

a. TO 150-01, “Designation of Internal Revenue Districts,” dated October 27, 1987, is superseded.

b. TO 150-03, “Designation of Internal Revenue Regions and Regional Service Centers,” dated January 24, 1986, is superseded.

Robert E. Rubin

Sec. 222. – Federal reserve districts; membership of national banks The continental United States, excluding Alaska, shall be divided into not less than eight nor more than twelve districts. Such districts may be readjusted and new districts may from time to time be created by the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, not to exceed twelve in all: Provided, That the districts shall be apportioned with due regard to the convenience and customary course of business and shall not necessarily be coterminous with any State or States. Such districts shall be known as Federal Reserve districts and may be designated by number. When the State of Alaska or Hawaii is hereafter admitted to the Union the Federal Reserve districts shall be readjusted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in such manner as to include such State. Every national bank in any State shall, upon commencing business or within ninety days after admission into the Union of the State in which it is located, become a member bank of the Federal Reserve System by subscribing and paying for stock in the
Federal Reserve bank of its district in accordance with the provisions of this chapter and shall thereupon be an insured bank under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1811 et seq.), and failure to do so shall subject such bank to the penalty provided by section 501a of this title

“Every Sovereign State (People) is bound to respect the independence of every other Sovereign State (People) and the courts of one country (People) will not sit in judgement on the acts of the government of another, done within (the same or) its own territory…”

The present Union States Municipal and Civil Laws and Codes of the Land are an ‘incorporated unit of self-government’ established by the political powers of the ‘General Assembly’ of each State of the Union, and initiated at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, North America, in the year Eighteen fifty-four (1854). It governs ‗ONLY‘ the rights and conduct of ―WHITE PEOPLE, Christians and Jews, of the Eighteen sixty-three (1863) Union States Rights Republic, under the Magna Charta (Charter), the Knights of Columbus Code, and the Ku Klux Klan Oath. Forever said Union States Rights Republic denies citizenship in the United States Republic (U.S.A.) to the descendants of the Moorish Nation in the Western Hemisphere, erroneously referred to, and ‘branded’ and mislabeled as, Negroes, Blacks, Coloreds, and African Americans, etc., etc. In addition, the Supreme Court of the United States (in the landmark case) of ―Dred Scott v. Sandford 60 US (19 Howard) 393 (1857) held that Negroes—whether held to slavery or free– were not included and were not intended to be included in the ‘category’ of ‘citizen’ (subjects) of the Union States Rights Republic. Resultantly, the True Indigene Nobles of the Al Moroccan Empire (Free Moors), bearers of the Names / Titles, Ali, El, Bey, Dey and Al, are excluded from the Union States Rights Republic (U.S.A.) jurisdiction. The True Nobles of the Al Moroccan Empire are Sovereign, Private, and Self-Governed, by Right-Law‘ Principles and customs; and ONLY Obligated to the ‗Free Moorish Zodiac Constitution‘ – Circle 7 – archaically established by our Ancient Fore-Mothers and Fore-Fathers. Such extended allegiance and ‗Obligation‘ includes ‗The Great Seal‘ and the High Principles and Moor-al Standards, embodied in the Moorish National Flag (Standard) – Love, Truth, Peace, Freedom, and Justice. The True Al Moroccan Noble Indigenes of the Land maintain a Constitutional and lawful, NON-OBLIGATORY tax Status‘ and position, relative to ‗FOREIGN ENTITY TAXATION‘ (Indigenes Not Taxed) and maintain a NON– OBLIGATORY respect for the Union States Rights Republic (U.S.A.), its members, its laws; its ordinances; its codes; it customs and its traditions, pursuant to: The Free Moorish American Zodiac Constitution – Articles IV and VI; The Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between the United States and Morocco -Seventeen Eighty-Seven (1787) – superseded by the Treaty of Eighteen Thirty-Six (1836); Resolution 75: Journals of The House of Representatives; United States – April 17, 1933 A. D. – Moorish American Society of Philadelphia and the Use of Their Names; The United Nations “Declaration of the Rights of the Child” General Assembly Resolution 1386 (XIV), 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No, 16) at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959); The United Nations “Universal Declarations on Human Rights” Article XV, General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) of 10, December 1948 A.D.; “Executive Order 13107”—United States Republic, North America -The Implementation of Human Rights Treaties; The National Constitution for the Continental United States, Article III, Section 2; Amendment V – Liberty Clause; Amendment IX—Reservation of the Rights of the People; The United States Department of Justice Moorish Credentials; Free Moorish Zodiac Constitution, Truth A-1 Classified; The United States Copyright Certificate Number AA222141 Clock of Destiny; The Moorish Nationality and Identification Card; Moorish Holy Temple of Science / Moorish Science Temple Identification Card, etc.

Furthermore, I Assert My full Birthrights – Sovereignty and Substantive Rights and claim to Hereditaments – Being a Sundry Free Moor / Muur and a (Natural Being) pursuant to: Moabite / Moorish Pedigree; The Free Moorish Zodiac Constitution; The Great Seal of the Moorish Nation (Ab Antiquo); The Treaty of Peace and Friendship – 1787 / 1836; The Sundry Free Moors Act of 1790; The 1781 Organic United States Constitution; The Moorish Federal Financiers Act (Union States Army: 1861 -1863); The 1854 Roman Catholic Magna Charta; the Knights of Columbus Code; The Ku Klux Klan Oath; The United Nations Charter, Article 55(c); The Rights of Indigenous People: Part I, Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5; Part II, Article 6; The United States Supreme Court – ‘Acts of State’; The foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 28 USC 1601; et Sequa., The Convention on International Road Traffic -Day 19, September 1949, The World Court Decision, The Hague, Netherlands – Day 21, January 1958 A.D = 1378 M.C. In reference to the Rights of the Natural People and Substantive Rights, etc., the following are pertinent Supreme Court Decisions, (Stare Decisis) to wit:

1. The Right to Travel; The Right to Mode of Conveyance; The Right to Locomotion are all Absolute Rights, and the Police can not make void the exercise of Rights. State v. Armstead, 60 s. 778, 779, and 781:
2. The use of the highways for the purpose of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common and Fundamental Right of which the public and Natural Beings cannot be deprived. Chicago Motor Coach v. Chicago 337 Illinois 200, 169 NE 22, ALR, Ligare v. Chicago 139 ILL. 46, 28 HE 934, Boone v. Clark 214 SW 607, 25 AM jur (1st), Highways, sec. 163:
3. The Right to Park or Travel is part of the Liberty of which the Natural Person, citizen cannot be deprived without “due process of law” under the 5th Amendment of the United States Constitution. Kent v. Dulles 357 US 116, 125:
4. The Right of a citizen to Travel upon the public highways and to transport one’s property thereon, either by carriage or automobile, is not a mere privilege, which a City may prohibit or permit at will, but a common Right, which he / she has under the Right to Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness. Thompson v. Smith 154 SE 579:
5. State Police Power extends only to immediate threats to public safety, health, welfare, etc., Michigan v. Duke 266 US, 476 Led. At 449: which driving and speeding are not. California v. Farley Ced. Rpt. 89, 20 CA3rd 1032 (1971):
6. The state is prohibited from violating Substantive Rights. Owens v. City, 445 US 662 (1980); and it can not do by one power (eg. Police Power) that which is, for example, prohibited expressly to any other such power (eg. Taxation / Eminent Domain) as a matter of Law. US and UT v. Daniels, 22 p 159, nor indirectly that which is prohibited to it directly. Fairbanks v. US 181, US 283, 294, 300:
7. Traveling in an automobile on the public roads was not a threat to the public safety or health and constituted no hazard to the public, and such a traveler owed no other duty to the public (eg. the State); he / she and his / her auto, having equal right to and on the roadways / highways as horses and wagons, etc.; this same right is still Substantive Rule, in that speeding, running stop signs, traveling without license plates, or registration, are not threats to the public safety, and thus, are not arrestable offenses. Christy v. Elliot, 216 I 131, 74 HE 1035, LRA NS 1905—1910: California v, Farley 98 CED Rpt. 89, 20 CA 3d 1032 (1971).
8. Under the United States Republic’s Constitutional system of Government and upon the individuality and intelligence of the citizen, the State does not claim to control one’s conduct to others, leaving one the sole judge as to all that affects oneself. Mugler v. Kansas 1213 US 623, 659—60:
9. Where Rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule – making or legislation, which would abrogate them. Miranda v. Arizona 384 US 436, 125:
10. The claim and exercise of Constitutional Rights cannot be converted into a crime. Miller v. Kansas 230 F 2nd 486, 489:
11. For a crime to exist, there must be an injured party (Corpus Delicti). There can be no sanction or penalty imposed on one because of this Constitutional Right. Sherer v. Cullen 481 F. 945:
12. If any Tribunal (court) finds absence of proof of jurisdiction over a person and subject matter, the case must be dismissed. Louisville v. Motley 2111 US 149, 29S. CT 42. “The Accuser Bears the Burden of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt”.
13. “Lack of Federal Jurisdiction can not be waived or overcome by agreement of parties”. Griffin v. Matthews, 310 F Supra 341, 342 (1969): and ―Want of Jurisdiction may not be cured by consent of parties. Industrial Addition Association v. C.I,R., 323 US 310, 313.

Whereas, In light of the foregoing Jurisprudence ‘Stare Decisis’ Supreme Court Decisions, Facts, and Law; and counter to the negative and ‘colorable’ social conditions instituted by State Persons of the Union States Society, there exists a blatant ‗WANT OF JURISDICTION‘ on the part of the Union States Rights Republic (U.S.A.), its agents, personnel, contractors, and assigns. Axioms are legally in force under National and International Law attending these issues. And this Affiant (Natural Person – In Propria Persona) does not waive any rights; does not transfer power of attorney; and does not willingly consent to any public trial or hearing in any ‘colorable’ tribunal venue or non-Article III, unconstitutional jurisdiction. The Official Oaths, the Obligations, and the Fiduciary duties of all accusers and bound ‗claimants‘ to National Law and Order; Civilization Principles fixed in Constitution Law, still stands! Definition and Truth still Rules. NON-COMPLIANCE is a Federal and International Law offence.

Whereas, there is no question that a ‘Bench Appearance Summons’, Detention, Arrest and Ticket or Citation issued by a Police Officer or others for traveling with no driver’s license, foreign driver’s license, not having current registration, or mandatory insurance, etc., which carries a fine or jail time, is a penalty or sanction and is indeed “converting a right into a crime”; thus violating Substantive Rights. It is reasonable to assume the these Supreme Court judicial decisions are straight and to the point, that there is no lawful method for government to put restrictions or limitations on Rights belonging to the People.

That the Organic United States Republic Constitution (derived from Ancient Moabite / Moorish Law) remains ‘The Supreme Law of the Land’. And all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of The United States Flag of Peace, pursuant to United States Code, Title 4, Chapter 1. Any law that is Repugnant to the Constitution, shall remain forever ‘colorable’ and is Null and Void. Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137, 174, 176 (1803). Any Municipal Officer, Person, Personnel, Employee or Contractor who violate the Rights of the People or Citizens are subject to suit in their personal and / or official capacity to wit:

Title 18, Part 1, Chapter 13 §241 of United States Codes of Law:

If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, commonwealth, Possession, or district in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or Laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; or…

If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with the intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured –

They shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts commited in violation of this section, or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggrivated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggrivated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, they shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.

Title 18, Part 1, Chapter 13 §242 of United States Codes of Law:

Whoever, under „color‟ of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or Laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, that are prescribed for the citizens, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodilly injury results from the acts commited in violation of this section, or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.

Therefore, in preservation of ‘The Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ and the Preservation of the Rights of the People, in accord and defence of the Constitution for the United States Republic of North America and its Republican Form of Government – being the ‘Supreme Law of the Land’; and primal to the contractual liabilities, Oath – bound Obligations, and Fiduciary Duties of the Officers of the Courts – Federal, State, City, and Municipal, etc., I hereby, Demand the enforcement of the De jure Laws of the United States, and all Treaties made under the Authority of The United States, in accord with Article VI of the Constitution; The Bill of Rights; The Declaration of the Rights of the Child; The Rights of Indigenous Peoples; The Universal Declaration of Human Rights; The United Nations Charter, Article 55(c); The United States Supreme Court – ‘Acts of State’; The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 28 USC 1601; et Sequa., The Convention

[Anonymous]

Many people are involved in diligent research concerning the use of all capital letters for proper names, e.g., JOHN PAUL JONES as a substitute for John Paul Jones in all court documents, driver’s licenses, bank accounts, birth certificates, etc.. Is the use of all capital letters to designate a name some special English grammar rule or style? Is it a contemporary American style of English? Is the use of this form of capitalization recognized by educational authorities? Is this an official judicial or U.S. government rule and/or style of grammar? Why do attorneys, court clerks, prosecutors judges, insurance companies, banks, credit card companies, utility companies, etc. always use all capital letters when writing a proper name?

What English grammar experts say

One of the foremost authorities on American English grammar, style, composition, and rules is The Chicago Manual of Style. The latest (14th) Edition, published by the
University of Chicago Press, is internationally known and respected as a major contribution to maintaining and improving the standards of written or printed text. Since
we can find no reference in their manual concerning the use of all capitalized letters with a proper name or any other usage, we wrote to the editors and asked this question:< br/>
“Is it acceptable, or is there any rule of English grammar, to allow a proper name to be written in all capital letters? For example, if my name was John Paul Jones, can it be written as JOHN PAUL JONES? Is there any rule covering this?”

The Editorial Staff of the University of Chicago answered:

“Writing names in all caps is not conventional; it is not Chicago style to put anything in all caps. For instance, even if ‘GONE WITH THE WIND’ appears on the title page all in caps, we would properly render it ‘Gone with the Wind’ in a bibliography. The only reason we can think of to do so is if you are quoting some material where it is important to the narrative to preserve the casing of the letters.

“We’re not sure in what context you would like your proper name to appear in all caps, but it is likely to be seen as a bit odd.”

Law is extremely precise. Every letter, capitalization, punctuation mark, etc., in a legal document is utilized for a specific reason and has legal (i.e. deadly force) consequences. If, for instance, one attempts to file articles of incorporation in the office of a Secretary of State of a State, if the exact title of the corporation — down to every jot and tittle — is not exactly the same each and every time the corporation is referenced in the documents to be filed, the Secretary of State will refuse to file the papers. This is because each time the name of the corporation is referenced it must be set forth identically in order to express the same legal entity. The tiniest difference in the name of the corporation identifies an entirely different legal person.

It is therefore an eminently valid, and possibly crucial, question as to why governments, governmental courts, and agencies purporting to exist (in some undefined, unproved manner) within the jurisdiction of “this state” insist on always capitalizing every letter in a proper name.

Mary Newton Bruder, Ph.D., also known as The Grammar Lady, who established the Grammar Hotline in the late 1980’s for the “Coalition of Adult Literacy,” was asked the following question:

“Why do federal and state government agencies and departments, judicial and administrative courts, insurance companies, etc., spell a person’s proper name in all capital letters? For example, if my name is John Paul Jones, is it proper at any time to write my name as JOHN PAUL JONES?”

Dr. Bruder’s reply was short and to the point:

“It must be some kind of internal style. There is no grammar rule about it.”

It seemed that these particular grammatical experts had no idea why proper names were written in all caps, so we began to assemble an extensive collection of reference books authored by various publishers, governments, and legal authorities to find the answer.

What English grammar reference books say

Manual on Usage & Style

One of the reference books obtained was the “Manual on Usage & Style,” Eighth Edition, ISBN I-878674-51-X, published by the Texas Law Review in 1995. Section D, CAPITALIZATION, paragraph D: 1:1 states:

“Always capitalize proper nouns… [Proper nouns], independent of the context in which they are used, refer to specific persons, places, or things (e.g., Dan, Austin, Rolls Royce).”

Paragraph D: 3:2 of Section D states:

“Capitalize People, State, and any other terms used to refer to the government as a litigant (e.g., the People’s case, the State’s argument), but do not capitalize other words used to refer to litigants (e.g., the plaintiff, defendant Manson).”

Either no attorney, judge, or law clerk in Texas has ever read the recognized law style manual that purports to pertain to them, or the act is a deliberate violation of the rules for undisclosed reasons. In either ignorance (“ignorance of the law is no excuse”) or violation (one violating the law he enforces on others is acting under title of nobility and abrogating the principle of equality under the law) of law, they continue to write “Plaintiff,” “Defendant,” “THE STATE OF TEXAS” and proper names of parties in all capital letters on every court document.

The Elements of Style

Another well-recognized reference book is “The Elements of Style,” Fourth Edition, ISBN 0-205-30902-X, written by William Strunk, Jr. and E.B. White, published by Allyn & Bacon in 1999. Within this renowned English grammar and style reference book, is found only one reference to capitalization, located within the Glossary at “proper noun,” page 94, where it states:

“The name of a particular person (Frank Sinatra), place (Boston), or thing (Moby Dick). Proper nouns are capitalized.”

There’s an obvious and legally evident difference between capitalizing the first letter of a proper name as compared to capitalizing every letter used to portray the name.

The American Heritage Book of English Usage

The American Heritage Book of English Usage, A Practical and Authoritative Guide to Contemporary English, published in 1996, at Chapter 9, E-Mail, Conventions and Quirks, Informality, states:

“To give a message special emphasis, an E-mailer may write entirely in capital letters, a device E-mailers refer to as screaming. Some of these visual conventions have emerged as away of getting around the constraints on data transmission that now limit many networks”.

Here is a reference source, within contemporary — modern — English, that states it is of an informal manner to write every word of — specifically — an electronic message, a.k.a. e-mail, in capital letters. They say it’s “screaming” to do so. By standard definition, we presume that is the same as shouting or yelling. Are all judges, as well as their court clerks and attorneys, shouting at us when they corrupt our proper names in this manner? (If so, what happened to the decorum of a court if everyone is yelling?) Is the insurance company screaming at us for paying the increased premium on our Policy? This is doubtful as to any standard generalization, even though specific individual instances may indicate this to be true. It is safe to conclude, however, that it would also be informal to write a proper name in the same way.

Does this also imply that those in the legal profession are writing our Christian names informally on court documents? Are not attorneys and the courts supposed to be specific, formally writing all legal documents to the “letter of the law?” If the law is at once both precise and not precise, what is its significance, credibility, and force and effect?

New Oxford Dictionary of English

“The New Oxford Dictionary of English” is published by the Oxford University Press. Besides being considered the foremost authority on the British English language, this dictionary is also designed to reflect the way language is used today through example sentences and phrases. We submit the following definitions from the 1998 edition:

Proper noun (also proper name). Noun. A name used for an individual person, place, or organization, spelled with an initial capital letter, e.g. Jane, London, and Oxfam.

Name. Noun 1 A word or set of words by which a person, animal, place, or thing is known,addressed, or referred to: my name is Parsons, John Parsons. Kalkwasser is the German name for limewater. Verb 2 Identify by name; give the correct name for: the dead man has been named as John Mackintosh. Phrases. 3 In the name of. Bearing or using the name of aspecified person or organization: a driving license in the name of William Sanders.

From the “Newbury House Dictionary of American English,” published by Monroe Allen Publishers, Inc., (1999):

name n. I [C] a word by which a person, place, or thing is known: Her name is Diane Daniel.

We can find absolutely no example in any recognized reference book that specifies or allows the use of all capitalized names, proper or common. There is no doubt that a proper name, to be grammatically correct, must be written with only the first letter capitalized, with the remainder of the word in a name spelled with lower case letters.

US Government Style Manual

Is the spelling and usage of a proper name defined officially by US Government? Yes. The United States Government Printing Office in their “Style Manual,” March 1984 edition (the most recent edition published as of March 2000), provides comprehensive grammar, style and usage for all government publications, including court and legal writing.

Chapter 3, “Capitalization,” at § 3.2, prescribes rules for proper names:

“Proper names are capitalized. [Examples given are] Rome, Brussels, John Macadam, Macadam family, Italy, Anglo-Saxon.”

At Chapter 17, “Courtwork, the rules of capitalization,” as mentioned in Chapter 3, are further reiterated:

“17.1. Courtwork differs in style from other work only as set forth in this section; otherwise the style prescribed in the preceding sections will be followed.”

After reading §17 in entirety, I found no other references that would change the grammatical rules and styles specified in Chapter 3 pertaining to capitalization.

At § 17.9, this same official US Government manual states:

“In the titles of cases the first letter of all principal words are capitalized, but not such terms as defendant and appellee.”

This wholly agrees with Texas Law Review’s Manual on “Usage & Style” as referenced above.

Examples shown in § 17.12 are also consistent with the aforementioned §17.9 specification: that is, all proper names are to be spelled with capital first letters; the balance of each spelled with lower case letters.

Grammar, Punctuation, and Capitalization

“The National Aeronautics and Space Administration” (NASA) has publish one of the most concise US Government resources on capitalization. NASA publication SP-7084, “Grammar, Punctuation, and Capitalization.” A Handbook for Technical Writers and Editors, was compiled and written by the NASA Langley Research Center in Hampton, Virginia. At Chapter 4, “Capitalization,” they state in 4.1 “Introduction:”

“First we should define terms used when discussing capitalization:

• All caps means that every letter in an expression is capital, LIKE THIS.
• Caps & lc means that the principal words of an expression are capitalized, Like This.
• Caps and small caps refer to a particular font of type containing small capital letters instead of lowercase letters.

Elements in a document such as headings, titles, and captions may be capitalized in either sentence style or headline style:

• Sentence style calls for capitalization of the first letter, and proper nouns of course.
• Headline style calls for capitalization of all principal words (also called caps & lc).

Modern publishers tend toward a down style of capitalization, that is, toward use of fewer capitals, rather than an up style.”

Here we see that in headlines, titles, captions, and in sentences, there is no authorized usage of all caps. At 4.4.1. “Capitalization With Acronyms,” we find the first authoritative use for all caps:

“Acronyms are always formed with capital letters. Acronyms are often coined for a particular program or study and therefore require definition. The letters of the acronym are not capitalized in the definition unless the acronym stands for a proper name:

Wrong – The best electronic publishing systems combine What You See Is What You Get (WYSIWYG) features…

Correct – The best electronic publishing systems combine what you see is what you get (WYSIWYG) features…

But Langley is involved with the National Aero-Space Plane (NASP) Program.”

This cites, by example, that using all caps is allowable in an acronym. “Acronyms” are words formed from the initial letters of successive parts of a term. They never contain periods and are often not standard, so that definition is required. Could this apply to lawful proper Christian names? If that were true, then JOHN SMITH would have to follow a definition of some sort, which it does not. For example, only if JOHN SMITH were defined as ‘John Orley Holistic Nutrition of the Smith Medical Institute To Holistics (JOHN SMITH)’ would this apply.

The most significant section appears at 4.5., “Administrative Names”:

“Official designations of political divisions and of other organized bodies are capitalized:

• Names of political divisions;
• Canada, New York State;
• United States Northwest Territories;
• Virgin Islands, Ontario Province;
• Names of governmental units, US Government Executive Department, US Congress, US Army;
• US Navy.”

According to this official US Government publication, the States are never to be spelled in all caps such as “NEW YORK STATE.” The proper English grammar — and legal — style is “New York State.” This agrees, once again, with Texas Law.

Review’s Manual on Usage & Style.

The Use of a Legal Fiction

The Real Life Dictionary of the Law

The authors of “The Real Life Dictionary of the Law,” Gerald and Kathleen Hill, are accomplished scholars and writers. Gerald Hill is an experienced attorney, judge, and law instructor. Here is how the term legal fiction is described:

“Legal fiction. n. A presumption of fact assumed by a court for convenience, consistency orto achieve justice. There is an old adage: Fictions arise from the law, and not law from fictions.”

Oran’s Dictionary of the Law

From Oran’s “Dictionary of the Law,” published by the West Group 1999, within the definition of “Fiction” is found:

“A legal fiction is an assumption that something that is (or may be) false or nonexistent is true or real. Legal fictions are assumed or invented to help do justice. For example, bringing a lawsuit to throw a nonexistent ‘John Doe’ off your property used to be the only way to establish a clear right to the property when legal title was uncertain.”

Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law

“Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law” 1996 states:

“legal fiction: something assumed in law to be fact irrespective of the truth or accuracy of that assumption. Example: the legal fiction that a day has no fractions — Fields V. Fairbanks North Star Borough, 818 P.2d 658 (1991).”

This is the reason behind the use of all caps when writing a proper name. The US and State Governments are deliberately using a legal fiction to “address” the lawful, real, flesh-and-blood man or woman. We say this is deliberate because their own official publications state that proper names are not to be written in all caps. They are deliberately not following their own recognized authorities.

In the same respect, by identifying their own government entity in all caps, they are legally stating that it is also intended to be a legal fiction. As stated by Dr. Mary Newton Bruder in the beginning of this memorandum, the use of all caps for writing a proper name is an “internal style” for what is apparently a pre-determined usage and, at this point, unknown jurisdiction.

The main key to a legal fiction is assumption as noted in each definition above.

Conclusion: There are no official or unofficial English grammar style manuals or reference publications that recognize the use of all caps when writing a proper name. To do so is by fiat, within and out of an undisclosed jurisdiction by unknown people for unrevealed reasons, by juristic license of arbitrary presumption not based on fact. The authors of the process unilaterally create legal fictions for their own reasons and set about to get us to take the bait, fall for the deceit.

Assumption of a Legal Fiction

An important issue concerning this entire matter is whether or not a proper name, perverted into an all caps assemblage of letters, can be substituted for a lawful Christian name or any proper name, such as the State of Florida. Is the assertion of all-capital letter names “legal?” If so, from where does this practice originate and what enforces it?

A legal fiction may be employed when the name of a “person” is not known, and therefore using the fictitious name “John Doe” as a tentative, or interim artifice to surmount the absence of true knowledge until the true name is known. Upon discovering the identity of the fictitious name, the true name replaces it.

In all cases, a legal fiction is an assumption of purported fact without having shown the fact to be true or valid. It is an acceptance with no proof. Simply, to assume is to pretend. Oran’s “Dictionary of the Law” says that the word “assume” means:

1. To take up or take responsibility for; to receive; to undertake. See “assumption.”
2. To pretend.
3. To accept without proof.

These same basic definitions are used by nearly all of the modern law dictionaries. It should be noted that there is a difference between the meanings of the second and third definitions with that of the first. Pretending and accepting without proof are of the same understanding and meaning. However, to take responsibility for and receive, or assumption, does not have the same meaning. Oran’s defines “assumption” as:

“Formally transforming someone else’s debt into your own debt. Compare with guaranty. The assumption of a mortgage usually involves taking over the seller’s ‘mortgage debt’ when buying a property (often a house).”

Now, what happens if all the meanings for the word “assume” are combined? In a literal and definitive sense, the meaning of assume would be: The pretended acceptance, without proof, that someone has taken responsibility for, has guaranteed, or has received a debt.

Therefore, if we apply all this in defining a legal fiction, the use of a legal fiction is an assumption or pretension that the legal fiction named has received and is responsible for a debt of some sort.

Use of the legal fiction “JOHN P JONES” in place of the proper name “John Paul Jones” implies an assumed debt guarantee without any offer of proof. The danger behind this is that if such an unproven assumption is made, unless the assumption is proven wrong it is considered valid.

An assumed debt is valid unless proven otherwise. (“An unrebutted affidavit, claim, or charge stands as the truth in commerce.”) This is in accord with the Uniform Commercial Code, valid in every State and made a part of the Statutes of each State. A name written in all caps — resembling a proper name but grammatically not a proper name — is being held as a debtor for an assumed debt. Did the parties to the Complaint incur that debt? If so, how and when?

Where is the contract of indebtedness that was signed and the proof of default thereon? What happens if the proper name, i.e. “John Paul Jones,” answers for or assumes the fabricated name, i.e. “JOHN P JONES?” The two become one and the same. This is the crux for the use of the all caps names by the US Government and the States. It is the way that they can bring someone into the “de facto” venue and jurisdiction that they have created. By implication of definition, this also is for the purpose of some manner of assumed debt.

Why won’t they use “The State of Texas” or “John Doe” in their courts or on Driver’s Licenses? What stops them from doing this? Obviously, there is a reason for using the all-caps names since they are very capable of writing proper names just as their own official style manual states. The reason behind “legal fictions” is found within the definitions as cited above.

The Legalities of All-Capital-Letters Names

We could go on for hundreds of pages citing the legal basis behind the creation and use of all-capital-letters names. In a nutshell, fabricated legal persons such as “STATE OF TEXAS” can be used to fabricate additional legal persons. “Fictions” arise from the law, not the law from fictions. Bastard legal persons originate from any judicial/governmental actor that wishes to create them, regardless of whether he/she/it is empowered by law to do so. However, a law can never originate from a fictional foundation that doesn’t exist.

The generic and original US Constitution was validated by treaty between individual nation states (all of which are artificial, corporate entities since they exist in abstract idea and construct). Contained within it is the required due process of law for all the participating nation states of that treaty. Representatives of the people in each nation state agreed upon and signed it. The federal government is not only created by it, but is also bound to operate within the guidelines of Constitutional due process. Any purported law that does not originate from Constitutional due process is a fictional law without validity. Thus, the true test of any American law is its basis of due process according to the organic US Constitution. Was it created according to the lawful process or created outside of lawful process?

Executive Orders and Directives

For years many have researched the lawful basis for creating all-caps juristic persons and have concluded that there is no such foundation according to valid laws and due process. But what about those purported “laws” that are not valid and have not originated from constitutional due process? There’s a very simple answer to the creation of such purported laws that are really not laws at all: “Executive Orders” and “Directives.” They are “color of law” without being valid laws of due process. These “Executive Orders” and “Directives” have the appearance of law and look as if they are laws, but according to due process, they are not laws. Rather, they are “laws” based on fictional beginnings and are the inherently defective basis for additional fictional “laws” and other legal fictions. They are “regulated” and “promulgated” by Administrative Code, rules and procedures, not due process. Currently, Executive Orders are enforced through the charade known as the Federal Administrative Procedures Act. Each State has also adopted the same fatally flawed administrative “laws.”

Lincoln Establishes Executive Orders

Eighty-five years after the Independence of the united States, seven southern nation States of America walked out of the Second Session of the thirty-sixth Congress on March 27, 1861. In so doing, the Constitutional due process quorum necessary for Congress to vote was lost and Congress was adjourned sine die, or “without day.” This meant that there was no lawful quorum to set a specific day and time to reconvene which, according to Robert’s Rules of Order, dissolved Congress. This dissolution automatically took place because there are no provisions within the Constitution allowing the passage of any Congressional vote without a quorum of the States.

Lincoln’s second Executive Order of April 1861 called Congress back into session days later, but not under the lawful authority, or lawful due process, of the Constitution. Solely in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the US Military, Lincoln called Congress into session under authority of Martial Law. Since April of 1861, “Congress” has not met based on lawful due process. The current “Congress” is a legal fiction based on nothing more meritorious than “Yeah, so what are you going to do about it?” Having a monopoly on the currency, “law,” and what passes for “government,” and most of the world’s firepower, the motto of the Powers That Be is: “We’ve got what it takes to take what you’ve got.”

Legal-fiction “laws,” such as the Reconstruction Acts and the implementation of the Lieber Code, were instituted by Lincoln soon thereafter and became the basis for the current “laws” in the US. Every purported “Act” in effect today is “de facto,” based on colorable fictitious entities created arbitrarily, out of nothing, without verification, lawful foundation, or lawful due process. All of such “laws” are not law, but rules of rulership by force/conquest, originating from and existing in military, martial law jurisdiction. Military, martial law jurisdiction

= jurisdiction of war

= win/lose interactions consisting of eating or being eaten, living or dying

= food chain

= law of necessity

= suspension of all law other than complete freedom to act in any manner to eat, kill, or destroy or avoid being eaten, killed, or destroyed

= no law

= lawlessness

= complete absence of all lawful basis to create any valid law.

Contractually, being a victim of those acting on the alleged authority granted by the law of necessity,

= no lawful object, valuable consideration, free consent of all involved parties, absence offraud, duress, malice, and undue influence

= no bona fide, enforceable contract

= no valid, enforceable nexus

= absolute right to engage in any action of any kind in self-defense

= complete and total right to disregard any alleged jurisdiction and demands from self admitted outlaws committing naked criminal aggression without any credibility and right to demand allegiance and compliance from anyone.

Every President of the United States since Lincoln has functioned by Executive Orders issued from a military, martial law jurisdiction with the only “law” being the “law of necessity,” i.e. the War Powers. The War Powers are nothing new. Indeed, they have been operational from the instant the first man thought he would “hide from God,” try to cheat ethical and natural law by over reaching, invade the space and territory of others, covet other people’s land or property, steal the fruits of their labors, and attempt to succeed in life by win/lose games. All existing “authority” in the United States today derives exclusively from the War Powers. Truman’s re-affirmation of operational authority under the War Powers begins: “NOW, THEREFORE, I, HARRY S. TRUMAN, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, 40 Stat. 415, as amended (section 5(b) of Appendix to Title 50), and section 4 of the act of March 9, 1933, 48 Stat. 2. …” Sic transit rights, substance, truth, justice, peace, and freedom in America, “the land of the free and the home of the brave.”

The Abolition of the English & American Common Law

Here’s an interesting quote from the 1973 session of the US Supreme Court:

“The American law. In this country, the law in effect in all but a few States until mid-l9th century was the pre-existing English common law… It was not until after the War Between the States that legislation began generally to replace the common law.” – Roe vs. Wade, 410 US 113.

In effect, Lincoln’s second Executive Order abolished the recognized English common law in America and replaced it with “laws” based on a fictional legal foundation, i.e., Executive Orders and Directives executed under “authority” of the War Powers. Most States still have a reference to the common laws within their present day statutes. For example, in the Florida Statutes (1999), Title I. Chapter 2, at § 2.01 “Common law and certain statutes declared in force,” it states:

“The common and statute laws of England which are of a general and not a local nature, with the exception hereinafter mentioned, down to the 4th day of July, 1776, are declared to be of force in this state; provided, the said statutes and common law be not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the acts of the Legislature of this state. History. — s. l, Nov. 6, 1829; RS 59; GS 59; RGS 71; CGL 87.”

Note that the basis of the common law is an approved Act of the people of Florida by Resolution on November 6, 1829, prior to Lincoln’s Civil War. Also note that the subsequent “laws,” as a result of Acts of the Florida Legislature and the United States, now take priority over the common law in Florida. In April 1861, the American and English common law was abolished and replaced with legal fiction “laws,” a.k.a. Statutes, Rules, and Codes based on Executive Order and not the due process specified within the organic Constitution. Existing and functioning under the law of necessity ab initio, they are all non-law and cannot validly assert jurisdiction, authority, or demand for compliance from anyone. They are entirely “rules of rulership,” i.e. organized piracy, privilege, plunder, and enslavement, invented and enforced by those who would rule over others by legalized violence in the complete absence of moral authority, adequate knowledge, and natural-law mechanics to accomplish any results other than disruption, conflict, damage, and devastation. The established maxim of law applies:

Extra territorium just dicenti non paretur impune. One who exercises jurisdiction out of his territory cannot be obeyed with impunity.

10 Co. 77; Dig. 2. 1. 20;
Story, Confl. Laws § 539;
Broom, Max. 100, 101.

Applying it all to Current “laws”

An established maxim of law states the importance of the name:

Ad recte docendum oportet, primum inquirere nomina, quia rerum cognitio a nominibusrerum dependet. In order rightly to comprehend a thing, inquire first into the names, for a right knowledge of things depends upon their names.

Co. Litt. 68.

Title III, “Pleadings and Motions,” Rule 9(a) “Capacity,” Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, states, in pertinent part:

“When an issue is raised as to the legal existence of a named party, or the party’s capacity to be sued, or the authority of a party to be sued, the party desiring to raise the issue shall do so by specific negative averment, which shall include supporting particulars.”

At this juncture, it is clear that the existence of a name written with all caps is a necessity-created legal fiction. This is surely an issue to be raised and the supporting particulars are outlined within this memorandum. Use of the proper name must be insisted upon as a matter of abatement — correction — for all parties of an action of purported “law.” However, the current “courts” cannot correct this since they are all based on presumed/assumed fictional law and must use artificial, juristic names. Instead, they expect the lawful Christian man or woman to accept the all-caps name and agree by silence to be treated as if he or she were a fictional entity invented and governed by mortal enemies. They must go to unlimited lengths to deceive and coerce this compliance or the underlying criminal farce would be exposed and a world-wide plunder/enslavement racket that has held all of life on this planet in a vice grip for millennia would crumble and liberate every living thing. At this point the would-be rulers of the world would be required to succeed in life by honest, productive labors the way those upon whom they parasitically feed are forced to conduct their lives.

Oklahoma Statutes

Since the entire game functions on the basis of people’s failure to properly rebut a rebuttable presumption, the issue then becomes how to properly rebut their presumption that you are knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily agreeing to be treated as if you were the all-caps name. One angle of approach is found in the requirement for proper names to be identified in any legal dispute. This includes a mandate to correct the legal paperwork involved when proper names are provided. In regard to criminal prosecution this is clearly set forth in the Oklahoma Statutes, Chapter 22, § 403:

“When a defendant is indicted or prosecuted by a fictitious or erroneous name, and in any stage of the proceedings his true name is discovered, it must be inserted in the subsequent proceedings, referring to the fact of his being charged by the name mentioned in the indictment or information.”

American Jurisprudence

In general, it is essential to identify parties to court actions properly. If the alleged parties to an action are not precisely identified, then who is involved with whom or what, and how? If not properly identified, all corresponding judgments are void, as outlined in Volume 46, American Jurisprudence 2d, at “Judgments:”

“§ 100 Parties — A judgment should identify the parties for and against whom it is rendered, with such certainty that it may be readily enforced, and a judgment which does not do so may be regarded as void for uncertainty. Such identification may be achieved by naming the persons for and against whom the judgment is rendered. Technical deficiencies in the naming of the persons for and against whom judgment is rendered can be corrected if the parties are not prejudiced. A reference in a judgment to a party plainly liable, followed by an omission of that party’s name from the language of the decree, at least gives rise to an ambiguity and calling for an inquiry into the court’s real intention as reflected in the entire record and surrounding circumstances.” [Footnote numbers and cites are omitted.]

The present situation in America

A legal person = a legal fiction

One of the terms used predominantly by the present civil governments and courts in America is “legal person.” Just what is a legal person? Some definitions are:

[A] legal person: a body of persons or an entity (as a corporation) considered as having many of the rights and responsibilities of a natural person and especially the capacity to sue and be sued. Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law (1996).

Person. I. A human being (a “natural” person). 2. A corporation (an “artificial” person). Corporations are treated as persons in many legal situations. Also, the word “person” includes corporations in most definitions in this dictionary. 3. Any other “being” entitled to sue as a legal entity (a government, an association, a group of Trustees, etc.). 4. The plural of person is persons, not people (see that word). — Oran’s “Dictionary of the Law,” West Group (1999).

Person. An entity with legal rights and existence including the ability to sue and be sued, to sign contracts, to receive gifts, to appear in court either by themselves or by lawyer and, generally, other powers incidental to the full expression of the entity in law. Individuals are “persons” in law unless they are minors or under some kind of other incapacity such as acourt finding of mental incapacity. Many laws give certain powers to “persons” which, in almost all instances, includes business organizations that have been formally registered such as partnerships, corporations or associations. — Duhaime’s Law Dictionary.

PERSON, noun. per’sn. [Latin persona; said to be compounded of per, through or by, and sonus, sound; a Latin word signifying primarily a mask used by actors on the stage.] — Webster’s 1828 Dictionary.

A corporation incorporated under de jure law, i.e. by bona fide express contract between real beings capable of contracting, is a legal fact. Using the juristic artifice of “presumption,” or “assumption” (a device known as a “legal fiction”), implied contract, constructive trusts, another entirely separate entity can be created using the name of the bona fide corporate legal fact (the name of the corporation) by altering the name of the corporation into some other corrupted format, such as ALL-CAPITAL LETTERS or abbreviated words in the name. The corporation exists in law, but has arbitrarily been assigned another NAME. No such corporation (legal fact), nor any valid law, nor even a valid legal fiction, can be created under the “law of necessity,” i.e. under “no law.” Likewise, the arbitrary use of the legal-fiction artifice of “right of presumption” (over unwary, uninformed, and usually blindly trusting people) can be legitimately exercised under “no law.” Anything whatsoever done under alleged authority of naked criminal aggression, i.e. law of necessity, can be rendered legitimate. Maxims of law describing “necessity” include:

• “Necessity has no law.” Plowd. 18, and 15 Vin. Abr. 534; 22 id. 540.
• “In time of war, laws are silent.” Cicero.

Non-existent law, the legal condition that universally prevails in the official systems of the world today, means that no lawful basis exists upon which anything can be created, or be made to transpire, upon which basis allegiance and obedience can be legitimately demanded. Acting under the law of necessity, i.e. lawlessness, allows complete and total right of everyone to disregard any and all alleged assertions of any lawful, verifiable, and legitimate jurisdiction over anything or anyone. Anyone acting against anyone under such non-law is self-confessing to be a naked criminal aggressor, and con man who has forfeited all credibility and right to demand allegiance, obedience, or compliance with any jurisdiction he might assert. If you, as a real being, are in real law and it is impossible for an attorney or judge to recognize or access it, you are not (and cannot be made subject to by them) in their jurisdiction. The crucial issue is then how to notice them of your position and standing.

A person created under de jure law, with the person’s identifying name appearing as prescribed by law and according to the rules of English grammar, is a legal fact. A corrupted “alter ego” version of that name, manufactured under the legal fiction of “right of presumption” will have “credibility” only so long as the presumption remains unchallenged. The rule of the world is that anything and everything skates unless you bust it.

Legal or Lawful?

It is crucial to define the difference between “legal” and “lawful.” The generic Constitution references genuine law. The present civil authorities and their courts use the word “legal.” Is there a difference in the meanings? The following is quoted from A Dictionary of Law (1893):

Lawful. In accordance with the law of the land; according to the law; permitted, sanctioned, or justified by law. “Lawful” properly implies a thing conformable to or enjoined by law; “Legal,” a thing in the form or after the manner of law or binding by law. A writ or warrant issuing from any court, under color of law, is a “legal” process however defective. See “legal.” [Bold emphasis added]

Legal. Latin legalis. Pertaining to the understanding, the exposition, the administration, the science and the practice of law: as, the legal profession, legal advice; legal blanks, newspaper. Implied or imputed in law. Opposed to actual “Legal” looks more to the letter [form/appearance], and “Lawful” to the spirit [substance/content], of the law. “Legal” is more appropriate for conformity to positive rules of law; “Lawful” for accord with ethical principle. “Legal” imports rather that the forms [appearances] of law are observed, that the proceeding is correct in method, that rules prescribed have been obeyed; “Lawful” that the right is act full in substance, that moral quality is secured. “Legal” is the antithesis of equitable, and the equivalent of constructive. 2 Abbott’s Law Dic. 24. [Bold emphasis added]

Legal matters administrate, conform to, and follow rules. They are equitable in nature and are implied (presumed) rather than actual (express). A legal process can be defective in law. This accords with the previous discussions of legal fictions and color of law. To be legal, a matter does not have to follow the law. Instead, it conforms to and follows the rules or form of law. This is why the Federal and State Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure are cited in every court Petition so as to conform to legal requirements of the specific juristic persons named, e.g., “STATE OF GEORGIA” or the “U.S. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT” that rule the courts.

Lawful matters are ethically enjoined in the law of the land — the law of the people — and are actual in nature, not implied. This is why whatever true law was upheld by the organic Constitution has no bearing or authority in the present day legal courts. It is impossible for anyone in “authority” today to access, or even take cognizance of, true law since “authority” is the “law of necessity,” 12 USC 95.

Therefore, it would appear that the meaning of the word “legal” is “color of law,” a term which Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, defines as:

Color of law. The appearance or semblance, without the substance, of legal right. Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because wrongdoer is clothed with authority of state, is action taken under “color of law.”

Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, page 241.

Executive Orders rule the land

The current situation is that legalism has usurped and engulfed the law. The administration of legal rules, codes, and statutes now prevail instead of actual law. This takes place on a Federal as well as State level. Government administrates what it has created through its own purported “laws,” which are not lawful, but merely “legal.” They are arbitrary constructs existing only because of the actions of people acting on fictitious (self-created) authority, i.e. no authority; they are authorized and enforced by legal Executive Orders. Executive Orders are not lawful and never have been. As you read the following, be aware of the words “code” and “administration.”

Looking at the United States Census 2000 reveals that the legal authority for this census comes from “Office of Management and Budget” (OMB) Approval No. 0607-0856. The 0MB is a part of the Executive Office of the President of the United States. The U.S. Census Bureau is responsible for implementing the national census, which is a division of the “Economics and Statistics Administration” of the U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC). The USDOC is a department of the Executive Branch. Obviously, Census 2000 is authorized, carried out, controlled, enforced and implemented by the President — the Executive Branch of the Federal Government — functioning as it has been since 1861, in the lawless realm of necessity (which is now even more degenerate than when it commenced under Lincoln).

In fact, the Executive Office of the President controls the entire nation through various departments and agencies effecting justice, communications, health, energy, transportation, education, defense, treasury, labor, agriculture, mails, and much more, through a myriad of Executive Orders, Proclamations, Policies, and Decisions.

Every US President since Lincoln has claimed his ‘authority’ for these Executive Orders on Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution:

“The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States; … He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law: but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.”

In reality, the Congress is completely by-passed. Since the Senate was convened in April, 1861 by Presidential Executive Order No. 2, (not by lawful constitutional due process), there is no United States Congress. The current “Senate” and “House” are, like everything, “colorable” (“color of Senate”) under the direct authority of the Executive Office of the President. The President legally needs neither the consent nor a vote from the Senate simply because the Senate’s legal authority to meet exists only by Executive Order. Ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, Federal judges, and all officers of the UNITED STATES are appointed by, and under authority of, the Executive Office of the President.

The Federal Registry is an Executive function

The first official act of every incoming President is to re-affirm the War Powers. He must do so, or he is devoid of power to function in office. The War Powers are set forth in the Trading With The Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, and the Amendatory Act of March 9, 1933 (The Banking Relief Act). In the Amendatory Act, every citizen of the United States was made an enemy of the Government, i.e. the Federal Reserve/IMF, et al, Creditors in bankruptcy who have conquered the country by their great paper-money banking swindle.

For the past 65 years, every Presidential Executive Order has become purported “law” simply by its publication in the Federal Register, which is operated by the Office of the Federal Register (OFR). In 1935, the OFR was established by the Federal Register Act. The purported authority for the OFR is found within the United States Code, Title 44, at Chapter 15:

Ҥ 1506. Administrative Committee of the Federal Register; establishment and composition; powers and duties

The Administrative Committee of the Federal Register shall consist of the Archivist of the United States or Acting Archivist, who shall be chairman, an officer of the Department of Justice designated by the Attorney General, and the Public Printer or Acting Public Printer. The Director of the Federal Register shall act as secretary of the committee. The committee shall prescribe, with the approval of the President, regulations for carrying out this chapter.”

Notice that the entire Administrative Committee of the Federal Register is comprised of officers of the Federal Government. Who appoints all Federal officers? The President does. This “act” also gives the President the authority to decree all the regulations to carry out the act. By this monopoly the Executive establishes, controls, regulates, and enforces the Federal Government without need for any approval from the Senate or anyone else (other than his undisclosed superiors). He operates without any accountability to the people at all. How can this be considered lawful?

In 1917, President Woodrow Wilson couldn’t persuade Congress to agree with his desire to arm United States vessels traversing hostile German waters before the United States entered World War I, so Wilson simply invoked the “policy” through a Presidential Executive Order. President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 9066 in December 1941 forcing 100,000 Americans of Japanese descent to be rounded up and placed in concentration camps while all their property was confiscated. Is it any wonder that the Congress, which the President “legally” controls, did not impeach President William Jefferson Clinton when the evidence for impeachment was overwhelming? On that note, why is it that Attorney-Presidents have used Executive Orders the most? Who, but an attorney, would know and understand legal rules the best. Sadly, they enforce what’s “legal” and ignore what’s lawful. In fact, they have no access to what is lawful since the entirety of their “authority,” which is ethically and existentially specious, derives from the War Powers.

How debt is assumed by legal fictions

We now refer back to the matter of assumption, as already discussed, with its relationship to arbitrarily created juristic persons, e.g. “STATE OF CALIFORNIA” or “JOHN P JONES.” Since an assumption, by definition, implies debt, what debt does a legal fiction assume? Now that we have explored the legal — executive — basis of the current Federal and State governments, it’s time to put all this together.

The government use of all caps in place of proper names is absolutely no mistake. It signifies an internal (“legal”) rule and authority. Its foundation is pure artifice and the results have compounded into more deceit in the form of created, promulgated, instituted, administered, and enforced rules, codes, statutes, and policy — i.e. “the laws that appear to be but are not, never were, and never can be.”

Qui sentit commodum, sentire debet et onus. He who enjoys the benefit, ought also to bear the burden. He who enjoys the advantage of a right takes the accompanying disadvantage — a privilege is subject to its condition or conditions. — Bouvier’s Maxims of Law (1856).

The Birth Certificate

Since the early 1960’s, State governments — themselves specially created, juristic, corporate persons signified by all caps — have issued Birth Certificates to “persons” with legal fiction all-caps names. This is not a lawful record of your physical birth, but rather the birth of the juristic, all-caps name. It may appear to be your true name, but since no proper name is ever written in all caps (either lawfully or grammatically) it does not identify who you are. The Birth Certificate is the government’s self-created document of title for its new “property,” i.e. the deed to the juristic-name artificial person whose all caps name “mirrors” your true name. The Birth Certificate brings the new all-caps name into colorable admiralty/maritime law, the same way a ship (and ship of state) is berthed.

One important area to address, before going any further, is the governmental use of older data storage from the late 1950’s until the early 1980’s. As a “left over” from various teletype-oriented systems, many government data storage methods used all caps for proper names. The IRS was supposedly still complaining about some of their antiquated storage systems as recent as the early 1980’s. At first, this may have been a necessity of the technology at the time, not a deliberate act. Perhaps, when this technology was first being used and implemented into the mainstream of communications, some legal experts saw it as a perfect tool for their perfidious intentions. What better excuse could there be?

However, since local, State, and Federal offices primarily used typewriters during that same time period, and Birth Certificates and other important documents, such as driver’s licenses, were produced with typewriters, it’s very doubtful that this poses much of an excuse to explain all-caps usage for proper names. The only reasonable usage of the older databank all-caps storage systems would have been for addressing envelopes or certain forms in bulk, including payment checks, which the governments did frequently.

Automated computer systems, with daisy-wheel and pin printers used prevalently in the early 1980’s, emulated the IBM electric typewriter Courier or Helvetica fonts in both upper and lower case letters. Shortly thereafter, the introduction of laser and ink-jet printers with multiple fonts became the standard. For the past fifteen years, there is no excuse that the government computers will not accommodate the use of lower case letters unless the older data is still stored in its original form, i.e. all caps, and has not been translated due to the costs of re-entry. But this does not excuse the entry of new data, only “legacy” data. In fact, on many government forms today, proper names are in all caps while other areas of the same computer produced document are in both upper and lower case. One can only conclude that now, more than ever, the use of all caps in substitution the writing a proper name is no mistake.

When a child is born, the hospital sends the original, not a copy, of the record of live birth to the “State Bureau of Vital Statistics,” sometimes called the “Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services” (HRS). Each STATE is required to supply the UNITED STATES with birth, death, and health statistics. The STATE agency that receives the original record of live birth keeps it and then issues a Birth Certificate in the corrupted, all-caps version of the baby’s true name, i.e. JAMES WILBER SMITH.

cer-tif-i-cate, noun. Middle English certificat, from Middle French, from Medieval Latinceruficatum. from Late Latin, neuter of certificatus, past participle of certificare, to certify, 15th century. 3: a document evidencing ownership or debt.– Merriam Webster Dictionary (1998).

The Birth Certificate issued by the State is then registered with the U.S. Department of Commerce — the Executive Office — specifically through their own sub-agency, the U.S. Census Bureau, which is responsible to register vital statistics from all the States. The word “registered,” as it is used within commercial or legal based equity law, does not mean that the all-caps name was merely noted in a book for reference purposes. When a Birth Certificate is registered with the U.S. Department of Commerce, it means that the all-caps legal person named thereon has become a surety or guarantor, a condition and obligation that is automatically and unwittingly assumed unless you rebut the presumption by effectively noticing them: “It ain’t me.”

registered. Security, bond. — Merriam-Webster Dictionary of Law (1996).

Security. I a: Something (as a mortgage or collateral) that is provided to make certain the fulfillment of anobligation. Example: used his property as security for a loan. lb: “surety.” 2: Evidence of indebtedness, ownership, or the right to ownership. — Ibid.

Bond. I a: A usually formal written agreement by which a person undertakes to perform a certain act (as fulfill the obligations of a contract) … with the condition that failure to perform or abstain will obligate the person … to pay a sum of money or will result in the forfeiture of money put up by the person or surety. lb: One who acts as a surety. 2: An interest-bearing document giving evidence of a debt issued by a government body or corporation that is sometimes secured by a lien on property and is often designed to take care of a particular financial need. — Ibid.

Surety. The person who has pledged him or herself to pay back money or perform a certain action if the principal to a contract fails, as collateral, and as part of the original contract. — Duhaime’sLaw Dictionary.

1. a formal engagement (as a pledge) given for the fulfillment of an undertaking.
2. one who promises to answer for the debt or default of another.

Under the Uniform Commercial Code, however, a surety includes a guarantor, and the two terms are generally interchangeable.

Merriam Webster’s “Dictionary of Law” (1996).

Guarantor. A person who pledges collateral for the contract of another, but separately, as part of an independently contract with the obligee of the original contract.

Duhaime’s Law Dictionary

It is not difficult to see that a state-created Birth Certificate, with an all-caps, name is a document evidencing debt the moment it is issued. Once a state has registered a birth document with the U.S. Department of Commerce, the Department notifies the Treasury Department, which takes out a loan from the Federal Reserve. The Treasury uses the loan to purchase a bond (the Fed holds a “purchase money security interest” in the bond) from the Department of Commerce, which invests the sale proceeds in the stock or bond market. The Treasury Department then issues Treasury securities in the form of Treasury Bonds, Notes, and Bills using the bonds as surety for the new “securities.” This cycle is based on the future tax revenues of the legal person whose name appears on the Birth Certificate. This also means that the bankrupt, corporate U.S. can guarantee to the purchasers of their securities the lifetime labor and tax revenues of every “citizen of the United States”/American with a Birth Certificate as collateral for payment. This device is initiated simply by converting the lawful, true name of the child into a legal, juristic name of a person.

Dubuque rei potissinia pars prineipium est — The principal part of everything is in the beginning. (“Well begun is half done.”)

Legally, you are considered to be a slave or indentured servant to the various Federal, State and local governments via your STATE-issued and STATE-created Birth Certificate in the name of your all-caps person. Birth Certificates are issued so that the issuer can claim “exclusive” title to the legal person created thereby. This is further compounded when one voluntarily obtains a Driver’s License or a Social Security Account Number. The state even owns your personal and private life through your STATE-issued marriage license/certificate issued in the all-caps names. You have no rights in birth, marriage, or even death. The state holds title to all legal persons the state creates via Birth Certificates until the rightful owner, i.e. you, reclaims/redeems it by becoming the holder in due course of the instrument.

The main problem is that the mother and father, and then the eighteen-year-old man or woman, voluntarily agreed to this contrived system of plunder and slavery by remaining silent — a legal default, latches, and failing to claim one’s own Rights. The maxim of law becomes crucially operative: “He who fails to assert his rights has none.”

The legal rules and codes enforce themselves. There is no court hearing to determine if those rules are correct. Government rules are self-regulating and self-supporting. Once set into motion, such “laws” automatically come into effect provided the legal process has been followed.

The various bankruptcies

The legal person known as the UNITED STATES is bankrupt and holds no lawful Constitutionally mandated silver or gold — gold coin or bullion — with which to back any currency. All private held and federally held gold coins and bullion in America was seized via Executive Order of April 5, 1933 and paid to the creditor, the private Federal Reserve Corporation under the terms of the bankruptcy.

Congress — still convening strictly under Executive Order authority — confirmed the bankruptcy through the Joint Resolution to Suspend the Gold Standard and Abrogate the Gold Clause, June 5, 1933, House Joint Resolution (HJR) 192, June 5, 1933, 73rd Congress, 1st Session, Public Law 73-10. This 1933 public law states, in part:

“… every provision contained in or made with respect to any obligation which purports to give the oblige a right to require payment in gold or a particular kind of coin or currency, or in an amount in money of the United States measured thereby, is declared to be against public policy.”

The corporate U.S. declared bankruptcy a second time, whereby the Secretary of Treasury was appointed “Receiver” for the bankrupt U.S. in Reorganization Plan No. 26, Title 5 USC 903, Public Law 94-564, “Legislative History,” page 5967.

Since 1933, the only “assets” used by the UNITED STATES to “pay its debt” to the Fed have been the blood, sweat, and tears of every American unfortunate to be saddled with a Birth Certificate and a Social Security Account Number (the U.S. Government must conceal this fact from the American people at all cost). Their future labor and tax revenues have been “legally” pledged via the new all-caps, juristic-person names appearing on the Birth Certificates, i.e. the securities used as collateral for loans of credit (thin-air belief) to pay daily operational costs, re-organization expenses in bankruptcy, insurance policy premiums required to float the bankrupt government, and interest on the ever-increasing, wholly fraudulent, debt.

All Caps Legal Person vs. The Lawful Being

Just who or what is the all-caps person, i.e. “JOHN PAUL JONES,” “JOHN P JONES,” or some other all capital letter corruption thereof? It is the entity the government created to take the place of the real being, i.e. John Paul Jones. The lawful Christian name of birthright has been replaced with a legal corporate name of deceit and fraud. If the lawful Christian name answers as the legal person, the two are recognized as being one and the same. However, if the lawful being distinguishes himself/herself as a party other than the legal fiction, the two are separated.

A result of the federal bankruptcy was the creation of the “UNITED STATES,” which was made a part of the legal reorganization. The name of each STATE was also converted to its respective, all-caps legal person, e.g. STATE OF DELAWARE. These new legal persons were then used to create more legal persons, such as corporations, with all-capital letters names, as well. Once this was accomplished, the con began to pick up speed. All areas of government and all alleged “courts of law,” are de facto, “color of law and right” institutions. The “CIRCUIT COURT OF WAYNE COUNTY” and the “U.S. DISTRICT COURT” can recognize and deal only with other legal persons. This is why a lawful name is never entered in their records. The all-caps legal person is used instead. Jurisdiction in such sham courts covers only other artificial persons. The proper jurisdiction for a lawful being is a Constitutionally sanctioned, common-law-venue court. Unfortunately, such jurisdiction was “shelved” in 1938 and is no longer available. The only courts today are statutory commercial tribunals collecting tribute (plunder) from the alleged Creditors who think they have conquered the country on their way to ruling the world.

We all need to know the answer to this question!

What/Who is the Straw Man?

July 28, 1999

Straw man, as defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition: A “front”; a third party who is put up in name only to take part in a transaction. Nominal party to a transaction; one who acts as an agent for another for the purpose of taking title to real property and executing whatever documents and instruments the principal may direct respecting the property. Person who purchases property for another to conceal identity of real purchaser, or to accomplish some purpose otherwise not allowed. [Emphasis added] There’s no telling when the deception really started, but one of the first major events was the incorporation of the United States in 1871, with the final act occurring in 1878. It appears from the Statutes at Large that this was only the incorporation of the District of Columbia, but in the final act the phrase “District of Columbia or United States” is used making the phrases interchangeable and allowing the United States to operate as a corporation.
The so-called government is not the government created by the Constitution, it is a Corporation operating in COMMERCE for a PROFIT. Every transaction is now considered by the US, INC. to be a commercial transaction by fictional entities (fictions at law).

What is a Fiction at Law?

A fiction at law, or legal fiction, is an artificially created entity that is only contemplated in law. In other words, it is not real except in the eyes of the law written by men. Legal fictions are the opposite of natural entities, such as people. A created legal fiction is endowed by the law to have some privileges that resemble the rights that people have, such as the right to hold property and to sue and be sued.
The most common legal fictions are corporations and trusts. These have been around for quite some time with their main purpose being to limit the liability of the people holding the corporation or trust, allowing them to NOT be personally responsible for their actions. Legal Fictions are not compatible with the Common Law, which is the law our land was founded upon. In common law, everyone is responsible for his own actions and is held accountable and responsible for any wrongdoing (harming another in any way)

What does this have to do with me?

In 1933, the governors of all the states met to discuss the “emergency” declared by FDR and to support the new process that was being established. The “government” was in bankruptcy and had to be funded in its state of bankruptcy. The governors made a “pledge” to the U.S., INC. to fund it. The pledge was that the assets and the energy of the people would back the “government” and secure the debt. But there was one little problem. Natural living people cannot mix with legal fictions (corporations) so it was necessary to create a “bridge” between the fictions and the people to bring the people under and make them subservient to the
“government” corporation. When the governors made the pledge, they agreed to register the birth certificates of the people with the U.S. Department of Commerce. The birth certificate is the security instrument (collateral) used to back up the pledge. The legal fiction was created by using the name on the birth certificate and writing it in all capital letters, the designation for a legal fiction. Then, because of the “pledge” YOU were determined to be the surety for the legal fiction.
Surety means: The one who is responsible to pay. So, when the government or any corporation uses any process whatsoever they are using it against the legal fiction, which they want YOU to think IS YOU. But when your name is written in all capital letters, IT IS NOT YOUR NAME!!. It is the designation of a legal fiction that is an
entirely separate entity. A living human cannot be a legal fiction, and a legal fiction cannot be a living human. One is real or natural, the other is created by “law.”
Whenever a government agency (such as a court) determines liability it is a liability of the legal fiction or Straw Man since everything is done in commerce. You are
presumed, as evidenced by the pledge of your governor, to be the surety for the Straw Man and you must pay the liability. REMEMBER: Every transaction is presumed by the “government” to be a transaction in commerce by a legal fiction.

What’s the Answer?

The only way out of this is to defeat the presumption that you are the surety for the Straw Man (legal fiction). The “Redemption Process” is the most promising way to defeat this presumption, using the Uniform Commercial Code, which is the “law” that the fictional commercial world operates under. The first step is to “Capture the Straw Man,” by filing a UCC-1 financing statement to secure a claim against the all capitalized legal fiction, or Straw Man, and the property/collateral. The next step is to accept your birth certificate for value and become the Holder in Due Course of that document. You will also want to accept for value your Drivers License, marriage license, other permits or licenses, and the Social Security Number that was assigned to the Straw Man. See the UCC-1 Text in the ‘Becoming a SPC Section!
The UCC-1 filing and the acceptance of these documents will REDEEM you and the Debtor and the property, by placing a ‘cloud’ over the title(s) to the property, from the commercial system and establish documented evidence to defeat the presumption that you are the surety for the Straw Man. When the birth certificate is accepted for value, YOU become the Holder in Due Course and the Governor’s position in the equation is also changed. Since the Governor is the GUARANTOR of the pledge when you are no longer the surety he/she becomes the surety for the Straw Man.
It is believed that when this happens the Governor must then post a bond equal to the value you placed on your acceptance. It’s very much like if the Governor cosigned on a loan for a car for you and you stopped making the payments, the bank then looks to HIM for the payments. However, it is the position (duty) of the SPC to establish the ‘agreement’ (see Conditional Acceptance Section), accept for value the presentment and discharge the fine, fee, tax, debt or judgment with a Bill of Exchange or other appropriate commercial paper.

This is not intended to be an instruction on how to use the Redemption Process, but merely to give a basic understanding of the “fictional commercial world” we have been operating in, and how they have “bridged the gap” between this and the real live people and drawn us into their Babylonian system as a surety for a legal fiction. It is also the intention of this writing to establish in your mind that IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT YOU DEFEAT THE PRESUMPTION THAT YOU ARE THE SURETY FOR THE STRAW MAN (Legal Fiction).

Action of Second Continental Congress, July 4, 1776 The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen United States of America

WHEN in the Course of human Events,

it becomes necessary for one People to dissolve the Political Bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the Powers of the Earth, the separate and equal Station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the Separation.

WE hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness — That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient Causes; and accordingly all Experience hath shewn, that Mankind are more disposed to suffer, while Evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the Forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long Train of Abuses and Usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object, evinces a Design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their Right, it is their Duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future Security. Such has been the patient Sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the Necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The History of the present King of Great- Britain is a History of repeated Injuries and Usurpations, all having in direct Object the Establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid World.

HE has refused his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public Good.

HE has forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of immediate and pressing Importance, unless suspended in their Operation till his Assent should be obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them.

HE has refused to pass other Laws for the Accommodation of large Districts of People, unless those People would relinquish the Right of Representation in the Legislature, a Right inestimable to them, and formidable to Tyrants only.

HE has called together Legislative Bodies at Places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the Depository of their public Records, for the sole Purpose of fatiguing them into Compliance with his Measures.

HE has dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly Firmness his Invasions on the Rights of the People.

HE has refused for a long Time, after such Dissolutions, to cause others to be elected; whereby the Legislative Powers, incapable of the Annihilation, have returned to the People at large for their exercise; the State remaining in the mean time exposed to all the Dangers of Invasion from without, and the Convulsions within.

HE has endeavoured to prevent the Population of these States; for that Purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their Migrations hither, and raising the Conditions of new Appropriations of Lands.

HE has obstructed the Administration of Justice, by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary Powers.

HE has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the Tenure of their Offices, and the Amount and Payment of their Salaries.

HE has erected a Multitude of new Offices, and sent hither Swarms of Officers to harass our People, and eat out their Substance.

HE has kept among us, in Times of Peace, Standing Armies, without the consent of our Legislatures.

HE has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power.

HE has combined with others to subject us to a Jurisdiction foreign to our Constitution, and unacknowledged by our Laws; giving his Assent to their Acts of pretended Legislation:

FOR quartering large Bodies of Armed Troops among us;

FOR protecting them, by a mock Trial, from Punishment for any Murders which they should commit on the Inhabitants of these States:

FOR cutting off our Trade with all Parts of the World:

FOR imposing Taxes on us without our Consent:

FOR depriving us, in many Cases, of the Benefits of Trial by Jury:

FOR transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended Offences:

FOR abolishing the free System of English Laws in a neighbouring Province, establishing therein an arbitrary Government, and enlarging its Boundaries, so as to render it at once an Example and fit Instrument for introducing the same absolute Rules into these Colonies:

FOR taking away our Charters, abolishing our most valuable Laws, and altering fundamentally the Forms of our Governments:

FOR suspending our own Legislatures, and declaring themselves invested with Power to legislate for us in all Cases whatsoever.

HE has abdicated Government here, by declaring us out of his Protection and waging War against us.

HE has plundered our Seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt our Towns, and destroyed the Lives of our People.

HE is, at this Time, transporting large Armies of foreign Mercenaries to complete the Works of Death, Desolation, and Tyranny, already begun with circumstances of Cruelty and Perfidy, scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous Ages, and totally unworthy the Head of a civilized Nation.

HE has constrained our fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas to bear Arms against their Country, to become the Executioners of their Friends and Brethren, or to fall themselves by their Hands.

HE has excited domestic Insurrections amongst us, and has endeavoured to bring on the Inhabitants of our Frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known Rule of Warfare, is an undistinguished Destruction, of all Ages, Sexes and Conditions.

IN every stage of these Oppressions we have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble Terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated Injury. A Prince, whose Character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the Ruler of a free People.

NOR have we been wanting in Attentions to our British Brethren. We have warned them from Time to Time of Attempts by their Legislature to extend an unwarrantable Jurisdiction over us. We have reminded them of the Circumstances of our Emigration and Settlement here. We have appealed to their native Justice and Magnanimity, and we have conjured them by the Ties of our common Kindred to disavow these Usurpations, which, would inevitably interrupt our Connections and Correspondence. They too have been deaf to the Voice of Justice and of Consanguinity. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the Necessity, which denounces our Separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of Mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace, Friends.

WE, therefore, the Representatives of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, in GENERAL CONGRESS, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the World for the Rectitude of our Intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly Publish and Declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be, FREE AND INDEPENDENT STATES; that they are absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political Connection between them and the State of Great-Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as FREE AND INDEPENDENT STATES, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which INDEPENDENT STATES may of right do. And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm Reliance on the Protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor.

To all persons to whom these presents shall come or be made known- WHEREAS the United States of America in Congress assembled by their
Commission bearing date the twelfth day of May One Thousand, Seven-Hundred and Eighty-Four thought proper to constitute John Adams, Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson their Ministers Plenipotentiary, giving to them or a Majority of them full powers to confer, treat & negotiate with the Ambassador, Minister or Commissioner of His Majesty the Emperor of Morocco concerning a Treaty of Amity and Commerce, to make & receive propositions for such Treaty and to conclude and sign the same, transmitting to the United States in Congress assembled for their final Ratification.

And by one other commission bearing date the Eleventh day of March One-Thousand Seven-hundred & Eighty-five did further empower the said
Ministers Plenipotentiary or a majority of them, by writing under the hands and Seals to appoint such agent in the said business as they might think proper with authority under the directions and instruction of the said Ministers to commence & prosecute the said Negotiations & Conferences for the said Treaty provided that the said Treaty should be signed by Ministers: And Whereas, We the said John Adams & Thomas Jefferson two of the said Ministers Plenipotentiary (the said Benjamin Franklin being absent) by writing under the Hand and Seal of the said John Adams at London, October fifth, One-thousand Seven-hundred and Eighty-five, & of the said Thomas Jefferson at Paris October the Eleventh of the same year, did appoint Thomas Barclay, Agent in the business aforesaid, giving him the Powers therein, which by the said second commission we were authorized go give, and the said Thomas Barclay in pursuance thereof, bath arranged Articles for a Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the
United States of America and His Majesty the Emperor of Morocco & sealed with His Royal Seal, being translated into the language of said United States of America, together with the Attestations thereto annexed are in the following words, To Wit:

In the name of Almighty God.

This is a Treaty of Peace and Friendship established between us and the United States of America, which is confirmed, and which we have ordered to be written in the Book and sealed with our Royal Seal at our Court of Morocco in the Twenty-Fifth day of the blessed month of Shaban, in the year One-Thousand Two-hundred, trusting in God it will remain permanent.

ARTICLE 1

We declare that both Parties have agreed that this Treaty consisting of twenty five Articles shall be inserted in this Book and delivered to the Honorable Thomas Barclay, the Agent of the United States now at our Court, with whose Approbation it has been made and who is duly authorized on their part, to treat with us concerning all the matters contained therein.

ARTICLE 2

If either of the parties shall be at war with any nation whatever, the other party shall not take a commission from the enemy nor fight under their colors.

ARTICLE 3

If either of the parties shall be at war with any nation whatever and take a prize belonging to that nation, and there shall be found on board subjects or effects belonging to either of the parties, the subjects shall be set at liberty and the effect returned to the owners. And if any goods belonging to any nation, with whom either the parties shall be at war, shall be loaded on vessels belonging to the other party, they shall pass free and unmolested without any attempt being made to take or detain them.

ARTICLE 4

A signal or pass shall be given to all vessels belonging to both parties, by which they are to be known when they meet at sea, and if the commander of a ship of war of either party shall have other ships under his convoy, the Declaration of the commander shall alone be sufficient to exempt any of them from examination.

ARTICLE 5

If either of the parties shall be at war, and shall meet a vessel at sea, belonging to the other, it is agreed that if an examination is to be made, it shall be done by sending a boat with two or three men only, and if any gun shall be bread and injury done without reason, the offending party shall make good all damages.

ARTICLE 6

If any Moor shall bring citizens of the United States or their effects to His Majesty, the citizens shall immediately be set at liberty and the effects restored, and in like manner, if any Moor not a subject of the dominions shall make prize of any of the citizens of America or their effects and bring them into any of the ports of His Majesty, they shall be immediately released, as they will be considered as under His Majesty’s Protection.

ARTICLE 7

If any vessel of either party shall put into a port of the other and have occasion for provisions or other supplies, they shall be furnished without any interruption or molestation.

ARTICLE 8

If any vessel of the United States shall meet with a disaster at sea and put into one of our ports to repairs, she shall be at liberty to land and reload her cargo, without paying any duty whatever.

ARTICLE 9

If any Vessel of the Untied States shall be cast on Shore on any Part of our Coasts, she shall remain at the disposition of the Owners and no one shall attempt going near her without their Approbation, as she is then considered particularly under our Protection; and if any Vessel of the United States shall be forced to put in to our Ports, by Stress of weather or otherwise, she shall not be compelled to land her Cargo, but shall remain in tranquility until the Commander shall think proper to proceed on his Voyage.

ARTICLE 10

If any Vessel of either of the Parties shall have an engagement with a Vessel belonging to any of the Christian Powers within gunshot of the Forts of the other, the Vessel so engaged shall be defended and protected as much as possible until she is in safety; and if any American Vessel shall be cast on shore on the Coast of Wadnoon or any Coast thereabout, the People to her shall be protected, and assisted until by the help of God, they shall be sent to their Country.

ARTICLE 11

If we shall be at War with any Christian Power and any of our Vessels sail from the Ports of the United States, no Vessel belonging to the enemy shall follow until twenty four hours after the Departure of our Vessels; and the same Regulation shall be observed towards the American Vessels sailing from our Ports be the enemies Moors or Christians.

ARTICLE 12

If any ship of war belonging to the United States shall put into any of our ports, she shall not be examined on any pretense whatever, even though she should have fugitive slaves on board, nor shall the governor or commander of the place compel them to be brought on shore on any pretext, nor require any payment for them.

ARTICLE 13

If a ship of war of either party shall put into a port of the other and salute, it shall be returned from the fort with an equal number of guns, not with more or less.

ARTICLE 14

The commerce with the United States shall be on the same footing as is the commerce with Spain, or as that with the most favored nation for the time being; and their citizens shall be respected and esteemed, and have full liberty to pass and repass our country and seaports whenever they please, without interruption.

ARTICLE 15

Merchants of both countries shall employ only such interpreters, and such other persons to assist them in their business, as they shall think proper. No commander of a vessel shall transport his cargo on board another vessel; he shall not be detained in port longer than he may think proper; and all persons employed in loading or unloading goods, or in any labor whatever, shall be paid at the customary rates, not more and not less.

ARTICLE 16

In case of a war between the parties, the prisoners are not to be made slaves, but to be exchanged one for another, captain for captain, officer for officer, and one private man for another; and if there shall prove a deficiency on either side, it shall be made up by the payment of one hundred Mexican dollars for each person wanting. And it is agreed that all prisoners shall be exchanged in twelve months from the time of their being taken, and that this exchange may be effected by a merchant or any other person authorized of by either of the parties.

ARTICLE 17

Merchants shall not be compelled to buy or sell any kind of goods but such as they shall think proper; and may buy and sell all sorts of merchandize but such as are prohibited to the other Christian nations.

ARTICLE 18

All goods shall be weighed and examined before they are sent on board , and to avoid all detention of vessels, no examination shall afterwards be made, unless it shall first be proved that contraband goods have been sent on board, in which case, the persons who took the contraband goods on board, shall be punished according to the usage and custom of the country, and no other person whatever shall be injured, nor shall the ship or cargo incur any penalty or damage whatever.

ARTICLE 19

No vessel shall be detained import on any pretense whatever, nor be obliged to take on board on any articles without the consent of the commander, who shall be at full liberty to agree for the freight of any goods he takes on board.

ARTICLE 20

If any of the citizens of the Untied States, or any persons under their protection, shall have any disputes with each other, the consul shall decide between the parties, and whenever the consul shall require any aid or assistance from our government, to enforce his decisions, it shall be immediately granted to him.

ARTICLE 21

If any citizen of the Untied States should kill or wound a Moor, or, on the contrary, if a Moor shall kill or wound a citizen of the United States, the law of the country shall take place, and equal justice shall be rendered, the consul assisting at the trial; and if any delinquent shall make his escape, the consul shall not be answerable for him in any manner whatever.

ARTICLE 22

If an American citizen shall die in our country, and no will shall appear, the consul shall take possession of hi affects; and if there shall be no consul, the effects shall be deposited in the hands of some person worthy of trust, until the party shall appear, who has right to demand them; but if the heir to the person deceased be present, the property shall be delivered to him without interruptions; and if a will shall appear, the property shall descend agreeable to that will as soon as the consul shall declare the validity thereof.

ARTICLE 23

The consuls of the United States of America, shall reside in any port of our dominions that they shall think proper; and they shall be respected, and enjoy all the privileges which the consuls of any other nation enjoy; and if any of the citizens of the United States shall contract any debts or engagements, the consul shall not be in any manner accountable for them, unless he shall have given a promise in writing for the payment or fulfilling thereof, without which promise in writing, no application to him for any redress shall be made.

ARTICLE 24

If any differences shall arise by either party infringing on any of the articles of this treaty, peace and harmony shall remain notwwithstanding, in the fullest force, until a friendly application shall be made for an arrangement, and until that application shall be rejected, no appeal shall be made to arms. And if a war shall break out between the parties nine months shall be granted to all the subjects of both parties, to dispose of their effects and retire with their property. And it is further declared, that whatever indulgences, in trade or otherwise, shall be granted to any of the Christian Powers, the citizens of the United States shall be equally entitled to them.

ARTICLE 25

This treaty shall continue in full force, with the help of God, for fifty years. We delivered this book into the hands of the before mentioned Thomas Barclay, on the first day of the blessed month of Ramadan, in the year one thousand two hundred.
I certify that the annexed is a true copy of the translation made by Isaac Cardoza Nunez, interpreter at Morocco, of the treaty between the Emperor of Morocco and the United States of America.

ADDITIONAL ARTICLE

Grace to the only God.

I, the under-written, the servant of God, Taher Ben Abdelkack Fennish, do certify, that His Imperial Majesty, my master, (whom God preserve), having concluded a treaty of peace and commerce with the United States of America, has ordered me, the better to complete, it, and in addition of the tenth article of the treaty, to declare, “That if any vessel belonging to the United States, shall be in any of the ports of his Majesty’s dominions, or within gun-shot of his forts, she shall be protected as much as possible; and no vessel whatever, belonging either to Moorish or Christian Powers, with whom the United States may be at war, shall be permitted to follow or engage her, as we now deem the citizens of America our good friends.”

And, in obedience to this Majesty’s commands, I certify this declaration, by putting my hand and seal to it, on the eighteenth day of Ramadan, (a) in the year one thousand two hundred. The servant of the King, my master, whom God preserve.

TAHER BEN ABDELKACK FENNISH.

I do certify that the above is a true copy of the translation made at Morocco, by Isaac Cordoza Nunez, interpreter, of a declaration made and signed by Sidi Hage Taher Fennish, in addition to the treaty between the Emperor of Morocco and the United States of America, which declaration the said Taher Fennish made by the express directions of his Majesty.

THOMAS BARCLAY.

TREATY WITH MOROCCO. 1787

Now, KNOW YE, That we, the said John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, Ministers Plenipotentiary aforesaid, do approve and conclude the said treaty, and every article and clause therein contained, reserving the same nevertheless to the Untied States in Congress assembled, for their final ratification.
In testimony whereof, we have signed the same with our names and seals, at the places of our respective residence, and at the dates expressed under our signatures respectively.

JOHN ADAMS, (L.S.)
London, January 25th, 1787.

THOMAS JEFFERSON, (L.S.)
Paris, January 1st, 1787.

To all to whom these Presents shall come, we the undersigned Delegates of the States affixed to our Names send greeting.

Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union between the states of New Hampshire, Massachusetts-bay Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia.

I.

The Stile of this Confederacy shall be
“The United States of America”.

II.

Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.

III.

The said States hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other, for their common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other, against all force offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretense whatever.

IV.

The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively, provided that such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into any State, to any other State, of which the owner is an inhabitant; provided also that no imposition, duties or restriction shall be laid by any State, on the property of the United States, or either of them.

If any person guilty of, or charged with, treason, felony, or other high misdemeanor in any State, shall flee from justice, and be found in any of the United States, he shall, upon demand of the Governor or executive power of the State from which he fled, be delivered up and removed to the State having jurisdiction of his offense.
Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these States to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other State.

V.

For the most convenient management of the general interests of the United States, delegates shall be annually appointed in such manner as the legislatures of each State shall direct, to meet in Congress on the first Monday in November, in every year, with a power reserved to each State to recall its delegates, or any of them, at any time within the year, and to send others in their stead for the remainder of the year.

No State shall be represented in Congress by less than two, nor more than seven members; and no person shall be capable of being a delegate for more than three years in any term of six years; nor shall any person, being a delegate, be capable of holding any office under the United States, for which he, or another for his benefit, receives any salary, fees or emolument of any kind.

Each State shall maintain its own delegates in a meeting of the States, and while they act as members of the committee of the States.
In determining questions in the United States in Congress assembled, each State shall have one vote.

Freedom of speech and debate in Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Congress, and the members of Congress shall be protected in their persons from arrests or imprisonments, during the time of their going to and from, and attendence on Congress, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace.

VI.

No State, without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, shall send any embassy to, or receive any embassy from, or enter into any conference, agreement, alliance or treaty with any King, Prince or State; nor shall any person holding any office of profit or trust under the United States, or any of them, accept any present, emolument, office or title of any kind whatever from any King, Prince or foreign State; nor shall the United States in Congress assembled, or any of them, grant any title of nobility.

No two or more States shall enter into any treaty, confederation or alliance whatever between them, without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, specifying accurately the purposes for which the same is to be entered into, and how long it shall continue.

No State shall lay any imposts or duties, which may interfere with any stipulations in treaties, entered into by the United States in Congress assembled, with any King, Prince or State, in pursuance of any treaties already proposed by Congress, to the courts of France and Spain.

No vessel of war shall be kept up in time of peace by any State, except such number only, as shall be deemed necessary by the United States in Congress assembled, for the defense of such State, or its trade; nor shall any body of forces be kept up by any State in time of peace, except such number only, as in the judgement of the United States in Congress assembled, shall be deemed requisite to garrison the forts necessary for the defense of such State; but every State shall always keep up a well-regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutered, and shall provide and constantly have ready for use, in public stores, a due number of filed pieces and tents, and a proper quantity of arms, ammunition and camp equipage.

No State shall engage in any war without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, unless such State be actually invaded by enemies, or shall have received certain advice of a resolution being formed by some nation of Indians to invade such State, and the danger is so imminent as not to admit of a delay till the United States in Congress assembled can be consulted; nor shall any State grant commissions to any ships or vessels of war, nor letters of marque or reprisal, except it be after a declaration of war by the United States in Congress assembled, and then only against the Kingdom or State and the subjects thereof, against which war has been so declared, and under such regulations as shall be established by the United States in Congress assembled, unless such State be infested by pirates, in which case vessels of war may be fitted out for that occasion, and kept so long as the danger shall continue, or until the United States in Congress assembled shall determine otherwise.

VII.

When land forces are raised by any State for the common defense, all officers of or under the rank of colonel, shall be appointed by the legislature of each State respectively, by whom such forces shall be raised, or in such manner as such State shall direct, and all vacancies shall be filled up by the State which first made the appointment.

VIII.

All charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defense or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several States in proportion to the value of all land within each State, granted or surveyed for any person, as such land and the buildings and improvements thereon shall be estimated according to such mode as the United States in Congress assembled, shall from time to time direct and appoint.

The taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid and levied by the authority and direction of the legislatures of the several States within the time agreed upon by the United States in Congress assembled.

IX.

The United States in Congress assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war, except in the cases mentioned in the sixth article — of sending and receiving ambassadors — entering into treaties and alliances, provided that no treaty of commerce shall be made whereby the legislative power of the respective States shall be restrained from imposing such imposts and duties on foreigners, as their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species of goods or commodities whatsoever — of establishing rules for deciding in all cases, what captures on land or water shall be legal, and in what manner prizes taken by land or naval forces in the service of the United States shall be divided or appropriated — of granting letters of marque and reprisal in times of peace — appointing courts for the trial of piracies and felonies commited on the high seas and establishing courts for receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of captures, provided that no member of Congress shall be appointed a judge of any of the said courts.
The United States in Congress assembled shall also be the last resort on appeal in all disputes and differences now subsisting or that hereafter may arise between two or more States concerning boundary, jurisdiction or any other causes whatever; which authority shall always be exercised in the manner following. Whenever the legislative or executive authority or lawful agent of any State in controversy with another shall present a petition to Congress stating the matter in question and praying for a hearing, notice thereof shall be given by order of Congress to the legislative or executive authority of the other State in controversy, and a day assigned for the appearance of the parties by their lawful agents, who shall then be directed to appoint by joint consent, commissioners or judges to constitute a court for hearing and determining the matter in question: but if they cannot agree, Congress shall name three persons out of each of the United States, and from the list of such persons each party shall alternately strike out one, the petitioners beginning, until the number shall be reduced to thirteen; and from that number not less than
seven, nor more than nine names as Congress shall direct, shall in the presence of Congress be drawn out by lot, and the persons whose names shall be so drawn or any five of them, shall be commissioners or judges, to hear and finally determine the controversy, so always as a major part of the judges who shall hear the cause shall agree in the determination: and if either party shall neglect to attend at the day appointed, without showing reasons, which Congress shall judge sufficient, or being present shall refuse to strike, the Congress shall proceed to nominate three persons out of each State, and the secretary of Congress shall strike in behalf of such party
absent or refusing; and the judgement and sentence of the court to be appointed, in the manner before prescribed, shall be final and conclusive; and if any of the parties shall refuse to submit to the authority of such court, or to appear or defend their claim or cause, the court shall nevertheless proceed to pronounce sentence, or judgement, which shall in like manner be final and decisive, the judgement or sentence and other proceedings being in either case transmitted to Congress, and lodged among the acts of Congress for the security of the parties concerned: provided that every commissioner, before he sits in judgement, shall take an oath to be administered
by one of the judges of the supreme or superior court of the State, where the cause shall be tried, ‘well and truly to hear and determine the matter in question, according to the best of his judgement, without favor, affection or hope of reward’: provided also, that no State shall be deprived of territory for the benefit of the United States.

All controversies concerning the private right of soil claimed under different grants of two or more States, whose jurisdictions as they may respect such lands, and the States which passed such grants are adjusted, the said grants or either of them being at the same time claimed to have originated antecedent to such settlement of jurisdiction, shall on the petition of either party to the Congress of the United States, be finally determined as near as may be in the same manner as is before prescribed for deciding disputes respecting territorial jurisdiction between different States.

The United States in Congress assembled shall also have the sole and exclusive right and power of regulating the alloy and value of coin struck by their own authority, or by that of the respective States — fixing the standards of weights and measures throughout the United States — regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the States, provided that the legislative right of any State within its own limits be not infringed or violated — establishing or regulating post offices from one State to another, throughout all the United States, and exacting such postage on the papers passing through the same as may be requisite to defray the expenses of the said office — appointing all officers of the land forces, in the service of the United States, excepting regimental officers — appointing all the officers of the naval forces, and commissioning all officers whatever in the service of the United States — making rules for the government and regulation of the said land and naval forces, and directing their operations.

The United States in Congress assembled shall have authority to appoint a committee, to sit in the recess of Congress, to be denominated ‘A Committee of the States’, and to consist of one delegate from each State; and to appoint such other committees and civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States under their direction — to appoint one of their members to preside, provided that no person be allowed to serve in the office
of president more than one year in any term of three years; to ascertain the necessary sums of money to be raised for the service of the United States, and to appropriate and apply the same for defraying the public expenses — to borrow money, or emit bills on the credit of the United States, transmitting every half-year to the respective States an account of the sums of money so borrowed or emitted — to build and equip a navy — to agree upon the number of land forces, and to make requisitions from each State for its quota, in proportion to the number of white inhabitants in such State; which requisition shall be binding, and thereupon the legislature of each State shall appoint the regimental officers, raise the men and cloath, arm and equip them in a solid-like manner, at the expense of the United States; and the officers and men so cloathed, armed and equipped shall march to the place appointed, and within the time agreed on by the United States in Congress assembled. But if the United States in Congress assembled shall, on consideration of circumstances judge proper that any State should not raise men, or should raise
a smaller number of men than the quota thereof, such extra number shall be raised, officered, cloathed, armed and equipped in the same manner as the quota of each State, unless the legislature of such State shall judge that such extra number cannot be safely spread out in the same, in which case they shall raise, officer, cloath, arm and equip as many of such extra number as they judeg can be safely spared. And the officers and men so cloathed, armed, and equipped, shall march to the place appointed, and within the time agreed on by the United States in Congress assembled.

The United States in Congress assembled shall never engage in a war, nor grant letters of marque or reprisal in time of peace, nor enter into any treaties or alliances, nor coin money, nor regulate the value thereof, nor ascertain the sums and expenses necessary for the defense and welfare of the United States, or any of them, nor emit bills, nor borrow money on the credit of the United States, nor appropriate money, nor agree upon the number of vessels of war, to be
built or purchased, or the number of land or sea forces to be raised, nor appoint a commander in chief of the army or navy, unless nine States assent to the same: nor shall a question on any other point, except for adjourning from day to day be determined, unless by the votes of the majority of the United States in Congress assembled.

The Congress of the United States shall have power to adjourn to any time within the year, and to any place within the United States, so that no period of adjournment be for a longer duration than the space of six months, and shall publish the journal of their proceedings monthly, except such parts thereof relating to treaties, alliances or military operations, as in their judgement require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the delegates of each State on any question shall be entered on the journal, when it is desired by any delegates of a State, or any of them, at his or their request shall be furnished with a transcript of the said journal, except such parts as are above excepted, to lay before the legislatures of the several States.

X.

The Committee of the States, or any nine of them, shall be authorized to execute, in the recess of Congress, such of the powers of Congress as the United States in Congress assembled, by the consent of the nine States, shall from time to time think expedient to vest them with; provided that no power be delegated to the said Committee, for the exercise of which, by the Articles of Confederation, the voice of nine States in the Congress of the United States assembled be requisite.

XI.

Canada acceding to this confederation, and adjoining in the measures of the United States, shall be admitted into, and entitled to all the advantages of this Union; but no other colony shall be admitted into the same, unless such admission be agreed to by nine States.

XII.

All bills of credit emitted, monies borrowed, and debts contracted by, or under the authority of Congress, before the assembling of the United States, in pursuance of the present confederation, shall be deemed and considered as a charge against the United States, for payment and satisfaction whereof the said United States, and the public faith are hereby solemnly pledged.

XIII.

Every State shall abide by the determination of the United States in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this confederation are submitted to them. And the Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the Union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every
State.

And Whereas it hath pleased the Great Governor of the World to incline the hearts of the legislatures we respectively represent in Congress, to approve of, and to authorize us to ratify the said Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union. Know Ye that we the undersigned delegates, by virtue of the power and authority to us given for that purpose, do by these presents, in the name and in behalf of our respective constituents, fully and entirely ratify and confirm each and every of the said Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union, and all and singular the matters and things therein contained: And we do further solemnly plight and engage the faith of our respective constituents, that they shall abide by the determinations of the United States in Congress assembled, on all questions, which by the said Confederation are submitted to them. And that the Articles thereof shall be inviolably observed by the States we respectively represent, and that the Union shall be perpetual.

In Witness whereof we have hereunto set our hands in Congress. Done at Philadelphia in the State of Pennsylvania the ninth day of July in the Year of our Lord One Thousand Seven Hundred and Seventy-Eight, and in the Third Year of the independence of America.

Agreed to by Congress 15 November 1777 In force after ratification by Maryland, 1 March 1781.

Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948

On December 10, 1948 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights the full text of which appears in the following pages. Following this historic act the Assembly called upon all Member countries to publicize the text of the Declaration and “to cause it to be disseminated, displayed, read and expounded principally in schools and other educational institutions, without distinction based on the political status of countries or territories.”

PREAMBLE

Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,

Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,

Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,

Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge,

Now, Therefore THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

Article 1.

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2.

Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 3.

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Article 4.

No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

Article 5.

No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 6.

Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Article 7.

All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Article 8.

Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

Article 9.

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Article 10.

Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

Article 11.

(1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.
(2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.

Article 12.

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 13.

(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Article 14.

(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.

(2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 15.

(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to
change his nationality.

Article 16.

(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.
(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.
(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

Article 17.

(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

Article 18.

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Article 19.

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Article 20.

(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
(2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

Article 21.

(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.
(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Article 22.

Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

Article 23.

(1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.
(2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.
(4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

Article 24.

Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

Article 25.

(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and wellbeing of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

Article 26.

(1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.

(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.
(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

Article 27.

(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

Article 28.

Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

Article 29.

(1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.
(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.
(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 30.

Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.

Construe(d) – To put together; to arrange or marshal the words of an instrument. To ascertain the meaning of language by a process of arrangement and inference.

Delegated – A person who is delegated or commissioned to act in the stead of another, Landro v. Pacific Atlantic S. S. Co., D.C.Wash., 30 F.Supp. 538, 539; a person to whom affairs are committed by another; an attorney. A person elected or appointed to be a member of a representative assembly. Usually spoken of one sent to a special or occasional assembly or convention. Manston v. McIntosh, 58 Minn. 525, 60 N.W. 672, 28 L.R.A. 605. The representative in congress of one of the organized territories of the United States. To send as an agent or representative; to commit to the care or management of another.

Disparage – To connect unequally; to match unsuitably.

Enumerated (ion) – This term is often used in law as equivalent to “mentioned specifically,” “designated,” or “expressly named or granted”; as in speaking of “enumerated” governmental powers, items of property, or articles in a tariff schedule. See Bloomer v. Todd, 3 Wash.T. 599, 19 P. 135, 1 L.R.A. 111.

People – A state; as the people of the state of New York. A nation in its collective and political capacity. Nesbitt v. Lushington, 4 Term R. 783; U. S. v. Quincy, 6 Pet. 467, 8 L.Ed. 458; U. S. v. Trumbull, D.C.Cal., 48 F. 99. The aggregate or mass of the individuals who constitute the state. Solon v. State, 54 Tex.Cr.R. 261, 114 S.W. 349; Loi Hoa v. Nagle, C.C.A.Cal., 13 F.2d 80, 81.

In a more restricted sense, and as generally used in constitutional law, the entire body of those citizens of a state or nation who are invested with political power for political purposes, that is, the qualified voters or electors. Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa 543, 15 N.W. 609; Boyd v. Nebraska, 12 S.Ct. 375, 143 U.S. 135, 36 L.Ed. 103; In re Incurring of State Debts, 19 R.I. 610, 37 A. 14; In re Opinion of the Justices, 226 Mass. 607, 115 N.E. 921, 922; State v. City of Albuquerque, 31 N.M. 576, 249 P. 242, 247. In neutrality laws, a government recognized by the United States. The Three Friends, D.C.Fla., 78 F. 175.

The word “people” may have various significations according to the connection in which it is used. When we speak of the rights of the people, or of the government of the people by law, or of the people as a non-political aggregate, we mean all the inhabitants of the state or nation, without distinction as to sex, age, or otherwise. But when reference is made to the people as the repository of sovereignty, or as the source of governmental power, or to popular government, we are in fact speaking of that selected and limited class of citizens to whom the constitution accords the elective franchise and the right of participation in the offices of government. Black, Const. Law 3d Ed. p, 30.

Prohibited – To forbid by law; to prevent;—not synonymous with “regulate.” Simpkins v. State, 35 Okl.Cr. 143, 249 P. 168, 170; Arkansas Railroad Commission v. Independent Bus Lines, 172 Ark. 3, 285 S.W. 388, 390.

Reserved – v. To keep back, to retain, to keep in store for future or special use, and to retain or hold over to a future time. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Strong Mfg. Co., C.C.A.6, 124 F. 2d 360, 363.

Respective(ly) – Relating to particular persons or things, each to each; particular; several; as, their respective homes. Sandford v. Stagg, 106 N.J.Eq. 71, 150 A. 187, 188.

Retained – To continue to hold, have, use, recognize, etc., and to keep. Kimbell Trust & Savings Bank v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 333 Ill. 318, 164 N.E. 661, 662.

In practice. To engage the services of an attorney or counselor to manage a cause. See Retainer.

Reminder Notes for
Future Classes:

State – A People permanently occupying a fixed territory, bound together by common-law, habits, and custom into one body politic exercising, through the medium of an organized government, independent sovereignty and control over all persons and things within its boundaries, capable of making war and peace and of entering into international relations with other communities of the globe. Black’s Law Dictionary 4th Edition.

Parties to the Constitution – United States:

1. Moors – Supreme Authority, and
2. Union [United] States of America – Europeans, the People adopted into the Nation.

Status – The etymology of the word state comes from the latin “Status” – stare – to stand; Status – manner of standing, attitude, position, carriage, manner, dress, apparel; and other senses. All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States – Moors, which shall consist-[ stands together with] of a Senate and House of Representatives – [members elected from the Union States]

The 3 Great Departments of Government:

• Legislative – pass law – this is appropriate if you comprehend that the Moors make up the United States and only the sovereign of the land can make any laws.
• Executive – approve and execute the laws that have been passed.
• Judicial – expound and enforce the laws that have been passed.

7 Lawful Questions:

1. 1. What is it that the Constitution does of certain rights?
      • What does this word mean?
   2. What does the 9th Bill of Rights prevent?
   3. Who has “certain rights”?
   4. Who has all the rights?
   5. Who is the 10th Bill of Rights speaking to really?
   6. What does the 10th Bill of Rights tell you?

Group Discussion Question

1. In the 10th Bill of rights where it states “The powers not delegated to the United States of America by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.” Who are they talking about really? What is the relationship? Ultimately who does it protect?

Supreme Laws for Review:

Supreme Court Justice Field, ‘There is no such thing as a power of inherent sovereignty in the government of the United States… In this country, sovereignty resides in the people, and Congress can exercise power which they have not, by their Constitution, entrusted to it. All else is withheld.” Juliard v. Greeman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884).

“…in our country the people are sovereign and the government cannot sever its relationship to them by taking away their citizenship.” Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 7; 8 S. Ct. 568, 2 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1958).

“When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the principles on which they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power. Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts. And the law is the definition and limitation of power.” Yik Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US 356 (1885)

Concluding Lawful Perspective:

“It will be an evil day for American Liberty if the theory of a government outside supreme law finds lodgment in our constitutional jurisprudence. No higher duty rests upon this Court than to exert its full authority to prevent all violations of the principles of the Constitution.” Downs v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)

Next Class:

We have concluded our 13 Course Class on the Organic American National Constitution – 7 Articles and 10 Bill Of Rights (Amendments). The Bill Of Rights were added (amended) prior to the ratification of the American National Constitution. Thus they are valid. Amendments after that are NOT valid except for Amendment 11, 12 (which enforces 9 & 10) and Amendment 13 in its entire 20 sections, which was / is published in Congressional Records. However what you mostly see published is Amendment 13 with only 2 sections. We have decided to extend this course to discuss Amendment 11, 12 and 13 in our next class.

Hint:

In Amendment 13 (with 20 sections), It clearly states that those who are descendants of Africans CANNOT be citizens / members of the United States of America — Think on Why.

Happy Winter Solstice

May you be graced with enough from your reaping and sowing to sustain you through the coming
Winter Months.

Plant your seeds (of thoughts) to be fertilized at the end of this season, in Pisces fertilizing waters, to be manifest and spring forth in the Spring—Vernal equinox.

From Sisters Standing On Law MHHS Blog Talk Radio

Sisters Anaidah El and Rahsmariah Bey

International law is the body of legal rules that apply between sovereign states and such other entities as have been granted international personality by sovereign states. Concerning labour law, the most important entity is International Labour Organization.

The rules of international law are of a normative character; that is, they prescribe standards of conduct. They distinguish themselves, however, from moral rules by being, at least potentially, designed for authoritative interpretation by an independent judicial authority and by being capable of enforcement by the application of external sanctions. These characteristics make them legal rules.

The law-creating processes of international law are the forms in which rules of international law come into existence; i.e., treaties, rules of international customary law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. It is the merit of article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice that this exclusive list of primary law-creating processes has received almost universal consent.

International law means public international law as distinct from private international law or the conflict of laws, which deals with the differences between the municipal laws of different countries.

International law forms a contrast to national law. While international law applies only between entities that can claim international personality, national law is the internal law of states that regulates the conduct of individuals and other legal entities within their jurisdiction.

International law can be universal, regional or bilateral. Although there is some duplication between universal and regional labour law, the practical value of regional law lies mainly in the possibility it offers to establish standards which are more progressive than worldwide standards for dealing with the special problems of the region concerned; to secure greater uniformity of law within a region; or to provide more extensive reciprocal advantages. Bilateral law has a different purpose. Mainly, it determines the conditions of entry and of employment in each contracting country for the nationals of the other. This chapter deals only with universal and regional labour law.

The sources – instruments by which states and other subjects of international law, such as certain international organizations – of international law are international agreements. The agreements assume a variety of form and style, but they are all governed by the law of treaties, which is part of customary international law.

A treaty, the typical instrument of international relations, is defined by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as an “agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation”.

Some multilateral agreements set up an international organization for a specific purpose or a variety of purposes. They may therefore be referred to as constituent agreements. The United Nations Charter (1945) is both a multilateral treaty and the constituent agreement of the United Nations. An example of a regional agreement that operates as a constituent agreement is the charter of the Organization of American States (Charter of Bogotá), which established the organization in 1948. The constitution of an international organization may be part of a wider multilateral treaty. The Treaty of Versailles (1919), for example, contained in Part I the Covenant of the League of Nations and in Part XIII the constitution of the International Labour Organization.

The term supranational is of recent origin and is used to describe the type of treaty structure developed originally by six western European states: France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. The first treaty was that of Paris, signed in 1951, establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC); the second, the Rome treaty, signed in 1957, establishing the European Economic Community (EEC); the third, the Rome treaty of the same date establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). A clause in the ECSC treaty provides for the complete independence of the members of the executive organ from the governments that appoint them.

Treaties, however, are not the only instruments by which international agreements are concluded. There are single instruments that lack the formality of a treaty called agreed minute, memorandum of agreement, or modus vivendi; there are formal single instruments called convention, agreement, protocol, declaration, charter, covenant, pact, statute, final act, general act, and concordat; finally there are less formal agreements consisting of two or more instruments, such as “exchange of notes” or “exchange of letters.” (See United Nations, Definition of Key Terms Used in the UN Treaty Collection)

INTERNATIONAL LAW LINKS

International Labour Law
Directory of International Law Attorneys
Natlex database
BNA international
Space Settlement Initiative

International War Crimes and Violations of the Rule of Law
IntLaw
Purpose and History – Women, Law & Development International
The Avalon Project : The International Military Tribunal for Germany
FAMILY LAW INFORMATION
All About Trademarks
Foreign Tax Law – What’s New
UN System Pathfinder: International Law – General issues
POLITICAL SCIENCE

U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Basics (Circular 1U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Basics (Circular 1

International Trademark Association

International Web Police
Wrightslaw – Special Education Law
What’s New at Street Law?
Legal Encyclopedia & Law Dictionary – The ‘Lectric Law Library Reference Room

U.S. LAW BOOKS – Build and maintain your Law Library

What Every Webmaster Needs To Know About Copyright Law

http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml

OTHER TYPES OF LAW LINKS

www.texasnationalpress.com/expose/copyrightname.shtml

usa-the-republic.com/jurisprudentia/defeated-arguments.html

The Importance of Studying Law

By Afrika Bambaataa

What is Law? There are all types of Law. There is Universal Law that deal with The Supreme Force whom set this whole Universe(s) into a system of Chaos, that became Law out of nothing like Darkness of Nothing to Light, Something. Something meaning giving you Sun, Moons, Stars, Planets, Nebulas, Milkey ways, Gasses, Water, Winds, Fires, Beings from different planets and a mind to even question if there is a Supreme Force, A God, or Gods and Goddesses, Elohiems, Neterus and Life beyond Earth. Everything in Life is base on Mathematics. You cannot do anything in Life without Mathematics. You sleep, walk, talk, think, eat, and run all to Mathematic and Mathematics is Law.

So What is Law and how many Laws there is??? According to The Black Laws Dictionary Vol. 2, Law is Orders. A system of principles and rules which of human conduct, being the aggregate of those commandments and principles which are either prescribe or recognized by the governing power in an organized jural society as it will inrelation to the conduct of the members of such society, and which it undertakes to maintain and sanction and to use as the criteria of the actions of such members. I Afika Bambaataa can also say that this can also be true dealing with the Governing Laws of The Universe(s) and its members, (Beings from all over the Universe(s) whom also follow what Laws of Their meaning or thinking of Their Supreme Force, Gods or Goddesses or heir selves of what ever state of Being that they are in as Life. Hold on this might get al little deep for you but we try to keep common sense in what we are saying with an open mind. Law is that which is laid down, ordained, or established. Arule or method according to which phenomena or actions co –exists or follows each other. So how many types of Law there is? So many that I could not put them all in this article. Many of your who are reading this article, I am not going to let you off easy and give you many of the answers, that is why you must research this yourselves. Look up the law that suits you. Universal Laws, Earth Laws, International Laws, Dimensional Laws, Mathematical Laws, Gravity Law, God (The Supreme Force Laws, under world Laws, Lucifer (Satan) Laws, Your Laws etc.

Classification Subject Matter Law that’s either public or private. There’s Constitutional Laws, Administrative Law, Criminal Law. There is Law of Citations, Law of evidence, Martial Law, as well as The Prophets of The Bible, The Qu’ Ran, The Book Coming Forth By Day and many Ancient Text Laws or Religious Laws. Laws rule you all even ifyou know it or not. There is even Laws of War, Laws of the Streets, Drug Laws, and Air Space Laws, Law of the Seas, Oceans and Land laws. We can do nothing without Laws. Even Savages who think they have no laws still are under some type of laws. There is Spiritual Laws, LocalLaws, Corporate Laws, Personal Laws or Indigenous Laws. What Laws are you following? The laws of Common Sense, Common Laws, Bankruptcy Law, Case Law, Maritime Law, Military Law, Municipal Laws Moral Law, Organic Law, Penal Law, Revenue Law, Written Law or straight up Natural Law. Do you Humans still think your not run by laws??? Do Extraterrestrials, Space Beings, Angels, Demons, whatever think all of youbeings on Earth and beyond, on Stars, Planets, Subterranean Worlds, Dimensional all think that all of your can get away from law. Life is Law, Birth is Law, and Death is Law so called time that always was and Law also runs forever. That why is so important for all to study some type of laws especially when the laws are controlling and studying you. Laws can make you a slave and guess what there are Slave-servitude laws. Laws of the Matrix. Go watch all The 4 Matrix movies again 15 times each and really study the movie.

How Many Laws there is??? Magic Laws, Witchcraft Laws, the Laws of Science, and the laws of health, Roman law, Foreign Laws, Absolute Law of Nature. There is so much laws that there is even Laws to govern Laws. So Sisters and Brothers, Humans of Earth, Beings of other places in the Universe(s) and Beyond, I don’t care where you’re at in whatever world your come from. STUDY THE LAWS OR THE LAWS WILL STUDY YOU.
Amen Ra

United Nations A/RES/61/295
General Assembly Distr.: General

2 October 2007 Sixty-first session Agenda item 68 06-51207

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly

[Without reference to a Main Committee (A/61/L.67 and Add.1)]

61/295. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
The General Assembly,
Taking note of the recommendation of the Human Rights Council contained in its resolution 1/2 of 29 June 2006, 1 by which the Council adopted the text of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
Recalling its resolution 61/178 of 20 December 2006, by which it decided to Defer consideration of and action on the Declaration to allow time for further Consultations thereon and also decided to conclude its consideration before the end of the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, Adopts the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as contained in the annex to the present resolution. 107th plenary meeting 13 September 2007
Annex
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples The General Assembly, Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and good faith in the fulfillment of the obligations assumed by States in accordance with the Charter, Affirming that indigenous peoples are equal to all other peoples, while recognizing the right of all peoples to be different, to consider themselves different, and to be respected as such, Affirming also that all peoples contribute to the diversity and richness of civilizations and cultures, which constitute the common heritage of humankind,
Affirming further that all doctrines, policies and practices based on or advocating superiority of peoples or individuals on the basis of national origin or racial, religious, ethnic or cultural differences are racist, scientifically false, legally invalid, morally condemnable and socially unjust,
Reaffirming that indigenous peoples, in the exercise of their rights, should be free from discrimination of any kind,
Concerned that indigenous peoples have suffered from historic injustices as a result of, inter alia, their colonization and dispossession of their lands, territories and resources, thus preventing them from exercising, in particular, their right to development in accordance with their own needs and interests,
Recognizing the urgent need to respect and promote the inherent rights of indigenous peoples which derive from their political, economic and social structures and from their cultures, spiritual traditions, histories and philosophies, especially
their rights to their lands, territories and resources,
Recognizing also the urgent need to respect and promote the rights of indigenous peoples affirmed in treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements with States,
Welcoming the fact that indigenous peoples are organizing themselves for political, economic, social and cultural enhancement and in order to bring to an end all forms of discrimination and oppression wherever they occur,
Convinced that control by indigenous peoples over developments affecting them and their lands, territories and resources will enable them to maintain and strengthen their institutions, cultures and traditions, and to promote their development in accordance with their aspirations and needs, Recognizing that respect for indigenous knowledge, cultures and traditional practices contributes to sustainable and equitable development and proper management of the environment, Emphasizing the contribution of the demilitarization of the lands and territories of indigenous peoples to peace, economic and social progress and development, understanding and friendly relations among nations and peoples of the world,
Recognizing in particular the right of indigenous families and communities to retain shared responsibility for the upbringing, training, education and well-being of their children, consistent with the rights of the child, Considering that the rights affirmed in treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements between States and indigenous peoples are, in some situations, matters of international concern, interest, responsibility and character, Considering also that treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements, and the relationship they represent, are the basis for a strengthened partnership between indigenous peoples and States, Acknowledging that the Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights2 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,2 as well as the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,3 affirm the fundamental importance of the right to self-determination of all peoples, by virtue of which they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development,
Bearing in mind that nothing in this Declaration may be used to deny any peoples their right to self-determination, exercised in conformity with international law, Convinced that the recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples in this Declaration will enhance harmonious and cooperative relations between the State and indigenous peoples, based on principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, non-discrimination and good faith, Encouraging States to comply with and effectively implement all their obligations as they apply to indigenous peoples under international instruments, in particular those related to human rights, in consultation and cooperation with the Peoples concerned, Emphasizing that the United Nations has an important and continuing role to play in promoting and protecting the rights of indigenous peoples, Believing that this Declaration is a further important step forward for the recognition, promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms of indigenous peoples and in the development of relevant activities of the United Nations system in this field, Recognizing and reaffirming that indigenous individual are entitled without discrimination to all human rights recognized in international law, and that indigenous peoples possess collective rights which are indispensable for their existence, well-being and integral development as peoples,
Recognizing that the situation of indigenous peoples varies from region to region and from country to country and that the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical and cultural backgrounds should be taken into consideration, Solemnly proclaims the following United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as a standard of achievement to be pursued in a spirit of partnership and mutual respect:
Article 1
Indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights4 and international human rights law.
Article 2
Indigenous peoples and individuals are free and equal to all other peoples and individuals and have the right to be free from any kind of discrimination, in the exercise of their rights, in particular that based on their indigenous origin or identity.
Article 3
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
Article 4
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.
Article 5
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State.
Article 6
Every indigenous individual has the right to a nationality.
Article 7
1. Indigenous individuals have the rights to life, physical and mental integrity, liberty and security of person.
2. Indigenous peoples have the collective right to live in freedom, peace and security as distinct peoples and shall not be subjected to any act of genocide or any other act of violence, including forcibly removing children of the group to another group.
Article 8
1. Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture.
2. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for:
(a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities;
(b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources;
(c) Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining any of their rights;
(d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration;
(e) Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic discrimination directed against them.
Article 9
Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right to belong to an indigenous community or nation, in accordance with the traditions and customs of the A/RES/61/295 5 community or nation concerned. No discrimination of any kind may arise from the exercise of such a right.
Article 10
Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their lands or territories. No relocation shall take place without the free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair compensation and, where possible, with the option of return.
Article 11
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs. This includes the right to maintain, protect and develop the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures, such as archaeological and historical sites, artefacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and visual and performing arts and literature.
2. States shall provide redress through effective mechanisms, which may include restitution, developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples, with respect to their cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without their free, prior and informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and
customs.
Article 12
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practise, develop and teach their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies; the right to maintain, protect, and have access in privacy to their religious and cultural sites; the right to the use and control of their ceremonial objects; and the right to the repatriation of their human remains.
2. States shall seek to enable the access and/or repatriation of ceremonial objects and human remains in their possession through fair, transparent and effective mechanisms developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned.
Article 13
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to revitalize, use, develop and transmit to future generations their histories, languages, oral traditions, philosophies, writing systems and literatures, and to designate and retain their own names for communities, places and persons.
2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that this right is protected and also to ensure that indigenous peoples can understand and be understood in political, legal and administrative proceedings, where necessary through the provision of interpretation or by other appropriate means.
Article 14
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to establish and control their educational systems and institutions providing education in their own languages, in a manner appropriate to their cultural methods of teaching and learning.
2. Indigenous individuals, particularly children, have the right to all levels and forms of education of the State without discrimination. A/RES/61/295 6
3. States shall, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, take effective measures, in order for indigenous individuals, particularly children, including those living outside their communities, to have access, when possible, to an education in their own culture and provided in their own language.
Article 15
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the dignity and diversity of their cultures, traditions, histories and aspirations which shall be appropriately reflected in education and public information.
2. States shall take effective measures, in consultation and cooperation with the indigenous peoples concerned, to combat prejudice and eliminate discrimination and to promote tolerance, understanding and good relations among indigenous peoples and all other segments of society.
Article 16
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to establish their own media in their own languages and to have access to all forms of non-indigenous media without discrimination.
2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that State-owned media duly reflect indigenous cultural diversity. States, without prejudice to ensuring full freedom of expression, should encourage privately owned media to adequately reflect indigenous cultural diversity.
Article 17
1. Indigenous individuals and peoples have the right to enjoy fully all rights established under applicable international and domestic labor law.
2. States shall in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples take specific measures to protect indigenous children from economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education, or to be harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development, taking into account their special vulnerability and the importance of education for their empowerment.
3. Indigenous individuals have the right not to be subjected to any discriminatory conditions of labor and, inter alia, employment or salary.
Article 18
Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters which would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-making institutions.
Article 19
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect them. A/RES/61/295 7
Article 20
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and develop their political, economic and social systems or institutions, to be secure in the enjoyment of their own means of subsistence and development, and to engage freely in all their traditional and other economic activities.
2. Indigenous peoples deprived of their means of subsistence and development are entitled to just and fair redress.
Article 21
1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the improvement of their economic and social conditions, including, inter alia, in the areas of education, employment, vocational training and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social security.
2. States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate, special measures to ensure continuing improvement of their economic and social conditions. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and persons with disabilities.
Article 22
1. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and persons with disabilities in the implementation of this Declaration.
2. States shall take measures, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, to ensure that indigenous women and children enjoy the full protection and guarantees against all forms of violence and discrimination.
Article 23
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for exercising their right to development. In particular, indigenous peoples have the right to be actively involved in developing and determining health, housing and other economic and social programmes affecting them and, as far as possible, to administer such programmes through their own institutions.
Article 24
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to their traditional medicines and to maintain their health practices, including the conservation of their vital medicinal plants, animals and minerals. Indigenous individuals also have the right to access,
without any discrimination, to all social and health services.
2. Indigenous individuals have an equal right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. States shall take the necessary steps with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of this right.
Article 25
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources and to uphold their responsibilities to future generations in this regard. A/RES/61/295 8
Article 26
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired.
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.
Article 27
States shall establish and implement, in conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned, a fair, independent, impartial, open and transparent process, giving due recognition to indigenous peoples’ laws, traditions, customs and land tenure systems, to recognize and adjudicate the rights of indigenous peoples pertaining to their lands, territories and resources, including those which were traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used. Indigenous peoples shall have the right to participate in this process.
Article 28
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can include restitution or, when this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensation, for the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior and informed consent.
2. Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned, compensation shall take the form of lands, territories and resources equal in quality, size and legal status or of monetary compensation or other appropriate redress.
Article 29
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the conservation and protection of the environment and the productive capacity of their lands or territories and resources. States shall establish and implement assistance programmes for indigenous peoples for such conservation and protection, without discrimination.
2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that no storage or disposal of hazardous materials shall take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples without their free, prior and informed consent.
3. States shall also take effective measures to ensure, as needed, that programmes for monitoring, maintaining and restoring the health of indigenous peoples, as developed and implemented by the peoples affected by such materials, are duly implemented. A/RES/61/295 9
Article 30
1. Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples, unless justified by a relevant public interest or otherwise freely agreed with or requested by the indigenous peoples concerned.
2. States shall undertake effective consultations with the indigenous peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, prior to using their lands or territories for military activities.
Article 31
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, as well as the manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cultures, including human and genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, oral traditions, literatures, designs, sports and traditional games and visual and performing arts. They also have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual property over such cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions.
2. In conjunction with indigenous peoples, States shall take effective measures to recognize and protect the exercise of these rights.
Article 32
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the development or use of their lands or territories and other resources.
2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.
3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such activities, and appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact.
Article 33
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own identity or membership in accordance with their customs and traditions. This does not impair the right of indigenous individuals to obtain citizenship of the States in which they live.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine the structures and to select the membership of their institutions in accordance with their own procedures.
Article 34
Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain their institutional structures and their distinctive customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases where they exist, juridical systems or customs, in accordance with international human rights standards. A/RES/61/295 10
Article 35
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine the responsibilities of individuals to their communities.
Article 36
1. Indigenous peoples, in particular those divided by international borders, have the right to maintain and develop contacts, relations and cooperation, including activities for spiritual, cultural, political, economic and social purposes, with their own members as well as other peoples across borders.
2. States, in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take effective measures to facilitate the exercise and ensure the implementation of this right.
Article 37
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and enforcement of treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements concluded with States or their successors and to have States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements.
2. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as diminishing or eliminating the rights of indigenous peoples contained in treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements.
Article 38
States in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples shall take the appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of this Declaration.
Article 39
Indigenous peoples have the right to have access to financial and technical assistance from States and through international cooperation, for the enjoyment of the rights contained in this Declaration.
Article 40
Indigenous peoples have the right to access to and prompt decision through just and fair procedures for the resolution of conflicts and disputes with States or other parties, as well as to effective remedies for all infringements of their
individual and collective rights. Such a decision shall give due consideration to the customs, traditions, rules and legal systems of the indigenous peoples concerned and international human rights.
Article 41
The organs and specialized agencies of the United Nations system and other intergovernmental organizations shall contribute to the full realization of the provisions of this Declaration through the mobilization, inter alia, of financial cooperation and technical assistance. Ways and means of ensuring participation of indigenous peoples on issues affecting them shall be established. A/RES/61/295 11
Article 42
The United Nations, its bodies, including the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, and specialized agencies, including at the country level, and States shall promote respect for and full application of the provisions of this Declaration and follow up the effectiveness of this Declaration.
Article 43
The rights recognized herein constitute the minimum standards for the survival, dignity and well-being of the indigenous peoples of the world.
Article 44
All the rights and freedoms recognized herein are equally guaranteed to male and female indigenous individuals.
Article 45
Nothing in this Declaration may be construed as diminishing or extinguishing the rights indigenous peoples have now or may acquire in the future.
Article 46
1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.
2. In the exercise of the rights enunciated in the present Declaration, human rights and fundamental freedoms of all shall be respected. The exercise of the rights set forth in this Declaration shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law and in accordance with international human rights obligations. Any such limitations shall be non-discriminatory and strictly necessary solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for meeting the just and most compelling requirements of a democratic society.
3. The provisions set forth in this Declaration shall be interpreted in accordance with the principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, equality, non-discrimination, good governance and good faith.
________________________________________________________________________
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OHCHR-UNOG
8-14 Avenue de la Paix
1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland

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