Black Law Dictionary

PARALYZED YETERANS DF AMERICA, WRG

BLACK ‘S
LAW DICTIONARY

Definitions of the Terms and Phrases of American and English Jurisprudence, Ancient and Modern

By
HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, M. A.
Author of Treatises on Judgments, Tax Titles, Intoxicating Liquors, Bankruptcy, Mortgages, Constitutional Law, Interpretation of Laws, Rescission and Cancellation of Contracts, Etc.

REVISED FOURTH EDITION
BY
THE PUBLISHER’S EDITORIAL STAFF

ST. PAUL, MINN.
WEST PUBLISHING CO.
1968

PREFACE
REVISED FOURTH EDITION

THE sustained and growing popularity of BLACK’S LAW DICTION-ARY since its appearance more than seventy five years ago is a strik-itig tribute to the scholarship and learning of Henry Campbell Black, and to the essential soundness of the plan adopted by him for the compilation of a legal lexicon.
In accordance with the original plan of this work, consistently adhered to in all subsequent editions, the law student, confronted in his casebooks with reports from the Year Books, or with extracts from Glanvil, Bracton, Littleton, or Coke, will find in this dictionary an unusually complete collection of definitions of terms used in old English, European, and feudal law. The student vill also find in this volume, on page 1795, a useful Table of British Regnal Years, listing the sovereigns of England for more than 900 years, together with the date of accession to the throne, and the length of reign.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY has proven its value through the years to the busy practitioner, judge and law student who requires quick and convenient access to the meanings of legal terms and phras-es found in statutes or judicial opinions, as well as to the special legal meanings of standard En glish words—meanings which frequently can-not be found in the ordinary English language dictionaries.
In the period of more than thirty five years since the publication of the Third Edition, the law has undergone substantial changes and developments. The vocabulary of the law has shown corresponding change and growth. A word, in the often quoted dictum of Mr. Justice Holmes, is "the skin of a living thought," and the words of statutes and judicial opinions reflect the contemporary thinking of legislators and jurists. In order adequately to represent this thinking in the fourth edition, a patient examination vías made of the thousands of opinions hánded down by the appellate courts each year. Some revi-sions and additions have been included in this Revised Fourth
tion.
Abbreviations of common words and phrases likely to be en-countered by the user are explained in appropriate places throughout the main body of the work. A Table of. Abbreviations of the titles of law reports, textbooks, and other legal literature is contained in the back of the volume and a Guide to Pronunciation is included in the front of the volume.
New features in this Revised Fourth Edition include the follow-
ing:
Code of Professional Responsibility
Code of Judicial Conduct
An Outline of the Minimum Requirements for Admission to Legal Practice in the United States

PREFACE—REVISED FOURTH EDITION
In order that BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY should continue to be a handy one-volume work of ready reference, the enlarged contents of the Fourth Edition necessitated an improved typographical style. The type for the Fourth Edition was accordingly completely reset and arranged in wider columns, in a more attractive and readable manner.
The Publisher has drawn freely on its wide experience to make the present edition of BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY superior to any of the earlier editions. It is confidently believed that this edition, both in content and format, sets new standards of excellence among law dictionaries.
THE PUBLISHER
ST. PAUL, MINN. June, 1968

CONTENTS
Preface—Revised Fourth Edition
Front Matter
Guide to Pronunciation vii
Code of Professional Responsibility >un
Code of Judicial Conduct LXIX
Minimum Requirements for Admission to Legal Practice
in the United States – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -LXXVII
Text of Definitions – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -1
Back Matter
Table of British Regnal Years – – – – – – – -1795
Abbreviations – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 1797
•
Page HI
Ellack’s Law

GUIDE TO PRONUNCIATION

A NOTE ON PRONUNCIATION OF LATIN

One of the difficulties in pronouncing legal terms is that one com-monly hears both the English system and the Roman system of pro-nouncing Latin words. Before 1900, the English pronunciation of Latin had developed for legal, médical, and other scientific terms. During the second half of the nineteenth century, scholars estab-lished that what is now known as the Roman pronunciation was used between 50 B.C. and 50 A.D. Nearly all schools in English-speaking countries adopted the Roman system of pronunciation. But by and large, the English pronunciation has persisted among lawyers, physi-cians, and scientists.
The main difference between the Roman and the English pro-nunciation of Latin is in the long sounds of a, e, and i. In English these sounds are á, é, and 1; in Roman, a is á; e is á; and i is é.
The dominant usage among lawyers today is probably the English pronunciation, but the Roman system taught in the schools still has its influence. Lawyers who studied Latin in school often tend toward the Roman, and others often tend toward the English. Yet ncarly all use both systems, or variations from both systems, to some extent.
For instante, many lawyers use the English pronunciation,
réz but many lawyers prefer to say ráz joTAII-ká’ta—which is neither English nor Roman but a mixture. The Roman rás
is seldom if ever heard. Probably all lawyers use the English há’be-As córipils or há’béz cór’püs; a lawyer who tries to get his client out of jail by asking for a writ of há’bá-ás cór’pús might not be understood. Yet the prevailing practice is probably to use the
Roman a-mé’cils cil’ré-1, and not the English cli’ri-é. One usually hears the mixture, si’né quá nón; one seldom if ever hears the English sine quá nón.
The following list is devoted mostly but not altogether to Latin words. For those words the English pronunciation is always in first place, followed by the Roman or a variation of the Roman when-ever it is known to be widely used. The English pronunciation is never incorrect in the view of lexicographers, although local or gen-eral usage may often cause some lawyers to prefer a pronunciation other than the English. As the study of Latin in the schools declines still further, the English pronunciation is likely to continue to increase.
fi a uniform systern is ever achieved, it is much more likely tobe the English than the Roman.

GUIDE TO PRONUNCIATION

KEY TO PRONUNCIATION
Máke; cháotic;• cáre; cát; árt; ácross; éat; evade; ébb; runnér; ice; hit; óak; óbey; órder; hót; fcDd; folt; finit; únite; úrge; N (French nasal, as in ensemble, áN sáN/b1).

KEY TO PRONUNCIATION

Máke; cháotic;• cáre; cát; árt; ácross; éat; evade; ébb; runnér; ice; hit; óak; óbey; órder; hót; fcDd; folt; finit; únite; úrge; N (French nasal, as in ensemble, áN sáN/b1).

a fortiori —————————— á fór’shi-ó’ri
a mensa et thoro———————– á mén’sá ét thó’ró
a priori á ——————————pri-Wri; pri-ó’ri; pri–(Yre
ab inconvenienti—————————— áb
ab initio ——————————áb in-ish’i-ó
actio in rem—————————— ák’sh1-5 in rém
ad idem ——————————ád i’dém
affiant—————————— á-fi’ánt
agister ——————————á-jís’tér
aleatory—————————— -tér-i
aliquot—————————— ál’i-kwót ambulatory
amicus curiae ——————————á-mrkils á-mé’cús kCeré-i
animo revertendi—————————— án’i-m5 rév’ér-tén’di
animo testamenti—————————— án’i-mó téslá-mén’ti
appellant—————————— á-pél’ánt
appellate—————————— á-pél’át
appellee
assignee—————————— ás’i-né’
autre vie, pur—————————— pdór üt’ré vé
bona fides—————————— bó’ná fi’déz
bona vacantia—————————— bó’ná vá-kán’shf-á
tapias ——————————ká’pl-ás; káp’i-ás
casus bell——————————i ká’sús bel
casus foederis—————————— ká’sús féd’ér-is
casus fortuitus—————————— ká’sús
casus omissus—————————— ká’sús
causa causans———————— kó’zá kó’zánz; kou’zá kou’zánz
causa monis ——————————kó’zá mór’tis; kou’zá mór’tis
causa sine qua nen——————– kó’zá si’né kwá nón’; kou’zá sI’né kwá /Va,
caveat emptor ——————————ká’vé-át émp’tór; ká’vé-át
certiorari ——————————súr’shi-ó-rár’i; -rá-ré
cestui que trust ——————————set’ ká trúst
chose—————————— shóz

consortium—————————— kón-sór’shi-tim
contra bonos mores—————————— kén’trá bi5’nés miVréz
coral)] nobis—————————— ké’rám nro’blis
corpus delicti—————————— kór’püs de-nklj
corpus juris—————————— kór’püs jtió’rls
curtesy—————————— kür’té-si
cy-pres—————————— sé’ prá’
damnum absque injuria—————————— dám’nüm ábs’kwé
de bene esse—————————— dé bé’né és’é
de facto—————————— dé fák’tó
de jure—————————— dé jcTiVré
de novo—————————— dé n¿i’vc3
del cred ere—————————— dél kréd’ér-é; kré’dér-é
delegatus non potest——————— dél kréd’ér-é; kré’dér-é
delegare—————————— déré-gá’tils nón pó’tést déré-gá’ré
demesne—————————— dé-mán’; -mén’
demur—————————— dé-mar’
demurrer—————————— dé-mar’
descriptio personas—————————— dé-skrip’shI-15 pér-sClné
detinue—————————— dét’i-nü
devise—————————— dé-viz
devisee—————————— dévl-zé’;
domicile—————————— dórn’i-sil
dominium
donatio mortis causa—————————— kófrzá; kou’zá
duces tecum—————————— diTsés té’küm
ejusdem generis—————————— é-jils’dém jén’ér-Ts
eleemosynary—————————— éré-mlisrf-nérl; él’é-é;
en ventre sa mere—————————— áN váN’tr’ sá’ mar’
enfeoff—————————— én-féf’; én-féf’
ex gratia—————————— éks grá’shi-á
ex parte—————————— éks párlé
ex post facto—————————— éks piist fák’tó
exequatur—————————— ék’sé-kwá’tér
expressio unius est—————————— éks-présh’i-5 ést éks-klaVzhi-5
exclusio alterius—————————— á1-té’ri-üs
facias—————————— fá’shi-ás
(scire facias)—————————— si’ré f á/sil-ás
(fieri facias)—————————— fi’e-r1 fáishi-ás
falsa demonstratio————————fál’sá dém’ón-stra’slii-5
feme covert—————————— fém küv’ért
feme solo—————————— fém 951

ferae naturae——————————fé’ré ná-ta’ré
force majeure——————————fórs’ má’zhür’
forma pauperis, in——————————in fór’má pó’pé-ris
functus officio——————————fúngklüs ó-fIsh’I-6
gratis——————————grális; grális
gravamen——————————grá-vá’mén
habeas corpus——————————há’bé-ás kór’pús; há’béz
ignorantia juris——————————ig’nó-rán’shi-á jc.Tó’rís
imperium
imprimatur——————————im’pri-málér; -pri-
in esse——————————in és’é
in extremis——————————in éks-tré’mfs
in fieri——————————in fl’é-ri
in futuro——————————in fti-tel’ró
in limine——————————in lim’i-né
in loco parentis——————————in 1ó’k45 pá-rén’tis
in pais——————————In pá
in parí delicto——————————in pá’ri dé-lic’tó; párri
in parí materia——————————In pá’ri má-té’rf-á; pá’ri
in personam——————————in pér-só’nám
in praesenti——————————in pré-zén’ti
in re——————————in re
in rem——————————in rém
in toto——————————in tó’tó
in transitu——————————in trán’sí-tú
indebitatus assumpsit——————————in-débltáltis;

á-sümp’sit; á-súm’sit
indicia——————————in-dish’í-á
indictment inter partes inter se——————————in-dish’í-á
inter vivos intra vires jura in re jus——————————in-

taches——————————lés-é’

lex domieilii——————————léks

lex forl—————————-léks fó’rl
lex bel—————————-léks ló’si
lex sitos—————————-léks
lien—————————-lé’én; lén
locus standi—————————-lé’én; lén
mala fides—————————-ló’küs stán’di
mandamus—————————-málá fi’déz; má’lá
mare clausum—————————-mán-dá’müs
mare liberum—————————-má’ré kló’süm; má’rl klou’zibn
mens rea—————————-má’ré
mesne—————————-ménz ré-á
mutatis mutandis—————————-mén; mán
ne exeat republica—————————-mó-tális mtl-tán’dIs
nihil est—————————-né ék’sé-át
nisi prius—————————-nihil ést
nolle prosequi—————————-ni’si pri’üs
non est facturo—————————-nól’é prós’é-kwi; prós’é-kwi
non obstante veredicto—————————-nón ést
non sequitur—————————-nón sék’wi-tér
nudum pactum—————————-nü’düm pák’tüm
nulla bona—————————-nül’á bó’ná
nunc pro tune—————————-nüngk’ pró’ tüngk’
obiter dictum—————————-ób’i-tér dik’tüm; (5b1-ter
obligatio—————————-
obligee—————————-ób’li-jé’
obligor—————————-ób’li-gór’;
onus probandi—————————-ó’nüs pró-bán’di
parens patriac—————————-pá’rénz pá’tri-é; pá’rénz pát’ré-I
parí delicto—————————-pá’ri pá’rI
parí passu—————————-pá’ri pásTi; pár’i pás’o—ó
particeps eriminis—————————-párli-séps krim’I-nls
pendente lite—————————-pén-dén’té
persona non grata—————————-pér-só’ná nón grá’tá
plene administravit—————————-plé’né ád-min’I-strá’vIt
poenitentiae, locus—————————-ló’küs pén’i-tén’shi-é; -shé-i
postea—————————-póst’é-á
praecipe—————————-prés’i-pé; pré’si-pé
prima facie—————————-pri’má fá’shI-é; fá’shé
profit a prendre—————————-próf’it á práN’dr
pro rata—————————-pró rálá; rá’tá
publici juris—————————-püb’li si jUó’ris
qua—————————-kwá; kwá
quaero—————————-kwé’ré

res •———————–réz; ráz
res gestae—————————réz jés’té; ráz jésli
res inter alios acta—————————réz in’tér ági-ós ák’tá
res ipsa loquitur—————————réz ip’sá lók’wi-tér; ráz
res judicata—————————réz jffdi-kálá; ráz jóTídi-kálá
restitutio in integrum—————————résiti-tü’shi-ó In in’té-gran
sans recours—————————SáN ré-koor’
scienter—————————si-én’tér

secos—————————
semble—————————sém’b’l
seriatim—————————sérl-á’ffin; sér’I-
sine die—————————si’ne dré
sine qua non—————————si’né quá nón; si’né quá nón
solatium—————————
stare decisis—————————stá’ré dé-si’sis; stá’ré
status quo—————————stálüs kwó
sub judice—————————süb
subpocna—————————süb-pé’ná; sú-pé’ná
subpocna duces tecum—————————süb-pé’ná; sú-pé’ná; dü’sés té’ktim
suggestio falsi—————————süg-jés’ehl-ó fál’si
sui generis—————————sü’i jén’ér-is
sui juris—————————sú’i jcTó’ris
supersedeas—————————sti-pér-sé’dé-ás
suppressio verá—————————sü-présh’I-5 vé’ri
tabula rasa—————————táb/1-1á rá’sá
ubi jus, ibi remed:um—————————ü’bi jús, i’bi
ultra vires—————————ürtrá vi’réz
uxor—————————üks’ór
venus—————————vén’ü
vis major—————————vis málór
volenti non fit injuria—————————vó-lén’ti nón fit in-jcTó’ri-á

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Table of Contents
Pape
PREAMBLE AND PRELIMINARY STATEMENT …………………..XVII
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHOULD ASSIST IN MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY AND COMPETENCE OF THE LEGAL PRO-
FESSION ………..XIX
Ethical Considerations ………..XIX
Disciplinary Rules …………XX
DR 1-101 Maintaining Integrity and Competence of the Legal
Profession ………….XX
DR 1-102 Misconduct ………….XX
DR 1-103 Disclosure of Information to Authorities ……….XXI
CANON 2. A LAWYER SHOULD ASSIST THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN FULFILLING ITS DUTY TO MAKE LEGAL COUNSEL
AVAILABLE ………..XXI
Ethical Considerations ………..XXI
Recognition of Legal Problems ………..XXI
Selection of a Lawyer: Generally XXIII
Selection of a Lawyer: Professional Notices and Listings . XXIII
Financial Ability to Employ Counsel: Generally ………XXV Financial Ability to Employ Counsel:
Persons Able to Pay Reasonable Fees XXV Financial Ability to Employ Counsel:
Persons Unable to Pay Reasonable Fees XXVII
Acceptance and Retention of Employment ………………………… XXVIII
Disciplinary Rules ……..XXIX
DR 2-101 Publicity in General ……..XXIX DR 2-102 Professional Notices, Letterheads, Offices, and Law
Lists ……..XXIX
DR 2-103 Recommendation of Professional Employment XXXII
DR 2-104 Suggestlon of Need of Legal Services …………. XXXIII
DR 2-105 Limitation of Practice ……………………………………… XXXIII
DR 2-106 Fees for Legal Services XXXIV
DR 2-107 Division of Fees Among Lawyers XXXIV
DR 2-108 Agreements Restricting the Practice of a Lawyer XXXV
DR 2-109 Acceptance of Employment XXXV
DR 2-110 Withdrawal from Employment XXXV
CANON 3. A LAWYER SHOULD ASSIST IN PREVENTING THE
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW ……………… XXXVI
Ethical Considerations ………………………………………………………………… XXXVI
Disciplinary Rules XXXVIII
DR 3-101 Aiding Unauthorized Practice of Law ………. XXXVIII
DR 3-102 Dividing Legal Fees with a Non-Lawyer ………. XXXVIII
DR 3-103 Forming a Partnership with a Non-Lawyer …. XXXVIII
* Adopted by the American Bar Association at annual meeting in Dallas, Texas, on Aug. 12, 1969. Copyrighted by American Bar Association. Published with permission.
Ellack’s Law Dictionary 4th Ed. Rey. XIII

CANON 4. A LAWYER SHOULD PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES
AND SECRETS OF A CLIENT XXXVIII
Ethical Considerations …………………………………………………………………… XXXVIII
Disciplinary Rules XXXIX
DR 4-101 Preservation of Confidentes and Secrets of a
Client ………………………………………………………………… XXXIX
CANON 5. A LAWYER SHOULD EXERCISE INDEPENDENT PRO-FESSIONAL JUDGMENT ON BEHALF OF A CLIENT XLI
Ethical Considerations …………………….XLI
Interests of a Lawyer That May Affect His Judgment …………XLI
Interests of Multiple Clients …………………XLIII
Desires of Third Persons ………..XLV
Disciplinary Rules ………………….XLVI
DR 5-101 Refusing Employment When the Interests of the Lawyer May Impair His Independent Professional
Judgment ………………….XLVI DR 5-102 Withdrawal as Counsel When the Lawyer Becomes
a Witness ………………….XLVI
DR 5-103 Avoiding Acquisition of Interest in Litigation . XLVI
DR 5-104 Limiting Business Relations with a Client …. XLVII
DR 5-105 Refusing to Accept or Continue Employment if the Interests of Another Client May Impair the Inde-
pendent Professional Judgment of the Lawyer .. XLVII
DR 5-10(3 Settling Similar Claims of Clients ………………..XLVII
DR 5-107 Avoiding Influence by Others Than the Client XLVII
CANON 6. A LAWYER SHOULD REPRESENT A CLIENT COM-
PETENTLY ………………………………………………………………… XLVIII
Ethical Considerations ………………………………………………………………….. XLVIII
Disciplinary Rules ………………….XLIX
DR 6-101 Failing to Act Competently ……….XLIX
DR 6-102 Limiting Liability to Client ……….XLIX
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHOULD REPRESENT A CLIENT ZEALOUS-
LY WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW ………… XLIX
Ethical Considerations ………XLIX
Duty of the Lawyer to a Client ……………………….L I
Duty of the Lawyer to the Adversary System of Justice LIV
Disciplinary Rules ………LVIII
DR 7-101 Representing a Client Zealously ……….LVIII
DR 7-102 Representing a Client within the Bounds of the Law LVIII DR 7-103 Performing the Duty of Public Prosecutor or Other
Government Lawyer …………………….LIX
DR 7-104 Communicating with One of Adverse Interest LIX
DR 7-105 Threatening Criminal Prosecution …………………….LIX
DR 7-106 Trial Conduct …………………….LIX
DR 7-107 Trial Publicity ………………………LX
DR 7-108 Communication with or Investigation of Jurors LXII
DR 7-109 Contact with Witnesses …………LXII
DR 7-110 Contact with Off icials …………………..LXII

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

With Amendments to March 1, 1974

PREAMBLE AND PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Preamble 1
The continued existente of a free and democratic society depends upon recognition of the concept that justice is based upon the rule of law grounded in respect for the dignity of the individual and his capacity through reason for enlightened self-gov-ernment.2 Law so grounded makes justice possi-ble, for only through such law does the dignity of the individual attain respect and protection. With-out it, individual rights become subject to unre-strained power, respect for law is destroyed, and rational self-government is impossible.
Lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship with and function in our legal system.3 A consequent obligation of lawyers is to maintain the highest standards of ethical con-duct.
In fulfilling his professional responsibilities, a lawyer necessarily assumes various roles that re-quire the performance of many difficult tasks. Not every situation which he may encounter can be foreseen,4 but fundamental ethical principies are always present to guide him. Within the framework of these principies, a lawyer must with courage and foresight be able and ready to shape the body of the law to the ever-changing relation-ships of society.5
1 The footnotes are intended merely to enable the reader to relate the provisions of this Code to the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics adopted In 1908, as amended, the Opin-ions of the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, and a limIted number of other sources; they are not intended to be an annotation of the views taken by the ABA Special Commlttee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards. Footnotes citing ABA Canons refer to the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, adopted in 1908, as amended.
2 Cf. ABA Canons, Preamble.
3 "[T]he lawyer stands today in special need of a clear understanding of his obllgations and of the vital connection between those obligations and the role his profession plays in society." Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1160 (1958).
4 ‘No general statement of the responsibilities of the legal profession can encompass all the situations in which the lawyer may be placed. Each position held by him makes its own peculiar demands. These demands the lawyer must clarif y for himself in the light of the particular role in which he serves." Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1218 (1958).

The Code of Professional Responsibility points the way to the aspiring and provides standards by which to judge the transgressor. Each lawyer must find within his own conscience the touch-stone against which to test the extent to which his actions should rise aboye minimum standards. But in the last analysis it is the desire for the re-spect and confidence of the members of his pro-fession and of the society which he serves that should provide to a lawyer the incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical conduct. The possible loss of that respect and confidence is the ultimate sanction. So long as its practitioners are guided by these principies, the law will continue to be a noble profession. This is its greatness and its strength, which permit of no compromise.
Preliminary Statement
In furtherance of the principies stated in the Preamble, the American Bar Association has promulgated this Code of Professional Responsi-bility, consisting of three separate but interrelated parts: Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Dis-ciplinary Rules.6 The Code is designed to be adopted by appropriate agencies both as an in-spirational guide to the members of the profession and as a basis for disciplinary action when the conduct of a lawyer falls below the required min-imum standards stated in the Disciplinary Rules,
Obviously the Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules cannot apply to non-law-yers; however, they do define the type of ethical conduct that the public has a right to expect not
"The law and its lnstitutions change as social condi-tions change. They must change if they are to preserve, much less advance, the political and social values from which they derive their purposes and their life. This is trae of the most important of legal institutions, the pro-fession of law. The profession, too, must change when conditions change in order to preserve and advance the social values that are its reasons for being." Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the Individual Lawyer and the Organized Bar, 12 U.C.L.A.L. Rey. 438, 440 (1965).
6 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin adopted a Code of Judicial Ethics in 1967. "The code is divided into stand-ards and rules, the standards being statements of what the general deslrable level of conduct should be, the rules being particular canons, the violation of which shall sub-ject an individual judge to sanctions." In re Promulgation of a Code of Judicial Ethics, 36 Wis.2d 252, 255, 153 N.W. 2d 873, 874 (1967).
The portion of the Wisconsin Code of Judicial Ethics entitled "Standards" states that "[t]he following stand-ards set forth the significant qualities of the ideal judge . . . ." Id., 36 Wis.2d at 256, 153 N.W.2d at 875. The portion entitled "Rules" states that "[t]he court promul-gates the following rules because the requirements of judi-

only of lawyers but also of their non-professional employees and associates in all matters pertaining to professional employment. A lawyer should ultimately be responsible for the conduct of his employees and associates in the course of the pro-fessional representation of the client.
The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the standards of pro-fessional conduct expected of lawyers in their rela-tionships with the public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession. They embody the general concepts from which the Ethical Consid-erations and the Disciplinary Rules are derived.
The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive. They constitute a body of principies upon which the lawyer can rely for guidance in many specific situations.7
The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Con-siderations, are mandatory in character. The Dis-ciplinary Rules state the minimum level of con-duct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action. Within the frame-
cial conduct embodied therein are of sufficient gravity to warrant sanctions if they are not obeyed . . . ." Id., 36 Wls.2d at 259, 153 N.W.2d at 876.
7 "Under the condltions of modern practice it Is peculiar-ly necessary that the lawyer should understand, not mere-ly the established standards of professional conduct, but the reasons underlying these standards. Today the lawyer plays a changing and Increasingly varled role. In many developing flelds the precise contribution of the legal pro-fesslon is as yet undefined." Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159 (1958).
"A true sense of professional responsibillty must derive from an understanding of the reasons that lie back of speciflc restraints, such as those embodied in the Canons. The grounds for the lawyer’s peculiar obligations are to be found in the nature of his calling. The lawyer who seeks a olear understanding of bis duties will be led to reflect on the special services his profession renders to so-ciety and the services it might render if its full capacities were realized. When the lawyer fully understands the nature of his office, he will then discern what restraints are necessary to keep that office wholesome and effective." Id.
8 "Disbarment, designed to protect the public, is a punish-ment or penalty imposed on the lawyer. . . . He is accordingly entitled to procedural due process, which in-dudes fair notice of the charge." In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550, 20 L.Ed.2d 117, 122, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226 (1968), rehearing denied, 391 U.S. 961, 20 L.Ed.2d 874, 88 S.Ct. 1833 (1968).
"A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other occupation in a manner or for rea-sons that contravene the Due Frocess or ,Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . A State can require high standards of qualification . . . but any qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant’s fitness or capacity to practice law." Schware
v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239, 1 L.Ed.2d 796, 801-02, 77 S.Ct. 752, 756 (1957).
"[A]n accused lawyer may expect that he will not be condemned out of a capricious self-righteousness or denied the essentials of a fair hearing." Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318, 320, 94 L.Ed. 123, 126, 70 S.Ct. 123, 124-25 (1949).
"The attorney and counsellor being, by the solemn judi-cial act of the court, clothed with his office, does not hold

work of fair trial,8 the Disciplinary Rules should be uniformly applied to all lawyers,9 regardless of the nature of their professional activities.10 The Code makes no attempt to prescribe either dis-ciplinary procedures or penalties 11 for violation of a Disciplinary Rule,12 nor does it undertake to de-fine standards for civil liability of lawyers for professional conduct. The severity of judgment against one found guilty of violating a Disciplinary Rule should be determined by the character of the offense and the attendant circumstances.13 An enforcing agency, in applying the Disciplinary Rules, may find interpretive guidance in the basic principles embodied in the Canons and in the ob-jectives reflected in the Ethical Considerations.
it as a matter of grace and favor. The right which it con-fers upon him to appear for sultors, and to argue causes, is something more than a mere indulgence, revocable at the pleasure of the court, or at the command of the legisla-ture. It is a right of which he can only be deprived by the judgment of the court, for moral or professional de-linquency." Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378-79, 18 L.Ed. 366, 370 (1866).
See generally Comment, Procedural Due Procesa and Character Hearings for Bar Applicants, 15 Stan.L.Rev. 500 (1963).
"The canons of professional ethics must be enforced by the Courts and must be respected by members of the Bar if we are to maintain public confidence in the in-tegrity and impartiality of the admInistration of justice." In re Meeker, 76 N.M. 354, 357, 414 P.2d 862, 864 (1966), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 449 (1967).
10 See ABA Canon 45.
"The Canons of this Association govern all lts members, irrespective of the nature of their practice, and the appli-cation of the Canons is not affected by statutes or regula-tions governing certain activities of lawyers which may prescribe less stringent standards." ABA Comm. on Pro-fessional Ethics, OPINIONS, No. 203 (1940) [hereinafter each Opinlon is cited as "ABA Opinion"].
Cf. ABA Opinion 152 (1936).
11 "There is generally no prescribed discipline for any particular type of improper conduct. The disciplinary measures taken are discretionary with the courts, which may disbar, suspend, or merely censure the attorney as the nature of the offense and past Indicia of character may warrant." Note, 43 Cornell L.Q. 489, 495 (1958).
12 The Code seeks only to specify conduct for which a lawyer should be disciplined. Recommendations as toa the procedures to be used in disciplinary actions and the grav-ity of disciplinary measures appropriate for violation of the Code are within the jurisdiction of the American Bar Association Special Committee on Evaluation of Dis-ciplinary Enforcement.
13 "The severity of the judgment of this court should be in proportion to the gravity of the offenses, the moral turpitude involved, and the extent that the defendant’s acts and conduct affect his professional qualifications to prac-tice law." Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Steiner, 204 La. 1073, 1092-93, 16 So.2d 843, 850 (1944) (Hlggins, T., con-curring in decree).
"Certainly an erring lawyer who has been dIsciplined and who having paid the penalty has given satisfactory evidence of repentance and has been rehabilitated and re-stored to his place at the bar by the court which knows him best ought not to have what amounts to an order of permanent disbarment entered against him by a federal court solely on the basis of an earlier criminal record and without regard to his subsequent rehabilitation and pres-
ent good character . . We think, therefore, that the district court should reconsider the appellant’s appl

CANON 1

A Lawyer Should Assist in Maintaining the Integrity and Competente of the Legal Profession

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

EC 1-1 A basic tenet of the professional respon-sibility of lawyers is that every person in our so-ciety should have ready access to the independent professional services of a lawyer of integrity and competence. Maintaining the integrity and im-proving the competence of the bar to meet the highest standards is the ethical responsibility of every lawyer.
EC 1-2 The public should be protected from those who are not qualified to be lawyers by reason of a deficiency in education 1 or moral standards 2 or of other relevant factors 3 but who nevertheless
cation for admission and grant it unless the court finds it to be a fact that the appellant is not presently of good moral or professional character." In re Dreier, 258 F.2d 68, 69-70 (3d Cir. 1958).
"[W]e cannot conclude that all educational restrictions [on bar admission] are unlawful. We assume that few would deny that a grammar school education requirement, before taking the bar examination, was reasonable. Or that an applicant had to be able to read or write. Once we conclude that some restriction is proper, then it becomes a matter of degree—the problem of drawing the line.
. .
"We conclude the fundamental question here is whether Rule IV, Section 6 of the Rules Pertaining to Admission of Applicants to the State Bar of Arizona is ‘arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.’ We conclude an educational requirement of graduation from an accredited law school is not." Hackin v. Lockwood, 361 F.2d 499, 503-04 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 960, 17 L.Ed.2d 305, 87 S.Ct. 396 (1966).
2 "Every state in the United States, as a prerequisite for admission to the practice of law, requires that applicants possess ‘good moral character.’ Although the requirement ls of judicial origin, it is now embodied in legislation in most states." Comment, Procedural Due Process and Char-acter Hearings for Bar Applicants, 15 Stan.L.Rev. 500 (1963).
"Good character in the members of the bar is essential to the preservation of the integrity of the courts. The duty and power of the court to guard its portals agalnst intrusion by men and women who are mentally and morally dishonest, unfit because of bad character, evidenced by their course of conduct, to participate in the administra-tive law, would seem to be unquestioned in the matter of preservation of judicial dignity and integrity." In re Monaghan, 126 Vt. 53, 222 A.2d 665, 670 (1966).
"Fundamentally, the question involved in both sltua-tions [i.e. admission and disciplinary proceedings] is the same—is the applicant for admission or the attorney sought to be disciplined a fit and proper person to be permitted to practice law, and that usually turns upon whether he has committed or is likely to continue to commit acts of moral turpitude. At the time of oral argument the at-torney for respondent frankly conceded that the test for admission and for discipline is and should be the same. We agree with this concession." Hallinan v. Comm. of Bar Examiners, 65 Ca1.2d 447, 453, 421 P.2d 76, 81, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 233 (1966).
s "Proceedings to gain admission to the bar are for the purpose of protecting the public and the courts from the ministrations of persons unfit to practice the profession. Attorneys are officers of the court appointed to assist the
seek to practice law. To assure the maintenance of high moral and educational standards of the legal profession, lawyers should affirmatively as-sist courts and other appropriate bodies in pro-mulgating, enforcing, and improving requirements for admission to the bar.4 In like manner, the bar has a positive obligation to aid in the continued improvement of all phases of pre-admission and post-admission legal education.
EC 1-3 Before recommending an applicant for admission, a lawyer should satisfy himself that the applicant is of good moral character. Although a lawyer should not become a self-appointed in-vestigator or judge of applicants for admission, he should report to proper officials all unfavor-able information he possesses relating to the character or other qualifications of an applicants
EC 1-4 The integrity of the profession can be maintained only if conduct of lawyers in violation of the Disciplinary Rules is brought to the atten-tion of the proper officials. A lawyer should re-veal voluntarily to those officials all unprivileged knowledge of conduct of lawyers which he believes clearly to be in violation of the Disciplinary Rules.° A lawyer should, upon request, serve on and assist committees and boards having responsi-bility for the administration of the Disciplinary Rules.7
EC 1-5 A lawyer should maintain high standards of professional conduct and should encourage fel-low lawyers to do likewise. He should be temper-ate and dignified, and he should refrain from all
court in the administration of justice. Into their hands are committed the property, the liberty and sometimes the• lives of their clients. This commitment demands a high degree of intelligence, knowledge of the law, respect for its function in society, sound and faithful judgment and, aboye all else, integrity of character in private and professional conduct." In re Monaghan, 126 Vt. 53, 222 A.2d 665, 676 (1966) (Holden, C. J., dissenting).
4 "A bar composed of lawyers of good moral character ís a worthy objective but it is unnecessary to sacrifice vital freedoms in order tu obtain that goal. It is also important both to society and the bar itself that lawyers be unin-timidated—free to think, speak, and act as members of an Independent Bar." Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 273, 1 L.Ed.2d 810, 825, 77 S.Ct. 722, 733 (1957).
5 See ABA Canon 29.
6 ABA Canon 28 designates certain conduct as unpro-fessional and then states that : "A duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon every member of the Bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner immedlately to inform thereof, to the end that the offender may be disbarred." ABA Canon 29 states a broader admonition: "Lawyers should expose without fear or favor before the proper tribunals corrupt or dishonest conduct in the profession."
7 "It is the obligation of the organized Bar and the in-dividual lawyer to give unstinted cooperation and assistance to the highest court of the state in discharging its function and duty with respect to discipline and in purging the profession of the unworthy." Report of the Special Com-rnittee on Disciplinary Procedures, 80 A.B.A.Rep. 463, 470

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

illegal and morally reprehensible conduct s Be-cause of his position in society, even minor viola-tions of law by a lawyer may tend to lessen public confidence in the legal profession. Obedience to law exemplifies respect for law. To lawyers es-pecially, respect for the law should be more than a platitude.
EC 1-6 An applicant for admission to the bar or a lawyer may be unqualified, temporarily or per-manently, for other than moral and educational reasons, such as mental or emotional instability. Lawyers should be diligent in taking steps to see that during a period of disqualification such per-son is not granted a license or, if licensed, is not permitted to practice.9 In like manner, when the disqualification has terminated, members of the bar should assist such person in being licensed, or, if licensed, in being restored to his full right to practice.
DISCIPLINARY RULES
DR 1-101 Maintaining Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession.
(A) A lawyer is subject to discipline if he has made a materially false statement in, or if he has deliberately failed to disclose a ma-terial fact requested in connection with, his application for admission to the bar.lo
Cf. ABA Canon 32.
9 "We decline, on the present record, to disbar Mr. Sher-man or to reprimand him—not because we condone bis ac-tions, but because, as heretofore indicated, we are con-cerned with whether he is mentally responsible for what he has done.
"The logic of the situation would seem to dictate the conclusion that, if he was mentally responsible for the conduct we have outlined, he should be disbarred: and, If he was not mentally responsible, he should not be per-mitted to practice law.
"However, the flaw in the logic is that he may have been mentally irresponsible [at the time of his offensive conduct] . . ., and. yet, have sufficiently Improved in the almost two and one-half years intervening to be able to capably and competently represent his clients. . . .
"We would make clear that we are satisfled that a case has been made against Mr. Sherman, warranting a refusal to permit him to further practice law in this state unless he can establish bis mental irresponsibility at the time of the offenses charged. The barden of proof is upon him.
"If he establishes such mental irresponsibility, the bur-den is then opon him to establish his present capability to practice law." In re Sherman, 58 Wash.2d 1, 6-7, 354 P.2d 888, 890 (1960), cert. denied. 371 U.S. 951, 9 L.Ed.2d 499, 83 S.Ct. 506 (1963).
10 "This Court has the inherent power to revoke a license to practice law in this State, where such license was issued by this Court, and its issuance was procured by the fraud-ulent concealment, or by the false and fraudulent repre-sentation by the applicant of a fact which was manifestly material to the issuance of the license." North Carolina ex rel. Attorney General v. Gorson, 209 N.C. 320, 326, 183 S.E. 392, 395 (1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 662, 80 L.Ed. 1387, 56 S.Ct. 752 (1936).
See also Application of Patterson, 318 P.2d 907, 913 (Or. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 947, 2 L.Ed.2d 822, 78 S.Ct. 795 (1958).
(B) A lawyer shall not further the application for admission to the bar of another person known by him to be unqualified in respect to char-acter, education, or other relevant attribute.11
DR 1-102 Misconduct.
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule.
(2) Clrcumvent a Disciplinary Rule through actions of another32
(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral tturpitude.13
11 See ABA Canon 29.
12 In ABA Opinion 95 (1933), which held that a municipal attorney could not permit police officers to interview per-sons with claims against the municipality when the at-torney knew the clalmants to be represented by counsel, the Committee on Professional Ethics said:
"The law officer is, of course, responsible for the acts of those in his department who are under his supervislon and control." Opinion 85. In re Robinson, 136 N.Y.S. 548 (affirmed 209 N.Y. 354-1912) held that it was a matter of disbarment for an attorney to adopt a general course of approving the unethical conduct of employees of bis client, even though he did not actively participate thereln.
. .. ‘The attorney should not advine or sanction acts by his client which he himself should not do.’ Opinion 75."
13 "The most obvious non-professional ground for dis-barment is conviction for a felony. Most states make con-viction for a felony grounds for automatic disbarment. Some of these states, including New York, make disbar-ment mandatory upon conviction for any felony, while others require disbarment only for those felonies which involve moral turpitude. There are strong arguments that some felonies, such as involuntary manslaughter, reflect neíther on an attorney’s fitness, trustworthiness, nor com-petence and, therefore, should not be grounds for disbar-ment, but most states tend to disregard these arguments and, following the common law rule, make disbarment mandatory on conviction for any felony." Note, 43 Cornell L.Q. 489, 490 (1958).
"Some states treat conviction for misdemeanors as
grounds for automatic disbarment . However, the vast majority, accepting the common law rule, require that the misdemeanor involve moral turpitude. While the definition of moral turpitude may prove difficult, it seems only proper that those minor offenses which do not affect the attorney’s fitness to continue in the profession should not be grounds for disbarment. A good example is an assault and battery conviction which would not involve moral turpitude unless done with malice and deliberation." Id. at 491.
"The term ‘moral turpitude’ has been used in the law for centuries. It has been the subject of many declslons by the courts but has never been clearly defined because of the nature of the term. Perhaps the best general defi-nition of the term ‘moral turpitude’ is that It lmports an act of baseness, vileness or depravlty in the duties which one person owes to another or to society in general, which is contrary to the usual, accepted and customary rule of right and duty which a person should follow. 58 C.J.S. at page 1201. Although offenses against revenue laws have been held to be•crimes of moral turpitude, it has also been held that the attempt to evade the payment of taxes due to the government or any subdivlsion thereof, while wrong and unlawful, does not involve moral turpitude. 58 C.J.S. at page 1205." Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Scheer, 149 W.Va. 721, 726-27, 143 S.E.2d 141, 145 (1965).

(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
(6) Engage in any other conduct that ad• versely reflects on his fltness to prac-tice law.14
DR 1-103 Disclosure of Information to Authori-ties.
(A) A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of DR 1-102 shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such vlolatlon.15
(B) A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge or evidence concerning another lawyer or a judge shall reveal fully such knowledge or evidence upon proper request of a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon the conduct of lawyers or judgeos

CANON 2

A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfilling Its Duty to Make Legal Counsel Availabl

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

EC 2-1 The need of members of the public for legal services 1 is met only if they recognize their
"The right and power to discipline an attorney, as one of its officers, is Inherent in the court. . . . This pow-er is not limitad to those instances of misconduct whereín he has been employed, or has acted, in a professional ca-pacity; but, on the contrary, this power may be exercised where his misconduct outside the scope of his professional relations shows him to be an unfit person to practice law." In re Wilson, 391 S.W.2d 914, 917-18 (Mo. 1965).
14 "It is a fair characterization of the lawyer’s responsi-bilily in our society that he stands ‘as a shield,’ to quote Devlin, J., in defense of right and to ward off wrong. From a profession charged with these responsibilities there must be exacted those qualities of truth-speaking, of a high sense of honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest ob-servante of fiduciary responsibility, that have, throughout the centuries, been compendiously described as ‘moral char-acter’ ". Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247 L.Ed.2d 796, 806, 77 S.Ct. 752. 761 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"Particularly applicable here is Rule 4.47 providing that ‘A lawyer should always maintain his integrlty; and shall not wilifully commit any act against the interest of the public; nor shall he vlolate his duty to the courts or his cllents; nor shall he, by any misconduct, commit any of-fense against the laves of Missouri or the United States of America, which amounts to a crime involving acta done by him contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals; nor shall he be guilty of any other misconduct whereby, for the protection of the public and those charged with the administration of justice, he should no longer be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.’ " In re Wilson, 391 S.W.2d 914, 917 (Mo. 1965).
15 See ABA Canon 29; cf. ABA Canon 28. 18 Cf. ABA Canons 28 ami 29.
"Men have need for more than a system of law; they have need for a system of law which functions, and that

legal problems, appreciate the importante of seek-ing assistance,2 and are able to obtain the services of acceptable legal counsel.3 Hence, important functions of the legal profession are to educate laymen to recognize their legal problems, to facili-tate the process of intelligent selection of lawyers, and to assist in making legal services fully avail-able?
Recognition of Legal Problems
EC 2-2 The legal profession should assist laymen to recognize legal problems because such prob• lems may not be self-revealing and often are not
means they have need for lawyers." Cheatham, The Law-yer’s Role and Surroundings, 25 Rocky Mt.L.Rev. 405 (1953).
2 "Law is not self-applying; men must apply and utilize it in concrete cases. But the ordinary man le incapable. He cannot know the principies of law or the rules guiding the machinery of law administration; he does not know how to formulate his desires with precision and to put them into writing; he is ineffective in the presentation of his claims." Cheatham, The Lawyer’s Role and Surround-ings, 25 Rocky Mt.L.Rev. 405 (1953).
3 "This need [to provide legal services] was recognized by . . . Mr. [Lewis F.] Powell [Jr., President, Amer-ican Bar Association, 1963-64], who said: ‘Looking at contemporary America realistically, we must admit that despite all our efforts to date (and these have not been insignificant), far too many persons are not able to obtain equal justice under law. This usually results because their poverty or their ignorance has prevented them from ob-taining legal counsel.’ " Address by E. Clinton Bamberger, Association of American Law Schools 1965 Annual Meeting, Dec. 28, 1965, in Proceedings, Part II, 1965, 61, 63-64 (1965).
"A wide gap separates the need for legal services and its satisfaction, as numerous studies reveal. Looked at from the sida of the layman, one reason for the gap is poverty and the consequent inability to pay legal fees. Another set of reasons is ignorance of the need for and the value of legal services, and ignorance of where to find a dependable lawyer. There is fear of the mysterious processes and delays of the law, and there is fear of over-reaching and overcharging by lawyers, a fear stimulated by the occasional exposure of shysters." Cheatham, Avail-ability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the In-dividual Lawyer and of the Organized Bar, 12 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 438 (1965).
4 "It is not only the right but the duty of the profession as a whole to utilize such methods as may be developed to bring the services of its members to those who need them. so long as this can be done ethically and with dignity." ABA Opinion 320 (1968).
"[T]here is a responsibility on the bar to make legal services available to those who need them. The maxim, ‘privilege brings responsibilities,’ can be expanded to read, exclusive privilege to rendar public service brings responsi-bility to assure that the service is available to those in need of it." Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the Individual Lawyer and of the Organized Bar, 12 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 438, 443 (1965).
"The obligation to provide legal services for those ac-tually caught up in litigation carries with it the obligation to make preventiva legal advice accessible to all. It is among those unaccustomed to business affairs and fearful of the ways of the law that such advice is often most need-ed. If it is not received in time, the most valiant and skillful representation in court may come too late." Pro-fessional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference.
44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1216 (1958).

timely noticed.5 Therefore, lawyers acting under proper auspices should encourage and participate in educational and public relations programs con-cerning our legal system with particular reference to legal problems that frequently arise. Such ed-ucational programs should be motivated by a desire to benefit the public rather than to obtain publicity or employment for particular lawyers.6 Examples of permissible activities include preparation of institutional advertisements 7 and professional arti-cles for lay publications s and participation in
3 "Over a period of years institutional advertising of pro-grams for the benefit of the public have been approved by this and other Ethics Committees as well as by the courts.
"To the same effect are opinions of this Committee: Opinion 179 dealing wlth radio programs presenting a sit-uation in which legal advice is suggested in connection with a drafting of a will; Opinions 205 and 227 permitting institutional advertising of lawyer referral plans; Opinion 191 holding that advertising by lawyer members of a non-bar associated sponsored plan violated Canon 27. The Illi-nois Ethics Committee, in its Opinion 201, sustained bar association institutional advertising of a check-up plan
"This Committee has passed squarely on the question of the propriety of institutional advertising in connection with a legal check-up plan. Informal Decision C-171 quotes wlth express approval the Michigan Ethics Committee as follows:
As a public service, the bar has in the past addressed the public as to the importance of making wills, consult-ing counsel in connection with real estate transactions, etc. In the same way, the bar, as such, may recommend this program, provided always that it does it in such a way that there is not suggestion of solicitation on behalf of any individual lawyer."
ABA Opinion 307 (1962).
e "We recognize a distinction between teaching the lay public the importance of securing legal services preventive In character and the solicitation of professional employment by or for a particular lawyer. The former tends to pro-mote the public interest and enhance the public estimation of the profession. The latter is calculated to injure the public and degrade the profession.
"Advertising which is calculated to teach the layman the benefits and advantages of preventive legal services will benefit the lay public and enable the lawyer to render a more desirable and beneficial professional service. . . ABA Opinion 179 (1938).
"[A bar association] may engage in a dignified institu-tional educational campaign so long as it does not Involve the Identification of a particular lawyer with the check-up program. Such educational material may polnt out the value of the annual check-up and may be printed in news-papers, magazines, pamphlets, and brochures, or produced by means of films, radio, television or other media. The Printed materials may be distributed in a dignified way through the offices of persons having close dealings with lawyers as, for example, banks, real estate agents, insur-ance agents and others. They may be available in law-Yers’ offices. The bar association may prepare and dis-tribute to lawyers materials and forms for use in the annual legal check-up." ABA Opinion 307 (1962).
a "A lawyer may with propriety write articles for publi-catlons in which he gives information upon the law . .." ABA Canon 40.
"The newsletters, by means of which respondents are alleged to have advertised their vares, were sent to the officers of union clients represented by their firm

seminars, lectures, and civic programs. But a lav.v-yer who participates in such activities should shun personal publicity.9
EC 2-3 Whether a lawyer acts properly in vol-unteering advice to a layman to seek legal services depends upon the circumstances.10 The giving of advice that one should take legal action could well be in fulfillment of the duty of the legal profession to assist laymen in recognizing legal problems.11 The advice is proper only if motivated by a desire to protect one who does not recognize that he may have legal problems or who is ignorant of his legal rights or obligations. Hence, the advice is im-proper if motivated by a desire to obtain personal benefit,12 secure personal publicity, or cause liti-gation to be brought merely to harass or injure another. Obviously, a lawyer should not contact
They contain no reference to any cases handled by the respondents. Their contents are confined to rulings of boards, commissions and courts on problems of interest to labor union, together with proposed and completed leg-islation important to the Brotherhood, and other items which might affect unions and their members. The re-spondents cite Opinion 213 of the Committee on Profession-al Ethics and Grievances as permitting such practice. Af ter studying this opinlon, we agree that sending of newsletters of the aboye type to regular clients does not offend Canon 27." In re Ratner, 194 Kan. 362, 371, 399 P.2d 865, 872-73 (1965).
Cf. ABA Opinion 92 (1933).
9 Cf. ABA Opinions 307 (1962) and 179 (1938).
"There is no ethical or other valid reason why an attor-ney may not write articles on legal subjects for magazines and newspapers. The fact that the publication is a trade journal or magazine, makes no difference as to the ethical question involved. On the other hand, it would be un-ethical and contrary to the precepts of the Canons for the attorney to allow his neme to be carried In the magazine
or other publication . . as a free legal adviser for the subscribers to the publication. Such would be contrary to Canons 27 and 35 and Opinions heretofore announced by the Committee on Professlonal Ethics and Grlevances. (See Opinions 31, 41, 42, and 56)." ABA Opinion 162 (1936).
lo See ABA Canon 28.
11 This question can assume constitutional dimensions: "We meet at the outset the contention that ‘solicitation’ is wholly outside the crea of freedoms protected by the First Amendment. To this contention there are two an-swers. The first is that a State cannot foreclose. the ex-ercise of constitutional rights by mere labels. The second is that abstract discussion is not the only species of com-munication which the Constltutlon protects; the First Amendment also protects vigorous advocacy, certainly of
lawful ends, against governmental intrusion. . .
• • • •
"However valid may be Virginia’s interest in regulating the traditionally illegal practice of barratry, maintenance and champerty, that interest does not justify the prohibi-tion of the NAACP activities disclbsed by this record. Ma-licious intent was of the essence of the common-law offens-es of fomenting or stirring up litigation. And whatever may be or may have been true of suits against governments in other countries, the exercise in our own, as in this case of First Amendment rights to enforce Constitutional rights through litigation, as a matter of law, cannot be deemed malicious." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429, 439-40, 9 L.Ed.2d 405, 415-16, 422, 83 S.Ct. 328, 336, 341 (1963).
12 See ABA Canon 27.

a non-client, directly or indirectly, for the purpose of being retained to represent him for compensa-tion.
EC 2-4 Since motivation is subjective and often difficult to judge, the motives of a lawyer who vol-unteers advice likely to produce legal controversy may well be suspect if he receives professional em-ployment or other benefits as a result.13 A lawyer who volunteers advice that one should obtain the services of a lawyer generally should not himself accept employment, compensation, or other benefit in connection with that matter. However, it is not improper for a lawyer to volunteer such ad-vice and render resulting legal services to close friends, relatives, former clients (in regard to mat-ters germane to former employment), and regular clients.14
EC 2-5 A lawyer who writes or speaks for the purpose of educating members of the public to recognize their legal problems should carefully refrain from giving or appearing to give a general solution applicable to all apparently similar in-dividual problems,18 since slight changes in fact situations may require a material variance in the applicable advice; otherwise, the public may be misled and misadvised. Talks and writings by lawyers for laymen should caution them not to attempt to solve individual problems upon the basis of the information contained therein.18
13 "The Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association and the decisions of the courts quite gen-erally prohibít the direct solicitation of business for gain by an attorney either through advertisement or personal communication; and also condemn the procuring of busi-ness by indirection through touters of any kind. It is dlsreputable for an attorney to breed litigation by seeking out those who have claims for personal injuries or other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents or runners, or to reward those who hring
or influence the bringing of business to his office. . . Moreover, It tends quite easily to the institution of base-less litigation and the manufacture of perjured testimony. From early times, this danger has been recognized in the law by the condemnation of the crime of common barratry, or the stirring up of sults or quarrels between individuals at law or otherwise." In re Ades, 6 F.Supp. 467, 474-75
(D. Mary. 1934).
14 "Rule 2.
"[A] member of the State Bar shall not solicit profes-sional employment by
"(1) Volunteering counsel or advice except where ties of blood relationship or trust make it appropriate." Cal. Business and Professions Code 1 6076 (West 1962).
15 "Rule 18 . . A member of the State Bar shall not
advise inquirers or render opinions to them through or in connection with a newspaper, radio or other publicity mecilum of any kind in respect to their specific legal prob-lems, whether or not such attorney shall be compensated for his services." Cal.Business and Professlons Code 1 6076 (West 1962).
16 "In any case where a member might well apply the advice given in the opinion to his individual affairs, the lawyer rendering the opinion [concerning problems com-mon to members of an association and dlstributed to the members through a periodic bulletin] should specifically state that this opinion should not be relied on by any
Selection of a Lawyer: Generally
EC 2-6 Formerly a potential client usually knew the reputations of local lawyers for competency and integrity and therefore could select a prac-titioner in whom he had confidente. This tradi-tional selection process worked well because it was initiated by the client and the choice was an in-formed one.
EC 2-7 Changed conditions, however, have seri-ously restricted the effectiveness of the traditional selection process. Often the reputations of law-yers are not sufficiently known to enable laymen to make intelligent choices.17 The law has become increasingly complex and specialized. Few law-yers are willing and competent to deal with every kind of legal matter, and many laymen have dif fi-culty in determining the competente of lawyers to render different types of legal services. The selection of legal counsel is particularly difficult for transients, persons moving into new arcas, persons of limited education or mean, and others who have little or no contact with lawyers.18
EC 2-8 Selection of a lawyer by a layman often is the result of the advice and recommendation of third parties—relatives, friends, acquaintances, business associates, or other lawyers. A layman is best served if the recommendation is disinterest-ed and informed. In order that the recommenda-tion be disinterested, a lawyer should not seek to influence another to recommend his employment.10 A lawyer should not compensate another person for recommending him, for influencing a prospec-tive client to employ him, or to encourage future recommendations.20
Selection of a Lawyer: Professional Notices and Listings
EC 2-9 The traditional ban against advertising by lawyers, which is subject to certain limited excep-tions, is rooted in the public interest. Competitive advertising would encourage extravagant, artful, self-laudatory 21 brashness in seeking business and
member as a basis for handling his individual affairs, but that in every case he should consult his counsel. In the publication of the opinion the association should make a similar statement." ABA Opinion 273 (1946).
17 "A group of recent interrelated changes bears directly on the availability of legal services. . . . [One] change is the constantly accelerating urbanization of the country and the decline of personal and neighborhood knowledge of whom to retal/1 as a professional man." Cheatham, Avail-ability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the In-dividual Lawyer and of the Organized Bar, 12 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 438, 440 (1965).
la Cf. Cheatham, A Lawyer When Needed: Legal Services for the Middle Classes, 63 Colum.L.Rev. 973, 974 (1963).
19 See ABA Canon 27.
20 See ABA Canon 28.
21 " ‘Self-laudation’ is a very flexible concept; Canon 27 does not define it, so what eourse of conduct would be said to constitute it under a given state of facts would no doubt vary as the opinions of men vary. As a famous English judge said, it would vary as the length of the chancellor’s foot. It must be ln words and tone that will ‘offend the traditions and lower the tone of our profession.’ When it

thus could mislead the layman.22 Furthermore, it would inevitably produce unrealistic expecta-tions in particular cases and bring about distrust of the law and lawyers.23 Thus, public confidence in our legal system would be impaired by such advertisements of professional services. The at-torney-client relationship is personal and unique and should not be established as the result of pressures and deceptions.24 History has demon-strated that public confidence in the legal system is best preserved by strict, self-imposed controls over, rather than by unlimited, advertising.
does this, it is ‘reprehensible.’ This seems to be the test by which ‘self-laudation’ is measured." State v. Nichols, 151 So.2d 257, 259 (Fla. 1963).
22 "Were it not for the prohibitions of . . [Canon
27] lawyers could, and no doubt would be forced to, en-gage competitively in advertising of all kinds in which each would seek to explain to the public why he could serve better and accomplish more than his brothers at the Bar.
"Susceptible as we are to advertising the public would then be encouraged to choose an attorney on the basis of which had the better, more attractive advertising program rather than on his reputation for professional ability.
"This would certainly maim, if not destroy, the dignity and professional status of the Bar of this State." State v. NIchols, 151 So.2d 257, 268 (Fla. 1963) (O’Connell, J., con-curring in part and dissenting in part).
23 Cf. ABA Canon 8.
24 "The prohibition of advertising by lawyers deserves some examination. All agree that advertising by an in-dividual lawyer, if permitted, will detract from the dignity of the profession, but the matter goes deeper than this. Perhaps the most understandable and acceptable additional reasons we have found are stated by one commentator as follows :
" ‘1. That advertisements, unless kept within narrow limits, like any other forro of solicitation, tend to stir up litigation, and such tendency is against the public interest.
That if there were no restrictions on advertise-ments, the least capable and least honorable lawyers would be apt to publish the most extravagant and alluring material about themselves, and that the harm which would result would, in large measure, fall on the ígnorant and on those least able to af-ford it.
That the temptation would be strong to hold out as inducements for employment, assurances of suc-cess or of satisfaction to the client, which assur-ances could not be realized, and that the giving of such assurances would materially increase the temptation to use ill means to secure the end de-sired by the client.
" ‘In other words, the reasons for the rule, and for the conclusion that it is desirable to prohiba advertising entirely, or to limit it within such narrow bounds that it will not admit of abuse, are based on the possibility and probability that this means of publicity, if permitted, will be abused.’ Harrison Hewitt in a comment at 15 A.B.A.J. 116 (1929) reproduced in Cheatham, Cases and Materials on the Legal Frotes-sion (2d Ed., 1955), p. 525.
"Of course, competition is at the root of the abuses in advertising. If the individual lawyer were permitted to compete with his fellows in publicity through advertising, we have no doubt that Mr. Ilewitt’s three points, quoted aboye, would accurately forecast the result." Jacksonville Bar Ass’n v. Wilson, 102 So.2d 292, 294-95 (Fla. 1958).
EC 2-10 Methods of advertising that are subject to the objections stated aboye 25 should be and are prohibited.26 However, the Disciplinary Rules recognize the value of giving assistance in the selection process through forms of advertising that furnish identification of a lawyer while avoiding such objections. For example, a lawyer may be identified in the classified section of the telephone directory,27 in the office building directory, and on his letterhead and professional card.25 But at all times the permitted notices should be dignified and accurate.
EC 2-11 The name under which a lawyer con-ducts his practice may be a factor in the selection process.29 The use of a trade name or an assumed name could mislead laymen concerning the identi-ty, responsibility, and status of those practicing thereunder.30 Accordingly, a lawyer in private practice should practice only under his own name, the name of a lawyer employing him, a partner-ship name composed of the name of one or more of the lawyers practicing in a partnership, or, if permitted by law, in the name of a professional legal corporation, which should be clearly designat-ed as such. For many years some law firms have used a firm name retaining one or more names of deceased or retired partners and such practice is not improper if the firm is a bona fide successor of a firm in which the deceased or retired person was a member, if the use of the name is authorized by law or by contract, and if the public is not mis-led thereby.34 However, the name of a partner
23 See ABA Canon 27.
26 Cf. ABA Opinions 309 (1963) and 284 (1951).
27 Cf. ABA Opinions 313 (1964) and 284 (1951).
28 See ABA Canon 27.
29 Cf. ABA Opinion 303 (1961).
30 See ABA Canon 33.
3, Id.
"The continued use of a firm name by one or more sur-viving partners after the death of a member of the firm whose name is in the firm title is expressly permitted by the Canons of Ethics. The reason for this is that all of the partners have by their joint and severa! efforts over a period of years contributed to the good will attached to the firm name. In the case of a firm having widespread connections, this good will is disturbad by a change in firm name every time a name partner dies, and that re-flects a loss in some degree of the good will to the building up of which the surviving partners have contributed their time, skill and labor through a period of years. To avoid this loss the firm name is continued, and to meet the re-quirements of the Canon the individuals constituting the firm from time to time are listad." ABA Opinion 267 (1945).
"Accepted local custom in New York recognizes that the name of a law firm does not necessarily Identify the in-dividual members of the firm, and hence the continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more partners is not a deception and is permissible. . . . The continued use of a deceased partner’s name in the firm title is not affected by the fact that another partner withdraws from the firm and his name is dropped, or the name of the new partner is added to the firm name." Opinion No. 45, Com-mittee on Professional Ethics, New York State Bar Ass’n, 39 N. Y.St. B. J. 455 (1967).
Cf. ABA Opinion 258 (1943).

who withdraws from a firm but continues to prac-tice law should be omitted from the firm name in order to avoid misleading the public.
EC 2-12 A lawyer occupyIng a judicial, legisla-tive, or public executive or administrative position who has the right to practice law concurrently may allow his name to remain in the name of the firm if he actively continues to practice law as a mem-ber thereof. Otherwise, his name should be re-moved from the firm name,32 and he should not be identified as a past or present member of the firm; and he should not hold himself out as being a practicing lawyer.
EC 2-13 In order to avoid the possibility of mis-leading persons with whom he deals, a lawyer should be scrupulous in the representation of his professional status.33 He should not hold himself out as being a partner or associate of a law firm if he is not one in fact,34 and thus should not hold himself out as a partner or associate if he only shares offices with another lawyer.35
EC 2-14 In some instances a lawyer confines his practice to a particular field of law.36 In the ab-sence of state controls to insure the existente of special competente, a lawyer should not be per-mitted to hold himself out as a specialist 37 or as having special training or ability, other than in the historically excepted fields of admiralty, trade-mark, and patent law.38
32 Cf. ABA Canon 33 and ABA Opinion 315 (1965).
33 Cf. ABA Opinions 283 (1950) and 81 (1932).
34 See ABA Opinion 316 (1967).
35 "The word ‘associates’ has a variety of meanings. Principally through custom the word when used on the letterheads of law firms has come to be regarded as de-scribIng those who are employees of the firm. Because the word has acqulred this special significante in connec-tIon with the practice of the law the use of the word to describe lawyer relationships other than employer-employee is likely to be misleading." In re Sussman and Tanner, 241 Ore. 246, 248, 405 P.2d 355, 356 (1965),
According to ABA Opinion 310 (1963), use of the term "associates" would be misleading in two situations : (1) where two lawyers are partners and they share both re-sponsibility and liability for the partnership; and (2) where two lawyers practice separately, sharing no responsi-bility or liability, and only share a suite of offices and some costs.
36 "For a long time, many lawyers have, of necessity, limited their practice to certain branches of law. The increasing complexity of the law and the demand of the public for more expertness on the part of the lawyer has, in the past few years—particularly in the last ten years-brought about specialization on an increasing scale." Re-port of the Special Committee on Specialization and Specialized Legal Services, 79 A.B.A.Rep. 582, 584 (1954).
37 "In varying degrees specialization has become the modus operandi throughout the legal profession. . . . American society is speciallzation conscious. The present Canons, however, do not allow lawyers to make known to the lay public the fact that they engage in the practice of a specialty. . . ." Tucker, The Large Law Firm: Considerations Concerning the Modernization of the Canoas of Professional Ethics, 1965 Wis.L.Rev. 344, 348-49 (1965).
33 See ABA Canon 27.
EC 2-15 The legal profession has developed law-yer referral systems designed to aid individuals who are able to pay fees but need assistance in locating lawyers competent to handle their par-ticular problems. Use of a lawyer referral system enables a layman to avoid an uninformed selection of a lawyer because such a system makes possible the employmént of competent lawyers who have indicated an interest in the subject matter in-volved. Lawyers should support the principie of lawyer referral systems and should encourage the evolution of other ethical plans which aid in the selection of qualified counsel.
Financial Ability to Employ Counsel: Generally EC 2-16 The legal profession cannot remain a viable force in fulfilling its role in our society un-less its members receive adequate compensation for services rendered, and reasonable Lees 39 should be charged in appropriate cases to clients able to pay them. Nevertheless, persons unable to pay all or a portion of a reasonable fee should be able to obtain necessary legal services,40 and lawyers should support and participate in ethical activities designed to achieve that objective.41
Financial Ability to Employ Counsel: Persons Able to Pay Reasonable Fees
EC 2-17 The determination of a proper fee re-quires consideration of the interests of both client and lawyers.42 A lawyer should not charge more than a reasonable fee,43 for excessive cost of legal service would deter laymen from utilizing the legal system in protection of their rights. Furthermore, an excessive charge abuses the professional rela-tionship between lawyer and client. On the other hand, adequate compensation is necessary in order to enable the lawyer to serve his client effectively and to preserve the integrity and independence of the profession.44
EC 2-18 The determination of the reasonableness of a fee requires consideration of all relevant cir-curnstances,45 including those stated in the Dis-ciplinary Rules. The fees of a lawyer will vary ac-cording to many factors, including the time re-quired, his experience, ability, and reputation, the
39 See ABA Canon 12. 4o Cf. ABA Canon 12.
41 "If there is any fundamental proposition of govern-ment on which all would agree, it is that one of the highest goals of society must be to achieve and maintain equality before the law. Yet this ideal remains an empty form of words unless the legal profession is ready to provide ade-quate representation for those unable to pay the usual fees." Professional Representation: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1216 (1958).
42 See ABA Canon 12.
43 Cf. ABA Canon 12.
44 "When members of the Bar are induced to render legal services for inadequate compensation, as a consequence the quality of the service rendered may be lowered, the welfare of the profession injured and the administration of justice made less efficient." ARA Opinion 302 (1961).
Cf. ABA Opinion 307 (1962).
45 See ABA Canon 12.

nature of the employment, the responsibility in-volved, and the results obtained It is a com-mendable and long-standing tradition of the bar that special consideration is given in the fixing of any fee for services rendered a brother lawyer or a member of his immediate family.
EC 2-19 As soon as feasible after a lawyer has been employed, it is desirable that he reach a clear agreement with his client as to the basis of the fee charges to be made. Such a course will not only prevent later misunderstanding but will also work for good relations between the lawyer and the client. It is usually beneficial to reduce to writing the understanding of the parties regarding the fee, particularly when it is contingent. A law-yer should be mindful that many persons who de-sire to employ him may have had little or no ex-perience with fee charges of lawyers, and for this reason he should explain fully to such persons the reasons for the particular fee arrangement he proposes.
EC 2-20 Contingent fee arrangements 47 in civil cases have long been commonly accepted in the United States in proceedings to enforce claims. The historical bases of their acceptance are that (1) they often, and in a variety of circumstances, provide the only practical means by which one having a claim against another can economically afford, finance, and obtain the services of a com-petent lawyer to prosecute his claim, and (2) a successful prosecution of the claim produces a res out of which the fee can be paid.48 Although a lawyer generally should decline to accept employ-ment on a contingent fee basis by one who is able to pay a reasonable fixed fee, it is not necessarily improper for a lawyer, where justified by the par-ticular circumstances of a case, to enter into a con-tingent lee contract in a civil case with any client who, after being fully informed of all relevant fac-tors, desires that arrangement. Because of the human relationships involved and the unique char-acter of the proceedings, contingent fee arrange-ments in domestic relation cases are rarely justi-fied. In administrative agency proceedings con-tingent fee contracts should be governed by the same considerations as in other civil cases. Public policy properly condemns contingent fee arrange-ments in criminal cases, largely on the ground that
47 Sea ABA Canon 13; see also Mackinnon, Contingent Fees for Legal Services (1964) (A report of the American Bar Foundation).
"A contract for a reasonable contingent fee where sanc-tioned by law is permitted by Canon 13, but the client must remain responsible to the lawyer for expenses ad-vanced by the latter. ‘There is to be no barter of the privilege of prosecuting a cause for galn in exchange for the promise of the attorney to prosecute at his own ex-pense.’ (Cardozo, C. J. in Matter of Gilman, 251 N.Y. 265, 270-271.)" ABA Opinion 246 (1942).
4s See Comment, Providing Legal Services for the Middle Class in Civil Matters: The Problem, the Duty and a So-lution, 26 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 811, 829 (1965).
legal services in criminal cases do not produce a res with which to pay the fee.
EC 2-21 A lawyer should not accept compensa-tion or any thing of value incident to his employ-ment or services from one other than his client without the knowledge and consent of his client after full disclosure.49
EC 2-22 Without the consent of his client, a law-yer should not associate in a particular matter an-other lawyer outside his firm. A fee may prop-erly be divided between lawyers 5o properly as-sociated if the division is in proportion to the serv-ices performed and the responsibility assumed by each lawyer 51 and if the total fee is reasonable.
EC 2-23 A lawyer should be zealous in his ef-forts to avoid controversies over fees with clients 52 and should attempt to resolve amicably any differ-ences on the subject.53 He should not sue a client for a fee unless necessary to prevent fraud or gross imposition by the client.54
49 See ABA Canon 38.
"Of course, as . . . [Informal Opinion 679] points out, there must be full disclosure of the arrangement [that an entity other than the client pays the attorney’s fee]
by the attorney to the client . . " ABA Opinion 320 (1968).
50 "Only lawyers may share in . . . a division of
fees, but . it is not necessary that both lawyers be admitted to practice in the same state, so long as the divi-sion was based on the division of services or responsibili-ty." ABA Opinion 316 (1967).
51 See ABA Canon 34.
"We adhere to our previous rulings that where a lawyer merely brings about the employment of another lawyer but renders no service and assumes no responsibility in the matter, a division of the latter’s fee is improper. (Opinions 18 and 153).
"It is assumed that the bar, generally, understands what acts or conduct of a lawyer may constitute ‘services’ to a client within the intendment of Canon 12. Such acts or conduct invariably, if not always, involve ‘responsibility’ on the part of the lawyer, whether the word ‘responsibili-ty’ be construed to denote the possible resultant legal or moral liability on the part of the lawyer to the client or to others, or the onus of deciding what should or should net be done in behalf of the client. The word ‘services’ in Canon 12 must be construed in this broad sense and may apply to the selection and retainer of associate counsel as well as to other acts or conduct in the client’s behalf." ABA Opinion 204 (1940).
52 See ABA Canon 14.
53 Cf. ABA Opinion 320 (1968).
54 See ABA Canon 14.
"Ours is a learned profession, not a mere money-getting
trade. . . . Suits to collect fees should be avoided. Only where the circumstances imperatively require, should resort be had to a sult to compel payment. And where a lawyer does resort to a suit to enforce payment of fees which involves a disclosure, he should carefully avoid any disclosure not clearly necessary to obtaining or defending bis rlghts." ABA Opinion 250 (1943).
But cf. ABA Opinion 320 (1968).

Financial Ability to Employ Counsel: Persons Unable to Pay Reasonable Fees
EC 2-24 A layman whose financial ability is not sufficient to permit payment of any fee cannot obtain legal services, other than in cases where a contingent fee is appropriate, unless the services are provided for him. Even a person of moderate means may be unable to pay a reasonable fee which is large because of the complexity, novelty, or difficulty of the problem or similar factors.55
EC 2-25 Historically, the need for legal services of those unable to pay reasonable fees has been met in part by lawyers who donated their services or accepted court appointments on behalf of such individuals. The basic responsibility for providing legal services for those unable to pay ultimately rests upon the individual lawyer, and personal involvement in the problems of the disadvantaged can be one of the most rewarding experiences in the lile of a lawyer. Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, should find time to participate in serving the dis-advantaged. The rendition of free legal services to those unable to pay reasonable fees continues to be an obligation of each lawyer, but the efforts of individual lawyers are often not enough to meet the need.58 Thus it has been necessary for the
55 "As a soclety increases In size, sophistication and tech-nology, the body of laws which is required to control that soclety also Increases in size, scope and complexity. With this growth, the law dlrectly affects more and more facets of individual behavior, creating an expanding need for legal services on the part of the individual members of the soclety. . . . As legal guidance In social and commer-cial behavior increasingly becomes necessary, there will come a concurrent demand from the layman that such guidance be made available to him. This demand will not come from those who are able to employ the best of legal talent, nor from those who can obtain legal assistance at little or no cost. It will come from the large ‘forgotten middle income class,’ who can neither afford to pay pro-portionately large fees nor qualif y for ultra-low-cost serv-ices. The legal profession must recognize this inevitable demand and consider methods whereby it can be satisfied. If the profession fails to provide such methods, the laity will." Comment, Providing Legal Services for the Middle Class in Civil Matters: The Problem, the Duty and a Solution, 26 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 811, 811-12 (1965).
"The issue is not whether we shall do something or do nothing. The demand for ordinary everyday legal justice Is so great and the moral nature of the demand is so strong that the issue has become whether we devise, maintain, and support suitable agencies able to satisfy the demand or, by our own default, force the government to take over the job, supplant us, and ultimately dominate us." Sinith, Legal Service Offices for Persons of Moderate Means, 1949 Wis.L.Rev. 416, 418 (1949).
56 "Lawyers have peculiar responsibilities for the just ad-ministration of the law, and these responsíbilities include providing advice and representation for needy persons. To a degree not always appreciated by the public at large, the bar has performed these obligations with zeal and devotion. The Committee is persuaded, however, that a system of justice that attempts, in mid-twentieth century America, to meet the needs of the financially incapacitated accused through primary or exclusive reliance on the uncompensat-ed services of counsel will prove unsuccessful and inade-
profession to institute additional programs to pro-vide legal services.57 Accordingly, legal aid of-fices,58 lawyer referral services,59 and other relat-ed programs have been developed, and others will be developed, by the profession.69 Every lawyer should support all proper efforts to meet this need for legal services.61
guate. . . A system of adequate representation, there-
fore, should be structured and financed in a manner re-flecting its public importance. . . . We believe that fees for private appointed counsel should be set by the court within maximum limits established by the statute." Report of the Att’y Gen’s Comm. on Poverty and the Ad-ministration of Criminal Justice 41-43 (1963).
57 "At present this representation [of those unable to pay usual fees] 1s being supplied in some measure through the spontaneous generosity of Individual lawyers, through legal aid societies, and—increasingly—through the organized ef-forts of the Bar. If those who stand in need of this serv-ice know of Its avallability and their need ls in fact ade-quately met, the precise mechanism by which this service ls provided becomes of secondary importance. It is of great importance, however, that both the impulse to ren-der this service, and the plan for making that Impulse effective, should arise within the legal profession Itself." Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Confer-ence, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1216 (1958).
58 "Free legal clinics carrled on by the organized bar are not ethically objectionable. On the contrary, they serve a very worthwhile purpose and should be encouraged." ABA Opinion 191 (1939).
59 "We are of the opinlon that the [lawyer referral] plan here presented does not fall within the inhibition of the Canon. No solicitation for a particular lawyer Is in-volved. The dominant purpose of the plan Is to provide as an obligation of the profession competent legal services to persons in low-income groups at fees within their ability to pay. The plan is to be supervised and directed by the local Bar Association. There is to be no advertisement of the names of the lawyers constituting the panel. The general method and purpose of the plan only is to be ad-vertised. Persons seeking the legal services- will be direct-ed to members of the panel by the Bar Association. Asíde from the filing of the panel with the Bar Association, there is to be no advertisement of the names of the lawyers constituting the panel. If these limitations are observed, we think there is no solicitation of business by or for par-ticular lawyers and no violation of the inhibition af Canon 27." ABA Opinion 205 (1940).
60 "Whereas the American Bar Association believes that it is a fundamental duty of the bar to see to it that all persons requiring legal advice be able to attain it, irrespec-tive of their economic status . .
"Resolved, that the Association approves and sponsors the setting up by state and local bar associations of lawyer referral plans and low-cost legal service methods for the purpose of dealing with cases of persons who might not
otherwise have the benefit of legal advice . Pro- ceedings of the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, Oct. 30, 1946, 71 A.B.A.Rep. 103, 109-10 (1946).
81 "The defense of indigent citizens, without compensa-tion, is carried on throughout the country by lawyers rep-resenting legal aid societies, not only with the approval, but with the commendation of those acquainted with the work. Not infrequently services are rendered out of sympathy or for other philanthropic reasons, by individual lawyers who do not represent legal aid societies. There is nothing whatever in the Canons to prevent a lawyer

Acceptance and Retention of Employment
EC 2-26 A lawyer is under no obligation to act as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client; but in furtherance of the objective of the bar to make legal services fully available, a lawyer should not lightly decline prof-fered employment. The fulfillment of this objec-tive requires acceptance by a lawyer of his share of tendered employment which may be unattractive both to him and the bar generally.62
EC 2-27 History is replete with instances of dis-tinguished and sacrificial services by lawyers who have represented unpopular clients and causes. Regardless of his personal feelings, a lawyer should not decline representation because a client or a cause is unpopular or community reaction is adverse.63
EC 2-28 The personal preference of a lawyer to avoid adversary alignment against judges, other lawyers,64 public officials, or influential members of the community does not justify his rejection of tendered employment.
EC 2-29 When a lawyer is appointed by a court or requested by a bar association to undertake representation of a person unable to obtain coun-sel, whether for financial or other reasons, he should not seek to be excused from undertaking
from performing such an act, nor should there., be." ABA Opinion 148 (1935).
62 But cf. ABA Canon 31.
63 "One of the highest services the lawyer can render to society is to appear in court on behalf of clients whose causes are in disfavor with the general public." Profession-al Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B. A.J. 1159, 1216 (1958).
One author proposes the following proposition to be in-cluded in "A Proper Oath for Advocates" : "I recognize that it Is sometimes difficult for clients with unpopular causes to obtaln proper legal representation. I will do all that I can to assure that the client with the unpopular cause is properly represe/Ved. and that the lawver renre-senting such a client recelves credit from and support of the bar for handling such a matter." Thode, The Ethical Standard for the Advocate, 39 Texas L.Rev. 575, 592 (1961).
"§ 6068. . . . It is the duty of an attorney
"(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed." Cal.Business and Professions Code § 6068 (West 1962). Virtually the same language ís found In the Oregon stat-utes at Ore.Rev.Stats. Ch. 9 § 9.460(8).
See Rostow, The Lawyer and His Client, 48 A.B.A.J. 25 and 146 (1962).
64 See ABA Canons 7 and 29.
"We are of the opinion that It is not professionally im-proper for a lawyer to accept employment to compel an-other lawyer to honor the just claim of a layman. On the contrary, it is hlghly proper that he do so. Unfortunately, there appears to be a widespread feeling among laymen that lt is difficult, If not impossible, to obtain justice when they have claims agalnst members of the Bar because other lawyers will not accept employment to proceed against them. The honor of the profession, whose members proud-ly style themselves offlcers of the court, must surely be sullied if its members bind themselves by custom to refrain from enforcing just claims of laymen against lawyers." ABA Opinion 144 (1935).
the representation except for compelling reasons.65 Compelling reasons do not include such factors as the repugnance of the subject matter of the pro-ceeding, the identity 66 or position of a person in-volved in the case, the belief of the lawyer that the defendant in a criminal proceeding is guilty,67 or the belief of the lawyer regarding the merits of the civil case.68
EC 2-30 Employment should not be accepted by a lawyer when he is unahle to render competent service 69 or when he knows or it is obvious that the person seeking to employ him desires to in-stitute or maintain an action merely for the pur-pose of harassing or maliciously injuring another.70 Likewise, a lawyer should decline employment if the intensity of his personal feeling, as distin-guished from a community attitude, may impair his effective representation of a prospective client. If a lawyer knows a client has previously obtained counsel, he should not accept employment in the matter unless the other counsel approves 71 or withdraws, or the client terminates the prior em-ployment.72
EC 2-31 Full availability of legal counsel requires both that persons be able to obtain counsel and that lawyers who undertake representation complete the work involved. Trial counsel for a convicted defendant should continue to represent his client by advising whether to take an appeal and, if the appeal is prosecuted, by representing him through the appeal unless new counsel is substituted or withdrawal is permitted by the appropriate court.
65 ABA Canon 4 uses a slightly different test, saying, "A lawyer assigned as counsel for an indigent prisoner ought
not to ask to be excused for any trivial reason . .." 66 Cf. ABA Canon 7.
67 See ABA Canon 5.
68 Dr. Johnson’s reply to Boswell upon being asked what he thought of "supporting a cause which you know to be bad" was : "Sir, you do not know it to be good or bad till the Judge determines it. I have said that you are to state facts fairly ; so that your thinking, or what you call knowing, a cause to be bad, must be from reason-ing, must be from supposing your arguments to be weak and inconciusive. But, Sir, that is not enough. An argu-ment which does not convince yourself, may convince the Judge to whom you urge it; and if it does convince him, why, then, Sir, you are wrong, and he is right." 2 Bos-well, The Life of Johnson 47-48 (Hill ed. 1887).
69 "The lawyer deciding whether to undertake a case must be able to judge objectively whether he Is capable of handling it and whether he can assume lts burdens without prejudice to prevlous commitments. . . ." Prof essional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1158, 1218 (1958).
70 "The lawyer must decline to conduct a civil cause or to make a defense when convinced that ít is Intended mere-lytOharass or to injure the opposite party or to work oppression or wrong." ABA Canon 30.
71 See ABA Canon 7.
n id.
"From the facts stated we assume that the client has discharged the first attorney and given notíce of the dis-charge. Such being the case, the second attorney may properly accept employment. Canon 7; Opinions

EC 2-32 A decision by a lawyer to withdraw should be made only on the basis of compelling circumstances 73, and in a matter pending before a tribunal he must comply with the rules of the tribunal regarding withdrawal. A lawyer should not withdraw without considering carefully and endeavoring to minimize the possible adverse ef-fect on the rights of his client and the possibility of prejudice to his client 74 as a result of his withdrawal. Even when he justifiably withdraws, a lawyer should protect the welfare of his client by giving due notice of his withdrawa1,75 suggesting employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled, cooperating with counsel subsequently employed, and otherwise endeavoring to minimize the possibility of harm. Further, he should refund to the client any compensation not earned during the employment.76
EC 2-33 Several Supreme Court decisions ap-parently give Constitutional protection to certain organizations which furnish certain legal services to their members under legal service plans which do not provide free choice in the selection of at-torneys.* The basic tenets of the profession, ac-cording to EC 1-1 are independence, integrity and competence of the lawyer and total devotion to the interests of the client.** There is substantial
73 See ABA Canon 44.
will carefully consider, before taking a case, whether it appears that I can fully represent the client within the framework of law. If the decision is ín the affirmative, then it will take extreme circumstances to cause me to de-cide later that I cannot so represent him." Thode, The, Ethical Standard for the Advocate, 39 Texas L.Rev. 575, 592 (1961) (from "A Proper Oath for Advocates").
74 ABA Opinion 314 (1965) held that a lawyer should not disassociate himself from a cause when "it le obvious that the very act of disassociation would have the effect of vio-lating Canon .97."
75 ABA Canon 44 enumerates instances in which ". . . the lawyer may be warranted in wIthdrawing on due no-tice to the client, allowing him time to employ another lawyer."
76 See ABA Canon 44.
*United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michi-gan, 401 U.S. 576, 28 L.Ed.2d 339, 91 S.Ct. 1076 (1971); United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217, 19 L.Ed.2d 426, 88 S.Ct. 353 (1967); Brother-hood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 12 L.Ed.2d 89, 84 S.Ct. 1113 (1964) ; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 9 L.Ed.2d 405, 83 S.Ct. 328 (1963).
* *"The very nature of the lawyer’s profession necessi-tates the utmost good faith toward his client and the highest loyalty and devotion to his client’s interest.”; In Re Thomasson’s Estate, 346 Mo. 911, 918, 144 S.W.2d 79, 80 (1940).
"The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary and of very delicate, exacting and confiden-tial character, requiring very high degree of fidelity and good faith on attorney’s part."; Laughlin v. Boatmen’s Nat. Bank of St. Louis, 163 S.W.2d 761, 762 (1942).
"The relation of an attorney to his client is pre-eminently confidential. It demands on the part of the attorney undivided allegiance, a conspicuous degree of falthfulness and disinterestedness, absolute integrity and utter renunciation of every personal advantage conflictingBlack’s Law Dictionary 4th Ed. Rey.

danger that lawyers rendering services under le-gal service plans which do not permit the bene-ficiarles to select their own attorneys will not be able to meet these standards. The independence of the lawyer may be seriously affected by the fact that he is employed by the group and by vir-tue of that employment cannot give his full devo-tion to the interest of the member he represents. The group which employs the attorney will in-evitably have the characteristic of a "lay inter-mediary" because of its control over the attorney inherent in the employment relationship. It is probably that attorneys employed by groups will be dirocted as to what cases they may handle and in the manner in which they handle the cases referred to them. It is also possible that the standards of the profession and quality of legal service to the public will suffer because considera-tion for economy rather than experience and com-petence will determine the attorneys to be em-ployed by the group. An attorney interested in maintaining the historie traditions of the profes-sion and preserving the function of a lawyer as a trusted and independent advisor to individual members of society should carefully consider the risks involved before accepting employment by groups under plans which do not provide their members with a free choice of counsel.

DISCIPLINARY RULES

DR 2-101 Publicity in Genera1.77
(A) A lawyer shall not prepare, cause to be pre-pared, use, or participate in the use of, any forra of public communication that contains professionally self-laudatory statements cal-culated to attract lay clients; as used herein, "public communication" includes, but is not Ilmited to, communication by means of tele-vision, radio, motion picture, newspaper, mag-azine, or book.
(B) A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other lawyer af-filiated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine advertise-ments, radio or television announcements, dis-play advertisements in city or telephone di-rectories, or other means of commercial pub-licity7,8nor shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf,"except that a lawyer

client." ; State Bar Association of Connecticut v. Con-necticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 234, 140 A.2d 863, 864, 69 A.L.R.2d 394, 402 (1958).
77 Cf. ABA Canon 27; see generally ABA Opinion 293 (1957).
79 Cf. ABA Opinions 133 (1935), 116 (1934), 107 (1934), 73 (1932), 59 (1931), and 43 (1931).
79 "There can be no justification for the participation and acquiescence by an attorney in the development and publication of an article which, on its face, plainly amounts to a self-interest and unethical presentation of his achieve-ments and capabilities." Matter of Connelly, 18 App.Div. 2d 466, 478, 240 N.Y.S.2d 126, 138 (1963).

recommended by, paid by, or whose legal ser-vices are furnished by, any of the offices or organizations enumerated in DR 2-103(D) (1) through (5) may authorize or permit or as-sist such organization to use such means of commereial publicity, which does not identify any lawyer by name, to describe the avail-ability or nature of its legal services or legal service benefits. This rule does not prohibit limited and dignified identification of a law-yer as a lawyer as well as by name: 8°
(1) In political advertisements when his professional status is germane to the political campaign or to a political is-sue.
(2) In public notices when the name and profession of a lawyer are required or authorized by law or are reasonably pertinent for a purpose other than the attraction of potential clients 8′
(3) In routine reports and announcements of a bona fide business, civic, profes-sional, or political organization in whieh he serves as a director or offieer.
(4) In and on legal documents prepared by him.
(5) In and on legal textbooks, treatises, and other legal publications, and in dignified advertisements thereof.
(6) In private communications by any of the offices or organizations enumerated in DR 2-103(D) (1) through (5), along with the biographical information per-mitted under DR 2-102(A) (6), in re-sponse to inquiries from a member or beneficiary of such office or organiza-tion.
(C) A lawyer shall not compensate or give any thing of value to representatives of the press,
"An announcement of the fact that the lawyer had re-signed and the name of the person to succeed him, or take over his work, would not be objectionable, either as an official communication to those ernployed by or connected with the administrative agency or instrumentality [that had employed him], or as a news release.
"But to include therein a statement of the lawyer’s ex-perience in and acquaintance with the various departments and agencies of the government, and a laudation of his legal ability, either generally or in a special branch of the law, is not only bad taste but ethically lmproper.
"It can have but one primary purpose or object : to aid the lawyer in securing professional employment in private practice by advertising his professional experience, attain-ments and ability." ABA Opinion 184 (1938).
Cf. ABA Opinions 285 (1951) and 140 (1935).
SO "The question is always . . whether under the
circumstance the furtherance of the professional employ-ment of the lawyer is the primary purpose of the adver-tisement, or is merely a necessary incident of a proper and legitimate objective of the client which does not have the effect of unduly advertising him." ABA Opinion 290 (1956).
See ARA Opinion 285 (1951).
el sea ARA Opinions 299 (1961), 290 (1956), 158 (1936), and 100 (1933) ; cf. ABA Opinion 80 (1932).

radio, television, or other communication medium in anticipation of or in return for professional publicity in a news item.82
DR 2-102 Professional Notices, Letterheads, Of-fices, and Law Lists.
(A) A lawyer or law firm shall not use profession-al cards, professional announcement cards, office signs, letterheads, telephone directory listings, law lists, legal directory listings, or similar professional notices or devices,83 ex-cept that the following may be used if they are in dignified form:
(1) A professional card of a lawyer identi-fying him by name and as a lawyer, and giving his addresses, telephone numbers, the name of his law firm, and any information permitted under DR 2-105. A professional card of a law firm may also give the names of mem-bers and associates. Such cards may be used for identification 84 but may not be published in perlodicals, maga-zines, newspapers,85 or other media.86
(2) A brief professional announcement card stating new or changed associations or addresses, change of firm name, or simi-lar matters pertaining to the profes-sional office of a lawyer or law firm, which may be mailed to lawyers, clients, formen clients, personal friends, and relatives.87 It shall not state bio-graphical data except to the extent rea-sonably necessary to identify the law-yer or to explain the change in his association, but it may state the im-mediate past position of the lawyer.88 It may give the names and dates of predecessor firms in a continuing line of succession. It shall not state the
"Rule 2.
"[A] member of the State Bar shall not soliclt pro-fessional employment by . .
"(4) The making of gifts to representatives of the press, radio, television or any medium of communica-tion in anticipation of or in return for publicity." CaI.Business and Professions Code § 6076 (West 1962).
83 Cf. ABA Opinions 233 (1941) and 114 (1934).
84 See ABA Opinion 175 (1938).
85 See ABA Opinions 260 (1944) and 182 (1938).
se But cf. ABA Opinions 276 (1947) and 256 (1943).
87 See ABA Opinion 301 (1961).
88 "[I]t has become commonplace for many lawyers tú participate in government service; to deny them the right, upon their return to private practice, to refer to their prior employment in a brief and dignified manner, would place an undue limitation upon a large element of our profes-sion. It is entirely proper for a member of the profession to explain his absence from private practice, where such Is the primary purpose of the announcement, by a brief and dignified reference to the prior employment.
. [A]ny such announcement should be limited to the immediate past connectlon of the lawyer with the gov-ernment, made upon his leaving that posltion to enter pri-vate practice." ABA Opinion 301 (1961).

nature of the practice except as per-mitted under DR 2-105.89
(3) A sign on or near the door of the office and in the building directory identifying the law office. The sign shall not state the nature of the practice, except as permitted under DR 2-105.
(4) A letterhead of a lawyer identifying him by name and as a lawyer, and giv-ing his addresses, telephone numbers, the name of his law firm, associates, and any information permitted under DR 2-105. A letterhead of a law firm may also give the names of members and associates,90 and names and dates relating to deceased and retired mem-bers.91 A lawyer may be designated "Of Counsel" on a letterhead if he has a continuing relationship with a law-yer or law firm, other than as a partner or associate. A lawyer or law firm may be designated as "General Coun-sel" or by similar professional refer-ence on stationery of a client if he or the firm devotes a substantial amount of professional time in the representa-tion of that client.92 The letterhead of a law firm may give the narres and dates of predecessor firms in a con-tinuing fine of succession.
(5) A listing of the office of a lawyer or law firm in the alphabetical and classified sections of the telephone di-rectory or directories for the geographi-cal area or arcas in which the lawyer resides or maintains offices or in which a significant part of his clientele re-sides 93 and in the city directory of the city in which his or the firm’s office is located; 94 but the listing may give only the name of the lawyer or law firm, the fact he is a lawyer, addresses, and telephone numbers.95 The listing shall not be in distinctive form 90 or

99 See ABA Opinion 251 (1943).
90 "Those lawyers who are working for an individual lawyer or a law firm may be designated on the letterhead and in other appropriate places as ‘associates’." ABA Opinion 310 (1963).
91 See ABA Canon 33.
92 But seo ABA Opinion 285 (1951).
93 See ABA Opinion 295 (1959).
94 But see ABA Opinion 313 (1964) which says the Corn-mittee "approves a listing in the classified section of the city directory for lawyers only when the listing Includes all lawyers residing in the community and when no charge is made therefor.-
95 "The listing should consist only of the lawyer’s name, address and telephone number." ABA Opinion 313 (1964).
90 "[A]dding to the regular classified listing a ‘second line’ in which a lawyer claims that he Is engaged in a ‘specialty’ is an undue attempt to make his name distinc-tive." ABA Opinion 284 (1951).

type.97 A law firm may have a listing in the firm name separate from that of its members and associates 98 The list-ing in the classified section shall not be under a heading or classification other than "Attorneys" or "Lawyers",99 except that additional headings or clas-sifications descriptive of the types of practice referred to in DR 2-105 are permitted.100
(6) A listing in a reputable law list 101 or legal directory giving brief biographical and other informativo data. A law list or directory is not reputable if its management or contents are likely to be misleading or injurious to the public or to the profession.102 A law list is concluslvely established to be reputable 1f it is certified by the American Bar Association as being in compliance with its roles and standards. The pub-lished data may include only the follow-ing: name, including name of law firm and names of professional associates; addresses 703 and telephone numbers; one or more fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm concentrates; 104 a

97 "[Opinion 284] held that a lawyer could not with pro-priety have his name Usted in distlnctive type ln a tele-phone directory or city directory. We afflrm that opin-ion," ABA Opinion 313 (1964).
See ABA Opinions 123 (1934) and 53 (1931).
98 "[I]f a lawyer Is a member of a law firm, both the firm, and the individual lawyer may be Usted separately." ABA Opinion 313 (1964).
99 See ABA Opinion 284 (1951).
loe See Silverman v. State Bar of Texas, 405 F.2d 410, (5th Cir. 1968); but seo ABA Opinion 286 (1952).
une,. ABA Canon 43.
102 Cf. ABA Opinion 255 (1943).
103 "We are asked to define the word ‘addresses’ appear-ing in the second paragraph of Canon 27 , .
"It is our opinlon that an address (other than a cable address) within the intendment of the canon is that of the lawyer’s office or of bis residence. Nelther address should be misleading. If, for example, an office address Is given, lt must be that of a bona fide office. The residence ad-dress, if given, should be identified as such if the city or other place of residence is not the same as that in which the law office is located." ABA Opinion 249 (1942).
los "[T]oday in varlous parts of the country Committees on Professlonal Ethics of local and state bar associations are authorizing lawyers to describe themselves in announce-ments to the Bar and in notices in legal periodicals and approved law lists as speclalists in a great variety of things. Thus in the approved law lists or professional announce-ments there appear, in connection with the names of in-dividual practltioners or firms, such designations as ‘In-ternational Law, Publlc and Private’ ; `Trial Preparation in Personal Injury and Negligence Actions’ ; ‘Philippine War Damage Claims’ ; ‘Antl-Trust’ ; ‘Domestic Relations’ ; ‘Tax Law’; ‘Negligence Law’. It would seem that the ABA has given at least its tacit approval to this sort of announcement.
"It is important that this sort of description Is not, in New York at least, permitted on letterheads or shingles or

statement that practice is limited to one or more fields of law; a statement that the lawyer or law firm specializes in a particular field of law or law practice but only if authorized under DR 2-105 (A) (4); 105 date and place of birth; date and place of admission to the bar of state and federal courts; schools attended, with dates of graduation, de-grees, and other scholastic distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; military service; posts of honor; legal author-ships; legal teaching positions; mem-berships, offices, committee assign-ments, and section memberships in bar associations; memberships and offices in legal fraternities and legal societies; technical and professional associations and societies; foreign language ability; names and addresses of references,106 and, with their consent, names of clients regularly represented.107
(B) A lawyer in private practice shall not practice under a trade name, a name that is mislead-ing as to the Identity of the lawyer or lawyers practicing under sueh name, or a firm name containing names other than those of one or more of the lawyers in the firm, except that the name of a professional corporation or pro-fessional association may contain "P.C." or "P.A." or similar symbols indicating the na-ture of the organization, and if otherwise law-ful a firm may use as, or continuo to include in, its name, the name or names of one or more deceased or retired members of the firm or of a predecessor firm in a continuing line of succession.108 A lawyer who assumes a judicial, legislative, or public executive or administrative post or office shall not permit his name to remain in the name of a law firm or to be used in professional notices of the firm during any significant period in which he is not actively and regularly practicing law as a member of the firm,109 and during such
elsewhere in communications to laymen. This is subject to the single exception that such announcement to laymen is permltted in the four traditional specialties, Admiralty, Patent, Copyright and Trade-mark." Report of the Special Committee on Specialization and Specialized Legal Educa-tion, 79 A.B.A.Rep. 582, 586 (1954).
105 This provislon is included to conform to action taken by the ABA House of Delegates at the Mid-Winter Meet-ing, January, 1969.
105 See ABA Canon 43 and ABA Opinion 119 (1934); but see ABA Opinion 236 (1941).
107 See ABA Canon 27.
tos See ABA Canon 33; cf. ABA Opinions 318 (1967), 267
(1945), 219 (1941), 208 (1940), 192 (1939), 97 (1933), and 6 (1925).
109 ABA Opinion 318 (1967) held, "anything to the con-trary in Formal Opinion 315 or in the other opinions cited notwlthstanding" that : "Where a partner whose name appears in the name of a law firm is elected or appointed to high local, state or federal office, which office he in-tends to occupy only temporarily, at the end of which time

period other members of the firm shall not use his name in the firm name or in profes-sional notices of the firm 110
(C) A lawyer shall not hold himself out as having a partnership with one or more other lawyers unless they are in fact partners.111
(D) A partnership shall not be formed or con-tinued between or among lawyers licensed in different jurisdictions maless all enumerations of the members and associates of the firm on its letterhead and in other permissible listings make clear the jurisdictional limitations on those members and associates of the firm not licensed to practice in all listed jurisdic-tions; 112 however, the same firm name may be used in each jurisdiction.
(E) A lawyer who is engaged both in the practice of law and another profession or business shall not so indicate on his letterhead, office sign, or professional card, nor shall he iden-tify himself as a lawyer in any publication in connection with his other profession or busi-ness.
(F) Nothing contained herein shall prohibit a law-yer from using or permitting the use, in con-nection with his name, of an earned degree or title derived therefrom indicating his train-ing in the law.
DR 2-103 Recommendation of Professional Em-ployrnent.113
(A) A lawyer shall not recommend employment, as a private practitioner,111 of himself, his partner, or associate to a non-lawyer who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer.115
he intends to return to his position with the firm, and provided that he is not precluded by holding such office from engaging in the practice of law and does not in fact sever his relationship with the firm but only takes a leave of absence, and provided that there is no local law, stat-ute or custom to the contrary, his name may be retained in the firm name during his term or terms of office, but only if proper precautions are taken not to mislead the public as to his degree of participation in the firm’s af-fairs."
Cf. ABA Opinion 143 (1935), New York County Opinion 67, and New York City Opinions 36 and 798; but cf. ABA Opinion 192 (1939) and Michigan Opinion 164.
110 Cf. ABA Canon 33.
111 See ABA Opinion 277 (1948); cf. ABA Canon 33 and ABA .Opinions 318 (1967), 126 (1935), 115 (1934), and 106 (1934).
112 see ABA Opinions 318 (1967) and 316 (1967); cf. ABA Canon 33.
113 cf. ABA Canons 27 and 28.
114 "We think it clear that a lawyer’s seekIng employ-ment in an ordinary law office, or appointment to a civil service position, is not prohibited by . . . [Canon 27]." ABA Opinion 197 (1939).
111 "[A] lawyer may not seek from persons not his clients the opportunity tú perform . . . a [legal] check-up." ABA Opinion 307 (1962

(B) Except as permitted under DR 2-103(C), a lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person or organization to recom-mend or secure his employment 116 by a client, or as a reward for having made a recommen-dation resulting in his employment 117 by a client.
(C) A lawyer shall not request a person or or-ganization to recommend or promote the use of his services or those of his partner or asso-ciate,118 or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a private practitioner, ex-cept that:
(1) He may request referrals from a law-yer referral service operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association rep-resentative of the general bar of the geographical area in which the associa-tion exists and may pay its fees inch dent thereto.119
(2) He may cooperate with the legal ser-vice activities of any of the offices or organizations enumerated hl. DR 2-103
(D) (1) through (5) and may perform legal services for those to whom he was recommended by it to do such work if:
(a) The person to whom the recom-mendation is made is a member or beneficiary of such office or organizations; and
(b) The lawyer remains free to ex-ercise his independent profession-al judgment on behalf of his client without direction or regu-lation by the organization or any person connected with it.
(D) A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a per-son or organization that furnishes, or pays for legal services to others, to promote the use of his services or those of his partner,
no Cf. ABA Opinion 78 (1932).
117 ‘"No financial connection of any kind between the Brotherhood and any lawyer is permissible. No lawyer can properly pay any amount whatsoever to the Brother-hood or any of its departments, officers or members as compensation, reimbursement of expenses or gratuity in connection with the procurement of a case.’ " In re Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, 13 I11.2d 391, 398, 150 N.E. 2d 163, 167 (1958), quoted in In re Ratner, 194 Kan 362, 372, 399 P.2d 865, 873 (1965).
See ABA Opinion 147 (1935).
118 "This Court has condemned the practice of ambu-lance chasing through the media of runners and touters. In similar fashion we have with equal emphasis condemned the practice of direct solicitation by a lawyer. We have classified both offenses as serious breaches of the Canons of Ethics demanding severe treatment of the offending lawyer." State v. Dawson, 111 So.2d 427, 431 (Fla. 1959).
119 "Registrants Lof a lawyer referral plan] may be re-quired to contribute to the expense of operating it by a reasonable registration charge or by a rcasonable percent-age of fees collected by them." ABA Opinion 291 (1956).
Cf. ABA Opinion 227 (1941).
XXX
or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a private practition-er, except as permitted in DR 2-101(B). How-ever, this does not prohibit a lawyer, or his partner, or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his finn, from being employed or paid by, or cooperating with, one of the following offices or organizations that promote the use of his services or those of bis partner, or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a private practitioner, if his independent professional judgment is exercised in behalf of his client without interferente or control by any or-ganization or other person:
(1) A legal aid office or publie defender office:
(a) Operated or sponsored by a duly accredited law school.
(b) Operated or sponsored by a bona fide non-profit community or-ganization.
(c) Operated or sponsored by a gov-ernmental agency.
(d) Operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association representa-tive of the general bar of the geo-graphical area in which the as-sociation exists.129
(2) A military legal assistance office.
(3) A lawyer referral service operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar asso-ciation representative of the general bar of the geographical area in which the association exists.121
(4) A bar association representative of the general bar of the geographical ama, in which the association exists 122 or an organization operated, sponsored or ap-proved by such a bar association.
(5) Any other organization that furnishes, renders, or pays for legal services to its members or beneficiarles, provided the following eonditions are satisfied: (a) As to such organizations other than a qualified legal assistance organization:
(i) Such organization is not or-ganized for profit and its pri-mary purposes do not include the recommending, furnish-ing, rendering of or paying for legal services.
(ii) Said services must be only in-cidental and reasonably re-
120 Cf. ABA Opinion 148 (1935).
121 Cf. ABA Opinion 227 (1941).
122 "If a bar association has embarked on a program of institutional advertising for an annual legal check-up and provides brochures and reprints, it is not improper to have these available in the lawyer’s office for persons to read and take." ABA Opinion 307 (1962).
Cf. ABA Opinion 121 (1934).

lated to the primary purposes of such organization.
(iii) Such organization or its par-ent or affiliated organization does not derive a profit or commercial benefit from the rendition of legal services by the lawyer.
(1v) The member or beneficiary for whom the legal services are rendered, and not such or-ganization, is recognized as the client of the lawyer in that matter.
(v) Any of the organization’s members or beneficiaries is free to seieet counsel or his or her own choice, provided that if such independent se-lection is made by the client, then such organization, if it customarily provides legal services through counsel it pre-selects, shall promptly re-imburse the member or bene-ficiary in the fair and equita-ble amount said services would have cost such organ-ization if rendered by coun-sel selected by said organiza-tion.
(vi) Such organization is in com-pliance with all applicable laws, rules of court and oth-er legal requirements that govern its operations.
(vii) The lawyer, or his partner,
or associate, or any other law-yer affiliated with him or his firm, shall not have initiated such organization for the pur-pose, in whole or in part, of providing financial or other benefits to him or to them.
(viii) The articles of organization, by-laws, agreement with
counsel, and the schedule of benefits and subscription charges are filed along with any amendments or changes within sixty days of the ef-fective date with the court or other authority having final jurisdiction for the dis-cipline of lawyers within the state, and within sixty days of the end of each fiscal year a financial statement show-ing, with respect to its legal service activities, the income received and the expenses and benefits paid or incurred are filed in the forro such au-thority may prescribe.
(ix) Provided, however, that any non-profit organization which is organized to secure and

protect Constitutionally
guaranteed rights shall be ex-empt from the requirements of (v) and (val.).
(b) As to a qualified legal assistance organization (not described in DR 2-102(D) (1) through (4) ) :
(i) The primary purpose of such organization may be profit or non-profit and it may include the recommending, furnish-ing, rendering of or paying for legal services of all kinds.
(ii) The member or beneficiary, for whom the legal services are rendered, and not such organization, is recognized as the client of the lawyer in the matter.
(iii) Such organization is in com-pliance with ah applicable laws, rules of court and oth-er legal requirements that govern its operations.
(iv) The lawyer, or his partner, or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, shall not have initi-ated suele organization for the purpose, in whole or in part, of providing financial or oth-er benefits to him or to them.
(E) A lawyer shall not accept employment when he knows or it is obvious that the person who seeks his services does so as a result of con-duct prohibited under this Disciplinary Rule.
DR 2-104 Suggestion of Need of Legal Serv-
ices.124
(A) A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a layman that he should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment resulting from that advice,’25 except that:
(1) A lawyer may accept employment by a close friend, relative, former client (if the advice is germane to the former employment), or one whom the lawyer reasonably believes to be a client.126
124 ABA Canon 28.
125 Cf. ABA Opinions 229 (1941) and 173 (1937).
126 "It certainly is not improper for a lawyer to advise his regular clients of new statutes, court decisions, and administrative rulings, which may affect the client’s in-terests, provided the communication ís stríctly limited to such information. . . .
"When such communications go to concerns or indi-viduals other than regular clients of the lawyer, they are thinly disguised advertisements for professional employ-ment, and are obviously improper." ABA Opinion 213 (1941).
"It is our opinion that where the lawyer has no reason to believe that he has been supplanted by another lawyer, it is not only his right, but it might even be his duty to advise his client of any change of fact or law which(2) A lawyer may accept employment that results from his participation in activi-tics designed to educate laymen to rec-ognize legal problems, to make selection of counsel, or to utilize available legal services if such activities are conducted or sponsored by a quali-fied legal assistance organization.
(3) A lawyer who is recommended, fur-nished or paid by any of the offices or organizations enumerated in DR 2-103
(D) (1) through (5) may represent a member or beneficiary thereof, to the extent and under the conditions pre-seribed therein. A lawyer whose legal services are currently being recommend-ed, furnished or paid for by a legal as-sistance organization defined in DR 2- 103 (D) (5) (a) may not accept employ-ment as a private practitioner from a member or beneficiary of such a legal assistance organization in any matter not covered by the benefits provided tmder the plan of such organization when such member or beneficiary has been his client under such plan.
(4) Without affecting his right to accept employment, a lawyer may speak pub-licly or write for publication on legal topics 127 so long as he does not em-phasize his own professional experience or reputation and does not undertake to give individual advice.
(5) If success in asserting rights or defens-es of his client in litigation in the nature of a elass action is dependent upon the joinder of others, a lawyer may accept, but shall not seek, employment from those contacted for the purpose of ob-taining their joInder.129
DR 2-105 Limitation of Practice.129
(A) A lawyer shali not hold himself out publicly as a specialist 130 or as limiting his practice,131 except as permitted under DR 2-102 (A) (6) or as follows:
(1) A lawyer anmitted to practice before the United States Patent Office may use
the designation "Patents," "Patent At-torney," or "Patent Lawyer," or any combination of those terms, on his let-terhead and office sign. A lawyer en-gaged in the trademark practice may use the designation "Trademarks," "Trademark Attorney," or "Trademark Lawyer," or any combination of those terms, on his letterhead and office sign, and a lawyer engaged in the admiralty practice may use the designation "Ad-miralty," "Proctor in Admiralty," or "Admiralty Lawyer," or any combina-tion of those ten-11s, on his letterhead and office sign.132
(2) A lawyer may permit his name to be Usted in lawyer referral service offices according to the fields of law in which he will accept referrals.
(3) A lawyer available to act as a consult-an) to or as an assoeiate of other law-yers in a particular branch of law or legal service may distribute to other lawyers and publish in legal journals a dignified announcement of such avail-ability,133 but the announcement shall not contain a representation of special competence or experience.134 The an-nouncement shall not be distributed to lawyers more frequently than once in a calendar year, but it may be published periodically in legal journals.
(4) A lawyer who is certified as a specialist in a particular field of law or law prac-tice by the authority having jurisdiction under state law over the subject of specialization by lawyers may hold him-self out as such specialist but only in accordance with the rules prescribed by that authority.135
DR 2-106 Fees for Legal Services.139
(A) A lawyer shall not enter finto an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or clearly ex-cessive fee.137
112 See ABA Canon 27; cf. ABA Opinion 286 (1952).
132 Cf. ABA Opinion 194 (1939). 134 See ABA Canon 46.
defeat the client’s testamentary purpose as expressed in the will.
“Periodic notices might be sent to the client for whom a lawyer has drawn a will, suggesting that lt might be wise for the client to reexamine his will to determine whether or not there has been any change in hls situation requir-ing a modification of his will." ABA Opinion 210 (1941).
Cf. ABA Canon 28.
127 Cf. ABA Opinion 168 (1937).
128 But cf. ABA Opinion 111 (1934).
129 See ABA Canon 45; cf. ABA Canons 27, 43, and 46.
110 Cf. ABA Op?nions 228 (1941) and 194 (1939).
111 See ABA Opinions 251 (1943) and 175 (1938).
121 This provision is included to conform to action taken by the ABA House of Delegates at the Mid-Winter Meeting, January, 1969.
13s See ABA Canon 12.
117 The charging of a "clearly excessive fee" is a ground for discipline. State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass’n. v. Richards, 165 Neb. 80, 90, 84 N.W.2d 136, 143 (1957). "An attorney has the right to contract for any fee he chooses so long as it is not excessive (see Opinion 190), and this Committee is not concerned with the amount of such fees unless so excessive as to constitute a misapprc-(B) A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudente would be left with a definite and firm convic-tion that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be considered as guides in de-termining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novel-ty and difficulty of the questions in-volved, and the skill requisite to per-form the legal service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preelude other em-ployment by the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged In the lo-cality for similar legal services.
(4) The amount involved and the results ob-tained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the profes-sional relationship with the client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contin-gent.138
(C) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect a contingent fee for rep-resenting a defendant in a criminal case.139
DR 2-107 Division of Fees Among Lawyers.
(A) A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal serv-ices with another lawyer who is not a partner
priation of the client’s funds (see Opinion 27)." ABA Opinion 320 (1968).
Cf. ABA Opinions 209 (1940), 190 (1939), and 27 (1930) and State ex rel. Lee v. Buchanan, 191 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1966).
118 Cf. ABA Canon 13; see generally MacKinnon, Con-tingent Fees for Legal Services (1964) (A Report of the American Bar Foundation).
130 "Contingent fees, whether in civil or criminal cases, are a special concern of the law. .
"In criminal cases, the rulo is stricter because of the danger of corrupting justice. The second part of Section 542 of the Restatement [of Contracts] reads: ‘A bargain
to conduct a criminal case . . in consideration of a
prornise of a fee contingent on success is illegal. . . "
Peyton v. Margiotti, 398 Pa. 86, 156 A.2d 865, 967 (1959).
"The third area of practice in whlch the use of the con-tingent fee is generally considered to be prohibited is the prosecution and defense of criminal cases. However, there are so few cases, and these are predominantly old, that it is doubtful that there can be said to be any current law
on the subject. . . In the absence of cases on the validíty of contingent fees for defense attorneys, ít is necessary to rely on the consensus among commentators that such a fee is void as against public policy. The nature of criminal practice itself makes unlikely the use of con-tingent fee contracts." MacKinnon, Contingent Fees for Legal Services 52 (1964) (A Report of the American Barin or associate of his law firm or law office, unless:
(1) The client consents to employment of the other lawyer after a full disclosure that a division of fees wlll be made.
(2) The division is made in proportion to the services performed and responsibili-ty assumed by eachmo
(3) The total fee of the lawyers does not clearly exceed reasonable compensation for all legal services they rendered the client.141
(B) This Disciplinary Rule does not prohibit pay-ment to a former partner or associate pur-suant to a separation or retirement agree-ment.
DR 2-108 Agreements Restricting the Practice of a Lawyer.
(A) A lawyer shall not be a party to or participate in a partnership or employment agreement with another lawyer that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice law after the termina-tion of a relationship created by the agree-ment, except as a condition to payment of retirement benefits.142
(B) In connection with the settlement of a con-troversy or suit, a lawyer shall not enter into an agreement that restricts his right to prac• tice law.
DR 2-109 Acceptance of Employment.
(A) A lawyer shall not accept employment on be

(2) Present a claim or defense in litigation that is not warranted under existing law, unless it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modi-fication, or reversal of existing law.
DR 2-110 Withdrawal from Employment.144
(A) In General.
(1) If permission for withdrawal from em-ployment is required by the mies of a tribunal, a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment in a proceeding be-fore that tribunal without its permis-sion.
(2) In any event, a lawyer shall not with-draw from employment until he has taken reasonable steps to avoid fore-seeable prejudice to the rights of his client, including giving due notice to his client, allowing time for employ-ment of other counsel, delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and complying with applicable laws and rules.
(3) A lawyer who withdraws from employ-ment shall refund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned.
(B) Mandatory withdrawal.
A lawyer representing a client before a tribunal, with its permission if required by its rules, shall withdraw from employment, and a lawyer representing a client in other matters shall withdraw from employment, if:
(1) He knows or it is obvious that his client is bringing the legal action, conducting the defense, or asserting a position in the litigation, or is otherwise having steps taken for him, merely for the pur-pose of harassing or maliciously injur-ing any person.
(2) He knows or it is obvious that his con-tinued employment will result in viola-tion of a Disciplinary Rule.145
(3) His mental or physical condition ren-ders it unreasonably difficult for him to carry out the employment effective-ly.
(4) He is discharged by his client.
(C) Permissive withdrawal.146
If DR 2-110(B) is not applicable, a lawyer may not request permission to withdraw in matters pending before a tribunal, and may
out of spite, or solely for the purpose of harassing or de-
laying another . . ." Cal.Business and Professions Code § 6067 (West 1962).
144 Cf. ABA Canon 44.
145 see also Code of Professional Responstbility, DR 5- 102 and DR 5-105.
146 Cf. ABA Canon 4.

of the professional judgment of the lawyer is his educated ability to relate the general body and philosophy of law to a specific legal problem of a client; and thus, the public interest will be better served if only lawyers are permitted to act in mat-ters involving professional judgment. Where this professional judgment is not involved, non-lawyers, such as court clerks, police officers, abstracters, and many governmental employees, may engage in occupations that require a special knowledge of law in certain areas. But the services of a lawyer are essential in the public interest whenever the exercise of professional legal judgment is required.
EC 3-6 A lawyer often delegates tasks to clerks, secretaries, and other lay persons. Such delegation is proper if the lawyer maintains a direct relation-ship with his client, supervises the delegated work, and has complete professional responsibility for the work product.3 This delegation enables a law-yer to render legal service more economically and efficiently.
EC 3-7 The prohibition against a non-lawyer practicing law does not prevent a layman from representing himself, for then he is ordinarily ex-posing only himself to possible injury. The pur-pose of the legal profession is to make educated legal representation available to the public; but anyone who does not wish to avail himself of such representation is not required to do so. Even so, the legal profession should help members of the public to recognize legal problems and to under-stand why it may be unwise for them to act for themselves in matters having legal consequences.
EC 3-8 Since a lawyer should not aid or en-courage a layman to practice law, he should not practice law in association with a layman or other-
3 "A lawyer can employ lay secretaries, lay investigators, lay detectives, lay researchers, accountants, lay scriveners, nonlawyer draf temen or nonlawyer researchers. In fact, he may employ nonlawyers to do any task for him except counsel clients about law matters, engage directly in the practice of law, appear in court or appear in formal pro-ceedings a part of the judicial process, so long as it is he who takes the work and vouches for it to the client and becomes responsIble to the client." ABA Opinion 316 (1967).
ABA Opinion 316 (1967) also stated that if a lawyer prac-tices law as part of a law firm which includes lawyers from several states, he may delegate tasks to flrm mem-bers In other states so long as he "is the person who, on behalf of the firm, vouched for the work of all of the oth-ers and, with the client and In the courts, did the legal acts deflned by that state as the practice of law."
"A lawyer cannot delegate his professional responsibility to a law student employed in his office. He may avail himself of the assistance of the student in many of the fields of the lawyer’s work, such as examination of case law, finding and Interviewing witnesses, making collections of claims, examining court records, delivering papers, conveying Important messages, and other similar matters. But the student is not permitted, until he Is admitted to the Bar, to perform the professional functions of a lawyer, such as conducting court trials, giving professional advice to clients or drawing legal documents for them. The stu-dent in all his work must act as agent for the lawyer em-ploying him, who must supervise his work and be responsi-ble for his good conduct." ABA Opinion 85 (1932).wise share legal fees with a layman.4 This does not mean, however, that the pecuniary value of the interest of a deceased lawyer in his firm or prac-tice may not be paid to his estate or specified per-sons such as his widow or heirs.5 In like manner, profit-sharing retirement plans of a lawyer or law firm which include non-lawyer office employees are not improper.6 These limited exceptions to the rule against sharing legal fees with laymen are permissible since they do not aid or encourage laymen to practice law.
EC 3-9 Regulation of the practice of law is ac-complished principally by the respective states.? Authority to engage in the practice of law con-ferred in any jurisdiction is not per se a grant of the right to practice elsewhere, and it is improper for a lawyer to engage in practice where he is not permitted by law or by court order to do so. However, the demands of business and the mobility of our society pose distinct problems in the regula-tion of the practice of law by the states .9 In fur-
4 "No division of fees for legal services is proper, ex-cept with another lawyer . . .." ABA Canon 34. Oth-erwise, according to ABA Opinion 316 (1967), "[t]he Can-ons of Ethics do not examine into the method by which such persons are remunerated by the lawyer. . . . They may be paid a salary, a per diem charge, a fíat fee, a con-tract price, etc."
See ABA Canons 33 and 47.
5 "Many partnership agreements provide that the active partners, on the death of any one of them, are to make payments to the estate or to the nominee of a deceased part-ner on a pre-determined formula. It is only where the effect of such an arrangement is to make the estate or nominee a member of the partnership along with the sur-viving partners that it is prohibited by Canon 34. Where the payments are made In accordance with a pre-existing agreement entered into by the deceased partner during his lifetime and providing for a fixed method for determining thelr amount based upon the value of services rendered during the partner’s lifetime and providing for a fixed period over which the payments are to be made, this is not the case. Under these circumstances, whether the pay-ments are considered to be delayed payment of compensa-tion earned but withheld during the partner’s lifetime, or whether they are considered to be an approximation of his interest in matters pending at the time of bis death, is im-material. In either event, as Henry S. Drinker says in his book, Legal Ethics, at page 189: ‘It would seem, however, that a reasonable agreement to pay the estate a proportion of the receipts for a reasonable period is a proper practical settlement for the lawyer’s services to bis retirement or death.’ " ABA Opinion 308 (1963).
Cf. ABA Opinion 311 (1964).
7 "That the States have broad power to regulate the practice of law is, of course, beyond question." United Mine Workers v. III. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).
"It is a matter of law, not of ethics, as to where an in-dividual may practice law. Each state has its own rules." ABA Opinion 316 (1967).
8 "Much of clients’ business crosses state les. People are mobile, moving from state to state. Many metro-polítan areas cross state lines. It is common today to have a single economic and social community lnvolving more than one state. The business of a single client may involve legal problems in several states." ABA Opinion 316 (1967).therance of the public interest, the legal profession should discourage regulation that unreasonably im-poses territorial limitations upon the right of a lawyer to handle the legal affairs of his client or upon the opportunity of a client to obtain the serv-ices of a lawyer of his choice in all matters includ-ing the presentation of a contested matter in a tribunal before which the lawyer is not permanent-ly admitted to practice .9

DISCIPL1NARY RULES
DR 3-101 Aiding Unauthorized Practice of Law.10
(A) A lawyer shall not aid a non-lawyer in the un-authorized practice of law.11
(B) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdic-tion where to do so would be in violation of regulatlons of the profession in that jurisdic-tion 12
DR 3-102 Dividing Legal Fees with a Non-Law-yer.
(A) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a non-lawyer,13 except that:
(1) An agreement by a lawyer with his firm, partner, or associate may provide for the payment of money, over a rea-sonable period of time af ter his death, to his estate or to one or more specified persons.14
(2) A lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the de

9 "[W]e reaffirmed the general principie that legal serv-ices to New Jersey residents with respect to New Jersey matters may ordinarily be furnIshed only by New Jersey counsel; but we pointed out that there may be multistate transactlons where strict adherence to this thesis would not be in the public interest and that, under the circumstances, it would have been not only more costly to the client but also ‘grossly impractical and inefticient’ to have had the settlement negotiations conducted by separate lawyers from different states." In re Estate of Waring, 47 N.J. 367, 376, 221 A.2d 193, 197 (1966).
Cf. ABA Opinion 316 (1967).
19 Conduct permitted by the Disciplinary Rules of Can-ons 2 and 5 does not violate DR 3-101.
11 See ABA Canon 47.
12 it should be noted, however, that a lawyer may en-gage in conduct, otherwise prohibited by this Disciplinary Rule, where such conduct is authorized by preemptive fed-eral legislation. See Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 10 L.Ed.2d 428, 83 S.Ct. 1322 (1963).
ls See ABA Canon 34 and ABA Opinions 316 (1967), 180 (1938), and 48 (1931).
"The receiving attorney shall not under any guise or form share his fee for legal services with a lay agency, personal or corporate, without prejudice, however, to the right of the lay forwarder to charge and collect from the creditor proper compensation for non-legal services ren-dered by the law [sic] forwarder which are separate and apart from the services performed by the receiving at-torney." ABA Opinion 294 (1958).
14 See ABA Opinions 309 (1963) and 266 (1945).

ceased lawyer that proportion of the total compensation which fairly repre-senta the services rendered by the de-ceased lawyer.
(3) A lawyer or law firm may include non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrange-ment-15
DR 3-103 Forming a Partnership with a Non-Lawyer.
(A) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a non-lawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.16
CANON 4
A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidentes and Secrets of a Client
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
EC 4-1 Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client and the proper function-ing of the legal system require the preservation by the lawyer of confidences and secrets of one who has employed or sought to employ him.1 A client must feel free to discuss whatever he wishes
15 Cf. ABA Opinion 311 (1964).
le See ABA Canon 33; cf. ABA Opinions 239 (1942) and 201 (1940).
ABA Opinion 316 (1967) states that lawyers licensed in different jurisdictions may, under certain conditions, en-ter "finto an arrangement for the practice of law" and that a lawyer licensed in State A is not, for such purpose, a layman in State B.
1 See ABA Canons 6 and 37 and ABA Opinion 287 (1953).
"The reason underlying the rule with respect to confi-dential communications between attorney and client is well stated in Mecham on Agency, 2d Ed., Vol. 2, § 2297, as follows: ‘The purposes and necessities of the relation between a client and his attorney require, in many cases, un the part of the client, the fullest and freest disclosures to the attorney of the client’s objects, motives and acts. This disclosure is made in the strictest confidente, rely-ing upon the attorney’s honor and fidelity. To permit the attorney to reveal to others what is so disclosed, would be not only a gross violation of a sacred trust upon his part, but it would utterly destroy and prevent the use-fulness and benefits to be derived from professional assist-ance. Based upon considerations of public policy, there-fore, the law wisely declares that all confidential com-munications and disclosures, made by a client to his legal adviser for the purpose of obtaining his professional aid or advice, shall be strictly privileged ;—that the attorney shall not be permitted, without the consent of his client,-and much less will he be compelled—to reveal or disclose communications made to him under such circumstances.’ " ABA Opinion 250 (1943).
"While it is true that complete revelation of relevant facts should be encouraged for trial purposes, nevertheless an attorney’s dealings with his client, if both are sin-cere, and if the dealings involve more than mere technical matters, should be immune to discovery proceedings. There must be freedom from fear of revealment of mat-ters disclosed to an attorney because of the peculiarly intimate relationshlp existing." Ellis-Foster Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 159 F.Supp. 917, 919 (D.N.J. 1958).
Cf. ABA Opinions 314 (1965), 274 (1946) and 268 (194

with his lawyer and a lawyer must be equally free to obtain information beyond that volunteered by his client.2 A lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling in order for his client to obtain the full advantage of our legal system. It is for the lawyer in the exercise of his independent professional judgment to sepa-rate the relevant and important from the irrelevant and unimportant. The observante of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate the con-fidences and secrets of his client not only facili-tates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also en-courages laymen to seek early legal assistance.
EC 4-2 The obligation to protect confidences and secrets obviously does not preclude a lawyer from revealing information when his client consents after full disclosure,3 when necessary to perform his professional employment, when permitted by a Disciplinary Rule, or when required by law. Un-less the client otherwise directs, a lawyer may dis-close the affairs of his client to partners or asso-ciates of his firm. It is a matter of common knowl-edge that the normal operation of a law office ex-poses confidential professional information to non-lawyer employees of the office, particularly secre-taries and those having access to the files; and this obligates a lawyer to exercise tare in selecting and training his employees so that the sanctity of all confidences and secrets of his clients may be pre-served. If the obligation extends to two or more clients as to the same information, a lawyer should obtain the permission of all before revealing the information. A lawyer must always be sensitive to the rights and wishes of his client and act scrupulously in the making of decisions which may involve the disclosure of information obtained in his professional relationship.4 Thus, in the ab-sence of consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer should not associate another lawyer in the handling of a matter; nor should he, in the ab-sence of consent, seek counsel from another lawyer
2 "While It is the great purpose of law to ascertain the truth, there is the countervailing necessity of insuring the right of every person to freely and fully confer and confide in one having knowledge of the law, and skilled in its practice, in order that the former may have adequate advice and a proper defense. This assistance can be made safely and readily available only when the client is free from the consequences of apprehension oí disclosure by reason of the subseq.uent statements of the skilled lawyer." Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1960).
Cf. ABA Opinion 150 (1936).
3 "Where . . . [a client] knowingly and after full disclosure participates in a [legal fee] financing plan which requires the furnlshing of certain information to the bank, elearly by his conduct he has waived any priv-Ilege as to that Information." ABA Opinion 320 (1968).
4 "The lawyer must decide when he takes a case whether It is a suitable one for him to undertake and after this decislon is made, he is not justified in turning against his client by exposing injurlous evidente entrusted to him. . . . [D]oing something intrinsically regrettable, because the only alternative involves worse consequences, is a necessity in every profession." Williston, Life and Law 271 (1940).
Cf. ABA Opinions 177 (1938) and 83 (1932)

of the client or his confidences or secrets would be revealed to such lawyer. Both social amenities and professional duty should cause a lawyer to shun indiscreet conversations concerning his clients.
EC 4-3 Unless the client otherwise directs, it is not improper for a lawyer to give limited informa-tion from his files to an outside agency necessary for statistical, bookkeeping, accounting, data proc-essing, banking, printing, or other legitimate pur-poses, provided he exercises due tare in the selec-tion of the agency and warns the agency that the information must be kept confidential.
EC 4-4 The attorney-client privilege is more limit-ed than the ethical obligation of a lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his client. This ethical precept, unlike the evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to the nature or source of information or the fact that others share the knowledge. A lawyer should endeavor to act in a manner which preserves the evidentiary privi-lege; for example, he should avoid professional discussions in the presence of persons to whom the privilege does not extend. A lawyer owes an ob-ligation to advise the client of the attorney-client privilege and timely to assert the privilege unless it is waived by the client.
EC 4-5 A lawyer should not use information ac-quired In the course of the representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client and a law-yer should not use, except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, such information for his own purposes.5 Likewise, a lawyer should be diligent in his efforts to prevent the misuse of such information by his employees and associates.6 Care should be exercised by a lawyer to prevent the disclosure of the confidences and secrets of one client to another,7 and no employment should be accepted that might require such disclosure.
EC 4-6 The obligation of a lawyer to preserve the confidences and secrets of his client continues after the termination of his employment.5 Thus a law-yer should not attempt to sell a law practice as a going business because, among other reasons, to do so would involve the disclosure of confidences and secrets.5 A lawyer should also provide for the
See ABA Canon 11.
6 See ABA Canon 37.
7 See ABA Canons 6 and 37.
"[A]ti attorney must not accept professional employment against a client or a former client which will, or even may require him to use confidential information obtained by the attorney in the course of his professional relations with such client regarding the subject matter of the employ-
ment . " ABA Opinion 165 (1936).
8 See ABA Canon 37.
"Confidential communications between an attorney and his client, made because of the relationship and concerning the subject-matter of the attorney’s employment, are generally privileged from disclosure without the con-sent of the client, and this privilege outlasts the attor-ney’s .employment. Canon 37." ABA Opinion 154 (1936).
9 Cf. ABA Opinion 266 (1945)

protection of the confidences and secrets of his client following the termination of the practice of the lawyer, whether termination is due to death, disability, or retirement. For example, a lawyer might provide for the personal papers of the client to be returned to him and for the papers of the lawyer to be delivered to another lawyer or to be destroyed. In determining the method of disposi-tion, the instructions and wishes of the client should be a dominant consideration.

DISCIPLINARY RULES
DR 4-101 Preservation of Confidentes and Se-crets of a Client.»
(A) "Confidente" refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applica-ble law, and "secret" refers to other informa-tion gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be heid inviolate or the disclosure of which would be em-barrassing or would be likely to be detrimen-tal to the client.
(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.11
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself 12 or of a third person,13 unless the client con-sents after full disclosure.

lo See ABA Canon 37; cf. ABA Canon 6.
11 "§ 6068 . It ls the duty of an attorney :
. . •
"(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself to preserve the secrets, of his client." Cal. Business and Professions Code § 6068 (West 1962). Vir-tually the same provision is found in the Oregon statutes. Ore.Rev.Stats. ch. 9, § 9.460(5).
"Communications between lawyer and client are priv-ileged (Wigmore on Evidente, 3d. Ed., Vol. 8, §§ 2290-2329). The modern theory underlying the privilege is sub-jective and is to give the client freedom of apprehension in consulting his legal adviser (ibid., § 2290, p. 548). The privilege applies to communications made in seeking legal advice for any purpose (ibid., § 2294, p. 563). The mere circumstance that the advice is given without charge there-fore does not nullify the privilege (ibid., § 2303)." ABA Opinion 216 (1941).
"It is the duty of an attorney to maintain the confidence
and preserve inviolate the secrets of his client . . ABA Opinion 155 (1936).
12 See ABA Canon 11.
"The provision respecting employment is in accord with the general rule announced in the adjudicated cases that a lawyer may not make use of knowledge or informa-tion acquired by him through his professional relations with his client, or in the conduct of his client’s business, to his own advantage or profit (7 C.J.S., § 125, p. 958; Healy v. Gray, 184 Iowa 111, 168 N.W. 222; Baumgardner v. Hudson, D.C.App., 277 F. 552; Goodrum v. Clement, D.C.App., 277 F. 586)." ABA Opinion 250 (1943).
13 See ABA Opinion 177 (1938)

(C) A lawyer may reveal:
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected, but only after a full disclosure to them.14
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Bailes or required by law or court order.15
(3) The intention of his client to eommlt a crime 16 and the information necessary to prevent the crime.17
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to es-tablish or collect his fee 18 or to defend

14 "[A lawyer] may not divulge confidential communi-cations, information, and secrets imparted to him by the client or acquired during thelr professional relations, un-less he Is authorized to do so by the client (People v. Ger-old, 265 III. 448, 107 N.E. 165, 178; Murphy v. Riggs, 238 Mich. 151, 213 N.W. 110, 112; Opinion of this Committee, No. 91)." ABA Opinion 202 (1940).
Cf. ABA Opinion 91 (1933).
11 "A defendant in a criminal case when admitted to bail is not only regarded as in the custody of his bail, but he is also in the custody of the law, and admission to bail does not deprive the court of its inherent power to deal with the person of the prisoner. Being in lawful custody, the defendant is guilty of an escape when he gains his liberty before he is delivered in due process of law, and is guilty of a separate offense for which he may be punished. In failing to disclose his client’s where-abouts as a fugitive under these circumstances the attor-ney would not only be aiding his client to escape trial on the charge for which he was indicted, but would likewise be aiding him in evading prosecution for the additional offense of escape.
"It Is the opinion of the committee that under such cir-cumstances the attorney’s knowledge of his client’s where-abouts is not privileged, and that he may be disciplined for failing to disclose that information to the proper au-
thorities. . ." ABA Opinion 155 (1936).
"We held in Opinion 155 that a communication by a client to his attorney in respect to the future commission of an unlawful act or to a continuing wrong is not priv-ileged from disclosure. Public policy forbids that the re-lation of attorney and client should be used to conceal wrongdoing on the part of the client.
"When an attorney representing a defendant in a criminal case applies on his behalf for probation or suspen-sion of sentence, he represents to the court, by implication at least, that his client will abide by the terms and con-ditions of the court’s order. When that attorney is later advised of a violation of that order, it is his duty to ad-vise his client of the consequences of his act, and endeavor to prevent a continuance of the wrongdoing. If his client thereafter persists in violating the terms and conditions of his probation, it is the duty of the attorney as an officer of the court to advise the proper authorities concerning his client’s conduct. Such information, even though coming to the attorney from the client in the course of his profes-sional relations with respect to other matters in which he represents the defendant, is not privileged from disclosure. . . ." ABA Opinion 156 (1936).
16 ABA Opinion 314 (1965) indicates that a lawyer must disclose even the confidences of his clients if "the facts in the attorney’s possession indicate beyond reasonable doubt that a crime will be committed."
See ABA Opinion 155 (1936).
17 See ABA Canon 37 and ABA Opinion 202 (1940). is Cf. ABA Opinion 250 (1943).

himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful con-duct.19
(D) A lawyer shall exercise reasonable tare to prevent his employees, associates, and others whose services are utilized by him from dis-closing or using confidences or secrets of a client, except that a lawyer may reveal the information allowed by DR 4-101(C) through an employee.

CANON 5

Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

EC 5-1 The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of com-promising influences and loyalties.1 Neither his

19 See ABA Canon 37 and ABA Opinions 202 (1940) and 19 (1930).
"[T]he adjudicated cases recognize an exception to the rule [that a lawyer shall not reveal the confidences of his client], where disclosure is necessary to protect the attorney’s interests arising out of the relation of attorney and client in which disclosure was made.
‘The exception is stated in Mechem on Agency, 2d Ed., Vol. 2, § 2313, as follows : ‘But the attorney may disclose information received from the client when it becomes necessary for his own protection, as if the client should bring an action against the attorney for negligente or mis-conduct, and it became necessary for the attorney to show what his instructions were, or what was the nature of the duty which the client expected him to perform. So if it became necessary for the attorney to bring an ac-tion against the client, the client’s privilege could not pre-vent the attorney from disclosing what was essential as a means of obtaining or defending his own rights.’
"Mr. Jones, in his Commentaries on Evidente, 2d Ed., Vol. 5, § 2165, states the exception thus : ‘It has frequently been held that the rule as to privileged communications does not apply when litigation arises between attorney and client to the extent that their communications are relevant to the issue. In such cases, if the disclosure of privileged communications becomes necessary to protect the attorney’s rights, he is released from those obligations of secrecy which the law places upon him. He should not, however, disclose more than is necessary for his own protection. It would be a manifest injustice to allow the client to take ad-vantage of the rule of exclusion as to professional confi-dence to the prejudice of his attorney, or that it should be carrled to the extent of depriving the attorney of the. means of obtaining or defending his own rights. In such cases the attorney is exempted from the obligations of
secrecy.’ ABA Opinion 250 (1943).
1 Cf. ABA Canon 35.
"[A lawyer’s] fiduciary duty is of the highest order and he must not represent interests adverse to those of the client. It is also true that because of bis professional responsibility and the confidente and trust which his client may legitimately repose in him, he must adhere to a high standard of honesty, integrity and good faith in deal-ing with his client. He is not permitted to take advantage of bis position or superior knowledge to impuse upon the client; nor to conceal facts or law, nor in any way deceive

terference would occur with respect to a prospec-tive client, a lawyer should decline employment proffered by him. After accepting employment, a lawyer should not acquire property rights that would adversely affect his professional judgment in the representation of his client. Even if the property interests of a lawyer do not presently in-terfere with the exercise of his independent judg-ment, but the likelihood of interferente can rea-sonably be foreseen by him, a lawyer should ex-plain the situation to his client and should decline employment or withdraw unless the client con-sents to the continuance of the relationship after full disclosure. A lawyer should not seék to per-suade his client to permit him to invest in an un-dertaking of his client nor make improper use of his professional relationship to influence his client to invest in an enterprise in which the lawyer is interested.
EC 5-4 If, in the course of his representation of a client, a lawyer is permitted to receive from his client a beneficial ownership in publication rights relating to the subject matter of the employment, he may be tempted to subordinate the interests of his client to his own anticipated pecuniary gain. For example, a lawyer in a criminal case who ob-tains from his client television, radio, motion pic-ture, newspaper, magazine, book, or other publica-tion rights with respect to the case may be influ-enced, consciously or unconsciously, to a course of conduct that will enhance the value of his publica-tion rights to the prejudice of his client. To pre-vent these potentially differing interests, such ar-rangements should be scrupulously avoided prior to the termination of all aspects of the matter giv-ing rise to the employment, even though his em-ployment has previously ended.
EC 5-5 A lawyer should not suggest to his client that á gift be made to himself or for his benefit. If a lawyer accepts a gift from his client, he is peculiarly susceptible to the charge that he unduly influenced or overreached the client. If a client voluntarily offers to make a gift to his lawyer, the lawyer may accept the gift, but bef ore doing so, he should urge that his client secure disinterested ad-vice from an independent, competent person who is cognizant of all the circumstances.3 Other than in
3 "Courts of equity will scrutinize with jealous vigilante transactions between parties occupying fiduciary relations
toward each other. . . A deed will not be held in- valid, however, if made by the grantor with full knowl-edge of its nature and effect, and because of the deliberate, voluntary and intelligent desire of the grantor.
Where a fiduciary relation exists, the burden of proof is on the grantee or beneficiary of an instrument executed during the existence of such relationship to show the fair-ness of the transaction, that it was equitable and just
and that it did not proceed from undue influence. . The same rule has application where an attorney engages In a transaction with a client during the existence of the relation and is beneflted thereby. . . . Conversely, an attorney is not prohibited from dealing with bis client or buying his property, and such contracts, if oyen, fair and honest, when deliberately made, are as valid as contracts
between other parties. . [I]mportant factors in determining whether a transaction 1s falr include a show-ing by the fiduciary (1) that he made a full and frank

exceptional circumstances, a lawyer should insist that an instrument in which his client desires to name him beneficially be prepared by another law-yer selected by the client.4
EC 5-6 A lawyer should not consciously influ-ence a client to name him as executor, trustee, or lawyer in an instrument. In those cases where a client wishes to name his lawyer as such, care should be taken by the lawyer to avoid even the appearance of impropriety.5
EC 5-7 The possibility of an adverse effect upon the exercise of free judgment by a lawyer on be-half of his client during litigation generally makes it undesirable for the lawyer to acquire a proprie-tary interest in the cause of his client or otherwise to become financially interested in the outcome of the litigation.6 However, it is not improper for a lawyer to protect his right to collect a fee for his services by the assertion of legally permissible liens, even though by doing so he may acquire an interest in the outcome of litigation. Although a contingent fee arrangement 7 gives a lawyer a financial interest in the outcome of litigation, a reasonable contingent fee is permissible in civil cases because it may be the only means by which a layman can obtain the services of a lawyer of his choice. But a lawyer, because he is in a better position to evaluate a cause of action, should enter into a contingent fee arrangement only in those instances where the arrangement will be beneficial to the client.
EC 5-8 A financial interest in the outcome of liti-gation also results if monetary advances are made by the lawyer to his client.S Although this assist-ance generally is not encouraged, there are in-stances when it is not improper to make loans to a client. For example, the advancing or guarantee-ing of payment of the costs and expenses of litiga-tion by a lawyer may be the only way a client can enforce his cause of action,9 but the ultimate lia-
disclosure of all the relevant Information that he had ; (2) that the consideration was adequate; and (3) that the principal had independent advice before completing the transaction." McFall v. Braden, 19 Il1.2d 108, 117-18, 166 N.E.2d 46, 52 (1960).
4 See State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass’n v. Richards, 165 Neb. 80, 94-95, 84 N.W.2d 136, 146 (1957).
5 See ABA Canon 9.
6 See ABA Canon 10.
7 See Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 2-20. See ABA Canon 42.
9 "Role 3a. . . . A member of the State Bar shall not directiy or indlrectly pay or agree to pay, or repre-sent or sanction the representatión that he will pay, med-ical, hospital or nursing bilis or other personal expenses incurred by or for a client, prospective or existing; pro-vided this rule shall not prohibit a member :
"(1) with the consent of the client, from paying or agreeing to pay to third persons such expenses from funds collected or to be collected for the client; or
(2) after he has been employed, from lending money to his client upon the client’s promise in writing to repay such loan: or
bility for such costs and expenses must be that of the client.
EC 5-9 Occasionally a lawyer is called upon to decide in a particular case whether he will be a witness or an advocate. If a lawyer is both coun-sel and witness, he becomes more easily impeach-able for interest and thus may be a less effective witness. Conversely, the opposing counsel may be handicapped in challenging the credibility of the lawyer when the lawyer also appears as an advo-cate in the case. An advocate who becomes a wit-ness is in the unseemly and ineffective position of arguing his own credibility. The roles of an ad-vocate and of a witness are inconsistent; the func-tion of an advocate is to advance or argue the cause of another, while that of a witness is to state facts objectively.
EC 5-10 Problems incident to the lawyer-witness relationship arise at different stages; they relate either to whether a lawyer should accept employ-ment or should withdraw from employment.10 Re-gardless of when the problem arises, his decision is to be governed by the same basic considerations. It is not objectionable for a lawyer who is a po-tential witness to be an advocate if it is unlikely that he will be called as a witness because his tes-timony would be merely cumulative or if his testi-mony will relate only to an uncontested issue.11 In the exceptional situation where it will be man-ifestly unfair to the client for the lawyer to refuse employment or to withdraw when he will likely be a witness on a contested issue, he may serve as advocate even though he may be a witness.12 In making such decision, he should determine the per-sonal or financial sacrifice of the client that may result from his refusal of employment or with-
(3) from advancing the costs of prosecutin•g or defend-ing a claim or action. Such costs wlthin the meaning of this subparagraph (3) include all taxable costs or disburse-ments, costs or investigation and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence." Cal. Business and Professions Code § 6076 (West Supp.1967).
lo "When a lawyer knows, prior to trial, that he will be a necessary witness, except as to merely formal mat-ters such as ldentífication or custody of a document or the like, neither he nor his firm or associates should con-duct the trial. If, during the trial, he discovers that the ends of justice require his testimony, he should, from that point on, if feasible and not prejudicial to his client’s case, leave further conduct of the trial to other counsel. If circumstances do not permit withdrawal from the con-duct of the trial, the lawyer should not argue the credi-bility of his own testimony." A Code of Trial Conduct: Promulgated by the American College of Trial Lawyers, 43 A.B.A.J. 223, 224-25 (1957).
11 Cf. Canon 19: "When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters, such as the attestation or custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to other counsel."
12 "It Is the general rule that a lawyer may not testify in litigation in which he is an advocate unless circum-stances arise which could not be anticipated and it is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In those rare cases where the testimony of an attorney is needed to protect his client’s interests, ít is not only proper but mandatory that it be forthcoming." Schwartz v. Wenger, 267 Minn. 40, 43-44, 124 N.W.2d 489, 492 (1963).

drawal therefrom, the materiality of his testimony, and the effectiveness of his representation in view of his personal involvement. In weighing these factors, it should be clear that refusal or with-drawal will impose an unreasonable hardship upon the client before the lawyer accepts or continues the employment.13 Where the question arises, doubts should be resolved in favor of the lawyer testifying and against his becoming or continuing as an advocate.14
EC 5-11 A lawyer should not permit his personal interests to influence his advice relative to a sug-gestion by his client that additional counsel be employed 1° In like manner, his personal interests should not deter him from suggesting that addi-tional counsel be employed; on the contrary, he should be alert to the desirability of recommend-ing additional counsel when, ín his judgment, the proper representation of his client requires it. However, a lawyer should advise his client not to employ additional counsel suggested by the client if the lawyer believes that such employment would be a disservice to the client, and he should dis-close the reasons for his belief.
EC 5-12 Inability of co-counsel to agree on a mat-ter vital to the representation of their client re-quires that their disagreement be submitted by them jointly to their client for his resolution, and the decision of the client shall control the action to be taken.18
EC 5-13 A lawyer should not maintain member-ship in or be influenced by any drganization of employees that undertakes to prescribe, direct, or suggest when or how he should fulfill his pro-fessional obligations to a person or organization that employs him as a lawyer. Although it is not necessarily improper for a lawyer employed by a corporation or similar entity to be a member of an organization of employees, he should be vig-ilant to safeguard his fidelity as a lawyer to his employer, free from outside influences.
13 -The great weight of authority in this country holds that the attorney who acts as counsel and witness, in be-half of his client, in the same cause on a material matter, not of a merely formal character, and not in an emergency, but having knowledge that he would be required to be a witness in ample time to have secured other counsel and given up his service in the case, violates a highly im-portant provlsion of the Code of Ethics and a rule of professlonal conduct, but does not commit a legal error in so testifying, as a result of which a new trial will be granted." Erwln M. Jennings Co. v. DiGenova, 107 Conn. 491, 499, 141 A. 866, 869 (1928).
14 "[Ciases may arise, and in practice often do arise, in which there would be a failure of justice should the at-torney withhold his testimony. In such a case it would be a vicious professional sentiment which would deprive the client of the benefit of his attorney’s testimony." Con-nolly v. Straw, 53 Wis. 645, 649, 11 N.W. 17, 19 (1881).
But see Canon 19: "Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in court in be-half of his client."
15 Cf. ABA Canon 7. See ABA Canon 7.
Interests of Multiple Clients
EC 5-14 Maintaining the independence of profes-sional judgment required of a lawyer precludes his acceptance or continuation of employment that will adversely affect his judgment on behalf of or dilute his loyalty to a client 17 This problem arises whenever a lawyer is asked to represent two or more clients who may have differing interests, whether such interests be conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or otherwise discordant.18
EC 5-15 If a lawyer is requested to undertake or to continue representation of multiple clients hav-ing potentially differing interests, he must weigh carefully the possibility that his judgment may be impaired or his loyalty divided if he accepts or continues the employment. He should resolve all doubts against the propriety of the representation. A lawyer should never represent in litigation mul-tiple clients with differing interests,19 and there are few situations in which he would be justified in representing in litigation multiple clients with potentially differing interests. If a lawyer ac-cepted such employment and the interests did be-come actually differing, he would have to with-draw from employment with likelihood of result-ing hardship on the clients; and for this reason it is preferable that he refuse the employment ini-tially. On the other hand, there are many in-stances in which a lawyer may properly serve mul-tiple clients having potentially differing interests in matters not involving litigation. If the inter-ests vary only slightly, it is generally likely that
17 See ABA Canon 6; cf. ABA Opinions 261 (1944), 242 (1942), 142 (1935), and 30 (1931).
19 The ABA Canons speak of "conflicting interests" rather than "differing interests" but make no attempt to define such other than the statement in Canon 6: "Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to con-tend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose."
19 "Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, adopt-ed by the American Bar Association on September 30, 1937, and by the Pennsylvania Bar Association on January 7, 1938, provides in part that ‘It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given alter a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this Canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.’ The full disclosure required by this canon contemplates that the possibly adverse effect of the conflict be fully explained by the attorney to the client to be affected and by him thoroughly understood.
"The foregoing canon applies to cases where the cir-cumstances are such that possibly conflicting interests may permissibly be represented by the same attorney. But manifestly, there are instantes where the conflicto of interest are so critically adverse as not to admit of one attorney’s representing both sides. Such is the situation which this record presento. No one could conscionably contend that the same attorney may represent both the plaintiff and defendant in an adversary action. Yet, that is what is being done in this case." Jedwabny v. Philo-delphia Transportation Co., 390 Pa. 231, 235, 135 A.2d 252, 254 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 966, 2 L.Ed.2d 541, 78 S.Ct. 557 (1958).

(B) A lawyer shall not accept employment in con-templated or pending litigation if he knows or It is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm ought to be called as a witness, except that he may undertake the employment and he or a lawyer in his firm may testify:
If the testimony will relate solely to an uncontested matter.
If the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality and there is no rea-son to believe that substantial evidence will be offered in opposition to the testi-mony.
If the testimony will relate solely to the nature and value of legal services ren-dered in the case by the lawyer or his firm to the client.
As to any matter, If refusal would work a substantial hardship on the client be-cause of the distinctive value of the law-yer or his firm as counsel in the partic-ular case.
DR 5-102 Withdrawal as Counsel When the Law-yer Becomes a Witness.30
(A) If, after undertaking employment in contem-plated or pending litigation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm ought to be called as a witness on behalf of his client, he shall withdraw from the con-duct of the trial and his firm, if any, shall not continue representation in the trial, except that he may continue the representation and he or a lawyer in his firm may testify in the circuanstances enumerated in DR 5-101(B) (1) through (4).
(B) If, after undertaking employment in contem-plated or pending litigation, a lawyer learns or it 1s obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm may be called as a witness other than on behalf of his client, he may continue the representation untes it is apparent that his testimony is or may be prejudicial to his client.31
the firm who was public prosecuting attorney. The. Opin-ion stated that it was clearly unethical for one member of the firm to oppose the interest of the state while an-
other member represented those interests . . Since the prosecutor himself could not represent both the public and the defendant, no member of his law flrm could either." ABA Opinion 296 (1959).
so Cf. ABA Canon 19 and ABA Opinions 220 (1941), 185 (1938), 50 (1931), and 33 (1931); but cf. Erwln M. Jen nings Co. v. DiGenova, 107 Conn. 491, 498-99, 141 A. 866, 868 (1928).
al "This Canon [19] of Ethics needs no elaboration to be applled to the facts here. Apparently, the object of this precept is to avoid putting a lawyer in the obviously embarrassing predicament of testifying and then having to argue the credibility and effect of his own testimony. It was not designed to permit a lawyer to call opposing counsel as a witness and thereby disqualify him as coun-sel." Galarowicz v. Ward, 119 Utah 611, 620, 230 P.2d 576, 580 (1951).
DR 5-103 Avoiding Acquisition of Interest in Lit-igation.
(A) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary in-terest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation he is conducting for a client,32 except that he may:
(1) Acquire a lien granted by law to secure his fee or expenses.
(2) Contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.33
While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial as« sista,nce to his client,34 except that a lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, including court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examina-tion, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the client remains ultimate-ly Hable for such expenses.
5-104 Limiting Business Relations with a Client.
A lawyer shall not enter Into a business trans-action with a client if they have differing interests therein and if the client expects the lawyer to exercise Ida professional judgment therein for the protection of the client, unless the client has consented after full disclosure.
Prior to conclusion of all aspects of the mat-ter giving rise to his employment, a lawyer shall not enter finto any arrangement or un-derstanding with a client or a prospective client by which he acquires an interest in pub-lication rights with respect to the subject matter of his employment or proposed em-ployment.
DR 5-105 Refusing to Accept or Confirme Em-ployment if the Interests of Another Client May Impair the Independent Professional Judgment of the Lawyer.
(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment 1f the exercise of his Independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or la likely to be adversely affected by the aecept-anee of the proffered employment,35 or if it would be likely to involve him in representing differIng interests, except to the extent per-mitted under DR 5-105(C).36
32 ABA Canon 10 and ABA Opinions 279 (1949), 246 (1942), and 176 (1938).
aa See Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-106(C).
34 See ABA Canon 42; cf. ARA Opinion 288 (1954).
35 See ABA Canon 6; cf. ABA Opinions 167 (1937), 60 (1931), and 40 (1931).
86 ABA Opinion 247 (1942) held that an attorney could not investígate a nlght club shooting on behalf of one of the owner’s liability lnsurers, obtaining the cooperation of the owner, and later represent the Injured patron in an action against the owner and a different insurance com-(B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employ-ment if the exercise of his independent pro-fessional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by his representation of another client, or if it would be likely to involve him in representing differ-ing interests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).37
(C) In the situations covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately rep-resent the interest of each and 1f each con• sents to the representation after full disclo-sure of the possible effect of such representa-tion on the exercise of his independent pro-fessional judgment on behalf of eaeh.
(D) If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm may accept or continue such employ-ment.
DR 5-106 Settling Similar Claims of Clients.35
(A) A lawyer who representa two or more clients shall not make or particípate in the making of an aggregate settlement of the claims of or agalnst bis clients, unless each client has consented to the settlement after being ad-vised of the existence and nature of all the claims involved in the proponed settlement, of the total amount of the settlement, and of the participation oí each person in the settlement•
DR 5-107 Avoiding Influence by Others Than the Client.
(A) Except with the consent of his client alter full diselosure, a lawyer shall not:
(1) Accept compensation for his legal serv-ices from one other than his client.
(2) Accept from one other than his client any thing of value related to his representa-tion of or bis employment by his client.39
(B) A lawyer shall not permit a person who rec-ommends, employs, or pays him to render legal services for another to direct or regulate
pany uniese the attorney obtain the "exprese consent of all concerned given alter a full disclosure of the facts," (duce to do so would be to represent conflicting lnterests.
Bes ABA Opinions 247 (1942), 224 (1941), 222 (1941), 218
(1941), 112 (1934), 83 (1932), and 86 (1932).
37 Cf. ABA Opinions 231 (1941) and 160 (1936).
38 Cf. ABA Opinions 243 (1942) and 235 (1941).
38 See ABA Canon 38.
"A lawyer who receives a commisslon (whether delayed or not) from a title insurance company or guaranty fund for recommending or selling the insurance to his client, or for work done for the client or the company, without either fully dlsclosing to the client his financial interest in the transaction, or crediting the client’s bill with the amount thus received, is guilty of unethical conduct." ABA Opinion 304 (1962).
his professional judgment in rendering such legal services 40
(C) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or asso-ciation authorized to practice law for a profit, if:
(1) A non-lawyer owns any interest therein,41 except that a fiduclary representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during administration;
(2) A non•lawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; 42 or
(3) A non-lawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer

CANON 6

A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Competently

EC 6-1 Because of his vital role in the legal process, a lawyer should act with competence and proper care in representing clients. He should strive to become and remain proficient in his prac-tice 1 and should accept employment only in mat-
40 See ABA Canon 35: cf. ABA Opinion 237 (1941).
"When the lay forwarder, as agent for the creditor, for-wards a claim to an attorney, the direct relationship of attorney and client shall then exlst between the attorney and the creditor, and the forwarder shall not Interpose ltself as an intermedlary to control the activities of the attorney." ABA Opinion 294 (1958).
41 "Permanent beneficia] and voting rlghts in the or-ganization set up to practice law, whatever lis form, must be restricted to lawyers whlle the organization le engaged In the practice of law." ABA Opinion 303 (1961).
42 "Canon 33 . promuigates underlying principies
that must be observed no matter In what form of organiza-tion lawyers practice law. Its requirement that no person shall be admltted or held out as a practitioner or member who is not a member of the legal profession duly author-ized to practice, and amenable to professional discipline, makes it clear that any centralized management must be in lawyers to avoid a violation of thls Canon." ABA Opin-ion 303 (1961).
43 "There is no intervention of any lay agency between lawyer and client when centralized management provided only by lawyers may give guidance or direction to the services being rendered by a lawyer-member of the or-ganization to a client. The language in Canon 35 that a lawyer should avoid all relations which direct the per-formance of his duties by or in the interest of an inter-mediary refers to lay intermediaries and not lawyer in-termediaries with whom he is associated in the practice of law." ABA Opinion 303 (1961).
1 "[W]hen a citizen is faced with the need for a lawyer, he wants, and is entitled to, the best informed counsel he can obtain. Changing times produce changes In our laws and legal procedures. The natural complexities of law require continuing Intensive study by a lawyer if he Is to render his clients a maximum of efficient service. And, In so doing, he maIntains the hlgh standards of the legal profession; and he aleo Increases respect and con-ters which he is or intends to become competent to handle.
EC 6-2 A lawyer is aided in attaining and main-taining his competence by keeping abreast of cur-rent legal literature and developments, participat-ing in continuing legal education programs,2 con-centrating in particular areas of the law, and by utilizing other available means. He has the addi-tional ethical obligation to assist in improving the legal profession, and he may do so by par-ticipating in bar activities intended to advance the quality and standards of members of the pro-fession. Of particular importante is the careful training of his younger associates and the giving of sound guidance to all lawyers who consult him. In short, a lawyer should strive at all levels to aid the legal profession in advancing the highest pos-sible standards of integrity and competence and to meet those standards himself.
EC 6-3 While the licensing of a lawyer is evi-dence that he has met the standards then prevail-ing for admission to the bar, a lawyer generally should not accept employment in any area of the law in which he is not qualified.3 However, he may accept such employment if in good faith he expects to become qualified through study and in-vestigation, as long as such preparation would not
fidence by the general public." Rochelle & Payne, The Struggle for Public Understanding, 25 Texas B.J. 109, 160 (1962).
"We have undergone enormous changes In the last flfty years within the lives of most of the adults living today who may be seekIng advice. Most of these changes have been accompanled by changes and developments In the law. . . . Every practicIng lawyer encounters these problems and is often perplexed with hls own Inability to keep up, not only with changes in the law, but also with changes in the lives of his clients and their legal problems.
"To be sure, no client has a right to expect that his law-yer will have all of the answers at the end of his tongue or even in the back of his head at all times. But the client does have the right to expect that the lawyer will have devoted his time and energies to maintaining and improving his competence to know where to look for the answers, to know how to deal with the problems, and to know how to advice to the best of his legal talents and abilities." Levy & Sprague, Accounting and Law: Is Dual Practice in the Public Interest?, 52 A.B.A.J. 1110, 1112 (1966).
2.’The whole purpose of continuing legal education, so enthuslastically supported by the ABA, is to make it pos-sible for lawyers to make themselves better lawyers. But there are no nostrums for proficiency in the law; it must come through the hard work of the lawyer himself. To the extent that that work, whether lt be in attending institutes or lecture courses, In studying after hours or in the actual day in and day out practice of his profession, can be concentrated within a limited field, the greater the proficiency and expertness that can be developed." Re-port of the Special Committee on Specialization and Spe-cialized Legal Education, 79 A.B.A.Rep. 582, 588 (1954).
3 "If the attorney is not competent to skillfully and properly perform the work, he should not undertake the service." Degen v. Steinbrink, 202 App.Div. 477, 481, 195 N.Y.S. 810, 814 (1922), af Fel mem., 236 N.Y. 669, 142 N.E.328 (1923).result in unreasonable delay or expense to his client. Proper preparation and representation may require the association by the lawyer of pro-fessionals in other disciplines. A lawyer offered employment in a matter in which he is not and does not expect to become so qualified should ei-ther decline the employment or, with the consent of his client, accept the employment and associate a lawyer who is competent in the matter.4
EC 6-4 Having undertaken representation, a law-yer should use proper care to safeguard the in-terests of his client. If a lawyer has accepted em-ployment in a matter beyond his competence but in which he expected to become competent, he should diligently undertake the work and study necessary to qualif y himself. In addition to being qualified to handle a particular matter, his obli-gation to his client requires him to prepare ade-quately for and give appropriate attention to his legal work.
EC 6-5 A lawyer should have prlde in his pro-fessional endeavors. His obligation to act com-petently calls for higher motivation than that arising from fear of civil liability or disciplinary penalty.
EC 6-6 A lawyer should not seek, by contract or other means, to limit his individual liability to his client for his malpractice. A lawyer who handles the affairs of his client properly has no need to attempt to limit his liability for his professional activities and one who does not handle the affairs of his client properly should not be permitted to do so. A lawyer who is a stockholder in or is as-sociated with a professional legal corporation may, however, limit his liability for malpractice of his associates in the corporation, but only to the ex-tent permitted by law

DISCIPLINARY RULES
DR 6-101 Failing to Act Competently. (A) A lawyer shall not:
(1) ~die a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is competent to handle it.
(2) Handle a legal matter without prepara-tion adequate in the circumstances.
(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.

4 Cf. ABA Opinion 232 (1941).
See ABA Opinion 303 (1961); cf. Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 2-11.
e The annual report for 1967-1968 of the Committee on Grlevances of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York showed a recelpt of 2,232 complaints; of the 828 offenses agalnst clients, 76 involved conversion, 49 involved "overreaching," and 452, or more than half of all such offenses, involved neglect. Annual Report of the Committee on Grlevances of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 12, 1968, at 4, col. 5.

DR 6-102 Limiting Liability to Client.
(A) A lawyer shall not attempt to exonerate him-self from or limit his liability to bis client for his personal malpractice.
CANON 7
A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
EC 7-1 The duty of a lawyer, both to his client 1 and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously 2 within the bounds of the law,3 which
1 "The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if It did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelfigent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69, 77 L.Ed. 158, 170, 53 S.Ct. 55, 64 (1932).
2 Cf. ABA Canon 4.
"At times . . . [the tax lawyer] will be wise to dis-card some arguments and he should exercise discretion to emphasize the arguments which In his judgment are most likely to be persuasive. But this process involves legal judgment rather than moral attitudes. The tax lawyer should put acide private disagreements with Congressional and Treasury policies. His own notions of policy, and his personal view of what the law should be, are irrelevant. The Job entrusted to him by bis client Is to use all his learning and ability to protect his client’s rights, not to help in the process of promoting a better tax system. The tax lawyer need not accept his client’s economic and social opinions, but the client is paying for technical at-tention and undivided concentration upon his affairs. He is equally entitled to performance unfettered by his attor-ney’s economic and social predilections." Paul, The Law-yer as a Tax Adviser, 25 Rocky Mt. L. Rey. 412, 418 (1953).
3 See ABA Canons 15 and 32.
ABA Canon 5, although only speaking of one accused of crime, imposes a similar obligation on the lawyer "[T]he lawyer is bound, by all fair and honorable means, to present every defense that the law of the land per-mits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law."
"Any persuasion or pressure on the advocate which de-ters him from planning and carryIng out the litigation on the basis of ‘what, within the framework of the law, is best for my client’s interest?’ interferes with the obligation to represent the client fully within the law.
"This obligation, in its fullest sense, is the heart of the adversary process. Each attorney, as an advocate, acts for and seeks that which in his judgment is best for his client, within the bounds authoritatively established. The advocate does not decide what is just in this case–he would be usurping the function of the judge and Jury-he acts for and seeks for his client that which he is en-titled to under the law. He can do no less and properly represent the client." Thode, The Ethical Standard for the Advocctte, 39 Texas L.Rev. 575, 584 (1961).
"The [Texas public opinion] survey indicates that dis-trust of the lawyer can be traced dlrectly to certain factors. Foremost of these is a basic misunderstanding of the function of the lawyer as an advocate In an ad-versary system.
"Lawyers are accused of taking advantage of ‘Ioopholes’ and ‘technicalities’ to win. Persons who make this charge are unaware, or do not understand, that the lawyer is hired to win, and if he does not exercise every legiti-mate effort in his client’s behalf, then he is betraying
inclu des Disciplinary Rules and enforceable pro-fessional regulations.4 The professional respon-sibility of a lawyer derives from his membership in a profession which has the duty of assisting members of the public to secure and protect avail-able legal rights and benefits. In our government of laws and not of men, each member of our so-ciety is entitled to have his conduct judged and regulated in accordance with the law; 5 to seek
a sacred trust." Rochelle & Payne, The Struggle for Public Understanding, 25 Texas B.T. 109, 159 (1962).
"The importante of the attorney’s undivided allegiance and falthful service to one accused of crime, irrespective of the attorney’s personal opinion as to the guilt of bis client, lies in Canon 5 of the American Bar Association Canon of Ethics.
"The difficulty lies, of course, in ascertaining whether the attorney has been guilty of an error of judgment, such as an election with respect to trial tactics, or has otherwise been actuated by his conscience or belief that his client should be convicted in any event. All too frequently courts are called upon to review actions of defense counsel which are, at the most, errors of judgment, not properly reviewable on habeas corpus un-less the trial is a farce and a mockery of justice which
requires the court to intervene. . . But when defense counsel, in a truly adverse proceeding, admits that his conscience would not permit him to adopt certain customary trial procedures, this extends beyond the realm of judgment and strongly suggests an invasion of con-stitutional rights." Johns v. Smyth, 176 F.Supp. 949, 952 (E.D.Va.1959), modified, United States ex rel. Wilkins v. Banmiller, 205 F.Supp. 123, 128, n. 5 (E.D.Pa•1962), aff’d, 325 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 847, 13 L.Ed.2d 51, 85 S.Ct. 87 (1964).
"The adversary system in law administration bears a striking resemblance to the competitive economic system In each we assume that the individual through partisan-ship or through self-interest will strive mightily for his side, and that kind of striving we must have. But neither system would be tolerable without restraints and modi-fications, and at times without outrlght departures from the system ltself. Since the legal profession is entrusted with the system of law administration, a part of its task is to develop in its members appropriate restraints without impairing the values of partisan striving. An accompany-ing task is to aid in the modification of the adversary sys-tem or departure from it in arcas to which the system is unsuited." Cheatham, The Lawyer’s Role and Surround-ings, 25 Rocky Mt. L.Rev. 405, 410 (1953).
4 "Rule 4.15 prohibits, in the pursuit of a client’s cause, ‘any manner of fraud or chicana’; Rule 4.22 requires ‘can-dor and falrness’ In the conduct of the lawyer, and for-bids the making of knowing misquotations; Rule 4.47 provldes that a lawyer ‘should always malntain his in-tegrity,’ and generally forbids all misconduct injurious to the interests of the public, the courts, or his cllents, and acts contrary to ‘justice, honesty, modesty or good morals.’ Our Commissioner has accurately paraphrased these rules as follows ‘An attorney does not have the duty to do all and whatever he can that may enable him to win his client’s cause or to further his client’s interest. His duty and efforts in these respects, although they should be prompted by his "entire devotion" to the interest of his client, must be within and not without the bounds of the law.’ " In re Wines, 370 S.W.2d 328, 333 (Mo.1963). See Note, 38 Texas L.Rev. 107, 110 (1959).
5 "Under our system of government the process of ad-judication is surrounded by safeguards evolved from cen-turles of experlence. These safeguards are not designed merely to lend formality and decorum to the t,ial of causes. They are predicated on the assumptlon that to se-

any lawful objective 6 through legaily permissible means; 7 and to present for adjudication any law-ful claim, issue, or defense.
EC 7-2 The bounds of the law in a given case are often difficult to ascertain.8 The language of legislative enactments and judicial opinions may be uncertain as applied to varying factual situa-tions. The limits and specific meaning of ap-parently relevant law may be made doubtful by changing or developing constitutional interpreta-tions, inadequately expressed statutes or judicial opinions, and changing public and judicial at-titudes. Certainty of law ranges from well-settled rules through areas of conflicting authority to areas without precedent.
EC 7-3 Where the bounds of law are uncertain, the action of a lawyer may depend on whether he is serving as advocate or adviser. A lawyer may serve simultaneously as both advocate and adviser, but the two roles are essentially different.8 In
cure for any controversy a truly informed and dispassion-ate decision is a difficult thing, requiring for lts achieve-ment a speclal summoning and organtzatlon of human ef-fort and the adoption of measures to exclude the biases and prejudgments that have free play outslde the courtroom. All of this goes for naught if the man with an unpopular cause is unable to find a competent lawyer courageous enough to represent him. His chance to have his day in court loses much of its meaning if his case is handicapped from the outset by the very kind of prejudgment our rules of evidence and procedure are intended to prevent." Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Con-ference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1216 (1958).
6 "[lit is . . . [the tax lawyer’s] positive duty to show the client how to aval] himself to the full of what the law permits. He is not the keeper of the Congres-slonal conscience." Paul, The Lawyer as a Ter Adviser, 25 Rocky Mt.L.Rev. 412, 418 (1953).
7 See ABA Canons 15 and 30.
8 "The fact that it desired to evade the law, as it is called, is immaterial, because the very meaning of a une in the law is that you intentionally may go as close to
it as you can if you do not pass it . It is a mat- ter of proximity and degree as to which minds will differ . . .." Justice Holmes, in Superior Oil Co. v. Missis-sippi, 280 U.S. 390, 395-96, 74 L.Ed. 504, 508, 50 S.Ct. 169, 170 (1930).
9 "Today’s lawyers perform two distinct types of func-tions, and our ethical standards should, but in the maln do not, recognize these two functions. Judge Phllbrick McCoy recently reported to the American Bar Association the need for a reappraisal of the Canons in light of the new and distinct functlon of counselor, as distinguished from advocate, which today predominates in the legal pro-fession. . . .
. In the flrst place, any revision of the canons must take into account and speak to thls new and now predomlnant functlon of the lawyer. . . . It is be-yond the scope of thls paper to discuss the ethical stand-ards to be applied to the counselor except to state that in my opinion such standards should require a greater recognitlon and protection for the interest of the public generally than le presently expressed in the canons. Also, the counselor’s obligation should extend to requiring hlm to inform and to impress upon the client a just solu-tion of the problem, considering all interests involved." Thode, The Ethical Standard for the Advocate, 39 Texas L.Rev. 575, 578-79 (1961).
asserting a position on behalf of his client, an advocate for the most part deals with past con-duct and must take the facts as he finds them. By contrast, a lawyer serving as adviser primarily assists his client in determining the course of fu-ture conduct and relationships. While serving as advocate, a lawyer should resolve in favor of his client doubts as to the bounds of the law.18 In serving a client as adviser, a lawyer in appropriate circumstances should give his professional opinion as to what the ultimate decisions of the courts would likely be as to the applicable law.
Duty of the Lawyer to a Client
EC 7-4 The advocate may urge any permissible construction of the law favorable to his client, without regard to his professional opinion as to the likelihood that the construction will ultimate-ly prevai1,11 His conduct is within the bounds of the law, and therefore permissible, if the position taken is supported by the law or is supportable by a good faith argument for an extension, modi-f ication, or reversal of the law. However, a law-yer is not justified in asserting a position in liti-gation that is frivolous.12
"The man who has been called finto court to answer for his own actions is entitied to fair hearing. Partisan ad-vocacy plays lts essential part in such a hearing, and the lawyer pleading his client’s case may properly present it in the most favorable light. A similar resolution of doubts in one direction becomes inappropriate when the lawyer acts as counselor. The reasons that justify and even require partisan advocacy in the trial of a cause do not grant any license to the lawyer to particípate as legal ad-visor in a line of conduct that is lmmoral, unfair, or of doubtful legality. In saving himself from thls unworthy
involvement, the lawyer cannot be guided solely by an un-reflective inner sense of good faith : he must be at pains
to preserve a sufficient detachment from his client’s In-terests so that he remains capable of a sound and objec-tive appratsal of the propriety of what his client proposes to do." Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Con! erence, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1161 (1958).
10 "[A] lawyer who 1s asked to advise his client
. . may freely urge the statement of positlons most favorable to the client just as long as there is reasonable basls for those positions." ABA Opinion 5L (1965).
11 "The lawyer . . . is not an umpire, but an ad-vocate. He is under no duty to refrain from making every proper argument in support of any legal point because he is not convinced of its inherent soundness. .
His personal belief in the soundness of his cause or of the authorities supporting it, is irrelevant." ABA Opinion 280 (1949).
"Counsel apparently misconceived his role. It was his duty to honorably present his client’s contentions in the light most favorable to his client. Instead he presumed to advise the court as to the validity and sufficiency of prisoner’s motion, by letter. We therefore conclude that the prisoner had no effective assistance of counsel and remand this case to the District Court with instructions to set aside the Judgment, appoint new counsel to represent the prisoner if he makes no objection thereto, and proceed anew." McCartney v. United States, 343 F.2d 471, 472 (9th Cir. 1965).
12 "Here the court-appointed counsel had the transcript but refused to proceed with the appeal because he found
no merit in it. . . We cannot say that there was a finding of frivolity by either of the California courts or EC 7-5 A lawyer as adviser furthers the inter-est of his client by giving his professional opinion as to what he believes would likely be the ulti-mate decision of the courts on the matter at hand and by informing his client of the practical effect of such decision.13 He may continue in the rep-resentation of his client even though his client has elected to pursue a course of conduct contrary to the advice of the lawyer so long as he does not thereby knowingly assist the client to engage in illegal conduct or to take a frivolous legal posi-tion. A lawyer should never encourage or aid his client to cornmit criminal acts or counsel his client on how to violate the law and avoid punishment therefor.14
EC 7-6 Whether the proposed action of a lawyer is within the bounds of the law may be a perplex-
that counsel acted in any greater capacity than merely as amicus curiae which was condemned in Ellis, supra. Hence California’s procedure did not furnish petitioner with counsel acting in the role of an advocate nor did it provide that full consideration and resolution of the mat-ter as Is obtained when counsel is acting in that capacity.
"The constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair process can only be attained where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate in behalf of his client, as opposed to that of amicus curiae. The no-merit letter and the procedure it triggers do not reach that dignity.
should, and can with honor and without conflict, be of more assistance to his client and to the court. His role as advocate requires that he support his client’s appeal to the best of his ability. Of course, if counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examina-tion of it, he should so advise the court and request per-mission to withdraw. That request must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. A copy of coun-sel’s brief should be furnished the indigent and time al-lowed him to raise any points that he chooses; the court-not counsel—then proceeds, after a full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous. If it so finds it may grant counsel’s request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal Insofar as federal re-quirements are concerned, or proceed to a decision on the merits, if state law so requires. On the other hand, if it finds any of the legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous) it must, prior to decision, afford the indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the appeal." Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 18 L.Ed. 2d 493, 498, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 1399-1400 (1967), rehearing de-nied, 388 U.S. 924, 18 L.Ed.2d 1377, 87 S.Ct. 2094 (1967).
See Paul, The Lawyer As a Tax Adviser, 25 Rocky Mt. L.Rev. 412, 432 (1953).
13 See ABA Canon 32.
14 -For a lawyer to represent a syndicate notoriously engaged in the violation of the law for the purpose of ad-vising the members how to break the law and at the same time escape it, is manifestly improper. While a lawyer may see to it that anyone accused of crime, no matter how serious and flagrant, has a fair trial, and present all available defenses, he may not co-operate in planning vio-lations of the law. There is a sharp distinction, of course, between advising what can lawfully be done and advising how unlawful acts can be done in a way to avoid con-viction. Where a lawyer accepts a retainer from an organization, known to be unlawful, and agrees in ad-vence to defend its members when from time to time they are accused of crime arising out of its unlawful activities, this is equally improper."
"See also Opinion 155." ABA Opinion 281 (1952).

ing question when his client is contemplating a course of conduct having legal consequence that vary according to the client’s intent, motive, or de-sires at the time of the action. Often a lawyer is asked to assist his client in developing evidence relevant to the state of mind of the client at a particular time. He may properly assist his client in the development and preservation of evidence of existing motive, intent, or desire; obviously, he may not do anything furthering the creation or preservation of false evidence. In many cases a lawyer may not be certain as to the state of mind of his client, and in those situations he should re-solve reasonable doubts in favor of his client.
EC 7-7 In certain areas of legal representation not affecting the merits of the cause or substan-tially prejudicing the rights of a client, a lawyer is entitled to make decisions on his own. But other-wise the authority to make decisions is exclusively that of the client and, if made within the frame-work of the law, such decisions are binding on his lawyer. As typical examples in civil cases, it is for the client to decide whether he will accept a settlement offer or whether he will waive his right to plead an affirmative defense. A defense law-yer in a criminal case has the duty to advise his client fully on whether a particular plea to a charge appears to be desirable and as to the pros-pects of success on appeal, but it is for the client to decide what plea should be entered and whether an appeal should be taken.15
EC 7-8 A lawyer should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client are made only after the client has been informed of relevant con-siderations. A lawyer ought to initiate this de-cision-making process if the client does not do so. Advice of a lawyer to his client need not be con-fined to purely legal considerations.16 A lawyer should advise his client of the possible effect of each legal alternative.17 A lawyer should bring to bear upon this decision-making process the full-ness of his experience as well as his objective viewpoint.’8 In assisting his client to reach a
11 See ABA Special Committee on Minimum Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice, Standards Re-lating to Pleas of Guilty pp. 69-70 (1968).
1G "First of all, a truly great lawyer is a wise counselor to all manner of men in the verted crises of their lives when they most need disinterested advice. Effective counseling necessarily involves a thoroughgoing knowledge of the principies of the law not merely as they appear in the books but as they actually operate in action." Van-derbilt, The Five Functions of the Lawyer : Service to Clients and the Public, 40 A.B.A.J. 31 (1954).
17 lawyer should endeavor to obtain full knowledge of
his client’s cause before advising thereon. . . ." ABA Canon 8.
19 -Mil devising charters of collaborative effort the lawyer often acts where all of the affected parties are present as participants. But the lawyer also performs a similar function in sltuations where this is not so, as, for example, In planning estates and drafting wIlls. Here the Instrument defining the terms of collaboration maY affect persons not present and often not born. Yet here, too, the good lawyer does not serve merely as a legal con-duit for bis client’s desires, but as a wise counselor, ex-proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer to point out those factors which may lead to a decision that is morally just as well as legally per-missible.19 He may emphasize the possibility of harsh consequences that might result from as-sertion of legally permissible positions. In the final analysis, however, the lawyer should always remember that the decision whether to forego le-gally available objectives or methods because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and not for himself, In the event that the client in a non-adjudicatory matter insists upon a course of conduct that is contrary to the judgment and ad-vice of the lawyer but not prohibited by Disciplin-ary Rules, the lawyer may withdraw from the employment.20
EC 7-9 In the exercise of his professional judg-ment on those decisions which are for his deter-mination in the handling of a legal matter,21 a law-yer should always act in a manner consistent with the best interests of his client.22 However, when an action in the best interest of his client seems to him to be unjust, he may ask his client for permission to forego such action 23
EC 7-10 The duty of a lawyer to represent his client with zeal does not militate against his con-current obligation to treat with consideration all persons involved in the legal process and to avoid the infliction of needless harm.
EC 7-11 The responsibilities of a lawyer may vary according to the intelligence, experience, men-
Perienced in the art of devlsing arrangements that wIll put in workable order the entangled affairs and interests of human beings." Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1162 (1958).
19 See. ABA Canon 8.
"Vital as is the lawyer’s role In adjudication, it should not be thought that 11 is only as an advocate pleading In open court that he contributes to the administration of the law. The most effective realization of the law’s aims of ten takes place in the attorney’s office, where litigation is forestalled by anticipating its outcome, where the law-yer’s qulet counsel takes the place of public force. Con-trary to popular belief, the compllance with the law thus brought about is not generally lip-serving and narrow, for by reminding him of its long-run costs the lawyer often deters his client from a course of conduct technically per-missible under existing law, though inconslstent with its underlying spirit ami purpose." Professional Responsi-bility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1161 (1958).
20 • ‘my summation of Judge Sharswood’s view of the advocate’s duty to the client is that he owes to the client the duty to use all legal means In support of the cllent’s case. However, at the same time Judge Sharswood recog-nized that many advocates would find this obligation un-bearable if applicable without exception. Therefore, the individual lawyer is given the choice of representing his client fully within the bounds set by the law or of telling his client that he cannot do so, so that the client may ob-tain another attorney if he wishes." Thode, The Ethical Standard for the Advocate, 39 Texas L.Rev. 575, 582 (1961).
Cf. Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-110 (C).
21 See ABA Canon 24.
22 Thode, The Ethical Standard for the Advocate, 39 Texas L.Rev. 575, 592 (1961).
23 Cf. ABA Opinions 253 (1946) and 178 (1938).
tal condition or age of a client, the obligation of a public of ficer, or the nature of a particular pro-ceeding. Examples include the representation of an illiterate or an incompetent, service as a pub-lic prosecutor or other government lawyer, and appearances bef ore administrative and legislative bodies.
EC 7-12 Any mental or physical condition of a client that renders him incapable of making a con-sidered judgment on his own behalf casts addi-tional responsibilities upon his lawyer. Where an incompetent is acting through a guardian or other legal representative, a lawyer must look to such representative for those decisions which are nor-mally the prerogative of the client to make. If a client under disability has no legal representative, his lawyer may be compelled in court proceedings to make decisions on behalf of the client. If the client is capable of understanding the matter in question or of contributing to the advancement of his interests, regardless of whether he is legally disqualified from performing certain acts, the law-yer should obtain from him all possible aid. If the disability of a client and the lack of a legal representative compel the lawyer to make deci-sions for his client, the lawyer should consider all circumstances then prevailing and act with care to safeguard and advance the interests of his client. But obviously a lawyer cannot perforen any act or make any decision which the law re-quires his client to perform or make, either act-ing for himself if competent, or by a duly consti-tuted representative if legally incompetent.
EC 7-13 The responsibility of a public prosecutor dif fers from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.24 This special duty exists because: (1) the prosecutor represents the sovereign and therefore should use restraint in the discretionary exercise of govern-mental powers, such as in the selection of cases to prosecute; (2) during trial the prosecutor is not only an advocate but he also may make decisions normally made by an individual client, and those affecting the public interest should be fair to all; and (3) in our system of criminal justice the ac-cused is to be given the benefit of all reasonable
24 See ABA Canon 5 and Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 79 L.Ed. 1314, 55 S.Ct. 629 (1935).
"The public prosecutor cannot take as a guide for the conduct of his office the standards of an attorney appear-ing on behalf of an individual client. The freedom else-where wisely granted to a partisan advocate must be severely curtalled if the prosecutor’s duties are to be prop-erly discharged. The public prosecutor must recall that he occupies a dual role, being obligated, on the one hand. to furnish that adversary element essential to the in-formed decision of any controversy, but being possessed, on the other, of important governmental powers that are pledged to the accomplishment of one objective only, that of impartial justice. Where the prosecutor is recreant to the trust implicit in bis office, he undermines confidence, not only in his profession, but in government and the very ideal of justice itself." Professional Responsibility: Re-port of the Joint Conference, 44 A B.A.J. 1159, 1218 (1958).
"The prosecuting attorney is the attorney for the state, and it is his prlmary duty not to convlct but to see that justice is done." ABA Opinion 150 (1936).

doubts. With respect to evidence and witnesses, the prosecutor has responsibilities different from those of a lawyer in private practice: the prose-cutor should make timely disclosure to the de-fense of available evidence, known to him, that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punish-ment. Further, a prosecutor should not intention-ally avoid pursuit of evidence merely because he believes it will damage the prosecution’s case or aid the accused.
EC 7-14 A government lawyer who has discre-tionary power relative to litigation should refrain from instituting or continuing litigation that is obviously unfair. A government lawyer not hav-ing such discretionary power who believes there is lack of merit in a controversy submitted to him should so advise his superiora and recommend the avoidance of unfair litigation. A government law-yer in a civil action or administrative proceeding has the responsibility to seek justice and to de-velop a full and fair record, and he should not use his position or the economic power of the government to harass parties or to bring about unjust settlements or results.
EC 7-15 The nature and purpose of proceedings before administrative agencies vary widely. The proceedings may be legislative or quasi-judicial, or a combination of both. They may be ex parte in character, in which event they may originate either at the instance of the agency or upon mo-tion of an interested party. The scope of an in-quiry may be purely investigative or it may be truly adversary looking toward the adjudication of specific rights of a party or of classes of parties. The foregoing are but examples of some of the types of proceedings conducted by administrative agencies. A lawyer appearing before an admin-istrative agency,25 regardless of the nature of the proceeding it is conducting, has the continuing duty to advance the cause of his client within the bounds of the law.26 Where the applicable rules of the agency impose specific obligations upon a lawyer, it is his duty to comply therewith, unless the lawyer has a legitimate basis for challenging the validity thereof. In all appearances before administrative agencies, a lawyer should identify himself, his client if identity of his client is not privileged,27 and the representative nature of his appearance. It is not improper, however, for a
25 As to appearances before a department of government,
Canon 26 provides: "A lawyer openly . may render
professional services . . in advocacy of claims be-
fore depa’rtments of government, upon the same principies of ethics which justify his appearance before the Courts
. . ."
25 "But as an advocate before a service which itself represents the adversary point of view, where his client’s case is fairly arguable, a lawyer is under no duty to dis-close its weaknesses, any more than he would be to make such a disclosure to a brother lawyer. The limitations within which he must operate are best expressed in Canon 22……ABA Opinión 314 (1965).
27 See Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
lawyer to seek from an agency information avail-able to the public without identifying his client.
EC 7-16 The primary business of a legislative body is to enact laws rather than to adjudicate controversies, although on occasion the activities of a legislative body may take on the characteris-tics of an adversary proceeding, particularly in in-vestigative and impeachment matters. The role of a lawyer supporting or opposing proposed legis-lation normally is quite different from his role in representing a person under investigation or on trial by a legislative body. When a lawyer ap-pears in connection with proposed legislation, he seeks to affect the lawmaking process, but when he appears on behalf of a client in investigatory or impeachment proceedings, he is concerned with the protection of the rights of his client. In ei-ther event, he should identify himself and his client, if identity of his client is not privileged, and should comply with applicable laws and leg-islative rules.28
EC 7-17 The obligation of loyalty to his client applies only to a lawyer in the discharge of his professional duties and implies no obligation to adopt a personal viewpoint favorable to the in-terests or desires of his client.29 While a lawyer must act always with circumspection in arder that his conduct will not adversely affect the rights of a client in a matter he is then handling, he may take positions on public issues and espouse legal reforms he favors without regard tu the individual views of any client.
EC 7-18 The legal system in its broadest sense functions best when persons in need of legal ad-vice or assistance are represented by their own counsel. For this reason a lawyer should not com-municate on the subject matter of the representa-tion of his client with a person he knows to be represented in the matter by a lawyer, unless pur-suant to law or rule of court or unless he has the consent of the lawyer for that person.30 If one is not represented by counsel, a lawyer represent-ing another may have to deal directly with the unrepresented person; in such an instance, a law-
28 See ABA Canon 26.
2J "Law should be so practiced that the lawyer re-mains free to make up his own mind how he will vote, what causes he will support, what economic and political philosophy he will espouse. It is une of the glories of the profession that it admits of this freedom. Distinguished examples can be cited of lawyers whose views were at variance from those of their clients, lawyers whose skill and wisdom make them valued advisers to those who had little sympathy with their views as citizens." Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B. A.T. 1159, 1217 (1958).
"No doubt some tax lawyers feel constrained to abstain from activities on behalf of a better tax system because they think that their clients may object. Clients have no right to object if the tax adviser handles their affairs competently and faithfully and independently of his pri-vate views as to tax policy. They buy his expert services. not his private opiniOns or his silente on issues that grave-ly affect the public interest." Paul, ‘l’he Lawyer as a Tal’ Adviser, 25 Rocky Mt.L.Rev. 412, 434 (1953).
30 See ABA Canon 9.

yer should not undertake to give advice to the person who is attempting to represent himself,31 except that he may advise him to obtain a lawyer.
Duty of the Lawyer to the Adversary System of Justice
EC 7-19 Our legal system provides for the ad-judication of disputes governed by the rules of substantive, evidentiary, and procedural law. An adversary presentation counters the natural hu-man tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully known; 3.1 the advocate, by his zealous preparation and presenta-tion of facts and law, enables the tribunal to come to the hearing with an open and neutral mind and to render impartial judgments.33 The duty of a lawyer to his client and his duty to the legal sys-tenn are the same: to represent his client zealous-ly within the bounds of the law.34
EC 7-20 In order to function properly, our ad-judicative process requires an informed, impartial tribunal capable of administering justice prompt-ly and efficiently 35 according to procedures that command public confidence and respect.36 Not on-ly must there be competent, adverse presentation of evidente and issues, but a tribunal must be aided by rules appropriate to an effective and dig-nified process. The procedures under which tribu-nals operate in our adversary system have been prescribed largely by legislative enactments, court rules and decisions, and administrative rules. Through the years certain concepts of proper pro-fessional conduct have become rules of law ap-plicable to the adversary adjudicative process. Many of these concepts are the bases for stand-ards of professional conduct set forth in the Dis-ciplinary Rules.
EC 7-21 The civil adjudicative process is pri-marily designed for the settlement of disputes be-tween parties, while the criminal process is de-
31 Id.
See Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conferen.ce, 44 A.B.A.S. 1159. 1160 (1958).
33 "Without the participation of someone who can act responsibly for each of I he parties, this essential narrow-ing of the issues [by exchange of written pleadings or stip-ulations of counsell becomes impossible. But here again the true significance of partisan advocacy lies deeper, touch-ing once more the integrity of the adjudicative process it-self. It is only through the advocate’s participation that the hearing may remain in fact what it purports to be in theory : a public trial of the facts and issues. Each ad-vocate comes to the hearing prepared to present his proofs and argumenta, knowing at the same time that his argu-menta may fail to persuade and that his proof may be re-
jected as inadequate. . . The deciding tribunal, on the other hand, comes to the hearing uncommitted. It has not represented to the public that any fact can be proved, that any argument is sound, or that any par-ticular way of stating a litigant’s case is the most effec-tive expression of its merits." Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1160-61 (1958).
34 Cf, ABA Canons 15 and 32. 31 Cf. ABA Canon 21.
3(1 See Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1.159, 1216 (1958).
signed for the protection of society as a whole. Threatening to use, or using, the criminal process to coerce adjustment of private civil claims or con-troversies is a subversion of that process; 37 fur-ther, the person against whom the criminal proc-ess is so misused may be deterred from asserting his legal rights and thus the usefulness of the civil process in settling private disputes is impaired. As in all cases of abuse of judicial process, the im-proper use of criminal process tends to diminish public confidence in our legal system.
EC 7-22 Respect for judicial rulings is essential to the proper administration of justice; however, a litigant or his lawyer may, in good faith and within the framework of the law, take steps to test the correctness of a ruling of a tribunal.38
EC 7-23 The complexity of law of ten makes it difficult for a tribunal to be fully informed unless the pertinent law is presented by the lawyers in the cause. A tribunal that is fully informed on the applicable law is better able to make a fair and accurate determination of the matter bef ore it. The adversary system contemplates that each lawyer will present and argue the existing law in the light most favorable to his client 39 Where a lawyer knows of legal authority in the control-ling jurisdiction directly adverse to the position of his client, he should inform the tribunal of its ex-istence unless his adversary has done so; but, hav-ing made such disclosure, he may challenge its soundness in whole or in part.40
37 "We are of the opinion that the letter in question was improper, and that in writing and sending it respond-ent was guilty of unprofessional conduct. This court has heretofore expressed its disapproval of using threats of criminal prosecution as a means of forcing settlement of civil claims. .
"Respondent has been guilty of a violation of a principie which condemns any confusion of threats of criminal prosecution with the enforcement of civil claims. For this misconduct he should be severely censured." Matter of Gelman, 230 App.Div. 524, 527, 245 N.Y.S. 416, 419 (1930).
38 "An attorney has the duty to protest the interests of his client. He has a rlght to presa legitimate argument and to protest an erroneous ruling." Gallagher v. Munici-pal Court, 31 Ca1.2d 784, 796, 192 P.2d 905, 913 (1948).
"There must be protection, however, in the far more frequent case of the attorney who stands on his rights and combats the order in good faith and without disrespect believing with good cause that it is void, for it is here that the independence of the bar becomes valuable." Note,
39 Colum.L.Rev. 433, 438 (1939).
39 "Too many do not understand that accomplishment of the layman’s abstract ideas of justice is the function of the judge and jury, and that it is the lawyer’s sworn duty to portray his client’s case in its most favorable light." Rochelle and Payne, The Struggle for Public Understand-ing, 25 Texas B.J. 109, 159 (1962).
40 "We are of the opinion that this Canon requires the lawyer to disclose such decisions [that are adverse to his client’s contentions] to the court. He may, of course, alt-er doing so, challenge the soundness of the decisions or present reasons which he belíeves would warrant the court in not following them in the pending case." ABA Opinion 146 (1935).
Cf. ABA Opinion 280 (1949) and Thode, The Ethical Standard for the Advocate, 39 Texas L.Rev. 575, 585-86

EC 7-24 In order to bring about just and in-formed decisions, evidentiary and procedural rules have been established by tribunals to permit the inclusion of relevant evidence and argument and the exclusion of all other considerations. The ex-pression by a lawyer of his personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, as to the credibility of a witness, as to the cuipability of a civil litigant, or as to the guilt or innocence of an accused is not a proper subject for argument to the trier of fact.41 It is improper as to factual matters be-cause admissible evidence possessed by a lawyer should be presented only as sworn testimony. It is improper as to all other matters because, were the rules otherwise, the silente of a lawyer on a given occasion could be construed unfavorably to his client. However, a lawyer may argue, on his analysis of the evidence, for any position or conclusion with respect to any of the foregoing matters.
EC 7-25 Rules of evidence and procedure are de-signed to lead to just decisions and are part of the frarnework of the law. Thus while a lawyer may take steps in good faith and within the frame-work of the law to test the validity of rules, he is not justified in consciously violating such rules and he should be diligent in his efforts to guard against his unintentional violation of them.42 As examples, a lawyer should subscribe to or verify only thóse pleadings that he believes are in com-pliance with applicable law and rules; a lawyer should not make any prefatory statement before a tribunal in regard to the purported facts of the case on trial unless he believes that his statement will be supported by admissible evidence; a law-yer should not ask a witness a question solely for the purpose of harassing or embarrassing him; and a lawyer should not by subterfuge put be-fore a jury matters which it cannot properly con-sider.
EC 7-27 Because it interferes with the proper ad-ministration of justice, a lawyer should not sup-press evidence that he or his client has a legal ob-ligation to reveal or produce. In like manner, a lawyer should not advise or cause a person to secrete himself or to leave the jurisdiction of a tribunal for the purpose of making him unavail-able as a witness therein.46
EC 7-28 Witnesses should always testify truth-fully 47 and should be free from any financial in-ducements that might tempt them to do other-wise.48 A lawyer should not pay or agree to pay a non-expert witness an amount in excess of re-imbursement for expenses and financial loss in-cident to his being a witness; however, a lawyer may pay or agree to pay an expert witness a rea-sonable fee for his services as an expert. But in no event should a lawyer pay or agree to pay a contingent fee to any witness. A lawyer should exercise reasonable diligente to see that his client and lay associates conform to these standards:19
EC 7-29 To safeguard the impartiality that is essential to the judicial process, veniremen and jurors should be protected against extraneous in-fluences.50 When impartiality is present, public confidence in the judicial system is enhanced. There should be no extrajudicial communication with veniremen prior to trial or with jurors during trial by or on behalf of a lawyer connected with the case. Furthermore, a lawyer who is not con-nected with the case should not communicate with
a matter vital te the issue under consideration.
"Respondent next urges that it was his duty to observe the utmost good faith toward his client, and therefore he could not divulge any confidential information. This duty to the client of course does not extend to the point of authorizing collaboration with him in the commission of fraud." In re Carroll, 244 S.W.2d 474, 474-75 (Ky. 1951).
45 "Under any standard of proper ethical conduct an attorney should not sit by silently and permit his client to commit what may have been perjury, and which cer-
tainly would mislead the court and the opposing narty on 50 See ABA Canon 23.
LVII
EC 7-26 The law and Disciplinary Rules prohibit the use of fraudulent, false, or perjured testimony or evidence.43 A lawyer who knowingly 44 par-ticipates in introduction of such testimony or evi-dence is subject to discipline. A lawyer should, however, present any admissible evidence his client desires to have presented unless he knows, or from facts within his knowledge should know, that such testimony or evidence is false, fraudulent, or per-j ured.45
41 See ABA Canon 15.
"The traditional duty of an advocate is that he honor-ably uphold the contentions of his client. He should not voluntarlly undermine them." Harders v. State of Cali-fornia, 373 F.2d 839, 842 (9th Clr. 1967).
42 See ABA Canon 22.
43 Id. Cf. ABA Canon 41.
44 See generally ABA Opinion 287 (1953) as to a lawyer’s duty when he unknowingly participates in introducing perjured testimony.
46 See ABA Canon 5; cf. ABA Opinion 131 (1935).
47 Cf. ABA Canon 39.
48 "The prevalence of perjury is a serious menace to the administration of justice, to prevent which no means have as yet been satisfactorily devised. But there certainly can be no greater incentive to perjury than to allow a party to make payments to its opponents witnesses under any guise or on any excuse, and at least attorneys who are of-ficers of the court to aid it in the administration of jus-tice, must keep themselves clear of any connection which in the slightest degree tends to induce witnesses to testi-fy in favor of their clients." In re Robinson, 151 App.Div. 589, 600, 136 N.Y.S. 548, 556-57 (1912), aff’d, 209 N.Y. 354, 103 N.E. 160 (1913).
49 "It will not do for an attorney who seeks to justify himself against charges of this kind to show that he has escaped criminal responsibility under the Penal Law, nor can he blindly shut his eyes to a system which tends to suborn witnesses, to produce perjured testimony, and to suppress the truth. He has an active affirmative duty te protect the administration of justice from perjury and fraud, and that duty is not performed by allowing his subordinates and assistants to attempt to subvert justice and procure results for his clients based upon false testi-mony and perjured witnesses." Id., 151 App.Div. at 592, 136 N.Y.S. at 551.

or cause another to communicate with a venire-man or a juror about the case. After the trial, communication by a lawyer with jurors is per-mitted so long as he refrains from asking ques-tions or making comments that tend to harass or embarrass the juror 51 or to influence actions of the juror in future cases. Were a lawyer to be prohibited from communicating after trial with a juror, he could not ascertain if the verdict might be subject to legal challenge, in which event the invalidity of a verdict might go undetected.52 When an extrajudicial communication by a lawyer with a juror is permitted by law, it should be made considerately and with deference to the personal feelings of the juror.
EC 7-30 Vexatious or harassing investigations of veniremen or jurors seriously impair the effective-ness of our jury system. For this reason, a law-yer or anyone on his behalf who conducts an in-vestigation of veniremen or jurors should act with circumspection and restraint.
EC 7-31 Communications with or investigations of members of families of veniremen or jurors by a lawyer or by anyone on his behalf are subject to the restrictions imposed upon the lawyer with respect to his communications with or investiga-tions of veniremen and jurors.
EC 7-32 Because of his duty to aid in preserving the integrity of the jury system, a lawyer who learns of improper conduct by or towards a venire-man, a juror, or a member of the family of either should make a prompt report to the court regard-ing such conduct.
EC 7-33 A goal of our legal system is that each party shall have his case, criminal or civil, ad-judicated by an impartial tribunal. The attain-ment of this goal may be defeated by dissemina-tion of news or comments which tend to influence judge or jury.53 Such news or comments may
51 "[I]t is unfair to jurors to permit a disappointed liti-gant to pick over their private associations in search of something to discredit them and their verdict. And it would be unfair to the public too if jurors should under-stand that they cannot convict a man of means without risking an ínquiry of that kind by paid investigators, with, to boot, the distortions an inquiry of that kind can pro-duce." State v. LaFera, 42 N.J. 97, 107, 199 A.2d 630, 636 (1964).
52 ABA Opinion 319 (1968) points out that "[m]any courts today, and the trend is in this direction, allow the testi-mony of jurors as to all irregularities in and out of the courtroom except those irregularities whose existence can be determined only by exploring the consciousness of a single particular juror, New Jersey v. Kociolek, 20 N.J. 92, 118 A.2d 812 (1955). Model Code of Evidente Rule 301. Certainly as to states in which the testimony and affidavits of jurors may be received in support of or against a mo-tion for new trial, a lawyer, in his obligation to protect his client, must have the tools for ascertaining whether or not grounds for a new trial exist and it is not unethical for him to talk to and question jurors."
53 Generally see ABA Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press, Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press (1966).
prevent prospective jurors from being impartial at the outset of the trial54 and may also interfere with the obligation of jurors to base their verdict solely upon the evidence admitted in the tria1.55
"[T]he trial court might well have proscribed extra-judicial statements by any lawyer, party, witness, or court
official which divulged prejudicial matters . . See State v. Van Dwyne, 43 N.J. 369, 389, 204 A.2d 841, 852 (1964), in which the court interpreted Canon 20 of the American Bar Association’s Canons of Professional Ethics to prohibit such statements. Being advised of the great public interest in the case, the mass coverage of the press, and the potential prejudicial impact of publicity, the court could also have requested the appropriate city and county officials to promulgate a regulation with respect to dissemination of information about the case by their employees. In addition, reporters who wrote or broad-cast prejudicial stories, could have been warned as to the impropriety of publishing material not introduced in the
proceedings. . In this manner, Sheppard’s right to a trial free from outside interferente would have been given added protection without corresponding curtailment of the news media. Had the judge, the other officers of the court, and the police placed the interest of justíce first, the news media would have soon learned to be content with the task of reporting the case as it unfolded in the courtroom—not pieced together from extrajudicial state-ments." Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361-62, 16 L. E.2d 600, 619-20, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1521-22 (1966).
"Court proceedings are held for the solemn purpose of endeavoring to ascertain the truth which is the sine qua non of a fair trial. Over the centuries Anglo-American courts have devised careful safeguards by rule and other-wise to protect and facilítate the performance of this high function. As a result, at this time those safeguards do not permit the televising and photographing of a criminal trial, save in two States and there only under restrictions. The federal courts prohibit it by specific rule. This is weighty evidence that our concepts of a fair trial do not tolerate such an indulgente. We have always held that the atmosphere essential to the preservation of a fair trial—the most fundamental of all freedoms—must be maintained at all costs." Estes v. State of Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540, 14 L.Ed.2d 543, 549, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1631-32 (1965), rehearing denied, 382 U.S. 875, 15 L.Ed.2d 118, 86 S.Ct. 18 (1965).
54 "Fretriai can create a major problem for the defend-ant in a criminal case. Indeed, it may be more harmful than publicity during the trial for it may well set the com-munity opinion as to guilt or innocence. . . . The trial witnesses present at the hearing, as well as the original jury panel, were undoubtedly made aware of the peculiar public importante of the case by the press and television coverage being provided, and by the fact that they themselves were televised live and their pictures re-broadcast on the evening show." Id., 381 U.S. at 536-37, 14 L.Ed.2d at 546-47, 85 S.Ct. at 1629-30.
5, "The undeviating rule of this Court was expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes over half a century ago in Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) :
The theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in upen court, and not by any outside influ-ence, whether of private talk or public print."
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351, 16 L.Ed.2d 600, 614, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1516 (1966).
"The trial judge has a large discretion in ruling on the issue of prejudice resulting from the reading by jurors
of news articles concerning the trial. . . Generaliza- tions beyond that statement are not profitable, because each case must turn on its special facts. We have here the exposure of jurors to information of a character whichThe release by a lawyer of out•of-court statements regarding an anticipated or pending trial may im-properly affect the impartiality of the tribuna1.56 For these reasons, standards for permissible and prohibited conduct of a lawyer with respect to trial publicity have been established.
EC 7-34 The impartiality of a public servant in our legal system may be impaired by the receipt of gifts or loans. A lawyer,57 therefore, is never justified in making a gift or a loan to a judge, a hearing officer, or an official or employee of a tribuna1,58 except as permitted by Section C(4) of Cannon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, but a lawyer may make a contribution to the campaign fund of a candidate for judicial office in con-
the trial judge ruled was so prejudicial it could not be dlrectly offered as evidence. The prejudice to the defend-ant is almost certain to be as great when that evidence reaches the jury through news accounts as when it is a part
of the prosecution’s evidence. . . It may indeed be greater for it is then not tempered by protective pro-cedures." Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312-13, 3 L.Ed.2d 1250, 1252, 79 S.Ct. 1171, 1173 (1959).
"The experienced trial lawyer knows that an adverse public opinion is a tremendous disadvantage to the de-fense of his client. Although Brand jurors conduct their deliberations in secret, they are selected from the body of the public. They are likely to know what the general public knows and to reflect the public attitude. Trials are open to the public, and aroused public opinion respect-ing the merits of a legal controversy creates a court room atmosphere which, without any vocal expression in the presence of the petit jury, makes itself felt and has its effect upon the action of the petit jury. Our fundamental concepts of justice and our American sense of fair play require that the petit jury shall be composed of persons with fair and impartial minds and without preconceived views as to the merits of the controversy, and that it shall determine the issues presented to it solely upon the evi-dence adduced at the trial and according, to the law given in the instructions of the trial judge.
"While we may doubt that the effect of public opinion would sway or bias the judgment of the trial judge in an equíty proceeding, the defendant should not be called upon to run that risk and the trial court should not have his work made more difflcult by any dissemination of state-ments to the public that would be calculated to create a public demand for a particular judgment in a prospective or pending case." ABA Opinion 199 (1940).
Cf. Estes v. State of Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 544-45, 14 L. Ed.2d 543, 551, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1634 (1965), rehearing denied, 381 U.S. 875, 15 L.Ed.2d 118, 86 S.Ct. 18 (1965).
56 See ABA Canon 20.
57 Canon 3 observes that a lawyer "deserves rebuke and denunciation for any device or attempt to gain from a Judge special personal consideration or favor."
See ABA Canon 32.

58 "Judicial Canon 32 provides :
" ‘A judge should not accept any presents or favors from litigants, or from lawyers practicing before him or from others whose interests are likely to be submitted to him for judgment.’
"The language of this Canon is perhaps broad enough to prohibit campaign contributions by lawyers, practicing before the court upon which the candidate hopes to sit. However, we do not think it was intended to prohibit such contributions when the candidate is obligated, by force of circumstances over which he has no control, to conduct a campaign, the expense of which exceeds that which he should reasonably be expected to personally bear!" ABA Opinion 226 (1941).formity with Section B(2) under Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
EC 7-35 All litigants and lawyers should have ac-cess to tribunals on an equal basis. Generally, in adversary proceedings a lawyer should not com-municate with a judge relative to a matter pend-ing before, or which is to be brought before, a tribunal over which he presides in circumstances which might have the effect or give the appear-ance of granting undue advantage to one party.59 For example, a lawyer should not communicate with a tribunal by a writing unless a copy thereof is promptly delivered to opposing counsel or to the adverse party if he is not represented by a lawyer. Ordinarily an oral communication by a lawyer with a judge or hearing officer should be made only upon adequate notice to opposing coun-sel, or, if there is none, to the opposing party. A lawyer should not condone or lend himself to pri-vate importunities by another with a judge or hearing officer on behalf of himself or his client.
EC 7-36 Judicial hearings ought to be conducted through dignified and orderly procedures designed to protect the rights of all parties. Although a lawyer has the duty to represent his client zealous-ly, he should not engage in any conduct that of-fends the dignity and decorum of proceedings 60 While maintaining his independence, a lawyer should be respectful, courteous, and aboye-board in his relations with a judge or hearing officer be-fore whom he appears.61 He should avoid undue solicitude for the comfort or conveniente of judge or jury and should avoid any other conduct cal-culated to gain special consideration.
EC 7-37 In adversary proceedings, clients are litigants and though ill feeling may exist between clients, such ill feeling should not influence a law-yer in his conduct, attitude, and demeanor towards opposing lawyers.62 A lawyer should not make unfair or derogatory personal reference to op-posing counsel. Haranguing and offensive tactics by lawyers interfere with the orderly administra-tion of justice and have no proper place in our legal system.
EC 7-38 A lawyer should be courteous to op-posing counsel and should accede to reasonable requests regarding court proceedings, settings, continuances, waiver of procedural formalities, and similar matters which do not prejudice the rights of his client.63 He should follow local customs of courtesy or practice, unless he gives timely no-tice to opposing counsel of his intention noc to do so.64 A lawyer should be punctual in fulfilling all professional commitments.65

55 See ABA Canons 3 and 32. 60 Cf. ABA Canon 18.
si See ABA Canons 1 and 3.
62 See ABA Canon 17.
63 See ABA Canon 24.
64 See ABA Canon 25.
65 See ABA Canon 21.

EC 7-39 In the final analysis, proper functioning of the adversary system depends upon coopera-tion between lawyers and tribunals in utilizing pro-cedures which will preserve the impartiality of tribunals and make their decisional processes prompt and just, without impinging upon the ob-ligation of lawyers to represent their clients zeal• ously within the framework of the law.

DISCIPLINARY RULES

DR 7-101 Representing a Client Zealously.
(A) A lawyer shall not intentionally: 66
(1) Fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available mean 67 permitted by law and the Dis-ciplinary Bales, except as provided by DR 7-101(B). A lawyer does not violate this Disciplinary Rule, however, by ac-ceding to reasonably requests of opposing counsel which do not prejudice the rights of his client, by being punctual in ful-filling all professional commitments, by avoiding offensive tactics, or by treating with courtesy and consideration al" per-sons involved in the legal procesa.
(2) Fall to carry out a contract of employ-ment entered into with a client for pro-fessional services, but he may withdraw as permitted under DR 2-110, DR 5-102, and DR 5-105.
(3) Prejudice or da.mage his client during the course of the professional relationship 68 except as required under DR 7-102(B).
(B) In his representation of a client, a lawyer may:
(1) Where permissIble, exercise his profes-sional judgment to waive or fail to as-sert a right or position of his client.
(2) Refuse to aid or participate in conduct that he believes to be unlawful, even though there is some support for an ar-gument that the conduct is legal.
DR 7-102 Representing a Client Within the Bounds of the Law.
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(1) File a sult, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other ac-tion on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or ma-liclously in jure another.69
(2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that Is unwarranted under existing law,
66 See ABA Canon 15.
67 See ABA Canons 5 and 15; cf. ABA Canons 4 and 32.
68 Cf. ABA Canon 24.
69 See ABA Canon 30.

except that he may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modifi-cation, or reversa’ of existing law.
(3) Conceal or knowingly fall to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal.
(4) Knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence.70
(5) Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact.
(6) Participate in the creation or preservation of evidente when he knows or it is ob-vious that the evidence is false.
(7) Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent.
(8) Knowingly engage in other ‘Ilegal con-duct or conduct contrary to a Disciplin-ary Rule.
(B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the rep-resentation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribuna1,71 except when the in-formation is protected as a privileged com. munication.
(2) A person other than his client has per-petrated a fraud upon a tribunal shall promptly reveal the fraud to the tribu-nal.72
DR 7-103 Performing the Duty of Public Pros-ecutor or Other Government Law-yer.73
(A) A public prosecutor or other government law-yer shall not instante or cause to be insti-tuted criminal charges when he knows or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable cause.
(B) A public prosecutor or other government law-yer in criminal litigation shall make timely diselosure to counsel for the defendant, or to the defendant if he has no counsel, of the existence of evidence, known to the prosecu-ter or other government lawyer, that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the ()fíense, or reduce the pun-ishment.
70 Cf. ABA Canons 22 and 29.
71 See ABA Canon 41; cf. Hinds v. State Bar, 19 Ca1.2d 87, 92-93, 119 P.2d 134, 137 (1941) ; but see ABA Opinion 287 (1953) and Texas Canon 38. Also see Code of Pro-fessional Responsibllity, DR 4-101(C) (2).
72 See Precision Inst. Mfg. Co. v. Automotive M. M. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 89 L.Ed. 1381, 65 S.Ct. 993 (1945).
73 Cf. ABA Canon 5.

DR 7-104 Communicating With One of Adverse Interest.14
(A) During the course of his representation of a elient a lawyer shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to com-municate on the subject of the representa-tion with a party he knows to be rep-resented by a lawyer in that matter un-less he has the prior consent óf the law-yer representing such other party 75 or is authorized by law to do so.
(2) Give advice to a person who is not rep-resented by a lawyer, other than the ad-vice to secure counse1,76 if the interests of such person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of his client.77
DR 7-105 Threatening Criminal Prosecution.
(A) A lawyer shall not present, participate in pre-senting, or theaten to present criminal charg-es solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.
DR 7-106 Trial Conduct.
(A) A lawyer shall not disregard or advice his client to disregard a standing rule of a tribu-nal or a ruling of a tribunal made in the eourse of a proceeding, but he may take ap-propriate steps in good faith to test the valld-ity of such rule or ruling.
(B) In presenting a matter to a tribunal, a law-yer shall disclose: 78
(1) Legal authority in the controlling juris-diction known to him to be directly ad-verse to the position of his client and which is not disclosed by opposing coun-se1.79
74 "Rale 12. . . A member of the State Bar shall
not communicate with a party represented by counsel up-on a subject of controversy, in the absence and without the consent of such counsel. This rule shall not apply to communication with a public officer, board, committee or body." Cal.Business and Professions Code § 6076 (West 1962).
76 See ABA Canon 9; cf. ABA Opinions 124 (1934), 108 (1934), 95 (1933), and 75 (1932); also see In re Schwabe, 242 Or. 169, 174-75, 408 P.2d 922, 924 (1965).
"It is clear from the earlier opinions of this committee that Canon 9 Is to be construed literally and does not al-low a communication with an opposing party, without the consent of his counsel, though the purpose merely be to Investigate the facts. Opinions 117, 95, 66," ABA Opinion 187 (1938).
76 Cf, ABA Opinion 102 (1933).
77 Cf. ABA Canon 9 and ARA Opinion 58 (1931).
78 Cf. Note, 38 Texas L.Rev. 107, 108-09 (1959).
79 "In the brief summary in the 1947 edition of the Com-mittee’s decisions (p. 17), Opinion 146 was thus sum-marized : Opinion 146—A lawyer should disclose to the court a decision directly adverse to his client’s case that is unknown to his adversary.

(2) Unless privileged or irrelevant, the iden-tities of the clients he represents and of the persons who employed him 80
(C) In appearing in his professional capacity be-fore a tribunal, a lawyer shall not:
(1) State or allude to any matter that he has no reasonable basis to believe is relevant to the case or that will not be supported by admissible evldence.8′
(2) Ask any question that he has no reason-able basis to believe is relevant to the case and that is intended to degrade a witness or other person.82
"We would not confine the Opinion to ‘controlling au-thorities’—i.e., those decisive of the pending case—but, in accordance with the tests hereafter suggested, would apply it to a decision directly adverse to any proposition of law on which the lawyer expressly relies, which would rea-sonably be considered important by the judge sitting on the case.
. The test in every case should be: Is the deci-sIon which opposing counsel has overlooked one which the court should clearly consider in deciding the case? Would a reasonable judge properly feel that a lawyer who ad-vanced, as the law, a proposition adverse to the undis-closed decision, was lacking in candor and fairness to him? Might the judge consider himself misled by an implied representation that the lawyer knew of no adverse au-thority?" ARA Opinion 280 (1949).
so "The authorities are substantially uniform against any privilege as applied to the fact of retainer or identity of the client. The privilege is limited to confidential com-munications, and a retainer is not a confidential communi-catIon, although it cannot come into existence without some communication between the attorney and the—at that stage prospective—client." United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 752, 89 L.Ed.2d 602, 65 S.Ct. 86 (1944).
"To be sure, there may be circumstances under which the identification of a client may amount to the prejudicial disclosure of a confidential communication, as where the substance of a disclosure has already heen revealed but not its source." Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962).
si See ABA Canon 22; cf. ABA Canon 17.
"The rule allowing counsel when addressing the jury the widest latitude in discussing the evidence and presenting the client’s theories falls far short of authorizing the state-ment by counsel of matter not in evidence, or Indulging in argument founded on no proof, or demanding verdicts for purposes other than the just settlement of the matters at issue between the litigante, or appealing to prejudice or passion. The rule confining counsel to legitimate argu-ment is not based on etlquette, but on justice. Its viola-tion is not merely an overstepping of the bounds of pro-priety, but a violation of a party’s rights. The jurors must determine the issues upon the evidence. Counsel’s address should help them do this, not tend to lead them astray." Cherry Creek Nat. Bank v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 207 App.Div. 787, 790-91, 202 N.Y.S. 611, 614 (1924).
82 Cf. ABA Canon 18.
"§ 6068. . . . It is the duty of an attorney :
"(f) To abstain from all offensive personality, and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged." Cal.Business and Pro-fessions Code § 6068 (West 1962).

(3) Assert his personal knowledge of the facts in issue, except when testifying as a witness.
(4) Assert his personal opinion as to the just-ness of a cause, as to the credibility of a witness, as to the culpability of a civil litigant, or as to the guilt or Innocence of an accused; 83 but he may argue, on his analysis of the evidence, for any posi-tion or conclusion with respect to the matters stated herein.
(5) Fall to comply with known local cus-toms of courtesy or practice of the bar or a particular tribunal without giving to opposing counsel timely notice of his in• tent not to comply.84
(6) Engage in undignified or discourteous éonduct which is degrading to a tribunal.
(7) Intentlonally or habitually violate any es-tablished rule of procedure or of evi-dence.
DB 7-107 Trial Publicity.85
(A) A lawyer participating in or associated with the investigation of a criminal matter shall
83 "The record in the case at bar was silent concerning the qualities and character of the deceased. It is especially improper, In addressing the jury in a murder case, for the prosecuting attorney to make reference to his knowl-edge of the good qualities of the deceased where there is no evidence in the record bearing upon his character.
. . A prosecutor should never inject into his argu- ment evidence not introduced at the trial." People v. Dukes, 12 111.2d 334, 341, 146 N.E.2d 14, 17-18 (1957).
84 "A lawyer should not ignore known customs or prac-tice of the Bar or of a particular Court, even when the law permita, without giving timely notice to the opposing counsel." ABA Canon 25.
85 The provisions of Sections (A), (3), (C), and (D) of this DIsciplinary Rule incorporate the fair trial-free presa standards which apply to lawyers as adopted by the ABA House of Delegates, Feb. 19, 1968, upon the recommenda-tion of the Fair Trial and Free Press Advisory Commlttee of the ABA Special Commlttee on Minimum Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice.
Cf. ABA Canon 20; see generally ABA Advisory Com-mlttee on Fair Trial and Free Press, Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press (1966).
"From the cases coming here we note that unfair and prejudicial news comment on pending trials has become in-creasingly prevalent. Due process requires that the ac-cused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from out-side influences. Given the pervaslveness of modern com-munications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial pub-licity from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the accused. And appellate tribunals have the duty to make an independent evaluation of the circumstances. Of course, there is nothing that prescribes the press from reporting events that transpire in the court-room. But where there is a reasonable likelihood that Prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat abates, or transfer It to another county not so permeated with pub-llclty. . . . The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that wlll protect their processes from preju-dicial outslde interferences. Neither prosecutors, counsel

not make or participate in making an extra-judicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication and that does more than state without elaboration:
(1) Information contained in a public record.
(2) That the investigation is in progress.
(3) The general scope of the investigation in-cluding a description of the offense and, if permitted by law, the Identity of the victim.
(4) A request for assistance in apprehending a suspect or assistance In other matters and the information necessary thereto.
(5) A warning to the public of any dangers.
(B) A lawyer or law firm associated with the prosecution or defense of a criminal matter shall not, from the time of the filing of a com-plaint, information, or indictment, the issu-anee of an arrest warrant, or arrest until the commencement of the trial or dispositIon without trial, make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disse_minated by means of public communication Eihd that re-lates to:
(1) The character, reputation, or prior crim-inal record (including arrests, indict. ments, or other charges of crime) of the accused.
(2) The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged or to a lesser offense.
(3) The existence or contents of any confes-sion, admission, or statement given by the accused or his refusal or failure to make a statement.
(4) The performance or results of any ex-aminations or tests or the refusal or fail-ure of the accused to submit to examina-tions or tests.
(5) The Identity, testimony, or credibility of a prospective witness.
(6) Any opinion as to the guilt or Innocence of the accused, the evidence, or the mei.- Its of the case.
(C) DR 7-107(B) does not preclude a lawyer dur-ing such period from announcing:
(1) The name, age, residente, occupation, and family status of the accused.
(2) If the accused has not been apprehended, any information necessary to aid in his apprehension or to warn the public of any dangers he may present.
for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforce-ment officers coming under the jurIsdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its function. Collabora-tion between counsel and the press as to information affect-Ing the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of dis-ciplinary measures." Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63, 16 L.Ed.2d 600, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1522 (1966).

(3) A request for a,ssistance in obtaining evi-dente.
(4) The Identity of the victim of the crime.
(5) The fact, time, and place of arrest, re-sistance, pursult, and use of weapons.
(6) The Identity of investigating and arrest-ing officers or agencies and the length of the investigation.
(7) At the time of seizure, a description of the physical evidente seized, other than a confession, admission, or statement.
(8) The nature, substance, or text of the charge.
(9) Quotations from or referentes to public records of the court in the case.
(10) The scheduling or result of any step in the judicial proceedings.
(11) That the accused denles the charges made against him.
(D) During the selection of a jury or the trial of a criminal matter, a lawyer or law firm asso-clated with the prosecution or defense of a criminal matter shall not make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be dissemi-nated by means of public communication and that relates to the trial, parties, or issues in the trial or other matters that are reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial, except that he may quote from or refer without comment to public records of the court in the case.
(E) After the completion of a trial or disposition without trial of a criminal matter and prior to the imposition of sentence, a lawyer or law firm associated with the prosecution or de-tense shall not make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by public communication and that is reasonably likely to al fect the imposition of sentence.
(F) The foregoing provisions of DR 7-107 also ap-ply to professional disciplinary proceedíngs and juvenile disciplinary proceedings when pertinent and consistent with other law appli-cable to such proceedings.
(G) A lawyer or law firm associated with a civil action shall not during its investigation or liti-gation make or participate in making an ex-trajudicial statement, other than a quotation from or reference to public records, that a reasonable person would expect to be dissemi-nated by means of public communication and that relates to:
(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved.
(2) The character, credibility, or criminal record of a party, witness, or prospec-tive witness.
(3) The performance or restas of any ex-aminations or tests or the refusal or
failure of a party to submit to such.

(4) Bis opinion as to the merits of the claims or defenses of a party, except as required by law or administrative rule.
(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial óf the action.
During the pendency of an administrative proceeding, a lawyer or law firm associated therewith shall not make or participate in making a statement, other than a quotation from or reference to public records, that a reasonable person would expect to be dissemi-nated by means of public communication if it is made outside the official course of the proceeding and relates to:
(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved.
(2) The character, credibility, or criminal record of a party, witness, or prospec-tive witness.
(3) Physical evidente or the performance or results of any examinations or tests or the refusal or failure of a party to submit to such.
(4) His opinion as to the merits of the claims, defenses, or positions of an
in-
terested person.
(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair hearing.
The foregoing provisions of DR 7-107 do not preclude a lawyer from replying to charges of misconduct publicly made against him or from participating in the proceedings of legis-lative, administrative, or other investigative bodies.
A lawyer shall exercise reasonable cure to pre-vent his employees and associates from mak-ing an extrajudicial statement that he would be prohibited from making under DR 7-107.
7-108 Communication with or Investigation of Jurors.
Bef ore the trial of a case a lawyer connected therewith shall not communicate with or cause another to communicate with anyone he knows to be a member of the venire from which the jury will be selected for the trial of the case.
During the trial of a case:
(1) A lawyer connected therewith shall not communicate with or cause another to communicate with any member of the jury.86
(2) A lawyer who is not conneeted there-with shall not communicate with or cause another to communicate with a juror concerning the case.
DR 7-108(A) and (B) do not prohibit a law-yer from communicating with veniremen or jurors in the course of official proceedings.

(D) After discharge of the jury from further con-sideration of a case with which the lawyer was connected, the lawyer shall not ask ques-tions of or make comments to a member of that jury that are calculated merely to harass or embarrass the juror or to influence his ac-tions in future jury service.87
(E) A lawyer shall not conduct or cause, by finan-cial support or otherwise, another to conduct a vexatious or harassing investigation of el-ther a venireman or a juror.
(F) All restrictions imposed by DR 7-108 upon a lawyer also apply to communications with or investigations of members of a family of a venireman or a juror.
(G) A lawyer shall reveal promptly to the court irnproper conduct by a venireman or a juror, or by another toward a venireman or a juror or a member of his family, of which the law-yer has knowledge.
DR 7-109 Contact with Witnesses.
(A) A lawyer shall not suppress any evidente that he or his client has a legal obligation to re-veal or produce 58
(B) A lawyer shall not advise or cause a person to secrete himself or to leave the jurisdiction of a tribunal for the purpose of making him un-available as a witness therein.88
(C) A lawyer shall not pay, offer to pay, or ac-quiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of his testimony or the outcome of the case.99 But a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or ac-quiesce in the payment of:
(1) Expenses reasonably incurred by a wit-ness in attending or testifying.
(2) Reasonable compensation to a witness for his loss of time in attending or tes-tifying.
(3) A reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert witness.
DR 7-110 Contact with Officials.81
(A) A lawyer shall not give or lend any thing of value to a judge, official, or employee of a
st "[I]t would be unethical for a lawyer te harass, en-tice, induce or exert influence on a juror to obtain his testimony." ABA Opinion 319 (1968).
88 See ABA Canon 5.
99 Cf. ABA Canon 5.
"Pule 15. . . . A member of the State Bar shall not advise a person, whose testimony cou]d establish or tend to establish a material fact, to avoid service of process, or secrete himself, or otherwise to make his testimony un-available." Cal.Business and Professions Code § 6076 (West 1962).
9° See In re O’Keefe, 49 Mont. 369, 142 P. 638 (1914). 91 Cf. ABA Canon 3.
tribunal, except as permitted by Section C(4) of Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, but a lawyer may make a contribution to the campaign fund of a candidate for judicial of-fice in conformity with Section B(2) under Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
(B) In an adversary proceeding, a lawyer shall not communicate, or cause another to com-municate, as to the merits of the cause with a judge or an official before whom the pro-ceeding is pending, except:
(1) In the course of official proceedings in the cause.
(2) In writing if he promptly delivers a copy of the writing to opposing counsel or to the adverse party if he is not rep-resented by a lawyer.
(3) Orally upon adequate notice to oppos-ing counsel or to the adverse party if he is not represented by a lawyer.
(4) As otherwise authorized by law,92 or by Section A(4) under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

CANON 8

A Lawyer Should Assist in Improving the Legal System

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

EC 8-1 Changes in human affairs and imperfec-tions in human institutions make necessary con-stant efforts to maintain and iniprove our legal system.’ This system should function in a man-

92 "Role 16. . . A member of the State Bar shall
not, in the absence of opposing counsel, communicate with or argue to a judge or judicial officer except in open court upon the merits of a contested matter pending before such judge or judicial officer; nor shall he, without furnishing opposing counsel with a copy thereof, address a written communication to a judge or judicial officer concerning the merits of a contested matter pending before such judge or judicial officer. This rule shall not apply to ex parte matters." Cal.Business and Professions Code § 6076 (West 1962).
1[Another] task of the great lawyer is to do his part individually and as a member of the organized bar to improve his profession, the courts, and the law. As President Theodore Roosevelt aptly put it, ‘Every man owes some of his time to the upbuilding of the profession to which he belongs.’ Indeed, this obligation is one of the great things which distinguishes a profession from a business. The soundness and the necessity of President Roosevelt’s admonition insofar as it relates to the legal profession cannot be doubted. The advances in natural science and technology are so startling and the velocity of change in business and in social lile is so great that the law along with the other social sciences, and even human llfe itself, is in grave danger of being extinguished by new gods of its own invention if it does not awake from its lethargy. Vanderbilt, The Five Functions of the Lawyer : Service to Clients and the Public, 40 A.B.A.J. 31, 31-32 1954).

ner that commands public respect and fosters the use of legal remedies to achieve redress of griev-ances. By reason of education and experience, lawyers are especially qualified to recognize de-ficiencies in the legal system and to initiate cor-rective measures therein. Thus they should par-ticipate in proposing and supporting legislation and programs to improve the system,2 without regard to the general interests or desires of clients or former clients.3
EC 8-2 Rules of law are deficient if they are not just, understandable, and responsive to the needs of society. If a lawyer believes that the existence or absence of a rule of law, substantive or proce-dural, causes or contributes to an unjust result, he should endeavor by lawful means to obtain ap-propriate changes in the law. He should encour-age the simplification of laws and the repeal or amendment of laws that are outmoded.4 Like-wise, legal procedures should be improved when-ever experience indicates a change is needed.
EC 8-3 The fair administration of justice re-quires the availability of competent lawyers. Members of the public should be educated to rec-ognize the existence of legal problems and the re-sultant need for legal services, and should be pro-vided methods for intelligent selection of counsel. Those persons unable to pay for legal services should be provided needed services. Clients and lawyers should not be penalized by undue geo-graphical restraints upon representation in legal matters, and the bar should address itself to im-provements in licensing, reciprocity, and admission procedures consistent with the needs of modem commerce.
EC 8-4 Whenever a lawyer seeks legislative or administrative changes, he should identify the ca-
2 See ABA Canon 29; Cf. Cheatham, The Lawyer’s Role and Surroundings, 25 Rocky Mt.L.Rev. 405, 406-07 (1953).
"The lawyer tempted by repose should recall the heavy costs paid by his profession when needed legal reform has to be accomplished through the initiative of public-spirited laymen. Where change must be thrust from without upon an unwilling Bar, the public’s least flattering picture of the lawyer seems confirmad. The lawyer concerned for the standing of his profession will, therefore, interest
self actively in the improvement of the law. In doing so he will not only help to maintain confidence in the Bar, but will have the satisfaction of meeting a responsibility inhering in the nature of his calling," Professional Re-sponsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1217 (1958).
aSee Stayton, Cum Honore Officium, 19 Tex.B.J. 765, 766 (1956); Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1162 (1958) ; and Paul, The Lawyer as a Tax Adviser, 25 Rocky Mt.L.Rev. 412. 433-34 (1953).
4 "There are few great figures in the history of the Bar who have not concerned themselves with the reform and improvement of the law. The special obligation of the profession with respect to legal reform rests on considera-tions too obvlous to require enumeration. Certainly it Is the lavvyer who has both the best chance to know when the law is working badly and the special competence to put it in order." Professtional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1217 (1958).

pacity in which he appears, whether on behalf of himself, a client, or the public.5 A lawyer may advocate such changes on behalf of a client even though he does not agree with them. But when a lawyer purports to act on behalf of the public, he should espouse only those changes which he conscientiously believes to be in the public inter-est.
EC 8-5 Fraudulent, deceptive, or otherwise ile-gal conduct by a participant in a proceeding be-fore a tribunal or legislative body is inconsistent with fair administration of justice, and it should never be participated in or condoned by lawyers. Unless constrained by his obligation to preserve the confidentes and secrets of his client, a lawyer should reveal to appropriate authorities any knowledge he may have of such improper conduct.
EC 8-6 Judges and administrative officials hav-ing adjudicatory powers ought to be persons of integrity, competence, and suitable temperament. Generally, lawyers are qualified, by personal ob-servation or investigation, to evaluate the qualifi-cations of persons seeking or being considered for such public offices, and for this reason they have a special responsibility to aid in the selection of only those who are qualified .6 It is the duty of lawyers to endeavor to prevent political consider-ations from outweighing judicial fitness in the selection of judges. Lawyers should protest ear-nestly against the appointment or election of those who are unsuited for the bench and should strive to have elected 7 or appointed thereto only those who are willing to forego pursuits, whether of a business, political, or other nature, that may inter-fere with the free and fair consideration of ques-tions presented for adiudication. Adjudicatory of-
5 "Rule 14. . . . A member of the State Bar shall not communicate with, or appear before, a public officer, board, committee or body, in his professional capacity, without first disclosing that he is an attorney representing interests that may be affected by action of such officer, board, committee or body." Cal.Business and Professions Code § 6076 (West 1962).
6 See ABA Canon 2.
"Lawyers are better able than laymen to appraise ac-curately the qualifications of candidates for judicial of-fice. It is proper that they should make that appralsal known to the voters in a proper and dignified manner. A lawyer may with propriety endorse a candidate for judicial office and seek like endorsement from other lawyers. But the lawyer who endorses a judicial candidate or seeks that endorsement from other lawyers should be actuated by a sincere belief in the superior qualifications of the candidate for judicial service and not by personal or sel-fish motives; and a lawyer should not use or attempt to use the power or prestige of the judicial off ice to secure such endorsement. On the other hand, the lawyer whose endorsement is sought, if he believes the candidate lacks the essential qualifications for the office or believes the opposing candidate is better qualified, should have the courage and moral stamina to refuse the request for en-dorsement." ABA Opinion 189 (1938).
7 "[W]e are of the opinion that, whenever a candidate for judicial office merits the endorsement and support of lawyers, the lawyers may make financial contributions toward the campaign if its cost, when reasonably conduct-ed, exceeds that which the candidate would be expected to bear personally." ABA Opinion 226 (1941).

ficials, not being wholly free to defend themselves, are entitled to receive the support of the bar against unjust criticism.8 While a lawyer as a citizen has a right to criticize such officials public-ly,9 he should be certain of the merit of his com-plaint, use appropriate language, and avoid petty criticisms, for unrestrained and intemperate state-ments tend to lessen public confidence in our legal system.» Criticisms motivated by reasons other than a desire to improve the legal system are not justified.
EC 8-7 Since lawyers are a vital part of the legal system, they should be persons of integrity, of professional skill, and of dedication to the im-provement of the system. Thus a lawyer should aid in establishing, as well as enforcing, stand-ards of conduct adequate to protect the public by insuring that those who practice law are qualified to do so.
EC 8-8 Lawyers often serve as legislators or as holders of other public offices. This is highly de-sirable, as lawyers are uniquely qualified to make significant contributions to the improvement of the legal system. A lawyer who is a public offi-cer, whether full or part-time, should not engage in activities in which his personal or professional interests are or foreseeably may be in conflict with his official duties.]-1
8 See ABA Canon 1.
o "Citizens have a right under our constitutional system to criticize governmental officials and agencies. Courts are not, and should not be, immune to such criticism." Konigsberg v. State ,Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 269 (1957).
lo "[E]very lawyer, worthy of respect, realizes that pub-lic confidence in our courts is the cornerstone of our gov-ernmental structure, and will refrain from unjustified at-tack on the character of the judges, while recognizing the duty to denounce and expose a corrupt or dishonest judge." Kentucky State Bar Ass’n v. Lewis, 282 S.W.2d 321, 326 (Ky. 1955).
"We should be the last te deny that Mr. Meeker has the right to uphold the honor of the profession and to expose without fear or favor corrupt or dishonest conduct in the profession, whether the conduct be that of a judge or not.
. . However, this Canon [29] does not permit one to make charges which are false and untrue and unfounded in fact. When one’s fancy leads him to make false charges, attacking the character and integrity of others, he does so at his peril. He should not do so without adequate proof of his charges and he is certainly not authorized to make careless, untruthful and vile charges against his professional brethren." In re Meeker, 76 N.M. 354, 364-65, 414 P.2d 862, 869 (1966), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 449, 17 L.Ed.2d 510, 87 S.Ct. 613 (1967).
11 "Opinions 16, 30, 34, 77, 118 and 134 relate to Canon 6, and pass on questions concerning the propriety of the con-duct of an attorney who is a publie officer, in represent-ing private interests adverse to those of the public body which he represents. The principie applied in those opin-ions is that an attorney holding public office should avoid all conduct which might leed the laymen to conclude that the attorney is utilizing his public position to further his professional success or personal interests." ABA Opin-ion 192 (1939).
EC 8-9 The advancement of our legal system is of vital importante in maintaining the rule of law and in facilitating orderly changes; therefore, law-yers should encourage, and should aid in making, needed changes and improvements.

DISCIPLINARY RULES

DR 8-101 Action as a Public Official.

(A) A lawyer who holds public office shall not:
(1) Use his public position to obtain, or at-tempt to obtain, a special advantage in legislative matters for himself or for a client under circumstances where he knows or it is obvious that such action is not in the public interest.
(2) Use his public position to influence, or attempt to influence, a tribunal to act in favor of himself or of a client.
(3) Accept any thing of value from any person when the lawyer knows or it is obvious that the offer is for the pur-pose of influencing his action as a pub-lic official.
DR 8-102 Statements Concerning Judges and Other Adjudicatory Officers.12
(A) A lawyer shall not knowingly make false statements of fact concerning the qualifica-tions of a candidate for election or appoint-ment to a judicial office.
(B) A lawyer shall not knowingly make false ac-cusatIons against a judge or other adjudica-tory officer.
DR 8-103 Lawyer Candidate for Judicial Office.
(A) A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial of-fice shall comply with the applicable provi-sions of Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Con-duct.

tribunal, created by the legislative group of which he is a member. We are of the opinion that he may practice before fact-finding officers, hearing bodies and commis-sioners, since under our views he may appear as counsel in the courts where his municipality is a party. Decisions made at such hearings are usually subject to administra-tive review by the courts upon the record there made. It would be inconsistent to say that a lawyer-member of a legislative body could not participate in a hearing at which the record is made, but could appear thereafter when the cause is heard by the courts on administrative review. This is subject to an important exception. He should not ap-pear as counsel where the matter is subject to review by the legislative body of which he is a member. . . . We are of the opinion that where a lawyer does so appear there would be conflict of interests between his duty as an advocate for his client on the one hand and the obligation to his governmental unit on the other." In re Becker, 16 I11.2d 488, 494-95, 158 N.E.2d 753, 756-57 (1959).
Cf. ABA Opinions 186 (1938), 136 (1935), 118 (1934), and 77 (1932

12 Cf. ABA Canons 1 and 2.

CANON 9

A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

EC 9-1 Continuation of the American concept that we are to be governed by rules of law re-quires that the people have faith that justice can be obtained through our legal system.’ A lawyer should promote public confidence in our system and in the legal profession.2
EC 9-2 Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by irresponsible or improper con-duct of a lawyer. On occasion, ethical conduct of a lawyer may appear to laymen to be unethical. In order to avoid misunderstandings and hence to maintain confidence, a lawyer should fully and promptly inform his client of material develop-ments in the matters being handled for the client. While a lawyer should guard against otherwise proper conduct that has a tendency to diminish public confidence in the legal system or in the legal profession, his duty to clients or to the pub-lic should never be subordinate merely because the full discharge of his obligation may be misun-derstood or may tend to subject him or the legal profession to criticism. When explicit ethical guidance does not exist, a lawyer should deter-mine his conduct by acting in a manner that pro-‘ motes public confidence in the integrity and effi-clency of the legal system and the legal profes-sion.3
EC 9-3 After a lawyer leaves judicial office or other public employment, he should not accept employment in connection with any matter in which he had substantial responsibility prior to his leaving, since to accept employment would give the appearance of impropriety even if none exists.4
EC 9-4 Because the very essence of the legal sys-tem is to provide procedures by which matters can be presented in an impartial manner so that they may be decided solely upon the merits, any state-ment or suggestion by a lawyer that he can or would attempt to circumvent those procedures is

1 "IntegrIty is the very breath of justice. Confidente in our law, our courts, and in the administration of jus-tice Is our supreme ínterest. No practice must be permit-ted to prevail which invites towards the administration of justice a doubt or distrust of its integrity." Erwin M. Jennings Co. v. DiGenova, 107 Conn. 491, 499, 141 A. 866, 868 (1928).
2 -A lawyer should never be reluctant or too proud to answer unjustified criticism of his profession, of himself, or of his brother lawyer. He should guard the reputation of his profession and of his brothers as zealously as he guards his own." Rochelle and Payne, The Struggie for Public Understanding, 25 Texas B.J. 109, 162 (1962).
3 See ABA Canon 29.
4 See ABA Canon 36.

detrimental to the legal system and tends to un-dermine public confidence in it.
EC 9-5 Separation of the funds of a client from those of his lawyer not only serves to protect the client but also avoids even the appearance of im-propriety, and therefore commingling of such funds should be avoided.
EC 9-6 Every lawyer owes a solemn duty to up-hold the integrity and honor of his profession; to encourage respect of the law and for the courts and the judges thereof; to observe the Code of Professional Responsibility; to act as a member of a learned profession, one dedicated to – public service; to cooperate with his brother lawyers in supporting the organized bar through the devot-ing of his time, efforts, and financial support as his professional standing and ability reasonably permit; to conduct himself so as to reflect credit on the legal profession and to inspire the confi-dence, respect, and trust of his clients and of the public; and to strive to avoid not only profession-al impropriety but also the appearance of impro-priety

DISCIPLINARY RULES

DR 9-101 Avoiding Even the Appearance of Im-propriety.6
(A) A lawyer shall not accept private employ-ment in a matter upon the merits of which he has acted in a judicial capacity

5 "As said in Opinion 49 of the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances of the American Bar Association, page 134: ‘An attorney should not only avoid impropriety but should avoid the appearance of impropriety.’ " State ex rel, Nebraska State Bar Ass’n v. Richards, 165 Neb. 80, 93, 84 N.W.2d 136, 145 (1957).
"It would also be preferable that such contribution [to the campaign of a candidate for judicial office] be made to a campaign committee rather than to the candidate personally. In so doing, possible appearances of impro-priety would be reduced toa minimum." ABA Opinion 226 (1941).
"The lawyer assumes high duties, and has imposed upon him grave responsibilities. He may be the means of much good or much mischief. Interests of vast magnitude are entrusted to him ; confidence is reposed in him; life, lib-erty, character and property should be protected by him. He should guard, with jealous watchfulness, his own repu-tation, as well as that of his profession." People ex rel. Cutier v. Ford, 54 III. 520, 522 (1870), and also quoted In State Board of Law Examiners v. Sheldon, 43 Wyo. 522, 526, 7 P.2d 226, 227 (1932).
See ABA Opinion 150 (1936).
e Cf. Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 5-6.
7 See ABA Canon 36.
"It is the duty of the judge to rule on questions of law and evidente in misdemeanor cases ami examínations in felony cases. That duty calls for impartial and unin-fluenced judgment, regardless of the effect on those im-medIately involved or others who may, directly or indirect-ly, be affected. Dlscharge of that duty might be greatly Interfered with if the judge, in another capacity, were permitted to hold himself out to employment by those who are to be, or who may be, brought to trial in felony

(B) A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial re-sponsibility while he was a public employee.9
(C) A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence improperly or upon irrele-vant grounds any tribunal, legislative body,9 or public official.
DR 9-102 Preserving Identity of Funds and Property of a Client.19
(A) AB funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, other than advances for costs and ex-
cases, even though he did not conduct the examination. His prívate interests as a lawyer in building up hís clien-tele, his duty as such zealously to espouse the cause of his prívate clients and to defend against charges of crime brought by law-enforcement agencies of which he is a part, might prevent, or even destroy, that unbiased judi-cial judgment which is so essential in the administration of justice.
"In our opinion, acceptance of a judgeship with the duties of conducting misdemeanor trials, and examinalions in felony cases to determine whether those accused should be bound over for trial in a higher court, ethically bars the judge from acting as attorney for the defendants upon such trial, whether they were examine(‘ by him nr by some other judge. Such a practice would not only dimin-Ish public confidence in the administration of justice in both courts, but would produce serious conflict between the private interests of the judge as a lawyer, and of his clients, and his duties asa judge in adjudicating important phases of criminal processes in other cases. The public and private dutics would be incompatible. The prestige of the judicial office would be diverted to private benefit. and the judicial office would be demcaned thereby." ABA Opinion 242 (1942).
"A lawyer, who has previously occupied a judicial posi-tion nr acted in a judicial capacity, should refrain from accepting employment in any matter involving the same facts as were involved in any specific question which he acted upon in a judicial capacity and, for the same rea-sons, should also refrain from accepting any, employment which might reasonably apocar to involve the same facts." ABA Opinion 49 (1931).
See ABA Opinion 110 (1934).
8 See ABA Opinions 135 (1935) and 134 (1935); cf. ABA Canon 36 and ABA Opinions 39 (1931) and 26 (1930). But see ABA Opinion 37 (1931).
8 "[A staternent by a governmental department or agency with regard to a lawyer resigning from its staff that in-eludes a laudation of his legal ability] carries implica-tions, probably not founded in fact, that the lawyer’s acquaintance and previous relations with the perSonnel of the administrative agencies of the government place him in an advantageous position in practicing before such agencies. So to imply would not only represent what prob-ably is untrue, but would be highly reprehensible." ABA Opinion 184 (1938).
iu See ABA Canon 11.
-Rule 9. . . A member of the State Bar shall not commingle the money or other property of a client with his own; and he shall promptly report to the client the receipt by him of all money and other property belonging to such client. Unless the client otherwise directs in writ-ing, he shall promptly deposit his client’s funds in a bank
or trust company . . in a bank account separate from his own account and clearly designated as ‘Clients’ Funds Account’ or ‘Trust Funds Account’ or words of similar import. Unless the client otherwise directs in writ

penses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable bank accounts maintained in the state in which the law office is situated and no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm shall be deposited therein except as follows:
(1) Funds reasonably sufficient to pay bank charges may be deposited there-in.
(2) Funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently or potentially to the lawyer or law firm must be deposited therein, but the portion belonging to the lawyer or law firm may be with-drawn when due unless the right of the lawyer or law firm to receive it is disputed by the client, in which event the disputed portion shall not be with-drawn until the dispute is finally re-solved.
(B) A lawyer shall:
(1) Promptly notify a client of the receipt of his funds, securities, or other prop-erties.
(2) Identify and label securities and prop-erties of a client promptly upon receipt and place them in a safe deposit box or other place of safekeeping as soon as practicable.
(3) Maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate ac-counts to his client regarding them.
(4) Promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client the funds, se-curities, or other properties in the pos-session of the lawyer which the client is entitled to receive.

DEFINITIONS*

As used in the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
(1) "Differing interests" include every interest that will adversely affect either the judg-

ing, securities of a client in bearer form shall be kept by the attorney in a safe deposit box at a bank or trust com-
pany, . . which safe deposit box shall be clearly designated as ‘Clients’ Account’ or ‘Trust Account’ or words of similar import, and be separate from the attorney’s own safe deposit box." Cal.Business and Professions Code § 6076 (West 1962).
"[C]ommingling is committed when a client’s money is intermingled with that of his attorney and its separate identity lost so that it may be used for the attorney’s per-sonal expenses or subjected to claims of his creditors. . The rule against commingling was adopted to provide against the probability in some cases, the possi-bility in many cases, and the danger in all cases that such commingling will result in the loes of clients’ money." Black v. State Bar, 57 Ca1.2d 219, 225-26, 368 P.2d 118, 122, 18 Cal.Rptr. 518, 522 (1962).
• "Confidente" and "secret" are defined in DR 4-101(A)

ment or the loyalty of a lawyer to a client, whether it be a conflicting, inconsistent, di-verse, or other interest.
(2) "Law firm" includes a professional legal corporation.
(3) "Person" includes a corporation, an associa-tion, a trust, a partnership, and any other organization or legal entity.
(4) "Professional legal corporation" means a corporation, or an association treated as a corporation, authorized by law to practice law for profit.
(5) "State" includes the Dishict of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and other federal territories and possessions.
(6) "Tribunal" includes all courts and all other adjudicatory bodies.
(7) "A Bar association representativa of the general bar of the geographical area in which the association exists" is a bar asso-elation, the membership of which is open to any lawyer in good standing in the geo-graphical area and which has a membership
at least equal to the lesser of three hun-dred members or twenty percent of the law-yers licensed to practica in the geographical area. A bar association of specialists as re-ferred to in DR 2-105(A) (1) or (4) is "a bar association representative of the gen-eral bar" even though it does not meet the test of the preeeding sentence.
(8) "Qualified legal assistance organization" is an organization described in DR 2-103(D) (1) through (4) or which reeommends, fur-nishes, renders or pays for legal services to its members or beneficiarles under a plan operated, administered or funded by an in-surance company or other organization which plan provides that the members or beneficiarles may seleet their counsel from lawyers representative of the general bar of the geographical area in which the plan is offered.
(9) "Lawyers representative of the general bar of the geographical area in which the plan is offered" are lawyers in good standing numbering not less than the greater of three hundred or twenty percent of those licensed to practice in the geographical area.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

CANON 1

A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary

An independent and honorable judiciary is in• dispensable to justice in our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should himself observe, high stand-ards of conduct so that the integrity and indo-pendence of the judiciary may be preserved. The provisions of this Code should be construed and applied to further that objective.

CANON 2

A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All His Activities

A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
B. A. judge should not allow his family, social, or other relationships to influence his judicial conduct or judgment. He should not lend the prestige of his office to advance the private interests of others; nor should he convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence him. He should not testify voluntarily as a char-acter witness.
Commentary
Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. He must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny. He must therefore accept restrictions on his conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.
The testimony of a judge as a character witness injects the prestige of his off ice into the proceed-ing in which he testifies and may be misunder-stood to be an official testimonial. This Canon, however, does not afford him a privilege against testifying in response to an official summons.
• The Code of Judicial Conduct was adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association on August 16, 1972.

CANON 3

A Judge Should Perform the Duties of His Office Impartially and Diligently

The judicial duties of a judge take precedente over all his other activities. His judicial duties include all the duties of his office prescribed by law. In the performance of these duties, the fol-lowing standards apply:

A. Adjudicative Responsibilities.
(1) A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it. He should be unswayed by partisan inter-ests, public clamor, or fear of criticism.
(2) A judge should maintain order and de-corum in proceedings before him.
(3) A judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom he deals in his official capacity, and should require similar conduct of lawyers, and of his staff, court officials, and others subject to his direction and control.
Commentary
The duty to hear all proceedings fairly and with patience is not inconsistent with the duty to dis-pose promptly of the business of the court. Courts can be efficient and business-like while be-ing patient and deliberate.
(4) A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard ac-cording to law, and, except as authorized by law, neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications concerning
a pending or impending proceeding. A judge, however, may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law appli-cable to a proceeding before him if he gives notice to the parties of the person consulted and the substance of the ad-vice, and affords the parties reasonable op-portunity to respond.
Commentary
The proscription against communications con-cerning a proceeding includes communications from lawyers, law teachers, and other persons who are not participants in the proceeding, except to the limited extent permitted. It does not preclude a judge from consulting with other judges, or with court personnel whose function is to aid the judge in carrying out his adjudicative responsibili-ties.
An appropriate and often desirable procedure for a court to obtain the advice of a disinterested ex-pert on legal issues is to invite him to file a brief amicus curiae.
(5) A judge should dispose promptly of the business of the court.
Commentary
‘Prompt disposition of the court’s business re-quires a judge to devote adequate time to his du-ties, to be punctual in attending court and expedi-tious in determining matters under submission, and to insist that court officials, litigants and their lawyers cooperate with him to that end.
(6) A judge should abstain from public com-ment about a pending or impending pro-ceeding in any court, and should require similar abstention on the part of court per-sonnel subject to his direction and con-trol. This subsection does not prohibit judges from making public statements in the course of their official duties or from explaining for public information the pro-cedures of the court.
Commentary
"Court personnel" does not include the lawyers in a proceeding before a judge. The conduct of lawyers is governed by DR7-107 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
(7) A judge should prohibit broadcasting, tele-vising, recording, or taking photographs in the courtroom and arcas immediately ad-jacent thereto during sessions of court or recesses between sessions, except that a judge may authorize:
(a) the use of electronic or photographic means for the presentation of evi-dence, for the perpetuation of a rec-ord, or for other purposes of judicial administration;
(b) the broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing of investitive, cere-monial, or naturalization proceedings;
(e) the photographic or electronic record-ing and reproduction of appropriate court proceedings under the following conditions:
(1) the means of recording will not distract participants or impalr the dignity of the proceedings;
(11) the parties have consented, and the consent to being depicted or recorded has been obtained from each witness appearing in the recording and reproduction;
(iii) the reproduction will not be ex-hibited until alter the proceeding has been concluded and all direct appeals have been exhausted; and
(1v) the reproduction will be exhibited only for instructional purposes in educational institutions.Commentary
Temperate conduct of judicial proceedings is es-sential to the fair administration of justice. The recording and reproduction of a proceeding should not distort or dramatize the proceeding.
B. Administrative Responsibilities.
(1) A judge should diligently discharge his administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in judicial admin-istration, and facilitate the performance of the administrative responsibilities of other judges and court officials.
(2) A judge should require his staff and court officials subject to his direction and con-trol to observe the standards of fidelity and diligente that apply to him.
(3) A judge should take or initiate appropri-ate disciplinary measures against a iudge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may become aware.
Commentary
Disciplinary measures may include reporting a lawyer’s misconduct to an appropriate disciplinary body.
(4) A judge should not make unnecessary ap-pointments. He should exercise his power of appointment only on the basis of merit, avoiding nepotism and favoritism. He should not approve compensation of ap-pointees beyond the fair value of services rendered.
Commentary
Appointees of the judge include officials such as referees, commissioners, special masters, receiv-ers, guardians and personnel such as clerks, sec-retaries, and bailiffs. Consent by the parties to an appointment or an award of compensation does not relieve the judge of the obligation pre-scribed by this subsection.
C. Disqualification.
(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instantes where:
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowl-edge of disputed evidentiary facts con-cerning the proceeding;
(b) he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;
Commentary
A lawyer in a governmental agency does not necessarily have an association with other lawyers employed by that agency within the meaning of this subsection; a judge formerly employed by a governmental agency, however, should disqualify himself in a proceeding if his impartiality might reasonably be questioned because of such associa-tion.
(e) he knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or bis spouse or minor child residing in Iris household, has a financial interest in the subject mat-ter in eontroversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(d) he or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trastee of a party;
(1) is acting as a lawyer in the pro-ceeding;
Commentary
The fact that a lawyer in a proceeding is af-filiated with a law firm with which a lawyer-rela-tive of the judge is affiliated does not of itself dis-qualify the judge. Under appropriate circumstanc-es, the fact that "his impartiality might reasonably be questioned" under Canon 3C(1), or that the lawyer-relative is known by the judge to have an interest in the law firm that could be "substantial-ly affected by the outcome of the proceeding" un-der Canon 3C(1) (d) (iii) may require his disquali-fication.
(iii) is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantial-ly affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) is to the judge’s knowledge like-ly to be a material witness in the proceeding;
(2) A iudge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself about the personal financial in-terests of his spouse and minor children residing ‘in his household.
(3) For the purposes of this section:
(a) the degree of relationship is calculat-ed according te the civil law system;
Commentary
According to the civil law system, the third de-gree of relationship test would, for example, dis-qualify the judge if his or his spouse’s father, grandfather, uncle, brother, or niece’s husbanci were a party or lawyer in the proceeding, but would not disqualify him if a cousin were a party or lawyer in the proceeding.
(b) "fiduciary" includes such relationships as executor, administrator, trastee, and guardian;
(e) "financial interest" means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, how-ever small, or a relationship as di-rector, advisor, or other active par-ticipant in the affairs of a party, ex• cept that:
(i) ownership in a mutual or com-mon investment fund that holds securities is not a "financial in-terest" in such securities unless the judge participates in the man-agement of the fund;
(ii) an office in mi educational, re-ligious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization is not a "finan-cial interest" in securities held by the organization;
(iii) the proprietary interest of a poli-cy holder in a mutual insurance company, of a depositor in a mu-tual savings association, or a simi-lar proprietary interest, is a "financial interest" in the organi-zation only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially af-fect the value of the interest;
(iv) ownership of government securi-ties is a "financial interest" in the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantial-ly affeet the value of the securi-ties.
D. Remittal of Disqualification.
A judge disqualified by the tercos of Canon 3C(1) (e) or Canon 3C(1) (d) may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the record the basis of his disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and law-yers, independently of the judge’s participa-tion, all agree in writing that the judge’s re-lationship is immaterial or that his financial interest is insubstantial, the judge is no longer disqualified, ami may participate in the pro-ceeding. The agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the rec-ord of time proceeding.
Commentary
This procedure is designed to minimize the chance that a party or lawyer will feel coerced into an agreement. When a party is not immediately available, the judge without violating this section may proceed on the written assurance of the law-yer that his party’s consent will be subsequently filed.

CANON 4

A Judge May Engage in Activities to Improve the Law, the Legal System, and the Administration of Justice

A Judge May Engage in Activities to Improve the Law, the Legal System, and the Administration of Justicecast doubt on his capacity to decide impartially any issue that may come before him:
A. He may speak, write, lecture, teach, and par-ticipate in other activities concerning the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice.
B. He may appear at a public hearing before an executive or legislative body or official on matters concerning the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice, and he may otherwise consult with an executive or legisla-tive body or °Metal, but only on matters con-cerning the administration of justice.
C. He may serve as a member, officer, or director of an organization or governmental agency de-voted to the improvement of the law, the le-gal system, or the administration of justice. He may assist such an organization in raising funds and may participate in their manage-ment and investment, but should not person-ally participate in public fund raising activi-ties. He may make recommendations to public and private fund-granting agencies on proj-ects and programs concerning the law, the legal system, and the administration of jus-tice.
Commentary
As a judicial officer and person specially learned in the law, a judge is in a unique position to con-tribute to the improvement of the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice, including revision of substantive and procedural law and improvement of criminal and juvenile justice. To the extent that his time permits, he is encouraged to do so, either independently or through a bar association, judicial conference, or other organiza-tion dedicated to the improvement of the law.
Extra-judicial activities are governed by Canon 5.

CANON 5

A Judge Should Regulate His Extra-Judicial Activities to Minimize the Risk of Conflict with His Judicial Duties

A. Avocational Activities. A judge may write, lecture, teach, and speak on non-legal subjects, and engage in the arts, sports, and other so-cial and recreational activities, if such avoca-tional activities do not detraet from the dig-nity of his office or interfere with the perform-ance of his judicial duties.

Commentary

Complete separation of a judge from extra-judicial activities is neither possible nor wise; he should not become isolated from the society in which he lives.
his judicial duties. A judge may serve as an officer, director, trustee, or non-legal advisor of an educational, religious, charitable, frater-nal, or civic organization not conducted for the economic or political advantage of its mem-bers, subject to the following limitations:
(1) A judge should not serve if it is likely that the organization will be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before him or will be regularly engaged in adversary proceedings in any court.
Commentary
The changing nature of some organizations and of their relationship to the law malees it necessary for a judge regularly to reexamine the activities of each organization with which he is affiliated to determine if it is proper for him to continue his relationship with it. For example, in many juris-dictions charitable hospitals are now more fre-quently in court than in the past. Similarly, the boards of some legal aid organizations now make policy decisions that may have political signifi-cante or imply commitment to causes that may come before the courts for adjudication.
(2) A judge should not solicit funds for any educational, religious, charitable, frater-nal, or civic organization, or use or permit the use of the prestige of his office for that purpose, but he may be listed as an officer, director, or trustee of such an or-ganization. He should not be a speaker or the guest of honor at an organization’s fund raising events, but he may attend such events.
(3) A judge should not give investment ad-vice to such an organization, but he may serve on its board of directors or trustees even though it has the responsibility for approving investment decisions.
Commentary
A judge’s participation in an organization de-voted to quasi-judicial activities is governed by Canon 4.
C. Financial Activities.
(1) A judge should refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect ad-versely on his impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties, exploit his judicial position, or in-volve him in frequent transactions with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court on which he serves.
(2) Subject to the requirements of subsection (1), a judge may hold and manage invest-ments, including real estate, and engage in other remunerative activity, but should not serve as an officer, director, man-ager, advisor, or employee of any busi-ness.
B. Civic and Charitable Activities. A judge may
participate in civic and charitable activities Commentary
that do not reflect adversely upon his impar- The Effective Date of Compliance provision of tiality or interfere with the performance of this Code qualifies this subsection with regard toa judge engaged in a family business at the time this Code becomes effective.
Canon 5 may cause temporary hardship in juris-dictions where judicial salaries are inadequate and judges are presently supplementing their income through commercial activities. The remedy, how-ever, is to secure adequate judicial salaries.
[Canon 5C(2) sets the minimum standard to which a full-time judge should adhere. Jurisdictions that do not provide adequate judicial salaries but are willing to allow full-time judges to supplement their in-comes through commercial activities may adopt the following substitute tmtil such time as adequate salaries are provided:
*(2) Subject to the requlrement of sub-section (1), a judge may hold and man-age investments, including real estate, and engage in other remunerative activity in-cluding the operation of a business.
Jurisdictions adopting the foregoing sub-stitute may also wish to prohibit a judge from engaging in certain types of busi-nesses such as that of banks, public utili-ties, insurance companies, and other busi-nesses affected with a public interest.1
(3) A judge should ~nage his investments and other financial interests to minimizo the nttmber of cases in which he is dis-qualified. As soon as he can do so with-out serious financial detriment, he should divest himself of investments and other financial interests that might require fre-quent disqualification.
(4) Neither a judge nor a member of his fam-ily residing in his household should accept a gift, bequest, favor, or loan from any-one except as follows:
(a) a judge may accept a gift incident to a public testimonial to him; books supplied by publishers on a compli-mentary basis for official use; or an invitation to the judge and bis spouse to attend a bar-related function or ac-tivity devoted to time improvement of the law, the legal system, or the ad-ministration of justice;
(b) a judge or a member of his family residing in his household may accept ordinary social hospitality; a gift, be-quest, favor, or loan from a relative; a wedding or engagement gift; a loan from a lending institution in its regu-lar course of business on the same terms generally available to persons who are not judges; or a scholarship or fellowship awarded on the same terms applied to other applicants;
(e) a judge or a member of his family re-siding in his household may accept any other gift, bequest, favor, or loan only if the donor is not a party or other person whose interests have come or are likely to come before
him, and, if its value exceeds $100, the judge reports it in the same manner as he reports compensation in Canon 6C.
Commentary
This subsection does not apply to contributions to a judge’s campaign for judicial office, a matter governed by Canon 7.
(5) For the purposes of this section "member of his family residing in his household" means any relative of a judge by blood or marriage, or a person treated by a judge as a member of his family, who resides in his household.
(6) A judge is not required by this Code to disclose bis income, debts, or investments, except as provided in this Canon and Can-ons 3 and 6.
Commentary
Canon 3 requires a judge to disqualify himself in any proceeding in which he has a financial in-terest, however small; Canon 5 requires a judge to refrain from engaging in business and from financial activities that might interfere with the impartial performance of his judicial duties; Can-on 6 requires him to report all compensation he receives for activities outside his judicial office. A judge has the rights of an ordinary citizen, in-cluding the right to privacy of his financial af-fairs, except to the extent that limitations thereon are required to safeguard the proper performance of his duties. Owning and reeeiving income from investments do not as such affect the performance of a judge’s duties.
(7) Information acquired by a judge in his judicial capacity should not be used or disclosed by him in financial dealings or for any other purpose not related to his judicial duties.
D. Fiduclary Activities. A judge should not serve as the executor, administrator, trustee, guard. ian, or other fiduciary, except for the estate, trust, or person of a member of his family, and then only if such service will not interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties. "Member of his family" includes a spouse, child, grandehild, parent, grandparent, or other relative or person with whom the judge maintains a close familia! relationship. As a family fiduciary a judge is subject to the following restrictions:
(1) He should not serve if it is likely that as a fiduciary he will be engaged in proceed. ings that would ordinarily come before him, or if the estate, trust, or ward be-comes involved in adversary proceedings in the court on which he serves or one un-der its appellate jurisdiction.
Commentary
The Effective Date of Compliance provision of this Code qualifies this subsection with regard to a judge who is an executor, administrator, trustee,financial af-fairs, except to the extent that limitations thereon are required to safeguard the proper performance of his duties. Owning and reeeiving income from investments do not as such affect the performance of a judge’s duties.
(7) Information acquired by a judge in his judicial capacity should not be used or disclosed by him in financial dealings or for any other purpose not related to his judicial duties.
D. Fiduclary Activities. A judge should not serve as the executor, administrator, trustee, guard. ian, or other fiduciary, except for the estate, trust, or person of a member of his family, and then only if such service will not interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties. "Member of his family" includes a spouse, child, grandehild, parent, grandparent, or other relative or person with whom the judge maintains a close familia! relationship. As a family fiduciary a judge is subject to the following restrictions:
(1) He should not serve if it is likely that as a fiduciary he will be engaged in proceed. ings that would ordinarily come before him, or if the estate, trust, or ward be-comes involved in adversary proceedings in the court on which he serves or one un-der its appellate jurisdiction.
Commentary
The Effective Date of Compliance provision of this Code qualifies this subsection with regard to a judge who is an executor, administrator, trustee,
LXXV
CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT
or other fiduciary at the time this Code becomes effective.
(2) While acting as a fiduciary a judge is sub-ject to the same restrictions on financial activities that apply to him in his person-al capacity.
Commentary
A judge’s obligation under this Canon and his obligation as a fiduciary may come into conflict. For example, a judge should resign as trustee if it would result in detriment to the trust to divest it of holdings whose retention would place the judge in violation of Canon 5C(3).
E. Arbitration. A judge should not act as an ar-bitrator or mediator.
F. Practice of Law. A judge should not practico law.
G. Extra-judicial Appointments. A judge should not accept appointment to a governmental committee, commission, or other position that is concerned with issues of fact or policy on matters other than the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice. A judge, however, may represent his country, state, or locality on ceremonial occasions or in connection with historical, ed-ucational, and cultural activities.
Commentary
Valuable services have been rendered in the past to the states and the nation by judges appointed by the executive to undertake important extra-judicial assignments. The appropriateness of con-ferring these assignments on judges must be re-assessed, however, in light of the demands on ju-dicial manpower created by today’s crowded dock-ets and the need to protect the courts from in-volvement in extra-judicial matters that may prove to be controversial. Judges should not be expect-ed or permitted to accept governmental appoint-ments that could interfere with the effectiveness and independence of the judiciary.
CANON 6
A Judge Should Regularly File Reports of Compensation Received for Quasi-Judicial and Extra-Judicial Activities
A judge may receive compensation and reim-bursement of expenses for the quasi-judicial and extra-judicial activities permitted by this Code, if the source of such payments does not give the ap-pearance of influencing the judge in his judicial duties or otherwise give the appearance of im-propriety, subject to the following restrictions:
A. Compensation. Compensation should not ex-ceed a reasonable amount nor should it ex-ceed what a person who is not a judge would receive for the same activity.
B. Expense Reimbursement. Expense reimburse-ment should be limited to the actual cost of travel, food, and lodging reasonably incurred
C.
by the judge and, where appropriate to the occasion, by his spouse. Any payment in ex-cess of such an amount is compensation.
Public Reports. A judge should report the date, place, and nature of any activity for whieh he received compensation, and the name of the payor and the amount of compensation so received. Compensation or income of a spouse attributed to the judge by operation of a community property law is not extra-judicial compensation to the judge. His report should be made at least annually and should be filed as a public document in the office of the clerk of the court on whieh he serves or other of-fice designated by rule of court.

CANON 7

A Judge Should Refrain from Political Activity Inappropriate to His Judicial Office

A. Political Conduct in General.
(1) A ludge or a candidate for election to ju-dicial office should not:
(a) act as a leader or hold any office in a political organization;
(b) make speeches for a political organi-zation or candidate or publicly endorse a candidate for public office;

Commentary

A candidate does not publicly endorse another candidate for public office by having his name on the same ticket.
(e) solicit funds for or pay an assessment or make a contribution to a political organization or candidate, attend po-litical gatherings, or purchase tickets for political party dinners, or other functions, except as authorized in sub-section A(2) ;
(2) A judge holding an office filled by public election between competing candidates, or a candidate for such office, may, only insofar as permitted by law, attend po-litical gatherings, speak to such gather-ings on bis own behalf when he is a can-didate for election or re-election, identify himself as a member of a political party, and contribute to a political party or or-ganization.
(3) A judge should resign his office when he becomes a candidate either in a party pri-mary or in a general election for a non-judicial office, except that he may con-tinue to hold his judicial office while be-ing a candidate for election to or serving as a delegate in a state constitutional convention, if he is otherwise permitted by law to do so.
(4) A judge should not engage in any other political activity except on behalf of meas-ures to improve the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice.

B. Campaign Conduct.
(1) A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that is filled either by public election between compet-ing candidates or en the basis of a merit system election:
(a) should maintain the dignity appro-priate to judicial office, and should encourage members of his family to adhere te the same standards of po-litical conduct that apply to him;
(b) should prohibit public officials or em-ployees subject to bis direction or con-trol from doing for him what he is prohibited from doing under this Canon; and except to the extent att-thorized under subsection B(2) or B(3), he should not allow any other person to do for him what he is pro-hibited from doing under this Canon;
(c) should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office; announce his views on disputed legal or political issues; or misrepresent bis identity, qualifications, present position, or oth-er fact.
(2) A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that is filled by public election between competing candidates should not himself solicit or accept campaign funds, or solicit publicly stated support, but he may establish conunittees of responsible per-sons to secure and manage the expen-diture of funds for his campaign and to obtain public statements of support for his candidaey. Such eommittees are not prohibited from soliciting campaign con-tributions and public support from law-yers. A candidate’s committees may so-licit funds for his campaign no earlier than [90] days before a primary eleetion and no later than [90] days after the last election in which he participates during the election year. A candidate should not use or permit the use of campaign contributions for the private benefit of himself or members of his family.
Commentary
Unless the candidate is required by law to file a list of his campaign contributors, their names should not be revealed to the candidate.
[Each jurisdiction adopting this Code should prescribe a time limit on soliciting campaign funds that is appropriate to the elective process there-in.]
(3) An incumbent judge who is a candidate for retention in or re-election to office without a competing candidate, and whose candldacy has drawn active opposition, may eampaign in response thereto and may obtain publicly stated support andeampaign funds in the manner provided in subsection B(2).
Compliance with the Code of Judicial Conduct
Anyone, whether or not a lawyer, who is an of-ficer of a judicial system performing judicial func-tions, including an officer such as a referee in bankruptcy, special master, court commissioner, or magistrate, is a judge for the purpose of this Code. All judges should comply with this Code ex-cept as provided below.
A. Part-time Judge. A part-time judge is a judge who serves on a continuing or periodic basis, but is permitted by law to devote time to some other profession or occupation and whose com-pensation for that reason is less than that of a full-time judge. A part-time judge:
(1) is not required to comply with Canon 5C (2), D, E, F, and G, and Canon 6C;
(2) should not practice law in the court on which he serves or in any court subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the court en which he serves, or act as a lawyer in a proceeding in which he has served as a judge or in any other proceeding related thereto.
B. Judge Pro Tempere. A judge pro tempore is
a person who is appointed to act temporarily as a judge.
(1) While acting as such, a judge pro tempore
is not required to comply with Canon 5C(2), (3), D, E, F, and G, and Canon 6C.
(2) A person who has been a judge pro
tempore should not act as a lawyer in a
proceeding in which he has served as a judge or in any other proceeding related thereto.
C. Retired Judge. A retired judge who receives the same compensation as a full-time judge on the court from which he retired and is eligible for recall to judicial service should comply with all the provisions of this Code except Canon 5G, but he should refrain from judicial service during the period of an extra-judicial appointment not sanctioned by Canon 5G. All other retired judges eligible for recall to ju-dicial service should comply with the provi-sions of this Code governing part-time judges.
Effective Date of Compliance
A person to whom this Code becomes applicable should arrange his affairs as soon as reasonably possible to comply with it. If, however, the de-mands on his time and the possibility of conflicts of interest are not substantial, a person who holds judicial office on the date this Code becomes effec-tive may:
(a) continue to act as an officer, director, or non-legal advisor of a family busi-ness;
(b) continue to act as an executor, ad-ministrator, trustee, or other fiduciary for the estate or person of one who is not a member of his family.

MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS
FOR ADMISSION TO LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES

This table contains information of educational and residence requirements reported in 1974. Full information and subsequent changes, if any, may be obtained by writing to the Clerk of the highest appellate Court or the Secretary of the Bar Board in each state. The compilation following does not reflect changes which may become effective on or after January 1, 1975

*Originally published in the Review of Legal Education, Fall 1972 and reprintedi with the permission of the American Bar Association 1973 and its Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar.

MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSION TO LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES

This table contains information of educational residence requirements reported September 1, 1970.
Full information and subsequent changes, if any, may be obtained by writing to the Clerk of the
highest appellate Court or the Secretary of the Bar Board in each state.

Minimum amount of general education Duration and distribution of
period of law study required before:
if pursued:

Residen: Requirements (for original applicants only, does not apply to lawyers seeking
admission on comity for whom 5

Beginning period Taking final
of law study examination

Wholly outside a law school

Partly in
a law school

Wholly in a law school
separare requirements are usually laid down)

American Bar Three years of resident study in a ……………………….. Not
permitted At least the law school study rec- Association
college for a 3-yrs. full-time or
commended in the next column.
Recommen- 2-yrs. for a 4-yrs. full-time law
No recommendation as to sup-
dations school study
plementary office work

Alabama 96 semester hours or
Not permitted No credit for office work 144 quarter hours

Alaska 3 years college
Not permitted Not permitted

Arizona 3 years college
Not permitted Not permitted

Arkansas 2 years college
Not permitted Not permitted

Three years of full-time or "a longer course. equivalent in the number of working hours," of
part-time study

4 years from school approved by Board or if school is approved by A.B.A.. 3 years

Graduare of A.B.A. approved lasv school

Graduate of an A.B.A. approved law school except for one who has practiced in another state at
least 5 of last seven years imme- diately preceding application

Graduation from law school ap- proved by A.B.A.

Bona fide residence at time of certifica- tMn

30 days before exam

Bona fide residence al time of application

California 2 years approved college, or be ………………………..
21 years of age ami pass an educa- tional equivalency examination or achieve admission lo an ac-
credited law school
4 years in California law office or California judge’s chambers, or by correspondence. Must study
aggregate of 3.456 hours and must take and pass first-year law stu- dents’ examination al end of
first year of law study

4 years. Any comhination of study menlioned in preceding column and law school study

3 yrs. full-time and graduation or 4 yrs. part-time in accredited law school. 4 yrs. in
unaccredited law school and must take and pass first year students’ examination at end of first
year of law study

Colorado 3 years regular college work M Not
permitted Not permitted
A.B.A. approved law school

Graduation as a full-time student or a part-time student under the standards adopted by the House
of Delegares of the ABA on February 12,1973

Bona Me residence for 1 mon. prior to examination and continuing unid admis- sion, except person
admitted and prac- ticing in another state, must become a resident prior to admission

BLACK’S
DICTIONARY OF LAW
FOURTH EDITION

levad

A. The first letter in the English and most other alphabets derived from the Roman or Latin al-phabet, which was one of several ancient Italian alphabets derived from the Greek, which was an adaptation of the Pheenician. The first letter in the Phcenician alphabet was called aleph, mean-ing "ox", which is also the meaning of the first letter in the Greek alphabet, alpha.
Alpha and the second letter of the Greek alpha-bet, beta, were combined to form "alphabet," which is largely the same in different languages. In Danish, Dutch, Polish and Swedish al fabet; in English, German and French, alphabet; in Italian, Portuguese and Spanish, alfabeto; in Russian, alfabetii, etc. This striking similarity shows borrowing, either mediately or immediate-ly, from the same source.
A has several different forms, the most curious of which is little a and big A. All of our letters were first capitals, and remained so for a long time. Then small letters alone were used for centuries. Later capitals were used with small letters, largely for ornamental purposes. The an-cient Egyptians had twenty a’s to choose from, and it is said that a is the initial letter of about one-seventh of all Armenian words.
Nundinal Letters
A is also the first of the nundinal letters con-sisting of the first eight letters of the alphabet. These letters were repeated successively from the first to the last day of the year by the Romans and every ninth day was market day, when the country people carne into the city to buy and seli and to attend to their private or religious affairs. However, no market day could coincide with the first day of January or the ninth day of the other months. The first market day of the year fell eight days from the preceding market day, which
Black’s Law Dictionary Revised 4th Eci.-

if the nundinal letter for a given year was, for example, A, the market day always coincided with A, which was the ninth day from the preceding market day, both inclusive. No judgment could be pronounced, nor assemblies of the people held, on these days, but this was changed by the lex Hortensia in 246 B.C. Proposed laws were post-ed, and a vote could not be taken until three Ro-man weeks (trinum nundinum), or 24 days, had elapsed. A judgment debtor had 30 days to sat-isfy judgment against him. If he failed to do so, he was seizecl and taken before the magistrate and if he could find no surety he was put in chains and held by the judgment creditor for 60 days, during which time the amount of his debt was proclaimed on three successive market days, and then if he failed, the XII Tables provided:
" * * Tertüs nundinus partis secanto; si plus
minusive secuerint, se fraude esto." (On the
third market day let him be cut into pieces; if any one Cany creditor] cut more or less than his share, it shall not be a crime). Shylock, it will be remembered, had to cut just a pound of fiesh and no more.
Dominical or Sunday Letters
A is also the first of the Dominical or Sunday letters, consisting of the first seven letters of the alphabet, which were introduced to replace the nundinal letters of the Romans. These letters, repeated successively from the first to the last day of the year, show the order of Sundays according to the Christian calendar. If the first day of January is on Sunday, all the rest of the days des-ignated by A will also be Sundays. Since each common year ends on the same day of the week that it begins, the dominical letters change each year in retrogression. If the year is a leap year an adjustment is made either on the 25tI! or 29th

of February. The dominical letters are used to determine the date of Easter but may also be used to determine the day of the week on which a given date falls in any year.

A as Symbol

Both as a symbol and as an abbreviation, A is used in every phase of human activity and learn-ing. In law, commerce, manufacturing, engineer-ing, printing, music, medicine, geometry, mathe-maties, physics, chemistry, logic, philosophy, aero-nautics, artillery, etc., these devices, which are meaningless to the unitiated, simply could not be dispensed with. The Puritans first burned A on the forehead of the adulterer,—or at least on that of the adulteress!—and later fastened it on the sinner’s clothing. The Roman judges used three wax-covered wooden tables. On one was in-scribed A for Absolgo (I acquit); on the second C for Condemno (I condemn), and on the third N. L. for Non liquet (It is not clear). When a proposed law was to be voted on, Roman voters received two tablets, on one of which was
in-scribed A for antiguo (for the old law), and on the other U. R. for Uti rogas (as you ask). A is also the first of the letters employed by the Se-mites and the ancient Greeks as numeral signs. If the Greek a was accented aboye, it stood for 1; if below, it stood for 1000. The Romans also used A as a numeral sign before they adopted the let-ter D. If A was not accented, it stood for 500, but if accented thus, Á, it stood for 5000.
The symbol @ is a graphic modification of the Latin ad, meaning "at" or "to". Some European railroads use A to designate first class railroad coaches. In European tourist guides A is used to designate places where there are hotels able to satisfy the wants of motorists. Mercantile agencies use A to indicate the highest commercial credit. A is also the highest mark given by teach-ers to pupils. Ship registries in United States, England, Germany and Norway use A to indicate the highest class of vessel.
In the record of American Shipping Al stands for a first-class vessel of the highest seaworthi-ness, the lower degrees being expressed by A11/2, etc., A3 being the lowest. In Lloyd’s Register Al means a first-class vessel. A printed in red means an over-aged vessel. iE a third-class ves-sel. The broad A means an iron ship. The de-scription of a ship as "Al" amounts to a war-ranty. 011ive v. Booker, 1 Exch. 423.
In ceramics A has various meanings. On fine old Sevres A alone shows that the piece was made in 1753, whereas AA shows that it was made in 1777. A is also used as a brand by certain breed-ers of bulls for the bull ring, as well as by manu-facturera of fine Toledo swords. A denotes the first of a series, and is used to distinguish the first page of a folio from the second, which is marked b (Coke, Litt. 114a, 114b), as well as the first foot-note and the first section or subsection in statutes. It is also the name of the sixth note of the natural diatonic scale of C, or the first note

of the relative minor scale. To this note all or-chestral instruments are tuned. A also indicates the key in which many great pieces of music are composed. The money coined at the Paris mint is marked with an A, and it was long supposed that such coinage was superior to that of the pro-vincial mints. This gave rise to the phrase Etre marqué á Z’A (to be marked with an A) and was used to indica te a man of eminent rank or merit, just as we use A-1 or A to indicate excellence of either persons or commodities.
A is also used in numerous other phrases and proverbs. For example, A word to the wise is sufficient. This ordinarily admonitory proverb was held to be libellous in view of the context in which it was used. One who had sold out to his partner warned customers that the buyer was not responsible for his debts, since he was a minor, and that "a word to the wise is sufficient." The court said: "But when what was previously said is followed by the significant and proverbially pre• cautionary words—’A word to the wise is suffi-cient,’ the idea is at once conveyed that plaintiff, is wanting in honor and integrity as a business man, and that those who should deal with him would suffer loss." Hays v. Mather, 15 Ill.App. 30, 34. For the phrase, from alpha to omega, there is our from A to Z and A to izzard, and the German von A bis Z, which mean from beginning to end; completely; thoroughly; or in more modern slang, from soup to nuts. The German proverb Wer A sagt, mus auch B sagen is based on a profound knowledge. of human nature, and translates, you can’t say A without saying B; in for a penny, in for a pound. In other words, don’t take the first step if you don’t want to go the limit. Of a very ignorant or stupid person it has long been said that He does not know great A from a bull’s foot or that he knows ni A ni B (neither A nor B). In Birds of a feather fiock together, a means the same, or a feather means the same kind.
A as Abbreviation
As an abbreviation a, either alone or in combi-nation with other letters, is used in all the arts and sciences as well in hundreds of non-technical ways. Its meaning as an abbreviation largely de-pends on context. In common usage, it may mean about, accepted, acne, aged, answer, ante, area, amateur, etc. It is also used for almost any name of a person beginning with A, as Alfred, Anna, etc. In chemistry it stands for argon. A note provided for "Int. @ 6% p. a." The court said: "The letter IP when used in a note, as it is here, is known and recognized among commercial peo-ple and businessmen as standing for ‘at.’ " Bel-ford v. Beatty, 34 N.E. 254, 255, 145 III. 414, 418.
A is an abbreviation of adversus (against). Versus and its abbreviation v. are much oftener used in this sense, though the original Latin meaning of versus is toward; in the direction of.
‘Á, angstrom unit; the unit for measuring the length of light waves. The ultra violet rays of sunlight between 3130A. and 2900A activate pro-

vitamins in the skin and certain foods, so as to produce the antirachitic substance known as vita-min D, which is also extracted from fish liver oils

The Spelling of A

A was formerly spelt a-per-se, a ("a" by itself makes the word "a") of which A-per-se-A, A per-sey, and apersie were corruptions and synony-mous with superior, chief, first, etc

A in Latin and Law Latin

Among the Romans this letter was used in crim-inal trials. The judges were furnished with small tables covered with wax, and each one in-scribed on it the initial letter of his vote: A (ab-solvo) when he voted to acquit the accused; C (condemno) when he was for condemnation; and N L (non liquet), when the matter did not appear clearly, and he desired a new argument.
The letter A (i. e. antiguo, "for the old law") was inscribed upon Roman ballots under the Lex Tahellaria, to indicate a negative vote; Tayl.Civ. Law, 191., 192.

A as Indefinite Article

A is the form of the indefinite article that is used before consonants and initial consonant sounds, on being used before initial vowel sounds, as, for example, a house, a year, a utility; but an oak, an ape and an hour, because the h is silent. .Formerly where the initial h of certain words was not accented, as historical, hypothetical, hotel, humble, etc., an was used, but now the h is no longer silent, and the best usage in both the Unit-ed States and England is to use a before such words. A hypothetical question, a historical mon-ument, a hotel, etc., are the correct forms.
The word "a" has varying meanings and uses. "A" means "one" or "any," but less emphatically than either. It may mean one where only one is intended, or it may mean any one of a great num-ber. It is placed before nouns of the singular number, denoting an individual object or quality individualizad. First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank of Chicago v. Armstrong, 222 Iowa 425, 269 N.W. 502, 506, 107 L.R.A. 873.
The article "a" is not necessarily a singular term; it is often used in the sense of "any" and is then applied to more than one individual object. Phila.delphia & R. R. Co. v. Green & Flinn, 2 W.W. Harr.(Del.) 78, 119 A. 840, 846; In re Sanders, 54 Law J.Q.B. The article "a" is not generally used in a singular sense unless such an intention is clear from the language of the statute, 1 C.J.S., A, p. 1, but statute providing that parties to "a" reorganization shall be deemed a single employ-ing unit referred to quality or nature of changes, rather than quantity, and meant not one or only one, but any, and fact that there had been more than one reorganization did not prevent statute from applying. Lindley v. Murphy, 387 Ill. 506, 56 N.E.2d 832, 838. So under a statute providing that the issuance of "a" certificate to one carrier should not bar a certificate to another over the same route, a certificate could be granted to more than two carriers over the same route. State ex. rel. Crown Coach Co. v. Public Service Commis-sion, 238 Mo.App. 287, 179 S.W.2d 123, 127. But the meaning depends on context. For example, in Workmen’s Compensation Act, on, or in or about "a" railway, factory, etc., was held not to mean any railway, factory, etc., but the railway, fac-tory, etc., of the employer. Francis v. Turiaer, [1900] 1 Q.B. 478; 69 L.J.Q.B. 182; 81 L.T. 770; 48 W.R. 228; 64 J.P. 53.
Insurance against loss occasioned by "a sea" did not limit insured to loss occasioned by a single wave, but covered losses occasioned by heavy waves during voyage. Snowden v. Guion, 101 N. Y. 458, 5 N.E. 322.
In State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Martin, 60 Ark. 343, 30 S. W. 421, 28 L.R.A. 153, the state Constitution provided for "a judge" in each circuit. Owing to incrcase in judicial business, the Legislature provided for an additional judge for the sixth circuit. It was contended that the statute was unconstitutional. The court raid:
"Now, the adjective ‘a,’ commonly called the ‘indefinite article,’ and so called, too, because it does not define any particular person or thing, is ectirely too indefinite, in the connection used, to define or lirnit the number of judges which the legislative wisdom may provide for the judicial circuits of the state. And it is perfectly obvious that its office and meaning was well understood by the framers of our constitution, for nowhere in that instru-ment do we find it used as a numerical limitation. It is insisted that if ‘a’ does not mean ‘une,’ and ‘but one,’ In the section quoted, then the way is open for a latitudi-narian constructjon in the various other sections where it occurs.
" * • • So the question recurs as to the slg,niflcance of the letter ‘a,’ for the convention must be taken tu’ have meant what they have plainly said. It perforrns precisely the same office here as in every other section where it occurs. Section 6 of the article 7 says, ‘A judge of the supremo court shall be learned in the law,’ etc.; section 16 says, ‘A clrcult judge shall be learned in the law,’ etc.; section 41, ‘A justice of the peace shall be a qualilied elector and a resident of the township,’ etc. 1)oes the
word In those sections mean orle, and only one, judge or justice? If so, which one’.’ In the same section in which ‘a judge’ occurs tve find, le shall be "a" conserva-tor of the peace within the circuit.’ Does ‘a conservator’ mean that he is to be the only conservator of the peace for the circuit? If so, this provision is plainly in conflict with others. See sections 4, 40. It is apparent that ‘a’ \vas used before the word ‘judge’ in the section under consideration because, according to our English idiom, the sentence could not have been euphoniously expressed without it. In some languages–the Latin and Russian, for instance—it would not have been used at all. It could have been omit-ted without in the least impairing the serse, and its use gave no additional force or meaning to the sentence. To use the illustration of the learned counsel for the state: If one orders ‘a sack of flour, a ham, a horse, a ton of coal,’ etc., it is understood he means but one. So it would be understood if he left off the ‘a,’ and said ‘sack of flour, ham, horse, ton of coal,’ the ‘a’ being used before the words beginning with the consonant sound simply to pre-serve the euphony. If the limitation is not in the word ‘judge’ without the ‘a,’ there is certainly no restriction with it, According to Mr. Webster, ‘a’ means ‘one’ or ‘any,’ but less ’emphatically than either.’ It may mean one where only one is intended, or it may be any one of a great number. That is the trouble. Of itself, it is in no cense a term of limitation. If there were a doren judges in any one circuit each would still be ‘a judge’ for that circuit. Mr. Webster also says, ‘It is placed before nouns of the singular number, denoting an individual object, or quality individualized."Quality’ is define(‘ as (1) ‘the condition of being of such a sort as distinguished from others; (2) special or temporary character; profes-sion, occupation.’ Webst. Dict. The ‘a was so used here. The character, or profession, individualized, was that of a judge. The functlons of the office to be performed were those of ‘a judge,’ not governor, shcriff, or constable. A review of the various other provisions of the constitution, supra, where the word ‘a’ occurs, shows that no absurd consequences, such as lining the caces in other depart-ments with a multitudinous array of incumbents, could possibly result."
Where the law required the delivery of a copy of a notice to husband and a copy to wife, the sheriff’s return that he had delivered "a copy" to husband and wife was insufficient. State v. Da-vis, Tex.Civ.App., 139 S.W.2d 638, 640.
In Lakeside Forge Co. v. Freedom Oil Works, 205 Pa, 528, 109 A. 216, 217, it was said:
" ‘A car or two’ signifies an lndeflnite small number, and may include as many as seven. In that respect the expression is similar to ‘a few.’ It must be construed with reference to the subject matter, and is not nceessarily confined to one or two. It is like the words ‘in a day or two.’ "
In Deutsch v. Mortgage Securities Co., 96 W.Va. 676. 123 S.E. 793, the (leed containecl a covenant against construc-tion of flats or apartments and provided that no dwelling but "a one-famfly house" should be bullt on the lot. The grantee built two one-family dwelling houses; and ft was held that he could properly do so.
"A" is sometimes read as "the." Bookham v. Potter, 37 L.J.C.P. 276; L.R. 3 C.P. 490; 16 W.R. 806; 18 L.T. 479, though the two terms are ordinarily distinguishable. Howell v. State, 138 S.E. 206, 164 Ga. 204. The grant of "a" right of sport-ing on land, gives only a concurrent right, but the grant of "the" right gives it exclusively. Sutherland v. Heathcote, [1892] 1 Ch. 475; 61 L.J. 248; 66 L.T. 210. And a license to fish with "a" rod and line does not justify the use of more than one rod and one line. Combridge v. Harrison, 72 L.T. 592; 64 L.J.M.C, 175; 59 J.P. 198.
Hinson v. Hinson, 176 N.C. 613, 97 S.E. 465, in-volved a will providing that son taking care of widow should receive $100 "a year." It was held that the quoted words were not synonymous with annually, but merely fixed the rate of compensa-ti6n, and that there was no right to compensation until widow’s death.
AAA. Agricultural Adjustment Act.
A. A. C. Anno ante Christum, the year before Christ.
A. A. C. N. Anno ante Christum natura, the year before the birth of Christ.
A AVER ET TENER. L. Fr. (L. Lat. habendum et tenendum.) To have and to hold. Co.Litt. §§ 523, 524. A aver et tener a ?uy et a ses heires, a touts j0113’8,—to have and to hold to him and his heirs forever. Id. § 625. See Ayer et Tener.
A. B. Able-boclied seaman. In English law a sea-man is entitled to be rated A. B. when he has served at sea three years before the mast. In the United States the term "Able Seaman" is used. For the requirements of able seaman, see 46 U.S. C.A. § 672. Also artium baccalaurens, bachelor of arts. In England, generally written B. A.
A. B. A. American Bar Association.
A. B. A. J. American Bar Association Journal.
A BON DROIT. With good reason; justly; right-fully.
A. C., Anno Christi, the year of Christ.
A/C means account and is much used by book-keepers. As used in a check, it has been bold not a direction to the bank to credit the amount of the check to the person named, but rather a mem-orandum to identify the transaction in which the check was issued. Marsh v. First State Bank & Trust Co. of Canton, 185 Ill.App. 29, 32.
A CANCELLANDO. From cancelling. 3 El. Comm. 46.
A CANCELLIS. The Chancellor.
A CANCELLIS CURIAE EXPLODI. To be ex-pelled from the bar of the court.
A CAPELLA OR A LA CAPELLA. In music, in the church style; also that the instruments are to play in unison with the vocal part, or that one part is to be played by a number of instruments.
A CAUSA DE CY. For this reason.

A. C. C. Agricultural Credit Corporatton. A CE. For this purpose.
A CEL JOUR. At this day.
A CIELO USQUE AD CENTRUM. From the heavens to the center of the earth. Or more fully, Cujus est solum ejes est usgue ad coelum et ad inferos. The owner of the soil owns to the heavens and also to the lowest depths. Or, Cujus est solum est casque ad cceluni,—the owner of the soil owns to the heavens. This doctrine has been questioned. Butler v. Frontier Telephone Co., 186 N.Y. 486, 79 N.E. 716, 11 L.R.A.,N.S., 920–and the flight of airplanes and recent oil and gas reg-ulations undoubtedly have qualified the owner’s dominion not only in the heavens but ín the lowest depths. See American Digest System, Mines and Minerals, C>92, and Trespass,
A COMMUNI OBSERVANTIA NON EST RECE-DENDUM. From common observance there should be no departure; there must be no de-parture from common usage. 2 Coke, 74; Co. Litt. 186a, 229b, 365a; Wing.Max. 752, max. 203. A maxim applied to the practice of the courts, to the ancient and established .forms of pleading and conveyancing, and to professional usage general-ly. Id. 752-755. Lord Coke applies it to common professional opinion. Co.Litt. 186a, 364b.
A CONFECTIONE. From the making. Clay-ton’s Case, 5 Coke, pt. II, la; Anonymous, 1 Ld. Raym. 480.
A CONFECTIONE PRAESENTIUM. From the making of the indentures. Clayton’s Case, 5 Coke, pt. II, la.
A CONSILIIS. (Lat. consilium, advice.) Of counsel; a counsellor. The term is used in the civil law by some writers instead of a responsis. Spelman, "Apocrisarius."
A CONTRARIO SENSU. On the other hand; in the opposite sense.
A CUEILLETTE. In French law. In relation to the contract of affreightment, signifies when the cargo is taken on condition that the master suc-ceeds in completing his cargo from other sources. Arg.Fr.Merc.Law, 543.
A. D. Anno Domini, in the year of our Lord.
An information charging that act was committed cm 4th day of August, "A. D. 190 ," alleged an impossible year "and it is quite evident that the last figure of the year was inadvertently ornitted but what that figure was
intended to be * cannot be inferred with any cer- tainty." People v. Weiss, 168 Ill.App. 502. 504.
"The information alleges that the oflense therein sought to be charged was committed ‘on the 30th day of April, A. D. 19 . There is no other allegation of time in the infor-formation, and it is in effect and for all practica! purposes wholly wanting in any allegation as to time. The time alleged is impóssible and in that respect the information is absurd. The objcction is not merely tcchnical, as that term is commonly used, but is substantial and fatal." Peo-ple v. Wagner, 172 Ill.App. 84, S’
A DATO. From the date. Cro.Jac. 135. See A Datu.
A DATU. Law Latin. From the date. Anony-mous, 1 Ld.Raym. 480; Haths v. Ash, 2 Salk. 413. See A Dato.
A DIE CONFECTIONIS. From the day of the making. Barwick’s Case, 5 Coke 93b.
A DIE DATUS. F’rom the day of the date. Hat-ter v. Ash, 1 Ld.Raym. 84; Anonymous, 1 Ld. Raym. 480; Seígnorett. v. Noguire, 2 Ld.Raym. 1241. Used in loases to determine the time or running of the estate, and when so used includes the day of the date. Doe v. Watkíns, 1 Cowp. 189, 191. But contra, see Haths v. Ash, 2 Salk. 413.
A DIGNIORI FIERI DEBET DENOMINATIO. Denomination ought to be from the more worthy. The description (of a place) should be taken from the more worthy subject (as from a will). Fleta, lib. 4, c. 10, § 12.
A DIGNIORI FIERI DEBET DENOMINATIO ET RESOLUTIO. The title and exposition of a thing ought to be derived from, or given, or made with reference to, the more worthy degree, quality, or species of it. Wing.Max. 265, max. 75.
A. E. C. Atomic Energy Commission.
A FINE FORCE. Of pure necessity.
A FORCE. Of necessity.
A FORCE ET ARMIS. With force and arms.
A FORFAIT ET SANS GARANTIE. In French law. A formula used in indorsing commercial paper, and equivalent to "without recourse."
A FORTIORI. With stronger reason; much more. A term used in logic to denote an argu-ment to the effect that because one ascertained fact exists, therefore another, which is included in it, or analogous to it, and which is less im-probable, unusual, or surprising, must also exist.
A GRATIA. By grace; not of right.
A. 11., Anno Hegirae (in the year of the hegira). A ISSUE. At issue.
A JURE SUO CADUNT. They (for example, per-sOns abandoning chattels) lose their right.
A JUSTITIA (QUASI A QUODAM FONTE) 0M-NIA <TURA EMANANT. From justice, as a foun-tain, all rights flow. Brac. 2 b.
A LA GRANDE GREVAUNCE. To the great grievance.
A LARGE. Free; at large.
A LATERE. Lat. Collateral. Used in this sense in speaking of the succession to property. Bract. 20b, 62b. From, on, or at the side; collaterally. A latere ascendit ( jus). The right ascends col-laterally. Justices of the Curia Regis are de-scribed as a latere regis residentes, sitting at the side of the King; Bract. fol. 108a; 2 Reeve, Hist. Eng.L. 250.

In Civil Law and by Bracton, a synonym for e transverso, across. Bract. fol. 67a.
Applied also to a process or proceeding. Keilw.
159. Out of the regular or lawful course; inci-dentally or casually. Bract. fol. 42b; Fleta, lib. 3, c. 15, § 13.
From the sido oí; denoting closeness of inti-macy or connection; as a court held before audi-tors specialiter a latere regis destinatis. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 2, § 4.
Apostolic; having full powers to represent the Pope as if he were present. Du Cange, Legati, a latero; 4 Bla.Com. 306.
A LIBELLIS. L. Lat. An officer who had charge of the libelli or petitions addressed to the soy-ereign. Calvin. A name sometimos given to a chancellor, (cancellarius,) in the early history of that office. Spelman, "Cancellarius."
A L’IMPOSSIBLE NUL N’EST TENU. No one is bound to do the impossible.
A LOUR FOY. In their allegiance.
A LUY ET A SES HEIRES A TOUTS JOURS. To him and to his heirs forever.
A. M. Ante meridiem, before noon. Only the abbreviation is ordinarily used. Orvik v. Cassel-man, 105 N.W. 1105, 15 N.D. 34. Also artium magister, master of arts. Also annus mirabilis, the wonderful year-1666, the year of the defeat of the Dutch fleet and of the great London fire. Also anno mundi, in the year of the world; that is, when the creation of the world is said to have taken place, 4004 B. C.
A. M. A. Agricultura’ Marketing Act.
A MA INTENT. On my action. Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 Smith Lead.Cas. (7th Am. ed.) 516.
A MANIBUS. Lat. Royal scribe. Amanuensis.
A MANU SERVUS. Lat. A handservant; a scribe; a secretary.
A ME. (Lat. ego, I.) A term in feudal grants denoting direct tenure of the superior lord. 2 Bell, II.L.Sc. 133.
Unjustly detaining from me. He is said to withhold a me (from me) who has obtained pos-session of my property unjustly. Calvinus, Lex. To pay a me, is to pay from my money.
A MENSA ET TIIORO. Lat. From table and bed, but more commonly translated, from bed and board. A kind of divorce, which is rather a separation of the parties by law, than a dis-solution of the marriage. 27 C.J.S., Divorce, §
160.
A MULTO FORTIORI. By far the stronger rea-son.
A NATIVITATE. From birth, or from infancy. Denotes that a disability, status, etc., is congeni-taL 3 Bla.Comm. 332; Reg.Orig. 266b.
A NON POSSE AD NON ESSE SEQUITUR AR-GUMENTUM NECESSARIE NEGATIVE, LICET NON AF’FIRMATIVE. A literal translation-From impossibility to non-existence the inference follows necessari]y in the negativo, though not in the affirmative—-is as ambiguous as the original. It could be translated thus: The negative infer-ence of non-existence necessarily follows from im-possibility of existence, but the aflirmative infer• ence of existence cannot be drawn from mere pos-sibility,
A. O. C. Anno orbis conditi, the year of the crea-tion of the world.
A OUTRANCE. To the bitter end; to excess; to the utmost extent. Frequently incorrectly written by persons with only a smattering of French á l’outrance.
A PAIS. To the country; at issue.
A PALATIO. L. Lat. From Palatium, (a pal-ace.) Counties palatine are hence so called. 1 Bl.Cornin. 117. See Palatium.
A. P. C. Alien Property Custodian.
A. P. C. N. Anno post Christum natum, the year after the birth of Christ.
A PIRATIS AUT LATRONIBUS CAPTI LIBERI PERMANENT. Persons taken by pirates or rob-bers remain free. Dig. 49, 15, 19, 2; Gro. de .1. B. lib. 3, c. 3, § 1.
A PIRATIS ET LATRONIBUS CAPTA DOMI-NUM NON MUTANT. Capture by pirates and robbers does not change title. Bynk. bk. 1, c. 17; 1 Kent, Comm. 108, 184. No right to booty vests in piratical captors; no right can be derived from them by recaptors to the prejudice of the original owners. 2 Wood.Lect. 428.
A POSTERIORI. Lat. From the effect to the cause; from what comes after. A term used in logic to denote an argument founded on experi-ment or observation, or one which, taking ascer-tained facts as an effect, proceeds by synthesis and induction to demonstrate their cause.
A. P. R. C. Anno post Roman conditam, year alt-er the foundation of Rome.
A PRENDRE. L. Fr. To take; to seize. Bref á prendre la terre, a writ to take the land. Fet Ass. § 51. A right to take something out of the soil of another is a profit a prendre, or a right coupled with a profit. 1 Crabb, Real Prop. p. 125, § 115. Distinguished from an easement. 5 Adol. & E. 758. Sometimes written as one word, apprendre, apprender. See Profit á prendre.
Rightfully taken from the soil. 1 N. & P. 172; Waters v. Lilley, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 145, 16 Arn.Dec. 333.
A PRIORI. Lat. From the cause to the effect; from what goes before. A term used in logic to

denote an argument founded on analogy, or ab-stract considerations, or one which, positing a general principie or admitted truth as a cause, proceeds to deduce from it the effects which must necessarily follow.
A PROVISIONE VIRI. By the provision of man. 4 Kent, Comm. 55.
A QUO. Lat. From which. A court a quo falso written "a qua") is a court from which a cause has been removed. The judge a quo is the judge in such court. Clegg v. Alexander, 6 La. 339.
A term used, with the correlative ad quem (to which), in expressing the computation of time, and also of distance in space. Thus, dies a quo, the day from which and dies ad quem, the day to which, a period of time is computed. So, termi-nas a quo, the point or limit from which, and terininus ad quem, the point or limit to which, a distance or passage in spa.ce is reckoned.
A QUO INVITO ALIQUID EXIGI POTEST. From whom something may be exacted against his will.
A. R. Anno Regni. In the year of the reign; as A. R. V. R. 22, (Anno Regni Victoriae Reginae vicesimo secundo) in the twenty-second year of the reign of Queen Victoria.
A REMENAUNT. Forever.
A RENDRE. (Fr. to render, to yield.) That which is to rbe rendered, yielded, or paid. Profits á rendre comprehend rents and services. Ham. N.P. 192.
A RESCRIPTIS VALET ARGUMENTUM. An ar-gument from rescripts i. e. original writs in the registerl is valid. Co.Litt. 11 a.
A RESPONSIS. L. Lat. In ecclesiastical law. One whose office it was to give ór convey an-swers; otherwise termed responsalis, and apocris-iarius. One who, being consulted on ecclesiastical matters, gave answers, counsel, or advice; other-wise termed a consiliis. Spelman, "Apocrisi-arius."
A RETRO. L. Lat. Behind; in arrear. Et redi-tus proveniens indo d retro fuerit, and the rent issuing therefrom be in arrear. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 55, § 2; c. 62, § 14.
A RUBRO AD NIGRUM. Lat. From the red to the black; from the rubric or title of a statute (which, anciently, was in red letters), to its body, which was in the ordinary black. Tray.Lat.Max.; Bell, "Rubric;" Erskine, Inst. 1, 1, 49.
A SAVOIR. To wit.
A SUMMO REMEDIO AD INFERIOREM AC. TIONEM NON IIABETUR REGRESSUS, NEQUE AUXILIUM. From (af ter using) the highest remedy, there can be no recourse (going back) to an inferior action, nor assistance, (derived from
it.) Fleta, lib. 6, c. 1, § 2. A maxim in the old law of real actions, when there were grades in the remedies given; the rule being that a party who brought a writ of right, which was the highest writ in the law, could not afterwards resort or descend to an inferior remedy. Bract. 112b; 3 Bl.Comm. 193, 194.
A TEMPORE CUJUS CONTRARII MEMORIA NON EXISTET. From a time of which there is no memory to the contrary.
A TENERIS ANNIS. By reason of youth. A TERME. For a or the term.
A TERME DE SA VIE. For the term of his life. U.B. 3 Edw. II, 55.
A TERME QUE N’EST MYE ENCORE PASSE. For a term that has not yet passed.
A TERME QUE PASSE EST. For a term that has passed.
A TORT. Without reason; unjustly; wrongfully.
A TORT ET A TRAVERS. Without considera-tion or discernment.
A TORT OU A DROIT. Right or wrong.
A VERBIS LEGIS NON EST RECENDENDUM. The words of a statute must not be departed from. 5 Coke 119; Wing.Max. 25. A court is not at liberty to disregard the letter of a statute, in fa-vor of a supposed intention. 1 Steph.Comm. 71; Broom, Max. 268.
A VINCULO MATRIMONII. Lat. From the bond of matrimony. A term descriptive of a kind of divorce, which effects a complete dissolution of the marriage contract. See Divorce.
A B (fr. Abba, Syr., Father). The eleventh month of the Jewish civil year, and the fifth of the sa-cred year. It answers to the moon that begins in July, and consists of thirty days. On the 24th is observed a feast in memory of the abolishment of the Sadducean law, which required sons and daughters to be equal heirs and heiresses of their pa rents’ estates. Brown’s Dict. of Bible, John’s Bib.Antiq. AB, at the beginning of English-Saxon names of places, is generally a contraction of ab-bot or abbey; whence it is inferred that those places once ha d an abbey there, or belonged to one elsewhere, as Abingdon in Berkshire. Blount’s Law Gloss. Wharton’s Law Lexicon.
AB. ABR. Abridgment.
AB ABUSU AD USUM NON VALET CONSE. QUENTIA. A conclusion ^ s to the use of a thing from its abuse is invalid. Broom, Max. 17.
AB ACTIS. Lat. An officer having charge of acta, public records, registers, journals, or min-utes; an officer who entered on record the acta or proceedings of a court; a clerk of court; anotary or actuary. Calvin.Lex.Jurid. See "Acta." This, and the similarly formed epithets á cancellis,
secretis, á libellis, were also anciently the titles of a chancellor, (cancellarius,) in the early his-tory of that office. Spelman, "Cancellarius."
AB AGENDO. Disabled from acting; unable to act; incapacitated for business or transactions of any kind.
AB ANTE. Lat. Before; in advance. Thus, a legislature cannot agree ab ante to any modifica-tion or amendment to a law which a third person may make. Allen v. McKean, 1 Sumn. 308, Fed. Cas.No.229 (college charter).
AB ANTECEDENTE. Lat. Beforehand; in ad-vance. 5 M. & S. 110.
AB ANTIQUO. From old times; from ancient time; of old; of an ancient date. 3 Bl.Comm. 95.
AB ASSUETIS NON FIT INJURIA. From things to which one is accustomed (or in which there has been long acquiescence) no legal injury or wrong arises. If a person neglect to insist on his right, he is deemed to have abandoned it. Amb. 645; 3 Brown, Ch. 639; Jenk.Cent.Introd. vi.
AB EPISTOLIS. Lat. An officer having charge of the correspondence (epistolce) of his superior or sovereign; a secretary. Calvin.; Spiegelius.
AB EXTRA. (Lat. extra, beyond, without.) From without. Lunt v. Holland, 14 Mass. 151.
AB INCONVENIENTI. From hardship, or iricon-venience. An argument founded upon the hard-ship of the case, and the inconveniente or disas-trous consequences to which a different course of reásoning would lead. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Hayward, 248 Mo. 280, 154 S.W. 140.
AB INITIO. Lat. From the beginning; from the first act; entirely; as to all the acts done; in the inception. A party may be said to be a tres-p’asser, an estate to be good, an agreement or deed to be void, or a marriage or act to be unlawful, ab initio. Plow. 6a, 16a; 1 Bl.Comm. 440; Hop-kins v. Hopkins, 10 Johns. (N.Y.) 369.
Before. Contrasted in this sense with ex post facto, 2 Shars.Bla,Comm. 308; or with postea, Calvinus, Lex., initiam.
Validity of lnsurance nolicy ab initio, In re Millers’ & Manufacturers’‘Ins. Co., 97 Minn. 98, 106 N.W. 485; Uncon-stitutional statute as not 1,nid ab initio, State v. Poulin, 105 Me. 224, 74 A. 119, 24 L.R.A.,N.S., 408; physical inca-pacity, marriage not void ab initio, Bennett v. Bennett, 169 Ala. 618, 53 So. 986, L.R.A.1916C, 693.
AB INITIO MUNDI. Lat. From the beginning of the world. Ab initio 9nundi usque ad hodier-num diem, from the beginning of the world to this day. Y.B.M. 1 Edw. III, 24.
AB INTESTAT. Intestate. 2 Low.Can. 219. Merlin, Répert.
AB INTESTATO. Lat. In the civil law. From an intestate; from the intestate; in case of intes-tacy. Hcereditas ab intestato, an inheritance de-
rived from an intestate. Inst. 2, 9, 6. Successio ab intestato, succession to an intestate, or in case of intestacy. Id. 3, 2, 3; Dig. 38, 6, 1. This an-swers to the descent or inheritance of real estate at common law. 2 Bl.Comm. 490, 516; Story, Confi.Laws, § 480. "Heir ab intestato." 1 Burr. 420. The phrase "ab intestato" is generally used as the opposite or alternative of ex testamento, (from, by, or under a will.) Vel ex testamento, vel ab intestato [hcereditates] pertinent,—inheri-tances are derived either from a will or from an intestate, (one who dies without a will.) Inst. 2, 9, 6; Dig. 29, 4; Cod. 6, 14, 2.
AB INVITO. Unwillingly. Against one’s will. By or from an unwilling party. A transfer ab invito is a compulsory transfer. See in invitum and invito.
AB JUDICATIO. A removal from court.
AB TRATO. Lat. By one who is angry. A de-vise or gift made by a man adversely to the in-terest of his heirs, on account of anger or hatred against them, is said to be made ab irato. A suit to set aside such a will is called an action ab irato. Merlin, Répert. Ab irato. Snell v. Weldon, 239 III. 279, 87 N.E. 1022.
AB OLIM. Of old.
AB OVO. The egg, hence from the beginning in allusion to old Roman custom of beginning a meal with eggs and ending with fruit, ab ovo usque ad mala. To begin with eggs and end with fruit. Also, at times in allusion to poets who began his-tory of Trojan war with the egg from which Hel-en was said to have been hatched in contrast with Homer who plunged into the midst of things, or in media res.
AB URBE CONDITA. See A.U.C.
ABACIST or ABACISTA. A caster of accounts, an arithmetician.
ABACTION. A carrying away by violence.
ABACTOR. A stealer and driver away of cattle or beasts by herds or in great numbers at once, as distinguished from a person who steals a single animal or beast. Also called abigeus, q. v.
ABADENGO. In Spanish law. Land owned by an ecclesiastical corporation, and therefore ex-empt from taxation. In particular, lands or towns under the dominion and jurisdiction of an abbot. Escriche, Dicc. Raz.
ABALIENATE. To transfer interest or title.
ABALIENATIO. In Roman law. The perfect conveyance or transfer of property from one Ro-man citizen to another. This term gave place to the simple alienatio, which is used in the Digest and Institutes, as well as in the feudal law, and from which the English "alienation" has been formed. Inst. 2, 8, pr.; Id. 2, 1, 40; Dig. 50, 16, 28; Calvinus, Lex., Abalienatio.

ABALIENATION. In the Civil Law, a making over of realty, or chattels to another by due course of law.
ABAMITA. Lat. In the civil law. A great-great-grandfather’s sister, (abavi soror.) Inst. 3, 6, 6; Dig. 38, 10, 3; Calvinus, Lex. Called omita maxi-ma. Id. 38, 10, 10, 17. Called, in Bracton, aba-mita magna. Bract. fol. 68b.
ABANDON. To desert, surrender, forsake, or cede. To relinquish or give up with intent of nev-er again resuming one’s right or interest. Bur-roughs v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 220 P. 152, 155, 109 Or. 404. To give up or to tease to use. Southern Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth, 105 S.E. 65, 67, 128 Va. 176. To give up absolutely; to forsake entirely; to renounce utterly; to re-linquish all connection with or concern in; to desert. Commonwealth v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 258 S.W. 101, 102, 201 Ky. 670. It includes the in-tention, and also the external act by which it is carried into effect.
ABANDONEE. A party to whom a right or prop-erty is abandoned or relinquished by another. Applied to the insurers of vessels and cargoes. Lord Ellenborough, C.J., 5 Maule & S. 82; Abbott, J., Id. 87; Holroyd, J., Id. 89.
ABANDONMENT. The surrender, relinquish-ment,,, disclaimer, or cession of property or of rights. Stephens v. Mansfield, 11 Cal. 363 (land) ; Munsey v. Marnet Oil & Gas Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 199 S.W. 686, 689 (oil lease) ; Shepard v. Alden, 201 N.W. 537, 539, 161 Minn. 135, 39 A.L.R. 1094 (bowling alleys) ; Union Grain & Elevator Co. v. McCammon Ditch Co., 240 P. 443, 445, 41 Idaho 216 (water rights).
The giving up of a thing absolutely, without ref-erence to any particular person or purpose, as throwing a jewel into the highway; leaving a thing to itself, as a vessel at sea; vacating prop-erty .with the intention of not returning, so that it may be appropriated by the next comer. 2 Bl. Comm. 9, 10; Judson v. Malloy, 40 Cal. 299, 310. Intention to forsake or relinquish the thing is an essential element, to be proved by visible acts. Sikes v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 28 S.W. 688; Jordan v. State, 107 Tex.Cr.R. 414, 296 S.W. 585, 586 (auto parts); Kunst v. Mabie, 72 W.Va. 202, 77 S.E. 987, 990 (uncut timber) ; Dow v. Worley, 126 Okl. 175, 256 P. 56, 60 (oil and gas lease) ; Duryea v. Elkhorn Coal & Coke Corporation, 123 Me. 482, 124 A. 206, 208.
The voluntary relinquishment of possession of thing by owner with intention of terminating his ownership, but without vesting it in any other per-son. Dober v. Ukase Inv. Co., 139 Or. 626, 10 P. 2d 356, 357. The relinquishing of all title, posses-sion, or claim, or a virtual, intentional throwing away of property. Foulke v. New York Consol. R. Co., 228 N.Y. 269, 127 N.E. 237, 238, 9 A.L.R. 1384 (package in subway car).
Abandonment In law depends upon concurrence of inten-tion to abandon and some overt act or failure to act which carnes Implication that owner neither claims nor retains
any Interest. Stinnett v. Kinslow, 238 Ky. 812, 38 S.W.2d 920, 922.
"Abandonment" includes both the intention to abandon and the external act by which the intention is carried Into effect. In determining whether one has abandoned his property or rights, the intention is the flrst and para-mount object of inquiry, for there can be no abandon-ment without the intention to abandon. Boatman v. An-dre, 44 Wyo. 352, 12 P.2d 370, 373. Generally, "abandon-ment" can arise from a single act or from a series of acts. Holly Hill Lumber Co. v. Grooms, 16 S.E.2d 816, 821, 198 S.C. 118.
Time 1s not an essential element of "abandonment," although the lapse of time may be evidente of an Inten-tion to abandon, and where it is accompanied by acts man-ifesting such an intention, It may be considered In deter-mining whether there has been an abandonment. Uliman ex rel. Eramo v. Payne, 127 Conn. 239, 16 A.2d 286, 287.
Mere nonuser is not necessaril:, no abandoninent. 11,11- nett y. Dickinson, 93 lid. 258. 49 A. 838 (heme); \Velsh Taylor, 134 N.Y. 450, 21 N.14. 896, 18 L.Il A. 535; Phillis Gross. 32 1-1.11), 428. 113 N.Y,". 373, 378 (0001ract for (leed). See, however, Corkran, 11111 K Co. v. A. H. Kohleinnon 136 Vid. 525, 111 A, 471, 471 (trademark).
from negleot: City of Vallezo v. Burrill. 64 Cal.App. 399. 221 P. 676 (pipo line).
"Abandonment" differs from surrender In that surrender requires an agreement, Noble v. Sturm, 210 Mich. 462, 178 N.W. 99, 103; and from forfeiture. in that forfeiture may be against the intention of the party alleged to have forfeited, Gula Water Co. v. Green, 29 Arlz. 304, 241 P. 307, 308.
In the Civil and French Law it is the act by which a debtor surrenders his property for the benefit of his creditors; Merlin, Répert. See Abandonment for Torts.

Actions, In General

Failure for indefinite period to prosecute action or suit, Morris v. Phifer State Bank, 90 Fla. 55, 105 So. 150, unless caused by an injunction, Barton v. Burbank, 138 La. 997, 71 So. 134. By statute in some states a definite time has been stated which will render a suit abandoned and subject to dis-missal. Public Utilities Commission v. Smith, 298 III. 151, 131 N.E. 371, 375.
Failure to submit issue by instruction, Unten lachner v. Wells, 317 Mo. 181, 296 S.W. 755, 756; failure to perform conditions necessary to valid appeal or writ of error, Lewis v. Martin, 210 Ala. 401, 98 So. 635; Board of Public Instruction for Marion County v. Goodwin, 89 Fla. 379, 104 So. 779; failure to take issue upon garnishee’s an-swer, Phelps v. Schmuck, 151 Kan. 521, 100 P.2d 67, 71.
Assignments of Error
Not argued. Meyer v. Hendrix, 311 Ill.App. 605, 37 N.E.2d 445, 446.
Not presented in brief. Roubay v. United States, QC.A.Cal., 115 F.2d 49, 50.
Not supported by point, argument or authority. Cone v. Ariss, 13 Wash.2d 650, 126 P.2d 591, 593.
Bankrupt’s Property
In re Mirsky, C.C.A.N.Y., 124 F.2d 1017. Building Restrictions
Violations of restrictive covenant, Meyer v. Stein, 284 Ky, 497, 145 S.W.2d 105, 107.

Cemeteries
No new burials and neglect of graves, Andrus v. Remmert, 136 Tex. 179, 146 S.W.2d 728, 730; casual use for farming purposes, In re Gundry, 294 Mich. 221, 292 N.W. 709, 711; disuse as to new interments, failure to cut grass ¿?r care for head-stones, In re Board of TransportItion of City of New York, 251 N.Y.S. 409, 413, 14 Misc. 557.

Children

Desertion or willful forsaking. Cannon v. State, 53 Ga.App. 264, 185 S.E. 364, 366.
Foregoing parental duties. Wright v. Fitzgib-bons, Miss., ?1 So.2d 709, 710.
Withdrawal or neglect of parental duties. In re Potter, 85 Wash. 617, 149 P. 23.
Relinquishment of parental claims. Glendin-ning v. McComas, 188 Ga. 345, 3 S.E.2d 562, 563.
Separation agreement committing custody of child to father. Gardner v. Hall, 132 N.J.Eq. 64, 26 A.2d 799, 809.
Separation from the child and failure to supply its needs. State v. Clark, 148 Minn. 389, 182 N.W. 452, 453.
Criminal offense, separation from child, and failure to supply its needs. Curtis v. State, 48 Ga.App. 135, 172 S.E. 99, 100.
Defeating recovery for wrongful death. In re Schiffrin’s Estate, 272 N.Y.S. 583, 585, 152 Misc. 33.

Compensation Claims

Failure to file application for hearing. Hanks v. Southern Public Utilities Co., 210 N.C. 312, 186 S.E. 252.

Condemnation Proceedings

Dismissal of a petition. Will County v. Cleve-land, 372 Ill. 111, 22 N.E.2d 929, 930.
Failure of commissioners to report, Kean v. Union County Park Commission, 129 N.J.Eq. 67, 18 A.2d 279, 280, or judgment determining invalid-ity. City of Los Angeles v. Abbott, Cal., 12 P.2d 19, 22; failure to pay moneys adjudged, Detroit International Bridge Co. v. American Seed Co., 228 N.W. 791, 795, 249 Mich. 289

Construction Work

Cessation of operation and intent of owner and contractor to cease operations permanently, or at least for definite period, or some fair notice or knowledge of abandonment by lien claimant, ac-tual or implied. Block v. Love, 136 Or. 685, 1 P.2d 588, 589

Contracts

To constitute "abandonment" by conduct, ac-tion relied on must be positive, unequivocal, and inconsistent with the existence of the contract, Mood v. Methodist Episcopal Church South, Tex. Civ.App., 289 S.W. 461, 464. Abanclonment is a matter of intent, Lohn v. Fletcher Oil Co., 38 Cal. App.2d 26, 100 P.2d 505, 507, and implies not only

nonperformance, but an intent not to perform which may be inferred from acts which necessari-ly point to actual abandonment, Losei Realty Cor-poration v. City of New York, 254 N.Y. 41, 171 N.E. 899

Copyrights

Common-law rights, Tatuas v. 20th Century Fox Film Corporation, Sup., 25 N.Y.S.2d 899, 901; sale and delivery of uncopyrighted painting to state-owned public institution, Pushman v. New York Graphic Soc., Sup., 25 N.Y.S.2d 32, 34; copyright-ed lectures not delivered to general public, but only to paying audiences and classes, National Institute for Improvement of Memory v. Nutt, D.C.Conn., 28 F.2d 132, 134.

Crups

Sharecropping tenant’s willful failure to culti-vate crops, Heaton v. Slaten, 25 Ala.App. 81, 141 So. 267, 268

Ditches

Town’s nonuser for a short period after per-mitting ditch to be blocked was insufficient. Fos-ter v. Webster, Sup., 44 N.Y.S.2d 153, 156. Mere nonuser does not constitute. Musselshell Valley Farming & Livestock Co. v. Cooley, 86 Mont. 276, 283 P. 213, 218. After prescriptive right attached, water shortage in subsequent years renderíng use of ditch unnecessary would not constitute. Bowman v. Bradley, 270 P. 919, 922, 127 Or. 45.

Domicile

Permanent removal from, Stafford v. Mills, 57 N.J.L. 570, 31 A. 1023.

Easements

To establish "abandonment" of an easement created by deed, there must be some conduct on part of owner of servient estate adverse to and inconsistent with existence of easement and con-tinuing for statutory period, or nonuser must be accompanied by unequivocal and. decisive acts clearly indicating an intent on part of owner of easement to abandon use of it. Richardson v. Tumbridge, 111 Conn. 90, 149 A. 241, -242.
Permanent cessation of use or enjoyment with no inten-tion to resume or reclaim. Welsh v. Taylor, 134 N.Y. 450, 31 N.E. 896, 18 L.R.A. 535; Corning v. Gould, 16 Wend., N.Y., 531. Intention and completad act are both essential. Town of Orlando v. Stevens, 90 Okl. 2, 215 P. 1050, 1051; Goodman v. Brenner, 219 Mich. 55, 188 N.W. 377; brick-ing up of the openings for stairway and halls of adjoining buildings, Miller v. Teer, 220 N.C. 605, 18 S.E.2d 173, 178; where object of use of dedicated property wholly fails, Dallas County v. Miller, 140 Tex. 242, 166 S.W.2d 922. But mere nonuser is not sufficient. Smelcer v. Rippetoe, 24 Tenn.App. 516, 147 S.W.2d 109, 113, 114; O’Barr v. Dun-can, 187 Ga. 642, 2 S.E.2d 82, 83; right of way acquired by grant. Burnham v. Mahoney, 222 Mass. 524, 111 N.E. 396, 398; Raleigh, C. & S. Ry. Co. v. McGuire, 171 N.C. 277, 88 S.E. 337, 339. Where owner of building had easement in adjoining wall, wrecking building preparatory to erection of a new building, did not cause loss of easement. Joel v. Publix-Lucas Theater, 193 Ga. 531, 19 S.E.2d 730, 736. And a mere temporary or occasional obstruction or use of an easement by the servient owner is not an "abandonment". Cerber v. Appel, Mo.App., 164 S.W.2d 225, 228. However nonuser of railroad crossing for more than 20 years, and

conveyance of strlps of land adjoining original right of way to railroad in fee simple, without reservation, con-stituted abandonment of easement in crossing. Cityco Realty Co. v. Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co., 158 Md. 221, 148 A. 441, 444

Employment

During Christmas holidays, notwithstanding a call at employer’s office and discussing business, Stinson v. Dairymen’s League Co-op. Ass’n, 186 A. 687, 688, 14 N.J.Misc. 671. Deviation from route, Loper v. Morrison, 145 P.2d 4, 23 Ca1.2d 600; truck driver unnecessarily permitting passenger to drive, Ginther v. J. P. Graham Transfer Co., 33 A. 2d 923, 924, 348 Pa. 60. Contra where truck driv-er remained on driver’s seat, directing operation of truck, and watched passenger’s driving, Gin-ther v. J. P. Graham Transfer Co., 27 A.2d 712, 714, 149 Pa.Super. 635; and where truck driver became sick, Matzek v. United Storage & Truck-ing Co., 186 A. 193, 122 Pa.Super. 146. Truck drivers becoming intoxicated and remaining from work, Naylon v. State, Ct.C1., 40 N.Y.S.2d 587, 590; Coal miner contrary to orders, riding on an empty car, Soroka v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 138 Pa.Super. 296, 10 A.2d.904, 907. But automobile driver’s choosing lcmger route by paved highways to pick up a needed change of clothing at home did not constitute an "abandon-ment" of bis employ-ment. Mitchell v. Mitchell Drilling Co., 154 Kan. 117, 114 P.2d 841, 844

Exceptions on Appeal
Not argued in brief, Currin v. Currin, 219 N.C. 815, 15 S.E.2d 279, 282. Not set out in brief, Star Mf g. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 222 N.C. 330, 23 S.E.2d 32, 40. Not complaining of rulings on exceptions, Buckalew v. Brockner, La:App., 11 So.2d 720, 722. Failing to answer appeal to re-urge exception, John Myers Implement Co. v. De Boer, La.App., 9 So.2d 832, 833. Filing an-swers without insisting on decision on exceptions to jurisdiction ratione personw, Weaver v. Mans-field Hardwood Lumber Co., La.App., 4 So.2d 781, 782.

Family

Where father during three or four months fol-lowing his departure contributed only $32 to sup-port of wife and three minor children, Howton v. Howton, 5tCal.App.2d 323, 124 P.2d 837, 839. Con-tra where father helped to support family, In re Iless’ Estate, 257 N.Y.S. 278, 282, 143 Misc. 335.

Franehises

Inferior service and lack of any service for few short intervals held insufficient to show "aban-donment" of ferry franchise. McConnell v. Crit-temlen County, 250 Ky. 359, 63 S.W.2d 329.

Highways

Where public ceases to use street or highway under circumstances indicating intent to abandon, Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. City of Flint, D. C.Mich., 55 F.2d 384, 386. But short sections of highway, discontinued by state highway commis-sion upon relocating highway, were not aban-doned. Mosteller v. Southern Ry. Co., 220 N.C. 275, 17 S.E.2d 133, 135. And cultivation of high-way for short period by abutting landowners was not an "abandonment" of highway. Chicago & E. I. Ry. Co. v. Road Dist. No. 10, 353 III. 160, 187 N.E. 155, 157.

Hornesteads
Removal with an intention never to return con-stitutes an "abandonment", and nothing less does. Farmers’ State Bank of Georgetown v. Roberts, Tex.Civ.App., 59 S.W.2d 1089. Must be voluntary action, Wood v. Wood, 203 Ark. 344, 157 S.W.2d 36, 38. Temporary absence with intention to re-turn, Brewer v. Brewer, 268 Ky. 625, 105 S.W.2d 582, 584. Absence of a design of permanent abandonment, Lanier v. Lanier, 95 Fla. 522, 116 So. 867, 868. Absence by necessity, Hinds v. Buck, 177 Tenn. 444, 150 S.W.2d 1071, 1072; sickness, In re Dunlap’s Estate, 161 Or. 93, 87 P.2d 225, 229; advancing years and inability to tare for selves, Gulf Production Co. v. Continental Oil Co., Tex., 132 S.W.2d 553, 573, 576; to rent to winter tour-ists, Collins v. Collins, 150 Fla. 374, 7 So. 443, 444. A deed with reservation of a life estate did not constitute "abandonment" of homestead. Arighi v. Rule & Sons, 41 Cal.App. 852, 107 P.2d 970, 972. Nor did filing of suit to partition land. Carr v. Langford, Tex.Civ.App., 144 S.W.2d 612, 613.
Husband
The act of a husband or wife who leaves his or her consort willfully, and with an intention of causing perpetual separation. People v. Cullen, 153 N.Y. 629, 47 N.E. 894, 44 L.R.A. 420.
Wife’s leaving husband for a trip te Europe of less than two months against husband’s wishes, did not constitute. In re Boesenberg’s Estate, 37 N.Y.S.2d 194, 196, 179 Misc. 3.
Abandonment as cause for divorce must be willful and intentional without intention of returning, and without consent of spouse abandoned. Hickey v. Hickey, 152 Wash. 429, 277 P. 994, 995. Husband forcibly expelling wife from home, Tenorio v. Tenorio, 44 N.M. 89, 98 P.2d 838, 847, Refusal to talk to husband did not establish. Wyahllyeth v. Wyahllyeth, 182 Md. 663, 32 A.2d 380, 381. Wife refusing without good cause to accompany husband when moving, Ventrano v. Vetrano, 54 N.Y.S.2d 537, 539.
Word "abandoned," within statute providing that no wife who has abandoned husband shall have right of elec-don to take against provisions of husband’s will, has meaning ascribed thereto in matrimonial litigations, and carries no connotation of infidelity. Adultery of aban-donad wife did not constitute "abandonment". In re Green’s Estate, 280 N.Y.S. 692, 702, 155 Misc. 641.
A wife who told husband to get out of wife’s home, and made no effort to effect a reconelliation, was not entltled to appointment as administratrix of his estate. In re Ban-aszak’s Estate, 1 N.Y.S.2d 15, 164 Misc. 829.
Where husband paid wife living apart in caring for their child, she had not abandoned husband so as to preclude the recovery of an industrial pension for his death. John-son v. Department of Labor and Industries of Washington, 3 Wash.2d 257, 100 P.2d 382, 385. But wife who had, prior te husband’s death, left husband, resisted efforts toward a reconciliation, and instituted annulment proeeedings, was not entitled to compensation for husband’s death. La Fountain v. Industrial Accident Commission, 13 Cal.App.2d 130, 56 P.2d 257, 258.
Insured Property
A relinquishment or cession of property by the owner to the insurer of it, in orden to claim as for

C.C.A.I11., 12 F.2d 733, 738.
The term is used only in reference to risks in naviga-tion; but the principie is applicable In tire insurance, where there are remnants, and sometimes. also, under stlpulations in life noticies in favor of creditors. Cincin-nati Ins. Co. v. Dufheld, 6 Ohio St. 200, 67 Am.Dec. 339.
Inventions
The giving up of rights by inventor, as where he surrenders his idea or discovery or relinquishes the intention of perfecting his invention, and so throws it open to the public, or where he negli-gently postpones the assertion of his claims or fails to apply for a patent, and allows the public to use his invention. Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, Pa., 59 S.Ct. 675, 681, 307 U.S. 5, 613, 616, 83 L.Ed. 1071.
Disclaimer of claim of patent, Triumph Explosivos v. Kilgore Mfg. Co., C.C.A.Md., 128 F.2d 444, 448; delaying
12 years alter reducing shoe to practice before applying for patent, Salisbury v. Pediforme Shoe Co., D.C.N.Y., 31 F.Supp. 3, 7; omitting for many years to take any step to reinstate or renew rejected application, Na-Mac Prod-ucts Corporation v. Federal Tool Corporation, C.C.A.M., 118 F.2d 167, 171; acquiescing in rejection of claims in patent application for device shown in later application for patent, Na-Mac Products Corporation v. Federal Tool Corporation, C.C.A.I11., 118 F.2d 167, 171; Na-Mac Prod-ucts Corporation v. Federal Tool Corporation, D.C.I11., 36 F.Supp. 426, 430. But mere lapse of time before an inven-tor applies for a patent is not sufficient. Imperial Brass Mfg. Co. v. Bonney Forge & Tool Works, D.C.Pa., 38 F. Supp. 829, 832. Patent application was not Oled until 21/2 years after date of conception of invention, Chicago Raw-hide Mfg. Co. v. National Motor Bearing Co., D.C.Cal., 50 F.Supp. 458, 460. Nor is disclosing, invention to individ-uals with purpose of interesting them in production or manufacture. Pennington Engineering Co. v. Houde En-gineering Corporation, D.C.N.Y., 43 F.Supp. 698, 706.
Leases in General
To constitute an "abandonment" of leased premises, there must be an absolute relinquish-ment of premises by tenant consisting of act and intention. Schnitzer v. Lanzara, 115 N.J.L. 332, 180 A. 234.
Closing up butcher shop with intention of giving up busi-ness and in removing all perishable merchandise, although tenant retained key and did not notify landlord of inten-tion to vacate premises, held an "abandonment" and not a ”surrender" of premises. Schnitzer v. Lanzara, 115 N. J.L. 332, 18 A. 234. Refusal by lessee of lessor’s offer to reconstruct burned building, Girard Trust Co. v. Tremblay Motor Co., 291 Pa. 507, 140 A. 506, 512. But tenants sur-rendering premises pursuant to notice of forfeiture did not "abandon" premisos. Becker v. Rute, 228 Iowa 533, 293 N.W. 18, 21.
Marriage
Withdrawal or denial of marital obligations without just cause, Reppert v. Reppert, Del.Super.,
13 A.2d 705, 1 Terry 492.
Mineral Leases
"Abandonment" consists of an actual act of re-linquishment, accompanied with the intent and purpose permanently to give up a claim and right of property. A distinction exists between "aban-donment" and "surrender" which is the relinquish-ment of a thing or a property right thereto to another, which is not an essential element ofabandonment. Distinction also exists between elements of "abandonment" and those of estoppel. Neither formal surrender of oil and gas lease nor release is necessary to effectuate "abandonment." Sigler Oil Co. v. W. T. Waggoner Estate, Tex.Civ. App., 276 S.W. 936, 938. Voluntary, intentional relinquishment of known right. Pure Oil Co. v. Sturm, 43 Ohio App. 105, 182 N.E. 875, 882.
Failing to start work under the lease for more than 40 years, Chapman v. Continental Oil Co., 149 Kan. 822, 89 P.2d 833, 834; breach of implied obligation to proceed with search and development of land with reasonable dili-gence, Wood v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co., D.C.Ark., 40 F. Supp. 42, 45; no drilling on leased land for more than two years, and failure to pay rentals, Rehart v. Klossner, 48 Cal.App.2d 40, 119 P.2d 145, 147; drawing of casing from well with no intention of replacing it, Seaboard Oil Co. v. Commonwealth, 193 Ky. 629, 237 S.W. 48, 50. But there must he an intention by lessee to relinquish leased prem-isos, Carter Oil Co. v. Mitchell, C.C.A.Okl., 100 F.2d 945, 950, 951; or an intention not to drill, Carter 011 Co. v. Mitchell, C.C.A.Okl., 100 F.2d 945, 950, 951. And ceasing of operations is not alone sufficient. Fisher v. Dixon, 188′ Okl. 7, 105 P.2d 776, 777. Doing no substantial work for about one year immediately preceding suit to cancel lease, but remaining in possession and doing some work, Deace v. Stribling, Tex.Civ.App., 142 S.W.2d 564, 567; disconnec-tion of well for a brief Interval while well was being drilled to a greater depth, Cole v. Philadelphia Co., 345 Pa. 315, 26 A.2d 920, 923; abandoning work on unproductive well was not an abandonment of leased premisos. Smith v. Tunos, 195 La. 400, 196 So. 912, 914

Mining Claims

Relinquishment of a claim held by location with-out patent, where the holder voluntarily leaves his claim to be appropriated by the next comer, with-out any intention to retake or resume it, and re-gardless of what may become of it in the future. O’Hanlon v. Ruby Gulch Mining Co., 48 Mont. 65, 135 P. 913, 918. The term includes both the in-tention to abandon and the act by which the abandonment is carried into effect. Peachy v. Frisco Gold Mines Co., D.C.Ariz., 204 F. 659, 668.
Abandonment takes place whenever locator leaves claim without intention of holding it. Crane v. French, 39 Cal. App.2d 642, 104 P.2d 53, 60. But mere absence from claim, is not sufficient. Crane v. French, 39 Cal.App.2d 642, 104 P.20 53, 60. And one co-owner’s abandoning his interest is not an "abandonment" of entire claim. Crane v. French, 39 Cal.App.2d 642, 104 P.2d 53, 60

Motions

Motion not called to court’s attention until final hearing, Williams v. Smith, 149 Fla. 735, 6 So.2d 853, 854. Grounds not insisted on, Meador v. Now-ell, 67 Ga.App. 564, 21 S.E.2d 312, 314; not argued in brief, In re Ilorton’s Estate, 154 Kan. 269, 118 P. 2d 527, 531. Rulings not urged on appeal, Spears v. Brown Paper Mill Co., La.App., 9 So.2d 332, 334. Admitting sufficiency of evidence to sustain ver-dict, Copeland v. State, 66 Ga.App. 142, 17 S.E.2d 288, 289. But service of answer after making of motion to strike out portions of a complaint was not an "abandonment" of the motion. Russo v. Signode Steel Strapping Co., Sup., 37 N.Y.S.2d 166.

Office

Abandonment of a public office is a species of resignation, but differs from resignation in that

resignation is a formal relinquishment, while abandonment is a voluntary relinquishment through nonuser. State v. Harmon, 115 Me. 268, 98 A. 804, 805.

98 A. 804, 805.
It is not wholly a matter of intention, but may result from the complete abandonment of duties of such a con-tinuance that the law will infer a relinquishment. Wilk-inson v. City of Birmingham, 193 Ala. 139, 68 So. 999, 1002. It must be total, and under such circumstances as clearly to indicate an absolute relinquishment; and whether an officer has abandoned an office depends on his overt acts rather than his declared intention. Parks v. Ash, 168 Ga. 868, 149 S.E. 207, 209. It Implies nonuser, but nonuser does not, of itself constitute abandonment. The failure to per form the duties pertaining to the office must be with actual or imputed intention on the part of the officer to abandon and relinquish the office. The intention may be inferred from the acts and conduct of the party, and Is a question of fact. Abandonment may result from an acquiescence by the officer in his wrongful removal or discharge, but, as in other cases of abandonment, the question of inten-tion Is

Temporary absence Is not ordinarily sufficient to consti-tute an "abandonment of office". State v. Green, 206 Ark. 361, 175 S.W.2d 575, 577. Responding to mandatory call for military service In emergency conditions, Caudel v. Prewitt, 296 Ky. 848, 178 S.W.2d 22, 25. And failure of former officers to assert right while decision of eligibility of elected successors was pending, was not an "abandon-ment" creating vacancy. State v. Levy Court of New Cas-tle County, Del., 3 W.W.Harr. 554, 140 A. 642, 645.

Oil Wells

Where owner ceased working on well to work elsewhere to procure money to do further work on well, well was not abandoned. Jones v. Jos. Greenspon’s Son Pipe Corporation, 313 Ill.App. 651, 40 N.E.2d 561.

Patento

There may be an abandonment of a patent, where the inventor dedicates it to the public use; and this may be shown by his failure to sue in-fringers, sell licenses, or otherwise make efforts to realize a personal advantage from his patent. Ransom v. New York, 4 Blatchf. 157, 20 Fed.Cas. 286.

Pleadings

The filing of a second amended complaint which was complete in itself and which did not reserve to itself any part of the original complaint or first amended complaint constituted an "abandon-ment" of the two former complaints. Seely v. Gilbert, 16 Wash.2d 611, 134 P.2d 710, 712. Cross-complainant by failing to take proper steps in trial court to have judgment that was silent on issues tendered by cross-complaint and answer thereto corrected did not thereby "abandon" cross-complaint. Brown v. National Life Ins. Co. of Washington County, Vt., 112 Ind.App. 684, 46 N.E. 2d 246, 24

Prescriptive Rights

Non-use alone is insufficient. Burkman v. City of New Lisbon, 246 Wis. 547, 19 N.W.2d 311, 313; Smelcer v. Rippetoe, 24 Tenn.App. 516, 147 S.W.2d 109, 113, 114.

Privileges

Witness before grand jury who answered ques-tions and immediately askea to retract answers,
and thereupon asserted his privilege, did not "abandon" right to claim the privilege. United States v. Weisman, C.C.A.N.Y., 111 F.2d 260, 261.

Property

"Abandoned property" in a legal sense is that to which owner has relinquished all right, title, claim, and possession, with intention of not reclaiming it or resuming its ownership, possession or enjoy-ment. Jackson v. Steinberg, Or., 200 P.2d 376, 377, 378.
There must be concurrence of act and intent, that Is, the act of leaving the premises or property vacant, so that it may be appropriated by the next comer, and the intention of not returning. Cohn v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Co., 103 Cal.App. 496, 284 P. 1051, 1052. Relinquishment of all title, possession, or claim; a virtual intentional throwing away of property. Ex parte Szczygiel, Sup., 51 N.Y.S.2d 699, 702. Actual relinquishment, gas in pipe was not aban-doned. Hein v. Shell Oil Co., 315 III.App. 297, 42 N.E.2d 949, 952. Nor was a sewing machine and phonograph left with landlady as security. Dickens v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co., 140 So. 296, 298, 19 La.App. 735.

Property for Special Purposes

Moving of church to erect drilling rig held not "ab’andonment of use for church purposes." Aban-donment meant to wholly discontinue church use, and additional use was not sufficient. Skipper v. Davis, Tex.Civ.App., 59 S.W.2d 454, 457.

Merger of churches was not. Bridgeport-City Trust Co. v. Bridgeport Hospital, 120 Conn. 27, 179 A. 92, 94. Nor where intention was that nonconforming use as a fraterni-ty house would be resumed. State ex rel. Morehouse v. Hunt, 235 Wls. 358, 291 N.W. 745, 751, 752. Nor mere cessation of a nonconforming use in zoned area for a rea-sonable period. Beyer v. Mayor and Council of Baltimore City, Md., 34 A.2d 765, 768, 769. Nor a discontinuance of a garage during war while owner served In army and on return postponed repossession for garage purposes due to elty’s using building. State v. Murray, 195 Wis. 657, 219 N.W. 271, 272. But removal of manufacturing equipment from manufacturing plant, was. Francisco v. City of Co-lumbus, Ohio App., 31 N.E.2d 236, 243. And also disposing of all machinery, taking down smokestack and using prop-erty for storage purposes, notwithstanding vague intention of resuming slaughter house business. Beyer v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City, 182 Md. 444, 34 A.2d 765, 768, 769.

Dedicated use must wholly fati. Kirchen v. Remenga, 291 Mich. 94, 288 N.W. 344, 350, 351. Erection of bulidings on park lands without objection of adjolning owners was not sufficient. Kirchen v. Remenga, 291 Mich. 94, 288 N.W. 344, 350, 351. Nor city’s permitting a citlzen’s rock gárden on small portin of street improvement tract. Kendrick v. City of St. Paul, 213 Minn. 283, 6 N.W.2d 449, 451. Nor diverting parkway to roadway. Ford v. City of Detroit, 273 Mich. 449, 263 N.W. 425, 426. Nor tearing down school building for salvaging material for erection of a waiting station for school children. McCullough v. Swlfton Consol. School Dist., 202 Ark. 1074, 155 S.W.2d 353. Nor temporary disuse of school when land was offered for sale, later rescinded. Bernard v. Bowen, 214 N.C. 121, 198 S.E. 584.

Railroad Property

"Abandon" means to relinquish or give up with intent of never again resuming or claiming one’s rights or interests in, to give up absolutely, to for. sake entirely, to renounce utterly, to relinquish all connection with or concern in. Capital Transit Co. v. Hazen, 93 F.2d 250, 251, 68 App.D.C. 91. Aban-donment did not mean a partial disuse with an in-tention to complete station on a contingency, but meant a final relinquishment, or giving up with-out intention of resuming. Wheeling & L. E. Ry. Co. v. Pittsburgh & W. V. Ry. Co., C.C.A.Ohio, 33 F.2d 390, 392. And to constitute an "abandon-ment" of right of way, there must be not only an actual relinquishment of the property, but an in-tention to abandon it. Abens v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 388 Ill. 261, 57 N.E.2d 883, 887.
Nonuser is a fact in determining it, but, though contin-uad for years, is not conclusive. Arlington Realty Co. v. Keller, 105 N.J.Eq. 196, 147 A. 437, 438. Plowing up ser-elent estate is not enough. Les v. Alibozek, 269 Mass. 153. 168 N.E. 919, 922, 66 A.L.R. 1094. Nor proposal to dcliver and receive freight by motortrucks. New York Dock Ry. v Pennsylvania R. Co., D.C.Pa., 1 F.Supp. 20, 21. But failure to maintain and use that part of railroad on land conveyed constituted "abandonment." Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co. v. Sweat, 177 Ga. 698, 171 S.E. 123, 129.

Remedies
Election of one of two inconsistent remedies, Lumber Mutual Casualty Ins. Co. of New York v. Friedman, 176 Misc. 703, 28 N.Y.S.2d 506, 509.

Rights in General

The relinquishment of a right. It implies some act of relinquishment done by the owner without regard to any future possession by himself, or by any other person, but with an intention to aban-
don. Dyer v. Sanford, 9 Mete., Mass., 395, 43 Am. Dec. 399.
It is properly confined to incorporeal hereditaments, since legal rights once vested must be divested according to law. But equitabie rights may be abandoned. Great Falls Co. v. Worster, 15 N.H. 412; Cox v. Colossal Cavern Co., 210 Ky. 612, 276 S.W. 540; Inhabitants of School Dist. No. 4 v. Benson, 31 Me. 381, 52 Am.Dec. 618.

Ship and Freight

Act by which shipowner surrenders ship and freight to a trustee for benefit of claimants. See 46 U.S.C.A. § 185; Ohio Transp. Co. v. Davidson
S. S. Co., 148 F. 185, 78 C.C.A. 319

In France and other countries It is the surrender to a person having a elann arising out of a contract made with the master. American Transp. Co. v. Moore, 5 Mich. 368.

Taxing Power

Act by which shipowner surrenders ship and freight to a trustee for benefit of claimants. See 46 U.S.C.A. § 185; Ohio Transp. Co. v. Davidson
S. S. Co., 148 F. 185, 78 C.C.A. 319.
In France and other countries It is the surrender to a person having a elann arising out of a contract made with the master. American Transp. Co. v. Moore, 5 Mich. 368.

Taxing Power

Delegation of taxing power by legislature to city was not "abandonment of taxing power". Mouledoux v. Maestri, 197 La. 525, 2 So.2d 11, 16.

Trade-marks and Trade Names

There must be not only nonuser, but also an intent to abandon. Rockowitz Corset & Brassiere Corporation v. Madame X Co., 248 N.Y. 272, 162 N. E. 76, 78; Manz v. Philadelphia Brewing Co., D.C. Pa., 37 F.Supp. 79, 81. To give up use of trade. marks permanently. Neva-Wet Corporation of America v. Never Wet Processing Corporation, 277 N.Y. 163, 13 N.E.2d 755, 761.

Disuse not sufficient in itself. Sherwood Co. v. Sherwood Distilling Co., 177 Md. 455, 9 A.2d 842, 845. Nor using owner’s name. Bunte Bros. v. Standard Chocolates, D.C. Mass., 45 F.Supp. 478, 480. However, nonuser with ex-tensive use by another is sufficient. Sherwood Co. v. Sher-wood Distilling Co., 177 Md. 455, 9 A.2d 842, 845. But not where receiver continuously operated trade-mark licensee’s property. American Dirigold Corporation v. Dirigold Met-als Corporation. C.C.A.Mich., 125 F.2d 446, 454. Nor sale of all physical assets of manufacturing company by trusteein bankruptcy. Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. 3. G. Menihan Corporation, D.C.N.Y., 28 F.Supp. 920, 923.

Trusts

State aid for hospital, with stipulation for beds for emergency cases, did not establish an "aban-donment of trust". Noble v. First Nat. Bank of Anniston, 241 Ala. 85, 1 So.2d 289, 291.

Water Rights

"’Abandonment," as applied to water rights may be defined to be an intentional relinquishment of a known right. It is not base(‘ on a time ele-ment, and mere nonuser will not establish "aban-donment" for any less time, at least, than statu-tory period, controlling element in "abandonment" being matter of intent. Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66 P.2d 894, 899. To desert or forsake right. The intent and an actual relinquishment must concur. Central Trust Co. v. Culver, 23 Colo. App. 317, 129 P. 253, 254. Concurrence of relin-quishment of possession, and intent not to resume it for beneficia’ use. Neither alone is suffi. cient. Osnes Livestock Co. v. Warren, 103 Mont. 284, 62 P.2d 206, 211.
Not using water when there was no water in creek be-cause of another user’s obstruction of fiow and appropria-tion of all the water did not constitute. New Mexico Prod-ucts Co. v. New Mexico Power CO.. 42 N.M. 311, 77 P.2d 634, 641. Nor did milling company’s permitting water’s use by upper irrigators. Hutchinson v. Stricklin, 146 Or. 285, 28 I’.2d 225, 230. Nor permitting upper appropriators to erect dam and store water. Irion v. Hyde, Mont., 81 P. 2d 353, 356. Nor chango of place of use of decreed water right. Harris v. Chapman, 51 Idaho 283, 5 P.28 733, 737. Nor failure to use all water to which entitled. Horse Creek Conservation Dist. v. Lincoln Land Co., 54 Wyo. 320, 92 P.2d 572, 577. Use of only enough water to water stock. because supply was insuflicient to irrigate land. Federal Land Bank v. Morris, 112 Mont. 445, 116 P.2d 1007, 1010. But right to use a particular quantity of water mal, be abandoned by failure to apply such water to a beneficial use for an unrcasonable period of time. Cundy v. Weber, 68 S.D. 214, 300 N.W. 17, 22

Wif e

Abandonment justifying divorce is a voluntary, unjustified, and final separation of one of married parties from the other, accompanied by an inten-tion to terminate the marital relation, or an un-justified refusal to resume suspended cohabita-tion, as where husband left his wife because his children by former marriage could not live peace-ably with second wife. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 158 Md. 80, 148 A. 259, 263.

Refusal by husband of request by sick wife without means of support, to return te heme held "abandonment" as respecto disorderly conduct. People v. Schenkel, 252 N.Y.S. 415, 418, 140 Mise. S43. Contra where separation agreement existed. People v. Cross, 291 N.Y.S. 597, 601, 161 Mise. 514. Where parties separated by agreement, and husband, in lieu of periodic payments for wife’s support, mude conveyance constituting, val viable consideration, held not "abandonment" as respects husband’s statutory right against wife’s will. In re McCann’s Estate, 281 N.Y.S. 445, 155 Misc. 763; or even if wife was justified in leaving hus-band on account of his cruel treatment, there must be a desertion without consent. In re Stolz’ Estate, 260 N.Y.S. 906, 145 Misc. 799. But while there can be no ”desertion" for divorce where parties are apart by consent, yet there may be an "abandonment" as respccts separate mainte-nance, although the separation originated and conlinued by consent of parties. Pierson v. Pierson, 189 A. 391, 395,15 N.J.Misc. 117. And as respects maintenance, husband’s conduct rendering wife’s condition unendurable constitutes "abandonment." Carder v. Carder, 227 Mo.App. 1005, 60 S.W.2d 706. Cruel treatment, Fallon v. Fallon, 111 N.T. Eq. 512, 162 A. 406, 408. Husband’s refusal of wife’s request to resume living with her, Clark v. Clark, 176 A. 81, 83, 13 N.J.Misc. 49; or refusal to receive wife at his residence, is an "abandonment" of her. Hockaday v. Hockaday, 182 La. 88, 161 So. 164. But not a husband’s removal from wife’s borne after wife had instituted sep-aration action, Kenneson v. Kenneson, 36 N.Y.S.2d 676, 685, 178 Misc. 832; or where husband moved out on command of wife’s father. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 24 N.Y.S.2d 613, 618. Mere failure to support wife is not an abandonment within Divorce Act. Biddle v. Biddle, 104 N.J.Eq. 313, 145 A. 639, 640; but failing to provide wife with necessitles, etc., is. Cooper v. Cooper, 176 Md. 695, 4 A.2d 714, 716. And convict sentenced for life did not abandon wife. In re Lindewall’s WIll, 18 N.Y.S.2d 281, 284, 259 App.Div. 196.

ABANDONMENT FOR TORTS. In the civil law. The relinquishment of a slave or animal who had committed a trespass to the person injured, in dis-charge of the owner’s liability for such trespass or injury. Just. Inst. 4, 8, 9. A similar right exists in Louisiana. Fitzgerald v. Ferguson, 11 La.Ann. 396

ABANDUN, ABANDUM, or ABANDONUM. Any-thing sequestered, proscribed, or abandoned. Abandon, i. e., in bannum res missa, a thing ban-ned or denounced as forfeited or lost, whence to abandon, desert, or forsake, as lost and gone. Cunningham; Cowell.
ABARNARE. Lat. To discover and disclose to a magistrate any secret crime. Leges Canuti, cap. 10.
ABATABLE NUISANCE. A nuisance which is practically susceptible of being suppressed, or ex-tinguished, or rendered harmless, and whose con-tinued existence is not authorized under the law. Fort Worth & Denver City Ry. Co. v. Muncy, Tex. Civ.App., 31 S.W.2d 491, 494.
ABATANLENTUM. L. Lat. In old English law. An abatement of freehold; an entry upon Lands by way of interposition between the death of the ancestor and the entry of the heir. Co. Litt. 277a; Yel. 151.
ABATARE. To abate. Yel. 151.
ABATE. To throw down, to beat down, destroy, quash. 3 Shars. Bla. Com. 168; Klamath Lum-ber Co. v. Bamber, 142 P. 359, 74 Or. 287. , To do away with or nullify or lessen or diminish, In re Stevens’ Estate, Cal.App., 150 P.2d 530, 534; to bring entirely down or demolish, to put an end to, to do away with, to nullify, to make void, Sparks Milling Co. v. Powell, 283 Ky. 669, 143 S.W.2d 75, 77.
See, also, Abatement; Abatement and RevIval.
ABATEMENT. A reduction, a decrease, or a diminution. The Vestris, D.C.N.Y., 53 F.2d 847, 852.
A judgment afforded a defense by way of abatement. Panos v. Great Western Packing Co., Cal.App., 126 P.2d 889, 892.

Contracts
A reduction made by the creditor for the prompt payment of a debt due by the payor or debtor. Wesk. Ins. 7.
Debts
In equity, when equitable assets are insufficient to satisfy fully all the creditors, their debts must abate in proportion, and they must be content with a dividend, for cequitas est quasi cequalitas.
Freehold
The unlawful entry upon and keeping posses-sion of an estate by a stranger, after the death of the ancestor and before the heir or devisee takes possession. Such an entry is techniCally called an "abatement," and the stranger an "aba-tor." It is, in fact, a figurative expression, de-noting that the rightful possession or freehold of the heir or devisee is overthroWn by the unlawful intervention of a stranger. Abatement differs from intrusion, in that it is always to the preju-dice of the heir or immediate devisee, whereas the latter is to the prejudice of the reversioner or remainder-man; and disseisin differs from them both, for to disseise is to put forcibly or fraudu-lently a person seised of the freehold out of pos-session. Brown v. Burdick, 25 Ohio St. 268. By the ancient laws of Normandy, this term was used to signify the act of one who, having an ap-parent right of possession to an estate, took pos-session of it immediately after the death of the actual possessor, before the heir entered. (How-ard, Anciennes Lois des Francais, tome 1, p. 539.)
Legacies
A proportional diminution or reduction of the pecuniary legacies, when the funds or assets out of which such legacies are payable are not suffi-cient to pay them in full. Ward, Leg. p. 369, c. 6, § 7; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 555; 2 Bl. Comm. 512, 513; In re ‘Hawgood’s Estate, 37 S.D. 565, 159 N.W. 117, 123. Legacy accepted in lieu of dower. In re Hartman’s Estate, 233 Iowa 405, 9 N.W.2d 359, 362.
Nuisance
The removal of a nuisance. 3 Bla. Comm. 5. See Nuisance.
Taxes and Duties
A drawback or rebate allowed in certain cases on the duties due on imported goods, in considera-tion of their deterioration or damage suffered during importation, or while in store. A diminu-tion or decrease in the amount of tax imposed upon any person. Rogers v. Gookin, 198 Mass. 434, 85 N.E. 405 (real estate taxes); Central Na-tional Bank v. City of Lynn, 156 N.E. 42 (Shares in national banks) 259 Mass. 1.
As applied to taxation, It presupposes error or mistake in assessment. Gulf States Steel Co. v. U. S., C.C.A.Ala., 56 F.2d 43, 46.
Abatement of taxes relieves property of its share of the burdens of taxation after the assessment has been tunde and the tax levied. Sheppard v. Hidalgo County, 126 Tex. 550, 83 S.W.2d 649, 657.

ABATEMENT AND REVIVAL

Actions at Law

As used in reference to actions at law, word abate means that action is utterly dead and can-not be revived except by commencing a new ac-tion. First Nat. Bank v. Board of Sup’rs of Harri-son County, 221 Iowa 348, 264 N.W. 281, 106 A.L.R. 566.
The overthrow of an action caused by the de-fendant’s pleading some matter of fact tending to impeach the correctness of the writ or declaration, which defeats the action for the present, but does not debar the plaintiff from recommencing it in a better way. 3 Bla. Comm. 301; 1 Chit. Pl. (6th Lond. Ed.) 446; Guild v. Richardson, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 370; Wirtele v. Grand Lodge A. O. U. W., 111 Neb. 302, 196 N.W. 510. See Plea in Abate-ment.
To put a final end to sult, Dodge v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County, 139 Cal.App. 178, 33 P.2d 695, 696; overthrow of pending action apart from cause of action, Burnand v. Irigoyen, 56 Cal.App.2d 624, 133 P.2d 3, 6.
On plaintiff’s death, Piukkula v. Pillsbury Astoria Flouring Milis Co., 150 Or. 304, 44 P.2d 162, 99 A.L.R. 259. Mere lapse of time between the death of a party and the taking of necessary steps to continue the action by or against the heir or personal representative does not work an abatement, Whaley v. Slater, 202 S.C. 182, 24 S.E.2d 266, 267.

Cause of Action

Destruction of cause of action. In re Thomas-son, Mo., 159 S.W.2d 626, 628.

Chancery Practico

It differs from an abatement at law in this: that in the latter the action is entirely dead and cannot be revived; but in the former the right to proceed is merely suspended, and may be revived; F. A. Mfg. Co. v. Hayden & Clemons, C.C.A.Mass., 273 F. 374; Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass’n v. Teal, D.C.S.C., 34 F.Supp. 714, 716.
In England, declinatory pleas to the jurisdiction and dilatory to the persons were (prior to the judicature act) sometimes, by analogy to common law, termed "picas in abatement."
Declinatory and dilatory pleas, see Story, Eq. Pl. § 708.
Death of one of parties, Geiger v. Merle, 360 III. 497, 196 N.E. 497, 502. Want of proper parties, 2 Tldd Pr. 932; Story, Eq.P1. § 354; Witt v. Ellis, 2 Cold., Tenw, 38; peti-tion for widow’s allowance, In re Samson’s Estate, 142 Neb. 556, 7 N.W.2d 60, 62, 144 A.L.R. 264.
ABATOR. In real property law, a stranger who, having no right of entry, contrives to get posses-sion of an estate of freehold, to the prejudice of the heir or devisee, before the latter can enter, alter the ancestor’s death. Litt. § 397. In the law of torts, one who abates, prostrates, or de-stroys a nuisance.
ABATUDA. Anything diminished. Moneta aba-tuda is money clipped or diminished in value. Cowell; Dufresne.
ABAVIA. Lat. In the civil law. A great-great-grandmother. Inst. 3, 6, 4; Dig. 38, 10, 1, 6; Bract. fol. 68b.

ABAVITA. A great-great-grandfather’s sister. Bract. fol. 68b. This is a misprint for abamita (q. v.). Burrill.
ABAVUNCULUS. Lat. In the civil law. A great-great-grandmother’s brother (avavice frater). Inst. 3, 6, 6; Dig. 38, 10, 3; Calvinus, Lex. Called avunculus maximus. Id. 38, 10, 10, 17. Called by Bracton and Fleta abauunculus inagnus. Bract. fol. 68b; Fleta, lib. 6, c. 2, § 19.
ABAVUS. Lat. In the civil law. A great-great-grandfather. Inst. 3, 6, 4; Dig. 38, 10, 1, 6; Bract. fol. 67a.
ABBACINARE. To blind by placing a burning basin or red-hot irons before the eye’s. A form of punishment in the Middle Ages. Also spelt abacinare. The modern Italian is spelt with two b’s, and means to blind. Abbacination. Blinding by placing burning basin or red-hot irons before the eyes. See Abbacinare.
ABBACY. The government of a religious house, and the revenues thereof, subject to an abbot, as a bishopric is to a bishop. Cowell. The rights and privileges of an abbot.
ABBEY. A monastery or nunnery for the use of an association of religious persons, having an ab-bot or abbess to preside over them.
ABBOT. A prelate in the 13th century who had had an immemorial right to sit in the national assembly. Taylor, Science of Jurispr. 287.
ABBOT, ABBAT. The spiritual superior or gover-nor of an abbey. Feminine, Abbess.
ABBREVIATE OF ADJUDICATION. In Scotch law. An abstract of the decree of adjudication, and of the Lands adjudged, with the amount of the debt. Adjudication is that diligente (execution) of the law by which the real estate of a debtor is adjudged to belong to his creditor in payment of a debt; and the abbreviate must be recorded in the register of adjudications

ABBREVIATIO PLACITORUM. An abstract of ancient judicial records, prior to the Year Books. See Steph. Pl. (7th Ed.) 410.
ABBREVIATIONS. Shortened conventional ex-pressions, employed as substitutes for names, phrases, dates, and the like, for the saving of space, of time in transcribing, etc. Abbott.
The abbreviations in common use in modern times con-sist of the initial letter or lettcrs, syllable or syllables, oí the word. Anciently, also, contractcd forms of words, obtained by the oniission of letters intermediate between the initial and final letters were much in use. These lat-ter forms are now more commonly designated by the term contraction.
For Table of Abbreviations, see Appendix.
ABBREVIATIONUM ILLE NUMERUS ET SEN-SUS ACCIPIENDUS EST, UT CONCESSIO NON SIT INANIS. In abbreviations, sudh number and sense is to be taken that the grant be not made void. 9 Coke, 48.

ABBREVIATORS. In ecclesiastical law. Officers whose duty it is to assist in drawing up the Pope’s briefs, and reducing petítions into proper form to be converted into papal bulls.
ABBROCHMENT, or ABBROACHMENT. The act of forestalling a market, by buying up at whole-sale the merchandise intended to be sold there, for the purpose of selling it at retail. See Fore-stalling the Market.
ABBUTTALS. See Abuttals.
ABDICATION. The act of a sovereign in re-nouncing and relinquishing his government or throne, so that either the throne is left entirely vacant, or is filled by a successor appointed or elected beforehand.
Also, where a magistrate or person in office voluntarily renounces or gives it up before the time of service has expired.
The act of abdicating; giving up of °ince, power or au-thority, right or trust; renunciation. McCormick v. Eng-strom, 119 Kan. 698, 241 P. 685, 6S8.
Abdication of rights to property may constitute an assignment. In re Johnston’s Estate, 186 Wis. 599, 203 N.W. 376, 377.
It dlffers from resignation, in that resignation is made by one who has received his office from another and restores it into his hands, as an inferior into the hands of a superior; abdication is the relinquishment of an office which has devolved by act of law. It is said to be a renunciation, quitting, and relinquishing, so as 1.0 have nothing further to do with, a thing, or the doing of such actions as are inconsistent with the holding of lt. Cham-bers.
ABDITORIUM. An abditory or hiding place, to hide and preserve goods, plate or money. Jacob.
ABDUCTION. In criminal law. The offense of taking away a wife, child, or ward, by fraud and persuasion, or open violence. 3 Bl.Comm. 139-141; State v. Chisenhall, 106 N.C. 676, 11 S.E. 518 (fe-male under 14) ; State v. Hopper, 186 N.C. 405, 119 S.E. 769, 772 (wife).
To take away surreptitiously by force in kid-napping. Doss v. State, 220 Ala. 30, 123 So. 231, 232, 68 A.L.R. 712.
The unlawful taking or detention of any female for purposes of marriage, concubinage, or prosti-tution. 4 Steph.Com. 84; People v. Crotty, 55 Hun, 611, 9 N.Y.S. 937. In many states this of-fense is created by statute and in most cases ap-plies to females under a given age.
By statute in some states, abduction includes the withdrawal of a husband from his wife, as where another woman alienates his affection and entices him away and causes him to abandon his wife. Humphrey v. Pope, 122 Cal. 253, 54 P. 847.
ABEARANCE. Behavior; as a recognizance to be of good abearance signifies to be of good be-havior. 4 Bl.Comm. 251, 256.
ABEREMURDER. (From Sax. abere, apparent, notorious; and mord, murder.) Plain or downright murder, as distinguished from the less heinous crime of manslaughter, or chance medley. Spelman; Cowell; Blount.
ABESSE. Lat. In the civil law. To be absent; to be away from a place. Said of a perso’n who was extra continentia urbis, (beyond the suburbs of the city.)
ABET. A French word combined of two words "a" and "beter"—to bait or excite an animal. It includes knowledge of the wrongful purpose of the perpetrator and counsel and encouragement in the crime. People v. Terman, 4 Cal.App.2d 345, 40 P.2d 915, 916.
To encourage, incite, or set another on to com-mit a crime. This+word is always applied to aid-ing the commission of a crime. To abet another to commit a murder is to command, procure, or counsel him to commit it, Old Nat. Brev. 21; Co.
Litt. 475; to command, procure, counsel, encour-age, induce, or assist, Short v. Commonwealth, 240 Ky. 477, 42 S.W.2d 696, 697; to encourage, counsel, induce, or assist, State v. Watts, Nev., 296 P. 26. Tú facilitate the commission of a crime, promote its accomplishment, or help in advancing or bring-ing it about. State v. Lord, 42 N.M. 638, 84 P.2d 80, 86. It includes knowledge of wrongful purpose of perpetrator. Daniels v. State, 58 Ga.App. 599, 199 S.E. 572, 577. State v. Kneedy, 232 Iowa 21, 3 N.W.2d 611, 615. People v. Stein, 55 Cal.App.2d 417, 130 P.2d 750, 751 (permitting wife to remain in house of prostitution).
See Abettor; Aid and Abet.
"Aid" and "abet" are nearly synonymous tercos as gen-erally used; but. strictly speaking, the formen terco does not Inmly guilty knowledge or felonious intent, whereas the ;vord "abet" includes knowledge of the wrongful pur-pose and counsel and encouragement in the commission of the crime. Forgcry, People v. Dole, 122 Cal. 486, 55 P. 581, 68 Am.St. Rep. 50; Raiford v. State, 59 Ala. 106; Violation of law• against free passes, State v. Ankrom, 86 W.Va. 570, 103 S.E. 925, 927; Crime against nature, State v. Start, 65 Or. 178, 132 P. 512, 513; Robbery, People v. Powers, 293 Ill. 600, 127 N.E 681, 682.
Instigate synonymous (malicious prosecution) Hughes v. Van Bruggen, 44 N.M. 534, 105 P.2d 494, 499.
"Abet" smacks more of technical terminology than does the word "aid", but it is almost synonymous with the word "aid". Assauit and battery, Gentry v. State, 65 Ga. App. 100, 15 S.E.2d 464, 465.
ABETTATOR. L. Lat. In old English law. An abettor. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 65, § 7. See Abettor.
ABETTOR. In criminal law. An instigator, or setter on; one who promotes or procures a crime to be committed. Old Nat.Brev. 21. One who commands, advises, instigates, or encourages an-other to commit a crime; a person who, being present or in the neighborhood, incites another to commit a crime, and thus becomes a principal. See State v. Baldwin, 193 N.C. 566, 137 S.E. 590, 591.
Must have rendered assistance or encouragement to the perpetrator of the crime with knowledge of his felonious intent; offense of "aiding and abetting" being committed by person present who does some act or speaks some word aiding the actual perpetrator of the crime. emulas v. Commonwealth, 224 Ky. 653, 6 S.W.2d 1082, 1083. Must

ABETTOR

aid or commit some overt act or act of encouragement. Long v. Commonwealth, 288 Ky. 83, 155 S.W.2d 246, 247. One who so far participates in the commission of the offense as to be present for the purpose of assisting if necessary. State v. Epps, 213 N.C. 709, 197 S.E. 580, 583.
The distinction between abettors and accessories is the presence or absence at the commission of the crime. Cowell; Fleta, lib. 1, c. 34. Presence and participation are necessary to constitute a person an abettor. 4 Sharsw.Bla. Comm. 33; Bradley v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 413, 257 S. W. 11, 13. Common design to take lile not necessary. State v. Lord, 42 N.M. 638, 84 P.2d 80, 86. Not essential that there should be a prearrangement or mutual under-standing or concert of action. McKinney v. Common-wealth, 284 Ky. 16, 143 S.W.2d 745, 747, 748.
ABEYANCE. In the law of estates. In expecta-tion, remembrance, and contemplation of law; the condition of a freehold when there is no per-son in being in whom it is vested.
In such cases the freehold has been said to be in nubibus (in the clouds), McKown v. McKown, 93 W.Va. 689, 117 S.E. 557, 559; in pendenti (in suspension); and i11, gremio legis (in the bosom of the law). Where there Is a tenant of the freehold, the remainder or reversion in fee may exlst for a time without any particular owner, in which case it is said to be in abeyance; Lyle v. Richards, 9 S. & R. Pa. 367; 3 Plowd. 29 a, b, 35 a; 1 Washb.R.P. 47.
Franchise of a corporation; Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 691, 4 L.Ed. 629. Personal property as in case of a vessel captured at sea from its captors until it becomes invested with the char-acter of a prize; 1 Kent, 102; 1 C.Rob.Adm. 139; 3 id. 97, n.; or the rights of property. of a bankrupt, pending adjudication; Bank v. Sherman, 101. U.S. 403, 25 L.Ed. 866.
A condition of being undetermined. Fenn v. American Rattan & Reed Mfg. Co., 75 Ind.App. 146, 130 N.E. 129, 130. (Seller stating its inability to promise to deliver.)
Sales to third parties, of property acquired by county at tax sale, being held in "abeyance", means that certain rights or conditions are in expectancy. Willard v. Ward County, 72 N.D. 291, 6 N.W.2d 566, 568.
ABIATICUS, or AVIATICUS. L. Lat. In feudal law. A son’s son; a grandson in the male line. Du Cange, Avius; Spelman; Lib.Feud., Baraterii, tit. 8, cited Id.
ABIDE. To accept the consequences of; to rest satisfied with; to wait for.
With reference to an order, judgment, or decree of a court, to perform, to execute. Jackson v. State, 30 Kan. 88, 1. P. 317. Where a statute provides for a recognizance "to abide the judgment of the court," one conditioned "to await the action of the court" is not sufficient; Wilson v. State, 7 Tex.App. 38. Defendant does not "abide the judgment" until costs of appeal are paid. Ex parte Til-lery, 22 Ala.App. 193, 114 So. 15. And see State v. Greg-ory, 205 Iowa, 707, 216 N.W. 17, 19.
Defendant’s presence in courtroom not a compliance with supersedeas bond conditioned to "abide final judg-ment," where there was no formal offer to surrender defendant into court’s custody. American Surety Co. of New York v. State, 50 Ga.App. 777, 179 S.E. 407.
To abide and satisfy is used to express the execution or performance of a judgment or order by carrying it into complete effect, Erickson v. Elder, 34 Minn. 371, 25 N.W. 804, Cf. Woolfolk v. Jones, D.C.Va., 216 F. 807, 809.
Where costs are to abide final result, "abide" is synon-ymous with conform to. Getz v. Johnston, 145 Md. 426, 125 A. 689, 691.
To abide order respecting seized property, means to per-form, obey, conform to. Cantor v. Sachs, 18 Del.Ch. 359, 162 A. 73, 84.
ABIDING BY. In Scotch law. A judicial declara-tion that the party abides by the deed on whichhe founds, in an action where the deed or writing is attacked as forged. Pat.Comp.. It has the ef-fect of pledging the party to stand the conse-quences of founding on a forged deed. Ball.
"Abide by" means to adhere to, to submit to, to obey, to accept the consequences of. Detroit Fidelity & Surety Co. v. U. S., C.C.A.Ohio, 36 F.2d 682, 683. (Recognizance)
To abide by an award means to await the award with-out revoking the submission. It does not mean to "acqui-esce in" or "not dispute." in the sense of not being at liberty to contest the validity of the award when made, Hunt v. Wilson. 6 N.II. 36; Quimby v. Melvin, 35 N.H. 198; Weeks v. Trask, 81 Me. 127, 16 A. 413, 2 L.R.A. 532.
ABIDING CONVICTION. A definite conviction of guilt derived from a thorough examination of the whole case. Hopt v. Utah, 7 S.Ct. 614, 120 U.S. 439, 30 L.Ed. 708. A settled or fixed conviction. Davis v. State, 8 Ala.App. 147, 62 So. 1027, 1033. People v. Castro, 68 Cal.App.2d 491, 157 P.2d 25, 30.
ABIDING FAITH. Belief or confidente in the guilt of one accused of crime which refnains or continuas in the minds of the jury. Gray v. State. 56 Okl.Cr. 208, 38 P.2d 967, 970.
ABIGEATORES. See Abigeus.
ABIGEATUS. Lat. In the civil law. The offense of stealing or driving away cattle. See Abigeus.
ABIGEI. See Abigeus.
ABIGERE. Lat. In the civil law. To drive away. Applied to those who drove away animals with the intention of stealing them. Applied, also, to the similar offense of cattle stealing on the borders between England and Scotland. See Abigeus.
To drive out; to expel by force; to produce abortion. Dig. 47, 11, 4.
ABIGEUS. Lat. (P1., abigei, or more rarely abigeatores.) In the civil law. A stealer of cat-tle; one who drove or drew away (subtraxit) cattle from their pastures, as horses or oxen from the herds, and made booty of them, and who fol-lowed this as a business or trade.
The term was applied also to those who drove away the smaller animals, as swine, sheep, and goats. In the latter case, it depended on the number taken, whether the offender was fur (a common thief) or abigeus. But the taking of a single horse or ox seems to have constituted the crime of abigeatus. And those who frcquently did this were clearly abigei, though they took but an animal or two at a time. Dig. 47, 14, 3, 2. See Cod. 9, 37; Nov. 22, c. 15, § 1; 4 Bl.Comm. 239.
ABILITY. When the word is used in .statutes, it is usually construed as referring to pecuniary ability, as in the construction of Tenterden’s Act (q. v.); 1M. &W. 101.
Contemplates earning capacity as well as property actu-ally owned, to support abandoned wife; State v. Witham, 70 Wis. 473, 35 N.W. 934, Contra, Washburn v. Washburn, 9 Cal. 475.
The ability to buy, required in a purchaser as a condi-tion to the broker’s right to a commission, is the financial

he founds, in an action where the deed or writing is attacked as forged. Pat.Comp.. It has the ef-fect of pledging the party to stand the conse-quences of founding on a forged deed. Ball.
"Abide by" means to adhere to, to submit to, to obey, to accept the consequences of. Detroit Fidelity & Surety Co. v. U. S., C.C.A.Ohio, 36 F.2d 682, 683. (Recognizance)
To abide by an award means to await the award with-out revoking the submission. It does not mean to "acqui-esce in" or "not dispute." in the sense of not being at liberty to contest the validity of the award when made, Hunt v. Wilson. 6 N.II. 36; Quimby v. Melvin, 35 N.H. 198; Weeks v. Trask, 81 Me. 127, 16 A. 413, 2 L.R.A. 532.

ABIDING CONVICTION. A definite conviction of guilt derived from a thorough examination of the whole case. Hopt v. Utah, 7 S.Ct. 614, 120 U.S. 439, 30 L.Ed. 708. A settled or fixed conviction. Davis v. State, 8 Ala.App. 147, 62 So. 1027, 1033. People v. Castro, 68 Cal.App.2d 491, 157 P.2d 25, 30.
ABIDING FAITH. Belief or confidente in the guilt of one accused of crime which refnains or continuas in the minds of the jury. Gray v. State. 56 Okl.Cr. 208, 38 P.2d 967, 970.
ABIGEATORES. See Abigeus.
ABIGEATUS. Lat. In the civil law. The offense of stealing or driving away cattle. See Abigeus.
ABIGEI. See Abigeus

ABIGERE. Lat. In the civil law. To drive away. Applied to those who drove away animals with the intention of stealing them. Applied, also, to the similar offense of cattle stealing on the borders between England and Scotland. See Abigeus.
To drive out; to expel by force; to produce abortion. Dig. 47, 11, 4.
ABIGEUS. Lat. (P1., abigei, or more rarely abigeatores.) In the civil law. A stealer of cat-tle; one who drove or drew away (subtraxit) cattle from their pastures, as horses or oxen from the herds, and made booty of them, and who fol-lowed this as a business or trade.
The term was applied also to those who drove away the smaller animals, as swine, sheep, and goats. In the latter case, it depended on the number taken, whether the offender was fur (a common thief) or abigeus. But the taking of a single horse or ox seems to have constituted the crime of abigeatus. And those who frcquently did this were clearly abigei, though they took but an animal or two at a time. Dig. 47, 14, 3, 2. See Cod. 9, 37; Nov. 22, c. 15, § 1; 4 Bl.Comm. 239.
ABILITY. When the word is used in .statutes, it is usually construed as referring to pecuniary ability, as in the construction of Tenterden’s Act (q. v.); 1M. &W. 101.
Contemplates earning capacity as well as property actu-ally owned, to support abandoned wife; State v. Witham, 70 Wis. 473, 35 N.W. 934, Contra, Washburn v. Washburn, 9 Cal. 475.
The ability to buy, required in a purchaser as a condi-tion to the broker’s right to a commission, is the financial

ability to meet the required tcrms of the sale, and does not mean solvency or ability to respond in damages for a breách of the contract. Stewart v. Sisk, 29 Ga.App. 17, 114 S.E. 71. See Able to Purchase.
A voter’s "ability to read" within meaning of election statutes is satisfled if he can .read in a reasonably intelli-gent manner sentences composed of words in common use and of average difficulty, although each word may not be always accurately pronounced, and "ability to write" is satisfled if he can by use of alphabetical signs express in a fairly legible way words of common use and average difil-culty, though each word may not be accurately spelled. Williams v. Hays, 175 Ky. 170, 193 S.W. 1046, 1047. But the mere ability to write one’s name and post office address, and nothing more, 1s insufficient. Murrel v. Allen, 180 Ky. 604, 203 S.W. 313, 314.
ABISHERING, or ABISHERSING. Quit of amercements. It originally signified a forfeiture or amercement, and is more properly mishering, mishersing, or miskering, according to Spelman. It has since been termed a liberty of freedom, be-cause, wherever this word is used in a grant, the persons to whom the grant is made have the for-feitures and amercements of all others, and are themselves free from the control of any within their fee. Termes de la. Ley, 7.
ABJUDICATIO. In old English law. The depriv-ing of a thing by the judgment of a court; a putting out of court; the same as forisjudicatio, forjudgment, forjudger. Co.Litt. 100a, b; Townsh. Pl. 49. A removal from court. Calvinus, Lex.
Used to indicate an adverse decision in a writ of right: Thus, the land is said to be abjudged from one of the parties and his heirs. 2 Poll. & Maiti. 62.
ABJURATION. A renunciation or abandonment by or upon oath.
The oath by which any person holding office in England was formerly obliged to bind himself not to ac.knowledge any right in the Pretender to the throne of England; 1 Bla.Com. 368; 13 and 14 W. III, c. 6, repealed by 30 and 31 Vic. c. 59.
It also denotes an oath abjuring certain doctrines of the church of Reme.

ABJURATION OF ALLEGIANCE. A naturalized citizen of the United States, must declare that he doth renounce and abjure all allegiance and fideli-ty which he owes to any foreign prince, state, etc. 8 U.S.C.A. § 735.
ABJURATION OF THE REALM. In ancient English law. A renunciation of one’s country, a species of self-imposed banishment, under an oath never to return to the kingdom unless by permis-sion. 4 Bl.Comm. 332; Avery v. Everett, 110 N.Y. 317, 18 N.E. 148, 1 L.R.A. 264. See Abjure.
ABJURE. To renounce, or abandon, by or upon oath. See Abjuration.
A departure from the state without the intention of returning, and not a renunciation of one’s country, upon an oath of perpetual banishment, as the term originally implied. Mead v. IIughes, 15 Ala. 148, 1 Am.P,ep. 123.
ABLE-BODIED. As used in a statute relating to service in the militia, this term does not imply an

absolute freedom from all physical ailment. It imports an absence of those palpable and visible defects which evidently incapacitate the person from performing the ordinary duties of a soldier. Darling v. Bowen, 10 Vt. 152. Ability to perform ordinary labor is not the test. Town of Marl-borough v. Sisson, 26 Conn. 57.
ABLE SEAMAN. A grade of merchant seamen. 46 U.S.C.A. § 672.
ABLE TO EARN. The phrase in the Workmen’s Compensation Act in reference to wages does not mean the maximum sum earned in ány one week, but a fair average of the weekly wages which employee is able to earn covering a sufficient period of time to determine his earning capacity. Reeves v. Dietz, 1 La.App. 501, 505. See also, Mt. Olive & Staunton Coal Co. v. Industrial Commis-sion, 301 III. 521, 134 N.E. 16. Amount one is capable of earning if employed. Ferrara v. Clif-ton Wright Hat Co., 125 Conn. 140, 3 A.2d 842, 843.
Ability to obtain and bold employment means that the person referred to is either able or unable to perform the usual duties of whatever employment may be under con-sideration, in the manner that such duties are customarily performed by the average person engaged in such employ-ment. Kinyon v. Kinyon, 230 Mo.App. 623, 71 S.W.2d 78, 82.
ABLE TO PURCHASE "Ability" in sales con-tracts, dependent on ability to purchase, usually means financial ability. Anderson v. Craig, 111 Mont. 182, 108 P.2d 205, 206; House v. Hamburg, Sup., 39 ‘N.Y.S.2d 20, 22. Purchaser must have financial ability and legal capacity to acquire land. Campbell v. Hood, Tex.Com.App., 35 S.W.2d 93, 95, 85 A.L.R. 266.
Purchaser la able to purchase, as respects broker’s right to commission, if he is financially able to command the necessary funds to Glose the deal within the time required. Hersh v. Garau, 218 Cal. 460, 23 P.2d 1022. Even though part of the money must be obtained on the purchased property itself. Pellaton v. Brunski, 69 Cal. App. 301, 231 P. 583, 584. But see Bateman v. Richard, 105 OId. 272, 232 P. 443, 445; and Reynor v. Mackrill, 181 Iowa 210, 164 N.W. 335, 1 A.L.R. 523, holding that a person, to be able to purchase, must have the money for the cash payment, and not merely property on which he could raise it. See, aleo, Peters v. Mullins, 211 Ky. 123, 277 S.W. 316, 317. See Financially Able.
ABLEGATI. Papal ambassadors of the second rank, who are sent to a country where there is not a nuncio, with a less extensive commission than that of a nuncio. This title is equivalent to envoy.
ABLOCATIO. A letting out to hire, or leasing for money. Calvin. Sometimes used in the English form "ablocation."
ABMATERTERA. Lat. In the civil law. A great-great-grandmother’s sister, (abaviw soror). Inst. 3, 6, 6; Dig. 38, 10, 3. Called matertera maxima. Id. 38, 10, 10, 17. Called, by Bracton, abmatertera magna. Bract. fol. 68b.
ABNEPOS. Lat. A great-great-grandson. The grandson of a grandson or granddaughter. Cal-vinus, Lex

ABNEPTIS. Lat. A great-great-granddaughter. The granddaughter of a grandson or granddaugh-ter. Calvinus, Lex.
ABODE. One’s home; habitation; place of dwell-ing; or residence. Ordinarily means "domicile." Hanson v. Williams, 170 Ga. 779, 154 S.E. 240, 242. Living place impermanent in character. Fowler v. Fowler, 156 Fla. ¿16, 22 So.2d 817, 818. Evans v. Evans, 141 Fla. 860, 194 So. 215, 217. The place where a person dwells. Dorsey v. Brigham, 177 Ill. 250, 52 N.E. 303, In re Erickson, 18 N.J.Misc. 5, 10 A.2d 142, 146.
Residence of a legal voter. Fry’s Election Case, 71 Pa. 302, 10 Am.Rep. 698; Dale v. Irwin. 78 III. 181; Pope v. Board of Election Com’rs, 370 III. 196, 18 N.E.2d 214, 216. Fixed place of residence for the time being. Augustus Co., for Use of Bourgeois v. Manzella, 19 N.J.Misc. 29, 17 A.2d 68, 70; Hudson v. Birmingham Water Works Co., 238 Ala. 38, 189 So. 72, 73. For service of process, one’s fixed place of residence for the time being. State ex rel. Mer-ritt v. Heffernan, 142 Fla. 496, 195 So. 145, 147; Kurilla v. Roth, 132 N.J.L. 213, 38 A.2d 862, 864.
ABOGADO. Sp. An advocate. See Bozero.
ABOLISII. To do away with wholly; to annul. Webster. To dispense with. Alexander v. City of Lampasas, Tex.Civ.App., 275 S.W. 614, 616. Put an end to. Stretch v. Murphy, 166 Or. 439, 112 P. 2d 1018, 1021.
Imports absolute destruction, having its root in the Latin word "abolere," meaning to destroy utterly. Applies particularly to things of a permanent nature, such as institutions, usages, customs, as the abolition of slavery. Pondelick v. Passaic County, 111 N.J.Law 187, 168 A. 146, 147.
ABOLITION. The destruction, annihilation, abro-gation, or extinguishment of anything. Peterson v. Pratt, 183 Iowa 462, 167 N.W. 101. Also the leave given by the sovereign or judges to a crim-inal accuser to desist from further prosecution. 25 Hen. VIII, c. 21.
In the Civil, French and German law, abolition is used nearly synonymously with pardon, remission, grace. Dig. 39, 4, 3, 3. There is, however, this difference: grace is the generic term; pardon, according to those laws, is the clemency which the prince extends to a man who has par-ticipated in a crime, without being a principal or accom-plice; remission is made in cases of involuntary homicides, and self-defence. Abolition is used when the crime can-not be remitted. The prince then may, by letters of aboli-tion, remit the punishment, but the infamy remains, un-less letters of abolition have been obtained before sentence. Encycl. de D’Alembert.
Abolition of position or office, Rexstrew v. City of Hunt-ington Park, Cal.App., 120 P.2d 136, 142. Positions of phy-sicians and dentists, Lewin v. La Guardia, 22 N.Y.S.2d 409, 411, 175 Misc. 165. Lay-off of court attendant, Pondelick v. Passaic County, 111. N.J.L. 187, 168 A. 146, 147. Trans-fer not an abolition of office, Tremp v. Patten, 132 Conn. 120, 42 A.2d 834, 837.
ABORDAGE. Fr. In French commercial law. Collision of vessels.
ABORTIFACIENT. In medical jurisprudence. A drug or medicine capable of, or used for, produc-ing abortion.
ABORTION. The expulsion of the fcetus at a pe-riod of utero-gestation so early that it has not acquired the power of sustaining an independent
life. The unlawful destruction, or the bringing forth prematurely, of the human fcetus before the natural time of birth; State of Magnell, 51 A. 606, 3 Pennewill (Del.) 307. The act of bringing forth what is yet imperfect. Also the thing prez maturely brought forth, or product of an untimely process. Sometimes loosely used for the offense of procuring a premature delivery; but strictly, the early delivering is the abortion; causing or procuring, abortion is the full name of the offense. Wells v. New England Mut. L. Ins. Co., 191 Pa. 207, 43 A. 126, 53 L.R.A. 327.
Criminal miscarriage, Commonwealth v. Sierakowskt, 154 Pa.Super. 321, 35 A.2d 790, 792; Mississippi State Board of Health v. Johnson, 197 Miss. 417, 19 So.2d 445, 448. "Abortion" and a "miscarriage produced by unlawful means" are synonymous, People v. Luckett, 23 Cal.App.2d 539, 73 P.2d 658, 659.
ABORTIONIST. One who criminally produces abortions, or one who follows business or prac-tices of crime of producing abortions. State v. Guaraneri, 59 R.I. 173, 194 A. 589, 592, 593.
ABORTIVE TRIAL. A term descriptive of the result when a case has gone off, and no verdict has been pronounced, without the fault, contri-vance, or management of the parties. Jebb & B. 51.
ABORTUS. Lat. The fruit of an abortion; the child born before its time, incapable of life.
ABOUT. Near in time, quantity, number, quality, or degree. Substantially, approximately, almost, or nearly. Odom v. Langston, 351 Mo. 609, 173 S.W.2d 826, 829. Testimony as to speed, Casto v. Hansen, 123 Or. 20, 261 P. 428, 429. Near, period of gestation of still born child, Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Walters, 190 Miss. 761, 198 So. 746, 748; Todd v. City of New York, City Ct., N.Y. 23 N.Y.S.2d 884, 888. Carrying burglar’s tools in suitcase, Trousdale v. State, 168 Tenn. 210, 76 S.W. 2d 646, 647. Near the time. State ex rel. Nagle v. Leader Co., 97 Mont. 586, 37 P.2d 561, 564.
When used with reference to time, the term is of flexible significance, varying with the circumstances and the con-nection in which it is employed. Burlington Grocery Co. v. Heaphy’s Estate, 98 Vt. 122, 126 A. 525, 528. But its use does not necessarily render time Immaterial, nor make a contract one terminable at will. Costello v. Siems-Carey Co., 140 Minn. 208, 167 N.W. 551, 552. In a charter party, "about to sail" means just ready to sail. [1893] 2 Q.B. 274. And when it is said that one is "about" to board a street car, it means "in the act of." Fox v. Denver City Tramway Co., 57 Colo. 511, 143 P. 278, 280. With relation to quantity, the term suggests only an estimate of protlable amount. Barkemeyer Grain & Seed Co. v. Hannant, 66 Mont. 120, 213 P. 208, 210. Its import is that the actual quantity is a near approximation to that mentioned, and it has the effect of providing against accidental varia-tions. Norrington v. Wright, 6 S.Ct. 12, 115 U.S. 188, 29 L.Ed. 366. It may be given practically the same effect as the phrase more or less. Pierce v. Miller, 107 Neb. 851, 187 N.W. 105, 107; Cargo under vessel charter, Steamship Co. of 1912 v. C. H. Pearson & Son Hardwood Co., C.C.A. N.Y., 30 F.2d 770, 773. Contract for sale of electric energy, Merced Irr. Dist. v. San Joaquin Light & Power Corpora-tion, 101 Cal.App. 153, 281 P. 415, 417. In a deed covers some slight or unimportant Inaccuracy. Parrow v. Proulx, 111 Vt. 274, 15 A.2d 835, 838. Synonymous with "on" or ‘upan," as in offense of carrying concealed weapons. State v. Brunson, 162 La. 902, 111 So. 321, 323; Carriage of a pistol or revolver in a grip, satchel, or hand bag held in the hand or connected with the person, State v. Blazo-vitch, 88 W.Va. 612, 107 S.E. 291, or on the running board of an automobile, Armstrong v. State, 98 Tex.Cr.R. 335, 265 S.W. 701. Paulk v. State, 97 Tex.Cr.R. 415, 261 S.W. 779, 780. Near by, close at hand, convenient of access. Welch v. State, 97 Tex.Cr.R. 617, 262 S.W. 485; Brown v. U. S., 30 F.2d 474, 475, 58 App.D.C. 311. Weapon on shelf lmmediately behind defendant, who was seated in coupé type automobile. Hampton v. Cornmonwealth, 257 Ky. 626, 78 S.W.2d 748, 750. As to number, it merely implies an estimate of a particular lot or class and not a warranty. Holland v. Rock, 50 Nev. 340, 259 P. 415. In connection with distance or Iocality, the term is of relative signifi-cante, varying with the circumstances. Parker v. Town of Pittsfield, 88 Vt. 155, 92 A. 24, 26. Employee on an ele-vator is "about the premises". Lienau v. Northwestern Telephone Exch. Co., 151 Minn. 258, 186 N.W. 945, 946. Workman 200 feet from a factory was "about" the factory. Wise v. Central Dalry Co., 121 Kan. 258, 246 P. 501, 503. An automobile mechanlc injured 1711, blocks from the em-ployers’ shop while making a road test of an automobile is not, Injured on, in, or about the employers’ place of business. Iott v. Mosby, 126 Kan. 294, 268 P. 109. "About" in lease meaning in other parts of building. William A. Doe Co. v. City of Boston, 262 Mass. 458, 160 N.E. 262. Estímate of distance, Picharella v. Ovens Transfer Co., 135 Pa. Super. 112, 5 A.2d 408, 409. Estimate as to time, char-ter of vessel, Britain S. S. Co. v. Munson S. S. Line. D.C. N.Y., 25 F.2d 868, 869. Instruction regarding specilied date, State v. Loahmann, Mo., 58 S.W.2d 309, 311. Courses and distantes, Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Luther, Tex. Civ.App., 40 S.W.2d 865, 867. Pistol under automobile seat. Commonwealth v. Nunnelley, 56 S.W.2d 689, 247 Ky. 109, 88 A.L.R. 805.
ABOUTISSEMENT. Fr. An abuttal or abutment. See Guyot, Répert. Univ. "Aboutissans."
ABOVE. Higher; superior. As, court aboye, plain-tiff or defendant aboye. Aboye 01 incumbrances means in excess thereof; Williams v. McDonald, 42 N.J.Eq. 395, 7 A. 886. Principal; as distin-guished from what is auxiliary or instrumental. 3 Bl.Comm. 291.
Ball to the action, or special ball, is otherwise termed ball aboye. 3 BI.Comm. 291. Jurisdiction "aboye" the ju-risdiction of justices of the peace. Synonymous with "without." Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Nellwood Lum-ber Co., 21 Ga.App. 209, 94 S.E. 86, 87. Aboye high water means aboye a tide which might rcasonably be expected to recur with some degree of frequency. Banks v. Wilming-ton Terminal Co., Del,Super., 24 A.2d 592, 598, 599, 601, 602, 2 Terry 489.
ABOVE CITED, or MENTIONED. Quoted be-fore. A figurativa expression taken from the ancient manner of writing books on scrolls, where whatever is mentioned or cited before in the same roll inust be aboye. Encyc. Lond.
ABPATRUUS. Lat. A great-great-uncle; or, a great-great-grandfather’s brother (abavi frater). Inst. 3, 6, 6; Dig. 38, 10, 3; Du Cange, Patruus. Called by Bracton and Fleta, abpatruus magnos. Bract. fol. 68b; Fleta, lib. 6, c. 2, § 17. It some-times means uncle, and sometimes great-uncle.
ABRIDGE. To reduce or contract; usually spoken of written language.
Copyright Law
To epitomize; to reduce; to contract. It im-plies preserving the substance, the essence, of a work, in language suited to such a purpose. In making extracts there is no condensation of the author’s language, and hence no• abridgment. To

abridge requires the exercise of the mind; it is not copying. Between a compilation and an abridgment there is a clear distinction. A compila-tion consists of selected extracts from different authors; an abridgment is a condensation of the views of one author. Story v. Holcombe, 4 Mc-Lean, 306, 310, Fed.Cas.No.13,497.

Practice

To shorten a declaration or count by taking away or severing some of the substance of it. Brooke, Abr., Com., Dig. Abridgment; 1 Viner, Abr. 109. See Abridgment.
ABRIDGMENT. Condensation; contraction. An epitome or compendium of another and larger work, wherein the principal ideas of the larger work are summarily contained.
Abrldgments of the law are hrief digests of the law. arranged alphabetically. (1 Stoph.Comm. 51.) The term "digest" has now supplanted that of "abridgment." Sweet.
ABRIDGMENT OF DAMAGES. The right of the court to reduce the damages in certain cases. Vide Brooke, tit. "Abridgment."
ABROAD. In English chancery law, beyond the seas.
ABROGATE. To annul, repeal, or destroy; to annul or repeal an order or rule issued by a sub-ordinate authority; to repeal a former law by legislative act, or by usage.
ABROGATION. The destruction or annulling of a former law, by an act of the legislative power, by constitutional authority, or by usage.
It stands opposed to rogation; and is distinguished from derogation, which implies the taking away only some part of a law; from subrogation, which denotes the adding a clause to it; from dispensation, which only sets it aside in a particular instance; and from antiquation, which is the refusing to pass a law. Encyc. Lond. Implied abrogation takes place when the new law contains provisions which are positively contrary -to former laws, without expressly abrogating such laws. Bernard v. Vignaud, 10 Mart.O.S. La. 560; and also when the order of things for which the law has been made no longer exists. See Ex parte Lum Poy, D.C., 23 F.2d 690.
For "Express Abrogation," see that title.
ABSCOND. To go in a clandestine manner out of the jurisdiction of the courts, or to lie con-cealed, in order to avoid their process. Malvin v. Christoph, 54 Iowa, 562, 7 N.W. 6. To hide, con-ceal, or absent oneself clandestinely, with the in-tent to avoid legal process. Smith v. Johnson, 43 Neb. 754, 62 N.W. 217. Postponing limitations. Keck v. Pickens, 207 Ark. 757, 182 S.W.2d 873, 875. Fleeing from arresVong or prosecuting officers of this state. Code Cr.Proc. art. 8. State v. Berry-hill, 188 La. 549, 177 So. 663.
ABSCONDING DEBTOR. One who absconds from his creditors.
An absconding debtor Is one who lives without the state, or who has lntentionally concealed himself from his credi-tors, or withdrawn himself from the reach of their suits, with intent to frustrate their just demands. Thus, if a person departs from his usual residence, or remains absent therefrom, or conceals himself in his house, so that he can-not be servcd with process, with intent unlawfully to de-lay or defraud his creditors, he is an absconding debtor; but If he departs from the state or from his usual abode, with the intention of again returning, and without any fraudulent design, he has not absconded, nor absented hlmself, within the intendment of the law. Doughnut Corporation of America v. Tsakirides, 121 N.J.L. 136, 1 A.2d 467, 469. A party may abscond, and subject himself to the operation of the attachment law against absconding debtors, without leaving the limits of the state. Field v. Adreon. 7 111d. 209. A debtor who is shut up from his creditors in his own house is an absconding debtor. Ives v. Curtiss, 2 Root (Conn.) 133. Salzman v. Robinson, 10 N.J.Misc.R. 51, 157 A. 547, 548.
ABSENCE. The state of being absent, removed, or away from one’s domicile, or usual place of residence. Maley v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 258 Pa. 73, 101 A. 911. Not present at particular time, op-posite of appearance at a specified time. Hamil-ton v. Bernstein, 133 Kan. 229, 299 P. 581.
Absence is of a fivefold kind: (1) A necessary absence, as in banished or transported persons; this is cntirely nec-essary. (2) Necessary and aoluntary, as upon the account of the commonwealth, or in the service of the church. (3)
A probable absence, according to the civilians, as that of students on the score of study. (4) Entirely volanlary, on account of trade, merchandise, and the like. (5) Absence cuna dolo et culpé, as not appcaring to a writ, subluena, citation, etc., or to delay or defeat creditors. or avoiding arrest, either on civil or criminal process. Ayliffe. Non-appearance to action, not rnerely that the party was not present In court vacating judgment. Strine v. Kaufman, 12 Neb. 423, 11 N.W. 867. In usual and natural signili-cation, means physical absence. Inhabitants of Lanes-borough v. Inhabitants of Ludlow, 250 Mass. 99, 145 N.E. 57, 58. Nonpresence. of ollicial for service. Kurre v. American Indemnity Co. of Galveston, Tex., 223 Mo.App. 406, 17 S.W.2d 685, 688.

Presumption of Death Created

Intent to establish home at place last heard from not required. American Nat. Ins. Co. v. García, Tex.Civ.App., 46 S.W.2d 1011, 1012. Away from a place to which one is expected to return. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc. v. Cooper, Tex.Civ.App., 164 S.W.2d 729, 731.
In Scotch Law, want or default of appearance. A.clecree is said to be in absence where the defender (defendant) does not appear. Ersk. Inst. bk. 4, tit. 3, § 6.
ABSENT. Being away from; at a distance from; not in company with.
Paine v. Drew, 44 N.H. 306, where ft was held that the word when used as an adjective referred only to the con-dition or situation of the person or thing spoken of at the time of speaking without reference to any prior con-dition or situation of the same person or thing, but when used as a verb implies prior presence. It has also been held to mean "not being in a particular place at the time referred to," and not to import prior presence. The term abscnt defendants does not embroco non-resident defend-ants but has reference to parties resident in the state, but temporarily absent therefrom. Wheeler v. Wheeler, 35 III. App. 123. See, however, Seimer v. James ‘Dickinson Farm Mortg. Co., D.C.I11., 299 F. 651, 658, holding that a foreign corporation is "absent" from the state, and limitation does not run in its favor. Commonwealth’s attorney is "absent" when disqualified or disabled from performing functions of ofilce. Northcutt v. Howard, 279 Ky. 219. 130 S.W.2d 70, 71, 72. A judge, disqualified to act. Dark Tohacco Growers’ Co-op. Ass’n v. Wilson, 206 Ky. 550. 267 S.W. 1092, 1093. A deceased stockholder employee is not "ab-sent" from duty, as respects sharing of profits, etc. Nich-ols v. Olympia Vencer Co., 135 Wash. S, 236 P. 791, 796. Nonresident with oflice in state is not absent from state. Corash v. Texas Co., 35 N.Y.S.2d 334, 340, 264 App.Div..292.
As a verb, "absent" means to take or withdraw to such a distance as te prevent intercourse; to depart from. People v. Day, 321 III. 552, 152 N.E. 495, 497.

ÁBSENT—MINDEDNESS. A state of mind in which the person affected fails to respond to the ordinary demands on his attention. Webster. See Racine Tire Co. v. Grady, 205 Ala. 423, 88 So. 337.
ABSENTE. Lat. Being absent; often used in the old reports of one of the judges not present at the hearing of a cause. 2 Mod. 14. Absente Reo, The defendant being absent.
ABSENTEE. One who dwells abroad; a land-lord who resides in a country other than that from which he draws his rents. McCul. Pol. Econ.; 33 Brit. Quar. Rev. 455. One who is ab-sent from his usual place of residence or domicile.
Foreign corporations, not filing declarations of domicile ami names of agents. Palmer v. Avalon Oil Co., 10 La. App. 512, 120 So. 781, 782. In Louisiana law, one who has left his residence in a state leaving no one to represent him. Bartlett v. Wheeler, 31 La.Ann. 540; or who resides in another state but has property in Louisiana. Penn v. Evans, 28 La.Ann. 576. It has been also defined as one who has foyer been domiciled in the state and who resides abroad. Morris v. Bienvenu, 30 La.Ann. 878. One person cannot be both,’ at the same time, in the meaning of the law, a resident and an absentee. Spence v. Spence, 105 So. 28, 29, 158 La. 961.
ABSENTEES, or DES ABSENTEES. A parlia-ment so called was held at Dublin, 10th May, 8 Hen. VIII. It is mentioned in letters patent 29 Hen. VIII.
ABSENTEM ACCIPERE DEBEMUS EUM QUI NON EST EO LOCI IN QUO PETITUR. We ought to consider him absent who is not in the place where he is demanded (or sought). Dig. 50, 16, 199.
ABSENTIA EJUS QUI REIPUBLICJE CAUSA ABEST, NEQUE El NEQUE ALII DAMNOSA ESSE DEBET. The absence of him who is away in behalf of the republic (on business of the state) ought not to be prejudicial either to him or to an-other. Dig. 50, 17, 140.
ABSOILE, ASSOIL, ABSOILE. To pardon; to deliver from excommunication. Staunford, Pl.Cr. 72; Kelham; Cowell.
ABSOLUTA SENTENTIA EXPOSITORE NON INDIGET. An absolute sentence or proposition (one that is plain without any scruple, or absolute without any saving) needs not an expositor. 2 Inst. 533.
ABSOLUTE. Complete; perfect; final; without any condition or incumbrance; as an absolute bond (sinsplex obligatio) in distinction from a con-ditional bond. Unconditional; complete and per-fect in itself ; without relation to or dependence on other things or persons. Instruction as to an "absolute" gift, Ketch v. Smith, 131 Okl. 263, 268 P. 715, 717. Irrevocable, final. Gift inter vivos by husband, President and Directors of Manhat-tan Co. v. Janowitz, 14 N.Y.S.2d 375, 382, 172 Misc. 290. Within limitation or restriction, Comford v. Cantrell, 177 Tenn. 553, 151 S.W.2d 1076, 1077.

An absolute estate is one that is free from all manner of condition or incumbrance; an estate in fee simple. John-
son v. McIntosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 5 L.Ed. 681; Fuller v. Miss-roon, 35 S.C. 314, 14 S.E. 714; Bradford v. Martin, 199 Iowa 250, 201 N.W. 574, 576; Middleton v. Dudding, Mo. Sup., 183 S.W. 443, 444.. A rule is said to be absolute when on the hearing it is confirmed and made final. A convoy-anee is said to be absolute, as distinguished from a mort-gage or other condi tional conveyance. Gogarn v. Connors.
153 N.W. 1068, 188 Mich. 161.. Absolute property is where a man hath solely and exclusively the right and also the
occupation of movable chattels; distinguished from a quali-fied property, as that of a bailee. 2 Kent 347. An absolute owner is one in whom elements of titles of possession, right of possession, and right of property, are combined. Harris v. Southeast Portland Lumber Co., 123 Or. 549, 262 P. 213, 244. Absolute ownership exists when interest is so completely vested in insured that he cannot be deprived of it without his own consent. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc. v. Sawyer, 57 Ga.App. 739, 196 S.E. 223, 224. Absolute rights are such as appertain and belong to particular per-sons merely as individuals or single persons, as distin-guished from relative rights, which are incident to them as members of society; 1 Sharsw.Bla.Com. 123; 1 Chit.Pr. 32. An absolute duty is one that is free from every restric-tion; unconditional; determined; not merely provisional: irrevocable. Broken telephone wires. Home Telephone Co. v. Weir, 101 N.E.1020, 1021, 53 Ind.App. 466; Railroad employee, Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Beltz, C.C.A.N.Y., 10 F.2d 74, 77; Pedestrians, Scibilia v. City of Philadelphia. 279 Pa. 549, 124 A. 273, 275, 32 A.L.R. 981. An "absolute power of disposition," in the absence of statute, would be orle by which the holder of the power might dispose of the property as fully and in the same manner as he might dis-pose of his individual estate acquired by his own efforts. In re Briggs’ Will, 167 N.Y.S. 632, 635, 101 Misc. 191. In the law of insurance that is an absolute interest in property which is so completely vested in the individual that there could be no danger of his being deprived of it without his own consent. Libby Lumber Co. v. Pacific States Fire Ins. Co., 79 Mont. 166, 255 P. 340, 345, 60 A.L.R. 1. It may be used in the sense of vested. Hough v. Ins. Co., 29 Conn. 20, 76 Am.Dec. 581. "Absoluta control" in Motor Vehicle Act does not require instant stoppage. Goff v. Clarksburg Dairy Co., 86 W.Va, 237, 103 S.E. 58, 60. As to absolute control of a mine, see People v. Boggess, 75 Cal.App. 499, 243 P. 478, 481; and of an estate, see Strlckland v. Strick-land, 271 III. 614, 111 N.E. 592, 594. Absolute veto is equiv-alent to "pocket veto". Okanogan, Methow, San Poelis (or San Poil), Nespelem, Colville, and Lake Indian Tribes or Bands of State of Washington v. United States, 49 S.Ct. 463, 279 U.S. 655, 73 L.Ed. 894, 64 A.L.R. 1434.
As to absolute "Conveyance," "Covenant," "Delivery," "Divorce," "Estate," "Gift," "Guaranty," "Interest," "Legacy," "Nuisance," "Nullity," "Obligation," "Proper-ty," "Rights," "Rule," "Sale," "Title," "Warrandice," see those titles.
ABSOLUTE LAW. The true and proper law of nature, immutable in the abstract or in principie, in theory, but not in application; for very often the object, the reason, situation, and other cir-cumstances, may vary its exercise and obligation. 1 Steph.Comm. 21 et seq.
ABSOLUTELY. Completely; wholly; without qualification; without reference or relatron to, or dependence upon, any other person, thing, or event. Thus, absolutely void means utterly void; Pearsoll v. Chapin, 44 Pa. 9. Absolutely neces-sary may be used to make the idea of necessity more emphatic; State v. Tetrick, 34 W.Va. 137, 11 S.E. 1002. An "absolutely necessary repair," with-in tercos of Wisconsin St. 1925, § 85.02, prohibit-ing parking of vehicles except for making abso-lutely necessary repairs, includes repair of a punctured tire. Long v. Steffen, 194 Wis. 179, 215 N.W. 892, 893, 61 A.L.R. 1155. Independently or unconditionally, wholly or positively. Collins

v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 178 Va. 501, 17 S.E.2d 413, 418.
"Absolutely void" is that which the law or nature of thing.s forbids to be enforced at all, and that is "relatively void" which the law condemns as a wrong to individuals and refuses to enforce against them. Kyle v. Chaves, 42 N.Mex. 21, 74 P.2d 1030; Scudder v. Hart, 45 N.M. 76, 110 P.2d 536, 541.
A devise of property to have "absolutely" means without condition, exception, restriction, qualitication or limitation, In re Darr’s Estate, 206 N.W. 2, 3, 114 Neb. 116, and cre-ates a fee-simple estate. In re Reynold’s Estate, 94 Vt. 149, 109 A. 60, 63.
ABSOLUTION. In Canon Law, a juridical act whereby the clergy declare that the sins of such as are penitent are remitted. Among Protes-tants it is chiefly used for a sentence by which a person who stands excommunicated is released or freed from that punishment. Encyc. Brit.
In the Civil Law a sentence whereby a party accused is declared innocent of the crime laid to his charge.
In French Law, the dismissal of an accusa-tion.
The term acquitment is employed when the accused is declared not guilty, and absolution when he is recognized as guilty but the act is not punishable by law or he is exonerated by some detect of intention or will. Merlin, Répert.
ABSOLUTISM. In politics. A system of gov-ernment in which public power is vested in some person or persons, unchecked and uncontrolled by any law, institution, constitutional device, or coordinate body.
ABSOLVE. To set free, or release, as from obli-gation, debt, or responsibility. State ex rel. St. Louis Car Co. v. Hughes, 348 Mo. 125, 152 S.W.2d 193, 194.
ABSOLVITOR. In Scotch law. An acquittal; a decree in favor of the defender in any action.
ABSQUE. Without. Occurs in phrases taken from the Latin; such as those immediately fol-lowing.
ABSQUE ALIQUO INDE REDENDO. Lat. With-out reserving any rent therefrom; without ren-dering anything therefrom. A term used of a free grant by the crown. 2 Rolle, Abr. 502.
ABSQUE CONSIDERATIONE CURVE. In old practice. Without the consideration of the court; without judgment. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 47, § 13.
ABSQUE HOC. Without this. These are techni-cal words of denial, used in pleading at common law by way of special traverse, to introduce the negative part of the plea, following the affrrma-tive part or inducement. Martin v. Hammon, 8 Pa. 270. See, also, Traverse.
ABSQUE IMPETITIONE VASTI. Without im-peachment of waste; without accountability for waste; without liability to suit for waste. A clause anciently of ten inserted in leases (as theequivalent English phrase sometimes is) signify-ing that the tenant or lessee shall not be Hable to suit (impetitio) or challenged, or called to ac-count, for committing waste. Co. Litt. 220a; Litt. § 352. See Waste.
ABSQUE TALI CAUSA. Lat. Without such cause. A form of replication, now obsolete, in an action ex delicto which works a general de-nial of the whole matter of the defendant’s plea of de injuria. Gould, Pl. c. 7, § 10; Steph. Pl. 191.
ABSTENTION. In French law. Keeping an heir from possession; also tacit renunciation of a succession by an heir. Merl. Répert.
ABSTRACT, n. A less quantity containing the virtue and force of a greater quantity; an abridgment. Alfiler v. Kansas City Light & Pow-er Co., C.C.A.Mo., 13 F.2d 723. A transcript is generally defined as a copy, and is more compre-hensive than an abstract. Harrison v. Mfg. Co., 10 S.C. 278, 283. Summary or epitome, or that which comprises or concentrates in itself the es-sential qualities of a larger thing or of several things. Robbins Inv. Co. v. Robbins, 49 Cal.App. 2d 446, 122 P.2d 91, 92.
ABSTRACT, v. To take or withdraw from; as, tO abstract the funds of a bank. Sprague v. State, 188 Wis. 432, 206 N.W. 69, 70.
ABSTRACT OF A FINE. In old conveyancing. One of the parts of a fine, being an abstract of the writ of covenant, and the concord, naming the parties, the parcels of land, and the agreement. 2 Bl.Comm. 351. More commonly called the "note" of the fine. See Fine; Concord.
ABSTRACT OF RECORD. A complete history in short, abbreviated form of the case as found in the record, complete enough to show that the questions presented for review have been properly reserved. State ex rel. Wallace State Bank v. Trimble, 308 Mo. 278, 272 S.W. 72, 73. Synopsis or summary of facts, rather than table of ron-tents of transcript. Wing v. Brasher, 59 Mont. 10, 194 P. 1106, 1108. Abbreviated accurate and authentic history of proceedings. Brown v. Reich-mann, 237 Mo.App. 136, 164 S.W.2d 201, 207.
ABSTRACT OF TITLE. A condensed history of the title to land, consisting of a synopsis or sum-mary of the material or operative portion of all the conveyances, of whatever kind or nature, which in any manner affect said land, or any estate or interest therein, together with a state-ment of all liens, charges, or liabilities to which the same may be subject, and of which it is in any way material for purchasers to be apprised. Warv. Abst. § 2. Stevenson v. Polk, 71 Iowa, 278, 32 N.W. 340.

Record title, not extrinsic evidence thereof. Upton v. Smith, 166 N.W. 268, 183 Iowa 588. Showing a marketable title Morgan v. W. A. Howard Realty Co., 68 Colo. 414,
facts relied on as evidence of title, together with ah such facts appearing of record as may impair the title. State ex rel. Freeman v. Abstracters Board of Examiners, 99 Mont. 564, 45 P.2d 668, 670. Vangsness v. Bovill, 58 S.D. 228, 235 N.W. 601, 604. Memorandum or concise statement in orderly form of the substance of documents or facts appearing on public records which affect title to real property. State ex rel. Doria v. Ferguson, 145 Ohio St. 12, 60 N.E.2d 476, 478.
ABSTRACT QUESTION. One which does not rest upon existing facts or rights. Morris Plan Bank of Fort Worth v. Ogden, Tex.Civ.App., 144 S.W.2d 998, 1004.
ABSTRACTION. Taking from with intent to in-jure or defraud, "wrongful abstraction" is "unau-thorized and illegal taking or withdrawing of funds, etc., and appropriation thereof to taker’s benefit." Pacific Coast Adjustment Bureau v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 115 Cal. App. 583, 2 P.2d 218, 219.
For benefit of taker or of another with bis consent. Austin v. Nieman, Tex.Civ.App., 3 S.W.2d 128, 129. Of-fense for bank officer, popular sense of word. Common-wealth v. Dauphinee, 121 Pa.Super. 565, 183 A. 807, 813. Under the National Bank Act, not necessarily the same as embezzlement, larceny, or misapplication of funds. Fer-guson v. State, 80 Tex.Cr.R. 383, 189 S.W. 271, 273. State v. Hudson, 93 W.Va. 435, 117 S.E. 122, 126.
ABSURDITY. That which is both physically and morally impossible; and that is to be regarded as morally impossible which is contrary to reason, so that it could not be imputed to a man in his right senses. State v. Hayes, 81 Mo. 574, 585. Anything which is so irrational, unnatural, or in-convenient that it cannot be supposed to have been within the intention of men of ordinary in-telligence and discretion. Black, Interp. Laws, 104; Graves v. Scales, 172 N.C. 915, 90 S.E. 439; obviously and fiatly opposed to the manifest truth; inconsistent with the plain dictates of common sense; logically contradictory; nonsen-sical; ridiculous. Wade v. Empire Dist. Electric Co., 98 Kan. 366, 158 P. 28, 30.
ABUNDANS CAUTELA NON NOCET. Abun-dant or extreme caution does no harm. 11 Co. 6; Fleta, lib. 1, c. 28, 1 1; 6 Wheat. 108. This princi-ple is generally applied to the construction of instruments in which superfluous words have been inserted more clearly to express the intention.
ABUS DE CONFIANCE. Fraudulently misusing or spending to anybody’s pre judice goods, cash, bills, documents, or contracts handed over for a special object. The Washington, D.C.N.Y., 19 F. Supp. 719, 722.
ABUSE, n. Everything which is contrary to good order established by usage. Merl. Répert. De-parture from use; immoderate or improper use.
Action that would be necessary In ordinary affairs to make one guilty of an "abuse" connotes conduct of a dif-ferent grade than what is meant when a court is said to have "abused its discretion." Beck v. Wings Field, Inc. C.C.A.Pa., 122 F.2d 114, 116.
191 P. 114, 115. An epitome of the record evidence of title.
De Huy v. Osborne, 96 Fla. 435, 118 So. 161, 162. Including Civil Law maps, plats, and other alds. Commissioners’ Court of
Madison County v. Wallace, 118 Tex. 279, 15 S.W.2d 535, The destruction of the substance 536. An epitome of the conveyances, transfers, and other using it. See Abuse, v.
of a thing in

Corporate Franchise or Entity
The abuse or misuse of its franchises by a cor-poration signifies any positive act in violation of the charter and in derogation of public right, willfully done or caused to be done; the use of rights or franchises as a pretext for wrongs and injuries to the public. People v. Atlantic Ave. R. Co., 125 N.Y. 513, 26 N.E. 622

Discretion
"Abuse of discretion" is synonymous with a fail-ure to exercise a sound, reasonable, and legal dis-cretion. Disbarrnent, Adair v. Pennewill, 153 A. 859, 860, 4 W.W.Harr.(Del.) 390. It is a strict legal term indicating that appellate court is simply of opinion that there was commission of an error of law in the circumstances. Refusing motion to amend pleadings, Tunstall v. Lerner Shops, 160 S.C. 557, 159 S.E. 386. Motions to con-solidate actions, Bishop v. Bishop, 164 S.C. 493, 162 S.E. 756, 757. Vacating judgment, Detroit Fi-delity & Surety Co. v. Foster, 171 S.C. 121, 169 S.E. 871, 881. And it does not imply intentional wrong or bad faith, or misconduct, nor any reflec-tion on the judge but means the clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment—one is that clearly against logic and effect of such facts as are pre-sented in support of the application or against the reasonable and probable deductions to be drawn from the facts disclosed upon the hearing; an improvident exercise of discretion; an error of law. New trial, State v. Draper, 83 Utah, 115, 27 P.2d 39. Setting aside of decree pro confesso. Ex parte Jones, 246 Ala. 433, 20 So.2d 859, 862.
A discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by and clearly against reason and evidence. Trimmer v. State, 142 Okl. 278, 286 P. 783, 786; Seaba v. State, 290 P. 1098, 1101, 144 Okl. 295. Unreasonable departure from considered precedente and settled judicial custom, con-stituting error of law. Beck v. Wings Field, Inc., C.C.A. Pa., 122 F.2d 114, 116, 117. The terco is commonly em-ployed to justify an Interferente by a higher court with the exercise of discretionary power by a lower court and is said by some authorities to imply not merely error of judgment, but perversity of will, passion, prejudice, par-tiality, or moral delinquency. The exercise of an honest judgment, however erroneous it may appear tu be, is not an abuse of discretion. Stroup v. Raymond, 183 Pa. 279, 38 A. 626. Where a court does not exercise a discretion in the sense of being discreet, circumspect, prudent, and exercis-ing cautious judgment, it is an abuse of discretion. State Board of Medical Examiners v. Spears, 79 Colo. 588, 247 P. 563, 565. Difference in judicial opinion is not synonymous with "abuse of judicial discretion" as respects setting asido verdict as against evidence. Belock v. State Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 106 Vt. 435, 175 A. 19, 22.
Distress
The using an animal or chattel distrained, which makes the distrainer hable as for a con-version.
Female Child
An injury to the genital organs in an attempt at carnal knowledge, falling short of actual penetra-tion. Lee v. State, 246 Ala. 69, 18 So.2d 706, 707. But, according to other authorities, "abuse" is here equivalent to ravishment or rape. Palin v. State. 38 Neb. 862, 57 N.W. 743. Physical abuse. Montgomery v. State, 28 Ala.App. 442, 186 So

Process
There is said to be an abuse of process when an adversary, through the malicious and unfouncl-ed use of some regular legal proceeding, obtains some advantage over his opponent. Wharton. Employment of process for doing an act clearly outside authority conveyed by express terms of writ. Shane v. Gulf Refining Co., 114 Pa.Super. 87, 173 A. 738, 740.
The gist of an action for "abuse of process" is improper use or perversion of process after it has been issued. Publix Drug Co. v. Breyer Ice Cream Co., 347 Pa. 346, 32 A.2d 413, 415. Holding of accused incommunicado before compiying with warrant requiring accused to be taken before mag,istrate. People v. Crabb, 372 III. 347, 24 N.E.2d 46, 49. Warrant of arrest tu merco debtor. In re Wil-liams, 233 Mo.App. 1174, 128 S.W.2d 1098, 1105. A mali-cious abuse of legal process occurs where the party em-ploys it for some unlawful object, not the purpose which it is intended by the law to effect; in other words, a perversion of it. Lauzon v. Charroux, 18 R.I. 467, 28 A. 975. Vybiral v. Schildhauer, 265 N.W. 241, 244, 130 Neb. 433; Silverman v. Ufa Eastern Division Distribution, 236 N.Y.S. 18, 20, 135 Misc. 814. Thus, where the purpose of a prosecution for issuance of a check without fundo was to collect a debt, the prosecution constituted an abuse of criminal process. Hotel Supply Co. v. Reid, 16 Ala.App. 563, 80 So. 137, 138. Regular and legitimate use of process, although with a bad intention, is not a malicious "abuse of process." Priest v. Union Agency, 174 Tenn. 304, 125 S. W.2d 142, 143. Action for "abuse of process" is distin-guished from action for "malicious prosecution," in that action for abuse of process resto upon improper use of reg-ularly issued process, while "malicious prosecution" has reference to wrong in issuance of process. Clikos v. Long, 231 Ala. 424, 165 So. 394, 396; Mclnnis v. Atlantic Inv. Cor-poration, 137 Or. 648, 4 P.2d 314, 315; Lobel v. Trade Bank of New York, 229 N.Y.S. 778, 781, 132 Misc. 643.
ABUSE, v. To make excessive or improper use of a thing, or to employ it in a manner contrary to the natural or legal rules for its use; to make an extravagant or excessive use, as tu abuse one’s authority.
In the civil law, the borrower of a chattel which, in its nature, cannot be used without consuming it. such as wine or grain, is said to abuse the thing borrowed if he uses it. It has been held to include misuse; Erie & North-East R. Co. v. Casey, 26 Pa. 287; to signify to injure, diminish in value, or wear away by improper use; id. ; to he synon-ymous with injure; Dawkins v. State, 58 Ala. 376, 29 Am. Rep. 754.
ABUSIVE. Tending to deceive; practicing abuse; prone to ill treat by coarse, insulting words. U. S. v. Ault, D.C.Wash., 263 F. 800, 810. Using in treatment, injurious, improper, hurtful, offen-sive, reproachful. People on Complaint of Wil-son v. Sinclair, 149 N.Y.S. 54, 56, 86 Misc. 426.
ABUT. To reach, to touch. In old law, the ends were said to abut, the sities to adjoin. Cro. Jac. 184. And see Lawrence v. Killam, 11 Kan. 499, 511; Springfield v. Green, 120 III. 269, 11 N.E. 261. To take a new direction; as where a bound-ing line changes its course. Speirnan, Gloss. Abuttare. To touch at the end; be contiguous; join at a border or bounclary; termina■ e; to end at; to border un; to reach or touch with an end. Assessment of property, ilensler v. City of Ana-cortes, 140 Wash. 184, 248 P. 406, 407. The term "abutting" implies a closer proxirnity than the term "adjacent." Reversion of vacated park land,City of Hutchinson v. Danley, 88 Kan. 437, 129 P. 163, 164. "Contiguous" synonymous, both con-veying idea that lot borders on improvement. Reynard v. City of Caldwell, 55 Idaho 342, 42 P.2d 292, 296.
No intervening land. Johnson v. Town of Watertown, 131 Conn. 84, 38 A.2d 1, 4. Property at end of street sought to be vacated. Messinger v. City of Cincinnati, 36 Ohio App. 337, 173 N.E. 260, 262. Widen street, leaving free access to paved street, property withirr assessment stat-utes. Goodman v. City of Birmingham, 223 Ala. 199, 135 So. 336, 337. Though the usual meaning of the word is that the things spoken of do actually adjoin, "bounding and abutting" have no such inflexible meaning as to re-quire lots assessed actually to touch the improvement; Cohen v. Cleveland, 43 Ohio St. 190, 1 N.E. 589.
ABUTMENTS. The walls of a bridge adjoining the land which support the end of the roadway and sustain the arches. The ends of a bridge, or those parts of it which touch the land. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Sussex County v. Stra-der, 18 N.J.Law, 108, 35 Am.Dec. 530. Support at either extreme end. City of New York v. New York Cent. R. Co., 48 N.Y.S,2d 189, 191, 183 Misc. 104.
ABUTTALS. Fr. The buttings or boundings of lands, showing to what other lands, highways, or places they belong or are abutting. Termes de la Ley; Cowell; Toml. It has been used to express the end boundary Unes as distinguished from those on the sides, as "buttals and sidings"; Cro.Jac. 183.
ABUTTER. One whose property abuts, is contigu-ous, or joins at a border or boundary, as where no other land, road, or street intervenes.
ABUTTING OWNER. An owner of land which abuts or adjoins. The term usually implies that the relative parts actually adjoin, but is some-times loosely used without implying more than close proximity. See Abut.
Where five-foot strip between property assessed for pav-ing and street was conveyed to city but not used for street purposes, property assessed held not "abutting property," Davidson v. Salt Lake City, 81 Utah 203, 17 P.2d 234, 237. Property owners held "abutting property owners," sub-ject to sewer assessment, notwithstanding street was wid-ened from 40 to 50 feet when incorporated in state high-way, and city hought the extra 5 feet on either side. Ca-rey-Reed Co. v. Siseo, 251 Ky. 22, 64 S.W.2d 430, 433. Rail-road in street was not "abutting owner". Town of Lenoir v. Carolina & N. W. Ry. Co., 194 N.C. 710, 140 S.E. 618, 619.
AC ETIAM. (Lat. And also.) The introduction of the statement of the real cause of action, used in those cases where it was necessary to allege a fictitious cause of action to give the court juris-diction, and also the real cause in compliance with the statutes. It is sometimes written acetiam. 2 Stra. 922. See Bill of Middlesex under Bill, defi-nition 2.
AC ETIAM BILL/E. And also to a bill. See Ac Etiam.
AC SI. (Lat. As if.) Townsh. Pl. 23, 27. These words frequently occur in old English statutes.Lord Bacon expounds their meaning in the statute of uses: "The statute gives entry, not simpliciter, but with an ac si." Bac. Read. Uses, Works, iv. 195,
ACADEME. Place of academic study. Sisters of Mercy v. Town of Hooksett, 93 N.H. 301, 42 A.2d 222, 225.
ACADEMY. An institution of learning. An as-sociation of experts in some particular branch of art,’literature, or science.
In its original meaning, an association formed for mutual improvement, or for the advancement of science or art; in later use, a species of educational Institution, of a grade between the common school and the collepe. Academy of Fine Arts v. Philadelphia County, 22 Pa. 496; School hold-ing rank between college and common school, U. S. ex rel. Jacovides v. Day, C.C.A.N.Y., 32 F.2d 542,544; Sisters of Merey v. Town of Hooksett, 93 N.H. 301, 42 A.2d 222, 225. See School.
ACAPTE. In French feudal law. A species of relief ; a seignorial right due on every change of a tenant. A feudal right which formerly pre-vailed in Languedoc and Guyenne, being attached to that species of heritable estates which were granted on the contract of emphyteusis. Guyot, Inst. Feod. c. 5, § 12.
ACCEDAS AD CURIAM. (Lat. That you go to court.) An original writ out of chancery directed to the sheriff, for the purpose of removing a re-plevin suit from a Court Baron or a hundred court to one of the superior courts of law. It directs the sheriff to go to the lower court, and enroll the proceedings and send up the record. See Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 18; Dy. 169; 3 Bl. Comm. 34.
ACCEDAS AD VICE COMITEM. L. Lat. (You go to the sheriff.) A writ formerly directed to the coroners of a county in England, commanding them to go to the sheriff, where the latter had suppressed and neglected to return a writ of pone, and to deliver a writ to him requiring him to return it. Reg. Orig. 83. See Pone.
ACCELERATION. The shortening of the time for the vesting in possession of an expectant in-terest. Wharton. Hastening of the enjoyment of an estate which was otherwise postponed to a later period. Blackwell v. Virginia Trust Co., 177 Va. 299, 14 S.E.2d 301, 304.
If the life estate fails for any reason, the remainder is "accelerated". Elliott v. Brintlinger, 376 III. 147, 33 N.E. 2d 199, 201, 133 A.L.R. 1364. The word is also used in ref-erence to contracts for payment of money in what is usual-ly called an "acceleration clause" by which the time for payment of the debt is hastcned or advanced because of breach of some condition such as failure to pay interest when due, McCormick v. Daggett, 162 Ark. 16, 257 S.W. 358: insolvency of the maker, Wright v. Seaboard Steel & Manganese Corporation, C.C.A.N.Y., 272 F. 807; or failure to keep rnortgaged premises insured, Porter v. Schroll, 93 Kan. 297, 144 P. 216.
ACCEPT. To receive with approval or satisfac-tion; to receive with intent to retain. See Morris v. State, 102 Ark. 513, 145 S.W. 213, 214. Also, in the capacity of drawee of a bill, to recognize the draft, and engage to pay it when due. It is notequivalent to "acquiesce." Applett v. Empire Inv. Co., 99 Or. 533, 194 P. 461, 462. Admit and agree to; accede to or consent to; receive with approval; adopt; agree to. Rocha v. Hulen, 6 Cal.App.2d 245, 44 P.2d 478, 482, 483. Street committee’s and city engineer’s reports. City of Morehead v. Blair, 243 Ky. 84, 47 S.W.2d 741, 742. Means something more than to receive, meaning to adopt, to agree to carry out provisions. Assignee of lease, Pickler v. Mershon, 212 Iowa, 447, 236 N.W. 382, 385; Central State Bank v. Herrick, 214 Iowa 379, 240 N.W. 242, 246. Renewal health and accident policy premiums, Prescott v. Mutual Ben. Health and Accident Ass’n, Fla., 183 So. 311, 314, 119 A.L.R. 525.

ACCEPTANCE. The taking and receiving of anything in good part, and as it were a tacit agreement to a preceding act, which might have been defeated or avoided if such acceptance had not been made. Brooke, Abr. The act of a per-son to whom a thing is offered or tendered by an-other, whereby he receives the thing with the in-tention of retaining it, such intention being evi-denced by a sufficient act. JEtna Inv. Corporation v. Chandler Landscape & Floral Co., 227 Mo.App. 17, 50 S.W.2d 195, 197.
The exercise of power conferred by an offer by performance of some act. In re Larney’s Estate, 266 N.Y.S. 564, 148 Misc. 871.

Bills of Exchange
An engagement to pay the bill in money when due. 4 East 72; Hunt v. Security State Bank, 91 Or. 362, 179 P. 248, 251.
The act by which the person on whom a bill of exchange is drawn (called the "drawee") assents to the request of the drawer to pay it, or, in other words, engages, or makes himself hable, to pay it when due. Bell-Wayland Co. v. Bank of Sugden, 95 Okl. 67, 218 P. 705. It may be by parol or in writing, and either general or special, absolute or conditional; and it may be impliedly, as well as expressly, given. 3 Kent, Comm. 83, 85; Story, Bills, §§ 238, 251. Telegram directing drawer to draw draft. Hoffer v. East-land Nat, Bank, Tex.Civ.App., 169 S.W.2d 275, 278. Cer-tification at request of the payee or holder. ‘Velch v. Bank of Manhattan Co., 35 N.Y.S.2d 894, 895, 264 App.Div. 906. But the usual and regular mode of acceptance is by the drawee’s writing across the face of the bill the word "ac-cepted," and subscribing his narre; alter which he is termed the acceptor. Story, Bills, § 243.
Contracts
Compliance by offeree with terms and condi-tions of offer would constitute an "acceptance". Davis & Clanton v. C. I. T. Corporation, 190 S.C. 151, 2 S.E.2d 382, 383.
Qualifications or conditions make a "counteroffer," not an "acceptance." Cohn v. Penn Beverage Co., 313 Pa. 349, 169 A. 768, 769. Bullock v. McKeon, 104 Cal.App. 72, 285 P. 392, 395.
Deed
Act by which vendee vests himself with title to the property. Hardin v. Kazee, 238 Ky. 526, 38 S.W.2d 438

Insurance

In a contract of insurance, the "acceptance" oc-curs when insurer agrees to accept application and to issue policy. Acacia Mut. Life Ass’n v. Berry, 54 Ariz. 208, 94 P.2d 770, 772. Delay or in-action on the part of an insurer cannot constitute an "acceptance". French American Banking Cor-poration v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., D.C.N.Y., 43 F.Supp. 494, 498. More than mere mental resolu-tion or determination on part of insurer to accept application. Must be communicated to applicant. Limbaugh v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., Springfield, Mass., Mo.App., 84 S.W.2d 208, 212.

Marine Insurance

The acceptance of an abandonment by the un-derwriter is his assent, either express or to be implied from the surrounding circumstances, to the sufficiency and regularity of the abandonment. Rap. & Law.

Sales

An acceptance implies, not only the physical fact of receiving the goods, but also the intention of retaining them. Illinois Fuel Co. v. Mobile & O. R. Co., 319 Mo. 899, 8 S.W.2d 834, 841.
Retaining and using goods. Ohio Electric Co. v. Wis-consin-Minnesota Light & Power Co., 161 Wis. 632, 155 N. W. 112, 113. Pressure tanks, Dunck Tank Works v. Suther-land, 236 Wis. 83, 294 N.W. 510, 513. Coal stokers used for 15 months before request for removal, United States v. Lux Laundry Co., C.C.A.Ind., 118 F.2d 848, 849. Where goods are expressly rejected, receipt does not mean accept-anee. State Board of Administration v. Roquemore, 218 Ala. 120, 117 So. 757, 760. The acceptance of goods sold under a contract which would be void by the statute of frauds without delivery and acceptance Involves something more than the act of the vendor in the delivery. It re-quires that the vendee should also act, and that his act should be of such a nature as to indicaté that he receives and accepts the goods delivered as his property. He must receive and retain the articles delivered, intending there-by to assume the title to them, to constitute the acceptance mentioned in the statute. Rodgers v. Phillips, 40 N.Y. 524. See, also, Snow v. Warner, 10 Mete (Mass.) 132, 43 Am.Dec. 417. There must be some unequivocal act, with intent to take possession as owner. Vacuum Ash & Soot Conveyor Co. v. Huyler’s, 101 N.J.Law, 147, 127 A. 203, 204. Title and possession must be in unrestricted control of buy-er so as not to permit of recall or rescission. Mellen Pro-duce Co. v. Fink, 225 Wis. 90, 273 N.W. 538. Mere words are insufficient to cstablish "delivery and receipt." Mellen Produce Co. v. Fink, 225 Wis. 90, 273 N.W. 538, 542.
The following are the principal varieties of acceptances:
Absoluto. An express and positive agreement to pay the bill according to its tenor.
Conditional. An engagement to pay the bill on the hap-pening, of a condition. Todd v. Bank of Kentucky, 3 Bush (Ky.) 628. A "conditional acceptance" is in effect a state-ment that the offeree is willing to enter luto a bargain differing in some respects from that proponed in the origi-nal offer. The conditional acceptance is, therefore, itself a counter offer. Hoskins v. Michcner, 33 Idaho, 681, 197 P. 724. Morris F. Fox & Co. v. Lisman, 208 Wis. 1, 237 N.W. 267, 271. Worley v. Holding Corporation, 348 III. 420, 181 N.B. 307, 309.
Express. An undertaking in direct and express terms to pay the bill; an absolute acceptance.
An undertaking to pay the bill inferred from acts of the drawee of a character which fairly warrant such an in ference. In case of a bilateral contract, "acceptance" of an offer need not be expressed, but may be shown by any words or acts indicating the offeree’s assent to the proposed bargaln. Prescott v. Mutual Seri, Health and Ac-cident Ass’n, 133 Fla. 510, 183 So. 311, 315, 119 A.L.R. 525. Frederick Raff Co. v. Murphy, 110 Conn. 234, 147 A. 709, 711. Tenant for several months contínued to occupy store-room and paid rentals, C. R. Anthony Co. v. Stroud, 189 Okl. 104, 114 P.2d 177, 178. Landlord’s reletting leased premises after default in rent, In re Lear Shoe Co., Sup., 22 N.Y.S.2d 778, 782. Taking possession, exercise of owner-ship and dominion and failure te complain to seller, Bell v. Main, D.C.Pa., 49 F.Supp. 689, 692.
Partial. An acceptance varying from the tenor of the bill. An acceptance to pay part of the amount for which the bill is drawn, 1 Strange 214, or to pay at a different time, 14 Jur. 806; Hatcher v. Stolworth, 25 Miss. 376; or at a different place, 4 M. & S. 462, would be partial. For some examples of what do and what do not constitute conditional acceptances, see Heaverin v. Donnell, 7 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 245, 45 Am.Dec. 302; Campbell v. Pettengill, 7 Greenl. (Me.) 126, 20 Am.Dec. 349; Ensign v. Clark Bros. Cutlery Co., 195 Mo.App. 584, 193 S.W. 961, 962. Provi-sions respecting cutting of timber etc. on optioned land, did not destroy the "acceptance". Bastian v. United Sietes, C. C.A.Ohlo, 118 F.2d 777, 779. Would be in named place for purpose of entering into option, Ackerman v. Carpenter, 113 Vt. 77, 29 A.2d 922, 925. Counter proposition to option. Tholl Oil Co. v. Miller, 197 La. 976, 3 So.2d 97, 98. Con-ditional, qualified acceptance, Moore Bros. v. Kirkpatrick, Tex.Civ.App., 172 S.W.2d 135, 137.
Qualified. One either conditional or partial, and which introduces a variation in the sum, time, mode, or place of payment.
Supra protest. An acceptance by a third person, after protest of the bill for non-acceptance by the drawee, to save the honor of the drawer or some particular indorser. A. general acceptance is an absolute acceptance precisely in conformity with the tenor of the bill itself, and not qualified by any statement, condition, or change. Todd v. Bank of Kentucky, 3 Bush (Ky.) 628. A special acceptance is the qualified acceptance of a bill of exchange, as where it is accepted as payable at a particular place "and not elsewhere." Rowe v. Young, 2 Brod. & B. 180. See Trade Acceptance.
ACCEPTANCE AU BESOIN. Fr. In French law. Acceptance in case of need; an acceptance by one on whom a bill is drawn au besoin, that is, in case of refusal or failure of the drawee to ac-cept. Story, Bills, §§ 65, 254, 255.

ACCEPTARE.

Civil Law

Lat. To accept; to assent; to assent to a prom-ise made by another. Gro. de J. B. lib. 2, c. 11, § 14.

Pleading

To accept. Acceptavit, he accepted. 2 Strange, 817. Non acceptavit, he did not accept. 4 Man. & G. 7

ACCEPTEUR PAR INTERVENTION. In French law. Acceptor of a bill for honor

ACCEPTILATION. In the civil and Scotch law. A release made by a creditor to his debtor of his debt, without receiving any consideration. Ayl. Pand. tit. 26, p. 570. It is a species of donation, but not subject to the forms of the latter, and is valid unless in fraud of creditors. Merl. Répert.
The verbal extinction of a verbal contract, with a declaration that the debt has been paid when it has not; or the acceptance of something merely imaginary in satisfaction of a verbal contract. Sanders’ Just. Inst. (5th Ed.) 386.

ACCESSION. Coming into possession of a right or office; increase; augmentation; addition.
The right to all which one’s oven property produces, whether that property be movable or immovable; and the right to that which is united to it by accession, either na-turaily or artiticially. 2 Kent, 360; 2 BI.Comm. 401; Franklin Service Stations v. Sterling Motor Truck Co. of N. E. 50 R.I. 336, 147 A. 754, 755.
Riparian owners’ right to abandoned river beds and rights of alluvion by accretion and reliction, Manry v. Robison, 122 Tex. 213, 56 S.W.2d 438, 443, 444.
A principie derived from the civil law, by which the owner of property becomes entitled to all which it pro-duces, and to all that is added or united to it, either natu-ral]y or artificially, (that is, by the labor or skill of anoth-er.) even where such addition extends to a change of form or materials; and by which, on the other hand. the pos-sessor of property becomes entitled to it, as against the original owner, where the addition made to it by bis skill and labor is of greater value than the property itself, or where the change effected in its form is so great as to rendar it impossible to restore it to its original chape. Twin City Motor Co. v. Rouzer Motor Co., 197 N.C. 371, 148 S.E. 461, 463. In Blackwood Tire & Vulcanizing Co. v. Auto Storage Co., 133 Tenn. 515, 182 S.W. 576, L.R.A.1916E, 254, Ann,Cas.1917C, 1168, this principie ovas applied in favor of the conditional seller who, on nonpayment, retook the automobile sold, together with tire casings which the buy-er had fitted thereto. Valley Chevrolet Co. v. O. S. Stapley Co., 50 Ariz. 417, 72 P.2d 945.

International Law

The absolute or conditional acceptance by one or several states of a treaty already concluded be-tween other sovereignties. Merl. Répert. It may be of two kinds: First, the formal entrance of a third state into a treaty so that such state be-comes a party to it; and this can only be with the consent of the original parties. Second, a state may accede to a treaty between other states solely for the purpose of guarantee, in which case, though a party, it is affected by the treaty only as a guarantor. 1 Oppenheim, Int.L. sec. 532. See Adhesion.

Also, the commencement or inauguration of a sovereign’s reign

ACCESSION, DEED OF. In Scotch law. A deed executed by the creditors of a bankrupt or insol-vent debtor, by which they approve of a trust giv-en by their debtor for the general behoof, and bind themselves to concur in the plans proposed for extricating his affairs. Bell, Dict.
ACCESSORIUM NON DUCIT, SED SEQUITUR SUUM PRINCIPALE. Co. Litt. 152a, 389a. That which is the accessory or incident does not lead, but follows, its principal.
ACCESSORIUS SEQUITUR NATURAM SUI PRINCIPALIS. An accessary follows the nature of his principal. 3 Inst. 139. One who is acces-sary to a crime cannot be guilty of a higher de-gree of crime than his principal.
ACCESSORY. Anything which is joined to anoth-er thing as an ornament, or to render it more perfect, or which accompanies it, or is connected with it, as an incident, or as subordinate to it, or which belongs to or with it; for example, the halter of a horse, the frame of a picture, the keys of a house.
Adjunct or accompaniment. Louis Werner Saw Mill Co. v. White, 205 La. 242, 17 So.2d 264, 270.
A sale of land carried with it the standing timber as an "accessory." Woollums v. Hewitt, 142 La. 597, 77 So. 295, 296,
Automohile Accessories
Articles primarily adapted for use in motor ve-hieles, under revenue acts. Universal Battery Co. v. U. S., Ct.C1., 50 S.Ct. 422, 423, 281 U.S. 580, 74 L.Ed. 1051.
Criminal Law
Contributing to or aiding in the commission of a crime. One who, without being present at the commission of a felonious offense, becomes guilty of such offense, not as a chief actor, but as a par-ticipator, as by command, advice, instigation, or concealment; either before or after the fact or commission; a particeps criminis. 4 BI.Comm. 35; Cowell.
One who is not the chief actor in the offense, nor pres-ent at its perfornlanee. but in some way concerned therein, either before or «J. ler the act committed. State v. Thomas, 1:36 A. 475, 477, 105 Conn. 757. One who aids and abets another. People v. Smith, 260 N.W. 911, 271 Mich. 553. Commands or counsels another. United States v. Peoni, C.C.A.N.Y., 100 F.2d 401, 402.
An "accessory" to a crime is always an "accomplice." People v. Ah Gee, 37 Cal.App. 1, 174 P. 371, 373. In certain crimes. there can be no accessories; all who are concerned are principals. These are (according to many authorities) treason, and all ofensas below the degree of felony: 4 Bla.Comm. 35; Com. v. McAtee, 8 Dana (Ky.) 28; Wil-liams v. State, 12 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 58.
Accessory Before the Fact
One who, bei•ng absent at the time a crime is committed, yet assists, procures, counsels, incites, induces, encourages, engages, or commands anoth-er to commit it. 4 Steph. Comm. 90, note n. People v. Owen, 241 Mich. 111, 216 N.W. 434. United States v. Pritchard, D.C.S.C., 55 F.Supp. 201, 203; rape, Clayton v. State, 244 Ala. 10, 13 So.2d 420, 422.
Murder, Wells v. State, 94 Ga. 70, 20 S.E.2d 580, 582. Distilling, State v. Lackmann, Mo., 12 S.W. 2d 424, 425.
Accessory During the Fact
One who stands by without interfering or giv-ing such help as may be in his power to prevent the commission of a criminal offense. Farrell v. People, 8 Colo.App. 524, 46 P. 841.
Accessory After the Fact
One who, having full knowledge that a crime has been committed, conceals it from the magis-trate, and harbors, assists, or protects the person charged with, or convicted of, the crime. Ver-non’s Ann.C.C.P. art. 53.
All persons who, after the commission of any felony, conceal or aid the offender, with knowl-edge that he has committed a felony, and with in-tent that he may avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction, or punishment, are accessories.

Comp.Laws N.D.1913, § 9219; Rev.Code S.D.1919, § 3595.
An accessory alter the fact is a person who, knowing a felony to have been committed by another, reccives, re-lieves, comforts or assists the felon, in order te enable him to escape from punishment, or the lile. Buck v. Common-wealth, 116 Va. 1031, 83 S.E. 390, 393. Knowledge, or de-nlal of knowledge, of perpetration of crime. or silente does not mak° one an "accessory after the fact." Com-‘ monwealth v. Giacobbe, 341 Pa. 187, 19 A.2d 71. 75. Cantu V. State, 135 S.W.2d 705, 710, 141 Tex.Cr.R. 99. But af-firmative action by false testimony or otherwise usable by accused to escape punishment constitutes cine "accessory" as to his testimony. Fisher v. State, 34 S.W.2d 293, 294, 117 Tex.Cr.R. 552; falso statements to sheriff relative to defendant’s connection with homicide in order lo evade arrest, Littles v. State, 111 Tex.Cr.R. 500, 14 S.W.2d 853, 854.

Aiders and Abettors Distinguished

The concept of an "accessory before the fact" presupposes a prearrangement to do the criminal act, and to constitute one an "aider and abettor" he must be on the ground and by his presence aid, encourage or incite the principal. Morei v. United States, C.C.A.Ohio, 127 F.2d 827, 830, 831.

Principal Distinguished

"Principal in the second degree," as distin-guished from "accessory before the fact," is one who aids in commission of felony by being either actually or constructively present, aiding, and abetting commission of felony, when perpetrated. Neumann v. State, 116 Fla. 98, 156 So. 237, 239.
ACCESSORY ACTION. In Scotch practice. An action which is subservient or auxiliary to anoth-er. Of this kind are actions of "proving the ten-or," by which lost deeds are restored; and actions of "transumpts," by which copies of principal deeds are certified. Bell, Dict.
ACCESSORY CONTRACT. In the civil law. A contract which is incident or auxiliary to another or principal contract; such as the engagement of a surety. Poth. Obl. pt. 1, c. 1, § 1, art. 2.
A principal contract is one entered into by both parties on their own accounts, or in the severa! qualities they as-sume. An accessory contract is made for assuring the per-formance of a prior contract, either by the same parties or by others; such as suretyship, mortgage, and pledge. Blaisdell v. Coe, 83 N.H. 167, 139 A. 758, 65 A.L.R. 626.

ACCESSORY OBLIGATION.

Civil Law

An obligation which is incident to another or principal obligation; the obligation of a surety. Poth. Obl. pt. 2, c. 1, § 6.

Scotch Law

tions, such as obligations to pay interest, etc. Ersk. Inst. lib. 3, tit. 3, § 60.
See, further, Obligation.

ACCESSORY TO ADULTERY. Implies more than connivance, which is merely knowledge with consent. A conniver abstains from interference;

an accessory directly commands, advises, or pro-cures the adultery. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, §§ 29, 31.

ACCIDENT. The word "accident" is derived from the Latin verb "accidere" signifying "fall upon, befali, happen, chance." In an etymological sense anything that happens may be said to be an accident and in this sense, the word has been defined as befalling; a change; a happening; an incident; an occurrence or event. In its most commonly accepted meaning, or in its ordinary or popular sense, the word may be defined as mean-ing a fortuitous circumstance, event, or happen-ing, an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circum-stances is unusual and unexpected by the person to whom it happens; an unusual, fortuitous, un-expected, unforeseen or unlooked for event, hap-pening or occurrence; an unusual or unexpected result attending the operation or performance of a usual or necessary act or event; chance or contingency; fortune; mishap; some sudden ánd unexpected event taking place without expectation, upon the instant, rather than something which continues, progresses or develops; something happening by chance; something unforeseen, un-expected, unusual, extraordinary or phenominal, taking place not according to the usual course of things or events, out of the range of ordinary calculations; that which exists or occurs abnor-mally, or an uncommon occurrence; the word may be employed as denoting a calamity, casual-ty, catastrophe, disaster, an undesirable or unfor-tunate happening; any unexpected personal in-jury resulting from any unlooked for mishap or occurrence; any unpleasant or unfortunate oc-currence, that causes injury, loss, suffering or death; some untoward occurrence aside from the usual course of events. Adams v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 136 Pa.Super. 454, 7 A.2d 544, 547; without known or assignable cause, Ramsay v. Sullivan Mining Co., 51 Idaho 366, 6 P.2d 856, 858.
In its proper use the terco excludes negligence; Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Allen, Tex.Civ.App., 43 S.W.2d 165, 170; that is, an accident is an event which occurs without the fault, carelessness, or want of proper circumspection of the person affected, or which could not have been avoid-ed by the use of that kind and degree of caro necessary to the exigency and in the circumstances in which he was placed. Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 292; essential requirement being that happening be one to which human fault does not contributc, Bogan v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 322 Mo. 1103, 19 S.W.2d 707, 713, 65 A.L.R. 129; happening of an event without any human agency, Terry v. Woodmen Accident Co., 225 Mo.App. 1223, 34 S.W.2d 163, 164. It has been said, moreover, that the word "ac-cident" does not have a settled legal signification; Klop-fenstein v. Union Traction Co., 112 Kan. 770. 212 P. 1097, 1098; and that in its ordinary meaning it does not nega-tive the idea of negligence on the part of the person whose physical act caused the occurrence. Campbcll v. Jones, 73 Wash. 688, 132 P. 635, 636. Not merely inevitable casual-ty or the act of providente, or what is technically calied vis major. or irresistible force. Gardner v. State, 1 N.Y. S.2d 994, 997, 166 Alise. 113.
See Act of God.

to be given to the insurer as a condition precedent to liability means an untoward and unforeseen occurrence in the operation of the automobile which results in injury to the person or property of another. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Marr, C.C. A.OkI., 98 F.2d 973, 975.
Connotes event which occurs without one’s foresight or expectation, and does not exclude negligente. American Indemnity Co. v. Jamison, Tex.Civ.App., 62 S.W.2d 197; without intention or design, Rothman v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co., 134 Ohio St. 241, 16 N.E.2d 417, 421, 117 A.L.R. 1169.
The word "accident", requiring operator of vehicle to stop immediately in case of accident, contemplates any situation occurring on the highway wherein he so operates ,his automobile as to cause injury to the property or person of another using the same highway. State v. Masters, 106 W.Va. 46, 144 S.E. 718, 719.

Equity

Such an unforeseen event, misfortune, loss, act, or omission as is not the result of any negligence or misconduct in the party. Engler v. Knoblaugh, 131 Mo.App. 481, 110 S.W. 16.
Unforeseen and undesigned event, productive of disadvantage. Wharton. Surprise is used inter-changeably. State ex rel. Hartley v. Innes, 137 Mo.App. 420, 118 S.W. 1168.
Occurrence, not the result of negligence or misconduct of the party seeking relief in relation to a contract, as was not anticipated by the parties when the same was entered into, and which gives an undue advantage to one of them over another in a court of law. White & Hamilton Lum-ber Co. v. Foster, 157 Ga. 493, 122 S.E. 29, 30.

Insurance Con tracts

An accident within accident insurance policies is an event happening without any human agency, or, if happening through such agency, an event which, under circumstances, is unusual and not expected by the person to whom it happens. Size-more v. National Casualty Co., 108 W.Va. 550, 151 S.E. 841.
Sudden and Instant happening, referable to definite and fixed period of time. Jackson v. Employers’ Liahility As-sur. Corporation, 248 N.Y.S. 207, 210, 139 Misc. 686.
May be inflicted intentionally and maliciously by one not the agent of the insured, if unintentional on the part of the insured. Goodwin v. Continental Casualty Co., 175 Okl. 469, 53 P.2d 241, 243.
A more comprehensive term than "negligence," and in its common signification the word means an unexpected happening without intention or design. Sontag v. Calor, 279 Mass. 309, 181 N.E. 182, 183.
Accidental’ injury or death is an unintended and unde-signed result arising from acts done, while injury or cleath by "accidental menos" is a result arising from nets unin-tentionally done. Adonis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 136 Pa.Super. 454, 7 A.2d 544, 547.

Maritime Law and Marine Insurance

"Accidents of navigation" or "accidents of the sea" are such as are peculiar to the sea or to usual navigation or the action of the elements, which do not happen by the intervention of man, and are not to be’ avoided by the exercise of proper prudence, foresight, and skill. The G. R. Booth, 19 S.Ct. 9, 171 U.S. 450, 43 L.Ed. 234. See also Perils of the Sea.

Practice

That which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. Cupples v. Zupan, 35 Idaho 458, 207 P. 328, 329. An event happening unex-pectedly and without fault; an undesigned and unforeseen occurrence of an afflictive or unfor-tunate character; a casualty or mishap. Allen v. State, 13 Okl.Cr. 533, 165 P. 748; Baird v. Ken-sal Light & Power Co., 246 N.W. 279, 282, 63 N.D. 88; drunkenness of juror during recess required discharge of jury. Fetty v. State, 119 Neb. 619, 230 N.W. 440, 442.

Workmen’s Compensation

Term "accident," within Workmen’s Compensa-tion Act, has been defined as a befalling; an event that takes place without one’s foresight or ex-pectation; an undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event; chance; contingency; often, an unde-signed and unforeseen occurrence of an afflictive or unfortunate character; casualty; mishap; as, to die by an accident. Its synonyms are chance, contingency, mishap, mischance, misfortune, dis-aster, calamity, catastrophe. Term "accidental" has been defined as happening by chance, or un-expectedly; taking place not according to the usual course of things; casual; fortuitous;
an accidental visit. Its synonyms are undesigned, unintended, chance, unforeseen, unexpected, un-premeditated; accessory, collateral, secondary, subordinate; extrinsic, extraneous, additional, adscititious, dependent, conditional. Indian Ter-ritory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Williams, 157 Okl. 80, 10 P.2d 1093, 1094.
With or without negligence. Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Co. v. Sexton, 242 Ky. 266, 46 S.W.2d 87, 88.
Not technical legal term. Arquin v. Industrial Commission, 349 Ill. 220, 181 N.E. 613, 614.

ACCIDENTAL. Happening by chance, or unex-pectedly; taking place not according to usual course of things; casual; fortuitous. Morris y. New York Life Ins. Co., C.C.A.Md., 49 F.2d 62, 63; Murphy v. Travelers Ins. Co., Neb., 2 N.W.2d 576, 578, 579.
ACCIDENTAL KILLING. One resulting from an act which is lawful and lawfully done under a reasonable belief that no harm is possible;—dis-tinguished from "involuntary manslaughter," which is the result of an unlawful act, or of a law-ful act done in an unlawful way. Rowe v. Com-monwealth, 206 Ky. 803, 268 S.W. 571, 573.
ACCIDENTAL VEIN. See Vein.
ACCIDERE. Lat. To fall; fall in; come to hand; happen. Judgment is sometimes given against an executor or administra tor to be satis-fied out of assets guando acciderint; i. e., when they shall come to hand. See Quando Acciderint.
ACCION. In Spanish law. A right of action; also the method of judicial procedure for the

recovery of property or a debt. Escriche, Dic. Leg. 49. Wilder v. Lambert, 91 Tex. 510, 44 S.W. 281, 284.
ACCIPERE QUID UT JUSTITIAM FACIAS, NON EST TAM ACCIPERE QUAM EXTORQUERE. To accept anything as a reward for doing justice is rather extorting than accepting. Lofft, 72.
ACCIPITARE. To pay relief to lords of manors. Capitali domino accipitare, i. e., to pay a relief, homage, or obedience to the chief lord on becom-ing his vassal. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 50.
ACCOLA

Civil Law

One who inhabits or occupies land near a place, as one who dwells by a river, or on the bank of a river. Dig. 43, 13, 3, 6.

Feudal Law

A husbandman; an agricultural tenant; a ten-ant os a manor. Spelman. A name given to a class of villeins in Italy. Barr. St. 302.

ACCOMENDA. In maritime law. A contract be-tween the owner of goods and the master of a ship, by which the formen intrusts the property to the latter to be sold by him on their joint ac-count.
In such case, two contracta take place: First, the con-tract called mandatum, by which the owner of the proper-ty gives the master power to dispose of it; and the con-tract of partnership, in virtue of which the profits are to be divided between them. One party runs the risk of losing bis capital; the other, bis labor. If the sale produces no more than first cost, the owner takes all the proceeds. It is only the profits which are to be divided. Emerig.Mar. Loans, §- 5.

ACCOMMODATED PARTY. One to whom the credit of the accommoclation party is loaned, and is not -necessarily the payee, since the inquiry al-ways is as to whom did the maker of the paper loan his credit as a matter of fact. Wilhoit v. Seavail, 121 Kan. 239, 246 P. 1013, 1015, 48 A.L.R. 1273; not third person who may receive advan-tage, State v. Banta, 148 Okl. 239, 299 P. 479, 483. First Nat. Bank v. Boxley, 129 Okl. 159, 264 P. 184, 186, 64 A.L.R. 588.
ACCOMMODATION. An arrangement or engage-nient made as a favor to another, not upon a con-sideration received; something done to oblige, us-ually spoken of a loan of money or commercial paper; also a friendly agreement or composition of differences. Abbott; Sales v. Martin, 173 Ky. 616, 191 S.W. 480, 482. The word implies no con-sideration. William D. Seymour & Co. v. Castell, 160 La. 371, 107 So. 143, 145.
"While a party’s intent may be to aid a maker of note by lending bis credit, If he seeks to accomplish thereby legitimate objects of bis own, and not simply to aid maker, the act is not for ‘accommodation.’ " Bazer v. Grirnmett, 16 La.App. 613, 135 So. 54, 56.
ACCOMMODATION ACCEPTANCE. The ac-ceptance of accommodation paper.
ACCOMMODATION BILL OR, NOTE. See. Ac-commodation Paper

ACCOMMODATION INDORSEMENT. See In-dorsement.
ACCOMMODATION INDORSER. A party who places his name to a note without consideration for purpose of benefiting or accommodating some other party. Stubbins Hotel Co. v. Bassharth, 43 N.D. 191, 174 N.W. 217, 218; McDaniel v. Al-toona State Bank, 126 Kan. 719, 271 P. 394.
ACCOMMODATION LANDS. Land bought by a builder or speculator, who erects houses thereon, and then leases portions thereof upon an im-proved ground-rent.
ACCOMMODATION MAKER. One who puts his name to a note without any consideration with the intention of lending his credit to the accommo-dated party. In re Chamberlain’s Estate, Cal. App., 109 P.2d 449, 454.
In this connection "without consideration" means "with-out consideration to the accommodating party directly." Warren Nat. Bank, Warren, Pa., v. Suerken, 45 Cal.App. 736, 188 P. 613, 614. One who receives no part of the pro-ceeds, which are used exclusively for another maker’s bene-fit, as in discharging his own personal obligation. Backer v. Grummett, 39 Cal.App. 101, 178 P. 312, 313. Must not
re-ceive any benefit or consideration directly or indirectly, and transaction must be one primarily for the benefit of the payee. First Trust Co. of Lincoln v. Anderson, 135 Neb. 397, 281 N.W. 796, 798; Void of present or anticipated personal profit, gain, or advantage. Robertson v. City Nat. Bank of Bowie, 120 Tex. 226, 36 S.W.2d 481, 483.
Incidental benefit to party Insufficient. Morrison v. Painter, Mo.App., 170 S.W.2d 965, 970.
ACCOMMODATION NOTE. One to which ac-commodating party has put his name, without consideration, to accommodate some other party, who is to issue it and is expected to pay it. Brown Carriage Co. v. Dowd, 155 N.C. 307, 71 S.E. ‘721, 724; Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Brown, 182 Iowa, 1044, 165 N.W. 70, 73.
ACCOMMODATION PAPER. An accornmoda-tion bill or note is one to which the accommodat-ing party, be he acceptor, drawer, or indorser, has put his name, without consideration, for the pur-pose of benefiting or accommodating some other party who desires te raise money on it, and is to provide for the bill when due. Miller v. Lar-ned, 103 III. 562; Crothers v. National Bank of Chesapeake City, 158 Md. 587, 149 A. 270, 272; Hickox v. Hickox, Tex.Civ.App., 151 S.W.2d 913, 917.
Must be executed for the purpose of loaning credit, and incidental benefit to party is insufficient. Morrison v. Painter, Mo.App., 17C .3.W.26 965, 970.
ACCOMMODATION PARTY. One who has signed an instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser without receiving value therefor, and for purpose of lending his name to some other person as means of securing credit. Bachman v. Junkin, 129 Neb. 165, 260 N.W. 813.
The term does not include one who, for the accommoda-tion of the maker, guaranteed the payment of a note. Noble v. 13ceman-Spaulding-Woodward Co., 65 Or. 93, 131 P. 1006, 1010.
Indorser, Myrtllles, Inc., v. Johnson, 121 Conn. 177, 199 A. 115, 117; president and directors of bank, Davis v. Holt. Federal Deposit Ins. Corporation, Intervenor, Mo.App., 154

S.W.2d 595. 597; apparent comaker. McLendon v. Lane, 51 Ga.App. 409, 180 S.E. 746; to make note look better for payee bank, Pirtle v. Johnson, 145 Kan. 8, 64 P.2d 2, 4.
ACCOMMODATION ROAD. A road opened for benefit of certain individuals to go from and to their homes, for service of their lands, and for use of some estates exclusively. Civ.Code La. art. 706.
ACCOMMODATION TRAIN. One designed to accommodate local travel by stopping at most stations. Gray v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 189 III. 400, 59 N.E. 950, 951. In another aspect it is a train designed to carry passengers as well as freight. White v. III. Cent. R. Co., 99 Miss. 651, 55 So. 593, 595.
ACCOMMODATION WORKS. Works which a railway company is required to make and main-tain for the accommodation of the owners or occu-piers of land adjoining the railway; e. g., gates, bridges, culverts, fences, etc. 8 Vict. c. 20, § 68.
ACCOMMODATUM. The same as commodaturn, q. 19.
ACCOMPANY. To go along with. Webster’s Dict. To go with or attend as a companion or as-sociate, to occur in association with. United States v. Lee, C.C.A.Wis., 131 F.2d 464, 466.
The word has been defined judicially in cases involving varied facts; thus, a boy driver was held not accompany-Mg the team when he was runnning to stop it. Willis v. Semmes, 111 Miss. 589, 71 So. 865, 866. A motion based on answer already deposited with the clerk of court is accompanied with copy of answer. Los Angeles County v. Lewis, 179 Cal. 398, 177 P. 154. 155. An automobile driver under sixteen is not accompanied by an adult person unless the latter exercises supervision over the driver. Rush v. McDonnell, 214 Ala. 47, 106 So. 175, 179. An unlicensed driver is not accompanied by a licensed driver unless the latter is near enough to render advice and assistance. Hughes v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 87 Conn. 416, 87 A. 721.
ACCOMPLICE. In criminal law. A person who knowingly, voluntarily, and with common intent with the principal offender Imites in the commis-sion of a crime. State v. Keithley, 83 Mont. 177, 271 P. 449, 451, People v. Frahm, 107 Cal.App. 253, 290 P. 678, 682, State v. Coroles, 74 Utah, 94, 277 P. 203, 204. One who is in some way concerned or associated in commission of crime; partaker of guilt; one who aids or assists, or is an accessory. McLendon v. U. S., C.C.A.Mo., 19 F.2d 465, 466. Equally concerned in the commission of crime. Fryman v. Commonwealth, 289 Ky. 540, 159 S.W. 24 426, 429.
An "accomplice" is one who is guilty of complicity in crime charged, either by being present and aiding or abet-ting in it, or having advised and encouraged it, though absent from place when it was committed, though mere presence, acquiescence, or silente, in the absence of a duty to act, is not enough, no mattcr how reprehensible it may be, to constitute one an accomplice. State v. Arnold, 84 Mont. 348. 275 P. 757, 700; presence unnecessary. King v. State, 135 Tex.Cr.R. 378, 120 S.W.2d 590. 592. Knowl-edge and concealment not suflIcient. Wallis v. State, Okl. Cr.App., 292 P. 1056, 1057.
Falsely denying having knowledge of crime not of itself suflicient. Tipton v. State, 126 Tex.Cr.R. 439, 72 S.W.2d 290, 293.
Black’s Law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed.-3

Thief and receiver of stolen property ordinarily not "accomplices". People v. Lima, 25 Ca1.2d 573, 154 P.2d 698, 700, 701.
Giver of bribe is an "accomplice". Turner v. State, 58 Ga.App. 775, 199 S.E. 837, 839, Contra, State v. Emory, 55 Idaho 649, 46 P.2d 67, 70.
As specifically applied to witnesses for the state and the necessity for corroborating them, "accomplice" includes all persons connected with the offense by an unlawful act or omission either before, at the time of, or after the com-mission of the offense, whether such witness was present or participated in the crime or not. Chandler v. State, 89 Tex.Cr.R. 309, 230 S.W. 1002, 1003.
Mere presence is insuflicient. Snowden v. State, 27 Ala. App. 14, 165 So. 410.
Suborned witness is an "accomplice". People v. Nicosia, 4 N.Y.S.2d 35, 37, 166 Misc. 597. Contra. State v. De Vaughn, 2 Cal.App.2d 572, 39 P.2d 223, 224.
Receiver of bribe not "accomplice" of giver. People v. Martin, 114 Cal.App. 392, 300 P. 130, 132.
The term includes all the participes criminis, Darden v. State, 12 Ala.App. 165, 68 So. 550, 551, whether they are considered, in strict legal propriety, as principals in the first or second degree, or merely as accessories before or after the fact. In re Rowe, 23 C.C.A. 103, 77 F. 161; Luck v. State, 125 Tex.Cr.R. 152, 67 S.W.2d 302. But in Ken-tucky it has been held that "accomplice" does not include an accessory after the fact. See, however, Commonwealth v. Barton, 153 Ky. 465, 156 S.W. 113, 114. And the same rule has been announced elsewhere. State v. Lyons, 144 Minn. 348, 175 N.W. 689, 691. A feigned accomplice has been defined as one who co-operates with view of aiding justice to detect a crime. State v. Verganadis, 50 Nev. 1, 248 P. 900, 903; Decoy not "accomplice". U. S. v. Becker, C.C.A.N.Y., 62 F.2d 1007, 1009.
Liquor control board inspector, Magee v. State, 135 Tex. Cr.R. 381, 120 S.W.2d 248, 249.
ACCORD, n. A satisfaction agreed upon between the party injuring and the party injured which, when performed, is a bar to all actions upon this account. Kromer v. Heim, 75 N.Y. 576, 31 Am. Rep. 491; Buob v. Feenaughty Machinery Co., 191 Wash. 477, 71 P.2d 559, 564. An agreement to accept, in extinction of an obligation, something different from or less than that to which the per-son agreeing to accept is entitled. Whepley Oil Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 6 Cal.App.2d 94, 44 P.2d 670, 677.
Substitution of an agreement between the party injur-ing and the party injured, in vlew of the original obliga-tion. Barbarich v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry. Co., 92 Mont. 1, 9 P.2d 797, 799.
It may arise hoth where the demand itself is unliqui-dated or in dispute. and where the amount and nature of the demand is undisputed, and it is agreed tu give and take less than the demand. J. F. Morgan Paving Co. v. Carroll, 211 Ala. 121, 99 So. 640, 641.
"Payment," as distinguished from accord, means full satisfaction. State v. Tyler County State Bank, Tex.Com. App., 277 S.W. 625, 627, 42 A.L.R. 1347.
See Accord and Satisfaction; Compromise and Settlement.
ACCORD, v. In practice. To agree or concur, as one judge with another. "I accord." Eyre, C. J., 12 Mod. 7. "The rest accordéd." 7 Mod. 361.
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. An agreement between two persons, one of whom has a right of action against the other, that the latter should do or give, and the former accept, something in sat-isfaction of the right of action different from, anci usually less than, what might be legally enforced.

When the agreement is executed, and satisfaction has been made, it is called "accord and satisfac-tion." Rogers v. Spokane, 9 Wash. 168, 37 P. 300.
It is discharge of contract, or of disputad claim arising either from contract or from tort, by substitution of agree-ment between parties in satisfaction of such contract or disputed claim and execution of the agreement. Nelson y. Chicago Mill & Lumber Corporation, C.C.A.Ark., 76 F.2d 17, 100 A.L.R. 87.
"Accord and satisfaction" results where there is assent to acceptance of payment in compromise of dispute, or in extinguishment of liability uncertain in amount, or where payment, coupled with condition whereby use of money will be wrongful if condition is ignored, is accepted. Hud-son v. Yonkers Fruit Co., 258 N.Y. 168, 179 N.E. 373. Regardless of whether claim is liquidated or unliquidated. May Bros. v. Doggett, 155 Miss. 849, 124 So. 476, 478.
Settlement of claims under insurance noticies. Lehaney v. New York Life Ins. Co., 307 Mich. 125, 11 N.W.2d 830, 832.
Accepted amount tendered by insurer as cash surrender value of policies. Greenberg v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 379 III. 421, 41 N.E.2d 495, 497, 140 A.L.R. 775.
See, also, Sierra & San Francisco Power Co. v. Uni-versal Electric & Gas Co., 197 Cal. 376, 241 P. 76, 80.
More recently, a broader application of the doctrine has been made, where one promise or agreement is set up in satisfaction of another. Continental Nat. Bank v. Mc-Geoch, 92 Wis. 286, 66 N.W. 606.
An "accord and satisfaction arises" where parties, by a subsequent agreement, have satisfied the formar one, and the latter agreement has been executed. The execution of a new agreement may itself amount to a satisfaction, where it is so expressly agreed by the parties; and with-out such agreement, if the new promise is founded on a new consideration, in which case the taking of the new consideration amounts to the satisfaction of the formar contract.
A dispute or controversy is not an essential element of ‘some forms of accord and satisfaction, as an accord and satisfaction of a liquidated claim by the giving and accept-ance of a smaller sum and some additional consideration, such as new security, payment of the debt before due, payment by a third person, or where property or personal services are accepted from an insolvent debtor in satis-faction. Burgamy v. Holton, 165 Ga. 384, 141 S.E. 42, 47.
"Composition settlement" contemplates agreement not only between debtor and creditors, but also among credi-tors, whereas "accord and satisfaction" is agreement between debtor and single creditor. Russell v. Douget, La.Anp., 171 So. 501, 502.
"Novation" is a species of "accord and satisfaction". Munn v. Town of Drakesville, 226 Iowa 1040, 285 N.W. 644, 648.
See Acceptance; Composition; Compromise; Novation.
ACCORDANCE. Agreement; harmony; con-cord; conformity. Webster, Dict.; City and County of San Francisco v. Boyd, 22 Ca1.2d 685,
140 P.2d 666, 668.
An act done .in accordance with a purpose once formed is not necessarily an act done in pursuance of such pur-pose, for the purpose may have been abandoned before the act was done. State v. Robinson,. 20 W. Va. 713, 742. A charter providing that a city’s power of taxation shall be exercised "in accordance with" the state Constitution and laws means in a manner not repugnant to or in conflict or inconsistent therewith. City of Norfolk v. Norfolk Landmark Pub. Co., 95 Va /564, 28 S.E. 959. 960. The words "in accordance with this act" as used in N. M. Laws 1899, c. 22, § 25, dealing with validity of tax titles, was not improperly interpreted as meaning "under this act." Straus v. Foxworth, 231 U.S. 162, 34 S.Ct. 42, 44, 58 L.Ed. 168.
ACCORDANT. Fr. and Eng. Agreeing; con-eurring. "Baron Parker, accordant," Hardr. 93

"Holt, C. J., accordant," 6 Mod. 299; "Powys, J., accord," "Powell, J., accord," Id. 298.
ACCOUCHEMENT. The act of a woman in giv-ing birth to a child. The fact of the accouche-ment, which may be proved by the direct testi-mony of one who was present, as a physician or midwif e, is of ten important evidence in proving parentage.
ACCOUNT. A detailed statement of the mutual demands in the nature of debt and credit between parties, arising out of contracts or some fiduciary relation. Portsmouth v. Donaldson, 32 Pa. 202, 72 Am.Dec. 782.
A statement in writing, of debts and credits, or of receipts and payments; a list of items of debts and credits, with their respective dates. Rens-selaer Glass Factory v. Reid, 5 Cow., N.Y., 593.
An "account" is defined as a statement of pecuniary transactions; a record or course of business dealings between parties; a list or statement of monetary transac-tions, such as payments, losses, sales, debits, credits, etc., in most cases showing a balance or result of comparison between items of an opposite nature; and is not held to include a liability for unliquidated damages resulting from the breach of an entire contract, expressIng only an entire consideration. Harnischfeger Sales Corporation v. Piekering Lumber Co., C.C.A.Mo., 97 F.2d 692, 695.
The word is sometimes used to denote the balance, or the right of action for the balance, appearing due upan a statement of dealings; as where one speaks of an assign-ment of accounts; but there is a broad distinction between an account and the -itere balance of an account, resembling the distinction in logic between the premises of an argu-ment and the conclusions drawn therefrom. A balance is but the conclusion or result of the debit and credit sides of an account. It implies mutual dealings, and the exist-ence of debt and credit, without which there could be no balance. McWilliams v. Allan, 45 Mo. 574.
A generic terco, difficult to define, having various mean-ings, depending sornewhat upen the surrounding circum-stances and the connection in which it is used. Wolcott & Lincoln v. Butler, 155 Kan. 105, 122 P.2d 720, 722, 141 A.L.R. 356.
Flexible in meaning, meaning valuation; worth; value. Ex parte Means, 200 Ala. 378, 76 So. 294; may refer either to past or futura indebtedness, Semel v. Braun, 157 N.Y. S. 907, 908, 94 Misc. 238; an itemized account, Brooks v. International Shoe Co., 132 Ark. 386, 200 S.W. 1027.

Closed

An account to which no further additions can be made on either side, but which remains stil• open for adjustment and set-off, which distinguish-es it from an account stated. Mandeville v. Wil-son, 5 Cranch 15, 3 L.Ed. 23.

Current

An open or running or unsettled account be-tween two parties; the antithesis of an account stated. See Watson v. Gillespie, 200 N.Y.S. 191, 198, 205 App.Div. 613; Caffarelli Bros. v. Lyons Bros. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 199 S.W. 685, 686; Con-tinental Casualty Co. v. Easley, Tex.Civ.App., 290 S.W. 251, 253.
An "account current" is an active checking account. through which credit and debit items are constantly pass-ing. In re Fricke’s ‘Will, 202 N.Y.S. 906, 912, 122 Misc. 427.
All items must constitute one demand. Meyers v.. Bar-rett & Zimmerman, 196 Minn. 276, 264 N.W. 769, 773

Duties

Duties payable by the English customs and in-land revenue act, 1881, (44 Vict. c. 12, § 38,) on a donatio mortis causa, or on any gift, the donor of which dies within three months after making it, or on joint property voluntarily so created, and taken by survivorship, or on property taken under a voluntary settlement in which the settlor had a life-interest

Mutual

Accounts comprising mutual credits between the parties; or an existing credit on one side which constitutes a ground for credit on the other, or where there is an unclerstanding that mutual debts shall be a satisfaction or set-off pro tanto between the parties. McConnell v. Arkansas Cof-fin Co., 172 Ark. 87, 287 S.W. 1007.

Open

An account which has not been finally settled or closed, but is still running or open to future ad-justment or liquidation. Open account, in legal as well as in ordinary language, means an indebt-edness subject to future adjustment, and which may be reduced or modified by proof. James v. Lederer-Strauss & Co., 32 Wyo. 377, 233 P. 137, 139.
An open account can become an account stated only by the debtor’s admission of liability, or failure to deny lia-bility for a reasonable time after receipt of account. Brooks v. White, 187 N.C. 656, 122 S.E. 561.

Payable

Payable

"Accounts payable" are contract obligations ow-ing by a person on open account. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. Karnes, 120 S.E. 321, 322, 137 Va. 714; State Tax Commission v. Shattuck, 38 P.2d 631, 63l, 44 Ariz. 379

Public

The accounts kept by officers of the nation, state, or kingdom, of the receipt and expenditure of the revenues of the government.

Rendered

An account made out by the creditor, and pre-sented to the debtor for his examination and ac-ceptance. When accepted, it becomes an account stated. Freeland v. Cocke, 17 Va. (3 Munf.) 352.

Settled

One in which the balance has been in fact paid, thereby differing from an account stated. See Dempsey v. McGinnis, 219 S.W. 148, 150, 203 Mo. App. 494

Stated

The settlement of an account between the par-ties, with a balance struck in favor of one of them; an account rendered by the creditor, and by the debtor assented to as correct, either ex-pressly, or by implication of law from the failpre to object. Preston v. La Belle View Corporation, 212 N.W. 286, 288, 192 Wis. 168.

Monthly statements rendered by bank without deposi-tor’s objection, Pierce & Gamet v. Live Stock Nat. Bank, 213 Iowa 1388, 239 N.W. 580, 583.
Unperformed promise of one party to pay a stated sum. Hammond Lumber Co. v. Richardson Building & Lumber Co., 209 Cal. 82, 285 P. 851, 853.
An agreement between parties who have had previous transactions of a monetary character that all the items of the account representing such transactions, and the bal-ance struck, are correct, together with a promise, express or implied, for the payment of such balance. Pelavin v. Fenton, Davis & Boyle, 255 Mich. 680, 239 N.W. 268, 269.
No particular form is necessary; it may be oral, writ-ten, partly oral and partly written. Murphy v. Smith, 26 Ariz. 394, 226 P. 206, 208. An account stated is not ordi-narily recognized in Virginia and West Virginia, except as between merchant and merchant, and principal and agent, with mutual accounts. Price Hill Colliery Co. v. Pinkney, 96 W.Va. 74, 122 S.E. 434, 436. This was also a common count in a declaration upon a contract under which the plaintiff might prove an absolute acknowledg-ment by the defendant of a liquidated demand of a fixed amount, which implies a promise to pay on request. It might be joined with any other count for a money demand. The acknowledgment or admission must have been made to the plaintiff or hls agent. Wharton.
ACCOUNT, or ACCOUNT RENDER. In prae-tice. "Account," sometimes called "account ren-der," was a form of action at common law against a person who by reason of some fiduciary relation (as guardian, bailiff, receiver, etc.) was bound to render an account to another, but refused to do so. Portsmouth v. Donaldson, 32 Pa. 202, 72 Am.Dec. 782; Peoples Finance & Thrift Co. of Visalia v. Bowman, 137 P.2d 729, 731, .58 Cal.App.2d 729.
"Action of account" is common-law action to compel person to render account for property or money of another. Dahlberg v. Fisse, 328 Mo. 213, 40 S.W.2d 606, 609. Equita-ble in nature. Gaines Bros. Co. v. Gaines, 188 Okl. 300, 108 P.2d 177, 179.
In England, this action early fell into disuse; and as it is one of the most dilatory and expensive actions known to the law, and the parties are held to the ancient rules of pleading, and no discovery can be obtained, it never was adopted to any great extent in the United States. But in some states this action was employed, chiefly because there were no chancery courts in which a bill for an accounting would lie. The action is peculiar in the fact that two judgments are rendered, a preliminary judgment that the defendant do account with the plaintiff (quod computet) and a final judgment (quod recuperet) alter the account-ing for the balance found due. Field v. Brown, 146 Ind. 293, 45 N.E. 464, 16 Blatchf. 178.
ACCOUNT-BOOK. A book kept by a merchant, trader, mechanic, or other person, in which are entered from time to time the transactions of his trade or business. Greenl. Ev. §§ 115-118.
Volumes bound or sewed together in which accounts are regularly kept, and excluding collections of loose and inde-terminate memoranda. W. T. Raleigh Co. v. Rotenberry, 174 Miss. 319, 164 So. 5, 6. May now include modern book of detachable leaves, but leaves must be of such appropri-ate uniformity of material as reasonably to constitute leaves of account book in which they are contained. W. T. Raleigh Co. v. Rotenberry, 174 Miss. 319, 164 So. 5, 6.
ACCOUNT COMPUTATIO. The primary idea of "account computatio", whether in proceedings of courts of law or equity, is some matter of debt and credit, or demand in nature thereof. Cole-man v. Kansas City, 351 Mo. 254, 173 S.W.2d 572, 576.
ACCOUNT FOR. To pay over the money to the person entitled thereto. U. S. v. Rehwald, D.C. Cal., 44 F.2d 663

ACCOUNT IN BANK. See Bank Account.
ACCOUNTABLE. Subject to pay; responsible; Hable. Where one indorsed a note "A. C. account-able," it was held that, under this forro of indorse-ment, he had waived demand and notice. Furber v. Caverly, 42 N.H. 74.
ACCOUNTABLE RECEIPT. An instrument ac-knowledging the receipt of money or personal property, coupled with an obligation to account for or pay or deliver the whole or some part of it to some person. State v. Riebe, 7 N.W. 262, 27 Minn. 315.
ACCOUNTANT. One who keeps accounts; a person skilled in keeping books or accounts; an expert in accounts or bookkeeping. See U. S. ex rel. Liebmann v. Flynn, D.C.N.Y., 16 F.2d 1006, 1007; Frazer v. Shelton, 150 N.E. 696, 701, 320 III. 253.
One competent to design and control systems of accounts. Roberts v. Hosking, 95 Mont. 562, 28 P.2d 199, 201.
A person who renders an account: an executor, guard-lan, etc.
ACCOUNTANT GENERAL, or ACCOMPTANT GENERAL. An officer of the court of chancery, appointed by act of parliament to receive all money lodged in court, and to place the same in the Bank of England for security. 12 Geo. I. c. 32; 1 Geo. IV, c. 35; 15 & 16 Vict. c. 87, §§ 18-22, 39. See Daniell, Ch.Pr. (4th Ed.) 1607 et seq. The office, however, has been abolished by 35 & 36 Vict. c. 44, and the duties transferred to her majesty’s paymaster general.
ACCOUNTANTS, CHARTERED. Persons skilled in the keeping ami examination of accounts, who are employed for the purpose of examining and certifying to the correctness of accounts of cor-porations and others. British Commonwealth equivalent of Certified Public Accountant.
ACCOUNTING. An act or system of making up or settling accounts; a statement of account, or a debit and credit in financial transactions. Kan-sas City v. Burns, 137 Kan. 905, 22 P.2d 444.
Rendition cf an account, either voluntarily or by order of a court. Buxton y. Edwards, 134 Mass. 567, 578. In the latter case, it imports a rendition of a judgmcnt for the
balance ascertained to be due. Apple y. Smith. 106 Kan. 717, 190 P. 8, 10. The term may include payment of the amount due. Pyatt v. Pyatt, 46 N.J.Eq. 285, 18 A. 1048.
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE. Contract obligations owing to a person on open account. West Vir-ginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. Karnes, 137 Va. 714, 120 S.E. 321, 322; charge accounts, Haverfiekl Co. v. Evatt, 143 Ohio St. 58, 54 N.E.2d 149, 152, in-stallment balances, Duke Power Co. v. IIillsbor-ough Tp., Somerset County, 20 N.J.Misc. 240, 26 A.2d 713, 725.
ACCOUPLE. To unite; to marry. Ne unques accouple, never married.
ACCREDIT. In international law. (1) To ac-knowledge; to receive as an envoy in his public

character, and give him credit and rank accord-ingly. Burke. (2) To send with credentials as an envoy. Webst.Dict. This latter use is now the accepted one.
ACCREDITED LAW SCHOOL. "An accredited law school" and a "law school approved by this court," are synonymous. Ex parte ‘State Board of Law Examiners of Florida, 141 Fla. 706, 193 So. 753.
ACCREDITED REPRESENTATIVE. As respects service of process, representative having general authority to act. Rorick v. Stilwell, 101 Fla. 4, 133 So. 609, 615.
ACCREDULITARE. L. Lat. In old records. To purge an offense by oath. Blount; Whishaw.
ACCRESCERE. In the civil and old English law. To grow to; to increase; to pass to, and become united with, as soil to land per alluvionem. Dig. 41, 1, 30, pr. The term is used in speaking of islands which are formed in rivers by deposit; Calvinus, Lex.; 3 Kent 423. It is used in a re-lated sense in the common-law phrase jus aceres-candi, the right of survivorship; 1 Washb.R.P. 426.

Pleading

To commence; to arise; to accrue. Quod actio non accrevit infra sex anos, that the action did not accrue within six years; 3 Chit.P1. 914.
ACCRETION. The act of growing to a thing; usually applied to the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of land by natural causes, as out of the sea or a river.

Civil Law

The right of heirs or legatees to unite or aggre-gate with their shares or portions of the estate the portion of any co-heir or legatee who ref uses to accept it, fails tu comply with a condition, be-comes incapacitated to inherit, or dies before the testator. Anderson v. Lucas, .204 S.W. 989, 993, 140 Tenn. 336. Under a deed of trust: Miller v. Douglass, 192 Wis. 486, 213 N.W. 320, 322.

Mortgages

As used in a mortgage on cattle, with all in-crease thereof and accretions thereto, the word "accretions" is not confined to the results of nat-ural growth, but includes the additions of parts frorri without, i. e., of cattle subsequently ¿-Heti to the herd. Stockyards Loan Co. v. Nichols, C.C.A.Okl., 243 F. 511, 513, 1 A.L.R. 547.

Realty

Addition of portions of son. by gradual deposi-tion through the operation of natural causes, tu that already in possession of owner. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Ramsey. 53 Ark. 314, 13 S.W. 931, 8 L.R.A. 559, 22 Am.St.Rep. 195; 51 L.R.A. 425, n.; Willett v. Miller, 176 Okl. 278, 55 P.2d 90, 92. Along banks of navigable or unnavigable stream. Smith v. Whitney, 105 Mont. 523, 74 P.2d 450, 453, change in river boundary, Hancock v. Muere, Tex.Civ.

filled was not an "accretion". City of Newport Beach v. Fager, 39 Cal.App.2d 23, 102 P.2d 438, 442.
Accretion of land is of two kinds : By allavion, i. e., by the washing up of sand or soil, so as to form firm ground; or by dereliction. as when the sea shrinks below the usual water-mark. The term "alluvion" is applied to deposit itself, while "accretion" denotes ,the act. However, the terms are frequently used synonyncously. Katz v. Patter-son, 135 Or. 449, 296 P. 54, 55. In deterrnining whether change in course of river is by "accretion" or "avulsion," test is not whether witnesses might see from time to time that progress has been made, but whether witnesses could perceive change while it was going on. Goins v. Merry-man, 183 Okl. 155, 80 P.2d 268, 270. Land uncovered by gradual subsidence of water is not an "accretion" but a "reliction." Independent Stock Farm v. Stevens, 128 Neb. 619, 259 N.W. 647, 648.

Trust Property

Receipts other than those ordinarily considered as income; and ordinary cash dividends, the solo income, were not accretions. Doty v. C. I. R., C.C. A.1, 148 F.2d 503, 505.
See Accrue; Avulsion; Alluvion; Reliction.
ACCROACH. To encroach; to exercise power without due authority. In French law, to delay. Whishaw.
To attempt to exercise royal power. 4 BI.Comm. 76. A knight who forcibly assaulted and detained one of the king’s subjects di’ he paid him a sum of money was held to have committed treason, on the ground of accroach-ment. 1 Hale, P.C. 80.
ACCROCHER. Fr. To delay; retard; put off. Accrocher un procés, to stay the proceedings in a suit.
ACCRUAL, CLAUSE OF. See Accruer, Clause of.
ACCRUAL BASIS. A method of keeping accounts which shows expenses incurred and income earned for a given period, although such expenses and income may not have been actually paid or re-ceived in cash. Orlando Orange Groves Co. v. Hale, 119 Fla. 159, 161 So. 284.
Right to receive and not the actual receipt determines inclusion of amount in gross income. When right tu recelve an amount becomes fixed, right accrues. H. Liebes & Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.9, 90 F.2d 932, 937. Obligations payable to or by taxpayer are treated as if discharged when incurred. H. Liebes & Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C.C.A.9, 90 F.2d 932, 936. Entries are made of credits and debits when liability arises, whether received or disbursed. Insurance Finance Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C.C.A.3, 84 F.2d 382. Books showing sales by accounts receivable and purchases by accounts payable, and set up inventories at beginning and end of year. Consolidated Tea Co. v. Bowers, D.C.N.Y., 19 F.2d 382.
ACCRUE. Derived from the Latin, "ad" and "creso," to grow to. In past tense, in sense of due and payable; vested. It means to increase; to augment; to come to by way of increase; to be added as an increase, profit, or damage. Harts-field Co. v. Shoaf, 184 Ga. 378, 191 S.E. 693, 695. Acquired; fell due; made or executed; matured; occurred; received; vested; was created; was incurred. H. Liebes & Co. v. Commissioner of

Internal Revenue, C.C.A.9, 90 F.2d 932, 936. To attach itself to, as a subordinate or accessory claim or demand arises out of, and is joined its principal. Lifson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.8, 98 F.2d 508.
Produce of money lent. "Interest accrues to principal." Weiss v. Cornmissioners of Land Office, 182 Okl. 39, 75 P.2d 1142, 1144. Costs accrue tu a judgment.
The term is also used of independent or original demands, and then means to arise, to happen, to come into force or existence; to vest; as in the phrase, "The right of action clid not accrue within six years." Amy v. Dubu-que. 98 U.S. 470, 476, 25 L.Ed. 228. Tu -become a present right or demand; tu come to pass. II. Liebes & Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.9, 90 F.2d 932, 936.
It is distinguished from sustain; Adams v. Brown, 4 Litt. (Kv.) 7; and from owing; Cross v. Partenheimer, 159 Pa. 556, 28 A. 370; l’ay v. Honoran, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 295; it is also distinguished from arise; State v. Circuit Court of Waushara County, 165 Wis. 387, 162 N.W. 436, 437.

Cause of Action

A cause of action "accrues" when a suit may be maintained thereon. Dillon v. Board of Pen-sion Com’rs of City of Los Angeles, 18 Ca1.2d 427, 116 P.2d 37, 39, 136 A.L.R. 800. Whenever one person may sue another. Hensley v. Conway, Tex.Civ.App., 29 S.W.2d 416, 418.

Cause of action "accrues," on date that damage is sus-tained and not date when causes are set in motion which ultimately produce injury. City of Philarlelphia v. Lieber-man, C.C.A.Pa., 112 F.2d 424, 428. Date of injury. Fred-ericks v. Town of Dover, 125 N.J.L. 288, 15 A.2d 784, 787. When actual damage has resulted. National Lead Co. v. City of New York, C.C.A.N.Y., 43 F.2d 914, 916. As soon as contract is breached. Wichita Nat. Bank v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Tex.Civ.App., 147 S.W.2d 295, 297.

Contracts

The word accrued, as used in reference to con-tracts in which process may be sent out of the country to be served, has reference to the place where the contract was made and executed. Phelps v. McGee, 18 III. 155, 158.

Taxation

Income "accrues" to taxpayer when there arises to him a fixed or unconditional right to receive it. Franklin County Distilling Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.6, 125 F.2d 800, 804, 805. But not unless there is a reasonable expectancy that the right will be converted into money or its equivalent. Swastika Oil & Gas Co. v. Commis-sioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.6, 123 F.2d 382, 384.
Where taxpayer makes returns on accrual basis, item "accrues" when all events occur which fix amount payable and determine liability of tax-payer. Hudson Motor Car Co. v. U. S., Ct.C1,, 3 F. Supp. 834, 847.
Tax "accrues" for deduction when all events have occurred which fix amount of tax and deter-mine liability of taxpayer for it, although there has not yet been assessment or maturity. Elm-hirst v. Duggan, D.C.N.Y., 14 F.Supp. 782, 784.
Estate tax "accrued," immediately on death, though not payable until one year thereaf ter. Ewbank v. U. S., C.C.A.Ind., 50 F.2d 409

sation, due and payable. Wood Coal Co. v. State Compensation Com’r, 119 W.Va. 581, 195 S.E. 528, 529.
ACCRUED DEPRECIATION. The lessened serv-ice value of the utility plant due to its consump-tion in furnishing service. Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 232 Wis. 274, 287 N.W. 122, 152. Portion of useful service life which has expired. State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Public Service Commission, 341 Mo. 920, 110 S. W.2d 749, 768.
ACCRUED RIGHT. As used in Constitution, a matured cause of action, or legal authority to de-mand redress. Morley v. Hurst, 174 Okl. 2, 49 P. 2d 546, 548.
ACCRUER (or ACCRUAL), CLAUSE OF. An ex-press clause, frequently occurring in the case of gifts by deed or will to persons as tenants in common, providing that upon the death of one or more of the beneficiaries his or their shares shall go to the survivor or survivors. Brown. The share of the decedent is then said to accrue to the others.
ACCRUING. Inchoate; in process of maturing. That which will or may, at a future time, ripen into a vested right, an available demand, or an existing cause of action. FIartsfield Co. v. Shoaf, 184 Ga. 378, 191 S.E..693, 695. Arising by way of increase, growth or profit. It connotes continuing growth, increase or augmentation. Globe Indem-nity Co. v. Bruce, C.C.A.Okl., 81 F.2d 143, 153.
ACCRUING COSTS. Costs and expenses incurred after judgment.
ACCRUING INTEREST. Running or accumulat-ing interest, as distinguished from accrued or matured interest; interest daily accumulating on the principal debt but not yet due and pagable. Gross v. Partenheimer, 159 Pa. 556, 28 A. 370.
ACCRUING RIGHT. One that is increasing, en-larging, or augmenting. Richards v. Land Co., 54 F. 209, 4 C.C.A. 290.
ACCT. An abbreviation for "account," of such universal and immemorial use that the courts will take judicial notice of its meaning. Heaton v. Ainley, 108 Iowa, 112, 78 N.W. 798.
ACCUMULATED PROFITS. Earned surplus or undivided profits. Flint v. Commissioner of Cor-porations and Taxation, 43 N.E.2d 789, 791, 792, 312 Mass. 204.
Include profits earned and invested. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation v. Filoon, 310 Mass. 374, 38 N.E.2d 693, 698, 700.
And they take into account losses, as well as gains. Com-missioner of Corporations and Taxation v. Church, Mass., 61 N.E.2d 143, 145.
ACCUMULATED SURPLUS. In statutes relative to the taxation of corporations, this term refels to the fund which the company has in excess of its capital and liabilities. Trenton Iron Co. v.
Yard, 42 N.J.Law, 357; People’s F. Ins. Co. v. Parker, 34 N.J.Law, 479, 35 N.J.Law, 575. See Earnings.
ACCUMULATIONS. Increase by continuous or repeated additions, or, if taken literally, means either profit accruing on sale of principal assets, or increase derived from their investment, or both. In re Wells’ Will, 300 N.Y.S. 1075, 1078, 165 Misc. 385.
Adding of interest or income of a fund to prin-cipal pursuant to provisions of a will or deed, preventing its being expended. In re Watson’s Will, 258 N.Y.S. 755, 144 Misc. 213.
When an executor or other trustee masses the rents, dividends, and other income which he receives, treats it as a capital, invests it, makes a new capital of the income derived therefrom, invests that, and so on, he is said to accumulate the fund, and the capital and accrued income thus procured constitute accumulations. Hussey v. Sar-gent, 116 Ky. 53, 75 S.W. 211, In re Rogers’ Estate, 179 Pa. 609, 36 A. 340. See Perpetuity.
ACCUMULATIVE. That which accumulates, or is heaped up; additional. Said of several things heaped together, or of one thing added to an-other.
ACCUMULATIVE JUDGMENT. Where a person has already been convicted and sentenced, and a second or additional judgment is passed against him, the execution of which is postponed until the completion of the first sentence, such second judgment is said to be accumulative.
As to accumulative "Legacy," see that title.
ACCUMULATIVE LEGACY. A second, double or additional legacy; a legacy given in addition to another given by the same instrument, or by another instrument.
ACCUMULATIVE SENTENCE. •A sentence, ad-ditional to others, imposed on a defendant who has been convicted upon an indictment containing several counts, each of such counts charging a distinct offense, or who is under conviction at the same time for several distinct offenses; one of such sentences to begin at the expiration of an-other. Carter v. Mclaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 22 S. Ct. 181, 46 L.Ed. 236; State v. Hamby, 126 N.C. 1066, 35 S.E. 614; Braudon v. Mackey, 122 Kan. 207, 251 P. 176, 177.
ACCUSARE NEMO SE DEBET, NISI CORAM DEO. No one is bound to accuse himself, except before God. See Hardres, 139.
ACCUSATION. A formal charge against a per-son, to the effect that he is guilty of a punishable offense, laid before a court or magistrate having jurisdiction to inquire into the alleged crime. Coplon v. State, 15 Ala.App. 331, 73 So. 225, 228. See Accuse.
"Accusation" is equivalent of "information" at common law which is mere allegation of prosecuting officer by whom it is preferred. Sutton v. State, 54 Ga.App. 349, 188 S.E. 60, 62.
ACCUSATOR POST RATIONABILE TEMPUS NON EST AUDIENDUS, NISI SE BENE DE OMISSIONE EXCUSAVERIT. Moore, 817. An accuser ought not to be heard after the expiration.

of a reasonable time, unless he can account satis-factorily for the delay.
ACCUSATORY PART. The "accusatory part" of an indictment is that part where the offense is named. Deaton v. Commonwealth, 220 Ky. 343, 295 S.W. 167, 168.
ACCUSE. To bring a formal charge against a person, to the effecf that he is guilty of a crime or punishable offense, before a court or magis-trate having jurisdiction to inquire into the al-leged crime. People v. Frey, 112 Mich. 251, 70 N W. 548.
In its popular sense "accusation" applies to all deroga-tory charges or imputations, whether or not they relate to a punishable legal offense, and however made, whether orally, by newspaper, or otherwise. People v. Braman, 30 Mich. 460. But in legal phraseology, it is limited to such accusations as have taken shape in a prosecution. United States v. Patterson, 150 U.S. 65, 14 S.Ct. 20, 37 L.Ed. 999.
ACCUSED. "Accused" is the generic name for the defendant in a criminal case, and is more ap-propriate than either "prisoner" or "defendant." 1 Car. & K. 131.
The person against whom an accusation is made; one who is charged with a crime or misdemeanor. See People v. Braman, 30 Mich. 468. The terco cannot be said to apply to a defendant in a civil action; Castle v. Houston, 19 Kan. 417, 37 Am.Rep. 127; and see Mosby v. Ins. Co., 31 Gratt. (Va.) 629.
ACCUSER. The person by whom an accusation is made.
ACCUSTOMED. Habitual; often used; synony-mous with usual; Farwell v. Smith, 16 N.J.Law, 133.
ACEPHALL The levelers in the reign of Hen. I.. who acknowledged no head or superior. Leges H. 1; Cowell. Also certain ancient heretics, who ap-peared about the beginning of the sixth century, and asserted that there was but one substance in Christ, and one nature. Wharton; Gibbon, Rom. Emp. ch. 47.
ACEQUIA. A ditch, channel, or canal, through which water, diverted from its natural course, is conducted, for use in irrigation or other purposes; public ditches. Comp.L.N.Mex. tit. 1, c. 1, § 6 (Comp.St.1929, §§ 151-401).
ACHAT, also ACHATE, ACHATA, ACHET. In French law. A purchase or bargain. Cowell.
It is used in some of our law-books, as well as achetor, a purchaser, which in some ancient statutes means pur-
veyor. Stat. 36 Edw. III; Merlin, Répert.
ACHERSET. In old- English law. A measure of grain, conjectured to have been the same with our quarter, or eight bushels. Cowell.
ACHIEVE SUBJECT MATTER. The English equivalent for patentability. Mesta Mach. Co. v. Federal Machine & Welder Co., C.C.A.Pa., 110 F. 2d 479, 480.
ACKNOWLEDGE. To own, avow, or admit; to confess; to recognize one’s acts, and assume the

ACKNOWLEDGMENT. To "acknowledge" is to admit, afflrm, declare, testify, avow, confess, or own as genuine. Favello v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass’n, 24 Cal.App.2d 342, 74 P.2d 1057,1058.
Child
An avowal or admission that the child is one’s own; recognition of a parental relation, either by a written agreement, verbal declarations or state-ments, by the life, acts, and conduct of the parties, or any other satisfactory evidente that che rela-tion was recognized and admitted. In re Spencer, Sur., 4 N.Y.S.,395; In re Hunt’s Estate, 33 N.Y.S. 256, 86 Hun, 232.
Parents formally acknowledged child. during ceremony in which both marriage and baptism took place. Cormier v. Cormier, 185 La. 968, 171 So. 93, 97, 98. Letter to regis-trar of college where child was student. In re Horne’s • Estate, 149 Fla. 710, 7 So.2d 13, 16.
The "public acknowledgment" of paternity, under Civ. Code Cal. § 230, is the opposite of private acknowledg-ment, and means the same kind of acknowledgment a father would make of his legitimate child. In re Baird’s Estate, 193 Cal. 225, 223 P. 974, 994.
Generally
Implying obligation or incurring responsibility. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Marshall, C.C.A. Wash., 102 F.2d 78, 81.
Act of a person who avows or admits the truth of certain facts which, if estabiished, will entail a civil liabi]ity upon him. Thus, the debtor’s acknowledgment of the creditor’s demand or right of action will toll the statute of limita-tions. Ft. Scott v. Hickman, 112 U.S. 150, 163, 5 Sup.Ct. 56, 28 L.Ed. 636; Letters, Leffek v. Luedeman, 95 Mont. 457, 27 P.2d 511, 91 A.L.R. 286; Lincoln-Al]iance Bank & Trust Co. v. Fisher, 286 N.Y.S. 722, 247 App.Div. 465; pay-ments. Erskine v. Upham, 56 Cal.App.2d 235, 132 P.2d 219, 224, 225. MeMahan y. Dorchester Fertilizer Co., 184 Md. 155, 40 A.2d 313, 314.
Testator’s statement to attesting witness. Anthony v. College of the Ozarks, 207 Ark. 212, 180 S.W.2d 321, 324.
Instruments
Formal declaration before authorized oficial, by person who executed instrument, that it is his free act and deed. Jemison v. Howell, 161 So. 806, 230 Ala. 423, 99 A.L.R. 1511. The certificate of the officer un such instrument that it has been so acknowledged. Williford v. Davis, 106 Okl. 208, 232 P. 828, 831.
Money
A sum paid in some parts of England by copy-hold tenants on th,e death of their lords, as a recognition of their new lords, in like manner as money is usually paid on the attornment of ten-ants. Called a fine by Blackstone; 2 Bla.Com. 98.
Separate Acknowledgment
An acknowledgment of a deed or other instru-ment, made by a married woman, on her exam-ination by the officer separate and apart from her husband. Hutchinson v. Stone, 79 Fla. 157, 84 So. 151, 154.
ACOLYTE. An inferior church servant, who, next under the sub-deacon, follows and waits upon the priests and deacons, and performs the albees

of lighting the candles, carrying the bread and wine, and paying other servile attendance. Spel-man; Cowell.
ACQUAINTED. Having personal knowledge of. Kelly v. Calhoun, 95 U.S. 710, 24 L.Ed. 544. Ac-quaintance expresses less than familiarity; In re Carpenter’s Estate, 94 Cal. 406, 29 P. 1101. It is "familiar knowledge"; Wyllis v. Haun, 47 Iowa, 614; Chauvin v. Wagner, 18 Mo. 531.
"Acquaintance" expresses less than familiarity; famili-arity less than intimacy. Acquaintance springs from oc-casional intercourse, familiarity from daily intercourse, intimacy from unreserved intercourse; acqualntance, hav-ing some knowledge, familiarity, from long habit, inti-macy, by close connection. Atkins Corporation v. Tourny, 6 Ca1.2d 206, 57 P.2d 480, 483. To be "personally acquainted with," and to "know personally," are equiva-lent terms; Kelly v. Calhoun, 95 U.S. 710, 24 L.Ed. 544. When used with reference to a paper to which a certificate or affldavit is attached, ft indicates a substantial Isnowl-edge of the subject-matter thereof. Bohan v. Casey, 5 Mo. App. 101.
ACQUEREUR. In French and Canadian law. One who acquires title, particularly to immovable property, by purchase.
ACQUEST. An estate acquired newly, or by pur-chase. 1 Reeve, Eng.Law, 56.
ACQUÉTS. In the civil law. Property which has been acquired by purchase, gift, or otherwise than by succession. Immovable property which has been acquired otherwise than by succession. Merl. Répert.
Proflts or gains of property, as between husband and wife. Civil Code La. art. 2402. The proflts of all the effects of which the husband has the administration and enjoymcnt, either of right or in fact, of the produce of the joint industry of both husband and wife, and of the estates which they may acquire during the marriage, either by donations made jointly to them both, or by pur-chase, or in any other similar way, even though the pur-chase be only in the neme of one of the two, and not of both. See Community; Conquéts.
ACQUIESCE. To give an implied consent to a transáction, to the accrual of a right, or to any act, by one’s mere silence, or without express assent or acknowledgment., Scott v. Jackson, 89 Cal. 258, 26 P. 898.
ACQUIESCENCE. Conduct recognizing the ex-istence of a transaction, and intended, in some extent at least, to carry the transaction, or permit it to be carried, into effect; it is some act, not deliberately intended to ratify a former transac-tion known to be voidable, but recognizing the transaction as existing, and intended, in some ex-tent at least, to carry it into effect, and to obtain or claim the benefits resulting from it, and thus differs from "confirmation," which implies a de-liberate act, intended to renew and ratify a trans-action known to be voidable. De Boe v. Prentice Packing & Storage Co., 172 Wash. 514, 20 P.2d 1107, 1110.
Passive compliance or satisfaction; distinguished from avowed consent on the one hand, and, on the other, from opposition or opon discontent. Paul v. Western Distribut-ing Co., 142 Kan. 816, 52 P.2d 379, 387. Acquiescence from which assent may be reasonably inferred. Frank v. Wilson & Co., 24 Del.Ch. 237, 9 A.2d 82, 86. Equivalent to assent inferred from silence with knowledge or from encourage-
ment and presupposes knowledge and assent. Andrew v. Rivers, 207 Iowa 343, 223 N.W. 102, 103. Imports tacit con-sent, concurrente, acceptance or assent. Natural Soda Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, Cal.App•, 132 P.2d 553, 563. A silent appearance of consent. Worcester, Dict. Darnell v. Bidwell, 115 Me. 227, 98 A. 743, 745, 5 A.L. R. 1320. Failure to make any objcctions. Scott v. Jackson, 89 Cal. 253, 26 P. 898. Submission to an act of which one had knowledge. See Pence v. Langdon, 99 U.S. 578, 25 L.Ed. 420. It imports full knowledge. Rabe v. Dunlap, 51 N.J.Eq. 40, 25 A. 959. Knowledge without objection. Indiana Harbor Belt R. Co. v. Tones, 220 Ind. 139, 41 N.E.2d 361, 363.
It is to be distinguished from avowed consent, on the one hand, and from open discontent or opposition, on the other.
It arises where a person who knows that he is entitled to impeach a transaction or enforce a right neglects to do so for such a length of time that, under the circumstances of the case, the other party may fairly infer that he has waived or abandoned his right. Norfolk & .W. R. Co. v. Perdue, 40 W. Va. 442, 21 S.E. 755.
Acquiescence and laches are cognate but not equivalent terms. The former is a submission to, or resting satisfied with, an existing state of things, while taches implies a neglect to do that which the party ought to do for his own benefit or protection. Hence laches may be evidence of acquiescence. Leches imports a merely passive assent, while acquiescence implies active assent. In re Wilbur’s Estate, 334 Pa. 45, 5 A.2d 325, 331. "Acquiescence" relates to inaction during performance of an act while "lachos" relates to delay after act is done. Bay Newfoundland Co. v. Wilson & Co., 24 Del.Ch. 30, 4 A.2d 668, 671, 673. "Acqui-escence" is synonymous with "abandonment"; Sclawr v. City of St. Paul, 132 Minn. 238, 156 N.W. 283, 284, and is distinguished from "admission"; Saunders v. Busch-Everett Co., 138 La. 1049, 71 So. 153, 154; and from "ratifi-cation" and "estoppel in pais" ; Marion Sav. Bank v. Leahy, 200 Iowa 220, 204 N.W. 456, 458; but see Murray v. Smith, 152 N.Y.S. 102, 108, 166 App.Div. 528; differs from "confirmation", in that confirmation implies a deliberate act, intended to renew and ratify a transaction known to be voidable, Bauer v. Dotterer, 202 Ark. 1055, 155 S.W.2d 54. 57. A forra of "equitable estoppel", Schmitt v. Wright, 317 111.App. 384, 46 N.E.2d 184, 192.
See Admission; Confession; Ratification.
ACQUIESCENCE, ESTOPPEL BY. Acquiescence is a species of estoppel. Bankers’ Trust Co. v. Rood, 211 Iowa, 289, 233 N.W. 794, 802, 73 A.L.R. 1421.
An estoppel arises where party aware of his rights sees other party acting opon mistaken notion of his rights. Minear v. Keith Furnace Co., Iowa, 239 N.W. 584, 587. Injury accruing, from one’s acquiescence in another’s action to his prejudice creates "estoppel". Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., C.C.A.I11., 125 F.2d 369, 375; Passive conduct on the part of one who has knowledge of the facts may be basis of estoppel. Winslow v. Burns, 47 N.M. 29, 132 P.2d 1048, 1050.
It must appear that party to be estopped was bound in equity and good conscience to speak and that party claim-ing estoppel relied upen acquiescence and was misled thereby to chango his position to his prejudice. Sherlock v. Greaves, 106 Mont. 206, 76 P.2d 87, 91.
Acquiescence in a judgment in order to constitute an estoppel must be unqualified. Messer v. Henlein, 72 N.D. 63, 4 N.W.2d 587, 589. One who stands by while his property is sold is "estopped" from setting up title against purchaser. Meadows v. Hampton Live Stock Commission Co., 55 Cal.App.2d 634, 131 P.2d 591, 592, 593.
The doctrine is applicable only where there is some ele-ment of turpitude or neglect. City of Lafayette v. Keen, 113 Ind.App. 552, 48 N.E.2d 63, 70.
ACQUIETANDIS PLEGIIS. A writ of justices, formerly lying for the surety against a creditor who refuses to acquit him after the debt has been satisfied. Reg. of Writs 158; Cowell; Blount

ACQUIRE. To gain by any means, usually by one’s own exertions; to get as one’s own; to ob-tain by search, endeavor, practice, or purchase; receive or gain in whatever manner; come to have. Clamo v. Gamble-Robinson Co., 190 Minn. 256, 251 N.W. 268, 269.
In law of contracts and of descents, to become owner of property; to make property one’s own. Crutchaeld v. Johnson & Latirner, 243 Ala. 73, 8 So.2d 412. To gain ownership of. Commissioner of Insurance v. Broad Street Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 312 Mass. 261, 44 N.E.2d 683, 684. Broad meaning including both purchase and construction; acquisition being the act of getting or obtaining some-thing which may be already in existence, or may be brought into existence through means employed to acquire it. Ronnow v. City of Las Vegas, 57 Nev. 332, 65 P.2d 133, 140. Sometimes used in the sense of "procure," Jolly v. McCoy, 36 Cal.App. 479, 172 P. 618, 619. It does not nec-essarily mean that title has passed, Godwirt v. Tuttle, 70 Or. 424, 141 P. 1120, 1122. Includes taking by devise, U. S. v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179. 44 S.Ct. 69, 70 68 L.Ed. 240, 29 A.L.R. 1547.
ACQUIRED. To get, procure, secure, acquire. Jones v. State, 126 Tex.Cr.R. 469, 72 S.W.2d 260, 263.
Coming to an Intestate in any other way than by gift, devise, or descent from a parent or the ancestor of a par-ent. In re Miller’s Will, 2 Lea (Tenn.) 54.
ACQUIRED RIGHTS. Those which a man does not naturally enjoy, but which are owing to his own procurement, as sovereignty, or the right of commanding, or the right of property. Borden v. State, 11 Ark. 519, 527, 44 Am.Dec. 217.
ACQUIRER TAX. German estate inheritance leg-acy tax, not true inheritance or legacy tax, im-posed upon recipient, and not affecting executors. In re Gotthelf’s Will, 273 N.Y.S. 247, 152 Misc. 309.
ACQUISITION. The act of becoming the owner of certain property; the act by which one ac-quires or procures the property in anything. State ex rel. Fisher v. Sherman, 135 Ohio St. 458, 21 N. E.2d 467, 470. Used also of the thing acquired. Hartigan v. City of Los Angeles, 170 Cal. 313, 149 P. 590, 592. Taking with, or against, consent. Scribner v. Wikstrom, 93 N.H. 17, 34 A.2d 658, 660. Especially a material possession obtained by any means. Jones v. State, 126 Tex.Cr.R. 469, 72 S.W.2d 260, 263.
Original acquisition Is that by which a man secures a property in a thing which is not at the time he acquires it, and in its then existing condition, the property of any other individual. It may result from occupancy; 2 Kent, 289; accession; 2 Kent, 293; intellectual labor—namely, for inventions, which are secured by patent rights,; and for the authorship of books, maps, and charts, which is protected by copyrights; 1 Bouv.Inst. 508, n.
Derivative acquisitions are those which are procured from others. Goods and chattels may change owners by act of law in the cases of forfeiture, succession, marriage, judgment, insolvency, and intestacy; or by act of the parties, as by glft or sale.
An acquisition may result from the act of the party him-self, or those who are in his power acting for him, as his children while minors; Gale v. Parrot, 1 N.H. 28. See Dig. 41. 1. 53; Inst. 2. 9. 3.
See Accession.
ACQUIT. To set free, release or discharge as from an obligation, burden or accusation. Com-monwealth v. Benson, 94 Pa.Super. 10, 15. To ab-solve, one from an obligation or a liability; or to legally certify the innocence of one charged with crime. Dolloway v. Turrill, 26 Wend.N.Y. 383, 400.
ACQUIT A CAUTION. The certificate proving receipt of security that goods shipped from one French port to another shall not be sent to a foreign country. Argles, Fr.Merc.Law, 543.
ACQUIT BACK. In mineral deed, vested in the grantee the title to such mineral rights as grantor had at time of execution of deed, where grantor had received his title from grantee and the ex-pression was intended to reconvey such title. Al-len v. Boykin, 199 Miss. 417, 24 So.2d 748, 750.
ACQUITMENT. See Absolution.
ACQUITTAL.

Contracts

A release, absolution, or discharge from an ob-ligation, liability, or engagement.
According to Lord Coke, there are three kinds of acquit-tal, narnely: by deed, when the party releases the obliga-tion; by prescription; by tenure; Co. Lftt. 100 a.

Crimes

The legal and formal certification of the inno-cence of a person who has been charged with crime; a deliverance or setting free a person from a charge of guilt.
In a narrow sense, it is the absolution pf a party accused on a trial before a traverse jury. Thomas v. De Graf-fenreid, 2 Nott & McC. (S. C.) 143. Properly speaking, however, one is not acquitted by the jury but by the judg-ment of the court. People v. Rogers, 170 N.Y.S. 86, 87, 102 Misc. 437. And he may be legally acquitted by a judg-ment rendered otherwise than in pursuance of a verdict, as where he is discharged by a magistrate because of the insufficiency of the evidence, or the indictment is dismissed by the court or a nol. pros. entered. State v. Hart, 90 N.T. Law 261, 101 A. 278. But compare State v. Smith, 170 N.C. 742; 87 S.E. 98, 99.
"Nol. pros." not equivalent of "acquittal." Bolton v. State, 166 Miss. 290, 146 So. 453, 454. The unnecessary dis-charge of the jury without the consent of the accused after it has been sworn may constitute an acquittal. Riley v. Cornmonwealth, 190 Ky. 204, 227 S.W. 146, 147. Acquittal discharges from guilt, pardon only from punishment. Younger v. State, 2 W. Va. 579, 98 Am.Dec. 791.
It may occur even though the question of guilt or Inno-cence has never been submitted to a jury, as where a defendant, having been held under an indictment or infor-mation, is discharged because not brought to trial within the time provided by the Criminal Code. State v. Taylor, 130 Kan. 813, 288 P. 731, 732.
Acquittals in fea are those which take place when the jury, upon trial, finds a verdict of not guilty.
Acquittals in law are those which take place by mere operation of law; as where a man has been charged merely as an asscssory, and the principal has been acquit-ted. 2 Co.Inst. 364. Compare State v. Walton, 186 N.C. 485, 119 S.E. 886, 888.
See Jeopardy; Autrefois Acquit; Convict.\

Feudal Law

The obligation on the part of a mesne lord to protect his tenant from any claims, entries or molestations by lords paramount arising out of the services due to them by the mesne lord. See Co.Litt. 100a.

ACQUITTANCE. A written discharge, whereby one is freed from an obligation to pay money or perform a duty. It differs from a release in not requiring to be under seal. Pothier, Oblig. n. 781. See Milliken v. Brown, 1 Rawle (Pa.) 391.
This word, though perhaps not strictly speaking synon-ymous with ”receipt," includes it. A receipt is one form of an acquittance; a discharge is another. A receipt in full is an acquittance, and a recelpt for a part of a demand or obligation is an acquittance pro tanto. State v. Shel-ters, 51 Vt. 104, 31 Am.Rep. 679.
ACQUITTED. Released; absolved; purged of an accusation; judicially discharged from accusation; released from debt, etc. Includes both civil and criminal prosecutions. Dolloway v. Turrill, 26 Wend. (N.Y.) 383, 399. See Acquittal.
ACRE. A quantity of land containing 160 square rods of land, in whatever shape. Serg. Land Laws Pa. 185; Cro.Eliz. 476, 665; 6 Coke 67; Poph. 55; Co.Litt. 5b.
Originally the word "acre" (acer, aker, or Sax, cecer) was not used as a measura of land, or to signify any determinate quantity of land, but to denote any open ground, (latum quantumvis agrura,) wide champaign, or field; which is still the meaning of the German acker, derived probably from the same source, and is preserved in the narres of some places in England, as Castle Acre, South Acre, etc. Burrill. Originally a strip in the fields that was ploughed in the forenoon. Maitland, Domesday and Beyond, 387.
ACRE FOOT. 325,850 gallons, or the amount of water which will cover one acre one foot in depth. Rowles v. Hadden, Tex.Civ.App., 210 S.W. 251, 258.
ACRE RIGHT. "The share of a citizen of a New England town in the common lands. The value of the acre right was a fixed quantity in each town, but varied in different towns. A 10-acre lot or right in a certain town was equivalent to 113 acres of upland and 12 acres of meadow, and a certain exact proportion was maintained between the acre right and salable lands." Messages, etc., of the Presidents, Richardson, X, 230.
ACREFIGHT, or ACRE. A camp or field fight; a sort of duel, or judicial combat, anciently fought by single combatants, English and Scotch, between the frontiers of the two kingdoms with sword and lance. Called "campfight," and the com-batants "champions," from the open "acre" or field that was the stage of trial. Cowell.
ACROMIAL PROCESS. A point in the region of the shoulder about where the arm joins or fits into the shoulder blade. Muskogee Electric Traction Co. v. Mueller, 39 Okl. 63, 134 P. 51, 52.
ACROSS. From side to side. Transverse to the length of. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Packet Co., 8 S.Ct. 874, 125 U.S. 260, 31 L.Ed. 731; but see Appeal of Bennett’s Branch Imp. Co., 65 Pa. 242. It may mean over, Brown v. Meady, 10 Me. 391, 25 Am.Dec. 248; or "upon and along," Mt. Vernon Telephone Co. v. Franklin Farmers’ Co-op. Tele-phone Co., 113 Me. 46, 92 A. 934, 935, Ann.Cas. 1917B, 649; or "upon," Jefferson County v. Louis-ville & I. R. Co., 160 S.W. 502, 504, 155 Ky. 810; or "within," Quanah, A. & P. Ry. Co. v. Cooper,

Tex.Civ.App., 236 S.W. 811, 812. See Comstock v. Van Deusen, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 163, where a grant of a right of way across a lot of land was held not to mean a right to enter at one side, go partly across and come out at a place on the same side. And compare Brooklyn Heights R. Co. v. Steers, 106 N.E. 919, 920, 213 N.Y. 76; but see Holley v. State, 9 Ala.App. 33, 63 So. 738.
ACT, In Scotch practice. To do or perform
judicially; to enter of record. Surety "acted in the Books of Adjournal." 1 Broun, 4.
ACT, n. Denotes affirmative; expression of will, purpose; cardes idea of performance; primarily that which is done or doing; exercise of power, or effect of which power exerted is cause; a per-formance; a deed. Brown v. Standard Casket Mfg;Co., 234 Ala. 512, 175 So. 358, 364.
In its most general sense, this noun significo something done voluntarily by a person; the exercise of an individ-ual’s power; an effect produced in the external world by an exercise of the power of a person objectively, prompted by intention, and proximately caused by a motion of the will. Herman v. Pan American Life Iras. Co., 183 La. 1045, 165 So, 195, 200. In a more technical sense, it means some-thing done voluntarily by a person, and of such a nature that certain legal consequences attach to it. Jefferson Standard Life lns. Co. v. Myers, Tex.Com.App., 284 S.W. 216, 218. Thus a grantor acknowledges the conveyance to be his "act and deed," the terms being synonymous. It may denote something done by an individual, as a private citizen, or as an officer; or by a hody of men, as a legis-latura, a council, or a court of justice; Including not merely physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judg-menta, resolves, awards, and determinations. Some gen-eral laws made by the Congress of the United States are styled joint resolutions, and these have the same force and effect as those styled acts. But see Decher v. Vaughan, 209 Mich. 565, 177 N.W. 388, 392. Cardes idea of performance. Edmonds v. Shirley, 22 Ala.App. 398, 116,So. 303.
An instrument in writing to verify facts. Web-ster, Dict.
It is used in this sense of the published acts of assembly, congress, etc. In a sense approaching this, it has been held in trials for treason that letters and other written documents were acts; 1 Fost.Cr.Cas. 198; 2 Stark. 116.
Act indicates the intention. 8 Co. 146b; Broom, Max. 301.

Civil Law

An act is a writing which states in a legal form that a thing has been said, done, or agreed. Merl. Répert.
Acta under private signature are those which have been ‘nade by private individuals under their hands.
Private acta are those made by private persons as regis-ters in relation to their receipts and expenditures, sched-ules, acquittances, and the like.
Public acta are those which have a public authority, and which have been made before public officers, are author-ized by a public seal, have been made public by the author-ity of a magistrate„ or which have been extracted and been properly authenticated from public records.

Legislation

A written law, formally ordained or passed by the legislativa power of a state, called in England an "act of parliament," and in the United States an "act of congress," or of the "legislature ;" a statute. People v. Tiphaine, 3 Parker, Cr.R. (N. Y.) 241; United States v. Smith, 27 Fed.Cas. 1167.

The words bill and law are frequ’ently used synony-mously with act, People v. City of Buffalo, 161’N.Y.S. 706, 712, 175 App.Div. 218, but incorrectly; Sedgwick County Com’rs v. Bailey, 13 Kan. 600; a bill being only the draft or form of the act presented to the legislature but not enacted; Southwark Bank v. Com., 26 Pa. 446. "Act" does not include ordinances or regulations made by local authorities, or even statutes having only a local applica-tion; People v. City of Buffalo, 157 N.Y.S. 938, 940, 93 Misc. 275; although sometimes used interchangeably with "measure" and "law"; Whittemore v. Terral, 140 Ark. 493, 215 S.W. 686, 687. Generally, the word refers to entire statute enacted, rather than to a section. Board of Trus-tees of Firemen’s Relief and Pension Fund of City of Muskogee v. Templeton, 184 Okl. 281, 86 P.2d 1000, 1002.
Acts are either puhlic or private. Public acts (also called general acts, or general statutes, or statutes at large) are those which relate to the community generally, or establish a universal rule for the governance of the whole body politic. Private acts (formerly called special, Co. Litt. 126a) are those which relate either to particular persons (personal acts) or to particular places (local acts), or which operate only upon specified individuals or their private concerns. Unity v. Burrage, 103 U.S. 454, 26 L.Ed. 465. Public acts are those which concern the whole com-munity and of which courts of law are bound to take judicial notice. Sasser v. Martin, 101 Ga. 447, 29 S.E. 278.
A "special" or "private" act is one operating only on particular persons and private concerns; a "local act" is ene applicable only to a particular part of the legislative jurisdiction. Trumper v. School Dist. No. 55 of Mussel-shell County, 55 Mont., 90, 173 P. 946, 947.
To denote an avowal of criminal acts, or the concession of the truth of a criminal charge, the word "confession" seems more appropriate

Practice-
Anything done by a court and reduced to writ-ing; a decree, judgment, resolve, rule, order, or other judicial proceeding. In Scotch law, the orders and decrees of a court, and in French and German law, all the records and documents in an action, are called "acts."
Scotch Practice-
An abbreviation of actor, (proctor or advocate, especially for a plaintiff or pursuer,) used in records. "Act. A. Alt. B." an abbreviation of Actor, A. Alter, B.; that is, for the pursuer or plaintiff, A., for the defender, B. 1 Broun, 336, note.

ACT BOOK. In Scotch practice. The minute book of a court. 1 Swin. 81.
ACT IN PAIS. An act done out of court, and not a matter of record. A deed or an assurance transacted between two or more private persons in the country, that is, according to the old com-mon law, upon the very spot to be transferred, is matter in pais. 2 Bl.Comm. 294.
ACT OF ATTAINDER. A legislative act, attaint-ing a person. See Attainder.
ACT OF BANKRUPTCY. Any act which renders a person liable to be proceeded against as a bank-rupt, or for which he may be adjudgeel bankrupt.
These acts are usually defined and classifled in statutes on the subject. Duncan v. Landis, C.C.A.Pa.. 106 Fed. 839, 45 C.C.A. 666; In re Chapman, D.C., 99 Fed. 395. Such as: insolvency or suffering or permitting a creditor to obtain a preference, Von Segerlund v. Dysart, C.C.A.Cal., 137 F.2d 755, 758, 761; appointment of a receiver, United States v. Emory, 62 S.Ct. 317, 319, 314 U.S. 423, 86 L.Ed. 315; hin-
dering, delaying or defrauding creditors, In re Thompson, D.C.La., 28 F.Supp. 707, 710; fallure to discharge a líen, In re Flushing Queensboro Laundry, C.C.A.N.Y., 90 F.2d 601. Permitting creditor to obtain any levy, attachment, judgment, or other lien, In re Day, D.C.Md., 22 F.Supp. 946. 949; assignment for benefit of creditors, In re Roy, D. C.N.H., 46 F.Supp. 952, 954; or a writtcn admission of one’s inability to pay his debts, In re Turner, D.C.Ky., 51 F. Supp. 740, 743.
ACT OF CURATORY. In Scotch law. The act ex-tracted by the clerk, upon any one’s acceptance of being curator. Forb.Inst. pt. 1, b. 1, c. 2, tit. 2. 2 Kames, Eq. 291. Corresponding with the order for the appointment of a guardian, in English and American practice.
ACT OF ELIZABETH. See Act of Supremacy.
ACT OF GOD. An act occasioned exclusively by violence of nature without the interference of any human agency. It means a natural necessity pro-ceeding from physical causes alone without the intervention of man. It is an act, everit, happen-ing, or occurrence, a disaster and effeet due to natural causes and inevitable accident, or disaster; a natural and inevitable necessity which implies entire exciusion of all human agency which op-erates without interference or aid from man and which results from naturá, causes and is in no sense attributable to human agency. It is an acci-dent which could not have been occasioned by human agency but proceeded from physical causes alone. Short v. Kerr, 104 Ind.App. 118, 9 N.E.2d 114, 118.
In the civil law, vis major. Any misadventure or cas-ualty is said to be caused by the "act of God" when It happens by the direct, immediate. and exclusive operation of the forces of nature, uncontrolled or uninfluenced by the power of man and without human intervention, and is of such a character that it could not have been pre-vented or escaped from by any amount of foresight or
prudence, or by any reasonable degree of care or
dilli-
gence, or by the aid of any appliances which the situation of the party might reasonably require him to use. Inevit-able accident, or casualty; any accident produced by any physical cause which is irresistible, such as lightning, tempests, perils of the seas, an inundation, or earthquake; and also the suelden illness or death of persons. People v. Tul-4.)s, 37 N.Y. 586; Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Hall, 124 Ga. 322, 52 S.E. 679, 4 L.R.A..N.S., 898, 110 Am.St.Rep. 170, 4 Ann.Cas. 128. Story, Ballm. §§ 25, 511; 2 Bl.Comm. 122. Inevitable accident or casualty. Noel Bros. v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 16 La.App. 622, 133 So. 830, 832; not pre-‘entable by human care, skill, or foresight, but resulting from natural causes, The Empress of France, D.C.N.Y., 49 F.2d 291. Misfortunes and accidenta arising from inevita-ble necessity which human prudence could not foresee or prevent. Pleasure Beach Park Co. v. Bridgeport Dredge & Dock Co., 116 Cono. 496. 165 A. 691, 692. Limited, v. Lehigh Valloy R. Co., D.C.N.Y.. 254 F. 351. 353, a landside in the Panama Canal, Gans S. S. Line v. Wilhelmsen, C.C. A.N.Y., 275 F. 254, 261, and changes in the styles of wear-ing apparel, Rosenblatt v. Winstanley, Mo.App., 186 S.W. 542, 543, are not "acts of God" ; otherwise. however, as to a strike, accompanied with violence and intimidation, see Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 15 Ga.App. 751, 84 S.E. 198, 199.
The terco is sometimes defined as equivalent te inevita-ble accident; Neal v. Saunderson, 2 Sin. & M. (Miss.) 572, 41 Am.Dec. 609; Central of Georgia By. Co. v. Council Bros., 36 Ga.App. 573, 137 S.E. 569. 570 (see, however, Can-non v. Hunt, 113 Ga. 509, 38 S.E. 983; Harmony Grove Telephone Co. v. Potts, 24 Ga.App. 178, 100 S.E. 236, but incorrectly, as there is a distinction between the two; Alaska Coast Co. y. Alaska Barge Co., 79 Wash. 216, 140 P. 334, 335. Bolton v. Burnett, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 222.
See Inevitable Accident; Perils of the Sea.

ACT OF GOVERNMENT

ACT OF GOVERNMENT. The usual name of Cromwell’s Constitution vesting the supreme power in a Protector and two houses of Parlia-ment, passed March 25, 1657.
ACT OF GRACE. In Scotch law. A term ap-plied to the act of 1696, c. 32, by which it was pro-vided that where a person imprisoned for a civil debt is so poor that he cannot aliment [maintain] himself, and will make oath to that effect, it shall be in the power of the magistrates to cause the creditor by whom he is incarcerated to provide an aliment for him, or consent to his liberation; which, if the creditor delay to do for 10 days, the magistrate is authorized to set the debtor at liberty. Bell. The term is often used to designate a general act of parliament, originating with the crown, such as has of ten been passed at the com-mencement of a new reign, or the coming of age or marriage of a sovereign, or at the close of a period of civil troubles, declaring pardon or am-nesty to numerous offenders. Abbott.
ACT OF HONOR. When a bill has been protested, and a third person wishes to take it up, or accept it, for honor of one or more of the parties, the notary draws up an instrument, evidencing the transaction, called by this name.
ACT OF INDEMNITY. A statute by which those who have committed illegal acts which subject them to penalties are protected from the conse-quences of such acts.
ACT OF INSOLVENCY. Within the meaning of the national currency act, an act which shows a bank to be insolvent, such as nonpayment of its circulating notes, bilis of exchange, or certificates of deposit; failure to make good the impairment of capital, or to keep good its surplus or reserve; in fact, any act which shows that the bank is unable to meet its liabilities as they mature, or to perform those duties which the law imposes for the purpose of sustaining its credit. Hayden v. Chemical Nat. Bank, C.C.A.N.Y., 84 Fed. 874, 28 C.C.A. 548; Kullman & Co. v. Woolley, C.C.A. Miss., 83 F.2d 129, 132; Garvin v. Chadwick Real-ty Corporation, 212 Ind. 499, 9 N.E.2d 268, 271.
ACT OF LAW. The operation of fixed legal tules upon given facts or occurrences, producing conse-quences independent of the design or will of the parties concerned; as distinguished from "act of parties." Also an act performed by judicial au-thority which prevents or preclndes a party from fulfilling a contract or other engagement. Met-calf v. State, 57 Okl. 64, 156 P. 305, 306, L.R.A. 1916E, 595.
ACT OF PARLIAMENT. A statute, law, or edict, made by the British sovereign, with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and the commons, in parliament assembled. Acts of parliament form the leges scriptce, i. e., the written laws of the kingdom.
ACT OF PROVIDENCE. An accident against which ordinary skill and foresight could not guard. McCoy v. Danley, 20 Pa. 91, 57 Am.Dec. 680. Equivalent to "act of God," see supra.
ACT OF SALE. In Louisiana law. An official record of a sale of property, made by a notary who writes clown the agreement of the parties as stated by them, and which is then signed by the parties and attested by witnesses. Hodge v. Palms, Mich., 117 Fed. 396, 54 C.C.A. 570.
ACT OF SETTLEMENT. The statute (12 & 13 Wm. III, c. 2) limiting the crown to the Princess Sophia of IIanover, and to the heirs of her body being Protestants. 1 Bla.Com. 128; 2 Steph.Com. 290. One clause of it made the tenure of judges’ office for life or good behavior independent of the crown.
ACT OF STATE. An act done by the sovereign power of a country, or by its delegate, within the limits of the power vested in him. An act of state cannot be questioned or made the subject of legal proceedings in a court of law.
ACT OF SUPREMACY. An act of 26 Hen. VIII. e. 1, and also 1 Eliz. c. 1, which recognized the king as the only supreme head on earth of the Church of England having fuli power to correct all errors, heresies, ahuses, offenses, contempts and enormities. The oath, taken under the act, denies to the Pope any other authority than that of the Bishop of Rome.
ACT OF UNIFORMITY. In English law. The statute of 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 4, enacting that the book of common prayer, as then recently revised, should be used in every parish church and other place of public worship, and otherwise ordaining a uniformity in religious services, etc. 3 Steph. Comm. 104.
ACT OF UNION. The statutes uniting England and Wales, 27 Hen. VIII, c. 26, confirmed by 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 26; England and Scotland, 5 Anne. c. 8; Great Britain and Ireland, 39 & 40 Geo. III, c. 67. 1 Bl.Comm. 97.
The act uniting the three lower counties (now Delaware) to the province of Pennsylvania, passed at Upland, Dec. 7, 1682, is so called.
ACT ON PETITION. A form of summary pro-ceeding formerly in use in the high court of admiralty, in England, in which the parties stated their respective cases briefly, and supported their statements by affidavit. 2 Dod.Adm. 174, 184; 1 Hagg.Adm. 1, note.
ACTA DIURNA. Lat. In the Roman law. Daily acts or chronicles; the public registers or journals of the daily proceedings of the senate, assemblies of the people, courts of justice, etc. Supposed to have resembled a modern newspaper. Brande. Thus: I do not find the thing published in the acta diurna (daily records of affairs); Tacitus, Ann. 3, 3; Ainsworth, Lex.; Smith, Lex.
ACTA EXTERIORA INDICANT INTERIORA SECRETA. 8 Coke, 146b. External acts indicate undisclosed thoughts.

ACTA IN UNO JUDICIO NON PROBANT IN ALIO NISI INTER EASDEM PERSONAS. Things done in one action cannot be taken as evidence in another, unless it be between the same parties. Tray.Lat.Max. 11.
ACTA PUBLICA. Lat. Things of general knowl-edge and concern; matters transacted before cer-tain public officers. Calvinus, Lex.
ACTE. In French law, denotes a document, or formal, solemn writing, embodying a legal attesta-tion that something has been done, corresponding to one sense or use of the English word "act."
Arles de naissance are the certificates of birth, and must contain the day, hour, and place of birth, together with the sex and intended christian name of the child, and the names of the parents and of the witnesses. Actes de manage are the marriage certificates, and contain names, professions, ages, and places of birth and domicile oí the two persons marrying, and of their parents; also the con-sent of these latter, and the mutual agreements of the intended husband and wife to take each other for better and worse, together with the usual attestations. Actes de décbs are the certificates of cleath, which are required to be drawn up before any one may be buried. Les actes de l’état civil are public documents. Brówn.
ACTE AUTHENTIQUE. A deed executed with certain prescribed formalities, in the presence of a notary, mayor, greffier, huissier, or other func-tionary qualified to act in the place in which it is drawn up. Argles, Fr.Merc.Law, 50.
ACTE DE FRANCISATION. The certificate of registration of a ship, by virtue of which its French nationality is established.
ACTE D’IIÉRITIER. Act of inheritance. Any ac-tion or fact on the part of an heir which mani-fests his intention to accept the succession; the acceptance may be express or tacit. Duverger.
ACTE EXTRAJUDICIAIRE. A document served by a huissier, at the demand of one party upon another party, without legal proceedings.
ACTING. The word "acting" means doing duty for another; officiating; holding a temporary rank or position or performing services tempo-rarily; as, an acting captain, manager, president. Pellecchia v. Mattia, 121 N.J.L. 21, 1 A.2d 28. Per-i orming; operating. See Meyer v. Johnston, 64 Ala. 603, 665.
An acting trustee is one who takes upon himself to per-foren some or all of the trusts mentioned in a will. Sharp v. Sharp, 2 Barn. & AId. 415.
ACTING OFFICER. The phrase "acting officer" is used to designate, not an appointed incumbent, but merely a locum tenens, who is performing the duties of an office to which he himself does not claim titie. State ex rel. Gossett v. O’Grady, 137 Neb. 824, 291 N.W. 497, 501; State Bank of Wil-liams v. Gish, 167 Iowa, 526, 149 N.W. 600, 601.
"Acting Supervising Architect." Fraser v. United States, 16 Ct.C1. 514. An acting executor is one who assumes to act as executor for a decedent, not being the executor legally appointed or the executor in fact. Morse v. Allen, 99 Mich. 303, 58 N.W. 327.
ACTIO. Lat. In the civil law. An action or suit; a right or cause of action. It should be
noted that this term means both the proceeding to enforce a right in a court and the right itself which is sought to be enforced.
The first sense here given ls the older one. Justinlan, following Celsus, gives the well-known definition: Actio nihil aliud est ~un jus persequendi iu judicio quod sibi debetur, which may be thus rendered: An action is simply the right to enforce one’s demands in a court of law. See Pollock, Expansion of C. L. 92.
ACTIO AD EXHIBENDUM. An action for the purpose of compelling a defendant to exhibit a thing or title in his power. It was preparatory to another action, which was always a real action in the sense of the Roman law; that is, for the recovery of a thing, whether it was movable or immovable. Merl.Quest.tome i, 84.
ACTIO .2ESTIMATORIA; ACTIO QUANTI MI-NORIS. Two names of an action which lay in behalf of a buyer to reduce the contract price proportionately to the defects of the object, not to cancel the sale; the judex had power, however, to cancel the sale. Hunter, Rom.Law, 332, 505.
ACTIO ARBITRARIA. Action depending on the discretion of the judge. In this, unless defendant would make amends to plaintiff as dictated by the judge in his discretion, he was liable to be con-demned. Hunter, Rom.Law, 825, 987.
ACTIO BONJE FIDEL (Lat.: An action of good faith.) A class of actions in which the judge might at the trial ex officio, take into account any equitable circumstances that were presented to him affecting either of the parties to the action. 1 Spence, Eq.Jur. 210, 218.
ACTIO CALUMNL2E. An action to restrain de-fendant from prosecuting a groundless proceeding or trumped-up charge against plaintiff. Hunter, Rom.Law, 859, 1020. An action for malicious prosecution. So.Afr.Leg.Dict.
ACTIO CIVILIS. In the common law. A civil ac-tion, as distinguished from a criminal action.
Bracton divides personal actions into criminalia et civitia, according as they grow out of crimes or contracts. Bract. fol. 101b. Actiones civiles are those forms of reme-dies which were established under the rigid system of the civil law, the jus civilis. See Actio Honoraria.
ACTIO COMMODATI. Included several actions appropriate to "enforce the obligations of a bor-rower or a lender. Hunter, Rom.Law, 305.
ACTIO COMMODATI CONTRARIA. An action by the borrower against the lender, to compel the execution of the contract. Poth. Prdt á Usage, n. 75.
ACTIO COMMODATI DIRECTA. An action by a lender against a borrower, the principal object of which is to obtain a restitution of the thing lent. Poth. Prét á Usage, nn. 65, 61,.
ACTIO COMMUNI DIVIDUNDO. An action to procure a judicial division of joint property. Hun-ter, Rom.Law, 194. It was analogous in its object to proceedings for partition in modern law.

ACTIO CONDICTIO INDEBITATI. An action by which the plaintiff recovers the amount of a sum of money or other thing he paid by mistake. Poth. Promutuum, n. 140; Merl. Répert.
ACTIO CONFESSORIA. An affirmative petitory action for the recognition and enforcement of a servitude. So called because based on plaintiff’s affirmative allegation of a right in defendant’s land. Distinguished from an actio negatoria, which was brought to repel a claim of defendant to a servitude in plaintiff’s land. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 324.
ACTIO CONTRARIO. Counter action or cross action.
ACTIO CRIMINALIS. Criminal action.
ACTIO DAMNI INJURIA. The name of a gen-eral class of actions for damages, including many species of suits for losses caused by wrongful or negligent acts. The term is about equivalent to our "action for damages."
ACTIO DE DOLO MALO. An action of fraud; an action which lay for a defrauded person against the defrauder and his heirs, who had been en-riched by the fraud, to obtain the restitution of the thing of which he had been fraudulently de-prived, with all its accessions (cum omni causa;) or, where this was not practicable, for compensa-tion in damages. Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 227.
ACTIO DE PECULIO. An action concerning or against the peculium, or separate property of a party.
ACTIO DE PECUNIA CONSTITUTA. An action for money engaged to be paid; an action which lay against any person who had engaged to pay money for himself, or for another without any formal stipulation. Inst. 4, 6, 9; Dig. 13, 5; Cod. 4, 18.
ACTIO DE TIGNO JUNCTO. An action by the the owner of material built by another into his building.
If so used in goocl faith double their value could be recovered; if in bad faith, the owner could recover suita-ble damage for the wrong, and recover the property when the building carne down, So. Afr. Leg. Dict.
ACTIO DEPOSITI CONTRARIA. An action which the depositary has against the depositor, to com-pel him to fulfil his engagement towards him. Poth. Du Dépót, n. 69.
ACTIO DEPOSITI DIRECTA. An action which is brought by the depositor against the depositary, in order to get back the thing deposited. Poth. Du Dépót, n. 60.
ACTIO DIRECTA. A direct action; an action founded on strict law, and conducted according to fixed forms; an action founded on certain legal obligations which from their origin were accurate-ly defined and recognized as actionable. See Actio

ACTIO EMPTI. An action employed in behalf of a buyer to compel a seller to perform his obliga-tions or pay compensation; also to enforce any special agreements by him, embodied in a con-tract of sale. Hunter, Rom.Law, 332, 505.
ACTIO EX CONDUCTO. An action which the bailor of a thing for hire may bring against the bailee, in order to compel him to redeliver the thing hired.
ACTIO EX CONTRACTU. In the civil and com-mon law. An action of contract; an action aris-ing out of, or founded on, contract. 3 Bl.Comm. 117.
ACTIO EX DELICTO. In the civil and common law. An action of tort; an action arising out of fault, misconduct, or malfeasance. Inst. 4, 6, 15; 3 Bl.Comm. 117. Ex maleficio is the more com-mon expression of the civil law; which is adopted by Bracton. Inst. 4, 6, 1; Bract. fols. 102, 103.
ACTIO EX LOCATO. An action upon letting; an action which the person who let a thing for hire to another might have against the hirer. Dig. 19, 2; Cod. 4, 65.
ACTIO EX STIPULATU. An action brought to enforce a stipulation.
ACTIO EXERCITORIA. An action against the exercitor or employer of a vessel.
ACTIO FAMILLIE ERCISCUNDM. An action for the partition of an inheritance. Inst. 4, 6, 20; Id. 4, 17, 4. Cailed, by Bracton and Fleta, a mixed ac-tion, and classed among actions arising ex quasi contracto. Brac. fol. 100b; Bract. fols. 443 b, 444; Fleta, lib. 2, c. 60, § 1.
ACTIO FURTI. An action of theft; an action founded upon theft. Inst. 4, 1, 13-17; Bract. fol. 444. This could be brought only for the penalty attached to the offense, and not to recover the thing stolen, for which other actions were pro-vided. Inst. 4, 1, 19. An appeal of larceny. The old process by which a thief can be pursued and the goods vindicated. 2 Holdsw.Hist.Eng.L. 202.
ACTIO HONORARIA. An honorary, or prwtorian action. Dig. 44, 7, 25, 35. Actiones honorarice are those forms of remedies which were gradually introduced by the prwtors and a diles, by virtue of their equitable powers, in order to prevent the failure of justice which too often resulted from the employment of the actiones civiles. These were found so beneficial in practice that they eventually supplanted the old remedies, of which in the time of Justinian hardly a trace remained. Mackeldey, Civ.L. § 194; 5 Savigny, System.
ACTIO IN FACTUM. In action adapted to the particular case, having an analogy to some actio in jus, the latter being founded on some subsisting acknowledged law. 1 Spence, Eq.Jur. 212. The origin of those actions is similar to that of actions on the case at common law.

Admiralty Law

An action directed against the particular person who is to be charged with the liability. It is
dis-tinguished from an actio in rem, which is a suit directed against a specific thing (as a vessel) ir-respective of the ownership of it, to enforce a claim or lien upon it, or to obtain, out of the thing or out of the proceeds of its sale, satisfac-tion for an injury alleged by the claimant.
Civil Law
An action against the person, founded on a per-sonal liability; an action seeking redress for the violation of a jus in personara or right available against a particular individual.
ACTIO IN REM. In the civil and common law. An action [or a thing; an action for the recovery of a thing possessed by another. Inst. 4, 6, 1. An action for the enforcement of a right (or for redress for its invasion) which was originally available against all the world, and not in any special sense against the individual sued, until he violated it. See In Rem.
ACTIO drUDICATI. An action instituted, after four months had elapsed after the rendition of judgment, in which the judge issued his warrant to seise, first, the movables, which were sold within eight days afterwarcls; and then the im-movables, which were delivered in pledge to the creditors, or put under the tare of a curator, and if, at the end of two months, the debt was not paid, the land was sold. Dig. 42, 1; Cod. 8, 34.
According to some authorities, if the defendant then utterly denied the rendition of the former judgment, the plaintiff was driven to a new action, conducted like any other action, which was called actio judicati, and which had for its object the determination of the question whether such a judgment had been rendered. The exact meaning of the term is by no means clear. See Savigny, Syst. 305, 411; 3 Ortolan, Just. § 2033.
ACTIO LEGIS AQUILLE. An action under the Aquilian law; an action to recover damages for maliciously or injuriously killing or wounding the slave or beast of another, or injuring in any way a thing belonging to another. Otherwise called dainn.i injurioe actio.
ACTIO MANDATI. Included actions to enforce contracts of mandate or obligations arising out of them. Hunter, Rom.Law, 316.
ACTIO MIXTA. A mixed action; an action brought for the recovery of a thing, or compensa-tion for damages, and also for the payment of a penalty: partaking of the nature both of an actio in rema and in personan. Inst. 4, 6, 16, 18, 19, 20; Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 209.
ACTIO NEGATORIA (or NEGATIVA). An ac-tion brought to repel a claim of the defendant to a servitude in the plaintiff’s land. Mackeld.Rom. Law, § 324. See Actio Confessoria.
ACTIO NEGOTIORUM GESTORUM. Included ac-tions between principal and agent and other par-tres to an engagement, whereby one person under-took the transaction of business for another.
ACTIO NON. In pleading. The Latin name of that part of a special plea which follows next after the statement of appearance and defense, and declares that the plaintiff "ought not to have or maintain his aforesaid action thereof against" the defendant (in Latin, actionem non habere debet). 1 Chit.Plead. 531; 2 id. 421; Stephens, Plead. 394.
ACTIO NON ACCREVIT INFRA SEX ANNOS. The name of the plea of the statute of limitations, when the defendant alleges that the plaintiff’s ac-tion has not accrued within six years.
ACTIO NON DATUR NON DAMNIFICATO. An action is not given to one who is not injured. Jenk.Cent. 69.
ACTIO NON FACIT REUM, NISI MENS SIT REA. An act does not make one guilty, unless the intention be bad. Lofft, 37.
ACTIO NON ULTERIUS. In English pleading. A name given to the distinctive clause in the plea to the further maintenance of the action, intro-duced in place of the plea puis darrein continu-ance; the averment being that the plaintiff ought not further (ulterius) to have or maintain his ac-tion. Steph.Pl. 64, 65, 401.
ACTIO NOXALIS. A noxal action; an action which lay against a master for a crime commit-ted or injury done by his slave; and in which the master had the alternative either to pay for the damage done or to deliver up the slave to the com. plaining party. Inst. 4, 8, pr.; Heinecc.Elem. lib. 4, tit. 8. So called from noxa, the offense or in-jury committed. Inst. 4, 8, 1.
ACTIO PERPETUA. An action without limita-tion period.
ACTIO PERSONALIS. In the civil and common law. A personal action.
The ordinary terco for this kind of action in the civil law is actio in personar)), (q. v.,) the word personalis being of only occasional occurrence. Inst. 4, 6, 8, in tit.; Id. 4, 11, pr. 1. Bracton, however, uses it freely, and hence the personal action of the common law. Bract. fols. 102a, 1590. See Actipn.
ACTIO PERSONALIS MORITUR CUM PER-SONA. A personal right of action dies with the person. Noy, Max. 14.
The maxim \vas originally applied to almost every form of action, whether arising out of contract or tort. but the common law was modified by the Statute of 4 Edward the III. Momand v. Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corporation, D.C.Okl., 37 F.Supp. 649, 652.
ACTIO PIGNORATITIA. An action of pledge; an action founded on the contract of pledge (pignus). Dig. 13, 7; Cod. 4, 24.
ACTIO PCENALIS. Called also actio ex delicto. An action in which a penalty was recovered of the delinquent.
Artiones pcenales and actiones mixtaa, comprehended cases of injuries, for which the civil law permltted redress

ACTIO PENALIS

by private action, but which modem civilization univer-sally regards as crinnes; that is, offenses against society at large, and punished by proceedings in the name•of the state alone. Thus, theft, receiving stolen goods, robbery, maliclous mischief, and the murder or neglig,ent homicide of a slave (in which case an injury to property was involved), gave risa to private actions for damages against the delinquent. Inst. 4, 1. De obligalion.ibus quce ex delicto nascuntur; id. 2. De bonis vi raptts; id. 3. De lege Aquilia. And sea Mackeldey, Civ.L. § 196; 5 Savigny, System, § 210.
Actio pcenalis in hmredem non datur, nisi forte ex damno locupletior hxres factus sit. A penal action is not given against an heir, unless, in-deed, such heir is benefited by the wrong.
ACTIO PRJEJUDICIALIS. A preliminary or pre-paratory action. An action instituted for the de-termination of some preliminary matter on which other litigated matters depend, or for the deter-mination of some point or question arising in an-other or principal action; and so called from its being determinad before, (prius, or prce judicari.)
ACTIO PRiESCRIPTIS VERBIS. A form of ac-tion which derived its force from continued usage or the responsa prudentium, and was founded on the unwritten law. 1 Spence, Eq.Jur. 212. The distinction between this action and an actio in facturo is said to be, that the latter was founded not on usage or the unwritten law, but by analogy to or on the equity of some subsisting law; 1 Spence, Eq.Jur. 212.
ACTIO PRJETORIA. A preetorian action; one introduced by the prmtor, as distinguished from the more ancient actio civilis, (q. v.) Inst. 4, 6, 3; Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 207.
ACTIO PRO SOCIO. An action of partnership. An action brought by one partner against his asso.ciates to compel them to carry out the terms of the partnership agreement. Story, Partn., Ben-nett ed. § 352; Pothier, Contr. de Société, n. 34.
ACTIO PUBLICIANA. An action which lay for one who had lost a thing of which he had bona fide obtained possession, before he had gained a property in it, in order to have it restored, under color that he had obtained a property in it by prescription. Inst. 4, 6, 4; Heinecc. Elem. lib. 4, tit. 6, § 1131; Halifax, Anal. b. 3, c. 1, n. 9. It was an honorary action, and derived its narre from the prmtor Publicius, by whose edict it was first given. Inst. 4, 6, 4.
ACTIO QUJELIBET IT SUA VIA. Every action proceeds in its own way. Jenk.Cent. 77.
ACTIO QUOD JUSSU. An action given against a master, founded on some business done by his slave, acting under his order, ( jussu.) Inst. 4, 7, 1; Dig. 15, 4; Cod. 4, 26.
ACTIO QUOD METUS CAUSA. An action grant-ed to one who had been compelled by unlawful force, or fear (metus causa) that was not ground-less, (metus probabilis or justus,) to deliver, sell, or promise a thing to another. Bract. fol. 103b; Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 226.

ACTIO REALIS. A real action. The proper terco in the civil law was rei vindicatio. Inst. 4, 6, 3.
ACTIO REDIIIBITORIA. An action to cancel a sale in consequence of defects in the thing sold.
It was prosecuted to compel complete restitution to the seller of the thing sold, with its produce and accessories, and to give the buyer .back the price. with interest, as an cquivalent for the restitution of the produce. Hunter, Rom.Law, 332. See Redhibitory Action.
ACTIO RERUM AMOTARUM. An action for things removed; an action which, in cases of divorce, lay for a husband against a wife, to re-cover things carried away by the latter, in con-templation of such divorce. Dig. 25, 2; Id. 25, 2, 25, 30. It also lay for the wife against the hus-band in such cases. Dig. 25, 2, 7, 11; Cod. 5, 21.
ACTIO RESCISSORIA. An action for restoring plaintiff to a right or title which he has lost by prescription, in a case where the equities are such that he should be relieved from the operation of the prescription. Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 226.
An action to rescind a prescriptive title by one who was entitled to exemption from the prescrip-tion law, as a minor, etc.
ACTIO SERVIANA. An action which lay for the lessor of a farm, or rural estate, to recover the goods of the lessee or farmer, which were pledged or bound for the rent. Inst. 4, 6, 7.
ACTIO STRICTI JURIS. An action of strict right. The class of civil law personal actions, which were adjudged only by the strict law, and in which the judge was limited to the precise language of the formula, and had no discretion-ary power to regard the bona fides of the trans-action. See Inst. 4, 6, 28; Gaius, iii. 137; Mackeld. Rom.Law, § 210; 1 Spence, Eq.Jur. 218.
ACTIO TEMPORALIS. An action which must be brought within a limited time. See Limitation.
ACTIO TUTELFE. Action founded on the duties or obligations arising on the relation analogous to that of guardian and ward.
ACTIO UTILIS. A beneficial action or equitable action. An action founded on equity instead of strict law, and available for those who had eq-uitable rights or the beneficial ownership of prop-erty.
Actions are divided into actiones directce or utiles. The former are founded on certain legal obligations which from their origin were accurately detined and recognized as ac-tionable. The latter were formed analogically in imitation of the former. They were permitted in legal obligations for which the actioncs directce were not originally intend-ed, but which resembled the legal obligations which formad the basis of the direct action. Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 207.
ACTIO VENDITI. An action employed in behalf of a seller, to compel a buyer to pay the price, or perform any special obligations embodied in a contract of sale. Hunter, Rom.Law, 332.
ACTIO VI BONORUM RAPTORUM. An action for goods taken by force; a species of mixed ac-tion, which lay for a party whose goods or mov-ables (bona) had been taken from him by force,

(vi,) to recover the things so taken, together with a penalty of triple the value. Inst. 4, 2; Inst. 4, 6, 19. Bracton describes it as lying de rebus mo-bilibus vi ablatis sive robbatis, (for movable things taken away by force, or robbed.) Brac. fol. 103b.
ACTIO VULGARIS. A legal action; a common action. Sometimes used for actio directa. Mack-eld.Rom.Law, § 207.
ACTION. Conduct; behavior; something done; the condition of acting; an act or series of acts.

French Commercial Law

Stock in a company, or shares in a corporation.

Practice

The legal and formal demand of one’s right from another person or party made and ínsisted on in a court of justice, Smith-Webster Co. v. John, C.C.A.Pa., 259 F. 549, 551; Dinsmore v. Barker, 61 Utah, 332, 212 P. 1109; Shaw v. Lone Star Building & Loan Ass’n, Tex.Civ.App., 40 S.W. 2d 968, 969. Pursuit of right in court, without regard to form of procedure. Ginzberg v. Wy-man, 272 Mass. 499, 172 N.E. 614, 615. Form of suit given by law for recovery of that which is one’s due. Co.Litt. 284b, 285a; Peterson v. A. Guthrie & Co., D.C.Wash., 3 F.Supp. 136, 138. Judicial means of enforcing a right. Code Ga. 1882, § 3151 (Civ.Code 1926, § 5507). Judicial rem-edy for the enforcement or protection of a right. White v. White, 98 Ind.App. 587, 186 N.E. 349, 351.
An ordinary proceeding in a court of justice by which one party prosecutes another for the en-forcement or protection of a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a public offense. Code Civ.Proc.S.D.1903, § 12 (Comp.Laws 1929, § 2091) ; Missionary Soc. v. Ely, 47 N.E. 537, 56 Ohio St. 405.
Cross-action, White v. St. Louis Post Offices Corporation, 348 Mo. 961, 156 S.W.2d 695, 698, and counterclalm, Webster v. Freeman, 27 Ca1.App.2d 5, 80 P.2d 497, 499, are actlons but not set off, Kress v. Central Trust Co. of Rochester, 283 N.Y.S. 467, 471, 246 App.D1v. 76.
It includes all the formal proceedings in a court of justice attendant upon the demand of a right made by one person of another in such court, including an adjudication upon the right and lts enforcement or denial by the court.
Proceedings held actlons: Disbarment, In re Wilcox, 90 Kan. 646, 135 P. 995; probating will, Simpson v. Simp-son, 273 III. 90, 112 N.E. 276, 277; will contest, Byrne v. Byrne, Mo.Sup., 181 S.W. 391, 392; workmen’s compensa-tion, Pigeon v. Employers’ Liabillty Assur. Corporation, 216 Mass. 51, 102 N.E. 932, 935, Ann.Cas.1915A, 737; crimi-nal prosecution, Mason v. U. S., C.C.A.I11., 1 P.2d 279, 280; mandamos, People v. Lueders, 287 III. 107, 122 N.E. 374, 375; naturalization, In re Fordiani, 98 Conn. 435, 120 A. 338, 341.
Proceedings held not actions: attachment, State v. Su-perior Court of Spokane County, 110 Wash. 49, 187 P. 708; arbitration, Temple v. Riverland Co., Tex.Civ.App., 228 S. W. 605, 609; criminal prosecution, U. S. v. Cleveland, D.C. Ala., 281 F. 249, 253; Wynn v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 644, 249 S.W. 783, 784; writ of citation, McClelland v. State, 101 Ohio St. 42, 127 N.E. 409, 410; certiorari, Camp-beli, v. Common Council of City of Watertown, 46 S.D. 574, 195 N.W. 442; mandamus, De Leyer v. Britt, 212 N.Y. 565, 106 N.E. 57; child’s support, Head v. Fuller, 122 Me. 15, 118 A. 714, 715; drainage, Richardson County v. Drainage
BlacWs Law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed.-4

Dist. No. 2 of Richardson County, 96 Neb. 169, 147 N.W. 205, 206; condemnation, State v. Superior Court for Ferry County, 145 Wash. 576, 261 P. 110, 111.

Scotch Law

A suit or judicial proceeding.

Sult Distinguished

Strictly applied, action does not usually refer to chancery practice. City of Beckley v. Craig-head, 125 W.Va. 484, 24 S.E.2d 908, 911. But terms "action" and "suit" are now nearly, if not entirely, synonymous. (3 Bl.Comm. 3, 116, et pas-sim.) Elmo v. James, Tex.Civ.App., 282 S.W. 835, 839; Coleman v. Los Angeles County, 180 Cal. 714, 182 P. 440. Or, if there be a distinction, it is that the term "action" is generally confined to proceedings in a court of law, while "suit" is equally applied to prosecutions at law or in equity. McBride v. University Club, 112 Ohio St. 69, 146 N.E. 804, 805; Guarantee Trust & Banking Co. v. Dickson, 148 Ga. 311, 96 S.E. 561, 562; Niantic Milis Co. v. Riverside & O. Milis, 19 R.I. 34, 31 A. 432; Ulshafer v. Stewart, 71 Pa. 170. Formerly, however, an action was considered as terminat-ing with the giving of judgment, the execution forming no part of it. (Litt. § 504; Co.Litt. 289a.) A suit included the execution. (Litt. § 291a.) So, an action is termed by Lord Coke, "the right of a suit." (2 Inst. 40.) Burrill.

Types of Actions

Actions are called, in common-law practice, ex contractu when they are founded on a contract; ex delicto when they arise out of a tort. Nelson v. Great Northern R. Co., 28 Mont. 297, 72 Pac. 642; Van Oss v. Synon, 85 Wis. 661, 56 N.W. 190.
If a cause of action arises from a breach of promise, the action is "ex contractu," and, if it arises from breach of duty growing out of contract, it is "ex delicto." Tort or trespass is none the less such because it incidentally in-volves breach of contract. Berning v. Colodny & Colodny, 103 Cal.App. 188, 284 P. 496, 498.
As to class or representative actions. See Class Or Representative Action.
As to the distinction between a revocatory ac-tion and an action in sirnulation, see Chapman v. Irwin, 157 La. 920, 103 So. 263, 265.
Civil actions are such as lie in behalf of persons to en-force their rights or obtain redress of wrongs in their rela-tion to indlviduals.
Common law actlons are such as will lie, on the par-ticular facts, at common law, without the aid of a stat-ute.
Criminal actions are such as are instituted by the sov-ereign power, for the purgase of punishing or preventing offenses against the public.
Local action. See Local Action.
Mixed actions partake of twofold nature of real and personal actions, having for their object the demand and restitution of real property and also personal damages for a wrong sustained. 3 B1 Comm. 118; Hall v. Decker, 48 Me. 257. Mixed actions are those which are brought for the specific recovery of lands, like real actions, but comprise, joined with this cláim, one for damages in re-spect of such property; such as the action of waste, where, in addition to the recovery of the place wasted, the de-mandant claims damages; the writ of entry, in which, by statute, a demand of mesne profits may be joined; and

ACTION

dower, in which a claim for detention may be included. 48 Me. 255. In the civil law, an action in which some spe-cific thing was demanded, and also some personal obliga-tion claimed to be performed; or, in other words, an ac-tion which proceeded both in rem and in personam. Inst. 4, 6, 20.
Penal actions are such as are brougnt, either by the state or by an individual under permission of a statute, to en-force a penalty imposed by law for the commission of prohlbited act.
Personal action. In civil law, an action in personam. It seeks to enforce an obligation imposed on the defendant by his contract or delict; that is, it is the contention that he is bound to transfer some dominion or to perforen some service or to repair some loss. Gaius, bk. 4, § 2. In com-mon law. An action brought for the recovery of some debt or for damages for some personal injury, in contradistinc-tion to the old real actions, which related to real property only. See 3 Bl.Comm. 117. Boyd v. Cronan, 71 Me. 286; Doe v. Waterloo Min. Co., C.C.Cal., 43 F. 219; Osborn v. Fall River, 140 Mass. 508, 5 N.E. 483. An action which can be brought only by the person himself who is injured, and not by bis representativas.
Popular actions, in English usage, are those actions which are given upon the breach of a penal statute, and which any man that will may sue on account of the king and himself, as the statute allows and the case requires. Because the action is not given to one especially, but gen-erally to any that will prosecute, it is callad "action pop-ular ;" and, from the words used in the process. (qui tom pro domino rege sequitur quant pro se ipso, who sues as well for the king as for himself,) it is callad a qui tam action. Tomlins.
Real actions. At common law, one brought for the spe-cific recovery of lands, tenements, or hereditaments. Steph.Pl. 3; Crocker v. Bleck, 16 Mass. 448; Hall v. Deck-er, 48 Me. 256; Doe v. Waterloo Min. Co., C.C.Cal., 43 F. 220; Mathews v. Sniggs, 75 Okl. 108, 182 P. 703, 708. They are droitural when they are based upon the right of prop-erty, and possessory when basad upon the right of posses-sion. They are either writs of right; writs of entry upon disseisin (which lie in the per, the per et cui, or the post), intrusion, or alienation; writs ancestral possessory, as mort d’ancestor, aiel, besaiel, cossinage, or nuper obiit. Com.Dig. Actions (D 2). The former class was divided into droitural, founded upon demandant’s own seisin, and ancestral droitural upon the demandant’s claim in respect of a mere right descended to him from an ancestor. Pos-sessory actions were divided in the same way—as to the demandant’s own seisin and as to that of his ancestor. Among the civilians, real actions, otherwise called "vindi-cations," were those in which a man demanded something that was his own. They were founded on duminion, or jus in re. The real actions of the Roman law were not. like the real actions of the common law, confined to real estate, but they included personal, as well as real, proper-ty. Wharton.
Statutory actions are such as can only be based upon the particular statutes creating them.
Transitory actions are those founded upon a cause of ac-tion not necessarily referring to or arising in any particu-lar locality. Their characteristic feature is that the right of action follows the person of the defendant. Brown v. Brown, 155 Tenn. 130, 296 S.W. 356, 358. Actions are "transitory" when the transactions relied en might have taken place anywhere, and are "local" when they could not occur except in some particular place; the distinction being in the sature of the subject of the injury, and not in the means used or the place at which the cause of action arises. Brady v. Brady, 161 N.C. 324, 77 S.E. 235, 236, 44 L.R.A.,N.S., 279; Taylor v. Sommers Bros. Match Co., 35 Idaho, 30, 204 P. 472, 474, 42 A.L.R. 189. The test of whether an action is local or transitory is whether the in-jury is done to a subject-matter which, in its natura, could not arlse beyond the locality of its situation, in contra-distinction to the subject causing the injury. IVIattix v. Swepston, 127 Tenn. 693, 155 S.W. 928, 929. Actions triable where defendant resides are termed "transitory" and those triable where the subject-matter is situated are termed "lo-cal." State v. District Court of Swift County, 164 Minn. 433, 205 N.W. 284, 285.
See Cause of Action.

ACTION EX CONTRACTU. An action for breach of promise set forth in a contract, express or implied. Bristol v. Sun Vacuum Stores, 181 Misc. 522, 42 N.Y.S.2d 501, 504; McCullough v. The American Workmen, 200 S.C. 84, 20 S.E.2d 640, 644.
ACTION EX DELICTO. An action arising from a breach of duty growing out of contract. Bern-ing v. Colodny & Colodny, 103 Cal.App. 188, 284 P. 496, 498; Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Maxam, 70 Ind.App. 266, 117 N.E. 801, 806.
ACTION FOR ACCOUNTING. Action in equity based on inadequacy of legal remedy and particu-larly applicable to mutual and complicated ac-counts and where confidential or fiduciary rela-tionship exists. Dahlberg v. Fisse, 328 Mo. 213, 40 S.W.2d 606, 609. To adjust mutual accounts and to strike a balance. Cline v. McKee, 186 Okl. 366, 98 P.2d 25, 27.
ACTION FOR MONEY HAD ‘ AND RECEIVED. One in assumpsit based upon promise to repay im-plied by law, and in respect of limitation is a stated or liquidated account. Mutual Building & Loan Ass’n v. Watson, 226 Ala. 526, 147 So. 817, 818.
where ene person has reeeived money or its equivalent under serh circumstances that in equity and good con-science he ought not te retain it and in justice it belongs to another. Interstate Life & Accident Co. v. Cook, 19
Tenn.App. 290, 86 .2d 887, 891.
ACTION FOR POINDING. An action by a credi-ter to ohtain a sequestration of the rents of land and the goods of his debtor for the satisfaction of the debt, or to enforce a distress.
ACTION IN PERSONAM, IN REM. See In Per-sonam, In Rem.
ACTION OF ABSTRACTED MULTURES. An ac-tion for multures or tolls against those who are thirled to a mil], i. e., bound to grind their corn at a certain mill, and fail to do so. Bell.
ACTION OF ADHERENCE. See Adherence.
ACTION OF A WRIT. A phrase used when a de-fendant pleads some matter by which he shows that the plaintiff had no cause to have the writ sued upon, although it may be that he is entitled to another writ or action for the same matter. Cowell.
ACTION OF ASSIZE. A real action which prov-es the title of the demandant, merely by showing his ancestor’s possession. Sherman v. Dilley, 3 Nev. 21, 26, citing 5 Chit.B1. 184.
ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT. See Assumpsit.
ACTION OF BOOK DEBT. A form of action for the recovery of claims, such as are usually evi-denced by a book-account; this action is princi-pally used in Vermont and Connecticut. Newton v. Higgins, 2 Vt. 366.
ACTION ON CONTRACT. An a.ction brought to enforce rights whereof the contract is the evi-

ACTIONABLÉ

clouded or its value depreciated, or whereby the plaintiff might be incommoded or damnifled by assertion of an out-standing title already held or to grow out of the adverse pretension. Bank of American Nat. Trust & Savings Ass’n v. Town of Atherton, 60 Cal.App.2d 268, 140 P.2d 678, 680.
ACTIONABLE. That for which an action will lie, furnishing legal ground for an action.
ACTIONABLE FRAUD. Deception practiced in order to induce another to part with property or surrender some legal right; a false representa-tion made with an intention to deceive; may be committed by stating what is known to be false or by professing knowledge of the truth of a state-ment which is false, but in either case, the essen-tial ingredient is a falsehood uttered with intent to deceive. Sawyer v. Prickett, 19 Wall. 146, 22 L. Ed. 105.
To constitute "actionable fraud," it must appear that de-fendant made a material representation; that it was false; that when he made it he knew it was false, or made it recklessly without any knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; that he made it with intention that it should be acted on by plaintiff ; that plaintiff acted in re-liance on it; and that plaintiff thereby suffered injury. Blair v. McCool, 136 Or. 139. 295 P. 950, 952. Essential ele-ments are representation, falsity. scienter, .deception, and injury. Cobb v. Cobb, 211 N.C. 146, 189 S.E. 479, 482.
ACTIONABLE MISREPRESENTATION. A false statement respecting a fact . material to the con-tract and which is influential in procuring it. Wise v. Fuller, 29 N.J.Eq. 257.
ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE. The breach or nonperformance of a legal duty, through neglect or carelessness, resulting in damage or injury to another. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Cutts, 95 Me. 162, 49 Atl. 673.
It is failure of duty, omission of something which ought to have been done, or doing of something which ought not to have been done, or which reasonable man. guided by considerations which ordinarlly regulate conduct of hu-man affairs, would or would not do. Goff v. Emde, 32 Ohio App. 216, 167 N.E. 699, 700. Essential elements are failure to exercise due tare, injury, or darnage, and proxi-mate cause. Rountree v. Fountain, 203 N.C. 381, 166 S.E. 329, 330.
ACTIONABLE NUISANCE. Anything wrong-f ully done or permitted which injures or annoys another in the enjoyment of his legal rights. Mil-ler v. City of Dayton, 70 Ohio App. 173, 41 N.E.2d 728, 730.
Anything injurtous to health, or lndecent, or offenslve to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property so as to Interfere with the confortable enjoyment of life or property. Cooper v. Overton, 102 Tenn. 211, 52 S.W. 183, 45 L.R.A. 591.
ACTIONABLE TORT. To constitute an "action-able tort," there must be a legal duty, imposed by statute or otherwise, owing by defendant to the one injured, and in the absence of such duty dam-age caused is "injury without wrong" or "damnum absque injuria." Coleman v. California Yearly Meeting of Friends Church, 27 Cal.App.2d 579, 81 P.2d 469, 470.
ACTIONABLE WORDS. In law of libel and slander, such words as naturally imply damage. Dahm v. O’Connell, 161 N.Y.S. 909, 911, 96 Misc.

Per Quod
Words actionable only on allegation and proof of special damage. Knapp v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 111 Colo. 492, 144 P.2d 981, 984,
Words not actionable per se opon their face. but only in consequence of extrinsic íacts showing circumstances under which they were said or the damages resulting to slandered party therefrom. Smith v. Mustain, 210 Ky. 445, 276 S.W. 154, 155, 44 A.L.R. 336. Not injurious on their face in their usual and natural signification, but only so in consequence oí extrinsic facts and requiring innuendo. Piplack v. Mueller, 97 Fla. 440, 121 So. 459.
Per Se
Words in themselves libelous. Knapp v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 111 Colo. 492, 144 P.2d 981, 984.
Words which law presumes must actually, proximately, and necessarily damage defendant for which general dam-ages are recoverable and whose injurious character is a fact of common notoriety. established by the general con-sent of men, necessarily importing damage. Ellsworth v. Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, 66 N.D. 578, 268 N.W. 400, 407. Words themselves opprobrious; susceptible only of opprobrious meaning. Fite v. Oklahoma Pub. Co., 146 Okl. 150, 293 P. 1073, 1075. Importing a charge of some punishable crime or some offensive disease, imputing moral turpitude, or tending, to injure a party in his trade or business. Barnes v. Trundy, 31 Me. 321; Lemons v. Wells, 78 Ky. 117; Mayrant v. Richardson, 1 Nott & McC. 347. 9 Am.Dec. 707. Tending to injure one’s reputation, thereby exposing him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, tend-ing to degrade or lower him. Hodges v. Cunningham, 160 Miss. 576, 135 So. 215, 217. Such words are actionable without allegation of special damages. Kluender v. Se-mann, 203 Iowa 68, 212 N.W. 326, 327. See also Libelous per se.
ACTIONABLE WRONG. Committed when a re-sponsible person has neglected to use a reasonable degree of care for protection of another person from such injury as under existing circumstances should reasonably have been foreseen as a proxi-mate consequence of that negligence. Chadwick v. Bush, 174 Miss. 75, 163 So. 823, 824.
ACTIONARE. L. Lat. (From actio, an action.) In old records. To bring an action; to prosecute, or sue. Thorn’s Chrori.; Whishaw.
ACTIONARY. A foreign comrnercial term for the proprietor of an action or share of a public company’s stock; a stockholder.
ACTIONES LEGIS. In the Roman law, legal or lawful action; actions of or at law,) legitimce ac-tiones.) Dig. 1, 2, 2, 6.
ACTIONES NOMINATZE. (Lat. named actions). In the English chancery, writs for which there were precedents. The statute of Westminster, 2, c. 24, gave chancery authority to form new writs in consimili casa; hence the action on the case.
ACTIONS. (Fr.) Shares of corporate stock. Compare Actionary.
ACTIONS ORDINARY. Yn Scotch law, all actions which are not rescissory. Ersk.Inst. 4, 1, 18.
ACTIONS RESCISSORY. In Scotch law, these are either (1) actions of proper improbation for declaring a writing false or forged; (2) actions of reduction-improbation for the production of a

writing in order to have it set aside or its effect ascertained under the certification that the writ-ing if not produced shall be declared false or forged; and (3) actions of simple reduction, for declaring a writing called for null until produced. Ersk.Princ. 4, 1, 5.
ACTIONUM GENERA MAXIME SUNT SER-VANDA. The kinds of actions are especially to be preserved: Lofft 460.
ACTIVE. That is in action; that demands ac-tion; actually subsisting; the opposite of pas-sive. An active debt is one which draws interest. An active trust is a confidence connected with a duty. An active use is a present legal estate.
ACTIVE CONCEALMENT. This implies a pur-pose or design accomplished by words or acts, while passive concealment consists in mere silence where there is a duty to speak. Vendt v. Duenke, Mo.App., 210 S.W.2d 692, 699.
Concealment becomes a fraud where it is effected by mis-leading and’ deceptive talk, acts, or conduct, where it is accompanied by misrepresentations, or where, in addition to a party’s silence, there is any statement, word, or act on his part which tends allirmatively toa suppression of the truth. Such conduct is designated active concealment. Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., C.C.A.I11., 112 F.2d 302, 309.
ACTIVE NEGLIGENCE. A term of extensive meaning obviously embracing many occurrences that would fali short of willful wrongdoing, or of crass negligence, for example, all inadvertent acts causing injury to others, resulting from failure to exercise ordinary care, likewise all acts the effects of which are misjudged or unforeseen, through want of proper attention, or reflection, and hence the term covers the acts of willful wrongdoing and also those which are not of that character. Cohen v. Noel, Tenn.App., 104 S.W.2d 1001, 1005.
ACTIVE SERVICE. "Active service" in army does not necessarily mean actual service, but means service performed at direction of superior officer or ofthcers while receiving emoluments to which soldier is entitled. United States v. Wood-worth, D.C.Mass., 36 F.Supp. 645, 646.
ACTIVE TRUST. See Trust.
ACTIVITY. A recreational "activity" is a physi-cal or gymnastic exercise, an agile performance, such as dancing. McClure v. Board of Education of City of Visalia, 38 Cal.App. 500, 176 P. 711, 712.
ACTON BURNEL, STATUTE OF. In English law, a statute, otherwise called Statutum Merca-torum or de Mercatoribus the statute of the mer-chante, made at a parliament held at the castle or village of Acton Burnel in Shropshire, in the 11th year of the reign of Edward I. 2 Reeves, Eng. Law, 158-162. It was a statute for the collection of debts, the earliest of its class, being enacted in 1283. A further statute for the same object, and known as De Mercatoribus, was enacted 13 Edw. I. (c. 3.). See Statute Merchant.

Old European Law

A patron, proctor, advocate, or pleader; one who acted for another in legal matters; one who represented a party and managed his cause. An attorney, bailiff, or steward; one who man-aged or acted for another. The Scotch "doer" ís the literal translation.

Roman Law

One who acted for another; one who attended to another’s business; a manager or agent. A slave who attended to, transacted, or superintend-ed his master’s business or affairs, received and paid out moneys, and kept accounts. Burrill.
The word has a variety of closely-related meanings, very nearly corresponding with manager. Thus, actor domince, manager of bis master’s farm; actor ecclesice, manager of church property; actores provinciarum, tax-gatherers, treasurers, and managers of the public debt.
Actor ecclesice.—An advocate for a church; one who protects the temporal interests of a church. Actor viliw was the steward or head-baillff of a town or village. Cow-ell.
Plaintiff or comp7ainant. In a civil or private action the plaintiff was often callad by the Romans "petitor;" in a public action (causa publIca) he was called "accusator." The defendant was callad "reos," both in private and pub-lic causes; this term, however, according to Cicero, (De Orat. ii, 43,) might signify either party, as indeed we might conclude from the word itself. In a private action, the defendant was often called "adversarius," but either party might be called so.
Also, the term is used of a party who, for the time bsing, sustains the burden of proof, or has the initiative in the suit.
Actor qui contra regulam qujd adduxit, non est audiendus. A plaintiff (or pleader) is not to be heard who has advanced anything against author-ity, (or against the rule.)
Actor sequitur forum rei. According as rei is intended as the genitive of res, a thing, or rens, a defendant, this phrase means; The plaintiff fol-lows the forum of the property in suit, or the fo-rum of the defendant’s residence. Branch, Max. 4. Home, Law Tr. 232; Story, Confl.L. § 325 k; 2 Kent 462.
ACTORE NON PROBANTE REUS ABSOLVI-TUR. When the plaintiff does not prove his case the defendant is acquitted (or absolved). Hob. 103.
ACTORI INCUMBIT ONUS PROBANDI. The burden of proof rests on the plaintiff, (or on the party who advances a proposition affirmatively.) Hob. 103.
ACTORNAY. In old Scotch law, an attorney. Skene.
ACTRIX. Lat. A female actor; a female plain-tiff. Calvinus, Lex.
ACTS OF COURT. Legal memoranda made in the admiralty courts in England, in the nature of pleas.
ACTS OF POSSESSION. To constitute adverse possession, acts of possession must be such as,if seen by the party whose claim is sought to be divested, would apprise him that the party doing the acts claimed the ownership of the property. Crosby v. City of Greenville, 183 Mich. 452, 150 N.W. 246, 248.
ACTS OF SEDERUNT. In Scotch law, ordinances for regulating the forms of proceeding, before the court of session, in the administration of justice, made by the judges, who have the power by virtue of a Scotch act of parliament passed in 1540. Ersk. Prin. § 14.
ACTUAL. Real; substantial; existing presently in act, having a valid objective existence as op-posed to that which is merely theoretical or possi-ble. Ciaccio v. Hartman, 170 La. 949, 129 So. 540. Opposed to potential, possible, virtual, conceiv-abie, theoretical, hypothetical, or nominal. Amer-ican Ins. Co. of Newark, N. J., v. Seminole County Board of Education, 51 Ga.App. 808, 181 S.E. 783, 786. Something real, in opposition to construc-tive or speculative; something existing in act. Astor v. Merritt, 4 S.Ct. 413, 111 U.S. 202, 28 L. Ed. 401. Existing in act, fact, or reality. Guar-isco v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co., 4 N.Y.S.2d 788, 792, 167 Misc. 875.
It is used as a legal term in contradistinction to virtual or constructive as of possession or occupation; Cleveland v. Crawford, 7 Hun (N.Y.) 616; or an actual settler. which implies actual residence; McIntyre v. Sherwood, 82 Cal. 139, 22 Pac. 937. An actual seizure means nothing more than seizure, since there was no fiction of construc-tive seizure before the act; L.R. 6 Exch. 203.
Actually is opposed to seemingly, pretendcdly. or feign-edly, as actually cm-maca in farming means really, truly, in fact; In re Strawbridgc & Mays, 39 Ala. 367; Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Commonwealth, 208 Ky. 606, 271 S.W. 693,
694.
As to actual "Bias," "Damages," "Delivery," "Fraud," "Mollee," "Notice," "Occupation," "Ouster," "Posses-sion," "Residence," "Seisin," "Total Loss," see those ti-tles.
ACTUAL AUTHORITY. In the law of agency, sueh authority as a principal intentionally confers on the agent, or intentionally or by want of ordi-nary care allows the agent to believe himself to possess. National Cash Register Co. v. Wichita Frozen Food Lockers, Tex.Civ.App., 172 S.W.2d 781, 787. Includes both express and implied au-thority. Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d 646, 651.
ACTUAL BIAS. See Bias.
ACTUAL CASH VALUE. The fair or reasonable cash price for which the property could be sold in the market, in the ordinary course of business, and not at forced sale; the price it will bring in a fair market after reasonable efforts to find a purchaser who will give the highest price. Pea-vy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Jackson, 161 La. 669, 109 So. 351, 352. What property is worth in money, allowing for depreciation. Gleris Falls Ins. Co. of New York v. Garner, 229 Ala. 39, 155 So. 533, 536. Ordinarily, "actual cash value," "fair mar-ket price," and "market value" are synonymous tercos. Butler v. .1Etna Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 64 N.D. 764, 256 N.W. 214, 218.

ACTUAL

ACTUAL CHANGE OF POSSESSION. In stat-utes of frauds, an open, visible, and unequivocal change of possessiori, manifested by the usual out-ward signs, as distinguished from a merely for-mal or constructive change. Stevens v. Irwin, 15 Cal. 503, 76 Am.Dec. 500.
ACTUAL COST. The actual price paid for goods by a party, in the case of a real bona fide pur-chase, and not the market value of the goods. Ogunquit Village Corporation v. Inhabitants of Wells, 123 Me. 207, 122 A. 522, 524.
"Actual cost" has no common-law significance, and it 1s without any well-understood trade or technical meaning. It is a general or descriptive term which may have vary-ing meanings according to the circumstances in which it is used. It imports the exact sum expended or loss sus-tained rather than the average or proportional part of the cost. Its meaning may be restricted to overhead or ex-tended to other ¡tenis. State v. Northwest Poultry & Egg Co., 203 Minn. 438, 281 N.W. 753, 755.
ACTUAL DELIVERY. See Delivery.
ACTUAL EVICTION. An actual expulsion of the tenant out of all or some part of the demised premises; a physical ouster or dispossession from the very thing granted or some substantial part thereof. Cauley v. Northern Trust Co., 315 Ill. App. 307, 43 N.E.2d 147, 155, 315.
An arbitrary and willful interference with tenant’s rights by landlord is essential. Kusche v. Sabin, City Ct., New Rochelle, 6 N.Y.S.2d 771, 773. Deprivation of beneficiad enjoyment of property in whole or in part or exclusion from some portion of demised premises. Kusche v. Sabin, City Ct., New Rochelle, 6 N.Y.S.2d 771, 773. Dispossession by process of law, Stanton v. Conley, 278 N.Y.S. 275, 277. 244 App.Div. 84. Expulsion or exclusion from demised premises. Liberal Savings & Loan Co. v. Frankel Realty Co., 137 Ohio St. 489, 30 N.E.2d 1012, 1017, physical expul-sion by landlord. General American Life Ins. Co. v. North American Mfg. Co., 320 Ill.App. 488, 51 N.E.2d 619, wrong-ful entry on premises by lessor is necessary. Title & Trust Co. v. Durkheimer Inv. Co., 155 Or. 427, 63 P.2d 909.
ACTUAL FRAUD. See Fraud.
ACTUAL LOSS. One resulting from the real and substantial destruction of the property in-sured.
ACTUAL MARKET VALUE. In custom laws, the price at which merchandise is freely offered for sale to all purchasers; the price which the manufacturer or owner would have received for merchandise, sold in the ordinary course of trade in the usual wholesale quantities. United States v. Sischo, D.C.Wash., 262 F. 1001, 1011.
ACTUAL NOTICE. See Notice. ACTUAL POSSESSION. See Possession.
ACTUAL PRACTICE. Active, open and notori-ous engagement in business, vocation or profes-sion as opposed to casual, occasional or clandes-tine practice. State ex rel. Laughlin v. Washing-ton State Bar Ass’n, 26 Wash.2d 914, 176 P.2d 301, 309.
ACTUAL RESIDENCE. The abode, where one actually lives, not mere naked legal residence. In Re McGrath, 243 App.Div. 803, 278 N.Y.S. 135,ACTUAL SALE. Lands are "actually sold" at a tax sale, so as to entitle the treasurer to the stat-utory fees, when the sale is completed; when he has collected from the purchaser the amount of the bid. Miles v. Miller, 5 Neb. 272.
ACTUAL VALUE. "Actual value" to be awarded in condemnation proceeding is price that would probably result from negotiations between will-ing seller and willing buyer. State v. Hoblitt, 87 Mont. 403, 288 P. 181, 185. "Actual value,’ "market value," "fair value," and the like may be used as convertible terms. Kerr v. Clinch-field Coal Corporation, 169 Va. 149, 192 S.E. 741, 744. "Saleable value," "actual value," "cash value," and others used in directions to tax as-sessing officers, all mean the same thing. In re Lang Body Co., C.C.A.Ohio, 92 F.2d 338, 340.
ACTUAL VIOLENCE. An assault with actual violence is an assault with physical force put in action, exerted upon the person assailed. The term violence is synonymous with physical force, and the two are used interchangeably in rela-tion to assaults. Tanner v. State, 24 Ga.App. 13Z 100 S.E. 44.
ACTUARIUS. In Roman law, a notary or clerk. One who drew the acts or statutes, or who wrote in brief the public acts.
An officer who had charge of the public baths; an officer who received the money for the soldiers, and distributed it among them; a notary.
An actor, which see. Du Cange.
ACTUARY. In English ecclesiastical law, a clerk that registers the acts and constitutions of the lower house of convocation; or a registrar in a court christian.
Also an officer appointed to keep savings banks accounts; the computing officer of an insurance company; a person skilled in calculating the val-ue of life interests, annuities, and insurances. Champagne v. Unity Industrial Life Ins. Co., La. App., 161 So. 52, 53.
ACTUM. Lat. A deed; something done.
ACTUS. In the civil law, an act or action. Non tantum verbis, sed etiam actu; not only by words, but also by act. Dig. 46, 8. 5.
A species of right of way, consisting in the right of driving cattle, or a carriage, over the land subject to the servitude. Inst. 2, 3, pr. It is some-times translated a "road," and included the kind of way termed "iter," or path. Lord Coke, whe adopts the term "actas" from Bracton, defines it a foot and horse way, vulgarly called "pack and prime way;" but distinguishes it from a cart-way. Co.Litt. 56a; Boyden v. Achenbach, 79 N.C. 539.
In old English law, an act of parliament; statute. 8 Coke 40. A distinction, however, was sometimes made between actus and statutum. Actus parliamenti was an act made by the lords and commons; and it became statutum, when it received the king’s consent. Barring.Obs.St. 46, note b.

Actus curiae neminem gravabit. An act of the court shall prejudice no man. Jenk.Cent. 118. Where a delay in an action is the act of the court, neither party shall suffer for it.
Actas Dei nemini est. damnosus. The act of God is hurtful to no one. 2 Inst. 287. That is, a per-son cannot be prejudiced or held responsible for an accident occurring without his fault and at-tributable to the "act of God." See Act of God.
Actus Dei nemini facit injuriam. The act of God does injury to no one. 2 Bl.Comm. 122. A thing which is inevitable by the act of God, which no industry can avoid, nor policy prevent, will not be construed to the prejudice of any person in \vhom there was no lachos. Broom, Max. 230.
Actus inceptus, cujus perfectio pendet ex vol-untate partium, revocari potest; si autem pen-det ex voluntate testix persona., vel ex contin-genti, revocari non potest. An act already be-gun, the completion of which depends on the will of the parties, may be revoked; but if it depend on the will of a third person, or on a con-tingency, it cannot be revoked. Bac.Max. reg. 20.
Actus ,judiciarios coram non judice irritas hab-etur, de ministeriali autem a quocunque provenit ratum esto. A judicial act by a judge without jurisdiction is void; but a ministerial act, from whomsoever proceeding, may be ratified. Lofft, 458.
Actus legis nemini est damnosus. The act of the law is hurtful to no one. An act in law shall prejudice no man. 2 Inst. 287.
Actus legis nemini facit injuriam. The act of the law does injury to no one. 5 Coke, 116.
Actus legitimi non recipiunt modum. Acts re-quired to be done by law do not admit of qualifica-tion. Hob. 153; Branch, Princ.
Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me, against my will, is not my act. Branch, Princ.
Actus non facit reum, nisi meas sit rea. An act does not malle [the doer of iti guilty, unless the mirad be guilty; that is, unless the intention be criminal. 3 Inst. 107. The intent and the act must both concur to constitute the crime, Lord Kenyon, C. J., 7 Term 514; Broom, Max. 306.
Actus repugnus non potest in esse produci. A repugnan’, act cannot be brought into being, i. e., cannot be made effectual. Plowd. 355.
Actus servi in lis quibus opera ejus communiter adhibita est, actus domini habetur. The act of a servant in those things in which he is usually em-ployed, is considered the act of his master. Lofft, 227.
A. D. An abbreviation of Anno Domini meaning in the year of our Lord. Commonwealth v. Tray-lor, 20 Ky,Law Rep. 97, 98, 45 S.W. 356.

AD CULPAM

AD. Lat. At; by; for; near; on account of; to; until; upon; with relation to or concerning.
AD ABUNDANTIOREM CAUTELAM. L. Lat. For more atrundant caution. 2 How. State Tr. 1182. Otherwise expressed, ad t’antelara ex super-abundanti. Id. 1163.
AD ADMITTENDUM CLERICUYI. For the ad-mitting of the clerk. A writ in the nature of an execution, commanding the bishop to admit bis clerk, upon the success of the latter in a quare inbpedit.
AD ALIUD EXAMEN. To another tribunal; be-longing to another court, cognizance, or jurisdic-tion.
AD ALIUM DIEM. At another day. A common phrase in the old reports. Yearb. P. 7 Hen. VI. 13.
AD ASSISAS CAPIENDAS. To take assises; to take or hold the assises. Bract. fol. 110a; 3 Bl. Comm. 185, 352. Ad assisam capiendam; to take an assise. Bract. fol. 110b.
Al) AlUDIENDAYI CONSIDERATIONEM CURI/E. To hear the judgment of the court. Bract. 383 b.
AD AUDIENDUM ET DETERMINANDUM. To hear and determine. St. Westm. 2, cc. 29, 30. 4 Bla.Com. 278.
Al) BARRAM. To the bar; at the bar. 3 How. State Tr. 112.
AD BARRAM EVOCATUS. Called to the bar. 1 Ld.Raym. 59.
AD CAMPI PARTEM. For a share of the field or land, for champert. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 36, § 4.
AD CAPTUM VULGI. Adapted to the common understanding.
AD COLLIGENDUM. For collecting; as an ad-ministrator or trustee ad colligendum. 2 Kent 414.
AD COLLIGENDUM BONA DEFUNCTI. For collecting the goods of the deceased. See Admin-istration of Estates.
AD COMMUNE NOCUMENTUM. To the com-mon nuisance. Broom & H.Com. 196.
AD COMMUNEM LEGEM. At common law, the name of a writ of entry (now obsolete) brought by the reversioners after the death of the life tenant, for the recovery of lands wrongfully alienated by him.
AD COMPARENDUM. To appear. Ad campar. endum, et ad standum inri, to appear and to stand to the law, or abide the judgment of the court. Cro.Jac. 67.
AD COMPUTUM REDDENDUM. To render an account. St.Westm. 2, c. 11.
Al) CULPAM. Until misbehavior.

AD CURIAM

AD CURIAM. At a court. 1 Salk. 195. To court. Ad curiam votare, to summon to court.
AD CUSTAGIA. At the costs. Toullier; Cowell; Whishaw.
AD CUSTUM. At the cost. 1 BI.Comm. 314.
AD DAMNUM. In pleading. "To the damage." The technical name of that clause of the writ or declaration which contains a statement of the plaintiff’s money loss, or the damages which he claims. Vincent v. Life Ass’n, 75 Conn. 650, 55 Atl. 177.
AD DEFENDENDUM. To defend. 1 Bl.Comm. 227.
AD DIEM. At a day; at the day. Townsh.P1. 23. Ad caium diem. At another day. Y.B. 7 Hen. VI, 13. Ad certum diem, at a certain day. 2 Strange, 747. Solvit ad diem; he paid at or on the day. 1 Chit.P1. 485.
AD EA QUIE FREQUENTIUS ACCIDUNT JURA ADAPTANTUR. Laws are adapted to those cases which most frequently occur. 2 Inst. 137; Broom, Max. 43.
Laws are adapted to cases which frequently occur. A statute, which, construed according to its plain words, is, in all cases of ordinary occurrence, in no degree Incon-sistent or unreasonable, should not be varied by construc-tion in every case, merely because there is one possible but highly improbable case in which the law would oper-ate with great severity and against our notions of justice. The utmost that can be contended is that the construction of the statute should be varied in that particular case, so as to obviate the injustice. 7 Exch. 549; 8 Exch. 778.
AD EFFECTUM. To the effect, or end. Co.Litt. 204a; 2 Crabb, Real Prop. p. 802, § 2143. Ad e ffectum sequentem, to the effect following. 2 Salk. 417.
AD EVERSIONEM JURIS NOSTRI. To the over-throw of our right. 2 Kent 91.
AD EXCAMBIUM. For exchange; for compensa-tion. Bract. fol. 12b, 37b.
AD EXHPEREDATIONEM. To the disherison, or disinheriting; to the injury of the inheritance. 3 B1.Comm. 288.
Formal words in the old writ of waste, which calls upon the tenant to appear and show cause why he hath commit-ted waste and destruction in the place named, ad exhoere-dationem, etc.; Fitzherbert, Nat.Bev. 55.
AD EXITUM. At issue; at the end (of the plead-ings.) Steph.P1. 24.
AD FACIENDUM. To do. Co.Litt. 204a. Ad faciendum, sub ficiendum et recipiendum; to do, submit to, and receive. Ad faciendam juratamil-lam; to make up that jury. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 65, § 12.
Al) FACTUM PRMSTANDUM. In Scotch law, a name descriptive of a class of obligations marked by unusual severity. A debtor ad fac. prces. is denied the benefit of the act of grace, the privilege of sanctuary, and the cessio bonorum; Erskine, Inst. lib. 3, tit. 3, § 62; Kames, Eq. 216.
AD FEODI FIRMAM. To fee farm. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 50, § 30.
AD FIDEM. In allegiance. 2 Kent, Comm. 56. Subjects born ad fidem are those born in alle-giance.
AD FILUM AQUIE. To the thread of the water; to the central line, or middle of the stream. Usque ad filum aguce, as far as the thread of the stream. Bract. fol. 208b; 235a. A phrase of f re-quent occurrence in modern law; of which ad medium filum aguce (q. v.) is another form, and etymologically more exact.
AD FILUM VIZE. To the middle of the way; to the central line of the road. Parker v. Inhabi-tants of Framingham, 8 Mete. (Mass.) 260.
AD FINEM. Abbreviated ad fin. To the end. It is used in citations to books, as a direction to read from the place designated to the end of the chapter, section, etc. Ad finem litis, at the end of the suit.
AD FIRMAM. To farm. Derived from an oid Saxon word denoting rent. Ad firmam noctis was a fine or penalty equal in amount to the estimated cost of entertaining the king for one night. Co-well. Ad feodi firmam, to lee farm. Spelman.
AD FUNDANDAM JURISDICTIONEM. To make the basis of jurisdiction. [1905] 2 K.B. 555.
AD GAOLAS DELTBERANDAS. To deliver the gaols; to empty the gaols. Bract. fol. 109b. Ad gaolam deliberandam; to deliver the gaol; to make gaol delivery. Bract. fal. 110b.
AD GRAVAMEN. To the grievance, injury, or oppression. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 47, § 10.
AD HOC. For this; for this special purpose.
An attorney ad hoc, or a guardian or curator ad hoc, is one appointed for a special purpose, generally to repre-sent the client or infant in the particular action In which the appointment is ‘nade. Bienvenu v. Insurance Co., 33. La.Ann. 212.
AD HOMINEM. To the person. A term used in logic with reference to a personal argument.
AD HUNC DIEM. At this day. 1 Leon. 90.
AD IDEM. To the same point, or effect. Ad idem facit, it makes to or goes to establish the same point. Bract. fol. 27b.
AD INDE. Thereunto. Ad inde requisitus, there-unto required. Townsh.P1. 22.
AD INFINITUM. Without limit; to an infinite extent; indefinitely.
AD INQUIRENDUM. To inquire; a writ of in-quiry; a judicial writ, commanding inquiry to be made of anything relating to a cause pending in court. Cowell.
AD INSTANTIAM. At the instance. 2 Mod. 44. Ad instantiam partis, at the instance of a party. Hale, Com.Law, 28.

AD INTERIM. In the meantime. An officer ad interim is one appointed to fill a temporary va-caney, or to discharge the duties of the office dur-ing the absence or temporary incapacity of its reg-ular incumbent.
AD JUDICIUM. To judgment; to court. Ad judi-ciurn provocare; to summon to court; to com-mence an action; a term of the Roman law.
Dig. 5, 1, 13, 14.
•
AD JUNGENDUM AUXILIUM. To joining in aid; to join in aid. See Aid Prayer.
AD JURA REGÍS. To the rights of the king; a writ which was brought by the king’s clerk, pre-sented to a living against those who endeavored to eject him, to the prejudice of the king’s title. Reg. Writs 61.
AD LARGU31. At large: as, title at large; assize at large. See Dane, Abr. c. 144, art. 16, § 7. Also at liberty; free, or unconfined. Ire ad largura, to go at large. Plowd. 37.
At large; giving details, or particulars; in extenso. A special verdict was formerly called a verdict at large. Plowd. 92.
AD LIBITUM. At pleasure. 3 Bla.Com. 292.
AD LITEM. For the suit; for the purposes of the suit; pending the suit. A guardian ad litem is a guardian appointed to prosecute or defend a suit on behalf of a party incapacitated by infancy or otherwise.
AD LUCRANDITM VEL PERDENDUM. For gain or loss. Emphatic words in the old warrants of attorney. Reg. Orig. 21, et seq. Sometimes ex-pressed in English, "to lose and gain." Plowd. 201.
AD MAJOREM CAUTELA31. For greater se-curity. 2 How.State Tr. 1182.
AD MANUM. At hand; ready for use. Et quer-ens sectam habeat ad inanum; and the plaintiff immediately have his suit ready. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 44, § 2.
AD MEDIUM FILUM AQUFE. To the middle thread of the stream. See Ad Filum Aqu.
AD MEDIU31 FILUM VISE. To the middle thread of the way.
AD MELIUS INQUIRENDUM. A writ directed to a coroner commanding him to hold a second in-quest. See 45 Law J.Q.B. 711.
AD MORDENDU1%I ASSUETUS. Accustomed to bite. Cro.Car. 254. A material averment in dec-larations for damage done by a dog to persons or animals. 1 Chit.P1. 388; 2 Chit.P1. 597.
AD NOCUMENTUM. To the nuisance, or annoy-ance; to the hurt or injury. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 52, § 19. Ad nocurnentum liberi tenementi sui, to the nuisance of his freehold. Formal words in the old assise of nuisance. 3 Bl.Comm. 221.
AD OFFICIUM JUSTICIARIORUM SPECTAT, UNICUIQUE CORAM EIS PLACITANTI JUS-TITIAM EXHIBERE. It is the duty of justices to administer justice to every one pleading before them. 2 Inst. 451.
AD OMISSA VEL MALE APPRETIATA. With relation to omissions or wrong interpretations. 3 Ersk.Inst. 9, § 36.
AD OPUS. To the work. See 21 Harv.L.Rev. 264, citing 2 Poll. & Maitl. 232 et seq.; Use.
AD OSTENDENDUM. To show. Formal words in old writs. Fleta, lib. 4, c. 65, § 12.
AD OSTIUM ECCLESILE. At the door of the church. One of the five species of dower formerly recognized by the English law. 1 Washb.Real Prop. 149; 2 B1.Comm. 132.
AD PIOS USUS. Lat. For pious (religious or charitable) uses or purposes. Used with reference to gifts and bequests.
AD PROSEQUENDAM. To prosecute. 11 Mod. 362.
Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impedia-tur sententiá. Relative words refer to the near-est antecedent, unless it be prevented by the con-text. Jenk.Cent. 180; Brown v. Brown, Del., 3 Terry 157, 29 A.2d 149, 153.
Al) PUNCTUM TEMPORIS. At the point of time. Sto.Bailm. § 263.
AD QUFEREVIONIA31. On complaint of.
AD QUAESTIONEM FACTI NON RESPONDENT JUDICES, Al) QUAESTIONE3I JURIS NON RE-SPONDENT JURATORES. Means that juries must answer to questions of fact and judges to qu.estions of law. Ex parte United States, C.C.A. Wis., 101 F.2d 870, 874.
AD QUEM. To which.
A term used in the eomputation of time or distanee. as correiative to a quo; denotes the end or terminal point. See A Quo.
The terminas a que is the point of beginning or de-parture: the terminas ad quem, the end of the period or point of arrival.
AD QUESTIONES FACTI NON RESPONDENT JUDICES; AD QUESTIONES LEGIS NON RE-SPONDENT JURATORES. Judges do not answer questions of fact; juries do not answer questions of law. 8 Coke, 308; Co.Litt. 295.
AD QUIESTIONES LEGIS JUDICES, ET NON JURATORES, RESPONDENT. Judges, and not jurors, decide questions of law. 7 Mass. 279.
AD QUOD CURIA CONCORDAVIT. To which the court agreed. Yearb.P. 20 IIen. VI. 27.
AD QUOD DAMNUM. The narre of a writ for-merly issuing from the English chancery, com-manding the sheriff to make inquiry "to what damage" a specified act, if done, will tend.

AD QUOD DAMNUM

It is a writ which ought to be sued before the king grants certain liberties, as a fair, market or such like, which may be prejudicial to others, and thereby it should be inquired whether it will be a prejudice to grant them, and to whom it will be prejudicial, and what prejudice \vill come thereby. Termes de la Ley.
There is also another writ of ad quod dasnnum, if any one will turn a common highway and lay out another way as beneficiad. Termes de la Ley.
The writ of ad quod damnum is a common-law writ. in the nature of an original writ, issued by the prothonotary, and in condemnation proceedings is returnable to and sub-ject to confirmation of the Superior Court. Elbert v. Scott, Del., 5 Boyce 1, 90 A. 587.
AD QUOD NON FUIT RESPONSUM. To which there was no answer.
A phrase used in the reports, where a point advanced in argument by one party was not denied by the other: or where a point or argument of counsel was not met or notice by the court; or where an objection was met by the court, and not replied to by the counsel who raised it. 3 Coke, 9; 4 Coke, 40.
AD RATIONEM PONET1E. To cite a person to appear. A technical expression in the old rec-ords of the Exchequer, signifying, to put to the bar and interrogate as to a charge made; to ar-raign on a trial.
AD RECOGNOSCENDUM. To recognize. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 65, § 12. Formal words in old writs.
AD RECTE DOCENDUM OPORTET, PRIMUM INQUIRERE NOMINA, QUIA RERUM COGNI-TIO A NOMINIBUS RERUM DEPENDET. In order rightly to comprehend a thing, inquire first into the names, for a right knowledge of things depends upon their names. Co.Litt. 68.
AD RECTUM. (L. Lat.) To right. To do right. To meet an accusation. To answer the demands of the law. Habeant eos ad rectum. They shall render themselves to answer the law, or to make satisfaction. Bract. fol. 124 b.
AD REPARATIONEM ET SUSTENTATIONEM. For repairing and keeping in suitable condition.
AD RESPONDENDUM. For answering; to make answer; words used in certain writs employed for bringing a person before the court to make answer in defense in a proceeding, as in habeas corpus ad respondendum and capias ad responden-citan, q. v.
AD SATISFACIENDUM. To satisfy. The em-phatic words of the writ of capias ad satisfacien-dum, which requires the sheriff to take the person of the defendant to satisfy the plaintiff’s claim.
AD SECTAM. At the suit of. Commonly abbre-viated to ads.
Used in entering and indexing the names of cases. where it is desired that the name of the defendant should come first. Thus, "B. ads. A." indicates that B. is defendant in an action brought by A., and the title so written would be an inversion of the more usual form "A. v. B."
AD STUDENDUM ET ORANDUM. For studying and praying; for the promotion of learning and religion. A phrase applied to colleges and uni-versities. 1 Bl.Comm. 467.AD TERMINUM ANNORUM. For a terco of years.
AD TERMINUM QUI l’IVETERIT. For a term which has passed. Words in the Latin form of the writ of entry employed at common law to recover, on behalf of a landlord, possession of premises, from a tenant holding over alter the expiration of the term for which they were demised. See Fitzh. Nat.Brev. 201.
AD TRISTEM PARTEM STRENUA EST SUS-PICIO. Suspicion lies heavy on the unfortunate side.
AD TUNC ET IBIDEM. In pleading, the Latin name of that clause of an indictment containing the statement of the subject-matter "then and there being found."
AD ULTIMAN VIM TERMINORUM. To the most extended import of the terms; in a sense as uni-versal as the terms will reach. 2 Eden, 54.
AD USUM ET COMMODUM. To the use and benefit.
AD VALENTIAM. To the value. See Ad Va-lorem.
AD VALOREM. According to value. Powell v. Gleason; Ariz., 74 P.2d 47, 50, 114 A.L.R. 838.
Duties are either ad valoren], or speeifie; the former when the duty is laid in the form of a percentage on the value of the property; the Iatter where it is imposed as a fixed sum on each article of a class without regard to its value. The term ad valorem tax means a tax or duty upon the value of the article or thing subject to taxation. Ar-thur v. Johnston, 185 S.C. 324, 194 S.E. 151, 154.
AD VENTREM INSPICIENDUM. To inspect the womb. A writ for the summoning of a jury of matrons to determine the question of pregnancy.
AD VIM MAJOREM VEL AD CASUS FORTUI-TUS NON TENETUR QUIS, NISI SUA CULPA INTERVENERIT. No one is held to answer for the effects of a superior force, or of accidents, un-less his own fault has contributed. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 72, § 16.
AD VITAM. For life. Bract. fol. 13b. In feodo, vel ad vitam; in fee, or for life. Id.
AD VITAM AUT CULPAM. For life or until fault. Words descriptive of a tenure of office "for life or good behavior," equivalent to quam-diu bene se gesserit.
AD VOLUNTATEM. At will. Bract. fol. 27a. Ad voiuntatein domini, at the will of the lord.
AD WARACTUM. To fallow. Bract. fol. 228b. See Waractum.
ADAPTED. Capable of use. People v. Dorring-ton, 221 Mich. 571, 191 N.W. 831, 832. Indicates that the object referred to has been made suit-able; has been made to conform to; has been made fit by alteration. Raynor v. United States, C.C.A.Ind., 89 F.2d 469, 471.

ADAWLUT. Corrupted from Adalat, justice, eq-uity; a court of justice. The terms "Dewanny Adawlut" and "Foujdarry Adawlut" denote the civil and criminal courts of justice in India. Wharton.
ADCORDABILIS DENARII. Money paid by a vassal to his lord upon the selling or exchanging of a feud. Ene. Lond.
ADD. To unite; attach; annex; join. Board of Com’rs of Hancock County v. State, 119 Ind. 473, 22 N.E. 10.
ADDENDUM. A thing that is added or to be add-ed; a list or section consisting of added material.
ADDICERE. Lat. In the civil law, to adjudge or condemn; to assign, allot, or deliver; to sell. In the Roman law, addico was one of the three words used to express the extent of the civil jurisdiction of the praotors.
ADDICT. As defined in Acts 1894, No. 157, one who has acquired the habit of using spirituous liquors or narcotics to such an extent as to de-prive him of reasonable self-control. Interdiction of Gasquet, 147 La. 722, 85 So. 884, 888.
ADDICTIO. In the Roman law, the giving up to a creditor of his debtor’s person by a magistrate; also the transfer of the (deceased) debtor’s goods to one who assumes his liabilities.
Additio probat minoritatem. An addition [to a narre] proves or shows minority or inferiority. 4 Inst. 80; Wing.Max. 211, max. 60. That is, if it be said that a man has a fee tail, it is less than if he has the fee.
This maxim is applied by Lord Coke to courts, and terms of law; minoritas being understood in the sense of difference, inferiority, or qualification. Thus, the style of the king’s bench is coram rece, and the style of the court of chancery is coram domino rege in cancellaria; the addition showing the difference. 4 Inst. 80. By the
word "fee" is intended fee-tail not being in- tended by ft, unless there be added to it the addition of the word "tail." 2 Bl.Comm. 106; Litt. § 1.
ADDITION. Implies physical contact, something added to another. Structure physically attached to or connected with building itself. Mack v. Eyssell, 332 Mo. 671, 59 S.W.2d 1049; Washington Loan & Trust Co. y. Hammond, 51 App.D.C. 260, 278 F. 569, 571.
Extension; increase; augmentation. Mey-ering y. Miller, 330 Mo. 885, 51 S.W.2d 65, 66.
That which has become united with or a part of. Judge v. Bergman, 258 III. 246, 101 N.E. 574, ‘ 576.
French Law
A supplementary process to obtain additional information. Guyot, Répert.
Insurance
The word "addition," as applied to buildings, usually means a part added or joined to a main building. Agnew v. Sun Ins. Office, 167 Wis. 456, 167 N.W. 829. It may also apply to buildings ap-purtenant to some other building though not ac-tually in physical contact therewith. Taylor v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co., 34 Cal.App. 471, 167 P. 899. Not limited to structures physically a part of the main building. Gertner v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 184 N.Y.S. 669, 670, 193 App.Div. 836.
Liens
Within the meaning of the mechanic’s lien law, an "addition" to a building must be a lateral ad-dition. Lake & Risley Co. v. Still, 7 N.J.Misc. 47, 144 A. 110. It must occupy ground without the limits of the building to which it constitutes an ad-dition, so that the lien shall be upon the building formed by the addition and the land upon which it stands. Updike v. Skillman, 27 N.J.L. 132. See also, Lamson v. Maryland Casualty Co., 196 Iowa 11S5, 194 N.W. 70, 71.
An alteratiori in a former building, by adcling to its height, or to its depth, or to the extent of its interior ac-commodations. is merely an "alteration," and not an "ad-dition." Putting a new slory on an old building is not an addition. Updike v. Skillman. 27 N.J.L. 132. See, also, Lamson v. Maryland Casualty Co., 196 Iowa 1185, 194 N.W. 70, 71.
Did not include new livestock acquired by mortgagor alt-er execution of mortgage. American State Bank of Water-town v. Boyle, 212 Minn. 293, 4 N.W.2d 108, 109.
Name
Whatever is added to a man’s name by way of title or description. Cowell.
In English law, there are four kinds of additions,—addi-tions of estafe, such as yeoman, gentleman, esquire; ad-ditions of degree, or names of dignity, as knlght, earl, mar-quis, duke; additions of trade, mystery, or occupation, as scrivener, painter, mason, carpenter; and additions of place of residence, as London, Chester, etc. The only ad-ditions recognized in American law are those of mystery and residence.
At common law there was no need of addition in any case; 2 Ld.Raym. 988: it was required only by stat. 1 Hen. V. e. 5, in cases where process of outlawry lies. In all other cases it is only a description of the person, and common reputation is sufficlent; 2 Ld.Raym. 849.
ADDITIONAL. This term embraces the idea of joining or uniting one thing to another, so as thereby to form one aggregate. Ex parte Boddie, 200 S.C. 379, 21 S.E.2d 4, 8.
"Additional security" imports a security, which, united with or joine.d to the former one, is deerned to make it, as an aggregate, sufficient as a security from the begin-ning. State v. Hull, 53 Miss. 626; Searcy v. Cullman County, 196 Ala. 287, 71 So. 664, 665.
ADDITIONAL BURDEN. See Eminent Domain.
ADDITIONAL INSURED. A person using anoth-er’s automobile, which is covered by liability policy containing statutory omnibus clause, only when insured’s permission is expressly or implied-ly given for particular use. Stewart v. City of Rio Vista, 72 Cal.App.2d 279, 164 P.2d 274, 275.
Driver chosen by friend to whom automobile was en-trusted by husband who had possession with direct permis-sion of wife in whose name record title lay was not ad-ditional insured. Fox v. Crawford, Ohio App., 80 N.E.2d 187, 189.
Where driver of automobile at time it struck pedestrian was using automobile for his own purpose atter having receivcd permission from owner only to get automobile

started and return automobile to owner’s honre, driver was not additional insured. Howe v. Farmers Auto. Inter-In-surance Exchange, Wash., 202 P.2d 464, 472.
ADDITIONAL LEGACY. See Legacy.
ADDITIONAL SERVITUDE. The imposition of a new and additional easement or servitude on land originally taken by eminent domain proceed-ings, a use of a different character, for which owner of property is entitled to compensation. S. D. Childs & Co. v. City of Chicago, 198 Ill.App. 590, 593; Williams v. Meridan Light & Ry. Co., 110 Miss. 174, 69 So. 596, 597.
ADDITIONAL WORK. Of nature involved in modifications and changes, not independent proj-ect. Maryland Casualty Co. v. City of South Nor-folk, C.C.A.Va., 54 F.2d 1032, 1037. Work which results from a change or alteration in plans con-cerning work which has to be done under a con-tract, while "extra work" relates to work which is not included within the contract itself. De Mar-tini v. Elade Realty Corp., Co.Ct., 52 N.Y.S.2d 487, 489.
ADDITIONALES. In the law of contracts. Ad-ditional terms or propositions to be added to a former agreement.
ADDITUR. The power of trial court to assess damages or increase amount of an inadequate award made by jury verdict, as condition of de-nial of motion for new trial, with consent of de-fendant whether or not plaintiff consents to such action. Dorsey et al. v. Barba et al., 226 P.2d 677.
ADDLED. Stupid, muddled, foolish. Windham v. State, 93 Tex.Cr.R. 477, 248 S.W. 51, 54.
ADDLED PARLIAMENT. The parliament which met in 1614. It sat for but two months and none of its bilis received the royal assent. Taylor, Jurispr. 359.
ADDONE, Addonne. L. Fr. Given to. Kelham.
ADDRESS. Place where mail or other communi-cations will reach person. Munson v. Bay State Dredginl_T, & Contracting Co., 314 Mass. 485, 50 N.E.2d 633, 636. Generally a place of business or residence.
Equity
Part of a bill wherein is given the appropriate and technical description of the court in which the bill is filed.
Legislation
A formal request addressed to the executive by one or both branches of the legislative body, re-questing him to perform some act.
It is provided as a means for the removal of judges deemed unworthy, though the causes of removal would not warrant impeachment. It is not provided for in the Con-stitution of the United States; and even in those states where the right exists it is exercised but seldom.
Offense
Not synonym of hazard, but an antonym, and, as respects gaming and devices, means skillful

management, dexterity, or adroitness. In re Wig-ton, 151 Pa.Super. 337, 30 A.2d 352, 355.
ADDRESS TO THE CROWN. When the royal speech has been read in Parliament, an address in answer thereto is moved in both houses. Two members are selected in each house by the ad-ministration for moving and seconding the ad-dress. Since the commencement of the session 1890-1891, it has been a single resolution express-ing their thanks to the sovereign for his gracious speech.
ADDUCE. To present, bring forward, offer, in-troduce. Used particularly with reference to evi-dence. Tuttle v. Story County, 56 Iowa 316, 9 N.W. 292.
Broader in its signification than the word "of-fered." Beatty v. O’Connor, 106 Ind. 81, 5 N.E. 880; Brown v. Griffin, 40 Ill.App. 558.
ADEEM. To take away, recall, or revoke. To satisfy a legacy by some gift or substituted dis-position, made by the testator, in advance. Tol-man v. Tolman, 85 Me. 317, 27 Atl. 184. Wood-burn Lodge No. 102, I. 0. 0. F., v. Wilson, 148 Or. 150, 34 P.2d 611, 614. See Ademption.
If the identical thing bequeathed is not in existence, or has been disposed of, the legacy is "adeemed" and the legatee’s rights are pone. Lange v. Lange, 127 N.J.Eq. 315, 12 A.2d 840, 843; Welch v. Welch, 147 Miss. 728, 113 So. 197, 198.
ADELANTADO. In Spanish law, the military and political governor of a frontier province. This oftice has long since been abolished. Also a president or president judge; a judge having jurisdiction over a kingdom, or over certain prov-inces only. So called from having authority over the judges of those places. Las Partidas, pt. 3, tit. 4, 1. 1.
ADELING, or ATHELING. Noble; excellent. A title of honor among the Anglo-Saxons, proper-ly belonging to the king’s children. Spelman.
ADEMPTIO. Lat. In the civil law, a revocation of a legacy; an ademption. Inst. 2, 21, pr. Where it was expressly transferred from one person to another, it was called translatio. Inst. 2, 21, 1; Dig. 34, 4.
ADEMPTION. Extinction or withdrawal of lega-cy by testator’s act equivalent to revocation or in-dicating intention to revoke. Tagnon’s Adm’x v. Tagnon, 253 Ky. 374, 69 S.W.2d 714.
Removal. Lewis v. Hill, 387 III. 542, 56 N.E.2d 619, 621. Testator’s giving to a legatee that which he has provided in bis will, or his disposing of that part of his estate so bequeathed in such manner as to make it impossible to carry out the will. Hurley v. Schuler, 296 Ky. 118, 176 S.W.2d 275, 276. Revocation, recalling, or cancellation, of a legacy, according to the apparent inten-tion of the testator, implied by the law from acts done by him in his life, though such acts do not amount to an express revocation of it. Burnham v. Comfort, 108 N.Y. 535, 15 N.E. 710.

The act by which the testator pays to his legatee, in his life-time, a general legacy which by his will he had pro-posed to give him at his death, 1 Rop.Leg. p. 365; and the act by which a specific legacy has become inoperative on account of the testator having parted with the subject. Dillender v. Wilson, 228 Ky. 758, 16 S.W.2d 173, 174.
See Advancement.
ADEO. Lat. So, as. Adeo plene et integre, as fully and entirely. 10 Coke, 65.
ADEQUATE. Sufficient; proportionate; equally efficient; equal to what is required; suitable to the case or occasion; satisfactory. Nagle v. City of Billings, 77 Mont. 205, 250 P. 445, 446. Equal to some given occasion or work. Nissen v. Miller, 44 N.M. 487, 105 P.2d 324, 326. Commensurate; it does not mean average or graduation. Vander-made v. Appert, 125 N.J.Eq. 366, 5 A.2d 868, 871.
ADEQUATE CARE. Such care as a man of ordi-nary prudence would himself take under similar circumstances to avoid accident; care proportion-ate to the risk to be incurred. Wallace v. Wilming-ton & N. R. Co., 8 Houst. (Del.) 529, 18 Atl. 818.
ADEQUATE CAUSE. Sufficient cause for a par-ticular purpose. Pennsylvania & N. Y. Canal & R. Co. v. Mason, 109 Pa. 296, 58 Am.Rep. 722.
In criminal law, adequate cause for the passion which reduces a homicide cornmitted under its influence from the grade of murder to manslaughter, means such cause as would commonly produce a degree of anger, rage, resent-ment, or terror, in a person of ordinary temper, sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool reflection. Insulting words or gestures, or an assault and battery so slight as to show no intention to intlíct pala or injury, or an injury to property unaccompanied by violente are not adequate causes. Vollintine v. State, 77 Tex.Cr.R. 522. 179 S.W. 108; Berry v. State, 157 S.W.2d 650, 652, 143 Tex.Cr.R. 67. See Adequate Provocation.
ADEQUATE COMPENSATION. Just value of property taken under power of eminent domain, payable in money. Buffalo, etc., R. Co. v. Ferris, 26 Tex. 588. Market value of property when taken. Louisiana Highway Commission v. Guidry, 176 La. 389, 146 So. 1, 5. It includes interest. Tex-arkana & Ft. S. Ry. Co. v. Brinkman, Tex.Civ. App., 288 S.W. 852, 853. It may include the cost or value of the property to the owner for the pur-poses for which he designed it. Elbert County v. Brown, 16 Ga.App. 834, 86 S.E. 651, 656.
Such only as puts injured party in as good a condition as he would have been in if injury had not been inflicted. Town of Winchester v. Cox, 129 Conn. 106, 26 A.2d 592, 597.
ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION. One which is equal, or reasonably proportioned, to the value of that for which it is given. 1 Story, Eq.Jur. §§ 244-247. One which is not so disproportionate as to shock our sense of that morality and fair deal-ing which should always characterize transac-tions between man and man. U. S. Smelting, Refining & Milling Co. v. Utah Power & Light Co., 197 P. 902, 905, 58 Utah, 168. Fair and reasonable under circumstances. Boulenger v. Morison, 88 Cal.App. 664, 264 P. 256, 259. Reasonably just and equitable. Laguna Land & Water Co. v. Green-wood, 92 Cal.App. 570, 268 P. 699, 700.

ADEQUATE. OR REASONABLE FACILITIES. Such railroad facilities as might be fairly de-manded, with regard to size of place, extent of demand for transportation, cost of furnishing ad-ditional accommodation asked for, and to all other facts which would have bearing upon question of conveniente and cost. Kurn v. State, 175 Okl. 379, 52 P.2d 841, 843.
ADEQUATE PREPARATION. Embraces full con-sultation with accused, interviews with witnesses, study of facts and law, and determination of char-acter of defense to be made and policy to be fol-lowed during trial. Nelson v. Commonwealth, 295 Ky. 641, 175 S.W.2d 132, 133.
ADEQUATE PROVOCATION. An adequate prov-ocation to cause a sudden transport of passion that may suspend the exercise of judgment and exclude premeditation and a previously formed design is one that is calculated to excite such anger as might obscure the reason or dominate the volition of an ordinary reasonable man. Com-monwealth v. Webb, 252 Pa. 187, 97 A. 189, 191.
ADEQUATE REMEDY. One vested in the com-plainant, to which he may at all times resort at his own option, fully and freely, without let or hindrance. Wheeler v. Bedford, 7 A. 22, 54 Conn. 244; State ex rel. Heimov v. Thomson, 131 Cono. 8, 37 A.2d 689, 692. Suitable, proportionate, or sufficient. Fischer v. Damm, 36 Ohio App. 515, 173 N.E. 449, 451.
A remedy which is plain and complete and as practical and efilcient to the ends of justice and its prompt ad-núnistration as the remedy in equity. Farmers & Traders Bank v. Kendrick, 341 Mo. 571, 108 S.W.2d 62, 64.
A remedy that affords complete relief with reference to the particular matter in controversy, and is appropriate to the circumstances of the case. State v, Huwe. 103 Ohio St. 546, 134 N.E. 456, 459. A remedy to be adequate, preclud-ing resort to mandarnus, must not only be one placing re-lator in statu quo, but must itself enforce in some way per-formance of the particular duty. State v. Erickson, 104 Conn. 542, 133 A. 683, 686. Must reach end intended, and actually campe’ performance of duty in question. Bucha-nen v. Buchanan, 124 Va. 255. 6 S.E.2d 612, 620. Must be plain, accurate, certain, speedy, specific, and appropriate to the particular circumstances, and must also be equally as convenient, beneficial. and effective as the remedy by mandamus. Simpson v. Williams Rural High School Dist., Tex.Civ.App., 153 S.W.2d 852, 856.
ADESSE. In the civil law; to be present; the opposite of abesse. Calvin.
ADEU. Without day, as when a matter is finally dismissed by the court. Alez adeu, go without day. Y. B. 5 Edw. II. 173. See Adieu.
ADFERRUMINATIO. In the civil law, the weld-ing together of iron; a species of adjunctio, (q. v.). Called also ferruniinatio. Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 276; Dig. 6, 1, 23, 5.
ADHERENCE. In Scotch law, the narre of a form of action by which the mutual obligation of mar-riage may be enforced by either party. Bell. It corresponds to the English action for the restitu-tion of conjugal rights. Wharton.

ADHERING

ADHERING. Joining, leagued with, cleaving to; as, "adhering to the enemies of the United States."
"Adhering" consists in giving to the United States the loyalty due from a citizen. United States v. Stephan, D.C. Mich., 50 F.Supp. 738, 741.
Any intentional act furthering hostile designs of enemies of the United States, or an act which intentionally strengthens or tends to strengthen enemies of the United States, or which weakens or tends to weaken power of the United States to resist and attack such enemies. constitutes "adhering" to such enemies. United States v. Haupt, D.C. III., 47 F.Supp. 836, 839.
Rebeis, being citizens, are not "enemies," within the meaning of the constitution; hence a conviction for trea-son, in promoting a rebellion, cannot be sustained under that branch of the constitutional definition which speaks of "adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort."’ United States v. Greathouse, 2 Abb.U.S. 364, Fed.Cas.No. 15,254.
ADLIESION. The entrance of another state into an existing treaty with respect only to a part of the principies laid clown or the stipulations agreed to. Opp.Int.L. § 533.
Properly speaking, by adhesion the third state becomes a party only to such parts as are spe-cifically agreed to, and by accession it accepts and is bound by the whole treaty. See Accession.
ADHIBERE. In the civil law, to apply; to em-ploy; to exercise; to use. Adhibere to use care. Adhibere vine, to employ force.
ADIATION. A term used in the laws of Holland for the application of property by an executor. Wharton.
ADIEU. L. Fr. Without day. A common term in the Year Books, implying final dismissal from court.
ADIPOCERE. A waxy substance (chemically margarate of ammonium or ammoniacal soap) formed by the decomposition of animal matter protected from the air but subjected to moisture; in medical jurisprudence, the substance into which a human cadaver is converted which has been buried for a long time in a saturated soil or has lain long in water.
ADIRATUS. Lost; strayed; a price or value set upon things stolen or lost, as a recompense to the owner. Cowell.
ADIT. In mining law, an entrance or approach; a horizontal excavation used as an entrance to a mine, or a vent by which ores and water are car-ried away; an excavation "in and along a lode," which in statutes of Colorado and other mining states is made the equivalent of a discovery shaft. Elecfro-Magnetic M. & D. Co. v. Van Auken, 9 Colo. 204, 11 P. 80.
ADITUS. An approach; a way; a public way. Co.Litt. 56a.
ADJACENT. Lying near or close to; sometimes, contiguous; neighboring. Ex parte Jeffcoat, 108 Fla. 207, 146 So. 827. Adjacent implies that the two objects are not widely separated, though they may not actually touch, Harrison v. Guilford County, 218 N.C. 718, 12 S.E.2d 269, while adjoin-ing imports that they are so joined or united to each other that no third object intervenes. Wolfe v. Hurley, D.C.La., 46 F.2d 515, 521.
A word of flexible meaning, depending opon context and suhject matter.. U. S. v. Denver & R. G. Ry. Co., D.C. Colo., 31 F. 886: Johnston v. Davenport Brick & Tila Co., D.C.Iowa, 237 F. 668, 669.
Suburbs of city not within limits of another municipali-ty though a long strip of land 10 feet wide connected the property with city limits. Beller v. City of Dallas, Tex. Civ.App., 177 S.W.2d 231, 235.
ADJECTIVE LAW. The aggregate of rules of procedure or practice. As opposed to that body of law which the courts are established to ad-minister, (called "substantive law,") it means the rules according to which the substantive law is administered. That part of the law which pro-vides a method for enforcing or maintaining rights, or obtaining redress for their invasion. Maurizi v. Western Coal & Mining Co., 321 Mo. 378, 11 S.W.2d 268, 272. Holl.Jur. 61,238.
ADJOINING. The word in its etymological sense, means touching or contiguous, as distinguished from lying near to or adjacent. Broun v. Texas & N. O. R. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 295 S.W. 670, 674; Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Inhabitants of City of Plainfield, 84 N.J.Law, 634, 87 A. 448, 450. Tú be in contact with; to abut upon. State ex rel. Boynton v. Bunton, 141 Kan. 103, 40 P.2d 326, 328. And the same meaning has been given to it when used in statutes. City of New York v. Alheidt, 151 N.Y.S. 463, 464, 88 Misc. 524. See Adjacent.
ADJOURN. To put off; defer; postpone. To postpone action of a convened court or body until another time specified, or indefinitely, the latter being usually called to adj.ourn sine die. Bispham v. Tucker, 2 N.J.L. 253; Reynolds v. Cropsey, 241 N.Y. 389, 150 N.E. 303. To suspend or recess dur-ing a meeting which continues in session. Byrd v. Byrd, 193 Miss. 249, 8 So.2d 510, 512.
Suspending business for a time, delaying. Prob-ably, without some limitation, it would, when used with reference to a sale on ‘foreclosure, or any judicial proceeding, properly include the fixing of the time to which the postponement was made. Waldrop v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 131 Ark. 453, 199 S.W. 369, 371, L.R.A.1918B, 1081.
ADJOURNAL. A term applied in Scotch law and practice to the records of the criminal courts. The original records of criminal trials were called "bukis of adiornale," or "books of adjournal," few of which are now extant. An "act of ad-journal" is an order of the court of justiciary entered on its minutes.
ADJOURNAMENTUM EST AD DIEM DICERE SEU DIEM DARE. An adjournment is tú appoint a day or give a day. 4 Inst. 27. Hence the formu-la "eat sine die."
ADJOURNATUR. L. Lat. It is adjourned. A
word with which the old reports very frequently conclude a case. 1 Ld.Raym. 602; 1 Show. 7; 1 Leon. 88.

A continuation of the same meeting, and at such adjourned meeting the governing body can do any act which might have been done if no adjourn-ment had taken place, and limitations imposed on governing body as regards action at original meet-ing obtain at adjourned meeting. Vogel v. Parker, 118 N.J.L. 521, 193 A. 817, 818. One ordered by board at regular meeting, and which is to con-vene after termination of such regular meeting and prior to next regular meeting. Byrd v. Byrd, 193 Miss. 249, 8 So.2d 510, 513.
ADJOURNED SUMMONS. A summons taken out in the chambers of a judge, and afterwards taken into court to be argued by counsel.
ADJOURNED TERM. In practice, a continuance, by adjournment, of a regular term. Harris v. Gest, 4 Ohio St. 473; Kingsley v. Bagby, 2 Kan. App. 23, 41 P. 991. Distinguished from an "addi-tional term," which is a distinct term. Harris v. Gest, 4 Ohio St. 473; Kingsley v. Bagby, 2 Kan. App. 23, 41 P. 991. A continuation of a previous or regular term; the same term prolonged, where-in power of court over business which has been done, and the entries made at the regular term, continues, Van Dyke v. State, 22 Ala. 57; Carter v. State, 14 Ga.App. 242, 80 S.E. 533, 534.
ADJOURNMENT. A putting off or postponing of business or of a session until another time or place; the act of a court, legislative body, public meeting, or officer, by which the session or assem-bly is dissolved, either temporarily or finally, and the business in hand dismissed from considera-tion, either definitely or for an interval. If the adjournment is final, it is said to be sine die. See Johnson City v. Tennessee Eastern Electric Co., 133 Tenn. 632, 182 S.W. 587, 589.
In the civil law a calling into court; a sum-moning at an appointed time. Due Cange.
ADJOURNMENT DAY. A further day appointed by the judges at the regular sittings at nisi prius to try issue of fact not then ready for trial.
ADJOURNMENT DAY IN ERROR. In English practice, a day appointed some days before the end of the term at which matters left undone on the affirmance day- are finished. 2 Tidd, Pr. 1176.
ADJOURNMENT IN EYRE. The appointment of a day when the justices in eyre mean to sit again. Cowell; Spelman.
ADJOURNMENT SINE DIE. An adjournment without setting a time for another meeting or ses-sion. See Sine Die.
ADJUDGE. To pass on judicially, to decide, set-tle, or decree, or to sentence or condemn. People v. Raye, 364 III. 72, 3 N.E.2d 972, 975.
Judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction; equiva-lent of convicted and sentenced. In re Tarlo’s Estate, 315 Pa. 321, 172 A. 139, 140. In-iones a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment. Department of Banking v. Hedges, 136 Neb. 382, 286 N.W. 277, 283. Does not mean the same as deented contra, under statute, State v. District Court, 64 Mont. 181, 208 P. 952, 955. Blaufus v. People, 69 N.Y. 107, 25 Am.Rep. 148. Predicated

Pa. 301. Compare Drinkhouse v. Van Ness, 202 Cal. 359, 260 P. 869, 874; People ex rel. Strohsahl v. Strohsahl, 222 N.Y.S. 319, 324, 221 App.Div. 86.
ADJUDICATAIRE. In Canadian law, a purchaser at a sheriff’s sale. See 1 Low.Can. 241; 10 Low. Can. 325.
ADJUDICATE. To settle in the exercise of ju-dicial authority. To determine finally. Synony-mous with adJudge in its strictest sense. United States v. Irwin, 8 S.Ct. 1033, 127 U.S. 125, 32 L.Ed. 99; Street v. Benner, 20 Fla. 700.
ADJUDICATEE. In French and civil law, the purchaser at a judicial sale. Brent v. New Or-leans, 6 So. 793, 41 La.Ann. 1098.
ADJUDICATIO. In the civil law, an adjudication. The judgment of the court that the subject-matter is the property of one of the litigants; confirma-tion of title by judgment. Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 204.
ADJUDICATION. The giving or pronouncing a judgment or decree in a cause; also the judgment given. People ex rel. Argus Co. v. Hugo, 168 N.Y. S. 25, 27, 101 Misc. 481. Or the entry of a decree by a court in respect to the parties in a case. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., v. United Artists Corpora-tion, C.C.A.Del., 113 F.2d 703, 706.
It implies a hearing by a court, after notice, of legal evidence on the factual issue involved. Genzer v. Fillip, Tex.Civ.App., 134 S.W.2d 730, 732. The equlvalent of a "determination." Campbell v. Wyoming Development Co., 55 Wyo. 347, 100 P.2d 124, 132. And contemplates that’the claims of all the parties thereto have been considered and set at rest. Miller v. Scobie, 152 Fla. 328, 11 So.2d 892, 894. The term is principally usecl in bankruptcy proceedings, the adjudication being the order which declares the debtor to be a bankrupt. First Nat. Bank v. Pothuisje, 217 Ind. 1, 25 N.E.2d 436, 438, 130 A.L.R. 1238.
French Law
A sale made at public auction and upon com-petition. Adjudications are voluntary, judicial, or administrative. Duverger.
Seotch Law
A species of diligente, or process for trans-ferring the estate of a debtor to a creditor, car-ried on as an ordinary action before the court of session. A species of judicial sale, redeemable by the debtor. A decreet of the lords of session, ad-judging and appropriating a person’s lands, here-ditaments, or any heritable right to belong to his creditor, who is called the "adjudger," for payment or performance. Bell; Ersk.Inst. c. 2, tit. 12, §§ 39-55; Forb.Inst. pt. 3, b. 1, c. 2, tit. 6.
Adjudication contra hwreditatem jacentem. When a debtor’s heir apparent renounces the succession, any creditor may obtain a. decree cognitionis cansó, the purpose of which is that the amount of the debt may be ascertained so that the real estate may be adjudged.
Adjudication in bankruptcy. See Bankruptcy.

Adjudication in implement. An action by a gran-tee against his grantor to compel him to com• plete the title.
ADJUNCT. Something added to another. New York Trust Co. v. Carpenter, C.C.A.Ohio, 250 F. 668, 672.
An additional juclge sometimes appointed in the Court of Delegates, q. v.
ADJUNCTIO. In the civil law, adjunction; a species of acccssio, whereby two things belong-ing to different proprietors are brought into firm connection with each other; such as interweaving, (intertextura); welding together, (adferrumina-tio); soldering together, (applumbatura); paint-ing, (pictura); writing, (scriptura) ; building, (inadificatio); sewing, (satio); and planting, (plantatio). Inst. 2, 1, 26–34; Dig. 6, 1, 23; Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 276. See Accessio.
ADJUNCTION. In civil law, the attachment or union permanently of a thing belonging to one person to that belonging to another. This union may be caused by inclusion, as if one man’s dia-mond be set in another’s ring, or by soldering, sewing, construction, writing, or painting.
The common law implicitly adopts the civil law doctrines. See 2 Bla.Com. 404. See Accession.
One associated with another in a subordinate or an auxiiiary manner; an associate.
ADJUNCTS. Additional judges sometimes ap-pointed in the Court of Delegates, q. v. See Shel-ford, Lun. 310; 1 Hagg.Eccl.Rep. 384; 2 Id. 84; 3 id. 471.
ADJUNCTUM ACCESSORIUM. An accessory or appurtenance.
ADJURATION. A swearing or binding upon oath.
ADJUST. To settle or arrange; to free from differences or discrepancies; to bring to satis-factory state so that parties are agreed, as to ad-just amount of loss by fire. Western Loggers’ Ma-chinery Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 136 Or. 549, 299 P. 311, 312. ContYoversy to property or estate, In re Sidman’s Estate, 278 N.Y.S. 43, 154 Alise. 675. To bring to proper relations; to settle; Jeff Davis County v. Davis, Tex.Civ.App., 192 S.W. 291, 295. To determine and apportion an amount due. Flaherty v. Insurance Co., 46 N.Y.S. 934, 20 App.Div. 275. Accounts are adjusted when they are settled and a balance struck. Townes y. Birchett, 12 Leigh Va. 173, 201. It is sometimes used in the sense of pay. See Lynch v. Nugent, 80 Iowa, 422, 46 N.W. 61. When used in reference to a liquidated claim, Combination Oil & Gas Co. v. Brady, Tex.Civ.App., 96 S.W.2d 415, 416.
ADJUSTED COST BASIS. For income tax pur-poses, original cost plus additions to capital less depreciation results in the "adjusted cost basis." Herder v. Helvering, 106 F.2d 153, 162, 70 App.D. C. 287.
ADJUSTER. One appointed to adjust a matter, to ascertain or arrange or settle. Commercial CreditCo. v. Macht, 89 Ind.App. 59, 165 N.E. 766. One who malees any adjustment or settlement. Popa v. Northern Ins. Co., 192 Mich. 237, 158 N.W. 945, 946, or who determines the amount of a claim, as
a claim against an insurance company. Sam-
.
ami( v. Insurance Co. of North America, 99 Or. 565, 194 P. 1095. He is a special agent for the person or company for whom he acts. Bond v. National Fire Ins. Co., 77 W.Va. 736, 88 S.E. 389, 394; Howe v. State Bar of California, 212 Cal. 222, 298 P. 25, 27. Compare Manheim v. Standard Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 84 Wash. 16, 145 P. 992.
ADJUSTMENT. An arrangement; a settlement. Henry D. Davis Lumber Co. v. Pacific Lumber Agency, 220 P. 804, 805, 127 Wash. 198.
In the ]aw of insurance, the adjustment of a loss ts the
ascertainment of its amount- and the ratable distrihution of it among those liable to pay it; the settling and as-certaining the amount of the indernnity which the assured, alter all allowances and deductions made, is entitled to re-ceive under the policy, and fixing the proportion which each underwriter is Hable to pay. Marsh.Ins. 4th Ed. 499; 2 Phil.Ins. § 1814, 1815; New York v. Insurance Co., 39 N.Y. 45, 100 Am.Dec. 400; Whipple v. Insurance Co., 11 11,i, I. 139.
ADJUTANT GENERAL. The term "civil adju-tant general" is used as one of convenience mere-ly to designate state adjutant general who has not been officially recognized by War Department. People v. Newlon, 77 Colo. 516, 238 P. 44, 47.
ADJUVARI QUIPPE NOS, NON DECIPI, BENE-FICIO OPORTET. We ought to be favored, not injured by that which is intended for our benefit. (The species of bailment called "loan" must be to the advantage of the borrower, not to his detri-ment.) Story, Bailm. § 275. See 8 El. & Bl. 1051.
ADLAMWR. In Welsh law, a proprietor who, for some cause, entered the service of another proprie-tor. and left him after the expiration of a year and a day. He was liable to the payment of 30 pence to his patron. Wharton.
ADLEGIARE. To purge one’s self of a crime by oath.
ADMANUENSIS. A person who swore by laying his hands on the book.
ADMEASUREMENT. Ascertainment by measure; measuring out; assignment or apportionment by measure, that is, by fixed quantity or value, by certain limits, or in definite and fixed proportions.
ADMEASUREMENT OF DOWER. In practice, a remedy which lay for the heir on reaching his majority to rectify an assignment of dower made during his minority, by which the doweress had received more than she was legally entitled to. 2 Bl.Comm. 136; Gilb. Uses, 379.
The remedy is of rare occurrence. Iones v. Brewer, 1 Pick. (Masa.) 314; McCormick v. Taylor, 2 Ind. 336. In some of the states the statutory proceeding enabling a widow to compel the assignment of dower is called "ad-measurement of dower."
ADMEASUREMENT OF PASTURE. In English law, a writ which lay between those that have common of pasture appendant, or by vicinage, in cases where any one or more of them surcharges the common with more cattle than they ought. Bract. fol. 229a; 1 Crabb, Real Prop. p. -318, § 358. The remedy is now abolished in England; 3 Sharsw.Bla.Com. 239, n.; and in the United States; 3 Kent 419.
ADMEASUREMENT, WRIT OF. It lay against persons who usurped more than their share, in the two following cases: Admeasurement of dow-er, and admeasurement of pasture. Termes de la Ley.
ADMENSURATIO. In old English law, admeas-urement. Reg.Orig. 156, 157.
ADMEZATORES. In old Italian law, persons chosen by the consent of contending parties, to decide questions between them. Literally, media-tors. Spelman.
ADMINICLE. Used as an English word in the statute of 1 Edw. IV, c. 1, in the sense of aid, or support.
In civil law, imperfect proof. Merl. Répert. See Adminiculum.
In Scotch law, an aid or support to something else. A collateral deed or writing, referring to another which has been lost, and which it is in general necessary to produce .before the tenor of the lost deed can be proved by parol evidence. Ersk.Inst. b. 4, tit. 1, § 55.
ADMINICULAR. Auxiliary or subordinate to. "The murder would be adminicular to the rob-bery," (i. e., committed to accomplish it.) The Marianna Flora, 3 Mason, 121, Fed.Cas.No.9080.
ADMINICULAR EVIDENCE. Auxiliary or sup-plementary evidence; such as is presented for the purpose of explaining and completing other evi-dence. (Chiefly used in ecclesiastical law)
ADMINICULATE. To give adminicular evidence.
ADMINICULATOR. An officer in the Romish church, who administered to the wants of widows, orphans, and afflicted persons. Spelman.
ADMINICULUM. Lat. An adminicle; a prop or support; an accessory thing. An aid or support to something else, whether a right or the evidence of one. It is principally used to designate evi-dence adduced in aid or support of other evidence, which without it is imperfect. Brown.
ADMINISTER. To manage or conduct. Glocksen v. Holmes, 299 Ky. 626, 186 S.W.2d 634, 637. To discharge the duties of an office; to take charge of business; to manage affairs; to serve in the conduct of affairs, in the application of things to their uses; to settle and distribute the estate of a decedent. Hunter v. City of Louisville, 208 Ky. 562, 271 S.W. 690, 691.
Also, to give, as an oath; to direct or cause to be taken. Gilchrist v. Comfort, 34 N.Y. 239; Brin-son v. State, 89 Ala. 105, 8 So. 527; State v. Van Wormer, 103 Kan. 309, 173 P. 1076, 1081.

To apply, as medicine or a remedy; to give, as a dose or something beneficial or suitable. Bar-field v. State, 71 Okl.Cr. 195, 110 P.2d 316, 317. To cause or procure a person to take some drug or other substance into his or her system; to direct and cause a medicine, poison, or drug to be taken into the system. State v. Jones, 4 Pennewill (Del.) 109, 53 Atl. 861; McCaughey v. State, 156 Ind. 41, 59 N.E. 169.
Neithér fraud nor deception is a necessary In-gredient in the act of administering poison. To force poison into the stomach of another; to com-pel another by threats of violente to swallow poison; to furnish poison to another for the pur-pose and with the intention that the person to whom it is delivered shall commit suicide there-with, and which poison is accordingly taken by the suicide for that purpose; or to be present at the taking of poison by a suicide, participating in the taking thereof, by assistance, persuasion, or otherwise,—each and all of these are forms and modes of "administering" poison. Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146.
ADMINISTRATION. Managing or conduct of an office or employment; the performance of the ex-ecutive duties of an institution, business, or the like. Webb v. Frohmiller, 52 Ariz. 128, 79 P.2d 510.
In public law, the administration of govern-ment means the practical management and direc-tion of the executive department, or of the public machinery or functions, or of the operations of the various organs of the sovereign; direction or oversight of any office, service, or employment. Greene v. Wheeler, C.C.A.Wis., 29 F.2d 468, 469. The terco "administration" is also conventionally applied to the whole class of public functionaries, or thóse in charge of the management of the ex-ecutive department. House v. Creveling, 147 Tenn. 589, 250 S.W. 357, 358.
ADMINISTRATION EXPENSE. "Administrative expenses" imply disbursements incidental to the management of the estate for which credit would be allowed on a voucher. In re Hooker’s Estate, 18 N.Y.S.2d 107, 112, 173 Misc. 515. Those deducti-ble in computing estate tax are merely charges which are proper deductions and in ordinary course of administration will ultimately be al-lowed. Bourne v. U. S., Ct.C1., 2 F.Supp. 228, 231.
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES. Supervision by an executor or administrator. Peterson v. Demmer, D.C.Tex., 34 F.Supp. 697, 700. Manage-ment of estate by independent executrix. Palf rey v. Harborth, Tex.Civ.App., 158 S.W.2d 326, 327. Normally involves the collection, management, and distribution of estate, including legal proceed-ings necessary to satisfy claims of creditors, next of kin, legatees, or whatever other parties may have any claim to property of a deceased person. Hawley v. Hawley, 114 F.2d 745, 748, 72 App.D.C. 376.
The management and settlement of the estate of an In-testate, or of a testator who has no executor, performed under the supervision of a court, by a person duly quali

ADMINISTRATION
and lega)ly appointed, and usually involving (1) the col-lection of the decedent’s assets; (2) payment of debts and claims against him and expenses; (3) distributing the re-mainder of the estate among those entitled thereto.
The term is applied broadly to denote the management of an estate by an executor, and also the management of estates of minore, lunatics, etc., in those cases where trus-tees have been appointed by authority of law to take charge of such estates in place of the legal owners, Bouvi-er; Crow v. Hubard, 62 Md. 565.
Administration is principally of the following kinds, viz.:
Ad colligendum bona defuncti. To collect the goods of the deceased. Special letters of administration granted to one or more persons, authorizing them to collect and pre-serve the goods of the deceased, are so called. 2 Bl.Comm. 5Q5; 2 Steph.Comm. 241. These are otherwlse termed "letters ad colligendum," and the party to whom they are granted, a "collector."
An administrator ad colligendum is the mere agent or officer of the court to collect and preserve the goods of the deceased until some one is clothed with authority to administer them, and cannot complain that another Is ap-pointed administrator In chief. Flora v. Mennice, 12 Ala. 836.
Ancillary administration is auxiliary and subordinate to the administration at the place of the decedent’s domicile; it may be taken out in any foreign state or country where assets are locally situated, and is merely for the purpose of collecting such assets and paying debts there.
Cum testamento annexo. Administration with the will annexed. Administration granted in cases where a testator makes a will, without narning any executors; or where the executors who are named in the will are incompetent to act, or refuse to act; or in case of the death of the executors, or the survivor of them. 2 B1.Comm. 503, 504.
De bonis non. Administration of the goods not ad-ministered. Administration granted for the purpose of ad-ministering such of the goods of a deceased person as were not administered by the former executor or administrator. Tucker v. Horner, 10 Phila.Pa. 122.
De bonis non cum testamento annexo. That which 1s granted when an executor dies leasing a part of the es-tate unadministered. Cien-lens v. Walker, 40 Ala. 189.
Durante absentia. That which is granted during the ab-sence of the executor and until he has proved the will.
Durante minori cetate. Where an infant is made execu-tor; in which case administration with will annexed is granted to another, during the minority of such executor, and untll he shall attain hls lawful age to act. See Godo. 102.
Foreign administration. That which is exercised by vir-tue of authority properly conferred by a foreign power.
Pendente lite. Administration during the suit. Ad-ministration granted during the pendency of a suit touch-ing the validity of a will. 18 N.J.Law, 15, 20.
Public administration is such as is conducted (in some jurisdictions) by an officer called the public administrator, who is appointed to administer in cases where the intes-tate has left no person entitled to apply for letters.
General administration. The grant of authority to ad-minister upon the entire estate of a decedent, ,,vithout re-striction or limitation, whether under the intestate laws or with the will annexed. Clemens v. Walker, 40 Ala. 198.
Special administration. Authority to administer upon some few particular effects of a decedent, as opposed to authority to administer his w-holc estate. In re Senate Bill, 12 Colo. 193, 21 P. 482.
Letters of Administration. The instrument by which an administrator or administratrig is authorized by the pro-bate court, surrogate, or other proper officer. to have the charge and administration of the goods and cha ttels of an intestate. See Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. v. Tisdale, 91. U.S. 243, 23 L.Ed. 314.
ADMINISTRATION SUIT. In English practico, a suit brought in chancery, by any one interested, for administration of a decedent’s estate, when there is doubt as to its solvency. Stimson.
ADMINISTRATIVE. Connotes of or pertains to administration, especially management, as by managing or conducting, dtrecting, or superintend-ing, the execution, application, or conduct of per-sons or things. Fluet v. McCabe, Mass., 299 Mass. 173, 12 N.E.2d 89, 93. Particularly, having the character of executive or ministerial action. Mauritz v. Schwind, Tex.Civ.App., 101 S.W.2d 1085, 1090. In this sense, administrative func-tions or acts are distinguished from such as are judicial. People v. Austin, 46 N.Y.Supp. 526, 20 App.Div. 1. Synonymous with "executive." Sheely v. People, 54 Colo. 136, 129 P. 201, 202; Saint v. Allen, 126 So. 548, 555, 169 La. 1046. An ad-ministrative act concerns daily affairs as distin-guished from permanent matters. People v. Graham, 70 Colo. 509, 203 P. 277, 278.
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS. Acts of an officer which are to be deemed as acts of administration, and are commonly called "administrative acts" and classed among those governmental powers properly assigned to the executive department, ‘are those acts which are necessary to be done to carry out legislative policies and purposes already declared by the legislative body or such as are devolved upon it by the organic law of its ex-istence. Ex parte McDonough, 27 Cal.App.2d 155, 80 P.2d 485, 487.
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY. An agency of the sovereign power charged wíth administering par-ticular legislation. Examples are compensation and industrial commissions, Joseph H. Weider-hoff, Inc., v. Neal, D.C.Mo., 6 F.Supp. 798, 799; Federal Trade Commission, Hastings Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 153 F.2d 253, cer-tiorari denied 66 S.Ct. 1344, 328 U.S. 853, 90 L.Ed. 1626; tax commissions, First State Bank of Moun-tainair v. State Tax Commission, 59 P.2d 667, 40 N.M. 319; public service commissions, New York Cent. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 7 N.E. 2d 957, 212 Ind. 329; and the like.
ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD. The term is very broad and includes bodies exercising varied func-tions, some of which involve orders made or other acts done ex parte or without full hearing as to the operative facts, while others are done only af ter such a notice and hearing, and the functions of the former kind are plainly "admin-istrative" and those of the latter are "quasi ju-dicial". Beaverdale Memorial Park v. Danaher, 127 Conn. 175, 15 A.2d 17, 21.
"Administrative boards" differ from ”courts" in that
boards frequently rcpresent public inlerests entrusted to boards, whereas courts are concerned with litigating rights of parties with adverse interests. Rommell v. Walsh, 15 A.2d 6, 9, 127 Conn. 16.
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION. "Administra-tive discretion" means that the doing of acts or things required to be done may rest, in part at least, upon considerations not entirely susceptible of proof or disproof and at times which consider-ing the circumstances and subject-matter cannot be supplied by the Legislature, and, a statute con-fers such discretion when it refers a commission or officer to beliefs, expectations, or tendencies

instead of facts for the exercise of the powers conferred. Culver v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., 74 S. W.2d 754, 757.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. That branch of pub-lic law which deals with the various organs of the sovereign power considered as in motion, and prescribes in detail the manner of their activity, being concerned with such topics as the collection of the revenue, the regulation of the military and naval forces, citizenship and naturalization, sani-tary measures, poor laws, coinage, police, the public safety and morals, etc. See Holl.Jur. 305-307.
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER. Politically and as used in constitutional law, an officer of th, execu-tive department of government, and generally one of inferior rank; legally, a ministerial or execu-tive officer, as distinguished from a judicial offi-cer. People v. Salsbury, 134 Mich. 537, 96 N.W. 936.
One who performs mere ministerial or administrativo functions. In re Gold, C.C.A.N.J., 93 F.2d 676, 680. 061-cero that are neither judicial nor legislative; executive ofacers, Spivey v. State, 104 P.2d 263, 277, 69 Okl.Cr. 397. Such as : The clerk of circuit court, State ex rel. and to Use of City of St. Louis v. Priest, 348 Mo. 37, 152 S.W.2d 109, 112. Receivers in bank liquidation proceedings, People ex rel. Nelson v. Crawford State Say, Bank, 310 III.App. 533, 34 N.E.2d 872. State highway commissioner, Strobel Steel Const. Co. v. Sterner, 125 N.J.L. 622, 18 A.2d 28, 29.
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY. One not judicial, but provided by commission or board created by legislative power. Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Ogden Levee Dist., C.C.A.Ark., 15 F.2d 637, 642. Against wrongful assessment of benefits by a levee district. Board of Directors of St. Francis Levee Dist. v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., C.C.A.Ark., 74 F.2d 183, 188.
ADMINISTRATOR, in the most usual sense of the word, is a person to whom letters of admin-istration, that is, an authority to administer the estate of a deceased person, have been gramed by the proper court. A representative of limited authority, whose duties are to collect assets of estate, pay its debts, and distribute residue to those entitled. Smith v. White’s Estate, 108 Vt, 473, 188 A. 901, 904. A technical trustee. In re Watkins’ Estate, Vt., 41 A.2d 180, 188.
He resembles an executor, but, being appointed by the court, and not by the deceased, he has to give security for the due administration of the estate, by entering into a bond with sureties, call-ed the administration bond. Smith v. Gentry, 16 Ga. 31; Collamore v. Wilder, 19 Kan. 78; C orm-ley v. Watson, 177 Ga. 763, 171 S.E. 280, 281.
By the law of Scotland the father is what is called the "administrator-in-law" for his children. As such, he is ipso jure their tutor while they are pupils, and their curator during their minority. The father’s power ex-tends over whatever estate may descend to his children, unless where that estate has been placed by the donor or grantor under the charge of special trustees or managers. This power in the father ceases by the child’s discontinu-ing to reside with him, unless he condrines to live at the father’s expense; and with rev-ard to dati-hte-s it censes on their marriage, the husband being the legal curator of his wife. Bell.

Civil Law

A manager or conductor of affairs, especially the affairs of another, in his name or behalf. A manager of public affairs in behalf of others. Calvin. A public officer, ruler, or governor. Nov. 95, gl.; Cod. 12, 8.

Domestic

One appointed at the place of the domicile of the decedent; distinguished from a foreign or an ancillary administrator.

Foreign

One appointed or qualified under the laws of a foreign state or country, where the decedent was domiciled.

Public

An official provided for by statute in some states to administer upon the property of intestates in certain cases. Seo Rocca v. Thompson, 32 S.Ct. 207, 223 U.S. 317, 56 L.Ed. 453.

ADMINISTRATOR CUM TESTAMENTO AN. NEXO. See Cum Testamento Annexo.ADMINISTRATOR DE BONIS NON. "Adminis-trators de bonis non administratis" are, as the term signifies, persons appointed by the court of probate to administer on the effects of a decedent which have not been included in a former admin-istration. Paul v. Butler, 129 Kan. 244, 282 P. 732, 734.
Where will is set asido as void, administrator subse-quently appointed is not "administrator de bonis non," but administrator of entire estate with power to attack nominated executor’s report. Douglas’ Adm’r v. Douglas’ Ex’r, 48 S.W.2d 11, 14, 243 Ky. 321.
ADMINISTRATOR WITH WILL ANNEXED. One appointed administrator of deceased’s estate after executors named in will refused to act. In re Kenney’s Estate, 41 N.M. 576, 72 P.2d 27, 29, 113 A.L.R. 403.
ADMINISTRATRIX. A woman who administers, or to whom letters of administration have been granted.
ADMINISTRAVIT. Lat. He has administered. Used in the phrase plene administravit, which is the name of a plea by an executor or administra-tor to the ‘effect that he has "fully administered" (lawfully disposed of) all the assets of the estate that have come to his hands.
ADMIRAL. Title of high naval officers; they are of various grades,—rear admiral, vice-admiral, admiral, admiral of the fleet, the last named being the highest. But by Act of Jan. 24, 1873 (17 Stat. 418), certain grades ceased to exist when the offices became vacant.
In old English law, a high officer or magis-trate that had the government of the king’s navy, and the hearing of all causes belonging to the sea. Cowell.
In European law, an officer who presided over the admiralitas, or collegium ammiralitatis. Locc. de Jur.Mar. lib. 2, c. 2, § 1.

ADMIRALITAS. L. Lat. Admiralty; the admir-alty, or court of admiralty.
In European law, an association of private armed vessels for mutual protection and defense against pirates and enemies
ADMIRALTY. A court which has a very exten-sive jurisdiction of maritime causes, civil and criminal, controversies arising out of acts done upon or relating to the sea, and questions of prize.
It is properly the successor of the consular courts, which were emphatically the courts of merchants and sea-going
persona, established in the principal maritime cities on the revival of commerce after the fall of the Western Empire, to supply the want of tribunals that might decide causes arising out of maritime commerce.
Also, the system of jurisprudence relating to and growing out of the jurisdiction and practice of the admiralty courts.
American Law
A tribunal exercising jurisdiction over all mari-time contracts, torts, injuries, or offenses. Pan-ama R. Co. v. Johnson, 44 S.Ct. 391, 264 U.S. 375, 68 L.Ed. 748.
"Admiralty" does not extend to all navigable waters, but is limited to the ocean, navigable rivers running into the ocean, and the Great Lakes and their connections, The Frank G. Fobert, D.C.N.Y., 32 F.Supp. 214, 216.
The jurisdiction of the admiral, and the administration of the admiralty law proper—the local maritime law—as it became a judicial function, has passed into the hands of the courts. Renew v. U. S., D.C,Ga., 1 F.Supp. 256, 259.
English Law
The court of the admiral, perhaps erected by Edward III, 3 Bla.Comm. 69, or as early as the time of Henry I.
The building where the lords of the admiralty transact business.
ADMIRALTY, FIRST LORD OF THE. The nor-mal head of the executive department of state which presides over the naval forces of the king-dom is the lord high admiral, but in practice the functions of the great office are discharged by sev-eral Lords Commissioners, of whom one, being the chief, is called the "First Lord," and is a mem-ber of the Cabinet. He is assisted by other lords, called Sea Lords, and by various secretaries.
ADMISSIBLE. Pertinent and proper to be con-sidered in reaching a decision. Used with refer-ence to the issues to be decided in any judicial proceeding.
As applied to evidence, the term means that it is of such a character that the court or judge is bound to receive it; that is, allow it to be intro-duced.
ADMISSION.
Ball
The order of a competent court or magistra te that a person accused of crime be discharged from actual custody upon the taking of bail. People v. Solomon, 15 Pac. 4, 5 Utah, 277.

Admitting to ball is a judicial act to be performed by a court or judicial oflicer, Trevathan v. Mutilad Life Ins. Co. of New York, 166 Or. 515, 113 P.2d 621, 624; and by "al-, lowing ball" or "admitting to bail" is not meant the formal justification, subscription, or acknowledgment by the sureties, the term first mentioned relating to the order determining that the offense is bailable and fixing the amount of undertaking, and "taking, the ball" rneaning the final acceptance or approval of it by the court. Clatsop County v. Wuopio, 95 Or. 30, 186 P. 547.

English Ecclesiastical Law

The act of the bishop, who, on approval of the clerk presented by the patron, after examination, declares him fit to serve the cure of the church to which he is presented, by the words "admitto te habilem," I admit thee able. 1 Crabb, Real Prop. p. 138, § 123.

Imrnigration Laws

Authorities accepting alien seaman into body of our inhabitants as possible resident. U. S. ex rel. Georgas v. Day, C.C.A.N.Y., 43 F.2d 917, 919.

Membership in Corporation

The act of a corporation or company by which an individual acquires the rights of a member of such corporation or company.

Practice as Attorney at Law
The act by which attorneys and counsellors be-come recognized as officers of the court and are allowed to practice.

Testimony or Evidente

Admission or concession by a party in pleading or as evidence. See Admissions.

ADMISSIONALIS. In European law. An usher. Spelman.
ADMISSIONS. Confessions, concessions or volun-tary acknowledgments made by a party of the existence of certain facts. Roosevelt v. Smith, 40 N.Y.S. 381, 17 Misc. 323. More accurately regard-ed, they are statements by a party, or some one identified with him in legal interest, of the ex-istence of a fact which is relevant to the cause of his adversary. Brooks v. Sessoms, 171 S.E. 222, 223, 47 Ga.App. 554. They are against the interest of the party making them. Little Fay Oil Co. v. Stanley, 90 Okl. 265, 217 P. 377, 378.
It is not essential that an "admission" be contrary to interest of party at time it is made; it is enough if it be inconsistent with position which party takes either in pleadings or at trial. Harvey v. Provandie, 83 N.H. 236, 141 A. 136, 140.
The term "admission" is usually applied to civil trans-actions and to those matters of fact in criminal cases which do not involve criminal intent, while the term "confession" is generally restricted to acknowledgments of guilt. Peo-ple v. Sourisseau, 62 Cal.App.2d 917, 145 P.2d 916, 923. State v. Lindsey, 26 N.M. 526, 194 P. 877, 878.
An "admission" as applied in criminal cases is the avowal of a fact or of circumstances from which guilt may be inferred, but only tending to prove the offense charged, and not amounting to a confession of guilt. Theis v. State, Ga., 164 S.

E. 456, 457. A statement by defendant• of fact or facts pertinent to issues tending, in connection with proof of other facts or circumstances, to prove guilt, but which is, of itself, insufficient to authorize conviction. Commonwealth v. Elliott, 292 Pa. 16, 140 A. 537, 538. Does not include statements which are part of the res geste. State v. Clark, 102 Mont. 432, 58 P.2d 276, 278.
Direct, called also express, admissions are those which are made in dlrect terms.
lmplied admissions are those which result from some act or failure to act of the party. Part payment of a debt is en admission of liability to pay debt. Hart v. Deshong, Del., 1 Terry 218, 8 A.2d 85, 87. Defendants’ failure to specifi-cally deny their signatures to notes, "admission" that they signed the acknowledgments. Háas v. Johnson, 203 La. 697, 14 So.2d 606, 608. Undenied accusations were implied "admission". State v. Postal, 215 Minn. 427, 10 N.W.2d 373, 378.
Incidental admissions are those made in some other con-nection, or lnvolved in the admission of some other fact.
Judicial admissions are those made in court by a per-son’s attorney for the purpose of being used as a substitute for the regular legal evidence of the facts at the trial. Martín v. State, 46 Okl.Cr. 411, 287 P. 424. Such as are made voluntarlly by a party, which appear of record in the proceedings of the court. Formal acts done by a party or his attorney in court on the trial of a cause for the purpose of dispensing with proof by the opposing party of some fact claimed by the latter to be true. Wiley v. Rutland R. Co., 86 Vt. 504, 86 A. 808, 810. Concession by defendant that she had executed a bill of sale for the automobile to intervener to secure an indebtedness was an "admisshin in judicio" by defendant against her title to the automo-bile. McDay v. Long, 63 Ga.App. 421, 11 S.E.2d 395, 399. But opening statements of counsel are not, technically, "admissions." Wilkey v. State ex rel. Smith, 238 Ala. 595, 192 So. 588, 591. See Acqulescence; Quasi-Admissions; True Admission.
Pleading
The acknowledgment or recognition by one par-ty of the truth of some matter alleged by the opposite party, made in a pleading, the effect of which is to narrow the area of facts or allegations required to be proved by evidence. Connecticut Hospital v. Brookfield, 69 Conn. 1, 36 A. 1017.
An allegation not denied is deemed not controverted, and silente of pleader 1s usually treated as an admission against him for purpose of the action. Doughty v. Pallis-sard, 3 N.Y.S.2d 452, 453, 167 Misc. 55. Generally plead-ings must be regarded as "judicial admissions", rather than ordlnary "admissions". Hughes v. Fort Worth Nat. Bank, Tex.Civ.App., 164 S.W.2d 231, 232.
In con f ession and avoidance, admission of truth of op-posite party’s pleading is made.
Express adrnissions may be made of matters of fact only. See Confession and Avoidance.
In E quity. Partial admissions are those which are de-livered in terms of uncertainty, mixed up with expianatory or qualifying circumstances.
P/enary admissions are those which admit the truth of the matter without qualification, whether it be asserted as from information and belief or as from actual knowl-edge. See Burrell v. Hackley, C.C.N.Y., 35 F. 833.
"Admissions against interest" are any state-ments made by or attributable to a party to an action, which constitute admissions against his interest and tend to establish or disprove any ma-terial fact in the case. Kallner v. Whaley, 148 Neb. 259, 27 N.W.2d 183, 189.
ADMIT. To allow, receive, or take; to suffer one to enter; to give possession; to license. Gregory v. United States, 17 Blatchf. 325, 10 Fed.Cas. 1195.
Confess. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Fodder, 99 Ind.App. 556, 193 N.E. 698, 700. Un-equivocal acknowledgment of guilt. Ex parte. Tozier, D.C.Me., 2 F.2d 268, 269. See Admission; Admissions.
ADMITTANCE. In English law, the act of giving possession of a copyhold estate. It is of three kinds: (1) Upon a voluntary grant by the lord, where the land has escheated or reverted to him. (2) Upon surrender by the former tenant. (3) Upon descent, where the heir is tenant on his ancestor’s death. 2 Bla.Comm. 366.
ADMITTENDO CLERICO. An old English writ issuing to the bishop to establish the right of the Crown to make a presentation to a benefice. A writ of execution upon a right of presentation to a benefice being recovered in quare impedit, ad-dressed to the bishop or his metropolitan, requir-ing him to admit and institute the clerk or pre-sentee of the plaintiff. Reg.Orig. 33a.
ADMITTENDO IN SOCIUM. A writ for asso-ciating certain persons, as knights and other gentlemen of the county, to justices of assize on the circuit. Reg.Orig. 206.
ADMIXTURE. A substance formed by mixing; state of being mixed; act of mixing.
ADMONISIL To caution or advise. People v. Pennington, 267 III. 45, 107 N.E. 871, 872. To counsel against wrong practices, or to warn against danger of an offense. Ft. Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Hendrickson, 126 Ark. 377, 189 S. W. 1064, 1067.
ADMONITION. A reprimand from a judge to a person accused, on being discharged, warning him of the consequences of his conduct, and intimating to him that, should he be guilty of the same fault for which he has been admonished, he will be punished with greater severity. Merlin, Répert. The admonition was authorized as a species of punishment for slight misdemeanors. In eccle-siastical law, this is the lightest forro of punish-ment.
Any authoritative oral communication or state-ment by way of advice or caution by the court to the jury respecting their duty or conduct as jurors, the admissibility or nonadmissibility of evidence, or the purpose for which any evidence admitted may be considered by them. Miller v. Noell, 193 Ky. 659, 237 S.W. 373, 374.
ADMONITIO TRINA. The threefold warning given to a ‘prisoner who stood mute, before he was subjected to peine forte et dure (q. v.). 4 BI.Comm. 325; 4 Steph.Comm. 391.
ADMORTIZATION. The reduction of property of lands or tenements to mortmain, in the feudal customs.
ADM’R. Ths abbreviation will be judicially pre-sumed to mean "administrator." Moseley v. Mas-tin, 37 Ala. 216, 221.

ADNEPOS. The son of a great-great-grandson. Calvinus, Lex.
ADNEPTIS. The daughter of a great-great-grand-daughter. Calvinus, Lex.
ADNICHILED. Annulled, canceled, made void. 28 Hen. VIII.
ADNIHILARE. In old English law, to annul; to make void; to reduce to nothing; to treat as nothing; to hold as or for nought.
ADNOTATIO. In the civil law, the subscription of a name or signature to an instrument. Cod. 4, 19, 5, 7.
A rescrlpt (q. v.) of the prince or emperor, signed with his own hand, or sign-manual. Cod. 1, 19, 1. "In the im-perial law, casual homicíde was excused by the indulgence of the emperor, signed with his own,sign-manual, annoto, tione principia." 4 Bl.Comm. 187.
ADOBE. Earth. In arid or desert regions, an alluvial or playa clay from which bricks are made for construction of houses, called "adobe" houses. See Sweeney v. Jackson County, 93 Or. 96, 178 P. 365, 376.
ADOLESCENCE. That age which follows puberty and precedes the age of majority. It commences for males at fourteen, and for females at twelve years, and continues until twenty-one years com-plete.
ADOPT. To accept, appropriate, choose, or select; to make that one’s own (property or act) which was not so originally.
To adopt a route for the transportation of the mail means to take the steps necessary to cause the mail to be transported over that route. Rhodes v. U. S., Dev.Ct.C1. 47. To adopt a contract is to accept it as binding, notwith-standing some defect which entitles the party to repudiate it. Thus, when a person affirms a voidable contract, or ratifies a contract made by his agent beyond his authority, he is sometímes said to adopt it. Sweet. Strictly, how-ever, the word "adopt" should be used to apply to void transactions, while the word "ratify" should be limited to the final approval of a voidable transaction by one who theretofore had the optional right to relieve himself from its obligations. United German Silver Co. v. Bronson, 92 Conn. 266, 102 A. 647, 648. "Adoption" of a contract by one not a party thereto is of the nature of a novation. Edwards v. Heralds of Liberty, 263 Pa. 548, 107 A. 324, 326. See Af-flrm.
To accept, consent to, and put into effective op-eration; as in the case of a constitution, constitu-tional amendment, ordinance, or by-law. Real v. People, 42 N.Y. 282; People v. Norton, 59 Barb. (N.Y.) 191. A Code. City of Albany v. Nix, 21 Ala.App. 164, 106 So. 199, 200. Statements in an application appearing aboye insured’s signature. Republic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 66 Ohio App.. 522, 35 N.E.2d 467, 468.
To take into one’s family the child of another and give him or her the rights, privileges, and duties of a child and heir. State v. Thompson, 13 La.Ann. 515; Abney v. De Loach, 84 Ala. 393.
Adoption of children was a thing unknown to the com-mon law, but was a familiar practice under the Roman law and In those countries where the civil law prevails, as France and Spain. Butterfield v. Sawyer, 187 Ill. 598, 58 N.E. 602, 52 L.R.A. 75, 79 Am.St.Rep. 246. Creature of the law, and statutory requirements must be strictly carried out. Owles v. Jackson, 199 La. 940, 7 So.2d 192, 194.
To accept an alien as a citizen or member of a community or state and invest him with corres-ponding rights and privileges, either (in general and untechnical parlance) by naturalization, or by an act equivalent to naturalization, as where a white man is "adopted" by an Indian tribe. Hampton v. Mays, 4 Ind.T. 503, 69 S.W. 1115.
ADOPTION. The taking and receiving as one’s own that to which he bore no prior relation, color-able or otherwise. Davies v. Lahann, C.C.A.N.M., 145 F.2d 656, 659. The act of one who takes an-other’s child into his own family, treating him as his own, and giving him all the rights and duties of his own child. See In re Chambers’ Estate, 183 N.Y.S. 526, 528, 112 Misc. 551. _In manner provided by and with consequences specified in statute. Fisher v. Robison, 329 Pa. 305, 198 A. 81, 82. A juridicial act creating between two persons cer-tain relations, purely civil, of paternity and filia-tion. 6 Demol. § 1; Grimes v. Grimes, 207 N.C. 778, 178 S.E. 573. The relation thereby created is a statutory status, not a contractual relation. Caruso v. Caruso, 13 N.Y.S.2d 239, 241, 175 Misc. 290. Though legal adoption may confer on per-son adopted rights of actual relationship of child, simple "adoption" extends only to his treatment as member of the household. Shepherd v. Sov-ereign Camp, W.O.W., 166 Va. 488, 186 S.E. 113, 116. See, also, Adopt.
Adoption, properly speaking, réfers only to persons who are strangers in blood, In re Lund’s Estate, Cal.App., 148 P.2d 709, 711. And is not synonymous with "legitimation," which refers to persons of the same blood. Blythe v. Ayres, 96 Cal. 532, 31 P. 915, 19 L.R.A. 40. But this dis-tinction ís not always observed. In re Presly’s Estate, 113 Okl. 160, 240 P. 89, 90. It is a relationship artificially cre-ated by statute. Borner v. Larson, 70 N. D. 313, 293 N.W. 836, 839.
ADOPTION BY PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGMENT. See Legitimate.
ADOPTIVE ACT. An act of legislation which comes into operation within a limited area upon being adopted, in manner prescribed therein, by the inhabitants of that area.
ADOPTIVUS. Lat. Adoptive. Applied both to the parent adopting, and the child adopted. Inst. 2, 13, 4; Inst. 3, 1, 10 -14.
ADPROMISSOR. In the civil and Scotch law, a guarantor, surety, or cautioner; a peculiar species of fidejussor; one who adds his own promise to the promise given by the-principal debtor, whence the name.
ADQUIETO. Payment. Blount.
ADRECTARE. To set right, satisfy, or make amends.
ADRHAMIRE. In old European law, to under-take, declare, or promise solemnly; to pledge; to pledge one’s self to make oath. Spelman.
ADRIFT. Sea-weed, between high and low water-mark, which has not been deposited on the shore, and which during flood-tide is moved by each ris-ing and receding wave, is adrift, although the

bottom of the mass may touch the beach. An-thony v. Gifford, 2 Alíen (Mass.) 549.
ADROGATION. In the civil law, the adoption of one who was impubes; that is, if a male, under fourteen years of age; if a female, under twelve. Dig. 1, 7, 17, 1.
ADS. An abbreviation for ad sectam (q. v.), meaning "at the suit of." Bowen v. Sewing Mach. Co., 86 111. 11.
ADSCENDENTES. Lat. In the civil law, ascend-ants. Dig. 23, 2, 68; Cod. 5, 5, 6.
ADSCRIPTI. See Adscriptus.
ADSCRIPTI GLEBJE. Slaves who served the master of the soil, who were annexed to the land, and passed with it when it was conveyed. Cal-vinus, Lex.
In Scotland, as late as the relgn of George III., laborers in collieries and salt works were bound to the coal-pit or salt work in which they were engaged, in a manner similar to that of the adscripti of the Romans. Bell. These servi adscripti (or adscriptitii) glebce held the same position as the villeins regardant of the Normans; 2 Bla.Com. 93. See 1 Poll. & Mait. 372.
ADSCRIPTITII. Lat. A species of serfs or slaves. See 1 Poll. & Mait. 372.
Those persons who were enrolled and liable to be drafted as legionary soldiers. Calvinus, Lex.
ADSCRIPTUS. In the civil law, added, annexed, or bound by or in writing; enrolled, registered; united, joined, annexed, bound to, generally. Ser-vus colonce adscriptus, a slave annexed to an es-tate as a cultivator. Dig. 19, 2, 54, 2. Fundus adscriptus, an estate bound to, or burdened with a duty. Cod. 11, 2, 3.
ADSESSORES. Sitie judges. Assistants or ad-visers of the regular magistrates, or appointed as their substitutes in certain cases. Calvinus, Lex. See Assessor.
ADSTIPULATOR. In Roman law, an accessory party to a promise, who received the same prom-ise as his principal did, and could equally receive and exact payment; or he only stipulated for a part of that ior which the principal stipulated, and then his rights were coextensive with the amount of his own stipulation. One who supplied the place of a procurator at a time when the law refused to allow stipulations to be made by pro-curation. Sandars, Just.Inst. (5th Ed.) 348.
ADULT.
Civil Law
A male infant who has attained the age of four-teen; a female ínfant who has attained the age of twelve. Dom.Liv.Prel. tit. 2, § 2, n. 8.
Common Law
One who has attained the legal age of majority, generally 21 years, though in some states women are legally "adults" at 18. Schenault v. State, 10 Tex.App. 410; Lucas v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 174 A. 712, 713, 113 N.J.Law, 491.
ADULTERY
ADULTER. Lat. One who corrupts; one who seduces another man’s wife. Adulter solictorum. A corruptor of metals; a counterfeiter. Calvinus. Lex.
ADULTERA. In the civil law, an adulteress; a woman guilty of adultery. Dig. 48, 5, 4, pr.; Dig. 48, 5, 15, 8.
ADULTERATION. The act of corrupting or de-basing; the act of mixing something impure or spurious with something pure or germine, or an inferior article with a superior one of the same kind. State v. Norton, 24 N.C. 40. The term is generally applied to the act of mixing up with food or drink intended to be sold other matters of an inferior quality, and usually of a more or less deleterious quality. Grosvenor v. Duffy, 121 Mich. 220, 80 N.W. 19, though the artificially colored poppy seeds were not deleterious and had the same food value as the naturally colored seeds. U. S. v. Two Bags, Each Containing 110 Pounds, Poppy Seeds, C.C.A.Ohio, 147 F.2d 123, 127.
ADULTERATOR. Lat. A corrupter. In the civil law. A forger; a counterfeiter. Adulteratores monetce, counterfeiters of money. Dig. 48, 19, 16, 9.
ADULTERINE. Begotten in an adulterous inter-courfse. Those are not deemed adulterine who are begotten of a woman openly married through ig-norance of a former wife being alive. In the Roman and canon law, adulterine bastards were distinguished from such as were the issue of two unmarried persons, and the former were treated with more severity, not being allowed the status of natural children, and being ineligible to holy orders.
ADULTERINE BASTARDS. The offspring of adulterous relations. Kotzke v. Kotzke’s Estate, 205 Mich. 184, 171 N.W. 442, 443. See, also, Adul-terous Bastards.
ADULTERINE GUILDS. Traders acting as a corporation without a charter, and paying a fine annually for permission to exercise their usurped privileges. Smith, Wealth Nat. b. 1, c. 10.
ADULTERIUM. A fine anciently imposed for the commission of adultery.
ADULTEROUS BASTARDS. Those produced by an unlawful connection between two persons, who at the time when the child was conceived, were, either of them or both, connected by marriage with some other person. Civil Code La. art. 182.
ADULTERY. Voluntary sexual intercourse of a married person with a person other than the of-fender’s husband or wife. Franzetti v. Franzetti, Tex.Civ.App., 120 S.W.2d 123, 127.
In some states, however, as was also true under the Ro-man and Jewish law, this crime is committed only when the woman is married to a third person; the unlawful com-merce of a married man with an unmarried woman not being of the grade of adultery. Com. v. Call, 21 Pick. Mass. 509, 32 Am.Dec. 284, and note; Com. v. Elwell, Metc. 190, 39 Am.Dec. 398. In other jurisdictions, both parties are guilty of adultery, even though only one of

them 1s married. Coodwin v. State, 70 Tex.Cr.R. 600, 158 S.W. 274, 275. .In some jurisdictions, also, a distinction is made between double and single adultery, the former being committed where both parties are married to other per-sons, the latter where one only is so married. Hunter v. U. S., 1 Pin.Wis. 91, 39 Am.Dee. 277.
Open and Notorious Adultery
To constitute living in open and notorious adul-tery, the parties must reside together publicly in the face of society, as if conjugal relations existed between them, and their so living and the fact that they are not husband and wife must be known in the community. McCullough v. State, 107 Tex.Cr.R. 258, 296 S.W. 530.
ADVANCE, v. To pay money or render other value before it is due; to furnish something be-fore an equivalent is received; to loan; to furnish capital in aid of a projected enterprise, in expecta-tion of return from it. Powell v. Allan, 70 Cal. App. 663, 234 P. 339, 344. To supply beforehand; to furnish on credit or before goods are delivered or work done; to furnish as a part of a stock or fund; to pay money before it is due; to furnish money for a specific purpose understood between the parties, the money or sum equivalent to be returned; furnishing money or goods for others in expectation of reimbursement; money or com-modities furnished on credit; a loan, or gift or money advanced to be repaid conditionally; may be equivalent to "pay." In re Altman’s Will, Sur., 6 N.Y.S.2d 972, 975.
An agreement to "advance" money for personal property implies a loan with property as pledge, rather than a pay-ment of purchase money in sale. Shelley v. Byers, 73 Cal. App. 44, 238 P. 177, 182.
ADVANCE PAYMENT. Payments made in an-ticipation of a contingent or fixed future liability. Smith v. Unity Industrial Life Ins. Co., La.App., 13 So.2d 129, 132.
ADVANCEMENT. Money or property given by a parent to his child or, sometirnes, presumptive heir, or expended by the former for the latter’s benefit, by way of anticipation of the share which the child will inherit in the parent’s estate and intended to be deducted therefrom. It is the lat-ter circumstance which differentiates an advance-ment from a gift or a loan. Brewer’s Adm’r v. Brewer, 181 Ky. 400, 205 S.W. 393, 396; In re Allen’s Estate, 207 Pa. 325, 56 A. 928.
A perfect and irrevocable gift, In re Wiese’s Estate, 222 Iowa 935, 270 N.W. 380, 382. Passing title in lifetime of donor, Burkhart v. Lowcry, 115 Ind.App. 445, 59 N.E.2d 732, 734: but which must be accounted for by donee on distribution of donor’s estate. In re Beler’s Estate, 205 Minn. 43, 284 N.W. 833, 835, 836, 837, 838. "Advancement," unlike "adernption" (q. v.), applies only to cases of in-testacy. Ellard v. Ferris, 91 Ohio St. 339, 110 N.E. 476, 479. An "advancement by portion," within the meaning of the statute, is a auto given by a parent to establish a child in life, (as by starting him in business,) or to make a provi-sien for the child, (as on the marriage of a daughter). L. R. 20 Eq. 155. See Ademption; Gift.
ADVANCES. Moneys paid before or in advance of the proper time of payment; money or com-modities furnished on credit; a loan or gift, or money advanced to be repaid conditionally. Pow-der Co. v. Burkhardt, 97 U.S. 110, 24 L.Ed. 973.
This word, when taken In its strict legal sense, does not mean gifts, (advancements,) and does mean a sort of loan; and, when taken in its ordinary and usual sense, it in-eludes both loans and gifts,—loans more readily, perhaps, than gifts. Landrum & Co. v. Wright, 11 Ala.App. 406, 66 So. 892.
Payments advanced to the owner of property by a factor or broker on the price of goods which the latter has in his hands, or is to receive, for sale.
"Loans" are repayable at maturity, while -advances" are not repaid by party receiving them, but are covered by proceeds of consigned goods. People ex rel. James Tal-cott, Inc., v. Goldfogle, 211 N.Y.S. 122, 123, 213 App.Div. 719.
ADVANTAGE. Any state, condition, circum-stance, opportunity, or means specially favorable to success, prosperity, interest, reputation, or any desired end. Duvall v. State, 92 Ind.App. 134, 166 N.E. 603, 604. Preference or priority. United States v. Preston, 4 Wash. 446, Fed.Cas.No.16,087.
ADVANTAGIUM. In old pleading, an advan-tage. Co.Ent. 484; Townsh.Pl. 50.
ADVENA. In Roman law, one of foreign birth, who has left his own country and settled else-where, and who has not acquired citizenship in his new locality; often called albanus. Du Cange.
ADVENT. A period of time recognized by the English common and ecclesiastical law, beginning on the Sunday that falls either upon St. Andrew’s day, being the 30th of November, or the next to it, and continuing to Christmas day. Wharton.
ADVENTITIOUS. That which comes incidental-ly, fortuitously, or out of the regular course. "Adventitious value" of lands, see Central R. Co. v. State Board of Assessors, 49 N.J.Law, 1, 7 A. 306.
ADVENTITIUS. Lat. Fortuitous; incidental; coming from an unusual source. Adventitia bona are goods which fall to a man otherwise than by inheritance. Adventitia dos is a dowry or portion given by some friend other than the parent.
ADVENTURA. An adventure. 2 Mon.Angl. 615; Townsh.Pl. 50. Flotson, jetson, and lagon are styled adventurce maris, (adventures of the sea.) Hale, De Jure Mar. pt. 1, c. 7.
ADVENTURE. A hazardous and striking enter-prise, a bold undertaking in which hazards are to be met and issue hangs upon unforeseen events. Bond v. O’Donnell, 205 Iowa, 902, 218 N.W. 898, 902, 63 A.L.R. 901.
Generally
Adventure, bill of. In mercantile law, a writing signed by a merchant, stating that the property in goods shipped in his name belongs to another, to the adventure or chance of which the person so named is to stand, with a covenant from the merchant to account to him for the produce.
Gross adventure. In maritime law, a loan on bottomry. So named because the Tender, in case

of a loss, or expense incurred for the common safety, must contribute to the gross or general average.
Joint adventure. A commercial or maritime en-terprise undertaken by ‘several persons jointly; a limited partnership,—not limited in the statu-tory sense as to the liability of the partners, but as to its scope and duration. Lobsitz v. E. Liss-berger Co., 168 App.Div. 840, 154 N.Y.S. 556, 557. A special partnership. McDaniel v. State Fair of Texas, Tex.Civ.App., 286 S.W. 513, 517. An as-sociation of two or more persons to carry out a single business enterprise for profit, for which purpose they combine their property, money, ef-fects, skill, and knowledge. Forman v. Lumm, 214 App.Div. 579, 212 N.Y.S. 487. A special com-bination of two or more persons, where, in some specific adventure, a profit is jointly sought, with-out any actual partnership or corporate designa-tion. Griffin v. Reilly, Tex.Civ.App., 275 S.W. 242, 246.
It is ordlnarily, but not necessarily, limited to a single transaction, Forbes v. Butler, 66 Utah, 373, 242 P. 950, 956, which serves to distinguish It from a partnership, Barry v. Kern, 184 Wis. 266, 199 N.W. 77, 78. But the business of conducting it to a successful termination may continue for
a number of years. Elliott y. Murphy Timber Co., 117 Or. 387, 244 P. 91, 93, 48 A.L.R. 1043. There is no real dis-tinction between a "joint adventure" and what Is termed a "partnership for a single transaction." Atlas Realty Co. v. Galt, 153 Md. 586, 139 A. 285, 286. A "joint adventure,"
while not identical with a partnership, is so similar in its nature and in the relations created thereby that the rights of the parties as between themselves are governed practi-cally by the same rules that govern partnershlps. Goss v. Lanln, 170 Iowa 57, 152 N.W. 43, 45.
Marine Insurance
A very usual word in policies of marine insur-ance, and everywhere used as synonymous, or nearly so, with "perils." It is of ten used by the writers to describe the enterprise or voyage as a "marine adventure" insured against. Moores v. Louisville Underwriters, C.C.Tenn., 14 Fed. 233.
Mercantile Law
Sending goods abroad under charge of a super-cargo or other agent, at the risk of the sender, to be disposed of to the best advantage for the benefit of the owners.
The goods themselves so sent.
ADVENTURER. One who undertakes uncertain or hazardous actions or enterprises. It is also used to denote one who seeks to advance his own interests by unscrupulous designs on the credulity of others. It has been held that to im-pute that a person is an adventurer is a libel; 18 L.J.C.P. 241.
ADVERSARIA. (From Lat. adversa, things re-marked or ready at hand.) Rough memoranda, common-place books.
ADVERSARY. A litigant-opponent, the opposite party in a writ or action.
ADVERSARY PROCEEDING. One having oppos-ing parties; contested, as distinguished from an
ex parte application; one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the oth-er party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding. Platt v. Magagnini, 187 P. 716, 718, 110 Wash. 39.
ADVERSE. Opposed; contrary; in resistance or opposition to a claim, application, or proceeding. Having opposing interests; having interests for the preservation of which opposition is essential. In re National Lock Co., D.C.I11., 9 F.Sppp. 432, 433.
As to adverse "Claim," "Enjoyment," "User," "Verdict," "Witness," see those titles.
ADVERSE INTEREST. The "adverse interest" of a witness, so as to permit cross-examination by the party calling him, must be so involved in the event of the suit that a legal right or liability will be acquired, lost, or materially affected by the judgment, and must be such as would be pro-moted by the success of the adversary of the par-ty calling him. Dinger v. Friedman, 279 Pa. 8, 123 A. 641, 643. On petition in bankruptcy court for removal of trustee’s attorney, attorney has an interest adverse to trustee. In re Mallow Hotel Corporation, D.C.Pa., 18 F.Supp. 15, 17.
ADVERSE PARTY. An "adverse party" entitled to notice of appeal is every party whose interest in relation to the judgment or decree appealed from is in conflict with the modification or rever-sal sought by the appeal.
Every party interested In sustaining the judgment or decree. Harrigan v. Gilchrist, 121 Wis. 127, 99 N.W. 909. All parties appearing against losing party unless reversal of case will not be to party’s detriment. Shea v. Shea, Iowa, 264 N.W. 590. Any party who would be prejudi-cially affected by a modification or reversal of the judg-ment appealed from. Great Falls Nat. Bank v. Young, 67 Mont. 328, 215 P. 651, 652. One who has interest in oppos-ing object sought to be accomplished by appeal. In re Baxter’s Estate, 94 Mont. 257, 22 P.2d 182. Party to rec-ord, whose interest in subject-matter of appeal is adverse te, reversal or modification of judgment or order appealed from. MacDonald v. Superior Court in and for City and County of San Francisco, 101 Cal.App. 423, 281 P. 672, 673. A party who, by the pleadings, is arrayed on the opposite side. Merrill v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 170 Minn. 332, 212 N.W. 533. The other party to the action. Highland v. Hines, 80 N.H. 179, 116 A. 347, 349. A party to the record for, or against, whom judgment Is sought. Merchants’ Supply Co. v. Hughes’ Ex’rs, 139 Va. 212, 123 S.E. 355, 356. "Opposite" party synonymous. In re Wah-shah-she-me-tsa-he’s Estate, 111 Okl. 177, 239 P. 177, 178. And term is not necessarily confined to plaintiffs as against defendants, or vice versa. Arwood v. Hill’s Adm’rs, 135 Va. 235, 117 S.E. 603, 605. But a defaulting defendant is not an "adverse party"; Holt v. Empey, 32 Idaho, 106, 178 P. 703; nor Is one who is named as a party but Is not served; Kissler v. Moss, 26 Idaho, 516, 144 P. 647. Compare Fer-gen v. Lonie, 50 S.D. 328, 210 N.W. 102, 103 (garnishment debtor not served in garnishment proceeding).
ADVERSE POSSESSION. A method of acquisi-tion of title by possession for a statutory period under certain conditions. Lowery v. Garfield County, Mont., 208 P.2d 478, 486. It has been de-scribed as the statutory method of acquiring title to land by limitation. Field v. Sosby, Tex.Civ. App., 226 S.W.2d 484, 486.
The possession must be actual, Ortiz v. Pacific States Properties, Cal.App., 215 P.2d 514, 516;

adverse, Flanery v. Greene, 158 S.W.2d 413, 415, 289 Ky. 244; under claim of right, Thomas v. Durchslag, III., 90 N.E.2d 200, 204, 404 Ill. 581; continuous, Davis v. Federal Land Bank of Col-umbia, 13 S.E.2d 417, 419, 219 N.Car. 248; open Wilberforce University v. College of Ed. and Indus. Arts at Wilberforce University, 90 N.E.2d 172, 173, 86 Ohio App. 121; notorious, Edie v. Coleman, 141 S.W.2d 238, 242, 243, 235 Mo.App. 1289; exclusive, Laudati v. State, 30 N.Y.S.2d 267, 270, and hostile, Singley v. Dempsey, 42 So.2d 609, 612, 252 Ala. 677. Although color of title is not essential, Roesch v. Gerst, 138 P.2d 846, 851, 852, 18 Wash.2d 294, it is of great evidentiary value in establishing adverse possession, Lincoln v. Milis, 2 So.2d 809, 811, 191 Miss. 512.
Adverse possession depends on intent of occu-pant to claim and hold real property in opposition to all the world, Sertic v. Roberts, 136 P.2d 248, 171 Ore. 121; and also embodies the idea that own-er of or persons interested in property have knowl-edge of the assertion of ownership by the occu-pant, Field v. Sosby, Tex.Civ.App., 226 S.W.2d 484, 486.
Payment of taxes alone is not sufflcient in it-self to establish adverse possession, Blitch v. Sapp, 194 So. 328, 330, 142 Fla. 166. It is manda-tory that the element of continuous possession exist for the full statutory period, Wells v. Tietge, 9 N.W.2d 180, 182, 143 Neb. 230.
ADVERSUS. In the civil law, against, (contra.) Adversus bonos mores, against good morals. Dig. 47, 10, 15.
Adversus extraneos vitiosa possessio prodesse solet. Prior possession is a good title of owner-ship against all who cannot show a better. D. 41. 2. 53; Salmond, Jurispr. 638.
ADVERTISE. To give notice to, inform or notify, give public notice of, announce publicly, notice or observe. People v. Hopkins, 263 N.Y.S. 290, 147 Misc. 12. To advise, announce, apprise, com-mand, give notice of, inform, make known, pub-lish. People v. Montague, 274 N.W. 347, 351, 280 Mich. 610. On call to the public attention by any means whatsoever; Commonwealth v. Allison, 227 Mass. 57, 116 N.E. 265, 266.
It includes publication by hand bilis, signs, bill boards, sound trucks and radio, Rust v. Missouri Dental Board, 348 Mo. 616, 155 S.W.2d 80, 83; or in a newspaper, or by means of placards, or other written public notices; Nichols v. Nichols, 192 Ala. 206, 68 So. 186, 187. It is merely iden-tification and description, apprising of quality and place, Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 36 S.Ct. 370, 377, 60 L.Ed. 679. And "advertising purposes" are not limited to matters of vocation, or even avocation, but include advertisernents essentially for unselfish purposes, Almind v. Sea Beach Ry. Co., 141 N.Y.S. 842, 843, 157 App.Div. 230.
ADVERTISEMENT. Notice given in a manner designed to attract public attention. Edwards v. Lubbock County, Tex., 33 S.W.2d 482, 484. Infor-mation communicated to the public, or to an in-dividual concerned, as by handbills or the news-paper, First Nat. Corporation v. Perrine, 99 Mont. 454, 43 P.2d 1073, 1077.
A sign-board, erected at a person’s place of business, giving notice that lottery tickets are for sale, Com. v. Hooper, 5 Pick.Mass. 42.
ADVERTISEMENTS OF QUEEN ELIZABETIL Certain articles or ordinances drawn up by Arch-bishop Parker and some of the bishops in 1564, at the request of Queen Elizabeth, the object of which was to enforce decency and uniformity in the ritual of the church. The queen subsequently refused to give her offlcial sanction to these ad-vertisements, and left them to be enforced by the bishops under their general powers. Phillim.Ecc. Law, 910; 2 Prob.Div. 276; 354.
ADVICE. View; opinion; the counsel given by lawyers to their clients; an opinion expressed as to wisdom of future conduct. Hughes v. Van Bruggen, 44 N.M. 534, 105 P.2d 494, 496.
The word has several different meanings, among others, as follows: Information or notice given; intelligence;— usually information communicated by letter;—Chiefly as to drafts or bilis of exchange; as, a letter of advice.— Advice Implies real or pretended knowledge, often pro-fessional or technical, on the part of the one who gives it. Provident Trust Co. v. National Surety Co., D.C.Pa., 44 F.Supp. 514, 515.
The instruction usually given by one merchant or banker to another by letter, informing him of shipments made to him, or of bilis or drafts drawn on him, with particulars of date, or sight, the sum, and the payee. Bilis presented for ac-ceptance or payn-tent are frequently dishonored for want of advice.
Letter of advice is a communication from one person to another, advising or warning the latter of something which he ought to know, and commonly apprising him before-hand of some act done by the writer which will ultimately affect the recipient. Chit. Bills, 162.
ADVISARE, ADVISARI. Lat. To consult, delib-erate, consider, advise; to be advised. Occurring in the phrase curia advisari ‘vult, which see (usu-ally abbreviated cur. adv. volt, or C. A. TT.,) the
court wishes to be advised, or to consider of the matter.
ADVISE. To give an opinion or counsel, or rec-ommend a plan or course of action; also to give notice. Long v. State, 23 Neb. 33, 36 N.W. 310. To encourage. Voris v. People, 75 Colo. 574, 227 P. 551, 553. "Inform" or "acquaint." Ericson v. Steiner, 119 Cal.App. 305, 6 P.2d 298, 300.
It is different in meaning from "instruct" or "persuade." Hughes v. Van Bruggen, 44 N.M. 534, 105 P.2d 494, 497. Where a statute authorizes the trial court to advise the jury to acquit, the court has no power to instruct the jury to acquit. The court can only counsel, and the jury are not bound by the advice. People v. Horn, 70 Cal. 17, 11 P. 470. "Advise" imports that it is discretionary or optional with the person addressed whether he will act on such advice or not. State v. Downing, 23 Idaho, 540, 130 P. 461, 462.
ADVISED. Prepared to give judgment, alter ex-amination and deliberation. "The court took time to be advised." 1 Leon. 187.
ADVISEDLY. With deliberation; intentionally. 15 Moore P.C. 147.
ADVISEMENT. Consideration; deliberation; consultation. Drainage Dist. No. 1 of Lincoln

County v. Suburban Irr. ‘Dist., 139 Neb. 460, 298 N.W. 131, 134. The consultation of a court, after the argument of a cause by counsel, and before delivering their opinion. In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 662, 14 S.Ct. 221, 37 L.Ed. 1211.
ADVISORY. Counselling, suggesting, or advis-ing, but not imperative or conclusive. A verdict on an issue out of charicery is advisory. Watt v. Starke, 101 U.S. 252, 25 L.Ed. 826. Not binding on chancellor. Merritt v. Palmer, 289 Ky. 141, 158 S.W.2d 163, 165.
ADVISORY OPINION. A formal opinion by judge or judges or a court or a law officer upon a question of law submitted by a legislative body or a governmental ,official, but not actually pre-s’ented in a concrete case at law. Douglas Oil Co. v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 81 S.W.2d 1064, 1077.
Merely opinion of judges or court, which adjudicates nothing and is binding en no one, in exercise of wholly non or extra-judicial function. The expression ordinarily connotes the practice which existed in England from very early times of extra-judicial consultation of the judges by the Crown and the House of Lords. Douglas Oil Co. v. State, Tex.Civ.App,, 81 S.W.2d 1064, 1077.
ADVOCACY. The act of pleading for, supporting, or recommending active espousal. Gitlow v. Peo-ple of State of New York, 45 S.Ct. 625, 626, 268 U.S. 652, 69 L.Ed. 1138.
ADVOCARE. Lat. To defend; to call to one’s aid; to vouch; to warrant.
ADVOCASSIE. L. Fr. The office of an advocate; advocacy. Kelham.
ADVOCATA. In old English law, a patroness; a woman who had the right of presenting to a church. Spelman.
ADVOCATE, v. To speak in favor of ; defend by argument. Ex parte Bernat, D.C.Wash., 255 F. 429, 432. To support, vindicate, or recommend publicly. Butash v. State, 212 Ind. 492, 9 N.E.2d 88, 90. Not for an educational purpose, but to disseminat e controversial "propaganda," which means plan for publication of doctrine or system of principies. Leubuscher v. Commissioner of In-ternal Revenue, C.C.A., 54 F.2d 998, 999.
ADVOCATE, n. One who assists, defends, or pleads for another; one who renders legal advice and aid and pleads the cause of another before a court or a tribunal, a counselor. Haverty Furni-ture Co. v. Foust, 174 Tenn. 203, 124 S.W.2d 694, 697.
A person learned in the law, and duly admitted to practice, who assists his client with advice, and pleads, for him in open court. Holthcuse.
An assistant; adviser; a pleader of causes.
Derived fron-i advocare, to summon to one’s assistance; advocatus originally signified an assistant or helper of any kind, even an accomplice in the commission of a crime; Cicero, Pro Ccecina, c. 8; Livy, lib. iI. 55; iii. 47; Tertul-han, De ldolatr. cap. xxiii.; Petron.• Satyric. cap. xv. Secondarily, it was applied to one called in te assist, a party in the conduct of a suit; Inst. 1, 11, D, 50, 13. de extr. cogn. Hence, a pleader, which is its present signifi-

Civil and Ecclesiastical Late

An officer of the court, learned in the law, who is engaged by a suitor to maintain or defend his cause.

in Scotland, and one of the great officers of state of Scotland. It is his duty to act as public prose-cutor; but private individuals injured ma.S7 prose-cute upon obtaining his concurrence. He is as-sisted by a solicitor general and four junior coun-sel, termed "advocates-depute." He has the pow-er of appearing as public prosecutor in any court in Scotland, where any person can be tried for an offense, or in any action where the crown is in-terested. Wharton.
—Queen’s advocate. A member of the College of Advocates, apkointed by letters patent, whose of-fice is to advise and act as counsel for the crown in questions of civil, canon, and international law. His rank is next after the solicitor general.
ADVOCATI. Lat. In Roman law, patrons; plead-ers; speakers.
ADVOCATI ECCLESIIE. Advocates of the church.
A term used In the ecclesiastical law to denote the patrons of churches who presented to the living on an avoidance. This term was also applied to those who were retained to argue the cases of the church. These were of tuvo sorts: those retained as pleaders to argue the cases of the church and attend to its law-matters; and advo-cates, or patrons of the advowson. Cowell; Spelman, Gloss.
ADVOCATI FISCI. In civil law, those chosen by the emperor to argue his cause whenever a question arose affecting his revenues. 3 Bla. Comm. 27. Advocates of the fisc, or revenue; fis-cal advocates, (qui causam fisci egissent.) Cod. 2, 9, 1; Cod. 2, 7, 13. Answering, in some measure, to the king’s counsel in English law.
ADVOCATIA. In the civil law, the quality, func-tion, privilege, or territorial jurisdiction of an ad-vocate.
The functions, duty, or privilege of an advo-cate. Du Cange, Advocatia.
ADVOCATION. In Scotch law, a process by which an action may be carried from an inferior to a superior court before final judgment in the former.
ADVOCATIONE DECIMARUM. A writ which lay for tithes, demanding the fourth part or up-wards, that belonged to any church.
ADVOCATOR. In old practice, one who called on or vouched another to warrant a title; a voucher. Advocatus; the person called on, or vouched; a vouchee. Spelman; Townsh.Pl. 45.
In Scotch practice, an appellant. 1 Broun, R.

ADVOCATUS. A pleader; a narrator. Bracton, 412 a, 372 b.
In the civil law, an advocate; one who managed or assisted in managing another’s cause before a judicial tribunal. Called also "patronus." Cod. 2, 7, 14. But distinguished from causidicus. Id. 2, 6, 6.
ADVOCATUS DIABOLI. In ecclesiastical law, the devil’s advocate; the advocate who argues against the canonization of a saint.
Advocatus est, ad quem pertinet jus advocationis alicujus ecclesise, ut ad ecclesiam, nomine pro-prio, non alieno, possit presentare. A patron is he to whom appertains the right of presentation to a church, in such a manner that he may pre-sent to such a church in his own name, and not in the name of another. Co.Litt. 119.
ADVOUTRER. In old English law, an adulterer. Beaty v. Richardson, 56 S.C. 173, 34 S.E. 73, 46 L.R.A. 517.
ADVOUTRY. In old English law, adultery be-tween parties both of whom were married. Hun-ter v. U. S., 1 PM. (Wis.) 91, 39 Am.Dec. 277. Or the offense by an adulteress of continuing to live with the man with whom she committed the adultery. Cowell; Termes de la Ley. Sometimes spelled "advowtry." See Advoutrer.
ADVOWEE, or AVOWEE. The person or patron who has a right to present to a benefice. Fleta, lib. 5, c. 14.
ADVOWEE PARAMOUNT. The sovereign, or highest patron.
ADVOWSON. In English ecclesiastical law, the right of presentation to a church or ecclesiastical benefice; the right of presenting a fit person to the bishop, to be by him admitted and instituted to a certain benefice within the diocese, which has become vacant. 2 Bl.Comm. 21; Co.Litt. 119b, 120a. The person enjoying this right is called the "patron" (patronus) of the church, and was formerly termed "advocatus," the advocate or defender, or in English, "advowee." Id.; 1 Crabb, Real Prop. p. 129, § 117.
When there is no patron, or he neglects to exercise his right within six months, It Is called a lapse, ami a titie is given to the ordinary to collate to a church: when a pres-entation is made by one who has no right, it Is called a usurpation.
Advowsons are of different kinds.
Advowson appendant is an advowson annexed to a manor, and passing with it, as incident or appendant to it, by a grant of the manor only, without adding any other words. 2 BI.Comm. 22; Co.Litt. 120, 121; 1 Crabb, Real Prop. p. 130, § 118.
Advowson collative. Where the bishop happens himself to be the patron, in which case (presentation being Impos-sible, or unnecessary) he does by one act, which is termed "conation," or conferring the benefice, all that is usually done by the separate acts of presentation and institution. 2 BI.Comm. 22, 23; 1 Crabb, Real Prop. p. 131, § 119.
Advowson donativo exists where the patron has the right to put his clerk in possession by his mere gift, or deed of donation, without any presentation to the bishop, or insti-tution by him. 2 Bl.Comm. 23; 1 Crabb, Real Prop. p. 131, § 119.
Advowson in gross 1s an advowson separated from the manor, and annexed to the person. 2 BI.Comm. 22; Co. Litt. 120; 1 Crabb, Real Prop. p. 1.30, § 118; 3 Steph. Comm. 116.
Advowson presentative is the usual kind of advowson, where the patron has the right of presentation to the bishop, or ordinary, and moreover to demand of him to institute his clerk, if he fin ds him canonically qualified. 2 Bl.Comm. 22; 1 Crabb, Real Prop. p. 131, § 119.
ADVOWTRY. See Advout:ry.
"ES. Lat. In the civil law, a house, dwelling, temple, place of habitation., whether in the city or country. Dig. 30, 41, 5. In the country every-thing upon the surf ace of the soil passed under the term "cedes." Du Cange; Calvin.
/EDIFICARE. Lat. In civil and old English law, to make or build a house; to erect a building. Dig. 45, 1, 75, 7.
;Edificare in tuo proprio solo non licet quod alteri noceat. 3 Inst. 201. To build upon your own land what may injure another is not lawful.
A proprietor of land has no right to erect an edifIce on his own ground, interfering with the due enjoyment of adjoining premises, as by overhanging them, or by throw-ing water from the roof and eaves upon them, or by obstructing ancient lights and windows. Broom, Max. 369.
ZEdificatum solo solo cedit. What is built upon land belongs to or goes with land. Broom, Max. 172; Co.Litt. 4a.
/Edilicia solo cedunt. Buildings belong to [go with] the soil. Fleta, lib. 3, c. 2, § 12.
7EDILE. In Roman law, an officer who attended to the repairs of the temples and other public buildings; the repairs and cleanliness of the streets; the tare of the weights and measures; the providing for funerals and games; and to reg-ulating the prices of provisions. Ainsvvorth, Lex.; Smith, Lex.; Du Cange.
1EDILITUM EDICTUM. In the Roman law, the 2Edilitian Edict.
An edict providing remedies for frauds irv sales, the execution of which belonged to the curule mdiles. Dig. 21, 1. See Cod. 4, 58. That provision by which the buyer of a diseased or imperfect slave, horse, or other animal was relieved at the expense of the vendor who had sold him as sound knowing him to be imperfect. Calvinus, Lex.
MFESN. In old English law, the remuneration to the proprietor of a domain f dr the privilege of feeding swine under the oaks and beeches of his woods.
ZEGROTO. Lat. Being sick or indisposed. A term used in some of the older reports. "Holt cegroto." 11 Mod. 179.
7EGYLDE. Uncompensated, unpaid for, un-avenged. From the participle of exclusion, a, ce, or ex, (Goth.,) and gild, payment, requital. .Anc. Inst.Eng.
ML. A Norman French term signifying "gra nd-father." It is also spelled "aieur and "ayle." Kelham.JEQUIOR EST DISPOSITIO LEGIS QUAM HOM-INIS. The disposition- of the law is more equita-ble than that of man. 8 Coke, 152.
IEQUITAS. In the civil law, equity, as opposed to strictum or summum jus, (q. v.). Otherwise called cequum, cequum bonum, cequum et bonum, cequum et justum. Calvin.
Referring to the use of this term, Prof. Gray says (Nature and Sources of the Law 290) : "Austin and Maine take cequitas as having an analogous meaning to equity; they apply the’ term to those rules which the praetors intro-duced through the Edict in modification of the jus civile, but it seems to be an error to suppose that xquitas had this sense in the Roman Law." He quotes Prof. Clerk (Jurisprudence 367) as doubting "whether sequitas is ever clearly used by the Roman jurists to indicate simply a department of Law" and expresses the opinion that an examination of the authorities more than justifies his doubt. .Zquitas is opposed to’ strictum jus and verles in meaning between reasonable modification of the letter and substantial justice. It is to be taken as a frame of mind in dealing with legal questions and not as a source of law.
See JEquum et Bonum.
1Equitas agit in personam. Equity acts upon the person. 4 Bouv.Inst. n. 3733.
lEquitas est correctio legis generaliter latan, qua parte deficit. Equity is the correction of that wherein the law, by reason of its generality, is deficient. Plowd. 375.
1Equitas est correctio quEedam legi adhibita,
ab eá abest aliquid propter generalem sine ex• ceptione comprehensionem. Equity is a certain correction applied to law, because on account of its general comprehensiveness, without an excep-tion, something is absent from it. Plowd. 467.
lEquitas est perfecta quoedam ratio qux jus strip• tum interpretatur et emendat; nulla scriptura comprehensa, sed solum in verá ratione consistens. Equity is a certain perfect rer son, which inter-prets and amends the written law, comprehended in no writing, but consisting in right reason alone. Co.Litt. 24b.
lEquitas est quasi Eequalitas. Equity is as it were equality; equity is a species of equality or equali-zation. .Co.Litt. 24.
lEquitas ignorantize opitulatur, oscitantial non item. Equity assists ignorance, but not careless-ness.
lEquitas non facit jus, sed juri auxiliatur. Eq-uity does not make law, but assists law. Lofft, 379.
lEquitas nunquam contravenit legis. Equity nev-er counteracts the laws.
lEquitas sequitur legem. Equity follows the law. 5 Barb.N.Y. 277, 282.
lEquitas supervacua odit. Equity abhors super-fluous things. Lofft, 282.
ilEquitas uxoribus, liberis, creditoribus maxime favet. Equity favors wives and children, credi-tors most of all.
AEQUUWI ET BONUM. "The Roman conception involved in `cequum et bonum’ or `sequitas’ is iden-tical with what we mean by ‘reasonable’ or nearly so."
"On the whole, the natural justice or ‘reason of the thing’ which the common law recognizes and applies does not appear to differ from the ‘law of nature’ which the Romans identified with jus gentium, and the medieval doetors of the civil and common law boldly adopted as being divine law revealed through man’s natural reason." Sir F. Pollock, Expans. of C. L. 111, citing [1902] 2 Ch. 661, where jus naturale and cequum et bonum were taker, to have the same meaning.
irEquum et bonum est lex legum. What is eq-uitable and good is the law of laws. Hob. 224.
MQUUS. Lat. Equal; even. A provision in a will for the division of the residuary estate ex cequus among the legatees means equally or even-ly. Archer v. Morris, 47 Atl. 275, 61 N.J.Eq. 152.
or ERA. A fixed point of chronological time, whence any number of years is counted; thus, the Christian era began at the birth of Christ, and the Mohammedan era at the flight of Mohammed from Mecca to Medina. The deri-vation of the word has been much contested. Wharton.
;ERARIUM. Lat. In the Roman law. The treas-ury, (fiscus.) Calvin.
AÉRIAL NAVIGATION. See Aeronautics.
AERODROME. A term originally applied by Professor Langley to his flying machine but now used in the same sense as "airport" (q. y.).
AERONAUT. This term under some statutes includes every person who, being in or upon an airship or anything attached thereto, undertakes to direct its ascent, course, or descent in the air, or the ascent, course, or descent in the air of anything attached to such airship.
Under the Uniform Aeronautics Act it includes aviator, pilot, baloonist, and every other person having any part in the operation of aircraft while in flight. See Aeronautics.
AERONAUTIC ACTIVITY. The term is broad enough to cover what is ordinarily incident to an airplane trip.. The aeronautic activities of one who takes such a trip do not begin or end with the actual flight, but include his presence or movements in or near to the machine incidental to beginning or concluding the trip. Blonski v. Bankers’ Life Co., 209 Wis. 5, 243 N.W. 410.
Insured killed when struck by propeller after emerging from airplane at end of flight, Day v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., C.C.A.Colo., 83 F.2d 147, 148. To a contrary effect: Tierney v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal.App. 779, 265 P. 400.
AERONAUTIC EXPEDITION. Traveling as pas-senger in airplane operated in regular passenger service was engaging in "aeronautic expedition" under life policy. Gibbs v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., 256 N.Y. 208, 176 N.E. 144. Contra. King v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, 232 Iowa 541, 5 N.W.2d 845, 846, 155 A.L.R.

1022. Pleasure trip in airplane over airport on pleasant day was not "aeronautic expedition" under life policy. Day v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., C.C.A.Colo., 83 F.2d 147, 149.
AERONAUTIC OPERATION. Passenger on reg-ularly scheduled airplane trip engaged in "aero-nautic operation," within life policy. Day v. Eq-uitable Life Assur. Soc. of Ú. S., C.C.A.Colo., 83 F.2d 147, 148. Did not include casual trip in air-plane; "aeronautic operations" signifying more than occasional venture. Gits v. New York Life Ins. Co., C.C.A.I11., 32 F.2d 7, 10. Nor a pleasure fiight in airplane. Day v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., C.C.A.Colo., 83 F.2d 147, 148.
AERONAUTICS. The science, art or practice of sailing in the air; aerial navigation; the branch of aerostatics which treats of floating in or navi-gating the air as in an airship or airplane. Mas-sachusetts Protective Ass’n v. Bayersdorfer, C.C.A. Ohio, 105 F.2d 595, 597. Operation of aircraf t. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States v. Dyess, 194 Ark. 1023, 109 S.W.2d 1263, 1265.
It is divided into two branches: aerostation, dealing with machines which, like ballcons, are lighter than air; and aviation, dealing with artificial fiight by machines which are heavier than air. Bew v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., 95 N.J.Law, 533, 112 A. 859, 860, 14 A.L.R. 983.
A passenger in an airplane, whether he takes part in lts operation or not, "participates in aeronautics" within the meaning of an insurance policy. Meredíth v. Business Men’s Acc. Ass’n of America, 213 Mo.App. 688, 252 S.W. 976, 977. Contra as to a transport airplane passenger who could not pilot an airplane, had no knowledge of flying, and at time of accident was traveling on prívate business. Gregory v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, C.C.A.Ark., 78 F.2d 522, 524. As to an insured, who was a fare-paying passenger on a commerclal transport plane over an estab-lished route while plane was wholly under the control of others. Bayersdorfer v. Massachusetts Protectíve Ass’n, D.C.Ohlo, 20 F.Supp. 489, 492. A father riding with son as guest in airplane purchased by father for son. Day v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., C.C.A.Colo., 83 F.2d 147, 149. And where insured after alighting from a fiight, in bending over to avoid a wire, was struck by the propel-ler of the aeroplane. Tierney v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of California, 89 Cal.App. 779, 265 P. 400, 401.
See, also, Aircraft; Airship; Airport; Airway; Aviation.
AEROPLANE. See Aircraft; Hydro-Aeroplane; Sea plane.
AEROSTATICS. "Aerostatics" is divided into two main branches; aerostation dealing, properly, with machines, which, like balloons, are lighter than air, and aviation dealing with the problem of artificial fiight by means of flying machines, which, like birds, are heavier than air. Swasey v. Massachusetts Protective Ass’n, C.C.A.Ariz., 96 F.2d 265, 266.
AEROSTATION. See Aerostatics, and Aeronau-tics, note.
LES. Lat. In the Roman law, money, (literally, brass;) metallic money in general, including gold. Dig. 9, 2, 2, pr.; Dig. 9, 2, 27, 5; Dig. 50, 16, 159.
LES ALIENUM. A civil law term signifying a debt. Literally translated, the money of anoth-er; the civil law considered borrowed money as
the property of another, as distinguished from ces suum, one’s own money.
IES SUUM. One’s own money. In the Roman law, debt; a debt; that which others owe to us, (quod alii nobis debent.) Dig. 50, 16, 213.
JESNECIA. In old English law, Esnecy; the right or privilege of the eldest born. Spelman; Glanv. lib. 7, c. 3; Fleta, lib. 2, c. 66, §§ 5, 6.
1ESNECIUS. See Anecius; Aesnecia.
/ESTHETIC. Relating to that which is beautiful or in good taste. People v. Wolf, 216 N.Y.S. 741, 744, 127 Misc. 382. Pertaining to the beautiful. Hav-A-Tampa Cigar Co. v. Johnson, 149 Fla. 148, 5 So.2d 433, 440.
AESTIMATIO CAPITIS. Lat. The value of a head.
In Saxon law, the estimation or valuation of the head ; the price or value of a man. The price to be paid for tak-ing the life of a human being. By the laws of Athelstan, the life of every man not excepting that of the king him-self, was estimated at a certain price, which was called the were, or wstimatio capitis. Crabb, Eng.Law, c. 4.
JETAS. Lat. In the civil law. Age.
.7ESTIMATIO PRPETERITI DELICTI EX POST-REMO FACTO NUNQUAM CRESCIT. The weight of a past offense is never increased by a subse-quent fact. Bacon.
JETAS INFANTLE (also written infantili) PROXIMA. The age next to infancy; the first half of the period of childhood (pueritia,) extend-ing from seven years to ten and a half. Inst. 3, 20, 9; 4 Bl.Comm. 22. See Age.
JETAS LEGITIMA. Lawful age; the age of twenty-five. Dig. 3, 5, 27, pr.; Id. 26, 2, 32, 2; Id. 27, 7, 1, pr.
ZETAS PERFECTA. Complete age; full age; the age of twenty-flve. Dig. 4, 4, 32; Id. 22, 3, 25, 1.
ZETAS PRIMA. The first age; infancy, (infan-tia). Cod. 6, 61, 8, 3.
JETAS PUBERTATI PROXIMA. The age next to puberty; the last half of the period of child-.hood (pueritia), extending from ten and a half years to fourteen, in which there might or might not be criminal responsibility according to natural capacity or incapacity. Inst. 3, 20, 9; 4 Bl.Comm. 22. See Age.
IETATE PROBANDA. A writ which inquired whether the king’s tenant holding in chief by chivalry was of full age to receive his lands. It was directed to the escheater of the county. Now disused.
JETHELING. In Saxon law, a noble; generally a prince of the blood.
AFFAIR. (Fr.). A law suit.
The term frequently refers to an amour; in-trigue; liaison.

AFFAIRS. An inclusive term, bringing within its scope and meaning anything that a person may do. Walker v. United States, C.C.A.Mo., 93 F.2d 383, 391.
A person’s concerns in trade or property; business. Bragaw v. Bolles, 51 N.J.Eq. 84, 25 A. 947. That which is done or to be done. Wicks v. City and County of Denver, 61 Colo. 266, 156 P. 1100, 1103. A corporation’s borrowing money, and methods of obtaining loans. Cameron v. First Nat. Bank, Tex.Civ.App., 194 S.W. 469, 470. Person and estate of alleged incompetent. State ex rel. Bevan y Wil-liams, 316 Mo. 665, 291 S.W. 481, 482. General operations carried on by an employer. Gocs v. Thomas E. Coale Coal Co., 142 Pa.Super. 479, 16 A.2d 720, 723.
AFFECT. To act upon; influence; change; en-large or abridge; often used in the sense of acting injuriously upon persons and things. Ryan v. Carter, 93 U.S. 84, 23 L.Ed. 807; Tyler v. Wells, 2 Mo.App. 538; Holland v. Dickerson, 41 Iowa 373; Meurer v. Hooper, Tex.Civ.App., 271 S.W. 172, 177. Does not mean to impair. Harris v. Friend, 24 N.M. 627, 175 P. 722, 725. To lay hold of or at-tack (as a disease does) ; to act, or produce an effect upon; to impress or influence (the mind or feelings) ; to touch. State v. Hurd, 5 Wash.2d 308, 105 P.2d 59, 61, 62. Acted upon, influenced, concerned. In re National Lock Co., D.C.Ill., 9 F. Supp. 432, 433. Implies an indirect relation. Chapman v. }lame Ice Co., D.C.Tenn., 43 F.Supp. 424, 428.
AFFECTED WITH A PUBLIC INTEREST. Af-firmatively, phrase means that a business or prop-erty must be sulh or be so employed as to justify the conclusion that it has been devoted to a pub-lic use, and its use thereby in effect granted to the public. Negatively, it does not mean that a business is affected with a public interest merely because it is large or because the public are war-ranted in having a feeling of concern in respect of its maintenance. H. Earl Clack Co. v. Public Service Commission of State of Montana, 94 Mont. 488, 22 P.2d 1056.
A business glven a virtual monopoly In its field or where the public adapt their business or conduct to the methods used by it. Western Buse Telephone Co. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 188 Minn. 524, 248 N.W. 220, 229. The business must affect the prosperity of a large part of [he members of the body politic. Ex parte Kazas, 22 Cal.App. 2d 161. 70 P.2d 962, 967. Thls phrase means something more than "quasi public," or "not strictly private," and similar phrases employed as a basis for upholding police regulations. A business is not affected with a public inter-est merely because the public derives benefit, accommoda-tion, ease or enjoyment from its existence or operation, such as admissions to places of amusement or entertain-ment. Tyson & Bro.-United Theatre Ticket °feces v. Ban-ton, 273 U.S. 418, 47 S.Ct. 426, 429, 71 L.Ed. 718, 58 A.L.R. 1236.
Businesses. Three classes of such businesses : (1) Thoso carried on under the authority of a public grant or privi-lege expressly or impliedly imposing an affirrnative duty of rendering public service demanded by the public, such as eommon carrlers and public utilities; (2) occupations regarded as exceptional, the public interest attaching to which has been recognized from earliest times and has sur-
■ ived the period of arbitrary laws by Parliament or colo-nial legislatures for regulating trades and callings, such as inns, cabs, and grist milis; (3) businesses which, though not public at their inception, have become such by devot-
ing business to a public use, thereby granting the publi2 an interest in that use and subjecting themselves to public regulation to extent of that interest, although the property continuas to belong to its private owner, and to be entitled to protection accordingly, as public warehouses
for storage of grain, banks, ami insurance companies. Rohrer v. Milk Control Board, 121 Pa.Super. 281, 184 A. 133, 138.
AFFECTIO TUA NOMEN IMPONIT OPER! TUO. Your disposition (or motive, intention) gives name (or character) to your work or act. Bract. fol. 2b, 101b.
AFFECTION. The making over, pawning, or mortgaging of a thing to assure the payment of a sum of money, or the discharge of some other duty or service. Crabb, Technol.Dict.
In a medica’ sense, an abnormal bodily condition. A local ”affection" is not a local disease within the meaning of an insurance policy, onless the affection has sufficiently developed to have some bearing on the general health. Cady v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 134 Wis. 322, 113 N.W. 967, 971, 17 L.R.A.,N.S., 260.
AFFECTUS. Disposition; intention, impulse or affection of the mind. One of the causes for a challenge of a juror is propter affectum, on ac-count of a suspicion of bias or favor. 3 Bl.Comm. 363; Co.Litt. 156.
AFFECTUS PUNITUR LICET NON SEQUATUR EFFECTUS. The intention is punished although the intended result does not follow. 9 Coke, 55.
AFFEER. To assess, liquidate, appraise, fix in amount.
Account
To confirm It on oath In the exchequer. Cowell;
Blount; Spelman.
Amercement
To establish the amount which one amerced in a court-leet should pay. See Amercement.
AFFEERORS. Persons who, in court-leets, upon oath, settle and moderate the fines and amerce-ments imposed on those who have committed of-fenses arbitrarily punishable, or that have no ex-press penalty appointed by statute. They are al-so appointed to moderate fines, etc., in courts-baron. Cowell.
AFFERMER. L. Fr. To let to farm. Also to make sure, to establish or confirm. Kelham.
AFFIANCE. To assure by pledge. A plighting of troth between man and woman. Littleton, § 39.
An agreement by which a man and woman promise each other that they will marry together. Pothier, Traité clu Mar, n. 24. Co.Litt. 34 a. See Dig. 23, 1, 1; Code, 5. 1. 4.
AFFIANT. The person who makes and sub-scribes an affidavit. The word is used, in this sense, interchangeably with "deponent." But the latter term should be reserved as the designation of one who makes a deposition.
AFFIDARE. To swear faith to; to pledge one’s faith or do fealty by making oath. Cowell. Used of the mutual relation arising between landlord and tenant; 1 Washb.R.P. 19; 1 Bla.Com. 367; Termes de la Ley, Fealty. Affidavit is of kindred meaning.
AFFIDARI. To be mustered and enrolled for sol-diers upon an oath of fidelity.

AFFIDATIO. A swearing of the oath of fidelity or of fealty to one’s lord, under whose protection the quasi-vassal has voluntarily come. Brown.
AFFIDATIO DOMINORUM. An oath taken by the lords in parliament.
AFFIDATUS. One who is not a vassal, but who for the sake of protection has connected himself with one more powerful. Spelman; 2 BI.Comm. 46.
AFFIDAVIT. A written or printed declaration or statement of facts, made voluntarily, and con-flrmed by the oath or affirmation of the party making it, taken before an officer having authori-ty to administer such oath. Cox v. Stern, 170 III. 442, 48 N.E. 906, 62 Am.St.Rep. 385; Hays v. Loomis, 84 Ill. 18. A statement or declaration re-duced to writing, and sworn to or affirmed before some officer who has authority to administer an oath or affirmation. Shelton v. Berry, 19 Tex. 154, 70 Am.Dec. 326, and In re Breidt, 84 N.J.Eq. 222, 94 A. 214, 216.
A written or printed declaration or statement of facts, !nade voluntarily, and confirmed by the oath or affirmation of the party making it, taken before an officer having authority to administer such oath. June v. School Dist. No. 11, Southfield Tp., 283 Mich. 533, 278 N.W. 676, 677, 116 A.L.R. 581. Any voluntary ex parte statement reduced to wrlting and sworn to or affirmed before some person legally authorized to administer oath or aflirmation, made without notice to adverse party and without opportunity to cross-examine. Kirk v. Hartlieb, 193 Ark. 37, 97 S.W.2d 434, 435, 436. The word sometimes lncludes "deposItions." U. S. v. Kaplan, D.C.Ga., 286 F. 963, 970.
"Affidavits" are of two kinds; those which serve as evl-dence to advise the court in the decislon of some prelimi-nary lssue or determination of some substantial right, and those which merely serve to invoke the Judicial power. Worthen v. State, 189 Ala. 395, 66 So. 686, 688.
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENSE. An affidavit stating that the defendant has a good defense to the plaintiff’s action on the merits. The statements required in such an affidavit vary considerably in the different states where they are required. Called also an affidavit of merits (q. v.), as in Massachusetts.
AFFIDAVIT OF DEMAND. "Affidavit of de-mand" Oled under Code section to obtain judg-ment for want of affidavit of defense held not equivalent of "declaration." Penn Central Light & Power Co. v. Central Eastern Power Co., 6 W. W.Harr. 74, 171 A. 332.
AFFIDAVIT OF MERITS. One setting forth that the defendant has a meritorious defense (substan-tial and not technical) and stating the facts con-stituting the same. Palmer v. Rogers, 70 Iowa 381, 30 N.W. 645. Represents that, on the sub-stantial facts of the case, justice is with the af-fiant. Wendel v. Wendel, 58 S.D. 438, 236 N.W. 468, 469.
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE. An affidavit intend-ed to certify the service of a writ, notice, or other document.
AFFIDAVIT TO IIOLD TO RAIL. An affidavit required in many cases before the defendant in a civil action may be arrested. Such an affidavit
must contain a statement, clearly and certainly expressed, by some one acquainted with the fact, of an indebtedness from the defendant to the plaintiff, and must show a distinct cause of action; 1 Chit.Pl. 165.
AFFILARE. L. Lat. To put on record; to file or affile. Affiletur, let it be filed. 8 Coke, 160. De recordo affilatum, affiled of record. 2 Ld. Raym. 1476.
AFFILE. A term employed in old practice, signi-fying to put on file. 2 Maule & S. 202. In modern usage it is contracted to file.
AFFILIATE. Signifies a condition of being unit-ed, being in close connection, allied, or attached as a member or branch. Johanson v. Riverside County Select Groves, 4 Cal.App.2d 114, 40 P,2d 530, 534.
"Afflliate with" le defined as to recelve on friendly tercos; to associate with; to be intímate with; to sympa-thize with; to consort with; and to connect or associate one’s self with. Wolck v. Weedin, C.C.A.Wash., 58 F.2d 928, 930. But "afIlliated" does not bear construction that one of aftillated organizations is in all particulars identical with or covered by parent organization with which it may be said to be affiliated. People v. Horluchl, 114 Cal.App. 415, 300 P. 457, 460.
AFFILIATION. Imports less than membership in an organization, but more than sympathy, and a working alliance to bring to fruition the pro-scribed program of a proscribed organization, as distinguished from mere co-operation with a pro-scribed organization in lawful activities, is es-sential. Bridges v. Wixon, Cal., 326 U.S. 135, 65 S.Ct. 1443, 1447, 89 L.Ed. 2103.
It Includes an element of dependabillty upon which the organization can rely which, though not equIvalent to membership duty, reste upon course of conduct that could not be abruptly ended without giving at least reasonable cause for charge of breach of good faith, U. S. ex rel. Kettunen v. Reimer, C.C.A.N.Y., 79 F.2d 315, 317.
The act of imputing or determining the paterni-ty of a bastard child, and the obligation to main-tain it.

Corporations
Actual control of corporations by same interests is insufficient; legally enforceable control of stock of corporations by same interests being required. Island Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A., 57 F.2d 992, 994. Commences with acquisition of corporation from owners out-side of group and ends with disposal of all prop-erties or stock to those outside group. Hernandez v. Charles Ilfeld Co., C.C.A.N.M., 66 F.2d 236, 238.
Ecclesiastical Law
A condition which prevented the superior from removing the person afilliated to another convent. Guyot, Répert.
French Law
A species of adoption which exists by custom in some parts of France. The person affiliated suc-ceeded equally with other heirs to the property ac-quired by the deceased to whom he had been af-filiated, but not to that which he inherited.

AFFINAGE. A refining of metals. Blount.
AFFINES. In the civil law, connections by mar-riage, whether of the persons or their relatives. Calvinus, Lex.
Neighbors, who own or occupy adjoining lands. Dig. 10, 1, 12.
From this word we have affinity, denoting relationship by marriage; 1 Bla.Com. 434. The singular, affinis, is used in a variety of related significations—a boundary ; Du Cange; a partaker or sharer, affinis culpce (an aider or one who has knowledge of a crime); Calvinus, Lex.
AFFINIS MEI AFFINIS NON EST MIHI AF-FINIS. One who is related by marriage to a per-son related to me by marriage has no affinity to me. Shelf.Mar. & Div. 174.
AFFINITAS. Lat. In the civil law, affinity; re-lationship by marriage. Inst. 1, 10, 6.
AFFINITAS AFFINITATIS. Remote relation-ship by marriage. That connection between par-ties arising from marriage which is neither con-sanguinity nor affinity. Davidson v. Whitehill, 87 Vt. 499, 89 A. 1081, 1085. This term signifies the connection between the kinsmen of the two per-sons married, as, for example, the husband’s brother and the wife’s sister. Erskine, Inst. 1. 6. 8.
AFFINITY. A close agreement; relation; spir-itual relation or attraction held to exist between certain persons. State ex inf. Norman v. Ellis, 325 Mo. 154, 28 S.W.2d 363, 367. Relation which one spouse because of marriage has to blood rela-tives of the other. State v. Hooper, 140 Kan. 481, 37 P.2d 52.
Degrees of relationship by affinity are computed as are degrees of relationship by consanguinity. The doctrine of affInity grew out of the canonical maxim that marriage makes husband and wife one. The husband has the same relation, by affinity, to his wlfe’s blood relatives as she has to them by consanguinity and vice versa. State v. Hooper, 140 Kan. 481, 37 P.2d 52,
Afflifity 1s distinguished finto three kinds: (1) Direct, or that subsisting between the husband and his wlfe’s rela-tions by blood, or between the wife and the husband’s rela-tions by blood; (2) secondary, or that which subsists between the husband and his wife’s relations by marriage; (3) collateral, or that which subsists between the husband and the relations of his wife’s relations. Wharton.
In a larger sense, consanguinity or kindred. Co.Litt. 157a.
Quasi Affinity
In the civil law, the affinity which exists be-tween two persons, one of whom has been be-trothed to a kinsman of the other, but who have never been married.
AFFIRM. To ratify, make flrm, confirm, estab-lish, reassert. Cowell; Ashby v. Peters, 128 Neb. 338, 258 N.W. 639, 644, 99 A.L.R. 843.
In the practice of appellate courts, to affirm a judgment, decree, or order, is to declare that it is valid and right, and must stand as rendered below; to ratify and reassert it; to concur In lts correctness and confirm its efflcacy. Boner v. Fall River County Bank, 25 Wyo. 260, 168 P. 726, 727.
Contracts
Ratify and accept voidable contract. Cf. Adopt.
Black’s Law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed.-6

Pleading
To allege or ayer a matter of fact; to state it affirmatively; the opposite of deny or traverse.
Practice
To make affirmation; to make a solemn and formal declaration or asseveration that an affi-davit is true, that the witness will tell the truth, etc., this being substituted for an oath in certain cases. Also, to give testimony on affirmation.
AFFIRMANCE. In practice. The confirming, or ratifying of a former law, or judgment. Cowell; Blount.
The confirmation and ratification by an appel-late court of a judgment, order, or decree of a lower court brought before it for review. See Af-firm, note.
The ratification or confirmation of a voidable contract or act by the party who is to be bound thereby.
The term is In accuracy to be distinguished from ratifi-cation, which is a recognition of the validity or binding force as against the party ratifying, of some act performed by another person; and from confirmation, which would seem to apply more properly to cases where a doubtful authority has been exercised by another In behalf of the person ratifying; but three distinctions are not generaily observed with much care.
AFFIRMANCÉ DAY GENERAL. In the English court of exchequer, a day appointed by the judges of the common Aleas, and barons of the exche-quer, to be held a few days after the beginning of every term for the general affirmance or reversal of judgments. 2 Tidd, Pr. 1091.
AFFIRMANT. A person who testifles on affirma-tion, or who affirms instead of taking an oath. See Affirmation. Used in affidavits and deposi-tions which are affirmed, instead of sworn to in place of the word "deponent."
AFFIRMANTI, NON NEGANTI INCUIVIBIT PROBATIO. The [burden of] proof lies upon him who affirms, not upon one who denles. Steph. Pl. 84.
AFFIRMANTIS EST PROBARE. He who affirms must prove. Porter v. Stevens, 9 Cush., Mass., 535.
AFFIRMATION. In practice, a solemn and for-mal declaration or asseveration that an affidavit is true, that the witness will tell the truth, etc., this being substituted for an oath in certain cases.
A solemn religious asseveration in the nature of an oath. 1 Greenl.Ev. § 371.
Quakers, as a class, and other persons who have conscl-entious scruples against taking an oath, are allowed to make affirmation In any mode which they may declare to be binding upon their conscientes, in confirmation of the truth of testimony which they are about to glve. 1 Atk. 21, 46; Cowp. 340, 389; 1 Leach Cr.Cas. 64; 1 Ry. & M. 77.
AFFIRMATION OF FACT. A statement concern-ing a subject-matter of a transaction which might otherwise be only an expression of opinion but he transaction, and reasonably induces the other party to consider and rely upon it, as a fact. Stone v. McCarty, 64 Cal.App. 158, 220 P. 690, 694.
AFFIRMATIO UNIUS EXCLUSIO EST ALTERI-4JS. The affirmance of one thing is the exclusion of the other. State v. Evans, 214 La. 472, 38 So.2d 140, 147.
AFFIRMATIVE. That which declares positively; that which avers a fact to be true; that which establishes; the opposite of negative.
The party who, upon the allegations of pleadings joining issue, is under the obligation of making proof, in the first instance, of matters alleged, is satd to hold the afilrmative, or, in other words, to sustaln the burden of proof. Abbott.
As to affirmative "Damages," "Plea," "Proof," "Warranty," see those titles.
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION. The "affirmative ac-tion" which the National Labor Relations Board ‘ is authorized to take to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act is action to make effective the redress of rights conferred upon employees by the act. National Labor Rela-tions Board v. National Casket Co., C.C.A.2, 107 F.2d 992, 998,
It le broad, but is not unlimited, la remedial not punI-tIve, and is to be exercised in aid of the Board’s authority to restrain violations and as a means of removing or avold-ing the consequences of vlolations, National Labor Rela-tions Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corporation, 306 U.S. 240, 59 S.Ct. 490, 497, 83 L.Ed. 627, 123 A.L.R. 599.
It la not disciplinary. National Labor Relations Board v. Leviton Mfg. Co., C.C.A.2, 111 F.2d 619, 621.
AFFIRMATIVE AUTHORIZATION. Something more than authority by mere implication. White, Gratwick & Mitchell v. Empire Engineering Co., 125 Misc. 47, 210 N.Y.S. 563, 572.
AFFIRMATIVE CHARGE. The general "affirma-tive charge" is an instruction to the jury that, whatever the evidence may be, defendant cannot be convicted under the count in the indictment to which the charge is directed. Coker v. State, 18 Ala.App, 550, 93 So. 384, 386.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE. In code pleading. New matter constituting a defense; new matter which, assuming the complaint to be true, con-stitutes a defense to it. Carter v. Eighth Ward Bank, 33 Misc. 128, 67 N.Y.S. 300.
AFFIRMATIVE EASEMENT. An "affirmative easement" is one which gives to the owner of the dominant tenement the right to use the servient tenement, or to do some act thereon which would otherwise be unlawful. Clements v. Taylor, Tex. Civ.App., 184 S.W.2d 485, 487.
AFFIRMATIVE PREGNANT. In pleading, an af-firmative allegation implying some negative in favor of the adverse party. Fields v. State, 134 Ind. 46, 32 N.E. 780.
AFFIRMATIVE PROOF. Such evidence of the truth of matters asserted as tends to establish them, regardless of character of evidence offered. Glass v. Newport Clothing Co., 110 Vt. 368, 8 A.2d 651, 654.
AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF. Relief, benefit, or com-pensation which may be due and granted to de-fendant. Garner v. Hannah, 6 Duer, N.Y., 262. Relief for which defendant might maintain an ac-tion independently of plaintiff’s claim and on which he might proceed to recovery, although plaintiff abandoned his cause of action or failed to establish it. Southwestern Surety Ins. Co. v. Walser, 77 Okl. 240, 188 P. 335, 336.
AFFIRMATIVE STATUTE. A statute couched in affirmative or mandatory terms. 1 Bl.Comm. 142.
One which directa the doing of an act, or declares what shall be done; as a negative statute is one which prohibits a thing from being done, or declares what shall not be done. Blackston,e describes affirmative acta of parliament as those "whereln justice is directed to be done according to the law of the land." 1 B1,Comm. 142.
AFFIRMATIVE WARRANTY. Affirms existence of a fact at time policy is entered into, while promissory warranty requires that something be done or not done after policy has taken effect. Sentinel Life Ins. Co. v. Blackmer, C.C.A.Colo., 77 F.2d 347, 350.
AFFIX. Fix or fasten in any way, to attach physically. Penn v. Dyba, 115 Cal.App. 67, 1 P.2d 461, 464. To attach to, inscribe, or impress upon, as a signature, a seal, a trade-mark. Pen.Code N.Y. § 367. To attach, add to, or fasten upon, per• manently, as in the case of fixtures annexed to real estate.
A thing is deemed to be affixed to land when it is attached to it by the roots, as in the case of trees, vines, or shrubs; or imbedded In it, as in the case of wells; or permanently resting upon it, as In the case of bulldings; or permanently attached to what is thus permanent, as by means of cement, plaster, nalls, bolts, or screws. Miller v. Waddingham, 3 Cal.Unrep.Cas. 375, 25 Pac. 688, n L.R.A. 510; Tolle v. Vandenberg, 44 Okl. 780, 146 P. 212, 213.
AFFIXING. Securely attached. Mechanics’ Nat. Bank of Trenton v. Newman, 137 Misc. 587, 244 N.Y.S. 529, 531.
AFFIXUS. In the civil law, affixed, fixed, or fas-tened to.
AFFLICTION. A distress of mind or body; that which causes continuing anguish or suffering.
AFFORARE. To set a price or value on a thing. Blount.
AFFORATUS. Appraised or valued, as things vendible in a market. Blount.
AFFORCE. To add to; to increase; to strength-en; to add force to.
AFFORCE THE ASSIZE. In old English practice, a method ,of securing a verdict, where the jury disagreed, either by confining them without meat and drink, or, more anciently, by adding other jurors to the panel, to a limited extent, until twelve could be found who were unanimous. Bract. fol. 185b, 292a; Fleta, lib. 4, c. 9, § 2; 2 Reeve, Hist.Eng.Law, 267.

AFFORCIAMENTUM. In old English law, a fortress or stronghold, or other fortification. Cow-elL
The calling of a court upon a solemn or extra-ordinary occasion. Id.
AFFOREST. To convert land into a forest in the legal sense of the word.
AFFORESTATION. The turning of a part of a country into forest or woodland or subjecting it to forest law, q. v.
AFFOUAGE. In French law, the right of the in-habitants of a commune or section of a commune to take from the forest the fire-wood which is necessary for their use. Duverger.
AFFRANCHIR. L. Fr. To set free. Kelham. AFFRANCHISE. To liberate; to make free.
AFFRAY. The fighting of two or more persons in some public place to the terror of the people. Wallace v. Commonwealth, 207 Ky. 122, 268 S.W. 809, 813.
Where two or more persons voluntarily or by agreement engage in any light, or use any blows or vlolence towards each other in an angry or quarrelsome mánner, in any public place to the disturbance of others.
Words are Insufficient, but if one person, by such abusive language toward another as is calculated and intended to bring on a fight, induces the other to strike him, both are guilty of "affray." State v. Maney, 194 N.C. 34, 138 S.E. 441, 442.
It differs from a riot in not being premeditated. Hawk. P.C. bk. 1, c. 65, § 3; 4 Bl.Comm. 146; 1 Russ.Crimes, 271.
AFFRECTAMENTUM. Affreightment; a con-tract for the hire of a vessel. From the Fr. fret, which, according to Cowell, meant tons or ton-nage. A ffreightamentum was sometimes used. Du Cange.
AFFREIGHTMENT: A contract of •affreightment is a contract with a ship-owner to hire his ship, or part of it, for the carriage of goods. The Fred Smartley, Jr., C.C.A.Va., 100 F.2d 971, 973.
Such a contract generally takes the forro elther of a charter-party or of a 13111 of lading. Bramble v. Culmer, 78 Fed. 501, 24 C.C.A. 182. A contract to transport goods con-stitutes a contract of "affreightment," although there is towage service connected therewith. The Independent, D.C.La., 37 F.Supp. 106, 111.
In French law, freighting and affreightIng are distin-guished. The owner of a ship freights it, (le frete;) he Is called the freighter, (freteur;) he is the letter or lessor, (locateur, locator.) The merchant affreights (affrete) the ship, and is called the affreighter, (affreteur;) he is the hirer, (locataire, conductor.) Emerig. Tr. des Ass. c. 11, § 3.
AFFRETEMENT. Fr. In French law, the hiring of a vessel; affreightment (q. v.). Called also nolissement. Ord.Mar. liv. 1, tit. 2, art. 2; Id. liv. 3, tit. 1, art. 1.
AFFRI. In old English law, plow cattle, bullocks or plow horses. A ffri, or afri carucce; beasts of the plow. Spelman.
AFFRONT. An insult or indignity; assault, in-sololence.
AFORESAID. Before, or already said, mentioned, or recited; premised. Plowd. 67. Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Smith, 191 Ala. 643, 68 So. 56, 57. Foresaid is used in Scotch law.
Although the words "preceding" and "aforesaid" gen-erally mean next before, and "foliowing" means next after, yet a different signification will be given to them if required by the context and the facts of the case. Simpson v. Robert, 35 Ga. 180.
AFORETHOUGHT. In criminal law, deliberate; planned; premeditated; prepense. State v. Fiske, 63 Conn. 388, 28 A. 572. See Malice Aforethought; Premeditation; 4 Bla.Com. 199; Respublica v. Mulatto Bob, 4 Dall., Pa., 146, 1 L.Ed. 776; U. S. v. Cornell, 2 Mas. 91, Fed.Cas.No.14,868.
"Aforethought" as used in the law of murder means thought of beforehand and for any length of time, however short, before the doing of the act, and is synonymous with premeditation. State v. Smith, 26 N.M. 482, 194 P. 869, 872.
AFRICAN DESCENT. Persons of African nativi-ty or of "African descent" within the meaning of the Naturalization Act, as amended by Act July 14, 1870 (8 U.S.C.A. § 703 note), are members of the negro races of Africa or their descendants by intermixture with races constituting free white persons, the negro races referred to being those from which the emancipated slaves in the United States descend. Ex parte Shahid, D.C.S.C., 205 F. 812, 815.
AFTER. Later, succeeding, subsequent to, in-ferior in point of time or of priority or prefer-ence.
Subsequent In time to. Cheney v. National Surety Cor-poration, 256 App.Div. 1041, 10 N.Y.S.2d 706. At. Hyman Bros, Box & Label Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 180 Cal. 423, 181 P. 784, 786. On and after New York Trust Co. v. Portland Ry. Co., 197 App.Div. 422, 189 N.Y.S. 346, 348. "At the end of" or "as soon as," and in computation of time, is generally understood in sense of excluding day of date mentioned. Taylor v. National Life & Acci-dent Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 63 S.W.2d 1082, 1083. But the words "after the filing" as used in sections 63 and 68 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C.A. §§ 103, 108) do not mean the day after that of filing, but refer to the very Instant of fil-ing if ascertainable. In re Ledbetter, D,C.Ga., 267 F. 893, 896. A note payable generally "after date," is payable on demand, Love v. Perry, 19 Ga.App. 86, 90 S.E. 978, 979,
AFTER-ACQUIRED. Acquired after a particular date or event. Thus, a judgment is a lien on af t-er-acquired realty, i. e., land acquired by the debt-or after entry of the judgment. Hughes v. Hughes, 152 Pa. 590, 26 A. 101.
AFTER ACQUIRED TITLE. Doctrine under which title acquired by grantor who previously attempted to convey title to land which he did not in fact own, inures automatically to benefit of prior grantees. Perkins v. White, Miss., 43 So.2d 897, 899; Morris v. Futischa, 194 Okl. 224, 148 P.2d 986, 987.
AFTER-BORN CHILD. A statute making a will void as to after-born children means physical birth, and is not applicable to a child legitimated by the marriage of its parents. Appeal of Mc-Culloch, 113 Pa. 247, 6 A. 253. See En Ventre Sa Mere; Posthumous Child.
AFTER—DISCOVERED
AFTER-DISCOVERED. Discovered or made known after a particular date or event.
AFTER-DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. See Evi-dence.
AFTER SIGHT. This term as used in a bill pay-able so many days after sight, means after legal sight; that is, after legal presentment for ac-ceptance. The mere fact of having seen the bill or known of its existente does not constitute le-gal "sight." Mitchell v. Degrand, 17 Fed.Cas. 494.
AFTERMATIL A second crop of grass mown in the same season; also the right to take such sec-ond crop. See 1 Chit.Gen.Pr. 181.
"Aftermath" as used in the manufacture of window glass means the colder glass remaining on and in molten bath alter drawing of glass cyllnder. Okmulgee Window Glasa Co. v. Window Olas! Mach. Co., C.C.A.Okl., 265 F. 626, 630.
AFTERNOON. May mean the whole time from noon to midnight, or it may mean the earlier part of that time as distinguished from evening. Clevenger v. Carl B. King Drilling Co., Tex.Civ. App., 62 S.W.2d 1001. But ordinarily means that part of day between noon and evening. Buttrick v. Woman’s Hospital Aid Ass’n, 87 N.H. 194, 177 A. 416, 418.
AFTERTHOUGHT. A thought composed after the event and with deliberation. A devise to es-cape difficulty.
AFTERWARD, AFTERWARDS. Subsequent in point of time; synonymous with "thereaf ter," Lamoutte v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 165 App. Div. 573, 151 N.Y.S. 148, 154, or with "then," Boyce v. Mosely, 102 S.C. 361, 86 S.E. 771, 772.
AGAINST. Adverse to; contrary, Cram v. Meag-her, 113 Vt. 463, 35 A.2d 855, In re Dean’s Estate, 350 Mo. 494, 166 S.W.2d 529, 533. Signifles discord or conflict; opposed to; without the consent of; in contact with. Palmer v. Superior Mf g. Co., D.C. N.Y., 203 F. 1003, 1005, Clemens v. Perry, Tex.Civ. App., 29 S.W.2d 529, 533. Sometimes meaning "upon," which is almost, if not altogether, synon-ymous with word "on." Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Gas Development Co., 103 Mont. 214, 62 P.2d 204, 205. Denoting manifestation of raped wo-man’s utmost reluctante and greatest resistance. State v. Egner, 317 Mo. 457, 296 S.W. 145, 146.
AGAINST THE EVIDENCE. Means "against the weight of the evidence." Cram v. Meagher, 113 Vt. 463, 35 A.2d 855.
AGAINST THE FORM OF THE STATUTE. Tech-nical words which must be used in framing an in-dictment for a breach of the statute prohibiting the act complained of. The Latin phrase is con-tra forman statuti, q. v. State v. Murphy, 15 R.I. 543, 10 A. 585.
AGAINST THE PEACE. A technical phrase used in alleging a breach of the peace. See Contra Pacem. State v. Tibbetts, 86 Me. 189, 29 A. 979.
AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, "Contrary to the evidence". Russell v. Pilger, 113 Vt. 537, 37 A.2d 403, 411.
AGAINST THE WILL. Technical words which must be used in framing an indictment for rob-bery from the person, rape and some other of-fenses. Whittaker v. State, 50 Wis. 521, 7 N.W. 431, 36 Am.St.Rep. 856.
AGALMA. An impression or image of anything on a seal. Cowell.
AGARD. L. Fr. An award. Nul fait agard; no award made.
AGARDER. L. Fr. To award, adjudge, or de-termine; to sentence, or condemn.
AGE. The length of time during which a person has lived; the time at which one attains full per-sonal rights and capacities. In law the term sig. nifies those periods in the lives of persons of both sexes which enable them to do certain acts which, bef ore they had arrived at those periods, they were prohibited from doing. 2 C.J.S., p. 1013.
As used in particular statutes, the term implies disability and, by definition, has been applied to all minors under a certain age and to others dis-abled by old age. Hampton v. Ewert, C.C.A.Okl.,
22 F.2d 81, 87.
Age and schooling certificate. Collings-Taylor Co. v. American Fidelity Co., 96 Ohio St. 123, 117 N.E. 158.
Age fixed by law. Johnson v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., 147 Or. 345, 32 P.2d 587.
Age of consent. Ex parte Hutchens, 296 Mo. 331, 246 S.W. 186, 189.
Age of legal consent. Johnson v. Alexander, 39 Cal.App. 177, 178 P. 297; Fisher v. Bernard, 65 Vt. 663, 27 A. 316.
Age of majorlty. Gates v. Shaffer, 72 Wash. 451, 130 P. 896.
Age of maturity. Commerclal Bank & Trust Co. v. Noble, 112 So. 691, 146 Miss. 552.
Age of twenty-one years. Vanderbilt v. Eldman, 196 U.S. 480, 25 S.Ct. 331, 49 L.Ed. 563.
Legal Age. See Legal Age.
Legal school age. Inhabitants of Needham v. Wellesley, 139 Mass. 372, 31 N.E. 732.
AGE, Awe, Aive. L. Fr. Water. Relham.
AGE PRAYER. A suggestion of nonage, made by an infant party to a real action, with a prayer that the proceedings may be deferred until his full age. It is now abolished. St. 11 Geo. IV.; 1 Wm. IV. c. 37, § 10; 1 Lil.Reg. 54; 3 Bl.Comm. 300.
AGENCY. Includes every relation in which one person acts for or represents another by latter’s authority, Saums v. Parfet, 270 Mich. 165, 258 N.W. 235, where one person acts for another, ei-ther in the relationship of principal and agent, master and servant, or employer or proprietor and independent contractor, Gorton v. Doty, 57
Idaho 792, 69 P.2d 136, 139.
Properly speaking, agency relates to commer-cial or business transactions. Humble Oil & Re-fining Co. v. Bell, Tex.Civ.App., 172 S.W.2d 800,

803, and frequently is used in connection with an arrangement which does not in law amount to an agency, as where the essence of an arrange-ment is bailment or sale, as in the case of a sale agency exclusive in certain territory. State Com-pensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Accident Com-mission, 216 Cal. 351, 14 P.2d 306, 310.
It also designates a place at which business of company or individual is transacted by an agent. Johnson Freight Lines v. Davis, 170 Tenn. 177, 93 S.W.2d 637, 639.
The relation created by express or implied contract or by law, whereby one party delegates the transaction of some lawful business with more or less discretionary power to another, who undertakes to manage the affair and ren-der to him an account thereof. State ex rel. Cities Service Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 337 Mo. 809, 85 S.W.2d 890, 894. Or where one person confides the man-agement of some affair, to be transacted on his account, to other party. 1 Liverm. Prin. & Ag. 2. Or one party is authorized to do certain acts for, or in relation to the rights or property of the other. But means more than tacit permission, and involves request, instruction, or com-mand. Klee v. U. S., C.C.A.Wash., 53 F.2d 58, 61. Being the consensual relation existing between two persons, by virtue of which one is subject to other’s control. Tarver, Steele & Co. v. Pendleton Gin Co., Tex.Civ.App., 25 S.W.2d 156, 159.
Actual agency. Exists where the agent is really em-ployed by the principal. Weidenaar v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 36 Mont. 592, 94 P. 1, 6.
Agency by estoppel. One created by operation of law and established by proof of such acts of the principal as reasonably lead to the conclusion of its existence. Sigel-Campion Live Stock Commission Co. v. Ardohain, 71 Colo. 410, 207 P. 82, 83. Arises where principal, by negligence in failing to supervise agent’s affairs, allows agent to exer-cise powers not granted to him, thus justifying others in believing agent possesses requisito authority. Reifsnyder v. Dougherty, 301 Pa. 328, 152 A. 98, 100. Though princi-pal have no notice of agent’s conduct, Dispatch Printing Co. v. National Bank of Commerce, 109 Minn. 440, 124 N.W. 236, 50 L.R.A.,N.S., 74.
Agency of necessity. A term sometimes applied to the kind of implied agency which enables a wife to procure what is reasonably necessary for her maintenance and sup-port on her husband’s credit and at his expense, when he falls to make proper provision for her necessities. Bost-wifk v. Brower, 49 N.Y.S. 1046, 22 Misc. 709.
Deed of agency. A revocable and voluntary trust for payment of debts. Wharton.
Exclusive agency. Defined as an agreement by owner that during life of contract he will not sell property to a purchaser procured by another agent, which agreement does not preclude owner himself from selling to a pur-chaser of his own procuring, while a contract giving a broker "exclusive sale" is more than such exclusive agency, and is an agreement by the owner that he will not sell the property during the life of the contract to any purchaser not procured by the broker In question. Harris v. McPher-son, 97 Conn. 164, 115 A. 723, 724, 24 A.L.R. 1530; Harris & White v. Stone, 137 Ark. 23, 207 S.W. 443, 444.
General agency. That which existe when there is a dele-gation to do all acts connected with a particular trade, business or employment. Hinkson v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 93 Or. 473, 183 P. 24, 29. It implies authority on the part of the agent to act without restriction or qualification in all matters relating to the business of his principal. Schwartz v. Maryland Casualty Co., 82 N.H. 177, 131 A. 352, 353.
Implied agency. One created by act of parties and deduced from proof of other facts. Sigel-Campion Live Stock Commission Co. v. Ardohain, 71 Colo. 410, 207 P. 82, 83. It is an actual agency, proved by deductions or infer-ences from other facts, and third party need have no knowledge of the principal’s acts, nor have relied on them. Kentucky-Pennsylvania 011 & Gas Corporation v. Clark, 247 Ky. 438, 57 S.W.2d 65.
Ostensible agency. One which exists where the principal intentionally or by want of ordinary care causes a Ultra person to belleve another to be his agent who is not really employed by him. Weidenaar v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 36 Mont. 592, 94 P. 1, 6. See, also, Agency by Estoppel.
AGENCY COUPLED WITH INTEREST. Interest in continued existence of power or authority to act with reference to business, where secured by contract and based on consideration moving from agent to principal looking to exercise of power as means of reimbursement, creates "agency coupled with an interest." Bowling v. National Convoy & Trucking Co., 101 Fla. 634, 135 So. 541, 544. Agent must have an interest or estate in the thing to be disposed of or managed under the power. Eduardo Fernandez Y Compania v. Lon-gino & Collins, 199 La. 343, 6 So.2d 137, 142, 143.
AGENCY RELATIONSHIP. An employment for purpose of representation in establishing legal re-lations between principal and third persons. Bla-bon v. Hay, 269 Mass. 401, 169 N.E. 268, 271.
AGENDA. Memoranda of things to be done, as items of business or discussion to be brought up at a meeting; a program consisting of such items. Webster. Baton Rouge Bldg. Trades Council v. T. L. James & Co., 201 La. 749, 10 So.2d 606, 619.
AGENESIA. In medical jurisprudence, impoten-tia generandi; sexual impotence; incapacity for reproduction, existing in either sex, and whether arising from structural or other causes.
AGENFRIDA. Sax. The true master or owner of a thing. Spelman.
AGENIIINA. In Saxon law, a guest at an inn, who, having stayed ‘there for three nights, was then accounted one of the family. Cowell.
AGENS. Lat. An agent, a conductor, or manag-er of affairs. Distinguished from factor, a work-man. A plaintiff. Fleta, lib. 4, c. 15, § 8.
AGENT. A person authorized by another to act for him, one intrusted with another’s business. Downs v. Delco-Light Co., 175 La. 242, 143 So. 227. One who represents and acts for another under the contract or relation of agency, q. v. Fowler v. Cobb, Mo.App., 232 S.W. 1084. A business rep-resentative, whose function is to bring about, mod-ify, affect, accept performance of, or terminate contractual obligations between principal and third persons. Saums v. Parfet, 270 Mich. 165, 258 N.W. 235. One who undertakes to transact some business, or to manage some affair, for another, by the authority and on account of the latter, and to render an account of it. 1 Livermore, Ag. 67. See Co.Litt. 207; 1 B. & P. 316; Thomas B. Jeffrey Co. v. Lockridge, 173 Ky. 282, 190 S.W. 1103, 1105. One who acts for or in place of another by author-ity from him; a substitute, a deputy, appointed by principal with power to do the things which prin-cipal may do. Stephenson v. Golden, 279 Mich. 710, 276 N.W. 849. One who deals not only with things, as does a servant, but with persons, using his own discretion as to means, and frequently establishing contractual relations between his
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principal and third persons. Rendleman v. Niag-ara Sprayer Co., D.C.I11., 16 F.2d 122, 124. See, also, State v. Bond, 94 W.Va. 255, 118 S.E. 276, 279.
Agent and patient. A phrase indicating the state of a person who is required to do a thing, and is at the same time the person to whom it is done; as, when a man is indebted to another, and he appoints him his executor, required to pay the debt in his capacity of executor. and entitled to receive ít in his own right. Termes de la Ley.
Apparent agent or ostensible agent. One whom the prin-cipal, eíther intentionally or by want of ordinary tare, induces third persons to believe to be his agent, though he has not, either expressly or by implication, conferred authority on him. Ware v. Home Mut. Ins. Ass’n of Iowa, 135 Neb. 329, 281 N.W. 617, 620. A person who, whether or not authorized, reasonably appears te> third person, because of manifestations of another, to be authorized to act as agent for such other. Hansche v. A. J. Conroy, Inc., 222 Wis. 553, 269 N.W. 309, 312.
Diplomatic agent. A person employed by a soverelgn to manage his private affairs, or those of his subjects in his name, at the court of a foreign government. Wolff, Inst. Nat. § 1237.
General agency business. One not engaged as agent for single firm or person, but holding himself out to public as being engaged In business of being agent. Comer v. State Tax Commission of New Mexico, 41 N.M. 403, 69 P.2d 936.
General agent. One employed in his capacity as a pro-fessional man or master of an art or trade, or one to whom the principal confides his whole business or all transactions or functions of a designated class; or he is a person who is authorized by his principal to execute all deeds, sign all contracts, or purchase all goods, required in a particular trade, business, or employment. See Story, Ag. § 17; Thompson v. Michigan Mut. Life Ins. Co., 56 Ind.App. 502, 105 N.E. 780, 782; Little v. Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co., 166 Iowa 651, 147 N.W. 872, 873. One empowered to transact all business of principal at any particular time or any particular place, a general manager. Abuc Trading & Sales Corporation v. Jennings, 151 Md. 392, 135 A. 166, 173. An agent to manage buildings and tease and collect the rents, Daniel v. Pappas, C.C.A.Okl., 16 F.2d 880, 883. An agent empowered to enter ínto contracts without consult-ing insurer, notwithstanding restriction of his territory, London & Lancashire Ins. Co. v. McWilliams, 215 Ala. 481, 110 So. 909, 910.
Local agent. One appointed to act as the representativa of a corporation and transact its business generally (or business of a particular character) at a given place or within a defined district. See Frick Co. v. Wright, 23 Tex. Civ.App. 340, 55 S.W. 608; Moore v. Freeman’s Nat. Bank, 92 N.C. 594.
Managing agent. A person who is Invested with general power, involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, as distinguished from an ordinary agent or employee, who acts in an Inferior capacity, and under the direction and control of superior authority, both in regard to the extent of the work and the manner of executing the same. Redd-ington v. Mariposa Land & Min. Co., 19 Hun, N.Y., 405; Taylor v. Granite State Prov. Ass’n, 32 N.C. 992, 136 N.Y. 343, 32 Am.St.Rep. 749. One who has exclusive supervision and control of some department of a corporation’s busi-ness, the management of which requires of such person the exercise of independent judgment and discretion, and the exercise of such authority that it may be fairly daid that service of summons upon him will result in notice to the corporation. Federal Betterment Co. v. Reeves, 73 Kan. 107, 84 P. 560, 4 L.R.A.,N.S., 460; Hatinen v. Payne, 150 Minn. 344. 185 N.W. 386, 387. As used in sec-tion 4274, Wilson’s Statutes of Oklahoma 1903, Ann., an agent whose agency extends to all the transactions of the corporation within the state; one who has or is engaged in the management of the business of the corporation, in distinction from the management of a local or particular branch or department of said business. Waters Pierce Oil Co. v. Foster, 52 Okl. 412, 153 P. 169, 171.
Mercantile agents. Agents employed for the sale of goods or merchandise are called "mercantile agents," and are of two principal classes,—brokers and factors (q. v.); a factor is sometimes callad a "commission agent," or "commission merchant." Russ. Merc. Ag. 1.
Practica of the House of Lords and Privy Council. In appeals, solicitors and other persons admitted to practice In those courts in a similar capacity to that of solicitors in ordinary courts, are technlcally called "agents." Macph. Priv. Coun. 65.
Private agent. An agent acting for an individual in bis prívate affairs; as distinguished from a public agent, who represents the government in some administrative capac-ity.
Public agent. An agent of the public, the state, or the government; a person appointed to act for the public in some matter pertaining to the administration of govern-ment or the public business. See Story, Ag. § 302; White-side v. United States, 93 U.S. 254, 23 L.Ed. 882.
Real-estate agent. Any person whose business it is to seil, or offer for sale, real estate for others, or to rent houses, stores, or other buildings, or real estate, or to col-lect rent for others. Act July 13, 1866, c. 184, § 9, par. 25; 14 St. at Larga, 118. Carstens v. McReavy, 1 Wash.St. 359, 25 P. 471.
A special agent is orle employed to conduct a particular transaction or piece of business for his principal or author-izad to perform a specified act. 1-Iinkson v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 93 Or. 473, 183 P. 24, 29; Pettijohn v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 100 Kan. 482, 164 P. 1096, 1097; Hoffman v. Marano, 71 Pa.Super.Ct. 26, 28.
AGENTES ET CONSENTIENTES PARI PENA PLECTENTUR. Acting and consenting parties are hable to the same punishment. 5 Coke, 80.
AGER. Lat. A field; land generally. A portion of land inclosed by definite boundaries. Munici-pality No. 2 v. Orleans Cotton Press, 18 La. 167, 36 Am.Dec. 624. In old English law, an acre (q. v.). Spelman.
AGGER. Lat. In the civil law, a dam, bank or mound. Cod. 9, 38; Townsh.P1. 48.
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT. The term has no tech-nical and definite common law meaning. In re Burns, C.C.Ark., 113 F. 987; People v. Ochotski, 115 Mich. 601, 73 N.W. 889. The term is one which is employed to describe an assault which has, in addition to the mere intent to commit it, another object which is also criminal, Brimhall v. State, 31 Ariz. 522, 255 P. 165, 53 A.L.R. 231; or to in-elude all those species of assault which, for vari-ous reasons, have come to be regarded as more heinous than common assault, State v. Jones, 133 S.C. 167, 130 S.E. 747; or which have been made the subject of special legislativa provisions, Daf-fan v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 21 S.W.2d 301 and Nje-cick v. State, 178 Wis. 94, 189 N.W. 147.
An assault where the means or instrument used to accomplish the injury is highly dangerous or where assall-ant has some ulterior and malicious motive in commating assault other than a mere desire to punish injured person. Strickbine v. State, 201 Ark. 1031, 148 S.W.2d 180, 181, 182; when committed with a deadly weapon under circum-stances not amounting to an intent to murder, Myers v. State, 72 Tex.Cr.R. 630, 163 S.W. 432; or when the instru-ment or means used is such as inflicts disgrace upon the person assaulted, Cirul v. State, 83 Tex.Cr.R. 8, 200 S.W. 1088; Scott v. State, 73 Tex.Cr.R. 622, 166 S.W. 729, 730 (indecent and improper fondling of the person). In Ari-zona, aggravated assault is different from simple assault on]y by infliction of serious bodily injury, Brirnhall v. State, 31 Ariz. 522, 255 P. 165, 166, 53 A.L.R. 231,
AGGRAVATING. Passenger ejected from plane. Delta Air Corporation v. Porter, 70 Ga.App. 152, 27 S.E.2d 758, 762.
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AGGRAVATION. Any circumstance attending the commission of a crime or tort which increases its guilt or enormity or adds to its injurious consequences, but which is aboye and beyond the essential constituents of the crime or tort itself.
Matter of aggravation, correctly understood, does not consist in acts of the same kind and description as those constituting the gist of the action, but in something done by the defendant, on the occasion of comrnitting the tres-pass, which is, to some extent, of a different legal char-acter from the principal act complained of. Hathaway v. Rice, 19 Vt. 107. So on an indIctment for murder the pris-oner may be convicted of manslaughter, for the averment of manee aforethought is merely matter of aggravation. Co.Litt. 282 a.
In pleading, the introduction of matter into the declaration which tends to increase the amount of damages, but does not affect the right of action itself. Steph.Pl. 257; 12 Mod. 597.
AGGRAVATION OF THE DISABILITY. Refers to the course or progress of the workman’s condi-tion resulting from the specific injury for which an award or arrangement of compensation has been made. Keefer v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 171 Or. 405, 135 P.2d 806, 809.
AGGREGATE. Entire number, sum, mass, or quantity of something; amount; complete whole, and one provision under will may be the aggre-gate if there are no more units to fall into that class. In re Curley’s Will, 151 Misc. 664, 272 N. Y.S. 489. Composed of several; consisting of many persons united together; a combined whole. 1 Bl.Comm. 469.
AGGREGATE CORPORATION. See Corporation.
AGGREGATES. Name for materials consisting largely of rock, gravel and sand used for construc-tion and surf acing of highways or, as a compo-nent part, in forming concrete for such construc-tion. Pioneer Gravel Equipment Mfg. Co. v. Dia-mond Iron Works, C.C.A.Minn., 72 F.2d 161.
AGGREGATIO MENTIUM. The meeting of minds. The moment when a contract is com-plete. A supposed derivation of the word "agree-ment," q. v.
AGGREGATION. In law pf patents, it means that the elements of a claimed combination are 1 incapable of co-operation to produce a unitary re-sult, and in its true sense does not need prior art patents to support it. National Popsicle Corpo-ration v. Harvey, D.C.Pa., 6 F.Supp. 784, 786.
it does not Imply mechanical interaction of parts, but only union of 011 elements of invention to realize single purpose. Simplex Piston Ring Co. of America v. Horton-Gallo-Creamer Co., C.C.A.Conn., 61. F.2d 748, 750. A com-bination which merely brines together two or more func-tions to be availed of independently of each other does not
represent "invention" but constitutes mere "aggregation." Hemming v. S. S. Kresge Co., D.C.Conn., 24 F.Supp. 981,. 983. The assembly of old elements, in a device in which
each performs the same function in the same way as it did when used alone, without mutuality of action, interaction,
or co-operation, is mere "aggregation" not involving inven-tion. In re Smith, 57 App.D.C. 204, 19 F.2d 678, 679.
AGGRESSOR. One who first employs hostile force. Penn v. Henderson, 174 Or. 1, 146 P.2d 760, 766. The party who first offers violence or
offense. He who begins a quarrel or dispute, el ther by threatening or striking another. See Wil-kie v. State, 33 Okl.Cr. 225, 242 P. 1057, 1059.
AGGRIEVED. Having suffered loss or injury; damnified; injured.
AGGRIEVED PARTY. One whose legal right is invaded by an act complained of, or whose pe-cuniary interest is directly affected by a decree or judgment. Glos v. People, 259 Ill. 332, 102 N.E. 763, 766, Ann.Cas.1914C, 119. See next topic. One whose right of property may be established or divested. McFarland v. Pierce, 151 Ind. 546, 45 N.E. 706. The word "aggrieved" refers .to a sub-stantial grievance, a denial of some personal or property right, or the imposition upon a party of a burden or obligation. Roullard v. McSoley, 54 R.I. 232, 172 A. 326, 327. Injured in a legal sense. In re Donnelly’s Estate, 55 S.D. 426, 226 N.W. 563, 565.
Adoption, Appeal of Cummings, 126 Me. 111, 136 A. 662, 663; disbarment, State v. Hunter, 152 Tenn. 233, 276 S.W. 639, 640; bar association, State v. Huddleston, 173 Ark. 686, 293 S.W. 353, 358; contra, disciplinary proceedings; In re Dolphin, 240 N.Y. 89, 147 N.E. 538, 539; lunacy inquIsi-tion, Commonwealth v. Davldson, 269 Pa. 218, 112 A. 115. One ‘against whom error has been commltted, Kinealy v. Macklin, 67 Mo. 95. Or one against whom an appealable order or judgment has been entered. Ely v. Frisbie, 17 Cal. 260. Any party having an interest recognized by law in the subject-matter, which interest is injuriously affected by judgment. Hornbeck v. Richards, 80 Mont. 27, 257 P. 1025, 1026. A complainant who has received less than the relief demanded, or a defendant who has not been accorded the full amount of his set-off or counterclaim. Blanchard v. Neill, 83 N.J.Eq. 446, 91 A. 811. See, also, Kondas v. Washoe County Bank, 50 Nev. 181, 254 P. 1080, 1081. One under necessity of answering or replying to irrelevant and redundant matter in a pleading. Shea v. Kiely, Sup., 167 N.Y.S. 570, 572.
AGILD. In Saxon law, free from penalty, not subject to the payment of gild, or weregild; that is, the customary fine or pecuniary compensation for an offense. Spelman; Cowell.
AGILER. In Saxon law, an observer or informer.
AGILLARIUS. L. Lat. In old English law, a hayward, herdward, or keeper of the herd of cat-tle in a common field. Cowell.
AGIO. In commercial law, a term used to ex-press the difference in point of value between metallic and paper money, or between one sort of metallic money and another. McCul.Dict.
An Italian word for accommodation.
AGIOTAGE. A speculation on the rise and fall of the public debt of states, or the public funds. The speculator is called "agioteur."
AGIST. In ancient law it meant to take in and give feed to the cattle of strangers in the king’s forest, and to collect the money due for the same to the king’s use. Spelman; Cowell.
In modern law it means to take in cattle to feed, or pasture, at a certain rate of compensation. Bank of Tehama County v. Federal Realty Co., 2 Ca1.2d 333, 40 P.2d 507, 509. See Agistment.

AGISTATIO

AGISTATIO ANIMALIUM IN FORESTA. The drift or numbering of cattle in the forest.
AGISTER. See Agistor.
AGISTERS, or GIST TAKERS. Officers appoint-ed to look after cattle, etc. See Williams, Com-mon, 232.
AGISTMENT. The taking and feeding of other men’s cattle in the king’s forest, or on one’s own land, at a certain rate. Bank of Tehama County v. Federal Realty Co., 2 Ca1.2d 333, 40 P.2d 507, 509. Also the profit or recompense for such pas-turing of cattle. Williams v. Miller, 68 Cal. 290, 9 Pac. 166. A species of bailment. Patchen-Wilkes Stock Farm Co. v. Walton, 166 Ky. 705, 179 S.W. 823.
In canon law it is a composition or mean rate at which some right or due might be reckoned.
There is also agistment of sea-banks, where lands are charged with a tribute to keep out the sea; and terne agistatce are lands whose owners must keep up the sea-banks. Holthouse.
Tithe of Agistment was a small tithe paid to the rector or vicar on cattle or other produce of grass lands. It was paid by the occupier of the land and not by the person who put in his cattle to graze. Rawle, Exmoor 31.
AGISTOR. One who takes in horses or other ani-mals to pasture at certain rates. Story, Bailm. § 443; Cox v. Chase, 99 Kan. 740, 163 P. 184, 186. An officer who had the charge of cattle pastured for a certain stipulated sum in the king’s forest and who collected the money paid for them.
AGITATOR. One who stirs up; excites; ruffies; perturbs. One who incessant advocates a social change.
Labor agitator. One actively engaged in promoting the interests of the laboring men. The term does not imply the use of unlawful or improper means. Wabash R. Co. v. Young, 69 N.E. 1003, 1005, 1006, 162 Ind. 102, 4 L.R.A., N.S., 1091.
Seditious agitator. A disturber of the public peace, a subverter of just laws, and a bad citizen. Wilkes v. Shields, 64 N.W. 921, 62 Minn. 426, 427.
AGNATES. In the law of descents, relations by the father, or on the father’s side. This word is used in the Scotch law, and by some writers as an English word, cqrresponding with the Latin agnati, (q. v.) Ersk.Inst. b. 1, tit. 7, § 4.
AGNATI: In Roman law, the term included all the cognates who trace their connection exclusive-ly through males.
A table of cognates is formed by taking each lineal ancestor in turn and including all his descendants of both sexes In the tabular view. If, then, in tracing the various branches of such a genealogical table or tree, we stop whenever we come to the name of a female, and pursue that particular branch or ramification no further, all who remain after the descendants of women have been excluded are agnates, and their connection together is agnatic rela-tionship. Maine, Anc. Law, 142.
All persons are agnatically connected together who are under the same patria potestas, or who have been under it, or who might have been under it if their lineal ancestor had lived long enough to exercise his empire. Maine, Anc. Law, 144.
The agnate family consisted of all persons living at the same time, who would have been subject to the patras potestas of a common ancestor, lf his lile had been con-tinued to their time. Radl.Rom.Law, 131.
Cognates were all persons who could trace their blood to a single ancestor or ancestress, and agnates were those cognates who traced their connection exclusively through males. Maine, Anc. Law. Between agnati and cognati there is this difference: that, under the name of agnati, cognati are included, but noté converso; for instante, a father’s brother, that is, a paternal uncle, is both agnatus and cognatus, but a mother’s brother, that Is, a maternal uncle, is a cognatus but not agnatus. (llig. 38, 7, 5, pr.) Burrill.
AGNATIC. [From agnati, q. v.1 Derived from or through males. 2 Bl.Comm. 236.
AGNATIO. In the civil law, relationship on the fathers’ side; the relationship of agnati; agna-tion. Agnatio a patre est. Inst. 3, 5, 4; Id. 3, 6, 6.
AGNATION. Kinship by the father’s side. See Agnates; Agnati.
AGNOMEN. Lat. An additional name or title; a nickname. A name or title which a man gets by some action or peculiarity; the last of the four names sometimes given a Roman. Thus, Scipio Africanus, (the African,) from his African vic-tories. Ainsworth; Calvinus, Lex. See Nomen.
AGNOMINATION. A surname; an additional name or title; agnomen.
AGNUS DEL Lat. Lamb of God. A piece of white wax, in a fíat, oval form, like a small cake, stamped with the figure of a lamb, and consecrat-ed by the pope. Cowell.
AGONY. Violent physical pain or mental dis-tress. City of Chicago v. McLean, 133 III. 148, 24 N.E. 527, 8 L.R.A. 765.
AGRAPHIA. See Aphasia.
AGRARIAN. Relating to land, or to a division or distribution of land; as an agrarian law.
AGRARIAN LAWS. In Roman law, laws for the distribution among the people, by public author-ity, of the lands constituting the public domain, usually territory conquered from an enemy.
In common parlante the term is frequently ap-plied to laws which have for their object the more equal division or distribution of landed property; laws for subdividing large properties and Mercas-ing the number of landholders.
AGRARIUM. A tax upon or tribute payable out of land.
AGREAMENTUM. In old English law, agree-ment; an agreement. Spelman.
AGREE. To concur; come into harmony; give mutual assent; unite in mental action; exchange promises; make an agreement; arrange; to settle. Mickleson v. Gypsy Oil Co., 110 Okl. 117, 238 P. 194, 198. Consent. Smith v. Jones, 185 Ga. 236, 194 S.E. 556, 560. Harmonize or reconcile. "You will agree your books." 8 Coke, 67. Concur or acquiesce in; approve or adopt. Agreed, agreed

to, are frequently used in the books, (like accord,) to show the concurrente or harmony of cases. Agreed per curiam is a common expression. Usually implies some contractual undertaking. In re Gray’s Estate, 160 Misc. 710, 290 N.Y.S. 603, 605. To grant or covenant, as when a grantor agrees that no building shall be erected on an ad-joining lot; Hogan v. Barry, 143 Mass. 538, 10 N. E. 253; or a mortgagor agrees to cause all taxes to be paid; Mackay v. Truchon, 171 Mo.App. 42, 153 S.W. 502, 503.
AGRÉÉ. In French law, a person authorized to represent a litigant bef ore the Tribunals of Com-merce. If such person be a lawyer, he is called an avocat-agréé. Coxe, Manual of French Law.
AGREEANCE. In Scotch law, agreement; an agreement or contract.
AGREED. Settled or established by agreement.
This word In a deed creates a covenant.
It is a technical term, synonymous with "contracted," McKisick v. McKisick, Meigs Tenn. 433. It means, ex vi termini, that it is the agreement of both parties. Aikin v. Albany, V. & C. R. Co., 26 Barb.N.Y. 298.
AGREED CASE. Stipulations signed by litigants’ attorneys, constituted an "agreed case". In re Davis Bros. Stone Co., 245 Wis. 130, 13 N.W.2d 512, 515.
Evidence presented by stipulation that stated facts con-stituted entire evidence is not an "agreed case". Struble-Werneke Motor Co. v. Metropolitan Securities Corporation, 93 Ind.App. 416, 178 N.E. 460, 462. Nor is an agreed state-ment of facts on which a case is submitted in lieu of evi-dence. Byers v. Essex Inv. Co., 281 Mo. 375, 219 S.W. 570, 571; Reddick v. Board of Com’rs of Pulaski County, 14 Ind.App. 598, 41 N.E. 834.
AGREED ORDER. The only difference between an agreed order and one which is made in the due course of the proceedings in an action is that in the one case it is agreed to, and in the other it is made as authorized by law. Claflin v. Gibson, 21 Ky.Law Rep. 337, 51 S.W. 439.
AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS. A statement of facts, agreed on by the parties as true and correct, to be submitted to a court for a ruling on the law of the case. United States Trust Co. v. New Mexico, 183 U.S. 535, 22 Sup.Ct. 172, 46 L.Ed. 315. See Case Stated.
Where testimony was contradictory, stipulation relating to testimony did not constitute an "agreed state of facts". McPherson v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 169 Or. 190, 127 P.2d 344, 346.
AGREEMENT. A coming or knitting together of minds; a coming together in opinion or determi-nation; the coming together in accord of two minds on a given proposition; in law a concord of understanding and intention between two or more parties with respect to the effect upon their relative rights and duties, of certain past or fu-ture facts or performances; the consent of two or more persons concurring respecting the transmis-sion of some property, right, or benefits, with the view of contracting an obligation, a mutual ob-ligation. Bac.Abr.; Rocha v. Hulen, 6 Cal.App.2d 245, 44 P.2d 478, 482.

The act of two or more persons, who unite in expressing a mutual and common purpose, with the view of altering their rights and obligations. The union of two or more minds in a thing done or to be done; a mutual assent to do a thing. Com. Dig. "Agreement," A 1. See Aggregatio Mentium. Carter v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 58 Okl. 365, 160 P. 319, 322. A compact between parties who are thereby subjected to the obligatíon or to whom the contemplated right is thereby secured. People v. Mills, 160 Misc. 730, 290 N.Y.S. 48, 52.
Although often used as synonymous with "contract," Douglass v. W. L. Williams Art Co., 143 Ga. 846, 85 S.E. 993, it is a wider term than "contract" (Anson, Cont. 4.) An agreement might not be a contract, because not fulfill-ing some requirement. And each of a series of mutual stipulations or constituent clauses in a contract might be denominated an "agreement." The meaning of the con-tracting parties is their agreement. Whitney v. Wyman, 101 U.S. 396, 25 L.Ed. 1050. "Agreement" is seldom applied to specialties. Pars.Cont. 6.
"Agreement" is not synonymous with "promise" or "undertaking." It signifies a mutual contract, on consid-eration. Andrews v. Pontue, 24 Wend.N.Y. 285; Wain v. Wariters, 5 East, 10; wherein parties must have a distlnct intention common to both, and without doubt or difference. Blake v. Mosher, 11 Cal.App.2d 532, 54 P.2d 492, 494.
The writing or instrument which is evidence of an agreement.
Classification
Conditional agreements, the operation and effect of which depend upon the existente of a supposed state of facts, or the performance of a condition, or the happening of a contingency.
Executed agreements, which have reference to past events, or which are at once closed and where nothing fur-ther remains to be done by the parties.
Executory agreements are such as are to be performed in the future. They are commonly preliminary to other more formal or Important contracts or deeds, and are usu-ally evidenced by memoranda, parol promises, etc.
Express agreements are those in which the terms and stipulations are specifIcally declared and avowed by the parties at the time of making the agreement.
Implied agreement. (1) Implied in fact. One Inferred from the acts or conduct of the parties, instead of being expressed by them in written or spoken words. Baltimore Mail S. S. Co. v. U. S., C.C.A.Md., 76 F.2d 582, 585. (2) Implied in law; more aptly termed a constructiva or quasi contract. One where, by fiction of law, a promise is imputed to perform a legal duty, as to repay money obtained by fraud or duress. Baltimore Mail S. S. Co. v. U. S., C.C.A.Md., 76 F.2d 582, 585. One infcrred by the law where the conduct of the parties with reference to the subject-matter is such as to induce the belief that they intended to do that which their acts indicate they have done. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. U. S., 261 U.S. 592, 43 S.Ct. 425, 67 L.Ed. 816; Cuneo v. De Cuneo, 24 Tex.Civ.App. 436, 59 S.W. 284.
Parol agreements. Such as are either by word of mouth or are committed to writing, but are not under seal. The common law draws only one great line, between things under seal and not under seal. Wharton.
In agreement means in conformity, or harmony with. Brown Real Estate Co. v. Lancaster Coun-ty, 110 Neb. 665, 194 N.W. 897, 898.
AGREEMENT FOR INSURANCE. An agree-ment often made in short terms preliminary to the filling out and delivery of a policy with spe-cific stipulations.
AGREEMENT NOT TO BE PERFORMED WITH-IN A YEAR. An agreement that necessarily must require more than year for performance. Marble

AGREEMENT

v. Town of Clinton, Mass., 9 N.E.2d 522, 524, 111 A.L.R. 1101. Incapable of performance within one year. Street v. Maddux, Marshall, Moss & Mallory, 58 App.D.C. 42, 24 F.2d 617, 619.
AGREEMENT OF SALE; AGREEMENT TO SELL. An agreement of sale may imply not merely an obligation to sell, but an obligation on the part of the other party to purchase (cf. Loud v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 313 Mo. 552, 281 S.W. 744, 755) while an agreement to sell is sim-ply an obligation on the part of the vendor or promisor to complete his promise of sale; Treat v. White, 181 U.S. 264, 21 Sup.Ct. 611, 45 L.Ed. 853. It is a contract to be performed in future, and, if fulfilled, results in a sale; it is prelimi-nary to sale and is not the sale. Callender v. Crossfield Oil Syndicate, 84 Mont. 263, 275 P. 273, 276.
AGREEMENT TO SELL LAND. A contract to be performed in future which if fulfilled results in sale. In re Frayser’s Estate, 401 Ill. 364, 82 N.E. 2d 633, 638.
AGREER. Fr. In French marine law, to rig or equip a vessel. Ord. Mar. liv. 1, tit. 2, art. 1.
AGREZ. Fr. In French marine law, the rig-ging or tackle of a vessel. Ord. Mar. liv. 1, tit. 2, art. 1; Id. tit. 11, art. 2; Id. liv. 3, tit. 1, art. 11.
AGRI. Arable lands in common fields.
AGRI LIMITATI.
In Rornan law, lands belonging to the state by right of conquest,, and granted or sold in plots. Sandars, Just.Inst., 5th Ed., 93.
In modem civil law, lands whose boundaries are strictly limited by the lines of government surveys. Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 11 Sup. Ct. 808, 35 L.Ed. 428.
AGRICULTURAL. Pertaining to, or dea]ing with, agriculture; also, characterized by or engaged in farming as the leading pursuit. Oak Woods Cem-etery Ass’n v. Murphy, 383 Ill. 301, 50 N.E.2d 582, 587.
AGRICULTURAL CHEMISTRY. A study of products of the soil, especially foods, their nutri-tive value, their intensive production, study of composition of soil, chemical methods of fertiliza-tion, prevention or amelioration of plant diseases, extinction of insects and other detriments to agri-culture, and in general study of animal and plant life with relation to the science of chemistry. In re Frasch’s Estate, 125 Misc.Rep. 381, 211 N.Y.S. 635, 638.
AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES. Generaily synonymous with agricultural or farm products, and not including agricultural implements, Bowles v. Rock, D.C.Neb., 55 F.Supp. 865, 868; or com-mercial fertilizer and ground and crushed lime-stone, Stiver v. Holley, 215 Ind. 9, 17 N.E.2d 831, 832.
AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT. Farm labor synonymous, and includes all farm work and work
incidental thereto. Smythe v. Phcenix, 63 Idaho 585, 123 P.2d 1010, 1012.
AGRICULTURAL HOLDING. Land cultivated for profit in some way. Within the meaning of the English Agricultural Holdings act of 1883, the term will not include natural grass lands. Such lands are pastoral holdings. 32 S.J. 630.
AGRICULTURAL LABOR. Services performed on farm, for owner or tenant. California Em-ployment Commission v. Butte County Rice Grow-ers Ass’n, Cal., 154 P.2d 892, 894. Broader in meaning than farming or farm labor and includes one engaged in horticulture. St. Louis Rose Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 348 Mo. 1153, 159 S.W.2d 249, 250, and maintenance work and similar service in employer’s farm park-ing house. Latimer v. United States, D.C.Cal., 52 F.Supp. 228, 234, 235, 236, 237. The science and art of production of plants and animals useful to man. Murphy v. Mid-West Mushroom Co., 350 Mo. 658, 168 S.W.2d 75, 77, 78.
AGRICULTURAL LANDS. A term used merely to distinguish rural from urban or other prop-erties. Eisenzimmer v. Bell, 75 N.D. 733, 32 N.W. 2d 891, 893.
Land may be assessable as "agricultural land" though it be covered by native timber and underbrush, grass, and weeds. Milne v. McKinnon, 32 S.D. 627, 144 N.W. 117, 118. The term is synonymous with land "agricultural in char-acter." State v. Stewart, 58 Mont. 1, 190 P. 129, 131.
AGRICULTURAL LIEN. A statutory lien in some states to secure money or supplies advanced to an agriculturist to be expended or employed in the making of a crop and attaching to that crop only. Jones-Phillips Co. v. McCormick, 174 N.C. 82, 93 S.E. 449, 452.
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT. Things which have a situs of their production upon the farm and which are brought into condition for uses of society by labor of those engaged in agricul-tural pursuits as contradistinguished from manu-facturing or other industrial pursuits. In re Rodgers, Neb., 134 Neb. 832, 279 N.W. 800, 803.
That which is the direct result of husbandry and the cultivation of the soil. The product in its natural unmanu-factured condition. Getty v. Milling Co., 40 Kan. 281, 19 P. 617. It has been held not to include beef cattle; Davis
Co. v. City of Macon, 64 Ga. 128, 37 Am.Rep. 60; but to include forestry products; Northern Cedar Co. v. French, 131 Wash. 394, 230 P. 837, 846.
AGRICULTURAL PURSUITS. Every process and step taken and necessary to the completion of a finished farm product. Big Wood Canal Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Division of Indus-trial Accident Board, 61 Idaho 247, 100 P.2d 49, 51.
AGRICULTURAL SOCIETY. One for promoting agricultural interests, such as improvement of land, implements, and brands of cattle. Crete Milis v. Nebraska State Board of Agriculture, 132 Neb. 244, 271 N.W. 684, 688; or for giving agricul-tural fairs; Town of West Hartford v. Connecticut Fair Ass’n, 88 Conn. 627, 92 A. 432.

AGRICULTURAL WORKER. Tasks incidental to agricultural activities all are within the scope of the employment of an "agricultural worker." Melendez v. Johns, Ariz., 76 P.2d 1163, 1167.
AGRICULTURE. The art or science of cultivating the ground, including the harvesting of crops, and in a broad sense, the science or art of produc-tion of plants and animals useful to man, includ-ing in a variable degree, the preparation of these products for man’s use. In the broad sense, it in-eludes farming, horticulture, forestry, together with such subjects as butter, cheese, making sugar, etc. Sancho v. Bowie, C.C.A.Puerto Rico, 93 F.2d 323, 324.
The cultivation of soil for food products or any other useful or valuable growths of the field or garden; tillage, husbandry; also, by extension, farming, including any industry practicad by a cultivator of the soll in connection with such cultivation, as breeding and rearing of stock, dairying, etc. The science that treats of the cultivation of the soil. Stand. Dict.; State v. Stewart, 58 Mont. 1, 190 P. 129, 131.
"Agriculture" refers to the field or farm with all its wants, appointments, and products, as distinguished from "horticulture," which refers to the garden, with its less important though varied products. Dillard v. Webb, 55 Ala. 468.
AGUSADURA. In ancient customs, a fee, due from the vassals to their lord for sharpening their plowing tackle.
AHTEID. In old European law, a kind of oath among the Bavarians. Spelman. In Saxon law. One bound by oath, q. d. "oathtied." From ath, oath, and tied. Id.
AID. To support, help, assist, or strengthen. Hines v. State, 16 Ga.App. 411, 85 S.E. 452, 454. Act in cooperation with. Cornett v. Common-wealth, 198 Ky. 236, 248 S.W. 540, 542.
Supplement the efforts of another. Anderson v. Board of Medical Examiners, 117 Cal.App. 113, 3 P.2d 344, 346.
A person "aids" when being present at the time and place he does some act to render aid to the actual perpe-tration of the crime, though he takes no direct share in its commission. State v. Johnson, 220 N.C. 773, 18 S.E.2d 358, 360.
This word must be distinguished from its synonym "encourage," the difference being that the former connotes active support and assistance. Although it may not import necessary criminality in the act furthered. See Abet.
AID AND ABET. Help, assist, or facilitate the commission of a crime, promote the accomplish-ment thereof, help in advancing or bringing it about, or encourage, counsel, or incite as to its commission. State v. Lord, 42 N.M. 638, 84 P.2d 80, 86.
Implies knowledge. Winning v. Board of Dental Exam-iners, 114 Cal.App. 658, 300 P. 866, 868.
At common law it consisted in being present at the time and place, and doing some act to render aid to the actual perpetrator of the crime, though without taking a direct share in lts commission. See 4 Bl.Comm. 34; State v. Tally, 102 Ala. 25, 15 So. 722.
It comprehends all assistance rendered by words, acts, encouragement, support, or presence, actual or construc-tive, to render assistance if necessary. Johnson v. State, 21 Ala.App. 565, 110 So, 55; State v. Davis, 191 Iowa, 720, 183 N.W. 314, 316. But it is not sufficient that there is a mere
negative acquiescence not in any way made known to the principal malefactor. People v. Barnes, 311 III. 559, 143 N.E. 445, 447. See Accessory; Abettor; Aider and Abet-tor.
AID AND ASSIST. The words "aided and as-sisted," as used in the statute prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors, as regards the condemna-tion or confiscation of vehicles, implies either knowledge on the part of the owner that the vehicle was being used for unlawful transporta-tion, or such negligente or want of tare as to charge him with such knowledge or notice. In re Gattina, 203 Ala. 517, 84 So. 760.
AID AND COMFORT. Help; support; assistance; counsel; encouragement.
As an element in the crime of treason (see Constitution of the United States, art. 3, § 3), the giving of "ald and comfort" to the enerny may consist in a mere attempt. It is not essential to constitute the giving of aid and com-fort that the enterprise commenced should be successful and actually render assistance. Young v. United States, 97 U.S. 39, 62, 24 L.Ed. 992. An act which intentionally strengthens or tends to strengthen enemies of the United States, or which weakens or tends to weaken power of the United States to resist and attack such enemies. United States v. Haupt, D.C.I11., 47 F.Supp. 836, 839. Any inten-tional act furthering hostile designs of enemies of the United States. United States v. Haupt, D.C.I11., 47 F.Supp. 836, 839.
AID BOND. See Bond.
AID OF THE RING. The king’s tenant prays this, when rent is demanded of him by others.
AID PRAYER. In English practice, a proceeding formerly made use of, by way of petition in court, praying in aid of the tenant for life, etc., from the reversioner or remainderman, when the title to the inheritance was in question. It was a plea in suspension of the action. 3 Bl.Comm. 300.
AID SOCIETIES. See Benefit Societies.
AIDER. One who is actually or constructively present at the commission of the offense and is a "principal". State v. Bachmeyer, 247 Wis. 294, 19 N.W.2d 261, 263.
Mere proof of a defendant’s presence at the time of the commission of a criminal act is not sulficient to render him an "aider". Gentry v. State, 65 Ga.App. 100, 15 S.E. 2d 464, 465.
AIDER AND ABETTOR. One who assists an-other in the accomplishment of a common design or purpose; he must be aware of, and consent to, such design or purpose. Peats v. State, 213 Ind. 560, 12 N.E.2d 270, 277.
One who advises, counsels, procures, or encourages another to commit a crime, himself being guilty of some overt act or advocacy or encouragement of his principal, actually or constructively present when crime is commtt-ted, and participating in commission thereof by some act, deed, word, or gestare, Turner v. Commonwealth, 268 Ky. 311, 104 S.W.2d 1085, and sharing the criminal intent of the principal. State v. Reedy, 97 W.Va. 549, 127 S.E. 24, 28. But one who incites or instigates the commission of a felony when he is neithcr actually nor constructively pres-ent is an "aider, abettor, or procurer" within the meaning, of a statute. Neal v. State, 104 Neb. 56, 175 N.W. 669, 670.
AIDER BY VERDICT. The healing or remission, by a verdict rendered, of a defect or error in pleading which might have been objected to before verdict.

AIDER

The presumption of the proof of all facts nec-cessary to the verdict as it stands, coming to the aid of a record in which such facts are not distinct-ly alleged.
AIDING AN ESCAPE. Any overt act, intended and useful to assist attempted or completed de-parture of prisoner from lawful custody before his discharge by due process of law. State v. Navarro, 131 Me. 345, 163 A. 103, 104.
AIDS. In feudal law, originally mere benevo-lences granted by a tenant to his lord, in times of distress; but at length the lords claimed them as of right.
They were principally three: (1) To ransom the lord’s person, if taken prisoner; (2) to make the lord’s eldest son and heir apparent a knight; (3) to give a sultable portion to the lord’s eldest daughter on her marriage. Abolished by 12 Car. II, c. 24.
Also, extraordinary grants to the crown by the house of commons, which were the origin of the modern system of taxation. 2 Bl.Comm. 63, 64.
A reasonable aid was a duty claimed by the lord of the fee of his tenants, holding by knight service, to marry his daughter, etc. Cowell.
AIEL (spelled also AyeZ, Aile, Ayle, and Aieul). L. Fr. A grandfather.
A writ which lieth where the grandfather was seized in his demesne as of fee of any lands or tenements in fee simple the day that he died, and a stranger abateth or entereth the same day and dispossesseth the heir. Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 222; Termes de la Ley; 3 Bla.Com. 186; 2 Poll. & Maitl. 57. See Abatement of Freehold.
AIELESSE. A Norman French term signifying "grandmother." Kelham.
AILE. A corruption of the French word aieul, grandfather. See Aiel.
AILMENT. Commonly means indisposition of body or mind, a slight illness. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Burton, 167 Tenn. 606, 72 S. W.2d 778, 781.
But within meaning of an application for a benefit cer-tificate, It is something which substantially impairs the health of the applicant, materially weakens the vigor of his constitution, or seríously deranges bis vital functions, thereby excluding chronic rheumatism. National Ameri-cans v. Ritch, 121 Ark. 185, 180 S.W. 488, 489. And in life insurance application does not ínclude mere temporary indisposition, which, though requiring medical treatment, is readily remediable. Zogg v. Bankers’ Life Co. of Des Moines, Iowa, C.C.A.W.Va. 62 F.2d 575, 578. Nor passing discomfort. Washington Fidelity Nat. Ins. Co. v. Lacey, 45 Ohio App. 104, 186 N.E. 751, 754. Ho\vever, it covers disorders which could not properly be called diseases. Cromeens v. Sovereign Camp W. O. W., Mo.App., 247 S.W. 1033, 1034.
AIM A WEAPON. To point it intentionally. Ed-wards v. State, 28 Ga.App. 466, 111 S.E. 748. "Aim" denotes direction toward some minute point in an object, while "point" implies direction toward the whole object. Buchanan v. State, 25 Okl.Cr. 198, 219 P. 420, 423.
AINESSE. In French feudal law, the right or privilege of the eldest born; primogeniture; esnecy. Guyot, Inst.Feud. c. 17.
AIR. That Huid transparent substance which sur-rounds our globe. Bank v. Kennett, 101 Mo.App. 370, 74 S.W. 474.
AIR BASE. See Base.
AIR CONDITION. To render a room, building, office, hotel or the like reasonably comfortable by circulating air which is maintained at a prede-termined temperature by either warming or cool-ing it. Magee Laundry & Cleaners v. Harwell Appliance Co., 184 Miss. 435, 185 So. 571, 572.
AIR COURSES. As applied to the operation of coal mines, passages for conducting air. Ricardo v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 100 Kan. 95, 163 P. 641, 543. See Airway.
AIRCRAFT. Any contrivance used, or designed for navigation of or fiight in the air, except• a parachute or other contrivance designed for such navigation but used primarily as safety equip-ment. 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 171-184.
As defined in the Uniform Aeronautics Act, the term includes balloon, airplane, hydroplane and every other vehicle used for navigation through the air. See Aeronautics; Airship; Hydro-Aero-plane.
AIRE. In old Scotch law, the court of the justices itinerant, corresponding with the English eyre, (q. v.) Skene de Verb. Sign. voc. ‘ter.
AIRPLANE. See Aeronautics; Hydro-Aeroplane; Aircraft; Airship.
AIRPORT. Landing and taking off place for air planes. City of Mobile v. Lartigue, 23 Ala.App. 479, 127 So. 257, 260.
With íts beacons, landing fields, runways, and hangars, it is analogous to a barbar with its llghts, wharves, and docks; the one is the landing place and haven of ships that navigate the water, the other of those that navigate the air. Coleman v. City of Oakland, 110 Cal, App. 715, 295 P. 59, 61. And includes all land, buildings, structures or other Improvements, necessary or convenient in the estab-lishment and operation of an airport. Moore v. Gordon, Tex.Civ.App., 122 S.W.2d 239, 242.
Any locality either of water or land which is adapted for the landing and taking off of aircraft and which pro-vides facilities for shelter, supply, and repair of aircraft, or a place used regularly for receiving or discharging pas-sengers or cargo by air. 49 U.S.C.A. II 171-184. City of Wichita v. Clapp, 125 Kan, 100, 263 P. 12, 63 A.L.R. 478.
AIRSHIP. Under some statutes it includes every kind of vehicle or structure intended for use as a means of transporting passengers or goods, or both, in the air. As defined by the International Flying Convention of 1919, an airship means an aircraft using gas lighter than air as a means of support and having means of propulsion.
See Aeronautics; Aircraft; Hydro-Aeroplane.
AIRT AND PAIRT. In old Scotch criminal law, accessary; contriver and partner. 1 Pitc.Crim. Tr. pt. 1, p. 133; 3 How.State Tr. 601. Now writ-ten art and part, (q. v.)
AIRWAY. Applies to air routes for either air-planes or seaplanes and is a material or perma-nent way through the air laid out with precision
92
ALCOHOLISM
and care that an engineer adopts in choosing the course of and laying down a roadway. City of Wichita v. Clapp, 125 Kan. 100, 263 P. 12, 14, 63 A.L.R. 478.
In English law, a passage for the admission of air finto a mine. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, § 28. See Air Courses.
AISIAMENT1UM (spelled also Esamentum, Ais-mentum). In old English law, an easement. Spel-man.
AISNE or EIGNE. In old English law, the eldest or first born.
AJOURNMENT. In French law, the document pursuant to which an action or suit is commenced, equivalent to the writ of summons in England. Actions, however, are in some cases commenced by reguéte or petition. Arg.Fr.Merc.Law, 545.
AJUAR. In Spanish law, paraphernalia. The jewels and furniture which a wife brings in mar-riage.
AJUTAGE (spelled also Adjutage). A conical tube used in drawing water through an aperture, by the use of which the quantity of water drawn is much increased.
AKIN. In old English law. Of kin. "Next-a-kin." 7 Mod. 140.
AL. L. Fr. At the; to the. Al barre; at the bar. Al huís d’esglise; at the church door.
ALJE ECCLESI.X. The wings or side aisles of a church. Blount.
ALANERARIUS. A manager and keeper of dogs for the sport of hawking; from alanus, a dog known to the ancients. A falconer. Blount.
ALARM LIST. The list of persons liable to mili-tary watches, who were at the same time exempt from trainings and musters. See Prov.Laws 1775-76, c. 10, § 18; Const.Mass. c. 11, § 1, art. 10; Pub.St.Mass.1882, p. 1287.
ALBA FIRMA. In old English law, white rent; rent payable in silver or white money, as distin-guished from that which was anciently paid in corn or provisions, called black mail, or black rent; reditus nigri. Spelman; Reg.Orig. 319b.
ALBACEA. In Spanish law, an executor or admin-istrator; one who is charged with fulfilling and executing that which is directed by the testator in his testament or other last disposition. Emeric v. Alvarado, 64 Cal. 529, 2 Pac. 418, 433.
ALBANAGIUM. In old French law, the state of alienage; of being a foreigner or alien.
ALBANUS. In old French law, a stranger, alien, or foreigner.
ALBINATUS. In old French law, the state or condition of an alien or foreigner.
ALBINATUS JUS. In old French law, the droit d’aubaine in France, whereby the king, at an
alien’s death, was entruea to all his property, un-less he had peculiar exemption. Repealed in June, 1791.
ALBUM BREVE. A blank writ; a writ with a blank or omission in it.
ALBUS LIBER. The white book; an ancient ‘book containing a compilation of the law and customs of the city of London.
ALCABALA. In Spanish law, a duty of a certain per cent. paid to the treasury on the sale or ex-change of property.
ALCAIDE. Sp. Jailer, warden, governor of a fortress.
ALCALDE. The narre of a judicial officer in Spain, and in those countries which have received
their laws and institutions from Spain. His func-tions somewhat resembled those of mayor in small municipalities on the continent, or justice of the peace in England and most of the United States. Castillero v. U. S., 2 Black, 17, 194, 17 L.Ed. 360.
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE. The term is distin-guished from the term "intoxicating liquor," in that a beverage may be alcoholic in that it contains some alcohol, and yet not be intoxicating as de-fined in National Prohibition Act. Premier-Pabst Sales Co. v. McNutt, D.C.Ind., 17 F.Supp. 708, 714.
Beer. Liquor Control Commisslon v. McGillis, 91 Utah, 586, 65 P.2d 1136, 1141. Ethyl alco,iol, within tax statute. H. 0. Hurley Co. v. Martin, 267 Ky. 182, 101 S.W.2d 657, 660. It is immaterial whether the liquor is suitable or deslrable for beverage purposes, If it Is prohibited by law and is in fact used as a beverage. Powell v. State, 179 Md. 399, 18 A.2d 587, 590, 591. But it must be drinkable. McChrlsty v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 26, 133 S.W.2d 976, 977.
ALCOHOLIC LIQUORS. "Alcoholic, spirituous and malt liquors" mean intoxicating liquors which can be used as a beverage, and which, when drunk to excess, will produce intoxication. Howard v. Acme Brewing Co., 143 Ga. 1, 83 S.E. 1096, 1097, Ann. Cas.1917A, 91; F. W. Woolworth Co. v. State, 72 Okl.Cr. 125, 113 P.2d 399, 403.
The term includes raw alcohol. C. J. Lincoln Co. v. State, 122 Ark. 204, 183 S.W. 173, 174. Beer, ale, or wine In Selective Service Act, § 12 (50 U.S.C.A. § 226 note). U. S.. v. Kinsel, D.C., 263 F. 141, 142. And lemon and vanilla extracto, made or used for beverage purposes, con-taining alcohol. Brandon v. State, 24 Ala.App. 289, 134 So. 890, 891. But not specially denatured alcohol. M. H. Mc-Carthy & Co. v. Doran, D.C.Mass., 43 F.2d 659, 661. See Intoxicating Liquor.
ALCOHOLISM. In medical jurisprudence, the pathological effect (as distinguished from physio-logical effect) of excessive indulgence in intoxi-cating liquors.
A morbid condition resulting from the Inordinate or excessive use of alcoholic beverages. Cochran v. Commis-sioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.4, 78 F.2d 176, 178.
It Is acute when Induced by excessive potations at one time or in the course of a single debauch. An attack of delirium tremens and alcoholic homicidal manía are exam-ples of thls form. It is chronic when resulting from the long-contlnued use of spirits in less quantities, as in the case of dipsomania.

ALCOVE

ALCOVE ROOM. An "alcove room," within Tene-ment House Law N. Y. § 65, is a room with an alcove. People on Complaint of Hickey v. White-low, Mag.Ct.N.Y., 166 N.Y.S. 141, 148.
ALDERMAN. A judicial or administrative magis-trate.
See Aldermannus.
Orlginally the word was synonymous with "elder" or -senator," but was also used to designate an earl, and even a king.
In American cities, one of a board of municipal officers next in order to the mayor. State v. Waterman, 95 Conn. 414, 111 A. 623, 624; Board of Lights and Waterworks v. Dobbs, 151 Ga. 53, 105 S.E. 611, 612. The aldermen are generally a legislative body, having limitad judicial pow-ers as a body, as in matters of internal pollee regulation, laying out and repairing streets, constructing sewers, and the like; though in many cities they hold separate courts, and have magisterial powers to a considerable extent.
In English law, an associate to the chief civil magistrate of a corporate town or city.
The word would seem to have been rather an appellation of honor, originally, than a distinguishing mark of office. Spelman Gloss.
ALDERMANNUS. L. Lat. An alderman.
ALDERMANNUS CIVITATIS VEL BURGI. Alder-man of a city or borough, from which the modern office of alderman has been derived. T. Raym. 435, 437.
ALDERMANNUS COMITATUS. The alderman of the county. According to Spelman, he held an office intermediate between that of an earl and a sheriff. According to other authorities, he was the same as the earl. 1 Bl.Comm. 116.
ALDERMANNUS HUNDREDI SEU WAPEN-TACHIL Alderman of a hundred or wapentake. Spelman.
ALDERMANNUS REGIS. Alderman of the king. So called, either because he received his appoint-ment from the king or because he gave the judg-ment of the king in the premises allotted to him.
ALDERMANNUS TOTIUS ANGLIX. Alderman of all England. An officer among the Anglo-Saxons, supposed by Spelman to be the same with the chief justiciary of England in later times. Spelman.
ALE-CONNER. In old English law, an officer appointed by the court-leet, sworn to look to the assise and goodness of ale and beer within the precincts of the leet. Kitch. Courts, 46; Whishaw. And to look to the assise of bread. Cowell.
This officer is still continued in name, though the duties are changed or given up; 1 Crabb, Real Prop. 501.
ALE-HOUSE. A place where ale is sold to be drunk on the premises where sold.
ALE SILVER. A rent or tribute paid annually to the lord mayor of London, by those who sell ale within the liberty of the city.
ALE-STAKE. A maypole or long stake driven into the ground, with a sign on it for the sale of ale. Cowell.
ALEA. Lat. In the civil law, a game of chance or hazard. Dig. 11, 5, 1. See Cod. 3, 43. The chance of gain or loss in a contract.
ALEATOR. Lat. (From alea, q. v., meaning dice). In the civil law, a gamester; one who plays at games of hazard. Dig. 11, 5; Cod. 3, 43.
ALEATORY CONTRACT. A mutual agreement, of which the effects, with respect both to the advantages and losses, whether to all the parties or to some of them, depend on an uncertain event. Losecco v. Gregory, 108 La. 648, 32 So. 985.
Contracts in which promise by one party is conditioned. on fortuitous event. Southern Surety Co. v. MacMillan Co., C.C.A.Okl., 58 F.2d 541, 549.
A contract, the obligation and performance of which depend upon an uncertain event, such as insurance, engage-ments to pay annuities, and the like.
A contract is aleatory or hazardous when the perform-ance of that which is one of its objects depends on an uncertain event. It is certain when the thing to be done is supposed to depend on the will of the party, or when in the usual course of events It must happen in the manner stipulated.
ALER A DIEU. L. Fr. In old practice. To be dismissed from court; to go quit. Literally, "to go to God."
ALER SANS JOUR. In old practice, a phrase used to indicate the final dismissal of a case from court without continuance. "To go without day."
ALEU. Fr. In French feudal law, an allodial estate, as distinguished from a feudal estate or benefice.
ALFET. A cauldron into which boiling water was poured, in which a criminal plunged his arm up to the elbow, and there held it for some time, as an ordeal. Du Cange.
ALFRED’S CODE. See Dombec, Domboc.
ALGARUM MARIS. Probably a corruption of Laganum maris, lagan being a right, in the mid-dle ages, like jetsam and flotsam, by which goods thrown from a vessel in distress became the property of the king, or the lord on whose shores they were stranded. Spelman; Jacob; Du Cange.
ALGO. Span. In Spanish law, property. White, Nov.Recop. b. 1, tit. 5, c. 3, § 4.
ALIA. Lat. Other things.
ALIA ENORMIA. Other wrongs. The name given to a general allegation of injuries caused by the defendant with which the plaintiff in an action of trespass under the common-law practice concluded his declaration. Archb.Crim.P1. 694.
ALIAMENTA. A liberty of passage, open way, water-course, etc., for the tenant’s accommodation. Kitchen.
ALIAS. Lat. Otherwise; equivalent of "alias dictus" or "otherwise called", indicating one was called by one or the other of two names, Com-

monwealth v. Liebowitz, 143 Pa.Super. 75, 17 A. 2d 719, 721; at another time; in another manner; formerly.
ALIAS DICTUS. "Otherwise called." Antone v. State, 49 Ariz. 168, 65 P.2d 646, 649, (shorter and more usual form, alias; see Kennedy v. People, 39 N.Y. 245). Known by both those names, and is called one or the other. People v. Mellon, 171 Misc. 171, 11 N.Y.S.2d 786, 790. A fictitious name assumed by a person is colloquially termed an "alias." State v. Melson, 161 La. 423, 108 So. 794, 795.
ALIAS EXECUTION. One issued after first has been returned without having accomplished its purpose. Richards-Conover Hardware Co. v. Sharp, 150 Kan. 506, 95 P.2d 360, 364.
ALIAS SUBPOENA. One issued after the first has been returned without having accomplished its purpose. Richards-Conover Hardware Co. v. Sharp, 150 Kan. 506, 95 P.2d 360, 364.
ALIAS SUMMONS. A summons issued when or-iginal has not produced its effect because defec-tive in form or manner of service, and when is-sued, which supersedes the first writ. Mansur v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of California, 136 Mo. App. 726, 118 S.W. 1193, 1194; McGuire v. Mont-vale Lumber Co., 190 N.C. 806, 131 S.E. 274, 275.
ALIAS TAX WARRANT. One issued after the first has been returned without having accomplish-ed its purpose. Richards-Conover Hardware Co. v. Sharp, 150 Kan. 506, 95 P.2d 360, 364.
ALIAS WRIT. A second writ. Ditmar v. Beck-ham, Tex.Civ.App., 77 S.W.2d 893, 894.
At common law "alias" as applied to an execution or fieri facias referred to new writ issued alter original fieri facias was returned unproductive, but under the. Code the term applies to an execution issued in lieu of a lost
U-Driv-It System of Macon v. Lyles, 71 Ga.App• 70, 30 S.E.2d 111, 114. A writ issued Where one of the same kind has already beeri issued in the same cause without having been effeetive. Schrnidt v. Schmidt, 108 Mont. 246, 89 P.2d 1020, 1021. It is used of all species of writs.
Historically, the word "alias" refers to a former com-mand of the same sort, and it vas part of a Latin sentence meaning, "We command you as we have before (sicut alias) commanded you." Schrnidt v. Schmidt, 108 Mont. 246, 89 P.2d 1020, 1021.
ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION. One issued aft-er the first has been returned without having ac-complished its purpose. Richards-Conover Hard-ware Co. v. Sharp, 150 Kan. 506, 95 P.2d 360, 364.
ALIBI. Lat. In criminal law, elsewhere; in an-other place. State v. Hubbard, 351 Mo. 143, 171 S. W.2d 701, 706.
Means that at time of commission of crime charged in indictment defendant was at different place so remote or distant or under such circumstances that he could not have committed offense. State v. Parsons, 206 Iowa 390, 220 N.W. 328, 330. It is a physical circurostance and derives its entire potency as a defense from fact that it involves the physical impossibility of guilt of accused. Gregg v. State, 69 Okl.Cr. 103, 101 P.2d 289, 296. Strictly it is not a defense though usually called such in criminal procedure. State v. Norman, 103 Ohio St. 541, 134 N.E. 474.
ALIEN. ti. A foreigner; one born abroad.
A person who owes allegiance to á foreign government. De Cano v. State, 7 Wash.2d 613, 110 P.2d 627, 631, 633.
In this country is a person born out of the United States and unnaturalized under our Constitution and laves, 2 Kent, Comm. 50. Caparell v. Goodbody, 132 N.J.Eq. 559, 29 A.2d 563, 569. In England, one born out of the allegiance of the king.
A native born Filipino living in the United States but not admitted to United States citizenship was an "alien". United States v. Gancy, D.C.Minn., 54 F.Supp. 755, 758, 759. But term for immigration purposes would not apply to a Filipino seeking to enter the Territory of Hawaii or to a Filipino lawfully admitted to Hawaii who seeks entry therefrom into the United States. Id. Nor to citizens of the Philippine Islands of the Filipino race. De Cano v. State, 7 Wash.2d 613, 110 P.2d 627, 631, 633.
As te the effect of marriage on the status of women, whether they were originally aliens or citizens of the United States, see 8 U.S.C.A. u§ 9-368; U. S. ex rel. Ulrich v. Kel]ogg. 58 App.D.C. 360, 30 F.2d 984, 985, 71 A.L.R. 1210. Petition of Peterson, D.C.Wash., 33 F.Supp. 615, 616. Johansen v. Staten Island Shipbuilding Co., 272 N.Y. 140, 5 N.E.2d 68, 70. In re Pezzi, D.C.Cal., 29 F.2d 999, 1001.
ALIEN or ALIENE. v. To transfer or make over to another; to convey or transfer the prop-erty of a thing from one person to another; to alienate. Usually applied to the transfer of lands and tenements. Co.I.itt. 118; Cowell.
ALIEN AMY. In international law, alien friend. An alien who is the subject or citizen of a foreign government at peace with our own.
ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS. Acts of congress of July 6 and July 14, 1798. See Whart. State Tr. 22.
ALIEN ENEMY. In international law, an alien who is the subject or citizen of some hostile state or power. See Dyer, 2b; Co.Litt. 129b. A person who, by reason of owing a permanent or temporary allegiance to a hostile power, becomes, in time of war, impressed with the character of an enemy. See 1 Kent, Comm. 74; 2 Id. 63; Bell v. Chapman, 10 Johns., N.Y., 183; Dorsey v. Brig-ham, 177 III. 250, 52 N.E. 303, 42 L.R.A. 809. Sub-jects of a foreign state at war with United States. Caparell v. Goodbody, 132 N.J.Eq. 559, 29 A.2d 563, 569.
Whether or not a person 15 an alien enemy depends, not on bis nationality, but on the place in which he voluntarily resides or carnes on business. Porter v. Freudenberg, [1915] 1 K.B. 857. See, also, Noble v. Great American Ins. Co., 194 N.Y.S. 60, 66, 200 App.Div. 773.
ALIEN FRIEND. Subjects of a foreign state at peace with the United States. Caparell v. Good-body, 132 N.J.Eq. 559, 29 A.2d 563, 569, 570. Or citizen; an alien amy. Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185, 186, 11 A.L.R. 166.
ALIEN NIÉE. An alien born, i. e., a person who. has been born an alien.
ALIENA NEGOTIA EXACTO OFFICIO GERUN-TUR. The business of another is to be conducted with particular attention. Jones, Bailm. 83; First. Nat. Bank of Carlisle v. Graham, 79 Pa. 118, 2L Am.Rep. 49.

ALIENABLE

ALIENABLE. Proper to be the sübject of aliena-tion or transfer.
ALIENAGE. The condition or state of an alien.
&LIENATE. To convey; to transfer the title to property. Co.Litt. 118b. Alien is very commonly used in the same sense. 1 Washb. Real Prop. 53.
-sen, alienate, and dispone" are the formal words of transfer in Scotch conveyances of heritable property. 13e11.
The term has a technical legal meaning, and any trans-fer of real estate, short of a conveyance of the title, is not an alienation of the estate. Masters v. Insurance Co., 11 Barb., N.Y., 630. See, also, Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Dunnington, 118 Okl. 231, 247 P. 353, 355. But the word has been defined as to convey or transfer to another as title, property, or right, to part voluntarily with owner-ship of property, and, in widest sense, property is alien-ated when transferred from one person to another in any way; but generally alienating is restricted to transfer of title to property by act of owner, as distinguished from transfer effected entirely by operation of law. Delfelder v. Poston, 42 Wyo. 176, 293 P. 354, 361.
ALIENATIO LICET PROHIBEATUR, CONSEN-SU TAMEN OMNIUM, IN QUORUM FAVOREM PROHIBITA EST, POTEST FIERI, ET QUILIBET POTEST RENUNCIARE JURI PRO SE ‘NTRO. DUCTO. Although alienation be prohibited, yet, by the consent of all in whose favor it is prohibi-ted, it may take place; for it is in the power of any man to renounce a law made in his own favor. Co.Litt. 98.
ALIENATIO REI PR2EFERTUR JURI ACCRE-SCENDI. Alienation is favored by the law rather than accumulation. Co.Litt. 185.
ALIENATION. In real property law, the trans-fer of the property and possession of lands, tene-ments, or other things, from one person to an-other. Termes de la Ley.
The term is particularly applied to absolute conveyances of real property. Conover v. Mutual Ins. Co., 1 N.Y. 290, 294. The voluntary and complete transfer from one person to another. Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okl. 204, 177 P. 86, 89, 3 A.L.R. 352; Chouteau v. Chouteau, 49 Okl. 105, 152 P. 373, 376. Dlsposition by will. Contra, Postlethwaite v. Edson, 102 Kan. 619, 171 P. 769, 773, L.R.A.1918D, 983. Leases, especially of Indians’ allotted lands. Bailey v. King, 57 Okl. 528, 157 P. 763, 764; Ashton v. Noble, 65 Okl. 45, 162 P. 784, 785; Williams v. Hylan, 215 N.Y.S. 101, 106, 126 Misc.Rep. 807. Every mode of passing realty by the act of the party, as distinguished from passing it by the opera-tion of law. Rathbun v. Allen, 63 R.I. 109, 7 A.2d 273, 275. But the term is inapplicable to mortgages. Worth-ington v. Tipton, 24 N.M. 89, 172 P. 1048, 1049.
The act by which the title to real estate is voluntarily resigned by one person to another and accepted by the latter, in the • forms prescribed by law. Cf. In re Ehr-hardt, U.S.D.C., 19 F.2d 406, 407 (bankruptcy proceedings).
It is said to signify the wrongful transfer of property to another or the wrongful conversion of property for which an action of trover was maintainable at common law. Sauls v. Whitman, 171 Okl. 113, 42 P.24 275, 280.
In medical jurisprudence, a generic term de-noting the different kinds or forms of mental aberration or derangement.
ALIENATION IN MORTMAIN. See Amortiza-tion; Mortmain.
ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS. The robbing of husband or wife of the conjugal affection, society, fellowshkp, and comfort which inheres in the nor-
mal marriage relation. Young v. Young, 236 Ala. 627, 184 So. 187, 190.
Lms of consortium between spouses from wrongful acts of others. Young v. Young, 236 Ala. 627, 184 So. 187, 190. The deprivation of one spouse of the right to the aid, com-fort, assistance, and society of the other spouse in family relationships. Hargraves v. Ballou, 47 R.I. 186, 131 A. 643, 645.
ALIENATION OFFICE. In English practice, an office for the recovery of fines levied upon writs of covenant and entries.
ALIENEE. One to whom an alienation, convey-ance, or transfer of property is made. See Alien-or.
ALIENI GENERIS. Lat. Of another kind. 3 P. Wms. 247.
ALIENI JURIS. Lat. Under the control, or sub-ject to the authority, of another person; e. g., an infant who is under the authority of his father or guardian; a wife under the power of her hus-band. The term is contrasted with Sui Juris, (q. v.).
ALIENIGENA. One of foreign birth; an alien. 7 Coke, 31.
ALIENISM. The state, condition, or character of an alien. 2 Kent, Comm. 56, 64, 69.
ALIENIST. One who has specialized in the study of mental diseases. State v. Reidell, 9 Houst., Del., 470, 14 A. 550, 552. Persons qualified by ex-perience, knowledge, and previous opportunities to express opinion as to defendant’s mental con-dition at a particular time. People v. Norton, 138 Cal.App. 70, 31 P.2d 809, 810.
ALIENOR. 11e who makes a grant, transfer of title, conveyance, or alienation. Correlative of alienee.
ALIENUS. Lat. Another’s; belonging to an-other; the property of another. Alienus homo, another’s man, or slave. Inste 4, 3, pr. Aliena res, another’s property. Bract. fol. 13b.
ALIGNMENT. The act of laying out or adjusting a line. The state of being so laid out or adjusted. The ground plan of a railway or other road or work as distinguished from its profile or gradients. Village of Chester v. Leonard, 68 Conn. 495, 37 A. 397. An adjustment to a line. Harner v. Monongalia County Court, 80 W.Va. 626, 92 S.E. 781, 785.
ALIKE. Similar to another. The term is not synonymous with "identical," which means "exact-ly the same." Carn v. Moore, 74 Fla. 77, 76 So. 337, 340.
ALIMENT. In Scotch law, to maintain, support, provide for; to provide with necessaries. As a noun, maintenance, support; an allowance from the husband’s estate for the support of the wife. Paters. Comp. §§ 845, 850, 893.

In civil law, food and other things necessary to the support of life; money allowed for the pur-pose of procuring these. Dig. 50, 16, 43.
In common law, to supply with necessaries. Purcell v. Purcell, 3 Edw.Ch.N.Y. 194.
ALIMENTA. Lat. In the civil law, aliments; things necessary to sustain life; means of sup-port, including food, (cibaria,) clothing, (vestitus,) and habitation, (habitatio.) Dig. 34, 1, 6.
ALIMENTOS. The Spanish term for support and maintenance. Escriche Diccionario.
ALIMONY. Comes from Latin "alimonia" mean-ing sustenance, and means, therefore, the suste-nance or support of the wife by her divorced hus-band and stems from the common-law right of the wife to support • by her husband. Eaton v. Davis, 176 Va. 330, 10 S.E.2d 893, 897. Derived from Latin word "alere," meaning to nourish or sustain. Allowances which husband by court order pays wife for maintenance while they are sepa-rated or after they are divorced. Merriman v. Hawbaker, D.C.I11., 5 F.Supp. 432, 433. Or pend-ing a suit for divorce. And see Bowman v. Worth-ington, 24 Ark. 522; Lynde v. Lynde, 64 N.J.Eq. 736, 52 A. 694, 58 L.R.A. 471. But in its strictly legal sense relates to the provisions made pen-dente lite. Warne v. Warne, 36 S.D. 573, 156 N. W. 60, 62. Compare Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584, 87 A. 1033, 1035, holding that in the ab-sence of statute, in case of an absolute divorce the duty to support ceases and with it the right to alimony.
Generally it is restricted to money unless otherwise authorized by statute. Lloyd v. Lloyd, 183 Ga. 751, 189 S.E. 903, 904. But it may be such an allowance out of hus-band’s estate. Davis v. Davis, 61 Okl. 275, 161 P. 190, 191. Equally applicable to all allowances, whether annual or in gross. Burrows v. Purple, 107 Mass. 432.
It may continue during the joint lives of husband and wife, or so long as they live apart. Cohen v. Cohen, Md., 174 Md. 61, 197 A. 564, 565, 566. But is essentially a dif-ferent thing from a division of the property of the parties. Mesler v. Jackson, Circuit Judge, 188 Mich. 195, 154 N.W. 63, 65. Not being an "estate", nor the separate property of wife. Cizek v. Cizek, 69 Neb. 797, 99 N.W. 28.
It does not partake of nature of damages or penalty for husband’s misconduct. Kennard v. Kennard, 87 N.H. 320, 179 A. 414, 419. Nor is it founded on contract, express or implied, but on husband’s natural and legal duty to sup-port wife. Smith v. Smith, D.C.N.Y., 7 F.Supp. 490, 491.
In its broad sense, it means also an award for the sup-port of a child or children. Schafer v. Schafer, 193 N.Y.S. 43, 44, 118 Misc.Rep. 254; Brown v. Brown, 222 Mass, 415, 111 N.E. 42, 43. And it includes provision for an educa-tion. Floyd v. Floyd, 91 Fla. 910, 108 So. 896, 898.
Alimony in gross, or in a lump sum, is in the nature of a final property settlement, and hence in some jurisdictions is not included in the term "alimony," which in its strict or technical sense contemplates money payments at regular inter-vals. Parrnly v. Parmly, 125 N.J.Eq. 545, 5 A.2d 789, 791; 27 C.J.S. Divorce, § 235, p. 965.
Alimony pendente lite is an allowance made pending a suit for divorce or separate mainte-nance including a reasonable allowance for prepa-ration of the suit as well as for support. Davis v. Davis, 15 Wash.2d 297, 130 P.2d 35

ALIUNDE

pending an appeal. Robinson v. Robinson, N.J. Err. & App., 92 A. 94, 96, L.R.A.1915B, 1071.
Permanent alimony is a provision for the sup-port and maintenance of a wife during her life-time. In re Spencer, 83 Cal. 460, 23 P. 395, 17 Am.St.Rep. 266.
ALIO INTUITU. Lat. In a different view; under a different aspect. 4 Rob.Adm. & Pr. 151. With another view or object; with respect to another case or condition. 7 East, 558; 6 M. & S. 231. See Diverso Intuitu.
ALIQUID CONCEDITUR NE INJURIA REMAN-EAT IMPUNITA, QUOD ALIAS NON CONCED-ERETUR. Something is (will be) conceded, to prevent a wrong remaining unredressed, which otherwise would not be conceded. Co.Litt. 197b.
ALIQUID POSSESSIONIS ET,, NIHIL JURIS. Somewhat of possession, and nothing of right, (but no right).
A phrase used by Bracton to describe that kind of pos-session which a person mlght have of a thing as a guard-ian, creditor, or the like; and also that kind of possession which was granted for a term of years, where nothing could be demanded but the usufruct. Bract. fois. 39a, 160a.
ALIQUIS NON DEBET ESSE JUDEX IN PRO-FRIA CAUSA, QUIA NON POTEST ESSE JU-DEX ET PARS. A person ought not to be judge in his own cause, because he cannot act as judge and party. Co.Litt. 141; 3 Bl.Comm. 59.
ALIQUOT. Strictly, contained in something else an exact number of times. But as applied to re-sulting trusts, "aliquot" is treated as meaning fractional. Fox v. Shanley, 94 Conn. 350, 109 A. 249, 251. And means any definite interest. Hin-shaw v. Russell, 280 Ill. 235, 117 N.E. 406, 408.
ALITER. Otherwise; as otherwise held or de-cided.
ALIUD EST CELARE, ALIUD TACERE. To con-ceal is one thing; to be silent is another. Lord Mansfield, 3 Burr. 1910.
ALIUD EST DISTINCTIO, ALIUD SEPARATIO. Distinction is one thing; separation is another. It is one thing to make things distinct, another thing to make them separable.
ALIUD EST POSSIDERE, ALIUD ESSE IN POSSESSIONE. It is one thing to possess; it is another to be in possession. Hob. 163.
ALIUD EST VENDERE, ALIUD VENDENTI CONSENTIRE. To sell is one thing; to consent to a sale (seller) is another thing. Dig. 50, 17, 160.
ALIUD EXAMEN. A different or foreign mode of trial. 1 Hale, Com.Law, 38.
ALIUNDE. Lat. From another source; from elsewhere; from outside.
Evidence aliunde. Evidence from outside, from another source. In certain cases a written in-

ALI1UNDE

strument may be explained by evidence aliunde, that is, by evidence drawn from sources exterior to the instrument itself, e. g., the testimony of a witness to conversations, admissions, or prelimi-nary negotiations.
Evidence aliunde (1. e., from without the will) may be received to explain an ambiguity in a will. 1 Greenl, Ev. § 291.
ALIUNDE RULE. A verdict may not be im-peached by evidence of juror unless foundation for introduction thereof is first made by compe-tent evidence aliunde, or from some other source. State v. Adams, 141 Ohio St. 423, 48 N.E.2d 861, 863, 146 A.L.R. 509.
ALIUS. Lat. Other. The neuter form is aliud, something else; another thing.
ALIVE. As respects birth, it means that child shall have an independent life of its own for some period, even momentarily, after birth. Evidenced by respiration or other indications of life, such as beating of heart and pulsation of arteries. Flem-ing v. Sexton, 172 N.C. 250, 90 S.E. 247, 249. Cf. Hydrostatic Test._ Or heart tones in response to artificial respiration, or pulsation of umbilical cord after being severed. In re Stuertz’ Estate, 124 Neb. 149, 245 N.W. 412, 413.
In respect of estate matters, a child en ventre sa mere is "born" and "alive" for all purposes for his benefit. In re Holthausen’s Will, 175 Misc. 1022, 26 N.Y.S.2d 140, 143.
ALL. Means the whole of—used with a singular noun or pronoun, and referring to amount, quan-tity, extent, duration, quality, or degree. The whole number or sum of—used collectively, with a plural noun or pronoun expressing an aggre-gate. Every member of individual component of; each one of—used with a plural noun. In this sense, all is used generically and distributively. "All" refers rather to the aggregate under which the individuals are subsumed than to the individ-uals themselves. State v. Hallenberg-Wagner Motor Co., 341 Mo. 771, 108 S.W.2d 398, 401. See Both.
ALL AMERICAN. Indicative of supremacy, su-periority, and distinction in the athletic world. R. W. Eldridge Co. v. Southern Handkerchief Mfg. Co., D.C.S.C., 23 F.Supp. 179, 182, 184, 185.
ALL AND SINGULAR. All without exception. A comprehensive term often employed in convey-anees, wills, and the like, which includes the ag-gregate or whole and also each of the separate items or components. McClaskey v. Barr, C.C., 54 Fed. 798.
ALL CASES AT LAW. Within constitutional guaranty of jury trial, refers to common law ac-tions as distinguished from causes in equity and certain other proceedings. Breimhorst v. Beck-man, 227 Minn. 409, 35 N.W.2d 719, 734.
ALL DISABILITY. Includes both total and par-tial disability caused by a permanent injury to the leg or arm, or resulting from or relating to the
permanent injury, and embraces not only all in-capacity to labor, directly or indirectly arising from such permanent injury, but likewise cases of no incapacity at all. Bausch v. Fidler, 277 Pa. 573, 121 A. 507. Includes pain, annoyance, incon-veniences, disability to work, and everything inci-dent to the permanent injury. Vanaskie v. Stev-ens Coal Co., 133 Pa.Super. 457, 2 A.2d 531, 532.
ALL FAULTS. A sale of goods with "all faults" covers, in the absence of fraud on the part of the vendor, all such faults and defects as are not in-consistent with the identity of the goods as the goods described. Whitney v. Boardman, 118 Mass. 242.
ALL FOURS. Two cases or decisions which are alike in all material respects, and precisely similar in all the circumstances affecting their determina-tion, are said to be or to run on "all fours."
ALL THE ESTATE. The narre given in England to the short clause in a conveyance or other as-surance which purports to convey "all the estate, right, title, interest, claim, and demand" of the grantor, lessor, etc., in the property dealt with. Dav.Conv. 93.
ALL THE MEMBERS. The provision of a church constitution that "all the members" can discharge their parish priest means that all shall have op-portunity to participate, but not that all mem-bers must attend the meeting or vote in the affirm-ative for the discharge of the priest. Stryjewski v. Panfil, 269 Pa. 568, 112 A. 764, 765.
ALL–ADDENDUM. As respects patent on a tooth gearing, "all-addendum" and "all-dedendum" mean that the working faces of the teeth of one element are outside, and those of the other ele-ment inside, their respective "pitch circles" which refers to circles passing through the pitch point and coaxial with the axes of rotation of the inter-meshing gear wheels. In re Cook, Cust. & Pat. App., 103 F.2d 909, 911.
ALLEGANS CONTRARIA NON EST AUDIEN-DUS. One alleging contrary or contradictory things (whose statements contradict each other) is not to be heard. 4 Inst. 279. Applied to the statements of a witness.
ALLEGANS SUAM TURPITUDINEM NON EST AUDIENDUS. One who alleges his own infamy is not to be heard. 4 Inst. 279.
ALLEGAR! NON DEBUIT QUOD PROBATUM NON RELEVAT. That ought not to be alleged which, if proved, is not relevant. 1 Ch.Cas. 45.
ALLEGATA. In Roman law, a word which the emperors formerly signed at the bottom of their rescripts and constitutions; under other instru-ments they usually wrote signata or testata. Encyc. Lond.
ALLEGATA ET PROBATA. Lat. Things alleged and proved. The allegations made by a party to a suit, and the proof adduced in their support. Crump v. State, 30 Ala.App. 241, 4 So.2d 188, 189.

ALLEGATIO CONTRA FACTUM NON EST AD-MITTENDA. An allegation contrary to the deed (or fact) is not admissible.
ALLEGATION. The assertion, declaration, or statement of a party to an action, made in a pleading, setting out what he expects to prove. Mathews v. Underpinning & Foundation Co., 17 N. J.Misc. 79, 4 A.2d 788, 789.
A material allegation in a pleading is one es-sential to the claim or defense.
In ecclesiastical law, the statement of the facts intended to be relied on in support of the con-tested suit.
In English ecclesiastical practice the word seems to designate the pleading as a whole: the three pleadings are known as the allegations; and the defendant’s plea is dis-tinguished as the defensive, or sometimos the responsive, allegation, and the complainant’s reply as the rejoining allegation.
ALLEGATION OF FACT. Generally narration of transaction by stating details according to their legal effect, and statement of right or liability flowing from certain facts is conclusion of law. Maylender v. Fulton County Gas & Electric Co., 131 Misc. 514, 227 N.Y.S. 209, 217.
ALLEGATION OF FACULTIES. A statement made by the wife of the property of her husband, in order to obtain alimony. Wright v. Wright, 3 Tex. 168. See Faculties.
ALLEGE. To state, recite, assert, or charge; to make an allegation. To affirm, assert, or declare. State v. Hostetter, Mo.Sup., 222 S.W. 750, 754.
ALLEGED. Stated; recited; claimed; asserted; charged. Lynn v. Nichols, 122 Misc.Rep. 170, 202 N.Y.S. 401, 406.
ALLEGIANCE. Obligation of fidelity and obedi-ence to government in consideration for protection that government gives. U. S. v. Kuhn, D.C.N.Y., 49 F.Supp. 407, 414.
The citizen or subject owes an absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign until he becomes a citizen or subject of another government or another sov-ereign. The alien owes a local and temporary allegiance during period of his residente. U. S. v. Wong Kim, Ark., 169 U.S. 649, 18 Sup.Ct. 456, 42 L.Ed. 890.
"The tie or ligamen which binds the subject [or citizen] to the king [or government] in return for that protection which the king [or government] affords the subject, [or citizen."] 1 BI.Comm. 366. It consists in "a true and faithful obedience of the subject due to his sovereign," 7 Coke, 4b, and is a comparatively modem corruption of ligeance (ligeantia), which is derived from liege (ltgiusl,’ meaning absolute or unqualified. It signified originally liege fealty, 1. e. absolute and unqualified fealty. 18 L.Q.Rev. 47.
In Norman French, alleviation; relief; redress. Kelham.
Acquired allegiance, is that binding a natural-ized citizen.
Local or actual allegiance, is that measure of obedience due from a subject of one government to another government, within whose territory he is temporarily resident. From this are excepted foreign sovereigns and their representatives, naval
and armed forces when permitted to remain in or pass through the country or its waters.
Natural allegiance. In English law, that kind of allegiance which is due from all men born with-in the king’s dominions, immediately upon their birth, which is intrinsic and perpetual, and, cannot be divested by any act of their own. 1 B1.Comm. 369; 2 Kent, Comm. 42. In American law, the al-legiance due from citizens of the United States to their native country, and also from naturalized citizens, and which cannot be renounced without the permission of government, to be declared by law. 2 Kent, Comm. 43-49.
It is said to be due to the king in his political, not his personal, capacity; L. R. 17 Q. B. D. 54, quoted in U. S. v. Wong Kim, Ark., 169 U.S. 663, 18 Sup.Ct. 456, 42 L.Ed. 890; and so in the United States "it is a political obliga-tion" depending not en ownership of land, but on the enjoyment of the protection of government; Wallace v. Harmstad, 44 Pa. 492; and it "binds the citizen to the observante of all laws" of his own sovereign; Adams v. People, 1 N.Y. 173.
ALLEGIARE. To defend and clear one’s self ; to wage one’s own law. An archaic word which simply means to define or justify by due course of law. State v. Hostetter. Mo., 222 S.W. 750.
ALLEGING DIMINUTION. The allegation in an appellate court, of some error in a subordinate part of the nisi prius record. See Diminution.
ALLEN CHARGE. An instruction advising jurors to have deferente for each other’s views, that they should listen, With a disposition to be convinced, to each other’s argument, deriving its name from the case of Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528, wherein the instruction was approved. Coupe v. United States, 72 App.D.C. 86, 113 F.2d 145, 149; Green v. U. S., 309 F.2d 852. Variously called dynamite charge, shotgun instruc-tion, third degree instruction.
ALLERGY. A susceptibility to disease. Vogt v. Ford Motor Co., Mo.App., 138 S.W.2d 684, 688.
ALLEVIARE. L. Lat. In old records, to levy or pay an accustomed fine or composition; to redeem by such payment. Cowell.
ALLEY. A narrow way designed for the special accommodation of the property it reaches. Atchi-son, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. City of Chanute, 95 Kan. 161, 147 P. 836, 837; Wooldridge v. Pacific Coast Coal Co., Wash., 155 P.2d 1001, 1003.
ALLIANCE. The relation or union between per-sons or families contracted by intermarriage; affinity.
In international law, a union or association of two or more states or nations, formed by league or treaty, for the joint prosecution of a war (offensive alliance), or for their mutual assistance and protection in repelling hostile attacks (de-fensive alliance). The league or treaty by which the association is formed. The act of confederat ing, by league or treaty, for the purposes men-tioned.
The term is also used in a wider sense, embracing unions for objects of common lnterest to the contracting partles,

ALLISION

as the "Holy Alliance" entered Into In 1815 by Prussia, Austria and Russia for the purpose of counteractIng the revolutionary movement in the lnterest of political liberal-ism.
ALLISION. The running of one vessel into or against another, as distinguished from a collision,
i. e., the running of two vessels against each other. But this distinction is not very carefully observed.
ALLOCABLE. Synonymous with "distributable". In analyzing accounts, the breaking down of a lump sum charged or credited to one account into several parts to be charged or credited to other accounts. Fleming v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.Tex., 121 F.2d 7, 9.
ALLOCATE. Power to allocate critical materials included power to distribute, to assign, to allot. Gallagher’s Steak House v. Bowles, C.C.A.N.Y., 142 F.2d 530, 534. To ration or withhold from private consumption. State ex rel. Guide Manage-ment Corp. v. Alexander, 223 Ind. 221, 59 N.E.2d 169, 172.
ALLOCATION. An allowance made upon an ac-count in the English exchequer. Cowell. Placing or adding to a thing. Encyc. Lond.
Assignment or allotment. Jacobson v. Bowles, D.C.Tex., 53 F.Supp. 532, 534.
ALLOCATIONE FACIENDA. In old English practice, a writ for allowing to an accountant such sums of money as he hath lawfully expended in his office; directed to the lord treasurer and barons of the exchequer upon application made. Jacob.
ALLOCATO COMITATU. In old English practice, in proceedings in outlawry, when there were but two county courts holden between the delivery of the writ of exigi lacias to the sheriff and its re-turn, a special exigi lacias, with an calocato comitatu issued to the sheriff in order to complete the proceedings. See Exigent.
ALLOCATUR. Lat. It is allowed. A word form-erly used to denote that a writ or order was al-lowed.
A word denoting the allowance by a master or prothono-tary of a Mil referred for his consideration, whether touch-
ing damages, or matter of account. Lee, Dlct.
A special allocatur is the special allowance of a writ (particularly a writ oí error) which is required In some Particular cases.
ALLOCATUR EXIGENT. A species of writ an-ciently issued in outlawry proceedings, on the re-turn of the original writ of exigent. 1 Tidd, Pr. 128. See Exigent.
ALLOCUTION. Formality of court’s inquiry of prisoner as to whether he has any legal cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him on verdict of conviction. Archb.Crim. Pl. 173; State v. Pruitt, Mo., 169 S.W.2d 399, 400.
ALLOCUTUS. See Allocution.
ALLODARIL Owners of allodial lands. Owners of estates as large as a subject may have. Co. Litt. 1; Bac. Abr. "Tenure," A.
ALLODIAL. Free; not holden of any lord or superior; owned without obligation of vassalage or fealty; the opposite of feudal. Barker v. Dayton, 28 Wis. 384; Wallace v. Harmstad, 44 Pa. 499.
ALLODIUM. Land held absolutely in one’s own right, and not of any lord or superior; land not subject to feudal duties or burdens.
An estate held by absolute ownership, without recognizing any superior to whom any duty is due on account thereof. 1 Washb.Real Prop. 16. McCartee v. Orphan Asylum, 9 Cow., N.Y., 511,
18 Am.Dec. 516.
ALLOGRAPH. A writing or signature made for a person by another; opposed to autograph.
ALLONGE. A piece of paper annexed to a bill of exchange or promissory note, on which to write endorsements for which there is no room on the instrument itself. Pardessus, n. 343; Story, Prom. Notes, §1 121, 151; Fountain v. Bookstaver, 141 III. 461, 31 N.E. 17; Bergmann v. Puhl, 195 Wis. 120, 217 N.W. 746, 748, 56 A.L.R. 915.
ALLOPATHIC PRACTICE. The ordinary method of practicing medicine as adopted and taught by the great body of physicians. Bradbury v. Bardin, 34 Conn. 452, 453, 35 Conn. 577. Also, and more properly, that method of combatting disease by the use of remedies producing effects different from those of the disease being treated;–opposed to homeopathy.
ALLOT. To apportion, distribute; to divide prop-erty previously held in common among those en-tilled, assigning to each his ratable portion, to be held in severalty; to set apart specific property, a share of a fund, etc., to a distinct party. Millet v. Bilby, 110 Okl. 241, 237 P. 859, 861.
In the law of corporations, to allot shares, debentures, etc., is to appropriate them to the applicants or persons who have applied for them; this is generally done by send-ing to each applicant a letter of allotment, informing hini that a certain number of shares have been allotted to him. Sweet.
ALLOTMENT. A share or portion; that which is allotted; apportionment, division; the distribu-tion of shares in a public undertaking or corpora-tion. Reuter v. Reuter’s Succession, 206 La. 474,
19 So.2d 209, 212. Assignment. Pace v. Eoff, Tex. Com.App., 48 S.W.2d 956, 963. Partition; the distribution of land under an inclosure act. The term ordinarily and commonly used to describe land held by Indians after allotment, and before the issuance of the patent in fee that deprives the land of its character as Indian country. Estes v. U. S., C.C.A., 225 F. 980, 981; Harris v. Gray-son, 90 Okl. 147, 216 P. 446, 449. See Allottee.
ALLOTMENT CERTIFICATE. A document is-sued to an applicant for shares in a company or public loan announcing the number of shares allotted or assigned and the amounts and due dates of the calls or different payments to be made on the same. An "allotment certificate," when issued to an enrolled member of the Five Civilized Tribes of the Indian Territory, is an

decide the question that the party to whom it issues is entitled to the land, and it is a convey-ance of the right to this title to the allottee. Bowen v. Carter, 42 Okl. 565, 144 P. 170, 173.
ALLOTMENT NOTE. In English law, a writing by a seaman, whereby he makes an assignment of part of his wages in favor of his wife, father or mother, grandfather or grandmother, brother or sister. Mozley & Whitley.
ALLOTMENT SYSTEM. Designate$ the practice in England of dividing land in smaIl portions for cultivation by agricultural laborers and other cottagers at their ieisure, and alter they have per-formed their ordinary day’s work. Wharton.
ALLOTMENT WARDEN. By the English general inclosure act, 1845, § 108, when an allotment for the laboring poor of a district has been made on an inclosure under the act, the land so allotted is to be under the management of the incumbent and church warden of the parish, and two other persons elected by the parish, and they are to be styled "the allotment wardens" of the parish. Sweet.
ALLOTTEE. One to whom an allotment is made, who receives a ratable share under an allotment; a person to whom land under an inclosure act or shares in a public undertaking are allotted.
An "allottee," as the word is used In the act of April 21, 1904 (chapter 1402, 33 Stat. 189-204), ís one, generaily an Indian, freedman, or adopted citizen of a tribe of Indians, to whom a tract of land out of a common holding has been given by, or under the supervIsion of, the United States. Lynch v. Franklin, 37 Okl. 60, 130 P. 599, 600. The word does not include such allottee’s heirs. Bradley v. Goddard, 45 Okl. 77, 145 P. 409, 410.
ALLOW. The word has no rigid or precise mean-ing, but its import varíes according to circum-stances or context in connection with which it is used. It may mean bestow, assign, to any one as his right or due, to accord, or to imply discre-tion, or unqualified and definite promise to do some specified thing. Dunlop Sand & Gravel Cor-poration v. Hospelhorn, 172 Md. 279, 191 A. 701, 706. To approve of, accept as true, approve, ad-mit, concede, adopt, or fix. Headford Bros. & Hitchins Foundry Co. v. Associated Manufac-turera Corporation of America, 224 Iowa 1364, 278 N.W. 624, 628. To grant, something as a deduc-tion or an addition; to abate or deduct; as, to allow a sum for leakage. Pittsburgh Brewing Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.3, 107 F.2d 155, 156. To grant, or permit; as to al-low an appeal or a marriage; to allow an account or claim. Also to give a fit portion out of a larger property or fund. Thurman v. Adams, 82 Miss. 204, 33 So. 944. To sanction, either directly or indirectly, as opposed to merely suffering a thing to be done. People v. Duncan, 22 Cal.App. 430, 134 P. 797, 798; to acquiesce in. Luckie v. Dia-mond Coal Co., 41 Cal.App. 468, 183 P. 178, 181; Curtis & Gartside Co. v. Pigg, 39 Okl. 31, 134 P. 1125, 1129. To suffer, to tolerate; Gregory v. U. S., 17 Blatchf. 325, Fed.Cas.No.5,803; to fix;
Hinds v. Marmolejo, 60 Cal. 229. To substitute. Glenn v. Glenn, 41 Ala. 571. Intent in wills; and an equivalent of I will; Ramsey v. Hanlon, C.C. Pa., 33 F. 425.
ALLOWANCE. A deduction, an average pay-ment, a portion assigned or allowed; the act of allowing. See Stone v. State, 197 Ala. 293; 72 So. 536, 537; Sawyer v. U. S., C.C.A., 10 F.2d 416, 421. For "Family," see that title.
In army terminology, ordinarily refers to extra and special items in addition to regular compensation. United States v. Jackson, S.C., 302 U.S. 628, 58 S.Ct. 390, 392, 82 L.Ed. 488.
As distingulshed from a "salary," which is a fixed com-pensation, decreed by authority and for permanence, and is paid at stated intervals, and depends upon time, and not the amount of the services rendered, "allowance" is a variable quantity. Blaine County v. Pyrah, 32 Idaho, 111, 178 P. 702, 703.
Not synonymous with "alimony". Warne v. Warne, 36 S.D. 573, 156 N.W. 60, 62.
Special allowances. In English practice, in tax-ing the costs of an action as between party and party, the taxing officer is, in certain cases, em-powered to make special allowances; i. e., to al-low the party costs which the ordinary scale does not warrant. Sweet.
ALLOWANCE PENDENTE LITE. In the English chancery division, where property which forms the subject of proceedings is more than sufficient to answer all claims in the proceedings, the court may allow to the parties interested the whole or part of the income, or (in the case of personalty) part of the property itself. St. 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, § 57; Daniell, Ch.Pr. 1070.
ALLOWED CLAIM. Against an estate it is a debt or charge which is valid in law and entitled to enforcement. Commissioner of Interna]. Revenue v. Lyne, C.C.A.1, 90 F.2d 745, 747.
ALLOY. An inferior or cheaper metal mixed with gold or silver in manufacturing or coining. As respects coining, the amount of alloy is fixed by law, and is used to increase the hardness and durability of the coin.
A compound of two or more metals. Trelbacher-Cherfils-che Werke Gesellschaft mit Beschrlinktr Haftung v. Roes-sler & Hasslacher Chemical Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 219 F. 210, 211. A mixture or combination of metals while in state of fusion. Pittsburgh Iron & Steel Foundries Co. v. Seaman-Sleeth Co., D.C.Pa., 236 F. 756, 757; Treibacher Chemische Werke Gesellschaft mit Beschránkter Haftung v. Roessler & Hasslacher Chemical Co., D.C.N.Y., 214 F. 410, 412.
ALLOYNOUR. L. Fr. One who conceals, steals, or carries off a thing privately. Britt. c. 17. See Eloigne.
ALLUVIO MARIS. Lat. In the civil and old English law, the washing up of the sea; the soil thus formed; formation of soil or land from the sea; maritime increase. Hale, Anal. § 8. "Al-luvio maris is an Mercase of the land adjoining, by the projection of the sea, casting up and adding sand and slubb to the adjoining land, whereby it is increased, and for the most part by insensible degrees." Hale, de Jure Mar. pt. 1, c. 6.

ALLUVION

ALLUVION. That increase of the earth on a shore or bank of a stream or the sea, by the force of the water, as by a current or by waves, which is s6 gradual that no one can judge how much is added at each moment of time. Inst. 1, 2, t. 1, § 20. Ang. Water Courses, 53. Jefferis v. East Omaha Land Co., 134 U.S. 178, 10 Sup.Ct. 518, 33 L.Ed. 872. Willett v. Miller, 176 Okl. 278, 55 P.2d 90, 92. "Accretion" denotes the act. However, the terms are frequently used synonymously. Katz v. Patterson, 135 Or. 449, 296 P. 54, 55. Avulsion is sudden and perceptible. St. Clair County v. Lovingston, 23 Wall. 46, 23 L.Ed. 59. See Accretion; Avulsion.
ALLY. A nation which has entered into an al-liance with another nation. 1 Kent, Comm. 69.’
A citizen or subject of one of two or more al-
lied nations. Siemund v. Schmidt, Mun.Ct.N.Y., 168 N.Y.S. 935.
ALMANAC. A publication, in which is recounted the days of the week, month, and year, both com-mon and particular, of ten distinguishing the fasts, feasts, terms, etc., from the common days by prop-er marks, pointing out also the several changes of the moon, tides, eclipses, etc.
ALMARIA. The archives, or, as they are some-times styled, muniments of a church or library.
ALMESFEOH. In Saxon law, alms-fee; alms-money. Otherwise called "Peter-pence." Cowell.
ALMOIN. Alms; a tenure of lands by divine service. See Frankalmoigne.
ALMONER. One charged with the distribution of alms. The office was first instituted in religious hóuses and although formerly one of importance is now in England almost a sinecure.
ALMOXARIFAZGO. In Spanish law, a general term, signifying both export and import duties, as well as excise.
ALMS. Charitable donations. Any species of relief bestowed upon the poor. That which is given by public authority for the relief of the poor.
ALMS FEE. Peter-pence (or Peter’s pence), which see.
ALMSHOUSE. A house for the publicly sup-ported paupers of a city or county. People v. City of New York, 36 Hun, N.Y., 311. In England an almshouse is not synonymous with a work-house or poorhouse, being supported by private endowment.
It may be a public institution kept up by public reve-nues, or it may be an Institution maintained by private endowment and contributlons, where the indigent, sick, and poor are cared for without cost to themselves. State Board of Control v. Buckstegge, 18 Arlz. 277, 158 P. 837, 839.
ALNAGER, or ULNAGER. A sworn officer of the king whose duty it was to look to the assise of woolen cloth made throughout the land, and to
the putting on the seals for that purpose ordained, for which he collected a duty called "alnage." Cowell; Termes de la Ley.
ALNETUM. In old records, a place where alders grow, or a grove of alder trees. Doomsday Book; Co.Litt. 4b.
ALOD, Alode, Alodes, Alodis. L. Lat. In feudal law, old forms of alodium or allodium (q.
A term used in opposition to feodum or fief, which means property, the use of which was bestowed upon another by the proprietor, on condition that the grantee should perform certain services for the grantor, and upan the failure of which the property should revert to the orig-inal possessor. See 1 Poll. & Maitl. 45.
ALODIAN. Sometimes used for allodial, but not well authorized. Cowell.
ALODIARH. See Allodarii.
ALONE. Apart from others; singly; sole. Sal-em Capital Flour Mills Co. v. Water-Ditch & Ca-nal Co., C.C.Or., 33 Fed. 154.
ALONG. Lengthwise of, implying motion or at or near, distinguished from across. Nicolai v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 227 Wis. 83, 277 N.W. 674, 678. By, on, up to, or over, according to the subject-matter and context. State v. Downes, 79 N.H. 505, 112 A. 246; Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Miller, C.C.A., 12 F.2d 41, 48. The term does not necessarily mean touching at all points; Com. v. Franklin, 133 Mass. 569; nor does it necessarily imply contact, Watts v. City of Win-field, 101 Kan. 470, 168 P. 319, 321.
ALSO. Besides; as well; in addition ; likewise; in like manner; similarly; too; withal. West Jersey Trust Co. v. Hayday, 124 N.J.Eq. 85, 199 A. 407, 411. Some other thing; including; further; furthermore; in the same manner; moreover; nearly the same as the word "and" or "likewise." Schilling v. Central California Traction Co., 1 P. 2d 53, 55, 115 Cal.App. 30.
The word imports no more than "ítem" and may mean the same as "moreover"; but not the same as "in like manner"; Evans v. Knorr, 4 Rawle (Pa.) 68; nor is it synonymous with "other," City of Ft. Smith v. Gunter, 106 Ark. 371, 154 S.W. 181, 183. It may be (1) the begin-ning of an entirely different sentence, or (2) a copulative carrying on the sense of the immediately preceding words into those immediately succeeding. Stroud, Jud. Dict., citing 1 Jarm. 497 n.; 1 Salk. 239: Security State Bank v. Jones, 121 Kan. 396, 247 P. 862, 863.
ALT. In Scotch practice, an abbreviation of Alter, the other; the opposite party; the defend-er. 1 Broun, 336, note.
ALTA PRODITIO. L. Lat. In old English law, high treason. 4 Bl.Comm. 75. See High Treason.
ALTA VIA. L. Lat. In old English law, a high-way; the highway. 1 Salk. 222. Alta via regia; the king’s highway; "the king’s high street." Finch, Law, b. 2, c. 9.
ALTARAGE. In ecclesiastical law, offerings made on the altar; all profits which accrue to the priest by means of the altar. Ayliffe, Parerg.

ALTENHEIM. A German word meaning "home for old people." German Pioneer Verein v. Mey-er, 70 N.J.Eq. 192, 63 A. 835.
ALTER. To make a change in; to modify; to vary in some degree; to change some of the ele-ments or ingredients or details without substitut-ing an entirely new thing or destroying the iden-tity of the thing affected. Davis v. Campbell, 93 Iowa, 524, 61 N.W. 1053. To change partially. Cross v. Nee, D.C.Mo., 18 F.Supp. 589, 594. To change in one or more respects, but without de-struction of existente or identity of the thing changed; to increase or diminish. Kraus v. Kraus, 301 Iil.App. 606, 22 N.E.2d 862. See Al-teration; Change.
To change may lmport the substitution of an entirely different thing, while to alter is to operate upon a subject-rnatter which continues objectively the same while modt-fied in some particular. To "amend" implies that the modification made in the subject improves it, which is not necessarily the case with an alteration. See Ex parte Woo Jan, D.C.Ky., 228 F. 927, 940.
But "alter" is sometimes used synonymously with "change," Board of Sup’rs of Yavapal County v. Stephens, 20 Ariz. 115, 177 P. 261, 264, and with "enlarge," City of Jamestown v. Pennsylvania Gas Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 1 F.2d 871, 883.
The other; the opposite party. See Alt. ALTER EGO. Second self. 3 C.J.S. Alter Ego.
Theory that subordínate or servient corporation may be controlled by superior or dominant corporation, so that dominant corporation may be held Hable for subordinate corporation’s negligence. Barnes v. Liebig, 146 Fla. 219, 1 So.2d 247, 253.
To establish the "alter ego" doctrine, It must be shown that the stockholders disregarded the entlty of the corpo-ration, made corporation a mere conduit for the transac-tion of their own private business, and that the separate individualities of the corporation and its stockholders in fact ceased to exist. Sefton v. San Diego Trust & Savings Bank, Cal.App., 106 P.2d 974, 984.
The doctrine of "alter ego" does not create assets for or in corporation, but it simply fastens liability on the individual who uses the corporation merely as an instru-mentality In conducting his own personal business, and that liability springs from fraud perpetrated not on the corporation, but on third persons dealing with corporation. Garvin v. Matthews, 193 Wash. 152, 74 P.2d 990, 992.
A new corporation taking over all of mortgaged assets of old corporation in exchange for all of old corporation’s capital stock and continuing to operate business formerly operated by old corporation was "alter ego" of old corpo-ration so as to be obligated to pay annual patent royalty which old corporation was required to pay, notwithstand-ing that old corporation retained title to roortgaged assets. Dummer v. Wheeler Osgood Sales Corp., 198 Wash. 381, 88 P.2d 453, 458.
ALTERATION. Variation; changing; making different. A change of a thing from one form or state to another; making a thing different from what it was without destroying its identity. Paye v. City of Grosse Pointe, 279 Mich. 254, 271 N.W. 826, 827. See Alter.
As applied to bui/dings, It Is a change or substitution in a substantial particular of one part of a building for a building different in that particular; a change or changes within the superficial limits of an existing structure ; an installation that becomes an integral part of the building and changes its structural quality; a substantial change therein; a varying or changing the form or nature of such building without destroying its identity. Paye v. City of Grosse Pointe, 279 Mich. 254, 271 N.W. 826, 827.

ALTERNATIVE

Alteration of highway means change of course of exist-ing highway, leaving it substantially the same highway as before, but with its course in some respects changed. Hue-ning v. Shenkenberg, 208 Wis. 177, 242 N.W. 552, 553.
An alteration is an act done upon the instru-ment by which its meaning or language is changed. If what is written upon or erased from the instrument has no tendency to produce this result, or to mislead any person, it is not an al-teration. Oliver v. Hawley, 5 Neb. 444.
An alteration is said to be material when it af-fects, .or may possibly affect, the rights of the persons interested in the document.
Language different in legal effect, or change in rights, interests, or obligations of parties. Bank of Moberly v. Meals, 316 Mo. 1158, 295 S.W. 73, 77; Commercial Credit Co. v. Giles, Tex.Civ.App., 207 S.W. 596, 598. It introduces some change into instrument’s terms, meaning, language, or details. See U. S. v. Sacks, 257 U.S. 37, 42 S.Ct. 38, 39, 66 L.Ed. 118. Strictly speaking, it is some material change on face of instrument by one of the parties thereto with-out consent of the other, Johnston v. DePuy, 15 N.J.Misc. 94, 188 A. 742, 743; since a mutual agreement of parties concerned creates a new agreement. Leake, Cont. 430. If performed by a mere stranger, it is more technically described as a spoliation or mutilation. Knox v. Home, Tex.Civ.App., 200 S.W. 259, 260; Bercot v. Velkoff, 111 Ind. App. 323, 41 N.E.2d 686, 692. The term is not properly applied to any change which involves the substitution of a practically new document. Kempner v. Simon, 195 N.Y.S. 333, 334, 119 Misc.Rep. 60. And it should in strictness be reserved for the designation of changes in form or lan-guage, and not used with reference to modifications in matters of substance. The term is also to be distinguished from "defacement." Too, if what is done simply takes away what was given before, or a part of it under a will, it is a revocation; but if it gives something in addition or In substitution, then It is an alteration. Appeal of Miles, 68 Conn. 237, 36 A. 39, 36 L.R.A. 176.
ALTERCATION. Warm contentions in words, dispute carried on with heat or anger, contro-versy, wrangle, wordy contest. Ivory v. State, 128 Tex.Cr.R. 408, 81 S.W.2d 696, 698.
ALTERIUS CIRCUMVENTIO ALTI NON PRIE. BET ACTIONEM. The deceiving of one person does not afford an action to another. Dig. 50, 17, 49.
ALTERNAT. A usage among diplomatists by which the rank and places of different powers, who have the same right and pretensions to pre-cedente, are changed from time to time, either in a certain regular order or one determined by lot. In drawing up treaties and conventions, for example, it is the usage of certain powers to al-ternate, both in the preamble and the signatures, so that each power occupies, in the copy intended to be delivered to it, the first place. Wheat.Int. Law, § 157.
ALTERNATE LEGACY. See Legacy.
ALTERNATIM. L. Lat. Interchangeably. Litt. § 371; Townsh.P1. 37.
ALTERNATIVA PETITIO NON EST AUDIEN-DA. An alternative petition or demand is not to be heard. 5 Coke, 40.
ALTERNATIVE. One or the other of two things; giving an option or choice; allowing a choice between two or more things or acts to be done. See Malone v. Meres, 91 Fla. 709, 109 So. 677, 693.

ALTERNATIVE

ALTERNATIVE CONTRACT. A contract whose terms allow of performance by the doing of either one of several acts at the election of the party from whom performance is due. Crane v. Peer, 43 N.J.Eq. 553, 4 A. 72.
ALTERNATIVE JUDGMENT. See Judgment.
ALTERNATIVE OBLIGATION. An obligation al-lowing the obligor to choose which of two things he will do, the performance of either of which will satisfy the instrument. A promise to deliv-er a certain thing or to pay a specified sum of money is an example of this kind of obligation.
ALTERNATIVE PLEADING. A pleading alleg-ing substantive facts so disjunctively that it can-not be determined upon which of them the plead-er intends to rely as basis for recovery. Groover v. Savannah Bank & Trust Co., 186 Ga. 476, 198 S.E. 217, 219.
ALTERNATIVE RELIEF. The term "alterna-tive," as used in Equity Rule 25 (see Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 8, 28 U.S.C.A.), allowing relief to be stated and sought in alternative forms, means mutually exclusive. Boyd v. New York & H. R. Co., D.C.N.Y., 220 F. 174, 179.
ALTERNATIVE REMAINDERS. Remainders in which disposition of property is made in alterna-tive, one to take effect only in case the other does not, and in substitution of it. Riddle v. Killian, 366 III. 294, 8 N.E.2d 629, 634.
ALTERNATIVE REIVIEDY. Where a new reme-dy is created in addition to an existing one, they are called "alternative" if only one can be en-forced; but if both, "cumulative."
ALTERNATIVE WRIT. A writ commanding the person against whom it is issued to do a specified thing, or show cause to the court why he should not be compelled to do it. Allee v. McCoy, 2 Marv., Del., 465, 36 A. 359. Under the common-law practice, the first mandamus is an alternative writ; 3 Bla.Com. 111; but in modern practice this writ is often dispensed with and its place is taken by a rule to show cause. See Mandamus.
ALTERNIS VICIBUS. L. Lat. By alternate turns; at alternate times; alternately. Co.Litt. 4a; Shep.Touch. 206.
ALTERUM NON LJEDERE. Not to injure anoth-er. This maxim, and two others, honeste vivere, and suum cuique tribuere, (q. v.,) are considered by Justinian as fundamental principies upon which all the rules of law are based. Inst. 1, 1, 3.
ALTERUTER. Lat. One of two; either.
ALTIUS NON TOLLENDI. In the civil law, a servitude due by the owner of a house, by which he is restrained from building beyond a certain height. Dig. 8, 2, 4; Sandars, Just.Inst. 119.
ALTIUS TOLLENDI. In the civil law, a servi-tude which consists in the right, to him who is entitled to it, to build his house as high as he may
think proper. In general, however, every one en-joys this privilege, unless he is restrained by some contrary title. Sandars, Just.Inst. 119.
ALTO ET BASSO. High and low. This phrase is applied to an agreement made between two contending parties to submit all matters in dis-pute, alto et basso, to arbitration. Cowell.
ALTUM MARE. L. Lat. In old English law, the high sea, or seas. Co.Litt. 260b. The deep sea. Super altum nutre, on the high seas. Hob. 212b.
ALUMNUS. A child which one has nursed; a foster-child. Dig. 40, 2, 14.
Also a graduate from a school, college, or oth-er institution of learning.
ALVEUS. The bed or channel through which the stream fiows when it runs within its ordinary channel. Calvinus, Lex.
Alveus derelictus, a deserted channel. Mackeld. Rom.Law, § 274.
AMALGAMATION. Union of different races, or diverse elements, societies, or corporations, so as to form a homogeneous whole or new body; inter-fusion; intermarriage; consolidation; coales-cence; as, the amalgamation of stock. Stand. Dict.
To join In a single body two or more associatIons, organ-Izations, or corporations. Peterson v. Evans, 288 III.App. 623, 6 N.E.2d 520.
In England ít Is applied to the merger or consolidation of two incorporated companies or societies.
The word has no definite meaning; it involves the blend-lng of two concerns into one; 1904, 2 Ch. 268.
AMALPHITAN CODE OR TABLE. A collection of sea-laws, compiled about the end of the elev-enth century, by the people of Amalphi.
It consists of the laws on maritime subjects, which were or had been in force in countries bordering on the Medi-terranean; and was for a long time received as authority in those countries. Azuni; Wharton. It became a part of the law of the sea; The Scotia, 14 Wall., U.S., 170, 20 L.Ed. 822. See Code.
AMANUENSIS. One who writes on behalf of another that which he dictates.
AMBACTUS. A messenger; a servant sent about; one whose services his master hired out. Spel-man.
AMBASCIATOR. A person sent about in the service of another; a person sent on a service, A word of frequent occurrence in the writers of the middle ages. Spelman.
AMBASSADOR. In international law, a public officer, clothed with high diplomatic powers, com-missioned by a sovereign prince or state to trans-act the international business of his government at the court of the country to which he is sent.
The commlssioner who represents one country in the seat of government of another. He is a public minister, which, usually, a consul 1s not. Brown. A person sent by one sovereign to another, with authority, by letters of credence, to treat on affalrs of state. Jacob. The personal representatives of the head 01 the state which sends them,

entitled to special honors and special privileges and having varied duties; mouthpiece of communIcations, government informant, and protector of citizens of his country. Rus-sian Government v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., D.C.N.Y., 293 F. 133. See Letter of Credence; Minister.
A distinction was formerly made between Ambassadors Extraordinary, who were sent to conduct special business or to remain for an indeterminate period, and Ambassadors Ordinary, who were sent on permanent missions; but this distinction is no longer observed.
AMBER, or AMBRA. In old English law, a meas-ure of four bushels.
AMBIDEXTER. Skiliful with both hands; one who plays on both sides. Applied anciently to an attorney who took pay from both sides, and sub-5equently to a juror guilty of the same offense. Cowell.
AMBIGUA RESPONSIO CONTRA PROFEREN-TEM EST ACCIPIENDA. An ambiguous answer is to be taken against (is not to be construed in favor of) him who offers it. 10 Coke, 59.
AIFIBIGUIS CASIBUS SEMPER PRZESUMITUR PRO REGE. In doubtful cases, the presumption always is in behalf oí the crown. Lofft, Append. 248.
AMBIGUITAS. Lat. From ambiguus, doubtful, uncertain, obscure. Ambiguity; uncertainty of meaning.
Ambiguitas latens, a latent ambiguity; ambigui-tas patens, a patent ambiguity. See Ambiguity.
AMBIGUITAS CONTRA STIPULATOREM EST. Doubtful words will be construed most strongly against the party using them.
AMBIGUITAS VERBORUM LATENS VERIFICA-TIONE SUPPLETUR; NAM QUOD EX FACTO ORITUR AMBIGUUM VERIFICATIONE FACTI TOLLITUR. A latent ambiguity in the language may be removed by evidence; for whatever am-biguity arises from an extrinsic fact may be ex-plained by extrinsic evidence. Bac.Max.Reg. 23. Said to be "an unprofitable subtlety; inadequate and uninstructive." Prof. J. B. Thayer in 6 Harv. L. 417.
AMBIGUITAS VERBORUM PATENS NULLA VERIFICATIONE EXCLUDITUR. A patent am-biguity cannot be cleared up by extrinsic evidence (or is never holpen by averment). Lofft, 249; Bacon, Max. 25.
AMBIGUITY. Doubtfulness; doubleness of mean-ing. Chapman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 172 S.C. 250, 173 S.E. 801, 803. Duplicity, indistinct-ness, or uncertainty of meaning of an expression used in a written instrument, Arkansas Amuse-ment Corporation v. Kempner, C.C.A.Ark., 57 F. 2d 466, 472. Want of clearness or definiteness; difficult to comprehend or distinguish; of doubt-ful import. Business Men’s Assur. Ass’n v. Read, Tex.Civ.App., 48 S.W.2d 678, 680. For "Extrinsic Ambiguity," see that title.
Ambiguity of language is to be distinguished from unin-telligibility and Inaccuracy, for words cannot be said to be ambiguous unless their signification seems doubtful and uncertain to persons of competent skill and knowledge to under,tand them. Story, Contr. 272. It does not include uncertainty arising from the use of peculiar words, or of common words in a peculiar sense. Wig. Wills, 174; In re Milllette’s Estate, 206 N.Y.S. 342, 349, 123 Misc.Rep. 745. It is latent where the language employed is clear and intelligible and suggests but a single meaning, but some extrinsic fact or extraneous evidence creates a necessíty for interpretation or a choice among two or more possible meanings, as where a description apparently plain and unambiguous Is shown to fit different pieces of property. Logue v. Von Almen, 379 I11. 208, 40 N.E.2d 73, 82, 149 A.L.R. 251. A patent ambiguity is that which appears on the face of the instrument, and arises from the defective, obscure, or insensible language used. Carter v. Holman, 60 Mo. 504; Stokeley v. Gordon, 8 Md. 505; Carroll v. Cave Hill Cemetery Co., 172 Ky. 204, 189 S.W. 186, 190.
AMBIGUITY UPON THE FACTUM. An ambigui-ty in relation to the very foundation of the instru-ment itself, as distinguished from an ambiguity in regard to the construction of its terms.
The term Is applied, for instante, to a doubt as to whether a testator meant a particular clause to be a part of the will, or whether it was introduced with his knowl-edge, or whether a codicil was meant to republish a former will, or whether the residuary clause was accidentally omitted. Eatherly v. Eatherly, 1 Cold., Tenn., 461, 465, 78 Am. Dec. 499.
AMBIGUUM PACTUM CONTRA VENDITOREM INTERPRETANDUM EST. An ambiguous con-tract is to be interpreted against the seller.
AMBIGUUM PLACITUM INTERPRETAR! DEB-ET CONTRA PROFERENTEM. An ambiguous plea ought to be interpreted against the party pleading it. Co.Litt. 303b.
AMBIT. A boundary line, as going around a place; an exterior or inclosing line or limit. Elli-cott v. Pearl, 10 Pet., U.S., 412, 442, 9 L.Ed. 475.
The limits or circumference of a power or jurlsdietion; the une circumscribing any subject-matter. As to the ambit of a port, see Leonis Steamshlp Co.; Ltd., v. Rank, Ltd., [1907] 1 K.B. 344, 352; Pyman Bros. v. Dreyfus Bros. & Co. [1890] 24 Q.B.D. 152, 155.
AMBITUS. In the Roman law, a going around; a path worn by going around. A space of at least two and a half feet in width, between neighboring houses, left for the conveniente of going around them. Calvin.
The procuring of a public office by money or gifts; the unlawful buying and selling of a public office. Inst. 4, 18, 11; Dig. 48, 14.
AMBLOTIC. Having the power to cause abor-tion; anything used to produce abortion.
AMBULANCE. A vehicle for the conveyance of the sick or wounded. In time of war they are considered neutral and must be respected by the belligerents. Oppenheim, Int.L. 126.
AMBULANCE CHASER. A lawyer or his agent who follows up accidents in the streets and tries to induce the injured person to sue for damages. Kelley v. Boyne, 239 Mich. 204, 214 N.W. 316, 318, 53 A.L.R. 273.
A popular name for one who solicits negligente cases for an attorney. In re Newell, 160 N.Y.S. 275, 278, 174 App. Dlv. 94. One seeking out persons and directing them to an attorney In consideration of a percentage of the recov-ery. In re Mitgang, 385 III. 311, 52 N.E.2d 807, 816.

AMBULANCE CHASING. A terco descriptive of the practice of some attorneys, on hearing of a personal injury which may have been caused by the negligente or wrongful act of another, of at once seeking out the injured person with a view to securing authority to bring action on account of the injury. Chunes v. Duluth, W. & P. Ry. Co., D.C.Minn., 298 F. 964. Laymen’s acquainting themselves with occurrence of accidents and ap-proaching injured persons or their representatives with a view toward soliciting employment for an attorney in the litigation arising from the acci-dent State ex rel. Wright v. Hinckle, 137 Neb. 735, 291 N.W. 68, 72.
AMBULATORIA EST VOLUNTAS DEFUNCTI USQUE AD VITAE SUPREMUM EXITUM. The will of a deceased person is ambulatory until the latest moment of life. Dig. 34, 4, 4.
AMBULATORY. (Lat. ambulare, to walk about). Movable; revocable; subject to change.
Ambulatoria voluntas (a changeable will) de-notes the power which a testator possesses of al-tering his will during his life-time. Hattersley v. Bissett, 50 N.J.Eq. 577, 25 Atl. 332.
Courts. The court of king’s bench in England was formerly called an ambulatory court, because it followed the king’s person, and was held some-times in one place and sometimes in another. So, in France, the supreme court or parliament was originally ambulatory. 3 Bl.Comm. 38, 39, 41.
A sheriff’s return has been raid to be ambula-tory until it is filed. Wilmot, J., 3 Burr. 1644.
AMBUSH. The noun "ambush" means (1) the act of attacking an enemy unexpectedly from a concealed station; (2) a concealed station, where troops or enemies lie in wait to attack by surprise, an ambuscade; (3) troops posted in a concealed place for attacking by surprise. The verb "am-bush" means to lie in wait, to surprise, to place in ambush. Dale County v. Gunter, 46 Ala. 118, 142, referred to in Darneal v. State, 14 Okl.Cr. 540, 174 P. 290, 292, 1 A.L.R. 638.
AMELIORATING WASTE. An act of lessee, though technically constituting waste, yet in fact resulting in improving instead of doing injury to land. J. H. Bellows Co. v. Covell, 28 Ohio App. 277, 162 N.E. 621, 622.
AMELIORATIONS. Betterments; improve-ments. 6 Low.Can. 294; 9 Id. 503.
AMENABLE. Subject to answer to the law; ac-countable; responsible; Hable to punishment. Pickelsimer v. Glazener, 173 N.C. 630, 92 S.E. 700, 704.
Also means tractable, that may be easily led or governed; formerly applied to a wife who is gov-ernable by her husband. Cowell.
AMEND. To improve. To change for the better by removing defects or faults. Cross v. Nee, D.C. Mo., 18 F.Supp. 589, 594. To change, correct, re-vise. Texas Co. v. Fort, 168 Tenn. 679, 80 S.W.2d 658, 660.
AMENDE HONORABLE. An apology.
old English law, it was a penalty imposed upon a per-son by way of dlsgrace or infamy, as a punishment for any offense, or for the purpose of making reparation for any injury done to another, as the walking finto church In a white sheet, with a rope about the neck and a torch in the hand, and begging the pardon of God, or the king, or any prívate individual, for some delinquency.
A punishment somewhat similar to this, which bore the same name, was common in France for offenses against public decency or morality. It was abolished by the ]aw of the 25th of September, 1791; Merlin, Répert. In 1826 it was re-introduced in cases of sacrilege and was finally abolished in 1830.
AMENDMENT. A change, ordinarily for the bet-ter. Musher v. Perera, 162 Md. 44, 158 A. 14, 15. An amelioration of the thing without involving the idea of any change in substance or essence. Van Deusen v. Ruth, 343 Mo. 1096, 125 S.W.2d 1, 3.
Any writing made or proposed as an improve-ment of some principal writing. Ex parte Woo Jan, D.C.Ky., 228 F. 927, 941; Couch v. Southern Methodist University, Tex.Civ.App., 290 S.W. 256, 260.
In legislation, ít is a modification or alteration proposed to be made in a bill on its passage, or an enacted law; also such modification or change when made. Brake v. Callison, C.C.Fla., 122 Fed. 722; State v. MacQueen, 82 W.Va. 44, 95 S.E. 666, 668.
It is to be distinguished from a "substitute for a bill." In re Ross. 86 N.J.Law, 387, 94 A. 304, 306. It is an altera-
tion in the law already existing, leaving some part of the original still standing. State ex inf. Crain ex rel. Peebles v. Moore, 339 Mo. 492, 99 S.W.2d 17, 19. To effect an improvement or better carry out the purpose for which statute was framed. State ex rel. Foster v. Evatt, 144 Ohio St. 65, 56 N.E.2d 265, 282. And it includes additions to, as well as corrections oí, matters already treated. Christian Feigenspan, Inc., v. Bodine, D.C.N.J., 264 F. 186, 190. See, also, State v. Fulton, 99 Ohio St. 168, 124 N.E. 172, 175.
In practice it is the correction of error commit-ted in progress of a cause. Lintott v. McCluskey, 105 N.J.Eq. 354, 148 A. 161, 164. The correction of an error committed in any process, pleading, or proceeding at law, or in equity, and which is done either of course, or by the consent of parties, or upon motion to the court in which the proceeding is pending. 3 Bl.Comm. 407, 448; 1 Tidd, Pr. 696. Hardin v. Boyd, 113 U.S. 756, 5 Sup.Ct. 771, 28 L. Ed. 1141.
An amendment to a pleading, as distinguished from a "supplemental pleading" (q. v.), has reference to facts existing at the time of the commencement of the action. Fisher v. Bullock, 198 N.Y.S. 538, 540, 204 App.Div. 523. And it is the correction of some error or mistake in a pleading already before the court. Pantaleo v. Colt’s Pat-ent Fire Arms Mfg. Co., D.C.N.Y., 13 F.Supp. 989, 990.
AMENDS. A satisfaction given by a wrongdoer to the party injured, for a wrong committed. 1 Lil.Reg. 81.
AMENITY. In real property law, such circum-stances, in regard to situation, outlook, access to a water course, or the like, as enhance the pleasant-ness or desirability of an estate for purposes of residente, or contribute to the pleasure and enjoy-ment of the occupants, rather than to their in-dispensable needs.

In England, upon the building of a railway or the con-structlon of other public works, "amenity damages" may be given for the defacement of pleasure grounds, the impalrment of riparian rights, or other destruction of or injury to the amenities of the estate.
In the law of easements, an "amenity" consists in restraining the owner from doing that with and on his property which, but for the grant or covenant, he might lawfully have done; sometimes called a "negative case-ment" as distinguished from that class of easements which compel the owner to suffer something to be done on his property by another. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Bren-nan, 30 Abb.N.C. 260, 24 N.Y.Supp. 784, 788. A restrictive covenant, South Buffalo Stores v. W. T. Grant Co., 274 N.Y.S. 549, 555, 153 Misc. 76.
AMENS. See Demens.
AMENTIA. Insanity; idiocy. See Insanity.
AMERALIUS. L. Lat. A naval commander, un-der the eastern Roman empire, but not of the highest rank; the origin, according to Spelman, of the modern titie and office of admiral. Spel-man.
AMERCE. To impose an amercement or fine; to punish by a fine or penalty.
AMERCEMENT. A pecuniary penalty, in the nature of a fine, imposed upon a person for some fault or misconduct, he being "in merey" for his offense. It was assessed by the peers of the de-linquent, or the affeerors, or imposed arbitrarily at the discretion of the court or the lord. Good-year v. Sawyer, C.C.Tenn., 17 Fed. 9.
The difference between amercements and fines is as fol-lows: The latter are certain, and are created by some statute; they can only be imposed and assessed by courts of record; the former are arbitrarily imposed. Termes de la Ley, 40.
The word "amercement" has long been especially used of a mulct or penalty, imposed by a court upon its own officers for neglect of duty, or fallare to pay over moneys collected. In particular, the remedy against a sheriff for failing to levy an execution or make return of proceeds of sale is, in several of the states, known as "amercement." ‘In others, the same result is reached by process of attach-ment. Abbott. Stansbury v. Mfg. Co., 5 N.J.Law, 441.
AMERCEMENT ROYAL. In Great Britain a pen-alty imposed on an officer for a misdemeanor in his office.
AMERICAN. Pertaining to the western hemis-phere or in a more restricted sense to the United States. See Beardsley v. Selectmen of Bridge-port, 53 Conn. 493, 3 A. 557, 55 Am.Rep. 152. It was assumed in Life Photo Film Corp. v. Bell, 90 Misc.Rep. 469, 154 N.Y.S. 763, 764, that the term "American" included all classes of citizens, native and naturalized, irrespective of where they origi-nally carne from.
AMERICAN AGENCY SYSTEM. Its purport is that upon termination of an insurance agency, if the agent’s financial obligations to the insurer are paid in full, all rights in the expiration data of existing insurance procured by the agent be-long to him. Woodruff v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 300 Mich. 54, 1 N.W.2d 450, 453.
AMERICAN CLAUSE. In marine insurance, a proviso in a policy to the effect that, in case of any subsequent insurance, the insurer shall nev-
ertheless be answerable for the full extent of the sum subscribed by him, without right to claim contribution from subsequent underwriters. American Ins. Co. v. Griswold, 14 Wend., N.Y., 399.
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE TABLE OF MOR-TALITY. A series of tables dealing with life in-surance, costs and values, varying according to the age of the insured, the period during which the policy has been in force, and the term of the particular policy. Horton v. Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 187 S.C. 155, 197 S.E. 512, 514, 116 A.L.R. 788.
AMEUBLISSEMENT. In French law, a species of agreement which by a fiction gives to immov-able goods the quality of movable. Merl. Répert.; 1 Low.Can. 25, 58.
AMI; AMY. A friend; as alien ami, an alien be-longing to a nation at peace with us; prochein ami, a next friend suing or defending for an in-fant, married woman, etc.
AMICABLE. Frien dly ; mutually f orbearing ; agreed or assented to by parties having conflict-ing interests or a dispute; as opposed to hostile or adversary.
AMICABLE ACTION. An action brought and carried on by the mutual consent and arrange-ment of the parties, to obtain judgment of court on a doubtful question of law, the facts being usu-ally settled by agreement. Lord v. Veazie, 8 How. 251, 12 L.Ed. 1067, See Case Stated.
AMIABLES COMPOSITEURS. See Amicable Compounders.
AMICABLE COMPOUNDERS. In Louisiana law and practice, amicable compounders are arbitra-tors authorized to abate something of the strict-ness of the law in favor of natural equity.
AMICABLE SCIRE FACIAS TO REVIVE A JUDGMENT. A written agreement, signed by the person to be bound by the revival, in the nature of a writ of scire facias with a confession of judg-ment thereon, which must be duly docketed, but which requires no judicial action on the part of the court, and which has the force and effect of a judgment rendered upon an adverse or contest-ed writ of scire facias. Second Nat. Bank, for Use of Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, v. Faber, 332 Pa. 124, 2 A.2d 747, 749.
AMICUS CURLzE, Lat. A friend of the court.
A by-stander (usually a counsellor) who interposes and volunteers information upon some matter of law in regard to which the judge is doubtful or nústaken, Fort Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Greathouse, Tex.Civ.App., 41 S.W.2d 418, 422: or upon a matter of which the court may take judicial cognizance. The Claveresk, C.C.A.N.Y., 264 F. 276, 279; In re Perry. 83 Ind.App. 456, 148 N.E. 163, 165. Implies friendly intervention of counsel to remind court of legal matter which has escaped its notice, and regarding which it appears to be in danger of going wrong. Blanch-ard v. Boston & M. R., 86 N.H. 263, 167 A. 158, 160.
Also a person who has no right to appear in a suit but is allowed to introduce argument, author-ity, or evidence to protect his interests. Ladue v. Goodhead, 181 Misc. 807, 44 N.Y.S.2d 783, 787.

AMIRAL. Fr. In French maritime law, admiral. Ord. de la Mar. liv. 1, tit. 1, § 1.
.AMITA. Lat. An aunt on the father’s side. Amita magna. A great-aunt on the father’s side. Amita major. A great-great aunt on the father’s side. Amita maxima. A great-great-great aunt, or a great-great-grandfather’s sister. Calvinus, Lex.
AMITINUS. The child of a brother or sister; a cousin; one who has the same grandfather, but different father and mother. Calvinus, Lex.
AMITTERE. Lat. In the civil and old English law, to lose. Hence the old Scotch "amitt."
AMITTERE CURIAM. To lose the court; to be deprived of the privilege of attending the court.
AMITTERE LEGEM TERRJE. To lose the protec-tion afforded by the law of the land.
AMITTERE LIBERAM LEGEM. To lose one’s frank-law.
A term having the same meaning as amittere legem ter-rce, (q. v.) He who lost his law lost the protection extended by the law to a freeman, and became subject to the same law as thralls or serfs attached to the land.
To lose the privilege of giving evidence under oath in any court; to become" infamous, and incapable of giving evidence. Glanville 2. If either party in a wager of battle cried "craven" he was condemned amittere liberam legem; 3 Bla.Com. 340.
AMNESIA. Loss of memory.
AMNESTY. A sovereign act of oblivion for past acts, granted by a government to all persons (or to certain persons) who have been guilty of crime or delict, generally political offenses,—treason, se-dition, rebellion,—and of ten conditioned upon their return to obediente and duty within a pre-scribed time.
A general pardon or proclamation of such par-don from subjects’ offenses against the govern-ment; while usually exerted in behalf of certain classes of persons, subject to trial, but not con-victed, it is not confined to such cases. Common-wealth v. Hamburg Magistrate, 104 Pa.Super. 221, 158 A. 629, 631.
A declaration of the person or persons who have newly acquired or recovered the sovereign power in a state, by which they pardon all persons who composed, supported, or obeyed the government which has been overthrowti.
The word "amnesty" properly belongs to International law, and is applied to treaties of peace following a state of war, and signifies there the burial in oblivion of the particular cause of strife, so that that shall not be again a cause for war between the panties; and this signification of "amnesty" is fully and poetically expressed in the Indian custom of burying the hatchet. And so amnesty is applied to rebellions which by their magnitude are brought within the rules of International law. It means only "oblivion," and never is a grant. Knote v. U. S., 10 Ct.Cl. 407.
Amnesty is the abolition and forgetfulness of the offense; pardon Is forgiveness. Knote v. U. S., 95 U.S. 149, 152, 24 L.Ed. 442. The first le usually addressed to crimes against the soverelgnty of the state, to political offenses; the sec-ond condones lnfractions of the peace of the state. Bur-dick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 35 S.Ct. 267, 271, 59 L.Ed. 476.
Express amnesty is one granted in direct terms.
Implied amnesty is one which results when a treaty of peace is made between contending par-ries. Vattel, 1, 4, c. 2, § 20.
AMONG. Mingled with or in the same group or class. Dwight Mf g. Co. v. Word, 200 Ala. 221, 75 So. 979, 983, Genung v. Best, 100 N.J.Eq. 250, 135 A. 514, 516. Intermingled with. Eddings v. South-ern Dairies, D.C.S.C., 42 F.Supp. 664, 666.
Commerce among the states cannot stop at the externa’ boundary line of each state. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 194, 6 L.Ed. 23; Ft. Smith & W. R. Co. v. Blevins, 35 Okl. 378, 130 P. 525, 529. Where property is directed by will to be distributed among several persons, it cannot be all given to one, nor can any of the persons be wholly excluded from the distribution. Hudson v. Hudson, 6 Munf., Va., 352.
"Among" is sometimes heid to be equivalent to "between"; Hick’s Estate, 134 Pa. 507, 19 A. 705; Records v. Fields, 155 Mo. 314, 55 S.W. 1021. But "among" implico more than two objects as differentiated with "between." St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Little, 320 Mo. 1058, 10 S.W.2d 47, 53.
AMORTISE. See Amortize.
AMORTISSEMENT. (Fr.) The redemption of a debt by a sinking fund.
AMORTIZATION. An allenation of lands or tene-ments in mortmain. The reduction of the proper-ty of lands or tenements to mortmain.
In its modern sense, amortization is the opera-tion of paying off bonds, stock, a mortgage, or other indebtedness, commonly of a state or cor-poration, by installments, or by a sinking fund. An "amortization plan" for the payment of an in-debtedness is one where there are partial pay-ments of the principal, and accrued interest, at stated periods for a definite time, at the expira-tion of which the entire indebtedness will be extin-guished. Bystra v. Federal Land Bank of Colum-bia, 82 Fla. 472, 90 So. 478, 480; Applestein v. Royalty Realty Corporation, 181 Md. 171, 28 A.2d 830, 831.
AMORTIZE. To alien lands in mortmain.
To destroy, kill, or deaden. Elliott v. U. S., D.C.Me., 16 F.2d 164, 165. See Amortization.
AMOTIO. In the civil law, a moving or taking away. "The slightest amotio is sufflcient to con-stitute theft, if the animus furandi be clearly es-tablished." 1 Swint. 205. See Amotion.
AMOTION. A putting or turning out; disposses-sion of lands. Ouster is an amotion of possession. 3 Bl.Comm. 199, 208.
A moving or carrying away; the wrongful tak. ing of personal chattels. Archb.Civil Pl.Introd. c. 2, § 3.
In corporation law, the act of removing an offlcer, or offlcial representative, of a corporation from his office or °Metal station, before the end of the term for which he was elected or appointed, but without depriving him of membership in the body corporate. In this last respect the term differs from "disfranchisement," or expulsion. Rich-ardo v. Clarksburg, 30 W.Va. 491, 4 S.E. 774; In re Koch, 257 N.Y. 318, 178 N.E. 545, 546.

AMOUNT. The effect, substance, or result; the total or aggregate sum. Hilburn v. Railroad Co., 23 Mont. 229, 58 P. 551.
The sum of principal and interest, McCabe v. Cary’s Ex’rs, 135 Va. 428, 116 S.E. 485, 491. But see In re Stone-man, Sur., 146 N.Y.S. 172, 175 (interest excluded). See, also, Candelaria v. Gutierrez, 28 N.M. 434, 213 P. 1037, holding that the "amount of judgment" within a statute requiring a bond for supersedeas does not include interest or costs.
AMOUNT COVERED. In insurance, the amount that is insured, and for which underwriters are liable for loss under a policy of insurance.
AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY. The damages claimed or relief demanded; the amount claimed or sued for. Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mu-tual Light, Heat & Power Co., 239 U.S. 121, 36 S.Ct. 30, 60 L.Ed. 174; Smith v. Giles, 65 Tex. 341; Wabash Ry. Co. v. Vanlandingham, C.C.A.Mo., 53 F.2d 51.
Value of property. Peterson v. Suero, C.C.A.N.C., 93 F.2d 878, 114 A.L.R. 890. Value of the property interest in trade-name. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation v. Kline, C.C.A.Iowa, 132 F.2d 520, 525. Value of the object sought to be gained by the suit. Boesenberg v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., C.C.A.I11., 128 F.2d 245, 246. Aggregate amount of all causes of action property joined in action at law. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Brent, D.C.N.Y., 2 F.Supp. 425, 426. Contra. Plaintiffs’ claims could not be aggregated for jurisdictional purposes. Independence Shares Corporation v. Deckert, C.C.A.Pa., 108 F.2d 51, 53.
AMOUNT IN DISPUTE. Value in money of the relief prayed for. Finley v. Smith, Mo.App., 170 S.W.2d 166, 170; or sought but denied, Bushnell v. Mississippi & Fox River Drainage Dist. of Clark County, 340 Mo. 811, 102 S.W.2d 871, 873, and in-eludes value of thing in contest where a thing, in-stead of an amount, is in dispute. Noel Estate v. Louisiana Oil Refining Corporation, La.App., 170 So. 272, 273.
AMOUNT OF LOSS. In insurance, the diminu-tion, destruction, or defeat of the value of, or of the charge upon, the insured subject to the as-sured, by the direct consequence of the operation of the risk insured against, according to its value in the policy, or in contribution for loss, so far as its value is covered by the insurance.
AMOUNT TO. To reach in the aggregate, to rise to or reach by accumulation of particular sums or quantities. Peabody v. Forest Preserve District of Cook County, 320 III. 454, 151 N.E. 271, 274.
AMOVE. To remove from a post or station. 3 C.J.S. p. 1059.
AMOVEAS MANUS. Lat. That you remove your hands.
After office found, the king was entitled to the things forfeited, either lands or personal property; the remedy for a person aggrleved was by "petition," or "monstrans de droit," or "traverses," to establish his superior right. Thereupon a writ issued, quod manus domini regís amove-antur. 3 Bl.Comm. 260.
AMPARO. In Spanish-American law, a document issued to a claimant of land as a protection to him, until a survey can be ordered, and the title of possession issued by an authorized commission-er. Trimble v. Smither’s Adm’r, 1 Tex. 790.
AMPLIATION. Action of judge in merely defer-ring the cause for further examination constitutes "ampliation," practice in such instances being for judge to make the usual notation of non liquet. Sonnier v. Sonnier, 14 La.App. 588, 130 So. 133, 135.
In civil law, a deferring of judgment until a cause be further examined. Calvin.; Cowell. An order for the rehearing of a cause on a day ap-pointed, for the sake of more ample information. Halifax, Anal. b. 3, c. 13, n. 32.
In this case, the judges pronounced the word amplius, or by writing the letters N. L. for non liquet (q. v.), sig-nifying that the cause was not olear. It is very similar to the common-law practice of entering cur. adv. vult in sim-ilar cases.
In French law, a duplicate of an acquittance or other instrument. A notary’s copy of acts passed before him, delivered to the parties.
AMPLIUS. In the Roman law, more; further; more time.
A word which the preetor pronounced in cases where there was any obscurity in a cause, and the judices were uncertain whether to condemn or acquit; by which the case was deferred to a day named. Adam, Rom. Ant. 287.
AMPUTATION OF RIGHT HAND. An ancient punishment for a blow givén in a superior court; or for assaulting a judge, sitting in the court.
AMUSEMENT. Pastime; diversion; enjoyment.
A pleasurable occupation of the senses, or that which furnishes it. Young v. Board of Trustees of Broadwater County High School, 90 Mont. 576, 4 P.2d 725, 726.
AMY. See Ami; Prochein Ami.
AN. The English indefinite article. Equivalent to "one" or "any"; seldom used to denote plurali-ty. Kaufman v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. 152, 46 Pac. 904.
AN ET JOUR. Fr. Year and day; a year and a day.
AN, JOUR, ET WASTE. In feudal law, year, day, and waste. A forfeiture of the lands to the crown incurred by the felony of the tenant, after which time the land escheats to the lord. Termes de la Ley, 40. See Year, Day, and Waste.
ANACRISIS. In the civil law, an investigation of truth, interrog4tion of witnesses, and inquiry made into any fact, especially by torture.
ANZESTHESIA. In medical jurisprudence. (1) Loss of sensation, or insensibility to pain, general or local, induced by the administration or applica-tion of certain drugs such as ether, nitrous oxide gas, or cocaine. (2) Defect of sensation, or more or less complete insensibility to pain, existing in various parts of the body as a result of certain diseases of the nervous system.
ANAGRAPH. A register, inventory, or commen-tary.
ANALOGOUS. Derived from the Greek ana, up, and logos, ratio. Means bearing some resem-blance. Irving v. Kerlow Steel Flooring Co., D.C. N.J., 25 F.Supp. 901, 902.
If elements and purposes of one art are so related and similar to those of another as to make an appeal to one skilled in such art, the two arts are "analogous". Cope-man Laboratories Co. v. General Plastics Corp., C,C.A.111., 149 F.2d 962, 963.
ANALOGY. In logic. Identity or similarity of proportion.
Where there is no precedent in point, in cases on the same subject, lawyers have recourse to cases on a different subject-matter, but governed by the same general princi-pie. This is reasoning by analogy. Wharton.
The similitude of relations which exist between things compared. See Smith v. State, 63 Ala. 58.
"Analogy" does not mean Identity, but Implies a dlf-ference. Sturm v. UlrIch, C.C.A.Okl., 10 F.2d 9, 11.
ANALYTICAL JURISPRUDENCE. A theory and system of jurisprudence wrought out neither by inquiring for ethical principies or the dictates of the sentiments of justice nor by the rules which may be actually in force, but by analyzing, classi-fying and comparing various legal conceptions. See Jurisprudence.
ANAPHRODISIA. In medical jurisprudence, im-potentia cceundi; frigidity; incapacity for sexual intercourse existing in’ either man or woman, and in the latter case sometimes called "dyspareunia."
ANARCHIST. One who professes and advocates the doctrines of anarchy, q. v. And see Cerveny v. Chicago Daily News Co., 139 III. 345, 28 N.E. 692, 13 L.R.A. 864. In the immigration statutes, it includes, not only persons who advocate the over-throw of organized government by force, but also those who believe in the absence of government as a political ideal, and seek the same end through propaganda. Ex parte Caminita, D.C.N.Y., 291 F. 913, 915.
ANARCHY. Absence of government; state of society where there is no law or supreme power; lawlessness or political disorder; destructive of and confusion in, government. People v. Mintz, 106 Cal.App. 725, 290 P. 93, 98.
At its best it pertains to a society made orderly by good manners rather than law, In which each person produces according to his powers and receives according to his needs, and at its worst, the word pertains to a terroristic resistance of all present government and social order. State v. Schleifer, 102 Conn. 708, 130 A. 184, 188.
Criminal anarchy as the doctrine that organized govern-ment should be overthrown by force, or by assassination of executive officers, or by any unlawful means. See Peo-ple v. Gitlow, 183 N.Y.S. 846, 847, 111 Misc.Rep. 641, and 15 Rep. Am. Bar Assn. 210.
ANATHEMA. An ecclesiastical punishment by which a person is separated from the body of the church, and forbidden all intercourse with the members of the same.
It differs from excommunication, which simply forbids the person excommunicated from going into the church and taking the communion with the faithful.
ANATHEMATIZE. To pronounce anathema up-on; to pronounce accursed by ecclesiastical au-thority; to excommunicate. See Anathema.
ANATOCISM. In the civil law, repeated or dou-bled interest; compound interest; usury. Cod. 4, 32, 1, 30.
ANCESTOR. One from whom a person lineally descended or may be descended; a progenitor. Russell v. Roberts, 54 Ohio App. 441, 7 N.E.2d 811, 814.
A former possessor; the person last seised. Termes de la Ley; 2 Bl.Comm. 201. A deceased person from whom another has inherited land. Bailey v. Bailey, 25 Mich. 185; McCarthy v. Marsh, 5 N.Y. 275.
For example, a child may be the "ancestor" of his par-ent, and an infant brother, the "ancestor" of an adult brother. Embraces collaterals as well as lineals. Purcell v. Sewell, 223 Ala. 73, 134 So. 476, 480. Correlative of "heir." In re Long’s Estate, 180 Okl. 28, 67 P.2d 41, 43, 110 A.L.R. 1002.
The term differs from "predecessor," in that it is applied to a natural person and his progenitors, while the latter is applied also to a corporation and those who have held «j’ices before those who now 911 them. Co. Litt. 78b. "Ancestor" may embrace both lineals and collaterals, Cor-nell v. Child, 170 App.Div. 240, 156 N.Y.S. 449, 452, or both testator and testatrix, Pfaffenberger v. Pfaffenberger, 189 Ind. 507, 127 N.E. 766, 767; It may also be limited to mean immediate ancestor, In re Simpson’s Estate, Sur., 144 N.Y.S. 1099, 1101.
ANCESTRAL. Relating to ancestors, or to what has been done by them; as homage ancestral (q. v.). Derived from ancestors.
Ancestral estates are such as are transmitted by descent, and not by purchase. 4 Kent. Comm. 404. Brown v. Whaley, 58 Ohio St. 654, 49 N.E. 479, 65 Am.St.Rep. 793. Or such as are acquired either by descent or by operation of law. taray v. Chapman, 122 Okl, 130, 243 P. 522, 525. Realty which carne to the intestate by descent or devise from a now dead ancestor or by deed of actual gift from a living one, there being no other consideration than that of blood. In re Long’s Estate, 180 Okl. 28, 67 P.2d 41, 50, 110 A.L.R. 1002. Real estate coming to distributee by descent, gift, or devise from any kinsman. Ward v. Ives, 91 Conn. 12, 98 A. 337, 339. Allotments to members of Indian tribes or their heirs have been treated as an ances-tral estate. Sims y. Brown, 46 Okl. 767, 149 P. 876, 877; McDougal v. McKay, 237 U.S. 372, 35 S.Ct. 605, 607, 59 L.Ed. 1001.
ANCHOR. A measure containing ten gallons.
The instrument used by which a vessel or other body is held. See Walsh v. Dock Co., 77 N.Y. 448; Reid v. Ins. Co., 19 Hun, N.Y., 284.
ANCHOR WATCH. A watch, consisting of a small number of men, (from one to four,) kept constantly on deck while the vessel is riding at single anchor, to see that the stoppers, painters, cables, and buoy-ropes are ready for immediate use. The Lady Franklin, 2 Lowell, 220, Fed.Cas. No.7,984. The lookout intrusted to one or two men when a vessel is at anchor. O’Hara v. Luck-enbach S. S. Co., 269 U.S. 364, 46 S.Ct. 157, 160, 70 L.Ed. 313.
ANCHORAGE. In English law, a prestation or toll for every anchor cast from a ship in a port; and sometimes, though there be no anchor. Hale, de Jure Mar. pt. 2, c. 6. See 1 W.B1. 413 et seq.; 4 Term. 262.

ANCIENT. Old; that which has existed from an indefinitely early period, or which by age alone has acquired certain rights or privileges accorded in view of long continuance.
ANCIENT DEED. A deed 30 years old and shown to come from a proper custody and having noth-ing suspicious about it. Davis v. Wood, 161 Mo. 17, 61 S.W. 695.
ANCIENT DEMESNE. Manors which in the time of William the Conqueror were in the hands of the crown, and are so recorded in the Domesday Book. Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 14, 56; Baker v. Wich, 1 Salk. 56.
Also a species of copyhold, which differs, how-ever, from common copyholds in certain privi-leges, but yet must be conveyed by surrender, ac-cording to the custom of the manor.
There are three sorts: (1) Where the lands are held freely by the king’s grant; (2) customary freeholds, which are held of a manor in ancient demesne, but not at the lord’s will, although they are conveyed by surrender, or deed and admittance; (3) lands held by copy of court-roll at the lord’s will, denominated copyholds of base tenure.
Tenure in ancient demesne may be pleaded in abate-ment to an action of ejectment. Rust v. Roe, 2 Burr. 1046.
ANCIENT DOCUMENTS. See Ancient Writings.
ANCIENT HOUSE. One which has stood long enough to acquire an easement of support against the adjoining land or building. 3 Kent, Comm. 437; 2 Washb.Real Prop. 74, 76.
In England this terco is applied to houses or buildings erected before the time of legal memory, (Cooke, Incl. Acts, 35, 109,) that is, before the reign of Richard I., although practically any house is an ancient messuage if ít was erected before the time of living memory, and its origin cannot be proved to be modern.
ANCIENT LIGHTS. Lights or windows in a house, which have been used in their present state, without molestation or interruption, for twenty years, and upwards.
To these the owner of the house has a right by prescrip-tion or occupancy, so that they cannot be obstructed or closed by the owner of the adjoining land which they may overlook. Wright v. Freeman, 5 Har. & J., Md., 477; Story v. Odln, 12 Mass. 160, 7 Am.Dec. 81.
ANCIENT READINGS. Readings or lectures up-on the ancient English statutes, formerly regard-ed as of great authority in law. Litt. § 481; Co. Litt. 280.
ANCIENT RECORDS. See Ancient Writings.
ANCIENT RENT. The rent reserved at the time the lease was made, if the building was not then under lease. Orby v. Lord Mohun, 2 Vern. 542.
ANCIENT SERJEANT. In English law, the eld-est of the queen’s serjeants.
ANCIENT STREET. The doctrine is not based upon fact that streets have existed for a long time, but is invoked when it appears that common grantor owning land comprising street in ques-tion as well as property in question and other lots has given deeds to lots bounding them by street, thereby not only dedicating the street to public
use but at same time creating private easements in the street, which cannot be taken without com-pensation. Dwornick v. State, 251 App.Div. 675, 297 N.Y.S. 409, 411.
ANCIENT WALL. A wall built to be used, and in fact used, as a party-wall, for more than twen-ty years, by the express permission and continu-ous acquiescence of the owners of the land on which it stands. Eno v. Del Vecchio, 4 Duer, N. Y., 53, 63. Schneider v. 44-84 Realty Corpora-tion, 169 Misc. 249, 7 N.Y.S.2d 305, 309.
ANCIENT WATER COURSE. A water course is "ancient" if the channel through which it natural-ly runs has existed from time immemorial inde-pendent of the quantity of water which it dis-charges. Earl v. De Hart, 12 N.J.Eq. 280, 72 Am. Dec. 395.
ANCIENT VVRITINGS. Documents bearing on their face every evidence of age and authenticity, of age of 30 years, and coming from a natural and reasonable official custody. Hartzell v. U. S., C. C.A.Iowa, 72 F.2d 569, 579.
These are presumed to be germine without express proof, when coming from the proper custody. Jones v. Scranton Coal Co., 274 Pa. 312, 118 A. 219. Bonds more than 50 years old are admissible as ancient documents, where they are on their face free from suspicion as to their authenticity, come from the proper source, and are accompanied by some corroborating evidence. Smythe v. Inhabitants of New Providence Tp., Union County, N. J., C.C.A.N.J., 263 F. 481. Only the original copy of a deed, not the record copy, can be considered as an ancient docu-ment. Laclede Land & Improvement Co. v. Goodno, Mo. Sup., 181 S.W. 410, 413.
ANCIENTS. In English law, gentlemen of the inns of court and chancery.
In Cray’s Inn the society consists of benchers, ancients, barristers, and students under the bar; and here the ancients are of the oldest barristers. In the Middle Tem-ple, those who had passed their readings used to be termed "ancients." The Inns of Chancery consist of ancients and students or clerks; from the ancients a principal or treas-urer is chosen yearly. Wharton.
The Council of Ancients was the upper Chamber of the French legislature under the constitution of 1795, consist-
íng 250, each required to be at least forty years old.
ANCIENTY. Eldership; seniority. Used in the statute of Ireland, 14 Hen. VIII. Cowell.
ANCILLA. Lat. A handmaid, an auxiliary, a subordinate. Manley v. Standard Oil Co. of Tex., D.C.Tex., 8 F.R.D. 354, 356.
ANCILLARY. Aiding; attendant upon; describ-ing a proceeding attendant upon or which aids another proceeding considered as principal. In re Stoddard, 238 N.Y. 147, 144 N.E. 484, 486. Auxil-iary or subordinate. Johnson v. Thomas, D.C. Tex., 16 F.Supp. 1019.
ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATION. Administra-tion in state where decedent has property and which is other than where decedent was domiciled. First Nat. Bank v. Blessing, 231 Mo.App. 288, 98 S.W.2d 149, 151.
ANCILLARY ATTACHMENT. One sued out in aid of an action already brought, its only office

ANCILLARY

being to hold the property attached under it for the satisfaction of the plaintiff’s demand. Tem-pleton v. Mason, 107 Tenn. 625, 65 S.W. 25.
ANCILLARY BILL OR SUIT. One growing out of and auxiliary to another action or suit, either at law or in equity, such as a bill for discotery, or a proceeding for the enforcement of a judg-ment, or to set aside fraudulent transfers of prop-erty. Coltrane v. Templeton, Va., 45 C.C.A. 328, 106 F. 370. One growing out of a prior suit in the same court, dependent upon and instituted for the purpose either of impeaching or enforcing the judgment or decree in a prior suit. Hume v. New York, C.C.A.N.Y., 255 F. 488, 491; Caspers v. Wat-son, C.C.A.I11., 132 F.2d 614, 615.
ANCILLARY JURISDICTION. "Ancillary juris-diction" of federal court generally involves either proceedings which are concerned with pleadings, processes, records or judgments of court in prin-cipal case or proceedings which affect property al-ready in court’s custody. Cooperative Transit Co. v. West Penn Electric Co., C.C.A.W.Va., 132 F.2d 720, 723. The ancillary process must be to aid, énjoin, or regulate original suit and prevent reliti-gation in other courts of issues heard and ad-judged in such suit. O’Brien v. Richtarsic, D.C. N.Y., 2 F.R.D. 42, 44.
ANCILLARY PROCEEDING. One subordínate to or in aid of another primary action. Schram v. Roney, D.C.Mich., 30 F.Supp. 458, 461.
ANCILLARY RECEIVER. One appointed in aid of, and in subordination to, a foreign receiver for purpose of collecting and taking charge of assets, as of insolvent corporation, in the jurisdiction where he is appointed. In re Stoddard, 242 N.Y. 148, 151 N.E. 159, 164, 45 A.L.R. 622.
ANCIPITIS USUS. Lat. In international law, of doubtful use; the use of which is doubtful; that may be used for a civil or peaceful, as well as military or warlike, purpose. Gro. de Jure B. lib. 3, c. 1, § 5, subd. 3; 1 Kent, Comm. 140.
AND. A conjunction connecting words or phrases expressing the idea that the latter is to be added to or taken along with the first. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. Thrift Co., 68 Ind.App. 198, 116 N.E. 756, 759. Added to, together with, joined with, Business Men’s Building & Loan Ass’n v. Tumulty, 13 N.J.Misc. 638, 180 A. 772. As well as. Porter v. Moores, 4 Heisk., Tenn., 16. Including. Finch v. Hunter, 148 Ark. 482, 230 S. W. 553, 554. "And also," Carter v. Keesling, 130 Va. 655, 108 S.E. 708, 713. Sometimes construed as "or." Land & Lake Ass’n V. Conklin, 182 App. Div. 546, 170 N.Y.S. 427, 428.
It expresses a general relation or connection, a participa-tion or accompaniment In sequence, having no inherent meaning standing alone but deriving force from what comes before and after. In Its conjunctive sense the word is used to conjoin words, clauses, or sentences, expressing the relation of addition or connection, and sIgnifying that something is to follow in addition to that which proceeds and its use implies that the connected elements must be grammatically co-ordlnate, as where the elements preced-ing and succeeding the use of the words refer to the same
subject matter. While it is said that there is no exact synonym of the word in English, it has been defined to mean "along with", "also", "and also", "as well as”, "be-sides", "together with". Oliver v. Oliver, 286 Ky. 6, 149 S.W.2d 540, 542.
When expression ”and/or" is used, that word may be taken as will best effect the purpose of the parties as gathered from the contract taken as a whole, or, in other words, as will best accord with the equity of the situation. Bobrow v. U. S. Casualty Co., 231 App.Div. 91, 246 N.Y.S. 363, 367.
The symbol "&c" indicates things of like character, with the things enumerated just before it. Fleck v. Harmstad, 304 Pa. 302, 155 A. 875, 878, 77 A.L.R. 874. It has been rec-ognized as "sanctioned by age and good use." Brown v. State, 16 Tex.App. 245. And was constantly used by Lord Coke without a suggestion from any quarter that it is not English; Berry v. Osborn, 28 N.H. 279.
ANDROCHIA. In old English law, a dairy-wo-man. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 87.
ANDROGYNUS. A hermaphrodite.
ANDROLEPSY. The taking by one nation of the citizens or subjects of another, in order to compel the latter to do justice to the former. Wolffius, § 1164; Moll. de Jure Mar. 26.
ANDROMANIA. Nymphomania. 44 C.J.S.
In-
sane Persons § 2, p. 19.
ANDROPHONOMANIA. Homicidal insanity.
ANECIUS. L. Lat. Spelled also cesnecius, eni-tius, ceneas, eneyus, Fr. aisne. The eldest-born; the first-born; senior, as contrasted with the puis-né (younger). Spelman.
ANEURISM, or ANEURYSM. A sac formed by the dilatation of the weakened walls of an artery, usually resulting in a soft pulsating tumor. 3 Words and Phrases, Perm. Ed.
ANEW. To try a case or issue "anew" or "de no-vo" implies that the case or issue has been heard before. Gaiser v. Steele, 25 Idaho, 412, 137 P. 889, 890.
ANGARIA. A term used in the Roman law to de-note a forced or compulsory service exacted by the government for public purposes; as a forced rendition of labor or goods for the public service; in particular, the right of a public officer to re-quire the service of vehicles or ships. See Dig. 50, 4, 18, 4.
In feudal law, any troublesome or vexatious personal service paid by the tenant or villein to his lord. Spelman.
In marittime law, a forced service (onus) im-posed on a vessel for public purposes; an im-pressment of a vessel. Locc. de Jure Mar. lib. 1, c. 5, §§ 1-6. See Angary, Right Of.
ANGARY, RIGHT OF. In international law, formerly the right ( jus angarice) claimed by a bel-ligerent to seize merchant vessels in the harbors of the belligerent and to compel them, on pay-ment of freight, to transport troops and supplies to a designated port. 2 Opp. 446.
At the present day, the right of a belligerent to appropriate, either for use, or for destruction in

case of necessity, neutral property temporarily located in his own territory or in that of the oth-er belligerent. The property may be of any de-scription whatever, provided the appropriation of it be for military or naval purposes.
ANGEL. An ancient English coin, of the value of ten shillings sterling. Jacob.
ANGER. A strong passion of the mind excited by real or supposed injuries; not synonymous with "heat of passion," "malice," or "rage or re-sentment," because these are all terms of wider import and may include anger as an element or as an incipient stage. Hoffman v. State, 97 Wis. 571, 73 N.W. 51.
ANGILD. In Saxon law, the single value of a man or other thing; a single weregild (q. v.); the compensation of a thing according to its single value or estimation. Spelman. The double gild or compensation was called "twigild," the triple, "trigild," etc. Id. See Angylde.
When a crime was committed, before the Con-quest, the angild was the money compensation that the person who had been wronged was en-titled to receive. Maiti. Domesday Book & Be-yond 274.
ANGINA PECTORIS. Violent paroxysm of pain arising frequently from some disease of the coro-nary arteries, and is manifestation of disease rather than recognized disease in itself. Foster v. Borough of State College, 124 Pa.Super. 492, 189 A. 786, 789.
ANGLESCIIERIA. In old English law, English-ery; the fact of being an Englishman.
ANGLIZE JURA IN OMNI CASU LIBERTATIS DANT FAVOREM. The laws of England in every case of liberty are favorable, (favor liberty in all cases.) Fortes. c. 42.
ANGLICE. In English, a term formerly used in pleading when a thing is described both in Latin and English, inserted immediately after the Latin and as an introduction of the English translation.
ANGLING. Derived from noun "angle," meaning a fishhook; tackle for catching fish, consisting of a Ene, hook, and bait, with or without a rod. Catching flsh by rod, line and hook, or by line and hook. State v. Mears, 213 Ind. 257, 12 N.E.2d 343, 344.
ANGLO-INDIAN. An Englishman domiciled in the Indian territory of the British crown.
ANGORA GOAT. A more or less degenerate goat, known as the "Cape Angora," produced by breeding the original Angora with the Cape Colo-ny goat, whose hair is shown to be dealt in, used, and known as mohair, is an "Angora goat" within the meaning of that expression in Schedule K, par. 305, Tariff Act of 1913. U. S. v. Beadenkopf Co., 8 Ct.Cust.App. 283, 284.
App., 161 S.W.2d 995, 1000. Agony, but, as used in law, particularly mental suffering or distress of great intensity. Cook v. Railway Co., 19 Mo.App. 334. It is not synonymous with inconvenience, an-noyance, or harassment. Western Union Tele-
graph Co. v. Stewart, Ala.App. 502, 79 So. 200, 201.
ANGYLDE. In Saxon law, the rate fixed by law at which certain injuries to person or property were to be paid for; in injuries to the person, it seems to be equivalent to the "were," i. e., the price at which every man was valued. It seems also to have been the fixed price at which cattle and other goods were received as currency, and to have been much higher than the market price, or ceapgild. Wharton. See Angild.
ANHLOTE. In old English law, a single tribute or tax, paid according to the custom of the coun-try as scot and lot.
ANIENS, or ANIENT. Null, void, of no force or effect. Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 214. See Anniented.
ANIMAL. Any animate being which is endowed with the power of voluntary motion. An animate being, not human. Bernardine v. City of New York, 182 Misc. 609, 44 N.Y.S.2d 881, 883.
Domestic animals are tame as distinguished from wild; living in or near the habitations of man or by habit or special training in association with man. Thurston v. Carter, 112 Me. 361, 92 A. 295, L.R.A.1915C, 359.
Domitce are those which have been tamed by man; do-mestic.
Ferce natures are those which still retain their wild na-ture.
Mansuetce naturce are those gentle or tame by nature, such as sheep and cows.
ANIMALS OF A BASE NATURE. Animals in which a right of property may be acquired by re-claiming them from wildness, but which, at com-mon law, by reason of their base nature, are not regarded as possible subjects of a larceny. 3 Inst. 109; 1 Hale, P.C. 511, 512.
Some anlmais which are now usually tamed come within this class, as dogs and cats; and others which, though wild by nature and often reclaimed by art and industry, clearly fall within the same rule, as bears, foxes, apes, monkeys, ferrets, and the like; 1 Hawk.P1.Cr. 33, § 36; 4 Bla.Com. 236; 2 East, Pl.Cr. 614. See 1 Wms.Saund. 84, note 2.
ANIMALIA FERA, SI FACTA SINT MANSUETA ET EX CONSUETUDINE EUNT ET REDEUNT, VOLANT ET REVOLANT, UT CERVI, CYGNI, ETC., E0 USQUE NOSTRA SUNT, ET ITA IN-TELLIGUNTUR QUAMDIU HABUERUNT ANI-MUM REVERTENDI. Wild animals, if they be made tame, and are accustomed to go out and re-turn, fiy away and fly back, as stags, swans, etc., are considered to belong to us so long as they have the intention of returning to us. • 7 Coke, 16.
ANIMO. Lat. With intention, disposition, design, will. Quo animo, with what intention. Animo cancellandi, with intention to cancel. 1 Pow.Dev. 603. Furandi, with intention to steal. 4 Bl.Comm. ANGUISIL Extreme pain of body or mind; ex- 230; 1 Kent, Comm. 183. Lucrandi, with intention cruciating distress. Carson v. Thompson, Mo. to gain or profit. 3 Kent, Comm. 357. Manendi,

ANIMO

with intention to remain. 1 Kent, Comm. 76. Morandi, with intention to stay, or delay. Republi-candi, with intention to republish. 1 Pow.Dev. 609. Revertendi, with intention to return. 2 Bl. Comm. 392. Revocandi, with intention to revoke. 1 Pow.Dev. 595. Testandi, with intention to make a will. See Animus and the titles which follow it.
ANIMO ET CORPORE. By the mind, and by the body; by the intention and by the physical act. Dig. 50, 17, 153; Id. 41, 2, 3, 1; Fleta, lib. 5, c. 5, §§ 9, 10
ANIMO FELONICO. With felonious intent. Hob. 134.
ANIMUS. Lat. Mind; intention; disposition; design; will. Animo (q. v.), with the intention or design. These terms are derived from the civil law.
ANIMUS AD SE OMNE JUS DUCIT. It is to the íntention that all law applies. Law always re-gards the intention.
ANIMUS CANCELLANDI. The intention of de-stroying or canceling, (applied to wilis).
ANIMUS CAPIENDI. The intention to take or capture. 4 C.Rob.Adm. 126, 155.
ANIMUS DEDICANDI. The intention of donating or dedicating.
ANIMUS DEFAMANDI. The intention of defam-ing. The phrase expresses the malieious intent which is essential in every case of verbal injury to render it the subject of an action for libel or slander.
ANIMUS DERELINQUENDI. The intention of abandoning. 4 C.Rob.Adm. 216. Rhodes v. White-head, 27 Tex. 304, 84 Am.Dec. 631.
ANIMUS DIVEIKRENDI. The intention of obtain-ing delay.
ANIMUS DONANDI. The intention of giving. Ex-pressive of the intent to give which is necessary to constitute a gift.
ANIMUS ET FACTUM. To constitute a change of domicile, there must be an "animus et factum"; the "factum" being a transfer of the bodily pres-ence, and the "animus" the intention of residing permanently or for indefinite period. Hayward v. Hayward, 65 Ind.App. 440, 115 N.E. 966, 970. See Animus Manendi.
ANDIUS ET FACTUS. Intention and act; will and deed. Used to denote those acts which be-come effective only when accompanied by a par-ticular intention.
ANIMUS F’URANDI. Intent to steal, or to feloni-ously deprive the owner permanently of his prop-erty. Jones v. Commonwealth, 172 Va. 615, 1 S.E. 2d 300, 301.
ANIMUS HOMINLS EST ANIMA SCRIPTI. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument.
9 Bulst. 67; Pitm. Prin. & Sur. 26. In order to give life or effect to an instrument, it is essential to look to the intention of the individual who exe-cuted it.
ANIIVIUS LUCRANDL The intention to make a gain or profit.
ANIMUS MANENDI. The intention of remaining; intention to establish a permanent residence. 1 Kent, Comm. 76. This is the point to be settled in determining the domicile or residence of a party. Id. 77. See Animus et Factum.
ANIMUS MORANDI. The intention to remain, or to delay.
ANIMUS POSSIDENDI. The intention of pos-sessing.
ANIMUS QUO. The intent with which.
ANIMUS RECIPIENDI. The intention of receiv-ing.
ANIMUS RECUPERANDI. The intention of re-covering. Locc. de Jure Mar. lib. 2, c. 4, § 10.
ANIMUS REPUBLICANDL The intention to re-publish.
ANIMUS RESTITUENDI. The intention of re-storing. Fleta, lib. 3, c. 2, § 3.
ANIMUS REVERTENDI. The intention of re-turning.
A man retains his domicile if he leaves it animo reverten-di. In re Miller’s Estate, 3 Rawle (Pa.) 312, 24 Am,Dee. 345; 4 BI.Comm. 225; 2 Russ.Crimes, 18; Poph. 42, 52; 4 Coke, 40. Also, a term employed in the civil law, in ex-pressing the rule of ownership in tamed animals.
ANIMUS REVOCANDI. The intention to revoke.
ANIMUS SIGNANDI. Intention to sign instru-ment as and for a will. Hamlet v. Hamlet, 183 Va. 453, 32 S.E.2d 729, 732.
ANIMUS TESTANDI. Intention or serious pur-pose to make will. In re Kemp’s Will, Del., 7 W. W.Harr. 514, 186 A. 890, 894.
ANKER. A measure containing ten gallons.
ANN. In Scotch law, half a year’s stipend, over and aboye what is owing for the incumbency, due to a minister’s relict, or child, or next of kin, after his decease. Whishaw.
ANNA. In East Indian coinage, a piece of money, the sixteenth part of a rupee.
ANNALES. Lat. Annuals; a title formerly given to the Year Books.
In old records. Yearlings; cattle of the first year. Cowell.
ANNALS. Masses said in the Romish church for the space of a year or for any other time, either for the soul of a person deceased, or for the bene-fit of a person living, or for both. Aylif. Parerg.
ANNALY. In Scotch law, to alienate; to convey.

ANNATES. In ecclesiastical law, first-fruits paid out of spiritual benefices to the Pope, so called be-cause the value of one year’s profit was taken as their rate.
ANNEX. Derived from the Latin "annectere," meaning to tie or bind to. To attach, and of ten, specifically, to subjoin. In re Annexation to City of Easton of Tract of Land in Williams Tp., Northampton County, 139 Pa.Super. 146, 11 A.2d 662, 664. To add to; to unite. The word ex-presses the idea of joining a smaller or subordi-nate thing with another, larger, or of higher im-portance. Waterbury Lumber & Coal Co. v. Aster-chinsky, 87 Conn. 316, 87 A. 739, 740, Ann.Cas. 1916B, 613. To consolidate, as school districts. Evans v. Hurlburt, 117 Or. 274, 243 P. 553, 554. To make an integral part of something larger.
It implies physical connection or physically joined to, yet physical connection may be dispensed with, and things may be annexed without being in actual contact, when reasonably practicable. Elliott Common School Dist. No. 48 v. County Board of School Trustees, Tex.Civ.App, 76 S.W.2d 786, 789.
In the law relating to fixtures, the expression "annexed to the freehold" means fastened to or connected with it; mere juxtaposition, or the laying of an object, however heavy, on the freehold, does not amount to annexation. Merritt v. Judd, 14 Cal. 64.
ANNEXATION. The act of attaching, adding, joining, or uniting one thing to another; general-ly spoken of the connection of a smaller or sub-ordinate thing with a larger or principal thing.
The attaching an illustrative or auxiliary document to a deposition, pleading, deed, etc., is called "annexing" it. So the incorporation of newly-acquired territory Into the national domain, as an integral part thereof, is called "an-nexation," as in the case of the addition of Texas to the United States.
In the law relating to fixtures: Actual annexation in-eludes every movement by which a chattel can be joined or united to the freehold. Constructive annexation is the union of such things as have been holden eparcel of the realty, but which are not actually annexed, fixed, or fastened to the freehold. Shep.Touch. 469; Amos & F. FIxt. 2.
Scotch Law
The union of lands to the crown, and declaring them inalienable. Also the appropriation of the church-lands by the crown, and the union of lands lying at a distante from the parish church to which they belong, to the church of another parish to which they are contiguous.
ANNI ET TEMPORA. Lat. Years and terms. An old title of the Year Books.
ANNI NUBILES. A woman’s marriageable years. The age at which a girl becomes by law fit for marriage; the age of twelve.
ANNICULUS. A child a year old. Calvinus, Lex.
ANNICULUS TRECENTESIMO SEXAGESIMO-QUINTO DIE DICITUR, INCIPIENTE PLANE NON EXACTO DIE, QUIA ANNUM CIVILITER NON AD MOMENTA TEMPORUM SED AD DIES NUMERAMUR. We call a child a year old on the three hundred and sixty-fifth day, when the day is fairly begun but not ended, because we calculate the civil year not by moments, but by days. Dig. 50, 16, 134; Id. 132; Calvin.
ANNIENTED. Made null, abrogated, frustrated, or brought to nothing. Litt. c. 3, § 741. Cf. Aniens.
ANNIVERSARY. An annual day, in old ecclesi-astical law, set apart in memory of a deceased person. Also called "year day" or "mind day." Spelman.
As applied to an insurance policy, "anniver-sary" means yearly recurring date of the policy, Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co. v. Skye, 113 Okl. 184, 240 P. 630, 632, or perhaps the date of the delivery thereof, Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Baker, Tex.Civ.App., 260 S.W. 223, 225.
ANNO DOMINI. In the year of the Lord. Com-monly abbreviated A. D. The computation of time, according to the Christian era, dates from the birth of Christ.
ANNONA. Barley; corn; grain; food; a yearly contribution of food, of various kinds, for sup-port.
Annona poro/4m, acorns; annona frumentum hordeo ad-mixtum, corn and barley mixed; annona ponis, bread without reference to the amount. Du Cange; Spelman, Gloss.; Cowell.
The term is used in the old English law, and also in the civil law quite generally, to denote anything contrlbuted by one person towards the support of another.
ANNON7E CIVILES. A species of yearly rents issuing out of certain lands, and payable to certain monasteries.
ANNOTATIO. In the civil law, the sign-manual of the emperor; a rescript of the emperor, signed with his own hand. It is distinguished both from a rescript and pragmatic sanction, in Cod. 4, 59, 1.
ANNOTATION. A remark, note, or commentary on some passage of a book, intended to illustrate its meaning. Webster.
In the civil law, an imperial rescript (see Re-script) signed by the emperor. The answers of the prince to questions put to him by private per-sons respecting some doubtful point of law. Also summoning an absentee. Dig. 1, 5. And the desig-nation of a place of deportation. Dig. 32, 1, 3.
ANNOUNCED. A decision is "announced," pre-venting nonsuit, when court’s conclusion on issue tried is made known from bench or by any publi-cation, oral or written, even if judgment has not been rendered. Ex parte Alabama Marble Co., 216 Ala. 272, 113 So. 240, 242,
ANNOYANCE. Discomfort; vexation. Not syn-onymous with anguish, inconvenience, or harass-ment. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Stewart, 16 Ala.App. 502, 79 So. 200, 201. "Annoyance and inconvenience" relate as much to physical as to mental conditions. Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Ader, 184 Ind. 235, 110 N.E. 67, 69. It includes feeling of imposition and oppression Alabama Water Service Co. v. Wakefield, 231 Ala. 112, 163 So. 626.

ANNUA

ANNUA NEC DEBITUM JUDEX NON SEPARAT IPSUM. A judge (or court) does not divide an-nuities nor debt. 8 Coke, 52; 1 Salk. 36, 65. Debt and annuity cannot be divided or apportioned by a court.
ANNUA PENSIONE. An ancient writ to provide the king’s chaplain, if he had no preferment, with a pension. Reg.Orig. 165, 307.
ANNUAL. Of or pertaining to year; returning every year; coming or happening yearly. Payne v. Gypsy Oil Co., 129 Okl. 18, 263 P. 138, 140. Oc-curring or recurring once in each year; continu-ing for the period of a year; accruing within the space of a year; relating to or covering the events or affairs of a year. State v. McCullough, 3 Nev. 224. Once a year, without signifying what time in year. Rolerson v. Standard Life Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 244 S.W. 845, 846.
ANNUAL AMOUNT. The annual amount of con-tribution at the rate at which deceased was con-tributing to support of partial dependents, at the time of his injury, regardless of whether that rate had existed for a year or more or for less than a year. Spreckles Sugar Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com-mission, 186 Cal. 256, 199 P. 8.
ANNUAL ASSAY. An annual trial of the gold and silver coins of the United States, to ascertain whether the standard fineness and weight of the coinage is maintained. See Rev.St.U.S. § 3547 (31 U.S.C.A. § 363).
ANNUAL AVERAGE EARNINGS. Include both the earnings from a seasonal occupation and also the actual earnings for the remainder of the year from whatever occupation they may have been received, provided the nonseasonal income is limi` ted to employments of the same class and is meas-ured by the wages of the injured employee, or those similarly employed, as the facts may re-quire, whenever the feature of nonseasonal em-ployment is involved Dicaro v. Fitzgibbon, 249 App.Div. 38, 291 N.Y.S. 764, 767.
ANNUAL DEPRECIATION. The annual loss, not restored by current maintenance, which is due to all the factors causing the ultimate retirement of the property. These factors embrace wear and tear, decay, inadequacy, and obsolescence. The annual loss in service value not restored by cur-rent maintenance and incurred in connection with the consumption or prospective retirement of prop-erty in the course of service from causes known to be in current operation, and whose effect can be forecast with a reasonable approach to ac-curacy. State v. Hampton Water Works Co., 91 N.H. 278, 18 A.2d 765, 770.
ANNUAL PENSION. In Scotch law, a yearly profit or rent.
ANNUAL RENT. In Scotch law, yearly interest on a loan of money.
ANNUAL SALARY. Does not refer to salary by calendar years, but by the years of incumbent’s
term, according to time of year when term com-menees, and salary must be calculated for year as a whole. State ex rel. Harvey v. Linville, 318 Mo. 698, 300 S.W. 1066, 1067.
ANNUAL VALUE. The net yearly income de-rivable from a given piece of property; its fair rental value for one year, deducting costs and expenses; the value of its use for a year.
ANNUALLY. In annual order or succession; yearly, every year, year by year. Upham v. Shat-tuck, 151 Kan. 966, 101 P.2d 901, 903. At end of each and every year during a period of time. Pat-terson v. McNeeley, 16 Ohio St. 348. Imposed once a year, computed by the year. People ex rel. Mutual Trust Co. v. Westchester County v. Miller, 177 N.Y. 51, 69 N.E. 124, 125.
ANNUITANT. The recipient of an annuity; one who is entitled to an annuity.
ANNUITIES OF TIENDS. In Scotch law, annui-ties of tithes; 10s. out of the boll of tiend wheat, 8s. out of the boll of beer, less out of the boll of rye, oats, and peas, allowed to the crown yearly of the tiends not paid to the bishops, or set apart for other pious uses.
ANNUITY. A yearly payment of money for life or years. State ex rel. Chamberlain v. Johnstone, 65 N.D. 727, 262 N.W. 193. Or in lee, and charge-able only on the person of the grantor. Co.Litt. 144b. A fixed sum, granted or bequeathed, pay-able periodically but not necessarily annually. Wilkin v. Board of Com’rs of Oklahoma County, 77 Okl. 88, 186 P. 474, 475; Fate v. Fate, 295 III. App. 271, 14 N.E.2d 890, 892. A legacy payable by installments. In re Beach’s Estate, 203 N.Y.S. 492, 494, 122 Misc.Rep. 261. Also, the right to receive such periodical amount. Daniel v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, Tex.Civ.App., 102 S.W.2d 256, 259.
It is distinguished from an "Income," In that the latter is interest or proflts to be earned. Grand Raplds Trust Co. v. Herbst, 220 Mich. 321, 190 N.W. 250, 252. Too, It is chargeable on the person merely, and so far personalty; while a rent-charge is something reserved out of realty, or fixed as a burden upon an estate in land. 2 BI.Comm. 40; Rolle, Abr. 226; Horton v. Cook, 10 Watts (Pa.) 127, 36 Am. Dec. 151.
The contract of annuity 1s that by which one party delivers to another a sum of money, and agrees not to re-claim it so long as the receiver pays the rent agreed upon. This annuity may be either perpetual or for life. See Succession of Vidalat, 155 La. 1005, 99 So. 801, 802.
The narre of an action, now disused, (L. Lat. breve de annuo redditu,) which lay for the re-covery of an annuity. Reg.Orig. 158b; Bract. fol. 203b; 1 Tidd, Pr. 3.
ANNUITY POLICY. An insurance policy provid-ing for monthly payments to insured to begin at fixed date and continue through insured’s life. Hamilton v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 196 Miss. 345, 17 So.2d 278, 280.
ANNUITY—TAX. An impost levied annually in Scotland for the maintenance of the ministers of

ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; ob-literate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with. Ex parte Mitchell, 123 W.Va. 283, 14 S.E.2d 771, 774. To cancel; destroy; abrogate. To annul a judgment or judicial proceeding is to deprive it of all force and operation, either ab initio or prospectively as to future transactions. In re Morrow’s Estate, 204 Pa. 484, 54 A. 342.
It is not a technical word and there is nothing which prevents the idea from being expressed in equivalent words; Woodson v. Skinner, 22 Mo. 24.
ANNULMENT. Act of annulling; act of making void retrospectively as well as prospectively. Deihl v. Jones, 170 Tenn. 217, 94 S.W.2d 47, 48.
Action for divorce Is distinguished from one for annul-ment, ín that "divorce action" is predicated on valid mar-riage and decree terminates relatIonship from date thereof, while "annulment" destroys existence of void or voldable marriage and everything appertaining thereto from the beginning. Wigder v. Wigder, 14 N.J.Misc. 880, 188 A. 235, 236.
ANNULUS. Lat. In oid English law, a ring; the ring of a door. Per haspam vel annulum hostii exterioris; by the hasp or ring of the outer door. Fleta, lib. 3, c. 15, § 5.
ANNULUS ET BACULUS. (Lat. ring and staff.) The investiture of a bishop was per annulum et baculum, by the prince’s delivering to the prelate a ring and pastoral staff, or crozier. 1 Bl.Comm. 378; Spelman.
ANNUM, DIEM, ET VASTUM. See Year, Day, and Waste.
ANNUS. Lat. In civil and oid English law, a year; the period of three hundred and sixty-five days. Dig. 40, 7, 4, 5; Calvin.; Bract. fol. 359b.
ANNUS DELIBERANDI. In Scotch law, a year of deliberating; a year to deliberate. The year allowed by law to the heir to deliberate whether he will enter and represent his ancestor. It com-menees on the death of the ancestor, unless in the case of a posthumous heir, when the year runs from his birth. Bell.
ANNUS, DIES, ET VASTUM. In oid English law, year, day, and waste. See Year, Day, and Waste.
ANNUS EST MORA MOTUS QUO SUUM PLAN-ETA PERVOLVAT CIRCULUM. A year is the duration of the motion by which a planet revolves through its orbit. Dig. 40, 7, 4, 5; Calvin.; Bract. 359b.
ANNUS ET DIES. A year and a day.
ANNUS INCEPTUS PRO COMPLETO HABE-TUR. A year begun is held as completed. Tray. Lat.Max. 45.
ANNUS LUCTUS. The year of mourning. It was a rule among the Romans, and also the Danes and Saxons, that widows should not marry infra annum luctils, (within the year of mourning.) Cod. 5, 9, 2; 1 Bl.Comm. 457.
ANNUS UTILIS. A year made up of available or serviceable days. Brissonius; Calvin. In the plural, anni utiles signifies the years during which a right can be exercised or a prescription grow. In prescription, the period of incapacity of a mi-nor, etc., was not counted; it was no part of the anni utiles.
ANNUUS REDITUS. A yearly rent; annuity. 2 Bl.Comm. 41; Reg.Orig. 158b.
ANOMALOUS. Deviating from common rule; ir-regular; exceptional; abnormal. Palmer v. Palm-er, Woolf & Gray, 183 La. 458, 164 So. 245, 247. Unusual; not conforming to rule, method, or type.
ANOMALOUS INDORSER. A stranger to a note, who indorses it after its execution and delivery but before maturity, and before it has been in-dorsed by the payee. Buck v. Hutchins, 45 Minn. 270, 47 N.W. 808.
ANOMALOUS PLEA. One which is partly affirma-tive and partly negative. Baldwin v. Elizabeth, 42 N.J.Eq. 11, 6 A. 275; Potts v. Potts, N.J.Ch., 42 A. 1055.
ANON., AN., A. Abbreviations for anonymous.
ANONYMOUS. Nameless; wanting a name or names. A publication, withholding the name of the author, is said to be anonymous. An anony-mous letter is one that has no name signed. Belk v. State, 102 Tex.Cr.R. 561, 278 S.W. 842.
Cases are sometimes reported anonymously, i. e., without giving the names of the parties. Abbreviated to "Anon."
An anonymous soclety In the Mexican code Is one which has no firm name and is designated by the particular des-Ignation of the object of the undertakIng.
ANOTHER. Additional. Harelson v. South San Joaquin Irr. Dist., 20 Cal.App. 324, 128 P. 1010, 1011. Distinct or different. Hammell v. State, 198 Ind. 45, 152 N.E. 161, 163; Ex parte Lyman, D.C.Wash., 202 F. 303, 304.
ANOTHER ACTION PENDING. See Auter Ac-tion Pendant.
ANOYSANCE. Annoyance; nuisance. Cowell; Kelham.
ANSEL, ANSUL, or AUNCEL. In oid English law, an ancient mode of weighing by hanging scales or hooks at either end of a beam or staff, which, being lifted with one’s finger or hand by the middle, showed the equality or difference be-tween the weight at one end and the thing weighed at the other. Termes de la Ley, 66.
ANSWER. As a verb, the word denotes an as-sumption of liability, as to "answer" for the debt or default of another.

Pleading
Strictly speaking, it is a pleading by which de-fendant in suit at law endeavors to resist the plaintiff’s demand by an allegation of facts, either denying allegations of plaintiff’s complaint or

ANSWER
confessing them and alleging new matter in avoid-ance, which defendant alleges should prevent re-covery on facts alleged by plaintiff. In re Herle’s Will, 173 Misc. 879, 19 N.Y.S.2d 263, 265.
In chancery pleading, the term denotes a de-fense in writing, made by a defendant to the alle-gations contained in a bill or information filed by the plaintiff against him.
In pleading, under the Codes of Civil Procedure, the an-swer is the formal written statement made by a defendant setting forth the grounds of his defense; corresponding to what, in actions under the common-law practice is called the "plea." But as used in a statute providing that de-fendant must appear and answer the petition, "answer" refers to any sort of pleading filed by defendant. State ex rel. Oliver Hast Auction Co. v. Grimm, 197 Mo.App. 566, 196 S.W. 1019, 1021. Cross-complaint. Celina Mut. Casu-alty Co. v. Baldridge, 213 Ind. 193, 12 N.E.2d 258, 260. Counterclaim. Long v. Mutual Trust Life Ins. Co., 191 Minn. 163, 253 N.W. 762. Motion to quash service of sum-mons. Philllps v. Manufacturera Trust Co., C.C.A.Idaho, 101 F.2d 723, 727. Objections by contestants to petition for probate of will. In re Swim’s Will, 258 N.Y.S. 458, 144 Misc. 206. Objections to executor’s final report. Meier y. Union Trust Co. of Indianapolis, 93 Ind.App. 457, 176 N. E. 42, 51. Demurrer. Evans v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County, 14 Cal.App.2d 743, 59 P.2d 159, 160, contra. Mariner v. Milisich, 45 Nev. 193, 200 P. 478.
In Massachusetts, the term denotes the statement of the matter intended to be relied upon by the defendant in avoidance of the plaintiff’s action, taking the place of spe-cial picas in bar, and the general issue, except in real and mixed actions. Pub.St.Mass.1882, p. 1287.
In matrimonial suits In the (English) probate, divorce, and admiralty division, an answer is the pleading by which the respondent puta forward his defense to the petition. Browne, Div. 223.
Under the old admiralty practice in England, the defenci-ant’s first pleading was called his "answer." Williams & B. Adm. Jur. 246.
Frivolous answer. See Sham Answer, infra.
An irrelevant answer is one that has no substantial rela-tion to the controversy;—distinguishable from a sham an-swer. Rosatti v. Commoh School Dist. No. 96 of Cass County, 53 N.D. 268, 205 N.W. 678, 679.
A sham ansioer is one sufficient on its face but so clearly false that it presents no real issue to be tried. Bank of Richards, Mo., v. Sheasgreen, 153 Minn. 363, 190 N.W. 484. One good in form, but false in fact and not pleaded in good faith. Burkhalter v. Townsend, 139 S.C. 324, 138 S.E. 34, 36. A frivolous answer, on the other hand, is one which on its face sets up no defense, although it may be true in fact.
A voluntary answer, in chancery, was an answer put in by a defendant, when plaintiff had filed no interrogatories which required to be answered. Hunt, Eq.
Practice
A reply to interrogatories; an affidavit in an-swer to interrogatories. The declaration of a fact by a witness after a question has been put, ask-ing for it.
ANTAPOCHA. In the Roman law, a transcript or counterpart of the instrument called "apocha" (q. v.), signed by the debtor and delivered to the creditor. Calvin.
ANTE. Lat. Before. Usually employed in old pleadings as expressive of time, as prce (before) was of place, and coram (before) of person. Townsh.P1. 22.
Occurring in a report or a text-book, it is used to refer the reader to a previous part of the book.
ANTE EXHIBITIONEM BILLfE. Before the ex-hibition of the bill. Before suit begun.
ANTE-FACTUM, or ANTE-GESTUM. Done be-fore. A Roman law term for a previous act, or thing done before.
ANTE JURAMENTUM. See Antejuramentum.
ANTE LITEM MOTAM. At time when declarant had no motive to distort truth. In re Hayden’s Estate, 176 Misc. 1078, 29 N.Y.S.2d 852, 856. Be-fore suit brought, before controversy instituted. Also, before the controversy arose. Corbett v. Hawes, 187 N.C. 653, 122 S.E. 478, 479.
ANTE MORTEM INTEREST. Interests existing, only prior to, and not after, transferor’s death. Cairins v. Martin, 130 N.J.Eq. 313, 22 A.2d 415, 419.
ANTE NATUS. Born before. A person born be-fore another person or before a particular event.
The term is particularly applied to one born in a country before a revolution, change of government or dynasty, or other political event, such that the question of his rights, status, or alleglance will depend upon the date of bis birth with reference to such event. In England, the term con,- monly denotes one born before the act of unlon wTth Scotland; in America, one born before the declaration of independence. Its opposite is post ?tatua, one born after the event.
ANTEA. Lat. Formerly; heretofore.
ANTECEDENT. Prior in point of time. Turner v. State, 84 Tex.Cr.R. 267, 206 S.W. 689.
ANTECEDENT CREDITORS. Those whose debts are created before the debtor makes a transfer not lodged for record. Stone v. Keith, 218 Ky. 11, 290 S.W. 1042, 1043.
ANTECESSOR. An ancestor (q.
ANTEDATE. To affix an earlier date; to date an instrument as of a time before the time it was written.
ANTEJURAMENTUM. In Saxon law, a prelimi-nary or preparatory oath (called also "prcejura-mentum," and "juramentum calumnice," (q. v.), which both the accuser and accused were required to make before any trial or purgation; the ac-cuser swearing that he would prosecute the crim-inal, and the accused making oath on the very day that he was to undergo the ordeal that he was in-nocent of the crime with which he was charged. Whishaw.
ANTENATI. See Ante Natus.
ANTENNA. In wireless telegraphy, the wire in the air on the tall mast is called the "antenna." National Electric Signaling Co. v. Telefunken Wireless Telegraph Co. of United States, C.C.A. N.Y., 221 F. 629, 631. A wire, or a combination of wires, supported in the air for directly transmit-ting electric waves into space, or receiving them therefrom. Webster, Dict.
ANTENUPTJAL. Made or done before a mar-riage.
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ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACT. A contract made before marriage. Agreement in contemplation of marriage, Hewett v. Gott, 294 P. 897, 901, 132 Kan. 168, called a marriage contract.
ANTENUPTIAL SETTLEMENTS. Contracts or agreements between a man and woman before marriage, but in contemplation and generally in consideration of marriage, whereby the property rights and interests of either the prospective husband or wif e, or both of them, are determined, or where property is secured to either or both of them, or to their children. In re Carnevale’s Will, 248 App.Div. 62, 289 N.Y.S. 185, 188.
ANTHRACITE COAL. "Anthracite coal" differs from bituminous coal in the amount of fixed carbon, the amount of volatile matter, color, luster, and structural character. The percentage of fixed carbon in anthracite coal is much higher and the percentage of volatile matter is much lower than in bituminous coal. Anthracite coal is hard, compact and is comparatively clean and free from dust and is commonly termed "hard coal," and burns with practically no smoke. Com-monwealth v. Hudson Coal Co., 287 Pa. 64, 134 A. 413, 414.
ANTHRACNOSE. A disease of watermelons caused by parasitic fungus capable of puncturing and invading tissues of rind and sometimos of pulp within fruit. S. L. Shepard & Co. v. Agwi-nones, Inc., C.C.A.S.C., 130 F.2d 67, 69.
.ANTHRACOSIS. A type of pneumoconiosis due to inhalation of coal dust. Allen v. Shell Petrol-eum Corporation, 146 Kan. 67, 68 P.2d 651, 657.
ANTHRAX. Also called splenic fever, carbuncu-lar fever, malignant pustule, charbon, and wool-sorters’ disease. An acute, infectious disease of animals, especially cattle, swine, and sheep, and transmissible to human beings. Century Dict.; Bacon v. United States Mut. Acc. Ass’n, 123 N.Y. 304, 25 N.E. 399, 400, 9 L.R.A. 617.
ANTHROPOMETRY. In criminal law and medi-cal jurisprudence. The measurement of the hu-man body; a system of measuring the dimensions of the human body, both absolutely and in their proportion to each other, the facial, cranial, and other angles, the shape and size of the skull, etc., for purposes of comparison with corresponding measurements of other individuals, and serving for the identification of the subject in cases of doubtful or disputed identity. It was largely adopted after its introduction in France in 1883, but fell into disfavor as being costly and as hable to error. It has given place to the "finger print" system devised by Francis Galton. See Bertillon System.
ANTI MANIFESTO. A term used in international law to denote a proclamation or manifesto pub-lished by one of two belligerent powers, alleging reasons why the war is defensive on its part.
ANTI-TRUST ACTS. Federal and state statutes to protect trade and commerce from unlawful re-
straints and monopolies. U. S. v. Knight Co., 15 S.Ct. 249, 156 U.S. 1, 39 L,Ed. 325; U. S. v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., C.C.A.Tex., 137 F.2d 459. See, also, Restraint of Trade.
Clayton Act. Oct. 15, 1914 as amended, 15 U.S C.A. §§ 12-27, 44; 18 U.S.C.A. § 412; 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 381-383. 386-390; 29 U. S. C. A. § 52.
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, July 2, 1890, as amended, 15 U. S.C.A. §§ 1-7, 15 note.
ANTICHRESIS. In the civil law. A species of mortgage, or pledge of immovables. An agree-ment by which the debtor gives to the creditor the income from the property which he has pledged, in lieu of the interest on his debt. Guyot, Répert; Marquise De Portes v. Hurlbut. 44 N.J.Eq. 517, 14 A. 891. It is analogous to the Welsh mortgage of the common law. In the French law. if the in-come was more than the interest, the debtor was entitled to demand an account of the income, and might claim any excess.
A debtor may give as security for his debt any immovable which belongs to him, the creditor hav-ing the right to enjoy the use of it on account of the interest due, or of the capital if there is no interest due; this is called "antichresis." Civ. Code Mex. art. 1927.
By the law of Louisiana, there are two kinds of pledges,—the pawn and the antichresis. A pawn relates to movables, and the antichresis to im-movables. The antichresis must be reduced to writing; and the creditor thereby acquires the right to the fruits, etc., of the immovables, de-ducting yearly their proceeds from the interest, in the first place, and af tervvards from the prin-cipal of his debt. He is bound to pay taxes on the property, and keep it in repair, unless the con-trary is agreed. The creditor does not become the proprietor of the property by failure to pay at the agreed time, and any clause to that effect is void. He can only sue the debtor, and obtain sentence for sale of the property. The possession of the property is, however, by the contract, transferred to the creditor. La.Civil Code, Arts. 3176-3181; Livingston v. Story, 11 Pet. 351, 9 L.Ed. 746.
The "antichresis" is an antiquated contract, and has been resorted to in Louisiana in but a few instances. Harang v. Ragan, 134 La. 201, 63 So. 875, 877. Essential element of contract, Conklin v. Caffall, 179 So. 434, 437, 438, 439, 189 La. 301.
ANTICIPATION. Act of doing or taking a thing before its proper time, Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 25 Del.Ch. 193, 15 A.2d 665, 668, 669. To do, take up, or deal with, before an-other; to preclude or prevent by prior action; to be before in doing, State ex rel. Todd v. Thomas, 127 Neb. 891, 257 N.W. 265, 96 A.L.R. 1470.
In conveyancing, the act of assigning, charging, or otherwise dealing with income before it be-comes due.
In patent law, a person is said to have been anticipated when he patents a contrivance already known within the limits of the country granting the patent. Topliff v. Topliff, 12 S.Ct. 825, 145 U. S. 156, 36 L.Ed. 658.
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An unsuccessful attempt to achieve a particular purpose is not "anticipation". Swan Carburetor Co. v. Nash Motors Co., D.C.Md., 25 F.Supp. 24, 34. The test being whether patentee has added anything of value to the sum of human knowledge, whether he has made the world’s work easier, cheaper, and safer, so that return to prior art would be a retrogression. Butler v. Burch Plow Co., C.C.A.Cal., 23 F.2d 15, 24. But invention is not "antici-pated" by accidental, incidental or unintentional use of some of its features, unless the benetlts or ensuing results from such use are appreciated or recognized. Balaban v. Polyfoto Corporation, D.C.Del., 47 F.Supp. 472, 477, 478.
In law of negligence, "anticipation" is not con-fined to expectation. Kenney v. Wong Len, 81 N.H. 427, 128 A. 343, 344. But compare Hardy v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., C.C.A.Ark., 266 F. 860, 863, 36 A.L.R. 1. It means probability not possibility as applied to duty to anticipate consequences of conduct attacked as negligent. Empire Dist. Elec-trict Co. v. Harris, C.C.A.Mo., 82 F.2d 48, 52.
ANTICIPATORY BREACH OF CONTRACT. See Breach of Contract.
ANTIGRAPHUS. In Roman law. An officer whose duty it was to take tare of tax money. A comptroller.
ANTIGRAPHY. A copy or counterpart of a deed.
ANTINOMIA. In Roman law. A real or ap-parent contradiction or inconsistency in the laws. Merl. Répert. Conflicting laws or provisions of law; inconsistent or conflicting decisions or cases.
ANTINOMY. A term used in logic and law to denote a real or apparent inconsistency or con-flict between two authorities or propositions; same as antinomia (q. v.).
ANTIQUA CUSTUMA. In English law. Ancient custom. An export duty on wool, woolfells, and leather, imposed during the reign of Edw. I. It was so called by way of distinction from an in-creased duty on the same articles, payable by for-eign merchants, which was imposed at a later period of the same reign and was called "custuma nova." 1 BI.Comm. 314.
ANTIQUA STATUTA. Also called "Vetera Stat-uta." English statutes from the time of Richard L to Edward III. 1 Reeve, Eng.Law, 227. See Nova Statuta.
ANTIQUARE. In Roman law. To restore a for-mer law or practice; to reject or vote against a new law; to prefer the old law. Those who voted against a proposed law wrote on their bah lots the letter "A," the initial of antiguo, I am for the old law. Calvin.
ANTIQUUM DOMINICUM. In old English law. Ancient demesne.
ANTITHETARIUS. In old English law. A man who endeavors to discharge himself of the crime of which he is accused, by retorting the charge on the accuser. He differs from an approver in this: that the latter does not charge the accuser, but others. Jacob.
ANTRUSTIO. In early feudal law. A confidential vassal. A term applied to the followers or de-
pendents of the ancient German chiefs, and of the kings and counts of the Franks. Burrill.
ANUELS LIVRES. L. Fr. The Year Books. Kel-ham.
ANY. Some; one out of many; an indefinite number. State v. Pierson, 204 Iowa 837, 216 N. W. 43, 44. One indiscriminately of whatever kind or quantity. Federal Deposit Ins. Corporation v. Winton, C.C.A.Tenn., 131 F.2d 780, 782. One or some (indefinitely). Slegel v. Slegel, 135 N.J.Eq. 5, 37 A.2d 57, 58. "Any" does not necessarily mean only one person, but may have reference to more than one or to many. Doherty v. King, Tex.Civ. App., 183 S.W.2d 1004, 1007. As a synonym for "some". Kayser v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of California, 234 Iowa 310, 12 N.W.2d 582, 587.
It is often synonymous with "either", State v. Antonio, 3 Brev. (S.C.) 562; Carr-Lowry Lumber Co. v. Martin, 144 Miss. 106, 109 So. 849, 850. And is given the full force of "every" or "all", Glen Alden Coal Co. v. City of Scranton, 282 Pa. 45, 127 A. 307, 308; Southern Ry. Co. v. Gaston County, 200 N.C. 780, 158 S.E. 481. Its generality may be restricted by the context, Drainage Dist. No. 1 of Bates County v. Bates County, Mo.Sup., 216 S.W. 949, 953. Thus, the giving of a right te do some act "at any time" is commonly construed as meaning within a reasonable time. Paulson v. Weeks, 80 Or. 468, 157 P. 590, 592, Ann.Cas. 1918D, 741. And the words "any other" following the enumeration of particular classes are to be read as "other such like," and include only others of like kind or character. Southern Ry. Co. v. Columbia Compress Co., C.C.A.S.C., 280 F. 344, 348.
ANYTHING. Sometimes used colloquially in the sense of whatever. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. H. Neuer Glass Co., C.C.A.Ohio, 253 F. 161, 164.
AORTA. The large artery of the body, about one and a half inches in diameter, through which blood is carried away from heart to be ultimately distributed to various parts of body. It is com-posed of three layers, an inner coat called the "intima," a middle coat called the "media," and an outer coat called the "adventia." Woelfle v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 234 Mo.App. 135, 112 S.W.2d 865, 870.
APANAGE. In old French law. A provision of lands or feudal superiorities assigned by the kings of France for the maintenance of their younger sons. An allowance assigned to a prince of the reigning house for his proper maintenance out of the public treasury. 1 Hallam, Mid. Ages, pp. ii, 88; Wharton.
APARTMENT. A part of a house occupied by a person, while the rest is occupied by another, or others. As to the meaning of this term, see Peo-ple v. St. Clair, 38 Cal. 137.
APARTMENT HOTEL. Generally understood to apply to those houses which contain nonhouse-keeping apartments without a kitchen or cooking
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facilities, wherein the proprietor furnishes a res-taurant for feeding the occupants of the different apártments. Waitt Const. Co. v. Chase, 188 N.Y. S. 589, 591, 197 App.Div. 327. A covenant pro-hibiting erection of an "apartment house" does not prohibit an apartment hotel containing one, two, and three room suites without kitchens or kitchenettes. Griswold Realty & Holding Corpo-ration v. West End Avenue & Seventy-Fifth St. Corporation, 209 N.Y.S. 764, 766, 125 Misc. 30.
APARTMENT HOUSE. A building arranged in several suites of connecting rooms, each suite designed for independent housekeeping, but with certain mechanical convenientes, such as heat, light, or elevator services, in common to all families occupying the building. Konick v. Champ-neys, 108 Wash. 35, 183 P. 75, 77, 6 A.L.R. 459. Sometimes called a flat or flat house. Lignot v. Jaekle, 72 N.J.Eq. 233, 65 A. 221. It comes within the prohibition of a restrictive building covenant forbidding buildings designed for any purpose other than a private dwelling house. Taylor v. Lambert, 279 Pa. 514, 124 A. 169, 170. But it is not a "hotel." Satterthwait v. Gibbs, 288 Pa. 428, 135 A. 862, 864. A house for two families has been held to be an "apartment house" within a restric-tive covenant. Austin v. Richardson, Tex.Com. App., 288 S.W. 180, 181.
An "apartment house" Is not a hotel, but is a building used as a dwelling for several families, each living separate and apart. Peirce v. Kelner, 304 Pa. 509, 156 A. 61, 62. It is not a number of private dwellings, built one on another, but a collection of dwellings. A place for housing a num-ber of people grouped in families assigned to different sec-tions in the same structure. Fox v. Sumerson, 338 Pa. 545, 13 A.2d 1, 2.
APARTMENT HOUSE IH—JACKER. One who takes possession of an insolvent or abandoned apartment house business, collects as much rent as possible in advance and pays no bilis of any kind, thus seriously affecting, if not destroying, the good will of the business Thompson v. Du-bois, 215 Cal. 577, 11 P.2d 862, 863.
APATISATIO. An agreement or compact. Du Cange.
APERTA BREVIA. Open, unsealed writs. APERTUM FACTUM. An overt act.
APERTURA TESTAMENTI. In the civil law. A form of proving a will, by the witnesses acknowl-edging before a magistrate their having sealed it.
APEX. The summit or highest point of anything; the top; e. g., in mining law, "apex of a vein." See Larkin v. Upton, 12 S.Ct. 614, 144 U.S. 19, 36 L.Ed. 330. An "apex" is all that portion of a terminal edge of a mineral vein from which the vein` hás extension downward in the direction of the dip. Stewart Mining Co. v. Ontario Mining Co., 35 S.Ct. 610, 614, 237 U.S. 350, 59 L.Ed. 989. Or it is the juncture of two dipping limbs of a fissure vein. Jim Butler Tonopah Mining Co. v. West End Consol. Mining Co., 38 S.Ct. 574, 576, 247 U. S. 450, 62 L.Ed. 1207.
The apex of ore vein or lode is ascent along Une of its dip or outcropping, beyond which it extends no further to surface of land. Brugger v. Lee Yim, 12 Cal.App.2d 38, 55 P.2d 564, 571.
APEX JURIS. The summit of the law; a legal subtlety; a nice or cunning point of law; close technicality; a rule of law carried to an extreme point, either of severity or refinement A term used to denote a stricter application of the rules of law than is indicated by the phrase summum jus (q. v.).
APEX RULE. In mining law. The mineral laws of the United States give to the locator of a min-ing claim on the public domain the whole of every vein the apex of which lies within his surface exterior boundaries, or within perpendicular planes drawn downward indefinitely on the planes of those boundaries; and he may follow a vein which thus apexes within his boundaries, on its dip, although it may so lar depart from the per-pendicular in its course downward as to extend outside the vertical side-lines of his location;. but he may not go beyond his end-lines or vertical planes drawn downward therefrom. This is called the apex rule. Rev.St.U.S. § 2322 (30 U.S.C.A. § 26) ; Stewart Mining Co v. Ontario Mining Co., 23 Idaho, 724, 132 P. 787, 792.
APHASIA. In medical jurisprudence. Loss of the faculty or power of articulate speech; a condition in which the patient, while retaining intelligence and understanding and with the organs of speech unimpaired, is unable (in "motor aphasia") to utter articulate words, or unable to vocalize the particular word which is in his mind and which he wishes to use, or utters words different from those he believes himself to be speaking, or (in "sensory aphasia" or apraxia) is unable to under-stand spoken or written language. Sensory aphasia includes word blindness and word deaf-ness, visual and auditory aphasia. Motor aphasia often includes agraphia, or the inability to write words of the desired meaning. The seat of the disease is in the brain, but it is not a form of insanity.
APHONIA. In medical jurisprudence. Loss of the power of articulate speech in consequence of mor-bid conditions of some of the vocal organs. It may be incomplete, in which case the patient can whisper. It is to be distinguished from congenital dumbness, and from temporary loss of volee through extreme hoarseness or minor affections of the vocal cords, as also from aphasia, the lat-ter being a disease of the brain without impair-ment of the organs of speech.
APICES JURIS NON SUNT JURA [JUS]. Ex-tremities, or mere subtleties of law are not rules of law [are not lawl. Co.Litt. 304b; 10 Coke, 126; Wing.Max. 19, max. 14; Broom, Max. 188. Legal principies must not be carried to their ex-treme consequences, regardless of equity and good sense. Salmond, Jurispr. 639. See Apex Juris.
APICES LITIGANDI. Extremely fine points, or subtleties of litigation. Nearly equivalent to the
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APNEA
modem phrase "sharp practice." "It is uncon-scionable in a defendant to take advantage of the apices litigandi, to turn a plaintiff around and make him pay costs when his demand is just." Per Lord Mansfield, in 3 Burr. 1243.
APNCEA. In medical jurisprudence. Want of breath; difficulty in breathing; partial or tempo-rary suspension of respiration; specifically, such difficulty of respiration resulting from over-oxy-genation of the blood, and in this distinguished from "asphyxia" (q. v.), which is a condition re-sulting from a deficiency of oxygen in the blood due to suffocation or any serious interferente with normal respiration. The two terms were formerly (but improperly) used synonymously.
APOCHA falso Apoca). Lat. In the civil law. A writing acknowledging payments; acquittance. It differs from acceptilation in this: that ac-ceptilation imports a complete discharge of the fornier obligation whether payment be made or not; apocha, discharge only upon payment being made. Calvin. See Antapocha.
APOCILIE ONERATORLzE. In old commercial law. Bills of lading.
APOCRISARIUS. In civil law. A messenger; an ambassador.
In ecclesiastical law. One who answers for another. An officer whose duty was to carry to the emperor messages relating to ecclesiastical matters, and to take back his answer to the peti-lioners. An officer who gave advice on questions of ecclesiastical law. An ambassador or legate of a pope or bishop. Spelman.
A messenger sent to transact ecclesiastical business and report to his superior; an officer who had charge of the treasury of a monastic edifice; an officer who took charge of opening and closing the doors. Du Cange; Spelman; Calvinus, Lex.
APOCRISARIUS CANCELLARIUS. In the civil law. An officer who took charge of the royal seal and signed royal dispatches.
Called, also, secretarios, consiliarius (from his giving advice) ; referendarius; a consiliis (from his acting as counsellor); a responsis, or respon-salis.
APOGEAN TIDES. When moon is farthest from earth, its tide-producing power is diminished and tides at such time exhibit a decreased rise and fall, and such tides are called "apogean tides." Miller v. Bay-To-Gulf, 141 Fia. 452, 193 So. 425, 428.
APOGRAPHIA. In civil law. An examination and enumeration of things possessed; an inven-tory. Calvinus, Lex.
APOPLEXY. In medical jurisprudence. The fail-ure of consciousness and suspension of voluntary motion from suspension of the functions of the cerebrum.
The group of symptoms arising from rupture of a minute artery and consequent hemorrhage in-to the substance of the brain or from the lodg-
ment of a minute clot in one of the cerebral arteries.
The symptoms consist usually of sudden loss of con-sciousness, muscular relaxation, lividity of the face and slow stertorous respiration, lasting from a few hours to several days. Death frequently ensues. If consciousness returns, there is found paralysis of some of the voluntary muscles, very frequently of the muscles of the face, arra, and leg upon one sido, giving the symptom of hemiplegia. There is usually more or less mental impairment, which presents no uniform character, but varíes indefinitely.
By apoplexy is meant a break or rupture of a blood vessel in the brain, not produced by any external cause. Robinson v. fEtna Life Ins. Co., Tex.Com.App., 276 S.W. 900, 902.
APOSTACY (also spelled Apostasy). In English law. The total renunciation of Christianity, by em-bracing either a false religion or no religion at all. This offense can take place only in such as have once professed the Christian religion. 4 Bl.Comm. 43; 4 Steph.Comm. 231.
APOSTATA. In civil and old English law. An apostate; a deserter from the faith; one wha has renounced the Christian faith. Cod. 1, 7; Reg.Orig. 71b.
APOSTATA CAPIENDO. An obsolete English writ which issued against an apostate, or one who had violated the rules of his religious order. It was addressed to the sheriff, and commanded him to deliver the defendant into the custody of the abbot or prior. Reg.Orig. 71, 267; Jacob; Wharton.
APOSTILLE, Appostille. L. Fr. An addition; a marginal note or observation. Kelham.
APOSTLES. In English admiralty practice. A term borrowed from the civil law, denoting brief dismissory letters granted to a party who appeals from an inferior to a superior court, embodying a statement of the case and a declaration that the record will be transmitted.
This term is still sometimes applied in the ad-miralty courts of the United States to the papers sent up or transmitted cm appeals.
APOSTOLI. In civil law. Certificates of the in-ferior judge from whom a cause is removed, di-rected to the superior. Dig. 49, 6. See Apostles.
Those sent as messengers. Spelman, Gloss.
APOSTOLUS. A messenger; an ambassador, legate, or nuncio. Spelman.
APOTIIECA. In the civil law. A repository; a place of deposit, as of wine, oil, books, etc. Cal-vin.
APOTHECARY. Any person who keeps a shop or building where medicines are compounded or prepared according to prescriptions of physicians, or where medicines are sold. Com. v. Fuller, 2 Walk. (Pa.) 550.
In England and Ireland an apothecary is a mem-ber of an inferior branch of the medical profes-sion and is licensed by the Apothecaries Company to practice medicine as well as to sell drugs.

The term "druggist" properly means one whose occupa-tion is to buy and sell drugs without compounding or pre-paring them. The term therefore has a much more limited and restricted meaning than the word ”apothecary," and there is little difficulty in concluding that the term "drug-gist" may be applied in a technical sense to persons who buy and sell drugs. State v. Donaldson, 41 Minn. 74, 42 N. W. 781.
APP. CT. Appellate Court.
APPARATOR. A furnisher or provider. For-merly the sheriff, in England, had charge of cer-tain county affairs and disbursements, in which capacity he was called "apparator comitatus" (apparator for the county), and received therefor a considerable emolument. Cowell.
APPARATUS. An outfit of tools, utensils, or in-struments adapted to accomplishment of any branch of work or for performance of experiment or operation. McClintock & Irvine Co. v. ;Etna Explosives Co., 260 Pa. 191, 103 A. 622, 623, Ann. Cas.1918E, 1078. A group or set of organs con-cerned in performance of single function. First State Bank of Perkins v. Pulliam, 112 Okl. 22, 239 P. 595, 596. A generic word of the most compre-hensive significance which may mean implements and an equipment of things provided, and adapt-ed as a means to some end. Bruce v. Sibeck, 25 Cal.App.2d 691, 78 P.2d 741, 743.
As used in statutes granting exemption from execution, etc., "apparatus" means a complex de-vice or machine designed for the accomplishment of a special purpose; a complex instrument or ap-pliance, mechanical or chemical, for a specific ac-tion or operation; machinery; mechanism; as a newspaper printing press, Harris v. Townley, Tex. Civ.App., 161 S.W. 5; or four pool tables, Harris v. Todd, Tex.Civ.App., 158 S.W 1189; but not a threshing outfit, Comer v. Powell, Tex.Civ.App., 189 S.W. 88, 91; nor a well-drilling rig, consist-ing of boiler, engine, and other parts of compli-cated machinery, Thresher v. McEvoy, Tex.Civ. App., 193 S.W. 159, 160. In re Willis, D.C.Tex., 292 F. 872, 873, it was said that the term "apparatus" is practically synonymous with "tools."
APPAREL. The term is said to derive from two sources, "apparel" from the Latin "ad," meaning to, and "par," meaning equal, to point out the means by which outwardly one keeps even or in fine with his group or class. In re Steimes’ Es-tate, 270 N.Y.S. 339, 150 Misc. 279 (a will case).
APPARENT. That which is obvious, evident, or manifest; what appears, or has been made mani-fest; appearing to the eye or mind. Walker v. John Smith, T., 199 Ala. 514, 74 So. 451, 453; In respect to facts involved in an appeal or writ of error, that which is stated in the record. An er-ror discovered by close scrutiny of the entire evi-dence is not "apparent." Stewart v. McAllister, Tex.Civ.App., 209 S.W. 704, 706.
"Apparent" means "open to view," "capable of being easily understood," "evident," "seeming," rather than "true" or "real," "synonymous with," "likely," "probable," or "obvious" and as meaning primarily, "capable of being seen or easily seen,""open to view," "visible to the eye," "within sight or view," and, secondarily, "clear or manifest to the understanding," "plain," "evident," "obvious," "known," "palpable," "indubitable," while "indubi-table" has been defined as meaning "certain" or "unquestionable," which is synonymous with "sure." Stevenson v. State, Del., 1 Terry 268, 8 A.2d 914, 915 (in statute requiring driver to stop after automobile accident).
The word "apparent" within rule that use of realty must be apparent to create easement by implication on severance of unity of ownership of dominant and servient tenements does not necessarily mean "visible", but means that ease-ment’s indicia, careful inspection of which by person ordi-narily conversant with subject would disclose such use, must be plainly visible. Romanchuk v. Plotkin, 215 Minn. 156, 9 N.W.2d 421, 425.
APPARENT AGENCY, See Agency.
APPARENT AUTHORITY. In the law of agency, such authority as the principal knowingly permits the agent to assume, or which he holds the agent out as possessing; such authority as he appears to have by reason of the actual authority which he has; such authority as a reasonably prudent man, using diligente and discretion, in view of the principal’s conduct, would naturally suppose the agent to possess. Iowa Loan & Trust Co. v. Sea-man, 203 Iowa 310, 210 N.W. 937, 940; Kissell v. Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. Ry. Co., 194 Mo.App. 346, 188 S.W. 1118, 1121; Brager v. Levy, 122 Md. 554, 90 A. 102, 104; Atto v. Saunders, 77 N.H. 527, 93 A. 1037, 1039; Campbell Paint & Varnish Co. v. Ladd Furniture & Carpet Co., Tex.Civ.App., 83 S.W.2d 1095, 1097; Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Wood, Tex.Civ.App., 94 S.W.2d 573, 574.
It includes the power to do whatever is usually done and necessary to be done in order to carry into effect the principal power conferred. Oliver v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 176 N.C. 598, 97 S.E. 490, 491. Such authority as a princi-pal intentionally or by want of ordinary tare causes or allows third person to believe that agent possesses. Fireman’s Fund Indemnity Co. v. Longshore Beach and Country Club, Inc., 127 Conn. 493, 18 A.2d 347, 349.
It is not actual authority and may often be authority not actually possessed by agent, but is such as principal holds agent out as possessing. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Steckel, 216 Iowa 1189, 250 N.W. 476; Herbert v. Lang-hoff, La.App., 164 So. 262, 266.
"Apparent authority" of an agent must be determined by what the principal does, rather than by acts of the agent. Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d 646, 651.
It must be traceable to the principal and cannot be es-tablished solely by acts and conduct of arent, and princi-pal is only hable for the appearance of authority caused by him. Storms v. United Grain & Millworkers’ Union, 64 Ohio App. 19, 27 N.E.2d 781, 783.
APPARENT DANGER. As used with reference to the doctrine of self-defense in homicide, means such overt actual demonstration, by conduct and acts, of a design to take life or do some great personal injury, as would make the killing ap-parently necessary to self-preservation. Modesett v. Emmons, Tex.Com.App., 292 S.W. 855, 856.
Under a statute providing that it shall not be a defense to an action for injuries to an employee that the dangers

inherent or apparent in the employment contributed to the injury, an "apparent danger" is one the existence of which the employee has knowleage, actual or constructive. Standard Steel Car Co. v. Martinecz, 66 Ind.App. 672, 113 N.E. 244, 248.
APPARENT DEFECTS. In a thing sold, are those which can be discovered by simple inspec-tion. Code La. art. 2497 (Civil Code, § 2521). See, also, Woolley v. Ablah, 119 Kan. 380, 240 P. 266, 269.
APPARENT EASEMENT. See Easement.
APPARENT HEIR. In English law. One whose right of inheritance is indefeasible, provided he outlive the ancestor. 2 Bl.Comm. 208. See, also, Heir Apparent. In Scotch law. He is the person to whom the succession has actually opened. He is so called until his regular entry on the lands by service or infeftment on a precept of clare constat.
APPARENT NECESSITY. In actions under the Alabama Homicide Act, "apparent necessity" which will justify killing in self-defense must be such as to impress a reasonable man of its pres-ence and imminence, and must so impress de-fendant at the time of the fatal shot. Drummond v. Drummond, 212 Ala. 242, 102 So. 112, 114.
APPARITIO. In old practice. Appearance; an appearance. Apparitio in judicio, an appearance in court. Bract. fol. 344. Post apparitionem, after appearance. Fleta, lib. 6, c. 10, § 25.
APPARITOR. An officer or messenger employed to serve the process of the spiritual courts in England and summon offenders. Cowell.
In the civil law. An officer who waited upon a magis-trate or •superior officer, and executed his commands. Cal-vin.; Cod. 12, 53-57.
APPARLEMENT. In old English law. Resem-blance; likelihood; as apparlement of war. St. 2 Rich. II. st. 1, c. 6; Cowell.
APPARURA. In old English law the apparura were furniture, implements, tackle, or apparel. Carucarum apparura, plow-tackle. Cowell.
APPEAL. In civil practice. The complaint to a superior court of an injustice done or error com-mitted by an inferior one, whose judgment or de-cision the court aboye is called upon to correct or reverse.
The removal of a cause from a court of inferior to one of superior jurisdiction, for the purpose of obtaining a review and retrial. Hall v. Kincaid, 64 Ind.App. 103, 115 N.E. 361, 365. Lea County State Bank v. McCaskey Register Co., 39 N.M. 454, 49 P.2d 577, 579.
In general terms a resort to an upper court or tribunal. State ex rel. School Dist. No. 8 v. Lens-man, 108 Mont. 118, 88 P.2d 63, 65. A rehearing by a superior court on both law and fact, a proc-ess of civil law origin, and the usual and appro-priate mode of review for cases originating in a court of equity. Sohland v. Baker, 15 Del.Ch. 431, 141 A. 277, 283, 58 A.L.R. 693.
The word "appeal" has no absolutely fixed and definite meaning but may be used to denote the review by a court of the action of some board or administrative officer. In re Determination of Relative Rights to Use of Waters of Des-chutes River, 108 P.2d 276, 281, 282, 165 Or. 435. An "ap-peal" is a creature of statute, not a constitutional or Inher-ent right. Carilli v. Hersey, 303 Mass. 82, 20 N.E.2d 492, 495. It is merely a continuation of original lawsuit. Bow-ersock v. Missouri Valley Draínage Dist. of Holt County, 237 Mo.App. 346, 168 S.W.2d 479, 481. Patterson v. Old Dominion Trust Co., 149 Va. 597, 140 S.E. 810, 813. It has become a term of general application in law, with meaning depending on statutory provisions respecting appellate pro-eedure. Cino v. Driscoll, 130 N.J.L. 535, 34 A.2d 6, 8.
Appeal is sometimes used to denote the nature of appel-late jurisdiction, as distinguished from original jurisdic-tion, without any particular regard to the mode by which a cause is transmitted to a superior jurisdiction. Dorrís Motor Car Co. v. Colburn, 307 Mo. 137, 270 S.W. 339, 346. "Appeal" has no conclusive meaning, and it Is necessary in each ínstance to look to the particular act giving an appeal, to determine powers to be exercised by the appel-late court. McCauley v. Imperial Woolen Co., 261 Pa. 312, 104 A. 617, 620.
The fundamental difference between an "appeal" and an action to "review" is that in the case of appeal the tri-bunal by which the first determination was made is not a party to the proceeding to review, while, in an action to review, the tribunal which made the determination Is a party to the proceeding to review. Milwaukee County v. Industrial Commission, 228 Wis. 94, 279 N.W. 655, 657, 658.
An "appeal" in equity Is a trial de novo. Simmons v. Stern, C.C.A.N.M., 9 F.2d 256, 259.
"Appeal" may also be used to denote the act of invoking another judicial forum for the trial. Newell v. Kalamazoo Circuit Judge, 215 Mich. 153, 183 N.W. 907, 908. See Ap-pealed. As used in statutes authorizing taxpayers or par-ties to condemnation proceedings to appeal, the term of ten has its nontechnical sense meaning to "apply for" or "ask." Purcell Bank & Trust Co. of Purcell v. Byars, 66 Okl. 70, 167 P. 216, 218.
An "appeal" is a step in a judicial proceeding, and in legal contemplation there can be no appeal where there has been no decision by a judicial tribunal. Two things are essential to an appeal in its proper sense: First, the de-cision of a judicial tribunal, and, second, a superior court invested with authority to review the decision of the In-ferior tribunal. People ex rel. Nelson Bros. Storage & Furníture Co. v. Flsher, 273 III. 228, 25 N.E.2d 785, 787.
"Appeal" differs from trial In that it is a review on orig-inal record after that has been made in accordance with well-recognized principies of judicial procedure. Koukly v. Weber, 277 N.Y.S. 39, 154 Misc. 659.
In criminal practice. A formal accusation made by one private person against another of having committed some heinous crime. 4 Bl. Comm. 312.
Appeal was also the name given to the proceed-ing in English law where a person, indicted of treason or felony, and arraigned for the same, confessed the fact before plea pleaded, and ap-pealed, or accused others, his accomplices in the same crime, in order to obtain his pardon. In this case he was called an "approver" or "prover," and the party appealed or accused, the "appellee." 4 Bl.Comm. 330. Appeals have been abolished by statute.
Cross Appeal
Where both parties to a judgment appeal there-from, the appeal of each is called a "cross-appeal" as regards that of the other. 3 Steph.Comm. 581.
Legislation
The act by which a member of a legislative body who questions the correctness of a decision

of the presiding officer, or "chair," procures a vote of the body upon the decision.
Old French Law
A mode of proceeding in the lords’ courts, where a party was dissatisfied with the judgment of the peers, which was by accusing them of having giv-en a false or malicious judgment, and offering to make good the charge by the duel or combat. This was called the "appeal of false judgment." Montesq. Esprit des Lois, liv. 28, c. 27.
Writ of Error Distinguished
The distinction between an appeal and a writ of error is that an appeal is a process of civil law origin, and removes a cause entirely, subjecting the facts, as well as the law, to a review and re-visal; but a writ of error is of common law ori-gin, and it removes nothing for re-examination but the law. Cunningham v. Neagle, 10 S.Ct. 658, 135 U.S. 1, 34 L.Ed. 55; Buessel v. U. S., C.C.A. Conn., 258 F. 811, 814. The present tendency is to ignore the distinction between "writ of error" and "appeal," and, when found in modem stat-utes, the meaning given "appeal" must be gath-ered from the language of the statute itself. Widgins v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 142 Va. 419, 128 S.E. 516, 518.
APPEAL BOND. The bond given on taking an appeal, by which the appellant and his sureties are bound to pay damages and costs if he fails to prosecute the appeal with effect. Omaha Hotel Co. v. Kountze, 2 S.Ct. 911, 107 U.S. 378, 27 L.Ed. 609. A general purpose of appeal bonds is to discourage vexatious and frivolous appeals. State v. Coletti, 102 Kan. 523, 170 P. 995, 997. To pro-tect those interested in the judgment. Richmond v. Williamson, 16 Wash.2d 194, 132 P.2d 1031, 1033.
The sole and only purpose of "appeal bond" Is to stay issuance of execution until cause can be passed upon and disposed of by appellate court. State ex rel. Gnekow v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Mo.App., 150 S.W.2d 581, 584.
APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS. A privilege given indigent person to prosecute an appeal, oth-erwise and independently allowable, without pay-ment of fees and costs incident to such prosecu-tion. Millslagle v. Olson, C.C.A.Neb., 130 F.2d 212, 213. See, also, In Forma Pauperis.
APPEALED. In a sense not strictly technical, this word may be used to signify the exercise by a party of the right to remove a litigation from one .forum to another; as where he removes a suit involving the title to real estate from a jus-tice’s court to the common pleas. Lawrence v. Souther, 8 Mete. (Mass.) 166.
APPEAR. In practice. To be properly before a court; as a fact or matter of which it can take notice. To be in evidence; to be proved. "Mak-ing it appear and proving are the same thing." Freem. 53. Coming into court by a party to a suit, whether plaintiff or defendant. Madison v. State, 31 Ala.App. 602, 20 So.2d 541, 542; Ben-nett v. Rodgers, 205 Mo.App. 458, 225 S.W. 101. See Appearance.
Frequently used in judicial proceedings as meaning "clear to the comprehension" when ap-plied to matters of opinion or reasoning, and "satisfactorily or legally known or made known", when used in reference to facts of evidence. Blackshear v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 26 S.E.2d 793, 804, 69 Ga.App. 790. Facts "appear" when the evidence from which facts may be found is in-troduced, and presumptions disappear when facts appear. Christiansen v. Hilber, 282 Mich:403, 276 N.W. 495, 497.
APPEAR OF RECORD. A substitution of trustee under deed of trust "appears of record" in the office of the chancery clerk, by being actually spread at large on the record. King v. Jones, 121 Miss. 319, 83 So. 531.
APPEARANCE. In practice. A coming into court as party to a suit, whether as plaintiff or defendant. Stephens v. Ringling, 102 S.C. 333, 86 S.E. 683, 685. The formal proceeding by which a defendant submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Flint v. Comly, 95 Me. 251, 49 A. 1044. The voluntary submission to a court’s jurisdiction. Pacilio v. Scarpati, 300 N.Y.S. 473, 478, 165 Misc. 586; Braman v. Braman, 258 N.Y.S. 181, 186, 236 App.Div. 164.
"Appearance" is the act of appearing, coming, or being in sight, becoming visible or clear to ap-prehension of the mind, of being known as sub-ject of observation or comprehension, or as a thing proved, of being obvious or manifest. Hal-lack & Howard Lumber Co. v. Bagly, 100 Colo. 402, 68 P.2d 442, 443.
Appearance anciently meant an actual coming into court, either in person or by attorney. Appearance may be made by the party in person or by his agent. Everett Ry., Light & Power Co. v. U. S., D.C.Wash., 236 F. 806, 808. But in criminal cases the personal appearance of the accused in court is often necessary.
An appearance may be either general or special; the former Is a simple and unqualified or unrestricted submis-sion to the jurisdiction of the court, the latter a submis-sion to the jurisdiction for some specific purpose only, not for all the purposes of the suit. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Industrial Board of Illinois, 282 III. 136, 118 N.E. 483, 485. A special appearance is for the purpose of testing the sufliciency of service or the jurisdiction of the court; a general appearance is made where the defendant waives defects of service and submits to the jurisdiction. State v. Huller, 23 N.M. 306, 168 P. 528, 534, 1 A.L.R. 170.
An appearance may also be either compulsory or volunta-ry, the former where it is compelled by process served on the party, the latter where It is entered by his own will or consent, without the service of process, though process may be outstanding. 1 Barb.Ch.Pr. 77. It is said to be optional when entered by a person who intervenes in the action to protect his own interesas, though not joined as a party; It occurs in chancery practice, especially in Eng-land ; conditional, when coupled with conditions as to its becoming or being taken as a general appearance; gratis, when made by a party to the action, but before the service of any process or legal notice to appear; de bene esse, when made provisionally or to remain good only upon a future contingency; or when designed to permit a party to a proceeding to refuse to submit his person to the jurisdic-tion of the court unless it is finally determined that he has forever waived that right. Farmers Trust ‘Co. v. Alexander, 334 Pa. 434, 6 A.2d 262, 265: subsequent, when made by a defendant af ter an appearance has already been entered for him by the plaintiff; corporal, when the per-son is physically present in court.
An answer constitutes an "appearance." Wieser v. Richter, 247 Mich. 52, 225 N.W. 542, 543. A party who an-

swers, consents to a continuance, goes to trial, takes an appeal, or does any other substantial act in a cause, al-though he has not been served with summons, is deemed to have entered his "appearance" unless he objects and preserves his protests to the jurisdiction of his person. Robinson v. Bossinger, 195 Ark. 445, 112 S.W.2d 637, 640. Acts of an attorney in prosecuting an action on behalf of his client constitute an "appearance." Pacilio v. Scarpati, 300 N.Y.S. 473, 165 Misc. 586.
Appearance by Attorney
This term and "appearance by counsel" are dis-tinctly different, the former being the substitution of a legal agent for the personal attendance of the suitor, the latter the attendance of an advo-cate without whose aid neither the party attend-ing nor his attorney in his stead could safely pro-ceed ; and an appearance by attorney does not su-persede the appearance by counsel. Mercer v. Watson, 1 Watts (Pa.) 351. See In re Ford’s Estate, 163 N.Y.S. 960, 98 Misc. 100.
Appearance Day
The day for appearing; that on which the par-ties are bound to come into court. Cruger v. Mc-Cracken (Tex.Civ.App.) 26 S.W. 282. Compare City of Decatur v. Barteau, 260 Ill. 612, 103 N.E. 601, 602.
Appearance Docket
A docket kept by the clerk of the court, in which appearances are entered, containing also a brief abstract of all the proceedings in the cause. See McAdams v. Windham, 191 Ala. 287, 68 So. 51, 52.
Notice of Appearance
A notice given by defendant to a plaintiff that he appears in the action in person or by attorney.
APPEARAND HEIR. In Scotch law. An appar-ent heir. See Heir Apparent.
APPELLANT. The party who takes an appeal from one court or jurisdiction to another. Used broadly or nontechnically, the term includes one who sues out a writ of error. Widgins v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 142 Va. 419, 128 S.E. 516, 518.
APPELLATE. Pertaining to or having cogni-zance of appeals and other proceedings for the judicial review of adjudications.
Word "appellate" has a general meaning, and it has a specific meaning indicating the distinction between orig-inal jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction. Woodruff v. Bell, 143 Kan. 110, 53 P.2d 498, 499.
APPELLATE COURT. A court having jurisdic-tion of appeal and review; a court to which caus-es are removable by appeal, certiorari, or error; a reviewing court, and, except in special cases where original jurisdiction is conferred, not a "trial court" or court of first instante. Sanborn v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 42 Cal.App.2d 99, 108 P.2d 458, 461; Jackson v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 179 Va. 642, 20 S.E.2d 489, 493.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION. The power and authority to take cognizance of a cause and pro-ceed to lts determination, not in its initial stages,
but only af ter it has been finally decided by an inferior court, i. e., the power of review and de-termination on appeal, writ of error, certiorari, or other similar process. Jurisdiction on appeal; jurisdiction to revise or correct the proceedings in a cause already instituted and acted upon by an inferior court, or by a tribunal having the attri-butes of a court. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Dodd, 105 Miss. 23, 61 So. 743, 49 L.R.A.,N.S., 565. The term includes proceedings in error. Miami Coun-ty v. City of Dayton, 92 Ohio St. 179, 110 N.E. 726, 727.
If court’s jurisdiction is appellate, It has no authority to determine a question in an action originally instituted in it. Rogers v. Leahy, 296 Ky. 44, 176 S.W.2d 93, 95, 149 A. L.R. 1267.
Exercise of "appellate jurisdiction" involves power not only to correct errors in judgment under review, but to make sueh disposition of causes as justice may require in order that a correct principie of decision, arising since judgment appealed from, and having a bearing upen the right disposition of the cause, may be passed on by trial court, whose judgment will be vacated and cause remanded for further proceeding to that end in proper cases. Yates v. St. Johns Beach Development Co., 122 Fla. 141, 165 So. 384, 385.
APPELLATIO. Lat. An appeal.
APPELLATOR. An old law term having the same meaning as "appellant" (q. v.).
In the civil law, the term was applied to the judge ad quem, or to whom an appeal was taken. Calvin.
APPELLEE. The party in a cause against whom an appeal is taken; that is, the party who has an interest adverse to setting aside or reversing the judgment. Slayton v. Horsey, 97 Tex. 341, 78 S.W. 919. Sometimes also called the "respond-ent."
In a nontechnical sense, "appellee" may include a de-fendant in writ of error. Widgins v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 142 Va. 419, 128 S.E. 516, 518.
In old English law. Where a person charged with trea-son or felony pleaded guilty and turned approver or "king’s evidence," and accused another as his accomplice in the same crime, in order to obtain his own pardon, the one so accused was called the "appellee." 4 B1.Comm. 330.
APPELLO. Lat. In the civil law. I appeal. The form of making an appeal apud acta. Dig. 49, 1, 2.
APPELLOR. In old English law. A criminal who accuses his accomplices, or who challenges a jury. See Approver.
APPEND. To add or attach. American Cannel Coal Co. v. Indiana Cotton Milis, 78 Ind.App. 115, 134 N.E. 891, 893.
APPENDAGE. Something added as an accessory to or the subordinate part of another thing. American Cannel Coal Co. v. Indiana Cotton Mills, 78 Ind.App. 115, 134 N.E. 891, 893.
An "appendage" for a schoolhouse includes a well on the school premises. Schofield v. School Dist. No. 113, Labette Óounty, 105 Kan. 343, 184 P. 480, 481, 7 A.L.R. 788. But "appendages" of a railroad do not include Liberty bonds pledged to indemnify a surety on its appeal bond, or cash which was not indispensable to enjoyment of the property nor to its operation. Jackman v. St. Louis & H. R. Co., 304 Mo. 319, 263 S.W. 230, 231.
126
APPLICATION
APPENDANT. A thing annexed to or belonging to another thing and passing with it; a thing of inheritance belonging to another inheritance Which is more worthy; as an advowson, common, etc., which may be appendant to a manor, com-mon of fishing to a freehold, a seat in a church to a house, etc. It differs from appurtenance, in that appendant must ever be by prescription, i. e., a personal usage for a considerable time, while an appurtenance may be created at this day; for if a grant be made to a man and his heirs, of common in such a moor for his beasts levant or couchant upon his manor, the commons are ap-purtenant to the manor, and the grant will pass them. Meek v. Breckenridge, 29 Ohio St. 648. See Appurtenance.
APPENDITIA. The appendages or appurte-nances of an estate or house, dwelling, etc.; thus, pent-houses are the appenditia domus. Cowell.
APPENDIX. A printed volume, used on an ap-peal to the English house of lords or privy
containing the documents and other evidence presented in the inferior court and referred to in the cases made by the parties for the appeal. Answering in some respects to the "paper-book" or "case" in American practice.
APPENSURA. Payment of money by weight in-stead of by count. Cowell.
APPERTAIN. To belong to; to have relation to; to be appurtenant to. Chattel mortgages, Ferguson v. Steen, Tex.Civ.App., 293 S.W. 318, 320; landlord and tenant, State v. Bodden, 166 Wis. 219, 164 N.W. 1009, 1011. To be used in con-nection with (sales contract), McVeety v. Hayes, 111 Wash. 457, 191 P. 401, 402. See, also, Appur-tenance; Appurtenant.
APPERTAINING. Connected with in use or oc-cupancy. It does not necessarily import contigui-ty, as does "adjoining." and is theref ore not synon-ymous with it: Miller v. Mann, 55 Vt. 475, 479. Peculiar to (sale of goods), Herndon v. Moore, 18 S.C. 339.
APPLE CIDER VINEGAR. Vinegar made from evaporated apples by treating them with a certain percentage of water squeezed out again as apple juice. People v. Douglas Packing Co., 236 N.Y. 1, 139 N.E. 759, 760.
APPLIANCE. Refers to machinery and all in-struments used in operating it, and is to be dis-tinguished from word "materials," which includes everything of which anything is made. Things apPlied to or used as a means to an end. Rob-erts v. City of Los Angeles; 61 P.2d 323, 330, 7 Ca1.2d 477. An "appliance" is a mechanical thing, a device or apparatus. One Black Mule v. State, 204 Ala. 440, 85 So. 749.
The term has been applied to a railroad track, Dines v. Kelley, Tex.Civ.App., 226 S.W. 493, 496; motor tracks in a coal mine, Jaggie v. Davis Colliery Co., 75 W.Va. 370. 84 S.E. 941; an automobile, Ross v. Tabor, 53 Cal.App. 605, 200 P. 971, 973; a telephone lineman’s safety belt, Boone v. Lohr, 172 Iowa 440, 154 N.W. 591, 592; and a plank on which a painting foreman was working, Peterson v. Beck,
27 Cal.App. 571, 150 P. 788, 789; but not, however, to a station water tank, rope, or scaffold used thereon, by a painter, McEarland v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 177 Ky. 551, 197 S.W. 944, 947; nor to a moving picture machine, Balcom v. Ellintuch & Yarfitz, 179 App.Div. 548, 166 N.Y.S. 841, 842; nor the steps of a caboose, Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Goldston, 163 Ky. 42, 173 S.W. 161, 162.
APPLICABLE. Fit, suitable, pertinent, or ap-propriate. Thomas v. City of Huntington, 80 Ind. App. 476, 141 N.E. 358, 359. Brought into actual contact with. People v. Buffalo Cold Storage Co., 185 N.Y.S. 790, 794, 113 Misc. 479.
When a constitution or court declares that the common law is in force in a particular state so far as It Is applica-ble, it is meant that II must be applicable to the habits and conditions of the community, as well as in harmony with the genius, the spirit, and the objects of their instItutIons. Wagner v. Bissell, 3 Iowa 402.
When a constitution prohibits the enactment of local or special laws in all cases where a general law would be ap-plicable, a general law should always be construed to be applicable, in this sense, where the entire people of the state have an interest in the subject. But where only a portion of the people are affected, as In locating a county-seat, It will depend upon the facts and clrcumstances of each particular case whether such a law would be applica-ble. Evans v. Job, 8 Nev. 322.
APPLICABLE LOCAL LAW. Terco used to deter-mine the persons who come within the term heirs and is the law which would be used to ascertain the heirs of the designated ancestor if he had owned the property and had died intestate. statement, Property, § 305e.
APPLICANT. An applicant, as for letters of administration, is one who is entitled thereto, and who files a petition asking that letters be granted. Jerauld v. Chambers, 44 Cal.App. 771, 187 P. 33.
APPLICARE. Lat. In old English law. To fasten to; to moor (a vessel). Anciently ren-dered, "to apply." • Hale, de Jure Mar.
APPLICATIO EST VITA REGULE. Application is the life of a rule. 2 Bulst. 79.
APPLICATION. A putting to, placing before, pre-ferring a request or petition to or before a person. The act of making a request for something. In re Meyer, 166 N.Y.S. 505, 100 Misc. 587. A written request to have a certain quantity of land at or near a certain specified place. Biddle v. Dougal, 5 Bin. (Pa.) 151. A petition. Scott v. Strobach, 49 Ala. 477, 489. Gardner v. Goodner Wholesale Grocery Co., 113 Tex. 423, 256 S.W. 911, 913. The use or disposition made of a thing. A bringing together, in order to ascertain some relation or establish some connection; as the appZication of a rule or principie to a case or fact.
Insurance
The preliminary request, .declaration, or state-ment made by a party applying for an insurance policy, such as one on his life, or against fire. Whipple v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 222 N.Y. 30, 118 N.E. 211, 212.
An "application" Is no more than proposition to insur-ance company and must be accepted before there can be meeting of minds required to form binding contract.
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APPLICATION
Brouster v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., Mo.App., 171 S.W.2d 775, 777; Kronjaeger v. Travelers Ins. Co., 124 W.Va. 730, 22 S.E.2d 689, 692.
Payments
Appropriation of a payment to some particular debt; or the determination to which of several demands a general payment made by a debtor to his creditor shall be applied.
Mere uncommunicated.’ intention or belief on part of debtor as to application of payment to creditor is not such an appropriation as constitutes "application" by him. Dela-ware Dredging Co. v. Tucker Stevedoring Co., C.C.A.Pa., 25 F.2d 44, 46.
Purchase Money
The disposition made of the funds received by a trustee on a sale of real estate held under the trust.
APPLY. To make a formal request or petition, usually in writing, to a court, officer, board, or company, for the granting of some favor, or of some rule or order, which is within his or their power or discretion. Fox^ example, to apply for an injunction, for a pardon, for a policy of insur-ance, or for a receiver. In re Bucyrus Road Ma-chinery Co., C.C.A.Ohio, 10 F.2d 333, 334.
To use or employ for a particular purpose; to appropriate and devote to a particular use, object, demand, or subject-matter. Thus, to apply pay-ments to the reduction of interest. Foley v. Hast-ings, 107 Conn. 9, 139 A. 305, 306. See Appro-priate.
To put, use, or refer, as suitable or relative; to co-ordinate language with a particular subject-matter; as to apply the words of a statute to a particular state of facts.
The word "apply" is used in connection with statutes in two senses. When construing a statute, in describing the class of persons. things, or functions which are within its scope; as that the statute does not "apply" to transactions in interstate u-I-nen-T. When discussing the use made of a statute, in referring to the process by which the statute is made operative; as where the jury is told to "apply" the statute of limitation if they find that the cause of ac-tion arose before a given date. Brandeis, J., dissenting in Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 42 S.Ct. 106, 110, a., 257 U.S. 282, 66 L.Ed. 239.
APPOINT. To designate, ordain, prescribe, nomí-nate. People v. Fitzsimmons, 68 N.Y. 519; Rhodes v. City of Tacoma, 97 Wash. 341, 166 P. 647. To allot, set apart. Heisler v. Robbins, 17 Ariz. 429, 153 P. 771, 772. To fix, constitute, or ordain, prescribe, settle, also to assign authority to a particular use, task or office, allot, designated. Lambach v. Anderson, 228 Iowa 1173, 293 N.W. 505, 510.
"Appoint" is used where exclusive power and authority is given to one person, officer, or body to name persons to hold certain otfices. State v. Doss, 102 W.Va. 162, 134 S.E. 749. It is usually distinguished from "elect," meaning to choose by a vote of the qualified voters of the city. State ex rel. Smith v. Bowman, 184 Mo.App. 549, 170 S.W. 700, 701, But the distinction is not invariably observed. Schaffner v. Shaw, 191 Iowa 1047, 180 N.W. 853, 854.
APPOINTEE. A person who is appointed or se-lected for a particular purpose; as the appointee under a power is the person who is to receive the benefit of the power.
"Appointed" and "etected" are used interchangeably. Van Cleve v. Wallace, 216 Minn. 500, 13 N.W.2d 467, 469.
APPOINTMENT. The designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to discharge the duties of some office or trust. In re Nicholson’s Estate, 104 Colo. 561, 93 P.2d 880, 884. See, also, Power of Appointment.
The exercise of a right to designate the per-son or persons who are to take the use of real estate. 2 Washb.Real Prop. 302; Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 308 III. 519, 139 N.E. 912, 919. The act of a person in directing the disposition of property, by limiting a use, or by substituting a new use for a former one, in pursuance of a power granted to him for that purpose by a preceding deed, called a "power of appointment;" also the deed or other instrument by which he so conveys. Where the power em-braces several permitted objects, and the appoint-ment is made to one or more of them, excluding others, it is called "exclusive."
Appointment may signify an appropriation of money to a specific purpose. Harris v. Clark, 3 N.Y. 93, 119, 51 Am.Dec. 352. See Illusory Ap-pointment. It may also mean the arranging of a meeting. Spears v. State, 89 Tex.Cr.R. 459, 232 S.W. 326, 328.
Office or Public Function
The selection or designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to fin an office or public function and discharge the duties of the same. State v. Braman, 173 Wis. 596, 181 N.W. 729, 730.
The terco "appointment" is to be distinguished from "election." The former is an executive act. Election means that the person is chosen by a principie of selection in the nature of a vote, participated in by the public gen-erally or by the entlre class of persons qualified to express their choice in this manner. Mono County v. Industrial Acc. Commission, 175 Cal. 752, 167 P. 377, 378.
"Election" to office usually refers to vote of people, whereas "appointment" relates to designation by some in-dividual or group. Board of Education of Boyle County v. McChesney, 235 Ky. 692, 32 S.W.2d 26, 27.
APPOINTOR. The person who appoints, or exe-cutes a power of appointment; as appointee is the person to whom or in whose favor an appoint-ment is made. 1 Steph.Comm. 506, 507; 4 Kent, Comm. 316.
One authorized by the donor, under the statute of uses, to execute a power. 2 Bouv.Inst. n. 1923.
The appointor is the instrument of the donor of the power, and the appointee takes under the original will or instrument which creates the trust, and not from the donee of the power. Barret v. Berea College, 48 R.I. 258, 137 A. 145, 147.
APPORT. L. Fr. In old English law. Tax; tallage; tribute; imposition; payment; charge; expenses. Kelham.
APPORTION. To divide and distribute propon tionally. School Dist. No. 3, Platte County, v. School Dist. No. 2, Platte County, 29 Wyo. 80, 210 P. 562.

APPORTIONMENT. The division, partition, or distribution of a subject-matter in proportionate parts. Hunt v. Callaghan, 32 Ariz. 235, 257 P. 648, 649. The division of rights or liabilities among several persons entitled or liable to them in accordance with their respective interests. Val-ley Nat. Bank of Phcenix v. Apache County, 57 Ariz. 459, 114 P.2d 883, 886.

Contracts

The allowance, in case of a severable contract, partially performed, of a part of the entire con-sideration proportioned to the degree in which the contract was carried out.

Corporate Shares

of the shares allowed to be issued by the charter, where more than the limitéd number have been subscribed for. Haight v. Day, 1 Johns.Ch.,

towards the removal of the incum-brance.
Rent
The allotment of their shares in a rent to each of several parties owning it. The determination of the amount of rent to be paid when the tenan-cy is terminated at some period other than one of the regular intervals for the payment of rent. Gluck v. Baltimore, 81 Md. 315, 32 A. 515, 48 Am. St.Rep. 515.
Representatives
The determination upon each decennial census of the number of representatives in congress which each state shall elect, the calculation being based upon the population. See Const.U.S. art. 1, § 2; Amend. 14, § 2.
Right of Common
A division of the right of common between sev-eral persons, among whom the land to which, as an entirety, it first belonged has been divided.
Taxes
The apportionment of a tax consists in a selec-tion of the subjects to be taxed, and in laying down the rule by which to measure the contribu-tion which each of these subjects shall make to the tax. Barfield v. Gleason, 111 Ky. 491, 63 S.W. 964.
APPORTS EN NATURE. In French law. That which a partner brings into the partnership other than cash; for instance, securities, realty or per-sonalty, cattle, stock, or even his personal ability and knowledge. Argl.Fr.Merc.Law, 545.
APPORTUM. In old English law. The revenue, profit, or emolument which a thing brings to the owner. Commonly applied to a corody or pen-sien. Blount.
Black’s law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed.-9
APPOSAL OF SHERIFFS. The charging them with money received upon their account in the exchequer. St. 22 ,S’z 23 Car. II.; Cowell.
APPOSER. An officer in the exchequer, clothed with the duty of examining the sheriffs in respect of their accounts. Usually called the "foreign ap-poser." Termes de la Ley. The ornee is now abolished.
APPOSTILLE, or APOSTILLE. In French law, an addition or annotation made in the margin of a writing. Merl. Répert.
APPRAISAL. A valuation or an estimation of value of property by two disinterested persons of suitable qualifications. Jacobs v. Schmidt, 231 Mich. 200, 203 N.W. 845, 846.
APPRAISE. In practice. To fix or set a price or value upon; to fix and state the true value of a thing, and, usually, in writing. Vincent v. Ger-man Ins. Co., 120 Iowa, 272, 94 N.W. 458. To val-ue property at what it is worth. Tax Commission of Ohio v. Clark, 20 Ohio App. 166, 151 N.E. 780, 781.
To "appraise" money means to count. In re Hollinger’s Estate, 259 Pa. 72, 102 A. 409.
APPRAISEMENT. A just and true valuation of property. A valuation set upon property under judicial or legislative authority. Cocheco Mfg. Co. v. Strafford, 51 N.H. 482. A valuation or es-timation of the value of property. Littlehead v. Sheppard, 123 Okl. 29, 251 P. 60, 62.
An "arbitration" presupposes a controversy or difference to be decided, and the arbitrators pro-ceed in a judicial way. On the other hand, an appraisal or valuation is generally a mere auxil-iary feature of a contract of sale, the purpose of which is not to adjudicate a controversy but to avoid one. Thompson v. Newman, 36 Cal.App. 248, 171 P. 982, 983.
APPRAISER. A person appointed by competent authority to make an appraisement, to ascertain and state the true value of goods or real estate.
The title of "appraiser" cardes with it a sig-nificance that he is to be the judge of the evi-dence he desires submitted to him on the question of valuation, in cases fairly treated by him. In re Gibert’s Estate, 160 N.Y.S. 213, 214, 96 Misc. 401.
General Appraisers
Appraisers appointed under an act of congress to afford aid and assistance to the collectors of customs in the appraisement of imported mer-chandise. Gibb v. Washington, 10 Fed.Cas. 288.
Merchant Appraisers
Where the appraisement of an invoice of im-ported goods made by the revenue officers at the custom house is not satisfactory to the importer, persons may be selected (under this name) to make a definitive valuation; they must be mer-
APPRECIABLE
chants engaged in trade. Oelberman v. Merritt, C.C.N.Y., 19 Fed. 408; s. c., 8 Sup.Ct. 151, 123 U.S. 356, 31 L.Ed. 164.
APPRECIABLE. Capable of being estimated, weighed, judged of, or recognized by the mind; capable of being perceived or recognized by the senses; perceptible but not a synonym of substan-tial. Fisher v. Los Angeles Pacific Co., 21 Cal. App. 677, 132 P. 767, 769; Stodder v. Rosen Talk-ing Mach. Co., 247 Mass. 60, 141 N.E. 569, 571.
As used in a decree enjoining operation of a cotton oil mili in such manner as to throw out lint in "appreciable" quantities, "appreciable" may be practically synonymous with unreasonabie. Buckeye Cotton 011 Co. v. Ragland, C. C.A.Miss., 11 F.2d 231, 234.
APPRECIATE. To estimate justly; to set a price or value on. Holmes v. Connell’s Estate, 207 Mich. 663, 175 N.W. 148, 149; Brace v. Black, 125 Ill. 33, 17 N.E. 66. When used with reference to the nature and effect of an act, "appreciate" may be synonymous with "know" or "understand." West-ern Indemnity Co. v. MacKechnie, Tex.Civ.App., 214 S.W. 456, 460.
APPRECIATION IN VALUE. Appreciation in the value of property has reference to the so-called unearned increment, and does not include that added value of the property made by exten-sions and permanent improvements. People ex rel. Adirondack Power & Light Corporation v. Public Service Commission, 193 N.Y.S. 186, 189, 200 App.Div. 268.
APPREHEND. To take hold of, whether with the mind, and so to conceive, believe, fear, dread, Trogdon v. State, 133 Ind. 1, 32 N.E. 725; or ac-tually and bodily, and so to take a person on a criminal process; to seize; to arrest, Hogan v. Stophlet, 179 Ill. 150, 53 N.E. 604, 44 L.R.A. 809. To understand. Golden v. State, 25 Ga. 527, 531. To be conscious or sensible of. Collins v. Liddle, 67 Utah, 242, 247 P. 476, 479.
APPREHENSIO. Lat. In the civil and old Eng-lish law. A taking hold of a person or thing; apprehension; the seizure or capture of a person. Calvin.
One of the varieties or subordinate forms of occupatio, or the mode of acquiring title to things not belonging to any one.
APPREHENSION.
In Practice
The seizure, taking, or arrest of a person on a criminal charge. The term "apprehension" is applied exclusively to criminal cases, and "arrest" to both criminal and civil cases. People v. Mar-tin, 188 Cal. 281, 205 P. 121, 123, 21 A.L.R. 1399.
Civil Law
A physical or corporal act, (corpus,) on the part of one who intends to acquire possession of a thing, by which he brings himself into such a re-lation to the thing that he may subject it to his exclusive control; or by which he obtains the
physical ability to exercise his power over the thing whenever he pleases. One of the requisites to the acquisition of judicial possession, and by which, when accompanied by intention, (animus,) possession is acquired. Mackeld.Rom.Law, §§ 248, 249, 250.
APPRENDRE. A fee or profit taken or received. Cowell.
APPRENTICE. A person, usually a minor, bound in due form of law to a master, to learn from him his art, trade, or business, and to serve him during the time of his apprenticeship. 1 Bl.Comm. 426. City of St. Louis v. Bender, 248 Mo. 113, 154 S.W. 88, 89, 44 L.R.A.,N.S., 1072.
APPRENTICE EN LA LEY. An ancient name for students at law, and afterwards applied to counsellors, apprentici ad barras, from which comes the moré modem word "barrister." In some of the ancient law-writers the terms appren-tice and barrister are synonymous. Co. 2d Inst. 214; Eunomus, Dial. 2, § 53, p. 155.
APPRENTICESHIP. A contract by which one person, usually a minor, called the "apprentice," is bound to another person, called the "master," to serve him during a prescribed term of years in his art, trade, or business, in consideration of being instructed by the master in such art or trade, and (commonly) of receiving his support and maintenance from the master during such term.
The term during which an apprentice is to serve.
The status of an apprentice; the relation sub-sisting between an apprentice and his master.
APPRENTICIUS AD LEGEM. An apprentice to the law; a law student; a counsellor below the degree of serjeant; a barrister. See Apprentice en la Ley.
APPRIZING. In Scotch law. A form of process by which a creditor formerly took possession of the estates of the debtor in payment of the debt due. It is how superseded by adjudications.
APPROACH. To come nearer in space. Lawrence v. Goodwill, 44 Cal.App. 440; Weber v. Greene-baum, 270 Pa. 382, 113 A. 413, 414.
Thus, an "approaching" street car is one coming near to, in point of time and place. Ruffin Coal & Transfer Co. v. Rich, 214 Ala. 622, 108 So. 600, 602.
APPROACH, RIGHT OF. In international law. The right of a ship of war, upon the high sea, to draw near to another vessel for the purpose of ascertaining the nationality of the latter. The Marianna Flora, 11 Wheat., U.S., 43, 44, 6 L.Ed. 405. Kent understood it to be equivalent to the right of visit. 1 Kent, Comm. 153. And at pres-ent the right of approach has no existente apart from the right of visit.
APPROACHES. A way, passage, or avenue by which a place or building can be approached; an access. State ex rel. Washington Toll Bridge Au-
130
APPROPRIATION
thority v. Yelle, 197 Wash. 110, 84 P.2d 688, 691; State v. Zangerle, 43 Ohio App. 30, 182 N.E. 644, 646.
Comprlsing the necessary traffic arteries and adjustment of a bridge to develop its maximum traffic capacity. State ex rel. Washington Toll Bridge Authority v. Yelle, 197 Wash. 110, 84 P.2d 688, 691, 692, 694; including embank-ments, grades, or structures of any sort serving as a pas-sage or way. Starrett v. Inhabitants of Town of Thomas-ton, 126 Me. 205, 137 A. 67, 70. That part of the roadway which is essential to make the bridge accessible and con-venient for public use. With respect to bridge or viaduct; In re Rosedale Ave. in City of New York, 162 N.Y.S. 877, 885, 175 App.Div. 864.
APPROBATE AND REPROBATE. In Scotch law. To approve and reject; to atternpt to take ad-vantage of one part, and reject the rest. Bell.
Equity suffers no person to approbate and reprobate the same deed. 1 Kames, Eq. 317; 1 Bell, Comm. 146. The doctrine of approbate and reprobate is the English doctrine of election.
APPROPRIATE. To make a thing one’s own; to make a thing the subject of property; to exercise d.ominion over an object to the extent, and for the purpose, of making it subserve one’s own proper use or pleasure. People v. Ashworth, 222 N.Y.S. 24, 27, 220 App.Div. 498. To prescribe a particular use for particular moneys; to desig-nate or destine a fund or property for a distinct use, or for the payment of a particular demand. McKenzie Const. Co. v. City of San Antonio, Tex., 50 S.W.2d 349, 352; Jennings v. Kinsey, 308 Mo. 265, 271 S.W. 786, 787. Also used in the sense of distribute.
In this sense it may denote the act of an executor or ad-ministrator who distributes the estate of his dccedent among the legatees, heirs, or others entitled, in pursuance of bis duties and according to their respective rights; to take away from one to whom a chattel belongs, and to de-vote it to the exclusive use and benefit of him who appro-priates it. Davis v. Perkins, 178 Ga. 195, 172 S.E. 562, 565; or properly used in this sense to denote the acquisition of property and a right of exclusive enjoyment in those things which before were without an owner or were publiei juris. People v. Lammerts, 164 N.Y. 137, 58 N.E. 22.
APPROPRIATE PROCESS. A subpoena, sub-poena duces tecum, or order to appear and pro-duce books and records and testify within Internal Revenue Code providing that the Com-missioner of Internal Revenue may ask the Dis-trict Court by appropriate process to compel at-tendance, testimony or production of books, pa-pers or other data. In re Wolrich, D.C.N.Y., 84 F.Supp. 481, 482.
APPROPRIATION. The act of ap.propriating or setting apart; prescribing the destination of a thing; designating the use or application of a fund. State v. Erickson, 93 Mont. 466, 19 P.2d 227, 229; McKenzie Const. Co. v. City of San An-tonio, Tex.Civ.App., 50 S.W.2d 349, 352.
Public Law
The act by which the legislative department of government designates a particular fund, or sets apart a specified portion of the public revenue or of the money in the public treasury, to be applied to some general object of governmental expendi-ture, or to some individual purchase or expense.
Blaine County Inv. Co. v. Gallet, 35 Idaho, 102, 204 P. 1066, 1067. Authority given by Legislature to proper officers to apply distinctly specified sum from designated fund out of treasury in given year for specified object or demand against state. State ex rel. Murray v. Carter, 167 Okl. 473, 30 P.2d 700, 702.
An element of the definition of "appropriation" is that the money appropriated be out of the general revenues of the state. Black and White Taxicab Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 25 Ariz. 381, 218 P. 139, 144. An "expenditure" is the expending, a laying out of money, disbursement, and is not the same as an "appropriation," the setting apart or as-signment to a particular person or use. Grout v. Gates, 97 Vt. 434, 124 A. 76, 80; Suppiger v. Eniking, 60 Idaho 292, 91 P.2d 362, 364, 365.
A specific appropriation is an act of the legisla-ture by which a named sum of money has been set apart in the treasury, and devoted to the pay-ment of a particular demand. Stratton v. Green, 45 Cal. 149.
Appropriation of land. The act of selecting, de-voting, or setting apart land for a particular use or purpose, as where land is appropriated for pub-lic buildings, military reservations, or other pub-lic uses. McSorley v. Hill, 2 Wash.St. 638, 27 Pac. 552; Jackson v. Wilcox, 2 III. 360. Taking of pri-vate property for public use in the exercise of the power of eminent domain. N. Ward Co. v. Board of Street Com’rs of City of Boston, 217 Mass. 381, 104 N.E. 965, 966. In this sense it may refer mere-ly to physical occupation and contemplate pay-ment prior thereto, in contra-distinction to "tak-ing," referring to a legal taking and presupposing payment atter damages are due. Keller v. City of Bridgeport, 101 Conn, 669, 127 A. 508, 511.
Appropriation of payments. The application of a payment to the discharge of a particular debt.
Thus, if a creditor has two distinct debts due to him from his debtor, and the latter makes a general payment on account, without specifying at the time to which debt he intends the payment to apply, it is optional for the creditor to appropriate (apply) the payment to either of the two debts he pleases. Gwin v. McLean, 62 Miss. 121; Martin v. Draher, 5 Watts (Pa.) 544.
Appropriation of water. An appropriation of water flowing on the public domain consists in the capture, impounding, or diversion of it from its natural course or channel and its actual appli-cation to some beneficial use private or personal to the appropriator, to the entire exclusion (or exclusion to the extent of the water appropriated) of all other persons. To constitute a valid ap-propriation, there must be an intent to apply the water to some beneficial use existing at the time or contemplated in the future, a diversion from the natural channel by means of a ditch or canal, or some other open physical act of taking posses-sion of the water, and an actual application of it within a reasonable time to some useful or bene-ficial purpose. In re Water Rights in Silvies River, 115 Or. 27, 237 P. 322, 336; In re Manse Spring and Its Tributaries, Nye County, 60 Nev. 280, 108 P.2d 311, 314; State of Neb. v. State of Wyo., U.S.Neb. & Wyo., 65 S.Ct. 1332, 1349, 325 U.S. 589, 89 L.Ed. 1815.
It follows water to its original source whether through surface or subterranean streams or through percolation,
131
APPROPRIATION
Justesen v. Olsen, 40 P.2d 802, 809, 86 Utah 158; and en-titles appropriator to continuing right to use water to ex-tent of appropriation, but not beyond that reasonably re-quired and actually used. State of Arizona v. State of California, Ariz. & Cal., 56 S.Ct. 848, 852, 298 U.S. 558, 80 L.Ed. 1331.
English Ecclesiastical Law
The perpetual annexing of a benefice to some spiritual corporation either sole or aggregate, be-ing the patron of the living. 1 Bl.Comm. 384; 3 Steph.Comm. 70-75; 1 Crabb, Real Prop. p. 144, § 129.
Where the annexation is to the use of a lay person, it is usually called an "impropriation" (q. v.). 1 Crahb, Real Prop. p. 145, § 130. There have heen no appropriations since the dissolution of monasterios.
APPROPRIATION BILL. A measure before a legislative body authorizing the expenditure of public moneys and stipulating the amount, man-ner, and purpose of the various items of expencli-ture. State ex rel. Finnegan v. Dammann, 220 Wis. 143, 264 N.W. 622, 624.
APPROPRIATOR. One who makes an appropria-tion; as, an appropriator of water. Lux v. Hag-gin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 Pac. 736.
English Ecclesiastical Law
A,spiritual corporation entitled to the profits of a benefice.
APPROVAL. The act of confirming, ratifying, sanctioning, or consenting to some act or thing done by another. Rooney v. South Sioux City, 111 Neb. 1, 195 N.W. 474, 475. "Approval" implies knowledge and exercise of discretion af ter knowl-edge. State v. Duckett, 133 S.C. 85, 130 S.E. 340, 342; McCarten v. Sanderson, 111 Mont. 407, 109 P.2d 1108, 1112, 132 A.L.R. 1229.
The act of a judge or magistrate in sanction-ing and accepting as satisfactory a bond, security, or other instrument which is required by law to pass his inspection and receive his approbation before it becomes operative.
APPROVE. To be satisfied with; to confirm, rati-fy, sanction, or consent to some act or thing done by another; to sanction officially; to ratify; to confirm; to pronounce good; think or judge well of; admit the propriety or excellence of; be pleased with. Western Hospital Ass’n v. Indus-trial Accident Board, 51 Idaho 334, 6 P.2d 8.15, 848; MacNeill v. Maddox, 194 Ga. 802, 22 S.E.2d 653, 654; Board of Education of City of Hutchin-son y. Reno Community High School, 124 Kan. 175; 257 P. 957, 959; Tibbens v. Clayton, D.C. Okl., 288 F. 393, 394. Distinguishable from "au-thorize," meaning to permit a thing to be done in future. Gray v. Gill, 210 N.Y.S. 658, 660, 125 Misc. 70.
To take to one’s proper and separate use. To improve; to enhance the value or profits of any-thing. To inclose and cultivate common or waste land.
To approve common or waste land is to inclose and con-vert It to the purposes of husbandry, which the owner might always do, provided he left common sufficient for such as were entitled to it. 3 Kent, Comm. 406.
Old Criminal Law
To accuse or prove; to accuse an accomplice by giving evidence against him.
APPROVED INDORSED NOTES. Notes in-dorsed by another person than the maker, for ad•• ditional security, the indorser being satisfactory to the payce. Milis v. Hunt, 20 Wend., N.Y., 431.
APPROVEMENT. At ancient common law a practico of criminal prosecutions by which a per-son accused of treason or felony was permitted to exonerate himself by accusing others and es-caping prosecution himself. Lee v. State, 115 Ha. 30, 155 So. 123; Guthrie v. Commonwealth, 171 Va. 461, 198 S.E. 481, 482, 119 A.L.R. 683.
The custom existecl only in capital cases, and consisted in the accuseci, called "approver", being arraigned and per-mitteci to confess before plea and appeal or accuse another as bis accomplice of the same crime in order to obtain his pardon.
APPROVER. L. Fr. To approve or prove; to vouch. Kelharn.
APPROVER. An accomplice in crime who ac-cuses others of the same offense, and is admitted as a wjtness at the discretion of the court to give evidence against his companions in guilt. He is vulgarly called "King’s Evidence."
One who confesses himself guilty of felony and accuses others of the same crime to save him-self from punishment. Myers v. People, 26 Ill. 175. By the old law, if he failed to convict those he accused he was at once hung. Lee v. State, 115 Fla. 30, 155 So. 123. See, also, Antithetarius.
In old English law. Certain men sent into the several counties to increase the farms (rents) of hundreds and wapentakes, which formerly were let at a certain value to the sheriff. Cowell.
Bailiffs of lords in their franchises. Sheriffs were called the king’s "approvers" in 1 Edw. III, st. 1, c. 1. Termes de la Ley, 49.
Approvers in the Marches were those who had license to sell and purchase beasts there.
APPROXIMATE. Used in the sense of an esti-mate merely, meaning more or less, but about and near the amount, quantity, or distante specified. Stockburger v. Brooker, 33 Ga.App. 676, 127 S.E. 663. Near to; about; a little more or less; close. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n v. Fitzgerald, Tex. Civ.App., 292 S.W. 925, 927. Fiesel v. Bennett, 225 Iowa 98, 280 N.W. 482, 484. "Approximately" is very nearly synonymous with "proximately," P. B. Arnold Co. v. Buchanan, 60 Ind.App. 626, 111 N.E. 204, 207; meaning very nearly, but not absolutely. Sandberg v. Margold Realty Corpo-ration, 247 N.Y.S. 139, 141, 231 App.Div. 241.
APPROXIMATION. Equitable doctrine by which precise terms of charitable trust can be varied under certain circumstances. Heustess v. Hunt-ingdon College, 242 Ala. 272, 5 So.2d 777, 779, 780; applicable solely to charitable trusts and em-ployed only where on failure of trust the court finds a general charitable intent. Waterbury Trust Co. v. Porter, 131 Conn. 206, 38 A.2d 598, 603.
132
APPRUARE. To take to one’s use or profit. Cow-ell.
APPULSUS. In the civil law. A driving to, as of cattle to water. Dig. 8, 3, 1, 1.
APPURTENANCE. That which belongs to some-thing else; an adjunct; an appendage; some-thing annexed to another thing more worthy as principal, and which passes as incident to it, as a right of way or other easement to land; an out-house, barn, garden, or orchard, to a house or messuage. Cohen v. Whitcomb, 142 Minn. 20, 170 N.W. 851, 852; Alwes v. Richheimer, 185 Ark. 535, 47 S.W.2d 1084, 1085; Joplin Waterworks Co. v. Jasper County, 327 Mo. 964, 38 S.W.2d 1068, 1076. An article adapted to the use of the property to which it is connected, and which was intended to be a permanent accession to the freehold. Szilagy v. Taylor, 63 Ohio App. 105, 25 N.E.2d 360, 361.
An article may become an "appurtenance to realty" without physical attachment. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 69 S.D. 225, 9 N.W.2d 140, 141.
APPURTENANT. Belonging to; accessory or in-cident to; adjunct, appended, or annexed to; an-swering to accessoriurn in the civil law. 2 Steph. Comm. 30 note. McClintic-Marshall Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 254 Mich. 305, 236 N.W. 792, 795; Be-ing employed in leases for the purpose of includ-ing any easements or servitudes used or enjoyed with the demised premises. Riddle v. Littlefield, 53 N.H. 508, 16 Am.Rep. 388.
A thing is "appurtenant" to something else only when it stands in relation of an incident to a principal, and is necessarily connected with the use and enjoyment of the latter. Catterall v. Pulis, 137 Okl. 86, 278 P. 292, 294.
A thing is deerned to be incidental or appurtenant to land when it is by right used with the land for its benefit, as in the case of a way, or water-course, or of a passage for light, air, or heat from or across the land of another. Mat-tix v. Swepston, 127 Tenn. 693, 155 S.W. 928, 930.
Land cannot be appurtenant to land. Hurley v. Liberty Lake Co., 112 Wash. 207, 192 P. 4, 5; except In case of land under water. In re Eastern Boulevard in Borough of the Bronx, City of New York, 243 N.Y.S. 57, 61, 230 App. Div. 52.
APRAXIA. See Aphasia.
APROVECHAMIENTO. In Spanish law. Ap-provement, or improvement and enjoyment of public° lands. As applied to pueblo lands, it has particular reference to the commons, and includes not only the actual enjoyment of them but a right to such enjoyment. Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530, 566.
APT. Fit; suitable; appropriate.
APT TIME. Apt time sometimes depends upon lapse of time; as, where a thing is required to be done at the first terco, or within a given time, it cannot be done afterwards. But the phrase more usually refers to the order of proceedings, as fit or suitable. Holmes Electric Co. v. Carolina Power & L,ight Co., 150 S.E. 621, 623, 197 N.C. 766.
APT WORDS. Words proper to produce the legal effect for which they are intended; sound techni-cal phrases.
AQUAGIUM
APTA VIRO. Fit for a husband; marriageable; a woman who has reached marriageable years.
APUD ACTA. Among the acts; among the re-corded proceedings. In the civil law, this phrase is applied to appeals taken orally, in the presence of the judge, at the time of judgment or sentence. Credit Co., Ltd., v. Arkansas Cent. Ry. Co., 9 S. Ct. 107, 108, 128 U.S. 258, 32 L.Ed. 448.
AQUA. In the civil and old English law. Water; sometimes a stream or water-course.
AQUA /ESTIVA. In Roman law. Summer wa-ter; water that was used in summer only. Dig. 43, 20, 1, 3, 4.
AQUA CEDIT SOLO. Water follows the land. A sale of land will pass the water which covers it. 2 Bl.Comm. 18; Co.Litt. 4.
AQUA CURRENS. Running water.
AQUA CURRIT ET DEBET CURRERE, UT CUR-RERE SOLEBAT. Water runs, and ought to run, as it has used to run. A running stream should be left to flow in its natural channel, without alteration or diversion, Goble v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 187 Ga. 243, 200 S.E. 259, 261; that water is the common and equal property of every one through whose domain it flows. Elmore v. In-galls, 17 So.2d 674, 245 Ala. 481.
AQUA DULCIS, or FRISCA. Fresh water. Reg. Orig. 97; Bract. fols. 117, 135.
AQUA FONTANEA. Spring water. Fleta, lib. 4, c. 27, § 8.
AQUA PROFLUENS. Flowing or running water. Dig. 1, 8, 2.
AQUA QUOTIDIANA. In Reman law. Daily wa-ter; water that might be drawn at all times of the year, (qua quis quotidie possit uti, si vellet). Dig. 43, 20, 1-4.
AQUA SALSA. Salt water.
AQUJE DUCTUS. In the civil law. A servitude which consists in the right to carry water by means of pipes or conduits over or through the estate of another. Dig. 8, 3, 1; Inst. 2, 3.
AQUJE HAUSTUS. In the civil law. A servitude which consists in the right to draw water from the fountain, pool, or spring of another. Inst. 2, 3, 2; Dig. 8, 3, 1, 1.
AQUZE IMMITTENIME. A civil law easement or servitude, consisting in the right of one whose house is surrounded with other buildings to cast waste water upon the adjacent roofs or yards. Similar to the common law easement of drip. Bel-lows v. Sackett, 15 Barb. (N.Y.) 96.
AQUAGIUM. A canal, ditch, or water course run-ning through marshy grounds. A mark or gauge placed in or on the banks of a running stream, to indicate the height of the water, was called "aqua• gaugiurn." Spelman.
133
AQUATIC
AQUATIC RIGHTS. Rights which individuals have to the use of the sea and rivers, for the pur-pose of fishing and navigation, and also to the soil in the sea and rivers.
AQUILIAN LAW. See Lex Aquilia.
ARABANT. They plowed. A term of feudal law, applied to those who held by the tenure of plow-ing and tilling the lord’s lands within the manor. Cowell.
ARABLE LAND. That which is fit for plowing or tillage, and thus is distinguishable from swamp land, which is land that is too wet for cultiva-tion. 6 C.J.S. p. 143; McCarter v. Sooy Oyster Co., 75 A. 211, 215, 78 N.J.Law, 394.
ARAHO. In feudal law. To make oath in the church or some other holy place. All oaths were made in the church upon the relics of saints, ac-cording to the Ripuarian laws. Cowell; Spelman.
ARALIA. Plowlands. Land fit for the plow. De-noting the character of land, rather than its con-dition. Spelman.
ARATOR. A plowman; a farmer of arable land.
ARATRUM TERRJE. In old English law. A plow of land; a plowland; as much land as could be tilled with one plow (or by a single "arator" or plowman). Whishaw.
ARATURA TERRiE. The plowing of land by the tenant, or vassal, in the service of his lord. Whi-shaw.
ARAT1URIA. Land suitable for the plow; arable land. Spelman.
ARBITER. A person chosen to decide a contro-versy; an arbitrator, referee. A person bound to decide according to the rules of law and equity, as distinguished from an arbitrator, who may proceed wholly at his own discretion, so that it be according to the judgment of a sound man. Cowell.
In the Roman law. A judge invested with a discretionary power. A person appointed by the prwtor to examine and decide that class of causes or actions termed "bonce fidei," and who had the power of judging according to the principies of equity, (ex cequo et bono;) distinguished from the judex, ( q. v.,) who was bound to decide ac-cording to strict law. Inst. 4, 6, 30, 31.
According to Mr. Abbott, the distinction is as follows: "Arbitrator" is a technical name of a person selected with reference to an established system for friendly determina-tion of controversies, which, though not judicial, is yet regulated by law; so that the powers and duties of the arbitrator, when once he is chosen, are prescribed by law, and his doings may be judicially revised if he has exceeded his authority. "Arbiter" is an untechnical designation of a person to whom a controversy is referred, irrespective of any law to govern the decision; and is the proper word to signify a refereg of a question outside of or aboye mu-nicipal law. But it is elsewhere said that the distinction between arbiters and arbitrators is not observed in modem. law. Russ.Arb. 112.
ARBITRAGE. Transactions of bankers and mer-cantile houses by which stocks or bilis are bought
in one

AQUATIC RIGHTS. Rights which individuals have to the use of the sea and rivers, for the pur-pose of fishing and navigation, and also to the soil in the sea and rivers.
AQUILIAN LAW. See Lex Aquilia.
ARABANT. They plowed. A term of feudal law, applied to those who held by the tenure of plow-ing and tilling the lord’s lands within the manor. Cowell.
ARABLE LAND. That which is fit for plowing or tillage, and thus is distinguishable from swamp land, which is land that is too wet for cultiva-tion. 6 C.J.S. p. 143; McCarter v. Sooy Oyster Co., 75 A. 211, 215, 78 N.J.Law, 394.
ARAHO. In feudal law. To make oath in the church or some other holy place. All oaths were made in the church upon the relics of saints, ac-cording to the Ripuarian laws. Cowell; Spelman.
ARALIA. Plowlands. Land fit for the plow. De-noting the character of land, rather than its con-dition. Spelman.
ARATOR. A plowman; a farmer of arable land.
ARATRUM TERRJE. In old English law. A plow of land; a plowland; as much land as could be tilled with one plow (or by a single "arator" or plowman). Whishaw.
ARATURA TERRiE. The plowing of land by the tenant, or vassal, in the service of his lord. Whi-shaw.
ARAT1URIA. Land suitable for the plow; arable land. Spelman.
ARBITER. A person chosen to decide a contro-versy; an arbitrator, referee. A person bound to decide according to the rules of law and equity, as distinguished from an arbitrator, who may proceed wholly at his own discretion, so that it be according to the judgment of a sound man. Cowell.
In the Roman law. A judge invested with a discretionary power. A person appointed by the prwtor to examine and decide that class of causes or actions termed "bonce fidei," and who had the power of judging according to the principies of equity, (ex cequo et bono;) distinguished from the judex, ( q. v.,) who was bound to decide ac-cording to strict law. Inst. 4, 6, 30, 31.
According to Mr. Abbott, the distinction is as follows: "Arbitrator" is a technical name of a person selected with reference to an established system for friendly determina-tion of controversies, which, though not judicial, is yet regulated by law; so that the powers and duties of the arbitrator, when once he is chosen, are prescribed by law, and his doings may be judicially revised if he has exceeded his authority. "Arbiter" is an untechnical designation of a person to whom a controversy is referred, irrespective of any law to govern the decision; and is the proper word to signify a refereg of a question outside of or aboye mu-nicipal law. But it is elsewhere said that the distinction between arbiters and arbitrators is not observed in modem. law. Russ.Arb. 112.
ARBITRAGE. Transactions of bankers and mer-cantile houses by which stocks or bilis are bought
in one market and sold in another for the sake of the profit arisirg from a difference in price in the two markets.
ARBITRAMENT. The award or decision of ar-bitrators upon a matter of dispute, which has been submitted to them. Termes de la Ley.
ARBITRAMENT AND AWARD. A plea to an ac-tion brought for the same cause which had been submitted to arbitration and on which an award had been made. Wats.Arb. 256.
ARBITRAMENTUM JEQUUM TRIBUIT CUIQUE SUUM. A just arbitration renders to every one his own. Noy, Max. 248.
ARBITRARILY. See Arbitrary.
A finding that certain orders were "arbitrarily" given by an engineer in charge of a public improvement did not amount to a finding that they were given in bad faith, fraudulently, or through ignorante or incompetency. First Savings & Trust Co. v. Milwaukee County, 158 Wis. 207, 148 N.W. 22, 33.
ARBITRARINESS. Conduct or acts based alone upon one’s will, and not upon any course of rea-soning and exercise of judgment. Garman v. My-ers, 183 Okl. 141, 80 P.2d 624, 626.
ARBITRARY. Means in an "arbitrary" manner, as fixed or done capriciously or at pleasure; with-out adequate determining principie; not founded in the nature of things; nonrational; not done or acting according to reason or judgment; depend-ing on the will alone; absolutely in power; ca-priciously; tyrannical; despotic; Corneil v. Swisher County, Tex.Civ.App., 78 S.W.2d 1072, 1074. Without fair, solid, and substantial cause; that is, without cause based upon the law. U. S. v. Lotempio, D.C.N.Y., 58 F.2d 358, 359; not gov-erned by any fixed rules or standard. People ex rel. Hultman v. Gilchrist, 188 N.Y.S. 61, 65, 114 Misc, 651.
ARBITRARY GOVERNMENT. The difference be-tween a free and an arbitrary government is that in the former limits are assigned to those to whom the administration is committed, but the latter depends on the will of the departments or some of them. Kamper v. Hawkins, 1 Va.Cas. 20, 23.
ARBITRARY POWER. Power to act according to one’s own will; especially applicable to power conferred on an administrative officer, who is not furnished any adequate determining principie. Fox Film Corporation v. Trumbull, D.C.Conn., 7 F.2d 715, 727.
ARBITRARY PUNISHMENT. That punishment which is left to the decision of the judge, in dis-tinction from those defined by statute.
ARBITRATION. The submission for determina-tion of disputed matter to private unofficial per-sons selected in manner provided by law or agree-ment. Stockwell v. Equitable Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 25 P.2d 873, 134 Cal.App. 534. The substitu-tion of their award or decision for judgment of a tour. t. In re Curtis-Castle Arbitration, 64 Conn. 501, 30 A. 769, 42 Am.St.Rep. 200; Atlantic Fruit

Co. v. Red Cross Line, D.C.N.Y., 276 F. 319; Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 44 S.Ct. 274, 264
U.S. 109, 68 L.Ed. 582.
Compulsory arbitration Is that which occurs when the consent of one of the parties Is enforced by statutory pro-visions. Wood v. City of Seattle, 23 Wash. 1, 62 Pac. 135, 52 L.R.A. 369.
Voluntary arbitration Is by mutual and free consent of the parties.
The submission is an agreement by which parties agree to submit their differences to the decision of a referee or arbitrators. It 1s sometimes termed a reference. 3 M. & W. 816; McManus v. McCulloch, 6 Watts (Pa.) 357; Ste-wart v. Cass, 16 Vt. 663, 42 Am.Dec. 534; Howard v. Sex-ton, 4 N.Y. 157. As to "final submission," see In re Oitt, 125 N.Y.S. 369, 140 App.Div. 382. In a wide sense, "arbi-tration" may embrace the whole method of thus settling controversles, and Include all the various steps. But in a more strlct use, the term denotes only the submission and hearing, the decision being separately spoken of, and called an "award." An award is the judgment or decision of ar-bitrators or referees on a matter submitted to them. It is also the writing containing such judgment. Cowell; Termes de la Ley; Jenk. 137. See Award.
As dIstinguished from appraisal, an arbitration presup-poses a controversy or a difference to be tried and decided. On the other hand, an appraisal or valuation is generally a mere auxiliary feature, as of a contract of sale, the pur-pose of which is not to adjudicate a controversy but to avoid one. Toledo S. S. Co. v. Zenith Transp. Co., 184 F. 391, 106 C.C.A. 501.
ARBITRATION CLAUSE. A clause inserted in a contract providing for compulsory arbitration in case of dispute as to rights or liabilities under it; ineffectual if it purports to oust the courts of jurisdiction entirely. See Perry v. Cobb, 88 Me. 435, 34 A. 278, 49 L.R.A. 389.
ARBITRATION OF EXCHANGE. This takes place where a merchant pays his debts in one country by a bill of exchange upon another.
The business of buying and selling exchange (bilis of ex-change) between two or more countries or markets, and particularly where the profits of such business are to be derived from a calculation of the relative value of ex-change in the two countries or markets, and by taking ad-vantage of the fact that the rate of exchange may be high-er in the one place than in the other at the same time.
ARBITRATOR. A private, disinterested person, chosen by the parties to a disputed question, for the purpose of hearing their contention, and giv-ing judgment between them; to whose decision (award) the litigante submit themselves either voluntarily, or, in some cases, compulsorily, by order of a court. Fudickar v. Insurance Co., 62
N.Y. 399.
"Referee" is of frequent modem use as a synonym of arbitrator, but is in its origin of broader signification and less accurate than arbitrator.
ARBITRIOS. In Spanish and Mexican law. Tax-es imposed by municipalities on certain articles of merchandise, to defray the general expenses of government, in default of revenues from "pro-prios" (q. v.), i. e., lands owned by the municipali-ty, or the income of which was legally set apart for its support. Sometimes used in a wider sense,
as meaning the resources of a town, including its privileges in the royal lands as well as the taxes. Escriche Dict.; Sheldon v. Milmo, 90 Tex. 1, 36 S.W. 413.
ARBITRIUM. The decision of an arbiter, or arbi-trator; an award; a judgment.
ARBITRIUM EST JUDICIUM. An award is a judgment. Jenk.Cent. 137.
ARBITRIUM EST JUDICIUM BONI VIRI, SEC-UNDUM ilEQUUM ET BONUM. An award is the judgment of a good man, according to justice. 3 Bulst. 64.
ARBOR. Lat. A tree; a plant; something larger than an herb; a general term including vines, osiers, and even reeds. The mast of a ship. Bris-sonius. Timber. Ainsworth; Calvinus, Lex.
In a technological sense, "arbor" denotes the core con-sisting of an iron pipe over which 1s spread a thin coating of damp sand and which 1s inserted in the mold used In casting iron plPe. Casey-Hedges Co. v. Gates, 139 Tenn. 63, 201 S.W. 760, 761, L.R.A.1918B, 184.
ARBOR CIVILIS. A genealogical tree. Coke, Inst.
ARBOR CONSANGUINITATIS. A table, formed in the shape of a tree, showing the genealogy of a family. See the arbor civilis of the civilians and canonists. Hale, Com.Law, 335.
ARBOR DUM CRESCIT, LIGNUM DUM CRES-CERE NESCIT. [That which is] a tree while it grows, [is] wood when it ceases to grow. Cro. Jac. 166; Hob. 77b, in marg.
ARBOR FINALIS. In old English law. A bound-ary tree; a tree used for making a boundary line. Bract. fols. 167, 207b.
ARCA. Lat. In the civil law. A chest or coffer; a place for keeping money. Dig. 30, 30, 6; Id. 32, 64. Brissonius.
ARCANA IMPERIL State secrets. 1 Bl.Comm. 337.
ARCARIUS. In civil and old English law. A treasurer; a keeper of public money. Cod. 10, 70, 15; Spelman.
ARCHAIONOMIA. A collection of Saxon laws, published during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, in the Saxon language, with a Latin version by Lam-bard.
ARCHBISHOP. In English ecclesiastical law. The chief of the clergy in his province, having, supreme power under the king or queen in all ecclesiastical causes. He has also his own diocese, in which he exercises episcopal jurisdiction, as in his province he exercises archiepiscopal authority. In England he is addressed as Most Reverend.
ARCHDEACON. A dignitary of the Anglican church who has ecclesiastical jurisdiction imme-diately subordinate to that of the bishop, either throughout the whole of his diocese or in some particular part of it. He is a ministerial officer; 1 Bla.Com. 383. He is addressed as Venerable.
ARCHDEACON’S COURT. In English ecclesias-tical law. A court held before a judge appointed by the archdeacon, and called his official. Its ARENIFODINA. In the civil law. A sandpit. Dig. 7, 1, 13, 5.
ARENTARE. Lat. To rent; to let out at a cer-tain rent. Cowell. Arentatio. A renting.
AREOPAGITE. In ancient Greek law. A lawyer or chief judge of the Areopagus in capital matters in Athens; a tribunal so called after a hill or slight eminence, in a street of that city dedicated to Mars, where the court ovas held in which those judges were wont to sit. Wharton.
ARERE. L. Fr. Behind; in arrear; back; again. Adams Gloss.
ARETRO. In arrear; behind. Also written a retro.
ARG. An abbreviation of arguendo. ARGENT. In heraldry. Silvér.
ARGENTARIUS (pl., Argentarii). In the Roman law, a money lender or broker; a dealer in mon-ey; a banker. Argentarium, the instrument of the loan, similar to the modern word "bond" or "note."
ARGENTARIUS MILES. A money porter in the English exchequer, who carries the money from the lower to the upper exchequer to be examined and tested. Spelman.
ARGENTEUS. An old French coin, answering nearly to the English shilling. Spelman.
ARGENTUM. Silver; money.
ARGENTUM ALBUM. Bullion; uncoined silver; common silver coin; silver coin worn smooth. Cowell; Spelman.
ARGENTUM DEI. God’s money; God’s penny; money given as earnest in making a bargain. Cowell.
ARGUENDO. In arguing; in the course of the argument. A statement or observation made by a judge as a matter of argument or illustration, but not directly bearing upon the case at bar, or only incidentally involved in it, is said (in the reports) to be made arguendo, or in the abbrev-iated form, arg.
ARGUMENT. An effort to establish helief by a course of reasoning.
In rhetoric and logic, an inference drawn from premises, the truth of which is indisputable, or at least highly probable.
The argument of a demurrer, special case, appeal, or other proceeding Involving a question of law, consists of the speeches of the opposed counsel; namely, the "open-Ing" of the counsel having the right to begin, (q. v.,) the speech of his opponent, and the "reply" of the first coun-sel. It answers to the trial of a question of fact. Sweet. But the submission of printed briefs may technically con-stitute an argument. State v. California Min. Co., 13 Nev. 209. Also, the opening statement to a jury is part of the argument. State v. McCaskill, 173 Iowa 563, 155 N.W. 976,
977.
ARGUMENTATIVE. By way of reasoning. In pleading. Indirect; inferential. Steph.P1. 179.
A pleading is so called In which the statement on which the pleader relies is implied instead of being expressed, or where it contains, in addition to proper statements of facts, reasoning or arguments upon those facts and their relation to the matter in dispute, such as should be re-served for presentation at the trial.
ARGUMENTATIVE INSTRUCTION. An instruc-tion which singles out or unduly emphasizes a particular issue, theory, or defense, or one which tends to invade the province of the jury with re-gard to the weight, probative effect, or sufficiency of the evidence or the inferences to be drawn therefrom. See 64 C.J. §§ 594, 601.
ARGUMENTUM A COMMUNITER ACCIDENTI-BUS IN JURE FREQUENS EST. An argument drawn from things commonly happening is fre-quent in law. Broom Max. 44.
ARGUMENTUM A DIVISIONE EST FORTISSI-MUM IN JURE. An argument from division [of the subject] is of the greatest force in law. Co. Litt. 213b; 6 Coke 60.
ARGUMENTUM A MAJORI AD MINUS NEGA-TIVE NON VALET; VALET E CONVERSO. An argument from the greater to the less is of no force negatively; affirmatively (or conversely) it is. Jenk.Cent. 281.
ARGUMENTUM A SIMILI VALET IN LEGE. An argument from a like case (from analogy) is good in law. Co.Litt. 191.
ARGUMENTUM AB AUCTORITATE EST FOR-TISSIMUM IN LEGE. An argument from au-thority is the strongest in the law. "The book cases are the best proof of what the law is." Co. Litt. 254a.
ARGUMENTUM AB IMPOSSIBILI VALET IN LEGE. An argument drawn from an impossibility is forcible in law. Co.Litt. 92a.
ARGUMENTUM AB INCONVENIENTI. An argu-ment arising from the inconvenience which the proposed construction of the law would create.
Where the constitutionality of a statute is con-cerned, it is only when the question is close and doubtful that this doctrine will be applied and consideration taken of the consequences of de-claring the statute unconstitutional. Calhoun County v. Early County, 205 Ga. 169, 52 S.E.2d 854; Smith v. City Council of Augusta, 203 Ga. 511, 47 S.E.2d 582, 587.
ARGUMENTUM AB INCONVENIENTI EST VALIDUM IN LEGE; QUIA LEX NON PERMIT-TIT ALIQUOD INCONVENIENS. An argument drawn from what is inconvenient is good in law, because the law will not permit any inconvenience. Co.Litt. 66a, 258.
ARGUMENTUM AB INCONVENIENTI PLURI-MUM VALET [EST VALIDUM] IN LEGE. An argument drawn from inconvenience is of the greatest weight [is forcible] in law. Co.Litt. 66a,97a, 152b, 258b; Broom, Max. 184. If there be in any deed or instrument equivocal expressions, and great inconveniente must necessarily follow from one construction, it is strong to show that such construction is not according to the true intention of the grantor; but where there is no equivocal expression in the instrument, and the words used admit only of one meaning, arguments of incon-venience prove only want of foresight in the grantor. 3 Madd. 540; 7 Taunt. 496.
ARIBANNUM. In feudal law. A fine for not setting out to join the army in obedience to the summons of the king.
ARIERBAN, or ARRIERE-BAN. An edict of the ancient kings of France and Germany, com-manding all their vassals, the noblesse, and the vassals’ vassals, to enter the army, or forfeit their estates on refusal. Spelman. See, also, Arrier Ban.
ARIMANNI. A medieeval term for a class of agricultural owners of small allodial farms, which they cultivated in connection with larger farms belonging to their lords, paying rent and service for the latter, and being under the protection of their superiors. Military tenants holding lands from the emperor. Spelman.
ARISE. To spring up, originate, to come into being or notice, to become operative, sensible, visible, or audible; to present itself. Bergin v. Temple, 111 Mont. 539, 111 P.2d 286, 289, 290, 133 A.L.R. 1115; Lane v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hart-ford, Conn., 230 Iowa 973, 299 N.W. 553, 555.
"Accrue" not synonymous; the latter term means to result, to add, to acquire, to receive, to benefit, Roques v. Continental Casualty Co., 17 La.App. 465, 135 So. 51, 52.
A case "arises" under the Constitution or a law of the United States, so as to be within the jurisdiction of a fed-eral court, whenever its correct decision depends on the construction of either. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Hirsch, C.C.A.Ohio, 204 F. 849, 851; Blease v. Safety Transit Co., C.C.A.S.C., 50 F.2d 852, 854.
A cause of action or suit "arises", so as to start runnIng of limitation, when party has a right to apply to proper tribunal for relief. Washington Security Co. v. State, 9 Wash.2d 197, 114 P.2d 965, 967, 135 A.L.R. 1330; and it arises at time when and place where act is unlawfully omit-ted or committed. State ex rel. Birnamwood Oil Co. v. Shaughnessy, 243 Wis. 306, 10 N.W.2d 292, 295.
ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF OWN EMPLOYMENT. Workmen’s Compensation Acts provide for compensating an employee whose injury is one "arising out of and in the course of the employment." These words describe an in-jury directly and naturally resulting in a risk reasonably incident to the employment. Thomas v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 104 Kan. 432, 179 P. 372, 374, 6 A.L.R. 445; Trudenich v. Marshall, D.C.Wash., 34 F.Supp. 486, 488. • They mean that there must be some causal connection between the conditions under which the employee worked and the injury which he received. Amicucci v. Ford Motor Co., 308 Mich. 151, 13 N.W.2d 241.
The words "arising out of employment" refer to the origin of the cause of the injury, while "course of em-ployment" refer to the time, place, and circumstances un-der which the injury occurred. Walker v. Hyde, 43 Idaho,
625, 253 P. 1104, 1105. See, further, Course; Watson v. Pitcairn, Mo.App., 139 S.W.2d 552, 554; Ervin v. Industrial Commission, 364 III. 56, 4 N.E.2d 22, 25.
ARISTOCRACY. A government in which a class of men rules supreme; a form of government which is lodged in a council composed of select members or nobles, without a m- onarch, and ex-clusive of the people.
A privileged class of the people; nobles and dignitaries; people of wealth and station.
ARISTO-DEMOCRACY. A form of government where the power is divided between the nobles (or the more powerful) and the people.
ARLES. Earnest. Used in Yorkshire in the phrase "Arles-penny." Cowell. In Scotland it has the same signification. Bell.
ARM OF THE SEA. A portion of the sea project-ing inland, in which the tide ebbs and flows. 5 Coke, 107. It is. considered as extending as far into the interior of a country as the water of fresh rivers is propelled backwards by the ingress of the tide. Adams v. Pease, 2 Conn. 484; U. S. v. Grush, 5 Mason, 290, Fed.Cas.No.15,268; Ex parte Byers, D.C.Mich., 32 Fed. 404. See Fauces Terne.
ARMA. Lat. Arms; weapons, offensive and de-fensive; armor; arms or cognizances of families.
ARMA DARE. To dub or make a knight.
ARMA IN ARMATOS SUMERE JURA SINUNT. The laws permit the taking up of arms against armed persons. 2 Inst. 574.
ARMA MOLUTA. Sharp weapons that cut, in contradistinction to such as are blunt, which only break or bruise. Fleta, lib. 1, c. 33, par. 6.
ARMA REVERSATA. Reversed arms, a punish-ment for a traitor or felon. Cowell.
ARMATA VIS. In the civil law. Armed force. Dig. 43, 16, 3; Fleta, lib. 4, c. 4.
ARMED. Furnished or equipped with weapons of offense or defense. People ex rel. Griffin v. Hunt, 270 N.Y.S. 248, 254, 150 Misc. 163.
A vessel is "armed" when she is fltted with a full arma-ment for fighting purposes. Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch, 121, 2 L.Ed. 208.
ARMED FORCE. As used in statutes authoriz-ing peace officers to summon an "armed force" to aid them, this term may refer to a military organization, but this is not necessarily so, and, depending on the context, it may mean only a posse comitatus (q. v.). Chapin v. Ferry, 28 P. 754, 756, 3 Wash. 386, 15 L.R.A. 116.
ARMED NEUTRALITY. An attitude of neutral-ity between belligerents which the neutral state is prepared to maintain by armed force if necessary.
ARMED PEACE. A situation in which two or more nations, while actually at peace with each other, are armed for possible or probable hostili-

ARMIGER. An armor-bearer; an esquire. A title of dignity belonging to gentlemen authorized to bear arms. Cowell. In its earlier meaning, a serv-ant who carried the arms of a knight. A tenant by scutage; a servant or valet; applied, also, to the higher servants in convents. Spelman.
ARMING ONE’S SELF. Equipping one’s self with a weapon or weapons. Simmons v. State, 87 Tex. Cr.R. 270, 220 S.W. 554.
ARMISCARA. An ancient mode of punishment, which was to carry a saddle at the back as a
token of subjection. Spelman.
ARMISTICE. A suspending or cessation of hostili-ties between belligerent nations or forces for a considerable time. Dooley v. Johnson, 133 Cal. App. 459, 24 P.2d 540.
The term cannot properly be applied to agreements he-tween a government on one side and rioters, brigands, and banditti mi the other. O’Neill v. Central Leather Co., 87 N.J.L. 552, 94 A. 789, 790, L.R.A.1917A, 276.
An armistice differs from a mere "suspension of arms" (q. v.) in that the latter is concluded for very brief periods and for local military purposes only, whereas an armistice not only covers a longer period, but is agreed upon for political purposes. It is said to be general if it relates to the whole area of the war, and porfia/ if it relates to only a portion of that area. Partial armistices are sometimes called truces (g. y.) but there is no hard and fast distinc-tion.
ARMORIAL BEARINGS. In English law. A de-vice depicted on the (now imaginary) shield of one of the nobility, of which gentry is the lowest degree. The criterios of nobility is the bearing of arms, or armorial bearings, received from an-cestry.
ARMORUM APPELLATIONE, NON SOLUM SCUTA ET GLADII ET GALEM, SED ET FUS-TES ET LAPIDES CONTINENTUR. Under the name of arms are included, not only shields and swords and helmets, but also clubs and stones. Co.Litt. 162.
ARMORY. A building where arms, ammunition, and instruments of war are stored. Comp.Laws 1929, §§ 692, 3395. Grosse Ile v. Saunders, 262 Mich. 451, 247 N.W. 912, 913.
ARMS. Anything that a man wears for his de-fense, or takes in his hands, or uses in his an ger, to cast at or strike at another. Co.Litt. 161b, 162a; State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18.
Arms, or coat of arms, signifles insignia, i. e., ensigns of honor, such as were formerly assumed by soldiers of fortune, and painted on their shields to distinguish them; or nearly the same as armorial bearings (q. v.).
ARMS, LAW OF. That law which gives precepts and rules concerning war; how to make and ob-serve leagues and truce, to punish offenders in the camp, and such like. Cowell; Blount. Now more commonly called the "law of war." See,
also, War.
ARMY. The armed forces of a nation intended for military service on land.
An "arrny" is a body of raen whose business is war, while the "mílitia" is a body of men composed of citizens
occuPled temporarily in the pursuít of civil life, but orgah-ized by discipline and drill, and called into the field for temporary military service when the exigencies of the country require it. And see Brown v. Soldiers’ Bonus Board, 44 R.I. 483, 116 A. 280, 281.
—Regular army. The permanent military estab-lishment, which is maintained both in peace and war according to law. 10 U.S.C.A. § 3; State v. Moorhead, 102 Neb. 276, 167 N.W. 70, 71.
AROMATARIUS. A word formerly used for a grocer. 1 Vent. 142.
AROUND. In the vicinity of. Hawkins v. First National Bank, Tex.Civ.App., 175 S.W. 163, 164.
Thus, sheep branded "O" on the hip or side may be within a mortgage covering sheep described as branded "0" around the hip bone.
ARPEN, Arpent, Arpennus. A measure of land of uncertain quantity mentioned in Dornesday and other old books; by some called an "acre," by others "half a/1 acre," and by others a "furlong." Spelman; Cowell; Blount. Quoted in McMillan v. Aiken, 205 Ala. 35, 88 So. 135, 143.
A French measure of land, containing one hundred square porches, of eighteen feet each, or about an acre. But the quantity varied in different provinces. Spelman. An "arpent" is a land mensure varying in dirnension from .84 of an acre to 1..04 acres and to 1.28 acres, accordingly as the arpent meant is an arpent de Paris, an arpent com-mun, or an arpent d’orclonnance. Troll v. City of St. Louis, 257 111o. 626, 168 S.W. 167, 171. In Louisiana, the tercos "arpent" and "acre" are sometimes used inter-changeably; but there is a considerable difference, the ar-pent being the square of 192 feet and the acre of 209 and a fraction, Randolph v. Sentilles, 110 La. 419, 34 So. 587.
ARPENTATOR. A measurer or surveyor of land. Cowell; Spelman.
ARRA. In the civil law. Earnést; earnest-mon-ey; evidence of a completed bargain. Used of a contract of marriage, as well as any other. Spelled, also, Arriza., Arrhce, Arrce, Calvin. Cf. Arles.
ARRAIGN. In criminal practice. To bring a prisoner to the bar of the court to answer the matter charged upon him in the indictment. Ex parte Jeffcoat, 109 Fla. 207, 146 So. 827, 828. The arraignment (q. v.) of a prisoner consists of call-ing upon him by name, and reading to him the indictment, (in the English tongue,) and demand-ing of him whether he be guilty or not guilty, and entering his plea. State v. Voelpel, 213 Iowa 702, 239 N.W. 677, 679.
In old English law. To order, or set in order; to conduct in an orderly manner; to prepare for trial. To arraign an assise was to cause the ten-ant to be called to make the plaint, and to set the cause in such order as the tenant might be enforced to answer thereunto. Litt. § 442; Co. Litt. 262b.
ARRAIGNMENT. See Arraign.
ARRAIGNS, CLERK OF. In English law. An assistant to the clerk of assise.

ARRAME1UR. In old French law. An officer em-"ployed to superintend the loading of vessels, and the safe stowage of the cargo. 1 Pet.Adm.Append. "XXV.
ARRANGEMENT. A setting in order. 1 El. & Bl. 540. Plan for corporate reorganization propos-ing to effect a composition or extension of time with reference to corporation’s unsecured debts. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Casey, C.C.A. Mass., 141 F.2d 104, 107.
ARRANGEMENT, DEED OF. A term used in England to express an assignment for the benefit of creditors.
ARRAS. In Spanish law. The donation which the husband makes to his wife, by reason or on account of marriage, and in consideration of the dote, or portion, which he receives from her. Mil-ler v. Dunn, 62 Mo. 219. The property contributed by the husband ad sustinenda onera matrimonii (for bearing the expenses).
ARRAY. The whole body of jurors summoned to attend a court, as they are arrayed or arranged on the panel. Dane, Abr. Index; 1 Chit.Crim.Law, 536; Com.Dig. "Challenge," B. Durrah v. State, 44 Miss. 789. A ranking, or setting forth in order; the order in which jurors’ names are ranked in the panel containing them. Co.Litt. 156a; 3 Bl.Comm. 359.
ARRAYER. An English military officer in the early part of the fifteenth century. His duties were similar to those of the modem Lord Lieuten-ant of a county.
ARREARS. or ARREARAGES. Money unpaid at the due time, as rent behind; the remainder due after payment of a part of an account; money in the hands of an accounting party. Board of Ed-ucation of Glen Ellyn Tp. High School Dist. No. 87 v. Boger, 291 III. 191, 125 N.E. 768, 770. Indebted-ness. State ex rel. City of South Euclid v. Zan-gerle, 145 Ohio St. 433, 62 N.E.2d 160, 162.
In arrear (arrears). Overdue and unpald. Hollingsworth v. Willis. 64 Miss. 157, 8 So. 170. Behind in the payment of that which is due. Grand Court of Texas Independent Order of Calanthe v. Johns, Tex.Civ.App., 181 S.W. 869, 870.
ARRECT. To accuse or charge with an offense. Arrectati, accused or suspected persons.
ARRENDAMIENTO. In Spanish law. The con-tract of letting and hiring an estate or land, (heredad.) White, Recop. b. 2, tit. 14, c. 1.
ARRENT. In old English law. To let or demise at a fixed rent. Particularly used with reference to the public domain or crown lands; as where a license was granted to inclose land in a 1 orest with a low hedge and a ditch, under a yearly rent, or where an encroachment, originally a purpres-ture, was allowed to remain on the fixing and pay-ment of a suitable compensation to the public for its maintenance.
ARREST. To deprive a person of his liberty by legal authority. Taking, under real or assumed
authority, custody of another for the purpose of holding or detaining him to answer a criminal charge or civil demand. Ex parte Sherwood, 29 Tex.App. 334, 15 S.W. 812. Physical seizure of person by arresting officer or submission to offi-cer’s authority and control is necessary to con-stitute an "arrest." Thompson v. Boston Pub. Co., 285 Mass. 344, 189 N.E. 210, 213. It is a restraint, however slight, on another’s liberty to come and go. Turney v. Rhodes, 42 Ga.App. 104, 155 S.E. 112. It is the taking, seizing or detaining the person of another, touching or putting hands upon him in the execution of process, or any act indicating an intention Yo arrest. U. S. v. Benner, Bald. 234, 239, Fed.Cas.No.14,568; State v. District Court of Eighth Judicial Dist. in and for Cascade County, 70 Mont. 378, 225 P. 1000, 1001; Hoppes v. State, 105 P.2d 433, 439, 70 Okl.Cr. 179.
As used in Bankruptcy Act, § 9 (11 USCA § 27), arrest in-
eludes "imprisonment.’ Ex parte Harrison, D.C.Mass., 272 F. 543, 544.
One of the means which the law gives the creditor to secure the person of his debtor while the suit is pending, or to compel him to give security for his appearance after judgment. La.Code Prac. art. 210.
As ordinarily used, the terms arrest and attáchment coin-cide in rneaning to some extent; though in strictness, as a distinction, an arrest may be said to be the act resulting from the service of an attachment. And in the more ex-tended sense which is sometimes given to attachment, in-cluding the act of taking, it would seem to differ from ar-rest in that it is more peculiarly applicable to a taking of property, while arrest is more commonly used in speaking of persons.
Arrest is also applied in some instantes to a seizure and detention of personal chattels, especially of ships and ves-seis; thus, in adrniralty actions a ship or cargo is arrested when the marshal has served the writ in an action in rem. Pelham v. Rose, 9 Wall. 103, 19 L.Ed. 602.
Civil Practice
The apprehension of a person by virtue of a lawful authority to answer the demand against him in a civil action. Gentry v. Griffith, 27 Tex. 462.
Criminal Cases
The apprehending or detaining of the person in order to be forthcoming to answer an alleged or suspected crime. Ex parte Sherwood, 29 Tex.App. 334, 15 S.W. 812.
The word arrest is said to be more properly used in civil cases, and apprehension in criminal. Thus, a man is ar-rested under a copias ad respondendu" and apprehended under a warrant charging him with larceny.
Malicious Arrest
An arrest made willfully and without probable cause, but in the course of a regular proceeding.
Farol Arrest
One ordered by a judge or magistrate from the bench, without written complaint or other pro-ceedings, of a person who is present before him, and which is executed on the spot; as in case of breach of the peace in open court.
Rearrest
Right of an officer to take without warrant one forcibly freeing himself after arrest. Gross v.

State, 186 Ind. 581, 117 N.E. 562, 1 A.L.R. 1151, or escaping in any manner, Hefler v. Hunt, 120 Me. 10, 112 A. 675, or violating parole, Massey v. Cun-ningham, 169 Ark. 410, 275 S.W. 737, or failing to respond to bond for appearance, Porter v. Gar-mony, 148 Ga. 261, 96 S.E. 426.
Second Arrest
The "second arrest" forbidden after discharge on habeas corpus means an imprisonment based on the same information and not under a new information foliowed by a lawful warrant. State v. Riley, 109 Minn. 437, 124 N.W. 13. See, also, Stair v. Heska Amone Congregation, 128 Tenn. 190, 159 S.W. 840, 841.
Warrant of Arrest
A written order issued and signed by a magis-trate, directed to a peace officer or some other person specially named, and commanding him to arrest the body of a person named in it, who is accused of an offense. Brown v. State, 109 Ala. 70, 20 So. 103.
ARREST OF INQUEST. Pleading in arrest of taking the inquest upon a former issue, and show-ing cause why an inquest should not be taken.
ARREST OF JUDGMENT. The act of staying a judgment, or refusing to render judgment in an action at law and in criminal cases, alter ver-dict, for some matter intrinsic appearing on the face of the record, which would render the judgment, if .given, erroneous or reversible. 3 Bl. Comm. 393; 3 Steph.Comm. 628; 2 Tidd, Pr. 918; Speer v. Pierce, 18 Tenn.App. 351, 77 S.W.2d 77, 78; State v. Ferguson, 165 Tenn. 61, 52 S.W.2d 140.
It Is the fact that a motion in arrest of judgment Is based on some defect on the face of the record or pleadings
which aids in distinguishing it from a motion for a new trial. Maddox Coffee Co. v. McHan, 22 Ga.App. 198, 95 S. E. 736. It differs also from a motlon to set aside a judg-
ment, in that a motion in arrest of judgment must be made during the term when the judgment was rendered. Love v. National Liberty Ins. Co., 157 Ga. 259, 121 S.E. 648, 650. A motion In arrest of judgment Is practically a demurrer, People v. Cordosco, 77 Cal.App. 780, 246 P. 461, 462, and has been abolished in some jurisdictions, State v. Sharp, Mo.Sup., 300 S.W. 501.
ARRESTANDIS BONIS NE DISSIPENTUR. In old English law. A writ which lay for a person whose cattle or goods were taken by another, who during a contest was likely to make away with them, and who had not the ability to render satis-faction. Reg.Orig. 126.
ARRESTANDO IPSUM QUI PECUNIAM RE-CEPIT. In old English law. A writ which issued for apprehending a person who had taken the king’s prest money to serve in the wars, and then hid himself in order to avoid going.
ARRESTATIO. In old English law. An arrest (q. y.).
ARRESTEE. In Scotch law. The person in whose hands, the movables of another, or a debt due to another, are arrested by the creditor of
the latter by the process of arrestment. 2 Kames, Eq. 173, 175.
If, in contempt of the arrestment, he make payment of the sum or deliver the goods arrested to the common debt-or, he is not only liable criminally for breach of the ar-restment, but he must pay the debt again to the arrester; Erskine, Inst. 3, 6, 6.
ARRESTER. In Scotch law. One who sues out and obtains an arrestment of his debtor’s goods or movable obligations. Erskine, Inst. 3. 6. 1.
ARRESTMENT. In Scotch law. Securing a crim-inal’s person till trial, or that of a debtor till he give security judicio sisti. The order of a judge, by which he who is debtor in a movable obligation to the arrester’s debtor is prohibited to make pay-ment or delivery till the debt due to the arrester be paid or secured. Erskine, Inst. 3. 6. 1; 1. 2. 12.
ARRESTMENT JURISDICTIONIS FUNDANDIE CAUSA. In Scotch law. A process to bring a foreigner within the jurisdiction of the courts of Scotland. The warrant attaches a foreigner’s goods within the jurisdiction, and these will not be released unless caution or security be given.
ARRESTO FACTO SUPER BONIS MERCATOR-UM ALIENIGENORUM. In old English law. A writ against the goods of aliens found within this kingdom, in recompense of goods taken from a denizen in a •foreign country, after denial of resti-tution. Reg.Orig. 129. The ancient civilians cálled it "clarigatio," but by the moderns it is termed "reprisalia."
ARRET. Fr. A judgment, sentence, or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction.
The term is derived from the French law, and is used in Canada and Louisiana.
Saisie arrét is an attachment of property in the hands of a third person. Code Pr.La. art. 209; 2 Low.Can. 77; 5 Low.Can. 198, 218. See "Saisie."
ARRETTED. Convened before a judge and charged with a crime.
Ad rectum malefactorem is, according to Brac-ton, to have a malefactor forthcoming to be put on his trial.
Imputed or laid to one’s charge; as, no folly may be arrested to one under age. Bracton, 1. 3, tr. 2, c. 10; Cunningham, Dict.; Cowell.
ARRHABO. In the civil law. Earnest; money given to bind a bargain. Calvin.
ARRHIE. In the civil law. Money or other valu-able things given by the buyer to the seller, for the purpose of evidencing the contract; earnest. See Arra; Pot-de-vin.
Arrhce sponsalitice were the earnest or present given by one betrothed to the other at the be-trothal.
ARRIAGE AND CARRIAGE. In English and Scotch law. Indefinite services formerly demand-able from tenants, but prohibited by statute, (20 Geo. II, c. 50, §§ 21, 22.) Holthouse; Ersk.Inst. 2,

mons to join the lord, addressed to those who had neglected the first. A summons of the inferiors or vassals of the lord. Spelman, Gloss. See, also, Arierban.
ABRIERE FIEF, or FEE. In feudal law. A fief or fee dependent on a superior one; an inferior fief granted by a vassal of the king, out of the fief held by him. Montesq. Esprit des Lois, liv. 31, cc. 26, 32.
ABRIERE VASSAL. In feudal law. The vassal of a vassal.
ARRIVAL. In marine insurance, arrival of a ves-sel means an arrival for purposes of business, re-quiring an entry and clearance and stay at the port so long as to require some of the acts con-nected with business, and not merely touching at a port for advices, or fo ascertain the state of the market, or being chiven in by an adverse wind and sailing again as soon as it changes. F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. U. S., C.C.A.Va., 18 F.2d 469,
470.
"A vessel arrives at a port of discharge when she comes, or is brought, to a place where it is intended to discharge her, and where is the usual and customary place of dis-charge. When a vessel is insured to one or two ports, and salls for one, the risk terminates on her arrival there. If a vessel is insured to a particular port of discharge, and is destined to discharge cargo successively at two different wharves, docks, or places, within that port, each being a distinct place for the delivery of cargo, the risk ends when she has been moored twenty-four hours in safety at the *first place. But if she is destined to one or more places for the delivery of cargo, and delivery or discharge of a por-Con of her cargo Is necessary, not by reason ot her hav-ing reached any destined place of delivery, but as a neces-sary and usual nautical measure, to enable her to reach such usual and destined place of delivery, she cannot prop-erly be considered as havtng arrived at the usual and custo-mary place of discharge, when she is at anchor for the purpose only of using such means as wlll better enable her to reach It. If she cannot get to the destined and usual place of discharge in the port because she is too deep, and must be lightered to get there, and, to aid in prosecuting the voyage, cargo is thrown overboard or put int° lighters, such discharge does not make that the place of arrival; it is only a stopping-place in the voyage. When the vessel is insured to a particular port of discharge, ar-rival within the limits of the harbor does not terminate the risk, If the place is not one where vessels are dis-charged and voyages completed. The policy covers the vessel through the port navigation, as well as on the opon sea, until she reaches the destined place." Simpson v. In-surance Co., Holmes, 137, Fed.Cas.No.12,886.
"Arrival of ship," within meaning of bilis of lading re-quiring claims to be filed, must be construed, where mis-delivery is chaiged, as meaning date when cargo is dis-charged or offe"ed for delivery. The Cardiganshire, D.C. Cal., 9 F.2d 416, 420. "Arrival" within the immigration laws means compliance with the requirements entitling an alien to entry. See 8 USCA §§ 106, 380. In re Kempson, D. C.Wash., 14 F.2d 668, 669.
ARRIVE. To come to a particular place; to reach a particular or certain place. Thompson v. U. S., 1 Brock. 411, Fed.Cas.No.13,985; 8 B. & C. 119.
The words "arrive" and "enter" are not always synony-mous; there certainly may be an arrival without an actual entry or attempt to enter. United States v. Open Boat, 5 Mason, 120, 132, Fed.Cas.No.15,967. And where a vessel from a forelgn port, laden with llquors, anchored within four leagues of the coast, and the master without a permit therefor allowed part of the cargo to be taken away, with the intention ot so disposing of the entire cargo, the vesse had "arrived" within the meaning of Tariff Act 1922, § 586 (19 USCA § 488). The Cherie, C.C.A.Me., 13 F.2d 992, 993.
ARROGATION. In the civil law. The adoption of a person who was of full age or sui juris. 1 Browne, Civil & Adm.Law, 119; Dig. 1, 7, 5; Inst. 1, 11, 3. Reinders v. Koppelmann,. 68 Mo. 497, 30 Am.Rep. 802.
ARRONDISSEMENT. In France, one of the sub-divisions of a department.
ARS,zE ET PENSAT/E. Burnt and weighed. A term formerly app]ied to money tested or assayed by fire and by weighing.
ARSENALS. Store•houses for arms; dock-yards, magazines, and other military stores.
ARSER IN LE MAIN. Fr. Burning in the hand. The punishment by burning or branding the left thumb of lay offenders who claimed and were al-lowed the benefit of clergy, so as to distinguish them in case they made a second claim of clergy. 5 Coke, 51; 4 Bl.Comm. 367; Termes de la Ley.
ARSON. At common law, the malicious burning of the house or outhouse of another. 4 Bla.Com. 220; Thacker v. Commonwealth, 219 Ky. 789, 294 S.W. 491, 492; State v. Berry, 188 La. 612, 177 So. 684, 686; Commonwealth v. Cooper, 264 Mass. 378, 162 N.E. 733, 734.
At common law burning buildings other than dwelling houses is not arson. Sawyer v. State, 100 Fla. 1603, 132 So. 188, 193. Part of building ignited sufticient to establlsh corpus delicti. State v. Caliendo, 4 A.2d 837, 840, 136 Me. 514.
At common law It must be the house of another. 1 Blsh. Cr.Law, § 389; State v. Beckwlth, Me., 198 A. 739, 742. But it Is now an offense to burn enes own house uisder the statutes of New Hampshire, Arkansas, California, and oth-er states. State v. Blumenthal, 136 Ark, 532, 203 S.W. 36, 37, L.R.A.1918E, 482.
Whether "house" or "dwelling house" be used In statute defining the crime may be of importance in determining whether occupancy is or is not an element. 1 Hale, P.C. 1 566, 567; Commonwealth. v. Barney, 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 478. Some states have expressly eliminated occupancy as an element, State v. Snover, 101 N.J.Law, 543, 126 A. 850; P.L. 1919, p. 257; while others have made it a distinction between degrees of the crime, People v. Abrams, 174 Cal. 172, 162 P. 395, 396.
In several states, this crime is divided into arson in the first, second, and third degrees, the first degree including the burning of an inhabited dwelling-house in the night-time; the second degree, the burning (at night) of a build-ing other than a dwelling-house, but so situated with ref-erence to a dwelling-house as Lo endanger it; the third degree, the burning of any building or structure not the subject of arson in the first or second degree, or the burn-ing of property, his own or another’s with intent to de-fraud or prejudice an insurer thereof. State v. Jessup, 42 Kan. 422, 22 P. 627.
ARSURA. The trial of money by heating it after it was coined. The loss of weight occasioned by this process. A pound was said to burn so many pence (tot ardere denarios) as it lost by the fire. Spelman. The term is now obsolete.
ART. Systematic application of knowledge or skill in effecting a desired result; also an em-ployment, occupatipn or business requiring such knowledge or skill; a craft; as industrial arts.

Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffier, D.C.Pa., 16 F.Supp. 729, 730; Miller v. State, 9 Okl.Cr. 255, 131 P. 717,. 718, L.R.A.1915A, 1038. A principie put in practice and applied to some art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. Earle v. Sawyer, 4 Mason, 1, Fed.Cas.No.4,247.
In the law of patents, this term means a useful art or manufacture which is beneficial and which is described with exactness in its mode of opera-tion. Such an art can be protected only in the mode and to the extent thus described. Jacobs
v. Baker, 7 Wall. 297, 19 L.Ed. 200. It is synonym-ous with process or method when used to produce a useful result, and may be either a force applied, a mode of application, or the specific treatment of a specific object, and must produce physical ef-fects. Emmett v. Metais Processing Corporation, C.C.A.Ariz., 118 F.2d 796, 798.
—Prior Art. In patent law, something that a man skilled in the art may by diligence discover. Davis-Bournonville Co. v. Alexander Milburn Co., C.C.A. N.Y., 1 F.2d 227, 231.
In seduction cases, "art" means the skillful and systematic arrangement of means for the attain-ment of a desired end. Hayes v. State, 19 Ala. App. 241, 96 So. 647.
ART, WORDS OF. Words used in a technical sense; words scientifically fit to carry the sense assigned them.
ART AND PART. In Scotch law. The offense committed by one who aids and assists the com-mission of a crime, but who not the principal or chief actor in its actual commission. An acces-sory. A principal in the second degree. Paters. Comp.
ART MUSEUM. A building containing works of art. In re Everson’s Will, 52 N.Y.S.2d 395, 399, 268 App.Div. 425.
ARTESIAN BASIN. A body of water more or less compact, moving through soils with more or less resistance. Justesen v. Olsen, 40 P.2d 802, 810, 86 Utah, 158.
ARTESIAN WELL. A well bored through im-permeable strata into a subterranean body of water which, being under pressure, rises naturally to the surface. Loosely, any deep bored well. 6 C.J.S. p. 773.
ARTHEL, ARDHEL, or ARDDELIO. To avouch; as if a man were taken with stolen goods in his possession he was allowed a lawful arthel, i. e., vouchee, to clear him of the felony; but provision was made against it by 28 Hen. VIII, c. 6. Blount.
ARTICLE. A separate and distinct part of an in-strument or writing comprising two or more par-ticulars; one of several things presented as con-nected or forming a whole. Carter v. Railroad Co., 126 N.C. 437, 36 S.E. 14. A particular object or substance, a material thing or a class of things. People v. Epstean, 170 N.Y.S. 68, 73, 102 Misc. 476. Material or tangible object. Gayer v. Whelan, 59
Cal.App.2d 255, 138 P.2d 763, 768. "Thing" of value. Gayer v. Whelan, 59 Cal.App.2d 255, 138 P.2d 763, 768.
In English ecclesiastical law. A complaint ex-hibited in the ecclesiastical court by way of libel. The different parts of a libel, responsive allega-tion, or counter allegation in the ecclesiastical courts. 3 Bl.Comm. 109.
In Scotch practice. A subject or matter; com-petent matter. "Article of dittay." 1 Broun, 62. A "point of dittay." 1 Swint. 128, 129.
ARTICLED CLERK. In English law. A clerk bound to serve in the office of a solicitor in con-sideration of being instructed in the profession. This is the general acceptation of the term; but it is said to be equally applicable to other trades and professions. Reg. v. Reeve, 4 Q.B. 212.
ARTICLES. 1. A connected series of proposi-tions; a system of rules. The subdivisions of a document, code, book, etc. A specification of dis-tinct matters agreed upon or established by au-thority or requiring judicial action.
2. A statute; as having its provisions articu-lately expressed under distinct heads. Several of the ancient English statutes were called "articles," (articuli.)
3. A system of .rules established by lega’ au-thority; as articles of war, articles of the navy, articles of faith. (See infra.)
4. A contractual document executed between parties, containing stipulations or terms of agree-ment; as articles of agreement, articles of part-nership,
5. A naval term meaning employment contract. South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, C.C.A. Ill., 104 F.2d 522, 526.
6. In chancery practice. A formal written statement of objections filed by a party, after depositions have been taken, showing ground for discrediting the witnesses.
7. In ecclesiastical law. A complaint in the form of a libel exhibited to an ecclesiastical court. See Article.
ARTICLES APPROBATORY. In Scotch law. That part of the proceedings which corresponds to the answer to the charge in an English bill in chan-cery. Paters. Comp.
ARTICLES IMPROBATORY. In Scotch law. Articulate averments setting forth the facts relied upon. Bell. That part of the proceedings which corresponds to the charge in an English bill in chancery to set aside a deed. Paters. Comp. The answer is called "articles approbatory."
ARTICLES, LORDS OF. A committee of the Scottish parliament, •which, in the mode of its elec-tion, and by the nature of its powers, was calcu-lated to increase the infiuence of the’ crown, and to confer upon it a power equivalent to that of a negative before debate. This system appeared in-consistent with the freedom of parliament, and at

the revolution the convention of estates declared it a grievance, and accordingly it was suppressed by Act 1690, c. 3. Wharton.
ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT. A written memo-randum of the terms of an agreement.
It is a common practice for persons to enter into articles oí agreement, preparatory to the execution of a formal deed, whereby it is stipulated that one of the parties shall convey to the other certain lands, or release his right to them, or execute some other disposition of them.
When persons form voluntary associations for religious, literary, social, or other purposes, and adopt rules by which to regulate their conduct and measure their rights, by the provisions of which members may be admitted and expelled, such rules are articles of agreement, to which all who have become members are parties, and by which they must be governed in their relations to the associations. Brown v. Harris .County Medical Soc., Tex.Ciy.App 194 S. W. 1179, 1180.
ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, OR OF INCOR-PORATION. Articles subscribed by the members of a joint-stock company or corporation organized under a general law, and which create the corpo-rate union between them. Such articles are in the nature of a partnership agreement, and com-monly specify the form of organization, amount of capital, kind of business to be pursued, location of the company, etc. Articles of association are to be distinguished from a charter, in that the lat-ter is a grant of power from the sovereign or the legislature.
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION. The name of the instrument embodying the compact made be-tween the thirteen original states of the Union, before the adoption of the present constitution.
ARTICLES OF FAITE In English law. The system of faith of the Church of England, more commonly known as the "Thirty-Nine Articles."
ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT. A formal writ-ten allegation of the causes for impeachment; answering the same office as an indictment in an ordinary criminal proceeding.
ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION. The instru-ment by which a private corporation is formed and organized under general corporation laws. People v. Golden Gate Lodge, 128 Cal. 257, 60 P. 865. See Articles of Association.
ARTICLES OF PARTNERSHIP. A written agree-ment by which the parties enter into a copartner-ship upon the terms and conditions therein stipu-lated.
ARTICLES OF RELIGION. In English ecclesi-astical law. Commonly called the "Thirty-Nine Articles ;" a body of divinity drawn up by the con-vocation in 1562, and confirmed by James I.
ARTICLES OF ROUP. In Scotch law. The terms and conditions under which property is sold at auction.
ARTICLES OF SET. In Scotch law. An agree-ment for a lease. Paters. Comp.
ARTICLES OF THE CLERGY. The title of a stat-ute passed in the ninth year of Edward II. for
the purpose of adjusting and settling the great questions of cognizance then existing between the ecclesiastical and temporal courts. 2 Reeve, Hist. Eng.Law, 291-296.
ARTICLES OF THE NAVY. A system of rules prescribed by act of parliament for the govern-ment of the English navy; also, in the United States, there are articles for the government of the navy.
ARTICLES OF THE PEACE. A complaint made or exhibited to a court by a person who makes oath that he is in fear of death or bodily harm from some one who has threatened or attempted to do him injury. The court may thereupon order the person complained of to fiad sureties for the peace, and, in default, may commit him to prison. 4 Bl.Comm. 255.
ARTICLES OF UNION. In English law. Articles agreed to, A. D. 1707, by the parliaments of Eng-land and Scotland, for the union of the two king-doms. They were twenty-five in number. 1 Bl. Comm. 96.
ARTICLES OF WAR. Codes framed for the gov-ernment of a nation’s army or navy.
ARTICÚLATE ADJUDICATION. In Scotch law. Where the creditor holds several distinct debts, a separate adjudication for each claim is thus called.
ARTICULATED PLEADING. The stating in sep-arate paragraphs, separately numbered, of each material fact of the petition. Newspaper Feature Service v. Southern Pub. Co., 140 La. 702, 73 So. 777.
ARTICULATELY. Article by article; by distinct clauses or articles; by separate propositions.
ARTICULI. Lat. Articles; items or heads. A term applied to some oid English statutes, and occasionally to treatises.
ARTICULI CLERI. "Articles of the clergy" (q. v.). See Circumspecte Agatis.
ARTICULI DE MONETA. Articles concerning money, or the currency. The title of a statute passed in the twentieth year of Edward I. 2 Reeve, Hist.Eng.Law, 228; Crabb, Eng.Law (Amer. Ed.) 167.
ARTICULI MAGNZE CHARTZE. The preliminary articles, forty-nine in number, upon which the Magna Charta was founded.
ARTICULI SUPER CUARTAS. Articles upon the charters. The title of a statute passed in the twenty-eighth year of Edward I. st. 3, confirming or enlarging many particulars in Magna Charta, and the Charta de Foresta, and appointing a method for enforcing the observance of them, and for the punishment of offenders. 2 Reeve, Hist. Eng.Law, 103, 233.
ARTICULO MORTIS. (Or more commonly in articulo mortis.) At the point of death; in the
article of death, which means at the moment of death; in the last struggle or agony. Succession of Villa, 132 La. 714, 61 So. 765, 770.
ARTIFICE. An ingenius contrivance or device of some kind, and, when used in a bad sense, it cor-responds with trick or fraud. United States v. Corlin, D.C.Cal., 44 F.Supp. 940, 943. It implies craftiness and deceit, and imports some element of moral obliquity. Davis v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 235 Mass. 482, 126 N.E. 841, 845; Finch v. Gibson, 140 Tenn. 134, 203 S.W. 759, 761.
A representation contrary to a well-known fact, such as a representation that pregnancy w111 not result from natu-ral sexual Intercourse, will not constitute artifice, decep-tion, or promises.
ARTIFICER. One who buys goods in order to re-duce them, by his own art or industry, into other forms, and then to sell them. Lansdale v. Bra-shear, 3 T.B.Mon. (Ky.) 335.
One who is actually and personally engaged or employed to do work of a mechanical or physical character, not including one who takes contracts for labor to be performed by others. Ingram v. Barnes, 7 El. & Bl. 135; Chawner v. Cummings, 8 Q.B. 321.
One who is master of his art, and whose em-ployment consists chiefly in manual labor. Whar-ton; Cunningham.
ARTIFICIAL. Is in opposition to the word "nat-ural". California Casualty Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, 13 Ca1.2d 529, 90 P.2d 289; Created by art, or by law; existing only by force of or in contempla-tion of law.
ARTIFICIAL FORCE. In patent law. A natural force so transformed in character or energies by human power as to possess new capabilities of ac-tion; this transformation of a natural force into a force practically new involves a true inventive act. Wall v. Leck, 60 Fed. 555, 13 C.C.A. 630.
ARTIFICIAL MEMBER OF BODY. A substitute for, and not a mere aid to, a natural part, organ, limb, or other separable part of body. Califor-nia Casualty Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Accident Commission, Cal.App., 82 P.2d 1115, 1116.
ARTIFICIAL PERSONS. Persons created and devised by human laws for the purposes of socie-ty and government, as distinguished from natural persons. Corporations are examples of artificial persons. 1 BI.Comm. 123. Chapman v. Brewer, 43 Neb. 890, 62 N.W. 320, 47 Am.St.Rep. 779.
ARTIFICIAL PRESUMPTIONS. Also called "le-gal presumptions ;" those which derive their force and effect from the law, rather than their nat-ural tendency to produce belief. 3 Starkie, Ev. 1235. Gulick v. Loder, 13 N.J.Law, 72, 23 Am.Dec. 711.
ARTIFICIAL SUCCESSION. The succession be-tween predecessors and successors in a corpora-tion aggregate or sole. Thomas v. Dakin, 22 Wend. (N.Y.) 100.
8Iack’s Law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed.-10
ARTIFICIAL WATER COURSE. See Water Course.
ARTIFICIALLY. Technically ; scienti fically ; us-ing terms of art. A will or contract is described as "artificially" drawn if it is couched in apt and technical phrases and exhibits a scientific ar-rangement.
ARTIFICIALLY DEVELOPED WATER. "Artifi-cially developed water," to which one may ac-quire right superior to adjudicated rights of earlier appropriators of natural waters of stream into which he turns it, is water produced and con-tributed by him, which would not have reached stream if left to flovv in accordance with natural laws. C.L. § 1766. In re Nix, 45 P.2d 176, 178, 96 Colo. 540.
ARTISAN. One skilled in some kind of mechani-cal craft or art; a skilled mechanic. O’Clair v. Hale, 25 Misc.Rep. 31; Warner Memorial Universi-ty v. Ritenour, Tex.Civ.App., 56 S.W.2d 236, 237.
As used in lien statutes, the term includes the architect, Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 38 Okl. 233, 132 P. 908, 911, 46 L.R.A.,N.S., 112, but not a subcontractor, Huffman v. McDonald, Tex.Civ.App., 261 S.W. 146, 147. An optometrist is not an "artisan." Swanz v. Clark, 71 Mont. 385, 229 P. 1108.
ARURA. An old English law term, signifying a day’s work in plowing.
ARVIL—SUPPER. A feast or entertainment made at a funeral in the north of England; arvil bread is bread delivered to the poor at funeral solemni-ties, and arvil, arval, or arval, the burial or funer-al rites. Cowell.
AS or A/S or A/s. Account sales; also alter sight, at sight.
AS. Lat. In the Roman and civil law. A pound weight; and a coin originally weighing a pound, (called also "libra") divided into twelve parts, called "uncice."
The parts were reckoned (as may be seen In the law, Servum de hceredibus, Inst. lib. xiii. Pandect) as follows: uncia, 1 ounce ; ser taus, 2 ounces; triens, 3 ounces ; quad-rans, 4 ounces; quincunx, 5 ounces; semis, 6 ounces; septunx, 7 ounces; bes, 8 ounces; dodrans, 9 ounces; dex-tans, 10 ounces; deunx, 11 ounces.
Any integral sum, subject to division in certain proportions.
Frequently applled In the civil law to Inheritances; the whole inheritance being termed "as," and its several pro-portionate parts -sextans," "quadrans," etc. Burrill.
The term "as," and the multiples of its uncice, were also used to denote the rates of interest. 2 Bl.Comm. 462, note m.
AS. Used as an adverb, etc., means like, similar to, of the same kind, in the same manner, in the manner in which. Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 75 Fla. 792, 78 So. 693, 697, L.R.A.1918E 639; Price v. Skylstead, 69 Mont. 453, 222 P. 1059, 1060. It may also have the meaning of because, since, or it be-ing the case that; State v. Rudman, 126 Me. 177, 136 A. 817, 819; in the character or under the name of; State v. Blue, 134 ‘La. 561, 64 So. 411, 414; when; Shane Bros. & Wilson Co. v. Barrett,

71 Ind.App. 313, 124 N.E. 780, 781; With signifi-canee of in degree, to that extent, so far. Snyder and Blankfard Co., v. Farmers Bank of Tif ton, 178 Md. 601, 16 A.2d 837, 841.
AS AGAINST; AS BETWEEN. These words con-trast the relative position of two persons, with a tacit reference to a different relationship between one of them and a third person. For instante, the temporary bailee of a chattel is entitled to it as between himself and a stranger, or as against a stranger; reference being made by this form of words to the rights of the bailor. Wharton.
AS FAR AS HUMAN CARE AND FORESIGHT WILL GO. Means for utmost tare and diligence of very cautious persons, and makes one responsi-ble for even slightest neglect. Kline v. Santa Bar-bara Consol. Ry. Co., 90 P. 125, 127, 150 Cal. 741.
AS IS. A sale of goods by sample "as is" requires that the goods be of the kind and quality repre-sented, even though they be in a dama ged condi-tion. Schwartz v. Kohn, Sup., 155 N.Y.S. 547, 548. Use of expression in sales agreement that goods are sold "as is" ilnplies that buyer is taking de-livery of goods in some way defective and upon express condition that he must trust to his own examination. Roby Motors Co. v. Cade, La.App., 158 So. 840, 841.
AS LONG AS. The phrase "as long as life doth last," in a will, is tantamount to "forever." In re Brown, 119 Kan. 402, 239 P. 747.
AS OF COURSE. Under a statute providing that an attachment will be dissolved, "as of course," upon defendant’s entering his appearance and fil-ing his answer, the quoted words mean when asked by defendant. Pitman v. West, 198 Mo.App. 92, 199 S.W. 756, 757.
AS PER. "As per" is a sort of law and business term which is hardly susceptible of literal transla-tion, but which is commonly understood to mean, "in accordance with," or "in accordance with the terms of," or "as by the contract authorized." Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Times Pub. Co., 142 La. 209, 76 So. 612, 617, L.R.A.1918B, 632.
AS SOON AS. This term has a relative meaning according to the thing which is to be done. Eich-elbaum & Smith v. Bishop, 75 Pa.Super.Ct. 528, 529. It often denotes merely a reasonable time; Childers v. Brown, 81 Or. 1, 158 P. 166, 168, Ann. Cas.1918D, 170; and it may be the equivalent of "whenever"; People v. Merhige, 180 N.W. 418, 422, 212 Mich. 601. Sometimes it means immedi-ately. Columbia Digger Co. v. Rector, D.C.S.D., 215 F. 618, 630.
AS SOON AS MAY BE. Promptly and with due diligence; as soon as was reasonably possible; within a reasonable time; as soon as possible; I orthwith; as soon as they conveniently can. George A. Fuller Co. v. Jersey City, 21 N.J.Misc. 38, 29 A.2d 720, 722.
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. When used with ref-erence to the time of performing some act, such
as the shipment of goods, these words mean mere-ly within a reasonable time. Birmingham Paper Co. v. Holder, 24 Ga.App. 630, 101 S.E. 692; Na-tional Cash Register Co. v. McCann, 140 N.Y.S. 916, 920, 80 Misc. 165 ("as soon as possible" re-quires a much more speedy fulfillment than within a reasonable time).
AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE. Means reasonable time. Callaway v. Central Surety & Insurance Corporation, C.C.A.Tex., 107 F.2d 761, 762; London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Shafer, D.C.Ohio, 35 F.Supp. 647, 649; London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Shafer, D.C.Ohio, 32 F.Supp. 905, 908; Un-verzagt v. Prestera, 13 A.2d 46, 48, 339 Pa. 141.
These words are not synonymous with "as soon as pos-sible"; they mean ordinarily as soon as reasonably can be expected. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n v. Mummey, Tex. Civ.App., 200 S.W. 251, 253; or ”in due time", Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n v. Mummey, Tex.Civ.App., 200 S.W. 251, 252. But the words have also been construed as prac-tically synonymous with speedily. Roberson v. Weaver, 145 Ga. 620, 89 S.E. 769, 772.
AS SPEEDILY AS POSSIBLE. Means within rea-sonable time or without unreasonable delay, hav-ing regard to all the circumstances of the case and the things to be done. Tatum v. Levi, 117 Cal. App. 83, 3 P.2d 963, 967.
AS SUCH. When used to give some example of a rule, is never exclusive of other cases which that rule is made to embrace. Dinnat v. Succession of Lewis, 8 La.App. 820, 821.
ASCEND. To go up; to pass up or upwards; to go or pass in the ascending line. 4 Kent, Comm. 393, 397.
ASCENDANTS. Persons with. whom one is re-lated in the ascending line; one’s parents, grand-parents, great-grandparents, etc.
ASCENDIENTES. In Spanish law. Ascendants; ascending heirs; heirs in the ascending line. Schm.Civil Law, 259.
ASCENT. Passage upwards; the transmission of an estate from the ancestor to the heir in the as-cending line. See 4 Kent, Comm. 393, 397.
ASCERTAIN. To 11x; to render certain or defi-nite ; to estimate and determine; to clear of doubt or obscurity. Pughe v. Coleman, Tex.Civ.App., 44 S.W. 578. To insure as a certainty. United States v. Foster, C.C.A.Iowa, 131 F.2d 3, 7. To find out by investigation, U. S. v. Carver, 43 S.Ct. 181, 182, 260 U.S. 482, 67 L.Ed. 361. Sometimes it means to "assess", Commonwealth v. Deford Co., 137 Va. 542, 120 S.E. 281, 285; or to "hear, try, and de-termine," In re Higgins’ Estate, 143 N.Y.S. 552, 556, 81 Misc. 579.
ASCERTAINED AS AFORESAID. Manner there-tofore prescribed. State ex rel. Walker v. Har-rington, Del., 30 A.2d 688, 693, 3 Terry 246.
ASCRIPTITIUS (or ASCRIPTITIUS). In Roman law. A foreigner who had been registered and naturalized in the colony in which he resided. Cod. 11, 47.

A man bound to the soil but not a slave. 2 Holdsw.Hist.E.L. 217. See Adscriptitii.
ASCUN, or ASCUNS. L. Fr. Any; any one; some. Adams Gloss.
ASESINATO. In Spanish law, murder. The term is said to be derived from the "assassins" of Syria. Escriche Diccionario. The offense corresponds closely to the common-law crime of murder in the first degree. U. S. v. Alias, 18 Philippine 453, 455; U. S. v. Pico, 18 Philippine 386, 388.
ASEXUALIZATION. See Vasectomy.
ASIDE. On one side; apart. To set aside. To annul; to make void. State v. Primm, 61 Mo. 171.
ASK. In an affidavit wherein affiant asks that a cause be reinstated and set down for trial, "asks" is practically synonymous with "moves." Harris y. Chicago House-Wrecking Co., 314 Ill. 500, 145 N.E. 666, 669.
ASPECT. View; object; possibility. Implies the existence of alternatives. Used in the phrases "bill with a double aspect" and "contingency with a double aspect."
ASPERSIONS. "Aspersions" may mean the mak-ing of calumnious report or may mean nothing more than criticism or censure. Fitts v. Davis, 269 F. 1018, 1019, 50 App.D.C. 234.
ASPHALT. A brown to black, solid bituminous substance occurring native at the Dead Sea, in Trinidad, and elsewhere, and also obtained as a residue from petroleum, coal tar, lignite tar, etc., and consists chiefly of a mixture of hydrocarbons and varíes from hard and brittle to plastic forms. Asphalt Revetment Co. v. United States, 48 F. Supp. 520, 523, 98 Ct.C1. 289.
ASPRYXIA. Apparent death, suspended anima-tion, in living organism due to deficiency of oxy-gen and excess of carbon dioxide in the blood. Levinson v. Reliance Life Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 184 Md. 453, 41 A.2d 485, 487. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v. New York Life Ins. Co., D.C.Md., 14 F.Supp. 721, 723.
ASPHYXIA CARBONICA. A suffocation from in-halation of coal gas, water gas, or carbon monox-ide. Levinson v. Reliance Life Ins. Co. of Pitts-burgh, Pa., Md., 184 Md. 453, 41 A.2d 485, 487.
ASPHYXIATION. A state of asphyxia. Stone v. Physicians Casualty Ass’n of America, 130 Neb. 769, 266 N.W. 605, 607.
ASPIRIN. A coal tar product commonly kept in drug stores and sold for medicinal purposes. It is not a proprietary or patent medicine, but is a drug or medicine, within a statute prohibiting re-tailing by one not a registered pharmacist. State v. Zotalis, 172 Minn. 132, 214 N.W. 766, 767. Peo-ple v. Garcia, 1 Cal.App.2d 761, 32 P.2d 445, 447. State v. Jewett Market Co., 209 Iowa, 567, 228 N.W. 288, 289.
ASPORTATION. The removal of things from one place to another. The carrying away of goods; one of the circumstances requisite to constitute the offense of larceny. 4 Bl.Comm. 231. Rex v. Walsh, 1 Moody, Cr.Cas. 14, 15. Any appreciable changing of the location of the property involved with felonious intent. People v. Ashworth, 222 N.Y.S. 24, 27, 220 App.Div. 498; Banks v. State, 133 Ark. 169, 202 S.W. 43.
To constitute "asportation," the thing taken must have been in entire or absolute possession of taker. Adams v. Commonwealth, 153 Ky. 88, 154 S.W. 381, 44 L.R.A.,N.S., 637. But goods need not be removed from owner’s prem-ises, but act of thief in putting property into sack which he carries ls sufficient. 21 Okl.St.Ann. § 1701. Brinkley v. State, 60 Okl.Cr. 106, 61 P.2d 1023, 1025. The slightest removal of goods from the place where the owner placed them or wanted them to be is sufficient. Driggers v. State, 118 So. 20, 21, 96 Fla. 232.
ASPORTAVIT. He carried away. Sometimes used as a noun to denote a carrying away. An "asportavit of personal chattels." 2 H.BI. 4.
ASSACIL In old Welsh law. An oath made by compurgators. Brown.
ASSART. In English law. The offense commit-ted in the forest, by pulling up the trees by the roots that are thickets and coverts for deer, and making the ground plain as arable land. It dif-fers from waste, in that waste is the cutting down of coverts which may grow again, whereas assart is the plueking them up by the roots and utterly destroying them, so that they can never afterward grow. This is not an offense if done with license to convert forest luto tillage ground. Consult Manwooa’s Forest Laws, pt. I, p. 171. Wharton. See Essarter.
ASSART RENTS. Rents paid to the Crown for assarted lands.
ASSASSINATION. Murder committed for hire, without provocation or cause of resentment given to the murderer by the person upon whom the crime is committed. Ersk.Inst. 4, 4, 45. A mur-der committed treacheróusly or by stealth or sur-prise, or by lying in wait. Sorrell v. State, 135 Tex.Cr.R. 535, 120 S.W.2d 1058, 1059.
ASSATIL An ancient custom in Wells, by which a person accused of crime could clear himself by the oaths of three hundred men. It was abolished by St. 1 Hen. V. c. 6. Cowell; Spelman.
ASSAULT. An intentional, unlawful offer of cor-poral injury to another by force, or force unlaw-ful]y directed toward person of another, under such circumstances as create well-founded fear of imminent peril; coupled with apparent present ability to execute attempt, if not prevented. State v. Staw, 97 N.J.L. 349, 116 A. 425; Naler v. State, 148 So. 880, 25 Ala.App. 486.
Intention to harm is of the essence, Raefeldt v. Koenig, 152 Wis. 459, 140 N.W. 56, 57, L.R.A.1918E, 1052; but gen-eral malevolence or recklessness is sufficient, State v. Fine, 324 Mo. 194, 23 S.W.2d 7, 10; hence striking intentionally, or by driving machine in reckless disregard of human life and safety is sufficient. Webb v. State, 68 Ga.App. 466, 23 S.E.2d 578, 580. It implies repulsion, or at least want of consent. People v. Dong Pok Yip, 164 Cal. 143, 127 P. 1031,

v. Berg, 340 Pa. 305, 16 A.2d 15, 16. Assault must have been unwarranted, but it need not have been committed in anger. McGovern v. Weis, 39 N.Y.S.2d 115, 118, 265 App. Div. 367; hence self-defense is not "assault". City of Gaff-ney v. Putnam, 197 S.C. 237, 15 S.E.2d 130, 131. Mere words, although provoking or insulting, are insufficient; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hill, C.C.A.Ala., 67 F.2d 487; Dahlin v. Fraser, 206 Minn. 476, 288 N.W. 851, 852.
In some jurisdictions degrees of the offense are estab-lished, as first degree, State v. Laughlin, Mont., 73 P.2d 718, 721; second degree, State v. Reynolds, 94 Wash. 270, 162 P. 358, 359; and third degree, State v. Steelc, 83 Wash. 470, 145 P. 581; State v. Laughlin„ 105 Mont. 490, 73 P.2d 718, 721.
Aggravated Assault
One committed with the intention of commit-ting some additional crime; or one attended with circumstances of peculiar outrage or atrocity. This class includes assault with a dangerous or deadly weapon; Brinkley v. State, 82 Tex.Cr.R. 150, 198 S.W. 940; assault upon infants or fe-males, if it create a sense of shame; Wren v. State, 27 Ariz. 491, 232 P. 398; and assault of lust, meaning an assault, less than felonious, with intent to have improper sexual connection; State v. Eslick, Mo.App., 216 S.W. 974, 975.
ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO COMMIT MAN-SLAUGHTER. An unláwful assault committed in such manner and with such means as would have resulted in commission of crime of man-slaughter if person .assaulted had then and there died from effects of assault. Lassiter v. State, 98 Fla. 370, 123 So. 735; State v. Crutcher, 1 N.W.2d 195, 199, 231 Iowa 418.
ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO COMMIT MUR-DER. To constitute this assault and specific in-tent to kill, actuated by malice aforethought, must concur. Perez v. State, 114 Tex.Cr.R. 473, 22 S. W.2d 309, 310; Griffin v. State, 177 S.E. 511, 50 Ga.App. 213.
ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO COMMIT RAPE. Is constituted by the existence of the facts which bring the offense within the definition of an as-sault, coupled with an intention to commit the crime of rape. Steptoe v. State, 133 Tex.Cr.R. 194, 115 S.W.2d 916, 917; State v. Jackson, 200 La. 432, 8 So.2d 285, 286.
ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO COMMIT ROB-BERY. Involves an assault as well as an intent to commit robbery. Foss v. State, 36 Ohio App. 417, 173 N.E. 296, 297.
Secret Assault
Under a North Carolina statute, to warrant con-viction for malicious, "secret assault," state must prove all essential elements of crime, namely, malice, use of deadly weapon in secret manner, with intent to kill. State v. Kline, 190 N.C. 177, 129 S.E. 417, 418.
It is not essential, however, that the person assaulted be
unconscious of the presence of his adversary, though the purpose of such adversary must not be known. State v. Oxendine, 187 N.C. 658, 122 S.E. 568, 571.
Simple Assault
One committed with no intention to do any oth-er injury. An offer or attempt to do bodily harm which falls short of an actual battery; an offer or attempt to beat another, but without touching him; for example, a blow delivered within strik-ing distance, but which does not reach its mark. Norton v. State, 14 Tex. 393. Also, sometimes, the use of physical violence upon another, with-out circumstances of aggravation. Ratcliff v. State, 106 Tex.Cr.R. 37, 289 S.W. 1072, 1074. "Sim-ple assault and battery" is an unlawful act of vio-lent injury to another, unaccompanied by any cir-cumstances of aggravation. State v. Jones, 133 S.C. 167, 130 S.E. 747, 751. And see State v. Staw, 97 N.J.L. 349, 116 A. 425.
ASSAY. The proof or trial, by chemiCal experi ments, of the purity or fineness of metals,—par-ticularly of the precious metals, gold and silver. West v. State, 140 Tex.Cr.R. 493, 145 S.W.2d 580, 584.
A trial of weights and measures by a standard; as by the constituted authorities, clerks of mar-kets, etc. Reg.Orig. 280.
A trial or examination of certain commodities, as bread, cloths, etc. Cowell; Blount. See An-nual Assay.
ASSAY OFFICE. The staff of persons by whom (or the building or department in which) the process of assaying gold and silver, required by government, incidental to maintaining the coin-age, is conducted.
ASSAYER. One whose business it is to make as-says of the precious metals. West v. State, 140 Tex.Cr.R. 493, 145 S.W.2d 580, 584.
ASSAYER OF THE KING. An officer of the royal mint, appointed by St. 2 Hen. VI. c. 12, who re-ceived and tested the bullion taken in for coining; also. called "assayator. regis." Cowell; Termes de la Ley.
ASSECURARE. To assure, or make secure by pledges, or any solemn interposition of faith. Cowell; Spelman.
ASSECURATION. In European law. Assurance; insurance of a vessel, freight, or cargo. Ferriére.
ASSECURATOR. In maritime law. An insurer, (aversor periculi.) Locc. de Jure Mar, lib. 2, c. 5, § 10.
ASSEDATION. In Scotch law. An old term, used indiscriminately to signify a lease or feu-right. Bell; Ersk.Inst. 2, 6, 20.
ASSEMBLAGE. A collection of persons. Also the act of coming together. State v. Breen, 110 Kan. 817, 205 P. 632, 633. Public address upon pub-lic grounds. In re Whitney, 57 Cal.App.2d 167, 134 P.2d 516, 521.
ASSEMBLE. When applied to a machine, "as-semble" means to collect or gather together the parts and place them in their proper relation to

each other to constitute the machine. Citizens’ Nat. Bank v. Bucheit, 14 Ala.App. 511, 71 So. 82, 38.
ASSEMBLY. The concourse or meeting together of a considerable number of persons at the same place. Alsó the persons so gathered.
Popular assemblies are those where the people meet to deliberate upon their rights; these are guaranteed by the constitution. Const.U.S.Amend. art. 1.
Political assemblies are ,those required by the constitution and laws: for example, the general assembly.
The lower or more numerous branch of the legislature in many of the states is also called the "Assembly" or "House of Assembly," but the term seems to be an appropriate one to designate any political meeting required to be held by law.
ASSEMBLY GENERAL. The highest ecclesiasti-cal court in Scotland, composed of a representa-tion of the ministers and elders of the church, regulated by Act 5th Assem. 1694.
ASSEMBLY, UNLAWFUL. In criminal law. The assembling of three or more persons together to do an unlawful act, who separate without actually doing it, or making any motion towards it. 3 Inst. 176; 4 Bl.Comm. 146. It differs from a riot or rout, because in each of the latter cases there is some act done besides the simple meeting. 1 Bish.Crim.Law, § 535; 2 Bish.Crim.Law, §§ 1256, 1259.
ASSENT. Compliance; approval of something done; a declaration of willingness to do some-thing in compliance with a request. Norton v. Davis, 83 Tex. 32, 18 S.W. 430; Appeal of Pitts-burgh, 115 Pa. 4, 7 A. 778; To approve, ratify and confirm. People v. Consolidated Indemnity and Ins. Co., 233 App.Div. 74, 251 N.Y.S. 566, 569. It implies a conscious approval of facts actually known, as distinguished from mere neglect to as-certain facts. White-Wilson-Drew Co. v. Lyon-Ratcliff Co., C.C.A.I11., 268 F. 525, 526. Sometimes it is equivalent to "authorize." Hagerla v. Mis-sissippi River Power Co., D.C.Iowa, 202 F. 776, 783. In the sense of the law is a matter of overt acts, not of inward unanimity in motives, design or the interpretation of words. Triboro Coach Corpo-ration v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 261 App.Div. 636, 27 N.Y.S.2d 83, 85.
"Assent" is an act of understanding, while "consent" is an act of the will or feelings. Klundby v. Hogden, 202 Wis. 438, 232 N.W. 858, 860, 73 A.L.R. 648. It means pas-sivity or submission which does not include consent. Per-ryman v. State, 63 Ga.App. 819, 12 S.E.2d 388, 390.

Express Assent
That which is openly declared.
Implied Assent
That which is presumed by law.

Mutual Assent

The meeting of the minds of both or all the parties to a contract; the fact that each agrees to all the terms and conditions, in the same sense and with the same meaning as the others. In-surance Co. v. Young, 23 Wall. 107, 23 L.Ed. 152.
ASSERT. To state as true; declare; maintain. To assert against another has probably a prima facie meaning of a contradiction of him, but the context or circumstances may show that it con-notes a criminatory charge; 7 L.J.Ex. 268.
ASSERTORY COVENANT. One which affirms that a particular state of facts exists; an affirm-ing promise under seal.
ASSERTORY OATII. See Oath.
ASSESS. To ascertain; fix the value of. State ex rel. Ambrose v. Trimble, 304 Mo. 533, 263 S.W. 840, 842. In re Calhoun Beach Holding Co., 205 Minn. 582, 287 N.W. 317, 322. To fix the amount of the damages or the value of the thing to be as-certained. New Orleans Terminal Co. v. Dixie Rendering, La.App., 179 So. 98, 100. To impose a pecuniary payment upon persons or property; People v. Priest, 169 N.Y. 435, 62 N.E. 568. To ascertain, adjust, and settle the respective shares to be contributed by several persons toward an object beneficial to them all, in proportion to the benefit received.
In connection with taxation of property, means to make a valuation and appraisal of property, usually in connection with listing of property fiable to taxation, and implies the exercise of dis-cretion on the part of officials charged with duty of assessing, including the listing or inventory of property involved, determination of extent of physical property, and placing of a value thereon. Montana-Dakota Power Co. v. Weeks, D.C.N.D., 8 F.Supp. 935, 936. To tax. Johnson City v. Clinch-field R. Co., 163 Tenn. 332, 43 S.W.2d 386, 387.
To adjust or fix the proportion of a tax which each per-son, of severa! fiable to it, has to pay; to apportion a tax among severa!; to distribute taxation in a proportion founded on the proportion of burden and benéfit. Seymour v. Peters, 67 Mich. 415, 35 N.W. 62. To calculate the rate and amount of taxes. Flanigan v. Ponce Jury of Jackson Parish, 145 La. 613, 82 So. 722, 726.
"Assess" is sometimes used as synonymous with "levy" ; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. State Board of Taxes and Assess-ment, 101 N.J.Law, 298, 128 A. 432, 433; and is sometimes distinguished therefrom; City of Portland v. Portland Ry. Light & Power Co., 80 Or. 271, 156 P. 1058, 1064.
ASSESSED. Is equivalent to imposed. Town of Brandon v. Harvey, 105 Vt. 435, 168 A. 708, 710. To value or appraise. Abrams v. City and County of San Francisco, 48 Cal.App.2d 1, 119 P.2d 197, 199.
ASSESSED VALUATION. Value on each unit of which a prescribed amount must be paid as prop-erty taxes. In re Calhoun Beach Holding Co., 205 Minn. 582, 287 N.W. 317, 322.
ASSESSMENT. In a general sense, the process of ascertaining and adjusting the shares respec-tively to be contributed by several persons towards a common beneficial object according to the benefit received.
Taxation
The listing and valuation of property for the purpose of apportioning a tax upon it, either ac-cording to value alone or in proportion to benefit received. Also determining the share of a tax to be paid by each of many persons; or apportion-ing the entire tax to be levied among the different taxable persons, establishing the proportion due from each. Town of Albertville v. Hooper, 196 Ala. 642, 72 So. 258. Northwestern Imp. Co. v. Henneford, 184 Wash. 502, 51 P.2d 1083, 1085. Iowa Nat. Bank. v. Stewart, 214 Iowa 1229, 232 N.W. 445, 451. It fixes the liability of the tax-payer and ascertains the facts and furnishes the data for the proper preparation of the tax rolls. Dallas Joint Stock Lánd Bank of Dallas v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 118 S.W.2d 941, 942.
"Assessment" and "levy" are frequently used inter-changeably. Huyler v. Huyler’s, 44 N.Y.S.2d 255, 257. Though properly speaking it does not include the levy of taxes. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Patrick Cud-ahy Family Co., C.C.A.7, 102 F.2d 930, 932. Assessment is also popularly used as synonym for taxation in general, the authorative imposition of a rato or duty to be paid, but in its technical signitication it is only taxation for a special purpose or local improvement, local taxation, as distin-guished from general taxation; taxation on principie of apportionment according to the relation between burden and benefit; whole taxes are impositions for purpose of general revenue. Collister v. Kovanda, 51 Ohio App. 43, 199 N.E. 477, 478; Home Owners’ Loan Corporation v. Tyson, 133 Ohio St. 184, 12 N.E.2d 478, 480; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Town of Ahoskie, 192 N.C. 258, 134 S.E. 653, 654.
An assessment is doubtless a tax, but the term implies something more; it implies a tax of a particular kind, predicated upon the principie of equivalents, or benefits, which are peculiar to the persons or property charged therewith, and which are said to be assessed or appraised, according to the measure or proportion of such equiva-lents; whereas a simple tax is imposed for the purpose of supporting the government generally, without reference to any snecial advantage which may be supposed to accrue to the persons taxed. Taxes must be levied, without discrim-ination, equally upon all the subjects of property; whilst assessments are only levied upen lands, or some other specific property, the subjects of the supposed benefits; to repay which the assessment is levied. In re Walker River Irr. Dist., 44 Nev. 321, 195 P. 327, 330.
Corporations
Installments of the money subscribed for shares of stock, called for from the subscribers by the directors, from time to time as the company re-quires money, are called "assessments," or, in England, "calls." Water Co. v. Superior Court, 92 Cal. 47, 28 Pac. 54, 27 Am.St.Rep. 91; Spangler v. Railr.oad Co., 21 III. 278; Stewart V. Publishing Co., 1 Wash.St. 521, 20 Pac. 605. While the terms "call" and "assessment" are generally used synon-ymously, the latter term applies with peculiar apt-ness to contributions aboye the par value of stock or the subscription liability of the stockholders; Porter v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 36 N.D. 199, 161 N.W. 1012, 1014; whereas "call" or "in-stallments" means action of the board of directors demanding payment of all or portion of unpaidsubscriptions; Seyberth v. American Commander Min. & Mill. Co., 42 Idaho, 254, 245 P. 392, 395.
It has been said, however, that the superadded liability of stockholders to creditors, is not in a true sense an "assessment," but is a "statutory liability." Leach v. Arthur Sav. Bank, 203 Iowa, 1052, 213 N.W. 772, 773

Damages

Fixing the amount of damages to which the suc-cessful party in a suit is entitled after an inter-locutory judgment has been taken; also the /lame, given to the determination of the sum which a corporation proposing to take lands for a public use must pay 4 satisfaction of the demand proved or the value taken

Insurance

An apportionment made in general average up-on the various articles and interests at risk, ac-cording to their value at the time and place of being in safety, for contribution for damage and sacrifices purposely made, and expenses incurred for escape from impending common peril. 2 Phil. Ins. c. xv.
A sum specially levied in mutual benefit insur-ance upon a fixed and definite plan within the limit of the company’s or society’s fundamental law of organization to pay losses, or losses and expenses incurred, being to a certain degree sub-stantially the equivalent of premiums. Beaver State Merchants’ Mut. Fire Ins. Ass’n v. Smith, 97 Or. 579, 192 P. 798, 800. The periodical demands made by a mutual insurance company, under its charter and by-laws, upon the makers of premium notes, are also denominated "assessments." Hill v. Insurance Co., 129 Mich. 141, 88 N.W. 392. Meaning "premiums," Ancient Order of United Workmen of Kansas v. Hobbs, 136 Kan. 708, 18 P.2d 561, 562; and being the consideration for the insurance contracts. Downing v. School Dist. of City of Erie, 297 Pa. 474, 147 A. 239, 240.

Mining

"Assessment" as applied to labor on mining claims is universally understood to mean the an-nual labor required by Rev.St.U.S. § 2324 (30 U.S. C.A. § 28), in order to hold the right to the pos-session of the claim after a discovery and com-plete location has been made. Smith v. Union Oil Co., 166 Cal. 217, 135 P. 966, 969. See Assessment Work.
ASSESSMENT ASSOCIATION. This term, as de-fined by the Nebraska insurance laws, does not include an insurance company which requires the payment of a fixed premium in advance and provides benefits not in any degree dependent upon the collection of assessments from othe’r members, and which does not provide for the levy-ing of extra assessments, if necessary. Western Life & Accident Co. of Colorado v. State Ins. Board of Nebraska, 101 Neb. 152, 162 N.W. 530.
ASSESSMENT COMPANY. In lif e insurance. A company in which a death loss is met by levy-ing an assessment on the surviving members of the association. National Ben. Ass’n v. Clay, 162 Ky. 409, 172 S.W. 922, 923.
ASSESSMENT CONTRACT. One wherein the payment of the benefit is in any manner or de-gree dependent on the collection of an assessment levied on persons holding similar contracta. Folk-ens v. Insurance Co., 98 Mo.App. 480, 72 S.W. 720.
ASSESSMENT DISTRICT. In taxation. Any subdivision of territory, whether the whole or part of any municipality, in which by law a sepa-rate assessment of taxable property is made by the officers elected or appointed therefor. Rev. Stat.Wis.1898, § 1031 (St.1931, § 70.04).
ASSESSMENT FOR BENEFITS. A burden lev-ied under the power of taxation. Jackson v. City of Lake Worth, 156 Fla. 452, 23 So.2d 526, 528.
See Tax. Cooper Union for Advancement of Science and Art v. City of New York, 272 App. Div. 438, 71 N.Y.S.2d 204, 207.
ASSESSMENT FUND. The assessment fund of a mutual benefit association is the balance of the assessments, less expenses, out of which benefi-ciaries are paid. Kerr v. Ben. Ass’n, 39 Minn. 174, 39 N.W. 312, 12 Am.St.Rep. 631.
ASSESSMENT INSURANCE. Exists when bene-fit to be paid is dependent upon collection of such assessments as may be necessary for paying the amounts to insured. Keen v. Bankers Mut. Life Co., 230 Mo.App. 1072, 93 S.W.2d 85, 90.
ASSESSMENT LABOR. These words in Act Feb. 12, 1903 (30 U.S.C.A. § 102), providing that such labor on oil claims may be done on one of a group of contiguous claims refers to the annual labor re-quired of the locator of a mineral claim after dis-covesy by Rev.St. § 2324 (30 U.S.C.A. § 28), and not to work before discovery. Union Oil Co. of California v. Smith, 39 S.Ct. 308, 311, 249 U.S. 337, 63 L.Ed. 635. See Assessment, under the heading "In Mining."
ASSESSMENT LIST. The list furnished by the assessor to the board of equalization. Adsit v. Park, 144 La. 934, 81 So. 430, 434.
ASSESSMENT PERIOD. Means taxable period. Johnson City v. Clinchfield R. Co., 163 Tenn. 332, 43 S.W.2d 386, 387.
ASSESSMENT ROLL. In taxation. The list or roll of taxable persons and property, completed, verified, and deposited by the assessors, not as it appears after review and equalization. Brady v. Weissenstein, 260 Mich. 678, 245 N.W. 798, 799.
ASSESSMENT WORK. Under the mining laws of the United States, the holder of an unpatented mining claim on the public domain is required, in order to hold his claim, to do labor or make im-provements upon it to the extent of at least one hundred dollars in each year.. Rev.St.U.S. § 2324 (30 U.S.C.A. § 28). This is commonly called by miners "doing assessment work."

ASSESSOR. An officer chosen or appointed to appraise, value, or assets property.
The assessing power, and not merely the county assessor. Board of Com’rs of San Miguel County v. Floaten, 66 Colo. 540, 181 P. 122.
A person learned in some particular science of industry, who sits with the judge on the trial of a cause requiring such special knowledge and gives his advice.
In England it is the practice in admiralty business to call in assessors, in cases involving questions of navigation or seamanship. They are called "nautical assessors" (q. v.), and are always Brethren of the Trinity House.

Civil and Scotch Law

Persons skilled in law, selected to advise the judges of the inferior courts. Bell; Dig. 1, 22; Cod. 1, 51.
ASSETS. The word, though more generally used to denote everything which comes to the represen-tatives of a deceased person, yet is by no means confined to that use, but has come to signify everything which can be made available for the payment of debts, whether belonging to the estate of a deceased person or not. Hence we speak of the assets of a bank or other monied corporation, the assets of an insolvent debtor, and the assets of an individual or private copartnership; and we always use this word when we speak of the means which a party has, as compared with his liabilities or debts. Pelican v. Rock Falls, 81 Wis. 428, 51 N.W. 871

Bankruptcy

The property or effects of a bankrupt or insol-vent, applicable to the payment of his debts.
The term ”assets" includes all property of every kind and nature, chargeable with the debts of the bankrupt, that comes into the hands of and under the control of the signee; and the value thereof is not to be considered a less sum than that actually realized out of said property, and received by the assignee for it. In re Taggert, 16 N.B.R. 351, Fed.Cas.No.13,725; Progressive Building & Loan Co. y. Hall, C.C.A.Va., 220 F. 45, 46.

Conunercial Law

The aggregate of available property, stock in trade, cash, etc., belonging to a merchant or mer-cantile company.
The term "assets," .as applied to a bank, is broad enough to cover anything which is or may be available to pay creditors; but, as usually understood, it refers to the tangible property of the corporation, and not to the lia-bility of stockholders contingent upon insolvency. Hill v. Smathers, 173 N.C. 642, 92 S.E. 607, 609; Deariso v. Mob-ley, 38 Ga.App. 313, 143 S.E. 915, 920. But when the indi-vidual liability of stockholders has been enforced by the superintendent of banks, funds collected by him thereun-der are "assets." Bennett v. Wilkes County, 164 Ga. 790, 139 S.E. 566, 568.
But on other hand stockholders’ voluntary assessment to relieve bank or for betterment of stock. Thomson v. Holt, 345 Mo. 296, 132 S.W.2d 974, 977; bank stockholders’ ha. bility, Farmers & Merchants Bank of Morgantown v. Bank of Masontown, 123 W.Va. 451, 15 S.E.2d 569, 572; and bank directors’ contribution to special bond account to make good shrinkage in regular bond were held to be assets. Asher v. West End Bank, 345 Mo. 89, 131 S.W.2d 549, 551.

Probate Law

Property of a decedent available for the pay-ment of debts and legacies; the estate coming to the heir or personal representative which is chargeable, in law or equity, with the obligations which such heir or representative is required, in his representative capacity, to discharge.
In an accurate and legal cense, all the personal property of the deceased which is of a salable natura. and may be converted into ready money, is deemed assets. But the word is not confined to such property; for all other prop-erty of the deceased, real or personal, tangible or intangi-ble, legal or equitable, which can be made availaole for or can be appropriated to payment of debts. is, in a lame cense, assets. Trust Co. v. Earle, 110 U.S. 710, 4 Sup.Ct. 231, 28 L.Ed. 351; Condo v. Barbour, 101 Ind.App. 483, 200 N.E. 76; Tapp v. Stuart, D.C.Okl., 6 F.Supp. 577, 578.

General

assets in the hands of executors or administrators, appliPable for the payment of debts. Termes de la Ley; 2 Bl.Comm. 510; 1 Crabb, Real Prop.
Favorite v. Booher, 17 Ohio St. 557.
—Assets per descent. That portion of the ances-tor’s estate which descends to the heir, and which is sufficient to charge him, as far as it goes. with the specialty debts of his ancestors. 2 Williams, Ex’rs, 1011.
—Equitable assets. Equitable assets are all as-sets which are chargeable with the payment of debts or legacies in equity, and which do not fall under the description of legal assets. 1 Story, Eq.Jur. § 552. Those portions of the property which by the ordinary rules of law are exempt from debts, but which the testator has voiuntarily charged as assets, or which, being non-existent at law, have been created in equity. Adams, Eq. 254, et seq.
They are so called because they can be reached only by the aid and instrumentality of a court of equity, and because their distribution is governed by a different rule from that which governs the distribution of legal assets. 2 Fonbl. Eq. b. 4, pt. 2, c. 2, § 1, and notes; Story, Eq. Jur. § 552.
—Legal assets. See Legal Assets.
—Personal assets. Chattels, money, and other personal property belonging to a bankrupt, in-solvent, or decedent estate, which go to the as-signee or executor.
—Quick assets. This term was used in a corpora-tion credit statement merely to distinguish liquid assets from those permanently invested in the business, like real estate and machinery, and in-cluded amounts charged against officers for re-turn of part of salaries paid them in a previous year, in accordance with the agreement of em-ployment. In re American Knit Goods Mfg. Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 173 F. 480, 97 C.C.A. 486.
—Real assets. Lands or real estate in the hands of an heir, chargeable with the payment of the debts of the ancestor. 2 BI.Comm. 244, 302.
ASSEVERATION. An affirmation; a positive as-sertion; a solemn declaration. This word is sel-dom, if ever, used for a declaration made under oath, but denotes a declaration accompanied with solemnity or an appeal to conscience, whereas by an oath one appeals to God as a witness of the truth of what one says.
ASSEWIARE. To draw or drain water from marsh grounds. Cowell.
ASSIGN, v. To make over or set over to another. North Tex. Nat. Bank v. Thompson, Tex.Civ.App., 23 S.W.2d 494, 499. To appoint, allot, select, or designate for a particular purpose, or duty.
Thus, In England, justices are said to be "assigned to take the assises," "assigned to hold pleas," "assigned to make gaol delivery," "assigned to keep the peace," etc. St. Westm. 2, c. 30; Reg. Orig. 68, 69; 3 B1.Comm. 58, 59, 353; 1 Bl. Comm. 351.
To transfer persons, as a sheriff is said to assign pris-oners in his custody

Conveyancing

To transfer; as to assign property, or some in-terest therein. Cowell; 2 BI.Comm. 326; North Texas Nat. Bank v. Thompson, Tex.Civ.App., 23 S.W.2d 494, 499; To transfer the title or owner-ship, as of choses in action. Burkett v. Doty, 176 Cal. 89, 167 P. 518, 520.

, Practice

To point at, or point out; to set forth, or speci-fy; to mark out or designate; to particularize; as to assign errors on a writ of error; to assign breaches of a covenant. 2 Tidd, Pr. 1168; 1 Tidd, 686; Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Noack, Tex. Civ.App., 45 S.W.2d 798, 801.
ASSIGNABILITY. "Survivability" convertible term. People ex rel. Rude v. La Salle County, 310. Il1.App. 541, 34 N.E.2d 865, 867. City of Milwau-kee v. Boynton Cab Co., 201 Wis. 581, 231 N.W. 597, 598.
ASSIGNABLE. That may be assigned or trans-ferred; transferable; negotiable, as a bill of ex-change. Comb. 176; Story, Bills, § 17.
ASSIGNATION. In French law. A writ of sum-mons.
In Scotch law. A term equivalent to assign-ment.
ASSIGNATION HOUSE. A bawdyhouse. State v. Bragg, Mo.App., 220 S.W. 25, 26. See, also, People v. Arcega, 49 Cal.App. 239, 193 P. 264, 266. A house resorted to for prostitution. State v._ Hesselmeyer, 343 Mo. 797, 123 S.W.2d 90, 99.
ASSIGNATUS UTITUR JURE AUCTORIS. An assignee uses the right of his principal; an as-signee is clothed with the rights of his principal. Wing.Max. 56; 1 Exch. 32; 18 Q.B. 878.
ASSIGNAY. In Scotch law. An assignee.
ASSIGNEE. A person to whom an assignment is made; grantee. Nolan v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.S.2d 360, 363, 179 Misc. 1011. Ely v. Com’rs, 49 Mich. 17, 12 N.W. 893, 13 N.W. 784. The term

is commonly used in reference to personal prop-erty; but it is not incorrect, in some cases, to apply it to realty, e. g., "assignee of the rever-sion."
Assignee in. fact is one to whom an assignment has been made in fact by the party having the right. Tucker v. West, 31 Ark. 643. One to whom an assignment has been made. Michigan Trust Co. v. Chaffee, D.C.N.D., 44 F.Supp. 848, 850.
Assignee in Zaw is one in whom the law vests the right; as an executor or administrator.

Old Law

A person deputed or appointed by another to do any act, or perform any business. Blount. An assignee, however, was distinguished from a depu-ty, being said to occupy a thing in his own right, while a deputy acted in right of another. Cowell.
ASSIGNEE FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS. One to whom, undel’ an insolvent or bankrupt law, the whole estate of a debtor is transferred to be administered for the benefit of creditors; he is a trustee for the creditors who stands in the shoes of an assignor, and can assert no claim to property which assignor could not. Slater v. Oriental Milis, 18 R.I. 352, 27 A. 443, 444; Textor v. Orr, 86 Md. 392, 38 A. 939, 940.
ASSIGNMENT. A transfer or making over to another of the whole of any property, real or personal, in possession or in action, or of any estate or right therein. Bostrom v. Bostrom, 60 N.D. 792, 236 N.W. 732, 734. It includes transfers of all kinds of property, Higgins v. Monckton, 28 Cal.App.2d 723, 83 P.2d 516, 519. But is ordinarily limited to transfers of choses in action and to rights in or connected with property, as distin-guished from the particular item of property. In re Beffa’s Estate, 54 Cal.App. 186, 201 P. 616, 617. It is generally appropriate to the transfer of ecluitable interests. Kavanaugh v. Cohoes Power & Light Corporation, 187 N.Y.S. 216, 228, 114 Misc. 590.
To constitute valid "assignment," there must be per-fected transaction between parties intended to vest in assignee present right In thing assigned. In re Lynch’s Estate, 272 N.Y.S. 79, 85, 151 Misc. 549. It is contract, and is subject to same requisites as to validity as other con-tracts, such as proper parties, mutual assent, considera-tion, and legal subject-matter. Hutsell v. Citizens’ Nat. Bank, 166 Tenn. 598, 64 S.W.2d 188.
The transfer of the interest one has in lands and tenements; more particularly applied to the unexpired residue of a term or estate for life or years; Cruise, Dig, tit. xxxii. (Deed) c. vii, § 15; 1 Steph.Com. 507.
The distinction between an "assignment" and a "sub-lease" is that an assignment transfers the entire unexpired term. Sandford v. Ambassador Restaurant Co., 247 N.Y.S. 655, 657, 139 Misc. 3.
The deed by which the transfer is made. Hum-phrey v. Coquillard Wagon Works, 37 Okl. 714, 132 P. 899, 902, 49 L.R.A.,N.S., 600.
A transfer of the title to a bill, note, or check.
An assignment at common law differs from an indorse-ment In that by an assignment the assignor passed titie to
the assignee but did not subject himself to any contractual liability, whereas an indorser, in additlon to passing titie, lmpliedly contracts to pay note at maturity on demand and notice on maker’s failure to so do. Johnson v. Beickey, 64 Utah, 43, 228 P. 189, 191.
In patent law, the transfer of the entire interest in a patented invention or of an undivided portion of such entire interest as to every section of the United States. Rob.Pat. § 762. It differs Irom grant in relation to the territorial area to which they relate. A grant is the transfer of the exclu-sive right in a specific part of the United States. It is an exclusive sectional right. A license is a transfer of a less or different interest than either the interest in a whole patent or an undivided part of such whole interest or an exclusive sec-tional interest. Littlefield v. Perry, 21 Wall. 205, 22 L.Ed. 577.
A license is distinguished from an assignment and a grant in that the latter transfers the monopoly as well as the invention, while a license transfers only the invention and does not affect the monopoly otherwise than by estop-ping the licensor from exercising his prohibitory powers in derogation of the privileges conferred by him upon the licensee. Rob. Pat. § 806. See Pope Mfg. Co. v. Mfg. Co., 144 U.S. 248, 12 S.Ct. 641, 36 L.Ed. 423.
—Assignment for benefit of creditors. An assign-ment in trust made by insolvent and other debtors for the payment of their debts. These are usually regulated by state statutes. Woodard v. Mor-rissey, 115 Kan. 511, 223 P. 306, 307.
The distinctive test between an "assignment" and a sale, where another creditor Is to be paid off, is that in the former case such other creditor is to receive some of the property or its proceeds, and in the latter the creditor to whom title is passed takes for himself the whole property, stipulating to pay the other creditor out of his own mezas and not out of the property or its proceeds. Silver & Gold-stein v. Chapman, 163 Ga. 604, 136 S.E. 914, 919.
—Assignment of account. Transfer te) assignee giving him a right to have moneys when collected applied to payment of his debt. Nanny v. EL E. Pogue Distillery Co., 56 Cal.App.2d 817, 133 P.2d 686, 688.
—Assignment of dower. The act by which the share of a widow in her deceased husband’s real estate is ascertained and set apart tu her. Bettis v. McNider, 137 Ala. 588, 34 So. 813, 97 Am.St.Rep. 59.
—Assignment of error. See Error.
—Assignment pro tanto. Where an order is drawn upon a third party and made payable out of a particular fund then due or to become due to the drawer, the delivery of the order to the payce operates as an assignment pro tanto of the fund. Doyle v. East New York Sav. Bank, 44 N.Y.S.2d 318, 323.
Under Mechanics’ Lien Law a worknian or materialman who serves on owner a stop notice becomes an assignee pro tanto of debt due from owner to contractor. Common-wealth Roofing Co. v. Riccio, 81 N.J.Eq. 486, 87 A. 114, 115.
Check drawn on a bank operates as an assignment pro tanto of depositor’s funds in favor of holder. Nat. Bank of America v. Indiana Ranking Co., 114 III. 433, 2 N.E. 401.
—Assignment with preferentes. An assignment for the benefit of creditors, with directions to the

assignee to prefer a specified creditor or class of creditors, by paying their claims in full before the others receive any dividend, or in some other manner. More usually termed a "preferential assignment."
—Foreign assignment. An assignment made in a foreign country, or in another state. 2 Kent, Comm. 405, et seq.
—General assignment. An assignment made °for the benefit of all the assignor’s creditors, instead of a few only; or one which transfers the whole of his estate to the assignee, instead of a part only. Royer Wheel Co. v. Fielding, 101 N.Y. 504, 5 N.E. 431.
—Voluntary assignment. An assignment for the benefit of bis creditors made by a debtor volun-tarily; as distinguished from a compulsory as-signment which takes place by operation of law in proceedings in bankruptcy or insolvency. Pre-sumably it means an assignment of a debtor’s property in trust to pay his debts generally, in distinction from a transfer of property to a par-ticular creditor in payment of his demand, or to a conveyance by way of collateral security or mort-gage. Dias v. Bouchaud, 10 Paige (N.Y.) 445.
ASSIGNOR. A person who assigns a right, wheth-er or not he is the original owner thereof. Re-statement, Contracts, § 149(2).
ASSIGNS. Assignees; those to whom property shall have been transferred. Now seldom used except in the phrase, in deeds, "heirs, administra-tors, and assigns." Stannard v. Marboe, 159 Minn. 119, 198 N.W. 127. It generally comprehends all those who take either immediately or remotely from or under the assignor, whether by convey-ance, devise, descent, or act of law. Ferrell v. Deverick, 100 S.E. 850, 853, 85 W.Va. 1.
ASSISA. In old English and Scotch law. An assise; a kind of jury or inquest; a writ; a sitting of a court; an ordinance or statute; a fixed or specific time, number, quantity, quality, price, or weight; a tribute, fine, or tax; a real action; the name of a writ. See Assise.
ASSISA ARMORUM. Assise of arms. A statute or ordinance requiring the keeping of arms for the common defense. Hale, Com.Law, c. 11.
ASSISA CADERE. To fail in the assise; i. e., to be nonsuited. Cowell; 3 Bl.Comm. 402.
ASSISA CADIT IN JURATUM. The assise falls (turns) into a jury; hence to submit a controversy to trial by jury.
ASSISA CONTINUANDA. An ancient writ ad-dressed to the justices of assise for the continua-tion of a cause, when certain facts put in issue could not have been proved in time by the party alleging them. Reg.Orig. 217.
ASSISA DE CLARENDON. The assise of Ciaren-don. A statute or ordinance passed in the tenth year of Henry II., by ,which those tbat were ac-
cused of any heinous crime, and not able to purge themselves, but must abjure the realm. had liberty of forty days to stay and try what succor they could get oi their friends towards their sustenance in exile. Bract. fol. 136; Co.Litt. 159a; Cowell.
ASSISA DE FORESTA. Assise of the forest; a statute concerning orders to be observed in the royal forests.
ASSISA DE MENSURIS. Assise of measures. A common rule for weights and measures, estab-lished throughout England by Richard I., in the eighth year of his reign. Hale, Com.Law, c. 7.
ASSISA DE NOCUMENTO. An assise of nui-sance; a writ to abate or redress a nuisance.
ASSISA DE UTRUM. An obsolete writ, which la y for the parson of a church whose predecessor had alienated the land and rents of it.
ASSISA FRISCIE FORTLZE. Assise of fresh force, which see.
ASSISA MORTIS D’ANCESTORIS. Assise of mort d’ancestor, which see.
ASSISA NOWE DISSEYSINZE. Assise of novel disseisin, which see.
ASSISA PANIS ET CEREVISI]E. Assise of bread and ale, or beer. The name of a statute passed in the fifty-first year of Henry III., containing regula-tions for the sale of bread and ale; sometimes called the "statute of bread and ale." Co.Litt. 159b; 2 Reeve, Hist.Eng.Law, 56; Cowell; Bract. fol. 155.
ASSISA PROROGANDA. An obsolete writ, which was directed to the judges assigned to take assises, to stay proceedings, by reason of a party to them being employed in the king’s business. Reg.Orig. 208.
ASSISA ULTIME PRMSENTATIONIS. A’ssise of darrein presentment, (q. v.).
ASSISA VENALIUM. The assise of salable com-modities, or of things exposed for sale.
ASSISE, or ASSISE. An ancient species of court, consisting of a certain number of men, usually twelve, who were summoned together to try a disputed cause, performing the funetions of a jury, except that they gave a verdict from their own investigation and knowledge and not upon evidence adduced. From the fact that they sat together, (assideo,) they were called the "assise." See Bract. 4, 1, 6; Co.Litt. 153b, 159b. A court composed of an assembly of knights and other substantial men, with the – baron or justice, in a certain place, at an appointed time. Grand Cou. cc. 24, 25.
The verdict or judgment of the jurors or recog-nitors of assise. 3 Bl.Comm. 57, 59.
In modern English law, the name "assises" or "assi zes" is given to the court, time, or place where the judges of assise and nisi prisas, who are sent by special commission from the crown on circuits through the kingdom, proceed to take inclictments, and to try such disputed causes issuIng out of the courts at Westminster as are then ready for trial, with the assistance of a jury from the particular county; the regular sesslons of the judges at nisi prius.
Anything reduced to a certainty in respect to time, number, quantity, quality, weight, measure, etc. Spelman.
An ordinance, statute, or regulation. Spelman gives this meaning of the word the first place among his definitions, observing that statutes were in England called "assises" down to the reign of Henry III.
A species of writ, or real action, said to have been invented by Glanville, chief justice to Henry II., and having for its object to determine the right of possession of lands, and to recover the possession. 3 B1.Comm. 184, 185.
The whole proceedings in court upon a writ of assise. Co.Litt. 159b. The verdict or finding of the jury upon such a writ. 3 B1.Comm. 57.
—Assise of Clarendon. See Assisa.
—Assise of darrein presentment. A writ of assise which formerly lay when a man or his ancestors under whom he claimed presented a clerk to a benefice, who was instituted, and afterwards, upon the next avoidance, a stranger presented a clerk and thereby disturbed the real patron. 3 Bl.Comm. 245; St. 13 Edw. I. (Westm. 2) c. 5. It has given way to the remedy by quare impedit.
—Assise of fresh force. In old English practice. A writ which lay by the usage and custom of a city or borough, where a man was disseised of his lands and tenements in such city or borough. It was called "fresh force," because it was to be sued within forty days after the party’s title ac-crued to him. Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 7 C.
—Assise of mort d’ancestor. A real action which lay to recover land of which a person had been deprived on the death of his ancestor by the abate-ment or intrusion of a stranger. 3 B1.Comm. 185; Co.Litt. 159a. It was abolished by St. 3 & 4 Wm. IV, c. 27.
—Assise of Northhampton. A re-enactment and enlargement (1176) of the Assise of Clarendon. 1 Holdsw.Hist.E.L. 21.
—Assise of novel disseisin. A writ of assise which lay for the recovery of lands or tenements, where the claimant had been lately disseised.
—Assise of nuisance. A writ of assise which lay where a nuisance had been committed to the complainant’s freehoid; either for abatement of the nuisance or for damages.
—Assise of the forest. A statute touching orders to be observed in the king’s forests. Manwood, 35.
—Assise of utrum. A writ of assise which lay for a parson to recover lands which his predecessor had improperly allowed the church to be deprived of. 3 Bla.Com. 257An assise for the trial of the question of wheth-er land is a lay fee, or held in frankalmoigne. 1 Holdsw.Hist.E.L. 21.
—Assise rents. The certain established rents of the freeholders and aneient copyholders of a manor; so called because they are assised, or made precise and certain.
—Grand assize. A peculiar species of trial by jury, introduced in the time of Henry II., giving the tenant or defendant in a writ of right the alternative of a trial by battel, or by his peers. Abolished by 3 & 4 Wm. IV, c. 42, § 13. See 3 Bl. Comm. 341. See Battel.
ASSISER. An assessor; juror; an officer who has the care and oversight of weights and meas-ures.
ASSISORS. In Scotch law. Jurors; the persons who formed that kind of court which in Scotland was called an "assise," for the purpose of inquiring
into and judging divers civil causes, such as per-*
ambulations, cognitions, molestations, purpres-
tures, and other matters; like jurors in England. Holthouse.
ASSIST. To help; aid; succor; lend countenance or encouragement to; participate in as an auxili-ary. People v. Hayne, 83 Cal. 111, 23 Pac. 1, 7 L.R.A. 348, 17 Am.St.Rep. 211. To contribute effort in the complete accomplishment of an ulti-mate purpose intended to be effected by those en-gaged. People v. Thurman, 62 Cal.App. 147, 216 P. 394, 395.
ASSISTANCE. Imports voluntary participation in wrongful acts of promotors. Peterson v. Hop-son, 29 N.E.2d 140, 148, 306 Mass. 597.
ASSISTANCE, or (ASSISTANTS) COURT OF. See Court of Assistants.
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. Sixth Amendment to Federal Constitution, guaranteeing accused in criminal prosecution "assistance of counsel" for his defense, means effective assistance. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6. Thomas v. District of Columbia, 90 F.2d 424, 428, 67 App.D.C. 179. As distinguished from bad faith, sham, mere pretense or want of opportunity for conferences and preparation. Beckett v. Hudspeth, C.C.A.Kan., 131 F.2d 195, 196.
ASSISTANCE, WRIT OF. See Writ of Assistance.
ASSISTANT. A deputy, agent, or employee; as, an assistant assessor. Pryor Brown Transfer Co. v. Gibson, 154 Tenn. 260, 290 S.W. 33, 35, 51 A.L. R. 193. One who stands by and aids or he]ps an-other, and is not an agent. Wells-Dickey Co. v. Embody, 82 Mont. 150, 266 P. 869, 874. Ordinarily refers te employee whose duties are to help his su-perior, to whom he must look for authority to act. State ex rel. Dunn v. Ayers, 112 Mont. 120, 113 P. 2d 785, 788.
ASSISTANT JUDGE. A judge of the English court of general or quarter sessions in Middlesex. He differs from the other justices in being a bar-rister of ten years’ standing, and in being salaried. St. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 71; 22 & 23 Vict. c. 4; Pritch. Quar.Sess. 31.
ASSISTANT TEACHER. An "assistant teacher," meaning a classroom teacher of a subject, is not a "laboratory assistant," meaning a helper of a teacher who does no teaching. People ex rel. Becker v. Board of Education of City of New York, Sup., 162 N.Y.S. 643, 648.
ASSISUS. Rented or farmed out for a specified assise; that is, a payrnent of a certain assessed rent in money or provisions.
ASSITHMENT. Weregild (q. v.) or compensation by a pecuniary mulct. Cowell.
ASSIZE. In the practice of the criminal courts of Scotland, the fifteen men who decide on the conviction or acquittal of an accused person are called the "assize," though in popular language, and even in statutes, they are called the "jury." Wharton. See Assise.
ASSIZES. Sessions of the justices or commis-sioners of assize. These assizes are held twice in each year in each of the various shires of Eng-land, with some exceptions, for the trial of mat-ters of fact in issue in both civil and criminal cases. They still retain the ancient narre in popu-lar language, though the commission of assize is no longer issued. See Assise.
ASSIZES DE JERUSALEM. A code of feudal jurisprudence prepared by an assembly "of barons and lords A. D. 1099, after the conquest of Jerusa-lem. It was compiled principally from the laws and customs of France.
ASSOCIATE. Signifies confederacy or union for a particular purpose, good or ill. Weir v. United States, C.C.A.Ind., 92 F.2d 634, 638, 114 A.L.R. 481; Means "also". Smith v. Maine, 260 N.Y.S. 409, 145 Misc. 521.
An officer in each of the English courts of com-mon law, appointed by the chief judge of the court, and holding his ofüce during good behavior, whose duties were to superintend the entry of causes, to attend the sittings of nisi prius, and there receive and enter verdicts, and to draw up the posteas and any orders of nisi prius. The as-sociates are now officers of the Supreme Court of Judicature, and are styled "Masters of the Su-preme Court." Wharton.
A person associated with the judges and clerk of assise in the commission of general jail de-livery. Mozley & Whitley.
The term is frequently used of the judges of appellate courts, other than the presíding judge or chief justice.
ASSOCIATES IN OFFICE. "Associates in office" are those who are united in action; who have a common purpose; who share the responsibility or authority and among whom is reasonable equality; those who are authorized by law to per-form the duties jointly or as a body. Barton v. Alexander, 27 Idaho 286, 148 P. 471, 474, Ann.Cas. 1917D, 729.
ASSOCIATION. The act of a number of persons in uniting together for some special purpose or business. The persons so joining. It is a word of vague meaning used to indicate a collection of persons who have joined together for a certain object. U. S. v. Martindale, D.C.Kan., 146 F. 280, 284; In re Sautter’s Estate, 142 Neb. 42, 5 N.W.2d 263, 268; W. R. Roach & Co. v. Harding, 348 Ill. 454, 181 N.E. 331, 336. An unincorporated society; a body of persons united and acting to-gether without a charter, but upon the methods and forms used by incorporated bodies for the prosecution of some common enterprise. Clark v. Grand Lodge of Brotherhood of Railroad Train-men, 328 Mo. 1084, 43 S.W.2d 404, 408. It is not a legal entity separate from the persons who com-pose it. Meinhart v. Contresta, Sup., 194 N.Y.S. 593, 594.
A confederacy or union for particular purposes, good or ill. Johnson’s Dict.
In that sense "association" ls a generic term and may indifferently comprehend a voluntary confederacy, which is a partnership dissoluble by the persons who formed it, or a corporate confederacy, deriving íts existence from a confederacy, and dissoluble only by the law." Campbell v. Floyd, 153 Pa. 84, 25 A. 1033, 1036.
A body of persons invested with some, yet not full, cor-porate ríghts and powers, but will not include the state. State v. Taylor, 7 S.D. 533, 64 N.W. 548.
"Association" and ”society" are convertible terms. Kribs v. United Order of Foresters, 191 Mo.App. 524, 177 S.W. 766, 769. Also often used as synonymous with "com-pany". Law v. Crist, 41 Cal.App.2d 862, 107 P.2d 953, 955.
It is fundamentally a largo partnership, from which it differs, in that it is not bound by the acts of the Individ-ual partners, but only by those of its manager or trustee; and that shares in it are transferable, and that it is not dissolved by the retirement, death, or bankruptcy of its individual members. In re Lloyds of Texas, D C.Tex., 43 F.2d 383, 385.
A "business trust" is an "association" when it has a continuing entity throughout trust period, centralized management, continuity of trust uninterrupted by death among beneficial owners, means for transfer of benefícial interests, and limitation of personal liabilities of partici-pants to property embarked in undertaking. Fletcher v. Clark, D.C.Wyo., 57 F.Supp. 479, 480.
"Association" has been held to include a common-law business or Massachusetts trust. Tracy v. Banker, 170 Mass. 266, 49 N.E. 308, 39 L.R.A. 508.
Articles of association. See Articles.
English Law
A writ directing certain persons (usually the clerk and his subordinate officers) to associate themselves with the justices and sergeants for the purpose of taking the assizes. 3 Bla.Comm. 59.
National Banking Associations
The statutory title of corporations organized for the purpose of carrying on the business of banking under the laws of the United States. Rev.St.U.S. § 5133 (12 USCA § 21).
ASSOCIÉ EN NOM. In French law. In a société en commandité an associé en nom is one who is hable for the engagements of the undertaking to the whole extent of his property. This expression arises from the fact that the narres of the associés

so liable figure in the firm-narre or form part of the société en ,nom collectif. Arg.Fr.Merc.Law, 546.
ASSOIL. (Spelled also assoile, assoile, assoilyie.) To absolve; acquit; to set free; to deliver from excommunication. St. 1 Hen. IV, c. 7; Cowell.
ASSOILZIE. In Scotch law. To acquit the de-fendant in an action; to find a criminal not guilty.
ASSUME. To pretend. To undertake; engage; promise. 1 Ld.Raym. 122; 4 Coke, 92; Hopkins v. Erskine, 118 Me. 276, 107 A. 829, 830. To take to or upon one’s self. Springer v. De Wolf, 194 III. 218, 62 N.E. 542, 56 L.R.A. 465, 88 Am.St.Rep. 155; Anicker v. Doyle, 84 Okl. 62, 202 P. 281, 284; Bel] Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania v. Public Service Commission of Pennsylvania, 119 Pa.Super. 292, 181 A. 73, 74. Also taking up, receiving, adopting, taking to oneself, or to put on deceitfully, take appearance of, affect, or outwardly seem. Nickell v. State, 205 Wis. 614, 238 N.W. 508, 510. To take on, become bound as another is bound, or put one-self in place of another as to an obligation or lia-bility. Texas Employbrs’ Ins. Ass’n v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 129 S.W.2d 746, 749.
ASSUMED RISK. See Assumption of Risk. ASSUMPSIT. Lat. He undertook; he promised.
A promise or engagement by which one person assumes or undertakes to do some act or pay something to another. It may be either oral or in writing, but is not under seal. It is express if the promisor puts his engagement in distinct and definite language; it is implied where the law infers a promise (though no formal one has passed) from the conduct of the party or the cir-cumstances of the case. Dukes v. Rogers, 67 Ga. App. 661, 21 S.E.2d 295, 297.
Practice
A form of action which lies for the recovery of damages for the non-performance of a parol or simple contract; or a contract that is neither of record nor under seal. 7 Term. 351; Ballard v. Walker, 3 Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 60. A liberal and equitable action, applicable to almost every case where money has been received which in equity and good conscience ought to be refunded; ex-press promise is not necessary to sustain action, but it may be maintained whenever anything is received or done from the circumstances of which the law implies a promise of compensation. Ar-mour & Co. v. Whitney & Kemmerer, Inc., 164 Va.12, 178 S.E. 889, 98 A.L.R. 596.
Express assumpsit. See Express Assumpsit
Special assumpsit is an action of assumpsit brought upon an express contract or promise.
General (common or indebitatus) assumpsit is an action of assumpsit brought upon the promise or contract implied by law in certain cases. It is founded upon what the law terms an implied promise on the part of defendant to pay what, in
good conscience, he is bound to pay to plaintiff. Tr. and Ha. Pr. 1490; Ruse v. Williams, 14 Ariz 445, 130 P. 887, 888, 45 L.R.A.,N.S., 923.
The action of assumpsit dlffers from tres pass and trover, which are founded on a tort, not upon a contract; from covenant and debt, which are appropriate where the ground of recovery is a sealed instrument, or special obli-gation to pay a fixed sum ; and from replevin, which seeks the recovery of specific property, if attainable, rather than ‘of damages.
ASSUMPSIT FOR MONEY FIAD AND RE-CEIVED. Is of equitable character and lies, in general, whenever defendant has received money which in equity and good conscience he ought to pay to plaintiff. Henderson v. Koenig, 192 Mo. 690, 91 S.W. 88, 91.
ASSUMPSIT ON QUANTUM MERUIT. When a person employs another to do work for him, with-out any agreement as to his compensation, the law implies a promise from the employer to the work-man that he will pay him for his services as much as he may deserve or merit. In such case, the plaintiff may suggest in his declaration that the defendant promised to pay him as much as he reasonably deserved, and then ayer that his trouble was worth such a sum of money, which the de-fendant has omitted to pay. This is called an "assumpsit on quantum meruit". Travis v. Ken-nedy, Tex.Civ.App., 66 S.W.2d 444, 446.
ASSUMPTION. The act of conceding or taking for granted. Gordon v. Schellhorn, 95 N.J.Eq. 563, 123 A. 549, 552.
The term is substantially synonymous with "inference," "probabillty," and "presumption." Ohio Bldg. Safety Vault Co. v. Industrial Board of Illinois, 277 Ill. 96, 115 N.E. 149, 154.
The act or agreement of assuming or taking upon one’s self; the undertaking or adoption of a debt or obligation primarily resting upon another, as where the purchaser of real estate "assumes" a mortgage resting upon it, in which case he adopts the mortgage debt as his own and becomes per-sonally liable for its payment. Lenz v. Railroad Co., 111 Wis. 198, 86 N.W. 607; Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania v. Public Service Commission of Pennsylvania, 119 Pa.Super. 292, 181 A. 73, 75.
The difference between the purchaser of land assuming a mortgage on it and simply buying subject to the mort-gage, is that In the former case he makes himself per-sonally liable for the payment of the mortgage debt, while in the latter case he does not. Hancock v. Fleming, 103 Ind. 533, 3 N.E. 254. When he takes the conveyance sub-ject to the mortgage, he is bound only to the extent of the property. Brichetto v. Raney, 76 Cal.App. 232, 245 P. 235, 241. Whcre one "assumes" a lease, he takes to him-self the obligations, contracts, agreernents, and benefits tu which the other contracting party was entitled under the terms of the lease. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Indiana, etc., 11. Co., 44 Ohio St. 287, 314, 7 N.E. 152.
ASSUMPTION OF INDEBTEDNESS. Means for one person to bind himself to pay debt incurred by another. Pawnee Ceunty Excise Board v. Kurn, 187 Okl. 110, 101 P.2d 614, 618.
ASSUMPTION OF RISK. Exists where none of fault for injury rests with plaintiff, but where plaintiff assumes consequences of injury occurring through fault of defendant, third person, or fault

of no one. Rodgers v. Stoller, 284 Ky. 108, 143 S. W.2d 1047, 1048. It is based upon the maxim "volenti non fit injuria," which means that to which a person assents is not regarded in law as an injury. Poole v. Lutz & Schmidt, 273 Ky. 586, 117 S.W.2d 575, 576. And predicated upon knowledge and consent. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Diggs, 205 Ark. 150, 167 S.W.2d 879, 883. While more generally used as between mas-ter and servant, courts do not confine it to stich relationship. Adams’ Adm’r v. Callis & Hughes, 253 Ky. 382, 69 S.W.2d 711, 712.
Doctrine held applicable in action by automobile guest passeneer. Gill v. Arthur, 69 Ohio App. 386, 43 N.E.2d 894, 899. But held not applicable in automobile collision cases generally. Schubring v. Weggen, 234 Wis. 517, 291 N.W. 788, 789. 790, 791.
In some jurisdictions, doctrine confined to master and servant relation. Do wse v. Maine Cent. R. R., 91 N.H. 419, 20 A.2d 629, 631; Parker v. Grand "Trunk Western R. Co., 261 Mich. 293, 246 N.W. 125, 126; West Texas Utilities Co. v. Reuner, Tex., 32 S.W.2d 264, 270. A term or condition in a con• tract of employment, either express or implied from the circumstances of the employment, by which the employee agrees that dangers of injury ordinarily or obviously incident to the discharge of his duty in the particular employment shall be at his own risk. Parker v. City of Wichita, 150 Kan. 249, 92 P.2d 86, 89; Wisconsin & Arkansas Lumber Co. v. Otts, 178 Ark. 283, 10 S.W.2d 364, 365; Southern Pac. Co. v. McCready, C.C.A.Cal., 47 F.2d 673, 675. It has reference to dangers that are normally and necessarily incident to the oc-cupation, which are deemed to be assumed by workmen of mature years, whether they are ac• tually aware of them or not. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Cochran, C.C.A.W.Va., 22 F.2d 22, 25.
It is founded upon the knowledge of the servant either actual dr constructive, as to the hazards to be encountered and his consent to take the chance of danger. Schuppenies v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 38 Idaho, 672, 225 P. 501, 505. But it does not Include the risks from the negligence of the master, or the gross negligence of his superior servant. Burton Const. Co. v. Metcalfe, 162 Ky. 366, 172 S.W. 698, 702; "ContrIbutory negligence" is not synonymous with assumption of risk. Dolese Bros. Co. v. Kahl,
203 F. 627, 630. "Assumed risk" is founded upon the knowledge of the employee, either actual or constructive, of the risks to be encountered, and his consent to take the chance of injury therefrom. Contributory negligence implies misconduct, the doing of an imprudent act by the injured party, or his dereliction in failing to take proper :precaution for his personal safety. The doctrine of assumed risk is founded upon contract, while contributory negligence is solely matter of conduct. Wheeler v. Tyler, 129 Minn. 206, 152 N.W. 137.
ASSUMPTION OF SKILL. The doctrine known as the "assumption of skill" on the part of the master sometimes makes the knowledge implied against the master relative to the safety of the place of work, and the nature, constituents, and general characteristics of the things used in the business, superior to that implied against the servant, especially where the servant is inex-perienced. Hines v. Little, 26 Ga.App. 136, 105 S. E. 618.
ASSURANCE. A pledge, guaranty, or surety. Na-tional Watch Co. v. Weiss, 163 N.Y.S. 46, 47, 98
Misc. 453. A declaration tending to inspire full confidence. Texas & N. O. Ry. Co. v. New, Tex. Civ.App., 95 S.W.2d 170, 175. A making secure; insurance.
The term was formerly of very frequent use in the modern sense of insurance, particularly in English mari-time law, and still appears in the policies of some com-panies, but is othcrwise seldom seen of late years. There seems to be a tendency, however, to use assurance for the contracts of life insurance companies, and insurance for risks upon property.
In conveyancing,. A deed or instrument of con-veyance. The legal evidences of the transfer of property are in England called the "common as-surances" of the kingdom, whereby every man’s estate is assured to him, and all controversies, doubts, and difficulties are either prevented or removed. 2 Bl.Comm. 294. State v. Farrand, 8 N.J.Law, 335.
ASSURANCE, FURTHER, COVENANT FOR. See Covenant for Further Assurance.
ASSURE. To make certain and put beyond doubt. Armour & Co. v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 41 R.I. 361, 103 A. 1031, 1033. To declare solemnly; to assure to any one with design of inspiring’ be-lief or confidence; to declare, ayer, avouch, assert, or asseverate. Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., C.C.A.Ihl., 89 F.2d 889, 891. Used interchangeably with insure in insurance law; in real property documents it means a warranty; and in business documents, generally, it means a pledge or se-curity. Utilities Engineering Institute v. Kafad, 58 N.Y.S.2d 743, 745, 185 Misc. 1035.
ASSURED. A person who has been insured by some insurance company, or underwriter, against losses or perils mentioned in the policy of insur-ance. Brockway v. Insurance Co., C.C.Pa., 29 Fed. 766.
Thus where a wife insures her husband’s life for her own benefit and he has no interest in the policy, she is the "assured" and he the "insured."
The person for whose benefit the policy is is-sued and to whom the loss is payable, not neces-sarily the person on whose life or property the policy is written. Insurance Co. v. Luchs, 2 S.Ct. 949, 108 U.S. 498, 27 L.Ed. 800. Ordinarily syn-onymous with insured. Thompson v. Northwest-ern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 161 Iowa, 446, 143 N.W. 518.
ASSURED CLEAR DISTANCE AHEAD. Re-quires driver keep automobile under such control that he can stop in distante that he can clearly see, the distante varying with circumstances. Lauerman v. Strickler, 141 Pa.Super. 240, 14 A.2d 608, 610; Smiley v. Arrow Spring Bed Co., 138 Ohio St. 81, 33 N.E.2d 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 133 A.L.R. 960.
ASSURER. An insurer against certain perils and dangers; an underwriter; and indemnifier.
ASSYTHEMENT. In Scotch law. Damages awarded to the relative of a murdered person from the guilty party, who has not been convicted and punished. Paters. Comp.ASTIPULATION. A mutual agreement, assent, and consent between parties; also a witness or record.
ASTITRARIUS HIERES. An heir apparent who has been placed, by conveyance, in possession of his ancestor’s estate during such ancestor’s lile-time. Co.Litt. 8.
ASTITUTION. An arraignment (q. v.).
ASTRARIUS. In old English law. A house-holder; belonging to the house; a person in ac-tual possession of a house.
ASTRARIUS RIERES. Where the ancestor by conveyance hath set his heir apparent and his family in a house in his lifetime. Cunningham, L. Dict.
ASTRER. In old English law. A householder, or occupant of a house or hearth.
ASTRICT. In Scotch law. To assign to a par-ticular mili.
ASTRICTION TO A MILL. A servitude by which grain growing on certain lands or brought within them must be carried to a certain mili to be ground, a certain multure or price being paid for the same. Jacob.
ASTRIHILTET. In Saxon law. A penalty for a wrong done by one in the king’s peace. The offender was to replace the damage twofold. Spel-man.
ASTRUM. A house, or place of habitation. Bract. fol. 267b; Cowell.
ASYLUM. A sanctuary, or place of refuge and protection, where criminals and debtors found shelter, and from which they could not be taken without sacrilege. Cromie v. Institution of Merey, 3 Bush (Ky.) 391,
Shelter; refuge; protection from the hand of justice. The word includes not only place, but also shelter, security, protection,
A fugitive from justice, who has committed a crime In a foreign country, ”seeks an asylum" at all times when he claims the use of the territories of the United States. In re De Giacomo, 12 Blatchf. 395, Fed.Cas.No.3,747. Every sovereign state has the right to offer an asylum to fugitives from other countries, but there is no corresponding right on the part of the alíen to claim asylum. In recent years this right of asylum has been voluntarily limited by most states by treaties providing for the extradition (q. v.) of fugitive críminals.
In time of war, a place of refuge in neutral territory for belligerent war-ships.
An institution for the protection and relief of unfortunates, as asylums for the poor, for the deaf and dumb, or for the insane. Lawrence v. Leidigh, 58 Kan. 594, 50 P. 600, 62 Am.St.Rep. 631. The term may also include a hospital con-structed and maintained by the United States government for the treatment of soldiers and ex-soldiers. Kemp v. Heebner, 77 Colo. 177, 234 P. 1068, 1069.
AT
AT. A term of considerable elasticity of mean-ing, and somewhat indefinite. As used to fix a time, it does not necessarily mean eo instante or the identical time named, or even a fixed definite moment. Barnett v. Strain, 151 Ga. 553, 107 S.E. 530, 532; In re Clark’s Estate, 61 P.2d 1221, 1222, 17 Cal.App.2d 323; And may mean on the same day, Perry v. Gross, 172 Cal. 468, 156 P. 1031, 1032. But "at" may often express simply near-ness and proximity, and consequently may denote a reasonable time. Smeltzer v. Atlanta Coach Co., 44 Ga.App. 53, 160 S.E. 665, 666. Primarily, "at" means "near" or "near to," and involves the idea of proximity. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Hill, 215 Ky. 222, 284 S.W. 1047, 1048, 48 A.L.R. 327; "At" a village or city may mean "near." Howell v. State, 164 Ga. 204, 138 S.E. 206, 209; Board of Trustees of Albany College v. Monteith, 64 Or. 356, 130 P. 633, 636. Depending on the context, "at" may be equivalent to "in"; Millikan v. Se-curity Trust Co., 187 Ind. 307, 118 N.E. 568; Fayette County Board of Education v. Tompkins, 212 Ky. 751, 280 S.W. 114, 116; "toward"; State v. Cun-ningham, 107 Miss. 140, 65 So. 115, 117, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1179; "after"; Davis v. Godart, 131 Minn. 221, 154 N.W. 1091, 1092; "not later than"; Smith v. Jacksonville Oil Mill Co., 21 Ga.App. 679, 94 S.E. 900, 901; or be equivalent to the words on, by, about, under, over, through, from, to, etc.
AT ARM’S LENGTII. Beyond the reach of per-sonal influence or control.
Parties are said to deal "at arm’s length" when each stands upon the strict letter of his rights. and conducts the business in a formal manner, without trustíng to the other’s fairness or integrity, and without being subject to the other’s control or overmastering influence.
AT BAR. Before the court. "The case at bar," etc. Dyer, 31.
AT ISSUE. Whenever the parties come to a point in the pleadings which is affirmed on one sitie and denied on the other, they are said to be at an issue. Willard v. Zehr, 215 III. 154, 74 N.E. 107, 108.
AT LARGE. Not limited to any particular place, district, person, matter, or question; open to dis-cussion or controversy; not precluded. Free; unrestrained; not under corporal control; as a ferocious animal so free from restraint as to be liable to do mischief. Fully; in detail; in an ex-tended form.
A congressman at large Is one who ls elected by the electors of an entlre state.
AT LAW. According to law; by, for, or in law; particularly in distinction from that which is done in or according to equity; or in titles such as sergeant at law, barrister at law, attorney or counsellor at law. Hooker v. Nichols, 116 N.C. 157, 21 S.E. 208.
AT LEAST. In deed of trust covenant specifying amount of fire insurance, means at lowest esti-mate, at smallest concession or claim, in smallest or lowest degree, at smallest number. Browne v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 225 Mo.App. 665, 37 S.W.2d 977, 979.

AT ONCE. In contracts of various kinds the phrase is construed as synonymous with "imme-diately" and "forthwith," where the subject-mat-ter is the giving of notice. The use of such term does not ordinarily can for instantaneous action, but rather that notice shall be given within such time as is reasonable in view of the circumstances. George v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 121 Neb. 647, 238 N.W. 36, 39. Likewise, contracts or statutes requiring the performance of a particular act "at once" are usually held to mean simply within a reasonable time. Arizona Power Co. v. State, 19 Ariz. 114, 166 P. 275, 277. An order to "ship at once" is synonymous with "as soon as possible". Myers v. Hardin, 208 Ark. 505, 186 S. W.2d 925, 928.
AT SEA. Out of the limits of any port or harbor on the sea-coast. U. S. v. Symonds, 7 S.Ct. 411, 120 U.S. 46, 30 L.Ed. 557.
AT WAR. Death of seaman from Pearl Harbor Attack as occurring while nation was "at war". Rosenau v. Idaho Mut. Ben. Ass’n, 65 Idaho 408, 145 P.2d 227, 232.
AT ANY TIME. Grant of time without limit. Haworth v. Hubbard, 220 Ind. 611, 44 N.E.2d 967, 970, 144 A.L.R. 887. Period of time limited by circumstances. Imes v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 84 P.2d 1106, 1107, 1108, 184 Okl. 79. Within a reasonable time. Haworth v. Hubbard, 220 Ind. 611, 44 N.E.2d 967, 970, 144 A.L.R. 887.
AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO. Synonymous with "not later than". Hughes v. United States, C.C.A. Tenn., 114 F.2d 285, 287.
AT THE COURTHOUSE DOOR. In proxidlity of courthouse door. At place provided for posting of legal .notices in courthouse. Matson v. Federal Farm Mortg. Corporation, Tex.Civ.App., 151 S.W. 2d 636, 640, 641.
AT THE END OF THE WILL.. The words "at the end of the will" within statute providing that every will shall be subscribed by testator at the end of the will mean the end of the language and not paper on which it is written. In re Golden’s Will, 300 N.Y.S. 737, 738, 165 Misc. 205; In re Hildreth’s Will, 36 N.Y.S.2d 938, 939, 940.
AT TIME CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUES. Is sometimes applied to present enforcible demand, but more often simply means to arise or come into existence. Stone v. Phillips, 142 Tex. 216, 176 S. W.2d 932, 933.
ATAMITA. In the civil law. A great-great-great-grandfather’s sister.
ATAVIA. In the civil law. A great-grandmother’s grandmother.
ATAVUNCULUS. The brother of a great-grand. father’s grandmother, or a great-great-great-grandfather’s brother.
ATAVUS. The male ascendant in the fifth degree. The great-grandfather’s or great-grandmother’s grandfather; a fourth grandfather.
The ascending line of lineal ancestry runs thus: Peter, Avus, Proarus, Abavus, Atavus, Tritavus. The seventh. generation in the ascending scale will be Tritavi-pater, and the next aboye it Proavi-atavus.
ATHA. (Spelled also Atta, Athe, Atte.) In Saxon law. An oath; the power or privilege of exacting and administering an oath. Spelman.
ATHEIST. One who does not believe in the ex-istence of a God. Gibson v. Insurance Co., 37 N.Y. 584.
ATIA. Hatred or ill-will. See De Odio et Atia. ATILIAN LAW. See Lex Atilia.
ATILIUM. The tackle or rigging of a ship; the harness or tackle of a plow. Spelman.
ATINIAN LAW. See Lex Atinia.
ATMATERTERA. A great-grandfather’s grand-mother’s sister, (atavice soror;) called by Bracton "atmatercera magna." Bract. fol. 68b.
ATOMIZE. To reduce to atoms or atom-like par-ticles; pulverize; spray. In re Preble, Cust. & Pat.App., 45 F.2d 1007, 1009; Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co. v. Greenawalt, C.C.A.Colo., 62 F.2d 1033, 1039.
ATPATRUUS. The brother of a great-grand-father’s grandfather.
ATRAVESADOS. In maritime law. A Spanlsh term signifying athwart, at right angles, or abeam; sometimes used as descriptive of the posi-tion of a vessel which is "lying to." The Hugo, D.C.N.Y., 57 F. 403, 410.
ATROCIOUS ASSAULT AND BATTERY. An as-sault by maiming and wounding. State v. Staw, 97 N.J.Law, 349, 116 A. 425.
ATROCITY. A .word implying conduct that is outrageously or wantonly wicked, criminal, vile, cruel; extremely horrible and shocking. State v. Wyman, 56 Mont. 600, 186 P. 1, 3.
ATROPINE. A drug employed for purposes of dilating the eye so as to put the small muscles inside the eye at rest and to prevent adhesions of the iris and lens. De Zon v. American President Lines, C.C.A.Cal., 129 F.2d 404, 406.
ATS. At suit of.
ATTACIL To bind, fasten, tie, or connect, to malee fast or join, and its antonyms are separate, detach, remove. State v. Modern Box Makers, 217 Minn. 41, 13 N.W.2d 731, 733. To take or apprehend by commandment of a writ or precept. Buckeye Pipe-Line Co. v. Fee, 62 Ohio St. 543, 57 N.E. 446, 78 Am.St.Rep. 743.
It differs from arrest, because it takes not only the body, but sometimes the goods, whereas an arrest is only agalnst the person; besides, he who attaches keeps the party attached in order to produce him in court on the day named, but he who arreste lodges the person arrested in the custody of a hlgher power, to be forthwlth disposed of. Fleta, lib. 5, c. 24. See Attachment.
In a broad sense, "attach" indicates any seizure of prop-erty for the purpose of bringing it within the custody of the court, and le not limited to a seizure on mesne process. In re Clerk, D.C.Mich., 11 F.2d 540, 541.

ATTACHÉ. A person attached to an embassy, to the suite of an ambassador, or to a foreign lega-tion. One connected with an office, e. g., a public office. Noel v. Lewis, 35 Cal.App. 658, 170 P. 857, 859.
ATTACHED. A term describing the physical union of two otherwise independent structures or objects, or the relation between two parts of a single structure, each having its own function. National Brake & Electric Co. v. Christensen, C. C.A.Wis., 229 F. 564, 570. As applied to buildings, the term is of ten synonymous with "annexed." Williams Mfg. Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 93 Vt. 161, 106 A. 657, 659.
The word "attached," in an affidavit of service of a notice, used to designate a notice appearing on the reverse side of the affidavit, is improper. Wood v. Yearous, 159 Iowa, 211, 140 N.W. 362, 364.
ATTACHIAMENTA. L. Lat. Attachment.
ATTACHIAMENTA BONORUM. A distress form-erly taken upon goods and chattels, by the legal attachiators or bailiffs, as security to answer an action for personal estate or debt.
ATTACHIAMENTA DE PLACITUS CORONZE. Attachment of pleas of the crown. Jewison v. Dyson, 9 Mees. & W. 544.
ATTACHIAMENTA DE SPINIS ET BOSCIS. A privilege granted to the officers of a forest to take to their own use thorns, brush, and windfalls, within their precincts. Kenn.Par.Antiq. 209.
ATTACHIAMENTUM. L. Lat. An attachment. ATTACHING CREDITOR. See Creditor.
ATTACHMENT. The act or process of taking, apprehending, or seizing persons or property, by virtue of a writ, summons, or other judicial order, and brin ging the same into the custody of the law; used either for the purpose of bringing a person before the court, of acquiring jurisdiction over the property seized, to compel an appearance, to furnish security for debt or costs, or to arrest a fund in the hands of a third person who may be-come hable to pay it over. Also the writ or other process for the accomplishment of the purposes aboye enumerated, this being the more common use of the word. A remedy ancillary to an action by which plaintiff is enabled to acquire a lien upon property or effects of defendant for satis-faction of judgment which plaintiff may obtain. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Vermillion v. Kirby, 62 S.D. 489, 253 N.W. 616; Lipscomb v. Rankin, Tex.Civ.App., 139 S.W.2d 367, 369. Though sometimes called an ancillary or auxiliary pro-ceeding, it is in all essential respects, a suit. Farmers State Bank of Lexington v. Lemmer, 130 Neb. 211, 264 N.W. 415, 416.
The purpose is to take defendant’s property into legal custody, so that it may be applied on defendant’s debt to plaintiff when established. John Deere Plow Co. of St. Louis v. L. D. Jennings, Inc., 203 S.C. 426, 27 S.E.2d 571, 372; Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Edwards, 281 Ky. 693, 137 3.W.2d 344, 348.
At common law, "attachment" was procedure whereby sheriff was, commanded to attach a defendant who, after
Black’s Law Dictionary Revised 4111 Ed.-11
betng personally served, disobeyed original writ of sum-mons, by keeping certain of his goods which he would for-feit if he did not appear, or by making him find securitles who would be amerced if he continued his nonappearance, and, if after such attachment he still neglected to appear, he would not only forfeit this security, but was compel-lable by a writ of distringas infinite. Grimmett v. Barn-well, 184 Ga. 461, 192 S.E. 191, 194, 116 A.L.R. 257.
Execution and attachment distinguished. See Execution.
Persons
A writ issued by a court of record, commanding the sheriff to bring before it a person who has been guilty of contempt of court, either in neglect or abuse of its process or of subordinate powers. 3 BI.Comm. 280; 4 Bl.Comm. 283; Commonwealth v. Shecter, 250 Pa. 282, 95 A. 468, 470.
Property
A species of mesne process, by which a writ is issued at the institution or during the progress of an action, commanding the sheriff to seize the property, rights, credits, or effects of the defend-ant to be held as security for the satisfaction of such judgment as the plaintiff may recover. It is principally used against absconding, concealed, or fraudulent debtors. U. S. Capsule Co. v. Isaacs, 23 Ind.App. 533, 55 N.E. 832.
To Give Jurisdiction
Where the defendant is a non-resident, or be-yond the territorial jurisdiction of the court, his goods or land within the territory may be seized upon process of attachment; whereby he will be compelled to enter an appearance, or the court acquires jurisdiction so far as to dispose of the property attached. This is sometimes called "for-eign attachment." Megee v. Beirne, 39 Pa. 50; Bray v. McClury, 55 Mo. 128. In such a case, the proceeding becomes in substance one in rem against the attached property. St. John v. Par-sons, 54 Ohio App. 420, 7 N.E.2d 1013, 1014.
Domestic and Foreign
In some jurisdictions it is common to give the name "domestic attachment" to one issuing against a resident debtor, (upon the special ground of fraud, intention to abscond, etc.,) and to designate an attachment against a non-resident, or his property, as "foreign." Longwell v. Hart-well, 30 A. 495, 164 Pa. 533; David E. Kennedy, Inc. v. Schleindl, 290 Pa. 38, 137 A. 815, 816, 53 A.L.R. 1020.
But the term "foreign attachment" more properly belongs to the process otherwise familiarly known as "garnishment." It was a peculiar and ancient remedy open to creditors within the jurisdiction of the city of London, by which they were enabled to satisfy their own debts by attaching or seizing the money or goods of the debtor in the hands of a third person within the iurisdic-tion of the city. Welsh v. Blackwell, 14 N.J.Law, 346. This power and process survive in modern law, in all com-mon-law jurisdictions, and are variously denominated "garnishment," "trustee process," or "factorizing." Raí-guel v. McConnell, 25 Pa. 362, 363. A "foreign attachment" is a mesne process issued to compel a foreign debtor to appear to the suit of his creditor, while "attachment execution" is a final process issued for the purpose of enforcing a judgment already obtained. Williams v. Ricca, 324 Pa. 33, 187 A. 722, 723.

ATTACHMENT EXECUTION. A name given in some states to a process of garnishment for the satisfaction of a judgment. As to the judgment debtor it is an execution; but as to the garnishee it is an original process—a summons commanding him to appear and show cause, if any he has, why the judgment should not be levied on the goods and effects of the defendant in his hands. Snider-man v. Nerone, 7 A.2d 496, 499, 136 Pa.Super. 381.
ATTACHMENT OF PRIVILEGE. In English law. A process by which a man, by virtue of his privi-lege, calls another to litigate in that court to which he himself belongs, and who has the privi-lege to answer there. A writ issued to apprehend a person in a privileged place. Termes de la Ley.
ATTACHMENT OF THE FOREST. One of the three courts formerly held in forests. The high-est court was called "justice in eyre’s seat;" the middle, the "swainmote;" and the lowest, the "at-tachment." Manwood, 90, 99.
ATTAIN. To reach or come to by progression or motion; to arrive at; as, to attain a ripe old age. Watkins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 156 Kan. 27, 131 P.2d 722, 723.
ATTAINDER. That extinction of civil rights and capacities which takes place whenever a person who has committed treason or felony receives sentence of death for his crime. 1 Steph.Com. 408; 1 Bish.Cr.L. § 641; State v. Hastings, 37 Neb. 96, 55 N.W. 781.
The effect of "attainder" upon such felon is, In general terms, that all his estate, real and personal. is forfeited. Caldwell v. Hill, 179 Ga. 417, 176 S.E. 381, 386, 98 A.L.R. 1124. It differs from conviction, in that it is af ter judg-ment, whereas conviction is upan the verdict of guilty, but bef ore judgment pronounced, and may be quashed upan some point of law rescrved, or judgment may be arrested. The consequences of attainder are forfeiture of property and corruption of blood. 4 131.Comm. 380. At the common law, attainder resulted in three ways, viz.: by con fession, by verdict, and by process or outlawry. The first case was where the prisoner pleaded guilty at the bar, or having fled to sanctuary, confessed his guilt and abjurad the realm to save bis life. The second was where the prisoner pleaded not ghilty at the bar, and the jury brought in a verdict against him. The third, when the person ac,-:used made his escape and was outlawed. Coke, Litt. 391.
In England, by statute 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23, attainder upon conviction, with consequent corruption of blood. forfeiture, or escheat, is abolished. In the United Sta.tes, the doctrine of attalnder Is now scarcely known, although during and shortly af ter the Revolution acts of attainder were passed by severa] of the states. The passage of such bilis is expressly forbidden by the constitution.
Bill of Attainder
A legislative ct, directed against a designated person, pro uncing him guilty of an alleged crime, (usúally treason,) without trial or convic-tion according to the recognized rules of proce-dure, and passing sentence of death and attainder upon him.
"Bills of attainder," as they are technically called, are such special acts of the legislature as inilict capital punish-ments upon persons supposed to be guilty of high offenses, such as treason and felony, without any conviction in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings. 1f an act inflicts a milder degree of punishment than death, it ir called a "bill of pains and penalties," but both are incluled in the
prohibition in the Federal constitution. Losier v. Sher-man, 157 Kan. 153, 138 P.2d 272, 273; State v. Graves, 352 Mo. 1102, 182 S.W.2d 46, 54.
ATTAINT. Attainted, stained, or blackened.
In old English practice. A writ which lay to inquire whether a jury of twelve men had given a false verdict, in order that the judgment might be reversed. 3 Bl.Comrn. 402; Bract. fol. 288b-292; Fleta, 1, 5, c. 22, § 8.
This inquiry was made by a grand assise or jury of twenty-four persons, usually knlghts, and, if they found the verdict a false one, the judgment was that the jurors should become infamous, should forfeit their goods and the profits of their lands, should themselves be imprisoned. and their wives and children thrust out of doors, should have their houses razed, their trees extirpated, and their meadows plowed up, and that the plaintlff should be restored to all that he Iost by reason of the unjust verdict. 3 Hl. Comm. 404; Co. Litt. 294b.
ATTAINT D’UNE CAUSE. In French law. The gain of a suit.
ATTEMPT.
In Civil Matters
In statutes and in cases other than criminal prosecutions an "attempt" ordinarily rneans an intent combined with an act falling short of the thing intended. In re Bergland’s Estate, 180 Cal. 629, 182 P. 277, 283, 5 A.L.R. 1363. It may be de-scribed as an endeavor to do an act, carried be-yond mere preparation, but short of execution. Columbian Ins. Co. of Indiana v. Modern Laundry, C.C.A.Minn., 277 F. 355, 358, 20 A.L.R. 1159.
In Criminal Law
An effort or endeavor to accomplish a crime, amounting to more than mere preparation or planning for it, which, if not prevented, would have resulted in the full consummation of the act attempted, but which, in fact, does not bring to pass the party’s ultimate design. Dooley v. State, 27 Ala.App. 261, 170 So. 96, 98.
Acts amounting to mere preparation for commission of crime, if unaccompanied by some overt act toward actual commission, do not amount to an "attempt" and cannot be punished as such. People v. Lombard, 131 Cal.App. 525, 21 P.2d 955. Implles an intent and an actual effort to carry out or consummate the intent or purpose. Dooley v. State, 27 Ala.App. 261, 170 So. 96, 97, 98.
To constitute an act of attempt, the act must possess four characteristics : First, ft must be a step toward a punishable offense; second, it must be apparently (but not necessarily in reality) adapted to the purpose intended; third. it must come dangerously near to success; fourth, it must not succeed. State v. Ainsworth, 146 Kan. 665, 72 P.2d 962.
ATTENDANT, n. One who owes a duty or service to another, or in some sort depends upon him. Termes de la Ley. One who follows and waits upon another.
ATTENDANT, adj. Accompanying, or connected with. Fletcher v. Winnfield Bottling Works, 160 La. 261, 107 So. 103, 104.
ATTENDANT TERMS. In English law, terms, (usually mortgages,) for a long period of years, which are created or kept outstanding for the

purpose of attending or waiting upon and protect-ing the inheritance. 1 Steph.Comm. 351.
A phrase used in conveyancing to denote estates which are kept alive, after the objects for which they were orig-inally created have ceased, so that they might be deemed merged or satisfied, for the purpose of protecting or strengthening the title of the owner. Abbott.
ATTENDED BY A PHYSICIAN. As used in ap-plication for insurance, requires an attendance with reference to some disease of a serious charac-ter, a ffecting sound bodily health and does not refer to a mere temporary indisposition or an ail-ment trivial in its nature. Houston v. Metropoli-tan Life Ins. Co., 232 Mo.App. 195, 97 S.W.2d 856, 861.
ATTENTAT. Lat. He attempts.
In the civil and canon law. Anything wrong-fully innovated or al lempted in a suit by an in-ferior judge (or judge a quo) pending an appeal. 1 Addams, 22, note; Shelf.Mar. & Div. 562; Ay-liffe, Parerg. 100.
ATTENTION. Consideration; notice. The phrase "your bill shall have attention" was held to be ambiguous and not to amount to an acceptance of the bill. 2 B. & Ald. 113.
ATTERMINARE. In old English law. To put off to a succeeding term; to prolong the time of payment of a debt. Stat.Westm. 2, c. 4; Cowell; Blount.
ATTERMINING. In old English law. A putting off; the granting of a time or term, as for the payment of a debt. Cowell.
ATTERMOIEMENT. In canon law. A making terms; a composition, as with creditors. 7 Low.C. 272, 306.
ATTEST. To bear witness to; to bear witness to a fact; to afiirm to be true or genuine; to act as a witness to; to certify; to certify to the veri-ty of a copy of a public document; formally by signature; to make solemn declaration in words or writing to support a fact; to signify by sub-scription of his narne that the signer has witnessed the execution of the particular instrument. Lind-sey v. Realty Trust Co., Tex.Civ.App., 75 S.W.2d 322, 324; City Lumber Co. of Bridgeport v. Borsuk, 131 Conn. 640, 41 A.2d 775, 778.
Also the technical word by which, in the practice in many of the states, a certifying officer gives assurance of the genuineness and correctness of a copy. Thus, an "attested" copy of a document is one which has been examined and compared with the original, with a certifi-cate or mernorandum of its correctness, signed by the per-sons who have examined it. Gerner v. Mosher, 58 Neb. 135, 78 N.W. 384, 46 L.R.A. 244.
ATTESTATION. The act of witnessing an instru-ment in writing, at the request of the party mak-ing the same, and subscribing it as a witness. In re Jones’ Estate, 101 Wash. 128, 172 P. 206, 207. The act of witnessing the execution of a paper and subscribing the name of the witness in testi-mony of such fact. In re Carlson’s Estate, 156 Or. 597, 68 P.2d 119, 121.
Execution and attestation are clearly distinct formalities; the former being the act of the party, the latter of the witnésses only. Subscription differs from attestation, in that the former is the mere manual or mechanical act of signing—the act of the hand, whereas the latter signifles the mental act of bearing witness to—the act of the senses. In re Smith’s Estate, 130 Neb. 739, 266 N.W. 611, 613.
ATTESTATION CLAUSE. That clause wherein the witnesses certify that the instrument has been executed before them, and the manner of the exe-cution of the same.
In wills. A certificate certifying as to facts and circumstances attending execution of will. In re Bragg’s Estate, 106 Mont. 132, 76 P.2d 57, 62.
ATTESTATION OF WILL. Act of witnessing performance of statutory requirements to valid execution. Davis v. Davis, Tex.Civ.App., 45 S.W. 2d 240, 241; Zaruba v. Schumaker, Tex.Civ.App., 178 S.W.2d 542, 543.
There is some authority to the effect that there may be a perfect attestation without subscription, on the theory that attestation is mental, and subscription is mechanical. re Chambers’ Estate, 187 Wash. 417, 60 P.2d 41, 44.
ATTESTED COPY. See Attest.
ATTESTING WITNESS. One who signs his name to an instrument, at the request of the party or parties, for the purpose of proving and identifying it. In re McDonough’s Estate, 193 N.Y.S. 734, 736, 201 App.Div. 203.
ATTESTOR. One who attests or vouches for.
ATTESTOR OF A CAUTIONER. In Scotch prac-tice. A person who attests the sufficiency of a cautioner, and agrees to become subsidiarie fiable for the debt. Bell.
ATTILE. In old English law. The rigging or fur-niture of a ship. Jacob, L.Dict. Rigging; tackle. Cowell.
ATTINCTA. L. Lat. An attaint, stain, or black-ening; a conviction or finding of guilty of some offense. Adams Gloss.
ATTORN. To turn over; to transfer to another money or goods; to assign to some particular use or service. Hemminger v. Klaprath, 15 N.J. Misc. 163, 189 A. 363, 364. To consent to the trans-fer of a rent or reversion. To agree to become tenant to one as owner or landlord of an estate previously held of another, or to agree to recog-nize a new owner of a property or estate and promise payment of rent to him. Hurley v. Stev-ens, 220 Mo.App. 1057, 279 S.W. 720, 722.
Feudal Law
To turn over; to transfer to another money or goods; to assign to some particular use or serv-ice. 2 Bla.Comm. 288; 1 Spence, Eq.Jur. 137.
Where a lord aliened his seigniory, he might, with the consent of the tenant, and in some cases without, attorn or transfer the homage and service of the latter to the alienee or new lord. Bract. fols. 81b, 82.
ATTORNARE. Lat. To attorn; to transfer or turn over; to appoint an attorney or substitute

ATTORNARE REM. To turn over money or goods, i. e., to assign or appropriate them to some particular use or service.
ATTORNATO FACIENDO VEL RECIPIENDO. An obsolete writ, which commanded a sheriff or steward of a county court or hundred court to receive and admit an attorney to appear for the person that owed suit of court. Fitz.N.B. 156, 349.
ATTORNATUS. One who is attorned, or put in the place of another; a substitute; hence, an at-torney. 7 C.J.S. p. 694.
ATTORNATUS FERE IN OMNIBUS PERSONAM DOMINI REPRESENTAT. An attorney repre-senta the person of his master in almost all re-spects. Adams Gloss., citing Bract. fol. 342.
ATTORNE. L. Fr. In old English law. An at-torney. Britt. c. 126.
ATTORNEY. In the most general sense this term denotes an agent or substitute, or one who is appointed and authorized to act in the place or stead of another. Nardi v. Poinsatte, D.C.Ind., 46 F.2d 347, 348. An agent, or one acting on be-half of another. Sherts v. Fulton Nat. Bank of Lancaster, 342 Pa. 337, 21 A.2d 18.
One who is put in place, stead, and turn of an-other to manage his matters of law. Kaufman v. Jurczak, 102 N.J.Eq. 66, 139 A. 716. An agent employed by party to case to manage it for him. McLyman v. Miller, 52 R.I. 374, 161 A. 111, 112.
When used •vith reference to the proceedings of courts, or the transaction of business in the courts, the term always means "attorney at law" (q. a.) unless a contrary meaning is clearly indicated. In re Morse, 98 Vt. 85, 126 A. 550, 551, 36 A.L.R. 527.
"Lawyer" and "attorney" are synonymous. Peo-ple v. Taylor, 56 Colo. 441, 138 P. 762, 763.
—Attorney ad hoc. See Ad Hoc.
—Attorney at large. In old practice. An attorney who practiced in all the courts. Cowell.
—Attorney at law. An advocate, counsel, or offi-cial agent employed in preparing, managing, and trying cases in the courts. An officer in a court of justice, who is employed by a party in a cause to manage it for him. In re Bergeron, 220 Mass. 472, 107 N.E. 1007, 1008, Ann.Cas.1917A, 549.
In English law. A public officer belonging to the supe-rior courts of common law at Westminster, who conducted legal proceedings on behalf of others, called his clients, by whom he was retained; he answered to the solicitor in the courts of chancery, and the proctor of the admiralty, ecclesiastical, probate, and divorce courts. An attorney was almost invariably also a solicitor. It is now provided by the judicature act, 1873, § 87, that solicitors, attorneys, or proctors of, or by law empowered to practice in, any court the jurisdictlon of which is by that act transferred to the high court of justice or the court of appeal, shall be called "solicitors of the supreme court." Wharton.
The term "attorney at law," as used in the United States, usually includes "barrister," "counsellor," and "solicitor," in the sense in which those terms are used in England. In some states, as well as in the United States supremo court, "attorney" and "counsellor" are distin-guishable, the former term being applied to the yodnger members of the bar, and to those who carry on the prac-
tice and formal parts of the suit, while "eounsellor" le the adviser, or special counsel retained to try the cause. Rap. & L.
—Attorney in fact. A private attorney authorized by another to act in his place and stead, either for some particular purpose, as to do a particular act, or for the transaction of business in general, not of a legal character. This authority is conferred by an instrument in writing, called a "letter of at-torney," or more commonly a "power of at-torney." Treat v. Tolman, C.C.A.N.Y., 113 F. 893, 51 C.C.A. 522; Massachusetts Bonding & In-surance Co. v. Bankers’ Surety Co., 96 Ind.App. 250, 179 N.E. 329, 334.
This term is employed to designate persons who act under a special agency, or a special letter of attorney, so that they are appointed in faclum, for the deed. or special act to be performed; but in a more extended sense it includes all other agents employed in any business, or to do any act or acts in vais for another. Bacon, Abr. Attor-ney; Story, Ag. § 25.
—Attorney of record. Attorney whose name must appear somewhere in permanent records or files of case, or on the pleadings or some instrument filed in the case, or on appearance docket. De-laney v. Husband, 64 N.J.L. 273, 45 A. 265. Per-son whom the client has named as his agent upon whom service of papers may be made. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 21 Ca1.2d 580, 134 P.2d 251, 254.
—Attorney of the wards and liveries. In English law. This was the third officer of the duchy court. Bac.Abr. "Attorney."
—Attorney’s certificate. In English practice, a certificate of the commissioners of stamps that the attorney therein named has paid the annual tax or duty. This must be renewed yearly; and the penalty for practising without such certificate is fifty pounds; Stat. 37 Geo. III. c. 90, §§ 26; 28, 30. See also 7 & 8 Vict. c. 73, §§ 21-26; 16 & 17 Vict. c. 63.
—Attorney’s lien. See Attorney’s Lien.
—Letter of attorney. A power of attorney; a written instrument by which one person consti-tutes another his true and lawful attorney, in or-der that the latter may do for the former, and in his place and stead, some lawful act. People v. Smith, 112 Mich. 192, 70 N.W. 466, 67 Am.St.Rep. 392. An instrument of writing, appointing an at-torney in fact for an avowed purpose and setting forth his powers and duties. Mullins v. Common-wealth, 179 Ky. 71, 200 S.W. 9, 11. It is, in effect, a mere con tract of agency. Filtsch v. Bishop, 118 Okl. 272, 247 P. 1110, 1111. A general power au-thorizes the agent to act generally in behalf of the principal. A special power is one limited to particular acts.
—Power of attorney. Commonly meant .the in-strument by which authority of one person to act in place and stead of another as attorney in fact is set forth. In re Katz’ Estate, 274 N.Y.S. 202, 152 Misc. 757.
—Public attorney. A name sometimes given to an attorney at law, as distinguished from a private ‘attorney, or attorney in fact.

ATTORNEY GENERAL.

English Law

The chief law officer of the realm, being created by letters patent, whose office is to exhibit infor-mations and prosecute for the crown in matters criminal, and to file bilis in the exchequer in any matter concerning the king’s revenue. 3 Bla. Comm. 27; Termes de la Ley; Wilentz v. Hen-drickson, 133 N.J.Eq. 447, 33 A.2d 366, 374.

American Law

The attorney general of the United States is the head of the department of justice, appointed by the president, and a member of the cabinet. He appears in behalf of the government in all cases in the supreme court in which the government is interested, and gives his legal advice to the president and heads of departments upon ques-tions submitted to him. Act of Sept. 24, 1789 (5 U.S.C.A. §§ 291, 303, 309).

He is the chief law officer of the federal and state gov-ernments with the duty of representing the sovereign, national or state. Johnson v. Commonwealth, ex rel. Meredith, 291 Ky. 829, 165 S.W.2d 820, 826.
In each state also there is an attorney general, or similar officer, who appears for the people, as in England the attorney general appears for the crown. State v. District Court, 22 Mont. 25, 55 Pac. 916; He is the chief law officer of the state and head of the legal department. People v. Newcomer, 284 Ill. 315, 120 N.E. 244, 247; Darling Apartment Co. v. Springer, 22 A.2d 397, 403, 25 Del. 420, 137 A.L.R. 803.

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S BILL. An indictment presented to grand jury by leave of court w•ithout prior complaint bef ore magistrate and holding for court. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 134 Pa. Super. 222, 4 .A.2d 324, 327.
ATTORNEY’S LIEN. The right of an attorney at law to hold or retain in his possession the money or property of a client until his proper charges have been adjusted and paid. It requires no eq-uitable proceeding for its establishment. Sweeley v. Sieman, 123 Iowa, 183, 98 N.W. 571. Also a lien on funds in court payable to the client, or on a judgment or decree or award in his favor, re-covered through the exertions of the attorney, and for the enforcement of which he must invoke the equitable aid of the court. Fowler v. Lewis, 36 W. Va. 112, 14 S.E. 447.
Charging lien. An attorney’s líen, for his proper compen-sation, on the fund or judgment which his client has recov-ered by means of his professional aid and services. Good-rich v. McDonald, 112 N.Y. 157, 19 N.E. 649; In re Craig, 157 N.Y.S. 310, 311, 171 App.Div. 218. It is a specific lien covering only the services rendered by an attorney in the action in which the judgment was obtained, whereas a retaining lien is a general lien for the balance of the account between the attorney and his client, and applies to the property of the client which may come into the attorney’s possession in the course of his employment. In re Heinsheimer, 143 N.Y.S. 895, 896, 159 App.Div. 33.
Retaining hen. The lien which an attorney has upon all his client’s papers, deeds, vouchers, etc., which remain in his possession, entitling, him to retain them until satisfac-tion of ,his claims for professional services. In re Wilson, D.C.N.Y., 12 F. 239; It is a general lien. Roxana Petro-leum Co. v. Rice, 109 Okl. 161, 235 P. 502, 507

ATTORNEYSHIP. The office of an agent or at-torney.
ATTORNMENT. In feudal and old English law. A turning over or transfer by a lord of the serv-ices of his tenant to the grantee of his seigniory.
Attornment is the act of a person who holds a leasehold interest in land, or estate for life or years, by which he agrees to become the tenant of a stranger who has acquired the fee in the land, or the remainder or reversion, or the right to the rent or services by which the tenant holds. Sny-der v. Bernstein Bros., 201 Iowa, 931, 208 N.W. 503, 504. It is an act by which a tenant acknowledges his obligation to a new landlord. Del-New Co. v. James, 167 A. 747, 748, 111 N.J.L. 157.
And requires an overt act by the tenant. Hem-minger v. Klaprath, 189 A. 363, 15 N.J.Misc. 163.
The doctrine of attornment grew out of the peculiar relations existing between the landlord and his tenant under the feudal law, and the reasons for the rule never had any existence in thls country, and is inconsistent with our laws, customs and institutions. Beyond its application to estop a tenant from denying the title of his landlord, it can serve hut little, ir any, useful purpose. Perrin v. Lep-per, 34 Mich. 292.
ATTRACTIVE AGENCIES DOCTRINE. See At-tractive Nuisance Doctrine. Schock v. Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, 5 Wash. 599, 105 P.2d 838, 843.
ATTRACTIVE INSTRUMENTALITIES DOC-TRINE. See Attractive Nuisance Doctrine. Schock v. Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, 5 Wash.2d 599, 105 P.2d 838, 843.
ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE. The doc-trine is that one maintaining on his premises a condition, instrumentality, machine or other agen-cy, which is dangerous to young children because of their inability to appreciate peril and may rea-sonably be expected to attract them to premises, owes duty to exercise reasonable care to protect them against dangers of such attraction. Schock v. Ringfing Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, 5 Wash.2d 599, 105 P.2d 838, 843.
The doctrine, is that person who has an instrumentality, agency, or condition upon his own premises, or who cre-ates such condition on the premises of another, or in a public place, which may reasonably be apprehended to be a source of danger to children, is under a duty to take such precautions as a reasonably prudent man would take to prevent injury to children of tender years whom he knows to be accustomed to resort there, or who may, by reason of something there which may be expected to attract them, come there to play. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. O’Neal, 48 Ga.App. 706, 172 S.E. 740, 741. It does not apply to natural condition or common dangers existing in order of nature, McCall v. McCallie, 48 Ga.App. 99, 171 S.E. 843, 814, applies only in favor of children of tender years, too young to appreciate danger. Drew v. Lett, 95 Ind.App. 89, 182 N.E. 547, 548. Requires that the attraction be visi-ble from a public place or a place where children have a right to be. Rokicki v. Polish Nat.• Alliance of United States of North America, 314 Ill.App. 380, 41 N.E.2d 300.
AU BESOIN. Fr. In case of need. "Au besoin
chez Messieurs d ." "In case of need, ap-
ply to Messrs. at ". A phrase some- times used in the direction of a bill of exchange, pointing out the person to whom application may be made for payment in case of failure or refusal

AUBAINE. See Droit d’Aubaine.
AUCTION. A public sale of land or goods, at public outcry, to the highest bidder. Perry Trad-ing Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 128 Fla. 424, 174 So. 854, 857, 111 A.L.R. 463.
A sale by auction is a, sale by public outcry to the highest bidder on the spot. Barber Lumber Co. v. Gifford, 25 Idaho, 654, 139 P. 557, 560.
While auction is very generally defined as a sale to the highest bidder, and this 1s the usual meaning, there may be a sale to the lowest bidder, as where land is sold for non-payment of taxes to whomsoever will take it for the shortest terco; or where a contract 1s offered to the one who will perform it at the lowest price. And there appear fairly included in the terco "auction." Abbott.
Dutch Auction
A method of sale by auction which consists in the public offer of the property at a price beyond its value, and then gradually lowering the price until some one becomes the purchaser. Crandall v. State, 28 Ohio St. 482.
Public Auction
A sale of property at auction, where any and all persons who choose are permitted to attend and offer bids. The phrase imports a sale to the highest and best bidder with absolute freedom for competitive bidding. State v. Miller, 52 Mont. 562, 160 P. 513, 515.
Though this phrase is frequently used, it is doubtful whether the word "public" adds anything to the force of the expression, since4"auction" ltself imports publieity. If there can be such a thing as a private auction, it must be one where the property is sold to the highest bidder, but only certain persons, or a certain class of persons, are permitted to be present or to offer bids.
AUCTIONARLE. Catalogues of goods for public sale or auction.
AUCTIONARIUS. A selier; a regrator; a re-tailer; one who bought and sold; an auctioneer, in the modern sense. Spelman, Gloss. One who buys poor, old, worn-out things to sell again at a greater price. Du Cange.
AUCTIONEER. A person authorized or licensed by law to sell Lands or goods of other persons at public auction; one who sells at auction. City of Chicago v. Ornstein, 323 Ill. 258, 154 N.E. 100, 52 A.L.R. 489; One who sells goods at public auction for another on commission, or for a recompense. State ex rel. Danziger v. Recorder of Mortgages for Parish of Orleans, 206 La. 259, 19 So.2d 129, 132.
Auctioneers differ from brokers, In that the latter may both buy and seli, whereas auctloneers can only sell ; also brokers may sell by prívate contract only, and auctToneers by public auction only. Auctioneers can only sell goods for ready money, but factors may sell upon credit. Wilkes v. Ellis, 2 H.Bl. 557; Steward v. Winters, 4 Sandf.Ch. (N. Y.) 590.
AUCTOR. In the Roman law. An auctioneer.
In the civil law. A grantor or vendor of any kind.
In old French law. A plaintiff. Kelham.
AUCTORITAS. In the civil law. Authority.
In old European law. A diploma, or royal charter. A word frequently used by Gregory of Tours and later writers. Spelman.
AUCTORITATES PIIILOSOPHORUM, MEDI-CORUM, ET POETARUM, SUNT IN CAUSIS ALLEGANDM ET TENENDIE. The opinions of philosophers, physicians, and poets are to be al-leged and received in causes. Co.Litt. 264.
AUCUPIA VERBORUM SUNT JUDICE INDIG-NA. Catching at words is unworthy of a judge. Hob. 343. Applied in State v. Flemming, 66 Me. 142, 151, 22 Am.R. 552.
AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM. Hear the other side; hear both sides. No man should be condemned unheard. Broom, Max. 113; L.R. 2 P.C. 106; Low-ry v. Inman, 46 N.Y. 119; Shaw v. Stone, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 243.
AUDIENCE. In international law. A hearing; interview with the sovereign. The king or other chief executive of a country grants an audience to a foreign minister who comes to him duly ac-credited; and, after the recall of a minister, an "audience of leave" ordinarily is accorded to him.
AUDIENCE COURT. In English law. A court belonging to the Archbishop of Canterbury, hav-ing jurisdiction of matters of form only, as the confirmation of bishops, and the like. This court has the same authority with the Court of Arches, but is of inferior dignity and antiquity. The Dean of the Arches is the official auditor of the Au-dience court. The Archbishop of York has also his Audience court.
AUDIENDO ET TERMINANDO. A writ or com-mission to certain persons to appease and punish any insurrection or great riot. Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 110.
AUDIT, n. The process of auditing accounts; the hearing and investigation had béf ore an audi-tor. People v. Barnes, 114 N.Y. 317, 20 N.E. 609; An official examination of an account or claim, comparing vouchers, charges, and fixing the bal-ance. Williams v. Tompkins, Tex.Civ.App., 42 S.W.2d 106, 110.
AUDIT, v. To hear; to examine an account; and in a broad sense it includes its adjustment or al-lowance, disallowance, or rejection. New York Catholic Protectory v. Rockland County, 144 N.Y. S. 552, 556, 159 App.Div. 455. An audience; a hearing; an examination in general; a formal or official examination and authentication of ac-counts, with witnesses, vouchers, etc. Green-Boots Const. Co. v. State Highway Commission, 165 Okl. 288, 25 P.2d 783.
Sometimes restricted to a mere mathematical calcula-tion or process, but, in its generally accepted sense, includes an investigation and weighing of the evidence and deciding of whether entries in books are true and correct. Lumber Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. of New York v. Horowitz, 1 N.Y.S.2d 191, 193, 165 Misc. 506.

AUDITA QUERELA. The name of a writ consti-tuting the initial process in an action brought by a judgment defendant to obtain relief against the consequences of the judgment, on account of some matter of defense or discharge, arising since its rendition and which could not be taken advantage of otherwise. Barnett v. Gitlitz, 290 Ill.App. 212, 8 N.E.2d 517, 520. May also lie for matters aris-ing before judgment where defendant had no op-portunity to raise such matters in defense. Louis E. Bower, Inc., v. Silverstein, 298 Ill.App. 145, 18 N.E.2d 385, 387.
In some states, where the same relief may be obtained by motion, the remedy by motion has superseded the ancient remedy.
AUDITOR. A public officer whose function is to examine and pass upon the accounts and vouchers of officers who have received and expended pub-lic money by lawful authority. An officer who examines accounts and verifies the accuracy of the statements therein. Hicks v. Davis, 100 Kan. 4, 163 P. 799.
General
Auditor of the imprest. Any of several officers in the English exchequer, who formerly had the charge of auditing the accounts of the customs, naval and military expenses, etc., now performed by the eommissioners for auditing public accounts. Jacob.
Auditor of the receipts. An officer of the Eng-lish exchequer. 4 Inst. 107.
State auditor. An officer whose business is to examine and certify accounts and claims against the state and to keep an account between the state and its treasurer. State v. Jorgenson, 29 N.D. 173, 150 N.W. 565, 567.
English Law
An officer or agent of the crown, or of a private individual, or corporation, who examines periodi-cally the accounts of under officers, tenants, stew-ards, or bailiffs, and reports the state of their ac-counts to his principal.
Practice
An officer (or officers) of the court, assigned to state the items of debit and credit between the parties in a suit where accounts are in question, and exhibit the balance. Campbell v. Crout, 3 R.I. 60.
AUGMENTATION. The increase of the crown’s revenues from the suppression of religious houses and the appropriation of their lands and revenues. Also the name of a court (now abolished) erected 27 Hen. VIII., to determine suits and controversies relating to monasteries and abbey-lands. The court was dissolved in the reign of Mary, but the office of augmentations remained long after. Cowell.
A share of the great tithes temporarily granted to the vicars by the appropriators, and made per-petual by statute 29 Car. II. c. 8. The word is used in a similar sense in the Canadian law.
AUGUSTA LEGIBUS SOLUTA NON EST. The empress or queen is not privileged or exempted from subjection to the laws. 1 Bl.Comm. 219; Dig. 1, 3, 31.
AULA. In old English law. A hall, or court; the court of a baron, or manor; a court baron. Spelman.
This word was employed In mediwval England along with curia; it was used of the meetings of the lord’s men held there in the same way that the word court was used. Malwain, High Court of Parl. 30.
AULA ECCLESLE. A nave or body of a church where temporal courts were anciently held.
AULA REGIS. (Called also Aula Regia.) The king’s hall or palace. The chief court of England in early Norman times. It was established by William the Conqueror in his own hall. It was composed of the great officers of state, resident in the palace, and followed the king’s household in all his expeditions. See, also, Curia Regis.
AULIC. Pertaining to a royal court.
AULIC COUNCIL. In the old German empire, the personal council of the emperor, and one of the two supreme courts of the empire which decided without appeal. It was instituted about 1502, was modified in 1654, and ceased to exist on the extinc-tion of the German Empire in 1806. The title was also given to the Council of State of the former Emperor of Austria. Cent.Dict.
AULNAGE. See Alnager. AULNAGER. See Alnager.
AUMEEN. In Indian law. Trustee; commission-er; a temporary collector or supervisor, appointed to the charge of a country on the removal of a zemindar, or for any other particular purpose of local investigation or arrangement.
AUMIL. In Indian law. Agent; officer; native collector of revenue; superintendent of a district or division of a country, either on the part of the government zemindar or renter.
AUMILDAR. In Indian law. Agent; the holder of an office; an intendant and collector of the rev-enue, uniting civil, military, and financial powers under the Mohammedan government.
AUMONE, SERVICE IN. Where lands are given in alms to some church or religious house, upon condition that a service or prayers shall be of-fered at certain times for the repose of the do-nor’s soul. Britt. 164.
AUNCEL WEIGIIT. In English law. An ancient mode of weighing, described by Cowell as "a kind of weight with scales hanging, or hooks fastened to each end of a staff, which a man, lifting up upon his forefinger or hand, discerneth the quality or difference between the weight and the thing weighed."

AUNT. The sister of one’s father or mother, and a relation in the third degree, correlative to niece or nephew. See 2 Comyn, Dig. 474; Dane, Abr. c. 126, a. 3, § 4.
AURA EPILEPTICA. In medical jurisprudence, a term used to designate the sensation of a cold vapor frequently experienced by epileptics before the loss of consciousness occurs in an epileptic fit. Aurentz v. Anderson, 3 Pittsb.R.(Pa.) 311.
AURES. A Saxon punishment by cutting off the ears, inflicted on those who robbed churches, or were guilty of any other theft.
AURUM REGINAE. Queen’s gold. A royal reve-nue belonging to every queen consort during her marriage with the king.
AUSTRALIAN BALLOT. An official ballot on which the names of all the candidates are printed. Its use is accompanied by safeguards designed to maintain secrecy in voting. The so-called Aus-tralian ballot laws, widely adopted in various forms in the United States, have generally been sustained by the courts. 29 C.J.S. p. 224.
AUSTRALIAN WOOL. A fine grade of wool grown in Australia. Federal Trade Commission v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 42 S.Ct. 384, 385, 258 U.S. 483, 66 L.Ed. 729.
AUTER, Autre. L. Fr. Another; other. See Autre.
AUTHENTIC. Genuine; true; real; pure; reli-able; trustworthy; having the character and au-thority of an original; duly vested with all nec-essary formalities and legally attested; compe-tent, credible, and reliable as evidence. Downing v. Brown, 3 Colo. 590; Woods v. Jastremski, 201 La. 1092, 11 So.2d 4, 8.
AUTHENTIC ACT. In the civil law. An act which has been executed before a notary or pub-lic officer authorized to execute such functions, or which is testified by a public seal, or has been ren-dered public by the authority of a competent mag-istrate, or which is certified as being a copy of a public register. Nov. 73, c. 2; Cod. 7, 52, 6, 4, 21; Dig. 22, 4; Mossler Acceptance Co. v. Osborne, La. App., 14 So.2d 492, 493.
AUTIFIENTICATION. In the law of evidence. The act or mode of giving authority or legal au-thenticity to a statute, record, or other written instrument, or a certified copy thereof, so as to render it legally admissible in evidence. Volo-shin v. Ridenour, C.C.A.Canal Zone, 299 F. 134. Verifications of judgments. Collette v. Hanson, 174 A. 466, 467, 133 Me. 146.
An attestation .made by a proper officer by which he certifies that a record is in due farm of law, and that the person who certifies it is the officer appointed so to do. Acts done with a view of causing an instrument to be known and identified.
AUTHENTICS. In the civil law. A Latin trans-lation of the Novels of Justinian by an anony-mous author; so called because the Novels were
translated entire, in order to distinguish it from the epitome mude by Julian. 1 Mackeldey, Civ. Law, § 72. A collection of extracts made from the Novels by a lawyer named Irnier, which he inserted in the code at the places to which they refer. These extracts have the reputation of not being correct. Merlin, Répert. Authentique.
AUTHENTICUM. In the civil law. An original instrument or writing; the original of a will or other instrument, as distinguished from a copy. Dig. 22, 4, 2; Id. 29, 3, 12.
AUTHOR. One who produces, by his own intel-lectual labor applied to the materials of his com-position, an arrangement or compilation new in itself. Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 4 S.Ct. 279, 111 U.S. 53, 28 L.Ed. 349.
A beginner or mover of anything; hence efflcient cause of a thing; creator; originator; a composer, as distin-guished from an editor, translator or compiler. Remick Music Corp. v. Interstate Hotel Co. of Neb., D.C.Neb., 58 F.Supp. 523, 531.
AUTHORITIES. Citations to statutes, precedents, judicial decisions, and text-books of the law, made on the argument of questions of law or the trial of causes before a court, in support of the legal posi-tions contended for, or adduced to fortify the opinion of a court or of a text writer upon any question.
AUTHORITY. Permission. People v. Howard, 31 Cal.App. 358, 160 P. 697, 701. Control over, juris-diction. State v. Home Brewing Co. of Indian-apolis, 182 Ind. 75, 105 N.E. 909, 916. Often synon-ymous with power. State v. District Court of Eighth Judicial Dist. in and for Natrona County, 33 Wyo. 281, 238 P. 545, 548. The power delegated by a principal to his agent. Clark v. Griflln, 95 N.J.Law, 508, 113 A. 234, 235. The lawful delega-tion of power by one person to another. Rucks-Brandt Const. Co. v. Price, 165 Okl. 178, 23 P.2d 690, 692. Power of agent to affect legal relations of principal by acts done in accordance with prin-cipal’s manifestations of consent to agent. In re Fitzpatrick’s Estate, Sur., 17 N.Y.S.2d 280, 288.
General
Authority by estoppel. Not actual, but apparent only, being imposed on the principal because his conduct has been such as to mislead, so that it would be unjust to let him deny it. Moore v. Switzer, 78 Colo. 63, 239 P. 874, 875. See Appar-ent Authority.
Authority eoupled with an interest. Authority given to an agent for a valuable consideration, or which forms part of a security. See Unger v. Newlin Haines Co., 94 N.J.Eq. 458, 120 A. 331, 335.
Apparent authority. That which, though not actually granted, the principal knowingly per-mits the agent to exercise, or which he holds him out as possessing. L. E. Mumford Banking Co. v. Farmers’ & Merchants’ Bank of Kilmarnock, 116 Va. 449, 82 S.E. 112, 118. See Authority by Es-toppel.

Express authority. That given explicitly, either In writing or orally. See Express Authority.
General authority. That which authorizes the agent to do everything connected with a particular business. Story, Ag. § 17. It empowers him to bind his principal by all acts within the scope of his employment; and it cannot be limited by any private direction not known to the party dealing with him. Paley, Ag. 199.
Implied authority. Actual authority circumstan-tially proved. Koivisto v. Bankers’ & Merchants’ Fire Ins. Co., 148 Minn. 255, 181 N.W. 580, 582. That which the principal intends his agent to pos-sess, and which is implied from the principal’s conduct. Moore v. Switzer, 78 Colo. 63, 239 P. 874, 875. It includes only such acts as are incident and necessary to the exercise of the authority expressly granted. Coulson v. Stevens, 122 Miss. 797, 85 So. 83, 85.
Limited authority. Such authority as the agent has when he is bound by precise instructions.
Naked authority. That arising where the princi-pal delegates the power to the agent wholly for the benefit of the formen
Special authority. That which is confined to an individual transaction. Whitehead v. Tuckett, 15 East, 400, 408. Such an authority does not bind the principal, unless it is strictly pursued. Paley, Ag. 202.
Unlimited authority. That possessed by an agent when he is left to pursue his own discretion.
Governmental Law
Legal power; a right to command or to act; the right and power of public officers to require obediente to their orders lawfully issued in the scope of their public duties.
In the English law relating to public adminis-tration, an authority is a body having jurisdic-tion in certain matters of a public nature.
AUTHORITY OF THE COURT. The official pow-er of the court. In re Bassett, 15 N.Y.S.2d 737, 745, 172 Misc. 613.
AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE A DEED. Must be given by deed. Blood v. Goodrich, 9 Wend. (N.Y.) 68, 75, 24 Am.Dec. 121.
AUTHORIZE. To empower; to give a right or authority to act. Board of Com’rs of Sedgwick County v. Toland, 121 Kan. 109, 245 P. 1019, 1021. To clothe with authority, warrant, or legal power. Arkansas & Memphis Ry. Bridge & Terminal Co. v. State, 174 Ark. 420, 295 S.W. 378, 380. To per-mit a thing to be done in the future. Gray v. Gill, 210 N.Y.S. 658, 660, 125 Misc. 70. It has a manda-tory effect or meaning, implying a direction to act. Quality Building & Securities Co. v. Bledsoe, 125 Cal.App. 493, 14 P.2d 128, 132.
"Authorized" is sometimes construed as equiva-lent to "permitted"; Crecelius v. Chicago, M. &
St. P. Ry. Co., 274 Mo. 671, 205 S.W. 181, 186; and sometimes as equivalent to "directed"; U. S. Sug-ar Equalization Board v. P. De Ronde & Co., C. C.A.Del., 7 F’.2d 981, 986; or to similar mandatory language. Catron v. Marron, 19 N.M. 200, 142 P. 380, 382. The word indicates merely possessed of authority; that is, possessed of legal or right-ful power, the synonym of which is "competency." Doherty v. Kansas City Star Co., 143 Kan. 802, 57 P.2d 43, 45.
AUTO ACORDADO. In Spanish colonial law. An order emanating from some superior tribunal, promulgated in the name and by the authority of the sovereign. Schm.Civil Law, 93.
AUTO LIVERY SERVICE. The business of fur-nishing for hire an automobile with a chauffeur, the car to be driven where the hirer directs. The term is also applied to the business of leasing driverless cars. See Collette v. Page, 44 R.I. 26, 114 A. 136, 18 A.L.R. 74.
See Automobile; Drive it Yourself Cars.
AUTO-OPTIC EVIDENCE. An exhibit of a thing offered before jury as evidence to be seen through jury’s own eyes. Johnson v. State, 139 Tex.Cr.R. 279, 139 S.W.2d 579, 581. See, also, Autoptic Proference.
AUTO STAGE. A motor vehicle used for the purpose of carrying passengers, baggage, or freight on a regular schedule of time and rates. State v. Ferry Line Auto Bus Co., 99 Wash. 64, 168 P. 893, 894. See Automobile.
AUTOCRACY. The name of an unlimited mon-archical government. A government at the will of one man, (called an "autocrat,") unchecked by constitutional restrictions or limitations.
AUTOGRAPIL One’s handwriting.
AUTOGRAPHIC. Self-writing or self-recording. In re Autographic Register Co., Cust. & Pat.App., 39 F.2d 718.
AUTOMATIC. Having inherent power of action or motion; self-acting or self-regulating; me-chanical. American Roll Gold Leaf Co. v. W. H. Coe Mfg. Co., C.C.A.R.I., 212 F. 720, 724.
AUTOMATISM. In medical jurisprudence, this term is applied to actions or conduct of an indi-vidual apparently occurring without will, purpose, or reasoned intention on his part; a condition sometimes observed in persons who, without being actually insane, suffer from an obscuration of the mental faculties, loss of volition or of mem-ory, or kindred affections. "Ambulatory automa-tism" describes the pathological impulse to pur-poseless and irresponsible wanderings from place to place often characteristic of patients suffering from loss of memory with dissociation of person-ality.
AUTOMOBILE. A vehicle for the transportation of persons or property on the highway, carrying its own motive power and not operated upon fixed

tracks. Blashfield’s Cyclippedia of Automobile Law, vol. 1, c. 1, § 2.
A wheeled vehicle propelled by gasoline, steam, or electricity. Stanley v. Tomlin, 143 Va. 187, 129 S.E. 379, 382. A self-propelled vehicle suitable for use on a street or roadway. State v. Freels, 136 Tenn. 483, 190 S.W. 454; A vehicle designed main-ly for the transportation of persons, equipped with an internal combustion, hydrocarbon vapor engine furnishing the motive power and forming a structural portion thereof. American-La France Fire Engine Co. v. Riordan, C.C.A.N.Y., 6 F.2d 964, 967. It is generic term, covering both trucks and passenger cars. Wiese v. Polzer, 212 Wis. 337, 248 N.W. 113, 116.
For "Auto Stage," "Family Automobile Doc-trine," "Family Car Doctrine," and "Family Pur-pose Doctrine," see those titles.
Etymologically, the term might include any self-pro-pelled vehicle, as an electric street car, or a motor boat, but in popular and legal usage it is confined to a vehicle for the transportation of persons or property on terrestrial highways, carrying its own motive power and not operated upon fixed tracks. Bethlehem Motors Corporation v. Flynt, 178 N.C. 399, 100 S.E. 693, 694. Synonymous with "motor vehicle," State v. Ferry Line Auto Bus Co., 99 Wash. 64, 168 P. 893, 894. "Car" as substitute or synonym. Mon-roe’s Adm’r v. Federal Union Life Ins. Co., 251 Ky. 570, 65 S.W.2d 680, 681.
Taxicabs included. Navy Gas & Supply Co. v. Schoech, 105 Colo. 374, 98 P.2d 860, 864, 126 A.L.R. 1225. Trolley vehicles or trolley busses excluded. City of Dayton v. De Brosse, 62 Ohio St. 232, 23 N.E.2d 647, 650.
AUTOMOBILE GUEST. A person who is received and entertained in the automobile of another. Chanson v. Morgan’s Louisiana & T. R. & S. S. Co., 18 La.App. 602, 136 So. 647, 649. Linn v. Nored, Tex.Civ.App., 133 S.W.2d 234, 237.
AUTONOMY. The political independence of a na-tion; the right (and condition) of power of self-government ; the negation of a state of political influence from without or from foreign powers. Lieber, Civ.Lib.; Green v. Obergfell, 121 F.2d 46, 57, 73 App.D.C. 298.
AUTOPSY. The dissection of a dead body for the purpose of inquiring into the cause of death. Pub. St.Mass.1882, p. 1288. Sudduth v. Insurance Co., C.C.Ky., 106 F. 823. A post mortem examination to determine the cause, seat, or nature of a dis-ease. E. O. Painter Fertilizer Co. v. Boyd, 93 Fla. 354, 114 So. 444, 445.
AUTOPTIC PROFERENCE. Proffering or pre-senting in open court of articles for observation or inspection of the tribunal. Kabase v. State, 31 Ala.App. 77, 12 So.2d 758, 764.
AUTRE. Fr. Another.
AUTRE ACTION PENDANT. In pleading. An-other action pending. A species of plea in abate-ment. 1 Chit.P1. 454.
AUTRE DROIT. In right of another, e. g., a trus-tee holds trust property in right of his cestui que trust. A prochein aniy sues in right of an infant. 2 B1.Comm. 176.
AUTRE VIE. Another’s life. A person holding an estate for or during the life of another is called a tenant "pur autre vie," or "pur terme d’autre vie." Litt. § 56; 2 Bl.Cornm. 120. See Estate Pur Autre Vie.
AUTREFOIS. L. Fr. At another time; former-ly; bef ore; heretofore.
AUTREFOIS ACQUIT. Fr. Formerly acquitted. In criminal law. The name of a plea in bar to a criminal action, stating that the defendant has been once already indicted and tried for the same alleged offense and has been acquitted. Simco v. State, 9 Tex.App. 348; State v. Bilton, 156 S.C. 324, 153 S.E. 269, 272.
AUTREFOIS ATTAINT. In criminal law. For-merly attainted. A plea that the defendant has already been attainted for one felony, and there-fore cannot be criminally prosecuted for another. 4 Bl.Comm. 336; 12 Mod. 109; R. & R. 268. This is not a good plea in bar in the United States, nor in England in modern law. 1 Bish.Cr.L. § 692; Singleton v. State, 71 Miss. 782, 16 So. 295, 42 Am. St.Rep. 488.
AUTREFOIS CONVICT. Fr. Formerly convict-ed. In criminal law. A plea by a criminal in bar to an indictment that he has been formerly con-victed of the same crime. 4 Bl.Comm. 336; 4 Steph.Comm. 404.
AUXILIARY. Aiding; attendant on; ancillary (q. v.); as, an auxiliary bill in equity, an auxiliary receiver. Buckley v. Harrison, 31 N.Y.S. 1001,10 Misc. 683; Bowman v. Stark, Tex.Civ.App., 185 S.W. 921, 924. Synonymous with "subsidiary." Baker v. Fenley, 128 S.W.2d 295, 298, 233 Mo.App. 998.
AUXILIATOR. Lat. Helper or assistant; the word is closely related to the English word auxil-iary. Esta Co. v. Burke, D.C.Pa., 257 F. 743, 746.
AUXILIUM. In feudal and old English law. Aid; compulsory aid, hence a tax or tribute; a kind of tribute paid by the vassal to his lord, be-ing one of the incidents of the tenure by knight’s service. Spelman; Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 62.
AUXILIUM AD FILIUM MILITEM FACIENDUM ET FILIUM MARITANDAM. An ancíent writ which was addressed to the sheriff to levy com-pulsorily an aid towards the knighting of a son and the marrying of a daughter of the tenants in ca pite of the crown.
AUXILIUM CURVE. In old English law. A pre-cept or order of court citing and convening a party, at the suit and request of another, to war-rant something. Kenn.Par.Ant. 477.
AUXILIUM REGIS. In English law. The king’s aid or money levied for the royal use and the pub-lic service, as taxes granted by parliament. A subsidy paid to the king. Spelman.
AUXILIUM VICE COMITI. An ancient duty paid to sheriffs. Cowell.
AVAIL OF MARRIAGE. In feudal law. The right of marriage, which the lord or guardian in chivalry had of disposing of his infant ward in matrimony. A guardian in socage had also the same right, but not attended with the same advan-tage. 2 BI.Comm. 88.
In Scotch law. A certain sum due by the heir of a deceased ward vassal, when the heir became of marriageable age. Ersk.Inst. 2, 5, 18.
AVAILABILITY FOR WORK. Within Unemploy-ment Compensation Law requires no more than availability for suitable work which claimant has no good cause for refusing. Hagadone v. Kirk-patrick, 66 Idaho 55, 154 P.2d 181, 182.
AVAILABLE. Suitable; usable. Lively v. Amer-ican Zinc Co. of Tennessee, 137 Tenn. 261, 191 S. W. 975, 979; Having sufficient force or efficacy; effectual. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Broderick, 56 Ind.App. 58, 102 N.E. 887, 891.
AVAILABLE MEANS. This phrase, among mer-cantile men, is a term well understood to be any-thing which can readily be converted into money; but it is not necessarily or primarily money itself. McFadden v. Leeka, 48 Ohio St. 513, 28 N.E. 874; Benedict v. Huntington, 32 N.Y. 224; Brigham v. Tillinghast, 13 N.Y. 218.
AVAILS. Profits, proceeds, or use. In re Cough-lin’s Estate, 53 N.D. 188, 205 N.W. 14, 16; Cordes v. Harding, 27 Cal.App. 474, 150 P. 650, 651. With reference to wills, it means the corpus or pro-ceeds of the estate after the payment of the debts. 1 Amer. & Eng.Enc.Law, 1039. See Allen v. De Witt, 3 N.Y. 279; McNaughton v. McNaughton, 34 N.Y. 201.
AVAL. In French law. The guaranty of a bill of exchange; so called because usually placed at the foot or bottom (aval) of the bill. Story, Bills, §§ 394, 454. 11 Harv.L.Rev. 55.
In Canadian law. The act of subscribing one’s signature at the bottom of a promissory note or of a bill of exchange; properly an act of surety-ship, by the party signing, in favor of the party to whom the note or bill is given. 1 Low.Can. 221; 9 Low.Can, 360.
AVANTURE. L. Fr. Chance; hazard; mis-chance.
AVARIA, AVARIE. Average; the loss and dam-age suffered in the course of a navigation. Poth. Mar.Louage, 105.
AVENAGE. A certain quantity of oats paid by a tenant to his landlord as rent, or in lieu of some other duties. Jacob, L.Dict.
AVENTURE, or ADVENTURE. A mischance causing the death of a man, as where a person is suddenly drowned or killed by any accident, without felony. Co.Litt. 391; Whishaw.
AVENUE. Any broad passageway, bordered on each side by trees. Greene v. Helme, 94 Vt. 392, 111 A. 557, 559. It may be synonymous with

"street" but not with "boulevard." City of St. Louis v. Breuer, Mo.Sup., 223 S.W. 108, 110.
"Street," "avenue," "road," "public road," ”county road," and "public highway" are used indiscrimlnately in legislatIon and judicial decisions. "Street" or "ayenue" commonly applies to a public highway in a village, town, or city and "road" to a suburban highway, but there may be "roads" in a city or town and "streets" and "avenues" in the country. City of Spokane v. Spokane County, 179 Wash. 130, 36 P.2d 311, 313.
AYER. L. Fr. To have.
Ayer et tener. In old conveyancing. To have and to hold.
AYER, v. In pleading. To declare or assert; to set out distinctly and formally; to allege.
In old plewiing. To avouch or verify. Litt. § 691; Co.Litt. 362b. To make or prove true; to make good or justify a plea.
AYER, n. In old English and French. Property; substance, estate and particularly live stock or cattle; hence a working beast; a horse or bul-lock. Cowell; Kelham.
Ayer corn. A rent reserved to religious houses, to be paid in corn. Corn drawn by the tenant’s cattle. Cowell.
Ayer land. In feudal law. Land plowed by the tenant for the proper use of the lord of the soil. Blount.
Ayer penny. Money paid towards the king’s averages or carriages, and so to be freed thereof. Termes de la Ley.
Ayer silver. A custom or rent formerly so called. Cowell.
AVERA. A day’s work of a ploughman, formerly valued at eight penco. Jacob, L.Dict.
AVERAGE. A mean proportion, medial sum or quantity, made out of unequal sums or quantities. Brisendine v. Skousen Bros., 48 Ariz. 416, 62 P.2d 326, 329, 112 A.L.R. 1089; Long v. Ottumwa Ry. & Light Co., 162 Iowa, 11, 142 N.W. 1008, 1015.
In ordinary usage the term signitles the mean between two or more quantities, measures, or numbers. If applied to something which is incapable of expression in terms of measure or amount, it signifies that the thing or person referred to is of the ordinary or usual type.
Average charges. "Average charges for toll and transportation" are understood to mean, and do mean, charges made at a mean rate, obtained by dividing the entire receipts for toll and trans-portation by the whole quantity of tonnage car-ried, reduced to a common standard of tons moved one mile. Hersh v. Railway. Co., 74 Pa. 190.
Average prices. Such as are computed on all the prices of any articles sold within a certain pe riod or district.
General average (also called "gross") consists of expense purposely incurred, sacrifice made, or damage sustained for the common satety of the vessel, freight, and cargo, or the two of them, at interests in the proportion of their respective val-ues exposed to the common danger, and ultimately surviving, including the amount of expense, sacri-fice, or damage so incurred in the contributory value. Star of Hope v. Annan, 9 Wall. 203, 19 L. Ed. 638; Lex Rhodia, Dig. 14, 2, 1.
"General average" is a contribution by the several inter-ests engaged in a maritime venture to make good the loss of one of them for the voluntary sacrifice of a part of the ship or cargo to save the residue of the property and the laves of those on board, or for extraordinary expenses nec-essarily incurred for the common benefit and safety of all. California Canneries Co. v. Canton Ins. Office, 25 Cal.App. 303, 143 P. 549, 553. The law of general average is part of the maritime law, and not of the municipal law, and applies to maritime adventures only. Ralli v. Troop, 157 U.S. 386, 15 S.Ct. 657, 39 L.Ed, 742.

Gross average. More commonly called "general average" (q. v.). Where loss or damage occurs to a vessel or its cargo at sea, average is the ad-justment and apportionment of such loss between the owner, the freight, and the cargo, in propor-tion to their respective interests and losses, in or-der that one may not suffer the whole loss, but each contribute ratably. Coster v. Insurance Co.,
2 Wash.C.C. 51, 6 Fed.Cas. 611.
Particular average is a loss happening to the ship, freight, or cargo which is not to be shared by contribution among all those interested, but must be borne by the owner of the subject to which it occurs. It is thus called in contradistinc-tion to general average. Bargett v. Insurance Co.,
3 Bosw. (N.Y.) 395.
Petty average denotes such charges and dis-bursements as, according to occurrences and the custom of every place, the master necessarily fur-nishes for the benefit of the ship and cargo, ei-ther at the place of loading or unloading, or on the voyage; such as the hire of a pilot for con-ducting a vessel from one place to another, tow-age, light money, beaconage, anchorage, bridge toll, quarantine and such like. Park, Ins. 100; Le Guidon, c. 5, a. 13; Weyt, de A. 3, 4; Weskett, art. Petty Av.; 2 Phill.Ins. § 1269, n. 1; 2 Arnould, Mar.Ins. 927.
Simple average is the same as "particular aver-age" (q. v.).
In maritime law. Loss or damage accidentally happening to a vessel or to its cargo during a voyage. Also a small duty paid to masters of ships, when goods are sent in another man’s ship, for their tare of the goods, over and aboye the freight.
In old English law. A service by horse or carriage, anciently due by a tenant to his lord. Cowell. A labor or service performed with work-ing cattle, horses, or oxen, or with wagons and carriages. Spelman.
Stubble, or remainder of straw and grass left in corn-flelds after harvest. In Kent it is called "gratten," and in other parts "roughings."
AVERIA. In old English law. A term applied to working cattle, such as horses, oxen, etc.
AVERIA CARRUCM. Beasts of the plow. 3 Bla. Comm. 9; 4 Term, 566.
AVERIIS CAPTIS IN WITHERNAM. A writ granted to one whose cattle were unlawfully dls. trained by another and driven out of the county in which they were taken, so that they could not be replevied by the sheriff. Reg.Orig. 82.
AVERIUM. Lat. Goods; property. A beast of burden. Spelman, Gloss.
AVERMENT. In pleading. A positive statement of facts, in opposition to argument or inference. 1 Chit.P1. 320; Bacon, Abr. Pleas, B.
Averments were formerly said to be general and par-ticular: but only particular averments are found in mod-ern pleading. 1 Chit.P1. 277.
Immaterial and impertinent averments (which are synonymous, 5 D. & R. 209) are those which need not be made, and, if made, need not be proved. Williamson v. Allison, 2 East, 446; Pan• ton v. Holland, 17 Johns. (N.Y.) 92, 8 Am.Dec. 369.
Negative averments are those in which a nega-tive is used.
Particular averments are the assertions of par-ticular facts.
Unnecessary averments are statements of mat• ters which need not be alleged, but which, if al-leged, must be proved. Carth. 200.
In old pleading. An offer to prove a plea, or pleading. The concluding part of a plea, replica-tion, or other pleading, containing new affirma-tive matter, by which the party offers or declares himself "ready to verily."
AVERRARE. In feudal law. A duty required from some eustomary tenants, to carry goods in a wagon or upon loaded horses. Jacob, L.Dict.
AVERSIO. In the civil law. An averting or turn-ing away. A term applied to a species of sale in gross or bulk.
Letting a house altogether, instead of in cham bers. 4 Kent, Comm. 517.
AVERSIO PERICULL A turning away of peril. Used of a contract of insurance. 3 Kent, Comm. 263.
AVERUM. Goods, property, substance; a beast of burden. Spelman.
AVET. A term used in the Scotch law, signifying to abet or assist.. Tomlin, Dict.
AVIA. In the civil law. A grandmother. Inst. 3, 6, 3.
AVIATICUS. In the civil law. A grandson.
AVIATION. The art of flying, especially the management of airplanes; the act, art or science of flying by mechanical means, especially with machines heavier than air. Massachusetts Pro-tective Ass’n v. Bayersdorfer, C.C.A.Ohio, 105 F. 2d 595, 597; Spychala v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 339 Pa. 237, 13 A.2d 32, 33.

AVIATION, ENGAGED IN. The phrase "engaged in aviation" within the meaning of an insurance policy denotes the act of flying in the air in a machine heavier than air, whether piloting or riding as a passenger. Masonic Acc. Ins. Co. v. Jackson, Ind.App., 147 N.E. 156. See Aeronautics.
AVIZANDUM. In Scotch law. To tnake avizan-dum with a process is to take it from the public court to the prívate consíderation of the judge. Bell.
AVOCAT. Fr. An advocate; a barrister.
AVOCATION. A calling away, a diversion, sug. gesting idea of smaller affairs of life, or occasion-al employments as distinguished from one’s ordi-nary or principal occupation. Bullía v. Dela-ware Bus Co., Del., 180 A. 519, 522, 7 W.W.Harr. 62; a subordinate or occasional occupation. Mu-tual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Enecks, 41 Ga. App. 644, 154 S.E. 198, 199.
AVOID. To annul; cancel; make void; to de• stroy the efficacy of anything. To evade; escape. Graves v. Apt, 233 Mass. 587, 124 N.E. 432, 433. But it has no sinister meaning, and does not imply subterfuge or artifice in escape. Booth v. Scott, 276 Mo. 1, 205 S.W. 633, 639.
AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES, DOCTRINE OF. Doctrine imposes duty on person injured to mini-mize damages. Reavis v. Raylor, Tex.Civ.App., 162 S.W.2d 1030, 1037; Lips v. Opp, 96 P.2d 865, 867, 150 Kan. 745.
AVOIDANCE. A making void, useless, empty, or of no effect; annulling, cancelling; escaping or evading.
English Ecelesiastical Law
The term describes the condition of a benefice when it has no incumbent.
Parliamentary Language
Avoidance of a decision signifies evading or superseding a question, or escaping the coming to a decision upon a pending question. Holthouse.
Pleading
The allegation or statement of new matter, in opposition to a former pleading, which, admitting the facts alleged in .such former pleading, shows cause why they should not have their ordinary legal effect: Mahaiwe Bank v. Douglass, 31 Conn. 175. See Confession and Avoidance.
AVOIRDUPOIS. The narre of a system of weights (sixteen ounces to the pound) used in weighing articles other than medicines, metals, and precious stones; so named in distinction from the Troy weight.
AVOUCIIER. The calling upon a warrantor of lands to fulfill his undertaking. See Voucher.
AVOUÉ. In French and Canadian law. A bar-rister, advocate, solicitor, or attorney. An officer charged with representing and defending parties before the tribunal to which he is attached. Du-verger.
AVOW. In pleading. To acknowledge and justify an act done. 3 Bla.Comm. 150. To make an avow-ry. Tleeta, 1.1, c. 4, Cunningham, Dict. See Avowry; Justification.
For example, when replevin is brought for a thing dis-trained, and the party taking claims that he hada right lo make the distress, he is said to avow. Newell Mill Co. v. Muxlow, 115 N.Y. 170, 21 N.E. 1048.
AVOWAL. An open declaration. Purpose is to enable the court to know what the witness would have stated in answer to the question propounded, and to inform the court what the interrogator would prove contrary to the testimony given at the trial. Fennell v. Frisch’s Adm’r., 192 Ky. 535, 234 S.W. 198 (1921) ; Robertson v. Commonwealth, 269 Ky. 317, 107 S.W.2d 292 ,(1937). See Clay, Kentucky Practice, Rule 43.10. Fed.R.Civ.P, 43(c),
AVOWANT. One who makes an avowry.
AVOWEE. In ecclesiastical law. An advocate of a church benefice.
AVOWRY. A pleading in the action of replevin, by which the defendant avows, that is, acknowl-edges, the taking of the distress or property complained of, where he took it in his own right, and sets forth the reason of it ; as for rent in ar-rear, damage done, etc. 3 B1.Comm. 149; 1 Tidd Pr. 645. L. A. W. Acceptance Corporation v. Cher-nick, 143 A. 783, 784, 49 R.I. 434.
Avowry 1s the setting forth, as In a declaration, the nature and merlts of the defendant’s case, showing that the distress taken by him was ]awful, which must be done with such sufficient authority as will entltle him to a retorno habendo. Wiihem v. Boyd, 172 Md. 79, 190 A. 823, 826.
An avowry must be distinguished from a justification. The formar species of plea admits the plaintiff’s owner-ship of the property, but alleges a right in the defendant sufflcient to warrant him in taking the property and which still subslsts. A justification, cm the other hand, denies that the plaIntiff had the right of property or possession in the subject-matter, alleging ft to have been in the defend-ant or a third person, or avers a right sufficient to warrant the defendant in taking it, although such right has not continued in force to the time of making answer. See 2 W.Jones, 25.
AVOWTERER. In English law. An adulterer with whom a married woman continues in adul-tery. Termes de la Ley.
AVOWTRY. In old English law. Adultery. Termes de la Ley.
AVULSION. The removal of a considerable quan-tity of soil from the land of one man, and its de-posit upon or annexation to the land of another, suddenly and by the perceptible action of water. 2 Washb.Real Prop. 452; Wharton. Rees v. Mc-Daniel, 115 Mo. 145, 21 S.W. 913; Schwartzstein v. B. B. Bathing Park, 197 N.Y.S. 490, 492, 203 App, Div, 700; Conkey v. Knudsen, 143 Neb. 5, 8 N.W. 2d 538, 542.
A sudden abandonment of an old channel and the crea-tlon of a new one. Harper v. Holston, 119 Wash. 436, 205 P. 1062, 1064.
Where running streams are the boundaries between states, the same rule applies as between private proprie-tors, and, if the stream from any cause, natural or arti-ficial, suddenly leaves its old bed and forms a new one by the process known as "avulsion," the resulting change of channel works no change of boundary, which remains in the middle of the old channel though no water may be

AVULSION

flowing in it and irrespective of subsequent changes in the new channel. State of Arkansas v. State of Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158, 38 S.Ct. 301, 304, 62 L.Ed. 638, L.R.A.1918D, 258; Stull v. U. S., C.C.A.Neb., 61 F.2d 826, 830.
To constitute "avulslon," rather than "accretion," so as to preclude change in boundary between riparian owners, it is not necessary that soil washed away be identifiable; it being sufflcient that change is so sudden that owner of land washed away is able to poInt out approximately as much land added to opposite bank as he had washed away. 60 Okl.St.Ann. § 335, 336. Goins v. Merryman, 183 Okl. 155, 80 P.2d 268.
See Accretion; Alluvion; Reliction.
AVUNCULUS. In the civil law. A mother’s brother. 2 Bl.Comm. 230. Avunculus magnus, a great-uncle. Avunculus major, a great-grand-mother’s brother. Avunculus maximus, a great-great-grandmother’s brother. See Dig. 38, 10, 10; Inst. 3, 6, 2.
AVUS. In the civil law. A grandfather. Inst. 3, 6, 1.
AWAIT. Used in old statutes to signify a lying in wait, or waylaying.
AWARD, v. To grant, concede, or adjudge to. To give or assign by sentence or judicial determi-nation. Hobson v. Superior Court of Tulare Coun-ty, 69 Cal.App. 60, 230 P. 456, 457. Thus, a jury awards damages; the court awards an injunction. Starkey v. Minneapolis, 19 Minn. 206 (Gil. 166). One awards a contract to a bidder. Jackson v. State, 194 Ind. 130, 142 N.E. 1, 2, (holding that a finding that a contract was "awarded to" a bidder meant it was entered into with all required legal formalities).
AWARD, n. The decision or determination ren-dered by arbitrators or commissioners, or other private or extrajudicial deciders, upon a contro-versy submitted to them; also the writing or doc-ument embodying such decision. Keiser v. Berks County, 253 Pa. 167, 97 A. 1067, 1068.
Under Workmen’s Compensation Acts, the term may be used in the aboye sense, as signitying a decislon or deter-mination of the Industrial Board, or some equivalent body. Frankfort General Ins. Co. v. Condultt, 74 Ind.App. 584, 127 N.E. 212, 215. It may also be used to refer to the amount of compensation flxed by the board, an "award" being an amount fixed by arbitration. Odrowski v. Swift & Co., 99 Kan. 163, 162 P. 268, 269. Hence, a compensation agree-ment, which is not approved by the Industrial Board, is not an award. Bruce v. Stutz Motor Car Co. of America, 83 Ind.App. 257, 148 N.E. 161, 162.
A judgment, sentence, or final decision. Higginbotham v. State, 20 Ala.App. 159, 101 So. 166. A flnding or judg-ment based upon an appralsement. Riddell v. Rochester German Ins. Co. of New York, 36 R.I. 240, 89 A. 833, 835. See Arbitration.
AWAY-GOING CROP. A crop sown before the expiration of a tenancy, which cannot ripen until after its expiration to which, however, the tenant is entitled. Broom, Max. 412; Miller v. Gray, Tex. Civ.App., 108 S.W.2d 265, 267, 268.
AWM. Also aum or awme. In old English stat-utes. A measure of avine, or vessel containing forty gallons.
AWN-RINDE. See Third-Night-Awn-Hinde.
AXIOM. In logic. A self-evident truth; an in-disputable truth.
AXMINSTER. The trade-name of a certain kind of rug. The term now generally includes the ma-chine-made product as well as the handmade. Beuttell & Sons v. U. S., 8 Ct.Cust.App. 409, 412.
AYANT CAUSE. In French law, and also in Louisiana, this term signifies one to whom a right has been assigned, either by will, gift, sale, ex-change, or the like; an assignee. An ayant cause differs from an heir who acquires the right by inheritance. 8 Toullier, n. 245.
AYLE. See Aiel.
AYRE. In old Scotch law. Eyre; a circuit or iter.
AYUNTAMIENTO. In Spanish law. A congress of persons; the municipal eouncil of a city or town. 1 White, Coll. 416; Friedman v. Goodwin, 9 Fed.Cas. 818; Strother v. Lucas, 12 Pet. 442, 9 L.Ed. 1137, notes.
AZURE. A term used in heraldry, signifying blue.

BLACK ‘S LAW DICTIONARY – Section B

BACKSIDE

B. The second letter of the English alphabet; is used to denote the second of a series of pages, notes, etc.; the subsequent letters, the third and following numbers.

B. C. An abbreviation for "bef ore Christ," "bail court," "bankruptcy cases," and "British Colum-bia."

B. D. S. A. Business and Defense Services Ad-ministration.

B. E. An abbreviation for "Baron of the Court of Exchequer."

B. F. An abbreviation for bonum factura, a good or proper act, deed, or decree; signifies "ap-proved."

B. L. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

B. R. An abbreviation for Bancus Regis, (King’s Bench,) or Bancus Regince (Queen’s Bench.) It is frequently found in the old books as a designa-tion of that court. In more recent usage, the ini-tial letters of the English names are ordinarily employed, i. e., K. B. or Q. B.

B. S. Bancus Superior, that is, upper bench.

E— S—. Designation of statements of another as

b— s— carried the implications that they were absurd and fanciful. People v. Nitti, 312 III. 73, 143 N.E. 448, 456.

BABBITT. To line or furnish with "babbitt met-al," which is a soft white anti-friction metal, of varying compositions, or any of several alloys sim-ilarly used. Ingersol v. National Sash & Door Factory, 134 La. 19, 63 So. 609, 610.

"BABY ACT." A plea of infancy, interposed for the purpose of defeating an action upon a con-tract made while the person was a minor, is vul-garly called "pleading the baby act.- By exten-sion, the term is applied to a plea of the statute of limitations.

BACHELERIA. In old records. Commonalty or yeomanry, in contradistinction to baronage.

BACHELOR. One who has taken the first degree (baccalaureate) in the liberal arts and sciences, or in lay3, medicine, or divinity, in a college or uni-versity.

A man who has never been married.
A kind of inferior knight; an esquire.

BACK, v. To indorse; to sign on the back; to sign generally by way of acceptance or approval. Where a warrant issued in one county is present-ed to a magistrate of another county and he signs it for the purpose of making it executory in his county, he is said to "back" it. 4 Bl.Comm. 291.

This custom prevails in England, Scotland, and some of the United States. So an indorser of a note or bill is colloquially said to "back" it. Sea-bury v. Hungerford, 2 Hill (N.Y.) 80.
BACK, adv. To the rear; backward; in a re-verse direction. Also, in arrear.

BACK CARRY. In forest law, the crime of hav-ing, on the back, game unlawfully killed. See Backbear.

BACK LANDS. A term of no very definite im-port, but generally signifying lands lying back from (not contiguous to) a highway or a water course. See Ryerss v. Wheeler, 22 Wend. (N.Y.) 150.

BACK TAXES. Those assessed for a previous year or years and remaining due and unpaid from the original tax debtor. M. E. Church v. New Orleans, 107 La. 611, 32 So. 101.

BACKADATION. See Backwardation.

BACKBEAR. In forest law. Carrying on the back. One of the cases in which an offender against vert and venison might be arrested, as being taken with the mainour, or manner, or found carrying a deer off on his back. Manwood; Cowell.

BACKBEREND (also Backberende). Sax. Bear-ing upon the back or about the person. Applied to a thief taken with the stolen property in his immediate possession. Bract. 1, 3, tr. 2, c. 32. Used with handhabend, having in the hand.

BACKBOND. A bond of indemnification given to a surety.
In Scotch law. A deed attaching a qualification or condition to the terms of a conveyance or other instrument. This deed is used when particular circumstances render it necessary to express in a separate form the limitations or qualifications of a right. Bell. The instrument is equivalent to a declaration of trust in English conveyancing.

BACKING. Indorsement; indorsement by a mag-istrate. Gondas v. Gondas, 99 N.J.Eq. 473, 134 A. 615, 617.

BACKING A WARRANT. See Back.

BACK-SEAT DRIVER. A highly nervous pas-senger whether sitting in rear or by driver, who by unwarranted advice and warnings interferes in careful operation of automobile. Winters v. York Motor Express Co., 116 Pa.Super. 421, 176 A. 812, 815.

BACKSIDE. In English law. A term formerly used in conveyances and also in pleading; it im-ports a yard at the back part of or behind a house, and belonging thereto.

BACKWARDATION (also called Backadation). In the language of the stock exchange, this term signifies a consideration paid for delay in the de-livery of stock contracted for, when the price is lower for time than for cash. Dos Passos, Stock-Brok. 270.

BACKWARDS. In a policy of marine insurance, the phrase "forwards and backwards at sea" means from port to port in the course of the voyage, and not merely from one terminus to the other and back. 1 Taunt. 475.

BACKWATER. Water in a stream which, in consequence of some dam or obstruction below, is detained or checked in its course, or fiows back. Webster v. North Poudre Irr. Co., 74 Colo. 565, 223 P. 36. Water caused to flow backward from a steam-vessel by reason of the action of its wheels or screw.

BACULUS. A rod, staff, or wand, used in old English practice in making livery of seisin where no building stood on the land, (Bract. 40;) a stick or wand, by the erection of which on the land in-volved in a real action the defendant was sum-moned to put in his appearance; this was called "baculus nuntiatorius." 3 B1.Comm. 279.

BAD. Vicious, evil, wanting in good qualities; the reverse of good. Davis v. Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances on Lives and Granting Annuities, 337 Pa. 456, 12 A.2d 66, 68. Defective, faulty, inferior, or imperfect. Kniffley v. Reid, 152 S.W. 2d 615, 616, 287 Ky. 212. The technical word for unsoundness in pleading.

BAD BEHAVIOR. Where a judgment in a crim. final case has been suspended on condition of good behavior, the term "good behavior" means con-duct that is authorized by law, and "bad behavior" means conduct such as the law will punish. State v. Hardin, 183 N.C. 815, 112 S.E. 593, 594.

BAD DEBT. Generally speaking, one which is un-collectible.

BAD FAITH. The opposite of "good faith," gen-erally implying or involving actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake as to one’s rights or duties, but by some interested or sinister motive. State v. Grif-fin, 100 S.C. 331, 84 S.E. 876, 877; Penn Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Mechanics’ Savings Bank & Trust Co., C.C.A.Tenn., 73 F. 653, 19 C.C.A. 316, 38 L.R.A. 33, 70; Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, 297 Mass. 398, 8 N.E.2d 895, 907.

BAD MOTIVE. Intentionally doing a wrongful act knowing at the time that it is wrongful. Luh-mann v. Schaefer, Mo.App., 142 S.W.2d 1088, 1090; Davis v. Nash Central Motors, Mo.App., 332 S.W. 2d 475, 480.

BAD PLACE. Under a contract requiring the em-ployer to timber all bad places in the mine unless caused by the miner’s negligente, a "bad place" was a place in the roof which could not be made reasonably safe by the ordinary propping usually done by the miner himself. W. G. Duncan Coal Co. v. Thompson’s Adm’r, 157 Ky. 304, 162 S.W. 1139, 1140.

BAD TITLE. One which conveys no property to the purchaser of the estate; one which is so radi-cally defective that it is not ma,ketable, and hence such that a purchaser cannot be legally compelled to accept it. Heller v. Cohen, 15 Misc. 378, 36 N.Y.S. 668.

BADGE. A mark or cognizance worn to show the relation of the wearer to any person or thing; the token of anything; a distinctive mark of office or service.

BADGE OF FRAUD. A term used relatively to, the law of fraudulent conveyances made to hinder and defraud creditors. It is defined as a fact tend-ing to throw suspicion upon a transaction, and calling for an explanation. Bump, Fraud.Conv. 31; Phelps v. Samson, 113 Iowa, 145, 84 N.W. 1051. It is a suspicious circumstance that overhangs a transaction, or appears on the face of the papers, Toone v. Waiker, 115 Okl. 289, 243 Pa. 147, 148. A circumstance which does not alone prove fraud, but which warrants inference of fraud, especially where there is a concurrence of many such badges. Brennecke v. Riemann, Mo., 102 S.W.2d 874, 877, 109 A.L.R. 1214.
Recognized "badges of fraud" include fIctItious consid-eration, false statements as to consideration, transactlons different from usual course of doing business, transfer of all of a tiebtor’s property, Insolvency, confidential relation-ship of parties, and transfers in anticipation of sult or execution. Hendrix v. Goldman, Mo., 92 S.W.2d 733, 736.

BADGER. In old English law. One who made a practice of buying corn or victuals in one place, and carrying them to another to sell and make profit by them.

BAG. A sack or satchel. A certain and custo-mary quantity of goods and merchandise in a sack. Wharton. An uncertain quantity of goods and merchandise, from three to four hundred.. Jacob.

BAGA. In English law. A bag or purse. Thus there is the petty-bag-office in the common-law ju-risdiction of the court of chancery, because all original writs relating to the business of the crown were formerly kept in a little sack or bag, in parva baga. 1 Madd.Ch. 4.

BAGAVEL. The citizens of Exeter had granted to them by charter from Edward I. the collection of a certain tribute or toll upon all manner of wares brought to that city to be sold, toward the paving of the streets, repairing of the walls, and maintenance of the city, which was commonly called bagavel, bethugavel and chippinggavel. Antiq. of Exeter.

BAGGAGE. In the law of carriers, this term comprises such articles of personal conveniente or necessity as are .usually carried by passengers for their personal use. It includes whatever the pas-senger takes with him for his personal use or con-venience according to the habits or wants of the particular class to which he belongs, either with reference to the immediate necessities or ultímate purpose of the journey. Texas & P. Ry. Co. v.. Bryant, Tex.Civ.App., 11 S.W.2d 659, 660

Thus, jewelry suitable to the condition in life of the pas-senger and intended for personal use on the journey is "baggage." Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Pugh, 157 Ark. 383, 248 S.W. 897. But it is not baggage where carried by a traveler for the use of another or for the purpose of busi-ness or sale. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Fontaine, 217 Ky. 211, 289 S.W. 263, 266, 52 A.L.R. 1064.

A multitude of objects have been held to be baggage; e. g., razors in a trunk checked by a male passenger, San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Creen, Tex.Civ.App., 170 S.W. 110, 111, and a thimble carried in her trunk by the mother of two small children, Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hestle, 200 Ala. 137, 75 So. 885, 887. Other articles have been held not to be baggage, such as stocks and bonds, Jandorf v. Pull-man Co., 171 N.Y.S. 321, 322, 104 Misc. 79; a gun and gun case, not connected with the purpose of the trip, House v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 32 S.D. 209, 142 N.W. 736. 738; and an article for use in housekeeping after the end of a passenger’s journey, Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Fletcher, 194 Ala. 257, 69 So. 634, 635.

BAGGAGE CAR. A closed car in a passenger train used to transport the property of the passen-gers. Ward v. Gulf, M. & N. R. Co., 23 Tenn.App. 533, 134 S.W.2d 917.

BAGGAGE CAR SERVICE. A service rendered in such car in connection with the transportation of passengers by a passenger train movement or its equivalent. Ward v. Gulf, M. & N. R. Co., 23 Tenn.App. 533, 134 S.W.2d 917, 923.

BAILADUM. A chest or coffer. Fleta.

BAIL, v. To procure the release of a person from legal custody, by undertaking that he shall appear at the time and place designated and submit him-self to the jurisdiction and judgment of the court.

To deliver the defendant to persons who, in the manner prescribed by law, become security for his appearance in court. To set at liberty a per-son arrested or imprisoned, on security being taken for his appearance on a day and a place certain, which security is called "bail," because the party arrested or imprisoned is delivered into the hands of those who bind themselves for his forthcoming, (that is, become bail for his due appearance when required,) in order that he may be safely pro-tected from prison. Wharton. Stafford v. State, 10 Tex.App. 49.

To procure release of one charged with an offense by insuring his future attendance in court and compelling him to remain within jurisdiction of court. Manning v. State ex rel. Williams, 190 Okl. 65, 120 P.2d 980, 981.
The object of "ball" in civil cases is either directly or indirectly to secure payment of a debt or performance of other civil duties, while in criminal cases object is to secure appearance of principal before the court when his presence le needed. Johnson v. Shaffer, 64 Ohio Aoo. 236, 28 N.E.2d 765, 767. In its more anclent signittcation, the word includes the delivery of property, real or personal, by one person to another.

BAIL, n. The surety or sureties who procure the release of a person under arrest, by becoming re-sponsible for his appearance at the time and place designated. Those persons who become sureties for the appearance of the defendant in court.

—Ball aboye or ball to the action. See Special bail, infra.

—Rail absolute. Sureties whose liability is condi-ditioned upon the failure of the principal to duly account for money coming to his hands as admin-istrator, guardian, etc.

—Bail below, or bail to the sheriff. See Bail to the sheriff or bail below, infra.

—Rail bond. A bond executed by a defendant who has been arrested, together with other persons as sureties, naming the sheriff, constable, or marshal as obligee, in a penal sum proportioned to the damages claimed or penalty denounced, condi-tioned that the defendant shall duly appear to answer to the legal process in the officer’s hands, or shall cause special bail to be put in, as the case may be.

An obligation signed by the accused with sure-ties, conditioned that the same shall be void on the performance by the accused of such acts as he is required to perform. State v. Wilson, 265 Mo. 1, 175 S.W. 603, 605.

Its purpose is to secure the presence of the one charged in court when his presence is required in order to answer to the charge. State v. Clark, 234 Iowa 338, 11 N.W.2d 722. In criminal cases, a ball bond is a contract under seal, which, from its nature, requires sureties or ball, and there-fore differs from a "recognizance," which is a debt or obli-gation of record, acknowledged before some court or mag-istrate authorized to take lt, with condition to do some particular act, and which need not be executed by the par-ties. State v. Bradsher, 189 N.C. 401, 127 S.E. 349, 351, 38 A.L.R. 1102. But under the law of Connecticut, "recog-nizance" and "bail" are interchangeable. National Surety Co. v. Nazzaro, 239 Mass. 341, 132 N.E. 49, 50.

—Ball common. A fictitious proceeding, intended only to express the appearance of a defendant, in cases where special bail is not required. It is put in in the same form as special bail, but the sure-ties are merely nominal or imaginary persons, as John Doe and Richard Roe. 3 Bl.Comm. 287.

—Rail court. In English law and practice. An auxiliary court of the court of queen’s bench at Westminster, wherein points connected more par-ticularly with pleading and practice are argued and determinad. Holthouse; Wharton, Law Dict. 2d Lond. ed. It has been abolished.

—Ball dock. Formerly at the Old Bailey, in London, a small room taken from one of the corners of the court, and left open at the top, in which certain malefactors were placed during trial. Cent. Dict.

—Ball in error. That given by a defendant who intends to bring a writ of error on the judgment and desires a stay of execution in the meantime.

—Ball piece. A formal entry or memorandum of the recognizance or undertaking of special ball in civil actions, which, after being signed and ac-knowledged by the bail before the proper officer, is filed in the court in which the action is pending. 3 Bl.Comm. 291; Worthen v. Prescott, 60 Vt. 68, 11 Atl. 690.

—Rail to the action or ball aboye. Special bail (q. v.).

—Rail to the sheriff or bail below. Persons who undertake that a defendant arrested upon mesne process in a civil action shall duly appear to an-swer the plaintiff; such undertaking being in the form of a bond given to the sheriff, termed a "ball bond" (q. v.). 3 BI.Comm. 290; 1 Tidd, Pr. 221. Sureties who bind themselves to the sheriff to secure the defendant’s appearance, or his put-ting in ball to the action on the return-day of the writ.

to the sheriff was orlginally designed to tempo-rarily Ilberate the defendant from close custody, and to place means in the sheriff’s hands to insure the defend-ant’s appearance to answer at the return of the writ.
• • • The appearance which was contemplated was not, however, necessarily an actual appearance In person, but by putting in new ball, called ball to the action, special ball, or ball aboye. Thls special ball, or ball aboye, was by recognizance, which was matter of record, and an act of appearance, and by it the ball were bound that if the defendant should be condemned he should pay or render himself a prisoner, and if he did not, that they would pay the condemnation. The undertaking of the ball to the sheriff, or ball below, was whoily different, and was adapte/1 to the specific exigency. It was In the form of bond to the sheriff, and was conditioned for the defend-ant’s appearance at the return of the writ, which meant putting in and perfecting bail aboye." De Myer v. McGon-egal, 32 Mich, 120, 124.

—Civil ball. That taken in civil actions.

—Common bail. Fictitious sureties formally en• tered in the proper office of the court. See Bail common, supra.

—Special ball. Responsible sureties who under-take as bail aboye. Persons who undertake joint-ly and severally in behalf of a defendant arrested on mesne process in a civil action that, if he be condemned in the action, he shall pay the costs and condemnation, (that is, the amount which may be recovered against him,) or render himself a prisoner, or that they will pay it for him. 3 Bl. Comm. 291; 1 Tidd, Pr. 245; Sellon, Pr. 137. See Bail to the sheriff or ball below, supra.

—Straw ball. Nominal or worthless ball. Irre-sponsible persons, or men of no property, who make a practice of going bail for any one who will pay them a fee therefor, and who originally, as a mark of their purpose, wore straw in their shoes.

BAIL. Fr. In French and Canadian law. A lease of lands. See Merlin, Répert. Bail.

—Ball 1 cheptel. A contract by which one of the parties gives to the other cattle to keep, feed and care for, the borrower receiving hall the profit of increase, and bearing half the loss. Duverger.

—Ball I ferme. A contract of letting lands.

—Ball h longues années. A lease for more than vine years; the same as bail emphyteotique ( see infra) or an emphyteutic lease.

–Ball loyer. A contract of letting houses.

—Ball h rente. A contract partaking of the nature of the contract of sale, and that of the contract of Tease; it is translative of property, and the rent is essentially redeemable. Clark’s Heirs v. Christ’s Church, 4 La. 286; Poth. Bail á Rente, 1, 3.

—Ball emphyteotique. An emphyteutic lease; a lease for a term of years with a right to prolong indefinitely; practically equivalent to an aliena-tion. 5 Low. C. 381; 6 Low. C. 58. See Emphy-teusi s.

BAILABLE. Capable of being bailed; admitting of bail; authorizing or requiring bail.

BAILABLE ACTION. One in which the defend-ant is entitled to be discharged from arrest only upon giving bond to answer.

BAILABLE OP’FENSE. One for which the prison-er may be admitted to bail.

BAILABLE PROCESS. Such as requires the offi-cer to take bail, after arresting the defendant. That under which the sheriff is directed to arrest the defendant and is required by law to discharge him upon his tendering suitable bail as security for his appearance. A capias ad respondendum is bailable; not so a capias ad satisfaciendum.

BAILEE. In the law of contracts. One to whom goods are bailed; the party to whom personal property is delivered under a contract of bailment. Hotels Statler Co. v. Safier, 103 Ohio St. 638, 134 N.E. 460, 462, 22 A.L.R. 1190. A species of agent to whom something movable is committed in trust for another. Cowart v. State, 16 Ala.App. 119, 75 So. 711, 713; Smith v. State, 78 Okl.Cr. 375, 148 P.2d 206, 208.

BAILEE POLICIES. Floating policies which cover goods while in possession of warehouse without particular description in the policy. Gillespie v. Federal Compress & Warehouse Co., 265 S.W.2d 21, 27, 37 Tenn.App. 476.

BAILIE. In the Scotch law. (1) A magistrate having inferior criminal and civil jurisdiction, similar to that of an alderman, (q. v.;) (2) an officer appointed to confer infeoffment, (q. v.;) a bailiff, (q. v.; ) a server of writs. Bell.

BAILIFF. One to whom some authority, care, guardianship, or jurisdiction is delivered, com-mitted, or intrusted; one who is deputed or ap-pointed to take charge of another’s affairs; an overseer or superintendent; a keeper, protector, or guardian; a steward. Spelman. A sheriff’s officer or deputy. 1 BI.Comm. 344. A court at-tendant, sometimes called a tipstaff.
A magistrate, who formerly administered justice in the parliaments or courts of France, answering to the English sheriffs as mentioned by Bracton.
A person acting in a ministerial capacity who has by delivery the custody and administration of lands or goods for the benefit of the owner or bailor, and is liable to render an account thereof. Co.Litt. 271; Story, Eq.Jur. § 446; West v. Weyer, 18 N.E. 537, 46 Ohio St. 66, 15 Am.St.Rep. 552.

—Balliff-errant. A bailifts deputy.
—Bailiffs of franchises. In English law. Officers who perform the duties of sheriffs within liberties or privileged jurisdictions, in which formerly the king’s writ could not be executed by the sheriff. Spelman.

—Bailiffs of hundreds. In English law. Officers appointed over hundreds, by the sheriffs, to col-lect fines therein, and summon juries; to attend the judges and justices at the assises and quarter sessions; and also to execute writs and process in the several hundreds. 1 Bl.Comm. 345; 3 Steph. Comm. 29; Bract. fol. 116.

of manors. In English law. Stewards or agents appointed by the lord (generally by an authority under seal) to superintend the manor, collect fines, and quit rents, inspect the buildings, order repairs, cut down trees, impound cattle trespassing, take an account of wastes, spoils, and misdemeanors in the woods and demesne lands, and do other acts for the lord’s interest. Cowell.

—High bailiff. An officer attached to an English county court. His duties are to attend the court when sitting; to serve summonses; and to execute orders, warrants, writs, etc. St. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, § 33; Poli.C.C.Pr. 16. He also has similar duties under the bankruptcy jurisdiction of the county courts.

—Special bailiff. A deputy sheriff, appointed at the request of a party to a suit, for the special purpose of serving or executing some writ or process in such suit.

BAILIVIA. In old law. A bailiff’s jurisdiction, a bailiwick; the same as bailium. Spelman. See Bailiwick.
In old English law. A Iiberty, or exclusive ju-risdiction, which was exempted from the sheriff of the county, and over which the lord of the Iiberty appointed a bailiff with such powers within his precinct as an under-sheriff exercised under the sheriff of the county. Whishaw.

BAILIIVICK. A bailivia.

BAILLEUR DE FONDS. In Canadian law. The unpaid vendor of real estate. 1 Low. C. 1, 6; 9 Low. C. 497.

BAILLI. In old French law. One to whom judicial authority was assigned or delivered by a superior.

BAILMENT. A delivery of goods or personal prop-erty, by one person to another, in trust for the execution of a special object upon or in relation to such goods, beneficial either to the bailor or bailee or both, and upon a contract, express or implied, to perform the trust and carry out such object, and thereupon either to redeliver the goods to the bailor or otherwise dispose of the same in conformity with the purpose of the trust. Fulcher

v. State, 32 Tex.Cr.R. 621, 25 S.W. 625.

A delivery of goods for some purpose, upon a contract, express or implied, that after the purpose has been ful-filled they shall be redefivered to the bailor, or otherwise dealt with according to his direction, or kept until reclaimed. In re George L. Nadell & Co., 294 Mich. 150, 292 N.W. 684, 686. A delivery of something of a personal nature by one party to another to be held according to the purpose or object of the delivery and to be returned or delivered over when that purpose is accomplished. Hardin v. Grant. Tex.Civ.Ann.. 54 S.W.2d 189, 190; Hogan v. O’Brien, 206 N.Y.S. 831, 833, 123 Misc. 865. The term "bailment" is derived from the French word "bailler," meaning "to deliver." It importe a delivery of personal property by one person to another in trust for a specific purpose, with a contract, expressed o implied, that the trust shall be faithfully executed and the property, re-turned or duly accounted for when the specific purpose is accomplished or kept until bailor ciabas it. Common-wealth v. Polk, 255 Ky. 100, 75 S.W.2c1 761, 764.
According to Story, the contract does not necessarily lmply an undertaking to redeliver the goods. On the other hand, Blac.:stone, although his definition does not include the return, speaks of it in all his examples of bailments as a duty of the bailee; and Kent says that the application of the term to cases in which no return or redelivery to the owner or his agent is contemplated, is extending the defini-tion of the term beyond its ordinary acceptation in English law. A consignment to a factor would be a bailment for sale, according to Story; while according to Kent it would not.

• Classification

Sir William Jones has divided bailments into five sorts, namely: Depositum, or deposit; man-datum, or commission without recompense; com-modatum, or loan for use without pay; pignori acceptum, or pawn; locatum, or hiring, which is always with reward. This last is subdivided into locatio rei, or hiring, by which the hirer gains a temporary use of the thing; locatio operis facien-di, when something is to be done to the thing de-livered; locatio operis mercium vehendarum, when the thing is merely to be carried from one place to another. Jones, Bailm. 36.

Lord Holt divided bailments thus:
(1) Depositum, or a naked bailment of goods, to be kept for the use of the bailor.
(2) Commodatum. Where goods or chattels that are use-ful are lent to the batlee gratis, to be used by him.
(3) Locatio rei. Where goods are lent to the ballee to be used by him for hire.
(4) Vadium. Pawn or pledge.
(5) Locatio operis faciendi. Where goods are delivered to be carried, or something is to be done about them, for a reward to be paid to the bailee.
(6) Mandatusn. A delivery of goods to somebody who Is to carry them, or do something about them, gratis. 2 Ld. Raym. 909.
Another dIviston, suggested by Bouvier as being a better general dtvlslon for practical purposes, is as follows: First, those bailments which are for the beneflt of the bailor, or of some person whom he represents; second, those for the beneflt of the ballee, or some person repre-sented by him; third, those which are for the beneflt of both parties.

In General

—Bailment for hire. A contract in which the bailor agrees to pay an adequate recompense for the safe-keeping of the thing intrusted to the cus-tody of the bailee, and the bailee agrees to keep it and restore it on the request of the bailor, in the same condition substantially as he received it, excepting injury or loss from causes for which he is not responsible.
—Bailment for mutual benefit. One in which the parties contemplate some price or compensa-tion in return for benefits flowing from the bail-ment, necessarily involving an express or im-plied agreement or undertaking to that effect. Armored Car Service, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Miami, Fla.App., 114 So.2d 431, 434. For example, delivery of automobile to one who, for a consider-ation, undertakes to repair it. Fox Chevrolet Sales, Inc. v. Middleton, to Use of Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 99 A.2d 731, 732, 203 Md. 158, 43 A.L.R.2d 399.
—Actual ballment. One which exists where there is either (a) an "actual delivery," consisting in giving to the bailee or his agent the real posses-sion of the chattel, or (b) a "constructive de-livery," ,consisting of any of those acts which, although not truly comprising real possession of the goods transferred, have been heid by legal construction equivalent to acts of real delivery. Wentworth v. Riggs, 159 App.Div. 899, 143 N.Y.S. 955, 956.
—Constructive bailment. One arising where the person having possession of a chattel holds it under such circumstances that the law imposes upon him the obligation to deliver it to another. Wentworth v. Riggs, 159 App.Div. 899, 143 N.Y.S. 955, 956. See, also, Involuntary bailment, infra.
—Gratuitous bailment. Another name for a depositum or naked bailment, which is made only for the benefit of the bailor and is not a source of profit to the bailee. Foster v. Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 499, 9 Am. Dec. 168.
—Involuntary bailment. One arising by the acci-dental leaving of personal property in the posses-sion of any person without negligence on the part of its owner. Grossman Co. v. White, 52 Okl: 117, 152 P. 816, 817
A "ballment— is created by the element of lawful pos-session and the duty to act for the thing as the property of another, whether such possession is based on contract in the ordinary sense or not. Foulke v. New York Consol. R. Co., 228 N.Y. 269, 127 N.E. 237, 239, 9 A.L.R. 1384. See Constructive ballment, supra.
—Lucrative bailment. One which is undertaken upon a consideration and for which a payment or recompense is to be made to the bailee, or from which he is to derive some advantage. Prince v. Alabama State Fair, 106 Ala. 340, 17 So. 449, 28 L.R.A. 716.
—Bailment Tease. A legal metnod by which one desiring to purchase an article but unable to pay therefor at the time, may secure possession there-of with the right to use and enjoy it as long as he gays stipulated rentals and becomes absolute owner after completing such installment pay-ments, on payment of an additional sum which may be nominal. In re Robinson, D.C.Pa., 40 F. Supp. 320, 322, 323.

Bailxnents as Distinguished from Other Transactions

—Chattel mortgages. A radical distinction be-tween a bailment and a chattel mortgage is that, by a mortgage, the title is transferred to the mortgagee, subject to be revested by performance of the condition, but, in case of a bailment, the ballor retains the title and parts with the pos-session for a special purpose. Walker v. Staples, 5 Allen (Mass.) 34.

—Debt. The distinction between an obligation to restore the specific thing received, or of returning others of equal value, is the distinction between a "bailment" and a "debt." Alamitos Land Co. v. Texas Co., 11 Cal.App.2d 614, 54 P.2d 489, 491.
—Exchanges. An agreement by which A is to let B have a horse, in consideration that B will let A have another horse, creates an exchange, not a bailment. Austin v. Seligman, C.C.N.Y., 21 Blatchf. 506, 18 Fed. 519.
—Partnerships. Where animals are delivered to be taken tare of for a certain time, and at the expiration of that time the same number of ani-mals is to be returned, and any increase is to be enjoyed by both parties, there is a bailment, not a partnership. Simmons v. Shaft, 91 Kan. 553, 138 P. 614, 615.
—Sales. The test of a ballment is that the iden-tical thing is to be returned in the same or in some altered form; if another thing of equal value is to be returned, the trafisaction is a sale; Sturm v. Boker, 14 S.Ct. 99; 150 U.S. 312, 37 L.Ed. 1093; Borman v. U. S., C.C.A.N.Y., 262 F. 26, 29.
Conditional sale. Contemplates that at some time the titie shall pass to the purchaser and that he shall pay the purchase price, while a "bailment" contemplates that the titie shall not pass to the bailee, but remain in the ballor, and that the property shall be returned to the ballor. Ver-mont Acceptance Corporation v. Wiltshire, 103 Vt. 219, 153 A. 199, 200, 73 A.L.R. 792.
—Trusts. The passing of the legal title from the owner to the party to whom personal property is delivered distinguishes a "trust" from a bailment. National Cattle Loan Co. v. Ward, 113 Tex. 312, 255 S.W. 160, 164; McIntyre v. Smith, 154 Md. 660, 141 A. 405, 410.
BAILOR. The party who bails or delivers goods to another, in the contract of bailment. MeGee v. French, 49 S.C. 454, 27 S.E. 487; Story, Bailm. §§ 74, 388.
BAIR-MAN. In old Scotch law. A poor insolvent debtor, left bare and naked, who was obliged to swear in court that he was not worth more than five shillings and fivepence.
BAIRN’S PART. In Scotch law. Children’s part; a third part of the defunct’s free movables, debts deducted, if the wife survive, and a hall if there be no relict. See Legitim.
BAIRNS. In Scotch law. A known term, used to denote one’s whole issue. Ersk.Inst. 3, 8, 48. But it is sometimes used in a more limited sense. Bell.
BAIT. To attack with violence; to provoke and harass. 2 A. & E. Encyc. 63; L.R. 9 Q.B. 380.
BAITING ANLMALS. In English law. Procuring them to be worried by dogs. Punishable on sum-mary conviction, under 12 & 13 Vid. c. 92, 3.
BARBE. In its ordinary use respecting a bakery business, a generic’ term including in its scope different services connected with the bakery busi-ness, such as doing shop service in putting bread in boxes. Futopolus v. Midland Casualty Co., 174 Wis. 208, 182 N.W. 845, 847.
BAKERY. Any place used for the purpose of rnixing, compounding, or baking for sale or for purposes of a restaurant, bakery or hotel, any bread; biscuit, pretzels, crackers, buns, rolls, maca-roni, cake, pies, or any food products of which fiour or meal is a principal ingredient. Continen-tal Baking Co. v. Campbell, 176 Okl. 218, 55 P.2d 114, 116.
BAKING POWDER. A mixture in dry form of certain alkali and acid substances, combined with a filler; when moistened and heated, as in baking dough, a chemical reaction occurs, liberating car-bonic gas, which "raises" or leavens the bread. Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Emerson, C.C.A.Ark., 270 F. 429, 436.
BALLENA. A large fish, called by Blackstone a "whale." Of this the king had the head and the queen the tail as a perquisite whenever one was taken on the coast of England. 1 Bl.Comm. 222; Prynne, Ann.Reg. 127.

BALANCE. An equality between the sums total of the two sides of an account, or the excess on either side. Jones v. Marrs, 114 Tex. 62, 263 S.W. 570, 574.
The conclusion or result of the debit and credit sides of an account. It implies mutual dealings, and the existente of debt and credit, without which there could be no bal-ance. Thillman v. Shadrick, 69 Md. 528, 16 Atl. 138. The amount remaining due from one person to another on a settlement of the accounts involving their mutual dealings; the difference between the two sides (debit and credit) of an account.
Offen used In the sense of residue or remainder, and, in a general sense, may be defined as what remains or is left over. Commercial Discount Co. v. Holland, 107 Cal.App. 83, 289 P. 906, 908.
—Balance of conveniente. A term descriptive of a rule for determining in a doubtful case what decree should be made; for example, whether an injunction should be granted. Cohen v. City of Houston, Tex.Civ.App., 176 S.W. 809, 814. It per-tains to a test to determine what order will with the least inconvenience to either party assure the victorious one the fruits of his decree. Town of Williams v. Iowa Falls Electric Co., 185 Iowa, 493, 170 N.W. 815.
—Balance of power. In international law. A dis-tribution and an opposition of forces, forming one system, so that no state shall be in a position, either alone or united with others, to impose its will on any other state or interfere with its in-dependence. Ortolan.
—Balance sheet. A statement made by merchants and others to show the true state of a particular business.
When it is desired to ascertain the exact state of a merchant’s business, or other commercial enterprise, at a given time, all the ledger accounts are closed up to date and balances struck; and these balances, when exhibited together on a single page, and so grouped and arranged as to close Into each other and be summed up in one general result, constitute the "balance-sheet." Eyre v. Harmon, 92 Cal. 580, 28 P. 779.

—General balance. Sometimes used to signify the difference which is due to a party claiming a lien on goods in his hands for work or labor done, or money expended in relation to those and other goods of the debtor. 3 B. & P. 485; 3 Esp. 268; McWilliams v. Allan, 45 Mo. 573.
—Net balance. In commercial usage, the balance of the proceeds, as from a sale of stock, after deducting the expenses incident to the sale. Evans v. Waln, 71 Pa. 74.

BALCANIFER, or BALDAKINIFER. The stand-ard-bearer of the Knights Templar.

BALCONIES. Small galleries of wood or stone on the outside of houses. In London, the erection of them is regulated by the building acts.

BALDIO. In Spanish law. Waste land; land that is neither arable nor pasture. White New Recop. b. 2, tit. 1, c. 6, § 4, and note. Unappropriated pub-lic domain, not set apart for the support of mu-nicipalities. Sheldon v. Milmo, 90 Tex. 1, 36 S.W. 415.

BALE. A pack or certain quantity of goods or merchandise, wrapped or packed up in cloth and corded round very tightly, marked and numbered with figures corresponding to those in the bilis of lading for the purpose of identification. Wharton.
A bale of cotton is a certain quantity of that commodity compressed into a cubical form, so as to occupy less room than when in bags. 2 Car. & P. 525. Penrlce v. Cocks, 2 Miss. 229.

A standard package of merchantable lint cotton, sep-arated from the seed by the first process of a cotton gin, weighing approximately 500 pounds, and classifiable under one of the recognized market grades. Wichita Falls Com-press Co. v. W. L. Moody & Co., Tex.Civ.App., 154 S.W. 1032, 1045.

BALISE. Fr. In French marine law. A buoy.

BALIUS. In the civil law. A teacher; one who has the tare of youth; a tutor; a guardian. Du Cange; Spelman.

BALIVA. (Spelled also Balliva; equivalent to Balivatus, Balivia). L. Lat. In old English law. A bailiwick; the jurisdiction of a sheriff; the whole district within which the trust of the sheriff was to be executed. Cowell; 3 Bla.Com. 283.

BALIVO AMOVENDO. See Ballivo Amovendo.

BALL-HOOTING. In lumbering, a term designat-ing a process of sliding log down a mountain side. Bradford v. English, 190 N.C. 742, 130 S.E. 705.

BALLAST. That which is used for trimming a ship to bring it down to a draft of water proper and sale for sailing. Great Western Ins. Co. v. Thwing, 13 Wall. 674, 20 L.Ed. 607.
There is considerable analogy between banast and ~- nage. Dunnage is placed under the cargo to keep lt from being wetted by water getting hito the hold, or between the dlfferent parcele to keep them from bruisIng and injur-ing each other. Great Western Ins. Co. v. Thwing, 13 Wall. 674, 20 L.Ed. 607.

BALLASTAGE

BALLASTAGE. A toll paid for the privilege of taking up ballast from the bottom of a port or harbor. This arises from the property in the soil. 2 Chltty, Comm.Law 16.

BALLIUM. A fortress or bulwark; also ball. Cun-ningham.

BALLIVO AMOVIENDO. An ancient writ to re• move a bailiff from his office for want of sufficient land in the bailiwick. Reg.Orig. 78.

BALLOON. See Aeronaut; Aeronautics; Aircraft.

BALLOON MORTGAGE. A mortgage providing for specific payments at stated regular intervals, and final payment of more than twice any of the periodic payments. Bellman v. Yarmark Enter-prises, Inc., Fla.App., 180 So.2d 663, 665.

BALLOT. Derived from ballotta, a round bullet, a voice or lot, means act of voting, usually in secret, by balls or by written or printed tickets or slips of paper; the system of voting by balls or tickets, or by any device for casting or recording votes, as by voting machine. Norris v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 192 A. 531, 535, 172 Md. 667. Also piece of paper on which the voter gives expression to his choice. Sawyer Stores v. Mitch-ell, 103 Mont. 148, 62 P.2d 342, 348.
A slip of paper bearing the names of the offices to be filled at the particular election and the names of the can-didates for whom the elector desires to vote, or contarn-ing a particular question of administration or public policy on which the voter is asked to express his views. It may be printed, or written, or partly printed and partly writ-ten, and 15 deposited by the voter in a "ballot box" which is In the custody of the of icers holding the election. Denny v. Pratt, 104 Conn. 396, 133 A. 107, 108.
Used as a symbol of secrecy, whlle "viva voce" is used as a symbol of publicity. Day v. Walker, 124 Neb. 500, 247 N.W. 350, 351.
The whole amount of votes cast.

Joint Ballot

In parliamentary practice, an election or vote by, ballot participated in by the members of both houses of a legislative assembly sitting together as one body, the result being determined by a majority of the votes cast by the joint assembly thus constituted, instead of by concurrent majori-ties of the two houses. See State v. Shaw, 9 S.C. 144.

Oficial Ballot

Depending on its use in local statutes, this term has a varied meaning. It may refer to a ballot which has been furnished by the clerk; Cain v. Garvey, Tex.Civ.App., 187 S.W. 1111, 1116; or it may contemplate that a ballot must have been printed under the supervision of a designated member of the electoral board, sealed by the board, and by resolution declared to be one of the official ballots for the election to be held; Xippas v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 497, 126 S.E. 207, 209.

Mutilated Ballot

One from which the narre of the candidate is cut out. Murray v. Waite, 113 Me. 485, 94 A. 943, 945, Ann.Cas.1918A, 1128. One which is destitute or deprived of some essential or valuable part; greatly shortened. Stubbs v. Moursund, Tex.Civ. App., 222 S.W. 632, 634.

BALLOT—BOX. A case usually made of wood for receiving ballots.

BALLOTTEMENT. Fr. In medical jurispru-dence. A test for pregnancy by palpation with the finger inserted in the vagina to the mouth of the uterus. The tip of the finger being quickly jerked upward, the feetus, if one be present, can be felt rising upward and then settling back against the finger.

BALNEARII. In the Roman law. Those who, stole the clothes of bathers in the public baths. 4 BI.Comm. 239.

BAN.

In Old English and Civil Law

A proclamation; a public notice; the announce-ment of an intended marriage. Cowell. An ex-communication; a curse, publicly pronounced. A proclamation of silence made by a crier in court bef ore the meeting of champions in combat. Cowell. A statute, edict, or command; a fine, or penalty. An expanse; an extent of space or terri-tory; a space inclosed within certain limits; the limits or bounds themselves. Spelman. An open field; the outskirts of a village. A privileged space or territory around a town, monastery, or other place.

French Law

The right of announcing the time of mowing, reaping, and gathering the vintage, exercised by certain seignorial lords. Guyot, Repert. Univ.

Old European Law

A military standard; a thing unfurled, a banner.. Spelman. A summoning to a standard; a calling out of a military force; the force itself so sum-moned; a national army levied by proclamation.

BANAL. In Canadian and old French law. Per-taining to a ban or privileged place; having qual-ities or privileges derived from a ban. Thus, a banal mili is one to which the lord may require his tenant to carry his grain to be ground.

BANALITY. In Canadian law. The right by vir-tue of which a lord subjects his vassals to grind at his mili, bake at his oven, etc. Used also of the region within which this right applied. Guyot, Repert. Univ.; 1 Low.C. 31; 3 Low.C. 1.

BANC. Bench; the place where a court perma-nently or regularly sits; the seat of judgment; as, banc le roy, the king’s bench; banc le common pleas, the bench of common pleas.
The full bench, full court. A "sitting in banc" is a meeting of all the judges of a court, usually for the purpose of hearing arguments on demur-rers, points reserved, motions for new trial, etc., as distinguished from the sitting of a single judge at the assises or at nisi prius and from trials at bar. CowelL

BANCI NARRATORES. In old English law. Ad-vocates; countors; serjeants. Applied to advo-cates in the common pleas courts. 1 B1.Comm. 24; Cowell.

BANCO. Ital. A seat or bench of justice; also, in commerce, a word of Italian origin signifying a bank. Also a small tract of land on opposite side of river from country to which it belongs, and so existing by virtue of an avulsive change in the river. San Lorenzo Title & Improvement Co. v. City Mortgage Co., Tex.Civ.App., 48 S.W.2d 310, 314. See, also, Banc.

BANCUS. L. Lat. In old English law and prac-tice. A bench or seat in the king’s hall or palace. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 16, § 1.
A high seat, or seat of distinction; a seat of judgMent, or tribunal for the administration of justice.
Often used for the court itself; thus, the English court of common pleas was formerly called Bancus. Viner, Abr. Courts (M).
A sitting in banc; the sittings of a court with its full judicial authority, or in full form, as distinguished from sittings at nisi prius. Cowell; Spelman.
A stall, bench, table, or counter, on which goods were exposed for sale. Cowell.

BANCUS REGINiE. The queen’s bench. See Queen’s Bench.

BANCUS REGIS. The king’s bench; the supreme tribunal of the king after parliament. 3 BI.Comm. 41.
In Banco Regis. In or before the court of king’s bench.

BANCUS SUPERIOR. The upper bench. The king’s bench was so called during the Protectorate.

BAND. In old Scotch law. A proclamation calling out a military force.

BANDIT. An outlaw; a man banned, or put un-der a ban; a brigand or robber. Banditti, a band of robbers.

BANE. A malefactor. Bract. 1. 1, t. 8, c. 1.
Also a public denunciation of a malefactor; the same with what was called "hutesium," hue and cry. Spelman.

BANERET, or BANNERET. In English law. A knight made in the field, by the ceremony of cutting off the point of his standard, and making it, as it were, a banner. Knights so made are accounted so honorable that they are allowed display their arms in the royal army, as barons do, and may bear arms with supporters. They were sometimes called "vexillarii." Wharton. •
A degree of honor next alter a baron’s, when conferred by the king; otherwise, it ranks after a baronet. 1 Bla.Comm. 403.

BANI. Deodands (q. v.).

BANISHMENT. In criminal law. A punishment inflicted upon criminals, by compelling them to quit a city, place, or country for a specified period of time, or for life. Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 14, 1 L.Ed. 721; People v. Potter, 1 Park.Cr.R. (N.Y.) 54. Synonymous with exilement and imports a compulsory loss of one’s country. 3 P. Wms. 38.
It is inflicted principally upon political offenders, "trans-portation" being the word used to express a similar pun-ishment of ordinary criminals. Banishment, however, merely forbids the return of the person banis’ed before the expiration of the sentence, while transportation involves the idea of deprivation of liberty after the convict arrives at the place to which he has been carried. Rap. & L.

BANISTER AND RAILING. These words, in the New York Tenement House Law, § 35, mean a balustrade, consisting of balusters or supports, upon which is placed a railing commonly placed on the outer or open edge of a stairway. Cahill v.
Kleinberg, 233 N.Y. 255, 135 N.E. 323.

BANK. A bench or seat; the bench of justice; ‘the bench or tribunal occupied by the judges; the seat of judgment; a court. The full bench, or full court; the assembly of all the judges of. a court.
A "sitting in bank" is a meeting of all the judges of a court, usually for the purpose of hearing arguments on demurrers, points reserved, motions for new trial, and other law points, as distinguished from the sitting of a single judge at the assises or at nisi prius and from trials at bar to determine facts. 3 Bla.Comm. 28, n. But in this sense, banc is perhaps the more usual form of the word. "sitting in bank" is also described as an official meeting of four of the judges of a common-law court. Wharton, Lex.
Bank le Roy. The king’s bench. Finch, 198.
An acclivity; an elevation or mound of earth, especially that which borders the sides of a water course.
The land adjacent to a river. Graham v. Knight, Tex. Civ.App., 240 S.W. 981, 983.
That part of a stream which retains the water. Dawson County v. Phelps County, 94 Neb. 112, 142 N.W. 697, 699.
The elevation of land which confines the waters of a stream in their natural channel when they rise the highest and do not overflow the banks. Department of Health of New Jersey v. Chemical Co. of America, 90 N.J.Eq. 425, 107 A. 164, 166. A water-washed and relatively permanent elevation or acclivity at the outer line of a river bed which separates the bed from the adjacent upland, and serves to confine the waters within the bed and to preserve the course of the river. State of Oklahoma v. State of Texas, 43 S.Ct. 221, 260 U.S. 606, 67 L.Ed. 428; Horton v. Niagara, Lockport & Ontario Power Co., 247 N.Y.S. 741, 745, 231 App.Div. 386. The land lying between the edge of the water of a stream at its ordinary low stage and the line which the edge of the water reaches in its ordinary high stage. Wemple v. Eastham, 150 La. 247, 90 So. 637, 638. An elevation of land which confines the waters of a stream when they rise out of the bed. Neither the line of ordinary high-water mark, nor of ordinary low-water mark, nor of a middle stage of water can be assumed as the line dividing the bed from the banks. Banks are fast land, on which vegetation appropriate to such land in the particular locality grows wherever the bank is not too steep to permit such growth, and bed is soil of a different character, and having no vegetation, or only such as exists, when commonly submerged in water. State v. Nolegs, 139 P. 943, 946, 40 Okl. 479. On the borders of navigable streams, where there are levees established according to law, the levees form the "banks of the river." Ward v. Board of Levee Com’rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 152 La. 158, 92 So. 769, 772.

An institution, of great value in the commercial world, empowered to receive deposits of monoy, to make loans, and to issue its promissory notes, (designed to circulate as money, and commonly called "bank-notes" or "bank-bilis,") or to perform any one or more of these functions. State v. Wagner, 202 Iowa, 739, 210 N.W. 901, 902; People v. Bartow, 6 Cow.N.Y. 290; Dearborn v. North-western Savings Bank, 42 Ohio St. 617; In re Prudence Co., D.C.N.Y., 10 F.Supp. 33, 36.
An institution, usually incorporated with power to issue its promissory notes intended to circulate as money (known as bank notes); or to receive the money of others en gen-eral deposit, to form a jolnt fund that shall be used by the institution, for its own benefit, for one or more of the piar-poses of making temporary loans and discounts; of deal-ing In notes, foreign and domestic bilis of exchange, coin, bullion, credits, and the remission of money; or with both these powers, and with the privileges, in addition to these basic powers, of receiving special deposits and making col-lections for the holders of negotiable paper, if the institu-tion sees fit to engage in such business. State of Kánsas ex rel. Boynton v. Hayes, C.C.A.Kan., 62 F.2d 597, 600. The term "bank" is usually restricted in its application to an incorporated body; whlle a private individual mak-ing it his business to conduct banking operations is gen-erally denominated a "banker." Hobbs v. Bank, C.C.A. N.Y., 101 F. 75, 41 C.C.A. 205; Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., C.C.Or., 23 F. 469.
The house or place where the business of bank-ing is carried on.

Banks In the commercial sense are of three kinds, viz.: (1) of deposit; (2) of discount; (3) of circulation. Strict-ly speaking, the term "bank" implies a place for the de-posit of money, as that is the most obvious purpose of such an institution. Originally the business of banking consisted only in recelving deposits, such as bullion, plate, and the like, for safe-keeping until the depositor should see fit to draw it out for use, but the business, in the progress of events, was extended, and bankers assumed to discount bilis and notes, and to loan money upon mort-gage, pawn, or other security, and, at a still later period, to issue notes of their own, intended as a circulating cur-rency and a medium of exchange, instead of goid and sil-ver. Modern bankers frequently exercise any two or even all three of those functions, but it is still true that an in-stitution prohibited from exercising any more than one of those functions is a bank, in the strictest commercial sense. Oulton v. German Sav. & L. Soc., 17 Wall. 118, 21 L.Ed. 618; Millikan v. Security Tr,ust Co., 118 N.E. 568, 569, 187 Ind. 307; Rev.St.U.S. § 3407 .(12 USCA § 561).

—Bank-account. A sum of money placed with a bank or banker, on deposit, by a customer, and subject to be drawn out on the latter’s check. The statement or computation of the several sums deposited and those drawn out by the customer on checks, entered on the books of the bank and the depositor’s passbook. Gale v. Drake, 51 N.H. 84.

—Bank bill. Same as bank note. Eastman v. Com., 4 Gray (Mass.) 416. See Bank note, infra.

—Bank book. A book kept by a customer of a bank, showing the state of his account with it. See Pass-book.

—Bank cashier. A chief executive officer and general agent through whom financial operations of bank are conducted. Hamilton Nat. Bank of Chattanooga, Tenn., v. Lerman, 229 Ala. 363, 157 So. 75.

—Bank charges. This term in an action on a bfil of exchange is equivalent to expenses of noting and may be especially endorsed as a liquidated demand; [1893] 1 Q.B. 318.

—Bank check. See Check.

—Bank credit. A credit with a bank by which, on proper security given to the bank, a person re-ceives liberty to draw to a certain extent agreed upon. In Scotland also called a cash account. Cent. Dict.

—Bank depositor. One who delivers to or leaves with a bank a sum of money subject to his order. Wharton v. Poughkeepsie Sav. Bank, 31 N.Y.S.2d 311, 313, 262 App.Div. 598.

—Bank draft. A check, draft, or other order for payment of money, drawn by an authorized officer of a bank upon either his own bank or some other bank in which funds of his bank are deposited. Polotsky v. Artisans Sav. Bank, Del., 180 A. 791, 792, 7 W.W.Harr. 142.

—Bank note. A promissory note issued by a bank or banker authorized to do so, payable to bearer on demand, and intended to circulate as money. Townsend v. People, 4 Ill. 328; Low v. People, 2 Park.Cr.R. (N.Y.) 37. See, also, Banker’s note.
In the early history of banks, their notes were generally denominated bilis of credit. Briscoe v. Bank of the Com-monwealth of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257, 9 L.Ed. 709.

—Bank stock. Shares in the capital of a bank; shares in the property of a bank. In England the term is applied chiefly to the stock of the Bank of England.

—Bank teller. See Teller.

—Bank in failing condition. Under sdme statutes, an insolvent bank. Hanson v. State, 160 Ark. 329, 254 S.W. 691, 694.

—Bank of circulation. One which issues bank notes payable to bearer. Dunn v. State, 13 Ga. App. 314, 79 S.E. 170, 171. See Bank of issue, infra.

—Bank of deposit. A savings bank or any other bank which receives money on deposit. Dunn v. State, 13 Ga.App. 314, 79 S.E. 170, 171.

—Bank of discount. One which lends money on collateral or by means of discounts of commercial paper. Dunn v. State, 13 Ga.App. 314, 79 S.E. 170, 171.

—Bank of issue. One which, pursuant to author-ity conferred by its charter, issues its own notes intended to circulate as money. Millikan v. Se-curity Trust Co., 187 Ind. 307, 118 N.E. 568, 569.

—Joint-stock banks. In English law. Joint-stock companies for the purpose of banking. They are regulated, according to the date of their incorpo-ration, by charter, or by 7 Geo. IV, c. 46; 7 & 8 Vict. cc. 32, 113; 9 & 10 Vict. c. 45, (in Scotland and Ireland; ) 20 & 21 Vict. c. 49; and 27 & 28 Vict. c. 32; or by the "Joint-Stock Companies Act, 1862," (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89.) Wharton.

—Savings bank. An institution in the nature of a bank, formed or established for the purpose of receiving deposits of money, for the benefit of the persons depositing, to accumulate the produce of so much thereof as shall not be required by the depositors, their executors or administrators, at compound interest, and to return the whole or any part of such deposit, and the produce thereof, to the depositors, their executors or administra-tors, deducting out of such produce so much as shall be required for the necessary expenses at-tending the management of such institution, but deriving no benefit whatever from any such de-posit or the produce thereof. Grant, Banks, 546; Bulakowski v. Philadelphia Sav. Fund Soc., 270 Pa. 538, 113 A. 553, 554. They differ from the ordi-‘nary banks of discount and deposit in not being engaged in business for profit. Commercial Trust Co. of New Jersey v. Hudson County Board of Taxation, 86 N.J.Law, 424, 92 A. 263, 265.

BANK HOLIDAY OF 1933. Presidential Procla-mations No. 2039, issued March 6, 1933, and No. 2040, issued March 9, 1933, temporarily suspended banking transactions by member banks of the Federal Reserve System. Normal banking func-tions were resumed on March 13, subject to cer-tain restrictions. The first proclamation, it was held, had no authority in law until the passage on March 9, 1933, of a ratifying act (12 U.S.C.A. § 95b). Anthony v. Bank of Wiggins, 183 Miss. 885, 184 So. 626. The present law forbids member banks of the Federal Reserve System to transact banking business, except under regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury, during an emergency proclaimed by the President. 12 U.S.C.A. § 95.

BANK NIGHT. A device by which a theater pro-vides a registration book which any person over eighteen years of age, whether a patron of the theater or not, may sign. The book is placed in the lobby or outside the doors of the theater and no charge is made for registration nor need one who does so buy a ticket to the theater. A num-ber is given to each narre. On stated occasions, the numbers representing all the names regis-tered are placed in a container on the stage of the theater and one number is drawn. The narre of the person having that registration number is announced both inside and outside the theater and on coming forward within a certain time, he receives a sum of money which the theater pro-vides from its own funds. If the person .whose number is drawn is outside the theater, he is per-mitted to enter and claim the award without pay-ing the admission. If he does not come forward within the time set, the money is added to the sum to be awarded on the next bank night. Un-der the plan, various safeguards are thrown about the operation to insure fairness in the allotment of the money. State v. Dorau, 124 Conn. 160, 198 A. 573, 574. If not a lottery, a bank night is at least a gift enterprise. Barker v. State, 56 Ga. App. 705, 193 S.E. 605, 609. But it is generally considered to be a lottery. State ex rel. Hunter v. Fox Beatrice Theatre Corporation, 133 Neb. 392, 275 N.W. 605, 606; Furst v. A. & G. Amuse-ment Co., 128 N.J.L. 311, 25 A.2d 892, 893; Com-monwealth v. Lund, 142 Pa.Super. 208, 15 A.2d 839, 846.

BANKABLE PAPER. In mercantile law. Notes, checks, bank bilis, drafts, and other securities for money, received as cash by the banks. The term does not necessarily mean discountable paper, but paper of such high credit that, if the time of pay-ment was reasonable and the banks had loanable funds, they would ordinarily discount it. Edward P. Allis Co. v. Madison Electric Light, Heat & Power Co., 9 S.D. 459, 70 N.W. 650, 652.
National bank notes are received as bankable money without regard to the locallty of the bank issuing them. U.S.Rev.Stat. § 5133 (12 USCA § 21); Veazie Bank v. Fen-no, 8 Wall. 533, 19 L.Ed. 482.

BANKER. A private person, who keeps a bank; one who is engaged in the business of banking. People v. Doty, 80 N.Y. 228; Auten v. Bank, 19 S.Ct. 628, 174 U.S. 125, 43 L.Ed 920.

Individual Banker

Under some statutes, an individual banker, as distinguished from a "private banker" (q. v.), is a person who, having complied with the statutory requirements, has received authority from the state to engage in the business of banking, while a private banker is a person engaged in banking without having any special privileges or authority from the state. Perkins v. Smith, 116 N.Y. 441, 23 N.E. 21.

Private Banker

One who canjes on the business of banking without being incorporated. State of Missouri v. Angle, C.C.A.Mo., 236 F. 644, 650; Herzog v. Transatlantic Trust Co., Sup., 172 N.Y.S. 394, 395. One who carries on the business of banking by re-ceiving money on deposit with or without interest, by buying and selling bilis of exchange, promis-sory notes, gold or silver coin, bullion, uncurrent money, bonds or stock, or other securities, and by loaning money without being incorporated. State ex rel. Barker v. Sage, 267 Mo. 493, 184 S.W. 984, 988. See Individual banker, supra.

BANKER’S ACCEPTANCE. A draft or bill of exchange of which the acceptor is a bank or banker engaged generally in the business of granting bankers’ acceptance credits. Atterbury v. Bank of Washington Heights of City of New York, 241 N.Y. 231, 149 N.E. 841, 843.

BANKER’S LIEN. A lien which a banker has by virtue of which he can appropriate any money or property in his possession belonging to a cus-tomer to the extinguishment of any matured debt of such customer to the bank, provided such prop-erty or money has not been charged, with the knowledge of the bank, with the subservience of a special burden or purpose, or does not constitute a trust fund of which the banker has notice. American Surety Co. of New York v. Bank of Italy, 63 Cal.App. 149, 218 P. 466, 468.

BANKER’S NOTE. A commercial instrument re-sembling a bank note in every particular except that it is given by a private banker or uníncorpo-rated banking institution. 6 Mod. 29; 3 Chit. Comm.Law 590.

BANKEROUT. O. Eng. Bankrupt; insolvent; indebted beyond the means of payment.

BANKING. The business of receiving money on deposit, louning money, discounting notes, issuing notes for circulation, collecting money on notes deposited, negotiating bilis, etc. Bank v. Turner, 154 Ind. 456, 57 N.E. 110,
The business of banking, as defined by law and custorn, consists in the issue of notes payable on demand intended to circulate as money when the banks are banks of issue; In receiving deposits payable on demand; in discounting commercial paper; making loans of money on collateral security; buying and selling bilis of exchange; negotiat-ing loans, and dealing, in negotiable securities issued by the government, state and national, and municipal and oth-er corporations. Mercantile Bank v. New York, 121 U.S. 138, 156, 7 S.Ct. 826, 30 L.Ed, 895; In re Prudence Co., D. C.N.Y., 10 F.Supp. 33, 36.
Having a place of business where deposits are received and paid out on checks and where money is loaned on security is the substance of the "business of banking." Marvin v. Kentucky Title Trust Co., 218 Ky. 135, 291 S.W. 17, 18, 50 A.L.R. 1337; State of Kansas ex rel. Boynton v. Hayes, C.C.A.Kan., 62 F.2d 597, 600.

BANKING A DEAL. Means making to one who wishes to consummate a deal a loan of money on collateral for a consideration which may consist of interest, a fee, or a part of the securities or prop-erty involved in the deal. Cray, McFawn & Co. v. Hegarty, Conroy & Co., D.C.N.Y., 27 F.Supp. 93, 99.

BANKING GAME. Gambling game at which mon-ey is bet or hazarded. State v. Singley, 195 La. 519, 197 So. 218, 219.

BANKING IIOURS. A term which, in addition to the regular hours, includes time to allow present-ment, after closing, to the bank returning a check, if such presentment is necessary in fact. Colum-bia-Knickerbocker Trust Co. v. Miller, 156 App. Div. 810, 142 N.Y.S. 440, 445.

BANKRUPT. Originally and strictly, a trader who secretes himself or does certain óther acts tending to defraud his creditors. 2 BI.Comm. 471; Shor v. McGregor, C.C.A.Tex., 108 F.2d 421, 423. In a looser sense, an insolvent person; a broken-up or ruined trader. Everett v. Stone, 3 Story, 453, Fed.Cas.No.4,577.
In the English law there were two characteristics which distinguished bankrupts from insolvents: the former must have been a tractor and the objert of the proceedings against, not by, him. As used in American law, the dis-tinction between a bankrupt and an insolvent is not gen-erally regarded. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 4 L.Ed. 529; 2 Kent, 390; McCormick v. Pickering, 4 N.Y. 283. On the continent of Europe, howe\ er, the distinction still exists. Holtz.Enc. voc. sig. Bankerott.
A person who has committed an act of bank-ruptcy; one who has done some act or suffered some act to be done in consequence of which, under the laws of his country, he is liable to be proceeded against by his creditors for the seizure and distribution among them of his entire prop-erty. Ashby v. Steere, 2 Woodb. & M. 347, 2 Fed. Cas. 15; In re Scott, 21 Fed.Cas. 803; U. S. v. Pusey, 27 Fed.Cas. 632. For "Examination of bankrupt", see Examination.
The term includes one against whom involurddry petition has been oled. United States v. Agresti, C.C.A.N.Y., 130 F.2d 152, 153, 154.

A person who, by the formal decree of a court, has been declared subject to be proceeded against under the bankruptcy laws, or entitled, on his vol-untary application, to take the benefit of such laws. See Bankruptcy Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 1, 30 Stat. 544 (11 USCA § 1).

BANKRUPT LAW, A law for benefit and relief of creditors and their debtors in cases in which the latter are unable or unwilling to pay their debts. Campbell v. Alleghany Corporation, C.C. A.Md., 75 F.2d 947, 951.
A bankrupt law is distinguished from the ordinary law between debtor and creditor, as involving these three gen-eral principies: (1) A surnmary and immediate seizure of all the debtor’s property; (2) a distribution of it among the creditors in general, instead of merely applying a por-tion of it to the payment of the individual complainant; and (3) the discharge of the debtor from future liability for the debts then existing.
The leading distinction between a bankrupt law and an insolvent law, in the proper technical sense, consists in the character of the persons upon whom it is designed to op-erate,—the former contemplating as its objects bankrupts only, that is, traders of a certain description; the latter, insolvents in general, or persons unable to pay their debts. This has led to a marked separation between the two sys-tems, in principie and in practice, which in England has always been carefully maintained, although in the United States it has of late been disregarded. A bankrupt law, moreover, in its proper sense, is a remedy intended pri-marily for the benefit of creditors; it is set in motion at their instance, and operates upan the debtor against his will, (in, invitum,) although in its result it effectually dis-charges him from his debts. An insolvent law, on the other hand, is chiefiy intended for the benefit of the debt-or, and is set in motion at his instance, though possibly less effective as a discharge in its final result. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 194, 4 L.Ed. 529; Vanuxen v. Haziehursts, 4 N.J.Law, 192, 7 Am.Dec. 582; Adams v. Storey, 1 Paine, 79, 1 Fed.Cas. 142; Kunzler v. Kohaus, 5 Hill (N.Y.) 317.
The only substantial difference between a strictly bank-rupt law and an insolvent law líes in the circumstance that the former affords relief upan the application of the credi-tor, and the latter upon the application of the debtor. Martin v. Berry, 37 Cal. 222.

BANKRUPTCY. The state or condition of one who is a bankrupt; amenability to the bankrupt laws; the condition of one who has committed an act of bankruptcy, and is liable to be proceeded against by his creditors therefor, or of one whose circumstances are such that he is entitled, on his voluntary application, to take the benefit of the bankrupt laws.
The term is used in a looser sense as synony-mous with "insolveney,"—inability to pay one’s debts; the stopping and breaking up of business because the trader is broken down, insolvent, ruined. Phipps v. Ilarding, C.C.A.Wis., 70 Fed. 468, 17 C.C.A. 203, 30 L.R.A. 513.
It constitutes a branch of equity jurisprudence. In re Flour Milis of America, D.C.Mo., 27 F.Supp. 559, 560. Its purpose is to secure finally to creditors distribution of value of at least part of debtor’s assets and to bankrupt discharge from his debts, to end that creditors may be paid as much as may be and that bankrupt may have new start in life. In re Jones, D.C.Mo., 10 F.Supp. 165, 167.
Insolvency means a simple inability to pay as debts should become payable, whereby the debtor’s business would be broken up; bankruptcy means the particular le-gal status, to be ascertained and declared by a judicial de-cree. In re Black, 2 Ben. 196, Fed.Cas.No.1,457.
The proceedings taken under the bankrupt law, against a person (or firm or company) to have him adjudged a bankrupt, and to have his estate administered for the benefit of the creditors, and divided among them. That branch of jurispru-dence, or system of law and practice, which is con-cerned with the definition and ascertainment of acts of bankruptcy and the administration of bankrupts’ estates for the benefit of their credi-tors and the absolution and restitution of bank-rupts.

Act of Bankruptcy. See Act.

Adjudication of Bankruptcy

The judgment or decree of a court having juris-diction, that a person against whom a petition in bankruptcy has been filed, or, who has filed his voluntary petition, be ordered and adjudged to be a bankrupt.

Bankruptcy Courts. Courts for the administra-tion of the bankrupt laws.

Bankruptcy Proceedings

This term includes all proceedings in a federal court having jurisdiction in bankruptcy, founded on a petition in bankruptcy and either directly or collaterally involved in the adjudication and discharge of the bankrupt and the collection and administration of his estate. Kidder v. Horrobin, 72 N.Y. 167. See, also, Proceedings in bankruptcy. Steps in administration of estate in bark-uptcy court within summary jurisdiction of bankruptcy court. (Bankr.Act, § 24a, b, 11 U.S.C.A. § 47(a) (b). Childs v. Ultramares Corporation, C.C.A. N.Y., 40 F.2d 474, 477.
Controversies Arising in Bankruptcy Proceed-ings. See Proceedings in bankruptcy.
Extension. See Extension.

Involuntary Bankruptcy. See Voluntary bank-ruptcy, infra.

Voluntary Bankruptcy

Bankruptcy (in the sense of proceedings taken under the bankruptcy law) is either voluntary or involuntary; the forme’ where the proceeding is initiated by the debtor’s own petition to be ad-judged a bankrupt and have the benefit of the law. In re Murray, D.C.Iowa, 96 F. 600; Metsker v. Bonebrake, 2 Sup.Ct. 351, 108 U.S. 66, 27 L.Ed. 654, the latter where he is forced luto bankruptcy on the petition of a sufficient number of his credi-tors.
See Bankrupt; Bankrupt Law.

Bankruptcy Rule

Allows claim only for amount of debt, less value of security. In re Baker, 333 Pa. 273, 3 A.2d 785, 786.

BANLEUCA. (Same as the French banlieue). An old law term, signifying a space or tract of country around a city, town, or monastery, dis-tinguished and protected by peculiar privileges. Spelman.

BANLIEU, or BANLIEUE. In French and Cana-dian law. The same as banleuca (q. v.).

BANNER. A small flag bearing a device or sym-bol and intended to be carried or waved. L.R. 2 P.C. 387. The term includes a canvas, parti-col-ored or bearing party words and stretched across a street. 4 O’M. & H. 179.

BANNERET. See Baneret.

BANNI, or BANNITUS. In old law, one under a ban, (q. v.;) an outlaw or banished man. Britt. cc. 12, 13; Calvin.

BANNI NUPTIARUM. L. Lat. In old English law. The bans of matrimony.

BANNIMUS. Lat. We ban or expel. The form of expulsion of a member from the University of Oxford, by al-fixing the sentence in some public places, as a promulgation of it. Cowell.

BANNIRE AD PLACITA, AD MOLENDINUM. To summon tenants to serve at the lord’s courts, to bring corn to be ground at his mili.

BANNITIO. Banishment; expulsion by a ban or public prociamation. Adams Gloss.

BANNITUS. See Banni.

BANNS OF MATRIMONY. Public notice or proc-lamation of a matrimonial contract, and the in-tended celebration of the marriage of the parties in pursuance of such contract. Cowell; 1 Bla. Comm. 439; Pothier, Du Mariage p. 2, c. 2.
Such announcement is required by the English law to be made in a church or chape!, during service, on three consecutive Sundays before the marriag’e is celebrated. The ohject is to afford an opportunity for any person to interpose an objection if he knows of any impedlment or other just cause why the marriage should not take place. The publication of the banns may be dispensed with by procuring a special license to marry.

BANNUM. A ban (q. v.).

BANNUS. In old’ English law. A proclamatjon. Bannus regir; the king’s prociamation, made by the voice of a herald, forbidding all present at the t-ial by combat to interfere either by motion or word, whatever they might see or hear. Bract. fol. 142.

BANQUE. Fr. A bench; the table or counter of a trader, merchant, or banker. ~que rolde; a broken bench or counter; bankrupt.

BANS OF MATRIMONY. See Banns of Matri-mony.

BANYAN. In East Indian law. A Hindoo mer-chant or shop-keeper. The word is used in Bengal to denote the nativo who manages the money con-cerns of a European, and sometimes serves him as an interpreter.

BAR. A partition or railing running across a court-room, intended to separate the general public from the space occupied by the judges, counsel, jury, and others concerned in the trial of a cause. In the English courts it is the parti-tion behind which all outer-barristers and every member of the public must stand. Solicitors, being officers of the court, are admitted within it; as are also queen’s counsel, barristers with pat-ents of precedente, and serjeants, in virtue of their ranks. Parties who appear in person also are placed within the bar on the floor of the court.
A particular part of the court-room; for exam-ple, the place where prisoners stand at their trial, hence the expression "prisoner at the bar."
The court, in its strictest sense, sitting in full term. The presence, actual or constructive, of the court. Thus, a trial at bar is one had before the full court, distinguished from a trial had before a single judge at nisi prius. So the "case at bar" is the case now before the eourt and under its con-sideration; the case being tried or argued.
In another sense, the whole body of attorneys and counsellors, or the members of the legal pro-fession, collectively, who are figuratively called the "bar," from the place which they usually oc-cupy in court. They are thus distinguished from the "bench," which term denotes the whole body of judges.
In the practice of legislative bodies, the outer boundary of the house; therefore, all persons, not being members, who wish to address the house, or are summoned to it, appear at the bar for that purpose.
In the law of contracts, an impediment, obsta-ele, or preventive barrier.-
Thus, relationship within the prohlbited degrees is a bar tú marriage. In this sense also we speak of the "bar of the statute of limitations."
That which defeats, annuls, cuts off, or puts an end to.
Thus, a provision "in bar of dower" is one which has the effect of defeating or cutting off the dower-rights which the wife would otherwise become entitled to in the particular land.
In pleading, a special plea, constituting a suffi-cient answer to an action at law; so called be-cause it barred, i. e., prevented, the plaintiff from further prosecuting it with effect, and, if estab-lished by proof, defeated and destroyed the ac-tion altogether. Now called á special "plea in bar." It may be further described as a plea or peremptory exception of a defendant to destroy the plaintiff’s action. City of San Antonio y, John-son, Tex.Civ.App., 186 S.W. 866. See Plea in bar.
A barrier or counter over which liquors and food are passed to customers, hence the portion of the room behind the counter where the liquors for sale are kept. Hinton v. State, 137 Tex.Cr.R. 352, 129 S.W.2d 670, 673.

BAR ASSOCIATION. An association of members of the bar. Such associations have been organized in most states. The first was in Mississippi in 1825, but it is not known to have had a continued existence. An association of Grafton and Coos counties in New Hampshire had an existence before 1800, and probably a more or less continu-ous life since then, having finally merged into a state association. Similar associations exist in many of the counties in various states.
—Bar integration. See Integrated Bar.

BAR FEE. In English law. A fee taken by the sheriff, time out of mind, for every prisoner who is acquitted. Bac.Abr. "Extortion." Abolished by St. 14 Geo. III. c. 26; 55 Geo. III. c. 50; 8 & 9 Vict. c. 114.

BAR ROOM. A place where intoxicating liquors are sold to be drunk on the same premises. City of Spokane v. Baughman, 103 P. 14, 17, 54 Wash. 315.
A room contain’ ing a bar or counter at which liquors are sold, or a room with a bar where liquors and refreshments are served. Mustard v. Elwood, C.C.A.Alaska, 223 F. 225, 226.
The words "bar" and "bar room" have a more restric-Live meaning than "saloon," and mean a place from which intoxicating liquors are to be sold. Grell Bros. Co. v. Mabson, 179 Ala. 444, 60 So. 876, 877, 43 L.R.A.,N.S., 664.

BAR SINISTER. A term popularly though er-roneously used for baton, a mark of illegitimacy. Webster.

BARAGARIA. Span. A concubine, whom a man keeps alone in his house, unconnected with any other woman. Las Partidas, pt. 4, tit. 14.

BARAT. See Berat.

BARATRIAM COMMITTIT QUI PROPTER PE-CUNIAM JUSTITIAIVI BARACTAT. He is guilty of barratry who for money sells justice. Bell. (This maxim, however, is one pertaining more to the meaning of "barratry" as used in Scotch law than to its common-law meaning. See Barratry.)

BARBANUS. In old Lombardic law. An uncle, (patruus.)

BARBAROUS. As used in a divorce statute, it implies a merciless and savage disposition, taking pleasure in suffering, without pity, and with an evil and malicious. will. Hansell v. Hansell, 15 Pa.Co.Ct.R., 514, 515.

BARBEE. One who makes a business of shaving and trimming beards and cutting and dressing hair. Dellacorte v. Gentile, 98 N.J.Eq. 194, 129 A. 739, 740.
The term has been held to include a woman, who, being employed in a beauty parlor serving women customers ex-clusively, cut a woman’s hair in the style of bobbed hair. State v. Leftwich, 142 Wash. 329, 253 P. 448, 449, 59 A.L.R. 539. But it has also been thought that the proprietor of a "hairdressing and beauty parlor," the important features of whose business included cutting hair, massaging, clip-ping hair with barber clippers, singeing the hair, giving tonics, shampooing, and manicuring, but not shaving the face, was not a "barber" within a statute subjecting bar-bers to examination and regulation. Keith v. State Barber Board, 112 Kan. 834, 212 P. 871, 872, 31 A.L.R. 432.
In England in former times, barbers also practiced sur-gery and dentistry, but by 32 Hen. VIII, c. 42, barbers, al-though they were thereby incorporated with the surgeons of London, were not to practice surgery, except the draw-Ing of teeth.

BARBICANAGE. In old European law. Money paid to support a barbican or watchtower.

BARBITTS. L. Fr. (Modern Fr. brebis.) Sheep.

BARE. Naked; without a covering; unaccompa-nied.

BARE OR MERE LICENSEE. One whose pres-ence on premises is merely tolerated; while a "licensee" or "invitee" is one who is on the prem-íses by invitation, express or implíed. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. McCleary, 175 Okl. 347, 53 P.2d 555, 557.

BARE PATENT LICENSE. A grant of authority to make, use or vend patented product throughout the United States or in a given part thereof, with no right of exciusion. 35 U.S.C.A. § 47. Innis, Speiden & Co. v. Food Machinery Corporation, D. C.Del., 2 F.R.D. 261, 263.

BARE TRUSTEE. One whose trust is to convey, and the time has arrived for a conveyance by him; or a trustee to whose office no duties were origi-nally attached, or who, although such duties were originally attached to his office, would, on the req-uisition of his cestuis que trust, be compellable in equity to convey the estate to them or by their direction. Christie v. Ovington, 1 Ch.Div. 279, 281.

BAREBONES PARLIAMENT. A parliament sum- moned by Cromwell in 1653.

BARET. L. Fr. A wrangling suit. Britt. c. 92; Co.I.itt. 368b.

BARGAIN. A mutual undertaking, contract, or agreement.
A contract or agreement between two parties, the one to sell goods or lands, and the other to buy them. Bank v. Archer, 16 Miss. 192.
As a verb, to sell for cash, or on terms, rather than to trade or exchange. In re Wellings’ Es-tate, 197 Cal. 189, 240 P. 21, 24.
"If the word ‘agreement’ imports a mutual act of two parties, surely the word ‘bargain’ is not less significatlye of the consent of two. In a popular sense, the former word is frequently used as declaring the engagement of one only. A man may agree to pay money or to perform some other act, and the word is then used synonymously with ‘promise’ or ‘engage.’ But the word ‘bargain’ is sel-dom used, unless to express a mutual contract or under-taking." Packard v. Richardson, 17 Mass. 131, 9 Am.Dec. 123.

—Bargain money. These words in a contract for the sale of land have much the same significance as earnest money. Morgan v. Forbes, 236 Mass. 480, 128 N.E. 792, 793.

—Catching bargain. A bargain by which money is loaned, at an extortionate or extravagant rato, to an heir or any one who has an estate in reverzion or expectancy, to be repaid on the vesting of his interest; or a similar unconscionable bargain with such person for the parchase oufright of his ex-pectancy. See Edler v. Frazier, 174 Iowa, 46, 156 N.W. 182, 187. That kind of fraud often perpe-trated upon young, inexperienced, or ignorant people. Provident Life & Trust Co. v. Fletcher, C.C.A.N.Y., 258 F. 583, 586.
See Unconscionable Bargain

BARGAIN AND SALE. In conveyancing. The transferring of the property of a thing from one to another, upon valuable consideration, by way of sale. Shep.Touch. (by Preston,) 221.
A contract or bargain by the owner of land, in consideration of money or its equivalent paid, to sell land to another person, called the "bar-gainee," whereupon a use arises in favor of the latter, to whom the seisin is transferred by force of the statute of uses. Laing v. McClung, 103 W. Va. 341, 137 S.E. 744, 745.
The proper and technical words to denote a bargain and sale are "bargain and sell ;" but any other words that are sufficient to raise a use uppn a valuable consideration are sufficient. 2 Wood.Conv. 15; Jackson ex dem. Hudson v. Alexander, 3 Johns. (N.Y.) 484, 3 Am.Dec. 517.
The expression "bargain and sale" Is also applied to transfers of personalty, in cases where there is first an ex-ecutory agreement for the sale, (the bargain,) and then an actual and completed sale.

BARGAIN OR CONTRACT IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE. Any bargain or contract which purports to limit in any way right of either party to work or to do business. Stoia v. Miskinis, 298 Mich. 105, 298 N.W. 469, 474.

BARGAINEE. The grantee of an estate in a deed of bargain and sale. The party to a bar-gain to whom the subject-matter of the bargain or thing bargained for is to go.

BARGAINOR. The person who makes a bargain. The party to a bargain who is to receive the con-sideration and perform the contract by delivery of the subject-matter.

BARGE. Name originally applied to a small sailing vessel but afterwards carne into general use for a fiat bottomed boat used for carrying goods on inland waterways. Barges are usually towed or fitted with some kind of engine. The Sakito Maru, D.C.Cal., 41 F.Supp. 769, 778.

BARK. It is sometimes figuratively used to de-note the mere words or letter of an instrument, or outer covering of the ideas sought to be ex-pressed, as distinguished from its inner substance or essential meaning. "If the bark makes for them, the pith makes for us." Bacon.

BARLEYCORN. In linear measure. The third of an inch.

BARMOTE COURTS. Courts held in certain min-ing districts belonging to the Duchy of Lancaster, for regulation of the mines, and for deciding ques-tions of title and other matters relating thereto. 3 Steph.Comm. 347, note b.

BARN. A covered building for securing produc-tions of the earth. Washington v. Arizona, 46 Ariz. 446, 52 P.2d 476, 478.
It may be both a cornhouse and a stable; State v. Smith, 28 Iowa 565, 568; and has been used interchangeably with stable; Saylor v. Commonwealth, 22 Ky.L.Rep. 472, 57 S. W. 614, 615.

BARNARD’S INN. An inn of chancery. See Inns of Chancery.

BARO. In old law, a man, whether slave or free. In later usage, a freeman or freedman; a strong man; a good soldier; a hired soldier; a vassal; a baron; a feudal tenant or client. A man of dig-nity and rank; a knight. A magnate in the church. A judge in the exchequer (baro scac-carii). The first-born child. A husband.
The word is said by Spelman to have been used more frequently in the last sense; Spelman, Gloss.

BARON. A lord or nobleman; the most general title of nobility in England. 1 B1.Comm. 398, 399. A particular degree or title of nobility, next to a viscount. The lowest title in Great Britain. A judge of the court of exchequer. 3 B1.Comm. 44; Cowell. A freeman. Co.Litt. 58a. Also a vassal holding directly from the king. A husband; oc-curring in this sense in the phrase "baron et feme," husband and wife.
The term has essentially the same meanings as Baro (q. v.).

BARON COURT. See Court-Baron,

BARON ET FEME. Man and woman; husband and wife. Spelman, Gloss.; 1 Bla.Comm. 442.
A wife being under the protection and influence of her baron, lord, or husband, is styled a "feme-covert," ( foe-mina viro cooperta,) and her state of marriage is called her "coverture." Cummings v. Everett, 82 Me. 260, 19 A. 456.

BARONS OF THE CINQUE PORTS. Members .Df parliament from these ports, viz.: Sandwich, Romney, Hastings, Hythe, and Dover. Winchel-sea and Rye have been added. See Cinque Ports.

BARONS OF THE EXCHEQU’ER. The six judges of the court of exchequer in England, of whom one is styled the "chief baron;" answering to the jus-tices and chief justice of other courts.

BARONAGE. In English law. The collective body of the barons, or of the nobility at large. Spelman.

BARONES SCACCARII. See Barons of the Ex-chequer.

BARONET. An English name or hereditary title of dignity or rank (but not a title of nobility, be-ing next below that of baron), established in 1611 by James I. It is created by letters patent, and descends to the male heir. Spelman.

BARONY. The dignity of a baron; a species of tenure; the territory or lands held by a baron. Spelman; 2 Holdsw.Hist.Eng.L. 159.
In Scotland, a large freehold estate, even though the proprietor is not a baron. See Barony of Land, infra.

BARONY OF LAND. In England, a quantity of land amounting to 15 acres. In Ireland, a subdi-vision of a county.

BARRA, or BARRE. In old practice. A plea in bar. The bar of the court. A barrister.

BARRATOR. One who commits barratry. See Barretor.

BARRATROUS. Fraudulent; having the charac-ter of barratry.

BARRATRY. In criminal law. Also spelled "Bar-retry." The offense of frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels and suits, either at law or otherwise. 4 Bla.Com. 134; State v. Batson, 220 N.C. 411, 17 S.E.2d 511, 512, 513.
Cornmon barratry is the practice of exciting groundless judicial proceedings. Pen.Code Cal. § 158: Lucas v. Pico, 55 Cal. 128; Com. v. McCulloch, 15 Mass. 229; Ex parte McCloskey, 82 Tex.Cr.R. 531, 199 S.W. 1101, 1102.
In maritime law. An act committed by the mas-ter or mariners of a vessel, for some unlawful or fraudulent purpose, contrary to their duty to the owners, whereby the latter sustain injury. It may include negligence, if so gross as to evidente fraud. Hansen v. Barnard, C.C.A.N.Y., 270 F. 163, 166.
Some fraudulent act of the master or mariners, tending to their own benefit, to the prejudice of the owner of the vessel, without his privity or consent. Kendrick v. Dela-field, 2 Caines N.Y. 67.
A generic term, which includes many acts of various kinds and degrees. It comprehends any unlawful, fraudu-lent, or dishonest act of the master or mariners, and every violation of duty by them arising from gross and culpable negligence contrary to their duty to the owner of the ves-sel, and which might work loss or injury to him in the course of the voyage insured. A mutiny of the crew, and forcible dispossession by them of the master and other officers from the ship, is a forra of barratry. Greene v. Pacific Mut. Ins. Co., 9 Allen, Mass., 217.
In Scotch law. The crime committed by a judge who receives a bribe for his judgment. Skene; Brande.
See Champerty.

BARRED. Obstructed by a bar; subject to hin-drance or obstruction by a bar or barrier which, if interposed, will prevent legal redress or recov-ery; as, when it is said that a claim or cause of action is "barred by the statute of limitations." Wilson v. Knox County, 132 Mo. 387, 34 S.W. 45, 477.

BARREL. A measure of capacity, equal (in Eng-land) to 36 imperial gallons. The standard United States measure, except as to barreis of petroleum, equals 31% gallons. Pope v. Joschke, Tex.Civ. App., 228 S.W. 986, 987.
In agricultural and mercantile parlance, as al-so in the inspection laws, the term means, prima facie, not merely a certain quantity, but, further, a certain state of the article; namely, that it is in a cask. State v. Moore, 33 N.C. 72.

BARREN MONEY. In the civil law. A debt
which bears no interest. e.

BARRENNESS. Sterility; the incapacity to bear children.

BARRETOR. In criminal law. A common mover, exciter, or maintainer of suits and quarrels either in courts or elsewhere in the country; a disturben of the peace who spreads false rumors and cal-umnies, whereby discord and disquiet may grow among neighbors. Co.Litt. 368.

Comnaon Barretor

One who frequently excites and stirs up ground-less suits and quarrels, either at law or otherwise. State v. Batson, 220 N.C. 411, 17 S.E.2d 511, 512, 513.

BARRETRY. In criminal law. The act or offense of a barretor, (q. v.;) usually called "common barretry." 4 Steph.Comm. 262. See Barratry.

BARRICADE. An obstruction or block to prevent passage. Schawe v. Leyendecker, Tex.Civ.App., 269 S.W. 864, 866; Crowley v. City of Raymond, 198 Wash. 432, 88 P.2d 858, 859.

BARRIER. A fence. Page Steel & Wire Co. v. Smith Bros. Hardware Co., C.C.A.Ohio, 64 F.2d 512.
In mining law and the usage of miners, a wall of coal left between two mines.

BARRISTER. In English law. An advocate; a counsellor learned in the law who has been ad-mitted to plead at the bar, and who is engaged in conducting the trial or argument of causes.
To be distinguished from the attorney, who draws the pleadings, prepares the testimony, and conducts matters out of court. In re Rickert, 66 N.H. 207, 29 Atl. 559, 24 L. R.A. 740.
See King’s Counsel.

Inner Barrister

A serjeant or king’s counsel who pleads within the bar.
Junior Barrister

A barrister under the rank of queen’s counsel. Also the junior of two counsel employed on the same side in a case. Mozley & Whitley.

Outer or Utter Barrister

One who pleads "outer" or without the bar.
Such barristers were so called because they sat "utter-most on the forms of the benchers which they call the bar." 29 L.Q.R. 25. They are distinguished from bench-ers, or those who have been readers, and are allowed to picad within the bar, as are the king’s counsel.
Utter Barrister
The same as "Outer barrister," supra.

Vacation Barrister

A counsellor newly called to the bar, who is to attend for several long vacations the exercises of the house.

BART. The usual abbreviation for Baronet (q. v.).

BARTER. A contract by which parties exchange goods or commodities for other goods. Finker v. Boyer, 331 Mo. 1242, 56 S.W.2d 372.
It dlffers from sale, in thls: that in the latter transac-tion goods or property are always exchanged for rnoney. Guerreiro v. Peile, 3 Barn. & Ald. 617; Cooper v. State, 37 Ark. 418; Meyer v. Rousseau, 47 Ark. 460, 2 S.W. 112. In a sale there is a fixed price; in a barter there is not. Speigle v. Meredith, 4 Biss. 120, Fed.Cas.No.13,227.

This term is not applied to contracts concerning land, but to such only as relate to goods and chattels. Speigle v. Meredith, 4 Biss. 123, Fed.Cas.No.13,227.
It sornetimes signifies a corrupt transaetion. In re Troy, 43 R.I. 279, 111 A. 723, 724.

BARTON. In old English law. The demesne land of a manor; a farm distinct from the mansion.
Sometimos it is used for the mamar house itself ; and in some places for out houses and fold yards. In the statute 2 & 3 Edw. 6, c. 12, Barton lands and demesne lands are used as synonymous. Cowell.

BAS. Fr. Low; inferior; subordinate.

BAS CHEVALIERS. In old English law. Low, or inferior knights, by tenure of a base military fee, as distinguished from barons and bannerets, who were the chief or superior knights. Cowell; Kennett, Paroch.Ant.; Blount.

BAS VILLE. In French law. The suburbs of a town.

BASAL FRACTURE. A fracture of the skull be-ginning at the base of the skull to the rear and left extending to the top of the skull. Marland Refining Co. v. McClung, 102 Okl. 56, 226 P. 312, 313.

BASE, adj. Low; inferior; servile; of subordi-nate degree; impure, adulterated, or alloyed.
—Base animal. See Animal.
—Base bullion. Base silver bullion is silver in bars mixed to a greater or less extent with alloys or base materials. Hope Min. Co. v. Kennon, 3 Mont. 44.
—Base coin. Debased, adulterated, or alloyed coin. Gabe v. State, 6 Ark. 540; Cohens v. Vir-ginia, 6 Wheat. 333, 5 L.Ed. 257.
—Base court. In English law. An inferior court, that is, not of record, as the court baron. Cun-ningham; Kitch. 95, 96; Cowell.
—Base estate. The estate which "base tenants" (q. v.) have in their land. Cowell.
—Base fee. In English law. An estate or fee which has a qualification subjoined thereto, and which must be determined whenever the qualifi-cation annexed to it is at an end. 2 BI.Comm. 109. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Railroad Co., 94 III. 93; Seo-bey v. Beckman, 111 Ind.App. 574, 41 N.E.2d 847, 850.
It is a fee for the reason that it may last for-ever if the contingency does not happen, but de-based because its duration depends upon collateral circumstances which qualify it. McIntyre v. Die-trich, 128 N.E. 321, 322, 294 Ill. 126; sometimes called a conditional fee; Citizens’ Electric Co. v. Susquehanna Boom Co., 113 A. 559, 561, 270 Pa. 517; a determinable fee; Penick v. Atkinson, 77 S.E. 1055, 1057, 139 Ga. 649, 46 L.R.A.,N.S., 284, Ann.Cas.1914B, 842; or a qualified fee; In re Douglass’ Estate, 143 N.W. 299, 302, 94 Neb. 280, Ann.Cas.1914D, 447. Burche v. Neal, 149 S.E. 611, 612, 107 W.Va. 559.

—Base infeftment. In Scotch law. A disposition of lands by a vassal, to be held of himself.
—Base right. In Scotch law. A subordinate right; the right of a subvassal in the lands held by him. Bell.
—Base services. In feudal law. Such services as were unworthy to be performed by the nobler men, and were performed by the peasants and those of servile rank. 2 Bla.Comm. 62; 1 Washb. R.P. 25.
—Base tenants. Tenants who performed to their lords services in villenage; tenants who held at the will of the lord, as distinguished from frank tenants, or freeholders. Cowell.
—Base tenure. A tenure by villenage, or other customary service, as distinguished from tenure by military service; or from tenure by free serv-ice. Cowell.

BASE, n. Bottom, foundation, groundwork, that on which a thing rests. Webster.
The locality on which a military or naval force relies for supplies or from which it initiates opera-tions. Webster. For example: air base; mili-tary base; marine base; naval base; submarine base.
—Base Hospital. See Hospital.
—Air Base. A military or naval establishment forming a center of supporting activities for the military or naval air arm; a training center for air corps personnel; a place where equipment and supplies of the air corps are kept. The term is in-cluded in the word fort. Greenville Basebali v. Bearden, 200 S.C. 363, 20 S.E.2d 813, 816.
—Submarine Base. A naval base for the housing, repair and maintenance of submarínes, for keep-ing supplies; a place where personnel is trained; a place from which operations are initiated.

BASED UPON. Means an initial or starting point for calculation. State ex rel. Snidow v. State Board of Equalization, 93 Mont. 19, 17 P.2d 68.

BASEBALL. A game of skill within the criminal offense of betting on such a game. Mace v. State, 58 Ark. 79, 22 S.W. 1108.
When played by professlonals for prollt, ít ls a perform-ance of worldly employment and business within the Sun-day Law of Pennsylvania. Commonwealth v. American Basebali Club of Philadelphla, 290 Pa. 136, 138 A. 497, 53 A.L.R. 1027.

BASEMENT. A floor partly beneath the surface of the ground but distinguished from a cellar by being well lighted and fitted for living purposes. In England the ground floor of a city house.

BASIC OR PIONEER PATENT. One discovered in new field and recognized by scientific world or industry as startling, unexpected, and unprophe-sied. Northwest Engineering Corporation v. Key-stone Driller Co., C.C.A.Wis., 70 F.2d 13, 16.

BASILEUS. A Greek word, meaning "king." A title assumed by the emperors of the Eastern Ro-man Empire. It is used by Justinian in some of the Novels; and is said to have been applied to the English kings before the Conquest. See 1 Bl. Comm. 242.

BASILICA. The name given to a compilation of Roman and Greek law, prepared about A.D. 880 by the Emperor Basilius, and published by his suc-eessor, Leo the Philosopher. It was written in Greek, was mainly an abridgment of Justinian’s Corpus Juris, and comprised sixty books, only a portion of which are extant. It remained the law of the Eastern Empire until the fall of Constanti-nople, in 1453.

BASILS. In old English law. A kind of money or coin abolished by Henry II.

BASIN. When speaking of a large river, ordinari-ly means or includes the entire area drained by the main stream and its tributaries. City of ‘Pulsa v. Peacock, 181 Okl. 383, 74 P.2d 359, 360.
In admiralty law and marine insurance. A part of the sea inclosed in rocks. U. S. v. Morel, 13 Am.Jur. 286, 26 Fed.Cas. 1,310.
BASIS. Fundamental principie; groundwork; support; foundation; the foundation or ground-work of anything; that upon which anything may rest or the principal component parts of a thing. Tolmie v. San Diego Fruit & Produce Co., 57 Idaho 631, 68 P.2d 61, 64. State v. Kansas City & M. Ry. & Bridge Co., 106 Ark. 248, 153 S.W. 614, 616.

BASKET TENURE. In feudal law. Lands held by the service of making the king’s baskets.

BASOCHE. Fr. An association of the "Clercs du Parlement" of Paris, supposed to have been insti-tuted in 1302. It judged all civil and criminal mat-ters that arose among the clerks and all actions brought against them. Hist. for Ready Reference.

BASSA, BASSO, or BASSUS. L. Lat. Low. Ad-ams Gloss.

BASSA TENURA. See Base Fee.

BASSE JUSTICE. In feudal law. Low justice; the right exercised by feudal lords of personally trying persons charged with trespasses or minor offenses.

BASSET. A card game resembling faro. It was invented in Venice, and was widely popular in Europe from about 1650 to 1800.

BASTARD. An illegitimate child; a child born of an unlawful intercourse, and before the lawful marriage of its parents. Pettus v. Dawson, 82 Tex. 18, 17 S.W. 714.
A child born after marriage, but under circum-stances which render it impossible that the hus-band of his mother can be his father. State v. Coliton, 73 N.D. 582, 17 N.W.2d 546, 548, 549, 156 A.L.R. 1403.

A child is not a bastard if born after marriage, although hegotten before. 1 Bla.Com. 455, 456; 8 East, 210; State v. Herman, 35 N.C. 502.
One begotten and born out of lawful wedlock. Ex parte Newsome, 212 Ala. 168, 102 So. 216, 218.
This definition, which is substantially the same as Black-stone’s, is open to the objection that it does not include with sufficient certainty those cases where children are born during wedlock but are not the children of the moth-er’s husband.
Such children as are not born either in lawful wedlock or within a competent time after its determination. In re Paterson’s Estate, 34 Cal.App.2d 305, 93 P.2d 825, 827.
One born of an illicit union. Civ.Code La. arts. 27, 197.
The term also includes a child born of parents while in a state of slavery, inasmuch as the parents were under dis-ability to contract marriage. Cole v. Taylor, 132 Tenn. 92, 177 S.W. 61, 65.
In Louisiana, "bastards," as distinguished from "natural children," are illegitimate children who have not been ac-knowledged by their parents. "Natural children" are those who have been acknowledged by both or either of their parents. Briggs v. McLaughlin, 134 La. 133, 63 Sb. 851, 852.
—Bastard eigné. In old English law. Bastard elder. If a child was born of an illicit connec-tion, and afterwards the parents intermarried and had another son, the elder was called bastard eigné, or, as it is now spelled, afiné, and the second son was called puisné, or since born, or sometimes he was called mulier puisné. 2 Bla.Comm. 248.
—Special bastard. One born of parents before marriage, the parents afterward intermarrying. 3 B1.Comm. 335.
By the civil and Scotch law, as well as by the statute law prevailing in over half of the states of the Union, the child would then be legitimated.

BASTARDA. A female bastard. Calvinus, Lex.; Fleta, lib. 5, e. 5, § 40.

BASTARDIZE. To declare one a bastard, as a court does. To give evidence to prove one a bas-tard. A mother (married) cannot bastardize her child.

BASTARDUS NON POTEST HABERE ILERE-DEM NISI DE CORPORE SUO LEGITIME PRO-CREATUM. A bastard can have no heir unless it be one lawfully begotten of his own body. Tray. Lat.Max. 51.

BASTARDUS NULLIUS EST FILIUS, AUT FILI-US POPULI. A bastard is nobody’s son, or the son of the people.

BASTARDY. The offense of begetting a bastard child. The condition of a bastard. Dinkey v. Com., 17 Pa. 129, 55 Am.Dec. 542.

BASTARDY PROCESS. The method provided by statute of proceeding against the putative father to secure a proper maintenance for the bastard. It Is of a special character in nature of civil action. In
re Mitchell, 189 Okl. 51, 113 P.2d 979, 980.

BASTON. In old English law, a baton, club, or staff. A term applied to officers of the wardens of the prison called the "Fleet," because of the staff carried by them. Cowell; Spelman; Termes de la Ley. See Justices of Trail-Baston.

BATABLE-GROUND. Land that is in controver-sy, or about the possession of which there is a dispute, as the Lands which were situated between England and Scotland before the Union. Skene.

BATAILLE. In old English law. Battel; the trial by combat or duellum.

BATH, KNIGHTS OF THE. See Knights of the Bath.

BATIMENT. In French marine law. A vessel or ship.

BATONNIER. The chief of the French bar in its various centres, who presides in the council of dis-cipline. Arg.Fr.Merc.Law, 546.

BATTEL. Trial by combat; wager of battel. See Wager of Battel.

BATTERY. Any unlawful beating, or other wrongful physical violence or constraint, inflicted on a human being without his consent. Goodrum v. State, 60 Ga. 511.
A wiliful and unlawful use of force or violente upon the person of another. Long v. Rogers, 17 Ala. 540. An un-lawful touching of the person of another by the aggressor himself, or any other substance put in motion by hico. Kir-land v. State, 43 Ind. 153, 13 Am.Rep. 386; Commonwealth v. Remley, 257 Ky. 209, 77 S.W.2d 784. The consummation of an unlawful assault. State v. Hamburg, Del., 143 A. 47, 48. The sllghtest touching of another, or of his clothes or anything else attached to his person, if done in a rude, insolent, or angry manner. Booher v. Trainer, 172 Mo.App. 376, 157 S.W. 848, 850; Commonwealth v. Gregory, 132 Pa. Super. 507, 1 A.2d 501, 503.
The actual offer to use force to the injury of another person is assault; the use of it Is battery, which always includes an assault; hence the two tercos are commonly combined in the term "assault and battery." Harris v. State, 15 Okl.Cr. 369, 177 P. 122, 123.
A surglcal operatlon is a technical "battery" regardless of its result, and is excusable only when there is express or implied consent by the patient. Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 156, 139 A.L.R. 1366.
—Assault and Battery of a High and Aggravated Nature. An unlawful act of violent injury to the person of another, accompanied by circumstances of aggravation, such as the use of deadly weapon, great disparity between the ages and physical conditions of the parties, or the purposeful inflic-tion of shame and disgrace. State v. Jones, 133 S.C. 167, 130 S.E. 747, 751.
—Simple Battery. One not accompanied by cir-cumstances of aggravation, or not resulting in grievous bodily injury.

BATTONIER. In French and Canadian law. A member of the bar selected as the head of the bar.

BATTURE. According to Richelet and the French Academy, a marine term, used to denote a bottom of sand, stone, or rock, mixed together, and rising towards the surface of the water; as a technical word and also in common parlance, an elevation of the bed of a river, under the surface of the wa-ter. The term is, however, sometimes used to de-note the same elevation of the bank, when it has risen aboye the surface of the water, or is as high as the land on the outside of the bank. Conkey v. Knudsen, 143 Neb. 5, 8 N.W.2d 538, 541.
In this latter sense it is synonymous with "alluvion." It means, in common-law language, land formed by acere-tion. Producers’ Oil Co. v. Hanszen, 132 La. 691, 61 So. 754.
The term is used in Louisiana, and is applied prinelpally to certain portions of the bed of the Mississippi river which are uncovered at time of low water but are covered annual-ly at time of ordinary high water. Boyce Cottonseed Oil Mfg. Co. v. Board of Com’rs of Red River, Atchafalaya & Bayou Bceuf Levee Dist., 160 La. 727, 107 So. 506, 508.

BAUXITE. An earth containing aluminum in suf-ficient quantities to make it worth working for the extraction of alumina. American Bauxite Co. v. Board of Equalization of Saline County, 119 Ark. 362, 177 S.W. 1151, 1152. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, D.C.N.Y., 44 F.Supp. 97, 109.

BAWD. One who procures opportunities for per-sons of opposite sexes to cohabit in an illicit man-ner; who may be, while exercising the trade of a bawd, perfectly innocent of committing in his or her own proper person the crime either of adultery or of fornication. See Dyer v. Morris, 4 Mo. 216.

BAWDY—HOUSE. A house of ill fame; a house of prostitution; a brothel. A house or dwelling maintained for the convenience and resort of per-sons desiring unlawful sexual connection. Davis v. State, 2 Tex.App. 427; State v. Porter, 38 Ark. 638; People v. Buchanan, 1 Idaho 689. An as-signation house. State v. Bragg, Mo.App., 220 S.W. 25, 26. A disorderly house. Putman v. State, 9 Okl.Cr. 535, 132 P. 916, 921, 46 L.R.A.,N.S., 593.
To constitute a bawdy-house, the house must be "resort-ed to" or "frequented," that is to say, used a number of times, by lewd people of both sexes. State v. Seba, Mo. App., 200 S.W. 300; but need not be inhabited or resorted to by more than one woman for purpose of prostitution. Trent v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 338, 25 S.E.2d 350, 351.

BAY. A pond-head made of a great height to keep in water for the supply of a mili, etc., so that the wheel of the mili may be turned by the water rushing thence, through a passage or flood-gate. St. 27 Eliz. c. 19. (This is generally called a fore-bay.)
A bending or curving of the shore of the sea or of a lake, so as to form a more or less inclosed body of water. State v. Town of Gilmanton, 14 N.H. 477. An opening into the land, or an arm of the sea, where the water is shut in on all sides except at the entrance. Mayo v. New York Cent. R. Co., 263 N.Y. 277, 189 N.E. 217, 218.

BAYGALL. A low-lying wet land matter with vegetable fibres and ofteri with gallberry and oth-er thick-growing bushes. McNeal v. Carter, 191 Ga. 441, 12 S.E.2d 332, 333.

BAY WINDOW. A window projecting from the wall of a building so as to form a recess or bay within, and, properly speaking, rising from the ground or basement, with straight sides only; but the term is also ordinarily applied to such projecting windows with curved sides, properly called bow windows, and also to projecting win-dows supported from the building, aboye the ground, properly called oriel windows. Hiero-nimus v. Moran, 272 III. 254, 111 N.E. 1022, 1023.

BAYLEY. In old English law. Bailiff. This term is used in the laws of the colony of New Plym-outh, Mass., A.D. 1670, 1671. Burrill.

BAYOU. A species of creek or stream common in Louisiana and Texas. An outlet from a swamp, pond, or lagoon, to a river; or the sea. See Surgett v. Lapice, 8 How. 48, 70, 12 L.Ed. 982.

BEACH. This term, in its ordinary signification, when applied to a place on tide waters means the space between ordinary high and low water mark; East Hampton v. Kirk, 6 Hun (N.Y.) 257; or the space over which the tide usually ebbs and flows. It is a term not more significant of a sea margin than "shore." Niles v. Patch, 13 Gray (Mass.) 257; Hodge v. Boothby, 48 Me. 68.
In common parlante designates that portIon of shore consisting generally of sand and pebbles, resulting usually from the action of water, as distinct from the upland, to which it of ten extends aboye normal high-water mark. Borden v. Town of Westport, 112 Conn. 152, 151 A. 512, 515.
Beach is synonymous with "shore," ”strand," or "flats." Littlefield v, Littlefield, 28 Me. 180.
The term may also include the sandy shore aboye mean high water which is washed by storms and exceptionally hieh tides. Newkirk v. Sherwood, 94 A. 982, 984, 89 Conn. 598.
To "beach" a ship is to run it upon the beach or shore; this is frequently found necessary in case of a fire, leak, etc.
See Foreshore; Sea-Shore.

Public Beach

One left by the state or others claiming it open to the common use of the public, which the un-organized public and each of its members have a right to use while it remains such. Brower v. Wakeman, 88 Conn. 8, 89 A. 913, 914.

BEACON. A light-house, or sea-mark, formerly used to alarm the country, in case of the approach of an enemy, but now used for the guidance of ships at sea, by night, as well as by day.

BEACONAGE. Money paid for the maintenance of a beacon or signal-light. Comyns, Dig. Navi-gation (H).

BEADLE. In English ecclesiastical law. An in-ferior parish officer, who is chosen by the vestry, and whose business is to attend the vestry, to give notice of its meetings, to execute its orders, to attend upon inquests, and to assist the constables. Wharton. See, also, Bedel.

BEAMS AND BALANCE. Instruments for weigh-ing goods and merchandise.

BEAR. To support, sustain, or carry; to give rise to, or to produce, something else as an inci-dent or auxiliary. See Stevenson v. Mellor, 252 Pa. 219, 97 A. 393, 394; to render, to manage, or direct, or to conduct; to carry on, or maintain; to be answerable for, and to defray. Teeter v. Mid-West Enterprise Co., 174 Okl. 644, 52 P.2d 810, 812.

BEAR ARMS. To carry arms as weapons and with reference to their military use, not to wear them about the person as part of the dress. Ay-mette v. State, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 158.
As applied to fire-arms, includes the right to` load and shoot them, and to use them as such things are generaily used. Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 480.

BEAR INTEREST. To generate interest, so that the instrument or loan spoken of shall produce or yield interest at the rate specified by the parties or granted by law. Slaughter v. Slaughter, 21 Ind. App. 641, 52 N.E. 995.

BEARER. One who bears, carries, or holds a thing. Defined by the Negotiable Instruments Act as the person in possession of a bill or note which is payable to bearer. Miller v. People’s Sav. Bank, 193 Mo.App. 498, 186 S.W. 547, 550.
When a check, note, draft, etc., is payable to "bearer," It imports that the contents thereof shall be payable to any person who may present the instrument for payment. Thompson v. Perrine, 106 U.S. 589, 1 S.Ct. 564, 568, 27 L. Ed. 298.

BEARERS. In old English law. Such as bear down or oppress others; maintainers. Cowell.

BEARING DATE. Disclosing a date on its lace; having a certain date. Words frequently used in pleading and conveyancing to introduce the date which has been put upon an instrument. See 2 Greenl.Ev. § 160; 2 Dowl. & L. 759.

BEAST. An animal; a domestic animal; a quad-ruped, such as may be used for food or in labor
or for sport; e. g., a cow; Taylor v. State, 6 Humph. (Tenn.) 285; a horse; Winfrey v. Zim-merman, 8 Bush (Ky.) 587; and a hog; State v. Enslow, 10 Iowa, 115; but a dog was held not to be; U. S. v. Gideon, 1 Minn. 292 (Gil. 226) ; but see Morewood v. Wakefield, 133 Mass. 241.

BEASTS OF THE CHASE. In English law. Properly, the buck, doe, fox, martin, and roe, but in a common and legal sense extending likewise to all the beasts of the forest, which beside the others are reckoneel to be the hind, hare, bear, and wolf, and, in a word, all wild beasts of ven-ery or hunting. Co.Litt. 233; 2 Bla.Comm. 39.

BEASTS OF THE FOREST. In English law. The hart, hind, hare, boar, and wolf. Co.Litt. 233a. See Beasts of the Chase.

BEASTS OF THE PLOW. An old term for ani-mals employed in the operations of husbandry, including horses. Somers v. Emerson, 58 N.H. 49.

BEASTS OF THE WARREN. In English law. Fiares. coneys, and roes. Co.Litt. 233; 2 Bla. Comm. 39.

BEASTGATE. In Suffolk, England, imports land and common for one beast. Bennington v. Good-title, 2 Strange, 1084; Rosc.Real Act. 485.

BEAT, v. To strike • or hit repeatedly; as with blows. Regina v. Hale, 2 Car. & K. 327; Com. v. McClellan, 101 Mass. 35; Com. v. McClellan, 101 Mass. 35.
In the criminal law and the law of torts, with reference to assault and battery, the term in-eludes any unlawful physical violente offered to another. See Battery.
To beat, in a legal sense, is not merely tu whip, wound, or hurt, but includes any unlawful imposition of the hand or arm. Goodrurn v. State, 60 Ga. 511; Yarbrough v. State, 17 Ga.App. 828, 88 S.E. 710, 711.

BEAT, n. In some of the southern states (as Ala-bama, Mississippi, South Carolina) the principal legal subdivision of a county, corresponding to towns or townships in other states; or a voting precinct. Eaton v. State, 20 Ala.App. 110, 101 So. 94, 95.

BEATING OF THE ROUNDS. An ancient cus-tom in England by which, once a year, the mM-ister, etc., of a parish walked about its boundaries to preserve a recollection of them. Cent.Dict. (Perambulation).

BEAUPLEADER. (L. Fr. fair pleading). A writ of prohibition directed to the sheriff or another, directing him not to take a fine for beaupleader.
There was anciently a fine Imposed called a fine for beaupleader, which is explained by Coke to have been orlg-inally imposed for bad pleading. Coke, 2d Inst. 123. The statute of Marlehridge (52 Hen. III.) c. 11, enacts, that neither in the circuit of justices, nor in countles, hun-dreds, or courts-baron, any fines shall be taken for fair pleading; namely, for not pleading fairly or aptly to the purpose. Upon this statute this writ was ordained, direct-ed to the sheriff, bailiff, or him who shall demand the fine; and it is a prohibition or eommand not to do it. Cowell; Co. 2d Inst. 122; Crabb, Eng.Law 150.

BEAUTY CULTURE. Generally, the means em-ployed to improve personal appearance, is an occupation operating directly on the person. Hoff v. State, Del.Super., 197 A. 75, 78, 81.

BECAUSE OF. For. Kelly v. State Personnel Board of California, 31 Cal.App.2d 443, 88 P.2d 264, 266.

BECAUSE OF EMPLOYMENT. In this phrase as used in the Workmen’s Compensation Act, ex-cepting an employer from liability for the willful act of a third person directed against an employee because of his employrnent, the wo,ds "because of" are not synonymous with "caused by" but with "on account of," or "by reason of." Saucier’s Case, 122 Me. 325, 119 A. 860, 861.

RECOME. To pass from one state to another; to enter into some state or condition.
Hence one who is a niember of a particular organization at the time of the enaetment of a statute runking, it a fel-ony to "become" a member of such an organization cannot be said to be within the puryiew of the act. State v. Laundy, 103 Or. 443, 204 P. 958, 963.

RED. The hollow or channel of a water course; the depression hetween the banks worn by the regular and usual fiow of the water.
Soil only which the water occupies sufilciently long and continuously to wrest it from vegetation and destroy its value for agricultural purposes. State ex rel. O’Connor v. Sorenson, 271 N.W. 234, 236, 222 Iowa 1248.
The land that is covered by the water In Its ordinary low stage. Wemple v. Eastham, 150 La. 247, 90 So. 637, 638.
That portion of its soil which is alternately covered and left bare as there may be an increase or diminution in the supply of water, and which is adequate to contain it at its average and mean state during an entire year. Mau-frais v. State, 142 Te 559, 180 S.W.2d 144, 147.
Area extending between the opposing banks measurad from the foot of the hanks from the top of the water at Its ordinary stage. including sand bars which may exist between the foot of said banks as thus defined. Town of Refugio Y. Heard, Tex.Civ.App., 95 S.W.2d 1008, 1010.
It includes the lancls below ordinary high water mark. United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 61 S.Ct. 772, 775, 312 U.S. 592, 313 U.S. 543, 85 L.Ed. 1064.
Bed of navigable lake extends to high water mark. Mi-ami Corporation v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315.
Also, the right of cohabitation or marital inter-course; as in the phrase "divorce from bed and board," or a mensa et thoro.

BED OF JUSTICE. In old French law. The seat or throne upon which the king sat when personal-ly present in parliament; hence it signified the parliament itself.

BED—ALE or BID—ALE. A friendly assignation for neighbors to meet and drink at the house of newly married persons or other poor_ people and then for the guests to contribute to the house-keepers. Cowell. See Bidal.

BEDDING. Covers practically everything, that is to say, mattresses, springs, cots, couches, quilts, cushions, and also the bed itself. Baltimore Bed-ding Corporation v. Moses, 182 Md. 229, 34 A.2d 338, 340.

BEDEHOUSE. A hospital or almshouse for bedes-men or poor people who prayed for their founders and benefactors. Cunningham.

BEDEL. In English law. A crier or messenger of court, who summons men to appear and answer th9rein. Cowell. A herald to make public proc-lamations. Cent. Dict.
An officer of the forest, similar to a sheriff’s special bailiff. Cowell.
A collector of rents for the king. Plowd. 199, 200.
An inferior officer in a parish or liberty, or in an institution, such as the Blue Coat School in Lon-don.
A subordinate officer of a university who walked with a mace before one of the officers on cere-monial occasions and performed other minor du-ties ordinarily. See Beadle.

BEDELARY. The jurisdiction of a bedel, as a bailiwick is the jurisdiction of a bailiff. Co.Litt. 234b; Cowell.

BEDEREPE. A service which certain tenants were anciently bound to perform, as to reap their landlord’s corn at harvest. Said by Whishaw to be still in existence in some parts of England. Blount; Cowell; Whishaw.

BEDE%VERI. Those which we now call banditti; profligate and excommunicated persons. Cunning-ham.

BEDLAM. A corruption of Bethlehem. The hos-pital of St. Mary of Bethlehem in London, orig-inally a priory, founded about 1247, but used from about 1400 as an asylum for the insane.

BEEF. Used frequently to mean an animal of the cow species and not beef prepared for market. A beef or one beef is an expression frequently used to designate an animal fit for use as beef, in-stead of designating it as a steer, a heifer, an ox, or a cow. Davis v. State, 40 Tex. 135.

BEER. A liquor compounded of malt and hops, differing from ales, not so much in its ingredients as in its processes of fermentation.
A hrewed liquor made of grain, especially barley, fla-varad with hops, which has undergone fermentation and contains alcohol. State v. Lynch, 5 Boyce (Del.) 569, 96 A. 32. An alcnholic beverage resulting from the fermentation of cereals or other starchy substances. U. S. v. Standard Brewery, D.C.Md., 260 F. 486, 487.
In its ordinary cense, it denotes a beverage which is In-toxicating ; Moffitt v. People. 59 Colo. 406, 149 P. 104, 107: Hoskins v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 204, 188 S.W. 348, 349: and is within the fair meaning of the words "strong or spirituous liquors," used in the statutes on this subject. Maier v. State, 2 Tex.Civ.App. 296, 21 S.W. 974.
But also held that "liquor," in common parlance, does not ordinarily mean "beer." Lea v. State, 181 S.W.2d 351, 353, 181 Tenn. 378.
Any liquor, whether intoxIcating or not, made by the usual process of making beer, although fermentation is arrested to reduce the percentage of alcohol. Brown v. State, 17 Ariz. 314, 152 P. 578, 582.

BEER—HOUSE; BEER—SHOP. In English law. A place where beer is sold to be consumed on the premises; as distinguished from a "beer-shop,"
which is a place where beer is sold to be consumed off the premises. 16 Ch.Div. 721.

BEFORE. Prior to; preceding. In the presence of; under the official purview of; as in a magis-trate’s jurat, "before me personally appeared," etc. State v. Murnane, 172 Minn. 401, 215 N.W.
863.
Thus, an acknowledgment made to an officer over a telephone wire by one who is not present with the officer, is not an acknowledgment "before" the officer. Hutchin-son v. State, 79 Fla. 157, 81 So. 151, 154.
In the absence of any statutory provision governing the computation of time, the authorities are uniform that. where an act is required to be done a certain number of days or weeks before a certain other day upon which an-other act is to be done, the day upon which the first act is done is to be excluded from the computation, and the whole number of days or weeks must intervene before the day lixed for dóing the second act. Ward v. Walters, 63 Wis. 44, 22 N.W. 844.
When used as a preposition, does not indícate a period of time as do the prepositions "for," "during," and "throughout," but merely an event or act preceding in time, or earlier than, or previously to, the time mentioned. First Nat. Corporation v. Perrine, 43 P.2d 1073, 1077, 99 Mont. 454.

BEG. To solicit alms or charitable aid. The act of a cripple in passing along the sidewalk and silently holding out his hand and receiving money from pass.ers-by is "begging for alms," within the meaning of a statute which uses that phrase. In re Haller, 3 Abb.N.C.,N.Y., 65.

BEGA. A land measure used in the East Indies. In Bengal it is equal to about a third part of an acre.

BEGET. See Begotten.

BEGGAR. One who lives by begging charity, or who has no other means of support than solicited alms.

BEGIN. To originate; to come into existence; to start; to institute; to initiate; to commence. People ex rel. Northchester Corporation v. Miller, 31 N.Y.S.2d 586, 587, 263 App.Div. 83.

BEGOTTEN. "To be begotten" means the same as "begotten," embracing all those whom the par-ent shall have begotten during his life, quos pro-creaverit. Cox v. Newby, 85 S.E. 369, 370, 101 S.C. 193. The term is peculiarly and chiefly ap-plicable to a father. Swain v. Bowers, 91 Ind. App. 307, 158 N.E. 598, 601.

BEGUM. In India. A lady, princess, woman of high rank.

BEGUN. In a statute providing that nothing con-tained in it should affect prosecutions "begun" under any existing act, the word "begun" means both those which have already been begun and those which may hereaf ter be begun. Lang v. U. S., C.C.A.I11., 133 F. 201, 66 C.C.A. 255.

BEHALF. Benefit, support, defence, or advan-tage.
A witness testifles on "behalf" of the party who calls him, notwithstanding his evidence proves to be adverse to that party’s case. Richerson v. Sternburg, 65 in. 274. See, further, 12 Q.B. 693; 18 Q.B. 512.

BEHAVIOR. Manner of having, holding, or keep-ing one’s self; manner of behaving, whether good or bad; conduct; manners; carriage of one’s self, with respect to propriety and morals; deport-ment. Webster. State v. Roll, 1 Ohio Dec. 284; Schneiderman v. United States, Cal., 63 S.Ct. 1333, 1340, 320 U.S. 118, 87 L.Ed. 1796.
Surety to be of good behavior is a larger requirernent than surety to keep the peare. Dalton, c. 122; 4 Burns, Just. 355. See Good Behavior.

BEHETRIA. In Spanish law. Lands situated in districts and manors in which the inhabitants had the right to select their own lords.

BEHOOF. Use; benefit; profit; service; advan-tage. It occurs in conveyances, e. g., "to his and their use and behoof." Stiles v. Japhet, 84 Tex. 91, 19 S.W. 450.

BEING STRUCK. Collision, or striking together of two objects, one of which may be stationary. Davilla v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 114 Cal.App. 308, 299 P. 831, 834.

BELIEF. A conviction of the truth of a proposi-tion, existing subjectively in the mind, and induced by argument, persuasion, or proof addressed to the judgment. Keller v. State, 102 Ga. 506, 31 S.E. 92. Latrobe v. J. H. Cross Co., D.C.Pa., 29 F.2d 210, 212. A conclusion arrived at from external sources after weighing probability. Ex parte State ex rel. Attorney General, 100 So. 312, 313, 211 Ala. 1.
Conviction of the mind, arising not from actual percep-tion or knowledge, but by way of inference, or from evi-dence received or information derlved from others.
A conviction of the truth of a given proposition or an al-leged fact resting upon grounds insufficient to constitute positive knowledge. Boone v. Merchants’ & Farmers’ Bank, D.C.N.C., 285 F. 183, 191.
With regard to things which make not a very deep im-pression on the memory, it may be called "belief." "Knowledge" is nothing more than a man’s firm belief. The differenre is ordinarily nicreiy in the degree; to be judged of by the court, when addressed to the court; by the jury, when áddressed to the jury. Hatch v. Carpenter, 9 Gray (Mass.) 274.
Knowledge is an assurance of a fact or proposi-tion founded on perception by the senses, or in-tuition; while "belief" is an assurance gained by evidence, and from other persons. Brooks v. Ses-soms, 47 Ga.App. 554, 171 S.E. 222, 224.
"Suspicion" is weaker than "belief," since suspicion requires no real foundation for its existence. while "be-lief" is necessarily based on at least assumed facts. Pen. Code, § 836, subd. 3. Cook v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co., 32 P.2d 430, 431, 138 Cal.App. 418.

BELLIGERENCY. In international law. The status of de facto statehood attributed to a body of insurgents, by which their hostilities are legal-ized.
Before they can be recognized as belligerents they must have some sort of political organization and be carrying on what in international law is regarded as legal war. There must be an armed struggle between two political bodies, each of which exercises de facto authority over persons within a determined territory, and commands an army which is prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war. Moore, Int. Law Dig. I, 196; Dana’s Wheaton. note 15, page 35; In re Jones, 71 W.Va. 567, 77 S.E. 1029, 45 L.R. A.,N.S., 1030, Ann.Cas.1914C, 31.
Quality of being belligerent; status of a belligerent; act or state of waging war; warfare. Webster’s New Int. Dict.

BELLIGERENT. In international law. As an ad-jective, it means engaged in lawful war. As a noun, it designates either of two nations which are actually in a state of war with each other, as well as their alijes actively co-operating, as dis-tinguished from a nation which takes no part in the war and maintains a strict indifference as be-tween the contending parties, called a "neutral." U. S. v. The Ambrose Light, D.C.N.Y., 25 F. 412; Johnson v. Jones, 44 III. 151, 92 Am.Dec. 159.

BELLIGERENTS. A body of insurgents who by reason of their temporary organized government are regarded as conducting lawful hostilities. Also, militia, corps of volunteers, and others, who although nót part of the regular army of the state, are regarded as lawful combatants provided they observe the laws of war. See Ex parte Tos-cano, D.C.Cal., 208 F. 938. See, also, Belligerency.
Bello parta cedunt reipublicze. Things acquired in war belong or go to the state. 1 Kent, Comm. 101; 5 C.Rob.Adm. 173, 181; The Joseph, 1 Gall. 558, Fed.Cas.No.7,533. The right to all captures vests primarily in the sovereign. A fundamental max-im of public law. Cited 2 Russ. & M. 56.

BELLUM. Lat. In public law. War. An armed contest between nations; the state of those who forcibly contend with each other. Jus belli, the law of war.

BELONG. To appertain to; to be the property of. Property "belonging" to a person has two general meanings: (1) ownership; People ex rel. Gill v. Lake Forest University, 367 III. 103, 10 N.E.2d 667, 671; and (2) less than ownership, i. e., less than an unqualified and absolute title, such as the ab-solute right of user. City and County of San Francisco v. McGovern, 28 Cal.App. 491, 152 P. 980, 984.
A road rnay be said with perfect propriety to belong to a man who has the right te use it as of right although the soil does not belong lo him; 31 L.J.Ex. 227.
When used in public and private statutes. and especially when used in reference to lnhabitancy, the peor, etc., des-ignates the place of a person’s legal settlernent. and not merely his place of residence. City of Bridgeport v. Town of Greenwich, 165 A. 797, 116 Conn. 537.

BELONGING. That which is connected with a principal or greater thing; an appenclage, an ap-purtenanee; also ownership. Church of the Holy Faith v. State Tax Commission, 39 N.M. 403, 48 P.2d 777, 779.

BELONGINGS. That which belongs to one; property; possessions;—a term properly used to express ownership. In a will. Ford’s Adm’r v. Wade’s Adm’r, 242 Ky. 18, 45 S.W.2d 818, 820.

BELOW. In practice. Inferior; of inferior juris-diction, or jurisdiction in the first instance. The court from which a cause is removed for review is called the "court below."
Preliminary; auxiliary or instrumental.
Bail to the sheriff is called "bail below," as being prelim-Inary to and intended to secure the putting in of bail aboye, or special bail. See Bail.

BENCH. A seat of judgment or tribunal for the administration of justice; the seat occupied by judges in courts; also the court itself, or the ag-gregate of the judges composing a court, as in the phrase "before the full bench."
The judges taken collectively, as distinguished from counsellors and advocates, who are called the bar.
The term, indicating originally the seat of the judges. carne to denote the body of judges taken collectively, and also the tribunal itself, as the King’s Bench.
In English ecclesiastical law. The aggregate body of bishops.

BENCH LEGISLATION. See Judge-made law under the title Judge.

BENCH WARRANT. Process issued by the court itself, or "from the bench," for the attach-ment or arrest of a person; either in case of con-tempt, or where an indictment has been found, or to bring in a witness who does not obey the .sub-pcena. So called to distinguish it from a warrant, issued by a justice of the peace, alderman, or com-missioner. Oxford v. Berry, 204 Mich. 197, 170 N.W. 83, 87.

BENCHERS. In English law. Seniors in the inns of Court, intrusted with their government, and usually, but not necessarily, king’s counsel, elected by co-optation, and having the entire man-agement of the property of their respective inns.

BENE. Lat. Well; in proper forro; legally; suíliciently.

BENEDICTA EST EXPOSITIO QUANDO RES REDIMITUR A DESTRUCTIONE. 4 Coke, 26. Blessed is the exposition when anything is saved from destruction. It is a laudable interpretation which gives effect to the instrument, and does not allow its purpose to be frustrated.

BENEFICE. In ecclesiastical law. In its techni-cal sense, this term includes ecclesiastical prefer-ments to which rank or public office is attached, otherwise described as ecclesiastical dignities or offices, such as bishopries, deaneries, and the like; but ín popular acceptation, it is almost invariably appropriated to rectos-les, vicarages, perpetual curacies, district churches, and endowed chap-elries. 3 Steph.Comm. 77.
"Benefice" is a term derived from the feudal law, In which it signified a permanent stipendiary estate, or an estate held by feudal tenure. 4 Bl.Comm. 107.

BÉNÉFICE. Fr. In French law. A benefit or advantage, and particularly a privilege given by. the law rather than by the agreement of the par-ties.

BÉNÉFICE DE DISCUSSION. Benefit of discus-sion. The right of a guarantor to require that the creditor should exhaust bis recourse against the principal debtor before having recourse to the guarantor himself.

BENÉFICE DE DIVISION. Benefit of division; right of contribution as between co-sureties.

BENÉFICE D’INVENTAIRE. A term which cor-responda to the beneficium inventarii of Roman law, and substantially to the English law doctrine that the executor properly accounting is only fia-ble to the extent of the assets received by him.

BÉNÉFICIAIRE. The person in whose favor a promissory note or bill of exchange is payable; or any person in whose favor a contract of any de-scription is executed. Arg.Fr.Merciaw. 547.

BENEFICIAL. Tending to the benefit of a per-son; yielding a profit, advantage, or benefit; en-joying or entitled to a benefit or profit. This term is applied both to estates (as a "beneficial inter-est") and to persons (as "the beneficial owner"). Kolh v. Landes, 277 III. 440, 115 N.E. 539, 541; In re Williams’ Will, 50 Mont. 142, 145 P. 957, 959.

BENEFICIA!, OR BENEVOLENT ASSOCIA-TION. A voluniary association for mutual assist-anee in time of need and sickness, and for the care of families of deceased members. Lafferty v. Supreme Council Catholic Mut. Ben. Ass’n, 259 Pa. 452, 103 A. 280, 281; but also held to in-elude incorporated organizations. State v. Texas Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Texas, Tex.Civ.App., 51 S.W. 2d 405, 410.
Another narre for a "benefit society;" "benevo-lent society," and "fraternal" or "friendly socie-ty." State v. Texas Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Texas, Tex.Civ.App., 51 S.W.2d 405, 410.

BENEFICIAL ENJOYMENT. The enjoyment which a man has of an estate in his own right and for his own benefit, and not as trustee for another. 11 H.L.Cas. 271.

BENEFICIAL ESTATE. An estate in expectancy is one where the right to the possession is post-poned to a future period, and is "beneficial" where the devisee takes solely for his own use or benefit, and not as the mere holder of the title for the use of another. In re Seaman’s Estate, 147 N.Y. 69, 41 N.E. 401.

BENEFICIAL INTEREST. Profit, benefit, or ad-vantage resulting from a contract, or the owner-ship of an estate as distinct from the legal own-ership or. control. People v. Schaefer, 266 III. 334, 107 N.E. 617, 619; Christiansen v. Depart-ment of Social Security, 15 Wash.2d 465, 131 P.2d 189, 191, 192.
When considered as designation of character of an estate, is such an interest as a devisee, legatee, or donee takes solely for hís own use or benefit, and not as holder of ti-tle for use and benefit of another. People v. Northern Trust Co., 330 III. 238, 161 N.E. 525, 528.

BENEFICIAL POWER. In New York law and practice. A power which has for its object the donee of the power, and which is to be executed solely for his benefit; as distinguished from a trust power, which has for its object a person oth-er than the donee, and is to be executed solely for the benefit of such person. Jennings v. Conboy, 73 N.Y. 234; In re New York Life Ins. & Trust Co., Sur., 139 N.Y.S. 695, 705; People, by Van Schaick v. New York Title & Mortgage Co., 270 N.Y.S. 473, 150 Misc. 488.

BENEFICIAL USE. The right to use and enjoy property according to one’s own liking or so as to derive a profit or benefit from it, including all that makes it desirable or habitable, as light, air, and access; as distinguished from a mere right of occupancy or possession. Reining v. Railroad Co., Super.Ct., 13 N.Y.Supp. 240.
Such right to enjoyment of property where legal title is in one person while right to such use or interest is in another. Christiansen v. Department of Social Security, 15 Wash.2d 465, 131 P.2d 189, 191.

BENEFICIARY. One for whose benefit a trust is created; a cestui que trust. 195 N.E. 557, 564, 97 A.L.R. 1170. A person having the enjoyment of property of which a trustee, executor, etc., has the legal possession. The person to whom a policy of insurance is payable. Parrott Estate Co. v. Mc-Laughlin. D.C.Cal., 12 F.Supp. 23, 25; Odom v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 173 Or. 435, 145 P.2d 480, 482. One receiving benefit or advantage, or one who is in receipt of benefits, profits, or ad-vantage. Bauer v. Myers, C.C.A.Kan., 244 F. 902, 908. For "Favored Beneficiary," see that title.

BENEFICIARY ASSOCIATION. See Beneficial or Benevolent Association.

BENEFICIARY HEIR. In the law of Louisiana. One who has accepted the succession under the benefit of an inventory regularly made. Civ.Code La. art. 883. Also, one who may accept the suc-cession with benefit of inventory. Succession of Galiano, La.App., 195 So. 377, 379.

BENEFICIO PRIMA, or PRIMO [ECCLESIASTI-CO HABEND0]. In English law. An ancient writ, which was addressed by the king to the lord chancellor, to bestow the benefice that should first fall in the royal gift, aboye or under a specified value, upon a person named therein. Reg.Orig. 307.

BENEFICIUM.
In Early Feudal Law
A benefice; a permanent stipendiary estate; the same with what was afterwards called a "fief," "feud," or "fee." 3 Steph.Comm. 77, note i; Spelman. It originally meant a "benefaction" from the king, usually to a noble.

In the Civil Law

A benefit or favor; any particular privilege. Dig. 1, 4, 3; Cod. 7, 71; Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 196.
A general term applied to ecclesiastical livings. 4 Bl.Comm. 107; Cowell.

In General

—Beneficium abstinendi. In Roman law. The power of an heir to abstain from accepting the inheritance. Sandars, Just.Inst. (5th Ed.) 214.
—Benefician) cedendarum actionum. In Roman law. The privilege by which a surety could, be-fore paying the creditor, compel him to make over to him the actions which belonged to the stipula-tor, so as to avail himself of them. Sandars, Just. Inst. (5th Ed.) 332, 351.
—Beneficium clericale. Benefit of clergy (q. v.).
—Beneficium competentiw. In Scotch law. The privilege of competency. A privilege which the grantor of a gratuitous obligation was entitled to, by which he might retain sufficient for his sub-sistence, if, before fulfilling the obligation, he was reduced to indigence. Bell. In the civil law. The right which an insolvent debtor had, among the Romans, on making cession of his property for the benefit of his creditors, to retain what was re-quired for him to live honestly according to his condition. 7 Toullier, n. 258.
A defendant’s privilege of being condemned only in an amount which he could pay without being reduced to a state of destitution. Sand. Justinian iv. vi. 37.
—Beneficium divisionis. In civil and Scotch law. The privilege of one of several co-sureties (cau-tioners) to insist upon paying only his pro rata share of the debt. Bell; La.Civ.Code, arts. 3045-3051.

—Beneflcium inventara See Benefit of Inventory.
—Beneficium ordinis. In civil and Scotch law. The privilege of order. The privilege of a surety to require that the creditor should first proceed against the principal and exhaust his remedy against him, before resorting to the surety. Bell.
—Beneficium separationis. In the civil law. The right to have the goods of an heir separated from those of the testator in favor of creditors.

BENEFICIUM INVITO NON DATUR. A privi-lege or benefit is not granted against one’s will. Adams Gloss.

BENEFICIUM NON DATUM NISI PROPTER OF-FICIUM. Hob. 148. A remuneration [is] not giv-en, unless on account of a duty performed.

BENEFICIUM NON DATUR NISI OFFICII CAU-SA. A benefice is not granted except on account or in consideration of duty. Adams Gloss.

BENEFICIUM PRINCIPIS DEBET ESSE MAN-SURUM. The benefaction of a prince ought to be lasting. Adams Gloss.

BENEFIT. Advantage; profit; fruit; privilege; advantage. Fitch v. Bates, 11 Barb. (N.Y.) 473; Ferrigino v. Keasbey, 93 Conn. 445, 106 A. 445, 447; In re Krause’s Estate, 173 Wash. 1, 21 P.2d 268; a pecuniary advantage or profit; gain; ac-count; interest; the whole benefit and entire beneficial interest. Bird v. Newcomb, 170 Va. 208, 196 S.E. 605, 608.
In the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the term "benefits" is used of an award to be granted when an injury results in death, and is distinguished from "compensation," which is to be granted when an injury results in incapacity or disability. Di Cicco v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 11 Ohio App. 271, 273.

In Contracts

When it is said that a valuable consideration for a promise may consist of a benefit to the prom-isor, "benefit" means that the promisor has, in return for his promise, acquired some legal right to which he would not otherwise have been en-titled. Irving v. Irwin, 24 P.2d 215, 216, 133 Cal. App. 374. Woolum v. Sizemore, 267 Ky. 384, 102 S.W.2d 323, 324.
"Benefit" is not limited to pecuniary gains, nor tú any particular kind of advantage; lt refers to what is ad-vantageous, whatever promotes prospérity or happiness, what enhances the value of the property or rights of citi-zens as contradistinguished from what is injurious. Hoop-er v. Merchants’ Bank & Trust Co., 130 S.E. 49, 52, 190 N.
C. 423.

In Eminent Domain

It is a rule that, in assessing damages for pri-vate property taken or injured for public use, "special benefits" may be set off against the amount of damage found, but not "general bene-fits." Within the meaning of this rule, general benefits are such as accrue to the community at large, to the vicinage, or to all property similarly situated with reference to the work or improve-ment in question; while special benefits are such as accrue directly and solely to the owner of the land in question and not to others. Brand v. Union Elevated R. Co., 101 N.E. 247, 249, 258 III. 133, Ann.Cas.1914B, 473, L.R.A.1918A, 878.

In Taxation

With reference to an assessment for a drainage ditch, a benefit is anything that will make land more valuable for tillage or more desirable for a residente or more valuable in the general market. Watson v. Armstrong, 180 Ind. 49, 102 N.E. 273.

BENEFIT ASSOCIATION. See Benefit Societies.

BENEFIT BUILDING SOCIETY. The original name for what is now more commonly called a "building society" (q. y.).

BENEFIT CERTIFICATE. A written obligation to pay the person therein named the amount speci-fied upon the conditions therein stipulated. Green v. Grand United Order of Odd Fellows, Tex.Civ. App., 163 S.W. 1068, 1070.
Also a term usually applied to policies issued by fraternal and beneficiary societies. Chandler v. New York Life Ins. Co., 194 Ark. 6, 104 S.W.2d 1060, 1061.

BENEFIT OF BARGAIN RULE. Under such rule a defrauded purchaser may recover the differ-ence between the real and the represented value of the property purchased regardless of the fact that the actual loss suffered might have been less. Stewart v. Potter, 44 N.M. 460, 104 P.2d 736, 739.

BENEFIT OF CESSION. In the civil law. The release of a debtor from futuro imprisonment for his debts, which the law operates in his favor upon the surrender of his property for the benefit of his creditors. Poth.Proc.Civil, pt. 5, c. 2, § 1.

BENEFIT OF CLERGY. In its original sense, the phrase denoted the exemption which was accorded to clergymen from the jurisdiction of the secular courts, or from arrest or attachment on criminal process issuing from those courts in certain partic-ular cases. Afterwards, it meant a privilege of exemption from the punishment of death accorded to such persons as were clerks, or who could read. This privilege of exemption from capital punishment was anciently allowed to clergymen only, but afterwards to all who were connected with the church, even to its most subordinate of-ficers, and at a still later time to all persons who could read, (then called "clerks,") whether ec-clesiastics or laymen. It does not appear to have been extended to cases of high treason, nor did it apply to mere misdemeanors. The privilege was claimed after the person’s conviction, by a species of motion in arrest of judgment, techni-cally called "praying his clergy." As a means of testing his clerical character, he was given a psalm to read, (usually, or always, the fifty-first,) and, upon his reading it correctly, he was turned over to the ecclesiastical courts, to be tried by the bishop or a jury of twelve clerks. These heard him on oath, with his witnesses and compurga. tors, who attested their belief in his innocence. This privilege operated greatly to mitigate the ex-treme rigor of the criminal laws, but was found to involve such gross abuses that parliament began to enact that certain crimes should be felonies "without benefit of clergy," and finally, by St. 7 Geo. IV. c. 28, § 6, it was altogether abolished. The act of congress of April 30, 1790, c. 9, § 31, 1 Stat. 119, provided that there should be no benefit of clergy for any capital crime against the United States, and, if this privilege formed a part of the common law of the several states before the Rev-olution, it no longer exists.

BENEFIT OF COUNSEL. The guaranty of "ben-efit of counsel" to accused, given in the Georgia Bill of Rights of Const. art. 1, § 1, par. 5, means more than the mere appointment by the court of counsel to represent the accused and implies also that such counsel be given a reasonable time for preparation to properly represent the accused at the trial. Reliford v. State, 140 Ga. 777, 79 S.E. 1128, 1129. Sheppard v. State, 165 Ga. 460, 141 S.E. 196, 198.

BENEFIT OF DISCUSSION. In the civil law. The right which a surety has to cause the prop-erty of the principal debtor to be applied in satis-faction of the obligation in the first instance. Civ.Code La. arts. 3045-3051. In Scotch law. That whereby the antecedent heir, such as the heir of line in a pursuit against the heir of tall-zie, etc., must be first pursued to fulfill the de-funct’s deeds and pay his debts. This benefit is likewise competent in many cases to cautioners.

BENEFIT OF DIVISION. Same as beneficiurn divisionis (q. v.).

BENEFIT OF INVENTORY. In the civil law. The privilege which the heir obtains of being fia-ble for the charges and debts of the succession, only to the value of the effects of the succession, by causing an inventory of there effects within the time and manner prescribed by law. Civil Code La. art. 1032.

BENEFIT OF ORDER. See Beneficium Ordinis.

BENEFIT SOCIETIES. Under this and several similar names, in various states, corporations ex-ist to receive periodical payments from members, and hold them as a fund to be loaned or given to members needing pecuniary relief. Such are beneficial societies of Maryland, fund associations of Missouri, loan and fund associations of Massa-chusetts, mechanics’ associations of Michigan, pro-tection societies of New Jersey. Friendly societies in Great Britain are a still more extensive and important species belonging to this class. Comm. v. Equitable Ben. Ass’n, 137 Pa. 412, 18 A. 1112.

BENERTIL. A feudal service rendered by the tenant to his lord with plow and cart. Cowell.

BENEVOLENCE. The doing of a kind or helpful action towards another, under no obligation ex-cept an ethical one.

The love of humanity; the desire to promote its prosperity or happiness. The term includes acts of well-wishing towards others, for the promotion of general happiness, and plans actuated by love of others and a desire for their well-being. In re Peabody’s Estate, 208 N.Y.S. 664, 671, 124 Misc. 338. Also beneficent; doing well.
It ís a broader term than "charity" which ít includes, and with which it is frequently used synonymously. "Charity" in its legal sense implies giving without con-. sideration or expectation of return, and "benevolence" ap-plies to any act which is prompted by or has for its object the well-being of others. State v. Texas Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Texas, Tex.Civ.App., 51 S.W.2d 405, 410.
In public law. Nominally a voluntary gratuity given by subjects to their king, but in reality a tax or forced loan. Cowell; 1 Bla.Comm. 140.

BENEVOLENT. Philanthropic; humane; having a desire or purpose to do good to nien; intended for the conferring of benefits, rather than for gain or profit; loving others and actively desirous of their well being. In re Altman’s Estate, 149 N.Y.S. 601, 605, 87 Misc. 255.
This word ls certainly more indeflnite, and of far wider range, than "charitable" or "religious ;" it would include all gifts prompted by good-will or kind feeling towards the recipient, whether an object of charlty or not. The natural and usual meaning of the word would so extend it. It has no legal meaning separate from its usual meaníng. "Charitable" has acquired a settled limited meaning in law, which confines it within known limits. But in all the decislons in England on the subject it has been heid that a devise or bequest for benevolent objects, or ín trust to give to such objects, is too indeflnite, and therefore void. Suter v. Hilliard, 132 Mass. 413, 42 Am.Rep. 444;
This word, as applied to objects or purposes, may refer to those which are in their nature charitable, and may also have a broader meaning’and include objects and pur-poses not charitable in the legal sense of that word. Acts of kindness, friendshlp, forethought, or good-will inight propérly be described as benevolent. It has therefore been heid that gifts to trustees to be applied for "benevolent purposes" at their discretion, or to such benevolent pur-poses as they could agree upon, do not create a public char-ity. But where the word is used in connection with other words explanatory of its meaning, and indicating the ín-tent of the donor to limit It to purposes strictly charitable, it has been heid to be synonyrnous with, or equivalent to, "charitable." Suter v. Hilliard, 132 Mass. 412, 42 Am.Rep. 444;

BENEVOLENT ASSOCLATIONS. Those having a philanthropic or charitable purpose, as distin-guished from such as are conducted for profit; specifically, "benefit associations" or "beneficial associations." Methodist Episcopal Church Bara-ca Club v. City of Madison, 167 Wis. 207, 167 N. W. 258, L.R.A.1918D, 1124.

BENEVOLENT CORPORATION. One that min-isters to all; the purpose may be anything that promotes the mental, physical, or spiritual wel-fare of man. Society of Helpers of Holy Souls v. Law, 267 Mo. 667, 186 S.W. 718, 725; with respect to exemption from succession tax. Corbin v. American Industrial Bank & Trust Co., 95 Conn. 50, 110 A. 459, 461. The term may include a cor-poration to which a bequest is made to be used in the improvement of the social, physical, and eco-nomic condition of the employees of a business corporation. In re Altman’s Estate, 149 N.Y.S. 601, 605, 87 Misc. 255.

BENEVOLENT SOCIETY. Benevolent associa-tion. Spring Park Ass’n v. Rosedale Park Amuse-ment Co., 216 Ala. 549, 114 So. 43, 44. In English law, "benevolent societies" are societies estab-lished and registered under the Friendly Societies Act, 1875, for any charitable or benevolent pur-poses.

BENEVOLENTIA REGIS HABENDA. The form iCi ancient fines and submissions to purchase the king’s pardon and favor in order to be restored to place, title or estate. Paroch.Antiq. 172.

BENHURST. In Berkshire,- a remedy for the in-habitants thereof to levy money recovered against them on the statute of hue and cry. 39 Eliz. c. 25.

BENIGNE FACIENDM SUNT INTERPRETA-TIONES CHARTARUM, UT RES MAGIS VA-LEAT QUAM PEREAT; ET QUIE LIBET CON-CESSIO

FORTISSIME CONTRA DONATOREM INTERPRETANDA EST. Liberal interpretations are to be made of deeds, so that the purpose may rather stand than fall; and every grant is to be taken most strongly against the grantor. Hayes v. Kershow, 1 Sandf.Ch. (N.Y.) 258, 268.

BENIGNE FACIENDiE SUNT INTERPRETA-TIONES, PROPTER SIMPLICITATEM LAICOR-UM, UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT; ET VERBA INTENTIONI, NON E CONTRA, DE-BENT INSERVIRE. Constructions [of written instruments] are to be made liberally, on account of the simplicity of the laity, [or common peo-ple,1 in order that the thing [or subject-matter] may rather have effect than perish, [or become voidl ; and words must be subject to the inten-tion, not the intention to the words. 2 Bla.Com. 379; 1 Bulstr. 175; Krider v. Lafferty, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 315.

BENIGNIOR SENTENTIA IN VERBIS GEN-. ERALIBUS SEU DUI3IIS, EST PRJEFERENDA. The more favorable construction is to be placed on general or doubtful expressions. 2 Kent 557.

BENIGNIUS LEGES INTERPRETAND/E SUNT QUO VOLUNTAS EARUM CONSERVETUR. Laws are to be more liberally interpreted, in order that their intent may be preserved. Dig. 1, 3, 18.

BENZINE. A crude petroleum distillate. George K. Hale Mfg. Co. v. Hafleigh & Co., C.C.A.Pa., 52 F.2d 714, 718.

BEQUEATIL To give personal property by will to another. Fielding v. Alkire, 124 Kan. 592, 261 P. 597, 599. It therefore is distinguishable from "devise," which is property used of realty. Stubbs v. Abel, 114 Or. 610, 233 P. 852, 857; Fleck v. Harmstad, 155 A. 875, 876, 304 Pa. 302, 77 A.L.R. 874.
But if the context clearly shows the intention of the testator to use the word "bequeath" as synonymous with "devise." it may be held to pass real property. Stubbs v. Abel, 114 Or. 610, 233 P. 852, 859.

BEQUEST. A gift by will of personal property; a legacy. In re Fratt’s Estate, 60 Mont. 526, 199 P. 711, 714; In re Wood’s Estate, 6 N.W.2d 846, 848, 232 Iowa 1004; Disposition of realty in will is termed "devise." Grand Island Trust Co. v. Snell, 249 N.W. 293, 125 Neb. 148.
The term does not mean a "gift" in the narrow sense of a voluntary act of charlty or good will, but ordinarily means a testaméntary disposition of the testator’s person-alty. First Presbyterian Church of Mt. Vernon v. Dennis, 178 Iowa, 1352, 161 N.W. 183, 185, L.R.A.1917C, 1005. It is not necessarily limited to a gratuity, and may include a recompense. U. S. v. Merriam, 44 S.Ct. 69, 70, 263 U.S. 179, 68 L.Ed. 240, 29 A.L.R. 1547.
"Bequest" and "devise" are often used synonymously. In re McGovern’s Estate, 77 Mont. 182, 250 P. 812, 817.

Conditional Bequest

One the taking effect or continuing of which de-pends upon the happening or non-occurrence of a particular event. Merrill v. College, 74 Wis. 415, 43 N.W. 104.

Executory Bequest

The bequest of a future, deferred, or contingent interest in personalty.

Residuary Bequest

A gift of all the remainder of the testator’s personal estate, alter payment of debts and lega-cies, etc.

Specific Bequest

One whereby the testator gives to the legatee all his property of a certain class or kind; as all his pure personalty.

BERAT. Also barca. A warrant or patent of dignity or privilege given by an Oriental monarch. Cent. Dict.

BERBIAGE. A rent paid for the pasturing of sheep. Wharton.

BERCARIA. In old English law, a sheepfold; also a place where the bark of trees was laid to tan.

BERCARIUS, or BERCATOR. A shepherd.

BEREWICHA, or BEREWICA. In old English law. A term used in Domesday for a village or hamlet belonging to some town or manor.

BERG. A rock (Cent. Dict.); a hill (Wharton) ; in South Africa, a mountain (Webster).

BERGHMAYSTER. An officer having charge of a mine. A bailiff or chief officer among the Der-byshire miners, who, in addition to his other du-ties, executes the office of coroner among them. Blount; Cowell.

BERGHMOTH, or BERGHMOTE. The ancient name of the court now called "barmote," (q. v.).

BERIA, SERIE, or BERRY. A plain; a large open field. Wharton. See Berra.

BERM BANK. A ledge at the bottom of a cutting or bank, as of a creek, to catch earth that may roll down the slope, or to strengthen the bank. Miller v. State, 149 N.Y.S. 788, 789, 164 App.Div. 522.

BERNET. In Saxon law. Burning; the crime of house burning, now called "arson." Cowell; Blount.

BERRA. In old law. A plain; open heath. Cow-ell.

BERRY, or BURY. A villa or seat of habitation of a nobleman; a dwelling or mansion house; a sanctuary.

BERTILLON SYSTEM. A method of anthropom-etry (q. v.), used chiefly for the identification of criminals and other persons, consisting of the tak-ing and recording of a system of numerous, mi-nute, and uniform measurements of various parts of the human body, absolutely and in relation to each other, the facial, cranial, and other angles, and of any eccentricities or abnormalities noticed in the individual.

BERTON. A large farm; the barn-yard of a large farm.

BES. Lat. In the Roman law. A division of the as, or pound, consisting of eight uncid;, or duo-decimal parts, and amounting to two-thirds of the as. 2 Bl.Comm. 462 note m.
Two-thirds of an inheritance. Inst. 2, 14, 5. , Eight per cent. interest. 2 Bl.Comm. ubi supra.

BESAILE, BESAYLE. The great-grandfather, proavus. 1 BLComm. 186.

BESAYEL, Besaiel, Besayle. In old English law. A writ which lay where a great-grandfather died seised of lands and tenements in lee-simple, and on ‘the day of his death a stranger abated, or en-teréd and kept out the heir. Reg.Orig. 226; Fitzh. Nat.Brev. 221 D; 3 l31.Comm. 186.

RESIDES. In addition to; moreover; also; like-wise. State v. State Road Commission, 100 W.Va. 531, 131 S.E. 7, 10.
In provisions in a will for children "besides" an eldest son, no children take unless there be a son. 4 Dr. & War. 235.

BESEECH. To entreat; to emplore. Tiencken v. Zerbst, 196 S.C. 438, 13 S.E.2d 483, 484.

BESOIN. Fr. Need. See Au Besoin.

BESOT. To stupefy, to make duli or senseless, to make to dote; and "to dote" is to be delirious, silly, or insane. Gates v. Meredith, 7 Ind. 440, 441.

BESS. A well-known contraction of "Elizabeth." H. R. & C. Co. v. Smith, 208 N.Y.S. 396, 400, 212 App.Div. 173.

BESSEMERIZING. A process by which copper relatively pure is obtained from matte. Peirce-Smith Converter Co. v. United Verde Copper Co., D.C.Del., 293 F. 108, 109.

BEST. Of the highest quality; of the greatest usefulness for the purpose intended. For ex-ample:
The "best bid" of interest by a prospective depositan, of school funds would not necessarily be the highest bid, but, looking to the solvency of the bidder, the bond tendered, and all the circumstances surrounding the transaction, the safety and preservation of the school fund, the "best bid" mlght be the lowest bid. Donna Independent School Dist. v. First State Bank of Donna, Tex.Civ.App., 227 S.W. 974, 975.
Where one covenants to use bis "best endeavors," there is no breach if he is prevented by causes wholly beyond his control and without any default on his part. 7 H. & N. 92.
The "best interests" of a child whose custody is In ques-tion has reference more particularly te the moral welfare than to mere comforts, benefits, or advantages that wealth can give. Jones v. Moore, 61 Utah, 383, 213 P. 191, 194. The "best interests" of an estate mean the greatest or most advantage or usefulness to such estate. Stockyards Nat. Bank of South Omaha v. Bragg, 67 Utah, 60, 245 P. 966, 971.

BEST EVIDENCE. Primary evidence, as distin-guished from secondary: original, as distin-guished from substitutionary; the best and high-est evidence of which the nature of the case is sus-ceptible, not the highest or strongest evidence which the nature of the thing to be proved admits of. See, also, Primary Evidente.
A written instrument is itself always regarded as the primary or best possible evidence of its existence and contents; a copy, or the recollection of a witness, would be secondary evidence. Manhattan Malting Co. v. Swete-land, 14 Mont. 269, 36 P. 84.
"Best evidence" or "primary evidence" includes the best evidence which is available toa party and procurable un-der the existing situation, and ad1 evidence falling short of such standard, and which in its nature suggests there is bettei. evidence of the same fact, is "secondary evidence." Best v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., Mo.App., 299 S.W. 118, 120.
The best evidence of a fact Is the testimony of a persa!) who knows. State v. Normandale, 154 La. 523, 97 So. 798, 799 (mother could testify to the date of her daughter’s birth, as against an objection that the baptismal certifi-cate or the registry was the best evidence).
"Best evidence rule". Is that highest available degree of proof must be produced. Cheadle v. Bardwell, 95 Mont. 299, 26 P.2d 336. It means that no evidence which is mere-ly substitutionary in its nature shall be received so long as original evidence can be had ; Pettit v. Campbell, Tex.Civ. App., 149 S.W.2d 633, 635, 636; that contents of document must be preved by producing document itself. Nunan v. Timberlake, 85 F.2d 407, 410, 66 App.D.C. 150.

BESTIA. A beast, as a being without reason; —opposed to man; while animal, a living being, includes man also. Adams Gloss., citing Just. Inst., 2, 1, 12.

BESTIAE CARUCAE. Beasts of the plow. Ad-ams Gloss., citing Fleta, IV, c. 17, § 14.

BESTIALITY. A sexual connection between a human being and a brute of the opposite sex. State v. Poole, 122 P.2d 415, 416, 59 Ariz. 44.
At common law the terco "crime against nature" em-braced both "sodomy" and "bestiality", State v. Poole, 122 P.2d 415, 416, 59 Ariz. 44. See Sodomy.

BESTOW. To give, grant, confer, or impart; not necessarily limited in meaning te "devise." Tillett v. Nixon, 180 N.C. 195, 104 S.E. 352, 355.

BET. An agreement between two or more per-sons that a sum of money or other valuable thing, to which all jointly contribute, shall become the solo property of one or some of them on the happcning in the future of an event at present un-certain, or according as a question disputed be-tween them is settled in one way or the other. Coulter y. State, 122 Tex.Cr.R. 9, 53 S.W.2d 477, 480.
A contract by which two or more parties agree that a sum of money, or other thing, shall be paid or delivered to ene of them on the happening or not happening of an un-certain event. Grooms v. Knox, 25 Ala.App. 185, 142 So. 582.
In a "bet" or "wager" money belongs to the persons-posting it, each of whom has a chance to win it, but, in the case of a "purse" or "premium," money belongs to the person offering it, who has no chance to win it, but is cer-tain to lose it. Toomey v. Penwell, 76 Mont. 166, 245 P. 943, 945, 45 A.L.R. 993.
Bet and wagtr are synonymous terms. Woodcock v. Me-Queen, 11 Ind. 16; Shutnate v. Com., 15 Grat. (Va.) 660.

BETHLEHEM. See Bedlam.

BETTING BOOK. A book kept for registering bets on the result of a race as operated on race track. In a broader sense, the "betting book" is that book which enables the professional bettor to carry on his business, and to promote a race, and it includes the book, the making book and the bookmaker. State v. Austin, 142 La. 384, 76 So. 809, 810; People v. Semmler, 345 Ill. 272, 178 N.E. 100, 101.

BETRAYAL. A "hetrayal," as of a professional secret on the part of a physician, signifies a wrongful disclosure in violation of the trust im-posed by the patient. Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831, 832, 9 A.L.R. 1250.

BETROTHED. One who has :exchanged promises to marry. The term may be synonymous with "in-tended wif e." Mace v. Grand Lodge, A. O. U. W. of Massachusetts, 234 Mass. 299, 125 N.E. 569.

BETROTHMENT, BETROTHAL. Mutual prom-ise of marriage; the plighting of troth; a mutual promise or contract between a man and woman competent to make it, to marry at a future time.

BETTER DESCRIBED. More fully delineated or more fully pictured or painted. Katzin v. Kru-vant, 99 N.J.Eq. 619, 133 A. 516, 517.

BETTER EQUITY. See Equity.

BETTERMENT. An improvement put upon an estate which enhances its value more than mere repairs. The improvement may be either tempo-rary or permanent. People v. Klee, 282 III. 440, 118 N.E. 754, 757.
Also applied to denote the additional value which an es-tate acquires le consequence of some public improvement, as laying out or widening a street, etc., Chase v. Sioux City, 86 Iowa, 603, 53 N.W. 333.

BETTERMENT ACTS. Statutes which provide that a bona fide occupant of real estate making lasting improvements in good faith shall have a lien upon the estate recovered by the real owner to the extent that his improvements have in-creased the value of the land. Also called "oc-cupying claimant acts." Jones v. Hotel Co., 86 F. 386, 30 C.C.A. 108.

BETWEEN. A space which separates. Hobson v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 161 Tenn. 419, 32 S. W.2d 1046. Strictly applicable only with refer-ence to two things, but this may be understood as including cases in which a number of things are discriminated collectively as two wholes, or as tak-en in pairs, or where one thing is set off against a number of others. In re McShane’s Will, 286 N.Y.S. 680, 682, 158 Misc. 777. Sometimes used synonymously with "among". In re Moore’s Es-tate, 157 Pa.Super. 296, 43 A.2d 359.
As a measure or indication of distante, this word has the effect of excludíng the two termini. Morris & E. R. Co. v. Central R. Co., 31 N.J.Law, 212.
If an act is to be done "between" two certain days, It must be performed before the commencement of the latter day. In computing the time in such a case, both the days named are to be exciuded. Hodges v. Filstrup, 94 Fla. 943, 114 So. 521, 522. But a clause In a contract of sale to the effect that the purchaser could require the vendor to repur-chase between the flfth and sixth year from a certain date means during the sixth year. Van Demark v. California Home Extension Ass’n, 43 Cal.App. 685, 185 P. 866, 868.
In case of a devise to A. and B. "between them," these words create a tenancy in common. Lashbrook v. Cock, 2 Mer. 70.
Between equal equities the law must prevail. This is hardly of general application.

BEVERAGE. A liquor or liquid for drinking. Burnstein v. U. S., C.C.A.Cal., 55 F.2d 599, 603. Especially pleasant or refreshing drink, or a ha-bitual one. Tennant v. F. C. Whitney & Sons, 133 Wash. 581, 234 P. 666, 670.
This term is properly used to distinguish a sale of liquors to be drunk for the pleasure of drinking, from liquors te be drunk in obedience to a physician’s advice, Falstaff Corporation v. Alíen, D.C.Mo., 278 F. 643, 645; or from a liquid which it is possible to swallow, but which is not rea-sonably palatable or flt for drinking, Tennant v. F. C. Whitney & Sons, 133 Wash. 581, 234 P. 666. Thus, ít is held that pure alcohol is not a "beverage" but a violent írritant. Chas. L. Joy & Co. v. Carlson, 28 Idaho 445, 154 P. 640, 641.
This term sornetimes has a narrower meaning signify-ing a drink artificially prepared. Clímax Dairy Co. v. Mulder, 78 Colo. 407, 242 P. 666, 669. United States v. Rob-aron, D.C.Kan., 38 F.Supp. 991, 992.

BEWARED. O. Eng. Expended. Before the Britons and Saxons had introduced the general use of money, they traded chiefly by exchange of wares. Wharton.

BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. In evi-dence means fully satisfied, entirely convinced, satisfied to a moral certainty; State v. Harris, 28 S.E.2d 232, 237, 223 N.C. 697; and phrase is the equivalent of the words olear, precise and indubi-table. Ferguson Packing Co. v. Mihalic, 99 Pa.Su-per. 158, 162.
An accused’s guilt must be established "beyond a rea-sonable doubt," which means that facts proven must, by virtue of their probative force, establish guilt. People ex rel. Schubert v. Pinder, 9 N.Y.S.2d 311, 312, 170 Mlsc. 345.

BEYOND SEA. Beyond the limits of the kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland; outside the United States; out of the state.
Beyond sea, beyond the four seas, beyond the seas, and out of the realm, are synonymous. Prior to the union of the two crowns of England and Scotland, on the accession of James I., the phrases "beyond the four seas," "beyond the seas," and "out of the realm," signifled out of the limlts of the realm of England. Pancoast’s Lessee v. Addi-son, 1 Har. & J. (Md.) 350, 2 Am.Dec. 520.
In Pennsylvania, it has been construed to mean "with-out the limits of the United States," which approaches the literal signification. Ward v. Hallarla, 2 Hall. 217, 1 L.rd. 355. The same construction has been given to it in Mis-souri. Keeton’s Heirs v. Keeton’s Adm’r, 20 Mo. 530. See Ang.Lim. §§ 200, 201.

BIAS. Inclination; bent; prepossession; a pre-conceived opinion; a predisposition to decide a cause or an issue in a certain way, which does not leave the mind perfectly open to conviction. Maddox v. State, 32 Ga. 587, 79 Am.Dec. 307; Pier-son v. State, 18 Tex.App. 558. To incline to one side. Yarbrough v. Mallory, 225 Ala. 579, 144 So. 447, 448. Condition of mind, which sways judg-ment and renders judge unable to exercise his functions impartially in particular case. Evans v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County, 107 Cal.App. 372, 290 P. 662, 665.
As used in law regarding disqualification of judge, refers to mental attitude or disposition of the judge toward a party to the litigation, and not to any views that he may entertain regarding the subject matter involved. State ex rel. Mitchell v. Sage Stores Co., 157 Kan. 622, 143 P.2d 652, 655.
Actual bias consists In the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror which satistles the court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, that the juror cannot try tile issues impartially and without prejudice to the substantlal rIghts of the party challenging. People v. Wells, 100 Cal. 227, 34 P. 718.

BIBLE. See Family Bible.

BICAMERAL SYSTEM. A term applied by Jere-my Bentham to the division of a legislative body into two chambers, as in the United States gov-ernment.

BID. An offer by an intending purchaser to pay a designated price for property which is about to be sold at auction. U. S. v. Vestal, D.C.N.C., 12 F. 59. Payne v. Cave, 3 Term, 149; Eppes v. Rail-road Co., 35 Ala. 56. See Chilling a sale.
An offer to perform a contract for work and labor or supplying materials at a specified price.
Simllarly, an offer to do any of various other acts, as the payment by a bank of a particular rete of Interest for the privilege of becoming a depositary of county funds. Casey v. Independence County, 109 Ark. 11, 159 S.W. 24, 25, Ann. Cas.1915C, 1008. A "bid" for bonds Is no more nor less than a propositIon. Joint School Dist. No. 132 in Major County and Alfalfa County v. Dabney, 127 Okl. 234, 260 P. 486, 491.
—Bid in. Property sold at auction is said to be "bid in" by the owner or an incumbrancer or some one else who is interested in it, when he attends the sale and makes the successful bid.
—Bid off. One is said to "bid off" a thing when he bids for it at an auction sale, and it is knocked down to him in immediate succession to the bid and as a consequence of it. Eppes v. Railroad Co., 35 Ala. 56; Doudna, v. Harlan, 45 Kan. 484, 25 Pac. 883.
—Bidder. One who makes a bid. One who offers to pay a specified price for an article offered for sale at a public auction. Webster v. French, 11 III. 254. As to "Responsible bidder" see that title.

—Biddings. Offers of a designated price for goods or other property put up for sale at auction.
—By-bidding. In the law relating to sales by auc-tion, this term is equivalent to "puffing." The practice consists in making fictitious bids for the property, under a secret arrangement with the owner or auctioneer, for the purpose of mislead-ing and stimulating other persons who are bidding in good faith.
—Competitive bidding. "Competitive bidding" means that the council must by due advertise-ment give opportunity for everyone to bid, but does not mean that more than one bid must be submitted. Blanton v. Town of Wallins, 218 Ky. 295, 291 S.W. 372, 375. The term means bidding upon the same undertaking, upon the same ma-terial items in the subject-matter, upon the same thing. Leininger v. Ward, 126 Okl. 114, 258 P. 863, 864.
—Upset bid. A bid made after a judicial sale, but before the successful bid at the sale has been con-firmed, larger or better than such successful bid, and made for the purpose of upsetting the sale and securing to the "upset bidder" the privilege of taking the property at his bid or competing at a new sale. Yost v. Porter, 80 Va. 858.

BIDAL, or BIDALL. An invitation of friends to drink ale at the house of some poor man, who hopes thereby to be relieved by charitable con-tribution. It is something like "house-warming," i. e., a visit of friends to a person beginning to set up housekeeping. Wharton. See Bed-Ale.
"There was an antient Custom called a Bid-Ale * * * when any honest Man decayed in his Estate, was set up again by the liberal Benevo-lence and Contributions of Friends at a Feast, to which those Friends were bid or invited. It was most used in the West of England, and in some Counties called a Help Ale." Brand’s Pop. Antiq. (1777), p. 339, note.

BIELBRIEF. Germ. In European maritime law. A document furnished by the builder of a vessel, containing a register of her admeasurement, par-ticularizing the length, breadth, and dimensions of every part of the ship.
It sometimes also contains the terms of akreement be-tween the party for whose account the ship 1s built, and the ship-builder. It has been termed in English the "grand bill of sale ;" in French, "contrat de construction ou de la vente d’un vaisseau," and corresponds In a great degree with the Engllsh, French, and American "register," (q,
being an equally essential document to the lawful owner-ship of vessels. Jac. Sea Laws, 12, 13, and note. In the Danish law, it is used to denote the contract of bottomry.

BIENES. Sp. In Spanish law. Goods; property of every description, including real as well as personal property; all things (not being persons) which may serve for the uses of man. Larkin v. U. S., 14 Fed.Cas. 1154.
—Bienes comunes. Common property; those things which, not being the private property of any person, are open to the use of all, such as the air, rain, water, the sea and its beaches. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 315, 10 Pac. 707.

—Bienes gananciales. A species of community in property enjoyed by husband and wife, the prop-erty being divisible equally between them on the dissolution of the marriage; does not include what they held as their separate property at the time of contracting the marriage. Welder v. Lambert, 91 Tex. 510, 44 S.W. 281.
—Bienes publicos. Those things which, as to prop-erty, pertain to the people or nation, and, as to their use, to the individuals of the territory or district, such as rivers, sliores, ports, and public roads. Lux v. IIaggin, 69 Cal. 315, 10 P. 707.

BIENNIALLY. This term, in a sta.tute, signifies, not duration of time, but a period fbr the happen-ing of an event; (ince in every two years. People v. Tremain, 9 Hun (N.Y.) 576; People y. Kilbourn, 68 N.Y. 479.

BIENS. In English law. Property of every de-scription, except estates of freehold and inheri-tance. Sugd.Vend. 495; Co.Litt. 119b.
In French law. This term includes all kinds of property, real and personal. Biens are divided into biens meubles, movable property; and biens immeubles, immovable property. The distinction between movable and immovable property is rec-ognized by the continental jurists, and gives rise, in the civil as well as in the common law, to many important distinctions as to rights and remedies. Story, Confl.Laws, § 13, note 1. Castle V. Castle, C.C.A.Hawaii, 267 F. 521, 523.

BIGA, or BIGATA. A cart or chariot drawn with two horses, coupled side to side; but it is said to be properly a cart with two wheels, sometimes drawn by one horse; and in the ancient records it is used for any cart, wain, or wagon. Jacob.

BIGAMUS. In the civil law. A man who was twice married; one who at different times and successively has married two wives. 4 Inst. 88. One who has two wives living. One who marries a widow.
Used in ecclesiastical matters as a reason for denying benefit of the clergy. Termes de la Ley.

BIGAMUS SEU TRIGAMUS, ETC., EST QUI DI-VERSIS TEMPORIBUS ET SUCCESSIVÉ DUAS SEU TRES UXORES HABUIT. 4 Inst. 88. A big-amus or trigamus, etc., is one who at different times and successively has married two or three wives.

BIGAMY. The criminal offense of willfully and knowingly contracting a second marriage (or go-ing through the form of a second marriage) while the first marriage, to the knowledge of the of-fender, is still subsisting and undissolved. Scog-gins v. Stal e, 32 Ark. 213; People v. Manfredonio, 191 N.Y.S. 748, 117 Misc. 632, 39 N.Y.Cr.R. 41.
The state of a man who has two wives, or of a woman who has two husbands, living at the same time. State v. Lindsey, 26 N.M. 526, 194 P. 877. Farewell v. Commonwealth, 189 S.E. 321, 323, 167 Va. 475.

The offense of having a plurality of wives at the same time is commonly denominated "polygamy;" but the name "bigamy" has been more freonently given to it in legal proceedings. 1 Russ.Crimes, 185.
The use of the word "bigamy" to describe this offense 15 well established by long usage. although often criticized as a corruption of the trae meaning of the word. Polygamy is suggested as the correct terin, instead of bigamy, to designate the offense of having a plurality of wives or hus-bands at the same time, and has been adopted for that purpose in the Massachusetts statutes. But as the sub-stance of the offense is marrying a second time, while having a lawful husband or wife living, without regard to the number of marriages that may have taken place, biga-my seems not an inappropriate terco. The objection to its use urged by Blackstone (4 BI.Cornm. 163) seems to be founded not so much upon considerations of the etymolog,y of the word as upon the propriety of distinguishing the ec-clesiastical offense termed "bigamy" in the canon law, and which is defined below, from the offense known as "big-amy" in the modem criminal law. The same distinction is carefully made by Lord Coke, (4 Inst. 88.) But, the ec-clesiastical offense being now obsolete, this reason for sub-stituting polygamy to denote the crime here defined ceas-es to have weight. Abbótt.
In the canon law, the term denoted the offense committed by an ecclesiastic who married two wives successively. It might be committed either by marrying a second wife after the death of a first or by marrying a widow.

BIGOT. An obstinate person, or one that is wed-ded to an opinion, in matters of religion, etc.

BILAGINES. By-laws of towns; municipal laws.

BILAN. A term used in Louisiana, derived from the French. A book in which bankers, merchants, and trailers write a statement of all they owe and all that is due them; a balance-sheet. See Dauph-in v. Soulie, 3 Mart. (N.S.) 446.

BILANCIIS DEFERENDIS. In English law. An obsolete writ addressed to a corporation for the carrying of weights to such a haven, there to weigh the wool anciently licensed for transporta-tion. Reg.Orig. 270.

BILATERAL CONTRACT. A term, used original-ly in the civil law, but now generally adopted, de-noting a contract in which both the contracting parties are bound to fulfill obligations reciprocally towards each other; as a contract of sale, where one becomes bound to deliver the thing sold, and the other to pay the price of it. Montpelier Semi-nary v. Smith, 69 Vt. 382, 38 A. 66. A contract executory on both sides, National Surety Co. v. City of Atlanta, 102 S.E. 175, 176, 24 Ga.App. 732, and one which includes both rights and duties on each side, Crane Ice Cream Co. v. Terminal Freezing & Hea ting Co., 147 Md. 588, 128 A. 280, 282, 39 A.L.R. 1184. One containing mutual prom-ises bctween parties; each panty bt‘ing both prorn-isor and promisee. Aden v. Dalton, 341 Mo. 454, 107 S.W.2d 1070, 1073.
"Every convention properly so called consists of a prom.- ise br mutual promises proffered and accepted. Where ene only of the agrceing parties gives a promise, the conven-tion is said to be ‘unilateral.’ Wherever mutual promises are proffered and accepted, there are, in strictness, two or more conventions. But where the performance of eith-er of the promises is made to depend on the performance of the other, the several conventions are commonly deemed one convention and the convention is then said to be ‘bi-lateral.’ " Aust.Jur. § 308.
See, also, Contract.

BILBOES. A device used for punishment at sea, similar to the stocks (q. v.) on land.

BILGED. In admiralty law and marine insur-ance. That state or condition of a vessel in which water is freely admitted through holes and breaches made in the planks of the bottom, occa-sioned by injuries, whether the ship’s timbers are broken or not. Peele v. Insurance Co., 3 Mason, 27, 39, 19 Fed.Cas. 103.

BILINE. A word used by Britton in the sense of "collateral." En line biline, in the collateral line. Britt, c. 119.

BILINGUIS. Of a double language or tongue; that can speak two languages. A term applied in the old books to a jury composed partly of Eng-lishmen and partly of foreigners, which, by the English law, an alien party to a suit is, in certain cases, entitled to; more commonly called a "jury de niedietate linguce." 3 Bl.Comm. 360; 4 Steph. Comm. 422.

BILL. A formal declaration, complaint, or state-ment of particular things in writing.
As a legal term, this word has many meanings and applications, the more important of which are enumerated below.

1. A formal written statement of complaint to a court of justice

In the ancient practice of the court of king’s bench, the usual and orderly method of beginning an action was by a bill, or original bill, or plaint. This was a written statement of the plaintiff’s cause of action, like a declaration or complaint, and always alleged a trespass as the ground of it, in order to give the court jurisdiction. 3 Sl.Comm. 43.
In Scotch law, every summary application in wríting, by way of petition to the Court of Ses-sion, is called a "bill." Cent. Dict.
—Bill chamber. In Scotch law. A department of the court of session in which petitions for sus-pension, interdict, etc., are entertained. It is equivalent to sittings in chambers in the English and American practice. Paters. Comp.
—BM of privilege. In old English law. A method of proceeding against attorneys and officers of the court not Hable to arrest. 3 Bl.Comm. 289.
—Bill of proof. In English practice. The name given, in the mayor’s court of London, to a species of intervention by a third person laying claim to the subject-matter in dispute between the parties to a suit.

2. A species of writ

A formal written declaration by a court to its officers, in the nature of process.

—Bill of Middlesex. An old form of process sim-ilar to a capias, issued out of the court of king’s bench in personal actions, directed to the sheriff of the county of Middlesex, (hence *the name,) and commanding him to take the defendant and have him before the king at Westminster on a day named, to answer the plaintiff’s complaint.

3. A formal written petition

To a superior court for action to be taken in a cause already determined, or a record or certified account of the proceedings in such action or some portion thereof, accompanying such a petition.
—Bill of advocation. In Scotch practice. A bill by which the judgment of an inferior court is ap-
pealed from, or brought under review of a su-perior. Bell.
—Bill of certiorari. A bill, the object of which is to remove a suit in equity from some inferior court to the court of chancery, or some other su-perior court of equity, on account of some alleged incompetency of the inferior court, or some injus-
tice in its proceedings. Story, Eq.Pl. (5th Ed.) 298.
—Bill of evidence. Stenographer’s transcript of testimony heard at trial and may be considered on appeal as bill of exceptions. Spencer v. Common-wealth, 250 Ky. 370, 63 S.W.2d 288.
—BM of exceptions. A formal statement in writ-ing of the objections or exceptions taken by a party during the trial of a cause to the decisions, rulings, or instructions of the trial judge, stating the objection, with the facts and circumstances on which it is founded, and, in order to attest its accuracy, signed and sealed by the judge; the object being to put the controverted rulings or decisions upon the record for the information of
the appellate court. Buessel v. U. S., C.C.A.Conn., 258 Fla. 811, 815.
it is designed to preserve and make a part of the record proceedings not otherwise of record. Yott v. Yott, 100 N. E. 902, 903, 257 El. 419; It is only that part of the proceed-ings not embraced in the judgment roll. When the ends of justice require it, the terms "bill of exceptions" and "statement of case" are regarded as synonymous; Shaw-nee Commercial College v. Aydelotte, 38 P.2d 579, 581, 170 Okl. 15.
"Bill of exceptions" and "transcripta of evidence," how-ever, are clearly distinguishable. The latter may contain no objection or exception, and nothing other than the evi-dence introduced on the trial; the former is, strictly speaking, only a record which points out alleged errors committed below in relation to evidence as well as other things. Broadway & Newport Bridge Co. v. Common-wealth, 173 Ky. 165, 190 S.W. 715, 719.

4. In equity practice

A formal written complaint, in the nature of a petition, addressed by a suitor in chancery to the chancellor or to a court of equity or a court having equitable jurisdiction, showing the narres of the parties, stating the facts which make up th, case and the complainant’s allegations, averrini that the acts disclosed are contrary to equity, and p-ay-ing for process and for specific relief, or for such relief as the circumstances demand. Sharon v. Sharon, 67 Cal. 185, 7 P. 456.
—Bill for a new trial. A bill in equity in which the specific relief asked is an injunction against the execution of a judgment rendered at law, and
a new trial in the actic, account of some fact which would render it inequitable to enforce the judgment, but which was not available to the-party on the trial at law, or which he was pre-vented from presenting by fraud or accident, with-out concurrent fraud or negligence on his own part.
—Bill for foreclosure. One which is filed by a mortgagee against the mortgagor, for the purpose of having the estate sold, thereby to obtain the sum mortgaged on the premises, with interest and costs. 1 Madd.Ch.Pr. 528.
—Bill for fraud. The object and effect of it, even if the fraud consists of want of notice, are to vacate the former decree, not to retry the case. Caldwell v. Huffstutter, 173 Tenn. 225, 116 S.W.2d 1017, 1019.
—Bill in aid of execution. A bill to set aside en-cumbrances or conveyances therein specified as fraudulent. Pape v. Pareti, 42 N.E.2d 361, 364, 315 Ill.App. 1; Dean v. Torrence, 299 N.W. 793, 796, 299 Mich. 24.
—Bill in nature of a bill of review. A bill in equity, to obtain a re-examination and reversal of a decree, filed by one who was not a party to the original suit, nor bound by the decree.
—Bill in nature of a bill of revivor. Where, on the abatement of a suit, there is such a transmis-sion of the interest of the incapacitated party that the title to it, as well as the person entitled, may be the subject of litigation in a court of chancery, the suit cannot be continued by a mere bill of revivor, but an original bill upon which the title may be litigated must be filed. This is called a "bill in the nature of a bill of revivor." It is founded on privity of es tate or title by the act of the party. And the nature and operation of the whole act by which the privity is creatéd is open to controversy. Story, Eq.P1. §§ 378-380; 2 Amer. & Eng.Enc.Law, 271.
—Bill in nature of a supplemental bill. A bill filed when new parties, with new interests, arising from events happening since the suit was com-menced, are brought bef ore the court; wherein it differs from a supplemental bill, which is property applicable to those cases only where the same parties or the same interests remain bef ore the court. Story, Eq.P1. (5th Ed.) § 345 et seq.
—Bill in nature of interpleader. See Bill of Inter-pleader.
—Bill of conformity. One filed by an executor or administrator, who finds the affairs of the de-ceased so much involved that he cannot safely administer the estate except under the direction of a court of chancery. This bill is filed against the creditors, generally, for the purpose of having all their claims adjusted, and procuring a final de-cree settling the order of payment of the assets. 1 Story, Eq.Jur. § 440.
—Bill of discovery. A proceeding by a party against an adversary for discoVery of facts within adversary’s knowledge, or discovery of documents, writings, or other things within his possession or power, to be used either offensively or defensively in a pending or contemplated action. Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Rawlins, Tex.Civ.App., 129 S. W.2d 485, 486; First Nat. Bank v. Dade-Broward Co., 171 So. 510, 125 Fla. 594.
In aid of action at law is equitable reinedy to enable litigant to obtain, prior to trial, such information as is in exclusive possession of adverse party and is necessary to establishment of complainant’s case. Yorkshire Worsted Milis v. National Transit Co., 325 Pa. 427, 190 A. 897, 898.
—Bill of information. Where a suit is instituted on behalf of the crown or government, or of those of whom it has the custody by virtue of its pre-rogative, or whose rights are under its particular protection, the matter of complaint is offered to the court by way of information by the attorney or solicitor general, instead of by petition. Where a suit immediately concerns the crown or govern-ment alone, the proceeding is purely by way of information, but, where it does not do so imme-diately, a relator is appointed, who is answerable for costs, etc., and, if he is interested in the mat-ter in connection with the crown or government, the proceeding is by information and bill. In-formations differ from bilis in little more than name and form, and the same rules are sub-stantially applicable to both. 3 Bl.Comm. 261.
—Bill of interpleader. The name of a bill in equity to obtain a settlement of a question of right to money or other property adversely claimed, in which the party filing the bill has no interest, al-though it may be in his hands, by compelling such adverse claimants to litigate the right or title be-tween themselves, and relieve him from liability or litigation. Republic Casualty Co. v. Fischmann, 99 N.J.Eq. 758, 134 A. 179, 180.
—Bill of peace. One which is filed when a person has a right which may be controverted by various persons, at different times, and by different ac-tions. Smith v. Cretors, 164 N.W. 338, 340, 181 Iowa 189.
—Bill of review. One which is brought to have a decree of the court reviewed, corrected, or re-versed. Dodge v. Northrop, 85 Mich. 243, 48 N.W. 505. It is in the nature of a writ of error. Rubin v. Midlinsky, 327 III. 89, 158 N.E. 395.
It is equitable procedure to procure explanation, altera-ton, or reversal of final decree by court which rendered it. People v. Sterling, 357 III. 354, 192 N.E. 229, 234.
The object of a "bu i of review" and of a bill in nature of a bill of revlew in the old chancery practice was to pro-cure a reversal, modification, or explanation of a decree in a former suit. Basa v. Sawyer, 159 Iowa 481, 141 N.W. 319, 32L A "bill of review," or a bill in the nature of a bill of review, are of three classes; those for error appearing on the face of the record, those for newly discovered evidence, and those for fraud impeaching the original transaction. Moore v. Shook, 276 III. 47, 114 N.E. 592, 593. Such bilis are peculiar to courts of equity at cornmon law. Satter-white v. State, 149 Ark. 147, 231 S.W. 886, 887.
—Bill of revivor. One which is brought to con-tinue a suit which has abated before its final con-summation, as, for example, by death, or marriage of a female plaintiff. Brooks v. Laurent, C.C.A. Fla., 98 F. 647, 39 C.C.A. 201.
—Bill of revivor and supplement. One which is a compound of a supplemental bill and bill of revivor, and not only continues the suit, which has abated by the death of the plaintiff, or the like, but supplies any defects in the original bill arising from subsequent events, so as to entitle the party to relief oh the whole merits of his case. Westcott. Bowie v. Minter, 2 Ala. 411.
—Bill quia timet. A bill invoking the aid of equity "because he fears," that is, because the complalnant apprehends an injury to his property rights or lnterests, from the fault or neglect of another. Bisp.Eq. § 568; 2 Story, Eq.Jur. § 826.
Such bilis are entertained to guard against possible or prospective injuries, and to preserve the means by which existing rights may be protected from future or contingent vlolations; differing from injunctions, in that the latter correct past and present or imminent and certain injuries. De Carli v. O’Brien, 41 P.2d 411, 416, 150 Or. 35, 97 A.L.R. 693.
—Bill to carry a decree into execution. One which is filed when, from the neglect of parties or some other cause, it may become impossible to carry a decree into execution without the further decree of the court. Hind, Ch.Pr. 68; Story, Eq.Pl. § 42.
—Bill to perpetuate testimony. A bill in equity filed in order to procure the testimony of witnesses to be taken as to some matter not at the time be-fore the courts, but which is likely at some future time to be in litigation. Story, Eq.P1. (5th Ed.) § 300 et seq.
—Bill to quiet possession and title. Also called a bill to remove a cloud on title (q. v.), and though sometimes classed with bilis quia tiniet or for the cancellation of void instruments, they may be resorted to in other cases when the complainant’s title is clear and there is a cloud to be removed; Maguire v. City of Macomb, 293 III. 441, 127 N.E. 682, 686.
—Bill to suspend a decree. One brought to avoid or suspend a decree under special circumstances.
—Bill to take testimony de bene esse. One which is brought to take the testimony of witnesses to a fact material to the prosecution of a suit at law which is actually commenced, where there is good cause to fear that the testimony may otherwise be lost before the time of trial. 2 Story, Eq.Jur. § 1813, n.
—Cross-bill. One which is brought by a defendant in a suit against a plaintiff in or against other de-fendants in the same suit, or against both, touch-ing the matters in question in the original bill. Story, Eq.P1. § 389; Mitf.Eq.P1. 80.
It is a bill brought by a defendant against a plaintiff, or other parties in a former bill depending, touching the matter in question in that bill. It is usually brought eith-er to obtain a necessary discovery of facts in aid of the de-fense to the original bill, or to obtain fuli relief to all par-ties in reference to the matters of the original bill. It is to be treated as a mere auxiliary suit. Kidder v. Barr, 35 N. H. 251; Blythe v. Hinckley, C.C.Cal., 84 F. 234. A species oí pleading, used for the purpose of obtaining a discovery necessary to the defense, or to obtain some relief foundeii on the collateral claims of the party defendant to the orig-inal suit. Tison v. Tison, 14 Ga, 167. Also, if a bill of ex-change or promissory note be given in consideration of another bill or notice, It is called a "cross" or "counter" bill or note. Landon v. Public Utilities Commission of Kansas, D.C.Kan., 234 F. 152, 167.
—Supplemental bill. A bill to bring before the court matters arising after the filing of the orig-inal bill or not then known to complainant. Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. City of Seattle, C.C. A.Wash., 5 F. (2d) 393. See Bill in nature of a supplemental bill.

5. In legislation and constitutional law

The word means a draft of an act of the legis-lature before it becomes a law; a proposed or projected law. A draft of an act presented to the legislature, but not enacted. Hubbard v. Lowe, D. C.N.Y., 226 F. 135, 137. Also a special act passed by a legislative body in the exercise of a quasi judicial power. Scudder v. Smith, 331 Pa. 165, 200 A. 601, 604.
The word "bill" may mean the bill as it is first intro-duced in one of the houses of the Iegislature, or it may re-fer to it at any time in any of its stages until finally passed. People v. Brady, 262 I11, 578, 105 N.E. 1, 4. An act is the appropriate term for it, after It has been acted on by, and passed by, the legislature. Herbring v. Brown, 92 Or. 176, 180 P. 328, 330. Thus, bilis of attainder, bilis of pains and penalties, are spoken of.
—Bill of attainder. See Attainder.
—Bill of indemnity. ‘ In English law. An act of parliament, passed every session until 1869, but discontinued in and after that year, as having been rendered unnecessary by the passing of the promissory oaths act, 1868, for the relief of those who have unwittingly or unavoidably neglected to take the necessary oaths, etc., required for the purpose of qualifying them to hold their respective offices. Wharton.
—Bill of pains and penalties. A special act of the legislature which inflicts a punishment, less than death, upon persons supposed to be guilty of treason or felony, without any conviction in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings.
It differs from a bill of attainder in this: that the pun-ishment inflicted by the latter is death.
—Private bill. One dealing only with a matter of private personal or local interest. Lowell, Gov. of Eng. 266.
Ali legislative bilis which have for their object some par-ticular or private interest are so termed, as distinguished from such as are for the benefit of the whole community, which are thence termed "public bilis." People v. Chau-tauqua County, 43 N.Y. 17.
—Private bill office. See Private.

—Private member’s bill. One of a public nature introduced by a private member;—distinguished from a private bill, which is one dealing only with a matter of private .personal or local interest. Lowell, Gov. of Eng. 266.

6. A solemn and formal legislative declaration of popular rights and liberties

Promulgated on certain extraordinary occa-sions, as the famous Bill of Rights in English history.
—Bill of rights. A formal and emphatic legislative assertion and declaration of popular rights and liberties usually promulgated upon a change of government; particularly the statute 1 W. & M. St. 2, c. 2. Also the summary of the rights and liberties of the people, or of the principies of con-stitutional law deemed essential and fundamental, contained in many of the American state constitu-tions. Hamill v. Hawks, C.C.A.Okl., 58 F.2d 41, 47. That portion of Constitution guaranteeing rights and privileges to the individual. Brown v. State, 219 Ind. 251, 37 N.E.2d 73, 77, 137 A.L.R. 679.

7. In the law of contracts

An obligation; a deed, whereby the obligor ac-knowledges himself to owe to the obligee a cer• tain sum of money or some other thing. It may be indented or poli, and with or without a penalty.
—Bill obligatory. A bond absolute for the pay-ment of money. It is called also a "single bill," and differs from a promissory note only in having a seal. See Bill penal. Bank v. Greiner, 2 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 115.
—Bill of debt. An ancient term including promis-sory notes and bonds for the payment of money. Com.Dig. "Merchant," F. 2.
—Bill penal. A written obligation by which a debtor acknowledges himself indebted in a certain sum, and binds himself for the payment thereof, in a larger sum, called a "penalty." Bonds with conditions have superseded such bilis in modern practice. They are sometimes called bilis obliga-tory, and are properly so called; but every bill obligatory is not a bill penal. Comyns, Dig. Ob-ligations, D; Cro.Car. 515. See 2 Ventr. 106, 198.
—Bill single. A written promise to pay to a per-son or persons named a stated sum at a stated time, without any condition. When under seal, as is usually the case, it is sometimes called a "bill obligatory," (q. v.) It differs from a "bill penal," (q. v.) in that it expresses no penalty.

8. In commercial law

A written statement of the terms of a contract, or specification of the items of a transaction or of a demand; also a general name for any item of indebtedness, whether receivable or payable.
Accounts for goods sold, services rendered, or work done. Newman v. San Antonio Traction Co., Tex.Civ.App., 155 S.W. 688, 690.

As a verb, as generally and customarily used in commercial transactions, "bill" is synonymous with "charge" or "invoice." George M. Jones Co. v. Canadian Nat. R. Co., D.C.Mich., 14 F.2d 852, 855.
—Bill-book. In mercantile law. A book in which an account of bilis of exchange and promissory notes, whether payable or receivable, is stated.
—Bill-head. A printed form on which merchants and traders make out their bilis and render ac-counts to their customers.
—Bill of lading. In common law. The writtén evidence of a contract for the carriage and de-livery of goods sent by sea for a certain freight. Mason v. Lickbarrow, 1 H.Pd. 359. A written memorandum, given by the person in command of a merchant vessel, acknowledging the receipt on board the ship of certain specified goods, in good order or "apparent good order," which he under-takes, in consideration of the payment of freight, to deliver in like good order (dangers of the sea excepted) at a designated place to the con-signee therein named or to his assigns. Devato v. Barreis, D.C.N.Y., 20 Fed. 510.
The term is often applied to a similar receipt and under-taking given by a carrier of goods by land. A bill of lad-ing Is an instrument in writing, signed by a carrier or his
agent, describing the freight so as to identify it, stating the name of the consignor, the terms of the contract for carriage, and agreeing or directing that the freight be de-Ilvered to the order or assigns of a specified person at a specified place. See Civil Code Cal. § 2126a; Aman v. Dover & Southbound R. Co., 179 N.C. 310, 102 S.E. 392, 393; Rudin v. King-Richardson Co., 143 N.E. 198, 201, 311 Ill. 513. It is receipt for goods, contract for thelr carriage, and Is documentary evidence of title to goods. Schwalb v. Erie R. Co., 293 N.Y.S. 842, 846, 161 MIsc. 743.
A clean bill of lading is one which contains nothing in the margin qualifying the words in the bill of lading itself. 61 Law T. 330; Creery v. Holly, 14 Wend. (N.Y.) 26; Sayward v. Stevens, 3 Gray (Mass.) 97.
An order bill of lading is one in which it is stated that goods are consigned to order of any person named therein. F. L. Shaw Co. v. Cole-man, Tex.Civ.App., 236 S.W. 178, 180.
A straight bill of lading is one in which it is stated that goods are consigned to a specified per-son. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Roe, 91 Fla. 762, 109 So. 205, 207.
A through bill of lading is one by. which a rail-road contracts to transport over its own line for a certain distance carloads of merchandise or stock, there to deliver the same to its connecting lines to be transported to the place of destination at a fixed rate per carload for the whole distance. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Vaughn, 4 Willson, Ct. App.Tex. § 182, 16 S.W. 775.
—Bill of pancels. A statement sent to the buyer of goods, along with the goods, exhibiting in de-tail the items composing the parcel and their sev-era! prices, to enable him to detect any mistake or omission; an invoice. —Bill of sale. In contracts. A written agreement, formerly limited to one under seal, by which one person assigns or transfers his right to or interest in goods and personal chattels to another. Wilson v. Voche, 172 S.E. 672, 48 Ga.App. 173. An instru-ment by which, in particular, the property in ships and vessels is conveyed. Young v. Stone, 70 N.Y.S. 558, 61 App.Div. 364. See Grand bill of sale, infra.
—Bill payable. In a merchant’s accounts, all bilis which he has accepted, and promissory notes which he has made, are called "bilis payable," and are entered in a ledger account under that name, and recorded in a book bearing the same title. See West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. Karnes, 137 Va. 714, 120 S.E. 321, 322.
receivable. In a merchant’s accounts, all notes, drafts, checks, etc., payable to him, or of which he is to receive the proceeds at a future date, are called "bilis receivable," and are entered in a ledger-account under that name, and also noted in a book bearing the same title. State v. Robinson, 57 Md. 501. Miami Coal Co. v. Fox, 203 Ind. 99, 176 N.E. 11, 16, 79 A.L.R. 333.
—Bill rendered. A bill of items rendered by a creditor to his debtor; an "account rendered," as distinguished from "an account stated." Hill v. Hatch, 11 Me. 455.
—Grand bill of sale. In English law. The name of an instrument used for the transfer of a ship while she is at sea. An expression which is under-stood to refer to the instrument whereby a ship was originally transferred from the builder to the owner, or first purchaser. 3 Kent, Comm. 133.

9. In the law of negotiable instruments

A promissory obligation for the payment of money.
Standing alone or without qualifying words, the term is understood to mean a bank note, United States treasury note, or other piece of paper cir-culating as money. Green v. State, 28 Tex.App. 493, 13 S.W. 785.
—Bill of credit. In constitutional law. A bill or promissory note issued by the government of a state or nation, upon its faith and credit, designed to circulate in the community as money, and re-deemable at a future day. Hale v. Huston, 44 Ala. 138, 4 Am.Rep. 124. In mercantile law. A license or authority given in writing from one person to another, very common among merchants, bank-ers, and those who travel, empowering a person to receive or take up money of their correspondents abroad.
—Bill of exchange. A written order from A. to B., directing B. to pay to C. a certain sum of mon-ey therein named. Byles, Bills, 1. An open (that is, unsealed) letter addressed by one person to another directing him, in effect, to pay, absolutely and at all events, a certain sum of money therein named, to a third person, or to any other to whom that third person may order it to be paid, or it may be payable to bearer or to the drawer him-self. 1 Daniel, Neg.Inst. 27.
An unconditional order In writing addressed by one per-son to another, signed by the person giving it, requiring the person to whom it is addressed to pay on demand or at a fIxed or determinable future time a sum certain in money to arder or to bearer. Clayton Town-Site Co. v. Clayton Drug Co., 147 P. 460, 20 N.M. 185; Smythe v. Sanders, 101 So. 435, 436, 136 Alise. 382; Sometimos called a "trade ac-ceptance." Jones v. Revere Preserving Co., 247 Mass. 225, 142 N.E. 70, 71.
A "check" differs from a "bill of exchange" in that it is always drawn on a deposit whereas a bill is not. Wilson v. Buchenau, D.C.Cal., 43 F.Supp. 272, 275.
—Domestic bill of exchange. A bill of exchange drawn on a person residing in the same state with the drawer; or dated at a place in the state, and drawn on a person living within the state. It is the residence of the drawer and drawee which must determine whether a bill is domestic or foreign. Ragsdale v. Franklin, 25 Miss. 143. See, also, Inland bill of exchange.
—Foreign bill of exchange. A bill of exchange drawn in one state or country, upon a foreign state or country. See Story, Bills, § 22; 3 Kent, Comm. 94, note.
A bill of exchange drawn In one country upon another country not governed by the same homogeneous laws, or not governed throughout by the same municipal laws. A bill of exchange drawn In one of the United States upor a person residing In another state is a foreign b111.
—Inland bill of exchange. One of which the drawer and drawee are residents of the same state or country. Miller v. American Gold Mining Co., 3 Alaska, 1. See Domestic bill of exchange.

10. In maritime law

The term is applied to contracts of various sorts, but chiefly to bilis of lading and to bilis of adventure.
—Bill of adventure. A written certificate by a merchant or the master or owner of a ship, to the effect that the property and risk in goods shipped on the vessel in his own name belong to another person, to whom he is accountable for the proceeds alone.
—Bill of gross adventure. In French maritime law. Any written instrument which contains a contract of bottomry, respondentia, or any other kind of maritime loan. There is no corresponding English term. Hall, Marit. Loans, 182, n.
—Bill of health. An official certificate, given by the authorities of a port from which a vessel clears, to the master of the ship, showing the state of the port, as respects the public health, at the time of sailing, and exhibited to the authorities of the port which the vessel next makes, in token that she does not bring disease.
If the bill alleges that no contagious or infectious disease existed, it is called a "clean" bill; if it admits that one was suspected or anticipated, or that one actually pre-vailed, it is called a "touched" or a "foul" bill.

11. In revenue law and procedure

The term is given to various documents filed in or issuing from a custom house, principally of the sorts described below.
—Bill of entry. An account of the goods entered at the custom-house, both incoming and outgoing. It must state the narre of the merchant exporting or importing, the quantity and species of mer-chandise, and whither transported, and whence.
—Bill of sight. When an im. porter of goods is ignorant of their exact quantity or quality, so that he cannot make a perfect entry of them, he may give to the customs offlcer a written description of them, according to the best of his information and belief. This is called a "bill of sight."
—Bill of store. In English law. A kind of license granted at the custom-house to merchants, to carry such stores and provisions as are necessary for their voyage, custom free. Jacob.
—Bill of sufferance. In English law. A license granted at the custom-house to a merchant, to suffer him to trade from one English port to an-other, without paying custom. Cowell.

12. In criminal law A bill of indictment, see infra.

—Bill of appeal. An ancient, but now abolished, method of criminal prosecution. See Battel.
—Bill of indictment. A formal written document accusing a person or persons named of having committed a felony or misdemeanor, lawfully laid before a grand jury for their action upon it. State v. Ray, Rice (S.C.) 4, 33 Am.Dec. 90. See Present-ment.
If the grand jury decide that a trial ought to be had, they indorse on it "a true bill;" if otherwise, "not a true or "not found."
13. In common-law practice
An itemized statement or specification of par-ticular details, especially items of cost or charge.
—Bill of costs. A certified, itemized statement of the amount of costs in an action or suit. Doe v. Thompson, 22 N.H. 219.
By the English usage, this term is applied to the state-ment of the charges and disbursements of an attorney or solicitor incurred ln the conduct of his client’s business, and which might be taxed upon application, even though not incurred in any suit. Thus, conveyancing costs might be taxed. Wharton,
—Bill of particulars. In practice. A written state-ment or specification of the particulars of the de-mand for which an action at law is brought, or of a defendant’s set•off against such demand, (in-cluding dates, sums, and items in detail,) furnished by one of the parties to the other, either volun-tarily or in compliance with a judge’s order for that purpose. 1 Tidd, Pr. 596-600; 2 Archb,Pr. 221; Ferguson v. Ashbell, 53 Tex. 250; Baldwin v. Gregg, 13 Mete. (Mass.) 255.

It le designed to aid the defendant In interposing the proper anewer and in preparing for trial, by giving him de-tailed information regarding the cause of action stated in the complaint. Wetmore v. Goodwin Film & Camera Co., (D.C.) 226 F. 352, 353. It is neither a pleading nor Proof of the facts therein contained, Nilson v. Ebey Land Co., 90 Wash. 295, 155 P. 1036, and is not for the purpose of dis-covering evidence, nor to find what plaintiff knows, but what he claims, Intermountain Ass’n of Credit Men v. Mil-waukee Mechanics’ Ins. Co., 44 Idaho 491, 258 P. 362, 363. A buil of particulars is not designed to uphold an insufli-cient indictment, but to give accused fair notice of what he is called on to defend. Clary v. Commonwealth, 163 Ky. 48, 173 S.W. 171, 173. People v. Bain, 359 III. 455, 195 N.E. 42.

14. In English law

A draft of a patent for a charter, commission, dignity, office, or appointment.
Such a bill is drawn up in the attorney general’s patent bill office, is submitted by a secretary of state for the King’s signature, when it Is called the "King’s bill," and is then countersigned by the secretary of state and. sealed by the privy seal, and then the patent is prepared and sealed. Sweet.
For Exchequer Bills, see that title.

BILL OF MORTALITY. A written statement or account of the number of deaths which have oc-curred in a certain district within a given time.

BILLA. L. Lat. A bill; an original bill.

BILLA CASSETUR, or QUOD BILLA CASSETUR. (That the bill be quashed.) In practice. The form of the judgment rendered for a defendant on a plea in abatement, where the proceeding is by bill; that is, where the suit is commenced by capias, and not by original writ. 2 Archb.Pr.K.B. 4.

BILLA EXCAMBII. A bill of exchange. BILLA EXONERATIONIS. A bill of lading.

BILLA VERA. (A true bill.) In old practice. The indorsement anciently made on a bill of in-dictment by a grand jury, when they found it sufficiently sustained by evidence. 4 Bl.Comm. 306.

BILLBOARD. An erection annexed to the land in the nature of a fence for the purpose of posting advertising bilis and posters. Randall v. Atlanta Advertising Service, 159 Ga. 217, 125 S.E. 462, 463; Cochrane v. McDermott Advertising Agency, 6 Ala.App. 121, 60 So. 421, 422.

BILLET. A soldier’s quarters in a civilian’s house; or the ticket which authorizes him to oc-cupy them.
In French law. A bill or promissory note. Billet á ordre, a bill payable to order. Billet vue, a bill payable at sight. Billet de com-
plaisance, an accommodation bill. Billet de change, an engagement to give, at a future time, a bill of exchange, which the party is not at the time prepared to give. Story, Bills, § 2, n.

BILLETA. In old English law. A bill or petition exhibited in parliament. Cowell.

BILLIARD TABLES. This term includes "pool tables" as used in statutes, since "pool tables" are billiard tables with pockets. Village of Atwood v. Otter, 296 111.70, 129 N.E. 573, 578.

BILLY. A small bludgeon that may be carried in the pocket; a club; especially, a policeman’s club. Cent. Dict.; Webster, New Intl. Dict.BI-METALLIC. Pertaining to, or consisting of, two metals used as money at a fixed relative value.

BI-METALLISM. The legalized use of two metals in the currency of a country at a fixed relative value.

BIND. To obligate; to bring or place under def-inite duties or legal obligations, particularly by a bond or covenant; to affect one in a constraining or compulsory manner with a contract or a judg-ment. Stone v. Bradbury, 14 Me. 193.
So long as a contract, an adjudlcation, or a legal rela-tion remains In force and virtue, and continues to impuse duties or obligations, it le said to be "bindrn..q." A man is bound by bis contract or promise, by a judgment or dé-cree against him, by his bond or covenant, by an estoppel, etc.

BIND OUT. To place one under a legal obligation to serve another; as to bind out an apprentice.

BINDER. The memorandum of an agreement for insurance, intended to give temporary protection pending investigation of the risk and issuance of a formal policy. Seiderman v. Herman Perla Inc., 268 N.Y. 188, 197 N.E. 190, 191.
A verbal contract of insurance In prxsent1, of which the insurance agent makes a memorandum, temporary in its nature, Norwich Union Fire Ins. Society v. Dalton, Tex. Civ.App., 175 S.W. 459, 460; thus constituting a short method of issuing a temporary policy to contlniie until execution of the formal one, Sherri v. National Surety Co., 243 N.Y. 266. 153 N.E. 70, 71. Carew, Show & Bernascont v. General Casualty Co. of America, 189 Wash. 329, 65 P.2d 689, 695.
A "binder" as used in marine insurance is an application for insurance made on behalf of the proposed insured and approved by the insurer or his agent. Muller v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. of City of New York, C.C.A.N.Y., 246 F. 759, 760.

BINDING INSTRUCTION. One in which jury is told if they find ceitain conditions to be true to find for plaintiff or defendant, as case might be. Scott-Burr Stores Corporation v. Foster, 197 Ark. 232, 122 S.W.2d 165, 169.

BINDING OVER. The act by which a court or magistrate requires a person to enter into a recog-nizance or furnish bail to appear for trial, to keep the peace, to attend as a witness, etc.

BINDING RECEIPT OR SLIP. Is a limited ac-ceptance of an application for insurance given by an authorized agent pending the ascertainment of the company’s willingness to assume the burden of the proposed risk, the effect of which is to protect the applicant until the company acts upon the application, and, if it declines to accept the burden, the binding effect of the slip ceases eo instante. Hallauer v. Fire Ass’n of Philadelphia, 83 W.Va. 401, 98 S.E. 441, 443; Seiderman v. Her-man Perla, Inc., 268 N.Y. 188, 197 N.E. 190, 191.

BINOCULAR VISION. The vision of the two eyes acting together, used in determining depth, width, distante, and comparative placing of different ob-jects; distinguished from "field vision," meaning the general vision used in catching in sight, and following and locating objects. Gigleo v. Dorfman & Kimiavsky, 106 Conn. 401, 138 A. 448, 450.

BIPARTITE. Consisting of, or divisible into, two parts. A term in conveyancing descriptive of an instrument in two parts, and executed by both parties.

BIRRETUM, BIRRETUS. A cap or coif used formerly in England by judges and serjeants at law. Spelman.

BIRTIL The act of being born or wholly brought into separate existente. Wallace v. State, 10 Tex. App. 270.

BIS. Lat. Twice.

BIS DA.T QUI CITO DAT. He pays twice who pays promptly.

BIS IDEM EXIGI BONA FIDES NON PATITUR; ET IN SATISFACTIONIBUS NON PERMXTTI-TUR AMPLIUS FIERI QUAM SEMEL FACTUM EST. Good faith does not suffer the same thing to be demanded twice; and in making satisfac-tion [for a debt or demandi it is not allowed to be done more than once. 9 Coke, 53.

BISAILE (also BESAILE, BESAYEL, BESAIEL, BESAYLE). The father of one’s grandfather or grandmother.
BISANTIUM, BESANTINE, BEZANT. An ancient coin, first issued at Constantinople; it ovas of two sorts,—gold, equivalent to a ducat, valued at 9s. 6d.; and silver, computed at 2s. They were both current in England. Wharton.

BI-SCOT. In old Engish law. A fine imposed for not repairing banks, ditches, and causeways.

BISHOP. In English law. An ecclesiastical digni-tary, being the chief of the clergy within his diocese, subject to the archbishop of the province in which his diocese is situated. Most of the bishops are also members of the House of Lords.

BISHOP’S COURT. In English law. An ecclesi-astical court, held in the cathedral of each diocese, the judge whereof is the bishop’s chancellor, who judges by the civil canon law; and, if the diocese be large, he has his commissaries in remoto parts, who hold consistory courts, for matters limited to them by their commission.

BISHOPRIC. In ecclesiastical law. The diocese of a bishop, or the circuit in which he has juris-diction; the office of a bishop. 1 BI.Comm. 377-332.

BISSEXT1LE. The day which is added every fourth year to the month of February, in order to make the year agree with the course of the sun.

By statute 21 Hen. III., the 28th and 29th of February count together as one day. This statute is in force in some of the United States. Porter v. Holloway, 43 Ind. 35; Harker v. Addis, 4 Pa. 515.

BITING RULE. When first taker of conveyed property under writing submitted for construc-tion is initially conveyed a fee title, it is then in-competent and invalid to modify, qualify, or reduce thereafter the apparent fee title of the first taker so as to reduce it to a life estate, and any gift over after death of first taker is void. Hanks v. McDanell, 210 S.W.2d 784, 786, 307 Ky. 243, 17 A.L.R.2d 1.

BITULITHIC. Designating a kind of paving the main body of which consists of broken stone cemented together with bitumen or asphalt. Wash-burn v. Board of Com’rs of Shawnee County, 103 Kan. 169, 172 P. 997, 998. Bituminous macadam means bitulithic pavement. Washburn v. Board of Com’rs of Shawnee County, 103 Kan. 169, 172 P. 997, 998. See Bitumen.

BITUMEN. Mineral pitch; black, tarry substancc uSed in cements, in construction of pavements, etc., and by extension, the term includes any one of natural hydrocarbons, including hard, solid, brittle varieties called asphalt, semi-solid maltha and mineral tars, oily petroleums, and light volatile naphthas. Western Willite Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt 11/If g. Co., C.C.A.Mo., 16.F.2d 446, 448.

BITUMINOUS COAL. Bituminous coal is much less hard than anthracite; it is dusty and dirty and is commonly termed "soft coal." Bituminous coal burns with more or less smoke while anthra-cite coal burns with practically no smoke. As the fuel ratio of bituminous coal rises the coal is more soft; as the fuel ratio of anthracite coal rises the coal is more hard. Commonwealth v. Hudson Coal Co., 287 Pa. 64, 134 A. 413, 414. See Anthracite coal.

BITUMINOUS MACADAM. Bitulithic pavement. Washburn v. Board of Com’rs of Shawnee County, 103 Kan. 169, 172 P. 997, 998. See Bitulithic.

BLACK ACRE and WHITE ACRE. Fictitious narres used by the old writers to distinguish one parcel of land from another, to avoid ambiguity, as well as the inconveniente of a fuller description.

BLACK ACT. The statute 9 Geo. I. c. 22, so called because it was occasioned by the outrages commit-ted by persons with their faces blacked or other-wise disguised, who appeared in Epping Forest, near Waltham, in Essex, and destroyed the deer there, and committed other offenses. Repealed by 7 & 8 Geo. IV, c. 27.

BLACK ACTS. Old Scotch statutes passed in the reigns of the Stuarts and down to the year 1536 or 1587, so called because printed in black letter. BelL

BLACK BOOK OF HEREFORD. In English law. An old record frequently referred to by Cowell and other early writers.

BLACK BOOK OF THE ADMIRALTY. A book of the highest authority in admiralty matters, gen-erally supposed to have been compiled during the reign of Edward III. with additions of a later date. It contains the laws of Oleron, a view of crimes and offenses cognizable in the admiralty, and many other matters. See De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gali. 404, Fed.Cas.No.3,776.

BLACK BOOK OF THE EXCHEQUER. The name of an ancient book kept in the English exchequer, containing a collection of treaties, con-ventions, charters, etc.

BLACK CAP. The head-dress worn by the judge in pronouncing the sentence of death. It is part of the judicial full dress, and is worn by the judges on occasions of especial state. Wharton.

BLACK CODE. A name given collectively to the body of laws, statutes, and rulos in force in various southern states prior to 1865, which regulated the institution of slavery, and particularly those for-bidding their reception at public inns and on public conveyances. Civil Rights Cases, 3 S.Ct. 18, 109 U.S. 3, 27 L.Ed. 835.

BLACK GAME. In English law. Heath fowl, in contradistinction to red game, as grouse.

BLACK LIQUOR. A term used in the paper pulp industry. It denotes a residual liquor coming from the digesters in which wood chips are cook-ed. Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. North Carolina Pulp Co., D.C.Del., 35 F.Supp. 215, 221.

BLACK MARIA. A closed wagon or van in which prisoners are carried to and from the jail, or be-tween the court and the jail.

BLACK MAT CABARETTA. A cross between a goatskin and a skin of some other animal. J. H. Stockamore Leather Co. v. Duane Shoe Co., 187 N.Y.S. 258, 195 App.Div. 947.

BLACK MUSLIM. An organization of American Negroes, founded in Detroit in 1930 by an Ameri-can Negro calling himself Mohammad Elijah. To the traditional Koran the founders added the doc-trine of Black Supremacy and proclaimed the desirability of maintaining ( or regaining) the purity of the black roce. 62 Col.L.Rev. 1488 (1962) ; 75 Harv.L.Rev. 837 (1962) ; State v. Cubbage (Del.), 210 A.2d 555 (1965).

BLACK RENTS. In old English law. Rents re-served in work, grain, provisions, or baser money than silver, in contradistinction to those which were reserved in white money or silver, which were termed "white rents," (reditws albi,) or hlanch farms. Tomlins; Whishaw. See Black-mail.

BLACK—ROD, GENTLEMAN USHER OF. In Eng-land, the title of a chief officer of the king, deriv-ing his name from the Black Rod of office, on the top of which reposes a golden lion, which he carries. During the session of Parliament he at-tends on the peers, summons the Commons to the House of Lords; and to his custody all peers im-peached for any crime or contempt are first com-mitted.

BLACK WARD. A subvassal, who held ward of the king’s vassal.

BLACKJACK. A short bludgeon consisting of a heavy head, as of metal, on an elastic shaft or with a flexible handle; a bludgeon-like weapon consisting of a lead slug attached to a leather thong; a small leather-covered club or billy weighted at the head and having an elastic shaft. 5 Words and Phrases, Perm. Ed.
As a card game, another name for vingt-et-un (twenty-one) ; also, a variety of hearts in which the jack of spades counts as ten hearts. Webster, New Intl. Dict.

BLACKLEG. A person who gets his living by frequenting race-courses and places where games of chance are played, getting the best odds, and giving the least he can, but not necessarily cheat-ing. That is not indictable either by statute or at ‘common law. Barnett v. Allen, 3 Hurl. & N. 379.
In a later case it has been thought that "blackleg" ordi-narily means a swindler, but does not mean a "scab" or strike breaker, and that its use may be libelous per se. United Mine Workers of America v. Cromer, 159 Ky. 605, 167 S.W. 891, 892.

BLACKLIST. A list of persons marked out for special avoidance, antagonism, or enmity on the part of those who prepare the list or those among whom it is intended to circulate; as where a trades-union "blacklists" workmen who refuse to conform to its rules, or where a list of insolvent or untrustworthy persons is published by a commer-cial agency or mercantile association. Quoted and relied on in Dick v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 86 Wash. 211, 150 P. 8, 12, Ann.Cas.1917A, 638, holding that this word is a generic term having no such well-defined meaning in law as to make its use in a pleading a definite charge of any specific mis-conduct against a person so charged. Cleary v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 147 Minn. 403, 180 N.W. 545, 546; Masters v. Lee, 39 Neb. 574, 58 N.W. 222; Mattison v. Railway Co., 2 Ohio N.P. 279.

BLACKMAIL. In one of its original meanings, this term denoted a tribute paid by English dwell-ers along the Scottish border to influential chief-tains’ of Scotland, as a condition of securing im-munity from raids of marauders and border thieves.
Also, rents payable in cattle, grain, work, and the like. Such rents were called "blackmail," (reditus nigri,) in distinction from white rents, (blanche firmes,) which were rents paid in silver. See Black rents.
The extortion of money by threats or overtures towards criminal prosecution or the destruction of a man’s reputation or social standing.
In common parlance, the term is equivalent to and syn-onymous with, "extortion,"—the exaction of money, either for the performance of a duty, the prevention of an injury, or the exercise of an influence. It supposes the service to be unlawful, and the payment involuntary. Not infre-quently it is extorted by threats, or by operating upon the fears or the credulity, or by promises to conceal, or offers to expose, the weaknesses, the follies, or the crimes of the victim. Mitchell v. Sharon, C.C.Cal., 51 F. 424; In re Milis, 104 Wash. 278, 176 P. 556, 562. "Blackmail" has a broader meaning than the New York statutory crime of blackmail, and denotes extortion in any mode by means of intimidation, as the extortion of money by threats of accusation or exposure, or of unfavorable criticism in the press. Guenther v. Ridgway Co., 156 N.Y.S. 534, 535, 170 App.Div. 725.

BLACKSMITH SHOP. A place to which the peo-ple of a community resort for the purpose of hav-ing machinery and tools repaired and iron work done. State v. Shumaker, 103 Kan. 741, 175 P. 978, 979.

BLADA. In old English law. Growing crops of grain of any kind. Spelman. All manner of an-nual grain. Cowell. Harvested grain. Bract. 217b; Reg.Orig. 94h, 95.

BLADARIUS. In old English law. A cornmonger; meal-man or corn-chandler; a bladier, or engrosser of corn or grain. Blount.

BLANC SEIGN. In Louisiana, a paper signed at the bottom by him who intends to bind himself, give acquittance, or compromise, at the discretion of the person whom he intrusts with such blanc seign, giving him power to fill it with what he may, think proper, according to agreement. Mus-son v. U. S. Bank, 6 Mart.O.S. (La.) 718.

BLANCH HOLDING. An ancient tenure of the law of Scotland, the duty payable being trifiing, as a penny or a pepper-corn, etc., if required; similar to free and common socáge.

BLANCHE FIRME. White rent; a rent reserved, payable in silver.

BL4NCUS. In old law and practice. White; plain; smooth; blank.

BLANK. A space left unfilled in a written docu-ment, in which one or more words or marks are to be inserted to complete the sense. Angle v. Insurance Co., 92 U.S. 337, 23 L.Ed. 556.
Also a skeleton or printed form for any legal document, in which the necessary and invariable words are printed in their proper order, with blank spaces left for the insertion of such names, dates, figures, additional clauses, etc., as may be neces-sary to adapt the instrument to the particular case and to the design of the party using it.

BLANK ACCEPTANCE. An acceptance of a bill of exchange written on the paper before the bill is made, and delivered by the acceptor.

BLANK BAR. Also called the "common bar." The name of a plea in bar which in an action of trespass is put in to oblige the plaintiff to assign the certain place where the trespass was commit-ted. It was most in practice in the common bench. See Cro.Jac. 594.

BLANK BONDS. Scotch securities, in which the creditor’s name was left blank, and which passed by mere delivery, the bearer being at liberty to put in his name and sue for payment. Declared void by Act 1696, c. 25.

BLANK INDORSEMENT. The indorsement of a bill of exchange or promissory note, by merely writing the name of the indorser, without mention-ing any person to whom the bill or note is to be paid; called "blank," because a blank or space is left over it for the insertion of the name of the indorsee, or of any subsequent holder. Otherwise called an indorsement "in blank." 3 Kent, Comm.
89; Story, Prom. Notes, § 138.

BLANKET. In tariff acts: A heavy cover for a bed or a horse, with a thick, soft nap on both sides. Riley & Co. v. U. S., 8 Ct.Cust.App. 116, 118.

BLANKET POLICY. See Insurance—Blanket Policy.

BLANKS. A kind of white money, (value 8d.,) comed by Henry V. in those parts of France which were then subject to England; forbidden to be current in that realm by 2 Hen. VI. c. 9. Wharton.

BLASARIUS. An incendiary.

BLASPIIEMY.

In English Law

Blasphemy is the offense of speaking matter relating to God, Jesus Christ, the Bible, or the Book of Common Prayer, intended to wound the feelings of mankind or to excite contempt and hatred against the church by law established, or to promote immorality. Sweet.

In American Law

Any oral or written reproach maliciously cast upon God, His name, attributes, or religion. Com. v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 213; Young v. State,
10 Lea (Tenn.) 165; People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. (N.Y.) 290, 5 Am.Dec. 335; Updegraph v. Com.,
11 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 406.
In general, blasphemy may be described as consisting in speaking ovil of the Deity with an impious purpose to derogate from the divino majesty, and to alienate the minds of others from the love and reverence of God.
It is purposely using words concerning God calculated and designed to impair and destroy the reverence, respect, and confidence due to Him as the Intelligent creator, gov-ernor, and judge of the world. It embraces the idea of detraction, when used towards the Supreme Being, as "calumny" usually cardes the same idea when applled to an individual. It is a wlllfui and malicious attempt to lessen men’s reverence of God by denying His existence, or His attributes as an intelligent creator, governor, and judge of men, and to prevent their having confidence in Him as such. Com. v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 211, 212.
The use of this word Is, In modem law, exclusively con-fined to sacred subjects; but blasphemia and blasphemare were anciently used to signify the reviling by one person of another. Nov. 77, c. 1, § 1; Spelman.

BLASTING. Practice or occupation of rending heavy masses, espeeially of rock, by means of ex-plosives, as in oil well drilling, quarrying, etc. Seismic Explorations v. Dobray, Tex.Civ.App., 169 S.W.2d 739, 742.

BLEACHERS. A relatively low-priced seat for a spectator at sports or games, or the section or structure (originally roofless) containing such seats. Lowden v. Jefferson County Excise Board, 122 P,2d 991, 992, 190 Okl. 276; Zeitz v. Coopers-town Baseball Centennial, N.Y.Sup., 29 N.Y.S.2d 56, 57.

BLEES. In old English law. Grain; particularly corn.

BLENCH, BLENCH HOLDING. See Blanch Hold-ing.

BLENDED FUND. In England, where a testator directs his real and personal estate to be sold, and disposes of the proceeds as forming one aggregate, this is called a "blended fund."

BLENDED PRICE. As applied to milk, a price paid to producers based upon a pool average weighted by the volume of milk disposed of, ac-cording to different types of utilization. Queens-boro Farm Products v. State, 24 N.Y.S.2d 413, 417, 175 Misc. 574.

BLETA. An old name for peat or combustible earth dug up and dried for burning. Wharton.

BLIND. The condition of one who is deprived of the faculty of seeing.
A voter le not "blind" within the meaning of Ky. St. § 1475, authorizing clerk to mark ballot for blind person, If he has left his spectacles at horno, but a person so devoid of sight that he cannot see pencil mark made by clerk is "blind." Smith v. Jones, 221 Ky. 546, 299 S.W. 170, 171. One who by accident lost all vision except enough to enable him to recognize a forro without distinguishing its out-fines is "blind" within the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Industrial Commission of Colorado v. Johnson, 64 Colo. 461. 172 P. 422, 423.

BLIND CAR. On railroads, one on which there is neither steps nor platform at the ends. Helm v. Hines, 109 Kan. 48, 196 P. 426.

BLIND CORNER. One where the building ex-tends to the property line. Mobile Light & R. Co. v. Gadik, 211 Ala. 582, 100 So. 837, 838.

BLIND NAILING. "Blind nailing," in a contract relating to the interior finish of a house, means driving the nails in with a nail set, and conceal-ing them with putty and paint. Sterling Engi-neering and Construction Co. v. Berg, 161 Wis. 280, 152 N.W. 851, 852.

BLIND TIGER. A place where intoxicants are sold on the sly, and contrary to the law. Town of Ruston v. Fountain, 118 La. 53, 42 So. 644; City of Shreveport v. Maroun, 134 La. 490, 64 So. 388, 389. A "tippling-house." Calhoun v. Bel, 136 La. 149, 66 So. 761, 762, Ann.Cas.1916D, 1165.

BLIND WAGON. Such as one used for moving furniture and the like, is one without the name or address of the owner of it thereon. Mike Berni-ger Moving Co. v. O’Brien, Mo.App., 240 S.W. 481, 483.

BLINDCRAFT. A natural descriptiva term iden-tifying in a broad sense work of the blind, convey-ing the idea of the blind performing deftly at any of the various skills or trades to which their talents are applied or leaving the suggestion of dexterity and skill of the blind as well as their handiwork itself. San Francisco Ass’n for Blind v. Industrial Aid for Blind, D.C.Mo., 58 F.Supp.. 995, 1001.

BLINKS. In old English law. Boughs broken down from trees and thrown in a way where deer are likely to pass. Jacob.

BLOCK. A square or portion of a city or town inclosed by streets, whether partially or wholly oc-cupied by buildings or containing only vacant lots. Also used synonymous with "square." Weeks v. Hetland, 202 N.W. 807, 812, 813, 52 N.D. 351. The platted portion of a city surrounded by streets. Cravens v. Putnam, 101 Kan. 161, 165 P. 801, 802. The terco need not, however, be limited to blocks platted as such, but may mean an area bounded on all sides by streets or avenues. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. v. City of Tulsa, Okl., C.C.A.OkI., 15 F.2d 960, 963. It must be surrounded on at least three sides by streets, which must be marked on the ground, and not simply indicated as such on a plat. Seested v. Dickey, 318 Mo. 192, 300 S.W. 1088, 1098.

BLOCK BOOK SYSTEM. An abstract of property assessed for taxes and also of property unrendered and of which owners were unknown, together with maps and plats. Southern Surety Co. v. Laf-ferty, Tex.Civ.App., 43 S.W.2d 460, 463.

BLOCK—BOOKING. The practice of licensing or offéring for license one motion picture feature or group of features on condition that exhibitor will also license another feature or group of fea-tures released by distributor during a given period. U. S. v. Paramount Pictures, N.Y., 68 S.Ct. 915, 928, 334 U.S. 131, 92 L.Ed. 1260.

BLOCK—HOLER. One who follows up the miner to blast or throw down large rocks left in the proc-ess of mining in a "stope." Mesich v. Tamarack Mining Co., 184 Mich. 363, 151 N.W. 564, 566.

BLOCK OF SURVEYS. In Pennsylvania land law. Any considerable body of contiguous tracts surveyed in the name of the same warrantee, with-out regard to the manner in which they were orig-inally located; a body of contiguous tracts located by exterior unes, but not separated from each oth-er by interior unes. Morrison v. Seaman, 183 Pa. 74, 38 A. 710.

BLOCK TO BLOCK RULE. The "block to block rule" for assessing the benefits for the opening of a new street is, the assessment against the lots in each block of the cost of acquiring the lands in that block. In re St. Raymona Ave. in City of New York, 162 N.Y.S. 185, 188, 175 App.Div. 518.

BLOCKADE. In International law. A marine in-vestment or beleaguering of a town or harbor. A sort of circumvallation round a place by which all foreign connection and correspondence is, as fax as human power can effect it, to be cut off. 1 C.Rob.Adm. 151.
It is not necessary, however, that the place should be invested by land, as well as by sea, in order to constitute a legal blockade; and, if a place be blockaded by sea only, it is no violation of belligerent rlghts for the neutral to carry on commerce with it by inland communIcatiorm. 1 Kent, Comm. 147.
The actual Investment of a port or place by a hostlle force fully competent, under ordinary circumstances, to cut off all communication therewilh, so arranged or dis-posed as to be able to apply its force to every point of practicable access or approach to the port or place so invested. The Olinde Rodrigues, D.C.S.C., 91 Fed. 274; Id., 19 S.Ct. 851, 174 U.S. 510, 43 L.Ed. 1065; The Peter-hoff, 5 Wall. 50, 18 L.Ed. 564; Grinnan v. Edwards, 21 W, Va. 347.
It is called a "blockade de facto" when the usual notice of the blockade has not been given to the neutral powers by the government causing the investment, in consequence of which the blockad-ing squadron has to warn off all approaching vessels.

Pacific Blockade

A means of coercion short of war, usually adopt-ed by the joint action of severas nations.
An instante of it occurred when Great Britain and Ger-many uníted to prevent the siave traffIc and stop the Importation of arma on the east coast of Africa. Snow. Int. Law 79. In 1827 Greece was blockaded by France, Russia, and Great Britain; In 1850 the Greek ports were blockaded by Great Britain, and again in 1855 by the corn-bined fleets of the flve Great Powers. In 1887 the Institute of International Law unanimously declared In favor of the legality of pacifle blockade, subject to certain condttions. See 21 L. Mag. & Rey. 285; 2 Oppen. II 40-49.

Paper Blockade

The state of a line of coast proclaimed to be under blockade in time of war, when the naval force on watch is not sufficient to repel a real at-tempt to enter.

Publie Blockade

A blockade which is not only established in fact, but is notified, by the government directing it, to other governments; as distinguished from a simple blockade, which may be established by a naval officer acting upoñ his own discrelion or under direction of superiors, without governmen-tal notification. The Circassian, 2 Wall. 150, 17 L. Ed. 796.

Simple Blockade

One established by a naval commander acting on his own discretion and responsihility, or under the direction of a superior officer, but without gov-ernmental orders or notification. The Circassian, 2 Wall. 150, 17 L.Ed. 796.

BLOCKAGE. Recognition in the field of taxation of fact that in some instantes a largo block of stock cannot be marketed and turne(‘ into cash as readily as a few shares. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. Reeves, Ky., 259 S.W.2d 432, 433.

BLOCKAGE RULE. Process of determining value of large blocks of corporate stock for gift and estate tax purposes, based on the post ulate that a largo block of stock cannot be marketed as readily and as advantageously in price as can a few shares. Montclair Trust Co. v. Zink, Prerog., 57 A.2d 372, 376, 380, 141 N.J.Eq. 401.

BLOCKHEAD. A term irnporting wa.nt of nat-ural cleverness, and slowness and obstinacy of mind.

A person may be said to be "of the blood" of another who has any, however small a portion, of the blood derived from a common ancestor, Miller v. Grimes, 262 Pa. 226, 105 A. 92, thus including half blood as well as whole blood, Gardner’s Estate v. Gardner. 42 Utah, 40, 129 P. 360, 361. All persons are of the bload of an ancestor who may, in the absence of other and nearer heirs, take by descent from that ancestor. Cornell v. Child, 156 N.Y.S. 449, 452, 170 App. Div. 240.

Half-Blood

A term denoting the degree of relationship which exists between those who have the same father or the same mother, but not both parents in common.

Mixed Blood

A person is "of mixed blood" who is descended from ancestors of different races or nationalities; but particularly, in the United States, the term de-notes a person one of whose parents (or more re-mote ancestors) was a negro. U. S. v. First Nat. Bank of Detroit, Minn., 234 U.S. 245, 34 S.Ct. 846, 848, 58 L.Ed. 1298.

Whole Blood

Kinship by descent from the same father and mother; as distinguished from half blood, which is the relationship of those who have one parent in common, but not both.

BLOOD FEUD. Avenging the slaughter of kin on the person who slaughtered him, or on his be-longings.
Whether the Teut.onic or the Anglo-Saxon law had a legal right of blood feud has been disputed, but in Alfred’s day it was unlawful to begin a feud until an, attempt had been made to exact the price of the life (weregild, q. v.).

BLOOD MONEY. A weregild, or pecuniary mulct paid by a slayer to the relativas of his victim. Al-so used, in a popular sense, as descriptive of mon-ey paid by way of reward for the apprehension and conviction of a person charged with a capital crime.

BLOOD STAINS, TESTS FOR. See Precipitin Test.

BLOODHOUNDS. Dogs remarkable for their sense of srnell and ability to follow a scent or track a human being. Pedigo v. Com., 103 Ky. 41, 44 S.W. 143, 42 L.R.A. 432, 82 Am.St.Rep. 566.
It has been held that to permit evidence that a hound has tracked an alleged criminal, it must be shown that it had been trained in that work.

BLOODWIT. An amercement for bloodshed. Cowell. The privilege of taking such amerce-ments. Skene. A privilege or exemption from paying a fine or amercement assessed for biood-shed. Cowell.

BLOODY HAND. In forest law. The having the hands or other parts bloody, which, in a person caught trespassing in the forest against venison, was one of the four kinds of circumstantial evi-dence of his having killPd deer, although he was not found in the act of chasing or hunting. Man-wood.

BLOWING WATER. By a ship is throwing water in the hold hack and forth and forcing it through

BLOOD. Kindred; consanguinity; family rela-tionship; relation by descent from a common an-cestor. Swasey v. Jaques, 144 Mass. 135, 10 N.E. 758, 59 Am.Rep. 65. ‘ crevices in the ceiling and coming in contact with the cargo. The Charles Rohde, D.C.Md., 8 F.2d 506.

BLUDGEON. Part of a boy’s baseball bat, the upper end of which had been broken off, has been held to be a bludgeon within a statute relating to the carrying of any concealed instrument. Peo-ple v. McPherson, 220 N.Y. 123, 115 N.E. 515, 516. Contra as to an iron bar, twenty inches long and three-eighths to one-half inch in diameter. People v. Visarities, 222 N.Y.S. 401, 403, 220 App.Div. 657.

BLUE. As applied to a cow, generally denoting either a modified shade of black, or black with white intermingled, or dark gray, dove, or slate color, which, in contrast with some decided color or with white, suggests and somewhat resembles blue. Graham v. State, 16 Ga.App. 221, 84 S.E. 981, 983.

BLUE LAWS. A supposititious code of severe laws for the regulation of religious and personal conduct in the colonies of Connecticut and New Haven; hence any rigid Sunday laws or religious regulations. The assertion by some writers of the existente of the blue laws has no other basis than the adoption, by the first authorities of the New Haven colony, of the Scriptures as their code of law and government, and their strict application of Mosaic principies. Century Dict.

BLUE NOTES. Notes accepted by a life insur-ance company for the amount of premiums on the policy, which provide for the continuance of the policy in force until the due date of the notes. Robnett v. Cotton States Life Ins. Co., 148 Ark. 199, 230 S.W. 257, 258.
"Extension notes" in insurance parlance. O’Dell v. American Nat. Ins. Co., Mo.App., 107 S.W.2d 108, 110.

BLUE SKY LAW. A popular name for acts pro-viding for the regulation and supervision of in-vestment companies, for the protection of the com-munity from investing in fraudulent companies. A law intended to stop the sale of stock in fly by night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations. Dinsmore v. National Hardwood Co., 234 Mich. 436, 208 N.W. 701.

BLUFF. A high, steep bank, as by a river, the sea, a ravine, or a plain, or a bank or headland with a broad, steep face. Columbia City Land Co. v. Ruhl, 70 Or. 246, 141 P. 208, 210.

BLUMBA. A certifying metal tag attached to kosher meat. People on Complaint of Waller v. Jacob Branfman & Son, 263 N.Y.S. 629, 632, 147 Misc. 290.

BLUNDER.• As applied in cases of ordinary negli-gence is the want of or absence of ordinary care, a failure to do ,what should have been done or the doing of that which should not have been done, re-sulting in the happening of an event or injury which could have and should have been foreseen and avoided by use of such care as a reasonably prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances. Loyd v. Pierce, Tex.Civ.App., 89 S.W.2d 1035, 1038.

BLUNDERBUSS. A firearm intended to shoot ob-jects at close quarters, without exact aim. Moline v. Kotch, 213 Minn. 326, 6 N.W.2d 462.

BOARD. An oficial or representative body or-ganized to perform a trust or to execute official or representative functions or having the manage-ment of a public office or department exercising administrative or governmental functions. Com-missioners of State Ins. Fund v. Dinowitz, 39 N.Y. S.2d 34, 38, 179 Misc. 278.
A committee of persons organized under au-thority of law in order to exercise certain authori-ties, have oversight or control of certain matters, or discharge certain functions of a magisterial, representative, or fiduciary character. Thus, "board of aldermen," "board of health," "board of directors," "board of works."
Also lodging, food, entertainment, furnished to a guest at an inn or boarding house.
When used with reference to prisoners, as a basis for the sheriff’s fee, board may be equivalent to "necessary food." Pacific Coal Co. v. Silver Bow County, 79 Mont. 323, 256 P. 386.
"Board," as a verb, means to receive food for a reasonable compensation, either with or with-out lodging. In re Doubleday, 159 N.Y.S. 947, 949, 173 App.Div. 739; Wofford v. Hooper, 149 Tenn. 250, 259 S.W. 549.
To "board" a train may mean simply to "enter" it. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 117 Ark. 329, 175 S.W. 411, 412.

BOARD MEASURE. This term, in a contract of sale of lumber for a specified price per thousand feet, literally implies a measurement of lumber having the dimensions of length, width, and thick-ness, according to the number of cubic inches; but it may be subject to explanation according to the particular circumstances. Paepcke-Leicht Lumber Co. v. Talley, 106 Ark. 400, 153 S.W. 833, 836.

BOARD OF ALDERMEN. The governing body of a municipal corporation. Oliver v. Jersey City, 63 N.J.Law, 96, 42 A. 782. See Aldermen.

BOARD OF AUDIT. A tribunal provided by stat-ute in some states, to adjust and settle the ac-counts of municipal corporations. Osterhoudt v. Rigney, 98 N.Y. 222.

BOARD OF CIVIL AUTIIORITY. In Vermont, in the case of a city this term includes the mayor and aldermen and justices residing therein; in the case of a town, the selectmen and town clerk and the justices residing therein; in the case of a village, the trustees or bailiffs and the justices residing therein. Vt.St.1894, 19, 59 (G.L. 70).

BOARD OF DIRECTORS. The governing body of a private corporation.
Bank’s "board of directors" within statute requiring their consent means all directors. Code 1923, § 3412. McLemore v. State, 26 Ala.App. 228, 157 So. 455, 457. "Township board" and "board of directora" as inter.. changeable terms. State ex rel. Kent v. Olenhouse, 324 Mo. 49, 23 S.W.2d 83, 85.

BOARD OF EDUCATION. An agency of the state for government and management of a school dis-trict. McCurdy v. Board of Education of City of Bloomington, 359 Ill. 188, 194 N.E. 287. The agen-cy to which state delegates power and duty of con-trolling schools in school district, Charles B. Sax-on, Inc., v. Board .of Education of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Town of Catskill, 168 Misc. 209, 4 N.Y.S.2d 757. Public municipal corporation, Gustafson v. Wethersfield Tp. High School Dist. 191, 319 Ill.App. 255, 49 N.E.2d 311, 312.

BOARD OF EQUALIZATION. See Equalization.

BOARD OF FIRE UNDERWRITERS. Unincor-porated voluntary associations composed exclu-sively of persons engaged in business of fire in-surance, for consolidation and co-operation in mat-ters affecting the business. Childs v. Insurance Co., 66 Minn. 393, 69 N.W. 141, 35 L.R.A. 99.

BOARD OF REALTIL A board or commission with certain powers and duties relative to preser-vation and improvement of the public health. Gaines v. Waters, 64 Ark. 609, 44 S.W. 353. A term descriptive of an official body. Fisher v. Kelly, 289 N.Y. 161, 44 N.E.2d 413, 416. The "De-partment of Health" of a city having a commis-sioner of health as its single executive head, was a "Board of Health". Fisher v. Kelly, 264 App. Div. 596, 36 N.Y.S.2d 497, 499.

BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS. A board exercising certain powers in respect to licensing osteopathic physicians and surgeons. Jordt v. Cal-ifornia State Board of Education, 35 Cal.App.2d 591, 96 P.2d 809, 811.

BOARD OF PARDONS. A board to investigate applications for executive clemency and to make reports and recommendations thereon to the gov-ernor.

BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS. Common council of city in taking action respecting street improve-ments and making assessments. City of Crown Point v. Newcomer, 204 Ind. 589, 185 N.E. 440, 441.

BOARD OF REVIEW. A quasi judicial body to hear evidence tending to show errors in an as-sessment roll and to decide whether the assessor’s valuation is correct. State v. Williams, 160 Wis. 648, 152 N.W. 450, 451.

BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUMY. An instrument of executive power, made up of subordinates of the commissioner of immigration with administra-tive duties. Pearson v. Williams, 202 U.S. 281, 26 S.Ct. 608, 50 L.Ed. 1029.

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS. An organized com-mittee, or body of officials, constituting part of the county government, with special charge of the county revenues.

BOARD OF THE TOWN. The board of education of a school district is a "board of the town."

Charles B. Saxon, Inc., v. Board of Education of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Town of Cat-skill, 168 Misc. 209, 4 N.Y.S.2d 757.

BOARD OF TRADE. An organization for the ad-vancement and protection of business interests. Retailers Credit Ass’n of Alameda County v. Com-missioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.9, 90 F.2d 47, 51, 111 A.L.R. 152. An organization of mer-chants, manufacturers, etc., of a city, for further-ing its commercial interests, advancing its pros-perity, etc. In England, an administrative depart-ment of government, for the consideration of mat-ters relating to trade and foreign plantations.

BOARD OF WORKS. A board for the better local management of the English metropolis having the care and management of grounds and gardens; the superintendente of drainage; the regulation of street trafflc and of the buildings of the metropo-lis. Brown.

BOARDER. One who makes a special contract for food with or without lodging. Berkshire Woollen Co. v. Proctor, 7 Cush., Mass., 424; One who boards at a boarding house or school. Atlan-tic City v. Le Beck, 125 N.J.L. 373, 15 A.2d 653, 654. One who has food and lodging for an agreed price, usually under a contract intended to con-tinue for a considerable period of time. Ullman v. State, 1 Tex.App. 220, 28 Am.Rep. 405.
A guest, as distinguished from boarder, comes and remains without any bargaln for time, and may go away when he Aleases. Stewart v. McCready, 24 How.Prac., N.Y., 62; In re Doubleday, 173 App.Div. 739, 159 N.Y.S. 947, 949.

BOARDING MOUSE. A house where the business of keeping boarders generally is carried on, and which is held out by the owner or keeper as a place where boarders are kept; one for the accom-modation of those who enter under contract for entertainment at a certain rate for a certain period of time, as for a week or month, at a rate of com-pensation agreed on; a house kept principally for the residente of permanent boarders. Singelakis v. Davidson, 117 N.J.L. 332, 188 A. 443, 444. A sort of public house, partaking in some degree of the character of an inn or restaurant. Baddour v. City of Long Beach, 279 N.Y. 167, 18 N.E.2d 18, 21, 124 A.L.R. 1003. A quasi public house, where boarders are generally and habitually kept, and which is held out and known as a place of enter-tainment of that kind. Cady v. McDowell, 1 Lans., N.Y. 486; Friedrich Music House v. Harris, 200 Mich. 421, 166 N.W. 869, L.R.A.1918D, 400.
A house occupied for carrying on the business of keeping boarders, although while prosecuting the business and as a means of prosecuting it, the occupant and his wife and children live in the house. Trainor v. Le Beck, 101 N.J.Eq. 823, 139 A. 16, 17. A boarding-house and an inn or hotel differs in, that in a boarding-house the guest is under an express contract, while in an inn there ls no express agree-ment. Willard v. Reinhardt, 2 E. D. Smith, N. Y., 148; McIntosh v. Schops, 92 Or. 307, 180 P. 593. An innkeeper is also bound to receive a guest when he presents himself. 2 El. & Bl. 144; McClaugherty v. Cline, 128 Tenn. 605, 163 S.W. 801. A "boarding-house" is also less public in char-aracter. State v. Brown, 112 Kan. 814, 212 P. 663, 664, 31 A.L.R. 338. See, also, Talbott v. Southern Seminary, 131 Va. 576, 109 S.E. 440, 19 A.L.R. 534. A "rooming house" diffcrs from a "boarding-house" only in that the latter furnishes meals. City of Independence v. Richardson, 117 Kan. 656, 232 P. 1044, 1046. A boarding school, however, is not a boarding-house within a lien statute. Talbott v. Southern Seminary, 131 Va. 576, 109 S.E. 440, 441, 19 A.L.R. 534.

BOARIUS, adj. Lat. Relating to neat cattle. See Bovarius.

BOAT. A small open vessel, or water craft, usu-ally moved by oars or rowing.
It ís commonly distinguished in law from a ship or ves-sel, by being of smaller size and without a deck. The Saxon, D.C.S.C., 269 F. 639, 641. But "boat" and "vessel" are often used synonymously. Southern Pac. Co. v. ten-sen, 244 U.S. 205, 37 S.Ct. 524, 527, 61 L.Ed. 1086, L.R.A. 1918C. 451. And see State v. Hutchins, 79 N.H. 132, 105 A. 519, 521, 2 A.L.R. 1685 ("boats and rafts" held broad enough te cover all water craft, not merely small row-boats). The verb "boat" means to go in a boat. Chappell v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 120 W.Va. 262, 197 S.E. 723, 724.
International rule that sailing vessels shall keep out of way of sailing vessels or boats fishing with nets or lines or trawls does not apply to craft 55 feet long equipped with machinery powerful enought to handle a trawl which would ordinarily be decked over, would have living ac-commodations for crew, etc. International Rules, art. 26, 33 U.S.C.A. § 111. The Virginia and Joan, C.C.A.Mass., 86 F.2d 259, 261. Seaplanes equipped with pontoons or hulls having hydroplaning surfaces are "hydroplane boats" though provided with wings. Fauber v. United States, Ct. Cl., 37 F.Supp. 415, 435.

BOATABLE. A term applied in some states to minor rivers and streams capable of being navi-gated in small boats, skiffs, or launches, though not by steam or sailing vessels. New England Trout, etc., Club v. Mather, 68 Vt. 338, 35 A. 323, 33 L.R.A. 569.
A "boatable stream" is one of common passage as a high way. Boutwell v. Champlain Realty Co., 89 Vt. 80, 94 A. 108, 111, Ann.Cas.1918A, 726.

BOATING. Conveyance by a boat, of whatever kind, of persons or freight. Bosworth v. Nelson, 172 Ga. 612, 158 S.E. 306, 307.

BOATSWAIN. A seaman who superintends the work of the crew. South Atlantic S. S. Co. of Delaware v. Munkacsy, Del., 7 W.W.Harr. 580, 187 A. 600, 604. The foreman of sailors. McCauley v. Pacific Atlantic S. S. Co., 167 Or. 80, 115 P.2d 307, 308.

BOB-TAIL DRIVER. A person collecting and de-livering Iaundry without being subject to com-plete control of employer. Ring v. City Dry Cleaners, Fla., 152 Fla. 622, 12 So.2d 593, 594.

BOBTAILED CABOOSE. One with a door in the front end and without any platform. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Johnson, Tex. Civ.App., 249 S.W. 1092.

BOBTAILS. Persons who conduct stores or es-tablishments of their own where patrons may bring articles to be laundered. Schwartz v. Laun-dry & Linen Supply Drivers’ Union, Local 187, 339 Pa. 353, 14 A.2d 438, 439.

BOC. In Saxon law. A book or writing; a deed or charter. Boc land, deed or charter land. Land boc, a writing for conveying land; a deed or char-ter; a land-book. The land-bocs, or evidentes of title, corresponding to modem deeds, were de-stroyed by William the Conqueror.

BOC HORDE. A place where books, writings, or evidences were kept, generally in monasteries. Cowell.

BOC LAND. In Saxon law. Allodial lands held by deed or other written evidence of title.

BOCERAS. Sax. A scribe, notary, or chancellor among the Saxons.

BODILY. Pertaining to or concerning the body; of or belonging to the body or the physical con-stitution; not mental but corporeal. Electric R. Co. v. Lauer, 21 Ind.App. 466, 52 N.E. 703; Provi-dent Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 18 Tenn. App. 452, 79 S.W.2d 296.
Under a health insurance policy the words "bodily dis-ease or illness" have been held to embrace insanity. Amer-ican Nat. Ins. Co. v. Denman, Tex.Civ.App., 260 S.W. 226, 227; Syphilis and insanity caused by syphilis. Magill v. Travelers Ins. Co., C.C.A.Mo., 133 F.2d 709, 712.

Bodily Harm

Any touching of the person of another against his will with physical force, in an intentional, hos-tile, and aggressive manner, or a projecting of such force against his person. People v. Moore, 50 Hun, 356, 3 N.Y.Supp. 159. Any impairment of physical condition of another’s body or physical pain or illness, but does not include minute dis-turbance of nerve centers caused by fear, shock or other emotions. Clark v. Associated Retail Credit-men of Washington, 70 App.D.C. 183, 105 F.2d 62, 64.

Bodily Heirs

Heirs begotten or borne by the person referred to; lineal descendants. Turner v. Hause, 199 Ill. 464, 65 N.E. 445; Righter v. Forrester, 1 Bush, Ky., 278.
Progeny or issue, including chlldren, grandchildren, and other lineal descendants. Matthews v. Matthews, 214 N.C. 204, 198 S.E. 663, 665. Children synonymous. Murdock v. Deal, 208 N.C. 754, 182 S.E. 466. Heirs of body synony-mous, Williamson v. Cox, 218 N.C. 177, 10 S.E.2d 662, 666. Adopted child as included in words "bodily heirs", Leep-er v. Leeper, 347 Mo. 442, 147 S.W.2d 660, 663, 133 A.L.R. 586. Words of limitation, Kinnaird v. Farmers’ & Mer-chante’ Bank, 249 Ky. 661, 61 S.W.2d 291.

Bodily Infirmity

A settled disease or ailment that would probab-ly result to some degree in general impairment of physical health and vigor. Travelers’ Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., y, Byers, 123 Cal.App. 473, 11 P.2d 444, 446; Ross v. First American Ins. Co., 125 Neb. 329, 250 N.W. 75, 79. An ailment or dis-order of an established and settled character. Maremont v. Lawyers Mut. Ben. Ass’n, 294 III. App. 605, 13 N.E.2d 849; Ross v. First American Ins. Co., 125 Neb. 329, 250 N.W. 75, 79; something that amounts to inroad on physical health or impairment of bodily or mental powers. McClure v. World Ins. Co., 126 Neb. 676, 254 N.W. 393; Gyulai v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 135 Pa. Super. 73, 4 A.2d 824, 826.

Bodily Injury

Any physical or corporeal injury; not necessari-ly restricted to injury to the trunk or main part of the body as distinguished from the head or limbs. State Life Ins. Co. v. Allison, C.C.A.Ala., 269 F. 93, 94, 14 A.L.R. 412; Ross v. International Travelers Ass’n, Tex.Civ.App., 283 S.W. 621. A physical injury only. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Shrigley, D.C.Ark., 26 F.Supp. 625, 628. A cut, bruise, or wound. Chase v. Business Men’s Assur. Co. of America, C.C.A.Utah, 51 F.2d 34, 36. A localized abnormal condition of the liv-ing body. King v. Travelers Ins. Co., 123 Conn. 1, 192 A. 311. An injury caused by external vio-lence. Brannaker v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Ameri-ca, 236 Mo.App. 239, 150 S.W.2d 498, 502. Burns v. Employers’ Liability Assur. Corporation, Limit-ed, of London, England, 134 Ohio St. 222, 16 N.E.2d 316, 321, 117 A.L.R. 733.
"Bodily injuries" and "personal injuries" are not syn-onymous. Malone v. Costa, 151 Fla. 144, 9 So.2d 275, 277. "Bodily injury" and "personal injury" may be used as equivalent terms. Cormier v. Hudson, 284 Mass. 231, 187 N.E. 625, 626. American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Ma-hon, 170 Md. 573, 185 A. 330, 332, 105 A.L.R. 1200.

Bodily Member

An ear is not embraced in the term "member". Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Cook, 69 Ga. App. 131, 25 S.E.2d 67, 71.

Great Bodily Harm

An injury of a greater and More serious kind than battery. Shires v. Boggess, 72 W.Va. 109, 77 S.E. 542, 545. Equivalent to "maim." State v. Foster, 281 Mo. 618, 220 S.W. 958, 959.

Great Bodily Injury

An injury of a more grave and serious charac-ter than an ordinary battery, but one which can-not be definitely defined. State v. Ockij, 165 Iowa, 237, 145 N.W. 486, 487; Hallett v. State, 109 Neb. 311, 190 N.W. 862, 863.

BODMERIE, BODEMERIE, BODDEMEREY. Belg. and Germ. Bottomry (q. v.).

BODY. A person. Used of a natural body, or of an artificial one created by law, as a corpora-tion.
The main part of the human body; the trunk. Walker v. State, 34 Fla. 167, 16 So. 80, 43 Am.St. Rep. 186. The term may, however, embrace all members of the person, Louisville Ry. Co. v. Veith, 157 Ky. 424, 163 S.W. 217; including the head, Franklin v. State, 33 Ohio Cir.Ct.R. 21, 22.
Also the main part of an instrument; in deeds it is spoken of as distinguished from the recitals and other introductory parts and signatures; in affidavits, from the title and jurat.
A collection of laws; that is, the embodiment of the laws in one connected statement or collec-tion, called a "body of laws" (q. y.).
A cement mixer assembled on a truck, Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Carter, 54 Ca1.App.2d 519, 129 P.2d 455, 457. The Workmen’s Benefit Fund of the United States of America. In re Workmen’s Benent Fund of United States, 38 N.Y.S.2d 429, 431, 265 App.Div. 176.

BODY CORPORATE. A corporation public or privaté.
School districts, Commonwealth v. School Dist. of Pitts-burgh, Allegheny County, 343 Pa. 394. 23 A.2d 496. State Building Commission, Utah State Building Commission. for Use ‘and Benefit of Mountain States Supply Co., v. Great American Indemnity Co., 105 Utah 11, 140 P.2d 763, 767.

BODY EXECUTION. An "execution" for confine-ment of defendant, Hershey v. People, 91. Colo. 113, 12 P.2d 345, 347.
A "body execution" is an "execution" which directs that, in accordance with the provisions therein set forth, the body of the defendant therein named be committed to jail. Ex parte Thompson, 111 Vt. 7, 9 A.2d 107, 110.

BODY HEIRS. Sometimes words of purchase. Brown v. Boone, 129 Kan. 786, 284 P. 436, 437.

BODY OF A COUNTY. A county at large, as dis-tinguished from any particular place within it. A county considered as a territorial whole. State v. Arthur, 39 Iowa, 632; People v. Dunn, 31 App. Div. 139, 52 N.Y.Supp. 968.

BODY OF AN INSTRUMENT. The main and op-erative part; the substantive provisions, as dis-tinguished from the recitals, title, jurat, etc.

BODY OF LAWS. An organized and systematic collection of rules of jurisprudence.

BODY OF THE OFFENSE. When applied to any particular offense, means that the particular crime charged has actually been committed by some one. Barrett v. State, 57 Okl. 259, 47 P.2d 613, 617.

BODY POLITIC OR CORPORATE. A social com-pact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole peo-ple, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good, Uricich v. Kolesar, 54 Ohio App. 309, 7 N.E.2d 413, 414. A term app]ied to a corpo-ration. County. Bazzoli v. Larson, 40 Ohio App. .321, 178 N.E. 331, 332; Lindburg v. Bennett, 117 Neb. 66, 219 N.W. 851, 855. Municipality. Middle-States Utilities Co. v. City of Osceola, 1 N.W.2d 643, 645, 231 Iowa 462; Lindburg v. Bennett, 117 Neb. 66, 219 N.W. 851, 855. School district. Pat-rick v. Maybank, 198 S.C. 262, 17 S.E.2d 530, 534.
State or nation or public associations, Utah State Building Commission, for Use and Benefit of Mountain States Supply Co., v. Great American Indemnity Co., 105 Utah 11, 140 P.2d 763, 767.

BOILARY. Water arising from a salt well be-longing to a person who is not the owner of the soil.

BOILER. Insurance policies defining a boiler as a receptacle in which steam is generated, including the stop valve nearest the boiler, have been held not to include a nipple screwed into the outlet of the stop valve, Cambria Coal Mining Co. v. Travel-ers’ Indemnity Co., 144 Tenn. 469, 234 S.W. 323, 324, nor the whistle pipe aboye the whistle valve, Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., D.C.Pa., 257 F. 849, 850; nor damage by gas ex-plosion in fire box and chimney, Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance Co. v. Kleinman, Tex.Civ.App., 293 S.W. 894, 895.
Under the Boiler Inspection Act Feb. 17, 1911, § 2, 45 U.S.C.A. § 23, a locomotive cab is an appur-tenance to the boiler, Brown v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 108 Misc. 384, 177 N.Y.S. 618, 619; and a bell ringer is a part or appurtenance of a locomotive and tender, Hines v. Smith, C.C.A.I11., 275 F. 766, 767; but not a so-called trail car similar to a flat car, used exclusively in switching cars or trains onto a transfer boat, for the purpose of preventing the great weight of the locomotive from being placed on the apron or approaches of the transfer boat, Alabama & V. Ry. Co. v. Ware, 129 Miss. 315, 92 So. 161, 162.

BOILS. A policy, providing for the payment of In-demnity in the event the insured suffered from "boils," is clear and explicit, and does not cover disability occasioned by a disease designated as "ischio-rectal abscess." Midland Casualty Co. v. Mason, 55 Okl. 93, 154 P. 1171, 1172. A localized inflammatory swelling of the skin. Beck v. State, 29 Ala.App. 410, 197 So. 42, 43.

BOIS, or BOYS. L. Fr. Wood; timber; brush.

BOLHAGIUM, or BOLDAGIUM. A little house or cottage. Blount.

BOLT. The desertion by one or more persons from the political party to which he or they be-long; the permanent withdrawal before adjourn-ment of a portion of the delegates to a political convention. Rap. & L.
A mass or block of wood from which anything may be cut or formed. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. J. F. Hasty & Sons, 255 U.S. 252, 41 S.Ct. 269, 270, 65 L.Ed. 614.

BOLTING. In English practice. A term formerly used in the English inns of court, but more par-ticularly at Gray’s Inn, signifying the private ar-guing of cases, as distinguished from mooting, which was a more formal and public mode of ar-gument. Cowell; Tomlins; Holthouse.

BOMBAY REGULATIONS. Regulations passed for the presidency of Bombay, and the territories subordinate thereto. They were passed by the governors in council of Bombay until the year 1834, when the power of local legislation ceased, and the acts relating thereto were thenceforth passed by the governor general of India in coun-cil. Mozley & Whitley.

BON. Fr. In old French law, a royal order or check on the treasury, invented by Francis L Bon pour mille livres, good for a thousand livres. Step.Lect. 387.
In modern law. The name of a clause (bonpour , good for so much) added to a cedule or promise, where it is not in the handwriting of the signer, containing the amount of the sum which he obliges himself to pay. Poth.Obl. part 4, ch. 1, art. 2, § 1.

BONA. Lat. n. Goods; property; possessions. In the Roman law, this term was used to designate all species of property, real, personal, and mixed, but was more strictly applied to real estate. In modern civil law, it includes both personal prop-erty (technically so called) and chattels real, thus corresponding to the French biens (q. V.). In the common law, its use was confined to the descrip-tion of movable goods. Tisdale v. Harris, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 13.

Bona Confiscata

Goods conflscated or forfeited to the imperial fise or treasury. 1 Bl.Comm. 299.

Bona et Catarla

Goods and chattles. Movable property. This expression includes all personal things that belong to a man. 16 Mees. & W. 68.

Bona Felanum

In English law. Goods of felony; the goods of one con-victed of felony. 5 Coke, 110.

Bona Forisfacta

Goods forfeited.

Bona Fugitivorum

In English law. Goods of fugitives; the proper goods of him who flies for felony. 5 Coke, 109b.

Bona /mmobi/ia

Lands. Castle v. Castle, C.C.A.Haw., 267 F. 521, 522. Bona Mobilia
In the civil law. Movables. Castle v. Castle, C.C.A. Haw., 267 F. 521, 522. Those things which move them-selves or can be transported from one place to another, and not permanently attached to a farm, heritage, or building.

Bona Notabilia

Notable goods; property worthy of notice, or of sufil-cient value to be accounted for. 2 Bl.Comm. 509; Rolle, Abr. 908. Moore v. Jordan, 36 Kan. 271, 13 P. 337, 59 Am. Rep. 550.

Bona Paraphernalia

In the civil law. The separate property of a married woman other than that which is included In her dowry; more particularly, her clothing, jewels, and ornaments. Whiton v. Snyder, 88 N.Y. 303.

Bona Peritura

Goods of a perishable nature; such goods as an executor or trustee must use diligente in disposing of and convert-ing them into money.

Bona U tlagatorum

Goods of outlaws; goods belonging to persons outlawed.

Bona Vacantia

Vacant, unclaimed, or stray goods. Those things in which nobody claims a property, and which belonged, under the common law, to the finder, except in certain instantes, when they were the property of the king. 1 BI.Comm. 298.

Bona Waviata

In English law. Walved goods; goods stolen and tvaived, that is, thrown away by the thief in his flight, for fear of being apprehended, or to facilitate his escape; and which go to the sovereign. 5 Coke, 109b; 1 Bl.Comm. 296.

BONA. Lat. adj. Good. Used in numerous legal phrases of which the following are the principal:

Bona Fides

Good falth; integrity of dealing; honesty; slncerity; the opposite of mala fides and of dolus malos.

Bona Gestura

Good abearance or behavior.

Bona Gratia

In the Roman law. By mutual consent; voIuntarlly. A term applied to a species of divorce where the parties sep-arated by mutual consent; or where the parties renounced their marital engagements without assigning any cause upon mere pretexts. Tayl. Civil Law, 361 362; Calvin. •

Bona Memoria

Gond memory. Generally used In the phrase sanee men-tis et bonce memorice, of sound mind and good memory, as descriptive of the mental capacity of a testator.

Bona Patria

In the Scotch law. An assize or jury of good neighbors. Bell.

BONA FIDE. In or with good faith; honestly, openly, and sincerely; without deceit or fraud. M. Lowenstein & Sons v. British-American Mfg. Co., C.C.A.Conn., 7 F.2d 51, 53; Fairfield Holding Corporation v. Souther, 258 Mass. 540, 155 N.E. 639, 640. Truly; actually; without simulation or pretense. Innocently; in the attitude of trust and confidence; without notice of fraud, etc. Real, actual, genuine, and not feigned. Bridgeport Mortgage & Realty Corporation v. Whitlock, 128 Conn. 57, 20 A.2d 414, 416.
The phrase "bona fide" is sometimes used amblguously; thus, the expression "bona fide holder for value" (see that tItle, infra) may either mean a holder for real value, as opposed to a holder for pretended value, or it may mean a holder for real‘value without notice of any fraud, etc. Byles, Bills, 121.

Bona Fide Contract Carriers

Germine contract carriers without deceit or fraud. Infan-tino v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 146 Pa.Super. 245, 22 A.2d 108, 109; Puhl v. Pennsylvania Pub-lic Utility Commission, 139 Pa.Super. 152, 11 A.2d 508, 511.

Bona Fide Holder for Value

An lnnocent or "bona fide holder for value" of negotiable paper is one who has taken it In good faith for a valuable consideration in the ordinary course of business and when it was not overdue. McCamant v. McCamant, Tex.Civ.App., 187′ S.W. 1096, 1099. "Holder in due course" as equivalent for expression "bona fide holder for value without notice." Drumm Const. Co. v. Forbes, 305 III. 303, 137 N.E. 225, 226, 26 A.L.R. 764; Bank of California v. National City Co., 138 Wash. 517, 244 P. 690, 691; Bruce v. Citizens’ Nat. Bank of Lineville, 185 Ala. 221, 64 So. 82, 84; Weller v. Meadows, Mo.App., 272 S.W. 85, 90. One who receives negotiable paper in payment of antecedent obligations without notice of prior equities. W. Horace Williams Co. v. Vandaveer, Brown & Stoy, Tex.Civ.App., 84 S.W.2d 333, 340.

Bona Fide Judgment Creditor

One who in good faith, without fraud or collusion, recov-ers a judgment for money honestly due him. Rochester Trust Co. v. White, 243 Pa. 469, 90 A. 127, 129.

Bona Fide Mortgagee

Essentlal elements of status aré good faith, valuable con-sideration, and absence of notice. Companaro v. Gondolfo, C.C.A.N.J., 60 F.2d 451, 452. To constitute "bona fide mortgagee" there must be an absence of notice and pay-ment of, or fixed liability for the consideration. Cam-bridge Production Credit Ass’n v. Patrick, 140 Ohio St. 521, 45 N.E.2d 751, 755, 144 A.L.R. 323.

Bona Fide Operation

Substantial, as distinguished from incidental, sporadic, or infrequent service. Goncz v. Interstate Commerce Com-mission, D.C.Mass., 48 F.Supp. 286, 288.

Bona Fide Possessor

One who nr,t only supposes himself to be the true pro-prietor of the land, but who is ignorant that his title is contested by some other person claiming a better right to Whitehead v. Barker, 288 Mich. 19, 284 N.W. 629, 631.
Bona Fide Possessor Facit Fructus Consumptos Suos
By good faith a possessor makes the fruits consumed his own. Tray. Lat. Max. 57.

Bona Fide Purchaser

A purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration and without notice. Neal v. Holt, Tex.Civ.App., 69 S.W.2d 603, 609. A purchaser for a valuable consideration paid or parted with In the belief that the vendor had a right to sell, and without any suspicious círcumstances to put him on ínquiry. Merritt v. Railroad Co., 12 Barb., N. Y., 605. One who acts without covin, fraud, or collusion; one who, in the commission of or connivance at no fraud, pays full price for the property, and in good faith, honestly, and in fair dealing buys and goes finto possession. Sanders v. McAffee, 42 Ga. 250. One who at time of purchase advances a new consideration, surrenders some security, or does some other act which leaves him In a worse posí-tion if his purchase should be set aside. Kelly v. Grainey, 113 Mont. 520, 129 P.2d 619, 626. Títle, possession, and want ef notice, elther actual or constructive, as the essen-tial factors. Taylor v. Lindenmann, 211 Iowa, 1122, 235 N.W. 310, 312. Payment of consideration prior to notice oí adverse claim as essential. The J. Oswald Boyd, D.C.Mich., 53 F.Supp. 103, 106. Payrnent of valuable con-sideration, good faith, absence of purpose to lake unfair advantage of third persons, and absence of actual or con-structive notice of outstanding rights of others as the essential element§. Luschen v. Stanton, 192 Okl. 454, 137 P.2d 567, 570. "Innocent purchaser for value" and "bona fide purchaser" as synonymous. Felts v. Whitaker, Tex. Civ.App., 129 S.W.2d 682, 690.

Bona Fide Residence

Residence with domicillary intent, I. e., a honre in which the party actually lives. Alburger v. Alburger, 138 Pa.Super. 339, 10 A.2d 883, 890.

BONA FIDES EXIGIT UT QUOD CONVENIT FIAT. Good faith demands that what is agreed upon shall be done. Dig. 19, 20, 21; Id. 19, 1, 50; Id. 50, 8, 2, 13.

BONN FIDEI NON CONGRUIT DE APICIBUS JURIS DISPUTARE. It is unbecoming to (or incompatible with) good faith to discuss (insist upon) the extreme subtleties of the law. A max-im which may be more freely rendered as mean-ing, "To insist on extreme subtleties of law is an encouragement to fraud." Adams. Gloss.

BONA FIDES NON PATITUR UT BIS IDEM EXIGATUR. Good faith does not allow us to demand twice the payment of the same thing. Dig. 50, 17, 57; Broom, Max. 338, note; Perine v. Dunn, 4 Johns.Ch., N.Y., 143.

BONN FIDEI. In the civil law. Of good faith; ir good faith.

BONIE FIDEI CONTRACTS. In civil and Scotch law. Those contracts in which equity may inter-pose to correct inequalities, and to adjust all mat-ters according to the plain intention of fhe par-ties. 1 Kames, Eq. 200.

BONN FIDEI EMPTOR. A purchaser in good faith. One who either was ignorant that the thing he bought belonged to another or supposed that the seller had a right to sell it. Dig. 50, 16, 109. See Id. 6, 2, 7, 11.

BONN FIDEI POSSESSOR. A possessor in good faith. One who believes that no other person has a better right to the possession than himself. Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 243.

BONN FIDEI POSSESSOR IN ID TANTUM QUOD SESE PERVENERIT TENETUR. A pos-sessor in good faith is Hable only for that which he himself has obtained (or that which has come to him). 2 Inst. 285.

BONANZA. Enormous profit for miner in placer mine. Ballagh v. Williams, 50 Cal.App.2d 10, 122 P.2d 343, 344.

BOND. A certificate or evidence of a debt. State v. Merchants Nat. Bank of Mobile, 230 Ala. 661, 162 So. 270; First State Bank of Kansas City v. Bone, 122 Kan. 493, 252 P. 250, 254. A contract. Cusack v. McGrain, 136 Ohio St. 27, 23 N.E.2d 633, 635. A debt on which interest is paid. Commis-sioner of Internal Revenue v. H. P. Hood & Sons, C.C.A.1, 141 F.2d 467, 469. A deed whereby the obligor obliges himself, his heirs, executors and administrators, to pay a certain sum of money to another at a day appointed. Gural v. Engle, 128 N.J.L. 252, 25 A.2d 257, 260; Commonwealth, for Use of Fayette County v. Perry, 330 Pa. 355, 199 A. 204, 206. A mere promise to pay, Deppe v. Lufkin, C.C.A.Mass., 116 F.2d 483, 486. A spe-cialty or sealed instrument and not merely a writ-ten instrument. Forrest v. Hawkins, 169 Va. 470, 194 S.E. 721, 722. A written obligation. Davis v. Phipps, 191 Ark. 298, 85 S.W.2d 1020, 1023, 100 A.L.R. 1110; Covington Virginian v. Woods, 182 Vá. 538, 29 S.E.2d 406; Code Miss.1930, § 1365. An instrument which is not necessarily under seal. Carson, Pirie, Scott & Co. v. Duffy-Powers, Inc., D.C.N.Y., 9 F.Supp. 199, 201; Code Miss.1930, § 1365. An instrument with a clause, with a sum fixed as a penalty, binding the parties to pay the same, conditioned, however, that the payment of the penalty may be avoided by the performance by some one or more of the parties of certain acts. In re Fitch, 3 Redf.Sur., N.Y., 459. And see Stifel Estate Co. v. Cella, 220 Mo.App. 657, 291 S.W. 515, 518. Any contractual funding device. Leon County v. State, 122 Fla. 505, 165 So. 666. Debentures. First State Bank of Kansas City v. Bone, 122 Kan. 493, 252 P. 250, 254. Obligation to pay interest embodied in bonds as included in word "bonds." Eisiminger v. Elliott, Colo., 103 Colo. 216, 84 P.2d 823, 825.
In old Scotch law. A bond-man; a slave. Skene.
Bonds are elther single (simple) or double, (condi-tonal.) A single bond is one In which the obligor binds himself, his heirs, etc., to pay a certain sum of money to another person at a specifled day. A double (or condi-tional) bond is one to which a condition is added that if the obligor does or forbears from doing some act the obli-gation shall be void. Formerly such a condition was some-
times contained in a separate instrument, and was then called a "defeasance."

Word "bond" in a statute means negotiable bonds. Boyal Oak Drain. Dist., Oakland County v. Keefe, C.C.A. Ohio, 87 F.2d 786. Word "borras" in statute held applicable to a single bond. Líen Law Ñ.Y. § 231. In re Downtown
Athietic Club of New York City, D.C.N.Y., 18 F.Supp. 712, 715.
As a verb, to place under the cohditions of a bond; specif.: to convert into a debt secured by bonds. State ex rel. Pittman Bros. Const. Co. v. Watson, 199 La. 623, 6 So.2d 709, 712. To give bond for, as for duties on goods; to secure payment of duties, by giving bond. Bonded, secured by bond. Bonded goods are those for the duties on which bonds are given.

Bond and Disposition in Security
In Scotch law. A bond and mortgage on land.

Bond and Mortgage

A species of security, consisting of a bond conditioned for the repayment of a loan of money, and a mortgage of realty to secure the performance of the stipulations of the bond. Meigs v. Bunting, 141 Pa. 233, 21 A. 588, 23 Am.St. Rep. 273.
A bond and mortgage are distinct and separate securi-ties. In re Maroney’s Estate, 311 Pa. 336, 166 A. 914, 915. "Bond" is prímarily contract to pay while "mortgage" is separate contract to secure payment. Mendelson v. Realty Mortg. Corporation, 257 Mich. 442, 241 N.W. 154, 155.
Investment In certiflcates of participation ín bonds and mortgages as within statute authorizing investment in "bonds and mortgages". In re Smith, 279 N.Y. 479, 18 N.E.2d 666, 670.

Bond Creditor

A creditor whose debt is secured by a bond.

Bond for Deed

An agreement to make title in the future or an executory or incomplete sale. Ingram v. Smith, 62 Ca.App. 335, 7 S.E.2d 922, 926. An agreement to buy and sell real estate on small monthly payment,. Galverina v. Hen L. Lewis Corporation, La.App., 165 So. 29.

Bond for Titie

An agreement to make title in the future or an executory or incomplete sale. Ingram v. Smith, 62 Ga.App. 335, 7 S.E.2d 922, 926. White v. Stokes, 67 Ark. 184, 53 S.W. 1060. In re Phcenix Planing Mill, D.C.Ga., 250 F. 899, 903. It is not a conveyance of legal titie but only a contract ter con-vey and may ripen into an equitable title upon payment of the consideration. Faddell v. Taylor, Tex.Com.App., 239 S.W. 931, 932.

Bond Issue

Denvery of instrumente as oovered by term. Vans Agnew v. Fort Myers Drainage Dlst., C.C.A.Fla., 69 F.2d 244, 245.
Bond of Indebtedness/nstruments containing promise to pay sum certain under seal and issued in serles in nature of corporate securities. Bellefleid Co. v. Heiner, D.C.Pa., 26 F.2d 292, 293. A tem-porary bond ín registered form issued by publie service corporation, Wisconsin Public Service Corporation v. United States, D.C.Wis., 40 F.Supp. 327, 330.

Bond of Such Ordinary

Bond that the ordinary gives for the faithful performance of duties as clerk. Jones v. Reed, 58 Ga.App. 72, 197 S.E. 665, 668.

Bond Tenante

In English law. Copyholders and customary tenants are sometimes so called. 2 Bi.Comm. 148.

Bond with Surety

Bond executed without surety but accompanfed by cer-tifled check as substitute. Clinch Valley Lumber Corpora-tion v. Hagan Estates, Inc., 167 Va. 1, 187 S.E. 440, 441.

Bonds of State or Public Corporation

State’s or city’s general obligation bonds. City of Los Angeles v. Agardy, 1 Ca1.2d 76, 33 P.2d 834, 835.
Eiack’s Law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed.-15

Claim Bond

Primarily in nature of forthcoming bond. Sanders v. Farrier, Tex.Civ.App., 271 S.W.2d 293, 298.

Corporate Bonds See Corporate Bonds.

Forthcoming Bond

A bond conditioned that a certain artide shall be forth-coming at a certain time or when called for. See Claim bond.

General Mortgage Bond

A bond secured upon an entine corporate property, parta of which are subject to one or more prior mortgages.

Heritable Bond

In Scotch law, a bond for a sum of money to which is joined a conveyance of land or of heritage, to be held by the creditor la security of the debt.

Income Bonds

Bonds on which interest is payable only when earned and after payment of interest upon prior mortgages.
Indemnity Bond See Indemnity Bond.

Liabliity Bond

One which is intended to protect the assured from lía-bility for damages or to protect the persone damaged by injuries occasioned by the assured as specified, when such liability should accrue, and be imposed by law, as by a court, as distinguished from an lndemnity bond, whose purpose is only to indemnify the assured against actual loas by way of reimbursement for moneys paid or which must be paid. Fenton v. Poston, 114 Wash. 217, 195 P. 31, 33.

Lloyd’s Bond

A bond issued for work done or goods delivered and bearing interest.

Municipal Bond See Municipal bonds.

Official Bond

A bond given by a public officer, conditioned that he shall well and faithfully perform all the duties of the oflice. The term 1s sometlmes made to include the bonds of execu-tors, guardians, trustees, etc.

Railroad Aid Bonds

Bonds issued by municipal corporations to aid in the construction of railways.

Redelivery Bond

A statutory bond given by a person in whose possession attached property le found in order to regain possession of the property. Burnham-Munger-Root Dry Goods Co. v. Strahl, 102 Neb. 142, 166 N.W. 266.

Simple Bond

At common law, a bond without penalty; a bond for the payment of a deflnite sum of money to a named obligee on demand or on a day certain. Burn.side v. Wand, 170 Mo. 531, 71 S.W. 337, 62 L.R.A. 427.

Single Bond

A deed whereby the obligor obligas himself, bis heirs, executors, and adminlstrators, to pay a certain sum oí money to the obligee at a day named, without terma of defeasance.

Straw Bond

A bond upon which ís used either the flamee of flctltious persons or those unable to pay the sum guaranteed; gen-erally applied to insufficient ball bonds, improperly taken.

BONDAGE. Slavery; involuntary personal servi-tude ; captivIty. In oíd English law, villenage, villein tenure. 2 BI.Comm, 92.

BONDED INDEBTEDNESS. Indebtedness law-fully contracted for corporate purposes, payable from taxes on all property within municipality. Bolton v. Wharton, 163 S.C. 242, 161 S.E. 454, 460.

BONDED WAREHOUSE. See Warehouse Sys-tem.

BONDSMAN. A surety; one who has entered in-to a bond as surety. The word seems to apply es-pecially to the sureties upon the bonds of officers, trustees, etc., while ball should be reserved for the sureties on recognizances and bail-bonds. Ha-berstich v. Elliott, 189 III. 70, 59 N.E. 557.

BONES GENTS. L. Fr. In old English law. Good men (of the jury).

BONI NOMINES. In old European law. Good men; a name given in early European jurispru-dence to the tenants of the lord, who judged each other in the lord’s courts. 3 B1.Comm. 349.

BONI JUDICIS EST AMPLIARE JURISDICTION-EM. It is the part of a good judge to enlarge (or use liberally) his remedial authority or juris-diction. 1 C.B.N.S. 255; 4 Bingh.N.C. 233; 4 Scott N.R. 229.

BONI JUDICIS EST AMPLIARE JUSTITIAM. It is the duty of a good judge to enlarge or ex-tend justice. 1 Burr. 304.

BONI JUDICIS EST JUDICIUM SINE DILA-TIONE MANDARE EXECUTIONI. It is the duty of a good judge to cause judgment to be executed without delay. Co.Litt. 289.

BONI JUDICIS EST LITES DIRIMERE, NE LIS EX LITE ORITUR, ET INTEREST REIPUBLIGIO UT SINT FINES LITIUM. It is the duty of a good judge to prevent litigations, that suit may not grow out of suit, and it concerns the welfare of a state that an end be put to litigation. 4 Coke, 15b; 5 Coke, 31a.

BONIFICATION. The remission of a tax, partic-ularly on goods intended for export, having the same effect as a bonus or drawback. A device en-abling a commodity to be exported and sold in the foreign market as if it had not been taxed. U. S. v. Passavant, 169 U.S. 16, 18 S.Ct. 219, 42 L. Ed. 644.

BONIS CEDERE. In the civil law. To make a transfer or surrender of property, as a debtor did to his creditors. Cod. 7, 71.

BONIS NON AMOVENDIS. A writ addressed to the sheriff, when a writ of error has been brought, commanding that the person against whom judg-ment has been obtained be not suffered to remove his goods till the error be tried and determined. Reg. Orig. 131.

BONITARIAN OWNERSHIP. In Roman law. A species of equitable title to things, as distin-guished from a title acquired according to the strict forms of the municipal law; the property of a Reman citizen in a subject capable of quiritary property, acquired by a title not known to the civil law, but introduced by the pretor, and protected by his imperium or supreme executive power, e. g., where res mancipi had been transferred by mere tradition. Poste’s Gaius Inst. 187. See Quiritari-an Ownership.

BONO ET MALO. A special writ of jail delivery, which formerly issued of course for each particu-lar prisoner. 4 B1.Comm. 270.

BONUM DEFENDENTIS EX INTEGRA CAUSA; MALUM EX QUOLIBET DEFECTU. The suc-cess of a defendant depends on a perfect case; his loss arises from some defect. 11 Coke, 68a.

BONUM NECESSARIUM EXTRA TERMINOS NECESSITATIS NON EST BONUM. A good thing required by necessity is not good beyond the limits of such necessity. Hob. 144.

BONUS. A consideration or premium paid by a company for a charter or other franchise or privilege. Com. v. Transp. Co., 107 Pa. 112; for privilege of carrying on corporate business, United Gas Improvement Co. v. Burnet, C.C.A.3, 64 F.2d 957. 958. A consideration for what is re-ceived, and advantage or benefit given in return for a benefit received, or an inducement for con-ferring a benefit. Church v. Winship, 175 La. 816, 144 So. 585, 586. "A definite sum to be paid at one time, for a loan of money for a specified pe-riod, distinct from and independently of the in-terest." Association v. Wilcox, 24 Conn. 147. A gratuity to which the recipient has no right to make a demand. Walling v. Plymouth Mf g. Cor-poration, C.C.A.Ind., 139 F.2d 178, 182. A pre-mium or extra or irregular remuneration in con-sideration of offices performed or to encourage their performance. Willkie v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.6, 127 F.2d 953, 956. A premium paid to a grantor or vender. An ad-vance royalty. Sneed v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.Tex., 119 F.2d 767, 770. An "arbi-trary award" given without reference to qualifica-tions for position. Thomas v. Kern, 280 N.Y. 236, 20 N.E.2d 738, 740. ‘An extra consideration given for what is received, or something given in addi-tion to what is ordinarily received by, or strictly due, the recipient. La Juett v. Coty Mach. Co., 153 Misc. 410, 275 N.Y.S. 822. An increase in salary or wages in contracts of employment. At-torney General v. City of Woburn, 317 Mass. 465, 58 N.E.2d 746, 747. An offer to employees to pro-cure efficient and faithful service. Roberts v. Mays Milis, 184 N.C. 406, 114 S.E. 530, 532, 28 A. L.R. 338; Duffy Bros. v. Bing & Bing, 217 App. Div. 10, 215 N.Y.S. 755, 758. Any premium or ad-vantage. Consideration or down payment for mineral lease or transfer of oil Lands. State Nat. Bank of Corpus Christi v. Morgan, Tex.Civ.App., 123 S.W.2d 1036, 1038; In re Levy, 185 Okl. 477, 94 P.2d 537, 539; Gift in recognition of officer’s past successful direction of corporate affairs. Thomas v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.La., 135 F.2d 378, 379. "Interest" for the purpose of ‘the usury law. Bowen v. Mt. Vernon Sav. Bank, 70 App.D.C. 273, 105 F.2d 796, 797.

The word "bonus" Juay in lts natural import imply a gift or gratuity. Carson v. Olcott, 105 Or. 259, 209 P. 610, 611. No distinction may be made between a soldier’s "bonus" given for past service and a "pension," the one being a reward for past military services payable at once, and the other such a reward payable in installments. Peo-ple v. Westchester County Nat. Bank of Peekskill, 231 N.Y. 465, 132 N.E. 241, 243, 15 A.L.R. 1344.

BONUS JUDEX SECUNDUM ZEQUTIVI ET BON-UM JUDICAT, ET 7EQUITATEM STRICTO JURI PILIEFERT. A good judge decides according to what is just and good, and prefers equity to strict law. Co.Litt. 34.

BONUS STOCK. Technically, stock issued to the purchasers of bonds as an inducement to them to purchase bonds or loan money. California Trona Co. v. Wilkinson, 20 Cal.App. 694, 130 P. 190, 194.

BONY. Slate and ,other refuse from mine. Mak-simshuk v. Union Collieries Co., 128 Pa.Super. 86, 193 A. 669, 671, 672, 673.

BOODLE. Usually applied to designate the mon-ey held to be paid or paid as a bribe for corrupt of-ficial action. Boehmer v. Detroit Free Press Co., 94 Mich. 7, 9, 53 N.W. 822, 823, 34 Am.St.Rep. 318.

BOODLING. In the slang of the day, corrupt leg-islative practices and corrupt infiuences affecting legislation. Julian v. Kansas City Star Co., 209 Mo. 35, 107 S.W. 496, 501.

BOOK. An assembly or concourse of ideas ex-pressed in words. U. S. v. One Obscene Book En-titled "Married Love", D.C.N.Y., 48 F.2d 821, 823. A literary composition which is printed; a printed composition bound in a volume. Scoville v. To-land, 21 Fed.Cas. 864. The largest subdivisions of a treatise or other literary composition.
A bound volume consisting of sheets of paper, not printed, containing manuscript entries; such as a mer-chant’s account-books, dockets of courts, etc. A manu-script as a "book". In re Beecher’s Estate, 17 Pa.C.C.R. 161; 8 L.J.Ch. 105. "Financial statement" of bank "book". State v. Cloutier, 181 La. 222, 159 So. 330.
Minute book of bank as "book." Lewis v. U. S., C.C.A. Okl., 22 F.2d 760, 764. Papers prepared in the progress of a cause, though entirely written, and not at all in the book form, such as demurrer-books, error-books, paper-books, etc. Photographs as books. Marietta Mfg. Co. v. Hedges-Walsh-Weidner Co., 9 W.W.Harr. 511, 2 A.2d 922, 927. . Records made on loose sheets as book. Town of Ben-nington v. Booth, 101 Vt. 24, 140 A. 157, 159, 57 A.L.R. 156. X-ray pictures as books. Whetsel v. Shaw, 343 Pa. 182, 22 A.2d 751, 753.
In copyright law, the term may include a pamphlet, a magazine, a collection of blank forms, or a single sheet of musie or of ordinary printing. U. S. v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1,093; M. Witmark & Sons v. Standard Music Roll Co., N.J., 221 F. 376, 380, 137 C.C.A. 184. A term which distinguishes writings from such other copyrightable sub-jects. Sebring Pottery Co. v. Stcubenville Pottery Co., D.C.Ohio, 9 F.Supp. 384, 386.

Book Account

A detailed statement, in the nature of debits and credits between persons; an’ account or record of debit and credit kept in a book. Taylor v. Horst, 52 Minn. 300, 54 N.W. 734; Wright v. Loaiza, 177 Cal. 605, 171 P. 311. A book in which a detailed history of business transac-tions is entered; a record of goods sold or services rendered; a statement in detail of the transactions between parties. Tillson v. Peters, 41 Cal.App.2d 671, 107 P.2d 434, 438.
Entire account between parties at time action Is com-menced. Gardner v. Rutherford, 57 Cal.App.2d 874, 136 P.2d 48, 52. Entrics on loose pages. Foothill Ditch Co. v. Wallace Ranch Water Co., 25 Cal.App.2d 555, 78 P.2d 215, 220.

Book Debt

The words "book debt" include goods sold and delivered, and work, labor, and services per-formed, the evidence of which consists of entries in an original book. Hamill v. O’Donnell, 2 Miles, Pa., 102.

Book of Acts

A term applied to the records of a surrogate’s court. 8 East, 187.

Book of Adjournal

In Scotch law. The original records of criminal trials in the court of justiciary.

Book of Original Entries

A book in which a merchant enters from day to day a record of his transactions. McKnight v. Newell, 207 Pa. 562, 57 A. 39. A book kept for charging goods sold and delivered, in which the entries are made contemporancously with the de-livery of the goods. United Grocery Co. v. J. M. Dannelly & Son, 93 S.C. 580, 77 S.E. 706, Ann.Cas. 1914D, 489. A book in which a detailed history of business transactions is entered. Nicola v. U. S., C.C.A.Pa., 72 F.2d 780, 783.
Distinguished from such books as a ledger. But see Cassil v. Carter, 98 Okl. 49, 223 P. 685, 686. Workmen’s slips for repairs done on automobiles, although not bound in book form. H. W. Emeny Auto Co. v. Neiderhauser, .175 Iowa 219, 157 N.W. 143, 144.

Book of Rates

An account or enumeration of the duties or tar-iffs authorized by parliament. 1 B1.Comm. 316.

Book of Responses

In Scotch law. An account which the directora of the chancery kept to enter all non-entry and relief duties payable by heirs who take precepts from chancery.

Book Value

As applied to stock, the" value shown by deduct-ing liabilities and other matters required to be de-ducted from assets, Elhard v. Rott, 36 N.D. 221, 162 N.W. 302; Gurley v. Woodbury, 177 N.C. 70, 97 S.E. 754, 756; the value determined by net profits or deficit, Davis v. Coshnear, 129 Me. 334, 151 A. 725, 727. The value found by adding to par value the plus value of surplus, In re Fisher’s Es-tate, 344 Pa. 607, 26 A.2d 192, 196. As applied to finance, the value of anything as shown in books of account. Davis v. Coshnear, 129 Me. 334, 151 A. 725, 727.

"Book value" of a business le based upon actual costs of a stock of merchandise and accounts on hand less deprecia-tion. Milis v. Rich, 249 Mich. 489, 229 N.W. 462, 463. "Book value" of building and loan stock is proportionate amount of net assets applicable. Thirteenth Ward Build-ing & Loan Ass’n of Newark v. Weissberg, 115 N.J.Eq. 487, 170 A. 662, 665, 98 A.L.R. 134.

Bookland

In English law. Land, also called "charter-land," which was held by deed under certain rents and free services, and differed in nothing from free socage land. 2 Bl.Comm. 90.

Books

All the volumes which contain authentic reports of decisions in English courts, from the earliest times to the present, are called, par excellence, "The Books." Wharton.

Books of Account

Books in which merchante, traders, and business men generally keep their accounts. Colbert v. Piercy, 25 N.C. 80. Entries made in the regular course of business. Nicola v. U. S., C.C.A.Pa., 72 F.2d 780, 783. Entries on loose leaves or cards. 12 Okl.St.Ann. § 501. Maney. v. Cherry, 170 Okl. 469, 41 P.2d 82, 83. Serial, continuous, and perma-nent memorials of business and affairs. Cudahy Packing Co. v. U. S., C.C.A.I11., 15 F.2d 133, 136. Broderick v. Adamson, 159 Misc. 634, 288 N.Y.S. 688, 696.
Pad slips, cash register items, and adding machine slips, pinned together and preserved. Home Ins. Co, v. Fiewel-len, Tex.Civ.App., 221 S.W. 630, 631. A diary. State v. Coffey, 8 Wash.2d 504, 112 P.2d 989, 991. A ledger of accounts. In re Anderson, D.C.N.Y., 35 F.Supp. 717, 719. A memorandum. Brett v. Dean, 239 Ala. 675, 196 So. 881, 883. A pay-roll book. Hirsch v. Automatic Canteen Co. of America, 296 Ill.App. 47, 15 N.E.2d 888.

Books of Bank

Stock books of bank. Broderick v. Adamson, 159 Misc. 634, 288 N.Y.S. 688, 696.

Books of Corporations

"Books, records, and papers" of corporations as interchangeable terms. Birmingham News v. State, 207 Ala. 440, 93 So. 25, 26. Whatever is kept as written evidence of official doings and business transactions. First Nat. Bank of Colo-rado Springs v. Holt, Mo.App., 158 S.W.2d 229, 231.

Books of Tax Receiver

Tax digests, copies of which must be placed in hands of state revenue commissioner, tax collec-tor, etc. Cady v. State, 198 Ga. 99, 31 S.E.2d 38, 43.

Face of Book

See Face of Book.

Office Book

See Office.

Reference Books

Books to refer to. State v. Innes, 89 Kan. 168, 130 P. 677, 679.

BOOKED. Engaged, destined, bound to promise or pledge oneself to make an engagement. Mente & Co. v. Heller, 99 N.J.Law, 475, 123 A. 755, 756.

BOOKING CONTRACT. A contract made by agents who procure contracts for appearance of acts and actors in theaters. Hart v. B. F. Keith Vaudevi]le Exchange, C.C.A.N.Y., 12 F.2d 341, 342, 47 A.L.R. 775.

BOOKMAKER. A professional betting man, es-pecia]ly one connected with the turf. City of Portland v. Duntley, Or., 203 P.2d 640, 644.

BOOKMAKING. Originally, the collection of sheets of paper or other substances on which en-tries could be made, either written or printed. People ex rel. Lichtenstein v. Langan, 196 N.Y. 260, 89 N.E. 921, 922, 25 L.R.A.,N.S., 479, 17 Ann. Cas. 1081. The term now commonly denotes the recording or registering of bets or wagers on any trial or contest of speed or power of endurance or selling pools. People of State of New York v. Bennett, C.C.N.Y., 113 Fed. 515, 516. A species of betting on horse races. Ex parte Hernan, 45 Tex.Cr.R. 343, 77 S.W. 225, 226. The bets are booked or a record kept of them in a book. Spies v. Rosenstock, 87 Md. 14, 39 A. 268, 269.

BOOKMAKING ESTABLISHMENT. Where wag-ers are made on horse races being run at tracks in various parts of United States. Albright v. Karston, 206 Ark. 307, 176 S.W.2d 421, 422.

BOOM. An inclosure formed by piers and a chain of spars to collect or store logs or timber. Pow-ers’ Appeal, 125 Pa. 175, 17 A. 254, 11 Am.St.Rep. 882; Gasper v. Heimbach, 59 Minn. 102, 60 N.W. 1080. Spars or logs and chains or other fixtures used to keep them in place. Rollins v. Clay, 33 Me. 132, 138.

BOOM COMPANY. A company formed to im-prove streams for floating of logs by booms and other contrivances, and to run, drive, boom and raft logs.

BOOMAGE. A charge on logs for use of a boom in collecting, storing, or rafting them. Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 83 Miss. 499, 35 So. 828. A right of entry on riparian lands to fasten booms and boom sticks. Farrand v. Clarke, 63 Minn. 181, 65 N.W. 361.

BOON DAYS. In English law. Certain days in the year (sometimes called "due days") on which tenants in copyhold were obliged to perform cor-poral services for the lord. Whishaw.

BOOSTED FIRE. A fire wherein some inflam-mable substance other than that of which the building was constructed or which it contained contributed to its burning and spreading. State v. Lytle, 214 Minn. 171, 7 N.W.2d 305, 309.

BOOT, or BOTE. An old Saxon Word, equivalent to "estovers."

BOOTHAGE. See Bothagiúm.

BOOTING, or BOTING, CORN. Certain rent corn, anciently so called. Cowell.

BOOTLEGGER. A seller of whisky. Medlock v. State, 79 Tex.Cr.R. 322, 185 S.W. 566, 568. One engaged in unlawful disposition of liquor. I-Iath-away v. Benton, 172 Iowa 299, 154 N.W. 474, 476. One who sells liquor on the sly. Knothe v. State, 115 Neb. 119, 211 N.W. 619, 621.

BOOTLEGGING. A popular designation for the use, possession, or transportation of liquor in vio-lation of the law, Commonwealth v. Cicere, 282 Pa. 492, 128 A. 446, 448, importing the peddling and illegal sales of intoxicating liquor, Lamar v. State, 190 Ind. 235, 130 N.E. 114.

BOOTSTRAP DOCTRINE. The decision of a court on a special as well as a general appearance that it has jurisdiction is not subject of collateral attack but is res judicata. Peri v. Groves, 183 Misc. 579, 50 N.Y.S.2d 300, 308.

BOOTY. Property captured from the enemy in war, on land. U. S. v. Bales of Cotton, 28 Fed. Cas. 302.

BOOZE. Intoxicating liquor. Tennant v. F. C. Whitney & Sons, 133 Wash. 581, 234 P. 666, 669.

BORD. An old Saxon word, signifying a cottage; a house; a table.

BORD-BRIGCH. In Saxon law. A breach or vio-lation of suretyship; pledge-breach, or breach of mutual fidelity.

BORD-HALFPENNY. A customary small toll paid to the lord of a town for setting in) boards, tables, booths, etc., in fairs or markets.

BORDAGE. In old English law. A species of base tenure, by which certain "bord lands" were anciently held in England; the service was that of keeping the lord in small provisions.

"BORDARIA. A cottage.

BORDARII, or BORDIMANNI. In old English law. Tenants of a less servile condition than the villani, who had a bord or cottage, with a small parcel of land, on condition they should supply the lord with small provisions. Spelman.

BORDER WARRANT. A process granted by a judge ordinary, on either side of the border be-tween England and Scotland, for arresting the person or effects of a person living on the oppo-site side, until he find security, judicio sisti. Bell.

BORDEREAU. In French law. A note enumerat-ing the purchases and sales which may have been made by a broker or stockbroker. This name is also given to the statement given to a banker with bilis for discount or coupons to receive. Arg.Fr.Merc.Law, 547. A detailed statement of account; a summary of an instrument.

BORDLANDS. The demesnes which the lords keep in their hands for the maintenance of their board or table. Cowell. Also lands held in bord-age. Lands which the lord gave to tenants on con-dition of suppiying him with small provisions, etc.

BORDLODE. A service anciently required of ten-ants to carry timber out of the woods of the lord to his house; or it is said to be- the quantity of food or provision which the bordarii or bordmen paid for their bbrdlands. Jacob.

BORDSERVICE. A tenure of bordlands.

BOREL-FOLK. Country people; derived from the French bourre, (Lat. floccus,) a lock of wool, because they covered their heads with such stuff. Blount.

BORG. In Saxon law. A pledge, pledge giver, or surety. The name given among the Saxons to the head of each family composing a tithing or decen-nary, each being the pledge for the good conduct of the others. Also the contract or engagement of suretyship; and the pledge given.

BORGBRICHE. A breach or violation of surety-ship, or of mutual fidelity. Jacob.

BORGESMON. In Saxon law. The name given to the head of each family composing a tithing.

BORGH OF HAMHALD. In old Scotch law. A pledge or surety given by the seller of goods to the buyer, to make the goods forthcoming as his own proper goods, and to warrant the same to him. Skene.

BORN. A child en ventre sa TnAre. Merrill v. Winchester, 120 Me. 203, 113 A. 261, 264. If an infant is born dead or at such an early stage of pregnancy as to be unable to live, it is to be con-sidered as never born. Marsellis v. Thalhimer, 2 Paige, Ch., N.Y., 35.

BORN ALIVE. Where child, although it never cried, breathed and its heart beat some minutes, it was "born alive." Sanford v. Getman, 124 Misc. 80, 206 N.Y.S. 865. A child never heard to cry, but whose heart beats could be heard, though no respiration could be induced, was "born alive." In re Union Trust Co., 89 Misc. 69, 151 N.Y.S. 246. 253.

BORN OUT OF WEDLOCK. Children whose par-ents are not, and have not been, married to each other regardless of marital status of either parent with respect to another. State v. Coliton, 73 N.D. 582, 17 N.W.2d 546, 549, 552, 156 A.L.R. 1403.

BORN OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES. Where, at time of birth of children born in the United States, their father was a duly accredited diplo-matic representative of the French Republic to the United States, they became subject to the jurisdic-tion of France, and were "born outside of the United States" within the naturalization provisions of section 315 of the Nationality Act of 1940, 8 U.S.C.A. § 715. In re Thenault, D.C.D.C., 47 F. Supp. 952, 953.

BOROUGIL

In English Law

A town, a walled town. Co.Litt. 108b. A town of note or importante; a fortified town. Cowell. An ancient town. Litt. 164. A corporate town that is not a city. Cowell. An ancient town, cor-porate or not, that sends burgesses to parliament. Co.Litt. 109a; 1 B1.Comm. 114, 115. A city or other town sending burgesses to parliament. 1 Steph.Comm. 116. In its more modern English acceptation, a town or city or place organized for government.
A parliamentary borough 1s a town which returns one or more members to parliament.

In Scotch Law

A corporate body erected by the charter of the sovereign, consisting of the inhabitants of the territory erected into the borough. Bell.

In American Law

In Pennsylvania, Connecticut and New Jersey, a part of a township having a charter for mu-nicipal purposes. Southport v. Ogden, 23 Conn. 128. See, also, 1 Dill.Mun.Corp. § 41, n.
A territorial fraction of a city having certain powers with reference to local concerns. Crose v. City of Los Angeles, 175 Cal. 774, 167 P. 386, 387. "Village" and "borough" as duplicate or cumulative names of the same thing. Brown v. State, 18 Ohio St. 496.

Borough Courts

In English law. Private and limited tribunals, held by prescription, charter, or act of parliament, in particular districts for the conveniente of the inhabitants, that they may prosecute small suits and receive justice at honre.

Borough English

A custom prevalent in some parts of England, by which the youngest son inherits the estate in preferente to his older brothers. 1 B1.Comm. 75.
The custom is said by Blackstone to have been derived from the Saxons, and to have been so called in distInction from the Norman rule of descent; 2 Bla.Comm. 83.

Borough Fund

In English law. The revenues of a municipal borough from rents and produce of its land, houses, and stocks and supplemented where nec-essary by a borough rate.

Borough-Heads

Borough-holders, bors-holders, or burs-holders. Borough-Reeve
The chief municipal officer in towns unincorpo-rated bef ore the municipal corporations act, 5 & 6 Wm. IV, c. 76.

Borough Sessions

Courts of limited criminal jurisdiction, estab-lished in English boroughs under the municipal corporations act.

Pocket Borough

A borough entitled to send a representative to parliament, in which a single individual could en-tirely control the election.

BORRASCA. Absence of profit, or not enough profit to pay the cost of operation, of a placer mine. Ballagh v. Williams, 50 Cal.App.2d 10, 122 P.2d 343, 344.

BORROW. To solicit and receive from another any article of property or thing of value with the intention and promise to repay or return it or its equivalent.
Strictly speaking, borrowlng implies a gratuitous loan. Carter-Mullaly Transfer Co. v. Angel), Tex.Civ.App., 181 S.W. 237, 238. But money may be "borrowed" on an agreement to pay interest for its use. Legal Tender Cases, 110 U.S. 421, 4 S.Ct. 122, 28 L.Ed. 204. Though the word is often used in the sense of returning the thing borrowed in specie, where money is borrowed, the identical money loaned is not to be re turnad. In a broad sense the term means a contract for the use of money. State v. School Dist., 13 Neb. 88, 12 N.W. 812. The term may he used to express the idea of receiving something from another for one’s own use, to appropriate. Finch v. McClellan, 77 Ind. App. 533, 130 N.E. 13, 15. The word "loan" is the correla-tiva of "borrow." U. S. v. Warn, D.C.Idaho, 295 F. 328, 330. The term when used In connection with lending an automobile chauffeur does not imply that the owner surren-ders control over him. Hooper v. Brawner, 148 Md. 417, 129 A. 672, 677. Compare Henderson v. State, 75 Fla. 464, 78 So. 427, 428, holding that an indlctment alleging that defendant "did borrow" a shotgun sufficiently allegad that defendant received the shotgun into his possession. The right to borrow money as applied to a municipal corpora-tion is a power to create lndebtedness. Jones v. Board of Education of Guilford County, 185 N.C. 303, 117 S.E. 37, 40.
Agreement by building and loan association, in purchas-ing residente property on which ít had a first mortgage, to assume a second mortgage. Gardner v. Johns, 64 Ohio App. 229, 28 N.E.2d 691, 694.
"Borrow" has been held the reciproca) action with "to lend". Bank of United States v. Drapkin & Goldberg Const. Co., City Ct., N.Y., 11 N.Y.S.2d 334, 336. Din taken from plots of ground near sides of highway embankment. State Y. Smith, 167 La. 301, 119 So. 56, 61. Earth brought from outside highway location and used for embankments. Barry v. Duffin, 290 Mass. 398, 195 N.E. 511, 514.

BORROW PIT. A pit or bank from which ma-terial is taken for use in filling or embanking. Haynes v. Jones, 91 Ohio St. 197, 110 N.E. 469, 470.

BORROWE. In old Scotch law. A pledge.

BORROWED CAPITAL. Moneys due by corpo-ration to another corporation used as its capital. State v. Banana Selling Co., 185 La. 668, 170 So. 30, 32.
Amount standing on books to personal credit of stock-holders credited without restriction or limitation en stock-holders as to manner or time of payment to them of respec-tive accounts. Weed & Bro. v. U. S., Ct.C1., 38 F.2d 935, 940. Dividends declared by corporation but not paid dur-ing taxable year. Bulger Block Coal Co. v. U. S., Ct.Cl., 48 F.2d 675, 677; Southport Mill y, Commissioner of In-ternal Revenue, C.C.A.La., 26 F.2d 17. Payment of losses sustaihed by corporation by 1ts principal stockholder. State v. Mayer Sugar & Molasses Co., 204 La. 742, 16 So.2d 251, 253.

BORROWED MONEY OR PROPERTY. Notes and bonds given in payment of assets. Coal Co. v. United States, C.C.A.W.Va., 137 F.2d 948, 953. Credit by bank to payee’s account of amount of customer’s notes taken in lieu of cash. Depart-ment of Treasury (Gross Income Tax Division) v. Advance Paint Co., 222 Ind. 294, 53 N.E.2d 59. Profits loaned by partners to partnership. Nye v. U. S., C.C.A.Mass., 84 F.2d 457, 462.

BORROWER. He to whom a thing is lent at his request.
Under usury statute, one having the use of money by forbearance of his creditor, or any person who secures the use of money in any way upon an excessive consideration, Law, Clark & Co. v. Mitchell, 200 Ala. 565, 76 So. 923, 924; the party who is bound by original contract to pay loan, Faber v. Siegel, 286 N.Y.S. 974, 158 Misc. 722; the pur-chaser of land subject to usurious mortgage and subsequent mortgagees, Batch v. Baker, 249 N.Y.S. 215, 217, 139 Misc. 717; the indorser of note who received no part of money advanced and who was mere surety, Faber v. Siegel, 286 N.Y.S. 974, 158 Misc. 722.

BORROWING POWER. Signifies only an un-funded indebtedness. Bond v. Cowan, 272 Mich. 296, 261 N.W. 331.

BORROWINGS. Checks by bank against second bank antl honored while items deposited former were in process of collection. Guaranty by bank of transaction where another bank issued letter of credit for first bank’s customer. Indebtedness represented by notes given by bank when borrow-ing money. Overdrafts by bank maintaining checking account with another bank. Schramm v. Bank of California Nat. Ass’n, 143 Or. 546, 20 P.2d 1093, 1096.

BORSITOLDER. In Saxon law. The borough’s ealder, or headborough.

BOSCAGE. In English law. The food which wood and trees yield to cattle; browsewood mast, etc. Spelman. An ancient duty of wind-fallen wood in the forest. Manwood.

BOSCARIA. Wood-houses, or ox-houses.

BOSCUS. Wood; growing wood of any kind, large or small, timber or coppice. Cowell; Jacob.

BOSTON CREAM PIE. Two layers of sponge cake with a layer of a sort of cream custard. Lohse v. Coffey, D.C.Mun.App., 32 A.2d 258, 259.

BOTE, BOT. In old English law. A recompense or compensation, or profit or advantage. Also reparation or amends for any damage done. Nec-essaries for the maintenance and carrying on of husbandry. An allowance; the ancient name for estovers.
House-bote is a sufficient allowance of wood from off the estate to repair or burn in the house, and sometimes termed "fire-bote ;" plow-bote and cart-bote are wood to be employed in making and repairing all ínstruments of husbandry; and hay-bote or hedge-bote is wood for repairing of hays, hedges, or fences. The word also signifies repara-tion for any damage or injury done, as man-bote, which was a compensation or amends for a man slain, etc.

BOTELESS. In old English law. Without amends; without the privilege of making satisfaction for a crime by a pecuniary payment; without relief or remedy. Cowell.

BOTH. The one and the other; the two without the exception of either. Lower Indian Creek Drainage and Levee Dist. of Cass County v. Vallery, 343 III. 49, 174 N.E. 842, 843. All of two, United States v. Eachman, D.C.Pa., 246 F. 1009, 1011. The term likewise has a meaning which excludes more than two mentioned subject mat-ters. In re Turner’s Estate, 171 Misc. 78, 11 N.Y. S.2d 800, 802.
"Either," may mean "both." Kibler v. Parker, 191 Ark. 475, 86 S.W.2d 925, 926.
Both Real and Personal
Use In will to indicate ah] of testatrix’ property. Hoff-man v. Hoffman, 61 Ohio App. 371, 22 N.E.2d 652, 654.

BOTHA. In old English law. A booth, stall, or tent to stand in, in fairs or markets. Cowell.

BOTHAGIUM, or BOOTHAGE. Customary dues paid to the lord of a manor or soil, for the pitch-ing or standing of booths in fairs or markets.

BOTHNA, or BUTIINA. In old Scotch law. A park where cattle are inclosed and fed. Bothna also signifies a barony, lordship, etc. Skene.

BOTILER OF THE KING. An officer who pro-vided the king’s wines. By virtue of his office, he might choose, .out of every ship laden with wines, one cask before the mast, and one behind. 25 Edw. III, st. 5, c. 21. Wharton. Cf. Butlerage.

BOTTELLARIA. A buttery or cellar, in which bottles or butts of wine and other liquors are deposited. Wharton.

BOTTLE. An open mouthed vessel, with a neck with an aperture which may be closed, capable of containing liquids. Fieldcrest Dairies v. City of Chicago, D.C.I11., 35 F.Supp. 451, 452.

BOTTOM ROLE CONTRACT. When operator drills a well to a certain depth, the owners or per-sons for whom the well is drilled will pay a certain sum. Barnett v. Kemerer, 179 Okl. 588, 66 P.2d 1053, 1055.

BOTTOM LAND. As used in a contract to convey means low land formed by alluvial deposits along the river, low-lying ground, a dale, valley, or inter-vale. Lexington & E. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 183 Ky. 343, 209 S.W. 59, 62.

BOTTOMAGE. L. Fr. Bottomry.

BOTTOMRY. In maritime law. A contract by which the owner of a ship borrows for the use, equipment, or repair of the vessel, and for a definite term, and pledges the ship (or the keel or bottom of the ship, pars pro toto) as security; it being stipulated that if the ship be lost in the specified voyage, or during the limited time, by any of the perils enumerated, the Tender shall lose his money. Carrington v. The Pratt, 18 How. 63, 15 L.Ed. 267; Braynard v. Hoppock, 7 Bosw.N.Y. 157.
A contract by which a ship or its freightage is hypothe-cated as security for a loan, which is to be repaid only in case the ship survives a particular risk, voyage, or period. Civ.Code Cal. § 3017. The contract usually in form a bond. When the loan is not made on the ship, but on the goods on- board, and which are to be sold or exchanged in the course of the voyage, the borrower’s personal responsibili-ty is deemed the principal security for the performance of the contract, which is therefore called "respondentia."

BOTTOMRY BOND. The instrument embodying the contract or agreement of bottomry. A con-tract for a loan on the bottom of the ship, at an extraordinary interest, upon maritime risks, to be borne by the Tender for a voyage, or for a definite period. The Grapeshot, 9 Wall. 135, 19 L.Ed. 651.

BOTULISM. Food poisoning caused by a toxín which is produced by Clostridium (bacillus) botu-linum. Armour & Co. v. Leasure, 177 Md. 393, 9 A.2d 572, 575.
BOUCHE. Fr. The mouth. An allowance of provision. Avoir bouche á court; to have an allowance at court; to be in ordinary at court; to have meat and drink scotfree there, Blount; Cowell.

BOUCHE OF COURT, or BUDGE OF COURT. A certain allowance of provision from the king to his knights and servants, who attended him on any military expedition.

BOUGH OF A TREE. In feudal law. A symbol which gave seisin of land, to hold of the donor in capite.

BOUGHT. The word "bought" implies a completed ,Itransaction, a vesting of the right of title to and possession of the property sold, Bull v. Morrison, Tex.Civ.App., 241 S.W. 561, 562, and also imports a valuable consideration, Grimes v. State, 32 Ga. App. 541, 123 S.E. 918.

BOUGHT AND SOLD NOTES. A note of the sale by a broker employed to buy and sell goods is called a "sold note," and a like note to the seller is called a "bought note." Avondale Mills v. Benchley Bros., 244 Mass. 153, 138 N.E. 586, 589.

BOULEVARD. The word originally indicated a bulwark or rampart, and afterwards applied to a public walk or road on the site of a demolished fortification, and is now employed in same sense as public drive. A street or highway with park-like appearance; or one specially designed for pleasure walking or driving. Newbold v. Brotzge, 209 Ky. 218, 272 S.W. 755, 756; Chaplin v. Kansas City, 259 Mo. 479, 168 S.W. 763, 765. A wide street, or a street encircling a town, with sides or center for shade trees, etc. State ex rel. Copland v. City of Toledo, 75 Ohio App. 378, 62 N.E.2d 256, 258. It is adapted and set apart for purposes of ornament, exercise, and amusement See, also, Avenue. A "public way", City of Medford v. Metropolitan District Commission, 303 Mass. 537, 22 N.E.2d 110, 111.
It is not technically a street, avenue, or highway. Howe v. Lowell, 171 Mass. 575, 51 N.E. 536; Park Com’rs v.
Farber, 171 III. 146, 49 N.E. 427. "Street" and "boulevard" may be interchangeable. City of Fargo v. Gearey, 33 N.D. 64, 156 N.W. 552, 555.

BOUNCER. A term used to designate persons employed to preserve the peace in establishments such as night clubs and other places of amusement where people indulge in dancing, drinking and in gambling. Moore v. Blanchard, La.App., 35 So.2d 667, 669.

BOUND. As an adjective, denotes the condition of being constrained by the obligations of a bond or a covenant.
In the law of shipping, "bound to" or "bound for" de-notes that the vessel spoken of is intended or designed to malee a voyage to the place named. U. S. v. Bengochea, C.C.A.Fla., 279 F. 537, 541.
"Bound" and "concluded" as synonymous. McKinnon v. Chenoweth, 176 Or. 74, 155 P.2d 944, 954.
As a noun, denotes a limit or boundary, or a line inclos-ing or marking off a tract of land. In the phrase "metes and bounds," denotes the natural or artificial marks which indicate their beginning and ending. "Bound" may signi-fy the limit itself, and "boundary" designate a visible mark which indicates the limit. "Bound" and "duty" as synonymous. Essenpreis v. Elliott’s Department Store Co., Mo.App., 37 S.W.2d 458, 462.

BOUND BAILIFFS. In English law. Sheriffs’ officers are so called, from their being usually bound to the sheriff in an obligation with sureties, for the due execution of their office. 1 Bl.Comm. 345, 346.

BOUNDARY. Every separation, natural or arti-ficial, which marks the confines or line of division of two cdntiguous estates. Civ.Code La. art. 826. Limits or marks of enclosures if possession be without title, or the boundaries or limits stated in title deed if possession be under a title. Snelling v. Adair, 196 La. 624, 199 So. 782, 787.
"At the entrance" and "at the boundary" as synony-mous. McGough v. Hendrickson, 58 Cal.App.2d 60, 136 P. 2d 110, 114. Banks or confines at ordinary high water as boundary of water course. Beck v. Kulesza, 4 W.W.Harr., Del., 559, 156 A. 346, 349. Meander une as "boundary". United States v. Elliott, C.C.A.Okl., 131 F.2d 720, 724.

Boundary Suit

Trespass to try title in which every matter in dispute would be determined by determination of boundary line. Southern Pine Lumber Co. v. Whiteman, Tex.Civ.App., 104 S.W.2d 635, 637.

Case of Boundary

One where the location of the boundary is the determining question of the entire case. West Lumber Co. v. Goodrich, 113 T. 14, 223 S.W. 183, 191; Maxfield v. E. L. Sterling & Sons, 110 Tex. 212, 217 S.W. 937.

Natural Boundary

Any formation or product of nature which may serve to define and fix one or more of the lines inclosing an estate or piece of property. See Peuker v. Canter, 62 Kan. 363, 63 P. 617.

Private Boundary

An artificial boundary set up to mark the beginning or direction of a boundary fine.

Public Boundary

A natural boundary; a ‘natural object or land-mark used as a boundary or as a beginning point for a boundary line.

BOUNDED TREE. A tree marking or standing at the comer of a field or estate.

BOUNDERS. In American law. Visible marks or objects at the ends of the fines drawn in sur-veys of land, showing the courses and distances. Burrill.

BOUNDS. The external or limiting fines, either real or imaginary, of any object or space; that which limits or circumscribes. Stone v. Wauke-gan, C.C.A. 7, 205 F. 495, 496.
Contract as meant by "bounds". City of Elkins v. Stick-ley, 114 W.Va. 103, 170 S.E. 902, 903. Edges of road as "bounds of the highway". Decker v. Roberts, 126 Conn. 478, 12 A.2d 541, 543. Trespass committed by a person who excavates minerals under-ground beyond boundary of his land as "working out of bounds."

BOUNTY. A gratuity, or an unusual or additional benefit conferred upon, or compensation paid to, a class of persons. Iowa v. McFarland, 110 U.S. 471, 4 S.Ct. 210, 28 L.Ed. 198; In re Hoag, D.C. N.Y., 227 F. 478, 479. A premium given or offered to enlisted men to induce enlistment into public service. Abbe v. Allen, 39 How.Prac., N.Y., 488.
An amount approprlated by Congress to repay the city for rental value of land talten for navy yard during Civil War as not a bounty. Moyers v. City of Memphís, 135 Tenn. 263, 186 S.W. 105, 113, Ann.Cas.1918C, 854.
Bounty is the appropríate term where services or action of many persons are desired, and each who acts upon the offer may entítle hImself to the promised gratuity. Re-ward is more proper in the case of a single service, which can be only once performed, and therefore will be earned only by the person or co-operative persons who succeed while others fail. Ingram v. Colgan, 106 Cal. 113, 38 P. 315, 28 L.R.A. 187, 46 Am.St.Rep. 221. Bonus, suggests the idea of a gratuity to induce a money transaction between individual& Abbott.

Bounty Lands

Portions of the public domain given or donated as a bounty for services rendered, chiefly for military service. See 43 U.S.C.A. § 791.

Bounty of Queen Ann

A narre given to a royal charter, which was confirmed by 2 Anne, c. 11, whereby all the reve-nue of first-fruits and tenths was vested in trus-tees, to form a perpetual fund for the augmenta-tion of poor ecclesia stical livings. Wharton.

BOURDON TUBE. A pressure-responsive device comprising a hollow tubular member. James P. Marsh Corporation v. United States Gauge Co., D. C.Ill., 42 F.Supp. 998, 1001.

BOURG.
In old French law. An assemblage of houses surrounded with walls; a fortified town or village.
In old English law. A borough, a village.

BOURGEOIS. The inhabitant of a bourg. A per-son entitled to the privileges of a municipal corpo-ration; a burgess. A member of the middle classes. People v. Gitlow, 234 N.Y. 132, 136 N.E. 317, 322.

BOURSE. Fr. An exchange; a stock-exchange.

BOURSE DE COMMERCE. In the French law. An aggregation, sanctioned by government, of merchants, captains of vessels, exchange agents, and courtiers, the two latter being nominated by the government, in each city which has a bourse. Brown.

BOUSSOLE. In French marine law. A compass; the mariner’s compass.

BOUWERYE. Dutch. In old New York law. A farm; a farm on which the farmer’s family resided.

BOUWMEESTER (also BOUWMASTER). Dutch. In old New York law. A farmer.

BOVARIUS, adj. Lat. Relating to horned cattle. The Forum Bovarium was the cattle market at Rome, near the Circus Maximus. It had a large brazen statue of an ox.

BOVATA TERR1E. As much land as one ox can cultivate. Said by some to be thirteen, by others eighteen, acres in extent. Skene; Spelman; Co. Litt. 5a. See Carucata.

BOVINE. From the Latin "bos," meaning cow or bull. "Neat cattle" are animals belonging to the genus "bos," a term not embracing horses, sheep, goats, or swine. "Cattle" as generally used in the Western States means "neat cattle"; it includes cows, bulls, and steers, but not horses, mares, geld-ings, colts, mules, jacks, or jennies, goats, hogs, sheep, shoats, or pigs. State v. District Court of Fifth Judicial Dist. in and for Nye County, 42 Nev. 218, 174 P. 1023, 1025.

BOW—BEARER. An under-officer of the forest, whose duty it was to oversee and true inquisition make, as well of sworn men as unsworn, in every bailiwick of the forest; and of all manner of trespasses done, either to vert or venison, and cause them to be presented, without any conceal-ment, in the next court of attachment, etc. Cromp. Jur. 201.

BOWIE KNIFE. A long knife shaped like a dag-ger but háving only one edge.. Knox v. State, 157 Tenn. 120,.6 S.W.2d 318, 319. A butcher knife, Mireles v. State, 80 Tex.Cr.R. 648, 192 S.W. 241, 242; a "dirk," Bivens v. State, 133 Tex.Cr.R. 604, 113 S.W.2d 921.

BOWYERS. Manufacturers of bows and shafts. An ancient company of the city of London.

BOX. A construction of permanent, fixed dimen-sions and size. Lyon, Inc., v. Clayton & Lambert Mfg. Co., D.C.Del., 13 F.Supp. 331, 333.

BOX DOLLY. A vehicle which has but one wheel, a wide cylindrical drum in the center of it, and is shaped like a box, the lower part of which extends down as far as the axis of the drum. The Rosalie Mahony, D.C.Wash., 218 F. 695, 697.

BOX STEP. A passenger car step. Hill v. Minne-apolis, St. Paul, & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 160 Minn. 484, 200 N.W. 485, 486.

BOX STRAPPING. Metal strips Intended to rein-force the ends of heavy wooden’ packing cases to prevent them from breaking open. Stanley Works v. Twisted Wire & Steel Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 256 F. 98, 99.

BOXED WEIGHT BASIS. According to weight at time of packing and after wrapping. Swift & Co. v. Wallace, C.C.A.7, 105 F.2d 848, 861.

BOXING BOUT. A contest of skill between two participants. Fischer v. City of Cleveland, 42 Ohio App. 75, 181 N.E. 668, 670.

BOXING OF FINE TREES. As equivalent to "hanging of cups upon timber." Howard v. State, 17 Ala.App. 9, 81 So. 345, 346.

BOY. Legitimate child. In re Dragoni, 53 Wyo. 143, 79 P.2d 465, 468. Male child. Hinerman v. Hinerman, 85 W.Va. 349, 101 S.E. 789, 790.

BOYCOTT. A conspiracy or confederation to pre-vent the carrying on of business, or to injure the business of any one by preventing potential cus-tomers from doing business with him or employ-ing the representatives of said business, by threats, intimidation, coercion, etc. Dick v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 86 Wash. 211, 150 P. 8, 12, Ann.Cas.1917A, 638; Hailey v. Brooks, Tex.Civ.App., 191 S.W. 781, 783.
Intimidation and coercion as essentlal elements. Smythe Neon Sign Co. v. Local Union No. 405 of International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers of Ceder Rapids, 226 Iowa 191, 284 N.W. 126, 130. Labor union members’ vol-untary determination to refraln from working in erection of materials not bearing union label. Frank Schmidt Planing Mill Co. v. Mueller, Mo.App., 154 S.W.2d 610, 614, 615. Labor union’s promulgation of rule prohibiting mem-bers from handling and erecting work not bearing union label, Crescent Planing Mill Co. v. Mueller, 234 Mo.App. 1243, 123 S.W.2d 193, 196. The word does not necessarily import illegality, Smythe Neon Sign Co. v. Local Union No. 405 of International Brotherhood of Electrlcal Workers of Ceder Rapids, 226 Iowa 191, 284 N.W. 126, 130.

Primary Boycott

That which occurs when an organized union of employees, by concerted action, ceases dealing with a former employer. Pierce v. Stablemen’s Union, Local No. 8760, 156 Cal. 70, 103 P. 325, 327.

Secondary Boycott

A combination to exercise coercive pressure on customers, actual or prospective, to cause them to withhold or withdraw their patronage. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 41 S. Ct. 172, 176, 65 L.Ed. 349, 16 A.L.R. 196. An act which, when committed in concert, may cause such injury to the public, or be so useless or un-fair that ihese conditions will be decisive as to whether such act is permissible or forbidden. Justin Seubert, Inc., v. Reiff, 98 Misc. 402, 164 N. Y.S. 522, 526.

BOYD RULE. In a corporate reorganization, no junior security may be given participation with-out providing a new consideration therefor, unless all securities senior to it have received full equiva-lent of their rights against the estate. Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corp., D.C.N.Y., 124 F.Supp. 728, 781.

BOYLE’S LAW. The principie that as the pres-sure of gas increases at a fixed temperature, the volume decreases in inverse proportion, or the product of the pressure and volume is a constant quantity. Huntington Development & Gas Co. v. Topping, 115 W.Va. 364, 176 S.E. 424, 425.

BOZERO. In Spanish law. An advocate; one who pleads the causes of others, or his own, before courts of justice, either as plaintiff or defendant. Called also abogado.

BRABANT. A variety of the old coin known as a crocard. See Crockards.

BRABANTER. A mercenary soldier or bandit who figured in the Anglo-French wars of the 11th and 13th centuries, and who carne from the old duchy of Brabant, now partly comprised in the provinces of Brabant in Belgium and of North Brabant in the Netherlands. Cent. Dict.

BRACERY. The statute of 32 Hen. VIII, c. 9, to prevent the buying and selling of pretended rights or titles, is commonly called "the Bill of Bracery and buying of titles." Cain v. Monroe, 23 Ga. 82, 86, 89, 94; Webb v. Camp, 26 Ga, 354, 357. See Buying Titles.

BRACHIUM MARIS. An arm of the sea.

BRACINUM. A brewing; the whole quantity of ale brewed at one time, for which tolsestor was paid in some manors. Brecina, a brewhouse.

BRAHMIN, BRAHMAN, or BRAMIN. In Hindu law. A divine; a priest; the fix st Hindu caste.

BRALN LNJURY. A "concussion" as "brain in-jury". Le Francois v. Hobart College, Sup., 31 N.Y.S.2d 200, 204.

BRAKE. An effective "brake" consists of the "brake shoe," and the "brake drum." Davis Sew-ing Mach. Co. v. New Departure Mfg. Co., C.C.A. Ohio, 217 F. 775, 780.

BRANCH. An offshoot, lateral extension, or sub-division. Any member or part of a body or sys-tem; a department. Northern Indiana Land Co. v. Carlin, 139 Ind. 324, 127 N.E. 197, 201.
A branch of a family stock is a group of persona related by descent from a comrnon ancestor, and related to the main stock by the fact that that common ancestor de-scends from the original founder or progenitor. Certificate given by the Trinity House to pilots who have passed an exarnination. Houston Pilots v. Goodwin, Tex.Civ.App., 178 S.W.2d 308, 311. "Group", "wing", "faction", "party" or "section" and "branch" as synonymous. In re Mc-Kean’s Estate, 152 Pa.Super. 613, 33 A.2d 51, 52.

BRANCH OF A RIVER. "Branch," as distin-guished from a channel of a river, may have two or more separate channels; "channel" meaning primarily the bed. United States v. Hutchings, D.C.Okl., 252 F. 841, 844.

BRANCH OF THE SEA. This term, as used at common law, included rivers in which the tide ebbed and flowed. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.Law, 86, 10 Am.Dec. 356.

BRANCH PILOT. One possessing a license, com-mission, gr certificate of competency issued by the proper authority and usually after an examination. Dean v. Healy, 66 Ga. 503; State v. Follett, 33 La. Ann. 228. Holder of certificate given by the Trin-ity House to pilots who have passed an examina-tion. Houston Pilots v. Goodwin, Tex.Civ.App., 178 S.W.2d 308, 311.

BRANCH RAILROAD. A lateral extension of a main line; a road connected with or issuing from a main line. Biles v. Railroad Co., 5 Wash. 509, 32 Pac. 211; Blanton v. Railroad Co., 86 Va. 618,
10 S.E. 925. Feeder lines, Union Pac. R. Co. v. Anderson, 167 Or. 687, 120 P.2d 578, 588.

BRAND. To stamp; to mark, either with a hot iron or with a stencil plate. Dibble v. Hathaway,
11 Hun, N.Y., 575. And see Miles v. Vermont Fruit Co., 98 Vt. 1, 124 A. 559, 563.

BRANDING. An ancient mode of punishment by inflicting a mark on an offender with a hot iron. A recognized punishment for some military of-fenses. Marking of cattle for the purpose of identification.

BRANDY. Product from distilling wine or the fermented juice of any fruit. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. California Wine Co., 313 III.App. 498, 40 N. E.2d 624, 627.

BRANKS. An instrument formerly used in some parts of England for the correction of scolds; a scolding bridle.

BRASIATOR. A maltster, a brewer. BRASIUM. Malt.

BRASS KNUCKLES or KNUCKS. A weapon worn on the hand for the purposes of offense or defense, so made that in hitting with the fist con-siderable damage is inflicted. It is called "brass knuckles" because it was originally made of brass. The term is now used as the name of the weapon without reference to the metal of which it is made; Patterson v. State, 3 Lea, Tenn., 575.

BRAWL. A clamorous or tumultuous quarrel in a public place, to the disturbance of the public peace.
In English law, specifically, a noisy quarrel or other uP-roarious conduct creating a disturbance in a church or churchyard. 4 B.Comm. 146; 4 Steph.Comm. 253.
"Tumults" and "brawls" as substantially identical. State v. Perkins, 42 N.B. 464.

BREACH. The breaking or violating of a law, right, or duty, either by commission or omission.
This name Is sometimes given to that part of the decla-ration which alleges the violation of the defendant’s prom-tse or duty, immediately preceding the ad damnum clause.
Expenditure by administrator of proceeds of policy pend-ing appeal from award of proceeds to admlnistrator as "breach" of obligation of faithful administration. State ex rel. and to Use of Gnekow v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 349 Mo. 528, 163 S.W.2d 86, 90.

BREACH OF CLOSE. The unlawful or unwar-rantable entry on another person’s soil, land, or close. 3 B1.Comm. 209.

BREACH OF CONTRACT. Failure, without legal excuse, to perform any promise which forms the whole or part of a contract. Friedman v. Katzner, 139 Md. 195, 114 A. 884, 886. Prevention or hin-drance by party to contract of any occurrence or performance requisite under the contract for the creation or continuance of a right in favor of the other party or the discharge of a duty by him. Sharp v. Williams, 141 Fla. 1, 192 So. 476, 480. Unequivocal, distinct and absolute refusal to per-form agreement. R. T. Clark & Co. v. Miller, 154 Miss. 233, 122 So. 475, 481. Violation of obligation. Russell v. Stephens, 191 Wash. 314, 71 P.2d 30, 31.

Anticipatory Breach

A breach committed before there is a present duty of performance, and is the outcome of words evincing intention to refuse performance in the future. King Features Syndicate v. Valley Broad-casting Co., D.C.Tex., 42 F.Supp. 107, 108.
Acquiescence by other party as necessary, Cerrutl v. Burdick, 130 Conn. 284, 33 A.2d 333, 335. Crear and un-equivocal, renunciation of contract and refusal to perform as essentlal, Kimel v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., C.C.A. Kan., 71 F.2d 921, 923. Party to contract putting it out of his power to perform as breach, Assembly, Inc., v. Giller, 134 Misc. 657, 236 N.Y.S. 308, 313. Positive statement that promissor will not or cannot substantially perform con-tractual duties as breach, Hawkinson v. Johnston, C.C.A. Mo., 122 F.2d 724, 729, 730.
Bankruptcy as "anticipatory breach", In re Robértson, D.C.Ark., 41 F.Supp. 665, 668.
Doctrine is that party denying liabllity destroys contract so far as able. Pollack v. Pollack, Tex.Com.App., 46 S.W. 2d 292, 293.

Continuing Breach

Such breach occurs where the state of affairs, or the specific act, constituting the breach, endures for a considerable period of time, or is repeated at short intervals.

Constructive Breach

Such breach takes place when the party bound to perform disables himself from performance by some act, or declares, before the time comes, that he will not perform. Jordan v. Madsen, 69 Utah, 112, 252 P. 570, 573; The Adamello, D.C.Va., 19 F.2d 388, 389.
BREACH OF COVENANT. The nonperformance of any covenant agreed to be performed, or the doing of any act covenanted not to be done. Holt-ho use.

BREACH OF DUTY. In a general sense, any vio-lation or omission of a legal or moral duty. More particularly, the neglect or failure to fulfill in a just and proper manner the duties of an of ce or fiduciary employment. Every violation by a trus-tee of a duty which equity lays upon him, whether willful and fraudulent, or done through negligente or arising through mere oversight or forgetful-ness, is a breach of duty. Hivick v. Hemme, 118 Okl. 167, 247 P. 692, 693.

BREACH OF POUND. The breaking any pound or place where cattle or goods distrained are deposited, in order to take them back. 3 BI.Comm. 146.

BREACH OF PRISON. The offense of actually and forcibly breaking a prison or gaol, with in-tent to escape. 4 Chit.Bl. 130, notes; 4 Steph. Comm. 255. The escape from custody of a person lawfully arrested on criminal process.

BREACH OF PRIVILEGE. An act or default in violation of the privilege of either house of parlia-ment, of congress, or of a state legislature.

BREACH OF PROMISE. Violation of a promise; ,chiefly used as an elliptical expression for "breach of promise of marriage."

BREACH OF THE PEACE. A violation or dis-turbance of the public tranquillity and order. The offense of breaking or disturbing the public peace by any riotous, forcible, or unlawful proceeding. 4 BI.Comm. 142, et seq.; People v. Bartz, 53 Mich. 493, 19 N.W. 161. "Breach of the peace" is a generic term, State v. Reichman, 135 Tenn. 653, 188 S.W. 225, 228, Ann.Cas.1918B, 889, and includes all violations of public peace or order and acts tending to a disturbance thereof, City of St. Louis v. Slupsky, 254 Mo. 309, 162 S.W. 155, 157, 49 L.R. A.,N.S., 919. One who commits a breach of the peace is guilty of disorderly conduct, but not all disorderly conduct is necessarily a "breach of the peace." Garvin v. City of Waynesboro, 15 Ga.App. 633, 84 S.E. 90, 91; City of Seattle v. Franklin, 191 Wash. 297, 70 P.2d 1049, 1051.
A constructive breach of the peace ls an unlawful act which, though wanting the elements of actual violence or injury to any person, is yet inconsistent with the peace-able ami orderly conduct of sociely. An apprehended breach of the peace is caused by the conduct of a man who threatens another with violence or physical injury, or who goes about in public with dangerous and unusual weapons in a threatening or alarming manner, or who publishes an aggravated libel upon another, etc.

BREACH OF TRUST. Any act done by a trustee contrary to the terms of his trust, or in excess of his authority and to the detriment of the trust; or the wrongful omission by a trustee of any act required of him by the terms of the trust. Also the wrongful misappropriation by a trustee of any fund or property which had been lawfully com-mitted to him in a fiduciary character. Every violation by a trustee of a duty which equity lays upon him, whether willful and fraudulent, or done through negligence, or arising through mere over-sight and forgetfulness, is a "breach of trust." The term, theref ore, includes every omission and commission in carrying out the trust according to its terms, of tare and diligente in protecting and investing the trust property, and of using perfect good faith. H. B. Cartwright & Bro. v. United States Bank & Trust Co., 23 N.M. 82, 167 P. 436, 453. A violation by the trustee of any duty which he owes to the beneficiary. Bruun v. Hanson, C.C.A.Idaho, 103 F.2d 685, 699.

BREACH OF TRUST WITH FRAUDULENT IN-TENT. Larceny after trust. State v. Owings, 205 S.C. 314, 31 S.E.2d 906, 907.

BREACH OF WARRANTY. In real property law and the law of insurance. The failure or false-hood of an affirmative promise or statement, or the nonperformance of an executory stipulation. Ste-wart v. Drake, 9 N.J.Law, 139. Failure of insured to disclose trivial and temporary disorders. Frank-lin Life Ins. Co. v. Critz, C.C.A.Miss., 109 F.2d 417. As used in the law of sales, "breach of war-ranty," unlike fraud, does not involve guilty knowledge, Anglo-California Trust Co. v. Hall, 211 P. 991, 993, 61 Utah, 223, and rests on contract, Oelwein Chemical Co. v. Baker, 204 Iowa, 66, 214 N.W. 595, 596. Falsity of statements incorporated into fidelity bond. City Bank & Trust Co. v. Com-mercial Casualty Co., La.App., 176 So. 27, 30.

BREAD ACTS. Laws providing for the suste-nance of persons kept in prison for debt.

BREAK. "Break" may be used in a broad sense, as in seller’s covenant in contract of sale of auto, to indicate a weakness, impairment, or destruction of parts, however caused. American Locomotive Co. v. National Wholesale Grocery Co., 226 Mass. 314, 115 N.E. 404, 405, L.R.A.1917D, 1125.

BREAK A LEG. Pertaining to a broken bone anywhere between ankle and hip, with possible exception of patella, 100% American Local Mut. Life & Accident Ass’n of El Paso v. Work, Tex. Civ.App., 289 S.W. 1020.

BREAK AND TAKE. Sale of merchandise or amusement where customer pays for a chattel and a chance for another unpaid for chattel, the ticket being the opportunity for fortuitous selec-tion of a differentiated article. Minter v. Federal Trade Commission, C.C.A.3, 102 F.2d 69, 73.

BREAKAGE. Odd cents retained by race track promoter out of amounts due on wagers. Wise v. Delaware Steeplechase & Race Ass’n, Del.Super., 2 Terry 182, 18 A.2d 419, 421, 423.

BREAKDOWN SERVICE. As applied to an elec-tric public service corporation is primarily a serv-ice for emergency and is used in case the electric plant of the customer breaks down; it is also used when very little electricity is required, as upon holidays and Sundays, and also at the peak of the service when a maximum current is required dur-ing the day. People ex rel. New York Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission for First Dist., 191 App.Div. 237, 181 N.Y.S. 259, 261.

BREAKING. Forcibly separating, parting, disin-tegrating, or piercing any solid substance.
In the law as to housebreaking and burglary, it means the tearing away or removal of any part of a house or of the locks, latches, or other fastenings intended to secure it, or otherwise exerting force to gain an entrante, with the intetit to commit a felony; or violently or forcibly break-ing out of a house, after having unlawfully entered it, in the attempt to escape. Sims v. State, 136 Ind. 358, 36 N.E. 278; Melton v. State, 24 Tex.App. 287, 6 S.W. 303. Actual -breaking" involves application of some force. Rains v. Commonwealth, 293 Ky. 429, 169 S.W.2d 41, 44, the action of accused must have been such as would, • without addi-tional effort, have made an entry possible. Armour v. State, 72 Okl.Cr. 44, 112 P.2d 1116, 1119, but there is no require-ment that there be shown violence, a latch lifted, or bolt drawn. People v. Viola, 264 App.Div. 38, 34 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1020. The term in indictment, Information or in-struction implies force. State v. Stuart, 316 Mo. 150, 289 S.W. 822, 824; Humphrey v. State, 110 Tex.Cr.R. 62, 7 S. W.2d 576, 577; McFarland v. Commonwealth, 227 Ky. 411, 13 S.W.2d 277, 278. The slightest force is sufficient, as the llfting or opening of a latch, Dennis v. State, 71 Tex.Cr. R. 162, 158 S.W. 1Q08, 1010; State v. Gendusa, 193 La. 59, 190 So. 332, 339; or the raising of a window, Hollis v. State, 69 Tex.Cr.R. 286, 153 S.W. 853, 854; State v. Chap-pell, 185 S.C. 111, 193 S.E. 924, 925; or the opening of a door, State v. Lapoint, 87 Vt. 115, 88 A. 323, 47 L.R.A.,N.S., 717; Gibson v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 704, 265 S.W. 339, 345; Yeargin v. State, 54 Okl.Cr. 34, 14 P.2d 431, 432; Kidd v. Commonwealth, 273 Ky. 300, 116 S.W.2d 636, 638; or the opening of unfastened transom. State v. Chappell, 185 S.C. 111, 193 S.E. 924; or entry with a key or by manlpulating hasp from outside, McGilveray v. State. 111 Tex.Cr.R. 256, 12 S.W.2d 585: or turning of knob of door, State v. Edell, 7 W.W.Harr. Del., 404, 183 A. 630. But en-try by open door, window, or other opening does not con-stitute "breaking". George v. State, 183 Miss. 327, 184 So. 67, 68. Breaking lock securing pump handle on gasoline tank releasing handle is sufficient "breaking". Chaney v. State, 25 Ala.App. 141, 142 So. 103.
As an element of the crime of burglary breaking may be either actual or constructíve. Davis v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 521, 110 S.E. 356. Entering a building by a chim-ney is a constructive breaking. State v. Hart, 94 S.C. 214, 77 S.E. 862.

BREAKING A CASE. The expression by the judges of a court, to one another, of their views of a case, in order to ascertain how far they are agreed, and as preliminary to the formal delivery of their opinions. "We are breaking the case, that we may show what is in doubt with any of us." Holt, C. J., addressing Dolbin, J., 1 Show. 423.

BREAKING A CLOSE. An unlawful entry upon land. Littleton v. Roberts, 181 S.C. 303, 187 S.E. 349, 350.
Wrongdoer need only set in motion some dangerous agency which in itself, though quite distant from wrong-doer, inflIcts wrong. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Bush, 191 Ark. 1085, 89 S.W.2d 723, 725, 103 A.L.R. 367.

BREAKING BULK. The offense committed by a bailee (particularly a carrier) in opening or un-packing the chest, parcel, or case containing goods intrusted to his care, and removing the goods and converting them to his own use.

BREAKING DOORS. Forcibly removing the fastenings of a house, so that a person may enter.

BREAKING INTO. Breaking with burglarious in-tent. State v. Hefflin, 338 Mo. 236, 89 S.W.2d 938, 946, 103 A.L.R. 1301.

BREAKING JAIL. The act of a prisoner in effect-ing his escape from a place of lawful confinement.

BREAKING OF ARRESTMENT. In Scotch law. The contempt of the law committed by an arrestee who disregards the arrestment used in his hands, and pays the sum or delivers the goods arrested to the debtor. The breaker is liable to the arrester in damages. See Arrestment.

BREAST OF THE COURT. A metaphorical ex-pression signifying the consciente, discretion, or recollection of the judge.
During the term of a court, the record is said to re-mata "in the breast of the judges of the court and in their remembrance." Co.LItt. 260a; 3 BI.Comm, 407. When we say that the record is in the "breast of the court" to be changed during the term, we only mean that the proceed-ings attested by it have not yet obtained that irrevocable character which places them beyond the power of the court alter the term. Wilison v. Ice, 78 W.Va. 672, 90 S.E. 272, 275.

BREATH. In medical jurisprudence. The air ex-pelled from the lungs at each expiration.

BREATHING. Expansion and contraction, under the influence of changing temperatures, of ma-terials used in cables for transmission of high-tension electric currents. Electric Cable Joint Co. v. Brooklyn Edison Co., N.Y., 292 U.S. 69, 54 S.Ct. 586, 587, 78 L.Ed. 1131.

BREDWITE. In Saxon and old English law. A fine, penalty, or amercement imposed for defaults in the assise of bread. Cowell.

BREED. Produce (offspring) by hatching or gestation; to hatch. Miller Hatcheries v. Boyer, C.C.A.Iowa, 131 F.2d 283, 287.

BREHON. In old Irish law. A judge. 1 Bl. Comm. 100. Brehons, (breitheamhuin,) judges.

BREHON LAW. The name given to the ancient system of law of Ireland as it existed at the time of its conquest by Henry II.

BRENAGIUM. A payment in bran, which tenants anciently made to feed their lords’ hounds.

BREPHOTROPHL In the civil law. Persons ap-pointed to take care of houses destined to receive foundlings.

BRETHREN. This word, in a will, may include sisters, as well as brothers, of the person indi-cated; it is not necessarily limited to the mas-culine gender. Terry v. Brunson, 1 Rich.Eq., S.C., 78.

BRETHREN OF TRINITY HOUSE. See Elder Brethren.

BRETTS AND SCOTTS, LAWS OF THE. A code or system of laws in use among the Celtic tribes of Scotland down to the beginning of the four-teenth century, and then abolished by Edward I. of England.

BRETTWALDA. In Saxon law. The ruler of the Saxon heptarchy.

BREVE. L. Lat. A writ. An original writ.
A writ or precept of the king issuing out of bis courts. A writ by which a person is summoned or attached to an-swer an action, complaint, etc., or whereby anything is commanded to be done in the courts, in order to justice, etc. Skene.

BREVE DE RECTO. A writ of right, or license for a person ejected out of ari estate, to sue for the possession of it.

BREVE INNOM1NATUM. A writ making only a general complaint, without the details or par-ticulars of the cause of action.

BREVE ITA DICITUR, QUIA REM DE QUA AGITUR, ET INTENTIONEM PETENTIS, PAU-CIS VERBIS BREVITER ENARRAT. A writ is so called because it briefly states, in few words, the matter in dispute, and the object of the party seeking relief. 2 Inst. 39.

BREVE JUDICIALE DEBET SEQUI SUUM ORIGINALE, ET ACCESSORIUM SUUM PRIN-CIPALE. Jenk.Cent. 292. A judicial writ ought to follow its original, and an accessory its prin-cipal.

BREVE JUDICIALE NON CADIT PRO DE-FECTU FORME. Jenk.Cent. 43. A judicial writ fails not through defect of form.

BREVE NOMINATUM. A named writ. A writ stating the circumstances or details of the cause of action, with the time, place, and demand, very particularly.

BREVE ORIGINALE. An original writ; a writ which gave origin and commsencement to a suit.

BREVE PERQUIRERE. To purchase a writ or license of trial in the king’s courts by the plain-tiff.

BREVE TESTATUM. A written memorandum introduced to perpetuate the tenor of the convey-ance and investiture of lands. 2 Bl.Comm. 307. In Scotch law. A similar memorandum made out at the time of the transfer, attested by the pares ourice and by the .seal of the superior. Bell.

BREVET.
In military law. A commission by which an officer is promoted to the next higher rank, but without conferring a right to a corresponding in-crease of pay.
In French law. A privilege or warrant granted by the government to a prívate person, authoriz-ing him to take a special benefit or exercise an exclusive privilege. Thus a brevet d’invention is a patent for an invention.

BREVIA. Lat. The plural of breve.

BREVIA ADVERSARIA. Adversary writs; writs brought by an adversary to recover land. 6 Coke, 67.

BREVIA AMICABILIA. Amicable or friendly writs; writs brought by agreement or consent of the parties.

BREVIA ANTICIPANTIA. At common law. An-ticipating or preventive writs. Six were included in this category, viz.: Writ of mesne; warrantia chartce; monstraverunt; audita querela; curia claudenda; and ne injuste vexes. Peters v. Linen-schmidt, 58 Mo. 466.

BREVIA DE CURSU. Writs of course. Formal writs issuing as of course.

BREVIA FORMATA. Certain writs of approved and established form which were granted of course in actions to which they were applicable, and which could not be changed but by consent of the great council of the realm. Bract. fol. 413b.

BREVIA JUDICIALIA. Judicial writs. Auxiliary writs issued from the court during the progress of an action, or in aid of the judgment.

BREVIA MAGISTRALIA. Writs occasionally is-sued. by the masters or clerks of chancery, the form of which was varied to suit the circum-stances of each case. Bract. fol. 413b.

BREVIA SELECTA. Choice or selected writs or processes. Often abbreviated to Brev. Sel.

BREVIA, TAM ORIGINALIA QUAM JUDICI-ALIA, PATIUNTUR ANGLICA NOMINA. 10 Coke, 132. Writs, as well original as judicial, bear English names.

BREVIA TESTATA. The name of the short mem-oranda early used to show grants of.lands out of which the deeds now in use have grown. Jacob.

BREVIARIUM ALARICIANUM. A compilation of Roman law made by order of Alaric II., king of the Visigoths, in Spain, and published for the use of his Roman subjects in the year 506. It is also known as Lex Romana Visigothorum. It became the principal, if not the only, representative of Roman law among the Franks.

BREVIARIUM ANIANI. Another name for the Brevarium Alaricianum, (q. v.) Anian was the referendery or chancellor of Alaric, and was com-manded by the latter to authenticate, by his sig-nature, the copies of the breviary sent to the comites. Mackeld. Rom. Law, 1 68.

BREVIATE. A brief; brief statement, epitome, or abstract. A short statement of contents, ac-companying a bill in parliament. Holthouse. The name is usually applied to the famous brief of Mr. Murray (afterwards Lord Mansfield) for the complainant in the case of Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. 444.

BREVIBUS ET ROTULIS LIBERANDIS. A writ or mandate to a sheriff to deliver to his successor the county, and appurtenances, with the rolls, briefs, remembrance, and all other things belong-ing to his office. Reg.Orig. 295.

BREWER. One who manufactures fermented liq-uors, for sale, from malt, wholly or in part, or from any substitute therefor. U. S. v. Wittig, 28 Fed.Cas. 745.

BRIBE. Anything of value; any gift, advantage or emolument; any price, reward or favor. State v. Douglas, 70 S.D. 203, 16 N.W.2d 489, 496. Any money, goods, right in action, property, thing of value, or any preferment, advantage, privilege or emolument, or any promise or undertaking to give any, asked, given, or accepted, with a corrupt in-tent to induce or influence action, vote, or opinion of person in any public or official capacity. People v. Van de Carr, 87 App.Div. 386, 84 N.Y.S. 461; People v. Ward, 110 Cal. 369, 42 P. 894; Williams v. State, 188 Ind. 283, 123 N.E. 209, 213. It is a gift, not necessarily of pecuniary value, bestowed to influence the conduct of the receiver, and must be of substantial value to him. People v. Hyde, 156 App.Div. 618, 141 N.Y.S. 1089, 1093.
Payment of corporate funds by director and executive officer of the corporation to offlcials of labor unlon to pre-vent ruinous strikes which union offlcials were under no legal duty to call as "bribe". Hornstein v. Paramount Pictures, Sup., 37 N.Y.S.2d 404, 412.

BRIBERY. The offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of any thing of value to influence action as official or in discharge of legal or public duty. Allen v. State, 63 Okl.Cr. 16, 72 P.2d 516, 519. The corrupt tendering or receiving of a price for official action. State v. London, 194 Wash. 458, 78 P.2d 548, 554, 115 A.L.R. 1255. The receiving or offering any undue reward by or to any person concerned in the administration of public justice or a public officer to influence his behavior in office. Walsh v. People, 65 III. 65, 16 Am.Rep. 569; State v. Harrah, 101 W.Va. 300, 132 S.E. 654, 655, 4 Bl.Comm. 139, and note. The taking or giving a reward for public office. Brown.
Acceptance by public officer of compensation for doing legal duty, Ex parte Montgomery, 244 Ala. 91, 12 So.2d 314, 317; agreement by public °facial to refrain from perform-ing oflicial act or to corruptly perform act contrary to rules of honesty essential, Selvidge v. State, 126 Tex.Cr.R. 489, 72 S.W.2d 1079, 1080; Attempt to bribe officer engaged in making an unlawful arrest, Sugarman v. State, 173 Md. 52, 195 A. 324, 326; Attempted bribery as included in term, Coleman v. State ex rel. Mitchell, 132 Fla. 845, 182 So. 627, 628; Coleman v. State ex rel. Mitchell, 132 Fla. 845, 182 So. 627, 628; "extortion" and "bribery" mutually exclusive, People v. Feld, 262 App.Div. 909, 28 N.Y.S.2d 796, 797; involuntary payments insufficient, Hornstein v. Paramount Pictures, Sup., 37 N.Y.S.2d 404, 413; unlawful concert of one or more persons actíng with one or more other per-sons essential, People v. Keyes, Cal.Sup., 284 P. 1105; vol-untary giving of something of value to influence perform-ance of ()nidal duty as essence, Hornstein v. Paramount Pictures, Sup., 37 N.Y.S.2d 404, 413.
At common law, the gíst of the offense was the tendency to prevert justice, People v. Peters, 265 III. 122, 106 N.E. 513, 515, Ann.Cas.1916A, 813; the offering, giving, receiving or solicitíng of anything of value to influence action as a public official, Coleman v. State ex rel. Mitchell, Fla., 182 So. 627, 628; corrupt agreement Induced by offer of re-ward, Osborn v. State, 160 Tenn. 594, 28 S.W.2d 47, 48; The term now extends to many classes of oflicers and Is not conflned to judicial offlcers; ít applies both to the actor and recelver, and extends to voters, cabínet ministers, leg-islators, sherlffs, and other classes. 2 Whart.Crim. Law, 1858. In re Crum, 55 N.D. 876, 215 N.W. 682, 688, 55 A.L.
R. 220; State v. McGraw, 142 La. 417, 76 So. 822. All per-sons whose official conduct is connected with the adminis-tration of the government are subjects, Commonwealth v. Benedlct, 114 Pa.Super. 183, 173 A. 850, 851; persons acting under color of title to office. though not an officer de jure, are subjects, Ex parte Covell, 63 Okl. 256, 74 P.2d 626, 631; but It has also been held that the person charged to have been bribed must be an officer, de facto or de jure, or among the governmental administrative personnel. State
v. London, 194 Wash. 458, 78 P.2d 548, 115 A.L.R. 1255.

BRIBERY AT ELECTIONS. The offense com-mitted by one who gives or promises or offers money or any valuable inducement to an elector, in order to corruptly induce the latter to vote in a particular way or to abstain from voting, or as a reward to the voter for having voted in a particular way or abstained from voting.

BRIBOUR. One that pilfers other men’s goods; a thief.

BRICOLIS. An engine by which walls were beaten down. Blount.

BRIDEWELL. In England. A house of correc-tion.

BRIDGE. A structure erected over a river, creek, stream, ditch, ravine, obstruction in highway or other place to facilitate the passage and for bene-fit of travelers.
The term includes both arches and abutments; Bardwell v. Town of Jamaica, 15 Vt. 438; Andrew B. Hendryx Co. v. City of New Haven, 104 Conn. 632. 134 A. 77, 79; as well as approaches; 71 L.T. 430; McGee v. Jones County.
161 Iowa, 296, 142 N.W. 957, 959, 48 L.R.A..N.S., 141 In re Park Lane South in City of New York, 206 App.Div. 269, 200 N.Y.S. 555, 557; contra, under a statute, City of Stam-ford v. Town of Stamford, 100 Conn. 434, 124 A. 26, 27. The term likewise includes fills or embankments, Havird v. Richmond County, 47 Ga.App. 580, 171 S.E. 220; Morgan County v. Glass, 139 Ga. 415, 77 S.E. 583; appurtenances necessary to its proper use, Lurnley v. Pollard. 61 Ga.App. 681, 7 S.E.2d 308, 313; culverts; Central Bridge & Const. Co. e. Saunders County, 106 Neb. 484, 184 N.W. 220, 223; contra, Village of Marlssa v. Jones, 327 Ill. 180, 158 N.E. 389, 394; viaducts; In re City of Boston, 221 Mass. 468, 109 N.E. 389, 392; but not a railway viaduct, designed only for the passage of engines and cars ; Bridge Proprietors v. Land & Improvement Co., 1 Wall. 116, 17 L.Ed. 571; nor does the term include a drain under a bridge; Ellis v. Floyd County, 24 Ga.App. 717, 102 S.E. 181; nor a fran-chise or contract to build a bridge; New Orleans Pontchar-train Bridge Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission,
162 La. 874, 111 So. 265, 266; nor piping and water boxes and culverts for drainage purposes across public roads, Montgomery County v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 41 Ga. App. 130, 152 S.E. 261, 262; nor flood walls, Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Jefferson County ex rel. Grauman, 278 Ky, 68, 128 S.W.2d 230, 232, 233; nor an elevated road-way or causeway of reinforced concrete, resting upon concrete piers or columns. Rumsey v. Department of La-bor and Industries, 192 Wash. 538, 74 P.2d 214, 216.
"Bridges" and "culverts" are not synonymous. Protest of Evans, 153 Okl. 191, 4 P.2d 1030, 1031.
Bridges are eíther public or private. Public bridges are such as form a part of the highway, common, according to their character as foot, horse, or carriage bridges, to the public generally, with or without toll. State v. Street, 117 Ala. 203, 23 So. 807; Bonneville County v. Bingham County, 24 Idaho, 1, 132 P. 431, 433; they are bridges across a creek, river, or other natural body of water, etc., erected for the accommodation of the public, In re Walnut St, Bridge in City of Des Moines, 220 Iowa 55, 261 N.W. 781, 782. A private bridge is one which is not open to the use of the public generally, and does not form part of the highway. Rex v. Bucks County, 12 East, 192. Such a bridge will not be considered a public bridge although it may be occaslonally used by the public. Thompson v. R. Co., 3 Sandf.Ch., N.Y., 625; 1 Rolle, Abr. 368, Bridges, pl. 2; 2 Inst. 701; 1 Salk. 359.

BRIDGE OVER A PUBLIC WAY. A bridge upon which railroad runs aboye highway. Boston & M. R. R. v. Worcester County Com’rs, 300 Mass. 415, 15 N.E.2d 455, 457.

BRIDGE UNDER A PUBLIC WAY. A bridge for travelers to use as part of a highway crossing railroad over level thereof. Boston & M. R. R. v. Worcester County Com’rs, 300 Mass. 415, 15 N.E. 2d 455.

BRIDGE-MASTERS. Persons chosen by the citi-zens, to have the care and supervision of bridges, and having certain fees and profits belonging to their office, as in the case of London Bridge.

BRIDLE ROAD. In the location of a private way laid out by the selectmen, and accepted by the town, a description of it as a "bridle road" does not confine the right of way to a particular class of anirnals or special mode of use. Flagg v. Flagg, 16 Gray, Mass., 175.
BRIEF. A written document; a letter; a writing in the forro of a letter. A summary, abstract, or epitome. A condensed statement or epitome of some larger document, or of a series of papers, facts ‘and circumstances, or propositions.
In American practice. A written or prínted document, prepared by counsel to serve as the basís for an argument upon a cause in an appellate court, and usually Oled for the Information of the court. It embodies the points of law which the counsel desires to establish, together with the argumenta and authorities upon which he rests his contention. A brief, within a rule of court requiring coun-sel to furnish briefs, before argument, ímplies some kind of statement of the case for the Information of the court. Gardner v. Stover, 43 Ind. 356. A "brief" Is the vehicle of counsel to convey to the appellate court the essential facts of his client’s case, a statement of the questions of law in-volved, the law he would have applied, and the application he desires made of it by the court. Bell v. Germain, 12 Cal.App. 375, 107 P. 630. The brief of evídence in connec-tion with an auditor’s report is considered a "brial" though it may embody the stenographic report of the testImony in full. McKenzle v. Perdue, 67 Ga.App. 202, 19 S.E.2d 765, 774.
In Eccleslastícal law. A papal rescrIpt sealed with wax. See Bull.
In English practice. A document prepared by the attor-ney, and given to the barrister, before the trial of a cause, for the Instruction and guidance of the latter. It contains, in general, all the Information necessary to enable the bar-ríster to successfully conduct theír client’s case in court, such as a statement of the facts, a summary of the plead-ings, the mames of the witnesses, and an outline of the evidence expected from them, and any suggestions arising out of the peculiarities of the case.
In Scotch law. Brief is used In the sense of "wrít," and this seems to be the sense in which the word is used in very many of the ancient writers.

Brief a l’evesque

A writ to the bishop which, in quare impedit, shall go to remove an incumbent, unless he re-cover or be presented pendente lite. 1 Keb. 386.

Brief of Title

A methodical epitome of all the patents, con-veyances, incumbrances, liens, court proceedings, and other matters affecting the title to real estate.

Brief Out of the Chancery

In Scotch law. A writ issued in the narre of the sovereign in the election of tutors to minors, the cognoscing of lunatics or of idiots, and the ascer-taining the widow’s terce; and sometimes in divid-ing the property belonging to heirs-portioners. In these cases only brieves are now in use. Bell.

Brief Papal

In ecclesiastical law. The pope’s letter upon matters of discipline.

Printed Brief

Typewritten brief is a written and not a "printed brief." Waterman Lumber & Supply Co. v. Holmes, Tex.Civ.App., 161 S.W. 70.

BRIEFLY. Concisely; in a few words; pertain-ing to a short or abridged statement. Boynton Real Estate Co. v. Woodbridge Tp., 94 N.J.Law, 226, 109 A. 514, 515.

BRIEVE. In Scotch law. A writ. 1 Kames, Eq. 146.

BRIGA. In oíd European law. Strife, contention, litigation, controversy.

BRIGANDINE. A coat of mail or ancient armour, consisting of numerous jointed scale-like plates, very plia.nt and easy for the body, mentioned in 4 & 5 P. & M. c. 2.

BRIGBOTE. In Saxon and oíd English law. A tribute or contribution towards the repairing of bridges. See Bote.

BRINE. A solution 4 per cent. salt is brine, with-in the meaning of the provision of paragraph 488, Free List, Tariff Act of 1913, for "fruits in brine." Amerman & Patterson v. U. S., 12 Ct.Cust.App. 117, 118.

BRING. To convey to the place where the speak-er is or is to be, to bear from a more distant to a nearer place, to make to come, procure, produce, draw to, to convey, carry or conduct, move. Fred-erick v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 207 Wis. 234, 240 N.W. 387, 390. The doing of something effectual; the bringing of someone to account, or the accom-plishment of some definite purpose. Landrum v. Fulton, 47 Ohio App. 376, 191 N.E. 917, 918.

BRING ABOUT. To procure, implies completion. Jackson v. Thompson, Tex.Civ.App., 74 S.W.2d 1055, 1057.

BRING INTO. To import, U. ,S. v. Gully, D.C.N. Y., 9 F.2d 959; to introduce, Sturgeon v. State, 17 Ariz. 513, 154 P. 1050, 1055, L.R.A.1917B, 1230.

BRING SUIT. To "bring" an action or suit has a settled customary meaning at law, and refers to the initiation of legal proceedings in a suit. Lake & Co. v. King County, 4 Wash,2d 651, 104 P.2d 599, 601. A suit is "brought" at the time it is commenced. Hames v. Judd, Com.Pl., 9 N.Y.Supp. 743, 30 St.R. 666, 16 Daly 110; Goldenberg v. Murphy, 108 U.S. 162, 2 Sup.Ct. 388, 27 L.Ed. 686; Buecker v. Carr, 60 N.J.Eq. 300, 47 Atl. 34. "Brought" and "commenced" in statutes of limita-tions are commonly deemed to have been used interchangeably. Hannaman v. Gordon, Tex.Com. App., 261 S.W. 1006, 1008. Under such statutes, the suit may be "brought," when the summons subsequently served is issued. Mill Creek & Mine-hill Nav. & R. Co. v. United States, D.C.Pa., 246 F. 1013, 1016. Under a statute providing that no action shall be "brought or maintained", "brought" applies to actions not yet instituted. Bruenn v. North Yakima School Dist. No. 7, Yakima County, 101 Wash. 374, 172 P. 569, 571. "Institute and prosecute" and "bring suit" as synonymous. Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Spil-lers, Tex.Civ.App., 88 S.W.2d 738, 740.

BRING UP. Nurse, rear, and educate child until full age. In re Bamber’s Estate, 147 Misc. 712, 265 N.Y.S. 798.

BRINGING ACTION TO TRIAL. Motion to re-set case for trial as "bringing action to trial". Craghill v. Ford, 127 Cal.App. 661, 16 P.2d 343, 346.

BRINGING ERROR. Writ of error is considered as brought at time it is filed in court which ren-ders judgment. Girard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Building & Loan Ass’n, C.C.A. Tex., 32 F.2d 736.

BRINGING MONEY INTO COIJET. The act of depositing money in the custody of a court or of its clerk or marshal, for the purpose of satisfying a debt or duty, or to await the result of an inter-pleader. Dirks v. Juel, 59 Neb. 353, 80 N.W. 1045.

BEIS. In French maritime law. Literally, break-ing; wreck. Distinguished from naufrage, (q. v.).

BRISTOL BARGAIN. In English law. A con-tract by which A. lends B. £1,000 on good security, and it is agreed that £500, together with interest, shall be paid at a time stated; and, as to the oth-er £500, that B., in consideration thereof, shall pay to A. £100 per annum for seven years. Wharton.

BRITISH COLUMBIA. The territory on the north-west coast of North America, once known by the designation of "New Caledonia." Its gov-ernment is provided for by 21 & 22 Vict. c. 99. Vancouver Island is united to it by the 29 & 30 Vict. c. 67. See 33 & 34 Vict. c. 66.

BRITISH SUBJECT. Any person owing perma-nent allegiance to crown. U. S. ex rel. Graber v. Karnuth, C.C.A.N.Y., 30 F.2d 242, 243.

BRITISH TBERMAL UNIT. The amount of heat required to raise a pound of water one degree Fahrenheit. Shawnee Gas & Electric Co. v. Cor-poration Commission of Oklahoma, 111 Okl. 13, 237 P. 844.

BROAD INTERPRETATION. That interpretation of Constitution or statute which, brushing aside minor objections and trivial technicalities, el-fectuates intent of act. In re Senate Resolution No. 2 Concerning Constitutionality of House Bill No. 6, 94 Colo. 101, 31 P.2d 325, 332.

BROCAGE. The wages, commission, or pay of a broker (also called "brokerage"). Also the avo-cation or business of a broker.

BROCARD. In old English law. A legal maxim. "Brocardica Juris," the title of a small book of legal maxims, published at Paris, 1508.

ROCARIUS, BROCATOR. In old English and Scotch law. A broker; a middleman between buy-er and seller; the agent of both transacting par-ties. Bell; Cowell.

BROCELLA. In old English law. A wood, a thicket or covert of bushes and brushwood. Cow-ell; Blount.

BROKEN. Impoverishment. Walsh v. Kennedy, 115 Mont. 551, 147 P.2d 425, 430.

BROKEN STOWAGE. In maritime law. That space in a ship which is not filled by her cargo.

BROKER. An agent employed to make bargains and contracts for a compensation. Story, Ag. § 28; Payne v. Ponder, 139 Ga. 283, 77 S.E. 32, 34. A dealer in securities issued by others. White v. Financial Guarantee Corporation, 13 Cal.App.2d 93, 56 P.2d 550, 553. A middleman or negotiator between parties. San Jacinto Life Ins. Co. v. Brooks, Tex.Civ.App., 274 S.W. 648, 650; Messick v. Johnson, 155 Okl. 139, 8 P.2d 28, 30; Gile v. Tsutakawa, 109 Wash. 366, 187 P. 323, 326; Civil Code La. art. 3016. A person dealing with an-other for sale of property. Davis v. Chipman, 210 Cal. 609, 293 P. 40, 44. A person whose busi-ness it is to bring buyer and seller together. Keys v. Johnson, 68 Pa. 42. The term extends to almost every branch of business, to realty as well as personalty. Richmond Mortgage & Loan Cor-poration v. Rose, 142 Va. 342, 128 S.E. 604, 605.
A voyage is called a "broker" where no fish are caught on a fishing voyage or from some other reason there are no proceeds from a fish auction. The Dirigo First, D.C.Mass., 60 F.Supp. 675.
For distinction between "commission merchant" and "broker," see Commission Merchant. For "Factor" and "broker" as synonymous or distin-guishable, see Factor.
Ordinarily, the term is applied to one acting for others but is applicable to one in business of negotiating pur-chases or sales for himself. McCornick & Co., Bankers, v. Tolmie Bros., 42 Idaho 1, 243 P. 355, 358; Johnson v. Winslow, 155 Misc. 170, 279 N.Y.S. 147.
A "broker" 1s an agent with special and limited author-ity. Stephenson v. Golden, 279 Mich. 710, 276 N.W. 849; 858; Portsmouth Cotton 011 Refining Corp. v. Madrid Cot-ton 011 Co., 200 Ala. 634, 77 So. 8, 9. A middleman, as dls-tinguished from a broker, is employed merely to bring the partles together when each desires to exchange his prop-erty for that of the other, or where one desires to sell and the other to purchase and his services are not rendered as the agent of either party; but a "broker" is the agent of a party, employed to procure a customer or to effect the sale or exchange. Tracey v. Blake, 229 Mass. 57, 118 N.E. 271, 272.
Brokers are of many kinds, the most important being enumerated and defined as follows:
Exchange Broker See Exchange Broker.

Merchandise Brokers

Buyers and sellers of goods and negotiators be-tween buyer and seller, but without having the custody of the property.

Money-Broker

A money-changer; a scrivener or jobber; one who lends or raises money to or for others.

Note Brokers

Negotiators of the discount or sale of cornmer-cial paper.

Pawnbrokers

Lenders of money on goods deposited with them in pledge, taking high rates of interest.

Real Estate Brokers

Persons who procure the purchase or sale of land, acting as intermediary between vendor and purchaser, and who negotiate loans on real-estate security, manáge and Tease estates, etc. Latta v. Kilbourn, 150 U.S. 524, 14 S.Ct. 201, 37 L.Ed. 169; Abraham v. Wasaff, 111 Okl. 138, 239 P. 138, 140. A broker employed in negotiating the sale, pur-chase, or exchange of lands on a commission con-tingent on success. Oregon Home Builders v. Montgomery Inv. Co., 94 Or. 349, 184 P. 487, 491. A person engaged in business to such an extent that it is his vocation or partial vocation. Morris v. O’Neill, 239 Mich. 663, 215 N.W. 8, 9; Kolb v. Burkhardt, 148 Md. 539, 129 A. 670, 672.

Ship-Brokers

Who transact business between the owners of ships and freighters or charterers, and negotiate the sale of vessels.

Stock Brokers

Brokers employed to buy and sell for their prin-cipals stocks, bonds, government securities, etc. The term "broker" applies as well to a broker on the Board of Trade as to one on the Stock Ex-change. Cutler v. Pardridge, 182 Ill.App. 350, 358.

BROKERAGE. The wages or commissions of a broker; also, his business or occupation.

BROKERAGE CONTRACT. A contract of agen-cy, whereby broker is employed to make contracts of kind agreed upon in name and on behalf of his principal, and for which he is paid an agreed commission. Nolen’s Adm’r v. Robinson, 213 Ky. 752, 281 S.W. 1034, 1036; Hardesty v. Martin Ebersbach Co., C.C.A.Ohio, 294 F. 5, 6. A uni-lateral contract wherein the principal makes an offer which is interpreted as promise to pay bro-ker a commission in consideration of his produc-ing a buyer ready, able, and willing to buy the property on the principal’s terms. In re Cowan’s Estate, Sur., 13 N.Y.S.2d 374, 376.

BROSSUS. Bruised, or injured with blows, wounds, or other casualty. Cowell.

BROTHEL. A bawdy-house; a house of ill fame; a common habitation of prostitutes. United States v. Casey, D.C.Ohio, 247 F. 362, 364.

BROTHER. One person is a brother "of the whole blood" to another, the former being a male, when both are born from the same father and mother. He is a brother "of the half blood" to that other (or half-brother) when the two are born to the same father by different mothers or by the same mother to different fathers.
The term may embrace half brothers. Thompson v. Smith, 102 Okl. 150, 227 P. 77, 80; Darson v. Moore, 163 Miss. 705, 142 So. 447, 452. It may be deemed to embrace only a blood brother. Droney v. U. S., D.C.D.C., 59 F.Supp. 154, 155

In the civil law, the following distinctions are observed: Two brothers who descend from the same father, but by different mothers, are called "consarwuine" brothers. If they have the same mother, but are begotten by different fathers, they are called "uterine" brothers. If they have both the same father and mother, they are denominated brothers ”germane."

BROTHER—IN—LAW. A wife’s brother or a sis-ter’s husband. There is not any relationship, but only affinity, between brothers-in-law. Farmers’ L. & T. Co. v. Iowa Water Co., C.C., 80 Fed. 469. See State v. Foster, 112 La. 533, 36 So. 554. Two men are not brothers-in-law from the circum-stance merely of having married sisters. Cruce v. State, 87 Fla. 406, 100 So. 264, 265.

BROTHERHOOD AND GUESTLING, COURT OF. The Brotherhood was a conference of seven towns (i. e., the Cinque Ports and two other ancient towns) as to the provision of the necessary ships and as to arranging for the herring sale at Yar-mouth, and for other such purposes. The Guest-ling was rather a wider meeting, at which not merely the Brotherhood, but deputies from other associated towns were present for the discussion of subjects of common interest to all.

BROUGHT. Taken; carried. United States v. Townsend, D.C.N.Y., 219 F. 761, 762. Past tense of "bring." Frederick v. Great Northern Ry. Co.,- 207 Wis. 234, 240 N.W. 387, 390, 80 A.L.R. 984.
A proceeding is not "brought" as regards defendant until process has been issued from an appropriate court in good faith intending or making an effort to serve it. City of Revere v. Special Judge of Dist. Court of Chelsea, 262 Mass.
393, 130 481, 433. A writ of error is not "brought"
cantil it is filed or lodged in the eourt, or with the elerk of the eourt, which rendered the iudgnient. U. S. y. Shaffer, D.C.Wash., 278 F. 549, 351.

BROUGHT IN QUESTION UPON THE RECORD. The constitutionality of an act is "brought in ques-tion upon the record" when it is clearly questioned by the allegation of any pleading, or by any other formal objection filed in the case. Brosco Frost, 63 R.I. 1, 6 A.2d 705, 706.

BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF. Equiva-lent to the expression "made known to." State v. Sullivan, 159 La. 589, 105 So. 631, 636.

BROUGHT TO TRIAL. An action is not brought to trial until the trial is commenced. Miller & Lux v. Superior Court of California in and for Merced County, 192 Cal. 333, 219 P. 1006, 1009.

BROWN DECREE. A decree which terminates marriage without specifying in whose favor issue as to grounds for divorce was decided. Spector v. Spector, 382 P.2d 659, 666, 94 Ariz. 175.

BRUARIUM. In old English law. A heath ground; ground where heath grows. Spelman.

BRUGBOTE. See Brigbote.

BRUILLUS. In old English law. A wood or grove; a thicket or clump of trees in a park or forest. Cowell.

BRUISE. In medical jurisprudence. A contusion; an injury upon the flesh of a person with a blunt or heavy instrument, without solution of continui-ty, or without breaking the skin. Shadock v. Road Co., 79 Mich. 7, 44 N.W. 158. See Contusion.

BRUKBARN. In old Swedish law. The child of a woman conceiving after a rape, which was made legitimate. Literally, the child of a struggle. Burrill.

BRUSHING. Digging of space in middle of bot-tom of mine entry or room neck in which to lay track. Schillings v. Big Creek Coal Co., Mo.App. 277 S.W. 964, 965.

BRUTUM FULMEN. An empty noise; an empty threat. A judgment void upon its face which is in legal effect no judgment at all, and by which no rights are divested, and from which none can be obtained, and neither binds nor bars anyone. Dol-lert v. Pratt-Hewit Oil Corporation, Tex.Civ.App., 179 S.W.2d 346, 348.
BS. Impurities in crude oil. Crude Oil Con-tracting Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, C.C.A.Okl., 118 F.2d 476.
B.T.U. "British Thermal Units." Bennett v. Pis-citello, 170 Misc. 177, 9 N.Y.S.2d 69, 71.

BUBBLE. An extravagant or unsubstantial proj-ect for extensive operations in business or com-merce, generally founded on a fictitious or exag-gerated prospectus, to ensnare unwary investors. Companies formed on such a basis or for such pur-poses are called "bubble companies." The term is chiefly used in England.

BUBBLE ACT. The statute 6 Geo. I, c. 18 (1719), "for restraining several extravagant and unwar-rantable practices herein mentioned," prompted by the collapse of the "South Sea Project." It was mostly repealed by the statute 6 Geo. IV. c. 91.

BUCK SWAMPER. An employee of lumber com-pany to mark timber and brush in a wooded area to be cut later for the formation of a road. De-masters v. State Compensation Com’r, 112 W.Va. 498, 165 S.E. 667.

BUCKET SHOP. An office or place (other than a regularly incorporated or licensed exchange) where persons engage in pretended buying and selling of commodities. Connor v. Black, 119 Mo. 126, 24 S.W. 184; Gatewood v. North Carolina, 203 U.S. 531, 27 S.Ct. 167, 51 L.Ed. 305.

BUCKETING. Receipt of orders to purchase and sell stock without intention of executing orders and without execution of orders. Kaiser v. But-chart, 200 Minn. 545, 274 N.W. 680, 683, 113 A.L.R. 847.

BUCK’S EXTENSION PROCESS. Some uniform, continuous force or pull applied to leg or foot be-low break to overcome natural contraction of mus-cies of thigh. Sweet v. Douge, 145 Wash. 142, 259 P. 25. See Counterextension.

BUCKSTALL. A toil, net, or snare, to take deer. 4 Inst. 306.

BUDGET. A balance sheet or statement of esti-mated receipts and expenditures. Appalachian Electric Power Co. v. City of Huntington, 115 W. Va. 588, 177 S.E. 431, 433; a plan or method where-by expenditures are controlled. Kistler v. Carbon County, 154 Pa.Super. 299, 35 A.2d 733, 735; An estimate. Board of Sup’rs of Chesterfield County v. Chesterfield County School Board, 182 Va. 266, 28 S.E.2d 698, 703.
A narre given in England to the staternent annually pre-sented to parliament by the chancellor of the exchequer, containing the estimates of the national revenue and ex-penditure.

BUDGET SYSTEM. A system by which income and expenditure for definite period are balanced. Rowe v. Stanley County, 52 S.D. 516, 219 N.W. 122, 123.

BUFFER. A contrivance to mitigate the shock by cars coming together rather than a safety ap-pliance; an elastic apparatus for deadening the jar caused by the collision of bodies. George v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 102 Kan. 774, 178 P. 403, 404.
"Agency," "adjunct," "branch," "Mstrumentality," "dummy," "tool" and "buffer" as synonymous. Lowen-dahl v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 247 App.D1v. 144, 287 N.Y.S. 62, 74.

BUFFET. A public place for lunch or light re-freshments. McCormick v. Brennan, 224 Ill.App. 251, 254.
BUG. Vibrating horizontal arm for the semi-au-tomatic production of code dots, as distinguished from the Morse key. Vibroplex Co. v. J. H. Bun-nell & Co., D.C.N.Y., 13 F.2d 528.

BUGGERY. A carnal copulation against nature; a man or a woman with a brute beast, a man with a man, or man unnaturally with a woman. 3 Inst. 58; 12 Coke, 36. Ausman v. Veal, 10 Ind. 356, 71 Am.Dec. 331; Com. v. J., 21 Pa.Co.Ct.R. 626. This term is often used interchangeably with "sodo-my"; but even when so used, it does not neces-sarily include the act called "fellatio" or "fella-tion." State v. Murry, 136 La. 253, 66 So. 963, 964. See Sodomy.

BUILD. To construct and raise anew. Attorney General ex rel. Gibson v. Board of Sup’rs of Mont-calm County, 141 Mich. 590, 104 N.W. 792, 794. To form by uniting materials into a regular struc-ture. United States v. Blair, C.C.N.Y., 190 F. 372, 374. The term may also be employed in the sense of obtain, secure, or acquire. Verner v. Muller, 89 S.C. 545, 72 S.E. 393.
"Build" is not synonymous with amend, repair, or main-taln. State v. White, 16 R.I. 591, 18 A. 179; Hutchinson v. City of Olympia, 2 Wash.T. 314, 5 P. 606, 608. But it has been held that a grant of power to build a railroad, or a requirement that certain persone shall build bridges, may include the power or duty of maintenance or repair. Cen-tral R. Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582, 624; Franklin County Com’rs v. White Water Valley Canal Co., 2 Ind. 162, 163.

BUILDER. One whose occupation is the building or erection of structures, the controlling and di-recting of construction, or the planning, construct-ing, remodeling and adapting to particular uses buildings and other structures. Turner v. Haar, 114 Mo. 335, 21 S.W. 737, 738. One who puts a structure luto permanent form. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 38 Okl. 233, 132 P. 908, 911, 46 L.R.A.,N.S., 112. One who builds. Hopkins v. Department of Labor and Industries, 190 Wash. 251, 67 P.2d 872, 875. The term may be synonymous with "contractor." State v. Clark, 43 Wash. 664, 86 P. 1067. It may also designate a shipwright, a mason, etc., and likewise an archi-tett. Savannah & C. R. Co. v. Callahan, 49 Ga. 506, 511. Contra, as to "architect," People ex rel. v. Lower, 251 III. 527, 96 N.E. 346, 347, 36 L.R.A. 1203.

BUILDING. An edifice. State v. Ornelas, 42 N.M. 17, 74 P.2d 723, 725; People v. Chase, 117 Cal.App.Supp. 775, 1 P.2d 60, 61; A structure. State v. Ornelas, 42 N.M. 17, 74 P.2d 723, 725. A fabric built or constructed. State v. Ornelas, 42 N.M. 17, 74 P.2d 723, 725. That which is built. Brown v. Sikes, 188 S.C. 288, 198 S.E. 854, 856; People v. Chase, 117 Cal.App.Supp. 775, 1 P.2d 60, 61.
A fabric or ediflce designed to stand more or Iess per-manently. Brown v. Sikes, 188 S.C. 288, 198 S.E. 854, 856; a fabric, structure, or edifice, designed for the habitation of men or animals or for the shelter of property. People v. Gillespie, 344 III. 290, 176 N.E. 316, 318. A structure or ediflce erected by man, composed of stone, wood, brick, marble or other proper substance, and Intended for use or conveniente. State v. Crouse, 117 Me, 363, 104 A. 525, 526; Sacks v. Legg, 219 Ill.App. 144, 147; Rabb v. W. P. Ellison, Inc., 89 N.J.Law, 416, 99 A. 119, 120. A structure or edifice inclosing a space within lts walls, and usually, but not necessarily, covered with a roof. State v. Elliott, 198 Iowa 71, 199 N.W. 270, 271; Netter v. Scholtz, 282 Ky. 493, 138 S. W.2d 951, 953.
"Erecting" as synonym. Board of Com’rs of Guadalupe County v. State, 43 N.M. 409, 94 P.2d 515, 516, 520; "prem-ises" as synonym. Everett v. Patrons’ & Farmers’ Mut. Fire Iris. Co. of Jackson County, 222 Mo.App. 1010, 7 S.W. 2d 463, 468.
The term generally, though not always, Implies the Idea of a habitation for the permanent use of man, or an erec-tion connected with his permanent use. Rouse v. Catskill & N. Y. Steamboat Co., 13 N.Y.S. 126, 127, 35 N.Y.St.Rep. 491; It lmports tangibility, Wells Fargo & Co. v. Jersey City, D.C.N.J., 207 F. 871, 876, and may include the land on which It stands, as well as adjacent land, Thomas v. Long, 182 Iowa, 859, 166 N.W. 287, 288; Dallas Land & Loan Co. v. Garrett, Tex.Civ.App., 276 S.W. 471, 473; Freedman v. S. S. Kresge Co., 290 Mass. 114, 194 N.E. 829, 830. It in-eludes many different kinds of structures and edifices. Great Eastern Casualty Co. v. Blackwelder, 21 Ga.App. 586, 94 S.E. 843, 844. The Identity or difference of meaning of the words "building," "Improvement" and "structure" de-pends upon context in connection with which they are used. Lanier v. Lovett, 25 Arlz. 54, 213 P. 391, 394.
A ship as building within gambling statute. People v. Chase, 117 Cal.App.Supp. 775, 1 P.2d 60, 61.

BUILDING A FIRE. "Kindling a fire" and "build-ing a fire" are equivalent. State v. Merrill, 132 Me. 103, 167 A. 172, 173.

BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION. An or-ganization for the purpose of accumulating a fund by subscriptions and savings of its members to assist them in building or purchasing for them-selves dwellings or real estate by the loan to them of the requisite money. McCauley v. Association, 97 Tenn., 13 Pickle, 421, 37 S.W. 212, 213, 35 L.R.A. 244; Rhodes v. Missouri Savings & Loan Co., 173 III. 621, 50 N.E. 998, 1000, 43 L.R.A. 93. A juristic person organized by government to accomplish certain ends, which may be public or quasi public. Hopkins Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Cleary, Wis., 296 U.S. 315, 56 S.Ct. 235, 80 L.Ed. 251, 100 A.L.R. 1403. Quasi public corporations chartered to encourage thrift and promote ownership of homes. Hopkins Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Cleary, Wis., 296 U.S. 315, 56 S.Ct. 235, 237, 241, 80 L.Ed. 251, 100 A.L.R. 1403.
A prívate corporation designed for the purpose of ac-cumulating frito its treasury, by means of the gradual pay-ment by its members of thelr stock subscriptIons in peri-odical installments, a fund to be invested from time to time In advances made to such shareholders on thelr stock as may apply for this privilege on approved security, the borrowing members paying Interest and a premlum for this preference in securing an advancement over other members, and continuing to pay the regular installments on their stock in addition, all of which funds, together with payments made by the nonborrowing members, in-cluding fines, forfeitures, and other like revenues, go into the common fund until it, with the proflts thereon, ag-gregates the face value of all the shares in the association, the legal effect of which is to extinguish the liability in-curred for the loans and advancements, and to distribute to each nonborrowing member the par value of his stock. Washington Nat. Building, Loan & Investment Ass’n v. Stanley, 38 Or. 319, 63 P. 489, 492, 84 Am.St.Rep. 793. See, also, Wilkinson v. Mutual Bldg. & Sav. Ass’n, C.C.A. Wis., 13 F.2d 997, 998.

BUILDING IS COVERED. The words ordinarily mean that the property shall be insured in the standard form of insurance from that instant for a reasonable time until either the policy or policies can be written out, or their issuance approved or disapproved or some other temporary impediment to the complete formal contract of insurance can be removed. Shumway v. Home Fire & Marine Iris. Co. of California, 301 Mass. 391, 17 N.E,2d 212, 214.

BUILDING LEASE. A lease of land for a long term of years, usually 99, at a rent called a "ground rent," the lessee covenanting to erect cer-tain edifices thereon according to specification, and to maintain the same, etc., during the term.

BUILDING LIEN. The statutory lien of a ma-terial-man or contractor for the erection of a building. June v. Doke, 35 Tex.Civ.App. 240, 80 S.W. 406.

BUILDING LINE. A line established by munici-pal authority, to secure uniformity of appearance in the streets of the city, drawn at a certain uni-form distante from the curó or from the edge of the sidewalk, and parallel thereto, upon which the fronts of all buildings on that street must be placed, or beyond which they are not allowed to project. See Tear v. Freebody, 4 C.B.,N.S., 263.
As used in a city charter authorizing the establishment of a "building line" aiong boulevards, the term means a mark of division or demarkation; an outline or contour; a limit or boundary;-not a straight line. City of St. Louis v. Handlan, 242 Mo. 88, 145 S.W. 421, 422, 423. As to the meaning of the term in town and city plats, see Simp-son v. Mikkelsen, 196 III. 575, 63 N.E. 1036, 1037.

BUILDING LOAN AGREEMENT. An agreement by which one undertakes to advance to another money to be used primarily in erection of build-ings. York Mortg. Corporation v. Clotar Const. Corporation, 254 N.Y. 128, 172 N.E. 265, 269.

BUILDING MATERIAL. Material used in con-struction work. Wood Preserving Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 235 Ala. 438, 179 So. 254, 255. Material essential to erection or construc-tion of house or other structure, Mutual Lumber Co. v. Sheppard, Tex.Civ.App., 173 S.W.2d 494, 497, 498, 500.

BUILDING OR STRUCTURE USED AS CHURCH. A building wholly dedicated to purposes of re-ligious worship. Miles v. McKinney, 174 Md. 551, 199 A. 540, 547, 117 A.L.R. 207.

BUILDING PERMIT. A permit to erect a build-ing. Commissioners of Easton v. Covey, 74 Md. 262, 22 A. 266; Commonwealth v. Devlin, 305 Pa. 440, 158 A. 161, 163.

BUILDING RESTRICTIONS. Covenants creating easement running with land in each deed contain-ing restrictions. Strauss v. J. C. Nichols Land Co., 327 Mo. 205, 37 S.W.2d 505, 508.

BUILDING SITE. As used in contract, for filling of the "building Bite" to grade, term contemplated the entire lot. Myevre v. Liberty Realty & Securi-ties Co., 156 La. 496, 100 So. 694, 696.

BUILDING SOCIETY. An association in which the subscriptions of the members form a capital stock or fund out of which advances may be made to tnembers desiring them, on mortgage security.

BUL. In the ancient Hebrew chronology, the eighth month of the ecclesiastical, and the second of the civil year. It has since been called "Marsh-evan," and answers to our October.

BULK. Unbroken packages. Merchandise which is neither counted, weighed, nor measured. See Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Gate City Fertilizer Co., Tex.Civ.App., 176 S.W. 868, 869.
Bulk is said of that which is neither counted, weighed, nor measured. A sale by the bulk Is the sale of a quanti-ty such as it is, without measuring, counting, or weighing. Civil Code La. art. 3556, par. 6.
When used In relation to sale of goods by sample, "bulk" means the whole quanti, of goods sold, which is supposed to be fairly represented by the sample. American Paper Products Co. v. Morton Salt Co., Mo.App., 279 S.W. 761, 763. This is the meaning which the word has as used in Uniform Sales Act Pa. § 14, P.L. c. 543; 69 P.S. § 123, F. A. D. Andrea, Inc., v. Dodge, C.C.A.Pa., 15 F.2d 1003, 1005.

BULK SALES ACTS. A class of statutes designed to prevent the defrauding of creditors by secret sale in bulk of all or substantially all of a mer-chant’s stock of goods. A. J. Long Cigar & Gro-cery Co. v. Harvey, 33 Ga.App. 236, 125 S.E. 870; Wolfe v. Bellfair Hat Co., Sup., 47 N.Y.S.2d 908, 910.

BULK WINDOWS. "Bulk windows" include show windows as well as bay windows, sometimes called "bow windows," within a statute confer-ring on cites the power to regulate certain ob-structions in the street. City of Baltimore v. Nird-linger, 131 Md. 600, 102 A. 1014, 1019.

BULL. In ecclesiastical law. An instrument granted by the pope of Rome, and sealed with a seal of lead, containing some decree, command-ment, or other public act, emanating from the pon-tiff. Bull, in this sense, corresponds with edict or letters patent from other governments. Cow-ell; 4 Bl.Comm. 110; 4 Steph.Comm. 177, 179.
There are three kinds of apostolical rescripts—the brief, the signature, and the bull; which last Is most commonly-used in legal matters.
This is also a cant term of the Stock Exchange, meaning one who speculates for a rise in the mar-ket.

BULL AND BOAR. These animals, by the an-cient custom of some places, were required to be kept by the parson for the use of his parishioners, in consideration of his having tithes of calves and pigs. 1 Rolle Abr. 559.

BULLDOZER. A blade, the arras of which are fastened to a tractor and hold the blade in front of the tractor. Eldredge v. Sargent, 150 Kan. 824, 96 P.2d 870, 871.

BULL-HEADED. Headstrong, obstinate, stupidly stubborn. Enloe v. Southern Ry. Co., 179 N.C. 83, 101 S.E. 556, 558.

BULL PEN. A certain place of confinement at a penitentiary. State v. Kelley, 118 Or. 397, 247 P. 146, 148.

BULLA. A seal used by the Roman emperors, during the lower empire; it was of four kinds,— gold, silver, wax, and lead.

BULLET Synonymous with "shot," meaning a projectile, particularly a solid ball or bullet that is not intended to fit the bore of a piece. Green v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 862, 94 S.E. 940, 941.

BULLETIN. An officially published notice or an-nouncement concerning the progress of matters of public importance. In France, the registry of the laws.

BULLETIN DES LOIS. In France, the official sheet which publishes the laws and decrees; this publication constitutes the promulgation of the law or decree.

BULLION. Gold and silver intended to be coined.
The term 1s usually applied to a quantity of these metals ready for the mint, but as yet lying in bars, plates, lumps, or other masses; but lt may also include ornaments or dishes of gold and silver, or forelgn coins not current as money, when intended to be descriptive of its adaptability to be coined, and not of other purposes to which it may be put. Thalheim v. State, 38 Fla. 169, 20 So. 938. The term may import money. Emery Bird Thayer Dry Goods Co. v. Williams, C.C.A.Mo., 98 F.2d 166, 171.

BULLION FUND. A fund of public money main-tained in connection with the mints, for the pur-pose of purchasing precious metals for coinage, and also of enabling the mint to make returns of coins to private depositors of bullion without wait-ing until such bullion is actually coined.

BUM-BAILIFF. A person employed to dun one for a debt; a bailiff employed to arrest a debtor. Probably a vulgar corruption of "bound-bailiff" (q. v.).

BUNCO GAME. Any trick, artifice, or cunning calculated to win confidence and to deceive, wheth-er by conversation, conduct, or suggestion. State v. Ferrato, 72 Wash. 112, 129 P. 898, 899.

BUNDA. In old English law. A bound, boundary, border, or limit (terminus, limes).

BUNDLE, v. To sleep on the same bed without undressing; applied to the custom of a man and woman, especially lovers, thus sleeping. A. & E. Ency. This custom is adverted to in Seagar v. Sligerland, 2 Caines, N.Y., 219, and Hollis v. Wells, 3 Clark, Pa., 169.

BUOY. In maritime law. A piece of wood or cork, or a barrel, raft, or other thing, made secure and floating upon a stream or bay, intended as a guide and warning to mariners, by marking a spot where the water is shallow, or where there is a reef or other danger to navigation, or to mark the course of a devious channel. Buoys are regu-lated by federal legislation; see 14 U.S.C.A. § 87.

BURDEN. A burden, as on interstate commerce, means anything that imposes either a restrictive or onerous load upon such commerce. State of Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., D.C.Mo., 282 F. 341, 345.
Where the Railroad Commission ordered construction of a viaduct carrying a street over railroad tracks. construc-tion and operation of street car tracks on the viaduct was not an "additional burilen," and did not entitle abutting owners to damages. In eminent domain or condemnation proceedings see In re Ely Ave. in City of New York, 88 Misc. 320, 150 N.Y.S. 698, 701.

BURDEN OF PROOF. (Lat. onus probandi.) In the law of evidence. The necessity or duty of af-firmatively proving a fact or facts in dispute on an issue raised between the parties in a cause. Willett v. Rich, 142 Mass. 356, 7 N.E. 776, 56 Am. Rep. 684; People v. McCann, 16 N.Y. 58, 69 Am. Dec. 642, 15 How.Pr. 503.
The term "burden of proof" is not to be confused with "prima fume case," Kendall v. Brownson, 47 N.H. 200; Carver v. Carver, 97 Ind. 511, or with expressions referring to a similar idea, such as the "burden of evidence," Hyer v. C. E. Holmes & Co., 12 Ga.App. 837, 79 S.E. 58, 60, or "the burden of proceeding," Mason v. Geist, Mo.App., 263 S.W. 236, 237, or the burden of going forward with the evidence, First Nat. Bank v. Ford, 30 Wyo. 110, 216 P. 691, 694, 31 A.L.R. 1441.
It is frequently said, however, to have two distinct mean-Ings: (1) the duty of producing evidence as the case pro-gresses, and (2) the duty to establish the truth of the claim by preponderante of the evidence, and though the former may pass from party to party, the latter rests throughout upon the party asserting the affirmative of the issue. Sellers v. Kincaid, 303 III. 216, 135 N.E. 429, 433; Stofer v. Dunham, Mo.App., 208 S.W. 641, 644.
Again "burden of proof" is sometimes used to refer mere-ly to the rule of practice fixing the order of proof, as dis-tinguished from the "preponderante of the evidence" meaning the weight of evidence. Thompson v. Dyson, 120 Kan. 591, 244 P. 867, 868.

BUREAU. An office for the transaction of busi-ness. A name given to the several departments of the executive or administrative branch of gov-ernment, or their divisions. In re Strawbridge, 39 Ala. 375; In re McLaughlin, 124 Misc. 766, 210 N.Y.S. 68, 72.
As applied to a division of an administrative depart-ment, the term may include the operating force. People v. Collin, 202 Ill.App. 100.

BUREAUCRACY. A system in which the business of government is carried on in departments, each under the control of a chief, in contradistinction from a system in which the officers of govern-ment have a co-ordinate authority.

BURG, BURGH. A term anciently applied to a castle or fortified place; a borough (q. v.). Spel-man.

BURGAGE. A name anciently given to a dwell-ing-house in a borough town. Blount.

BURGAGE-HOLDING. A tenure by which lands in royal boroughs in Scotland were held of the sovereign. The service was watching and ward-ing, and was done by the burgesses within the territory of the borough, whether expressed in the charter or not.

BURGAGE-TENURE. In English law. One of the three species of free socage holdings; a ten-ure whereby houses and lands which were former-ly the site of houses, in an ancient borough, are held of some lord by a certain rent. There are a great many customs affecting these tenures, the most remarkable of which is the custom of Bor-ough English. See Litt. § 162; 2 Bl.Comm. 82.

BURGATOR. One who breaks into houses or in-closed places, as distinguished from one who com-mitted robbery in the open country. Spelman.

BURGBOTE. In old English law. A term applied to a contribution towards the repair of castles or walls of defense, or of a borough.

BURGENSES. In old English law. Inhabitants of a burgus or borough; burgesses. Fleta, lib. 5, c. 6, § 10.

BURGERISTIL A word used in Domesday, signi-fying a breach of the peace in a town. Jacob.

BURGESS. In English law. An inhabitant or freeman of a borough or town; a person duly and legally admitted a member of a municipal corpo-ration. Spelman; 3 Steph.Comm. 188, 189. A magistrate of a borough. Blount. An elector or voter; a person legally qualified to vote at elec-tions. The word in this sense is particularly de-fined by the statute 5 & 6 Wm. IV. c. 76, §§ 9, 13. 3 Steph.Comm. 192. A representative of a bor-ough or town, in parliament. Co.Litt. 109a; 1 Bl.Comm. 174.
In American law. The chief executive officer of a borough, bearing the same relation to its government and affairs that the mayor does to those of a city; so used in Pennsylvania. In Con-necticut boroughs the board of burgesses cor-responds to the township board or board of trustees in some other states, or to the common council of a city. Cent. Dict.

BURGESS ROLL. A roll, required by the St. 5 & 6 Wm. IV. c. 76, to be kept in corporate towns or boroughs, of the names of burgesses entitled to certain new rights conferred by that act.

BURGH—BRECHE. A fine imposed on the com-munity of a tocan, for a breach of the peace, etc.

BURGH ENGLISH. See Borough English. BURGH ENGLOYS. Borough English (q. v.).

BlURGHIVIAILS. Yearly payments to the crown of Scotland, introduced by Malcolm III., and re-sembling the English fee-farm rents.

BURGHMOTE. In Saxon law. A court of jus-tice held semi-annually by the bishop or lord in a burg, which the thanes were bound to attend without summons.

BlURGLAR. One who commits burglary. One who breaks into a dwelling-house in the nighttime with intent to commit a felony. O’Connor v. Press Pub. Co., 34 Misc. 564, 70 N.Y.Supp. 367. See Burglary.

BLTRGLARIOUSLY. In pleading. A technical word which must be introduced into an indict-ment for burglary at common law. Lewis v. State, 16 Conn. 34; Reed v. State, 14 Tex.App. 665.

BURGLARITER. L. Lat. (Burglariously.) In old criminal pleading. A necessary word in in-dictments for burglary.

BURGLARY. The breaking and entering the house of another in the nighttime, with intent to commit a felony therein, whether the felony be actually committed or not. Soders v. State, 81 Tex.Cr.R. 506, 195 S.W. 1146, 1147; Hunter v. State, 29 Ind. 80; State v. Allen, 186 N.C. 302, 119 S.E. 504, 506; State v. Hodgdon, 89 Vt. 148, 94 A. 301, 302.
The common-law definition has been much modified by statute In several of the states. Pen.Code Cal. § 459; Peo-ple v. Mendelson, 264 III. 453, 106 N.E. 249, 251, L.R.A. 1915C, 627; State v. Dunlap, 103 N.J.Law, 209, 136 A. 510; Burglary of private residente at night is "nighttime bur-glary" and not ordinary "burglary." Shaffer v. State, 137 Tex.Cr.R. 476, 132 S.W.2d 263. Commission in nighttime is not essential. People v. Glickman, 377 III. 360, 36 N.E.2d 720, 722, 723; State v. Williams, 189 La. 355, 179 So. 452. Entry in the nighttime without breaking, or breaking and entering in the daytime constitutes "burglary." State v. Williams, 189 La. 355, 179 So. 452.
Intended commission of some other offense is essential. Commonwealth v. Doran, 145 Pa.Super. 173, 20 A.2d 815, 816.
Entry finto a house made in an unusual place with in-tent to commit a felony or theft is a "burglary by break-ing." Harroll v. State, 135 Tex.Cr.R. 65, 117 S.W.2d 103.
See Breaking.

BURGLARY IN THE FIRST DEGREE. Unlawful and intentional breaking and unlawful and inten-tional entry in nighttime into dwelling house pres-ently occupied, with intent to commit felony. State v. Madden, 212 N.C. 56, 192 S.E. 859, 860.

Burglary committed "between sunset and sun-rise". People v. Helsley, 41 Cal.App.2d 935, 108 P.2d 97, 98.

BURGOMASTER. The title given in Germany to the chief executive Officer of a borough, town, or city; corresponding to our "mayor."

BURGUNDIAN LAW. See Lex Burgundionum. BURGWHAR. A burgess (q. y.).

BURIL A fastness. The hill-top that has been fortified as a burh. Very often it has given its name to a neighboring village; it is the future borough. The entrenchment around a great man’s house was a burh. See Maitland, Domesday and Beyond, 183.

BURIAL. Act of burying a deceased person, sep-ulture, interment, act of depositing a dead body in the earth, in a tomb or vault, or in the water; the act of interring the human dead. Brady v. Presnell, 204 N.C. 659, 169 S.E. 278, 280. See Lay v. State, 12 Ind.App. 362, 39 N.E. 768.

BURIAL INSURANCE. A contract based on le-gal consideration whereby obligor undertakes to furnish obligee or one of latter’s relatives at death burial reasonably worth fixed sum. Sisson v. Pra-ta Undertaking Co., 49 R.I. 132, 141 A. 76.

BURIAL PLACE. A portion of ground set apart for or occupied by grave, or as a grave or grave-yard. Code 1932, § 9052. Leaphart v. Harmon, 186 S.C. 362, 195 S.E. 628, 629.

BURIAL PURPOSES. Continuing care, preserva-tion, and ornamentation of the place of inter-ment as included in term. People v. Rosehill Cemetery Co., 371 III. 510, 21 N.E.2d 766, 770.

BURKING, BURKISM. Murder committed with the object of selling the cadaver for purposes of dissection, particularly and originally, by suffo-cating or strangling the victim.

BURLAW COURTS. Courts consisting of neigh-bors selected by common consent to act as judges in determining disputes between neighbor and neighbor.

BURLAWS. In Scotch law. Laws made by neigh-bors elected by common consent in the burlaw courts. Skene.

BURLESQUE. A plotless musical entertainment consisting of a series of unrelated episodes and dances, all with the purpose of depicting or sug-gesting sexual subjects or objects. Bonserk Thea-tre Corporation v. Moss, Sup., 34 N.Y.S.2d 541, 549.

BURN, n. A hurt, injury, or effect caused by burn-ing. Webster, Dict.
A "first-degree burn" varíes from redness to a blister. A "second-degree burn" results where the skin is charred or killed. Murphy v. Ludowici Gas & Oil Co., 96 Kan. 321, 150 P. 581, 582.

BURN, v. To consume with fire. See Hiatt v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., 197 Iowa 153, 197 N.W. 3, 4, 33

A.L.R. 655; Pacific Creosoting Co. v. Thames & Mersey Marine Ins. Co., D.C.Wash., 210 F. 958, 959.
"Burning," outslde of laboratorles and certain work-shops, is a process of oxidation, which, 1f sufficiently vio-lent, heats the elements Involved to incandescence, and, if combustible gases are given off, there is a llame. Scully v. Bremer County Farmers’ Mut. Fire Ins. Ass’n, 215 Iowa 368, 245 N.W. 280, 282.
The verb "to burn," 1 an indictment for arson, is to be taken in lts common meaning of "to consume with fire." Hester v. State, 17 Ga. 130. To constitute a "burning" essentlal to arson, there must be a wasting or destruction of the fibers or texture of the wood, no matter how small in extent. People v. 011ff, 361 III. 237, 197 N.E. 777, 780; it is not necessary that the building should be consumed or materially injured and it is sufficient if fire is actually com-municated to any part thereof, however small. State v. Mutschler, 55 N.D. 120, 212 N.W. 832, 833; charring is burning. State v. Pisan, 107 Conn. 630, 141 A. 660, 661.

BURNED OUT OF SIGHT. Merchandise is "burned out of sight" when burned to an ash or into such small particles that it might be washed away by water or swept into débris. Hyland v. Millers Nat. Ins. Co., D.C.Cal., 58 F.2d 1003, 1007.

BURNING FLUID. As used in policies of insur-ance, this term does not mean any Huid which will burn, but it means a recognized article af commerce, called by that name, and which is a different article from naphtha or kerosene. Put-nam v. Insurance Co., C.C.N.Y., 4 Fed. 764; Wheeler v. Insurance Co., 6 Mo.App. 235.

BURNING IN THE HAND. In old English crimi-nal law, laymen, upon being accorded the benefit of clergy, were burned with a hot iron in the brawn of the left thumb, in order that, being thus marked, they could not again claim their clergy. 4 B1.Comm. 367. This practice was finally abolished by Stat. 19 Geo. III. c. 74; though before that time the burning was often done with a cold iron.

BURNT COTTON. Cotton which has been on fire, and which has not been subsequently repicked and rebaled. Southern Ry. Co. v. Pettit, C.C.A. Tenn., 257 F. 663, 664.

BURROCHIUM. A burroch, dam, or small wear over a river, where traps are laid for the taking of fish. Cowell.

BURROVVMEALIS. In Scotch law. A term used to designate the rents paid into the king’s private treasury by the burgesses or inhabitants of a bor-ough.

BURSA. Lat. A purse.

BURSAR. A treasurer of a college.

BURSARIA. The exchequer of collegiate or con-ventual boches; or the place of receiving, paying, and accounting by the bursars. Also stipendiary scholars, who live upon the burse, I und, or joint-stock of the college.

BURYING ALIVE. In English law. The ancient punishment of sodomites, and those who contract-ed with Jews. Fleta, lib. 1, c. 27, § 3.

BURYING-GROUND. A placa set apart for the interment of the dead; a cemetery. Appeal Tax Court v. Academy, 50 Md. 353.

BUS. A vehicle which serves passenger public, but does not operate upon fixed tracks. Patillo v. State, 120 Tex.Cr.R. 568, 47 S.W.2d 847.

BUSCARL. In Saxon and old English law. Sea-men or marines. Spelman.

BUSHEL. A dry measure, containing four pecks, eight gallons, or thirty-two quarts. But the di-mensions of a bushel, and the weight of .a bushel of grain, etc., vary in the different states in con-sequence of statutory enactments. Richardson v. Spafford, 13 Vt. 245; Milk v. Christie, 1 Hill, N.Y., 106; Hockin v. Cooke, 4 Term, 316.

BUSHIDO. Jap. The unwritten code of conduct of the Samurai demanding loyalty to superiors only, simplicity of living and military valor. Treachery and brutality against one’s enemies, and self-sacrifice, blind loyalty and unquestioning obedience to one’s superiors are cardinal charac-teristics of the code. 1945 Report of the Tenney Joint Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Ac-tivities to the California Legislature, p. 49.

BUSINESS. The term "business" has no definite or legal meaning. Connor v. City of University Park, Tex.Civ.App., 142 S.W.2d 706, 715; it may be an uncertain one. In re Frey’s Will, 154 Misc. 421, 277 N.Y.S. 269, 272.
The term may mean or embrace:
Activity, Norman v. Southwestern R. Co., 42 Ga.App. 812, 157 S.E. 531, 533; In re Frey’s Will, 277 N.Y.S. 269, 272, 154 Misc. 421; activity of some continuity, regularity and permanency, means of material being and livelihood, Board of Sup’rs of Amherst County v. Boaz, 176 Va. 126, 10 S.E.2d 498, 499. Activity or enterprlse for gain, benefit, advan-tage or livelihood, Union League Club v. Johnson, Cal. App., 108 P.2d 487, 490. Activity which benefits corpora-tion’s organizers or members, O’Neil v. United Producers & Consumers Co-op., 57 Ariz. 295, 113 P.2d 645, 648; affairs, Sills v. Sorenson, 192 Wash. 318, 73 P.2d 798, 802, Indus-trial Fibre Co. v. State, 31 Ohio App. 347, 166 N.E. 418, 419; any particular occupation or employment, Industrial Fibre Co. v. State, 31 Ohio App. 347, 166 N.E. 418, 419; automo-bile liability policy excepting liability to insured’s chauf-feurs while engaged in his "business," anything in which insured desired to concern himself. Dickey v. General Accldent Fire & Life Assur. Corporation Limited of Perth, Scotland, 328 Pa. 541, 195 A. 875; barter, Wtlls v. National. Mineral Co., 176 Okl. 193, 55 P.2d 449, 453; busyness, Snell v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.Fla., 97 F.2d 891, 892; calling, Gardner v. Trastees of Main St. M. E. Church of Ottumwa, Iowa, 244 N.W. 667, 669, Morgan v. Salt Lake City, 78 Utah 403, 3 P.2d 510, 513; capacity by which results are reached, Norman v. Southwestern R. Co., 42 Ga.App. 812, 157 S.E. 531, 533; In re Frey’s Will, 277 N.Y.S. 269, 272, 154 Misc. 421; commercial or industrial establishment or enterprise, Westor Theatres v. Warner Bros. Pictures, D.C.N.J., 41 F.Supp. 757, 761; concern, Industrial Fibre Co. v. State, 31 Ohio App. 347, 166 N.E. 418, 419; constant or continuous or habitual employment or occupation, Burk v. United States, C.C.A.AIa., 134 F.2d 879, 881; efforts of men to improve their economic condi-tions and satisfy their desires, people ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Jersin, 101 Colo. 406, 74 P.2d 668, 670; employment, Indus-trial Fibre Co. v. State, 31 Ohio App. 347, 166 N.E. 418, 419; employment, occupation, or professlon engaged In for gain or livelihood, Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v. McNamee, 123 Neb. 71, 249 N.W. 92, 93; employment occupying substan-tial portion of time and attention, Walsh v. Industrial Com-mission, 345 III. 366, 178 N.E. 82, 83; energy by which results are reached, Norman v. Southwestern R. Co., 42 Ga.App. 812, 157 S.E. 531, 533; In re Frey’s Will, 277 N.Y.S. 269, 272, 154 Misc. 421; enterprise in which person
engaged shows willingness to invest time and capital on future outcome, Doggett v. Burnet, 62 App.D.C. 103, 65 F.2d 191, 194; every legitimate avocation in life by which honest support for family may be obtained, Postal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Powell, Tex.Civ.App., 47 S.W.2d 343, 352; every step in a long, complicated financial or commercial transaction, Business Management Corporation v. Depart-ment of Industrial Relations, Cal.App., 123 P.2d 142, 143; everything about which a person can be employed, Iliggins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 312 U.S. 212, 61 S.Ct. 475, 478, 85 L.Ed. 783; exchange of things of value, Wills v. National Mineral Co., 176 Okl. 193, 55 P.2d 449, 453; family car doctrine, any benefit which may inure to the owner, Donn v. Kunz, Ariz., 79 P.2d 965, 968; good will, In re Frey’s Will, 277 N.Y.S. 269, 272, 154 Misc. 421, In re Web-er’s Estate, 261 Pa. 561, 104 A. 735, 737; intereourse of a commercial character, Karnuth v. U. S., on Petition of Albro, for Cook, N. Y., 279 U.S. 231, 49 S.Ct. 274, 278, 73 L.Ed. 677; mercantile transactions in general, Industrial Fibre Co. v. State, 31 Ohio App. 347, 166 N.E. 418, 419; occupation, Industrial Fibre Co. v. State, 31 Ohio App, 347, 166 N.E. 418, 419, Morgan v. Salt Lake City, 78 Utah 403, 3 P.2d 510, 513; occupation connected with operation or details of barter, trade, industry or commerce, Bankers’ Holding Corporation v. Maybury, 161 Wash. 681, 297 P. 740, 743, 75 A.L.R. 1237; occupation or duty which requires attention as a business, Taylor v. Seney, 52 Ohio App. 79, 3 N.E.2d 374, 376; opportunities, Norman v. Southwestern R. Co., 42 Ga.App. 812, 157 S.E. 531, 533, In re Frey’s Will, 277 N.Y.S. 269, 272, 154 Misc. 421; ordinary vocation, Ost-lie v. H. F. Dirks & Son, 189 Minn. 34, 248 N.W. 283; pro-fessions, Connor v. City of University Park, Tex.Civ.App., 142 S.W.2d 706, 715; property, In re Frey’s Will, 277 N.Y.S. 269, 272, 154 Misc. 421; In re Weber’s Estate, 261 Pa. 561, 104 A. 735, 737; pursuit, Morgan v. Salt Lake City, 78 Utah 403, 3 P.2d 510, 513; regular profession, trade or occupation, Bordo v. Grayek, 136 Pa.Super. 124, 7 A.2d 142, 144; rlght or occasion of making one’s self busy, Indus-trial Fibre Co. v. State, 31 Ohio App. 347, 166 N.E. 418, 419; sale, Wills v. National Mineral Co., 176 Okl. 193, 55 P.2d 449, 453; that which habitually busies or occupies or engages the time, attention, labor, and effort of men as a principal serious concern or interest or for livelihood or proflt, Curley v. New England Trust Co., 221 Mass. 384, 109 N.B. 171, 174, Massolini v. Driscoll, 114 Conn. 546, 159 A. 480, 482; trade, Connor v. City of University Park, Tex.Civ. App., 142 S.W.2d 706, 715, Morgan v. Salt Lake City, 78 Utah 403, 3 P.2d 510, 513; transaction, Industrial Fibre Co. v. State, 31 Opio App. 347, 166 N.E. 418, 419; occasional, single or isolated activities do not constitute business, Van-dervort v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 203 Wis. 362, 234 N.W. 492, 493; Goddard v. Chaffee, 2 Allen, Mass., 395, 79 Am.Dec. 796. But see Industrial Commission v. Hammond, 77 Colo. 414, 236 P. 1006, 1008.
Definition of ”business" is not dependent on whether enterprise is profitable or has prospects of being profitable. Doggett v. Burnet, 62 App.D.C. 103, 65 F.2d 191, 193.
Labor, business, and work are not synonyms.

Business A ffected with Public Intere,st

One so employed as to justlfy conclusion that it has been devoted to public use, and lts use thereby in effect granted to public. Williams v. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana, Tenn., 278 U.S. 235, 49 S.Ct. 115, 116, 73 L.Ed. 287, 60 A.L.R. 596.

Business Agent

Agent having some general supervision over general affairs. Rorick v. Stilwell, 101 Fla. 4, 133 So. 609, 615.

Business Compulsion

Species of duress. Marrazzo v. Orino, Wash., 194 Wash. 364, 78 P.2d 181, 186.

Business Corporation

A corporation organized for the purpose of car-rying on a business for profit. City of St. Louis v. Smith, 325 Mo. 471, 30 S.W.2d 729, 731.

Business Course

A course such as is usually taught by business or commercial schools and colleges. Union Nat. Bank v. Kirby, 189 Ark. 369, 72 S.W.2d 229, 230.

Business Done in State

Business begun and completed or ended in state. Clark v. Atlantic Pipe Line Co., Tex.Civ.App., 134 S.W.2d 322, 328.

Business Enterprise

Investment of capital, labor and management in an undertaking for profit; one of the recog-nized attributes is centralized management and control. Helvering v. Jewel Mining Co., C.C.A.8, 126 F.2d 1011, 1015.

Business Gains

Gains from sale, exchange, or other disposition of property used in business. Fackler v. Commis-sioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.6, 133 F.2d 509, 512.

Business Hours

In general those hours during which persons in the community generally keep their places open for the transaction of business. Casalduc v. Diaz, C.C.A.Puerto Rico, 117 F.2d 915, 916.
In respect to the time of presentment and demand of bilis and notes, business hours generally range through the whole day down to the hours of rest in the evening, except when the paper is payable at a bank or by a banker; Cayuga County Bank v. Hunt, 2 Hill, N,Y., 635. See Lunt v. Adams, 17 Me. 230.
An order allowing a stockholder to examine the books of a corporation ”during business hours" does not mean that such examination be carried on throughout the entíre business day, nor in the nlghttime. Breslauer v. S. Frank-lin & Co., 205 Ill.App. 372, 374.

Business League

An association is a business league if persons thereof have some common business interest. Un-derwriters’ Laboratories v. Commissioner of In-ternal Revenue, C.C.A.7, 135 F.2d 371, 374.

Business Losses

Losses from sale, exchange, or other disposi-tion of property used in trade or business. Fack-ler v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.6, 133 F.2d 509, 512.

Business Name

Trade-name, business name and commercial name as synonymous. Plum v. Siekmann, 135 Neb. 101, 280 N.W. 264, 268.

Business of Peddling

Business of one relying on present solicitation of chance patrons for purchases of uncertain quantities and making concurring deliveries. Na-tional Baking Co. v. Zabel, 227 Wis. 93, 277 N.W. 691, 693.

Business of Public Character

Business wherein person engaged expressly or impliedly holds himself out as engaged in business of supplying his product or service to public as a class or to limited portion of public. Masgai v. Public Service Commission of Pennsylvania, 124 Pa.Super. 370, 188 A. 599, 600.

Business of Same Nature

Business of like character. Rahoutis v. Unem-ployment Compensation Commission, 171 Or. 93, 136 P.2d 426, 434.

Business of Similar Nature

Business of analogous nature. Bedford v. John-son, 102 Colo. 203, 78 P.2d 373, 376.

Business of the Community

A business in which a husband is engaged is prima facie the business of the community. Bird v. Steele, 74 Wash. 68, 132 P. 724, 725.
Business Pertaining to Ilis Occupation
Duty pertaining to his occupation as synonym. Doherty v. American Employers’ Ins. Co. of Bos-ton, Mass., 112 N.J.Law, 52, 169 A. 652, 653.

Business Situs

A situs acquired for tax purposes by one who has carried on a business in the state more or less permanent in its nature. Endicott, Johnson & Co. v. Multnomah County, 96 Or. 679, 190 P. 1109, 1111. A situs arising when notes, mortgages, tax sale certificates and the like are brought into the state for something more than a temporary purpose, and are devoted to some business use there and thus become incorporated with the property of the state for revenue purposes. Lockwood v. Blodgett, 106 Conn. 525, 138 A. 520, 525. A situs arising where possession and control of property right has been localized in some independent bus-iness or investment away from owner’s domicile so that its substantial use and value primarily attach to and become an asset of the outside busi-ness. State v. Atlantic Oil Producing Co., 174 Okl. 61, 49 P.2d 534, 538.

Business Trust

As distinguished from a joint-stock company, a pure "business trust" is one in which the man-agers are principals, and the shareholders are cestuis que trust. Betts v. Hackathorn, 159 Ark. 621, 252 S.W. 602, 604, 31 A.L.R. 847. The essen-tial attribute is that property is placed in the hands of trustees who manage and deal with it for use and benefit of beneficiaries. Morriss v. Finkelstein, Mo.App., 127 S.W.2d 46, 49. A "Mas-sachusetts trust" or "common law trust," In re Conover’s Estate, 295 Ill.App. 443, 14 N.E.2d 980, 985.

Business Visitor

One who is invited or permitted to enter or re-main upon the premises of another for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with the business dealings between them, Kurre v. Graham Ship by Truck Co., 136 Kan. 356, 15 P.2d 463, 465. One who comes on land at occupant’s instante for purposes connected with purpose, business, or oth-erwise, for which occupant uses land, Haefeli v. Woodrich Engineering Co., 255 N.Y. 442, 175 N.E. 123, 125.

Farming Business

See Farming Business.

Private Business or Enterprise

One in which capital, time, attention, labor, and intelligence have been invested for gain and profit for private benefit, purposes and use. Green v. Frazier, 44 N.D. 395, 176 N.W. 11, 17.

Public Business

An element is that the business by its nature must be such that the public must use the same, or the commodities bought and sold in such man-ner as to affect the community at large as to sup-ply, price, etc. Cónsumers’ Light & Power Co. v. Phipps, 120 Okl. 223, 251 P. 63, 64.

BUSONES COMITATUS. In old English law. The barons of a county.

BUSSA. A term used in the old English law, to designate a large and clumsily constructed ship.

BUT. Except, except that, on the contrary, or, and also, yet, still. State v. Marsh, 108 Neb. 267, 187 N.W. 810, 812; Rickman v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 715, 243 S.W. 929.

BUTANE. Highly explosive and inilammable sub-stance. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Callaway, D.C. Okl., 45 F.Supp. 586, 588.

BUTCHER. One who slaughters animals or dresses their flesh for market; a dealer in meat. Broadway v. Cope, 208 N.C. 85, 179 S.E. 452; Provo City v. Provo Meat & Packing Co., 49 Utah 528, 165 P. 477, 479, Ann.Cas.1918D, 530.

BUTLERAGE. A privilege formerly allowed to the king’s butler, to take a certain part of every cask of wine imported by an alien; the part of the cask thus taken.
Called also prisage; 2 Bulstr. 254. Anciently, it might be taken also of wine imported by a sub-ject. 1 Bla.Com. 315; Termes de la Ley; Cowell.
See, also, Botiler of the King.

BUTLER’S ORDINANCE. In English law. A law for the heir to punish waste in the life of the an-cestor.
"Though it be on record in the parliament book of Edward I., yet lt never was a statute, nor ever so received; but only some constitution of the king’s council, or lords in parliament, which never obtained the strength or force of an act of parliament." Hale, Hist. Eng. Law, p. 18.

BUTT. A measure of liquid capacity, equal to one hundred and eight gallons; also a measure of land.

BUTTALS. The bounding Enes of land at the end; abuttals, which see.

BUTTE. A hill. State v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304, 163 So. 145.

BUTTED AND BOUNDED. A phrase sometimes used in conveyancing, to introduce the boundáries of lands. See Butts and Bounds.

BUTTER. A dairy product manufactured exclu-sively from pure, unadulterated milk or cream, or both, with or without salt or coloring matter. Pardy v. Boomhower Grocery Co., 178 App.Div. 347, 164 N.Y.S. 775, 776; a product which should contain not less than 80 per centum by weight of milk fat. U. S. v. Centralia Dairy Co., D.C.Wash., 60 F.2d 141, 142.

BUTTER FAT. The natural fat of milk. Wise-man v. Affolter, 192 Ark. 509, 92 S.W.2d 388, 389.

BUTTS. In old English law. Short pieces of land left unplowed at the ends of fields, where the plow was turned a bout (otherwise called "headlands") as sidelings were similarly unplowed pieces on the cides. Burrill; Cowell. Also a place where bowmen meet to shoot at a mark.

BUTTS AND BOUNDS. A phrase used in con-veyancing, to describe the end Fines or circum-scribing Fines of a certain piece of land. The phrase "metes and bounds" has the same meaning.
The angles or points where these Enes change their direction. Cowell; Spelman, Gloss. See Abuttals.

BUTTY. A local term in the north of England, for the associate or deputy of another; also of things used in common.

BUY. To acquire the ownership of property by giving an accepted price or consideration therefor; or by agreeing to do so; to acquire by the pay-ment of a price or value; to purchase. Webster. To obtain something for a price, usually money. In re Troy, 43 R.I. 279, 111 A. 723, 724. As applied to prohibition law, means to possess. Slaughter v. State, 23 Ala.App. 390, 128 So. 129.

BUY IN. To purchase, at public sale, property which is one’s own or which one has caused or procured to be sold.

BUYER. One who buys; a purchaser, particularly of chattels.

BUYER 60 CONTRACT. A contract wherein pur-chaser not wishing to pay for stock purchased outright buys it at a price in excess of the market and is allowed 60 days’ time to pay for stock. Herrlein v. Tocchini, 128 Cal.App. 612, 18 P.2d 73, 75.

BUYING LONG. Purchase of stocks now with the expectation of selling thcm for a profit in the future. Henderson v. Usher, 125 Fla. 709, 170 So. 846, 851.

BUYING TITLES. The purchase of the rights or claims to real estate of a person who is not in possession of the land or is disseised. Void, and an offense, at common law and by 32 Hen. VIII, c. 9. This rule has been generally adopted in the United States, and is affirmed by statute in some states; 3 Washb.R.P. *596. Hinman v. Hinman, 4 Conn. 575; Helms v. May, 29 Ga. 124; Wash v. Mc-Brayer, 1 Dana, Ky., 566; Bush v. Cooper, 26 Miss. 599, 59 Am.Dec. 270. But in other states, such a purchase is valid. Fetrow v. Merriwether, 53 III. 279; Hall’s Lessee v. Ashby, 9 Ohio, 96, 34 Am. Dec. 424.
See, also, Bracery.

BY. Before a certain time, Rankin v. Woodworth, 3 Pen. & W., Pa., 48. Beside. Close to. In. In close proximity. In consequence of. Not later than a certain time, Fanta v. Maddex, 80 Cal.App. 513, 252 P. 630, 633; Scheuer & Tiego v. Benedict, 173 Wis. 241, 181 N.W. 129, 12 A.L.R. 1166. On or before a certain time, J. C. Engelman Land Co. v. La Blanco Agr. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 220 S.W. 653, 655. Through the means, act, agency or instru-mentality of, Carroll v. Industrial Commission of Colorado, 69 Colo. 473, 195 P. 1097, 19 A.L.R. 107; Stevenson v. Lee Moor Contracting Co., 45 N.M. 354, 115 P.2d 342, 349. T. Under. With. The word may be used as exclusive, use preceding signature as indicating signature officially, and not personally. Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances on Lives and Granting Annuities v. Wallace, 346 Pa. 532, 31 A.2d 71, 77.

BY AN ACQUITTANCE FOR THE LAST PAY-MENT ALL OTHER ARREARAGES ARE DIS-CHARGED. Noy, 40.

BY-BIDDER. One employed by the seller or his agent to bid on property with no purpose to be-come a purchaser, so that bidding thereon may be stimulated ‘in others who are bidding in good faith. Osborn v. Apperson Lodge, Free and Accepted Masons, No. 195, of Louisa, Ky., 213 Ky. 533, 281 S.W. 500, 502, 46 A.L.R. 117.

BY-BIDDING. See Bid.

BY BILL, BY BILL WITHOUT WRIT. In prac-tice. Terms anciently used to designate actions commenced by original bill, as distinguished from those commenced by original writ, and applied in modern practice to suits commenced by tapias ad respondendum. 1 Arch.Pr. pp. 2, 337; 3 Bla. Comm. 285, 286. See Harkness v. Harkness, 5 Hill, N.Y., 213. The usual course of commencing an action in the King’s Bench was by a bill of Middlesex. In an action commenced by bill it is not necessary to notice the form or nature of the action. 1 Chit.P1. 283.

BY COLOR OF OFFICE. Acts done "by color of office" are where they are of such a nature that office gives no authority to do them. State v. National Surety Co., 162 Tenn. 547, 39 S.W.2d 581, 583.

BY ESTIMATION. In conveyancing. A term used to indicate that the quantity of land as stated is estimated only, not exactly measured; it has the the same meaning and effect as the phrase "more or less." Hays v. Hays, 126 Ind. 92, 25 N.E. 600, 11 L.R.A. 376. It is said that the meaning of these words has never been precisely ascertained by judicial decision. See Sugden, Vend. 231; Noble v. Googins, 99 Mass. 234.

BY GOD AND MY COUNTRY. In oíd English criminal practice. The established formula of reply by a prisoner, when arraigned at the bar, to the question, "Culprit, how wilt thou be tried?"

BY LAW. By statutory law, Board of EducItion of Union Free School Dist. No. Six of Town of Greenburgh v. Town of Greenburgh, 277 N.Y. 193, 13 N.E.2d 768, 770. By state-wide legislation, and not ordinance, U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Guenther, C.C.A.Ohio, 31 F.2d 919, 920.

BY—LAW MEN. In English law. The chief men of a town, representing the inhabitants. In an ancient deed, certain parties are described as "yeomen and by-law men." 6 Q.B. 60. They ap-pear to have been men appointed for some pur-pose of limited authority by the other inhabitants, under by-laws of the corporation appointing.

BY—LAWS. Regulations, ordinances, rules or laws adopted by an association or corporation or the like for its government. The word has also been used to designate the local laws or municipal statutes of a city or town. See Kilgour v. Gratto, 224 Mass. 78, 112 N.E. 489, 490. But of late the tendency is to employ the word "ordinance" ex-clusively for this class of enactments, reserving "by-law" for the rules adopted by private corpora-tions.
In England the term by-law includes any order, rule or regulation made by any local authority or statutory corporation subordinate to Parliament; 1 Odgers, C.L. 91.
A resolution is not necessarily a by-law though a by-law may be in the form of a resolution. Peck v. Elliott, C.C.A. Tenn., 24 C.C.A. 425, 79 Fed. 10, 38 L.R.A. 616; Bagley v. Oil Co., 201 Pa. 78, 50 A. 760, 56 L.R.A. 184. Distlnction between a -by-law and a regulation, if any, discussed, Compton v. Van Volkenburgh, 34 N.J.Law, 135.

BY OPERATION OF LAW. Effected by some positive legal rule or amendment. Terminals & Transportation Corporation v. State, 169 Misc. 703, 8 N.Y.S.2d 282, 284.

BY—PASSING. As used in a contract for the con-struction of a subway, requiring the by-passing of all gas pipes whose service cannot be temporarily dispensed with, "by-passing" means the temporary cutting out of the gas mains under the street and laying of substituted temporary overhead gas pipes until all danger in using the original pipes is passed. Degnon Contracting Co. v. City of New York, 202 App.Div. 390, 196 N.Y.S. 63, 64.

BY REASON OF. Because of. Freeman v. Ben-nett, Tex.Civ.App., 195 S.W. 238, 241. By means, acts, or instrumentality of. State v. Kaufman, 50 S.D. 645, 211 N.W. 691, 692.

BY THE BY (also Bye). Incidentally; without new process. A term used in former English practice to denote the method of filing a declara-tion against a defendant who was already in the custody of the court at the suit of a different plain-tiff or of the same plaintiff in another cause. It is no longer allowed; Archbold, New Pr. 293.

BY VIRTUE OF. By force of, by authority of, by reason of. Phillips v. Houston Nat. Bank, Hous-ton, Tex., C.C.A.Tex., 108 F.2d 934, 936. Because of, through, or in pursuance of. State ex rel. and to Use of Jasper County v. Gass, 317 Mo. 744, 296 S.W. 431, 432. Money received by an officer by virtue of his office is money which that officer received under the law of his office, and not in violation thereof. Hollingsworth v. State, 73 Fla. 44, 75 So. 612, 614.

BYE—BIL—WUFFA. In Hindu law. A deed of mortgage or conditional sale.

BYRLAWS. See Burlaws.

BYROAD. The statute law of New Jersey recog-nizes three different kinds of roads: A public road, a private road, and a byroad. A byroad is a road used by the inhabitants, and recognized by statute, but not laid out. Such roads are often called "driftways." They are roads of necessity in newly-settled countries. Van Blarcom v. Frike, 29 N.J.Law, 516. See, also, Stevens v. Alíen, N.Y.Law, 68. An obscure or neighborhood road in its earlier existente, not used to any ‘great ex-tent by the public, yet so far a public road that the public have of right free access to it at all times. Wood v. Hurd, 34 N.J.Law, 89.

BYSTANDER. One who stands near; a chance looker-on; hence one who has no concern with the business being transacted. Baker v. State, 79 Tex. Cr.R. 510, 187 S.W. 949, 952; One present but not taking part, looker-on, spectator, beholder, ob-server. Music v. De Long, 209 Iowa, 1068, 229 N. W. 673, 676.
Under statutes relating to summoning of bystanders to complete jury panel, "bystanders" may be held to mean qualified talesmen summoned by sheriff from county at large. Commonwealth v. Sacco, 255 Mass. 369, 151 N.E. 839, 847. The term means qualified electors, not neces-sarily persons present in court. Bennett v. State, 161 Ark. 496, 257 S.W. 372, 373.
Under statutes authorizing "bystanders" to certif y bill of exceptions, parties to the suit and their attorneys, Walker v. State, 88 Tex.Cr.R. 389, 227 S.W. 308, 312; and also witnesses in the case, McConnell v. McCord, 170 Ark. 839, 281 S.W. 384, as well as persons not present at the trial, are not bystanders, Buck v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 267 Mo. 644, 185 S.W. 208, 211. Though jurors are not "bystanders" in the ordinary meaning of that term, they can sign a bystanders’ bill of exceptions to acts and comments by the court and the argument of attorneys thereon. Alamo Iron Works v. Prado, Tex.Civ.App., 220 S.W. 282, 291.

BLACK ‘S LAW DICTIONARY – Section C

c

C. The third letter of the alphabet.

The letter is used as an abbreviation of many words of which it is the initial letter, such as cases, civil, circuit; as a numeral, in like manner with that use of A and B; and to designate the third of a series of propositions, sections, etc.
It was used among the Romans to denote condemnation, being the initial letter of condemno, 1 condemn. Tayl. Civil Law, 192.
The initial letter of the word "Codex," used by some writers in citing the Code of Justinian. Tayl. Civil Law, 24.
C.—CT.—CTS. These abbreviations stand for "tent" or "cents," and any one of them, placed at the top or head of a column of figures, sufficiently indicates the denomination of the figures below. Jackson v. Cummings, 15 Ill. 453; Linek v. Litch-field, 141 Ill. 469, 31 N.E. 123.
C. A. B. Civil Aeronautics Board.
C. A. F. Under "c. a. f." provision in sale con-tract, freight figures substantially only as a part of the purchase price, not as a reservation of title, and the situation is similar to a "c. i. f." contract. Madeirense Do Brasil S/A v. Stulman-Emrick Lum-ber Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 147 F.2d 399, 402; cost and freight allowed to point of destination, being the equivalent of shipment F. O. B. from point of origin. Farris & Co. v. William Schluderberg, T. J. Kurdle Co., 142 Fla. 765, 196 So. 184.
C. A. V. An abbreviation for curia advisari vult, the court will be advised, will consider, will delib-erate.
C. B. In reports and legal documents, an abbrevia-tion for common bench. Also an abbreviation for chief baron.
C. C. Various terms or phrases may be denoted by this abbreviation; such as circuit court, (or city or county court; ) criminal cases, (or crown or civil or chancery cases; ) civil code; chief com-missioner; and cepi corpus, I have taken his body.
C. C.; B. B. I have taken his body; bail bond entered. See Capias ad Respondendum.
C. C. P. An abbreviation for Code of Civil Proce-dure; also for court of common pleas.
C. C. & C. I have taken his body and he is held.
C. F. & I. Also written "c. f. i." Letters used in contracts for cost, freight and insurance, indicat-ing that the price fixed covers not only cost but freight and insurance to be paid by the seller; Benj. Sales, § 887; L.R. 8 Ex. 179; 7 H. & N. 574; Mee v. McNider, 109 N.Y. 500, 502, 17 N.E. 424.
C. I. A. Central Intelligente Agency.
C. I. F. Also written "c. i. f." These letters in contracts of sale indicate, as does the expression

"c. f. i." or "C. F. & I." (q. v.), that the price fixed covers the cost of goods, insurance, and freight. National Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Mann, 251 Mass. 238, 146 N.E. 791, 793; A. Klipstein & Co. v. Dilsizian, C.C.A.N.Y., 273 F. 473, 475; Colum-bus Bagging & Tie Co. v. Steel Union Co., 43 Ga. App. 126, 158 S.E. 459, 460.
C. J. An abbreviation for chief justice; also for circuit judge.
C. L. An abbreviation for civil law.
C. L. P. Common law procedure, in reference to the English acts so entitled.
C. 0. D. "Collect on delivery." These letters import the carrier’s liability to return to the con-signor either the goods or the charges. U. S. Exp. Co. v. Keefer, 59 Ind. 267; Express Co. v. Wolf, 79 Ill. 434; Danciger v. American Express Co., 192 Mo.App. 172, 179 S.W. 797, 798. The carrier ac-cepts a check instead of cash at its own peril. Joseph Mogul, Inc., v. C. Lewis Lavine, Inc., 220 App.Div. 287, 221 N.Y.S. 391, 393.
C. P. An abbreviation for common pleas. C. P. A. Certified Public Accountant.
C. R. An abbreviation for curia regis; also for chancery reports.
C. S. C. Civil Service Commission.
C. T. A. An abbreviation for cum testamento annexo, in describing a species of administration.
C. & F. The term "c. & f." means that the sale price includes in a lump sum "cost" and "freight" to named destination, and either requires seller to prepay freight or permits buyer, after having paid actual charges, to deduct them from the price. Madeirense Do Brasil S/A v. Stulman-Emrick Lumber Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 147 F.2d 399, 402.
A. SA. An abbreviation of tapias ad satisfacien-m, q. v.
CABAL. A small association for the purpose of intrigue; an intrigue. This name was given to that ministry in the reign of Charles II. formed by Clifford, Ashley, Buckingham, Arlington, and Lauderdale, who concerted a scheme for the resto-ration of popery. The initials of these five names form the word "cabal;" hence the appellation. Hume, Hist.Eng. ix. 69.
CABALIST. In French commercial law. A factor or broker.
CABALLARIA. Pertaining to a horse. It was a feudal tenure of lands, the tenant furnishing a horseman suitably equipped in time of war, or when the lord had occasion for his service.

CABALLERIA. In Spanish law. An allotment of land acquired by conquest, to a horse° soldier. A quantity of land, varying in extent in different provinces. In those parts of the United States which formerly belonged to Spain, it is a lot of one hundred feet front, two hundred feet depth, and equivalent to five peonias. 2 White, New Recop. 49; Strother v. Lucas, 12 Pet. 444, 9 L.Ed. 1137, note; Escriche, Dice. Raz.
CABALLERO. In Spanish law. A knight. So called on account of its being more honorable to go on horseback (4 caballo) than on any other beast.
CABANA. Cabin or small house. Godson v. Town of Surfside, 150 Fla. 614, 8 So.2d 497, 500.
CABARET. A room where musical entertainment is permitted in connection with restaurant busi-ness. People v. Liquorman, 171 Misc. 535, 13 N. Y.S.2d 410, 411.
CABINET. The advisory board or council of a king or other chief executive. The select or secret colmen of a prince or executive government; so called from the apartment in which it was orig-Inally held. Webster
CABINET COUNCIL. In English law. A prívate and confidential assembly of the most considerable ministers of state, to concert measures for the ad-ministration of public affairs; first established by Charles I. Wharton.
CABLE. A large and strong rope or chain. An assembly of wires held together in some way. Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. National Electric Products Corporation, D.C.Del., 56 F.Supp. 979, 981.
The term "cable railroad" in a city charter has been held to Imply street rallroads. City of Denver v. Mercan-tile Tzust Co. of New York, C.C.A.Colo., 201 F. 790, 802,
CABLE TRANSFER. A credit for a sum of mon-ey payable at the place indicated. Oshinsky v. Taylor, Sup., 172 N.Y.S. 231, 232.
CABLISH. Brush-wood, or more properly wind-fall-wood.
CABOOSE CAR. A car attached to the rear of a freight train, fitted up for the accommodation of the conductor, brakeman, and chance passengers. Mammoth Cave R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 176 Ky. 747, 197 S.W. 406, 407.
CABOTAGE. A nautical term from the Spanish, denoting strictly navigation from cape to cape along the coast without going out into the open sea. In International Law, cabotage is identified with coasting-trade so that it means navigating and trading along the coast between the ports thereof.
CACHEPOLUS, or CACHERELLAS. An inferior bailiff, or catchpoll. Jacob.
CACHET, LETTRES DE. Letters issued and signed by the kings of France, and countersigned

by a secretary of state, authorizing the imprison-ment of a person. Abolished during the revolu-tion of 1789. See Lettres de Cachet.
CACICAZGOS. In Spanish-American law. Prop-erty entailed on the caciques, or heads of Indian villages, and their descendants. Schm.Civil Law, 309.
CADASTRE. Sp. An official statement of the quantity and value of real property in any dis-trict, made for the purpose of justly apportioning the taxes payable on such property. Strother, v. Lucas, 12 Pet. 410, 428, note, 9 L.Ed. 1137.
CADASTU. In French law. An official statement of the quantity and value of realty made for pur-poses of taxation; same as cadastre, (q. v.).
ÚADAVER. A dead human body; a corpse. Cadaver nullius in bonis, no one can have a right of property in a corpse. 3 Co.Inst. 110, 2 Bl. Comm. 429; Griffith v. Railroad Co., 23 S.C. 32, 55 Am.Rep. 1.
CADAVEROUS. Pale, wan or ghastly appear-ance. Commonwealth v. Caldutte, 136 Pa.Super. 52, 7 A.2d 121, 123.
CADERE. Lat. To end; cease; fail; as In phrases such as cadit actio, (or breve,) the action (or writ) fails; cadit assisa, the assise abates; cadit qucestio, the discussion ends, there is no room for further argument; cadere ab actione (literal-ly, to fall from an action), to fail in an action; cadere in partem, to become subject to a division.
To be changed; to become; to be turned into. Cadit assisa in juratum, the assise is changed into a jury. Calvinus, Lex.
CADET. Students in the milítary academy at West Point are styled "cadets;" students in the naval academy at Annapolis, "cadet midshipmen."
In England. A younger brother; the younger son of a gentleman; particularly applied to a vol-unteer in the army, waiting for some post. Jacob.
CADI. A Turkish civil magistrate.
CADIT. Lat. It falls, abates, fails, ends, ceases. See Cadere.
CADUCA. In the civil law. Property of an in-heritable quality; property such as descends to an heir. Also thé lapse of a testamentary disposi-tion or legacy. Also an escheat; escheated prop-erty.
CADUCARY. Relating to or of the nature of escheat, forfeiture, or confiscation. 2 Bl.Comm. 245.
CFEDUA. In the civil and old common law. Kept for cutting; intended or used to be cut. A term applied to wood.
CESAR. In the Roman law. A cognomen in the Gens Julia, which was assumed by the successors of Julius. Tayl. Civil Law, 31.
WESAREAN (also spelled Caesarian) OPERA-TION. A surgical operation whereby the fcetus is taken from the mother, with a view to save the lives of both, or either of them. Wharton.
CIETERUS. Lat. Other; another; the rest. CIETERIS PARIBUS. Other things being equal.
CzETERIS TACENTIBUS. The others being si. lent; the other judges expressing no opinion. Comb. 186.
CZETERORUM. When a limited administration has been granted, and all the property cannot be administered under it, administration cwternrum, (as to the residue) may be granted.
CAFE. A place where meals and drinks are served to the public generally or to selected por-tions of the public. In re Bowers, D.C.Cal., 33 F. Supp. 965, 966.
The word as ordinarlly and popularly usad means a res-
taurant or house for refreshments. Proprietors’ Realty Co. v. Wohltmann, 95 N.J.Law, 303, 112 A. 410. The terms "restaurant" and "café" are substantially synonymous. State v. Shoaf, 179 N.C. 744, 102 S.E. 705, 9 A.L.R. 426.
CARTER. In old French law. A list of grievances prepared for deputies in the states-general. A peti-tion for the redress of grievances enumerated.
CAHOOTS. Partnership, teaming up, or combin-ing efforts. City of Abilene v. Luhn, Tex.Civ.App., 65 S.W.2d 370, 371.
CAIN, or CANE. In Scotch law. Rent paid in kind, as in poultry, eggs, etc.; hence, any tax, tribute, or duty. Cent. Dict.
CAIRNS’ ACT. An English statute for enabling the court of chancery to award damages. 21 & 22 Vict. c. 27. Repealed as having been superseded by the Judicature Act of 1873.
CAISSON DISEASE. A dizziness accompanied with partial paralysis of the limbs, caused by too rapid reduction of air pressure to which men have been accustomed. Williams v. Missouri Bridge & Iron Co., 212 Mich. 150, 180 N.W. 357, 358. A con-dition caused by excessive air pressure wherein gas emboli or bubbles in the tissues of the body may induce severe pain and paralysis, Cannella v. Gulf Refining Co. of Louisiana, La.App., 154 So. 406, 413.
CALABOOSE. A terco used vulgarly, and occa-sionally in judicial proceedings and law reports, to designate a jail or prison, particularly a town or city jail or lock-up. Supposed to be a corruption of the Spanish calabozo, a dungeon. See Gilham v. Wells, 64 Ga. 194.
CALAMITY. A state of deep distress or misfor-tune, produced by some adverse circumstance or event; misery; any great misfortune or cause of loss or misery; usually an event or disaster that produces extensive evil. City of Muskegon Heights v. Danigelis, 253 Mich. 260, 235 N.W. 83, 84, 73 A.L.R. 696.
CALAMUS. Lat. A reed; cane; hence, a reed pen; reed-pipe; arrow; small rod, etc. Harper,
Lat. Dict. Also, an ancient Greek measure of length of 10 feet. Cent. Dict.
CALCETUM, CALCEA. A causeway, or common, hard-way, maintained and repaired with stones and rubbish.
CALCULATE. To compute mathematically; in its broader significance, to intend, to purpose, or to design. State v. Smith, 57 Mont. 349, 188 P. 644, 648.
CALCULATED. An act may produce a certain, effect, whether intended or not; fitted, adapted, or suited. Polly v. People, 107 Colo. 6, 108 P.2d 220, 223. Likely or intended. State v. Wyman, 56 Mont. 600, 186 P. 1, 5; Pouchan v. Godeau, 167 Cal. 692, 140 P. 952, 953.
CALE. In old French law. A punishment of sailors, resembling the modern "keelhauling."
CALEFAGIUM. In old law. A right to take fuel yearly. Cowell; Blount.
CALENDAR. The established order of the divi-sion of time into years, months, weeks, and days; or a systematized enumeration of such arrange-ment; an alman,ac. Rives v. Guthrie, 46 N.C. 86; Sculley v. Red Lodge-Rosebud Irr. Dist., 83 Mont. 282, 272 P. 543, 552.

Calendar Days

A calendar day contains 24 hours but "calendar days" may be synonymous with "working days." Sherwood v. American Sugar Refining Co., C.C. A.N.Y., 8 F.2d 586, 588. The time from midnight to midnight, Lanni v. Grimes, 173 Misc. 614, 18 N. Y.S.2d 322, 327. So many days reckoned accord-ing to the course of the calendar.

Calendar Month

One of the months of the year as enumerated in the calendar. Daley v. Anderson, 7 Wyo. 1, 48 P. 840, 75 Am.St.Rep. 870.

Calendar Week

A block of seven days registered on calendar beginning with Sunday and ending with Saturday. Sonoma County v. Sanborn, 1 Cal.App.2d 26, 36 P.2d 419, 422. Term may consist of any seven days of given month. Sonoma County v. Sanborn, 1 Cal.App.2d 26, 36 P.2d 419, 422.

Calendar Year

The period from January 1 to December 31, in-clusive. Byrne v. Bearden, 27 Ga.App. 149, 107 S. E. 782, 783; Application of Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 183 Misc. 490, 48 N.Y.S. 374, 375. Ordi-narily calendar year means 365 days except leap year, and is composed of 12 months varying in length. Shaffner v. Lipinsky, 194 N.C. 1, 138 S.E. 418, 419; United States, for Use of Strona v. Bussey, D.C.Cal., 51 F.Supp. 996, 999.
"Calendar year precedlng election" means year beginning January 1 and ending

Calendar of Causes

A list of the causes instituted in the particular court, and now ready for trial, drawn up before beginning of the term. It is sometimes called the "trial list," or "docket."

Calendar of Prisoners

In English practice. A list kept by the sheriffs containing the names of all the prisoners in their custody, with the several judgments against each in the margin. Staundef.P.C. 182; 4 Bl.Comm. 403.

Special Calendar

A calendar or list of causes, containing those set down specially for hearing, trial, or argument.
CALENDS. Among the Romans the first day of every month, being spoken of by itself, or the very day of the new moon, which usually happen together. And if pridie, the day before, he added to it, then it is the last day of the foregoing month, as pridie calend. Septemb. is the last day of August. If any number be placed with it, it signifies that day in the former month which comes so much before the month named, as the tenth calends of October is the 20th day of September; for if one reckons backwards, be-ginning at October, that 20th ddy of September makes the 10th day before October. In March, May, July, and October, the calends begin at the sixteenth day, but in other months at the four-teenth; which calends must ever bear the name of the month following, and be numbered back-wards from the first day of the said following months. Jacob. See Rives v. Guthrie, 46 N.C. 87.
CALENDS, GREEK. A metaphorical expression for a time never likely to arrive, inasmuch as the Greeks had no calends.
CALF. As used in an exemption statute, should be construed to include an animal sucking a cow that is being milked, even though the animal be a yearling. Kiggins v. Henne & Meyer Co., Tex. Civ.App., 199 S.W. 494, 496.
CALICHE ROCK. A substance containing cal-cium carbonate like that found in ordinary lime-stone. Board of Com’rs of Roosevelt County v. Good, 44 N.M. 495, 105 P.2d 470, 472.

Contract Language

As used in contract, means demand for pay-ment of, especially by formal notice. Keyes v. Kimmel, 9 N.J.Misc.R. 604, 155 A. 19, 20.

Conveyancing

A visible natural object or landmark designated in a patent, entry, grant, or other conveyance of lands, as a limit or boundary to the land described, with which the points of surveying must corres-pond. Also the courses and distances designated. King v. Watkins, C.C.Va., 98 Fed. 922. See, also, Kentucky Union Co. v. Shepherd, 192 Ky. 447, 234 S.W. 10, 13.\

Corporation Law

A demand by directors upon subscribers for shares for payment of a portion or installment; in this sense, it is capable of three meanings: (1) The resolution of the directora to levy the assess-ment; (2) its notification to the persons fiable to pay; (3) the time when it becomes payable. Rail-way Co. v. Mitchell, 4 Exch. 543; Hatch v. Dana, III., 101 U.S. 205, 25 L.Ed. 885; Stewart v. Pub. Co., 1 Wash.St. 521, 20 P. 605.
Although the terms "call" and "assessment" are often used synonymously, the latter term applies with peculiar aptness to contributions aboye the par value of stock or the subscription liability of the stockholders. Porter v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 36 N.D. 199, 161 N.W. 1012, 1014. See Assessment

Dealings in Futures

Deposit of more margin. Fenner v. Tucker, 213 N.C. 419, 196 S.E. 357, 359.

Dealings in Securities or Grain

Option or right to demand a certain amount of securities or grain at a fixed price at or within certain time agreed on. Colston v. Burnet, 61 App. D.C. 192, 59 F.2d 867, 868; Dillon, Read & Co. v. Hoey, D.C.N.Y., 45 F.Supp. 475, 477.

English Law

The election of students to the degree of bar-rister at law, hence the ceremony or epoch of elec-tion, and the number of persons elected.
Mutual Act or Beneflt Association Certilicate
Official declaration that payment is required or demand for payment. Pasley v. Brady Mut. Life Ass’n, Tex.Civ.App., 2 S.W.2d 278, 279.
CALL, v. To summon or demand by name; to demand the presence and participation of a num-ber of persons by calling aloud their names, either in a pre-arranged and systematic order or in a succession determined by chance.
Terms "called" and ”sold" as equivalent. In re Gyll-strom’s Will, 15 N.Y.S.2d 801, 808, 172 Misc. 655.

Call of the House

A call of the names of members of a legislative body in pursuance of a resolution requiring at-tendance of members.

Calling a Summons

In Scotch practice. See this described in Bell, Dict.

Calling an Election

Commonly construed as including, or as being synonymous with, the giving of notice of the elec-tion. State v. Hall, 73 Or. 231, 144 P. 475, 478; People v. Gough, 260 III. 542, 103 N.E. 685, 686.

Calling the Docket

The public calling of the docket or list of causes at commencement of term of court for setting atime for trial or entering orders of continuance, default, nonsuit, etc. Blanchard v. Ferdinand, 132 Mass. 391.

Calling the Jury

Successively drawing out of a box the names of the jurors on the panels annexed to the nisi prius record, and calling them over in the order in which they are so drawn.

Calling the Plaintiff

A formal method of causing a nonsuit to be en-tered. When a plaintiff or his counsel, seeing that sufficient evidence has not been given to maintain the issue, withdraws, the crier is ordered to call or demand the plaintiff, and if neither he, nor any person for him appear, he is nonsuited. The phrase "let the plaintiff be called" is to be ex-plained by reference to this practice. See 3 Bla. Comm. 376; 2 C. & P. 403; Porter v. Perkins, 5 Mass. 236, 4 Am.Dec. 52.

Calling to Testify

Under certain statutes, when adversary takes the witness’ deposition, Allen v. Pollard, 109 Tex. 536, 212 S.W. 468; Clayton v. Ogden State Bank, 82 Utah 564, 26 P.2d 545, 548; or when he files interrogatories to the witness stating that his deposition will be taken in answer thereto, Wyatt v. Chambers, Tex.Civ.App., 182 S.W. 16, 18.

Calling to the Bar

In En glish practice. Conferring the dignity or degree of barrister at law upon a member of one of the inns of court. Holthouse. "Calls to the bench and bar are to be made by the most ancient, heing a reader, who is present at supper on call night." 1 Black Books of Lincoln’s Inn. 339.

Calling Upon a Prisoner
When a prisoner has been found guilty on an indictment, the clerk of the court addresses him and calls upon him to say why judgment should not be passed upon him.
CALL PATENT. One whose corners are all stakes, or all but one, or whose fines were not run out and marked at time. Combs v. Combs, 238 Ky. 362, 38 S.W.2d 243, 244.
CALLABLE. Option to pay before maturity on cal]. In re Opinions of the Justices, 231 Ala. 152, 164 So. 572, 578.
CALLABLE BONDS. Bonds which may be called for payment before their maturity. Fales v. Mult-nomah County, 119 Or. 127, 248 P. 151, 152.
CALLED UPON TO PAY. Compelled or required to pay. Taylor v. Coon, 79 Wis. 76, 48 N.W. 123, 128.
CALLERS. Persons employed by a motor carrier to unload truck or trailer bodies and advise check-er of nature of items of freight unloaded. Cream v. M. Moran Transp. Lines, D.C.N.Y., 57 F.Supp.

CALLING. A business, occupation, or trade. Gray v. Board of County Com’rs of Sedgwick County, 101 Kan. 195, 165 P. 867, 868, L.R.A.1918F, 182. One’s usual occupation, vocation, or business. Crook v. Commonwealth, 147 Va. 593, 136 S.E. 565, 567, 50 A.L.R. 1043. A profession, Ex parte Galusha, 184 Cal. 697, 195 P. 406, 407; C. D. Sham-burger Lumber Co. v. Delavan, Tex.Civ.App., 106 S.W.2d 351, 355, 356.
CALPES. In Scotch law. A gift to the head of a clan, as an acknowledgment for protection and maintenance.
CALUMNIA.
In the civil law calumny, malice, or ill design; a false accusation; a malicious prosecution. Lan-ning v. Christy, 30 Ohio St. 115, 27 Am.Rep. 431.
In the old common law. A claim, demand, chailenge to jurors.
CALlUMNILE JURAMENTUM. In the old canon law. An oath similar to the ealumnice jus juran-dum, (q. v.).
CALUMNIE JUSJURANDUM. The oath of (against) calumny. An oath imposed upon the parties to a suit that they did not sue or defend, with the intention of calumniating, (calumniarsdi animo,) i. e., with a malicious design, but from a firm belief that they had a good cause. Inst. 4, 16. The object was to prevent vexatious and un-necessary suits. It was especially used in divorce cases, though of little practical utility; Bish. Marr. & Div. § 353; 2 Bish.Marr.Div. & Sep. § 264. A somewhat similar provision is to be found in the requirement made in some states that the defendant shall file an affidavit of merits.
CALUMNIATOR. In the civil law. One who ac-cused another of a crime without cause; one who brought a false accusation. Cod. 9, 46.
CALUMNY. Defamation; slander; false accusa-tion of a crime or offense. See Calumnia.
CALVIN’S CASE. Calvin v. Smith, 7 Rep. 1; 2 S.T. 559, decided in 1608, in which it was held that persons born in Scotland after the accession of James I to the crown of England in 1603 were not aliens but were capable of inheriting land in England. Wharton.
CALVO DOCTRINE. The doctrine stated by the Argentine jurist, Carlos Calvo, that a government is not bound to indemnify aliens for losses or in-juries sustained by them in consequence of domes-tic disturbances or civil war, where the state is not at fault, and that therefore foreign states are not justified in intervening, by force or otherwise, to secure the settlement of claims of their citizens on account of such losses or injuries. Such inter-vention, Calvo says, is not in accordance with the practice of European States towards one another, and is contrary to the principie of state sovereign-ty. 3 Calvo §§ 1280, 1297. The Calvo Doctrine is to be distinguished from the Drago Doctrine (q. v.).
See 18 Green Bag 377.

CALYYSO SONG. A song distinguished by a certain form, rhythm, and narrative style, ap-parently indigenous to the Island of Trinidad. Baron v. Leo Feist, Inc., D.C.N.Y., 78 F.Supp. 686, 687.
CAMARA. In Spanisit law. A treasury. Las Partidas, pt. 6, tit. 3,1, 2.
The exchequer. White, New Recop. b. 3, tit. 8, c. 1.
CAMBELLANTJS, or CAMBELLARIUS. A cham-berlain. Spelman.
CAMBER. Ship’s camber is convex are of vessel’s deck from side to side. The Indien, C.C.A.Cal., 71 F.2d 752, 757.
CAMBIALE JUS. The law of exchange.
CAMBIATOR. In old English law. An exchanger. Cambiatores monetce, exchangers of money; mon-ey-changers.
CAMBIO. In Spanish law. Exchange. Schm. Civil Law, 148.
CAMBIPARTIA. Champerty; from campus, a field, and partas, divided. Spelman.
CAMBIPARTICEPS. A champertor.
CAMBIST. In mércantile law. A person skilled in exchanges; one who trades in promissory notes or bills of exchange; a broker.
CAMBIUM. In the civil law. Change or exchange. A term applied indifferently to the exchange of land, money, or debts. Du Cange.
Cambium reale or manuales was the term generally used to denote the technical common-law exchange of lands; cambium locale, mercantile, or trajectitium, was used to designate t he modero mercan tile con traet of exchange, whereby a man agrees, in consideration of a sum of money poi d him In one place, to pay a like sum In another place. Poth. de Change, n. 12; Stoi.y, Bills, § 2, et seo,
CAMERA. In old English law. A chamber, room, or apartment; a judge’s chamber; a treasury; a chest or coffer. Also, a stipend payable from vassal to lord; an annuity. See In Camera.
CAMERA REGIS. In old English law. A cham-ber of the king; a place of peculiar privileges especially in a commercial point of view. The city of London was so called. Year Book, p. 7, Hen. VI, 27; Burrill, Law Dic.•
CAMERA SCACCARII. The old narre of the exchequer chamber.
CAMERA STELLATA. The star chamber (q. v.).
CAMERALISTICS. The science of finance or Pub-lic revenue, comprehending the means of raising and disposing of it.
CAMERARIUS. A chamberlain; a keeper of the public money; a treasurer. Spelman Gloss. Caan-bellarius; 1 Perr. & D. 243. Also a bailiff or re-CAMINO. In Spanish law. A road or highway. Las Partidas, pt. 3, tit. 2, 1. 6.
CAMOUFLAGE. The art of disguising or con-cealing the nature of objects. Palmer v. .Com-monwealth, 240 Ky. 175, 41 S.W.2d 936, 938.
CAMP. The ground or spot on which huts, tents, are erected for shelter; single hut or shelter; to camp; to encamp; to lodge in a camp. Jones v. State, 64 Ga.App. 376, 13 S.E.2d 462, 465.
CAMPAIGN. All the things and necessary legal and factual acts done by a candidate and his ad-herents to obtain a majority or plurality of the votes to be cast; running for office, or candidacy for office. Norris v. United States, C.C.A.Neb., 86 F.2d 379, 382. Any organized effort to promote a cause or to secure some definite result with any group of persons. State ex rel. Green v. City of Cleveland, Ohio App., 33 N.E.2d 35, 36.
CAMPANA. In old European law. A bell. Spel-man.
CAMPANA BAJULA. A small handbell used in the ceremonies of the Romish church; and, among Protestants, by sextons, parish clerks, and criers. Cowell.
CAMPANARIUM, CAMPANILE. A belfry, bell tower, or steeple; a place where bells are hung. Spelman; Townsh.P1. 191, 213.
CAMPARTUM. A part of a larger field or ground, which would otherwise be in gross or in common. See Champert; Champerty.
CAMPBELL’S (LORD) ACTS. English statutes, for amending the practice in prosecutions for libel, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93; also 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, providing for compensation to relatives in the case of a person having been killed through negligence; also 20 & 21 Vict. c. 83, in regard to the sale of obscene books, etc.
CAMPERS. A share; a champertor’s share; a champertous division or sharing of land.
CAMPERTUM. A cornfield; a field of grain. Blount; Cowell; Jacob; Whishaw.
CAMPFIGHT. In old English law. The fighting of two champions or combatants in the field; the judicial combat, or duellum. 3 Inst. 221.
CAMPUM PARTERE. To divide the land. See Champerty.
CAMPUS. (Lat. A field.)
In old European law. An assembly of the peo-ple anciently held in the open air, in some plain.
In feudal and old English law. A field, or plain. The field, ground, or lists marked out for the combatants in the duellum, or trial by battle. Burrill, Law Dict.
CAMPUS MAII. The field of May. An anniver-sary assembly of the Saxons, held on May-day, when they confederated for the CAMPUS MARTII. The field of March. See Champ de Mars.
CAN. As a noun, a contraption in which em-plóyees are lowered to the floor of a mine. Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting Co. v. Coffey, 186 Okl. 214, 97 P.2d 48, 49.
CAN. As a verb, to be enabled by law; to have a right to, Bailey Realty & Loan Co. v. Bunting, 31 Ala.App. 450, 19 So.2d 607, 608. To put in a can pr cans, to preserve by putting in sealed cans, to tin, Henry v. Markesan State Bank, C.C.A.Minn., 68 F.2d 554, 557; is often interpreted as the equivalent of "may." The Pantorium v. Mc-Laughlin, 116 Neb. 61, 215 N.W. 798, 799. See Cannot.
CANA. A Spanish measure of length varying (in different localities) from about five to seven feet.
CAÑADA. Sp. Valley. Benavides v. State, Tex. Civ.App., 214 S.W. 568, 572.
CANADIAN JUMPER. A term applied to a nervous person who jumps when another touches him, shouting at the same time, or when anything thrown hits him, or when a loud noise is made. Goupiel v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 94 Vt. 337, 111 A. 346, 347.
CANAL. An artificial ditch or trench in the earth, for confining water to a defined channel, to be used for purposes of transportation. See Bishop v. Seeley, 18 Conn. 394; Hubbarel v. Dunne, 276 III. 598, 115 N.E. 210, 215; Guinan v. Boston, Cape Cod & New York Canal Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 1 F.2d 239.
It includes the banks; it has reference to the excavation or channel as a receptacle for the wa-ter; it is an artificial thing. Kennedy v. Indianap-olis, 103 U.S. 604, 26 L.Ed. 550. As used in statute concerning right of way over public lands for irrigation, it embraces whole project including reservoir. U. S. v. Big Horn Land & Cattle Co., C.C.A.Colo., 17 F.2d 357, 364; Johnson Irr. Co. v. Ivory, 46 Wyo. 221, 24 P.2d 1053, 1056.
CANCEL. To obliterate; to strike or cross out; to destroy the effect of an instrument by defacing, obliterating, expunging, or erasing it; to revoke or recall. Ellsworth College v. Carleton, 178 Iowa 845, 160 N.W. 222, 223; Reliance Life Ins. Co. v. Thayer, 84 Okl. 238, 203 P. 190, 192. To annul or destroy, make void or invalid, or set asile. Irwin v. State Brokerage Co., 82 Ind.App. 687, 147 N.E. 531, 532; In re Crawford’s Will, 80 Misc. 615, 142 N.Y.S. 1032, 1033; Clegg v. Schvaneveldt, 79 Utah 195, 8 P.2d 620, 621. To rescind or abandon. Pearson v. Brown, 27 Cal.App. 125, 148 P. 956, 958. To repeal, surrender, or waive. Greib v. Dullea, 66 Cal.App.2d 986, 153 P.2d 581, 590. To terminate. Schwartz v. Van Winkle, Sup., 47 N.Y.S.2d 264, 265.
The term is sometimes equivalent to "discharge" or "pay." Auburn City Bank v. Leonard, 40 Barb., N.Y., 119; Debes v. Texas Nat. Bank of Beaumont, Tex.Civ.App., 92 S.W.2d 476, 479

Courts of equity frequently cancel instruments which have answered the end for which they were created, or instruments which are void or voidable, in order to pre-vent them from being vexatiously used against the person apparently bound by them. Snell, Eq. 498.
See Cancellation..

CANCELLARIA. Chancery; the court of chan-cery. Curia cancellaria is also used in the same sense. See 4 Bl.Comm. 46; Cowell.

CANCELLARII ANGLIIE DIGNITAS EST, UT SECUNDUS A REGE IN REGNO HABETUR.

The dignity of the chancellor of England is that he is deemed the second from the sovereign in the kingdom. 4 Inst. 78.
CANCELLARIUS. A chancellor; a scrivener, or notary. A janitor, or one who stood at the door of the court and was accustomed to carry out the commands of the judges. Du Cange.
In early English law, the keeper of the king’s seal. In this sense only, the word chancellor seems to have been used in the English law; 3 Bla.Comm. 46. See 15 Harv.L. Rey. 109: 4 Co.Inst. 78; Dugdale Orig. Jur. fol. 34; and generally Selden, Discourses; Inderwick, King’s Peace; 3 Steph.Com. 346; 1 Poll. & Maitl. 172: 1 Stubhs, Const. Hist. 381; Campbell, Lives of the Lord Chancellors, vol: 1; Holdsw. Hist. E. L. ; Poliock, Expans. of C. L.
CANCELLATION. Abandonment of contract. State ex rel. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Larson, 152 Fla. 729, 12 So.2d 896, 897. Act of crossing out a writing, Plaut v. Shirley, 200 Ky. 619, 255 S.W. 273, 274; In re Parsons’ Will, 119 Misc. 26, 195 N.Y.S. 742, 745; Culp v. First Commercial Sav. Bank of Constantine, 288 Mich. 646, 286 N.W. 113, 114; act which manifests an intent to annul and puts the instrument in condition where its invalidity appears on its face, In re Akers’ Will, 74 App.Div. 461, 77 N.Y.Supp. 643; Baldwin v. Howell, 45 N.J.Eq. 519, 15 A. 236; In re Tremain’s Will, Surr., 7 N.Y.S.2d 781, 790; Annulment or ab-rogation, Golden v. Fowler, 26 Ga. 464, Winton v. Spring, 18 Cal. 455, Sanborn v. Ballonfonte, 98 Cal.App. 482, 277 P. 152, 155; defacement or muti-lation of instrument, Worcester Bank & Trust Co. v. Ellis, 292 Mass. 88, 197 N.E. 637, 639. Re-duction by insurer of amount of insurance, Gill v. Fidelity Phenix Fire Iris. Co., D.C.Ky., 5 F.Supp. 1, 2; Suspension of insurance policy, Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Farmers’ Mut. Ins. Ass’n of Adams and Adjoining Counties, 217 Iowa 1098, 253 N.W. 52. Termination, Otterbein v. Babor & Co-meau Co., 272 N.Y. 149, 5 N.E.2d 71, 72, 107 A.L.R. 1510; words of revocation written across instru-ment, In re Semler’s Will, 176 Misc. 687, 28 N.Y. S.2d 390, 392, 393.
Cancellation is properly distinguished from obliteration. Towrishend v. Howard, 86 Me. 285, 29 A. 1077. Spoliation may amount to a cancellation. Cancellation does not revoke unless done with that intention. In re Woods’ Will, Sur., 11 N.Y.Supp. 157.
CANCELLATURA. In old English law. A can-celing. Bract. 398b.
CANCELLI. The rails or lattice work or balus-ters inclosing the bar of a court of justice or the communion table. Also the lines drawn on the face of a will or other writing, with the intention of revoking or annulling it.

CANDIDATE. One who seeks or offers himself, or is put forward by others, for an Office, privilege, or honor. Starkweather v. Hoss, 126 Or. 630, 270 P. 768, 770; State ex rel. Ranney v. Corey, Ohio App., 47 N.E.2d 799, 800; it is not necessary that he should have been nominated. Leonard v. Com., 112 Pa. 624, 4 A. 224. A nominee, State ex rel. Van Schoyck v. Board of Com’rs of Lincoln Coun-ty, 46 N.M. 472, 131 P.2d 278, 284. Under a presi-dential primary law, a person receiving the ap-proval of the required number of petitioners may be dedmed a candidate even contrary to his wishes. McCamant v. Olcott, 80 Or. 246, 156 P. 1034, 1038, L.R.A.1916E, 706.
CANDLEMAS—DAY. In English law. A festival appointed by the church to be observed on the second day of February in every year, in honor of the purification of the Virgin Mary, being forty days after her miraculous delivery. At this fes-tival, formerly, the Protestants went, and the Papists now go, in procession with lighted can-dles; they also consecrate candles on this day for the service of the ensuing year. It is the fourth of the four cross quarter-days of the year. Whar-ton.
CANE. In Scotch law. The same as cain (q. v.).
CANFARA. In old records. A trial by hot iron, formerly used in England. Whishaw.
CANNOT. Denotes that one is not able (te do some act). Southern Pac. Co. v. Frye & Bruhn, 82 Wash. 9, 143 P. 163, 165. But the term is often equivalent to "shall not." Bragg v. Hatfield, 124 Me. 391, 130 A. 233, 234.
CANON.
A Dignitary of the English Church
A dignitary of the English church, being a pre-bendary or member of a cathedral chapter. All members of chapters except deans are now en-titled canons, in England. 2 Steph.Comm. 11th ed. 687, n.; 1 Bla.Comm. 382.
A Law, Rule, etc.
A law, rule, or ordinance in general, and of the church in particular. An ecclesiastical law or stat-ute. A rule of doctrine or discipline. The term is generally applied to designate the ordinances of councils and decrees of popes.
A System or Aggregation of Correlated Rules
A system or aggregation of correlated rules, whether of statutory origin or otherwise, relat-ing to and governing a particular department of legal science or a particular branch of the sub-stantive law.
Canon law. A body of ecclesiastical jurispru-dence. In England, according to Blackstone, there is a kind of national canon law. 1 Bl. Comm. 82. The canon law is contained in two principal parts,–the decrees or ecclesiastical con-stitutions made by the popes and cardinals; andthe decretals or canonical epistles written by the pope, or by the pope and cardinals, at the suit of one or more persons. As the decrees set out the origin of the canon law, and the rights, dignities, and decrees of ecclesiastical persons, with their manner of election, ordination, etc., so the de-cretals contain the law to be used in the ecclesias-tical courts. Jacob. The canon law forms no part of the law of England, unless it has been brought into use and acted on there; 11 Q.B. 649. See gen-erally Encyel.Br., sub Doce, Canon Law; Maitland, Canon Law; Jenks’ Teutonic Law; 1 Sel. Essays on Anglo-Amer.Leg.Hist. 46; Ayliffe, Par.Jur.Can. Ang.; Preface to Burn, Ecel.Law, Tyrwhitt ed. 22; Hale, Civ.L. 26; Bell’s Case of a Putative Marriage, 203; Dict du. Droit Canonique; Stair, Inst. b. 1, t. 1, 7; 1 Poll. & Maitl. 90.
Canon religiosorum. In ecclesiastical records. A book wherein the religious of every greater con-vent had a fair transcript of the rules of their order, frequently read among them as their local statutes. Kennett, Gloss.; Cowell.
Canons of construction. The system of fundamen-tal rules and maxims which are recognized as governing the construction or interpretation of written instruments. In re Clarke, 174 App.Div. 736, 161 N.Y.S. 484, 487.
Canons of descent. The legal rules by which in-heritances are regulated, and according to which, estates are transmitted by descent from the an-cestor to the heir.
Canons of inheritance. The legal rules by which inheritances are regulated, and according to which estates are transmitted by descent from the an-cestor to the heir. 2 Bl.Comm. 208.
In Civil, Spanish, and Mexican Law an annual charge or rent; an emphyteutic rent.
In Old English records. A prestation, pension, or customary payment.
CANONICAL. Pertaining to, or in conformity to, the canons of the church.
CANONICAL DISABILITY. Incurable physical impotency or incapacity for copulation. D. v. D., Del.Super., 2 Terry 263, 20 A.2d 139, 141.
CANONICAL OBEDIENCE. That duty which a clergyman owes to the bishop who ordained him, to the bishop in whose diocese he is beneficed, and also to the metropolitan of such bishop. Wharton.
CANONICES. In old English law. A canon. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 69, § 2.
CANONIST. One versed and skilled in the canon law; a professor of ecclesiastical law.
CANONRY. In English ecclesiastical law. An ecclesiastical benefice, attaching to the office of canon. Holthouse.
CANT. In the civil law. A method of dividing property held in common by two or more joint owners. It may be avoided by the consent of all of those who are interested, in the same man-ner that any other contract or agreement may be avoided. Hayes v. Cuny, 9 Mart.O.S. (La.) 87. See LicitacionCANTEL, or CANTLE. A lump, or that which is add,ed aboye measure; also a piece of anything, as "cantel of bread," or the like. Blount.
CANTERBURY, ARCHBISHOP OF. In English ecclesiastical law. The primate of all England; the chief ecclesiastical dignitary in the church. His customary privilege is to crown the kings and queens of England. Has also, by 25 Hen. VIII, c. 21, the power to grant dispensations. Wharton.
CANTRED. A district comprising a hundred vil-lages; a hundred. A term used in Wales in the same sense as "hundred" is in England. Cowell; Termes de la Ley.
CANUM. In feudal law. A species of duty or tribute payable from tenant to lord, usually con-sisting of produce of the land.
CANVASS. The act of examining and counting the returns of votes cast at a public election. Bowler v. Eisenhood, 1 S.Dak. 577, 48 N.W. 136, 12 L.R.A. 705; In re Stewart, 24 App.Div. 201, 48 N.Y.S. 957.
CANVASSER. Any of certain persons, as officers of a state, county, or district, intrusted with the duty of examining the returns of votes cast at an election. See Canvass.
One who, in a given town, city, or county, goes from house to house in an effort to take orders for goods; in this sense, to be distinguished from traveling salesmen. City of El Dorado Springs v. Highfill, 268 Mo. 501, 188 S.W. 68.
CAP. In mining, a square piece of plank or block wedged between the top of posts or props and the roof of the mine. Big Branch Coal Co. v. Wren-chie, 160 Ky. 668, 170 S.W. 14, 16.
CAP BOARD. Board about fourteen inches long and about four inches wide which is placed on top of a pillar in mines to prevent pillar from break-ing through slate when weight comes against it. Hall v. Proctor Coal Co., 236 Ky. 813, 34 S.W.2d 425, 426,
CAP OF MAINTENANCE. One of the regalia or ornaments of state belonging to the sovereigns of England, before whom it is carried at the corona-tion and other great solemnities. Caps of mainte-nance are also carried before the mayors of sev-eral cities in England. Enc.Lond.
CAPABLE. Susceptible; competent; qualified; fitting; possessing legal power or capacity. Unit-ed States v. Sischo, D.C.Wash., 262 F. 1001, 1005. Able, fit or adapted for. U. S. v. Sischo, C.C.A. Wash., 270 F. 958, 961; State v. Wharton, 132 Kan. 409, 295 P. 656, 658. "Capable of contracting" as meaning legally capable, not mentally capable. Szl.ved v. Morris & Co., 187 Mo.App. 510, 174 S.W. 146, 148

CAPACITY. A word having many meanings, de-pendent on its relationship to the subject-matter. Campbell v. Cornish, 163 Okl. 213, 22 P.2d 63.
It may mean: ability; actual production of an oil well, Helis v. Ward, D.C.La., 20 F.Supp. 514, 517; en intelligent perception and understanding of the dispositions made of property. etc., In re Null’s Estate, 302 Pa. 64, 153 A. 137, 139. Qualification; size, space, or coro pass, strength, pow-er or force, Campbell v. Cornish, 163 Okl. 213, 22 P.2d 63; sound mine], Chambers y. Wien, Tex.Civ.App., 133 S.W.2d 279. 282; the attributc of persons which enables them to perform civil or juristic acts. Sargent v. Burdett, 96 Ge. 111, 22 S.E. 667; 2 Com.Dig. 291.
"Capacity to sue" consists in right to come into court, Draden v. Neal, 132 Kan. 387, 295 P. 678, 680.
"Public capacity" of municipal property is such capacity as all the people of the state are alike interested in. Board of Com’rs of Woodward County v. Willett, 49 Okl. 254, 152 P. 365, 366, L.R.A.1916E, 92.
CAPAX BOLI. Lat. Capable of committing crime, or capable of criminal intent. The phrase describes the condition of one who has sufficient intelligence and comprehension to be held crimi-nally responsible for bis deeds.
CAPAX NEGOTII. Competent to transact af-f airs; having business capacity.
CAPE. In English practice. A judicial writ, now abolished, touching a plea of lands or tenements.
It was divided into cape magnum, or the Brand cape, which lay before appearance to summon the tenant to answer the default, and also over to the demandant and cape paruum, or petit cape, after appearance or view granted, summoning the tenant to answer the default only. Termes de la Ley; 3 Steph.Comm. 606, note; Fleta, I. 6, c. 55, § 40; 2 Wnis.Saund. 45 c, d; Rosc. Real Act. 165, et sea. It was called a "cape," from the word with which it commenced, and a "grand cape" (or cape magnum) to dis-tinguish ít from the petit cape, which lay after appearance.
CAPE AD VALENTIAM. A species of cape mag-num.
CAPELLA. In old records. A box, cabinet, or repository in which were preserved the relics of martyrs. Spelman. A small building in which relics were preserved; an oratory or chapel. Id.
In old English law. A chapel. Fleta, lib. 5, c. 12, § 1; Spelman; Cowell.
CAPERS. Vessels of war owned by private per-s,ons, and different from ordinary privateers only in size, being smaller. Beawes, Lex Merc. 230.
CAPIAS. Lat. "That you take." The general name for several species of writs, the common characteristic of which is that they require the of-ficer to take the body of the defendant into custo-dy; they are writs of attachment or arrest.
In English practice, the process on an indíct-ment when the person charged is not in custody, and in cases not otherwise provided for by statute. 4 Steph.Comm. 383

Capias Ad Audiendum Judicium

A writ issued, in a case of misdemeanor, after the defendant has appeared and is found guilty, to bring him to hear judgment if he is not present when called. 4 BI.Comm. 368.

Capias Ad Computandum

In the action of account render, after judgment of quod computet, if the defendant refuses to ap-pear personally before the auditors and make his account, a writ by this name may issue to compel him. The writ is now disused. See Thesaurus Brevium, 38; Coke, Entries, 46, 47, Rastell, En-tries, 14 b. 15.

Capias Ad Respondendum

"capias," and commonly abbreviated to ca. resp.) by which actions at law were frequently commenced; and which commands the sheriff to take the defendant, and him safely keep, so that he may have his body before the court on a cer-tain day, to answer the plaintiff in the action. 3 Bl.Comm. 282; 1 Tidd, Pr. 128. It notifies de-fendant to defend suit and procures his arrest until security for plaintiff’s claim is furnished. Null v. Staiger, 333 Pa. 370, 4 A.2d 883, 885.

Capias Ad Satisfaciendum

A writ of execution, (usually termed, for brevi-ty, a "ca. sa.,") which commands the sheriff to take the party named, and keep him safely, so that he may have his body before the court on a certain day, to satisf y the damages or debt and damages in certain actions. It deprives the party taken of his liberty until he makes the satisfac-tion awarded. 3 Bl.Comm. 414, 415; 2 Tidd, Pr. 993, 1025; Litt. § 504; Co.Litt. 289a; Strong v. Linn, 5 N.J.Law, 803. As ‘a rule it lay in all cases where a capias ad respondendum lay. It was a very common form of execution; but its efficiency has been destroyed by statutes.

Capias Extendi Facias

A writ, in the nature of a reprisal, which lies for one whose goods or cattle, taken under a distress, are removed from the county, so that they cannot be replevied, commanding the sheriff to seize oth-er goods or cattle of the distrainor of equal value

Capias Pro Fine

(That you take for the fine or in merey.) For-merly, if the verdict was for the defendant, the plaintiff was adjudged to be amerced for his false claim; but, if the verdict was for the plain-tiff, then in all actions vi et armis, or where the defendant, in his pleading, had falsely denied his own deed, the judgment contained an award of a capiatur pro fine; and in all other cases the de-fendant was adjudged to be amerced. The inser-tion of the misericordia or of the capiatur in the judgment is now unnecessary. Wharton; 8 Coke, 60; 11 Coke, 43; Co.Litt. 131; 3 Bl.Comm. 398; 5Mod. 285. A writ in all respects an execution for collection of fine. Board of Councilmen of City of Frankfort v. Rice, 249 Ky, 771, 61 S.W.2d 614, 615.

Capias Utlagatum

writ which lies against a person who has been outlawed in an action, by which the sheriff is commanded to take him, and keep him in cus-tody until the day of the return, and then present him to the court, there to be dealt with for his contempt. Reg.Orig. 138b; 3 Bl.Comm. 284

CAPIATUR PRO FINE. (Let him be taken for the fine.) In English practice. A clause inserted at the end of old judgment records in actions of debt, where the defendant denied his deed, and it was found against him upon his false plea, and the jury were troubled with the trial of it. Cro. Jac. 64. See Capias pro Fine.
CAPITA. Heads, and, figuratively, entire bodies, whether of persons or animals. Spelman.
Persons individually considered, without rela-tion to others, (polis;) as distinguished from stirpes or stocks of descent. The term in this sense, making part of the common phrases, in capita, per capita, is derived from the civil law. Inst. 3, 1, 6.
CAPITA, PER. By heads; by the poll; as in-dividuals. In the distribution of an intestate’s personalty, the persons legally entitled to take are said to take per capita, that is, equal shares, when they claim, each in his own right, as in equal degree of kindred; in contradistinction to claiming by right of representation, or per stirpes.
CAPITAL, n. The word may have different mean-ings when used in different connections. Commis-sioner of Corporations and Taxation v. Filoon, 310 Mass. 374, 38 N.E.2d 693, 699, 700, 705.
It may mean; actual property or estate, People v. Com’rs of Taxes, 23 N.Y. 192; State ex rel. Corinne Realty Co. v. Becker, 320 Mo. 908, 8 S.W.2d 970, 972. Aggregate of property, Southern Package Corporation v. State T EL X Commisslon, 195 Miss. 864, 15 So.2d 436; all capital invested plus surplus or undivided profits, W. A. Gordon & Co. v. Lines, D.C.La., 25 F.2d 894, 895; amount, or value, of property up to par value of paid up issued shares or stated value of no-par shares, Randall v. Balley, 23 N.Y.S.2d 173, 182; assets, Pace v. Pace Bros. Co., 91 Utah, 149, 63 P.2d 590, 591. Capital stock, Security State Bank v. Breen, 277 N.W. 497, 500, 65 S.D. 640; condemnatlon award, In re Wacht’s Estate, 32 N.Y.S.2d 871, 903, 904; contributions by partners, M. & C. Creditors Corporation v. Pratt, 17 N.Y.S.2d 240, 258, 259, 172 Misc. 695. Dividends earned before creation of trust, Hubley’s Guardian Ad Litem v. Wolfe, 259 Ky. 574, 82 S.W.2d 830, 834, 101 A.L.R. 1359; dividends received by trustee stockholder in liquida-tion of corporation, Anderson v. Bean, 272 Mass. 432, 172 N.E. 647, 651, 72 A.L.R. 959; extraordlnary dividends paid on reducing value of stock, In re Sears’ Will, 26 N.Y.S.2d 912, 915, 176 Misc. 242. Fund, Civ.Code, art. 148. French v. Wolf, 181 La. 733, 160 So. 396, Webb v. Armistead, C.C.Va., 26 F. 70; gain from sale of realty, United States v. National City Bank of New York, D.C.N.Y., 21 F.Supp. 791, 794; means contributed by share owners, Parkinson v. State Bank of Millard County, 84 Utah, 278, 35 P.2d 814, 820, 94 A.L.R. 1112; money invested at interest; money required of partners by agrecment, M. & C. Creditors Cor-poration v. Pratt, 17 N.Y.S.2d 240, 258, 259, 172 Misc. 695; money which one adventures in an undertaking; paid-up issued shares of stock, Newileld v. Stieglitz, D.C.N,Y., 47

F.Supp. 885, 886; place where legislative department holds its sessions and where chief offices of the executive are located; political and governmental metropolis; preferred stock received as dividend, Burns v. Hines, 298 Ill.App. 563, 19 N.E.2d 382, 392; principal sum of a fund of money; proceeds of sale or exchange of capital of trust property, In re Clarke’s Will, 204 Minn. 574, 284 N.W. 876, 879; property, Putnam v. U. S., C.C.A.Mass., 149 F.2d 721, 726; repayment of a debt, Philadelphia Nat. Bank v. Rothensies, D.C.Pa., 43 F.Supp. 923, 925; seat of government; stock dividends, Gray v. Hemenway, 268 Mass. 515, 168 N.E. 102, 103; subscribed, paid-up capital, Child v. Ogden State Bank. 81 Utah, 464, 20 P.2d 599, 607, 88 A.L.R. 1284; sum formed when profits apportioned to building and loan association shares coalesce with dues paid, In re Sixth Ward Building & Loan Ass’n of Newark, 134 N.J.Eq. 98, 34 A.2d 292, 295; sum total of corporate stock. Haggard v. Lexington Utilities Co., 260 Ky. 261, 84 S.W.2d 84, 87; surplus used as capital, Feeders’ Supply Co. v. Commis-sioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.8, 31 F.2d 274, 270; unamortized debt discount and expense, State Tax Commis-sion v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 194 Miss. 260, 11 So.2d 828, 829.
In polithcal economy, that portion of the produce of industry existing in a country, which may be made directly available, either for the support of human existence, or the facilitating of production.
The term does not embrace temporary loans. Balley v. Clark, 21 Wall. 286, 22 L.Ed. 651. But see Bridgewater Mfg. Co. v. Funkhouser, 115 Va. 476, 79 S.E. 1074, 1075.
Income is the fruit of capital; capital is the source of income. Carter v. Rector, 88 Okl. 12, 210 P. 1035, 1037.
As to what is moneyed capital in a federal act respecting state taxation of national bank stock, see First Nat. Bank v. Chapman, 173 U.S. 214, 19 S.Ct. 407, 43 L.Ed. 669.
CAPITAL, adj. Affecting or relating to the head or life of a person; entailing the ultimate pen-alty. Principal; leading; chief; as "capital bur-gess." 10 Mod. 100

Capital Assets

All capital invested plus surplus or undivided profits. Williams v. McGowan, D.C.N.Y., 58 F. Supp. 692, 694, 695; Assets of a permanent or fixed nature or employed in carrying on business or trade. Rathborne v. Collector of Revenue, 196 La. 795, 200 So. 149, 153, 154; goodwill, Williams v. McGowan, D.C.N.Y., 58 F.Supp. 692, 694, 695, Com-missioner of Internal Revenue v. Shapiro, C.C.A.6, 125 F.2d 532, 535, 536; property acquired and held for profit or investment for more than two years. Sommers v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.10, 63 F.2d 551, 553; title to property held for profit. Jones’ Estate v. Commissioner of In-ternal Revenue, C.C.A.Tex., 127 F.2d 231, 232.

Capital Case or Crime

One in or for which death penalty may, but need not necessarily, be inflicted, Lee v. State, 31 Ala.App. 91, 13 So.2d 583, 587.

Capital Expenditure

Cost of construction made with expectation of existence for an indefinite period, E. W. Edwards & Son v. Clarke, D.C.N.Y., 29 F.Supp. 671, 672, 673; expenditure in nature of an investment for the fu-ture, Marin Union Junior College Dist. v. Gwinn, 106 Cal.App. 12, 288 P. 799, 800.

Capital Gains

Additions to principal, Holcombe v. Ginn, 296 Mass. 415, 6 N.E.2d 351, 108 A.L.R. 1134; gainsAdditions to principal, Holcombe v. Ginn, 296 Mass. 415, 6 N.E.2d 351, 108 A.L.R. 1134; gains

Capital Impairment

Reduction of assets of corporation below ag-gregate of outstanding shares of capital stock. Ashman v. Miller, C.C.A.Mich., 101 F.2d 85, 90.

Capital Increase

An increase not attributable to earnings. In re Lueders’ Estate, 337 Pa. 155, 10 A.2d 415, 417.

Capital Investment

Acquisition price of a "capital asset", Commis-sioner of Internal Revenue v. Rowan Drilling Co., C.C.A.Tex., 130 F.2d 62, 64, 65; capital stock, sur-plus and undivided profits, O’Connor v. Bankers Trust Co., 159 Misc. 920, 289 N.Y.S. 252, 276; mon-ey spent to increase an asset. Peerless Stages v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.9, 125 F.2d 869, 871.

Capital Outlay

Money expended in "acquiring, equipping, and promoting an enterprise. Rideout v. Eich, 105 Cal.App. 597, 288 P. 450, 45

Capital Punishment

Punishment of death. Ex parte Herndon, 18 Okl.Cr. 68, 192 P. 820, 19 A.L.R. 804, State v. John-ston, 83 Wash. 1, 144 P. 944, 945.

Capital Recovery

Collection of charged-off bad debt where reserve account system is used. National Bank of Tulsa v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, Okl., 145 P.2d 768, 771, 772.

Capital Stock

The term has various meanings.
It may mean: amount fixed by charter to be subscribed and paid in or secured to be paid In by shareholders. State ex rel. Corinne Realty Co. v. Becker, 320 Mo. 908. 8 S.W.2d 970, 971. Amount of stock that corporation may issue. Schwemer v. Fry, 212 Wis. 88, 249 N.W. 62, 90 A.L.R. 308; amount subscribed, contributed or secured to be paid in. Haggard v. Lexington Utilities Co., 260 Ky. 261, 84 S.W. 2d 84, 87; Person v. Board of State Tax Com’rs, 184 N.C. 499, 115 S.E. 336, 346; capital, Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Swartz, 284 Ill. 108, 119 N.E. 990, 992; Louis-ville & N. R. Co. v. Bosworth, D.C.Ky., 209 F. 380, 411, corporate assets or property, Bates v. Daley’s Inc., 5 Cal. App.2d 95, 42 P.2d 706, 709; evidence of rights in prop-erty. Southern Package Corporation v. State Tax Commis-sion, 195 Miss. 864, 15 So.2d 436; fund employed in carry-ing on business or enterprise, Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. t`u, v. Harmon. 19 !dont. 1, 295 p. 7G2, 719: liability uf the corporation to its shareholders, after creditors’ claims have becn liquidated, Department of Treasury of Indiana v. Crowder, 214 Ind. 252, 15 N.E.2d S9, 91; valuation of the corporation as a business enterprise, Commonwealth v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corporation, 336 Pa. 209, 8 A.2d 404, 410

Capital Stock Tax

Tax on privilege of doing business, Wisconsin Cent. Ry. Co. v. U. S., Ct.CI., 41 F.2d 870, 885.

Capital Surplus

excess of capital stock liability. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation v. Filoon, 310 Mass. 374, 38 N.E.2d 693, 699, 700.
CAPITALE. A thing which is stolen, or the value of it. Blount.
CAPITALE VIVENS. Live cattle. Blount.
CAPITALIS. In old English law. Chief; princi-pal; at the head. A term applied to persons, places, judicial proceedings, and some kinds of property.
CAPITALIS BARO. In old English law. Chief baron. Capitalis baro scaccarii domini re gis, chief baron of the exchequer. Townsh.P1. 211.
CAPITALIS CUSTOS. Chief warden or magis-trate; mayor. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 64, § 2.
CAPITALIS DEBITOR. The chief or principal debtor, as distinguished from a surety, (plegius.)
CAPITALIS DOMINUS. Chief lord. Fleta, lib. 1, c. 12, § 4; Id. c. 28, § 5.
CAPITALIS JUSTICIARIUS. The chief justicia-ry; the principal minister of state, and guardian of the realm in the king’s absence.
This office origlnated under William the Conqueror; but its power was greatly diminished by Magna Charta, and finally distributed among several courts by Edward I. Spelman; 3 BI.Comm. 38.
CAPITALIS JUSTICIARIUS AD PLACITA COR-AM REGE TENENDA. Chief justice for holding pleas before the king. The title of the chief jus-tice of the king’s bench, first assumed in the lat-ter part of the reign of Henry III. 2 Reeve, Eng. Law, 91, 285.
CAPITALIS JUSTICIARIUS BANCI. Chief jus-tice of the bench. The title of the chief justice of the (now) court of common pleas, first men-tioned in the first year of Edward I. 2 Reeve, Eng.Law, 48.
CAPITALIS JUSTICIARIUS TOTIUS ANGLI/E. Chief justice of all England. The title of the presiding justice in the court of aula regis. 3 Bl.Comm. 38; 1 Reeve, Eng.Law, 48.
CAPITALIS PLEGIUS. A chief pledge; a head borough. Townsh.P1. 35.
CAPITALIS REDITUS. A chief rent.
CAPITALIS TERRA. A head-land. A piece of land lying at the head of other land.
CAPITALIST. One exclusively dependent on ac-cumulated property, whether denoting a person of large wealth or one having an income from in-vestments. Elliott v. Frankfort Marine, Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co. of Frankfort-on-the-Main, Germany, 172 Cal. 261, 156 P. 481, 483, L.R.A. 1916F, 1026. The word has no legal meaning. In re Green’s Estate, 109 Misc. 112, 178 N.Y.S. 353,

CAPITALIZATION METHOD. A method of measuring values of realty for purpose of deter-mining values of mortgages by expertly estimat-ing the gross income which property should throw off, and separately the expenses reasonably re-quired to carry it, and thus arriving at a fair es-timate of net income and using a capitalization figure or factor, expertly chosen. Depreciation must be taken into consideration in use of such method. In re New York Title & Mortgage Co. (Series B-K), 21 N.Y.S.2d 575, 594, 595.
CAPITALIZE. In one sense, to convert a periodi-cal payment into a sum in hand. Brown v. Erie R. Co., 87 N.J.Law, 487, 91 A. 1023, 1026, Ann.Cas. 1917C, 496.
CAPITANEUS. A tenant in capite. He who held his land or title directly from the king himself. A captain; a naval commander. This latter use began A. D. 1264. Spelman, Gloss. Capitaneas, Admiralius. A commander or ruler over others, either in civil, military, or ecclesiastical matters.
CAPITARE. In old law and surveys. To head, front, or abut; to touch at the head, or end.
CAPITATIM. Lat. By the head; by the poli; severally to each individual.
CAPITATION TAX. A poll tax. A tax or imposi-tion upon the person. Leedy v. Bourbon, 12 Ind. App. 486, 40 N.E. 640; Hattiesburg Grocery Co. v. Robertson, 126 Miss. 34, 88 So. 4, 5, 25 A.L.R. 748. It is a very ancient kind of tribute, and an-swers to what the Latins called "tributum," by which taxes on persons are distinguished from taxes on merchandise, called "vectigalia." Whar-ton

CAPITE. Lat. By the head.
Tenure in capite was an ancient feudal tenure, whereby a man held lands of the king lmmediately. It was of two sorts,—the one, principal and general, or of the king as the source of all tenure; the other, special and subaltern, or of a particular subject. It Is now abollshed. Jacob. As to distribution per capita, see Capita, per.
CAPITE MINUTUS. In the civil law. One who had suffered capitis diminutio, one who lost, status or legal attributes. See Dig. 4, 5.
CAPITIS DIMINUTIO. In Roman law. A dimin-ishing or abridgment of personality; a loss or cur-tailment of a man’s status or aggregate of legal attributes and qualifications.
CAPITIS DIMINUTIO MAXIMA. The highest or most comprehensive loss of status. This oc-curred when a man’s condition was changed from one of freedom to one of bondage, when he be-carne a slave. It swept away with it all rights of citizenship and all family rights.
CAPITIS DIMINUTIO MEDIA. A Lesser or medi-um loss of status. This occurred where a man lost his rights of citizenship, but without losing his liberty. It carried away also the family rights.
CAPITIS DIMINUTIO MINIMA. The lowest or least comprehensive degree of loss of status. This

occurred where a man’s family relations alone were changed. It happened upon the arrogation of a person who had been his own master, (sui juris,) or upon the emancipation of one who had been under the patria potestas. It left the rights of liberty and citizenship unaltered. See Inst. 1, 16, pr.; 1, 2, 3; Dig. 4, 5, 11; Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 144.
CAPITITIUM. A covering for the head, men-tioned in St. 1 Hen. IV. and other old statutes, which prescribe what dresses shall be worn by all degrees of persons. Jacob.
CAPITULA. Collections of laws and ordinances drawn up under heads of divisions. Spelman. The term is used in the civil and old English law, and applies to the ecclesiastical law also, meaning chapters or assemblies of ecclesiastical persons. Du Cange. The Royal and Imperial Capitula were the edicts of the Frankish Kings and Emper-ors.
CAPITULA CORON1E. Chapters of the crown. Chapters or heads of inquiry, resembling the ca-pitula itineris (infra) but of a more minute char-acter.
CAPITULA DE JUDZEIS. A register of mort-gages made to the Jews. 2 B1.Comm. 343; Crabb, Eng.Law, 130, et seq.
CAPITULA ITINERIS. Articles of inquiry which were anciently delivered to the justices in eyre when they set out on their circuits. These sched-ules were designed to include all possible varieties of crime. 2 Reeve, Eng.Law, p. 4, c. 8.
CAPITULA RURALIA. Assemblies or chapters, held by rural deans and parochial clergy, within the precinct of every deanery; which at first were every three weeks, afterwards once a month, and subsequently once a quarter. Cowell.
CAPITULARY. In French law. A collection and code of the laws and ordinances promulgated by the kings of the Merovingian and Carlovingian dynasties.
Any orderly and systematic collection or code of laws.
In ecclesiastical law. A collection of laws and ordinances orderly arranged by divisions. A book contairling the beginning and end of each Gospel which is to be read every day in the ceremony of saying mass. Du Cange.
CAPITULATION. In military law. The surren-der of a fort, fortified town, or army in the field to a besieging or opposing army; the treaty or agreement between the commanding officers which embodies the terms and conditions on which the surrender is made.
In international law. Capitulations is the name used for treaty engagements between the Turkish government and the principal states of Europe by which subjects of the latter, residents in the ter-ritory of the former, were exempt from the laws

of the places where they dwelt. 1 Kinglake, In-vasion of Crimea 116.
"The ‘usages of the Franks’ begin in what are known in International law as ‘the capitulations,’ granting rights of exterritoriality to Christians residing or travellng In Mo-hammedan countries. • • • By these • • • capitula-tions a usage was established that Franks [a generlc name for all participante In such privileges], being in Turkey, whether dorniciled or temporarily, should be under the ju-risdiction, civil and criminal, of their respective ministera and consuls." Dainese v. United States, 15 Ct.Cl. 64.
In the civil law. An agreement by which the prince and the people, or those who have the right of the people, regulate the manner in which the government is to be administered. Wolfflus, § 989.

CAPITULI AGRI. Head-fields; lands lying at the head or upper end of furrows, etc.
CAPITULUM. Lat. A leading division of a book or writing; a chapter; a section. Tert.Adv.Jud. 9, 19. Abbreviated, Cap.
CAPITULUM EST CLERICORUM CONGREGA. TIO SUB UNO DECANO IN ECCLESIA CATRE-PRAL!. A chapter is a congregation of clergy under one dean in a cathedral church. Co.Litt. 98.
CAPPA. In old records. A cap. Cappa honoris, the cap of honor. One of the solemnities or cere• monies of creating an earl or marquis.
CAPPER. A decoy or lure for purpose of swin-dling. Barron V. Board of Dental Examiners of California, 109 Cal.App. 382, 293 P. 144, 145.
CAPRICIOUS DISBELIEF. A willful, deliberate disbelief of an apparently trustworthy witness. Popilock v. Piernikoski, 161 Pa.Super. 587, 56 A. 2d 326, 328.
CAPTAIN. A head-man; commander; command-ing officer.
The captain of a war-vessel is the officer first in com-mand. In the United States navy, the rank of "oaptain" Is intermediate between that of "commander’• and "com-modore." The governor or controllIng officer of a vessel in the merchant service is usually styled "captain" by the inferior officers and seamen, but in maritime business and admiralty law is perhaps more commonly designated as "master." In foreign jurisprudence his title is often that of “patron." In the United States army (and the militia) the captain Is the commander of a company of soldiers, one of the divisions of a regiment. The term Is also used to designate the commander of a squad of municipal po-llee.
The "captain of the watch" on a vessel is a kind of fore-man or overseer and is an officer within statutes regulating conduct of cfficers to seamen. U. S. v. Trice, D.C.Tenn., 30 red. 491.
CAPTATION. In French law. The act of one who succeeds in controlling the will of another, so as to become master of it; used in an invidious sense. Succession of Schlumbrecht, 138 La. 173, 70 So. 76, 79.
It was formerly applied to the first stage of the hypnotic or mesmeric trance.
CAPTATOR. A person who obtains a gift or leg-acy through artifice. See Captation.

CAPTIO. In old English law and practice. A taking or seizure; arrest; receiving; holding of court.
CAPTION. In Practice. That part of a legal instrument, as a commission, indictment, etc., which shows where, when, and by what authority it is taken, found, or executed. U. S. v. Beebe, 2 Dak. 292, 11 N.W. 505.
When used with reference to an indictment, caption signifles the style or preamble or commencement of the in-dictment; when used with reference to a commission, it signifies the certificate to which the commissioners’ names are subseribed, declaring when and where it was executed. Brown. The caption is not a part of the indictment, Brown v. Hudspeth, C.C.A.Kan., 103 F.2d 958, 959, but is the formal history of its finding, and is to be distinguished from the introductory portion. Harrington v. U. S., C.C.A. Iowa, 267 F. 97, 100. Caption of indictment is entry of rec-ord showing when and where court is held, who presided, venire and indorsements, and who were summoned and sworn as grand jurors. Williams v. State, 20 Ala.App. 26, 100 So. 573, 574.
The caption of a pleading, deposition, or other paper connected with a case in court, is the heading or introduc-tory clause which shows the names of the parties, name of the court, number of the case on the docket or calendar, etc. Quoted with approval in St. Louis Lightning Rod Co. v. Johnson, 18 Ga.App. 190, 89 S.E. 169, 170. The terms "title" and "caption" are synonymous. Id. The caption of depositions should state the title of the cause. the names of the parties, and at whose instante the depositions are taken: Knight v. Nichols, 34 Me. 208. See Waskern v. Diamond, 1 Hemp. 701, Fed.Cas.No.17.248. Generally, the title or caption is not part of the pleading, unless express-ly made so by reference in the body thereof. Jackson v. Ashton, 8 Pet. 148, 8 L.Ed. 898.
Also signifies a taking, seizure, or arrest of a person. 2 Salk. 498. The word in this sense is now obsolete in English law.
In Scotch law. Caption is an order to incar-cerate a debtor who has disobeyed an order, given to him by what are called "letters of horning," to pay a debt or to perform some act enjoined thereby. Bell.
CAPTIVES. Prisoners of war. As in the goods of an enemy, so also in his person, a sort of qualified property may be acquired, by taking him a pris-oner of war, at least till his ransom be paid. 2 Al.Comm. 402.
CAPTOR. In international law. One who takes or seizes property in time of war; one who takes the property of an enemy. In a stricter sense, one who takes a prize at sea. 2 Bl.Comm. 401;
1 Kent, Comm. 86, 96, 103. Consult Oakes v. U. S., 174 U.S. 778, 19 S.Ct. 864, 43 L.Ed. 1169. The term also designates a belligerent who has captured the person of an enemy.
CAPTURE. In international law. The taking or wresting of property from one of two belligerents by the other. Also a taking of property by a bel-ligerent from an offending neutral.
In some cases, this is a mode of acquiring prop-erty. Thus every one may, as a general rule, on his own land, or on the sea, capture any wild ani-mal, and acquire a qualified ownership in it by confining it, or absolute ownership by killing it.
2 Steph.Comrn. 79.
Capture, in technical language, is a taking by military power; a seizure is a taking by civil authority. U. S. v. Athens Armory, 35 Ga. 344, Eed.Cas.No.14,473.

The sequestering of alien enemy property under vesting orders by the alien property custodian is in the nature ot a "capture", Crowley v. Allen, D.C.Cal., 52 F.Supp. 850, 852.
CAPUT. A head; the head of a person; the whole person; the life of a person; one’s per-sonality; status; civil condition.
At common law. A head. Caput cornitatis, the head of the county; the sheriff; the king. Spelman. A person ; a life. The upper part of a town. Cowell. A castle. Spelman.
Capitis mstimatio. In Saxon law. The estima-tion or value of the head, that is, the price or value of a man’s life.
Caput anni. The first day (or beginning) of the year.
Caput baroniw. The castle or chief seat of a ba ron.
Caput jejunii. The beginning of the Lent fast, i. e., Ash Wednesday.
Caput loci. The head or upper part of a place.
Caput lupinum. In old English law. A wolf’s head. An outlawed felon was said to be caput lupinum, and might be knocked on the head like a wolf. 4 Bla.Comm. 320, 284.
Caput mortuum. A dead head; dead; obsolete.
Caput portus. In old English law. The head of a port. The town to which a port belongs, and which gives the denomination to the port, and is the head of it. Hale de Jure Mar. pt. 2, (de portu-bus maris,) e, 2.
Caput, principium, et finis. The head, beginning, and end. A term applied in English law to the king, as head of parliament. 4 Inst. 3; 1 Bl. Comm. 188.
In civil law. It signified a person’s civil condition or status, and among the Romans consisted of three component parts or elements,—libertas, lib-erty; civitas, citizenship; and familia, family.
CAPUTAGIUM. In old English law. Head or poll money, or the payment of it. Cowell; Blount; Spelman, Gloss.
CAPUTIUM. In old English law. A head of land; a headland. Cowell.
CAR. A vehicle primarily intended for transpor-tation of persons or freight, Hall v. Federal Life Ins. Co., Mo.App., 71 S.W.2d 762, 764; a vehicle moved on wheels, Burrus v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 225 Mo.App. 1129, 40 S.W.2d 493, 494.
The term may include a vehicle adapted to running on the rails of a railroad. State v. Tardiff, 111 Me. 552, 90 A. 424, 425, L.R.A.1915A, 817; a hand car, Boyd v. Missourl Pac. Ry. Co., 249 Mo. 110, 155 S.W. 13, 17, Ann.Cas.1914D, 37; a locomotive, U. S. v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co., D.C. Pa.. 223 F. 215, 216; a tender and locomotive, Pennell v. Philadelphia & Reading Railway Co., 231 U.S. 675, 34 S.Ct. 220, 58 L.Ed. 430; an automobile. Monroe’s Adm’r v. Fed-eral Union Life Ins. Co., 251 Ky. 570, 65 S.W.2d 680, 681.

Car Load

The quantity usually contained in an ordinary car used for transporting the particular commodity involved. Ward v. Cotton Seed Products Co., 193 Ala. 101, 69 So. 514, 515.

General Service Cars

Cars serviceable as flat or gondola cars and also as dump cars. National Dump Car Co. v. Pullman Co., C.C.A.Ill., 228 F. 122, 124.
CAR TRUST CERTIFICATES, OR SECURITIES. A class of investment securities based upon the conditional sale or hire of railroad cars or locomo-tives with a reservation of title or lien in the ven-dor or bailor until the property is paid for. See Fidelity Trust Co. v. Lederer, D.C.Pa., 276 F. 51; Commonwealth v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 287 Pa. 190, 134 A. 455.
CARABUS. In old English law. A kind of raft or boat. Spelman.
CARAT. A measure of weight for diamonds ‘and other precious stones, equivalent to three and one-sixth grains Troy, though divided by jewelers into four parts called "diamond grains." Also a stand-ard of fineness of gold, twenty-four carats being conventionally taken as expressing absolute puri-ty, and the proportion of gold to alloy in a mix-ture being represented as so many carats.
CARBON COPY. A copy, as of a letter, produced by placing a sheet of carbon paper between two sheets of letter paper, so that the same impres-sion produces both the letter and the carbon copy. Engles v. Blocker, 127 Ark. 385, 192 S.W. 193, 195. See, also, Copy.
CARBONIC ACID. See Choke damp.
CARCAN. In French law. An instrument of punishment, somewhat resembling a pillory. It sometimes signifies the punishment itself. Biret, Vocab.
CARCANUM. A gaol; a prison.
CARCARE. In oid English law. To load; to load a vessel; to freight.
CARCATUS. Loaded; freighted, as a ship. CARCEL-AGE. Gaol-dues; prison-fees.
CARCER. A prison or gaol. Strictly, a place of detention and safe-keeping, and not of punishment. Co.Litt. 620.
CARCER AD NOMINES CUSTODIENDOS, NON AD PUNIENDOS, DARI DEBET. A prison should be used for keeping persons, not for pun-ishing them. Co.Litt. 260a. See Dig. 48. 19. 8. 9.
CARCER NON SUPPLICII CAUSA SED CUSTO-DIE CONSTITUTUS. A prison is ordained not for the sake of punishment, but of detention and guarding. Lofft, 119.
CARDINAL. In ecclesiastical law. A dignitary of the court of Rome, next in rank to the pope. There are cardinal bishops, cardinal priests, and cardinal deacons. See Fleury, Hist. Ecclés. liv. xxxv. n. 17, li. n. 19; Thomassin, part. ü. liv.

c. 53, part. iv. liv. 1. cc. 79, 80; Loiseau, Traité des Ordres, c. 3, n. 31; André Droit Canon.
CARDS. In criminal law. Small papers or paste-boards of an oblong or rectangular shape, on which are printed figures or points, used in play-ing certain games. See State v. Lewis, 12 Wis. 434.
CARE. Attention, Seaman v. State, 106 Ohio St. 177, 140 N.E. 108, 111, Lustenberger v. Boston Cas-ualty Co., Mass., 14 N.E.2d 148, 151, 115 A.L.R. 1055; charge, Emery v. Wheeler, 152 A. 624, 626, 129 Me. 428, Lustenberger v. Boston Casualty Co., Mass., 14 N.E.2d 148, 151, 115 A.L.R. 1055; custody, Madison v. State, 163 Tenn. 198, 42 S.W.2d 209, Fox West Coast Theatres v. Union Indemnity Co., 167 Wash. 319, 9 P.2d 78, 81; diligence; discretion; heed, caution, concern, Northern Indiana Power Co. v. West, 218 Ind. 321, 32 N.E.2d 713, 720; in-clination, wish or disposition, Stella v. Downy-flake Restaurant, 126 Conn. 441, 11 A.2d 848, 849; maintenance, Stafford v. Stovall, 109 Okl. 234, 235 P. 238, 239; management, Seaman v. State, 106 Ohio St. 177, 140 N.E. 108, 111; opposite of negli-gence or carelessness, Raymond V. Portland R. Co., 100 Me. 529, 62 A. 602, 605, 3 L.R.A.,N.S., 94; oversight, Emery v. Wheeler, 129 Me. 428, 152 A. 624, 626, Madison v. State, 163 Tenn. 198, 42 S.W.2d 209; prudence, Quanah, A. & P. Ry. Co. v. Eblen, Tex.Civ.App., 55 S.W.2d 1060, 1063; regard, Lus-tenberger v. Boston Casualty Co., Mass., 14 N.E.2d 148, 151, 115 A.L.R. 1055, Arnold v. United States, C.C.A.Colo., 94 F.2d 499, 505; safekeeping, preser-vation, security, Fox West Coast Theatres v. Union Indemnity Co., 167 Wash. 319, 9 P.2d 78, 81; to cause to have care; to trouble; to care for; to regard. Arnold v. United States, C.C.A.Colo., 94 F.2d 499, 505; vigilante; watchfulness.
There are three degrees of care whIch are frequently ree-ognized, corresponding (Inversely) to the three degrees oí negligente, viz.: slight care, ordinary care, and great care.
Slight care Is such as persons of ordinary prudence usu-ally exercise about their own affairs of slight Importante. 25 Okl.St.Ann. § 4. Or it is that degree of care which a person exercises about his own concerns, though he may be a person of less than common prudence or of careless and inattentive disposition. Litchfield v. Whlte, 7 N.Y. 442, 57 Am. Dec. 534; Bank v. Guilmartin, 93 Ga. 503, 21 S. E. 55, 44 Am.St.Rep. 182.
Ordinary care is that degree oí care which persons of ordinary care and prudence are accustomed to use and em-ploy, under the same or similar circumstances. Gunn v. Railroad Co., 36 W.Va. 165, 14 S.E. 465, 32 Am.St.Rep. 842; Railroad Co. v. Howard, 79 Ga. 44, 3 S.E. 426; Llston v. Reynolds, 69 Mont. 480, 223 P. 507, 509; Pauls Valley Compresa & Storage Co. v. Harris, 62 Okl. 103, 162 P. 216, 218. Or it is that degree of care which may reasonably be expected from a person In the party’s situation, that la, reasonable care. Neal v. Gillett, 1855, 23 Conn. 443.
Reasonable care is such a degree of care, precaution, or diligence as may fairly and properly be expected or re-quired, having regard to the nature of the action, or oí the subject-matter, and the circumstances surrounding the transaction. See Johnson v. Hudson River R. Co., 6 Duer, N.Y., 646; Appel v. Eaton & Price Co., 97 Mo.App. 428, 71 S.W. 741; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Noble, 142 III. 578, 32 N. E. 684. It Is such care as an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under the conditions existing at the time he is called upon to act. Midland Valley R. Co. v. Bell, C.C.A.Okl., 242 F. 803, 808; Loverage v. Carmichael, 164 Minn. 76, 204 N.W. 921, 922. Substantially synonymous with ordinary or due care. Kucera v. Grigsby, 24 OhloApp. 457, 156 N.E. 249, 250; Wiley v. Rutland R. Co., 86 Vt. 504, 86 A. 808, 811.
Great care is such as persons of ordlnary prudence usu-ally exercise about affairs of their own which are of great importante; or it 1s that degree of care usually bestowed upon the matter in hand by the most competent, prudent, and careful persona having to do with the particular sub-ject. Railway Co. v. Smith, 87 Tex. 348, 28 S.W. 520; Telegraph Co. v. Cook, Cal., 61 F. 628, 9 C.C.A. 680.
A high degree of care is not the legal equivalent of rea-tonable care. Gallatty v. Central R. of New Jersey, 86 N.J.Law, 416, 92 A. 279, 280. It is that degree of care which a very cautious, careful, and prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances. Bryn-ing v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas, Tex.Civ.App., 167 S.W. 826, 827; a degree of care commensurate with the risk of danger. New Jersey Fidelity & Plato Glass Ins. Co. v. Lehigh Vailey R. Co., 92 N.J.Law, 467, 105 A. 206, 207.
Highest degree of care and utmost degree of care have substantially the same meaning. Erogan v. Union Traction Co., 76 W.Va. 699, 86 S.E. 753, 756. "Highest degree of care" only requires the care and skill exacted of persons engaged in the same or similar business. Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Cockrell, 10 Ala.App. 578, 65 So. 704. It means the highest degree required by law where human safety is at stake, and the highest degree known to the usage and practico of very careful, skillful, and diligent persons engaged in the same business by similar means or agencies. Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Barrett, 179 Ala. 274, 60 So. 262, 264.
This dIvIslon finto three degrees of care, however, does not command universal assent. Raymond v. Portland R. Co., 100 Me. 529, 62 A. 602, 605, 3 L.R.A.,N.S., 94; Pom-roy v. Bangor & Aroostook R. Co., 102 Me. 497, 67 A. 561, 562.
CARELESS. Synonymous with "negligent," the latter being probably the better word in pleadings. Delmore v. Kansas City Hardwood Flooring Co., 90 Kan. 29, 133 P. 151, 47 L.R.A.,N.S., 1220. Ab-sence of ordinary or proper care, Pelfrey v. Com-monwealth, 247 Ky. 484, 57 S.W.2d 474. Reckless, Stout v. Gallemore, 138 Kan. 385, 26 P.2d 573, 577.
CARELESSLY. Without care. Seago v. Paul Jones Realty Co., 185 Mo.App. 292, 170 S.W. 372, 373. Negligently; denoting the absence of ordi-nary care. Jones v. Commonwealth, 213 Ky. 356, 281 S.W. 164, 167.
CARENA. A term used in the old ecclesiastical law to denote a period of forty days.
CARENCE. In French law. Lack of assets; in-solvency.
A proc¿s-verbal de carente is a document setting out that the huissier attended to issue execution upon a judg-ment, but found nothing upon which to levy. Arg.Fr. Merc.Law, 547.
CARETA (spelled, also, Carreta and Carecta). A cart; a cart-load.
CARETORIUS, or CARECTARIUS. A carter. Blount.
CARGA. In Spanish law. An incumbrance; a charge. White, New Recop. b. 2, tit. 13, c. 2, § 2.
CARGAISON. In French commercial law. Car-go; lading.
CARGARE. In old English law. To charge. Spelman.

CARGO. In mercantile law. The load or lading of a vessel; the goods, merchandise, or whatever is conveyed in a ship or other merchant vessel. Seamans v. Loring, 21 Fed.Cas. 920; Thwing v. Insurance Co., 103 Mass. 401, 4 Am.Rep. 567.
While "cargo" 1s primarily the load of the ship, It may have a varying meaning. Pennsylvania Sugar Co. v. Czarnikow-Rionda Co., C.C.A.Pa., 245 F. 913, 915. The term may be applied in such a sense as to Include passen-gers, as well as freight, but in a technical sense lt desig-natos goods only. Wolcott v. Eagle Ins. Co., 4 Pick., Mass., 429. Thus, we say, A cargo of emigrants. See 7 M. & G. 729. 744; Davison v. Von Lingen, 113 U.S. 49, 5 S.Ct. 346, 28 L.Ed. 885.
CARIAGIUM. In old English law. Carriage; the carrying of goods or other things for the king.
CARISTIA. Dearth, scarcity, dearness. Cowell.
CARK. In old English law. A quantity of wool, whereof thirty make a sarplar. (The latter is equal to 2,240 pounds in weight.) St. 27 Hen. VI. c. 2. Jacob.
CARLISLE TABLES. Life and annuity tables, compiled at Carlisle, England, about 1780. Used by actuaries, etc.
CARMACK ACT. An act of Congress, June 29, 1906, 49 U.S.C.A. § 20(11, 12), amending the Hep-burn Act. It supersedes all state regulations; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Miller, 226 U.S. 513, 33 S.Ct. 155, 57 L.Ed. 323.
CARMEN. In the Roman law. Literally, a verse or song. A formula or form of words used on various occasions, as of divorce. Tayl.Civil Law, 349.
CARNAL. Pertaining to the body, its passions and its appetites; animal; fleshly; sensual; im-pure; sexual. People v. Battilana, 52 Cal.App.2d 685, 126 P.2d 923, 928.
CARNAL ABUSE. An act of debauchery of the female sexual organs by those of the male which does not amount to penetration;—the offense com-monly called statutory rape consists of carnal abuse. State v. Huggins, 84 N.J.Law, 254, 87 A. 630, 633. An injury to the genital organs in an attempt at carnal knowledge, falling short of actual penetration. Snyder v. State, 92 Ohio St. 167, 110 N.E. 644, 645. Carnal knowledge of a female child of tender age includes abuse. Daw-kins v. State, 58 Ala. 376, 29 Am.Rep. 754.
CARNAL KNOWLEDGE. Coitus; copulation; the act of a man in having sexual bodily connec-tion with a woman; sexual intercourse. State v. Normandale, 154 La. 523, 97 So. 798, 800; Patton v. State, 105 Tex.Cr.R. 128, 287 S.W. 51, 52. There is "carnal knowledge" if there is the slightest pen-etration of the sexual organ of the female by the sexual prgan of the male. It is not necessary that the vagina be entered or that the hymen be ruptured; the entering of the vulva or labia is suf-ficient. State v. Huggins, 84 N.J.Law, 254, 87 A. 630, 633.

CARNALITER. In old criminal law. Carnally. Carnalitisr cognovit, carnally knew. Technical words in indictments for rape, and held essential.
1 Hale, P.C. 637-639.
CARNALLY KNEW. In pleading. A technical phrase in an indictment to charge the defenclant with the crime of rape. Some authorities suggest that the words "carnally knew" are included in the term "rapuit" and are therefore unnecessary;
2 Hawk.P.C. c. 25, § 56; 2 Stark.Cr.P1. 431, n. (e) ; at least in states in which the statutes do not des-ignate the crime by the words "did ravish and carnally know"; 1 Hale, P.C. 628, 632; 3 Russell, Cr. (6th ed.) 230. See Noble v. State, 22 Ohio St. 545; Dawkins v. State, 58 Ala. 378, 29 Am.Rep. 754.
CARNO. In old English law. An immunity or privilege. Cowell.
CAROOME. In English law. A license by the lord mayor of London to keep a cart.
CARPEMEALS. Cloth made in the northern parts uf England, of a coarse kind, mentioned in 7 Jac. I. c. 16. Jacob.
CARRERA. In Spanish law. A carriage-way: the right of a carriage-way. Las Partidas, pt. 3, tit. 31, 1. 3.
CARRIAGE. A vehicle used especially for the transportation of persons either for pleasure or business, and drawn by horses or other draught animals over the ordinary streets and highways of the country; not including cars used exclusively upon railroads or street railroads expressly con-structed for the use of such cars. Snyder v. North Lawrence, 8 Kan. 84; Cream City R. Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 63 Wis. 93, 23 N.W. 425, 53 Am.Rep. 267.
The act of carrying, or a contract for transporta-tion of persons or goods.
As used In exemption statutes, Includes en automobile, Patten v. Sturgeon, C.C.A.Okl., 214 F. 65, 67, Hammond v. Pickett, Tex.Civ.App., 158 S.W. 174, 175, and it includes motor vehicles under various other circumstances. Ansell v. City of Boston. 254 Mass. 208, 150 N.E. 167, 168; State v. Tarvis, 89 Vt. 239, 95 A. 541, 543.
In admiralty, "carriage" Includes abilfty to lift a cargo and hola it afloat, and does not necessarlly involve any transiation of the vessel from one place to another. The Tungshoved, D.C.N.Y., 272 F. 122, 124.
The business of carriage 1s that arising under contracts by which a person obligates himself, for an agreed price, to transport, or have transported, an object of some kind, to a designated place. Kocke v. Garnler, 15 La.App. 461, 131 So. 198, 199.
The contract of carriage is a contract for the conveyance of property, persons, or messages, from one place to an-other. Civ.Code Cal. 9 2085; Comp.Laws N.D.1913, 1 6185; Comp.Laws S.D.1929, 1108.
As to "carriage by land or water" within the Illinois Workmen’s Compensation Act, see Stevens v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 306 III. 370, 137 N.E. 859, 861; Mattoon Clear Water Co. v. Industrial Commisslon, 291 III. 487, 126 N.E. 168, 169.
CARRICLE, or CARRACLE. A ship of great bur-den.
CARRIER. One undertaking to transport persons or property, Windham v. Pace, 192 S.E. 271, 6

S.E.2d 270, 274; or one employed in or engaged in the business of carrying goods for others for hire. Roeske v. Lamb, 39 N.M. 111, 41 P.2d 522, 523.
In common speech, "carriers" means transportation sys-tems as distinguished from corporations owning or operat-Ing them. Virginian Ry. Co. v. Mullens, 271 U.S. 220, 46 S.Ct. 526, 529, 70 L.Ed. 915. And this is its meaning as used in the Federal Control Act, 9 10. Mlssouri Pac. R. Co. v. Ault, 256 U.S. 554, 41 S.Ct. 593, 65 L.Ed. 1087; Birmingham Trust & Savings Co. v. Atlanta, B. & A. Ry. Co., D.C.Ga., 271 F. 731, 739 (Transportation Act). An electric rallway that is part of the "general stearn-railroad system" is a "carrier" subject to the Railway Labor Act, Sprague v. Woll, C.C.A.I11., 124 F.2d 767, 769.
A school bus acts as a "carrier." Leach v. School Dist. No. 322 of Thurston County, 197 Wash. 384, 85 P.2d 666, 667.
Carriers are either common or private. Stand-ard Oil Co. v. Public Service Commission of Wis-consin, 21.7 Wis. 563, 259 N.W. 598.
Common carriers are those that hold themselves out or undertake to carry persons or goods of all persons indif-ferently, or of all who choose to employ it, Merchants Par-col Delivery v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission. 150 Pa.Super. 120, 28 A.2d 340, 344; Burnett v. Riter. Tex.Civ. App., 276 S.W. 347, 349; or those whose occupation or business is transportation of persons or things for hire or reward, In re Rodgers, Neb., 279 N.W. 800, 803, 804.
Common carriers of passengers are those that undertake to carry all persons indifferently who may apply for pas-sage. so long as there is room, and there is no legal excuse for refusal. Lazor v. Banas, 114 Pa.Super. 425, 174 A. 817, 819; Anderson v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 100 Misc. 411, 166 N.Y.S. 640, 642.
Private carrlers are those who transport or undertake to transport in a particular inetance for hire or reward: Allen v. Sackrider, 37 N.Y. 341; Columbus-CincinnatI Trucking Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 141 Ohio St. 228, 47 N.E.2d 623, 625, 626.
For "Extension", see that title.
CARRIER’S LIEN. The right to hold the con-signee’s cargo until payment is made for the work of transporting it. Sommers Const. Co. v. At-lantic Coast Line R. Co., 62 Ga.App. 23, 7 S.E.2d 429, 431.
CARROTED FUR. Fur that has been treated by a solution of nitrate of mercury, so as to remove the water-repellant substance covering the fibers, making them more pliable and more easily to interlock with other fibers of fur, or of wool. Mat-teawan Mfg. Co. v. Emmons Bros. Co., C.C.A. Mass., 253 F. 372, 375.
CARRUCA. See Caruca.
CARRY. To bear, bear about, sustain, transport, remove, or convey. To have or bear upon or about one’s person, as a watch or weapon;—loco-motion not being essential. State v. Nieto, 101 Ohio St. 409, 130 N.E. 663, 665. Compare Heaton v. State, 130 Tenn. 163, 169 S.W. 750. As applied to insurance, means "possess" or "hold." San Francisco Realty Co. v. Linnard, 98 Cal.App. 33, 276 P. 368, 370.
CARRY A MEMBER. To pay the assessments against a sick or indigent member, as of a bene-ficial association, the pay/ lent being made by the other members or the local lodge or camp on his behalf. Bennett v. Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World, Tex.Civ.App., 168 S.W. 1023, 1026.

CARRY AN ELECTION. For a candidate to be elected, or a measure carried, at an election, he or it must receive a majority or a plurality of the legal votes cast. McKinney v. Barker, 180 Ky. 526, 203 S.W. 303, 304, L.R.A.1918E, 581.
CARRY ARMS 011 WEAPONS. To wear, bear, or carry them upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose of use, or for the purpose of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in case of a conflict with another person. State v. Carter, 36 Tex. 89; State v. Mur-ray, 39 Mo.App. 128.
CARRY COSTS. A verdict is said to carry costs when the party for whom the verdict is given be-comes entitled to the payment of his costs as in-cident to such verdict.
CARRY ON TRADE OR BUSINESS. To conduct, prosecute or continue a particular avocation or business as a continuous operation or permanent occupation. The repetition of acts may be suf-ficient. Lichtenstein v. State, 34 Ga.App. 138, 128 S.E. 704; Ledgerwood v. Dashiell, Tex.Civ.App., 177 S.W. 1010, 1012; Martin v. Bankers’ Trust Co., 18 Ariz. 55, 156 P. 87, 90, Ann.Cas.1918E, 1240; Territory v. Harris, 8 Mont. 140, 19 P. 286; Hutch-ings v. Burnet, 61 App.D.C. 109, 58 F.2d 514. To hold one’s self out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or services. Helvering v. High-land, C.C.A.4, 124 F.2d 556, 561.
CARRY PASSENGERS FOR A CONSIDERA-TION. Transportation of persons under such conditions that operator owes them duty of car-rier for hire. Cartos v. Hartford Accident & In. demnity Co., 160 Va. 505, 169 S.E. 594, 597.
CARRY STOCK. To provide funds or credit for its payment for the period agreed upon from the date of purchase. Saltus v. Genin, 16 N.Y.Super. Ct. 260. And see Pickering v. Demerritt, 100 Mass. 421.
CARRY THE IRON. See Fire Ordeal under the title Ordeal.
CARRYING AWAY. In criminal law. The act of removal or asportation, by which the crime of larceny is completed, and which is essential to con-stitute it. Gettinger v. State, 13 Neb. 308, 14 N.W. 403.
CART. In its ordinary and primary acceptation, a carriage with two wheels; yet it may mean a carriage in general, Favers v. Glass, 22 Ala. 624, 58 Am.Dec. 272; but not an automobile, Whitney v. Welnitz, 153 Minn. 162, 190 N.W. 57, 28 A.L.R. 68. The vehicle in which criminals are taken to execution.
CART BOTE. Wood or timber which a tenant is allowed by law to take from an estate, for the purpose of repairing instruments, (including nec-essary vehicles,) of husbandry. 2 Bl.Comm. 35. See Bote.CARTA.
In old English law. A charter, or deed. Any written instrument.
In Spanish law. A leiter; a deed; a power of attorney. Las Partidas, pt. 3, tit. 18, 1. 30.
CARTA MERCATORIA. A grant (1303) to cer-tain foreign merchants, in return for custom du-ties, of freedom to deal %.vholesale in all cities and towns of England, power to export their mer-chandise, and liberty to dwell where they pleased, together with other rights pertaining to speedy justice; 1 Holdsw.Hist.E.L. 311.
CARTE. In French marine law. A chart.
CARTE BLANCHE. A white sheet of paper; an instrument signed, but otherwise left blank. A sheet given to an agent, with the principal’s sig-nature appended, to be filled up with any contract or engagement as the agent may see fit. Hence, metaphorically, unlimited authority.
CARTEL.
In Trade and Commeree
A combination of producers of any product joined together to control its production, sale, and price, and to obtain a monopoly in any particular industry or commodity. Also, an association by agreement of companies or sections of companies having common interests, designed to prevent ex-treme or unfair competition and allocate mar-kets, and to promote the interchange of knowl-edge resulting from scientific and technical re-search, exchange of patent rights, and standardiza-tion of products. U. S., v. National Lead Co., D.C. N.Y., 63 F.Supp. 513.
State of War
An agreement between two hostile powers for the deliver-y of prisoners or deserters, or authoriz-ing certain non-hostile intercourse between each other which would otherwise be prevented by the state of war; for example, agreements for inter-communication by post, telegraph, telephone, rail-way. II Op. 282.
Duel
A written challenge to a duel.
CARTULARY. A place where papers or records are kept.
In the plural; Ancient English reeords containing docu-ments and legal proceedings–the munintents of -Ude of the great landowners, and other miscellaneous documents. 2 Holdsw.Hist.E.L. 273. See 1 Poli. & tlaitl. p. xxii.
CARUCA, or CARCA. A plow. A four-wheeled carriage. A team for a plow, or four oxen abreast. See Carucata.
CARUCAGE. In old English law. A kind of tax or tribute anciently imposed. upon every plow, (carue or plow-land,) for the public service. Spel-man. The act of plowing.
CARUCATA, CARUCATE. A certain quantity of land used as the basis for taxation. A cartload. As much land as may be tilled by a single plow in a year and a day. Skene, de ‘verb, sig. A plow land of one hundred acres. Ken. Gloss. The

quantity varíes in different counties from sixty to one hundred and twenty acres. Whart. See Lit-tleton, Ten. cclxii; 2 Holdsw.Hist.E.L. 56; Maitl. Domesday Book and Beyond 395; 1 L.J.R. 96. Also, a team of cattle, or a cart-load. See Bovata terrw.
CARUCATARIUS. One who held lands in carv-age, or plow-tenure. Cowell.
CARUE. A carve of land; plow-land. Britt. c. 84.
CARVAGE. The same as carucage, (q. v.) Cow-ell.
CARVE. In old English law. A carucate or plow-land.
CAS FORTUIT. Fr. In the law of insurance. A fortuitous event; an inevitable accident.
CASATA. In old English law. A house with land sufficient for the support of one family. Other-wise called "hila," a hide of land, and by Bede, "familia." Spelman.
CASATUS. A vassal or feudal tenant possessing a casata; that is, having a house, household, and property of his own.
CASE.

Action, Cause, Suit, or Controversy

A general term for an action, cause, suit, or controversy, at law or in equity; a question con-tested before a court of justice; an aggregate of facts which furnishes occasion for the exercise of the jurisdiction of a court of justice. Quoted with approval in Kelly v. Roetzel, 64 Okl. 36, 165 P. 1150, 1153. See, also, Gebhard v. Sattler, 40 Iowa, 156; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 352, 4 L.Ed. 97. A controversy that is litigated. City of Akron v. Roth, 88 Ohio St. 456, 103 N.E. 465, 467. A cause of action. Strother v. Union Pac. R. Co., D.C.Mo., 220 F. 731, 732; Colla v. Carmichael U-Drive Autos, 111 Cal.App. 378, 294 P. 378, 380.
The word ”case" or "cause" means a judicial proceeding for the determination of a controversy between parties wherein rights are enforced or protected, or wrongs are prevented or redressed, Ex parte Chesser, 93 Fla. 590, 112 So. 87, 90; any proceeding judicial in its nature, Mc-Carthy v. Clancy, 110 Conn. 482, 148 A. 551, 557.
Case of actual controversy. The phrase in Federal De-claratory Judement Act connotes controversy of justiciable nature, excluding advisory decree on hypothetical facts. John P. Agnew & Co., Inc. v. Hoage, App.D.C., 69 App.D. C. 116, 99 F.2d 349, 351.
Case sufficient to go to a jury. A case that has proceed-ed upon sufficient proof to that stage where it must be sub-mitted to jury and not decided against the state as a mat-ter of law. State v. McDonough, 129 Conn. 483, 29 A.2d 582, 584.
Cases and controversies. Thls term, as used In the consti-tution of the United States, embraces claims or contentlons of litigants brought before the court for adjudication by regular proceedings established for the protection or en-forcement of rights, or the prevention, redress, or punish-ment of wrongs; and whenever the claim or contention of a party takes such a form that the judicial power is cap-able of acting upon it, it has become a case or controversy. Interstate Commerce Com’n v. Brlmson, 154 U.S. 447, 14 Sup.Ct. 1125, 38 L.Ed. 1047. These two terms are to be distinguished; for there may be a "separable controversy" within a "case," which may be removed from a state court to a federal court, though the case as a whole is not removable. Snow v. Smith, C.C.Va., 88 Fed. 658. The term "controversies", if distinguishable frofn "cases", is so in that it is less comprehensive than the term "cases" and includes only suits of a civil nature, Smith v. Blackwell, C.C.A.S.C., 115 F.2d 186, 188

Applications and Special Proceedings

The wotd "case" may include application for divorce, applications for the establishment of high-ways, applications for orders of support of rela-tives, and other special proceedings unknown to the common law. S. D. Warren Co. v. Fritz, 138 Me. 279, 25 A.2d 645, 648.

Box or Container
A box or container, as for cans or bottles filled with milk or other liquid goods. Ex parte Rein-
eger, 184 Cal. 97, 193 P. 81, 83.

Event, Happening, etc.

In ordinary usage, the word "case" means "event," "happening," "situation," "circumstances." Highfield v. Delaware Trust Co., Del.Super., 188 A. 919, 922.

Form of Action

A form of action which lies to recover damages for injuries for which the more ancient forms of action will not lie. Steph.Pl. 15. An abbreviated form of the title "trespass on the case," q. v. Munal v. Brown, C.C.Colo., 70 F. 968. See, also, Wadleigh v. Katahdin Pulp & Paper Co., 116 Me. 107, 100 A. 150, 151. Action where injury is mere-ly consequential. Mawson v. Vess Beverage Co., Mo.App., 173 S.W.2d 606, 612, 613

Grand Jury Inquiry

As used in statute authorizing a challenge to an individual grand juror, any matter that might become subject of inquiry by grand jury. People v. Prior, 268 App.Div. 717, 54 N.Y.S.2d 150, 153.

Statement of Facts

A statement of the facts involved in a transac-tion or series of transactions, drawn up in writing in a technical form, for submission to a court or judge for decision or opinion. Under this meaning of the term are included a "case made" for a mo-tion for new trial, a "case reserved" on the trial of a cause, an "agreed case" for decision without trial, etc.
Case agreed on. A formal written enumeration of the facts in a case, assented to by both parties as corct and complete, and submitted to the court by their agreement, in order that a decision may be rendered without a trial, upon the court’s conclusions of law upon the facts as stat-ed.
Case for motion. In English divorce and probate practice, when a party desires to make a motion, he must among other papers, a case for motion, contalning an ab-stract of the proceedings in the sult or action, a statement of the circumstances on which the motion is founded, and the prayer or nature of the decree or order desired. Browne, Div. 251; Browne, Prob.Pr. 295.
Case-malle. A statement of facts in relation to a disputed point of law, agreed to by both parties and submitted to the court without a preceding action. This is found only in the ade states. See De Armond v. Whitaker, 99 Ala. 252, 13 So. 613; A complete record of each successive ac-

tion of the trial court at the trial, including testimony. In re Opinion of the Judges, 29 Okl.Cr. 27, 232 P. 121, 122. A "case-made" consists of those things which transpired in court during the trial, and which are not a part of the record. Jones v. State, 9 Okl.Cr. 189, 130 P. 1178.
Case on appeal. In American practice. Before the argu-ment in the appellate court of a case brought there for re-view, the appellant’s counsel prepares a document or brief, bearing this name, for the information of the court. de-tailing the testimony and the proceedings below. In Eng-lish practice. The "case on appeal" is a printed statement prepared by each of the parties to an appeal to the house of lords or the prlvy council, setting out methodically the facts which make up his case, with appropriate references to the evidence printed in the "appendix." The term also denotes a written statement, prepared and transmitted by an inferior court or judge raising a question of law for the opinion of a superior court.
Case reservad. A statement in wrItIng of the facts proved on the trial of a cause, drawn up and settled by the at-torneys and counsel for the respective parties under the supervision of the judge, for the purpose of having certain points of law, which arose at the trial and could not then be satisfactorily decided, determinad upon full argument before the court In banc. This is otherwise called a ”spe-cial case;" and It is usual for the parties, where the law of the case Is doubtful, to agree that the jury shall find a general verdict for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the court upon such a case to be made, instead of obtain-ing from the jury a special verdict. 3 BI.Comm. 378; 3 Steph.Comm. 621; Steph.Pl. 92, 93; 1 Burrill, Pr. 242, 463.
Case stated. In practice. An agreement in wrlting, be-tween a plaintiff and defendant, that the facts in dispute between them are as therein agreed upon and set forth. 3 Sharsw.Bla.Comm. 453, n.; 6 Term, 313. A case agreed upon, A statement of all the facts of a case, with the names of the witnesses, and a detall of the documents which are to support them. A statement of agreed facts. Caissie v. City of Cambridge, 317 Mass. 346, 58 N.E.2d 169. An au-ditor’s report. Hanifin v. C. & R. Const. Co., 313 Mass. 651, 48 N.E.2d 913, 918. A brief. As to the distinction be-tween submission on a case stated and a submission merely un agreed facts, see Frati v. Jannini, 226 Mass. 430, 115 N.E. 746, 747.
Case to move for new trial. In practice. A case prepared by the party against whom a verdict has been given, upon which to move the court to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial.

Supplementary Proceedings

The word "cases" in section providing that "act shall apply in all cases now pending or hereafter instituted in which the final decree of divorce was recorded prior to the effective date of this act", is synonym of "supplementary proceedings". Chia-petta v. Jordan, 16 So.2d 641, 644, 153 Fla. 788.
CASE LAW. The aggregate of reported cases as forming a body of jurisprudence, or the law of a particular subject as evidenced or formed by the adjudged cases, in distinction to statutes and other sources of law.
CASE SYSTEM. A method of teaching or study-ing the science of the law by a study of the cases historically, or by the inductive method. It was introduced in the Law School of Harvard Univer-sity in 1869-70 by Christopher C. Langdell, Dane Professor of Law.
CASEMENT. A window sash opening on hinges affixed to the upright side of the frame, and in-eludes wooden as well as steel construction. John-son Metal Products Co. v. Lundell-Eckberg Mfg. Co., D.C.N.Y., 18 F.Supp. 572, 574.

CASH. Money or its equivalent; usually ready money. Kerlin v. Young, 159 Ga. 95, 125 S.E. 204, 207; Britain v. Rice, Tex.Civ.App., 204 S.W. 254, 256.
Money in hand, either in current coin or other legal ten-der, or in bank bilis or check paid and received as money. Dunlap v. Whitmer, 133 La. 317, 62 So. 938, 943, Ann.Cas. 1915C, 990. Bank deposits, In re Feist’s Will, 170 Misc. 497, 10 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508; Lane v. Railey, 280 Ky. 319, 133 S. W.2d 74, 79, 80. Bank notes or sight drafts, Lane v. Raí-ley, 280 Ky. 319, 133 S.W.2d 74, 79, 80. Bank’s deposit certiflcate. Bingham v. Montcalm County, 251 Mich. 651, 232 N.W. 348, check, Van Decar v. Streeter, 136 Misc. 206, 240 N.Y.S. 492, 497. Commercial paper. Commercial Credit Corporation v. Third & Lafayette Streets Garage, 131 Misc. 786. 228 N.Y.S. 166, 168. Currency, coin, specie. Lane v. Railey, 280 Ky. 319, 133 S.W.2d 74, 79, 80. Whatever can be used as money without being converted Into another form. That which circulates as money, including bank bilis. Hooper v. Flood, 54 Cal. 221; Dazel v. Landry, 21 Nev. 291, 30 Pac. 1064; United States v. Williams, D.C. Wash., 282 F. 324, 325. The term may Include currency, municipal orders, warrants, or strip. Arkansas Public Utilities Co. v. Incorporated Town of Beber Springs, 151 Ark. 249, 235 S.W. 999, 1001. It is frequently used as an antonym of "credit." Parrish v. American Ry. Employees’ Pub. Corporation, 83 Cal.App. 298, 256 P. 590, 591; State v. Woodward, 208 Ala. 31, 93 So. 826.
CASH ACCOUNT. A record, in bookkeeping, of all cash transactions; an account of moneys re-ceived and expended.
CASH BOOK. In bookkeeping, an account book in which is kept a record of all cash transactions, or all cash received and expended.
The object of the cash book ís to afford a constant facili-ty to ascertain the true state of a man’s cash. Pardessus, n. 87.
CASH CONTRACT. A "cash contract," as of a municipal corporation, is one not creating a debt within the constitution. Jeffersonville v. Cotton State Belting Supply Co., 30 Ga.App. 470, 118 S. E. 442.
CASH DISCOUNT. A deduction from billed price which seller allows for payment within a certain time. Leonard v. U. S., Ct.Cl., 7 F.Supp. 295, 297.
CASI’ MARKET VALUE. "Fair market value", "reasonable market value" or "fair cash market value" as synonymous. Housing Authority of Birmingham Dist. v. Title Guarantee Loan & Trust Co., 243 Ala. 157, 8 So.2d 835, 837. For "Fair Cash Market Value," see that title.
CASH NOTE. In England. A bank-note of a provincial bank or of the Bank of England.
CASH PRICE. A price payable in cash at the time of sale of property, in opposition to a barter or a sale on credit.
CASH SALE. A sale for money in hand. Steward v. Scudder, 24 N.J.Law, 101; Bass v. Green & Yates, 201 Ala. 515, 78 So. 869. A sale conditioned on payment concurrent with delivery. Weyer-haeuser Timber Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 150 Or. 172, 43 P.2d 1078, 1081. See, further, Sale.
CASH SURRENDER VALUE. The "cash sur-render value" of a life policy is the reserve less a surrender charge. Guggenheim v. Rasquin, U.S. N.Y., 312 U.S. 254, 61 S.Ct. 507, 508, 85 L.Ed. 813.
CASH VALUE. The cash value of an article or piece of property is the price which it would bring at private sale (as distinguished from a forced or auction sale) the tern-is of sale requiring the pay-ment of the whole price in ready money, with no deferrecl payments. Tax Com’rs v. Holliday, 150 Ind. 216, 49 N.E. 14, 42 L.R.A. 826; Cummings v. Bank, 101 U.S. 162, 25 L.Ed. 903. For "Fair Cash Value," see that title.
Actual value or market value, Fort Worth & D. N. Ry. Co. v. Sugg, Tex.Civ.App., 68 S.W.2d 570, 572; Yeoman Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. State Board of Assessment, 229 Iowa 220, 294 N.W. 330, 334. Clear market value or fair market value. In re Ryerson’s Estate, 239 Wis. 120, 300 N.W. 782, 784. Price property will bring on sale by one de-siring, but not compelled, to sell to one desiring, but not compelled, to purchase. Insurance Co. of North America v. McGraw, 255 Ky. 839, 75 S.W.2d 518, 520. Saleable value, In re Lang Body Co., C.C. A.Ohio, 92 F.2d 338, 340. Usual selling price at private sale and not at a forced or auction sale. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co. v. Union Title Guar-antee Co., 175 La. 183, 143 So. 43, value at which property would be taken in payment of just debt from solvent debtor. Bank of Fairfield v. Spokane County, 173 Wash. 145, 22 P.2d 646, 652.
CASHIER, y. In military law. To deprive a mili-tary officer of his rank and office.
CASHIER, n. An officer of a moneyed institu-tion, or commercial house, or bank, who is in-trusted with, and whose duty it is to take care of, the cash or money of such institution or bank. A custodian of the money of a bank, mercantile house, and the like. Miller v. State, 88 Tex.Cr. R. 69, 225 S.W. 379, 381, 12 A.L.R. 597.
The cashler of a bank Is its chief executive oflicer. Pem-iscot County Bank v. Central-State Nat. Bank, 132 Tenn. 152, 177 S.W. 74, 75; Bank of Commerce of Chanute v. Sacos, 96 Kan. 437, 152 P. 28, 29. He is its chief financial( agent, through whom its principal financial dealings are conducted; Brown v. Mt. Holly Nat. Bank, 288 Pa. 478,l 136 A. 773, 775; and ís peculiarly that agency authorized’ to make loans and collections, whose special duty ít is to give direction to and further the stockholders’ interests; People’s Bank of Calhoun v. Harry L. Winter, Inc., 161 Ga. 898, 132 S.E. 422, 424.
He recelves and pays out its moneys, collects and pays lts debts, and receives and transfers its commercial securi-ties. Tellers and other subordinate oflicers may be appoint-ed, but they are under his direction, and are, as it were, the arms by which designated portions of his various func-tions are discharged. Merchants’ Nat. Bank v. State Nat. Bank, 10 Wall. 650, 19 L.Ed. 1008.
CASHIERED. Dismissal with ignominy or dis-honor, or in disgrace. Metropolis Co. v. Croasdell, 145 Fla. 455, 199 So. 568, 569.
CASHIER’S CHECK. See Check.
CASHLITE. An amercement or fine; a mulct.
CASING–READ GAS. Natural gas from an oil well, saturated with oil vapors or gasoline. 58 C.J.S. p. 26.

—Casing-head gasoline. Sometimes called natur-al gasoline. It is produced from casing-head gas by compression or separation of the gases which come from oil wells. 58 C.J.S. p. 21.
CASKET. In one sense, a coffin. Ware v. State, 31 Ga.App. 554, 121 S.E. 251.
CASSARE. To quash; to render void; to break. Du Cange.
CASSATION. In French law. Annulling; re-versal; hreaking the force and validity of a judg-ment. A decision emanating from the sovereign authority, by which a decree or judgment in the court of last resort is broken or annulled. Merl. Repert.
CASSATION, COURT OF. (Fr. tour de cassa-tion.) The highest court in France; so termed from possessing the power to quash (casser) the decrees of inferior courts. It is a court of ap-peal in criminal as well as civil cases.
CASSETUR BULLA. (Lat. That the bill be quashed.) In practice. The form of the judg-ment for the defendant on a plea in abatement, where the action was commenced by bill, (billa.) 3 Bl.Comm. 303; Steph.Pl. 128, 131. The form of an entry made by a plaintiff on the record, after a plea in abatement, where he found that the plea could not be confessed and avoided, nor traversed, nor demurred to; amounting in fact to a discon-tinuance of the action. 2 Archb.Pr.K.B. 3, 236; 1 Tidd, Pr. 683.
CASSETUR BREVE. (Lat. That the writ be quashed.) In practice. The form of the judg-ment for the defendant on a plea in abatement, where the action was commenced by original writ (breve). 3 BI.Comm. 303; Steph.Pl. 107, 109.
A judgment sometimes entered against a plain-tiff at his request when, in consequence of allega-tions of the defendant, he can no longer prosecute his suit with effect. 5 Term 634.
CASSOCK, or CASSULA. A garment worn by a priest.
CAST, y. In old English practice. To allege, offer, or present; to proffer by way of excuse (as to "cast an essoin").
This word is now used as a popular, rather than a technical, term, in the sense of to over-come, overthrow, or defeat in a civil action at law. It also means to deposit formally or officially. Maddox v. Board of State Canvassers, Mont., 149 P.2d 112, 115; Port of Palm Beach Dist. v. State, 156 Fla. 99, 22 So.2d 581, 582. It is also used in connection with the imposition upon a party liti-gant of costs in the suit: as, A. is "cast" for the costs of the case.
CAST AWAY. To cast away a ship is to do such an act upon or in regard to it as causes it to perish or be lost, so as to be irrecoverable by ordi-nary means. The term is synonymous with "de-stroy," which means to unfit a vessel for service beyond the hope of recovery by ordinary means. U. S. v. Vanranst, 28 Fed.Cas. 360.

CASTEL, or CASTLE. A fortress in a town; the principal mansion of a nobleman. 3 Inst. 31.
CASTELLAIN. In old English law. The lord, owner, or captain of a castle; the constable of a fortified house; a person having the custody of one of the crown mansions; an officer of the forest.
CASTELLANUS. A castellain; the keeper or con-stable of a castle. Spelman.
CASTELLARIUM, CASTELLATUS. In old Eng-lish law. The precinct or jurisdiction of a castle. Blount.
CASTELLOR’UM OPERATIO. In Saxon and old English law. Castle work. Service and labor done by inferior tenants for the building and upholding of castles and public places of defense. One of the three necessary charges, (trinado necessitas,) to which all Lands among the Saxons were expressly subject. Cowell. Towards this some gave their personal service, and others, a contribution of money or goods. 1 Bla.Comm. 263.
CASTIGATORY. An engine used to punish wom-en who have been convicted of being common scolds. It is sometimes called the trebucket, tum-brel, ducking-stool, or cucking-stool. U. S. v. Royall, 27 Fed.Cas. 907.
CASTING VOTE. Where the votes of a delibera-tive assembly or legislative body are equally divid-ed on any question or motion, it is the privilege of the presiding officer to cast one vote (if other-wise he would not be entitled to any vote) on either side, or to cast one additional vote, if he has ‘ already voted as a member of the body. This is called the "casting vote." Brown v. Foster, 88 Me. 49, 33 A. 662, 31 L.R.A. 116.
CASTLEGUARD. In feudal law. An imposition anciently laid upon such persons as lived within a certain distante of any castle, towards the main-tenance of such as watched and warded the castle.
CASTLEGUARD RENTS. In old English law. Rents paid by those that dwelt within the pre-cincts of a castle, towards the maintenance of such as watched and warded it.
CASTRENSIS. In the Roman law. Relating to the camp or military service.
Castrense peculium, a portion of property which a son acquired in war, or from his connection with the camp. Dig. 49, 17.
CASTRUM. Lat.
In Roman law. A camp.
In old English law. A castle. Bract. fol. 69b. A castle, including a manor. 4 Coke, 88.
CASU CONSIMILI. In old English law. A writ of entry, granted where tenant by the curtesy, or tenant for life, alienated in fee, or in tall, or for another’s life, which was brought by him in rever-sion against the party to whom such tenant so alienated to his prejudice, and in the tenant’s life-time. Termes de la Ley. See Consimili Casu.

CASU PROVISO. Lat. In the case provided for. A writ of entry frarned under the provisions of the statute of Gloucester (6 Edw. I.) c. 7, which lay for the benefit of the reversioner when a tenant in dower aliened in fee or for lite.
CASUAL. Accidental, Gray v. Greenwood, 32 A. 2d 347, 350, 21 N.J.Misc. 137; Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Owens, Tex.Civ.App., 54 S.W.2d 848, 853; Sonnenberg v. Berg’s Market, 227 Mo.App. 391, 55 S.W.2d 494; by chance, Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Owens, Tex.Civ.App., 54 S.W.2d 848, 853; coming by chance, Lawrenz v. Langford Electric Co., 206 Minn. 315, 288 N.W. 727, 731; Norris v. Koenig, Mo.App., 183 S.W.2d -160, 162; fortuitous, Sonnen-berg v. Berg’s Market, 227 Mo.App. 391, 55 S.W.2d 494, 495. Happening or coming to pass without design and without being foreseen or expected. Root v. Topeka Ry. Co., 96 Kan. 694, 153 P. 550; Ranson-Rooney Co. v. Overseas Ry., 17 La.App. 205, 134 So. 765, 768; impermanent, Board of Sup’rs of Amherst County v. Boaz, 176 Va. 126, 10 S.E.2d 498, 500; incidental, Mason v. Wampler, 89 Ind.App. 483, 166 N.E. 885, 886, Coffin v. Hook, Ind.App., 45 N.E.2d 369, 372; indeterminate, Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Owens, Tex.Civ.App., 54 S.W.2d 848, 853; irregular, Gardner v. Trustees of Main St. M. E. Church of Ottumwa, 217 Iowa, 1390, 250 N.W. 740; liable to happen, subject to chance or accident, Coffin v. Hook, 112 Ind.App. 549, 45 N.E. 2d 369, 372; occasional, Cardillo v. Mockabee, 70 App.D.C. 16, 102 F.2d 620, 622; uncertain, Coffin v. Hook, 112 Ind.App. 549, 45 N.E.2d 369, 372; un-expected, Gray v. Greenwood, 21 N.J.Misc. 137, 32 A.2d 347, 350; Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Owens, Tex.Civ.App., 54 S.W.2d 848, 853; unforeseen, Tex-as & N. O. R. Co. v. Owens, Tex.Civ.App., 54 S.W. 2d 848, 853; Lawrenz v. Langford Electric Co., 206 Minn. 315, 288 N.W. 727, 731; unpremeditated, Lawrenz v. Langford Electric Co., 206 Minn. 315, 288 N.W. 727, 731; without regularity, Norris v. Koenig, Mo.App., 183 S.W.2d 160, 162; Sonnenberg v. Berg’s Market, 227 Mo.App. 391, 55 S.W.2d 494.
CASUAL BETTOR. An occasional and irregular bettor who is not guilty of crime of engaging in betting and gambling organized and carried on as a systematic business. Bamman v. Erickson, 288 N.Y. 133, 41 N.E.2d 920, 922.
CASUAL DEFICENCY OF REVENDE. An un-foreseen or unexpected deficiency, or an insuffi-ciency of funds to meet some unforeseen and necessary expense. Atlanta Distributing Termi-nals v. Board of Com’rs etc., of Fulton County, 177 Ga. 250, 170 S.E. 52, 56.
CASUAL DEFICIT. A deficit happening by chance or accident and without design. State Budget Commission v. Lebus, 244 Ky. 700, 51 S.W.2d 965.
CASUAL EJECTOR. In practice. The nominal defendant in an action of ejectment. French v. Robb, 67 N.J.Law, 260, 51 A. 509, 57 L.R.A. 956.
CASUAL EMPLOYEE. Though courts have re-frained from defining "casual employee" as suchterm is used in the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the test in the particular case is whether service rendered or work done, rather than contract of hiring, is of casual nature; infrequency of em-ployment or its duration being immaterial. Hygeia Ice & Coal Co. v. Schaeffer, 152 Md. 231, 136 A. 548, 551.
As regards whether an employee is a "casual" employee the word "casual" means something happening without design and unexpeetedly. Ward v. Ocean Forest Club, 188 S.C. 233, 198 S.E. 385.
CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. Employment at uncer-tain times or irregular intervals. Johnson v. Wis-consin Lumber & Supply Co., 203 Wis. 304, 234 N.W. 506, 507, 72 A.L.R. 1279; employment by chance, fortuitously, and for no fixed time, Boyd v. Philmont Country Club, 129 Pa.Super. 135, 195 A. 156, 157, 158; employment casual and not in usual course of trade, business, occupation or profession of employer. Kunkler v. Mauck, 108 Ind.App. 98, 27 N.E.2d 97, 99. Employment for short time and limited and temporary purpose, Moore v. Clarke, 171 Md. 39, 187 A. 887, 894, 107 A.L.R. 924; fortuitous and irregular employment. McCabe v. Timothy Shanahan & Son, 147 Pa.Su-per. 491, 24 A.2d 16, 18; occasional, irregular or.in-cidental employment, Maguire v. Valley Forge Military Academy, 116 Pa.Super. 495, 176 A. 865, 867.
The test is the nature of the work or an analysis of the contract of employment. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Brooks, D.C.Mo., 43 F.Supp. 870, 872; or whether the employment is .necessary to carry out the employer’s business in usual way. Thompson v. G. Correale & Sons, 130 N.J.L. 431, 33 A.2d 578, 579; or the scope of the contract of employment or the continuity of employment. Cochrane v. William Penn Hotel, Hartford Acci-dent & Indemnity Co., Intervener, 140 Pa.Super. 323, 13 A.2d 875, 877; "Casual" means occasional; incidental; happening at uncertain times; not stated or regular; its antonyms being regular; systematic; periodic; certain, Pooler’s Case, 122 Me. 11, 118 A. 590, 591; Dial v. Coleman’s Lunch, 217 Iowa, 945, 251 N.W. 33; happening or coming to pass without design and without being foreseen or expected, accidental, fortuitous, coming by chance, coming without regularity, Tokash v. Gen-eral Baking Co., 349 Mo. 767, 163 S.W.2d 554, 556; The term refers to nature of employment and not to length. Parks v. E. M. Carmell Co., 168 Tenn. 385, 79 S.W.2d 285, 287.
CASUAL .EVIDENCE. A phrase used to denote all such evidence as happens to be adducible of a fact or event, but which was not prescribed by statute or otherwisé arranged beforehand to be the evidence of the fact or event. Brown.
CASUAL PAUPER. A poor person who, in Eng-land, applies for relief in a parish other than that of his settlement. The ward in the work-house to which they are adrnitted is called the "casual ward."
CASUAL POOR. In English law. Those who are not settled in a parish. Such poor persons as are
suddenly taken sick, or meet with some accident, when away from home, and who are thus provi-dentially thrown upon the charities of those among whom they happen to be. Force v. Haines, 17 N.J.Law, 405.
CASUALTY. Accident; event due to sudden, un-expected or unusual cause; event not to be fore-seen or guarded against; inevitable accident; misfortune or mishap; that which comes by chance or without design. A loss from such an event or cause; as by fire, shipwreck, lightning, etc. Story, Bailm. § 240; Gill v. Fugate, 117 Ky. 257, 78 S.W. 191; Farmers Co-op. Soc. No. 1 of Quanah v. Maryland Casualty Co., Tex.Civ.App., 135 S.W.2d 1033, 1036; Matheson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A., 54 F.2d 537, 539; Stieffen v. Darling, 158 Va. 375, 163 S.E. 353, 354.
Chance; accident; contingency; also that which comes without design or without being foreseen. Bennett v. Howard, 175 Ky. 797, 195 S.W. 117, 118, L.R.A.1917E, 1075; United States v. Rogers, C.C.A. Cal., 120 F.2d 244, 246.
-Casualties of superiority. In Scotch law. Pay-ments from an inferior to a superior, that is, from a tenant to his lord, which arise upon uncertain events, as opposed to the payment of rent at fixed and stated times. Bell.
-Casualties of wards. In Scotch law. The mails and duties due to the superior in wardholdings.
CASUS. Lat. Chance; accident; an event; a case; a case contemplated.
CASUS BELLI. An occurrence giving rise to or justifying war.
CASUS FcEDERIS. In International law. The case of the treaty. The particular event or situa-tion contemplated by the treaty, or stipulated for, or which comes within its terms. Grotius, b. 2, c. 25; Vattel, b. 2, c. 12, 4 168; 1 Kent, 49. In com-mercial law. The case or event contemplated by the parties to an individual contract or stipulated for by it, or coming within its terms.
CASUS FORTUITUS. An inevitable accident, a chance occurrence, or fortuitous event. A loss happening in spite of all human effort and saga-city. 3 Kent, Comm. 217, 300; The Majestic, 166 U.S. 375, 17 S.Ct. 597, 41 L.Ed. 1039.
CASUS FORTUITUS NON EST SPERANDUS, ET NEMO TENETUR DEVINARE. A fortuitous event is not to be expected, and no one is bound to foresee it. 4 Coke, 66.
CASUS FORTUITUS NON EST SUPPONENDUS. A fortuitous event is not to be presumed. Hardr. 82, arg.
CASUS MAJOR. In the civil law. A casualty; an extraordinary casualty, as fire, shipwreck, etc. Dig. 44, 7, 1, 4.
CASUS OMISSUS. A case omitted; an event or contingency for which no provision is made; par-ticularly a case not provided for by the statute

on the general subject, and which is therefore left to be governed by the common law. 5 Co. 38; 11 East 1; Brown, Max. 46.
CASUS OMISSUS ET OBLIVIONI DATUS DIS-POSITIONI JURIS COMMUNÍS RELINQUITUR. A case omitted and given to oblivion (forgotten) is left to the disposal of the common law. 5 Coke, 38. A particular case, left unprovided for by statute, must be disposed of according to the law as it existed prior to such statute. Broom, Max. 46; 1 Exch. 476.
CASUS OMISSUS PRO OMISSO HABENDUS EST. A case omitted is to be held as (intention-ally) omitted. Tray.Lat.Max. 67.
CAT. A domestic animal that catches mice; a well known domesticated carnivorous mammal kept to kill mice and rats and as a house pet. Thurston v. Carter, 112 Me. 361, 92 A. 295, L.R.A. 1915C, 359.
An instrument with which criminals are flogged. It consists of nine lashes of whipcord, tied to a wooden handle, and is frequently called cat-o-nine-tails. It is used where the whipping-post is re-tained as a mode of punishment and was formerly resorted to in the navy.
CATALLA. In old English law. Chattels. The word among the Normans primarily signified only beasts of husbandry, or, as they are still called, "cattle," but, in a secondary sense, the term was applied to all movables in general, and not only to these, but to whatever was not a fief or feud. Wharton.
CATALLA JUSTE POSSESSA AMITTI NON POSSUNT. Chattels justly possessed cannot be lost. Jenk.Cent. 28.
CATALLA OTIOSA. Dead goods or chattels, as distinguished from animals. Idle cattle, that is, such as were not used for working, as distinguish-ed from beasts of the plow; called also animalia otiosa. Bract. Pols. 217, 217b; 3 B1.Comm. 9.
CATALLA REPUTANTUR INTER MINIMA IN LEGE. Chattels are considered in law among the least (or minor) things. Jenk.Cent. 52.
CATALLIS CAPTIS NOMINE DISTRICTIONIS. An obsolete writ that lay where a house was with-in a borough, for rent issuing out of the same, and which warranted the taking of doors, win-dows, etc., by way of distress.
CATALLIS REDDENDIS. For the return of the chattels; an obsolete writ that lay where goods delivered to a man to keep till a certain day were not upon demand redelivered at the day. Reg. Orig. 39.
CATALLUM. A chattel. Most frequently used in the plural form, catalla (q. y.). Cowell; Du Cange.
CATALS. Goods and chattels. See Catalla.
CATANEUS. A tenant in capite. A tenant hold-ing immediately of the crown. Spelman.
CATASCOPUS. An old name for an archdeacon.
CATASTROPHE. A notable disaster; a more serious calamity than might ordinarily be under-stood from the term "casualty." Reynolds v. Board of Com’rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 139 La. 518, 71 So. 787, 791.
CATCH TL’VIE CHARTER. One under which compensation is paid for the time the boat is ac-tually used. Schoonmaker-Conners Co. v. New York Cent. R. Co., D.C.N.Y., 12 F.2d 314, 315.
CATCHING BARGAIN. See Bargain.
CATCHINGS. Things caught, and in the posses. sion, custody, power, and dominion of the party, with a present capacity to use them for his own purposes. The term includes blubber, or pieces of whale flesh cut from the whale, and stowed on or under the deck of a ship. A policy of insurance upon outfits, and catchings substituted for the out-fits, in a whaling voyage, protects the blubber. Rogers v. Insurance Co., 1 Story, 603; Fed.Cas.No. 12,016; 4 Law Rep. 297.
CATCHLAND. Land in Norfolk, so called because it is not known to what parish it belongs, and the minister who first seizes the tithes of it, by right of preoccupation, enjoys them for that year. Cowell.
CATCHPOLL. A name formerly given to a sheriff’s deputy, or to a constable, or other officer whose duty it is to arrest persons. He was a sort of serjeant. The word is not now in use as an official designation. Minshew.
CATER COUSIN. (From Fr. Quatrecousin.) A cousin in the fourth degree; hence any distant or remote relative. Bla.Law Tracts 6.
CATHEDRAL. In English ecclesiastical law. A tract set apart for the service of the church. The church of the bishop of the diocese, in which is his cathedra, or throne, and his special jurisdiction; in that respect the principal church of the diocese.
CATIIEDRAL PREFERMENTS. In English ec-clesiastical law. All deaneries, archdeaconries, and canonries, and generally all dignities and offices in any cathedral or collegiate church, be-low the rank of a bishop.
CATHÉDRATIC. In English ecclesiastical law. A sum of 2s. paid to the bishop by the inferior cler-gy; but from its being usually paid at the bishop’s synod, or visitation, it is commonly named syno-dals. Wharton.
CATHOLIC CREDITOR. In Scotch law. A credi-tor whose debt is secured on all or several distinct parts of the debtor’s property. Bell.
CATHOLIC EMANCIPATION ACT. The statute of 10 Geo. IV, c. 7, by which Roman Catholics were restored, in general, to the full enjoyment of all civil rights, except that of holding eccle-siastical offices, and certain high appointments in• the state. 3 Steph.Comm. 109.

CATONIANA REGULA. In Roman law. The rule which is commonly expressed in the maxim, Quod ab initio non valet tractu temporis non convalebit, meaning that what is at the beginning void by reason of some technical (or other) legal defect will not become valid merely by length of time. The rule applied to the institution of hceredes, the bequest of legacies, and such like. The rule is not without its application also in English law; e. g., a married woman’s will (being void when made) is not made valid merely be-cause she lives to become a widow. Brown.
CATTLE. A generic term for domestic quad-rupeds ; animals used by man for labor or food. In its primary sense, it embraces horses, mares, geldings, foals, or fillies, asses, and mules, as well as animals of the ox kind or bovine species. Bell v. Erie R. Co., 183 App.Div. 608, 171 N.Y.S. 341, 343. The term may also include goats, swine, and sheep. Ash Sheep Co. v. U. S., 252 U.S. 159, 40 S.Ct. 241, 243, 64 L.Ed. 507. Calves running with their mothers are cattle. Peterson v. Citi-zens’ Bank of Stuart, 117 Neb. 327, 220 N.W. 575, 577.
In the narrower, popular sense, animals of the bovine genus. State v. Eaglin, 148 La. 75, 86 So. 658, 659; Gragg v. State, 112 Neb. 732, 201 N.W. 338, 340. This is the sense in which the term is generally used in the western United States, and it is said further that it is not generally, but may be, taken to mean calves, or animals younger than yearlings. State v. District Court of Fifth Judi• cial Dist. in and for Nye County, 42 Nev. 218, 174 P. 1023, 1025.
CATTLE GATE. In English law. A customary proportionate right of pasture enjoyed in common with others. 34 E. L. & Eq. 511; 1 Term 137. A right to pasture cattle in the land of another. It is a distinct and several interest in the land, passing by lease and release. 13 East, 159; 5 Taunt. 811.
CATTLEGUARD. A device to prevent cattle from straying along a railroad-track at a highway-cross-ing. Heskett v. Railway Co., 61 Iowa, 467, 16 N.W. 525; True v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 113 Me. 375, 94 A. 183, 184.
CATTLE PASS. As used in a statute, a narrow passage way under a railroad track high and wide enough to admit the passage of a cow, horse, or ox to and from a pasture. True v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 113 Me. 375, 94 A. 183, 184.
CATTLE RANGE. Under a statute, a range the usual and customary use of which has been for cattle. State v. Butterfield, 30 Idaho 415, 165 P. 218, 219.
CATTLE RUSTLING. Stealing of bovine cattle, Galeppi v. C. Swanston & Son, 107 Cal.App. 30, 290 P. 116, 119.
CAUCASIAN. Pertaining to the white race, to which belong the greater part of European nations and those of western Asia. Rice v. Gong Lum

139 Miss. 760, 104 So. 105, 110. The term is inap-plicable to denote families or stocks inhabiting Europe, and speaking either the so-called Aryan or Semitic languages. Ex parte Shahid, D.C.S.C., 205 F. 812, 814.
CAUCUS. A meeting of the legal voters of any political party assembled for the purpose of choos-ing delegates or for the nomination of candidates for office.
CAUDA TERRFE. A land’s end, or the bottom of a ridge in arable land. Cowell.
CAULCEIS. Highroads or ways pitched with flint or other stones.
CAUPO. In the civil law. An innkeeper. Dig. 4, 9, 4, 5.
CAUPONA. In the civil law. An inn or tavern. Inst. 4, 5, 3.
CAUPONES. In the civil law. Innkeepers. Dig. 4, 9; Id. 47, 5; Story, Ag. § 458.
CAURSINES. Italian merchants who carne into England in the reign of Henry III., where they established themselves as money lenders, but were soon expelled for their usury and extortion. Cowell; Blount.

In General

Lat. A cause, reason, occasion, motive, or in-ducement

As Preposition

Used with the force of a preposition, it means by virtue of, on account of. Also with reference to, in contemplation of. Causa mortis, in ahticipa-tion of death.

Condition, etc.
A condition; a consideration; motive for per-forming a juristic act. Used of contracts, and found in this sense in the Scotch law also. Bell.

In the Civil Law and in Old English Law

The word signified a source, ground, or mode of acquiring property; hence a title; one’s title to property. Thus, "titulaos est justa causa possi-dendi id quod nostrum est;" title is the lawful ground of possessing that which is ours. 8 Coke, 153. See Mackeld.Rom.Law, §§ 242, 283

In Old English Law

A cause; a suit or action pending. Causa tes-tamentaria, a testamentary cause. Causa matri-monialis, a matrimonial cause. Bract. fol. 61.

In Old European Law

Any movable thing or article of property. See "Cause."

CAUSA CAUSX EST CAUSA CAUSATI. The cause of a cause is the cause of the thing caused. 12 Mod. 639. The cause of the cause is to be con-sidered as the cause of the effect also. Freem. 329

CAUSA CAUSANS. The immediate cause; the last link in the chain of causation.
CAUSA CAUSANTIS, CAUSA EST CAUSATI. The cause of the thing causing is the cause of the effect. 4 Camp. 284; Marble v. City of Worcester, 4 Gray, Mass., 398.
CAUSA DATA ET NON SECUTA. In the civil law. Consideration given and not followed, that is, by the event upon which it was given. The name of an action by which a thing given in the view of a certain event was reclaimed if that event did not take place. Dig. 12, 4; Cod. 4, 6.
CAUSA ECCLESLE PUBLICIS MQUIPARATUR; ET SUMMA EST RATIO QU’E PRO RELIGIONE FACIT. The cause of the church is equal to public cause; and paramount is the reason which makes for religion. Co.Litt. 341.
CAUSA ET ORIGO EST MATERIA NEGOTII. The cause and origin is the substance of the thing; the cause and origin of a thing are a material part of it. The law regards the original act. 1 Coke, 99; Wing.Max. 41, Max. 21.
CAUSA IIOSPITANDI. For the purpose of being entertained as a guest. 4 Maule & S. 310.
CAUSA JACTITATIONIS MARITAGII. A forro of action which anciently lay against a party who boasted or gave out that he or she was married to the plaintiff, whereby a common reputation of their marriage might ensue. 3 Bla.Comm. 93. See Jactitation of Marriage.
CAUSA LIST. See Cause List.
CAUSA MATRIMONII PLUELOCUTI. A writ ly-ing where a woman has given lands to a man in fee-simple with the intention that he shall marry her, and he refuses so to do within a reasonable time, upon suitable request. Cowell. Now obso-lete. 3 Bla.Comm. 183, n.
CAUSA MORTIS. In contemplation of approach-ing death.
CAUSA MORTIS DONATIO. See Donatio Mortis Causa.
CAUSA PATET. The reason is open, obvious, plain, clear, or manifest. A common expression in old writers. Perk. c. 1, §§ 11, 14, 97.
CAUSA PROXIMA. The immediate, nearest, or latest cause. The efficient cause; the one that nec-essarily sets the other causes in operation. In-surance Co. v. Boon, 95 U.S. 117, 130, 24 L.Ed. 395.
CAUSA PROXIMA NON REMOTA SPECTATUR. An efficient adequate cause being found, it must be considered the true cause unless some other independent cause is shown to have intervened be-tween it and the result. Mead v. Chickasha Gas & Electric Co., 137 Okl. 74, 278 P. 286, 291. The immediate (or direct), not the remote, cause, is looked at, or considered. 12 East, 648; 3 Kent, Comm. 302; Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Reeves, 10 Wall. 191, 19 L.Ed. 909; L. R. 1 C. P. 320; 4 Am.

L.Rev. 201. For a distinction, however, between immediate and proximate cause, see "Cause."
CAUSA REI. In the civil law. Things accessory or appurtenant. The accessions, appurtenances, or fruits of a thing; comprehending all that the claimant of a principal thing can demand from a defendant in addition thereto, and especially what he would have had, if the thing had not been withheld from him. Inst. 4, 17, 3; Mackeld. Rom.Law, § 166.
CAUSA REMOTA. A remote or mediate causé; a cause operating indirectly by the intervention of other causes.
CAUSA SCIENTIZE PATET. The reason of the knowledge is evident. A technical phrase in Scotch practice, used in depositions of witnesses.
CAUSA SINE QUA NON. A necessary or inevita-ble cause; a cause without which the effect in question could not have happened. Hayes v. Rail-road Co., 111 U.S. 228, 4 S.Ct. 369, 28 L.Ed. 410. A cause without which the thing cannot be. With reference to negligente, it is the cause without which the injury would not have occurred. Fish-er v. Butte Electric Ry. Co., 72 Mont. 594, 235 P. 330, 332.
CAUSA TURPIS. A base (immoral or illegal) cause or consideration.
CAUSA VAGA ET INCERTA NON EST CAUSA RATIONABILIS. 5 Coke, 57. A vague and un-certain cause is not a reasonable cause.
CAUSA’. DOTIS, VIVE, LIBERTATIS, FISCI SUNT INTER FAVORABILIA IN LEGE. Causes of dower, Life, liberty, revenue, are among the things favored in law. Co.Litt. 341.
CAUSAM NOBIS SIGNIFICES QUARE. A writ addressed to a mayor of a town, etc., who was by the king’s writ commanded to give seisin of lands to the king’s grantee, on his delaying to do it, requiring him to show cause why he so delayed the performance of his duty. Blount; Cowell.
CAUSARE. In the civil and old English law. To be engaged in a suit; to litigate; to conduct a cause.
CAUSATOR. A litigant; one who takes the part of the plaintiff or defendant in a suit.
In old European law. One who manages or litigates another’s cause. Spelman.
CAUSE, v. To be the cause or occasion of; to effect as an agent; to bring about; to bring into existence; to make. La Page v. U. S., C.C.A. Minn., 146 F.2d 536, 538, 156 A.L.R. 965; Huffman v. U. S., C.C.A.Colo., 259 F. 35, 38; Shea v. U. S., C.C.A.Ohio, 251 F. 440, 447. To induce; to com-pel. Hill v. Montgomery, 352 Mo. 147, 176 S.W. 2d 284, 287.
CAUSE, n. (Lat. causa.) Each separate antece-dent of an event, Griffin v. Anderson Motor Serv-ice Co., 227 Mo.App. 855, 59 S.W.2d 805, 808.

Means, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Funderburk, Tex.Civ.App., 81 S.W.2d 132, 137. Motive, In re Canal Bank & Trust Co.’s Liquidation, 178 La. 575, 152 So. 297, 298. Probable cause, State v. Brock-man, 231 Wis. 634, 283 N.W. 338, 340. Producing cause, Traders & General Insurance Co. v. Ray, Tex.Civ.App., 128 S.W.2d 80, 84. Sum of antece-dente of an event, Burns v. Eminger, 84 Mont. 397, 276 P. 437, 442; Griffin v. Anderson Motor Serv-ice Co., 227 Mo.App. 855, 59 S.W.2d 805, 808. That which produces an effect; whatever moves, im-pels or leads. Weinberg v. Richardson, 291 III. App. 618, 10 N.E.2d 893; Merlo v. Public Service Co. of Northern Illinois, 381 III. 300, 45 N.E.2d 665, 675; State v. Craig, 161 S.C. 232, 159 S.E. 559, 560. The origin or foundation of a thing, as of a suit or action; a ground of action. State v. Dougherty, 4 Or. 203.
As used with reference to the removal of an officer or employee, "cause" means a just, not arbitrary, cause; one relating to a material matter, or affecting the public interest. Brokaw v. Burk, 89 N.J.Law, 132, 98 A. 11, 12; a cause relating to and affecting administration of office and of substantial nature directly affecting public’s rights and interests, State ex rel. Rockwell v. State Board of Edu-cation, 213 Minn. 184, 6 N.W.2d 251, 260, 143 A.L.R. 503.
Conduct indicating unworthy or illegal motives or im-proper administration of power, Voorhees v. Kopler, 239 App.Div. 83, 265 N.Y.S. 532, 533; Tappan v. Helena Fed-eral Savings & Loan Ass’n of Helena, Ark., 193 Ark. 1023, 104 S.W.2d 458, 459; Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co. v. Kinsler, 12 Ca1.2d 98, 81 P.2d 913, 915; mis-feasance or nonfeasance, Schoonover v. City of Viroqua, 244 Wis. 615, 12 N.W.2d 912, 914; As used in fraternal benent society by-law authorizing suspension of subordinate coun-cii and dissolution of its charter, "cause," means legal cause or just cause, a substantial, reasonable, or just cause. Wichlta Council No. 120 of Security Ben. Ass’n v. Security Ben. Ass’n, 138 Kan. 841, 28 P.2d 976, 979, 94 A.L.R. 629.
"Cause" and "consequence" are correlative terms. Kel-sey v. Rebuzzini, 87 Conn. 556, 89 A. 170, 171, 52 L.R.A., N.S., 103; In re Benson, 178 Okl. 299, 62 P.2d 962, 965.
Clause for termination of employment for "any cause" held to refer to cause justifying termination for employee’s breach of contract, not arbitrarily. Parsil v. Emery, 242 App.Div. 653, 272 N.Y.S. 439, 440.
Statute permitting an award to be set aside for "cause" means for good cause or some such cause as fraucT or sur-prise, Elsenpeter v. Potvin, 213 Minn. 129, 5 N.W.2d 499, 501.

In Civil and Scotch Law

The consideration of a contract, that is, the inducement to it, or motive of the contracting party for entering into it. Dig. 2, 14, 7; Toullier, liv. 3, tit. 3, c. 2, § 4; 1 Abb. 28; Bell, Dict.
The civilians use the term "cause," in relation to obliga-tions, in the same sense as the word "consideration" is used in the jurisprudence of England and the United States. It means the motive, the’inducement to the agree-ment,-id quod inducet ad contrahendum.- Mouton v. No-ble, 1 La.Ann. 192. But see Ames, 3 Sel.Essays in Anglo-Amer.Leg.Hist. 279; Poll.Contr. 74.
Used also in the civil law in the sense of res <a thing). Non porcellum, non agnellum nec alía causa (not a hog, not a lamb, nor other thing). Du Cange.

In Practice
A suit, litigation, or action. Any question, civil or criminal, litigated or contested before a court of justice.
As used in venue statute, "cause" means "cause of ac-tion", which means the right which a party has to institute a judicial proceedlng. Bergin v. Temple, 111 Mont. 539, 111 P.2d 286, 289, 133 A.L.R. 1115.
Cause imports a judicial proceedlng entire, and is nearly synonymous with lis in Latin, or sult in English. "Case" not infrequently has a more limlted signification, Import-ing a collection of facts, with the conclusion of law there-on. See Shirts v. Irons, 47 Ind. 445; Erwin v. U. S., D.C. Go.., 37 Fed. 470, 2 L.R.A. 229. But "cause" and "case" are often synonymous. Zilz v. Wilcox, 190 Mich. 486, 157 N.W. 77, 80; Schmalz v. Arnwine, 118 Or. 300. 246 P. 718, 719; Cheney v. Richards, 130 Me. 288, 155 A. 642, 644.
A distinction is sometimes taken between "cause" and "action." Burrill observes that a cause is not, like an ac-tion or suit, said to be commenced, nor is an action, like a cause, said to be tried. But, if there is any substantial difference between these tercos, it must lie in the fact that "action" refers more peculiarly to the legal procedure of a controversy; "cause" to its merits or the state of facts involved. Thus, we cannot say "the cause should have been replevin." Nor would it be correct to say "the plain-tiff pleaded his own action."
As to "Probable Cause" and "Proximate Cause," see those titles. As to challenge "for cause," see "Challenge."
CAUSE-BOOKS. Books kept in the central office of the English supreme court, in which are en-tered all writs of summons issued in the office. Rules of Court, v 8.
CAUSE LIST. In English practice. A printed roll of actions, to be tried in the order of their en-try, with the names of the solicitors for each liti-gant. Similar to the calendar of causes, or dock-et, used in American courts.
CAUSE OF ACTION. A "cause of action" may mean one thing for one purpose and something different for another. Venezuelan Meat Export Co. v. U. S., D.C.Md., 12 F.Supp. 379, 383; U. S. v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., Ct.C1., 288 U.S. 62, 53 S. Ct. 278, 280, 77 L.Ed. 619.
‘ It may mean: accident, Maryland Casualty Co. v. Gerlaske, C.C.A.Tex., 68 F.2d 497, 499; act causing injury, Fiscus v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 153 Kan. 493, 112 P.2d 83, 85; action, Wattman v. St. Luke’s Hospital Ass’n, 314 Ill,App, 244, 41 N.E.2d 314, 319; averment of facts sufflclent to justify a court in rendering a judgnient, Mobley v. Smith, 24 Ala.App. 553, 138 So. 551; Vickers v. Vickers, 45 Nev. 274, 202 P. 31, 32; breach of contract or agreement, Press v. Davis, Tex.Civ.App., 118 S.W.2d 982, 989, 990; breach of duty. Shapiro v. McCarthy, 279 Mass. 425, 181 N.E. 842, 844; case, Colla v. Carmlchael U-Drive Autos, 111 Cal.App. 378, 294 P. 378, 380; claim, Bishop v. Jensen, 212 Wis. 30, 248 N.W. 771, 772; East Side Mill & Lumber Co. v. Southeast Portland Lumber Co., 155 Or. 367, 64 P.2d 625, 627, 628; concept of law of remedies. Rooney v. Maczko, 315 Pa. 113, 172 A. 151, 153; U. S. v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., Ct.C1., 288 U.S. 62, 53 S.Ct. 278, 280, 77 L.Ed. 619; concurrence of the facts giving rise to enforceable claim, United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, D.C.Cal., 21 F.Supp. 645, 660; contract, Stone Fort Nat. Bank of Nacogdoches v. Forbess, 126 Tex. 568, 91 S.W.2d 674; demand, State v. Vincent, 152 Or. 205, 52 P.2d 203, 206; every fact which ít is necessary to establish to support right or obtain judgment, Beale v. Cherryhomes, Tex.Civ.App., 21 S.W.2d 65, 66; Dublin Mill & Elevator Co. v. Cornelius, Tex.Civ.App., 5 S.W.2d 1027, 1028; fact, or a state of facts to which law, sought to be enforced against a person or thing, applies. Culf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co v. Cities Service Co., D.C.Del., 270 F. 994, 995; Condor Petroleum Co. v. Greene, Tex.Civ.App., 164 S.W.2d 713, 718; Burns v. Duncan, 23 Tenn.App. 374, 133 S.W.2d 1000, 1004;
facts constituting wrong, Whalen v. Strong, 230 App.Div.
617, 246 N.Y.S. 40, 45; facts which give rise to one or more relations of right-duty between two or more persons,
Elliott v. Mosgrove, 162 Or. 507, 93 P.2d 1070, 1072, 1073,
1076; failure to perform legal obligation to do, or refrain from performance of, some act, In re Canfield’s Will, 165
Misc. 66, 300 N.Y.S. 502; ground on which an action may
be maintained or sustained, ground or reason for an ac-tion, East Side Mill & Lumber Co. v. Southeast Portland
Lumber Co., 155 Or. 367, 64 P.2d 625, 627, 628. Juncture of wrong and damage, City of Newport v. Rawlings, 289 Ky. 203, 158 S.W.2d 12, 14; legal duty and breach of duty, Alford v. Zeigler, 65 Ga.App. 294, 16 S.E.2d 69, 74; legal liability arising out of facts, White v. Nemours Trading Corporation, D.C.Mass., 290 F. 250, 252; legal obligation, Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Clegg, 103 Utah 414, 135 P.2d 919, 922, 923; legal right In plaintiff and duty in defendant and violation or breach of right or duty, Evan’s v. Williams, 291 Ky. 484, 165 S.W.2d 52, 54; legal right of action. Inhabitants of Town of Milo v. Milo Water Co., 129 Me. 463, 152 A. 616, 617; legal right violated. Howard V. Brown, 172 Okl. 308, 44 P.2d 959, 961; legal wrong threatened or committed, Connor v. Williams, 187 S.C. 119, 197 S.E. 211, 214; matter for which action may be brour;ht, Ex parte Teeters, 130 Or. 631. 280 P. 660. 662; Williams v. City of Dallas, Tex.Civ.App., 52 S.W.2d 373, 375; negligent act or acts, Cox v. Wilkes-Barre R. Corporation, 334 Pa. 568, 6 A.2d 538, 539; obligation, United States v. Standard 011 Co. of California, D.C.Cal., 21 F.Supp. 645, 660; oc-currence which gives rise to litigation, Maryland Casualty Co. v. Gerlaske, C.C.A.Tex., 68 F.2d 497, 499; particular matter for which suit is brought, Severance v. Heyl & Patterson, 115 Pa.Super. 36, 174 A. 787, 789; power to en-force obligation, Woods v. Cook, 14 Cal.App.2d 560, 53 P.2d 965, 966; primary right and corresponding duty and delict or wrong, Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc., 145 Ohio St. 321, 61 N.E.2d 707, 714; redressible wrong, Meshek v. Cordes, 164 Okl. 40, 22 P.2d 921, 926; or breach of duty by defendant, Skalow-ski v. Joe Fisher, Inc., 152 S.C. 108, 149 S.E. 340, 344, 65 A. L.R. 1427; American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Warnock, Tex.Civ. App., 143 S.W.2d 624, 628; right of action or right of re-covery, Williams v. City of Dallas, Tex.Civ.App., 52 S.W. 2d 373, 375; Graham v. Scripture, 26 How.Prac., N.Y., 501; right to bring suit, Viers v. Webb, 76 Mont. 38, 245 P. 257, 259; Grenada Bank v. Petty, 174 Miss. 415, 164 So. 316, 318; right to enforce obligations, Woods v. Cook, 14 Ca1.App.2d 560, 58 P.2d 965, 966; right to prosecute an action with effect. Travelers’ Ins. Co. v. Louis Padula Co., 224 N.Y. 397, 121 N.E. 348 350; right to recover something from another, Universal Oil Products Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, D.C.Mo., 6 F.Supp. 37, 39; right to relief in court, Kittin-ger v. Churchill Evangelistic Ass’n, 239 App.Div. 253, 267 N.Y.S. 719, 722: Mulligan v. Bond & Mortgage Guarantee Co., 193 App.Div. 741, 184 N.Y.S. 429, 431; subject matter of the controversy, Johnson v. Jordan, D.C.Okl., 22 F.Supp. 286, 289; subject-matter on which plaintiff grounds his right of recovery, Zelen v. Domestic Industries, 131 Neb. 123, 267 N.W. 352, 354; East Side Mill & Lumber Co. v. Southeast Portland Lumber Co., 155 Or. 367, 64 P.2d 625, 627, 628; that which creates necessity for bringing action, Brevick v, Cunard S. S. Co., 63 N.D. 210, 247 N.W. 373, 375; that which produces or effects result complained of, Jacobson v. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass’n, 73 N.D. 108, 11 N.W.2d 442, 445, 446; unlawful violation of a right. Keith v. Texas & P. R. Co., 14 La.App. 290, 129 So. 190, 194; violation or invasion of right, East Side Lumber & Coal Co. v. Barfield, 193 Ga. 273, 18 S.E.2d 492, 496; wrong committed or threatened, Criswell v. Criswell, 101 Neb. 349, 165 N.W. 302.
It may sometimes mean a person having a right of ac-tion. Thus, where a legacy is left to a married woman, and she and her husband bring an action to recover it, she is called in the old books the "meritorious cause of action." 1 H.Bl. 108.
A distinction may be taken between "cause of action" and "right of action." Elliott v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ey. Co., 35 S.D. 57, 150 N.W. 777, 779. The cause of action is distinct from the "remedy." Tonn v. Inner Shoe Tire Co., Tex.Civ.App., 260 S.W. 1078, 1080. And the cause of action may exist, though the remedy does not. Chandler v. Horne, 23 Ohio App. 1, 154 N.E. 748, 750.
Cause of action is not synonymous with chose in action. Bank of Commerce v. Rutland & W. R. Co., 10 How.Prac.,

N.Y. 1. But under Montana statute, f f the rellef souglit is the recovery of money or other personal property, the cause of action is designated a "thing in action." State v. District Court of Tenth Judicial Dist. In and for Fergus County, 74 Mont. 355, 240 P. 667, 669.
CAUSE OF INjURY. That which actually pro-duces it, Anderson v. Byrd, 133 Neb. 483, 275 N. W. 825, 826.
CAUSE SUIT TO BE EROUGIIT. Commence or begin, State v. Osen, 67 N.D. 436, 272 N.W. 783, 784.
CAUSES CÉLEBRES. Celebrated cases. A work containing reports of the decisions of interest and importance in French courts in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Secondarily a single trial or decislon is often called a "cause céldbre," when it is remarkable on account of the parties invoived or the unusual, interesting, or sensational character of the facts.
CAUSEWAY. A raised roadbed through low lands; it differs from a levee. Board of Sup’rs of Quitman County v. Carrier Lumber & Mfg. Co., 103 Miss. 324, 60 So. 326, 327. See, also, Coleman-Fulton Pasture Co. v. Aransas County, Tex.Civ. App., 180 S.W. 312, 313.
CAUSIDICUS. In the civil law. A speaker or pleader; one who argued a cause ore tenus. See "Advocate."
CAUTELA. Lat. Care; caution; vigilance; pre-vision.
CAUTI JURATORIA. See "Caution Juratory."
CAUTIO. In the Civil and French law. Security given for the performance of any thing; bail; a bond or undertaking by way of surety. Also the person who becomes a surety.
In Scotch law. A pledge, bond, or other securi-ty for the performance of an obligation, or com-pletion of the satisfaction to be obtained by a judi-cial process. Bell, Dict.; 6 Mod. 162.
CAUTIO FIDEJUSSORIA. Security by means of bonds or pledges entered into by third parties. Du Cange.
CAUTIO MUCIANA. Security given by an heir or legatee, to obtain immediate possession of inher-itance or legacy, for observante of a condition an-nexed to the bequest, where the act which is the object of the condition is one which he must avoid committing during his whole life, e. g., that he will never marry, never leave the country, never engage in a particular trade, etc. See Mackeld. Rom.Law, § 705.
CAUTIO PIGNORATITIA. Security given by pledge, or deposit, as plate, money, or other goods.
CAUTIO PRO EXPENSIS. Security for costs, charges, or expenses.
CAUTIO USUFRUCTUARIA. Security, which tenants for life give, to preserve the property rented free from waste and injury. Ersk.Inst. 2, 9, 59.

CAUTION. In Scotch law, and in admiralty law. Surety; security; bail; an undertaking by way of surety. 6 Mod. 162. See Cautio. See also Pru-dence; Cautious.
To warn, exhort, to take heed, or give notice of danger. Arnold v. United States, C.C.A.Colo., 94 F.2d 499, 501.
CAUTION JURATORY. In Scotch law. Security given by oath. That which a suspender swears is the best he can afford in order to obtain a sus-pension. Ersk.Pract. 4, 3, 6.
CAUTIONARY. In Scotch law. An instrument in which a person binds himself as surety for an-other.
CAUTIONARY JUDGMENT. Where an action in tort was pending and the plaintiff feared the de-fendant would dispose of his real property be-fore judgment, a cautionary judgment was en-tered with a lien on the property; Seisner v. Blake, 13 Pa.Co.Ct.R. 333; so in an action on a note against a religious association, where it was alleged that the defendant was endeavoring to sell its real estate before judgment on the note; Witmer & Dundore v. Port Treverton Church, 17 Pa.Co.Ct.R. 38.
CAUTIONE ADMITTENDA. In English ecclesias-tical law. A writ that lies against a bishop who holds an excommunicated person in prison for contempt, notwithstanding he offers sufficient cau-tion or security to obey the orders and command-ment of the church for the future. Reg.Orig. 66; Cowell.
CAUTIONER. In Scotch law. A surety; a bonds-man. One who binds himself in a bond with the principal for greater security. He is still a cau-tioner whether the bond be to pay a debt, or whether he undertake to produce the person of the party for whom he is bound. Bell.
CAUTIONNEMENT. In French law. The same as becoming surety in English law.
CAUTIONRY. In Scotch law. Suretyship.
CAUTIOUS. Careful; prudent. Horton v. New York Cent. R. Co., 205 App.Div. 763, 200 N.Y.S. 365, 366.
The terms "cautious" and "prudent" may be used inter-changeably in defining negligence. Malcolm v. Mooresville Cotton Milis, 191 N.C. 727, 133 S.E. 7, 9. But "cautious" differs from "prudent" in suggesting the idea of timidity, with its secondary meaning as overprudent; fearful. Peo-ple v. Anderson, 58 Cal.App. 267, 208 P. 324, 325. See Prudente.
CAVEAT. Lat. Let him beware.
An Intimation to a judge or offlcer notifying him to sus-pend a proceeding until merits of the caveat are deter-mined. In re Phillips’ Estate, 293 Pa. 351, 143 A. 9. A formal notíce or warning given by a party interested to a court, judge, or ministerial officer against the performance of certain acts within his Power and jurisdíction. This process may be used in the proper courts to prevent (tem-porarily or provisionally) the proving of a will or the grant of administration, or to arrest the enrollment of a decree in chancery when the party intends to take an ap-peal, to prevent the grant of letters patent, etc. It is also used, in the American practice, as a kind of equltable pro-
cess, to stay the granting of a patent for lands. Ex parte Crafts, 28 S.C. 281, 5 S.E. 718; In re McCahan’s Estate, 221 Pa. 188, 70 A. 711; See, also, 1 Burn, EccI.Law 19, 263; Nelson, Abr.; Dane, Abr.; Ayliffe, Parare. ; 3 Bla. Comm. 246; 2 Chit.Pr. 502, note 8; 3 Redf.Wills 119; Poph. 133; 1 Sid. 371.
In patent law. A formal written notice to officers of the patent-office, requiring them to refuse letters patent on a particular invention or device to any other person, until the party filing the caveat (calle(‘ the "caveator") shall have an opportunity to establish his claim to priority of invention. The practice was abolished by act of Tune 25, 1910, c. 414, § 1, 36 Stat. 843.
CAVEAT ACTOR. Let the doer, or actor, beware.
CAVEAT EMPTOR. Let the buyer beware (or take care). Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U.S. 108, 116, 3 S.Ct. 537, 28 L.Ed. 86.
This maxim summarizes the rule that a purchaser must examine, judge, and test for himself, Miller v. Tif-fany, 1 Wall. 309, 17 L.Ed. 540; Hargous v. Stone, 5 N.Y. 82; Humphrey v. Baker, 71 Okl. 272, 176 P. 896; the pur-chaser at sheriff’s sales must inform himself of extent of judgment debtor’s title, Brightwell v. First Nat. Bank, C. C.A.Fla., 109 F.2d 271, 273; the purchaser takes tisk of quality and condition unless he protects himself by a war-ranty or there has been a false representation, State ex rel. Jorres Store Co. v. Shain, Mo., 179 S.W.2d 19, 20. There is no warranty of title. McKnight v. Johnson, 236 Ky. 763, 34 S.W.2d 239, 240.
CAVEAT EMPTOR, QUI IGNORARE NON DE-BUIT QUOD JUS ALIENUM EMIT. Hob. 99. Let a purchaser beware, who ought not te he ig-norant that he is purchasing the rights of anoth-er. Let a buyer beware; for he ought not te be ignorant of what they are when he buys the rights of another. Broom, Max. 768; Co.Litt. 132 a; 3 Taunt. 439; Sugd. V. & P. 328; 1 Story, Eq.Jur. ch. 6.
CAVEAT TO WILL. A demand that will be pro-duced and probated in open court. An attack on validity of alleged will. Whitehurst v. Abbott, 225 N.C. 1, 33 S.E.2d 129, 132.
CAVEAT VENDITOR.
In Roman law. A maxim, or rule, casting the responsibility for defects or deficiencies upon the seller of goods. See Hargous v. Stone, 5 N.Y. 73.
In English and American Jurisprudence. Calma t venditor is sometimes used as expressing, in a rough way, the rule which governs all those cases of sales to which caveat emptor does not apply.
CAVEAT VIATOR. Let the wayfarer beware. Broom, Max. 387, n.; 10 Exch. 774. This phrase has been used as a concise expression of the duty of a traveler on the highway to use due care to detect and avoid defects in the way. Cornwell v. Com’rs, 10 Exch. 771, 774.
CAVEATOR. One who files a caveat.
CAVENDUM EST A FRAGMENTIS. Beware of fragments. Bac.Aph. 26.
CAYERE. Lat. In the civil and common law. To take care; to exercise caution; to take care or provide for; to provide by law; to provide against; to forbid by law; to give security; to give caution or security on arrest.CAVERS. Persons stealing ore from mines in Derbyshire, punisháble in the berghmote or min-ers’ court; also officers belonging to the same mines. Wharton.
CAYA. In old English law. A quay, kay, key, or wharf. Cowell.
CAYAGIUM. In old English law. Cayage or kay-age; a toll or duty anciently paid the king for landing goods at a quay or wharf. The barons of the Cinque Ports were free from this duty. Cowell.
CEAP. A bargain; anything for sale; a chattel; also cattle, as being the usual medium of barter. Sometimes used instead of ceapgild, (q.
CEAPGILD. Payment or forfeiture of an animal. An ancient species of forfeiture. ,Cowell.
CEASE. To stop; to become extinct; to pass away; to come to an end. MacDonald v. JEtna Indemnity Co., 90 Conn. 226, 96 A. 926, 927; Mar-tin v. Gray, 193 Ark. 32, 97 S.W. 439, 441. Sus-pend or forfeit. Marks v. La Guardia, Sup., 31 N.Y.S.2d 333, 350. A cessation of activity. Huas-teca Petroleum Co. v. Cia de Navegacao Lloyd Brasileiro, D.C.N.Y., 297 F. 318, 321; In re Simp-son, 62 Cal.App. 549, 217 P. 789, 790.
City of Macon v. Bunch, 156 Ca. 27, 118 S.E. 769, held that a city detective, by being kept in jail for 31 days to answer an indictment, did not cease to perform the duties of his office so as to cause a vacaney therein.
CEASE TO DO BUSINESS. A going concern ceases to do business when ít sells all its property, plant, assets of all kinds, including cash, and the buyer takes possession. Van Oss v. Premier Petroleum Co., 113 Me. 180, 93 A. 72, 77.
CEDE. To yield up; to assign; to grant. Gen-erally used to designate the transfer of territory from one government to another. Goetze v. Unit-ed States, C.C.N.Y., 103 Fed. 72; Baltimore v. Turnpike Road, 80 Md. 535, 31 A. 420.
CEDENT. In Scotch law. An assignor. One who transfers a chose in action. Kames, Eq. 43.
CEDO. I grant. The word ordinarily used in Mexican conveyances to pass title to lands. Mul-ford v. Le Franc, 26 Cal. 88, 108.
CEDULA.
In old English law. A schedule.
In Spanish law. An act under private signa-ture, by which a debtor admits the amount of the debt, and hinds himself to discharge the same on a specified day or on demand. Also the notice or citation affixed to the door of a fugitive criminal requiring him to appear before the court where the accusation is pending.
CEDULE. In French law. The technical name of an act under private signature. Campbell v. Nicholson, 3 La.Ann. 458.
CELATION. In medical jurisprudence. Conceal-

CELDRA. In old English law, a chaldron. In old Scotch law, a measure of grain, otherwise called a "chalder." See 1 Kames, Eq. 215.
CELEBRATION OF MARRIAGE. The formal act by which a man and woman take each other for husband and wife, according to law; the solemni-zation of a marriage. The term is usually applied to a marriage ceremony attended with ecciesias-tical functions. See Pearson v. Howey, 11 N.J. Law, 19.
CELIBACY. The condition or state of life of an unmarried person.
CELLERARIUS. A butler in a monastery; some-times in universities called "manciple" or "ca-terer."
CEMETERY. A graveyard; burial ground. Pet-erson v. Stolz, Tex.Civ.App., 269 S.W. 113, 117; Village of Villa Park v. Wanderer’s Rest Ceme-tery Co., 316 III. 226, 147 N.E. 104, 105. Place or area set apart for interment of the dead. City of Wichita v. Schwertner, 130 Kan. 397, 286 P. 266, 268, Damon v. State, Tex.Com.App., 52 S.W.2d 368, 370.
Terrn includes not only lots for depositing the bodies of the dead, but also avenues, walks, and grounds for shrub-bery and ornamental purposes. Ex parte Adlof, 86 Tex. Cr.R. 13, 215 S.W. 222, 223. Town of Blooming Grove v. Roselawn Memorial Park Co., 231 Wis. 492, 286 N.W. 43, 45. A place of burial, differing from a churchyard by its locality and incidents. Wharton. See Winters v. State, 9 Ind. 174; Cemetery Ass’n v. New Haven, 43 Conn. 243, 21 Am.Rep. 643.
Six or more human bodies being buried at one place con-stitutes the place a cemetery.
CEMETERY WORK. Platting, grading, planting, beautifying, and maintaining a tract of land in such manner as to render it a proper place for sepulture of the dead, and to preserve it as such. Rosedale Cemetery Ass’n v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, 37 Cal.App. 706, 174 P. 351, 352.
CENDULIE. Small pieces of wood laid in the form of tiles to cover the roof of a house; shingles. Cowell.
CENEGILD. In Saxon law. An expiatory mulct or fine paid to the relations of a murdered per-son by the murderer or his relations. Spelman.
CENELL1E. In old records. Acorns.
CENNINGA. A notice given by a buyer to a sell-er that the things which had been sold were claimed by another, in order that he might appear and justify the sale. Blount; Whishaw. But the exact significance of this term is somewhat doubt-ful. Spelman, Gloss.
CENS. In French Canadian law. An annual trib-ute or due reserved to a seignior or lord, and im-poned merely in recognition of his superiority. Guyot, Inst. c. 9. The ceras varíes in amount and in mode of payment. 2 Low.C. 40. See Censive; Censitair

CENSARIA. In old English law. A farm, or House and land let at a standing rent. Cowell.
CENSARIL In old English law. Farmers, or such persons as were liable to pay a census, (tax.) Blount; Cowell.
CENSERE. In the Roman law. To ordain; to de-cree. Dig. 50, 16, 111.
CENSITAIRE. In Canadian law. A tenant by cens, (q. v.)
CENSIVE. In Canadian law. Tenure by cens, (q. v.)
CENSO. In Spanish and Mexican law. An an-nuity. A ground rent. The right which a person acquires to receive a certain annual pension, for the delivery which he makes to another of a de-termined sum of money or of an immovable thing. Civ.Code Mex. art. 3206. See Schm.Civil Law, 149, 309; White, New Recop. bk. 2, c. 7, § 4.
CENSO AL QUITAR. A redeemable annuity; otherwise called "censo redimible." Trevino v. Fernandez, 13 Tex. 630.
CENSO CONSIGNATIVO. A censo (q. v.) is called "consignativo" when he who receives the money assigns for the payment of the pension (annuity) the estate the fee in which he reserves. Civ.Code Mex. art. 3207.
CENSO ENFITEUTICO. In Spanish and Mexican law. An emphyteutic annuity. That species of censo (annuity) which exists where there is a right to require of another a certain canon or pension annually, on account of having trans-ferred to that person forever certain real estate, but reserving the fee in the land. The owner who thus transfers the land is called the "censualista" and the person who pays the annuity is called the "censatario." Hall, Mex.Law, § 756; Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 557.
CENSO RESERVATIO. In Spanish and Mexican law. The right to receive from another an annual pension by virtue of having transferred land to him by full and perfect title. Trevino v. Fernan-dez, 13 Tex. 655:
CENSORSHIP. The denial of right of "freedoin of the press" and of right of "freedom of speech", and of all those rights and privileges which are had under a free government. Esquire, Inc., v. Walker, D.C.D.C., 55 F.Supp. 1015, 1020.
CENSUALES. In old European law. A species of oblati or voluntary slaves of churches or mon-asteries; those who, to procure the protection of the church, bound themselves to pay an annual tax or quit-rent only of their estates to a church or monastery.
CENSUERE. In Roman law. They have decreed. The term of art, or technical term for the judg-ment, resolution, or decree of the senate. Tayl. Civil Law, 566.

CENSUMETHIDUS, or CENSUMORTIIIDUS. A dead rent, like that which is called "mortmain." Blount; Cowell.
CENSURE. In ecclesiastical law. A spiritual punishment.
It consists in withdrawing from a baptlzed person (whether belonging to the clergy or the lalty) a privilege which the church glves him, or in wholly expelling him from the Christian communlon. The principal varleties of censures are admonition, degradation, deprivation, excom-munication, penance, sequestration, suspension. Phlllim. Ecc.Law, 1367.
A custom observed in certain manors in Devon and Corn-well, where all persons aboye the age of sixteen years are cited to swear fealty to the lord, and to pay lid. per poli, and ld. per annum.
CENSUS. The official counting or enumeration of people of a state, nation or district, Huntington v. Cast, 149 Ind. 255, 48 N.E. 1025; Republic v. Paris, 10 Hawaii, 581; Vale Independent Consol. School Dist. No. 2 of Butte County v. School Dist. No. 71 of Meade County, 54 S.D. 207, 222 N.W. 948. It is a finding of the population and not an "esti-mate." State ex rel. Reynolds v. Jost, 265 Mo. 51, 175 S.W. 591, 597, Ann.Cas.1917D, 1102.
In Roman law. A numbering or enrollment of the people, with a valuation of their fortunes.
In old European law. A tax, or tribute; a toll. Montesq. Esprit des Lois, liv. 30, c. 14.
CENSUS REGALIS. In English law. The annual revenue or income of the crown.
CENT. A coin of the United States, the least in value of those now minted. It is the hundredth part of a dollar. Its weight is 48 gr., and it is com-posed of ninety-five per centum of copper and of five per centum of tin and zinc in such proportions as shall be determined by the Director of the Mint. Act of Feb. 12, 1873, § 16. See Rev.Stat. § 3515, 31 U.S.C.A. § 317.
CENTAL. A weight of 100 pounds avoirdupois, used af Liverpool for corn. Cent.Dict. Usually called hundredweight in the United States.
CENTENA. A hundred. A district or division containing originally a hundred freemen, estab-lished among the Goths, Germans, Franks, and Lombards, for military and civil pu: poses, and answering to the Saxon "hundred." Spelman; 1 BI.Comm. 115.
Also, in old records and pleadings, a hundred weight.
CENTENARII. Petty judges, under-sheriffs of counties, that had rule of a hundred, (centena,) and judged smaller matters among them. 1 Vent. 211.
CENTENI. The principal inhabitants of a cen-tena, or district composed of different villages, originally in number a hundred, but afterwards only called by that name.
CENTER. This term is often used, not in its strict sense of a geographical or mathematical center, but as meaning the middle or central point or

portion of anything. Bass v. Harden, 160 Ga. 400, 128 S.E. 397, 400; Hill v. Ralph, 165 Ark. 524, 265 S.W. 57, 58; Darnell v. Ransdall, Mo.App., 277 S.W. 372, 373.
The center of a section of land is the intersection of a straight line from the north quarter corner to the south quarter corner with a straight line from the east quarter corner to the west quarter comer. Lunz v. Sandmeier’s Estate, 172 Minn. 338, 215 N.W. 426. Similarly, the center of a street intersection refers to the point where the center fines of the two streets cross. Thrush v. Lingo Lumber Co., Tex.Civ.App., 262 S.W. 551, 552. The edges of the hardened surface of a road constitute the "bounds of the highway" in cletermining "center" of highway at an inter-section. Decker v. Roberts, 126 Conn. 478, 12 A.2d 511. 5-13. The center of the main channel of a river, is the middle of broad and distinctly defined bed of main river, Hill City Compress Co. v. West Kentucky Coal Co., 155 Miss. 55, 122 So. 747, 748

CENTESIMA. In Roman law. The hundredth part.
Usuria? centesimce. Twelve per cent. per annum; that Is, a hundredth part of the principal was due each month, —the month being the unit of time from which the Romans reckoned interest. 2 B1.Comm. 462, note.
CENTIME. The name of a denomination of French money, being the one-hundredth part of a franc.
CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT. Since 1834, an English court, having jurisdiction for the trial of crimes and misdemeanors committed in London and certain adjoining parts of Kent, Essex, and Sussex, and of such other criminal cases as may be sent to it out of the king’s bench superseded the "Old Bailey."
CENTRAL OFFICE. The central office of the su-preme court of judicature in England is the office established in pursuance of the recommendation of the legal departments commission in order to consolidate certain offices. It is divided into departments. Sweet.
CENTRAL STATION. A plant at which electric current is generated to supply con sumers. Peo-ple ex rel. Taylor v. Walsh, 140 Misc. 25, 248 N.Y.S. 753, 757.
CENTRAL TRAFFIC CONTROL. A system of railroad operation for directing the movement of trains by signals controlled from a central point. Van Schaick v. McCarthy, C.C.A.Colo., 116 F.2d 987, 990.
CENTRAL VISION. The exact and clear vision of the thing one looks directly at. Baugh v. Glas-sell-Rogers Drilling Co., La.App., 190 So. 130, 132.
CENTRALIZATION. The system of government in a country where management of local matters is in the hands of functionaries appointed by the ministers of state, paid by the state, and in con-stant communication and under the constant con-trol and inspiration of the ministers of state, and where the funds of the state are largely applied lo local purposes. Wharton.
CENTUMVIRI. In Roman law. The name of an important court consisting of a body of one hun-dred and five judges. 3 Bla.Comm. 515.
CENTURY. One hundred. A body of one hun-dred men. The Romans were divided into con-turies as the English were divided into hundreds.
Also a cycle of one hundred years.
CEORL. In Anglo Saxon law. A class of free-men personally free, but poásessing no landed property. Guizot, Rep.Govt.
A tenant at Will of free condition, who held land of the thane on condition of paying rent or services. Cowell.
A freeman of inferior rank occupied in hus-bandry. Spelman.
Under the Norman rule, this term, as did others which denoted workmen. especially those which applied to the conquered race, became a term of reproach, as is indicated by the popular signification of churl. Cowell; 1 Poll. Maitl. 8; 2 id. 458.
CEPI. Lat. I have taken. This word was of fre-quent use in the returns of sheriffs when they were made in Latin, and particularly in the return to a writ of tapias.
The fui]. return (In Latin) to a writ of tapias was com-monly mute in cine of the foliowing forms: Cepi corpus, I have taken the body, i. e., arrested the body of the de-fendant: Cepi corpus et bail, I have taken the body and re-temed the defendant on a bail-bond; Cepi corpus et com-mittitur, I have taken the body and he has been committed ft° prison); Cepi corpus et est in custodia, I have taken the defendant and he Is in custody; Cepi corpus et est los guidus, I have taken the defendant and he is sick, i. e., so sick that he cannot safely be removed from the place vhere the arrest was made; Cepi corpus et paratum habeo, I have taken the body and have it (him) ready, i. e., in cus-tody and ready to be produced when ordered.
CEPIT.
In civil practice. He took. This was the char-acteristic word employed in (Latin) writs of tres-pass for goods taken, and in declarations in tres-pass and replevin.
Replevin in the cepit 1s a form of replevin which ts brought for carrying away goods merely. Wells, Repl. § 53; Ford v. Ford, 3 Wis. 399.
In criminal practice. A technical word necessary in an indictment for larceny. The charge must be that the defendant took the thing stolen with a felonious design. Bac.Abr. "Indictment," G, 1.
CEPIT ET ABDUXIT. He took and led away. The emphatic words in writs in trespass or indict-ments for larceny, where the thing taken was a living chattel, i. e., an animal.
CEPIT ET ASPORTAVIT. He took and carried away. Applicable in a declaration in trespass or an indictment for larceny where the defendant has carried away goods without right. 4 Bl. Comm. 231.
CEPIT IN ALIO LOCO. In pleading. A plea in replevin, by which the defendant alleges that he took the thing replevied in another place than that mentioned in the declaration. 1 Chit.Pl. 490 Rast.Entr. 554, 555; Morris, Repl. 141; Wells Repl. § 707.
CEPPAGIUM. In old English law. The stumpf or roots of trees which remain in the ground after the trees are felled. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 41, § 24..

CERA, or CERE. In old English law. Wax; a seal.
CERA DIPRESSA. Lat. An impressed seal.
It may include an impression made on wafers or other adhesive substances capable of receiving an irnpression, or cven paper. Pierce v. Indseth, 106 U.S. 546, 1 S.Ct. 418, 27 L.Ed. 254.
CERAGRUM. In old English law. A payment to provide candles in the church. Blount.
CEREVISA. In old English law. Ale or beer.
CERT MONEY. In old English law. Head money or common fine. Money paid yearly by the .resi-dents of several manors to the lords thereof, for the certain keeping of the leet, (pro certo letce;) and sometimes to the hundred. Blount; 6 Coke, 78; Cowell.
CERTA DEBET ESSE INTENTIO, ET NARRA-TIO, ET CERTUM FUNDAMENTUM, ET CERTA RES QUiE DEDUCITUR IN JUDICIUM. The de-sign and narration ought to be certain, and the foundation certain, and the matter certain, which is brought into court to be tried. Co.Litt. 303a.
CERTA RES. In old English law. A certain thing. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 60, §1 24, 25.
CERTAIN. Ascertained; precise; identified; defi-nitiva; clearly known; unambiguous; or, in law, capable of being identified or made known, with-out liability to mistake or ambiguity, from data already given. Losecco v. Gregory, 108 La. 648, 32 So. 986; White v. Wadhams, 204 Mich. 381, 170 N.W. 60, 62. Not specifically named; indetermi-nate, indefinite; one or some. Wilhite v. Arm-strong, 328 Mo. 1064, 43 S.W.2d 422, 423. Some among possible others, In re Mineral Lac Paint Co., D,C.Pa., 17 F.Supp. 1, 2. That which may be made certain. Brown v. City of Shreveport, La. App., 15 So.2d 234, 236; Singer v. Campbell, 217 Ky. 8.30, 290 S.W. 667, 668; Civ.Code La. art. 3556; Lee v. Pearson, La.App., 143 So. 516, 518.
CERTAIN SERVICES. In feudal and old English la.w. Such services as were stinted (limited or de-fined) in quantity, and could not be exceeded on any pretense; as to pay a stated annual rent, or to plow such a field for three days. 2 Bl.Comm. 61.
CERTAINTY. Absence of doubt. Bennett v. Mc-Krell, Tex.Civ.App., 125 S.W.2d 701, 707

In Pleading

Distinctness; clearness of statement; particu-larity.
Such precision and explicitness In the statement of al-leged facts that the pleader’s averments and contention may be readily understood by the pleader on the other side, as well as by the court and jury. State v. Burke, 151 Mo. 143, 52 S.W. 226.
This word is technically usad In pleading in two different senses, signifying either distinctness, or particularity, as opposed to undue generality.
Certainty is sald to he of three sorts: (1) Certainty to a common intent is such as is attained by using word in their ordinary meaning, but is not exclusive of another meaning which might be made out by argument or In-ference. See 2 H.Bla. 530; Andr.Steph.Pl. 384. (2) Cer-tainty to a certain intent in general is that which allows of no misunderstanding lf a fair and reasonable construc-tion is put upon the language employed, without bringing in facts which are possible, but not apparent. 1 Wms. Saund. 49: Fuller v. Hampton. 5 Conn. 423. (3) Certainty to a certain intent in particular is the highest degree of technical accuracy and precision. Co.Litt. 303; 2 11.BI. 530: State v. Parker, 34 Ark. 158, 36 Am.Rep. 5; Lawes, Pl. 54. These definitions. which have been adopted from Coke, have been subjected to severe criticism, but are of some utility in drawing attention to the different degrees of exactness and fulness of statement required in different instantes. 13 East, 112: 3 Maule & S. 14; People v. Dun-lap, 13 Johns., N.Y., 437.

In Contracts

The quality of being specific, accurate, and dis-tinct. As to uncertainty of contract, see Davie v. Min. Co., 93 Mich. 491, 53 N.W. 625, 24 L.R.A. 357; Van Schaick v. Van Buren, 70 Hun, 575, 24 N.Y.S. 306.

A thing is certain when its essence, quality, and quantity are described. distinctly set forth, etc. Dig. 12, 1, 6. It is uncertain when the description is not that of an individual obiect. but desicnates only the kind. Cly.Code La. art. 3556, par. 7; 5 Coke, 121.

In Determining Negotiability oí Instrument

That is certain which may be rendered certain; a commercial, and not mathematical, certainty. Gerrish v. Atlantic Ice & Coal Co., C.C.A.Ga., 80 F. 2d 648, 650.
CERTIFICANDO DE RECOGNITIONE STAPU-LIE. In English law. A writ commanding the mayor of the staple to certify to the lord chan-cellor a statute-staple taken before him where the party himself detains it, and refuses to bring in the same. There is a like writ to certify a stat-ute-merchant, and in divers other cases. Reg.Orig. 148, 151, 152.
CERTIFICATE. A document in use in the Eng-lish customhouse. No goods can be exported by certificate, except foreign goods formerly import-ed, on which the whole or a part of the customs paid on importation is to be drawn back. Whar-ton.
A ticket. Hall v. U. S., D.C.Cal., 10 F.Supp. 739, 740.
A warrant. Graham v. State, 123 Tex.Cr.R. 121, 57 S.W.2d 850, 854.
A written assurance, or official representation, that some act has or has not been done, or some event occurred, or some legal formality been com-plied with.
A written assurance made or lssuing from some court, and designad as a notice of things done therein, or as a warrant or authority, to some other court, judge, or offi-cer. People v. Foster, 27 MIsc.Rep. 576, 58 N.Y.S. 574: U. S. v. Ambrose, 108 U.S. 336, 2 S.Ct. 682, 27 L.Ed. 746. A statement of some fact in a writing signed by the pare., certifying. Nowell v. Mayor and Council of Monroe, 177 Ca. 618. 171 S.E. 136, 141. A declaration in writing. Bailen & Friedman v. Bank of Krenlin, 37 Okl. 112, 130 P. 539, 540, 44 L.R.A.,N.S., 621. A -certificate- by a public offi-cer is a statement written and signed, but not necessarily or customarily sworn to, which is by law made evidente of the truth of the facts stated for all or for certain purposes. State v. Abernethy, 190 N.C. 768, 130 S.E. 619, 620.\

A wrlting by which testimony ts given that a fact has or has not taken place. Laclede Land & Improvement Co. v. Morten, 183 Mo.App. 637, 167 S.W. 658.
CERTIFICATE FOR COSTS. In English practice. A certificate or memorandum drawn up and signed by the judge before whom a case was tried, setting out certain facts the existence of which must be thus proved before the party is entitled, under the statutes, to recover costs.
CERTIFICATE INTO CHANCERY. In English practice. This is a document containing the opin-ion of the common-law judges on a question of law submitted to them for their decision by the chancery court.
CERTIFICATE LANDS. In Pennsylvania, in the period succeeding the revolution, lands set apart in the western portion of the state, which might be bought with the certificates which the soldiers of that state in the revolutionary array had received in lieu of pay. Cent. Dict.
CERTIFICATE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT. The certificate of a notary public, justice of the peace, or other authorized officer, attached to a deed, mortgage, or other instrument, setting forth that the parties thereto personally appeared before him on such a date and acknowledged the instru-ment to be their free and voluntary act and deed. Read v. Loan Co., 68 Ohio St. 280, 67 N.E. 729, 62 L:R.A. 790. A verification of the act of the maker of an instrument. Thane v. Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank of Dallas, Tex.Civ.App., 129 S.W.2d 795, 799.
CERTIFICATE OF ASSIZE. A writ granted for the re-examination or retrial of a matter passed by assize before justices. Fitzh..Nat.Brev. 181. It is now entirely obsolete. 3 Bla.Comm. 389. Con-sult, also, Comyns, Dig. Assize (B, 27, 28).
CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT. A written ac-knowledgment by a bank or banker of a deposit with promise to pay to depositor, to his order, or to some other person or to his order, Wheelock v. Cantley, 227 Mo.App. 102, 50 S.W.2d 731, 734; Mariland Finance Corporation v. People’s Bank of Keyser, 99 W.Va. 230, 128 S.E. 294, 295. A bank’s promissory note, Dickenson v. Charles, 173 Va. 393, 4 S.E.2d 351, 353.
Documents showing deposits in building and loan association in form of passbooks or any oth-er appropriate written recital. Alter v. Security Building & Loan Co. of Defiance, 58 Ohio App. 114, 16 N.E.2d 228, 233.
CERTIFICATE OF DONATION. A permit or right granted certificate holder to enter upon land belonging to state to make improvernents required by law. Young v. Pumphrey, 191 Ark. 98, 83 S.W. 2d 84, 86.
CERTIFICATE OF EVIDENCE. Practically syn-onymous with bill of exceptions. Yott v. Yott, 257 III. 419, 100 N.E. 902, 903.

CERTIFICATE OF HOLDER OF ATTACHED PROPERTY. A certificate required by statute, in some states, to be given by a third person who is found in possession of property subject to an at-tachment in the sheriff’s hands, setting forth the amount and character of such property and the nature of the defendant’s interest in it. Code Civil Proc.N.Y. § 650, Civil Practice Act, § 918.
CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION. The in-strument by which a private corporation is formed, under general statutes, executed by sev-eral persons as incorporators and filed in some designated public office as evidence of corporate existence. This is properly distinguished from a "charter," which is a direct legislative grant of corporate existence and powers to named in-dividuals.
CERTIFICATE OF INDEBTEDNESS. An obli-gation sometimes issued by corporations having practically the same force and effect as a bond, though not usually secured on any specific prop-erty. Christie v. Duluth, 82 Minn. 202, 84 N.W. 754. It may, however, create a lien on all the property of the corporation issuing it, superior to the rights of general creditors. Jefferson Bank-ing Co. v. Trustees of Martin Institute, 146 Ga. 383, 91 S.E. 463, 466.
CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST. An instrument evidencing a fractional or percentage interest in oil and gas production. People v. Sidwell, 27 Cal. 2d 121, 162 P.2d 913, 915.
CERTIFIOATE OF OCCUPANCY. A paper certi-fying that premises complied with provisions of zoning ordinance. Frank J. Durkin Lumber Co. v. Fitzsimmons, 106 N.J.Law, 183, 147 A. 555, 557.
CERTIFICATE OF PREFERRED STOCK. Cer-tificate that person is registered holder of desig-nated number of shares of preferred capital stock. Cring v. Sheller Wood Rim Mfg. Co., 98 Ind.App. 310, 183 N.E. 674, 677.
CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY. A license or permit to use highways for stated purposes. Railroad Commis-sion of Texas v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Tex.Civ.App., 92 S.W.2d 296, 301, 302.
CERTIFICATE OF P1URCHASE. A certificate is-sued by public officer to successful bidder at a judicial sale (such as a tax sale), which will en-title him to a deed upon confirmation of sale by the court, or (as the case may be) if the land is not redeemed within the time limited. Lightcap v. Bradley, 186 Ill. 510, 58 N.E. 221.
CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRY. In maritime law. A certificate of the registration of a vessel accord-ing to the registry acts, for the purpose of giving her a national character. 3 Steph.Comm. 274; 3 Kent, Comm. 139-150.
CERTIFICATE OF SALE. The same as "certifi-cate of purchase," supra.

CERTIFICATE OF STOCK. A certificate of a cor-poration or joint-stock company that named per-son is owner of designated number of shares of stock. Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U.S. 549, 10 S.Ct. 1057, 34 L.Ed. 525; Edwards v. Wabash Ry. Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 264 F. 610, 613. A written instrument stating or acknowledging that named person is owner of designated number of shares of stock. It is merely written evidence of ownership of stock, and of the rights and liabilities resulting from such ownership. It is merely a paper repre-sentation of an incorporeal right, and stands an the footing similar to that of other muniments of title. Whitehead v. Gormley, 116 Okl. 287, 245 P. 5G2, 565, 47 A.L.R. 171; Misenheimer v. Alexan. der, 162 N.C. 226, 78 S.E. 161, 164; Home for Des. titute Crippled Children v. Boomer, 308 Ill.App, 17Ó, 31 N.E.2d 812, 820; Warren v. New Jersey Zinc Co., N.J.Ch., 116 N.J.Eq. 315, 173 A. 128, 132.
CERTIFICATE SENT TO 1 B. Notation reading "Certificate Sent to 1 B" meant that certificate was to be sent to single beneficiary if war risk in-surance application should be accepted. McCor-mack v. U. S., C.C.A.N.Y., 66 F.2d 519, 521.
CERTIFICATE, TRIAL BY. A mode of trial now little in use; it is resorted to in cases where the fact in issue lies out of the cognizance of the court, and the judges, in order to determine the question, are obliged to rely upon the solemn averment or information of persons in such a station as af-fords them the clearest and most competent knowledge of the truth. Brown.
CERTIFICATION. In Scotch practice. This is the assurance given to a party of the course to be followed in case he does not appear or obey the order of the court.
CERTIFICATION OF ASSIZE. In English prac-tice. A writ anciently granted for the re-examina ing or retrial of a matter passed by assize before justices, now entirely superseded by the remedy afforded by means of a new trial. See Certificate of Assize.
CERTIFICATS DE COUTUME. In French law. Certificates given by a foreign lawyer, establish-ing the law of the country to which he belongs upon one or more fixed points. These certificates can be produced before the French courts, and are received as evidence in suits upon questions of foreign law. Arg,Fr.Merc.Law, 548.
CERTIFIED CARRIERS. Carriers using high-ways of state to whom certificates of public con-venience and necessity have been issued. People v. Henry, 131 Cal.App. 82, 21 P.2d 672.
CERTIFIED CHECK. A depositor’s check recog-nized and accepted by bank of leer as valid ap-propriation of the amount specified and as drawn against funds held by bank.
The usual rnethod of certification is for cashier or tener to write across face of check, over his signat are. state-ment that it is good when properly indorsed. See McAdoo v. Farners’ State Bank of Zenda, 106 Kan. 662. 189 P. 155, 156; Bathg,ate v. Exchange Bank of Chula, 199 Mo.App. 583, 205 S.W. 875, 876.
The certification of a check is a statement of fact, amounting to an estoppel of the bank to deny liability, Bank of Bay Biscayne v. Ball, 99 Fla. 745, 128 So. 491, 492. A warranty that sullicient funda are on deposit and have boca set acide. World Exchange Bank v. Cornmercial Cas-ualty Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 1, 173 N.E. 902, 904. It means that bank holds money to pay check and is ]fiable to pay it to proper party. Sundial Const. Co. v. Liberty Bank of Buffalo, 277 N.Y. 137, 13 N.E.2d 745, 746.
CERTIFIED COPY. A copy of a documént or record, signed and certified as a true copy by the officer to whose custody the original is intrusted. People v. Foster, 27 Misc. 576, 58 N.Y.Supp. 574; Ehrlich v. Mulligan, 104 N.J.Law, 375, 140 A. 463, 465, 57 A.L.R. 596.
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT. A trained accountant who examines the books of accounts of corporations and others and reports upon them.
CERTIFY. To testify in writing; to make known or establish as a fact. Smith v. Smith, Ind.App., 110 N.E. 1013, 1014. To vouch for a thing in writ-ing. State ex inf. Carnahan ex rel. Webb v. Jones, 266 Mo. 191, 181 S.W. 50, 52. To give a certificate, or to make a declaration about a writ-ing. Ainsa v. Mercantile Trust Co. of San Fran-cisco, 174 Cal. 504, 163 P. 898, 901. To warrant. Ettman v. Federal Life Ins. Co., D.C.Mo., 48 F. Supp. 578, 580.
CERTIORARI. Lat. (To be informed of, to be made certain in regard to.) The name of a writ of review or inquiry. Leonard v. Willcox, 101 Vt. 195, 142 A. 762, 766; Nissen v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen
Helpers of America, 229 Iowa 1028, 295 N.W. 858.
Certiorari is an appellate proceeding for re-examinatiore of action of inferior tribunal or as auxiliary process to• enable appellate court tú obtain further information in pending cause. Shapleigh Hardware Co. v. Brumfleld, 159′ Miss. 175, 130 So. 98. A writ directed only to an inferior tribunal, Stewart v. Johnston, C.C.A.Cal., 97 F.2d 548. It is a discrelionary writ, Lennon v. School Dist. No. 11, Greer County, 189 Okl. 37, 113 P.2d 382, 384. Issued only for good cause un showing negativing laches in prosecuting appeal, In re Snelgrove, 208 N.C. 670, 182 S.E. 335, 336. It is available for review of ollicial, judicial or quasi judicial actions. State v. Canlield, 166 Minn. 414, 208 N.W. 181; People ex rel. Elmore v. Allman, 382 In. 156, 46 N.E.2d 974, 975. It brings roto superior court the record of the admin-istrativo or inferior judicial tribunal for ínspection, Murphy v. Cuesta. Rey & Co., 381 III. 162, 45 N.E.2d 26, 28. It lies as a substituto for an appeal, Pue v. Hood, 222 N.C. 310, 22 S.E.2d 896, 898. To correct errors oí law, Dube v. Mayor of City of Fall Rivcr, 308 Mass. 12, 30 N.E.2d 817, 818; to restrain excesses of jurisdiction, Stacy v. Mayor of City of Haverhill, 317 Mass. 188, 57 N.E.2d 564. To review erroneous or unwarranted acts or proceedings, State ex rel. Allen v. Rose, 123 Fla. 544, 167 So. 21, 24. To review ques-tions of law, Public Welfare Commission v. Civil Service Commission, 289 Mich. 101, 286 N.W. 173, 175. Where cir-cumstances are so exceptional that an immediate review is. in inlerest of justice, Vingi v. Read. 68 R.I. 484, 29 A.2d 637, 639; where judginent is a miscarriage of justice or will result in substantial injury to lela] rights, Goodkind e. Wolkowsky, 151 Fla. 62, 9 So.2d 553, 562; or where applieant for writ lost right of appeal through no fault of bis own, McCain v. Collins, 204 Ark. 521, 164 S.W.2d 445, 451. It lies to determine whether inferior tribunal acted within or abused or excecdcd jurisdiction, Brundage v. O’Berry, 101 Fla. 320, 134 So. 520, 521; Pierce v. Green, 229 Iowa 22, 294 N.W. 237, 253, 131 A.L.R. 335; or pro-ceeded illegally, Board of Zoning Appeals of City of Indi-anapolis v. Waintrup, 99 Ind.App. 576, 193 N.E. 701, 705; or proceeded regularly, In re Revocation of Restaurant

Liquor License No. R-8981, Issued tú John Mami, 144 Pa.Super. 285, 19 A.2d 549, 552; or whether judgment is prejudicial and rnaterially harmful, Jacksonville American Pub. Co. v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 143 Fla. 835, 197 So. 672, 674. It performs the office of the common-law writ of error, Berry v. Recorder’s Court of Town of West Orange, 124 N.J.L. 385, 11 A.2d 743, 745. Limited review only is involved in the writ, Brundage v. O’Berry, 101 Fla. 320, 134 So. 520, 521. Quashal of record or proceeding is the only relief available, State ex rel. St. Louis County v. Evans, 316 Mo. 209, 139 S.W.2d 967, 969.
Originally, and in English practice, an original writ com-manding judges or offlcers of inferior courts to certify or to return records or proceedings in a cause for judicial review of their action. Jacob; Ashworth v. Hatcher, 98 W.Va. 323, 128 S.E. 93. For other common-law definitions, see F. N. B. 554 A; Bac.Abr. 162, 168, ening 4 Burr. 2244; In re Dance, 2 N.D. 184, 49 N.W. 733, 33 Am.St.Rep. 768.
In Florida the writs of "certiorari" in use are the com-mon-law writs, the statutory writ to review judgments of civil courts of record, the rule certiorari to review inter-locutory appeals in equity, the rule certiorari for supply-ing omitted parts of records on appeals or writs of error, and writs of certiorari issued to review quasi judicial judg-ments or orders of quasi judicial bodies or offlcers. Kil-gore v. Bird, 149 Fla. 570, 6 So.2d 541, 544, 545.
In Massachusetts it is a writ by the supreme judicial court commanding inferior tribunal to certify and return its records in a particular case that any errors or irregu-larities which appear in the proceedings may be corrected. Pub.St.Mass.1882, p. 1288; Coolidge v. Bruce, 249 Mass. 465, 144 N.E. 397.
In Texas, the ordinary office of writ of "certiorari" is to perfect the record on appeal. Rev.St.1925, art. 932. Zam-ora v. Garza, Tex.Civ.App., 117 S.W.2d 165.
In somes states the writ has been abolished by statute so far as the common-law narre is concerned, but the remedy is preserved under the new narre of "writ of revlew"; Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Robinson, Tex., 1 C.C.A. 91, 48 F. 771.
CERTIORARI, BILL OF. In English chancery practice. An original bill praying relief. It was filed for the purpose of removing a suit pending in some inferior court of equity into the court of chancery, on account of some alleged incompe-tency or inconveniente.
CERTIORARI FACIAS. Cause to be certified. The command of a writ of certiorari.
CERTUM EST QUOD CERTUM REDDI POTEST. That is certain which can be rendered certain. Co.Litt. 45 b, 96 a, 142 a; 2 Bla.Comm. 143; 2 M. & S. 50; 3 Term 463; 3 M. & K. 353; President, etc., of Lechmere Bank v. Boynton, 11 Cush., Mass., 380.
CERURA. A mound, fence, or inclosure.
CERVISARII. In Saxon law. Tenants who were bound to supply drink for their lord’s table. Cowell.
CERVISIA. Ale, or beer. Sometimes spelled
"cerevisia."
CERVISIARIUS. In old records. An alehouse keeper. A beer or ale brewer. Blount; Cowell.
CERVUS. Lat. A stag or deer.
CESAREVITCII, CESAREWITCIL Originally, a title introduced in Russia in 1799 by Paul I (1754-1801) for his second son, the Grand Duke Constan-tine. Afterward the title of the czar’s eldest son,

or the heir apparent to the Russian throne. 6 New Internatl.Encyc. 420.
CESAREVNA. In Imperial Russia, the title of the wife of the cesarevitch, or heir apparent. 6 New Internatl.Encyc. 420.
CESIONARIO. In Spanish law. An assignee. White, New Recop. b. 3, tit. 10, c. 1, § 3.
CESS, v. In old English law. To cease, stop, determine, fail.
CESS, n. An assessment or tax. In Ireland, it was anciently applied to an exaction of victuals, at a certain rate, for soldiers in garrison.
CESSA REGNARE, SI NON VIS JUDICARE. Cease to reign, if you wish not to adjudicate. Hob. 155.
CESSANTE CAUSA, CESSAT EFFECTUS. The cause ceasing, the effect ceases. Broom, Max. 160; 1 Exch. 430.
CESSANTE RATIONE LEGIS, CESSAT ET IPSA LEX. The reason of the law ceasing, the law it-self also ceases. Broom, Max. 159; 4 Co. 38; Ap-peal of Cummings, 11 Pa. 273; Nice’s Appeal, 54 Pa. 201. See Dig. 35, 1, 72, 6.
CESSANTE STATU PRIMITIVO, CESSAT DE-RIVATIVUS. When the primitive or original es-tate determines, the derivative estate determines also. 8 Coke, 34; Broom, Max. 495; 4 Kent 32.
CESSARE. L. Lat. To cease, stop, or stay.
CESSAVIT PER BIENNIUM. In practice. An obsolete writ, which could formerly have been sued out when the defendant had for two years ceased or neglected to perform such service or to pay such rent as he was bound to do by his tenure, and had not upon his lands sufficient goods or chattels to be distrained. Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 208. It also lay where a religious house held lands on condition of performing certain spiritual services which it failed to do. 3 Bl.Comm. 232. Emig v. Cunningham, 62 Md. 460.
CESSE. (1) An assessment or tax; (2) a tenant of land was raid to cesse when he neglected or ceased to perform the services due to the lord. Co.Litt. 373a, 380b.
CESSER. Neglect; a ceasing from, or omission to do, a thing. 3 Bl.Comm. 232. The determina-tion of an estate. 1 Coke, 84; 4 Kent, Comm. 33, 90, 105, 295. The determination or ending of a term, annuity, etc. Sweet.
As to the cesser clause in a charter party, see Steamship Rutherglen Co. v. Howard Houlder & Partners, N.Y., 122 C.C.A. 166, 203 F. 848; The Marpesia, C.C.A.N.y., 292 F. 957, 973.
CESSER, PROVISO FOR. A provision in a set-tlement creating long tercos that when the trusts are satisfied, the term should cease and determine. Sweet. This proviso generally expresses three events: (1) The trusts never arising; (2) their

becoming unnecessary or incapable of taking ef-fect; (3) the performance of them. Sugd.Vend. (14th Ed.) 621-623.
CESSET EXECUTIO. (Let execution stay.) In practice. A stay of execution; or an order for such stay; the entry of such stay on record. 2 Tidd, Pr. 1104.
CESSET PROCESSUS. (Let process stay.) A stay of proceedings entered on the record. See 2 Dougl. 627; 11 Mod. 231. Formal order for stay of process or proceedings, Brooks v. Super Service, 183 Miss. 833, 183 So. 484.
CESSIO. Lat. A cession; a giving up, or relin-quishment; a surrender; an assignment.
CESSIO BONORUM. Iri Roman law. Cession of goods. A surrender, relinquishment, or assign-ment of all his property and effects made by an in-solvent debtor for the benefit of his creditors. The term is commonly employed in modern con-tinental jurisprudence to designate a bankrupt’s assignment of property to be distributed among his creditors, and is used in the same sense by some English and American writers, but here rather as a convenient than as a strictly technical term. See 2 Bl.Comm. 473; Dig. 2, 4, 25; 48, 19, 1; Nov. 4. 3; La.Civ.Code art. 2166 (Civ.Code, art. 2170) ; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat, 122, 4 L.Ed. 529.
CESSIO IN JURE. In Reman law. A fictitious suit, in which the person who was to acquire the thing claimed (vindicaban the thing as his own, the person who was to transfer it acknowl-edged the justice of the claim, and the magistrate pronounced it to be the property (addicebat) of the claimant. Sandars’ Just.Inst., 5th Ed., 89, 122.
CESSION. The act of ceding; a yielding or giv-ing up; surrender; relinquishment of property or rights

In the Civil Law

An assignment. The act by which a party trans-fers property to another. The surrender or as-signment of property for the benefit of one’s cred-itors. See Cessio Bonorum.

In Ecclesiastical Law

A giving up or vacating a benefice, by accepting another without a proper dispensation. 1 B1. Comm. 392; Latch. 234; Cowell.

In Public Law

The assignment, transfer, or yielding up of ter-ritory by one state or government to another. Municipality of Ponce v. Church, 210 U.S. 310, 28 S.Ct. 737, 52 L.Ed. 1068.
CESSION DES BIENS. In French law. The vol-untary or compulsory surrender which a debtor in insolvent circumstances makes of all his goods to his creditors.

CESSION OF GOODS. The surrender of prop-erty; the relinquishment that a debtor makes of
Black’s Law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed.-10

all his property to his creditors, when he flnds himself unable to pay his debts. Civil Code La. art. 2170.
CESSIONARY. In Scotch law. An assignee. Bell.
CESSIONARY BANKRUPT. One who gives up his estate to be divided among his creditors.
CESSMENT. An assessment, or tax.
CESSOR. One who ceases or neglects so long to perform a duty that he thereby incurs the danger of the law. O. N. B. 136.
CESSURE. L. Fr. A receiver; a bailiff. Kel-ham.
C’EST ASCAVOIR. L. Fr. That is to say, or to-wit. Generally written as one word, cestascavoir, cestascavoire.
C’EST LE CRIME QUI FAIT LA HONTE, ET NON PAS L’ÉCHAFAUD. Fr. It is the offense which causes the shame, and not the scaffold.
CESTUI, CESTUY. He. Used frequently in com-position in law French phrases.
CESTUI QUE TRUST. He who has a right to a beneficial interest in and out of an estate the legal title to which is vested in another. 2 Washb. Real Prop. 163. The person who possesses the equitable right to property and receives the rents, issues, and profits thereof, the legal estate of which is vested in a trustee. Bernardsville Methodist Epis-copal Church v. Seney, 85 N.J.Eq. 271, 96 A. 388, 389; Moore v. Shifflett, 187 Ky. 7, 216 S.W. 614, 616. Beneficiary of trust, Ulmer v. Fulton, 129 Ohio St. 323, 195 N.E. 557, 564, 97 A.L.R. 1170.
CESTUI QUE USE. He for whose use and benefit lands or tenements are held by another. The cestui que use has the right to receive the profits and benefits of the estate, but the legal title and possession (as well as the duty of defending the same) reside in the other. 2 Bla.Comm. 330; 2 Washb. Real Prop. 95.
CESTUI QUE VIE. He whose lile is the measure of the duration of an estate. 1 Washb. Real Prop. 88. The person for whose libe any lands, tene-ments, or hereditaments are held.
CESTUY QUE DOIT INHERITER AL PÉRE DOIT INHERITER AL FILS. He who would have been heir to the father of the deceased shall also be heir of the son. Fitzh. Abr. "Descent," 2; 2 Bl. Comm. 239, 250.
CF. An abbreviated forro of the Latin word con-ler, meaning "compare." Directs the reader’s at-tention to another part of the work, to another volume, case, etc., where contrasted, analogous, or explanatory views or statements may be found.
C11. This abbreviation most commonly stands for "chapter," or "chancellor," but it may also mean "chancery," or "chief."
CHACE. L. Fr. A chase or hunting ground.

CHACEA. In old English law. A station of game, more extended than a park, and less than a forest; also the liberty of chasing or hunting within a cer-tain district; also the way through which cattle are driven to pasture, otherwise called a "drove-way." Blount.
CHACEA EST AD COMMUNEM LEGEM. A chase is by common law. Reg.Brev. 806.
CHACEABLE. L. Fr. That may be chased or hunted.
CHACER. L. Fr. To drive, compel, or oblige; also to chase or hunt.
CHACURUS. L. Lat. A horse for the chase, or a hound, dog, or courser.
CHAFEWAX. An officer in the English chancery whose duty was to prepare wax to seal the writs, commissions, and other instruments thence issu-ing. The office was abolished by St. 15 & 16 Vict.
c. 87, § 23.
CHAFFERS. An ancient term for goods, wares, and merchandise; hence the word chaffering, which is yet used for buying and selling, or beat-ing down the price of an article. The word is used in Stat. 3 Edw. III. c. 4.
CHAFFERY. Traffic; the practice of buying and selling.
CHAIN. A measure used by engineers and sur. veyors, being twenty-two yards in length.
CHAIN OF TITLE. Successive conveyances, or other forms of alienation, affecting a particular parcel of land, arranged consecutively, from the government or original source of title down to the present holder. Capper v. Poulsen, 321 III. 480, 152 N.E. 587, 588; Maturi v. Fay, 96 N.T.Eq. 472, 126 A. 170, 173; Havis v. Thorne Inv. Co., Tex.Civ. App., 46 S.W.2d 329, 332.
CHAIN STORE. A store in a group of stores, one or more of which is located within the state, under the same management, supervision, or ownership. Lee v. Herndon, 151 Fla. 657, 10 So.2d 305, 306.
CHAIRMAN. A name given to the presiding offi-cer of an assembly, public meeting, convention, deliberative or legislative body, board of directors, committee, etc.
CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES OF THE WHOLE HOUSE. In English parliamentary practice. In the commons, this officer, always a member, is elected by the house on the assembling of every new parliament. When the house is in committee on bilis introduced by the government, or in com-mittee of ways and means, or supply, or in com-mittee to consider preliminary resolutions, it is his duty to preside.
CHALDRON, CHALDERN, or CHALDER. Twelve sacks of coals, each holding three bushels, weigh-ing about a ton and a half. In Wales they reckon 12 barreis or pitchers a ton or chaldron, and 29 cwt. of 120 lbs. to the ton. Wharton.

A measure of capacity, equal to fifty-eight and two-thirds cubic feet, nearly. Cowell.
CHALLENGE, v. To object or except to; to pre. fer objections to a person, right, or instrument; to formally call into question the capability of a per-son for a particular function, or the existente of a right claimed, or the sufficiency or validity of an instrument; to call or put in question; to put into dispute; to render doubtful.
CHALLENGE, n. A request by one person to an-other to fight a duel. Ivey v. State, 12 Ala. 276; Hawk.Pl.Cr. b. 1, c. 3, § 3; State v. Farrier, 8 N.C. 487; 2 Bish.Cr.Law, § 312.
An objection or exception.
The objection or exception may be:
1. Against a person who presents himself at the polis as a voter, in order that his right to cast a bailot may be inquired into.
2. Against legal documents, as a declaration, count, or writ. But this use of the word is now obsolescent. See, however, Adkins v. Wayne County Court, 94 W.Va. 460, 119 S.E. 284, 285.
3. Taken to the personal qualifIcation of a judge or magistrate about to preside at the trial of a cause; as on account of personal interest, his having been of counsel. bias, etc. See Bank of North America v. Fitzsimons, 2 Binn., Pa., 454; Pearce v. Affleck, 4 id. 349.
4. Taken to the jurors summoned and returned for the trial of a cause, People v. Travers, 88 Cal. 233, 26 P. 88. See 2 Poll. & Maitl. 619, 646; Co.Litt. 155b.

Challenge for Cause

A challenge to a juror for which some cause or reason is alleged. Termes de la Ley; BI.Comm. 353. Thus dis-tinguished from a peremptory challenge. Turner v. State, 114 Ga. 421, 40 S.E. 308; Cr. Code N. Y. § 374.

Challenge Propter Affectum

A challenge on account of bias or partiality or prejudice. State v. Sawtelle, 66 N.H. 488, 32 A. 831.

Challenge Propter Defectum

A challenge on account of some legal disqualification, such as infancy or alienage.

Challenge Propter Delictum

A challenge on account of crime; that is, disqualification arising from the conviction of an infamous crime. Co.Litt. 155 b et seq.; State v. Levy, 187 N.C. 581, 122 S.E. 386, 389.

Challenge Propter Honoris Respectum

challenge on account of party’s social rank.

Challenge to the Array

An exception to the whole panel in which the jury are arrayed, or set in order by the sheriff in his return, upon account of partiality, or some default in the sheriff, cor-oner, or other officer who arrayed the panel or made the return. 3 BI.Cc>mm. 359; Co.Litt. 155b; Moore v. Guano Co., 130 N.C. 229, 41 S.E. 293; Durrah v. State, 44 Miss. 789. A challenge to the farm and rnanner of making up the panel. Cobb v. Atlanta Coach Co., 46 Ga.App. 633, 168 S.E. 126, 127. A challenge that goes to illegality of draw-ing, selecting, or impaneling array. Lake v. State, 100 Fla. 386, 129 So. 833, 834.

Challenge to the Favor

A challenge based on circumstances of suspicion, as acquaintance, and the like. 3 BI.Comm. 363; 4 B1.Comm. 353; State v. Sawtelle, 66 N.H. 488, 32 A. 831; Cobb v. Atlanta Coach Co., 46 Ga.App. 633, 168 S.E. 126, 127.

Challenge to the Panel

The same as a challenge to the array, supra. See Pen. Code Cal. § 1058; Pate v. State, 15 Okl.Cr. 90, 175 P. 122, 123.

Challenge to the Poli

A challenge mute to an individual juror. State v. Car-lino, 99 N.J Law, 292, 122 A. 830, 831; Cobb v. Atlanta Coach Co., 46 Ga.App. 633, 168 S.E. 126, 127.

General Challenge

A species of challenge for cause, being an objection to a particular juror, to the effect that the juror is disqualified from serving in any case. Pen. Code Cal. § 1071.

Peremptory Challenge

In criminal practice. A species of challenge which the prosecution or the prisoner is allowed to have against a certain number of jurors, without assigning any cause. Lewis v. U. S., 146 U.S. 370, 13 S.Ct. 136, 36 L.Ed. 1011; Turpin v. State, 55 Md. 462; Leary v. Railway Co., 69 N.J.Law, 67, 54 A. 527

Principal Challenge

A challenge of a juror for a cause which carries with it, prima facie, evident marks of suspicion either of matice or favor; as that a juror is of kin to either party within the ninth degree; that he has an interest in the cause, etc. 3 BI.Comm. 363. A species of challenge to the array /nade on account of partiality or some default in the sheriff or his under-officer who arrayed the panel. 4 Bla.Comm. 353; Co.Litt. 156 a, b. A challenge based on alleged facts from which, if proven to be true, incapacity to serve is con-clusively presumed. Cobb v. Atlanta Coach Co., 46 Ga.App. 633, 168 S.E. 126, 127. A challenge for principal cause, Rutler v. Greensboro Fire Ins. Co., 196 N.C. 203, 145 S.E. 3, 4.

CHALLENGE TO FIGHT. A summons or invita-tion, given by one person to another, to engage in a personal combat; a request to fight a duel. A criminal offense. See Steph.Crim.Dig. 40; 3 East, 581; State v. Perkins, 6 Blackf.Ind. 20.
CHAMBER. A room or apartment in a house. A private repository of money; a treasury. A com-partment; a hollow or cavity. Proudfit Loose Leaf Co. v. Kalamazoo Loose Leaf Binder Co., C.C. A.Mich., 230 F. 120, 131. Also used to designate a court, a commission, or an association of person habitually meeting together in an apartment, e. g., the "star chamber," "chamber of deputies," "chamber of commerce."
CHAMBER BUSINESS. A term applied to all such judicial business as may properly be trans-acted by a judge at his chambers or elsewhere, as distinguished from such as must be done by the court in session. In re Neagle, C.C.Cal., 39 Fed. 855, 5 L.R.A. 78.
CHAMBER OF ACCOUNTS. In French law. A sovereign court, of great antiquity, in France, which took cognizance of and registered the ac-counts of the king’s revenue; nearly the same as the English court of exchequer. Ene. Brit.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE. An association (which may or may not be incorporated) com-prising the principal merchants, manufacturers, and traders of a city, designed for convenience in buying, selling and exchanging goods, and to foster the commercial and industrial interests of the place. Similar societies are known by various names, as, Board of Trade, etc. A board or asso-ciation to promote the commercial interests of a locality, county, or the like, or a society of a city who meet to promote the general trade and com-merce of the place. Retailers Credit Ass’n of Ala-

meda County v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-nue, C.C.A.9, 90 F.2d 47, 51, 111 A.L.R. 152.
CHAMBER SURVEYS. In Pennsylvania, false and fraudulent pretenses of surveys of public lands surveyors. Schraeder Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Packer, 129 U.S. 688, 9 S.Ct. 385, 32 L.Ed. 760.
CHAMBER, WIDOW’S. A portion of the effects of a deceased person, reserved for the use of his widow, and consisting of her apparel, and the furniture of her bed-chamber, is called in London the "widow’s chamber." 2 Bl.Comm. 518.
This custom in London of reserving her apparel and furniture for the widow of a freeman was abolished by 19 & 20 Vict. c. 94.
CHAMBERDEKINS, or CHAMBER DEACONS. In old English Jaw. Certain poor Irish scholars, clothed in mean habit, and living under no rule; also beggars banished from England. 1 Hen. V. cc. 7, 8. Wharton.
CHAMBERLAIN. Keeper of the chamber. Orig-inally the chamberlain was the keeper of the treasure chamber (camera) of the prince or state; otherwise called "treasurer." Cowell.
The name of several high officers of state in England, as the lord great chamberlain of Eng-land, lord chamberlain of the household, chamber-lain of the exchequer. Cowell; Blount.
The, word is also used in some American cities as the title of an offieer corresponding to "treas-urer."
CHAMBERLARIA. Charnberlainship; the office of a chamberlain. Cowell.
CHAMBERS.
In Practice
The private room or office of a judge; any place in which a judge hears motions, signs pa-pers, or does other business pertaining to his office, when he is not holding a session of court. Business so transacted is said to be done "in chambers." Quoted with approval in Chapman v. Chattooga Oil-Mill Co., 22 Ga.App. 446, 96 S.E. 579, 580. See, also, Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Long, 122 Okl. 86, 251 P. 486, 491; Hoskins v. Baxter, 64 Minn. 226, 66 N.W. 969; In re Verdigris Conservancy Dist., 131 Kan. 214, 289 P. 966, 968. The term is also applied, in England, to the private office of a barrister.
In International Law
Portions of the sea cut off by Enes drawn from one promontory to another, or included within Enes extending from the point of one cape to the next, situate on the sea-coast of the same nation, and which are claimed by that nation as asylums for merchant vessels, and exempt from the opera-tions of belligerents.
CHAMBERS OF THE KING. See King’s Cham-bers.
CHAMBIUM. In old English law. Change, or exchange. Bract. fols. 117, 118.

CHAMBRE DEPEINTE. A name anciently given to St. Edward’s chamber, called the "Painted Chamber," destroyed by fire with the houses of parliament.
CHAMFER. A small gutter, furrow, or groove; the slope or bevel produced by cutting off the edge of anything which was originally right angled. Syracuse Chilled Plow Co. v. Robinson, C.C.N.Y., 35 F. 502, 503.
CHAMOTTE. A clay which has been burned to an extent which deprives it of further shrinkage on being again subjected to heat. Panzl v. Battle Island Paper & Pulp Co., D.C.N.Y., 132 F. 607, 609. As used in the arts, see Id., C.C.A.N.Y., 138 F. 48, 50.
CHAMP DE MAI. (Lat. Campus Madi.) The field or assembly of May. The national assembly of the Franks, held in the month of May.
CHAMP DE MARS. (Lat. Campus Martii.) The field or assembly of March. The national assem-bly of the Franks, held in the month of March, in the open air.
CHAMPART. In French law. The grant of a piece of land by the owner to another, on condition that the latter would deliver to him a portion of the crops. 18 Toullier, n. 182.
CHAMPERT.
In old English law. A share or division of land; ehamperty.
In old Scotch law. A gift or bribe, taken by any great man or judge from any person, for delay of just actions, or furthering of wrongous actions, whether it be lands or any goods movable. Skene.
CHAMPERTOR. In criminal law. One who makes or brings pleas or suits, or causes them to be moved or brought, either directly or indirectly, and sues them at his proper costs, upon condition of having a part of the gains or of the land in dis-pute. One guilty of champerty. St. 33 Edw. I, c. 2; In re Aldrich, 86 Vt. 531, 86 A. 801, 802.
CHAMPERTOUS. Of the nature of champerty; affected with champerty.
The conveyance of land which is in the adverse posses-sion of another is "champertous". Reynolds v. Thomas Forman Co., 295 Ky. 41, 174 S.W.2d 132, 134.
CHAMPERTY. A bargain by a stranger with a party to a suit, by which such third person under-takes to carry on the litigation at his own cost and risk, in consideration of receiving, if successful, a part of the proceeds or subject sought to be re-covered. Small v. Mott, 22 Wend., N.Y., 405; Gil-man v. Jones, 87 Ala. 691, 5 So. 785, 7 So. 48, 4 L.R.A. 113; Jamison Coal & Coke Co. v. Goltra, C.C.A.Mo., 143 F.2d 889, 895, 154 A.L.R. 1191. An agreement between owner of claim and volunteer that latter may collect claim at his own expense and divide proceeds. Gibson v. Gillespie, 4 W.W. Harr. (Del.) 331, 152 A. 589, 593.
The purchase of an interest in a thing in dispute, with the object of maintaining and taking part in the litigation. 7 Bing. 378.
"Maintenance" consists ln maintaining, supporting, or
promoting the litigation of another. "Champerty" is a bargain to divide the proceeds of litigation between the owner of the liquidated claim and a party supporting or enforcing the litigation. Draper v. Zebec, 219 Ind. 362, 37
N.E.2d 952, 956,
CHAMPION. A person who fights a combat in his own cause, or in place of another. The per-son who, in the trial by battel, fought either for the tenant or demandant. 3 Bl.Comm. 339; Brac-ton, 1. 4, t. 2, c. 12.
A person who engages in any contest; a com-batant; a fighter; one who acts or speaks in be-half of a person, or a cause; defender; an ad-vocate. Egan v. Signal Pub. Co., 140 La. 1069, 74 So. 556, 558.
CHAMPION OF THE KING OR QUEEN. An ancient officer, whose duty it was at the corona-tion to challenge "that, if any man shall deny the king’s title to the crown, he is there ready to de-fend it in single combat." Wharton.
CHANCE. Absence of explainable or controllable causation; accident; fortuity; hazard; result or issue of uncertain and unknown conditions or forces; risk; unexpected, unforeseen, or unintend« ed consequence of an act. The opposite of inten-tion, design, or contrivance.
But it has been held that there is a wide difference between chance and accident. Harless v. U. S., Morris, Iowa, 169, 173.
CHANCE BARGAIN. The entering into a con-tract for better or worse, accornpanied by the taking of chances as to the true facts and situation of the thing or article bargained about. Marr v. Lawson, 290 Ky. 342, 161 S.W.2d 42, 44.
CHANCE-MEDLEY. In criminal law. A sudden affray. This word is sometimes applied to any kind of homicide by misadventure, but in strict-ness it is applicable to such killing only as happens in defending one’s self. 4 Bl.Comm. 184.
CHANCE VERDICT. See Verdict.
CIIANCEL. In ecclesiastical law. The part of a church in which the communion table stands; it belongs to the rector or the impropriator. 2 Broom & H. Comm. 420.
CHANCELLOR. In American law, this is the name given in some states to the judge (or the presiding judge) of a court of chancery.
In England, besides being the designation of the chief judge of the court of chancery, the terco is used as the title of several judicial otlicers attached to bishops or other high dignitaries and to the universities. The title is also
used in some of the dioceses of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States to designate a member of the legal profession who gives advice ami counsel to the bishop and other ecclesiastical authorities.
In Scotland, this title is given to the foreman of an assize or jury. Bisph.Eq. 7.
An bearing this title is to he found in some coun- tries of Europe, and is generany invested with extensive political authority.

Chancellor of a Cal h e dral

In English ecclesiastical law. One of the quatuor per – sonce or four chief dignitaries of the cathedrals of the old foundation.In ecclesiastical law, the officer appointed to assist a bishop in matters of law, and to hold his consistory courts for him. 1 BI.Comm. 382; 2 Steph.Comm. 672.

Chancellor of a University

In English law. The officio’ head of a university.

Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster

In English law. An officer before whom, or his deputy, the court of the duchy chamber of Lancaster is held. Hob. 77; 3 BI.Comm. 78

Chancellor of the Exchequer

In English law. A high officer of the crown, who for-merly sat in the exchequer court. Cowell. In modem times his duties are such as pertain to a minister of state charged with the management of the national revenue and expenditure. 2 Steph.Com. 467.

Chancellor of the Order of the Carter and Other Military Orders

In England, an officer who seals the commissions and the mandates of the chapter and assembly of the knights, keeps the register of their proceedings, and delivers their acts under the seal of their order.

Chancellor, the Lord Iligh

In England, the highest judicial functionary In the king-dom.
He exercises many functions and powers over and aboye the jurisdiction which he exercises in his judicial capacity in the supreme court of judicature, of which he is the head. Wharton

Vice-Chancellor

In English law. A judge of the court of chancery, acting as assistant to the lord chancellor, and holding a separate court. 3 Steph.Comm. 418.

CHANCELLOR’S COURTS IN THE TWO UNI-VERSITIES. In English law. Courts of local jurisdiction, resembling borough courts, in and for the two universities of Oxford and Cambridge in England. 3 Bl.Comm. 83; Odgers, C.L. 1030; 12 East, 12; 13 East, 635; 15 East, 634; 10 Q.B. 292.
CHANCEE. To adjust according to principles of equity, as would be done by a court of chancery. Cent. Dict.
The practice arose in parts of New England when the
courts, without equity jurisdiction, were compelled to act upon equitable principies. See Lewiston v. Gagne, 89 Me. 395, 36 A. 629, 56 Am.St.Rep. 432; In re Appel, Mass., 90 C.C.A. 172, 163 F. 1002, 20 L.R.A.,N.S., 76.
CHANCERY. Equity; equitable jurisdiction; a court of equity; the system of jurisprudence ad-ministered in courts of equity. Kenyon v. Kenyon, 3 Utah, 431, 24 P. 829. See Court of Chancery.
CHANGE. As a noun. An alteration; a modifica-ton or addition; substitution of one thing for an-other. Exchange of money against money of a different denomination. Also small coin. Also an abbreviation of exchange.
As a verb. Alter; cause to pass from one place to another; exchange; make different; put one thing in place of another; vacate.
CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY. A divesting of beneficial interest held by one person and a vesting of that interest in another. Goldman v. Moses, 287 Mass. 393, 191 N.E. 873, 874.
CHANGE OF DOMICILE. Change of abode or residente and intention to remain. In re Fischer’s

Estate, 151 Misc. 74, 271 N.Y.S. 101. Shenton v. Abbott, 178 Md. 526, 15 A.2d 906, 908, 909.
CHANGE OF GRADE. Usually understood as an elevation or depression of the surface of a street, or a change of the natural contour of its lace so as to facilitate travel over it. 1VIcCabe v. City of New York, 155 App.Div. 262, 140 N.Y.S. 127. 131.
It is essential that there shall have been a previously established grade and that a new grade be physically made. Gas Engine & Power Co. v. City of New York, 166 App.Div. 297, 151 N.Y.S. 310, 313; Berglar v. University City, Mo.App., 190 S.W. 620, 623.
CHANGE OF LOCATION. Removal from old to new location. Weber County v. Ritchie, 98 Utah 272, 96 P.2d 744.
CHANGE OF VENUE. Properly speaking, the removal of a suit begun in one county or district to another county or district for trial, though the term is also sometimes applied to the removal of a suit from one court to another court of the same county or district. Felts v. Railroad Co., 195 Pa. 21, 45 A. 493; State v. Wofford, 119 Mo. 375, 24 S. W. 764.
CHANGER. An officer formerly belonging to the king’s mint, in England, whose business was chiefiy to exchange coin for bullion brought in by merchants and others.
CHANNEL. The bed in which the main stream of a river flows, rather than the deep water of the stream as followed in navigation. Bridge Co. v. Dubuque County, 55 Iowa, 558, 8 N.W. 443. See The Oliver, D.C.Va., 22 F. 849; Iowa v. Illinois, 147 U.S. 1, 13 S.Ct. 239, 37 L.Ed. 55.
But the term is sometimes used to designate the custom-ary and traveled fairway. The Arlington, C.C.A.N.Y., 1.9 F.2d 285, 286, 54 A.L.R. 101. It may also be used as a generic term applicable to any water course, whether river, creek, slough, or canal. McKissick Cattle Co. v. Alsaga, 41 Cal.App. 380, 182 P. 793, 797. The "channel" of a river is to be distinguished from a "branch." U. S. v. Hutchings, D.C.Okl., 252 F. 841, 844.
Main Channel
That bed of the river over which the principal volume of water flows. St. Louis & St. P. Packet Co. V. Keokuk & H. Bridge Co., C.C.Iowa, 31 F. 757. Compare State of Oklahoma v. State of Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 42 S.Ct. 406, 414, 66 L.Ed. 771.
The main channel of a navigable strcam, called for as a boundary between states, means the "thalweg," or deepest and rnost navigable channel as It then existed. Whiteside v. Norton, C.C.A.Minn., 205 F. 5, 9.
Natural Channel
The channel of a stream as determined by the natural conformation of the country through which it flows. See Larrabee v. Cloverdale, 131 Cal. 96, 63 P. 143. The floor or bed on which the water flows, and the banks on each side thereof as carved out by natural causes. Pima Farms Co. v. Proctor, 30 Ariz. 96, 245 P. 369, 372.
CHANTER. The Chief singer in the c

CHANTRY. A church or chapel endowed with lands for the maintenance of priests to say mass daily for the souls of the donors. Termes de la Ley; Cowell.
CHAPEL. A place of worship; a lesser or in-ferior church, sometimes a part of or subordinate to another church. Webster. Rex v. Nixon, 7 Car. & P. 442; In re Atkinson’s Will, 120 Misc. 186, 197 N.Y.S. 831, 832.

Chapel of Ease

In English ecclesiastical law. A chapel built in aid of original church for parishioners who had fixed their residence at some distance. 3 Steph. Comm. 151.

Free Chapels

So called from their freedom or exemption from all ordinary jurisdiction.

Private Chapels

Chapels owned by private persons, and used by themselves and their families. 2 Steph.Comm. 745

Proprietary Chapels

In English law. Those belonging to private persons who have purchased or erected them with a view to profit or otherwise.

Public Chapels

In English law, chapels founded later than the church for parishioners who fixed their residence at a distance; and chapels so circumstanced were described as "chapels of case." 3 Steph.Comm. (7th Ed.) 745.
CHAPELRY. The precinct and limits of a chapel. The same thing to a chapel as a parish is to a church. Cowell; Blount; Termes de la Ley.
CHAPERON. A hood or bonnet anciently worn by the Knights of the Garter; also a little es-cutcheon fixed in the forehead of horses drawing a hearse at a funeral. Wharton.
ClIAPITRE. A summary of matters to be in-quired of or presented before justices in eyre, justices of assise, or of the’peace, in their sessions. Also articles delivered by the justice in his charge to the inquest. Brit. c. iii.
CHAPLAIN. An ecclesiastic who performs divine service in a chapel; but it more commonly means one who attends upon a king, prince, or other per-son of quality, for the performance of clerical duties in a private chapel. 4 Coke, 90. A clergy-man officially attached to a ship of war, to an army, (or regiment,) or to some public institution, for the purpose of performing divine service. Webster.
CHAPMAN. An itinerant vendor of small wares. A trader who trades from place to place. Say. 191, 192.
CHAPTER. In ecclesiastical law. A congregation of ecclesiastical persons in a cathedral church, consisting of canons, or prebendaries, whereof the dean is the head, all subordinate to the bishop. And they are termed "capitulum," as a kind of head, in.stituted not only to assist the bishop but also anciently to rule and govern the diocese in the time of vacation. Burn, Dict.; Coke, Litt. 103.
CHARACTER. Class or division to which claim belongs, Jackson State Nat. Bank of Jackson, Miss., v. Merchants’ Bank & Trust Co. of Jackson, Miss., 177 La. 975, 149 So. 539, 541.
The aggregate of the moral qualities which belong to and distinguish an individual person; the general result of the one’s distinguishing at-tributes.
That moral predisposition or habit, or aggregate of ethical qualities, which is believed to attach to a person, on the strength of the common opinion and report concern-ing him. A person’s fixed dispositlon or tendency, as evi-denced to others by bis habits of life, through the mani-festaticn of which his general reputation for the posses-sion of a character, good or otherwise, is obtained. Keith v. State, 127 Tenn. 40, 152 S.W. 1029, 1030.
The estimate attached to an individual or thing the com-munity. Biddle v. Riley, 118 Ark. 206, 176 S.W. 134, 137, L.R.A.1915F, 992; Rogers v. State, 126 Tex.Cr.R. 39, 70 S.W.2d 188, 189; H. L. Shaffer & Co. v. Prosser, 99 Colo. 335, 62 P.2d 1161, 1113. The opinion generally entertained of a person derived from the common report of the people who are acquairited with him. Smith v. State, 88 Ala. 73, 7 So. 52; State v. Turner, 36 S.C. 534, 15 S.E. 602.
Although "character" is often used in the sense of "rep-utation," Garrison v. State, 217 Ala. 322, 116 So. 705; Commonwealth v. Harvie, 345 Pa. 516, 28 A.2d 926, 927; the tercos are distinguishable, State v. Taylor, 267 Mo. 41, 183 S.W. 299, 301; Commonwealth v. Webb, 252 Pa. 187, 97 A. 189, 192.
Though, in a subjective cense, character, general char-acter, and general report or reputation are the same. Pow-ers v. Leach, 26 Vt. 278; and though general character has always been proved by proving general reputation. Leve-rich v. Frank, 6 Or. 213. See, also, Richardson v. State, 94 Tex.Cr.R. 616, 253 S.W. 273, 277. "Character" is what a man is, and "reputation" is what he is supposed to be. State v. Pickett, 202 Iowa, 1321, 210 N.W. 782, 783. "Char-acter" depends on attributes possessed, and "reputation" on attributes which others believe one to possess. Bills v. State, 187 Ind. 721, 119 N.E. 465. The fornier signifies real-ity and the latter merely what is accepted to be reality at present. State v. Leabo, 120 Or. 160, 249 P. 363.
CIIARBON. Another name for anthrax (q. y.).
CHARGE, v. To impose a burden, duty, obligation, or lien; to create a claim against property; to claim ; to demand; to accuse; to instruct a jury on matters of law. To impose a tax, duty, or trust. Ex parte Horn, D.C.Wash., 292 F. 455, 457. In commercial transactions, to bill or invoice. George M. Jones Co. v. Canadian Nat. Ry. Co., D. C.Mich., 14 F.2d 852, 855.
A jury is "charged" with duty of trying prisoner (or, as otherwise expressed, with his f ate or his "deliverance") as soon as they are impaneled and sworn; this is a different matter from "charging" the jury in the sense of glving them instructions. Tomasson v. State, 112 Tenn. 596, 79 S.W.803. And see Keith v. Commonwealth, 197 Ky. 362, 247 S.W. 42, 44.
To load, as a firearm. People v. Limeberry, 298 Ill. 355, 131 N.E. 691, 696.
CHARGE, n. An incumbrance, lien, or claim; a burden or load; an obligation or duty; a liability; an accusation. Darling v. Rogers, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 491. Custody. Randazzo v. U. S., C.C.A.Mo.,300 F. 794, 797; In re Boulware’s Will, 258 N.Y.S. 522, 144 Misc. 235. Price. Aiken Milis v. United States, D.C.S.C., 53 F.Supp. 524, 526. Rate. Bor-ough of Mechanicsburg v. Valley Rys., 109 Pa. Super. 48, 165 A. 541, 542.
Conversion" of electrical energy into chemical energy within a cell or storage battery. Elliott Works v. Frisk, D.C.Iowa, 58 F.2d 820, 822.
In Common-law Practice
The final address by judge to jury before verdict, in which he sums up the case, and instructs jury as to the rules of law which apply to its various issues, and which they must observe. The term also applies to the address of court to granel jury, in which the latter are Instructed as to their duties.
In Contracta
An obligation. Com.Dig. "Rent," c. 6; 2 Ball & B. 223; Termes de la Ley. An undertaking to keep the custody of another person’s goods. State v. Clark, 86 Me. 194, 29 A. 984.
In Criminal Lato
An accusation or oral charge. People v. Ross, 235 Mich. 433, 209 N.W. 663, 666; Haggard v. First Nat, Bank of Mandan, 72 N.D. 434, 8 N.W.2d 5, 9. A formal complaint, information, or indictment. People v. Leporl, 35 Cal.App. 60, 169 P. 692, 694. A count. State v. Thornton, 142 La. 797, 77 So. 634, 636; State v. Pucketty, 39 N.M. 511, 50 P.2d 964, 965. Accused or arraigned. Code Cr.Proc. § 57. People v. Hickox, 10 N.Y.S.2d 318, 320, 170 Misc. 354.
In Equity Pleading
An allegation in the bill of matters which disprove or avoid a defense which it ís alleged the defendant Is sup-posed to pretend or intend to set up. Story, Eq.P1. § 31; Cooper, Eq.P1. 11; 1 Dan.Ch.Pr. 372, 1883, n.; 11 Ves.Ch. 574.
In Equity Practice
A written statement presented to a master In chancery by a party of the ítems with which the opposite party should be debited or should account for, or of the claim of the party making it. A charge may embrace the whole liabilities of the accounting party. Hoff.Mast. 36.
In Scotch. Law
The command of the king’s letters to perform some act; as a charge to enter heir. Also a messenger’s execution, requiring a person to obey the order of the king’s letters; as a charge on letters of horning, or a charge against a superior. Bell.
In the Law of Wills
A responsIbility or liability ímposed by the testator upon a devisee personally, or upon the land devised. Potter v. Gardner, 12 Wheat. 498, 6 L.Ed. 706; Boal v. Metropolitan Museum of Art of City of New York, C.C.A.N.Y., 298 F. 894, 908. A pecuniary burden. In re Clark’s Will, 37 N.Y.S.2d 522, 523, 179 Misc. 75.
A devise for beneficial enjoyment of devisee subject te payment of a sum of money or performance of a particular duty. Howells State Bank v. Pont, 113 Neb. 181, 202 N.W. 457, 459.
General Charge
The charge or instruction of the court to the jury upon the case, as a whole, or upon its general features and char-acteristics.
Public Charge
A person whom it is necessary to support at public expense by reason of poverty, insanity and poverty, disease and poverty, or idiocy and poverty. Wallis v. U. S., ex rel. Mannara, C.C.A.N.Y., 273 F. 509, 511. As used in Inmigra-tion Act Feb. 5, 1917, § 19, 8 U.S.C.A. § 155, ene who pro-duces a money charge on, or an expense to, the public for support and tare. Ex parte Kichmiriantz, D.C.Cal., 283 F. 697, 698. As so used, the term is not limited to paupers or those fiable to become such, but includes those who will not undertake honest pursuits, or who are likely to become periodically the inmates of prisons. Ex parte Horn, D.C. Wash., 292 F. 455, 457. But see Ng Fung Ho v. White, C.C.A.Cai., 266 F. 765, 769

A charge or instruction given by the court to the jury, upon some particular point or question involved In the case, and usually in response to counsel’s request for such instruction.
CHARGE AND DISCHARGE. Under former equi-ty practice, in taking an account before a master, a written statement of items for which plaintiff asked credit and a counter-statement, exhibiting claims or demands defendant held against plain-tiff.
CHARGÉ DES AFFAIRES, or CHARGÉ D’AF-FAIRES. The title of a diplomatic representative of inferior rank. In re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403, 10 S.Ct. 854, 34 L.Ed. 222; Du Pont v. Pichon, 4 Dall. 321, 1 L.Ed. 851.
CHARGE—OFF. Anything manifesting intent to eliminate an item from assets. Rubinkam v. Com-missioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.7, 118 F.2d 148, 149.
CHARGE—SHEET. A paper kept at a police-station to receive each night the names of the persons brought and given into custody, the nature of the accusation, and the name of the accuser in each case. Wharton.
CHARGE TO ENTER HEIR. In Scotch law. A writ commanding a person to enter heir to his predecessor within forty days, otherwise an action to be raised against him as if he had entered.
CHARGEABLE. This word, in its ordinary ac-ceptation, as applicable to the imposition of a duty or burden, signifies capable of being charged, sub-ject to be charged, Hable to be charged, or proper to be charged. Gilfillan v. Chatterton, 38 Minn. 335, 37 N.W. 583.
CHARGEANT. Weighty; heavy; penal; expen-sive. Kelham.
CHARGES. The expenses which have been in-curred, or disbursements made, in connection with a contract, suit, or business transaction. Spoken of an action, it is said that the term includes more than what falls under the technical description of "costs."
Instructions. Standard v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co., Tex.Civ.App., 47 S.W.2d 443, 447.
CHARGING LIEN. A lien is a charging lien where the debt is a charge upon the specific prop-erty although it remains in the debtor’s posses-sion. See, also, Attorney’s Lien.
CHARGING ORDER. See Order.
CHARITABLE. Having the character or purpose of a charity (q. y.).
The term is sometimes deemed to be synonymous with
"eleemosynary," Hamburger v. Cornell University, 166 N.Y.S. 46, 48, 99 Misc. 564; with "benevolent," In re Dors Estate, 182 Cal. 159, 187 P. 428, 431; with "beneficent," People v. Thomas Walters Chapter of Daughters of Ameri-can Revolution, 311 III. 304, 142 N.E. 566.
CHARITABLE BEQUEST. A bequest is charit-able if its aims and accomplishments are ofreligious, educational, political, or general social interest to mankind and if the ultimate recipients constitute either the community as a whole or an unasoertainable and indefinite portion thereof. In re Henderson’s Estate, 17 Ca1.2d 853, 112 P.2d 605, 607, 609. See, also, Charity.
CHARITABLE CORPORATION. One that freely and voluntarily ministers to the physical needs of those pecuniarily unable to help themselves. In re Rockefeller’s Estate, 177 App.Div. 786, 165 N.Y.S. 154, 158. One which, by its powers, or usage, is charged with administering charitable relief. In re Beekman’s Estate, 196 App.Div. 681, 188 N.Y.S. 178, 179. One organized for the purpose, among other things, of promoting the welfare of man-kind at large, or of a community, or of some class from a part of it indefinite as to number of in-dividuals. In re Dol’s Estate, 186 Cal. 64, 198 P. 1039.
CHARITABLE GIFT. See Charity.
CHARITABLE HOSPITAL OR SANITARIUM. One maintained for gratuitous treatment of sick and needy. Moss v. Youngblood, 187 Ga. 188, 200 S.E. 689, 694. One not maintained for a gain, profit or private advantage. In re Farmers’ Union Hospital Ass’n of Elk City, 190 Okl. 661, 126 P.2d 244, 246. One operated by means of contributions, Bedford v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corporation, 102 Colo. 538, 81 P.2d 752, 759, 760. One when charges collected are no more than needed for maintenance. Gundry v. R. B. Smith Memorial Hospital Ass’n, 293 Mich. 36, 291 N.W. 213, 214, 215. One when income from patients able to pay is used for maintenance or extension of facilities devoted to charitable purposes. Benton County v. Allen, 170 Or. 481, 133 P.2d 991, 992, 993, 995. One which does not deny treatment to persons unable to pay though it charges those able to pay. Commis-sioner of Internal Revenue v. Battle Creek, C.C.A. Fla., 126 F.2d 405, 406.
CHARITABLE INSTITUTION. One supported in whole or in part at public expense or by charity. City of Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Sanitarium, 117 Miss. 709, 78 So. 702. One for the relief of a cer-tain class of persons, either by alms, education, or tare. Utica Trust & Deposit Co. v. Thompson, 87 Misc. 31, 149 N.Y.S. 392, 398. One administering a public or private charity; an eleemosynary insti-tution. St. Albans Hospital v. Town of Enosburg, 96 Vt. 389, 120 A. 97, 99. One performing service of public good or welfare without profit. Society of Cincinnati v. Exeter, 92 N.H. 348, 31 A.2d 52, 55.
CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION. One which has no capital stock and no provision for making divi-dends and profits, but derives its funds mainly from public and private charity, and holds them in trust for the objects and purposes expressed in its charter. Congregational Sunday School & Pub-lishing Soc. v. Board of Review, 290 Ill. 108, 125 N.E. 7, 9. One conducted not for profit, but for promotion of welfare of others. Stearns v. Asso-ciation of Bar of City of New York, 154 Misc. 71, 276 N.Y.S. 390

CHARITABLE SCHOOL OR EDUCATIONAL IN-STITUTION. A college preparatory school operat-ed without profit some of whose students paid no tuition, College Preparatory School for Girls of Cincinnati v. Evatt, 144 Ohio St. 408, 59 N.E.2d 142,
145. One devoted to public education without private gain. Southern Methodist University v. Clayton, 142 Tex. 179, 176 S.W.2d 749, 750. One supported wholly or in part by public subscriptions or endowment, New York University v. Taylor, 251 App.Div. 444, 296 N.Y.S. 848, 849; or by private charity. Bodenheimer v. Confederate Memorial Ass’n, D.C.Va., 5 F.Supp. 526, 528.
CHARITABLE SOCIETY. An educational insti-tution is a charitable society. In re Cooper’s Es-tate, 229 Iowa 921, 295 N.W. 448, 454.
CHARITABLE USES OR PURPOSES. Originally those enumerated in the statute 43 Eliz. c. 4, and afterwards those which, by analogy, come within its spirit and purpose. Boyle, Char. 17. See, also, Charity.
CHARITABLE TRUST. A fiduciary relationship subjecting holder of property to deal with it for a charitable purpose. In re White’s Estate, 340 Pa. 92, 16 A.2d 394, 396, 397. A trust for benefit of public or of some portion thereof. Delaware Trust Co. v. Fitzmaurice, Del.Ch., 31 A.2d 383, 388. Its characteristics are the expression of a definite charitable purpose and the indefiniteness of the beneficiaries. Woodcock v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 214 N.C. 224, 199 S.E. 20.
A cemetery corporation is a "charitable trust". De Geeter v. Wolklin, 133 N.T.Eci. 510, 42 A.2d 561, 562. So, too, a Christian church. Burgie v. Muench, 65 Ohio App. 176, 29 N.E.2d 439, 440.
CHARITY. The word "charity" may be used in a subjective or an objective sense.
It may mean or apply to:
Aceomplishment of some social lnterest, In re TollInger’s Estafe, 349 Pa. 393, 37 A.2d 500, 501, 502. Act or feeling of benevolence, Southern Methodist Hospital and Sanatorium of Tucson v. Wilson, 51 Ariz. 424, 77 P.2d 458. Advance-ment of purposes beneficial to public, Rabinowitz v. Woll-man, 171 Md. 6, 197 A. 566, 568. All good affections men ought to bear towards each other. Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves. 399. All which alds man and seeks to Improve his condition. Waddell v. Young Women’s Chris-tian Ass’n, 133 Ohio St. 601, 15 N.E.2d 140, 142. Alrnsgiv-ing, In re Rathbone’s Estate, 11 N.Y.S.2d 506, 527, 170 Misc. 1030. Amelioration of persons In unfortunate clr-cumstances, Second Nat. Bank v. Second Nat. Bank, 171 Md. 547, 190 A. 215, 111 A.L.R. 711. An Institution founded by a gift and intended for public use as a hospital, library, school, or museum, Southern Methodist Hospital and Sana-torium of Tucson v. Wilson, 51 Ariz. 424, 77 P.2d 458, 460, 461. Any purpose in which the public has an Interest, Col-lins v. Lyon, Inc., 181 Va. 230, 24 S.E.2d 572, 580. Any purpose of general benefit untainted by motives of prívate gain. Stearns v. Association of Bar of City of New York, 276 N.Y.S. 390, 395, 154 Misc. 71. Any scheme or effort to better the condition of society or any considerable part thereof. Tharpe v. Central Georgie. Council of Boy Scouts of America, 185 Ga. 810, 196 S.E. 762, 764, 116 A.L.R. 373. Assistance to persons in establishing. Bruce v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n, 51 Nev. 372, 277 P. 798, 799; assist-ance to the needy. Benefit of handcraftsmen. Benefit of an indefinite number of persons, Morgan v. National Trust Bank of Charleston, 331 III. 182, 162 N.E. 888, 890. Benefit of minister. In re Edge’s Estate, 288 N.Y.S. 437, 440, 159 MIsc. 505. Benevolence, philanthropy, and good will. Santa Fe Lodge No. 460, B. P. O. E., v. Employment Sec.

Commission, 49 N.M. 149, 159 P.2d 312, 315. Benevolent or philanthropic, Beckwith v. Parish, 69 Ga. 569; Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. 23. Dissemination of knowledge; Chris-tian love, Boruch v. SS. Peter & Paul’s Orthodox Russian Church, 111 N.J.L. 116, 166 A. 723. Conferring advantages of a social character. La Soclete Francaise De Bienfai-sanee Mutuelle v. California Employment Commission, 56 Cal.App.2d 534, 133 P.2d 47, 51, 52. Eleemosynary, Collier v. Lindley, 203 Cal. 641, 266 P. 526, 528. General public use which extends to the rich as well as to the poor. Ham-ilton v. Corvallis General Hospital Ass’n, 146 Or. 168, 30 P.2d 9, 14, Gift for beneflt of indefinite number, St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Burnet, C.C.A., 59 F.2d 922, 926. Gift to the general public use. Maretick v. South Chicago Com-munity Hospital, 297 Ill,App. 488, 17 N.E.2d 1012, 1014. Gift without consideration or expectation of return, State v. Texas Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Texas, Tex.Clv.App., 51 S.W.2d 405, 410. Improvement of man. Boston Symphony Orchestra v. Board of Assessors of City of Boston, Mass., 1 N.E.2d 6, 9. Improvement of spiritual, mental, social and physical conditions. Andrews v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of Des Moines, 226 Iowa 374, 284 N.W. 186, 192. Lessening burdens of government. Stork v. Schmidt, 129 Neb. 311, 261 N.W. 552, 554. Physical, mental or moral betterment, In re Tollinger’s £state, 349 Pa. 393, 37 A.2d 500, 501, 502. Promotion of government or municipal pur-poses, Powers v. First Nat. Bank, Tex.Civ.App., 137 S.W.2d 839, 842. Promotion of happiness of man. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Welch, D.C.Mass., 25 F.Supp. 45, 48. Promo-tion of philanthropic and humanitarian purposes. Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, Mass., 556. Promotion of well-doing and well-being of social man. Krause v. Peoría Housing Authority, 370 III. 356. 19 N.E.2d 193, 199. Promotion or fos-tering science, education, enlightenment, benefit, of man-kind, Irwin v. Swinney, D.C.Mo., 44 F.2d 172, 174. Prop-erty held for public purposes. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Burnet, C.C.A.8, 59 F.2d 922, 927. Public benefit, con-venience, utility, or comfort, Clamp v, Presbyterian Soc. of Sackets Harbor, 173 N.Y.S. 581, 584, 105 Misc. 139. Recia-mation of criminals. Relief of persons in unfortunate cir-cumstances, Second Nat. Bank v. Second Nat. Bank, 171 Md. 547, 190 A. 215, 111 A.L.R. 711. Religious, educational, benevolent, and humanitarian objects. In re Jordan’s Estate, 329 Pa. 427, 197 A. 150. Services accorded to the needy. Unselfish things as are wont to be done by those who are animated by love. Sok v. McCaughn, C.C.A.Pa., 42 F.2d 616, 619. What is done out of good will and a desire to add to the improvement of moral, mental, and physlcal welfare of public. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Welch, D.C.Mass., 25 F.Supp. 45, 48. Whatever is given for love of God or love of your neighbor, free from every consid-eration that is personal, private, or sellish. Vidal v. Gir-ard, 2 How. 128, 11 L.Ed. 205, appr. Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. 35. Whatever proceeds from sense of moral duty or feeling of kindness and humanity for relief or comfort of another, Doyle v. Railroad Co., 118 Mass. 195, 198, 19 Am. Rep. 431. Uncertainty regarding beneficiarios is distinct feature. Goode’s Adm’r v. Goode, 238 Ky. 620, 38 S.W.2d 691, 694.

Foreign Charity

One created or endowed in a state or country foreign to that of the domicile of the benefactor. Taylor’s Ex’rs v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr College, 34 N.J.Eq. 101.

Public Charity

A charity wherein the benefit is conferred on indefinite persons composing the public or some part of the public. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Harris, 359 III. 86, 194 N.E. 250, 253.
A glft to be applied consistently with existing laws for the beneflt of an indefinite number of persons, by bringing their minds under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering, or con-straint, or by assisting them to establish themselves In life, or by erecting and maintaining public buildings or works, or otherwise lessening the burdens of government. Robinson v. Crutcher, 277 Mo. 1, 209 S.W. 104, 105.
A "purely public charity" which Legislature may exempt from taxation is a charity indlscrlminately dis-pensed to some portion or group of public where ends accotriplished are wholly benevolent and are acconaplishedwithout proflt or gain and, the beneficiarles are saved from becoming burdens upon society and the state. City of Houston v. Scottlsh Rite Benev. Ass’n, 111 Tex. 191, 230 S.W. 978, 981.

Pure Charity

One which is entirely gratuitous, and which dispenses its benefits without any charge or pecu-niary return whatever. See In re Lenox’s Estate, Sur., 9 N.Y.S. 895, 31 St.R. 959; Kentucky Female Orphan School v. Louisville, 100 Ky. 470, 36 S.W. 921, 40 L.R.A. 119.

CHARLATAN. One who pretends to more knowl-edge or skill than he possesses; a "quack." Brinkley v. Fishbein, C.C.A.Tex., 110 F.2d 62, 64.
CHARLEY. A familiar nickname or substitute for "Charles." Carroll v. State, 24 Okl.Cr. 26, 215 P. 797, 798.
CHARRE OF LEAD. A quantity consisting of 36 pigs of lead, each pig weighing about 70 pounds.
CHART. The word "chart," as used in the copy-right law, does not include sheets of paper exhibit-ing tabulated or methodically arranged informa-tion. Taylor v. Gilman, C.C.N.Y., 24 Fed. 632.
CHARTA.

In Old English Law

A charter or deed; an instrument written and sealed; the formal evidente of conveyances and contracts. Also any signal or token by which an estate was held.
The term came to be applied, by way of eminente, to such documents as proceeded from the sovereign, granting liberties or privileges, and either where the recipient of the grant was the whole nation, as in the case of Magna Charta, or a public body, or private individual, in which case it corresponded to the modero word "charter."

In the Civil Law

Paper, suitable for the inscription of documents or books; hence, any instrument or writing. See Dig. 32, 52, 6; Nov. 44, 2.
Charta Communis
In old English law. An indenture ; a common or mutual charter or deed; one containing mutual covenants, or involving mutuality of obligation; one to which both par-ties might have occasion to refer, to establish their respec-tive rights. Bract. fols. 33b, 34.
Charta Cyrographata (or Chyrographata)
In old English law. A chirographed charter; a charter executed in two parts, and cut through the middle, (sein-ditur per meaium,) where the word "cyrographum," or "ehirographum," was written in large Letters. Bract. 34; Fleta, lib. 3, c. 14, § 3. See Chirograph.
Charta De Foresta
A collection of the laws of the forest, made In the 9th Hen. III, and said to have been originally a part oí Magna Charta.
The Charta de foresta was called the Great Charter of the woodland population, nobles, barons, freemen, and slaves, loyally granted by Henry III, early in his reign (A.D.1217). Inderwick, King’s Peace 159; Stubb’s Charters 847. There is a difference of bpinion as to the original charter of the forest similar to that which exists respecting the true and original Magna Carta (q. v.), and for the same reason, viz., that both required repeated conflrmation by the kings, despite their supposed inviolability. This justifles the remark of recent historians as to the great charter that "this theoretical sanctity and this practical insecurity’ areshared with ‘the Great Charter" of Liberties’ by the Char-ter of the Forest which was issued in 1217." 1 Poli. & Maitl. 158. It is asserted with great positiveness by Inder-wick that no forest charter was ever granted by King John, but that Henry III. issued the charter of 1217 (which he puts in the third year of the reign, which, however, only commenced Oct. 28, 1216), in pursuance of the promises of his father; and Lord Coke, referring to it as a charter on which the lives and liberties of the woodland population depended, says that ít was conflrmed at least thírty times between the death of John and that of Henry V.; 4 Co.Inst. 303.
Webster, under the title Magna Charta, says that the name is applied to the charter granted in the 9th Hen. III. and confirmad by Edw. I. Prof. Maitland, in speaking of Magna Carta, refers to ”the sister-charter which deflned the forest law" as one of the four documents which, at the death of Henry III., comprised the written law of England. 1 Soc. England 410. Edward I. in 1297 confirmed "the charter made by the common consent of all the realm In the time of Henry III. to be kept in every point without breach." Inderwick, King’s Peace 160; Stubb’s Charters 486. The Century Dictionary refers to this latter charter of Edw. I. as the Charter of -the Forest; but it was, as already shown, only a confirmation of it, and a comparison of the authorities leaves little if any doubt that the date was as aboye stated and the history as here given. Its provisions may be found in Stubb’s Charters and they are summarized by Inderwick, in his work aboye cited.

Charta De Una Parte
A deed-poll; a deed of one part. Formerly used to dis-tinguish a deed poli—that is, an agreement made by one party only—from a deed inter hartes. Co.Litt. 229.
Charta Partita
(Literally, a deed divided.) A charter-party. 3 Kent, Comm. 201.
CHARTA DE NON ENTE NON VALET. A deed of a thing not in being is not valid. Co.Litt. 36.
CHARTA NON EST NISI VESTIMENTUM DONATIONIS. A deed is nothing else than the vestment of a gift. Co.Litt. 36.
CHAUSSÉE. Fr. A levee of earth, made to re-tain the water of a river or pond; a levee made in low, wet, and swampy places to serve as a road. Armas v. New Orleans, 3 La. 86, 99.
CHARTA LIBERTATUM. The charters (grants) of liberties. These are Magna Charta and Charta de Foresta.
CHARTARUM SUPER FIDEM, MORTUIS TEST-IBUS, AD PATRIAM DE NECESSITUDINE RE-CURRENDUIVI EST. Co.Litt. 36. The witnesses being dead, the truth of charters must of neces-sity be referred to the country, i. e., a jury.
CHARTE. Fr. A chart, or plan, which mariners use at sea.
CHARTE-PARTIE. Fr. In French marine law. A charter-party.
CHARTEL. A variant of "cartel" (q. v.).
CHARTER, v. In mercantile law. To hire or lease a vessel for a voyage. Thus, a "chartered" is distinguished from a "seeking" ship. 7 East, 24.
CHARTER, n. An instrument emanating from the sovereign power, in the nature of a grant, either to the whole nation, or to a class or portion of the people, or to a colony or dependency, and assuring to them certain rights, liberties, orpowers. Such was the "Great Charter" or "Magna Charta," and such also were the charters granted to certain of the English colonies in America. See Story, Const. § 161; 1 Bla.Comm. 108.
A charter differs from a constitution, in that the former is granted by the sovereign, while the latter is established by the people themselves.
A city’s organic law. Hudson Motor Car Co. v. City of Detroit, 282 Mich. 69, 275 N.W. 770, 773, 113 A.L.R. 1472.
An act of a legislature creating a corporation, or creating and defining the franchise of a corpo-ration. Baker v. Smith, 41 R.I. 17, 102 A. 721, 723; Bent v. Underdown, 156 Ind. 516, 60 N.E. 307. Also a corporation’s constitution or organic law; Schultz v. City of Phcenix, 18 Ariz. 35, 156 P. 75, 76; C. J. Kubach Co. v. McGuire, 199 Cal. 215, 248 P. 676, 677; that is to say, the articles of incorporation taken in connection with the law under which the corporation was organized; Chi-cago Open Board of Trade v. Imperial Bldg. Co., 136 Ill.App. 606; In re Hanson’s Estate, 38 S.D. 1, 159 N.W. 399, 400. The authority by virtue of which an organized body acts. Ryan v. Witt, Tex. Civ.App., 173 S.W. 952, 959. A contract between the state and the corporation, between the corpo-ration and the stockholders, and between the stockholders and the state. Bruun v. Cook, 280 Mich. 484, 273 N.W. 774, 777.

In Old English Law

A disposition made by a superior to his vassal, for something to be performed or paid by him. 1 Forb.Inst. pt. 2, b. 2, c. 1, tit. 1. A writing which contains the grant or transmission of the feudal right to the vassal. Ersk.Inst. 2, 3, 19.

Blank Charter

A document given to the agents of the crown in the reign of Richard II. with power to fill up as they pleased

Charter of Pardon
In English law. An instrument under the great seal, by which a pardon is granted to a man for a felony or other offense.
Charter o} the Forest
See Charta de foresta.
Charter Rolls
Ancient English records of royal charters, granted between the years 1199 and 1516.
CHARTER-HOUSE. Formerly a convent of Car-thusian monks in London; now a college founded and endowed by Thomas Sutton. The governors of the charter-house are a corporation aggregate without a head, president, or superior, all the members being of equal authority. 3 Steph. Comm. (7th Ed.) 14, 97.
CHARTER-LAND. In English law. Otherwise called "book-land." Property held by deed under

certain rents and free services. It, in effect, differs nothing from the free socage lands, and hence have arisen most of the freehold tenants, who hold of particular manors, and owe suit and service to the same. 2 Bl.Comm. 90.

CHARTER-PARTY. A contract by which a ship, or some principal part thereof, is let to a merchant for the conveyance of goods on a determined voyage to one or more places. Fish v. Sullivan, 40 La.Ann. 193, 3 So. 730; Vang v. Jones & Laugh-lin Steel Corporation, D.C.Pa., 7 F.Supp. 475, 478.
A specific and express contract by which the owner lets a vessel or some particular part thereof tú another person for a specifled time or use. Tones & Laughlin Steel Corpo-ration v. Vang, C.C.A.Pa., 73 F.2d 88, 91.
A written agreement by which a ship-owner lets the whole or a part to a merchant for the conveyance of goods in consideration of payment of freight. Maude & P. Mer. Shipp. 227; Parker v. Washington Tug & Barge Co., 85 Wash. 575, 148 P. 896, 898. 3 Kent Comm. 201.
The contract by which a ship owner may either let the capaeity or burden of the shlp, continuing the employment of the owner’s master, crew, and equIpments, or may sur-render the entire ship to the charterer, who then provides them himself. The master or part owner may be a char-terer. Civil Code Cal. § 1959; Civil Code Dak, § 1127.
"A charter party may be a contract for the lease of the vessel, or for a special service to be rendered by the owner of the vessel. Where, as is very frequently the case, the shipowner undertakes to carry a cargo, to be provided by the charterer, on a designated voyage, the arrangement is * • * a mere contract of affreightment." United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. 1, 35 S.Ct. 459, 460, 59 L.Ed. 813, Ann. Cas.1916A, 286.

CHARTERED SHIP. A ship hired or freighted; a ship which is the subject-matter of a charter-party.
CHARTERER. In mercantile law. One who char-ters (i. e., hires or engages) a vessel for a voyage; a freighter. 2 Steph.Comm. 184; 3 Kent, Comm. 137; Turner v. Cross, 83 Tex. 218, 18 S.W. 578, 15 L.R.A. 262.
CHARTIS REDDENDIS. (For returning the char-ters.) An ancient writ which lay against one who had charters of feoffment intrusted to his keeping and refused to deliver them. Reg.Orig. 159.
CHARTOPHYLAX. In old European law. A keeper of records or public instruments; a chartu-lary; a registrar. Spelman.
CHARUE. In old English law. A plow. Restes des charues; beasts of the plow.
CHASE. The liberty or franchise of hunting, one’s self, and keeping protected against all other persons, beasts of the chase within a specified dis-trict, without regard to the ownership of the land. 2 Bl.Comm. 414-416.
The act of acquiring possession of animals ferce naturce by force, cunning, or address.
A privileged place for preservation of deer and beasts of the forest. It is commonly less than a forest and of larger compass than a park. Every forest is a ehase, but every chase is not a forest. It differs from a park in that it is not inclosed, yet it must have certain metes and bounds. Man-wood, 49: Termes de la Ley.

Common Citase
In old English law. A place where all alike were entitled to hunt wild animals.
CHASSIS. As applied to a motor car,• the rec-tangular metal framework, as distinguished from its body and seats, but including its accessories for propulsion, as the tanks, motor, etc., and gen-eral running gear. Kansas City Automobile School Co. v. Holcker-Elberg Mfg. Co., Mo.App., 182 S.W. 759, 761.
CHASTE. Never voluntarily having had unlawful sexual intercourse. Marchand v. State, 113 Neb. 87, 201 N.W. 890, 891. An unrnarried woman who has had no carnal knowledge of men. New v. State, 141 Tex.Cr.R. 536, 148 S.W.2d 1099, 1101.
One who falls from virtue and afterwards reforms is chaste within the meaning of the seduction statutes. Wood v. State, 48 Ga. 288, 15 Am.Rep. 664; People v. Weinstock, 27 N.Y.Cr.R. 53, 140 N.Y.S. 453, 456.
CHASTE CHARACTER. Den oting purity of mInd and innocence of heart;—not limited merely to un-lawful sexual intercourse. State v. Wilcoxen, 200 Iowa, 1250, 206 N.W. 260, 261.
As used in statutes, means actual personal virtue. It may include the character of one who was formerly unchaste but is reformed. Boak v. State, 5 Iowa, 430; People v. Nelson, 153 N.Y, 90, 46 N.E. 1040, 60 Am.St.Rep. 592.
CHASTITY. Purity; continence.
It means that virtue which prevents the unlawful inter-course of the sexes; the state of purity or abstinente from unlawful sexual connection, People v. Kehoe, 123 Cal. 224, 55 P. 911, 69 Am.St.Rep. 52; actual personal virtue and character, and not a mere external reputation for chastity. People v. Weinstock, 27 N.Y.Cr.R. 53, 140 N.Y.S. 453, 457. See Chaste.
CHATTEL. An article of personal property; any species of property not amounting to a freehold or fee in land. People v. Holbrook, 13 Johns., N.Y., 94; U. S. v. Sischo, C.C.A.Wash., 270 F. 958, 961. A thing personal and movable. Castle v. Castle, C.C.A.Haw., 267 F. 521, 522. Things which in law are deemed personal property, they are divisible finto chattels real and chattels personal.
The terco "chattels" is a more comprehensive one than "goods," as it includes animate as well as inanimate prop-erty. 2 Chit.BI.Comm. 383, note. In a devise, however, they may be of the same import. Shep.Touch. 447; 2 Fonbl.Eq. 335.
Chattel Interest
An interest in corporeal hereditaments less than a freehold. 2 Kent, Comm. 342.
Personal Chattels
Movable things. 2 Bl.Comm. 387; 2 Kent, 340; Co.Litt. 48a; 4 Co. 6; In re Gay, 5 Mass. 419; Miller v. Hirschmann, 170 Md. 145, 183 A. 259, 263.
Evidentes of debt are chattels personal. Greene Line Terminal Co. v. Martin, 122 W.Va. 483, 10 S.E.2d 901, 906.
Real Chattels
Such as concern, or savor of, the realty, such as leasehold estates; interests issuing out of, or annexed• to, real estate; such chattel interests as devolve alter the manner of realty. Mozley & Whitley; 2 Bl.Comm. 386; In re Dalton’s Estate, 183 Iowa, 1013, 168 N.W. 332, 334; Intermountain Realty Co. v. Allen, 60 Idaho 228, 90 P.2d 704, 706,
122 A.L.R. 647; Keystone Pipe & Supply Co. v. Crabtree, 174 Okl. 562, 50 P.2d 1086, 1088. An interest in real estate less than freehold, Lincoln Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Fort Wayne v. Nathan, 215 Ind. 178, 19 N.E.2d 243, 249.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE. A mortgage on chattels. O’Connor v. Hassett, 207 Iowa, 155, 222 N.W. 530. A transfer of some legal or equitable right in per-sonal property or creation of a lien thereon as security for payment of money or performance of some other act, Miller v. Eagle, Star & British Dominions Ins. Co., Limited, of London, England, United States Branch, New York, 146 S.C. 123, 143 S.E. 663, 666; Columbia Cas. Co. v. Sodini, 159 Kan. 478, 156 P.2d 524, 528; Anglo-American Mill Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 76 Colo. 57, 230 P. 118, 120; subject to defeasance on performance of the conditions. Personal Finance Co. of Providence v. Henley-Kimball Co., R.I., 1 A.2d 121, 124, 117 A.L. R. 1476; Thomas, Mortg. 427.
An instrument of sale of personalty conveying title mortgagee with terms of defeasance; and, if the terms of redemption are not complied with, then, at common law, the title becomes absolute. Stewart v. Siater, 6 Duer (N. Y.) 99; In re Packard Press, C.C.A.N.Y., 5 F.2d 633, 635. A bill of sale with a defeasance clause incorporated in It. Monongahela Ins. Co. v. Batson, 111 Ark. 167, 163 S.W. 510, 511; Bank of Dillon v. Murchison, C.C.A.4, 213 F. 147, 151.
An absolute piedge, to become an absolute interest if not redeemed at a flxed time. Cortelyou v. Lansing, 2 Caines, Cas., N.Y., 200, per Kent, Ch.
A conditional sale of chattel as security for debt or per-formance of some other obligation. Jones, Chat. Mortg.
1. Allen v. Steiger, 17 Colo. 552, 31 P. 226; Adlcr, Saiz-man & Adier v. Ammerman Furniture Co., 100 Conn. 223,
123 A. 268, 269.
A pledge is distinguished from a chattel mortgage In that in a mortgage, the title is transferred; in a piedge, the possession. Jones, Mortg. § 4; Security Trust Co. v. Edwards, 90 N.J.Law, 558, 101 A. 384, 385, L.R.A.1917F, 273; Thompson v. Dollivér, 132 Mass. 103; Thoen y. First Nat. Bank, 199 Minn. 47,.271 N.W. 111, 113; In piedge, the pawnee has only a special property in the thing deposited. Evans v. Darlington, 5 Blackf., Ind., 320.
A conditional sale Is distinguished from a chattel mort-gage In that the purchaser has merely a right to purchase, and no debt or obligation exists on the part of the ven-dor. Weathersly v. Weathersly, 40 Miss. 462, 90 Am.Dec. 344; Gomez v. Kamping, 4 Daly, N.Y., 77. In mortgage, title passes; in conditional sale possession is transferred ami title retained. Kettwig v. Aero Iny. Co., 191 Minn. 500, 254 N.W. 629.
CHATTEL REAL. AH interests in real estate of lesser dignity than a freehold estate, and which lesser estates or interest descended under the rules for devaluation of personal property and not as freehold or fee simple estates. Intermountain Realty Co. v. Allen, 60 Idaho 228, 90 P.2d 704, 705, 122 A.L.R. 647.
CHAUD—MEDLEY. A homicide committed in the heat of an affray and while under the influence of passion; it is thus distinguished from chance-medley, which is the killing of a man in a casual affray in self-defense. 4 Bl.Comm. 184. It has been said, however, that the distinction is of no great importance. See 1 Russ.Crimes, 660.CHAUFFEUR. An operator who directly or in-directly receives compensation for operating mo-tor vehicle. Turner v. State, 226 Ala. 269, 146 So. 601. Operators who drive jitneys in cities and towns for hire, Day v. Bush, 18 La.App. 682, 139 So. 42, 44. Person employed or paid to operate, drive and attend car. People v. Fulton, 96 Misc. 663, 162 N.Y.S. 125, 126; Des Moines Rug Cleaning Co. v. Automobile Underwriters, 215 Iowa 246, 245 N.W. 215, 217; State v. Depew, Md., 175 Md. 274, 1 A.2d 626, 627.
Test whether person is a chauffeur Is whether he operat-ed motor vehicle in whole or part-time employment, wheth-er he was at such time an employee, servant, agent, or independent contractor, and whether he was paid for his service. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cronholm, D.C.Tex., 32 F.Supp. 375, 377.
CHAUMPERT. A kind of tenure mentioned in a patent of 35 Edw. ÍII. Cowell; Blount.
CHAUNTRY RENTS. Money paid to the crown by the servants or purchasers of chauntry-lands. See Chantry.
CHEAT, v. To deceive and defraud. State v. Mastin, 277 Mo. 495, 211 S.W. 15, 18; Moore v. State, 92 Ind.App. 150, 168 N.E. 202, 203. It nec-essarily implies a fraudulent intent. Clolinger v. Callahan, 204 Ky. 33, 263 S.W. 700, 702.
The words "cheat ami defraud" usually mean to Induce a person to part with the possession of property by reason of intentionally false representations relied and acted upon by such person to his harm. Antonio Pepe Co. v. Apuzzo, 98 Conn. 807, 120 A. 681, 682; They include not only the crime of false pretenses, but also all civil frauds. Hinshaw v. State, 188 Ind. 147, 122 N.E. 418, 419. They include all tricks, devices, artifices, or deceptions used to deprive an-other of property or other right. State v. Parker, 114 Conn. 354, 158 A. 797, 800.
CHEAT, n. Swindling; defrauding. "Deceitful practices in defrauding or endeavoring to defraud another of his known right, by some willful device, contrary to the plain rules of common honesty." Hawk.P.C. b. 2, c. 23, § 1. "The fraudulent obtain-ing the property of another by any deceitful and illegal practice or token (short of felony) which affects or may affect the public." Steph.Crim. Law, 93.
Cheats, punishable at common law, are such cheats (not amounting to felony) as are effected by deceitful or illegal symbols or tokens which may affect the public at large, and against which common prudence could not have guarded. 2 Whart.Crim.Law, § 1116; 2 East, P.C. 818; Von Mumm v. Frash, C.C.N.Y., 56 F. 836; State v. Parker, 43 N.H. 85.
CHEATERS, or ESCHEATORS, were officers ap-pointed to look after the king’s escheats, a duty which gave them great opportunities of fraud and oppression, and in consequence many complaints were made of their misconduct. Hence it seems that a cheater carne to signify a fraudulent per-son, and thence the verb to cheat was derived. Wharton.
CHECK, v. To control or restrain; to hold within bounds. To verify or audit; to verify, guard, or examine the work of another. Marsh v. State, 125

Ark. 282, 188 S.W. 815, 816; State v. Hearn, 115 Ohio St. 340, 154 N.E. 244, 245. Particularly used with reference to the control or supervision of one department, bureau, office, or person over another.
As used in Initiative statute, to compare names of signer of petition against official registration list. Halgren v. Welling, 91 Utah, 16, 63 P.2d 550, 554.
CHECK, n. A commercial device intended for use as a temporary expedient for actual money, and
enerally designed for immediate payment, and not for circulation. Kennedy v. Jones, 140 Ga. 302, 78 S.E. 1069, 1070, Ann.Cas.1914D, 355; Merchants’ Nat. Bank v. Bank, 10 Wall. 647, 19 L.Ect. 1008.
A draft for payment of money. Wright v. Loring, 351 III. 584, 184 N.E. 865, 866. An order for payment of money. Glennan v. Rochester Trust & Safe Deposlt Co., 209 N.Y. 12, 102 N.E. 537, 539, 52 L.R.A.,N.S., 302, Ann.Cas.1915A, 441; Welss v. Fenwick, 111 N.J.Eq. 385, 162 A. 609, 611; Anderson v. National Bank of Tacoma, 146 Wash. 520, 264 P. 8, 10. A request to pay money, Standard Factors Cor-poration v. Manufacturera Trust Co., 182 Misc. 701, 50 N.Y. S.2d 10, 13.
A draft or order upon a bank or banking-house, pur-porting to be drawn upon a deposit of funds, for the pay-ment at all events of a certain sum of money to a certain person therein named, or to him or his order, or to bearer, and payable instantly on demand. 2 Daniel, Neg.Inst. § 1566; Bank v. Wheaton, 4 R.I. 33; Economy Fuse & Mfg. Co. v. Standard Electric Mfg. Co., 359 III. 504, 194 N.E. 922, 924.
A Bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand. Commercial & Savings Bank Co. of Bellafontaine, Ohio, v. Cltizens’ Nat. Bank of Franklin, 68 Ind.App. 417, 120 N.E. 670, 674; Bell-Wayland Co. v. Bank of Sugden, 95 Okl. 67, 218 P. 705, 706; Thomas v. Berger, 118 Pa.Super. 422, 180 A. 32. A check differs from an ordinary bill of exchange in that It is drawn on a bank or bankers, and is payable immediately on presentment, without days of grace; it is payable immediately on presentment, and no acceptance as distinct from payment is required; it is supposed to be drawn upon a previous deposit’of funds, and is an absolute appropriation of so much money in the hands of the bank-ers to the holder of the check. Merchants’ Nat. Bank v. State Nat. Bank, 10 Wall. 647, 19 L.Ed, 1008; People v. Compton, 123 Cal. 403, 56 P. 44.
The term "check," within the ordinary meaning of that. term, includes "draft," the only distinction being that In a draft the drawer is a bank, while in the ordinary check the drawer is an individual. Leach v. Mechanics’ Sav. Bank, 202 Iowa, 899, 211 N.W. 506, 508, 50 A.L.R. 388.
A check is a contract. Deal v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 225 Ala. 533, 144 So. 81, 82, 86 A.L,R. 455; Roff v. Crenshaw, dal.App., 159 P.2d 661, 662.
Cashier’s Check
One issued by an authorízed offlcer of a bank directed to another person, evidencing that the payee is authorized to demand and recelve upon presentation from the bank the amount of money represented by the check. State v. Tyler County State Bank, Tex.Com.App., 277 S.W. 625, 627, 42 A. L.R. 1347. A forro of a check by which the bank lends its credit to the purchaser of the check, the purpose being to make It available for immediate use in banking circles. Duke y. Johnson, 127 Wash. 601, 221 P. 321, 322. A bill of exchange drawn by a bank upon ítself, and accepted by the act of issuance. Anderson v. Bank of Tupelo, 135 Miss. 351, 100 So. 179; In its legal effect, it is the same as a certifi-
cate of deposit, certified check or draft. Montana-Wyo-ming Ass’n of Credit Men v. Commercial Nat. Bank of Miles City, 80 Mont. 174, 259 P. 1060, 1061. An acknowl-edgment of a debt drawn by bank upon itself. In re Liquidation of State Bank of Binghamton, 152 Misc. 579, 274 N.Y.S. 41.
Crossed Check
A check crossed with two lines, between which are elther the name of a bank or the words "and company," in full or abbreviated. In the formen case, the banker on whom it la drawn must not pay the money for the check to any

other than the banker named; in the latter case, he must not pay it to any other than a banker. 2 Steph.Comm. 118, note c. And sea 7 Exch. 389; [19031 A.C. 240; Farm-ers’ Bank v. Johnson, King & Co., 134 Ga. 486, 68 S.E. 85, 30 L.R.A.,N,S., 697.
Forged Check
A check on which the maker’s name is forged-not one which has forged indorsements. Klelnman v. Chase Nat. Bank of City of New York, 424 Misc. 173, 207 N.Y.S. 191, 193. See, also, International Union Bank v. National Sure-ty Co., 245 N.Y. 368, 157 N.E. 269, 270. A check which 15 created as a result of a criminal act of forgery. Samples v. Milton County Bank, 34 Ga.App. 248, 129 S.E. 170.
Memorandum Check
A check given by a borrower to a Tender, for the amount of a short loan, with the understanding that it la not to be presentad at the bank, but Will be redeemed by the maker himself when the loan falls due. This understanding is evidenced by wrItIng the word "Mem." on the check. This is not unusual among merchants. See U. S. v. Isham, 17 Wall. 502, 21 L.Ed. 72$; Franklin Bank y. Freeman, 16 Plek., Mass., 539; Story, Pr.Notes § 499.
Traveler’s. Check
See that title.
CHECK-BOOK. A book containing blank checks on a particular bank or banker.
CHECK-OFF SYSTEM. Deduction by employer from pay of employees of sums and payment of such sums to union. Pacific Milis v. Textile Work-ers’ Union of America, Local No. 254, 197 S.C. 330, 15 S.E.2d 134, 136, 135 A.L.R. 497; Local 60 of Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America v. Welin Davit and Boat Corporation, 133 N.J.Eq. 551, 33 A.2d 708, 709; Borderland Coal Corporation v. International Or-ganization of United Mine Workers of America, D. C.Ind., 275 F. 871, 873.
CHECK-ROLL. In English law. A list or book, containing the names of such as are attendants on, or in the pay of, the queen or other great personages, as their household servants.
CHECKER. The old Scotch form of exchequer.
CHECKERBOARD SYSTEM. This term, with reference to entries on lands, means one entry built on another, and a third on the second. Se-quatchie & South Pittsburg Coal & Iron Co. v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co., 131 Tenn. 221, 174 S.W. 1122.
CHEFE. In Anglo-Norman law. Were or were-gild; the price of the head or person, (capitis pretium.)
CHEMERAGE. In old French law. The privi-lege or prerogative of the eldest. A provincial term derived from chemier, (q. v.) Guyot, Inst.
CIJEMIER. In old French law. The eldest born. A term used in Poitou and other places. Guyot, Inst.
CHEMIN. Fr. The road wherein every man goes; the king’s highway. Called in law Latin via regia. Termes de la Ley; Cowell; Spelman, Gloss.
CHEMIS. In old Scotch law. A chief dwelling or mansion house.

CHEQUE. A variant of check (q. v.).
CHEROKEE NATION. One of the civilized In-dian tribes. See Indians; Indian Tribe.
CHEVAGE. A sum of money paid by villeins to their lords in acknowledgment of their bondage.
It was exacted for permission to niarry, and also permis-sion to remain without the dominion of the lord. When paid to the king, lt was called subjection. Termes de /a Ley; Co.Litt. 140 a;, Spelman, Gloss.
Chevage seems also to have been used for a sum of money yearly given to a man of power for his countenance and protection as a chief or lead-er. Termes de la Ley; Cowell.
CHEVANTIA. In old records. A loan or advance of money upon credit. Cowell.
CHEVISANCE. An agreement or composition; an end or order set down between a creditor or debtor; an indirect gain in point of usury, etc.; also an unlawful bargain or contract. Whar-ton.
CHEVITII’E. In old records. Pieces of ground, or heads at the end of plowed lands. Cowell.
CHEZE. A homestead or homesfall which is ac-cessory to a house.
CHICANE. Swindling; shrewd cunning. The use of tricks and artifice.
CIIICKASAW NATION. One of the civilized In-dian tribes. See Indians; Indian Tribe.
CHIEF. One who is put aboye the rest. Princi-pal; leading; head; eminent in power or impor-tance; the best or most important or valuable of several; paramount; of leading importance.
Declaration in chief is a declaration for the prin-cipal cause of action. 1. Tidd, Pr. 419.
Examination in chief is the first examination of a witness by the party who produces him. 1 Greenl.Ev. § 445.
Tenant in chief. See "Chief, tenant in," infra.
CHIEF BARON. The presiding judge of the Eng-lish court of exchequer; answering to the chief justice of other courts. 3 Bl.Comm. 44; 3 Steph. Comm. 401.
CHIEF CLERK. The principal clerical officer of a bureau or department, who is generally charged, subject to the direction of his superior officer, with the superintendente of the administration of the business of the office.
CHIEF .JUDGE. In some states, the presiding judge, as in the New York Court of Appeals and the Maryland Court of Appeals. The term is also used in 1 Tyler (Vt.) with "assistant" judge for the puisne. It is likewise applied to the judge of the London bankruptcy court. In general, the term is equivalent to "presiding justice" or "pre-siding magistrate." Sean v. Loryea, 81 Cal. 151, 22 P. 513.
CHIEF JUSTICE. The presiding, eldest, or prin-cipal judge of a court of justice.

CHIEF JUSTICE OF ENGLAND. The presiding judge in the king’s bench division of the high court of justice, and, in the absence of the lord chan-cellor, president of the high court, and also an ex officio judge of the court of appeals. The full title is "Lord Chief Justice of England."
CHIEF JUSTICE DF THE COMMON PLEAS. In England. The presiding judge in the court of common pleas, and afterwards in the common pleas division of the high court of justice, and one of the ex officio judges of the high court of appeal.
CHIEF JUSTICIAR. In old English law. A high judicial Officer and special ma gistrate, who pre-sided over the aula regis of the Norman kings, and who was also the principal minister of state, the second man in the kingdom, and, by virtue of his office, guardian of the realm in the king’s ab-sence. 3 Bl.Comm. 38.
CHIEF LORD. The immediate lord of the fee, to whom the tenants were directly and personally responsible. Burton, R.P. 317.
CHIEF MAGISTRATE. The head of the executive department of government of a nation, state, or municipal corporation. Mclntire v. Ward, 3 Yeates, Pa., 424.
CHIEF OFFICE. Office of paramount importance or the leading office. City of Newark v. New Jer-sey Inv. ‘Co., 18 N.J.Misc. 182, 11 A.2d 730, 731.
CHIEF PLEDGE. The borsholder, or chief of the borough. Spelman.
CHIEF RENTS. In English law. Were the an-nual payments of freeholders of manors; and were also called "quit-rents," because by paying them the tenant was freed from all other rents or services. 2 Bl.Comm. 42.
CHIEF, TENANT IN. In English feudal lt.w. All the land in the kingdom was supposed to be holden mediately or immediately of the king, who was styled the "Lord Paramount," or "Lord Aboye All;" and those that held immediately under him, in right of his crown and dignity, were called his tenants "in capite" or "in chief," which was the most honorable species of tenure, but at the same time subjected the tenant to greater and more burdensome services than inferior tenures did. Brown. One who held directly of the king. 1 Washb.R.P. *19.
CHIEFRIE. In feudal law. A small rent paid to the lord paramount.
CHILD. See Children.
CHILDREN. Progeny

Child of tender age or years

Such a child must be less than 14 years old. Barnhill’s Adrn’r v. Mt. Morgan Coal Co., D.C.Ky., 215 F. 608, 610. A minor more than 15 years of age is not included within the meaning of the term. Paulk & Fossil v. Lee, 31 Ga.App. 629, 121 S.E. 845.

Child’s Part

A "child’s part," which a widow, by statute in some states, is entitled to take in lieu of dower or the provision made for her by will, is a full share to which a child of the decedent would be entitled, subject to the debts of the estate and the cost of administration up to and including distri-bution. Benedict v. Wilmarth, 46 Fla. 535, 35 So. 84.

Illegitimate Child

A bastard (q. y.).
Legltimate Child
One bor:n in lawful wedlock.

Posthumous Child One born after the father’s death.
Qtrasi Posthumous Child
In the civil law. One who, born during the life of his grandfather, or other male ascendant, was not his heir at the time he made his testament, but who by the death of his father became his heir in his life-time. Inst. 2, 13, 2; Dig. 28, 3, 13.
The word "child" in statutes of ten means either child or children. Cunningham v. Dunn, 84 W.Va. 593, 100 S.E. 410, 411. See Children.
"Children" is ordinarily a word of description, limlted to persons standing in the same relation, and has the same effect as if all the names were given. Rowley v. Currie, 94 N.J.Eq. 606, 120 A. 653, 656.
The words "child or children," in their usual sense, are words of purchase. Phillips v. Mercantile Trust Co. of Baltimore, 195 A. 394, 395, 173 Md. 290; Kelly v. Kelly, 176 Ark. 548, 3 S.W.2d 305; Deener v. Watkins, 191 Ark. 776, 87 S.W.2d 994, 995; they may, however, be used as words of llmitation, Bonds v. Hutchison, 199 S.C. 197, 18 S. E.2d 661, 662, 663; Crawford v. Withrow, 314 Pa. 497, 171
A. 894, 895; Young v. Munsey Trust Co., 72 App.D.C. 73, 111 F.2d 514, 515.
The terms "child" .or "children" may include or apply to:
Adopted children, Dyer v. Lane, 202 Ark. 571, 151 S.W.2d 678, 680; Ex parte Chile, 213 Ala. 599, 105 So. 686, 687; Ryan v. Foreman, 262 III. 175, 104 N.E. 189; but some de-cisions hold that ado.pted children are not included in ab-sence of manifest intention, Savells v. Brown’s Guardian, 187 Ky. 134, 218 S.W. 462, 463; Melek v. Curators of Uni-versity of Missouri, 213 Mo.App. 572, 250 S.W. 614, 615; for cases holding that "child" or "children" does not in-elude adopted children, see Everitt v. LaSpeyre, 195 Ga.

377, 24 S.E.2d 381, 383; Moffet v. Cash, 346 III. 287, 178 N. E. 658, 659; In re Sandford’s Estate, 160 Misc. 898, 290 N. Y.S. 959, 960; Adult child, Mindlin v. Consolidated Tax-payers Mut. Ins. Co., 173 Misc. 961, 19 N.Y.S.2d 340, 342; State ex rel. Buerk v. Calhoun, 330 Mo. 1172, 52 S.W.2d
742, 83 A.L.R. 1393; after-born child, Westport Paper-Board Co. v. Staples, 127 Conn. 115, 15 A.2d 1, 5; contra, Albers v. Donovan, 371 III. 458, 21 N.E.2d 563, 565; all lineal descendants. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Park, 307 Mass. 255, 29 N.E.2d 977, 980; blood relations. In re Fletcher’s Estate, 103 Pa.Super. 69, 157 A. 810, 811; child by seeond marriage, Nelson v. Estill, 175 Ga. 526, 165 S.E. 820, 823; child that would inherit from an Intestate parent, In re Gossett’s Estate, 46 N.M. 344, 129 P.2d 56. 58, 60, 142 A.L.R. 1441; child en ventre sa mere, Valley Nat. Bank v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 57 Ariz. 276, 113 P.2d 359, 361: Thomson v. Elliott, 152 Misc. 188, 273 N.Y.S. 898; children born In wedlock, Bell v. Phyn, 7 Ves. 458; In re Silva’s Estate, 32 Ariz. 573, 261 P. 40, 41. Chil-dren by former marriage, In re Freisinger’s Will, 263 App. Dlv. 970, 33 N.Y.S.2d 196, 197: children by various mar-riages of parent named, McMullen v. Block, Tex.Civ.App., 168 S.W.2d 667, 670; children in first degree. In re Brown’s Estate. 133 Misc. 587, 233 N.Y.S. 426, 430; Children regard-less of age, Citizens’ Bank of Lancaster v. Foglesong, 326 Mo. 581, 31 S.W.2d 778, 783; correlative of "parent;" descendant or descendants of first degree, Benncrs v. First Nat. Bank of Birmingham. 247 Ala. 74, 22 So.2d 435, 442: first degree descendants, Spencer v. Title Guarantee Loan & Trust Co., 222 Ala. 485, 132 So. 730, 731; first generation of offspring. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Beebe, D.C.Md., 57 F.Supp. 754, 757.
Grandchildren, Holbrook v. Shepard, 245 N.Y. 618, 157 N. E. 882; Tucker v. Tucker, 259 Ky. 361, 82 S.W.2d 458, 459, 460; Cherokee Brick Co. v. Bishop. 156 Tenn. 168, 299 S. W. 770; but, ordinarily, grandchildren are not included, Lowrey v. Le Flore, 48 Okl. 235, 149 P. 1112, 1114, Ann. Cas.1918E, 1001; Saha v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltlmore, 184 Md. 24, 40 A.2d 231, 238; In re Blodgett’s Will, 250 App.Div. 324, 294 N.Y.S. 358, 366; as used in deeds or wills especially, the term "children" will not be construed to mean grandchildren, unless a strong case of intention or context requires it. Greenfield v. Lauritson, 306 III. 279, 137 N.E. 818, 819; Davis v. Mitchell, Tenn. App.,. 178 S.W.2d 889, 904; In re Reed’s Estate, 342 Pa. 54, 19 A.2d 365, 366.
Heirs or heirs of the body, Beall v. Beall, 331 III. 28, 162 N.E. 152, 154; Schwarz v. Babe, 129 Kan. 430, 283 P. 642, 643; Conover v. Code, 184 Ind. 604, 112 N.E. 7, 12; Dar-ragh v. Barmore, Tex.Com.App., 242 S.W. 714, 718; but the intention to use "children" in the sense of "heirs" must be made clear. Farrell v. Faries, Del., 22 A.2d 380, 384. 385. So, too, the term "heirs" may mean "children," Albers v. Donovan, 371 III. 458, 21 N.E.2d 563, 565; Lane v. Citizen’s & Southern Nat. Bank, 195 Ga. 828. 25 S.E.2d 800, 804; but the intention to so use the word must be manifest. Welles v. Pape, 63 Ohio App. 432, 27 N.E.2d 169, 172; For cases holding that "heirs" does not mean "children" see Erwin Nat. Bank v. Riddle, 18 Tenn.App. 561, 79 S.W.2d 1032, 1038; Triplett v. Triplett, 332 Mo. 870, 60 S.W.2d 13, 15.
Illegitimate children, State ex rel. Herbert v. Hocking Valley Mining Co., 73 Ohio App. 483, 57 N.E.2d 236, 238; In re Anonymous, 165 Misc. 62, 300 N.Y.S. 292; but other declslons have held that the terms exclude illegitimate chil-dren, Bank of IvIontclair v. McCutcheon, 107 N.J.Eq. 564, 152 A. 379, 380; Jacobs v. United States, C.C.A.La., 112 F. 2d 51; Gee y, Commonwealth, 263 Ky. 808, 94 S.W.2d 17, 19; iliegitimate children that have been acknowledged or adopted, Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Marshall, C.C.A. Wash., 102 F.2d 78, 81; Jenkins v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal.App.2d 50, 40 P.2d 45, 46; Hastings v. Rathbone, 194 Iowa, 177, 188 N.W. 960, 962, 23 A.L.R. 392; immediate offspring or progeny, McQueen v. Stephens, Tex.Civ.App., 100 S.W.2d 1053, 1055; In re Conant’s Estate, 144 Misc.
743, 259 N.Y.S. 885; infant offspring. In re Berg’s Estate, 72 N.D. 52, 4 N.W.2d 575, 580, 140 A.L.R. 1312; Issue, Woodley v. Howse, 133 Kan. 639, 3 P.2d 475, 476; Hodge v. Lovell’s Trustee, 262 Ky. 509, 90 S.W.2d 683, 686. So too, "issue" may mean "childrén." Pierson v. Tones, 108 N.J.Eq. 453, 155 A. 541, 542; In re Morningstar’s Will, 143 Misc. 620, 257 N.Y.S. 240, 249. Legltimate children, Dunlavy v. Lowrie, 372 III. 622, 25 N.E 2d 67 71; Town of Plymouth v. Hey, 285 Mass. 357, 189 N.E. 100, 101; Middle-ton v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., C.C.A.N,Y., 70 F.2d 326, 328;

legitimated child, Brown v. Shwinogee, 128 Okl. 149, 261 P. 920, 921; living children, In re Schuette’s Estate, 138 Neb. 568, 293 N.W. 421, 422; Ward v. Ward, 176 Ga. 849, 169 S.E. 120, 121, 122; male or female, Turner v. Metropoli-tan Life Ins. Co., 56 Cal.App.2d 862, 133 P.2d 859, 861; Curtis v. Safe Deposit & Trus` Co. of Baltimore, 178 Md.
360, 13 A.2d 546, 548; mar., child, Killian v. Burnham, 191 Okl. 248, 130 P.2d 538, 539; In re Drye, 250 Mich. 210, 229 N.W. 623, 625; minor or minors. Walsh v. Walsh, Cal.App., 108 P.2d 763, 764; State v. Flath, 59 N.D. 121, 228 N.W. 847, 849; "natural-born children." In re Corr’s Estate, 338 Pa. 337, 12 A.2d 76, 78; natural offspring of parentage, In re Wait’s Estate, Sur., 42 N.Y.S.2d 735, 738, 739; offspring of either sex and of any age, Morris v. Wil-liams, Tex.Civ.App., 92 S.W.2d 541, 544; opposite of "adult," Miller v. Flnegan, 26 Fla. 29, 7 So. 140, 6 L.R.A. 813; Potter v. tolden Rule Grocery Co., 169 Tenn. 240, 84 S.W.2d 364, 365; person under age of 18 years, State v. Flath, 59 N.D. 121, 228 N.W. 847, 848; person under age of majortty, Wade v. State, 24 Ala.App. 176, 132 So. 71, 72; posthumous child, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Dudley, 180 Tenn. 191, 173 S.W.2d 142, 144; posthumous, illegitimate child, Morgan v. Susino Const. Co., 130 N.J.L. 418, 33 A.2d 607, 610.
Contra, Gierak v. Lehlgh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Co., 101 Pa.Super. 397, 399; Staker v. Industrial Commission of Ohlo, 127 Ohio St. 13. 186 N.E. 616; quick child, Guiffrida v. State, 61 Ga.App. 595, 7 S.E.2d 34, 35; sons and daugh-ters, Kimberlin v. Hicks, 150 Kan. 449. 94 P.2d 335, 340; Stepchildren, Newark Paving Co. v. Klotz, 85 N.J.Law, 432, 91 A. 91, 92; Travelers Ins. Co. v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Del., 1 Terry 285, 9 A.2d 88, 91.
CHILDWIT. In Saxon law. The right which a lord had of taking a fine of his bondwoman got-ten with child without his license. Termes de la Ley.
The custom in Essex county, England, whereby every reputed father of a bastard child was obliged to pay a small fine to the lord. Cowell.
CHILLING A SALE. The act of bidders or oth-ers who combine or conspire to suppress fair com-petition at a sale, for the purpose of acquiring the property -at -Iess than its fair value. Vette v. Hackman, 292 Mo. 138, 237 S.W. 802, 805.
CHILTERN HUNDREDS. In English law. The offices of steward or bailiff of His Majesty’s three Chiltern Hundreds of Stoke, Desborough, and Bonenham; or the steward of the Manor of North-sted. Chiltern Hundreds is an appointment under the hand and seal of the Chancellor of the Exche-quer. May, Parl.Pr. 642.
The stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds is a nominal offIce in the gift of the crown, usually aceepted by mem-bers of the house of commons desirous of vacating thelr seats. By law a member once duly elected to parliament is compelled to discharge the duties of the trust conferred upon him, and Is not enabled at will to resign it. But by statute, If any member accepts any ofilee of proflt from the crown, (except officers in the army or navy accepting a new commission,) his seat is vacated. If, therefore, any mem-ber wishes to retire from the representation of the county or borough by which he was sent to parliament, he applies to the lords of the treasury for the stewardship of one of the Chiltern Hundreds, which having received, and thereby accomplished his purpose, he again resigns the office. Brown.
CHIMIN. In old English law. A road, way, high-way. It is either the king’s highway (chiminus regis) or a private way. The first is that over which the subjects of the realm, and all others under the protection of the crown, have free lib-erty to pass, though the property in the soil itself belong to some private individual; the last is that
in which one person or more have liberty to pass over the land of another, by prescription or char-ter. Wharton. See Chemin.
CHIMINAGE. A toll for passing on a way through a forest; called in the civil law "peda-gium." Cowell. See Co.Litt. 56 a; Spelman, Gloss.; Termes de la Ley; Baldwin’s Ed. of Brit-ton, 63.
CHIMINUS. The way by which the king and all his subjects and all under his protection have a right to pass, though the property of the soil of each sirle where the way lieth may belong to a private man. Cowell.
CHIMNEY MONEY, or HEARTH IIIONEY. A tax upon chimneys or hearth; an ancient tax or duty upon houses in England, now repealed. See Hearth Money; Fuage.
CHIPPINGAVEL. In old English law. A tax upon trade; a toll imposed upon traffic, or upon goods brought to a place to be sold; a toll for buying and selling. Whishaw; Blount.
CHIRGEMOT, CHIRCHGEMOT. (Also spelled Chirgemote, Chirchgemote, Circgemote, Kirk-mote.) In Saxon law. An ecclesiastical assembly or court. Spelman. A synod or meeting in a church or vestry. 4 Inst. 321; Blount; Spelman, Gloss.; Hen. I. cc. 4, 8; Cunningh.Law Dict.
CHIROGRAPH. In Civil and Canon law. An in-strument written out and subscribed by the hand of the party who made it, whether the king or a private person. Du Cange; Cowell.
In old English law. A deed or indenture; also the last part of a fine of land, called more com-monly, perhaps, the foot of the fine. Cruise, Dig. t. 35, c. 2, s. 52.
An instrument of glft or conveyance attested by the sub-scription and crosses of the witnesses, which was In Saxon times called "chirographum," and which, being somewhat changed in form and manner by the Normans, was by íhem styled "charta." Anciently when they made a chirograph or deed which required a counterpart, as we cali it, they engrossed it twice upon one piece of parchment contrari-wise, leaving a space between, In which they wrote in capital letters the word "chirograph," and then cut the parchment in two through the middle of the word, giving a part to each party. Cowell; 2 Bla.Comm. 296. See, also, Charta cyrographata.
In Scotch law. A written voucher for a debt. Bell.
CHIROGRAPHA. In Roman law. Writings ema-nating from a single party, the debtor.
CHIROGRAPHER OF FINES. In English law. The title of the officer of the common pleas who engrossed fines in that court so as to be acknowb edged into a perpetual record. Cowell.
CHIROGRAPIUUM. In Roman law. A handwrit-ing; that which was written with a person’s own hand. An obligation which a person wrote or subscribed with his own hand; an acknowledg-ment of debt, as of money received, with a prom-ise to repay. An evidente or voucher of debt; a security for debt. Dig. 26, 7, 57, pr. A right of action for debt.

CHIROGRAPHUM APUD DEBITOREM REPER-TUM PRMS1UMITUR SOLUTUM. An evidence of debt found in the debtor’s possession is presumed to be paid. Halk.Max. 20; Bell, Dict. See 14 M. & W. 379.
CHIROGRAPHUM NON EXTANS PR1ESUMI-TUR SOLUTUM. An evidence of debt not exist-ing is presumed to have been discharged. Tray. Lat.Max. 73.
CHIROPODIST. One who treats diseases or mal-formations of the hands or feet, especially a sur-geon for the feet, hands, and nails; a cutter or extractor of corns and callosities. State v. Arm-strong, 38 Idaho 493, 225 P. 491, 33 A.L.R. 835.
CHIROPODY. The art of removing corns and callouses. State v. Armstrong, 38 Idaho 493, 225 P. 491, 493, 33 A.L.R. 835.
CHIROPRACTIC, CHIROPRACTICS. A system of healing that treats disease by manipulation of the spinal column. Joyner v. State, 181 Miss. 245, 179 So. 573, 575, 115 A.L.R. 954. A system of ther-apeutic treatment, through adjusting of articula-tions of human body, particularly those ,of the spine. Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P.2d 654, 662. The specific science that removes pressure on the nerves by the adjustment of the spinal vertebrae. State v. Boston, 226 Iowa 429, 284 N.W. 143, 144.
CHIROPRACTOR. One who practices the systeni of chiropractic. Cummings v. State, 214 Ala. 209, 106 So. 852, 854. One professing a system of ma-nipulations which aims to cure disease by the mechanical restoration of displaced or subluxated bones, especially the vertebrffl, to their normal re-lation. Board of Medical Examiners of State of Utah v. Freenor, 47 Utah, 430, 154 P. 941, 942, Ann. Cas.1917E, 1156.
CHIRURGEON. The ancient denomination of a surgeon.
CHIVALRY. In feudal law. Knight-service Ten-ure in chivalry was the same as tenure by knight-service. 2 BI.Comm. 61, 62.
CHIVALRY, COURT OF. See Court of Chivalry.
CHIVALRY, TENURE BY. Tenure by knight-service. Co.Litt.
CHOATE LIEN. Lien which is perfected so that nothing more need be done to make it enforcible. Identity of lienor, property subject to lien and amount of lien are all established. Walker v. Paramount Engineering Co., C.A.Mich., 353 F.2d 445, 449; U. S. v. City of New Britain, Conn., Conn., 74 S.Ct. 367, 369, 347 U.S. 81, 98 L.Ed. 520. The lien must be definite and not mere ascertain-able in the future by taking further steps. Gower v. State Tax Commission, 295 P.2d 162, 207 Or. 288.
CHOKE DAMP. A common name for carbonic acid;—so called from its extinguishing of flame and animal life. Wells’ Adm’r v. Sutherland Coal & Coke Co., 116 Va. 1003, 83 S.E. 384, 385.

CHOP-CHURCH. A word mentioned in 9 Hen. VI. c. 65, by the sense of which it was in those days a kiwi of trade, and by the judges declared to be lawful. But Brooke, in his abridgment, says it was only permissible by law. It was, without doubt, a nickname given to those who used to change benefices, as to "chop and change" is a common expression. Jacob.
CHOPS. The mouth of a harbor. Pub.St.Mass. 1882, p. 1288.
CHORAL. In ancient times a person admitted to sit and worship in the choir; a chorister.
CHOREPISCOPUS. In old European law. A rural bishop, or bishop’s vicar. Spelman; Cow-ell.
CHOSE. Fr. A thing; an article of personal property. A chose is a chattel personal, (Wil-liams, Pers.Prop. 4,) and is either in action or in possession. See Chose in Action and Chose in Possession, infra.
Chose local. A local thing; a thing annexed to a place, as a mill. Kitchin, fol. 18; Cowell; Blount.
Chose transitory. A thing which is movable, and may be taken away or carried from place to place. Cowell; Blount.
CHOSE IN ACTION. A personal right not re-duced into possession, but recoverable by a suit at law. North Carolina Bank & Trust Co. v. Wil-liams, 160 S.E. 484, 485, 201 N.C. 464. A right to personal things of which the owner has not the possession, but merely a right of action for their possession. 2 Bl.Comm. 389, 397; 1 Chit.Pr. 99. The phrase includes all personal chattels which are not in possession; 11 App.Cas. 440; Powers v. Fisher, 279 Mich. 442; 272 N.W. 737, 739; and all property in action which depends entirely on con-tracts express or implied; Castle v. Castle, C.C.A. Hawaii, 267 F. 521, 523. A right to receive or re-cover a debt, demand, or damages on a cause of action ex contractu or for a tort or omission of a duty. Comyns, Dlg. Biens. Moran v. Adkerson, 168 Tenn. 372, 79 S.W.2d 44, 45. Pickering v. Peskind, 43 Ohio App. 401, 183 N.E. 301, 303. A right to recover by suit a personal chattel. Gar-ford Motor Truck Co. v. Buckson, 4 W.W.Harr. 103, 143 A. 410, 411. Assignable rights of action ex contractu and perhaps ex delicto. Coty v. Cogswell, 100 Mont. 496, 50 P.2d 249, 250. Person-alty to which the owner has a right of possession in future, or a right of immediate possession, wrongfully withheld. And see Tumy v. Mayer, 289 Ill. 458, 124 N.E. 661, 662.
CHOSE IN POSSESSION. A personal thing of which one has possession. A thing in poásession, as distinguished from a thing in action. Vawter v. Griffin, 40 Ind. 601. See Chose in Action. Tax-es and customs, if paid, are a chose in possession; if unpaid, a chose in action. 2 Bl.Comm. 408.
CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS. Under the municipal organization of the state of New Jersey, each

county has a board of officers, called by this name, composed of representatives from the cities and townships within its limits, and charged with ad-ministering the revenues of the county. They cor-respond to the "county commissioners" or "super-visors" in other states.
CHOUT. In Hindu law. A fourth, a fourth part of the sum in litigation. The "Mahratta chout" is a fourth of the revenues exacted as tribute by the Mahrattas.
CIIOW SUM. A Chinese name for ginseng roots which have been dried and treated with sugar and honey, such treatment having the purpose and effect of enhancing their value commercially but not therapeutically. Tong & Co. v. U. S., 12 Ct. Cust.App. 32, 33.
CHRENECRUDA. Under the Salic law. This was a ceremony performed by a person who was too poor to pay his debt or fine, whereby he ap-plied to a rich relative to pay it for him. It con-sisted (after certain preliminaries) in throwing green herbs upon the party, the effect of which was to bind him to pay the whole demand.
CHRISTIAN. Pertaining to Jesus Christ or the religion founded by him; professing Christianity. As a noun, it signifies one who accepts and pro-fesses to live by the doctrines and principies of the Christian religion; it does not include Mo-hammedans, Jews, pagans, or infidels. State v. Buswell, 40 Neb. 158, 58 N.W. 728, 24 L.R.A. 68. One who believes or professes or is assumed to be-lleve in Jesus Christ, and the truth as taught by Him. Conway v. Third Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 118 N.J.Eq. 61, 177 A. 113, 116.
CHRISTIAN NAME. The baptismal name as distinct from the surname. Stratton v. Foster, 11 Me. 467. The name which is given one after his birth or at baptism, or is afterward assumed by him In addition to his family name. Badger Lum-ber Co. v. Collinson, 97 Kan. 791, 156 P. 724, 725.
A Christian name may conslst of a single letter. Whar-ton; People v. Reilly, 257 III. 538, 101 N.E. 54, Ann.Cas. 1914A, 1112. There is no presumption that letters are not themselves Christian names, and where a letter or letters appear before a surname they are treated, in the absence of any showing to the contrary, as the Christian name. Riley v. Litchfield, 168 Iowa, 187, 150 N.W. 81, 82, Ann.Cas. 1917B, 172.
CHRISTIANITATIS CURIA. The court Christian. An ecclesiastical court, as opposed to a civil or lay tribunal. Cowell. See, also, Court Christian.
CHRISTIANITY. The religion founded and es-tablished by Jesus Christ. Hale v. Everett, 53 N. H. 9, 54, 16 Am.Rep. 82; People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. (N.Y.) 297, 5 Am.Dec. 335.
CHRISTMAS DAY. A festival of the Christian church, observed on the 25th of December, in memory of the birth of Jesus Christ.
CHROME YELLOW. A metal largely used as a yellow pigment. It is an active poison. U. S. v. R. C. Boeckel & Co., C.C.A.Mass., 221 F. 885,

CHROMO. A -chromolithograph;—a picture pro-duced from drawings on stones, each color being represented by a different stone.. Stecher Litho-graphic Co. v. Dunston Lithograph Co., D.C.N.Y., 233 F. 601, 602.
CHRONIC. With reference to diseases, of long duration, or characterized by slowly progressive symptoms; deep-seated and obstinate, or threaten-ing a long cóntinuance;—distinguished from acute. Golden v. Lerch Bros., 211 Minn. 30, 300 N.W. 207, 211.
CHURCH. In its most general sense, the religious society founded and established by Jesus Christ, to receive, preserve, and propagate his doctrines and ordinances.
It may also mean a body of communicants gathered finto church order, StebbIns v. Jennings, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 193; body or community of Christians, united under one form of government by the professlon of the same faith, and the observance of the same ritual and ceremonies, McNeilly v. First Presbyterian Church In Brookline, 243 Mass. 331, 137 N.E. 691, 694; building, Combined Congregations of District of Columbia v. Dent, 140 F.2d 9, 10, 78 U.S.App. D.C. 254; congregation, Trustees of Pencader Presbyterian Church in Pencader Hundred v. Glbson, Del., 22 A.2d 782, 787, 788; organization for religlous purposes, Williams v. Williams, 215 N.C. 739, 3 S.E.2d 334, 338; place where per-sons regularly assemble for worship, Stubbs v. Texas Liq-uor Control Board, Tex.Civ.App., 166 S.W.2d 178, 180; rellgious society or body, In re Werner’s Will, Sur., 181 N. Y.S. 433, 434; society of persons who profess the Christian religlon, Church of the Holy Faith v. State Tax Commis-sion, 39 N.M. 403, 48 P.2d 777, 784.
In English ecclesiastical law. An institution established by the law of the land in reference to religion. 3 Steph. Comm. 54. The word "church" is said to mean, in strict-ness, not the material fabrlc, but the cure of souls and the right of tithes. 1 Mod. 201.
A congregational church is a voluntary assoclation of Christians united for discipline and worship, connected with, and forming a part of, some religlous society, hay-ing a legal existence. Anderson v. Brock, 3 Me. 248.

Church Building Acts

Statutes passed in England in and since the year 1818, to extend the accommodation afforded by the national church. 3 Steph.Comm. 152-164

Church Discipline Act

The statute 3 & 4 Vict. c. 86, containing regula-tions for trying clerks in holy orders charged with offenses against ecclesiastical law, and for enforc-ing sentences pronounced in such cases. Phillim. Ecc.Law, 1314

Church of England

A distinct branch of Christ’s church, it is also an institution of the state of which the sovereign is the supreme head. Wharton. Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch 292, 3 L.Ed. 735.

Church Property

Within constitutional exemption from taxation, it means property used for religious worship and instruction. Church of the Holy Faith v. State Tax Commission, 39 N.M. 403, 48 P.2d 777, 784.

Church Rate

In English law. A sum assessed for the repair of parochial churches by the representatives of the parishioners in vestry assembled. Wharton

Church Reeve

A church warden; an overseer of a church. Now obsolete. Cowell.

Church-Scot

In old English law. Customary obligations paid to the parish priest; from which duties the re-ligious sometimes purchased an exemption for themselves and their tenants.

Church Wardens

A species of ecclesiastical officers who are in• trusted with the tare and guardianship of the church building and property. See 3 Steph.Comm. 90; 1 Bla.Comm. 394; Cowell; Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43, 3 L.Ed. 650.

Church-Yard

See Cemetery.

Community Church

A name signifying a federation of churches re-taining their separate identity and distinctive doctrines. Christian Church of Vacaville v. Crys-tal, 78 Cal.App. 1, 247 P. 605, 608.
CHURCITESSET. In old English law. A certain portion or measure of wheat, anciently paid to the church on St. Martin’s day; and which, ac-cording to Fleta, was paid as well in the time of the Britons as of the English. Fleta, lib. 1, c. 47, § 28.
CHURL. In Saxon law. A freeman of inferior rank, chiefly employed in husbandry. 1 Reeve, Eng.Law, 5. A tenant at will of free condition, who held land from a thane, on condition of rents and services. Cowell. See Ceorl.
CL Fr. So; here. Ci Dieiu Vous eyde, so help you God. Ci devant, heretofore. Ci bien, as well.
CIBARIA. Lat. In the civil law. Food; victuals. Dig. 34, 1.
CICATRIX. In medical jurisprudence. A scar; the mark left in the flesh or skin alter the heal-ing of a wound, and having the appearance of a seam or of a ridge of flesh.
CIDER. Formerly, any liquor made of fruit juices; now, the juice of apples either before or alter fermentation. People v. Tretneck, 22 N.Y.S. 2d 720, 721, 175 Misc. 41; People v. McCoy, 217 Mich. 575, 187 N.W. 338.
Cider vinegar. Vinegar made from apple cider. People v. Douglas Packing Co., 194 N.Y.S. 633, 635, 118 Misc. 775.
Hard cider. Fermented cider, a strong, spirituous, and intoxicating drink. Monroe Cider Vinegar & Fruit Co. v. Riordan, D.C.N.Y., 274 F. 736, 737; People v. Emmons, 144 N.W. 479, 481, 178 Mich. 126, Ann.Cas.1915D, 425.
Sweet cider. Cider before fermentation, or cider in which fermentation has been prevented—cider not yet become hard. U. S. v. Dodson, D.C.CaI., 268 F. 397, 403. A nonalcoholic beverage com-posed of the expressed juice of apples. Monroe Cider Vinegar & Fruit Co. v. Riordan, C.C.A.N.Y., 280 F. 624, 626.
CINQUE PORTS. Certain important ports or havens on the south-east coast of England, towards France. 3 B1.Comm. 79. Their represen-tatives in parliament and inhabitants were termed barons. Brande; Cowell; Termes de la Ley. And see Round, Feudal England 563.
The 18 & 19 Vict. c. 48, (amended by 20 & 21 Vitt. c. 1,) abolished jurisdiction and authority of the lord warden of the Cinque Ports.
CIPHER. Ordinarily, a secret or disguised writ-ten communication, unintelligible to one without a key. As applied to telegrams, a "cipher" mes-sage is one that is unintelligible. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Geo. F. Fish, Inc., 148 1\ild. 210, 128 A. 14, 16.
CIPPI. An old English law term for the stocks, an instrument in which the wrists or ankles of petty offenders were confined.
CIRCADA. A tribute anciently paid to the bishop or archbishop for visiting churches. Du Fresne.
CIRCA. Lat. About; around; also, concerning; with relation to. Commonly used before a given date when the exact time is not known; as, circo 1800. Abbreviated circ. or c.
CIRCAR. In Hindu law. Head of affairs; the state or government; a grand division of a prov-ince; a headman. A name used by Europeans in Bengal to denote the Hindu writer and account-ant employed by themselves, or in the public of-fices. Wharton.
CIRCUIT. A division of the country, appointed for a particular judge to visit for the trial of caus-es or for the administration of justice. See 3 Bla. Comm. 58; State v. Mappus, 107 S.C. 345, 92 S.E. 1053.
Circuits, as the term is used in England, may be other-wise defined to be the periodical progresses of the judges of the superior courts of common law, through the several counties of England and Wales, for the purpose of ad-ministering civil and criminal justice. 3 Bla.Comm. 57; 3 Steph.Comm. 321.
CIRCUIT COURTS. Courts whase jurisdiction ex-tends over several counties or districts, and of which terms are held in the various counties or districts to which their jurisdiction extends.
In several of the states, the name given to a tribunal, the territorial jurisdiction of which may comprise several counties or districts, and wh ose sessions are held in such counties or districts al-ternately. These courts usually have general origfinal jurisdiction. Renshaw v. Reyholds, 317 Mo. 484, 297 S.W. 374, 37.6.
• The narre of a former.system of emitas uf the United States, invested with general original Mrisdietion of sneh matters and causes as are of Federal coge isan ce, except the matters specially delegated te the distriel courts. 1 tient, Cenen. 301-303.
CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS. See Courts of Appeals.
CIRCUIT JUDGE. The judge of a circuit court. Crozier v. Lyons, 72 Iowa 401, 34 N.W. 186.
CIRCUIT JUSTICE. In federal law and practice. The justice of the supreme court who is allotted to a given circuit. 28 U.S.C.A. § 42.
CIRCUIT PAPER. In English practice. A paper containing a statement of the time and place at which the several assises will be held, and other statistical information connected with the assises. Holthouse.
CIRCUITUS EST EVITANDUS; ET BONI JU-DICIS EST LITES DIRIMERE, NE LIS EX LITE ORIATUR. 5 Coke, 31. Circuity is to be avoided; and it is the duty of a good judge to determine litigations, lest one lawsuit arise out of another. Co.Litt. 384 a; Wing.Max. 179; Broom, Max. 343; 15 M. & W. 208; 5 Exch. 829.
CIRCUITY OF ACTION. A complex, indirect, or roundabout course of legal proceeding, making two or more actions necessary in order to effect that adjustment of rights between all the parties concerned in the transaction which, by a more di, rect course, might have been accomplished in -a single suit. Fellows v. Fellows, 4 Cow. (N.Y.) 682, 15 Am.Dec. 412.
CIRCULAR INSANITY. Maniac depressive psy-chosis. Turley v. Turley, 374 III. 571, 30 N.E.2d 64, 65.
CIRCULAR LETTER OF CREDIT. A letter au-thorizing one person to pay money or extend cred-it to another on the credit of the writer. Pines v. United States, C.C.A.Iowa, 123 F.2d 825, 828.
CIRCULAR NOTES. Instruments similar to "let-ters of credit." They are drawn by resident bank-ers upon their foreign correspondents, in favor of persons traveling abroad. Brown.
CIRCULATED. A thing is "circulated" when it passes, as from one person or place to another, or spreads, as a report or tale. Willard v. State, 129 Tex.Cr.R. 384, 87 S.W.2d 269, 270.
CIRCULATION. As used in statutes providing for taxes on the circulation of banks, this term includes al’ currency or circulating notes or bilis, or certificates or bills intended to circulate as mon-ey. U. S. v. Wilson, 106 U.S. 620, 2 S.Ct. 85, 27 L. Ed. 310. As used in newspaper and magazine publishing businesses, a body of subscribers and an established advertising clientele. Meredith Pub. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C,A., 64 F.2d 890, 893. Reading of libelous document

with defendant’s consent in hearing of others. Myre v. State, 126 Tex.Cr.R. 157, 70 S.W.2d 428.
Circulating medium. This term is more compre-hensive than the term "money," as it is the me-dium of exchanges, or purchases and sales, wheth-er it be gold or silver coin or any other article.
CIRCULATORY HEATING SYSTEM. One in which the heating box, being outside the room to be heated, heats a body of air in passing over it, which body of air is then conducted to the room to be heated, thus indirectly accomplishing the re-sult;—distinguished from a "radiating" or direct system, in which the heating body or box is in the room intended to be heated. Pelton v. Williams, C.C.A.Ohio, 235 F. 131, 132.
CIRCUMDUCTION. In Scotch law. A closing of the period for lodging papers, or doing any other act required in a cause. Paters. Comp.
CIRCUMDUCTION OF THE TERM. In Scotch practice. The sentence of a judge, declaring the time elapsed within which a proof ought to have been led, and precluding the party from bringing forward any further evidence. Bell.
CIRCUMFERENTIAL. Etymologically inclusive of spiral. See George W. Todd & Co. v. J. Whita-ker Mfg. Co., D.C.Pa., 226 F. 791, 794.
CIRCUMSPECTE AGATIS. The title of a statute passed 13 Edw. I (1285) and so called from the "nidal words of it, the object of which was to as-certain the boundaries of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in some particulars, or, in other words, to regulate the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical and temporal courts. 2 Reeve, Eng.Law, 215, 216. See, how-ever, 2 Holdsw.Hist.E,L. 246. And see Articles of the clergy.
CIRCUMSTANCES. Attendant facts. Pope v. Reading Co., 304 Pa. 326, 156 A. 106, 109. The surroundings at the commission of an act.
The terms "circumstance" and "fact" are, in many ap-plications, synonymous; but the true distinction of a circumstance is lts reiative character. "Any fact may be a circumstance with reference to any other fact." 1 Benth. Jud.Evid. 42, note; Id. 142. "Circumstances" are minor facts, Pulliam v. State, 196 Ga. 782, 28 S.E.2d 139, 147; related or accessory facts, occurrences or things which stand around, or about, which attend upon, which closely precede or follow, which surround.and accompany, which depend upon, or which support or qualify a principal fact or event, Salter v. State, 163 Ga. 80, 135 S.E. 408, 409.
As used in a statute for an ailowance for the wlfe in a divorce action, having regard to the "circumstances" of the parties, it includes practically everything which has a legitimate bearing on present and prospective matters re-lating to the lives of both parties. Lamborn v. Lamborn, 80 Cal.App. 494, 251 P. 943, 945.
The "circumstances of the transaction itself," as used in the doctrine of dying deciarations, are the circumstances or facts leading up to, causing, or attending the homicide, and are not confined to occurrences at the very time there-of. Pendieton v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 676, 109 S.E. 201, 209.
Thrift, integrity, good repute, business capacity, and stability of character, for example, are "circumstances" which may be very properly considered in determining the question of "adequate security." Martín v. Dulce, 5 Redf. Sur. (N.Y.) 600.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. The term in-dudes all evidence of indirect nature. Milligan v. State, 109 Fla. 219, 147 So. 260, 263.
It is dlrect evidence as to facts deposed to but indirect as to the factum probandum, Brown v. State, 126 Tex.Cr.R. 449, 72 S.W.2d 269, 270; evidence of facts or circumstances from whlch the existence or nonexistence of fact in issue may be inferred. People v. Steele, 37 N.Y.S.2d 199, 200, 179 Misc. 537; Wolff v. Employers Fire Ins. Co., 282 Ky. 824, 140 S.W.2d 640, 645, 130 A.L.R. 682; Scott v. State, 57 Ga.App. 489, 195 S.E. 923, 924; inferences drawn from facts proved, Hatfield v. Levy Bros., 18 Ca1.2d 798, 117 P. 2d 841, 845; preponderance of probabilities, Hercules Pow-der Co., v. Nieratko, 113 N.J.L. 188, 173 A. 606, 610; pro-cess of deciffion by whlch court or jury may reason from circumstances known or proved, to establish by inference the principal fact, People v. Taddlo, 292 N.Y. 488, 55 N.E. 2d 749, 750.
It means that existence of principal facts is only inferred from circumstances. Twln City Fire Ins. Co. v. Lonas, 255 Ky. 717, 75 S.W.2d 348, 350.
When the existence of the principal fact is deduced from evidentiary by a process of probable reasoning, the evi-dence and proof are said to be presumptive. Best, Pres. 246; Id. 12. All presumptive evidence is circumstantial be-cause necessarily derived from or made up of circum-stances, but all circumstantial evidence is not presumptive. Burrill.
The proof of various facts or circumstances which usual-ly attend the main fact in dispute, and therefore tend to prove its existence, or to sustain, by their consistency, the hypothesis claimed. Or as otherwise defined, it consists in reasoning from facts which are known or proved to es-tablish such as are conjectured to exist.
CIRCUMSTANTIBUS, TALES DE. See Tales.
CIRCUMVENTION. In Scotch law. Any act of fraud whereby a person is reduced to a deed by decreet. It has the same sense in the civil law. Dig. 50, 17, 49, 155. And see Oregon v. Jennings, 7 S.Ct. 124, 119 U.S. 74, 30 L.Ed. 323.
CIRCUS. A large inclosure with one end rounded for races, a show in which feats of horsemanship, tumbling, strength, etc., are exhibited. Zucarro v. State, 82 Tex.Cr.R. 1, 197 S.W. 982, 985, L.R.A. 1918B, 354.
CIRIC. In Anglo-Saxon and old English law, a church.
CIRIC-BRYCE. Any violation of the privileges of a church.
CIRIC SCEAT. Church-scot, or shot; an ecclesi-astical due, payable on the day of St. Martin, con-sisting chiefly of corn.
CIRLISCUS. A ceorl (q. v.).
CISTA. A box or chest for the deposit of char-ters, deeds, and things of value.
CITACION. In Spanish law. Citation; sum-mons; an order of a court requiring a person against whom a suit has been brought to appear and defend within a given time.
It is synonymous with the term emplazamiento In the old Spanish law, and the in jus vocatio of the Roman law.
CITATIO. Lat. A citation or summons to court.
CITATIO AD REASSUMENDAM CAUSAM. A summons to take up the cause. A process, in the civil law, which issued when one of the parties to
a suit died before its determination, for the plain-tiff against the defendant’s heir, or for the plain-tiff’s heir against the defendant, as the case might be; analogous to a modern bill of revivor, which is probably borrowed from this proceeding.
CITATIO EST DE JURI NATURAL!. A sum-mons is by natural right. Cases in Banco Regis Wm. III. 453.
CITATION. A writ issued out of a court of com-petent jurisdiction, commanding a person therein named to appear on a day named and do some-thing therein mentioned, or show cause why he should not. Proctor, Prac. Sheldon v. Sheldon, 100 N.J.Eq. 24, 134 A. 904, 907. An order or sum-mons by which a defendant is directed or notified to appear. Adams v. Citizens Bank, 136 So. 107, 109, 17 La.App. 422; Burrage v. Hunt Production Co., Tex.Civ.App., 114 S.W.2d 1228, 1239. The act by which a person is so summoned or cited.
It is usually original process in any proceeding where used, and in such respect is analogous to a writ of tapias or summons at law and subpeena in chancery. Gondas v. Gondas, 99 N.J.Eq. 473, 134 A. 615, 618.
As the act of the court through its proper officer com-manding the appearance of defendant at the time and place named to answer to plaintiff’s petition, it has the dignity of offlcial character ami weight of superior authority. Mor-an Oil & Gas Co. v. Anderson, Tex.Civ.App., 223 S.W. 1031, 1032. It is used in this sense, in American law, in the practice upon writs of error from the United States su-preme court, and in the proceedings of courts of probate in many of the states. Durfee v. Durfee, 293 Mass. 472, 200 N.E. 395, 397; Schwartz v. Lake, 109 La. 1081, 34 So. 96.
It is also the name of the process used in the English ec-clesiastical, probate, and divorce courts be call the defend-ant or respondent before them. 3 Bl.Comm. 100; 3 Steph. Comm. 720. And in Scotch practice it is the calling of a party to an action done by an officer of the court under a proper warrant; the service of a writ or bill of sum-mons. Paters. Comp.
CITATION OF AUTHORITIES. The reading, or production of, or reference to, legal authorities and precedents, (such as constitutions, statutes, reported cases, and elementary treatises,) in argu-ments to courts, or in legal text-books, to establish or fortify the propositions advanced.
CITATIONS, LAW OF. In Roman law. An act of Valentinian, passed A. D. 426, providing that the writings of only five jurists, viz., Papinian, Paul, Gaius, Ulpian, and Modestinus, should be quoted as authorities. The majority was Binding on the judge. If they were equally divided the opinion of Papinian was to prevail; and in such a case, if Papinian was silent upon the matter, then the judge was free to follow his own view of the mat-ter. Brown.

CITATIONES NON CONCEDANTUR PRIUS-QUAM EXPR1MATUR SUPER QUA RE FIERI DEBET CITATIO.

Citations should not be grant-ed before it is stated about what matter the cita-tion is to be made. (A maxim of ecclesiastical law.) 12 Coke, 44.

CITE. L. Fr. City; a city. Cite de Loundr’, city of London.

CITE. To summon; to command the presence of a person; to notify a person of legal proceed-ings against him and require his appearance thereto. See In re Eno’s Estate, 180 N.Y.S. 889, 890, 111 Misc. 69. To read or refer to legal au-thorities, in an argument to a court or elsewhere, in support of propositions of law sought to be es-tablished.
CITIZEN. A member of a free city or jural so-ciety, (civitas,) possessing all the rights and priv-ileges which can be enjoyed by any person under its constitution and government, and subject to the corresponding duties. "Citizens" are mem-bers of community inspired to common goal, who, in associated relations, submit themselves to rules of conduct for the promotion of general welfare and conservation of individual as well as collec-tive rights. In re McIntosh, D.C.Wash., 12 F. Supp. 177.
‘rhe term appears to have been used In the Roman gov-ernment to designate a person who had the freedom of the city, and the right to exercise all political and civil priv-ileges of the government. There was siso, at Rome, a partial citizenship, including civil, but not political rights. Complete citizenship embraced both. Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind. 451; 17 L.Q.Rev. 270; 1 SeLEssays in Anglo-Amor. L.H. 578.
A member of a nation or body politic of the sovereign state or political society who owes allegiance, Luria v. 1J. S., 34 S.Ct. 10, 19, 231 U.S. 9, 58 L.Ed. 101; U. S. v. Polzin, D.C.Md., 48 F.Supp. 476, 479.
A member of the civil state entitled to all its privileges. Cooley, Const Lim. 77. One of the sovereign people. A constituent member of the sovereignty synonymous with the people. Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 404, 15 L.Ed. 691

In American Law

One who, under the constitution and laws of the United States, or of a particular state, is a mem-ber of the political community, owing allegiance and being entitled to the enjoyment of full civil rights. Amy v. Smith, 1 Litt. (Ky.) 331; Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 22 L.Ed. 627.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the Unit-ed States and of the state wherein they reside. Amend. XIV, Const.U.S.; Nyman v. Erickson, 100 Wash. 149, 170 P. 546, 547.
The term may include or apply to an elector qualified to vote in an election, Belmont v. Town of Gulfport, 97 Fla. 688, 122 So. 10; children of alien parents born in United States, Von Schwerdtner v. Piper, D.C.Md., 23 F.2d 862, 863; U. S. v. Minoru Yasui, D.C.Or., 48 F.Supp. 40, 54; children of American citizens born outside United States, Hoaland v. Attorney General of United States, D.C.Md., 42 F.Supp. 13, 22; Indiang, United States v. Hester, C.C.A. Okl., 137 F.2d 145, 147; State v. McAlhaney, 220 N.C. 387, 17 S.E.2d 352, 354; national banks, American Surety Co. v. Bank of California, C.C.A.Or., 133 F.2d 160, 162; Ezzell v. First Nat. Banks, 218 Ala. 462, 119 So. 2, 3; negroes and whites, United States v. Ellis, D.C.S.C., 43 F.Supp. 321, 324; nonresident who has qualified as administratrix of estate of deceased resident, Williams’ Code Tenn. § 8236. Ilunt v. Noll, C.C.A.Tenn., 112 F.2d 288, 289; persons en-titled to privileges and immunities conferred upon same tercos upon which they are conferred upon other citizens, Austin v. United States, D.C.I11., 40 F.Supp. 777, 778.
The terms "citizen" and "citizenship" are distinguish-able from "resident" or "inhabitant." Jeffcott v. Donovan, C.C.A.Ariz., 135 F.2d 213, 214; and from "domicile," Wheeler v. Burgess, 263 Ky. 693, 93 S.W.2d 351, 351; First Carolinas Joint Stock. Land Bank of Columbia v. New York Title & Mortgage Co., D.C.S.C., 59 F.2d 350, 351. The words "citizen" and "citizenship," however, usuallyinclude the idea of domicile, Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Petrowsky, C.C.A.N.Y., 250 F. 554, 557; citizen inhabitant and resident of ten synonymous, Jonesboro Trust Co. v. Nutt, 118 Ark. 368, 176 S.W. 322, 324; Edgewater Realty Co. v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co., D.C.Md., 49 F. Supp. 807, 809; and citizenship and domicile are often synonymous. Messick v. Southern Pa. Bus Co., D.C.Pa., 59 F.Supp. 799, 800.
A corporation is a citizen of state under whose laws it is created and a nonresident of every other state. Jack-son Securities & Investment Co. v. State, 241 Ala. 288, 2 So.2d 760, 764. It is not a citizen within meaning of fed-eral constitution declaring citizens of each state entitled to privileges and immunities of citizens in the severa’ states or within Fourteenth Amendment prohibiting states from abridging privileges and immunities of citizens of United States, J. D. L. Corporation v. Bruckman, 11 N.Y. S.2d 741, 746, 171 Misc. 3; but see In re Thermiodyne Radio Corporation, D.C.Del., 26 F.2d 713, 714; nor within statute authorizing citizens of United States to prosecute appeal to Circuit Court of Appeals without prepaying costs or giving security, Atlantic S. S. Corporation v. Kelley, C.C.A.Fla., 79 F.2d 339, 340; nor within statute authorizing permission to citizens to sue in forma pauperis, Quittner v. Motion Picture Producers & Distributors of America, C.C.A.2, 70 F.2d 331, 332; nor within statute requiring suit in district wherein either plaintiff or defendant resides. Standard Stoker Co. v. Lower, D.C.Md., 46 F.2d 678. 684; Suther-land v. U. S., C.C.A.Neb., 74 F.2d 89, 92. Insurance com-panies, incorporated under state law, are "citizens of this state" within statute requiring foreign Insurance compa-nies to file bonds for payment of thelr obligations to such citizens. Republic Ins. Co. v. Cunningham, Tex.Civ.App., 62 S.W.2d 339, 343. The term "citizen" will not be con-strued to include a Corporation, unless the general purpose and import of the statutory or constitutional provision seems to require it. St. Louis & S. F. R Co. v. State, 120 Ark. 182, 179 S.W. 342, 343, Ann.Cas.1917C, 873; Jennings v. Idaho By., Light & Power Co., 26 Idaho, 703, 146 P. 101, 102, L.R.A.1915D, 115, Ann.Cas.1916E, 359.
Neither a corporation nor a partnership is a citizen of the United States entitled to immunity from service of summons by substituted service, Western Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Lamson Bros. & Co., D.C.lowa, 42 F.Supp. 1007, 1012.
Filipinos are not citizens of United States, De Cano v. State, 7 Wash.2d 613, 110 P.2d 627, 631; People v. Cordero, 50 Ca1.App.2d 146, 122 P.2d 648, 649; but see holding that Filipinos are within provision of Neutrallty Act deflning "citizen" as including any individual owing allegiance to the United States. Suspine v. Compania Transatlantica Centroamericana, S. A., D.C.N.Y., 37 F.Supp. 268, 271.
A state cannot be a citizen. Query v. 206 Cases of Assort-ed Liquor, D.C.S.C., 49 F.Supp. 693, 695.
But a state ami the federal government each has citizens of its own, and the same person may be at the same tirite a citizen of the United States and a citizen of a state. The government of the United States can neither grant nor secure tu its citizens rights or privileges which are not ex-pressly or by implication placed under its jurisdiction. AH that cannot be so granted or secured are left to the exclusive protection of the states. U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588.
With reference to the jurisdiction and power of federal courts and removal of actions a citizen of the District of
Columbia is not "citizen of a state", Neild v. District of Columbia, 110 F.2d 246, 249, 71 App.D.C. 306; Glaeser v. Acacia Mut. Life Ass’n, D.C.Cal., 55 F.Supp. 925, 926; a corporation is a citizen of the state where it Is organized, and a foreign corporation does not become a citizen of an-other state where it is authorized to carry on business, Van Buren v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., D.C.Mass., 42 F.Supp. 279, 280; a municipal subdivision, such as county, city, town, or school district, Is a citizen, Siegel v. City of Detroit, Department of Street Railways, D.C.Mich., 52 F.Supp. 669; Pettibone v. Cook County, Minn., C.C.A. Minn., 120 F.2d 850, 852; a national bank is a citizen of state where it has its principal place of business. American Surety Co. of New York v. Bank of California, D.C.Or., 44 F.Supp. 81, 83; Atwood v. National Bank of Lima, C.C.A. Ohio, 115 F.2d 861, 862; a state is not a citizen, Board of Health of Township of Hillside v. Mundet Cork Corpora-tion, 126 N.J.Eq. 100, 8 A.2d 105, 106, 107; State of North Dakota v. National Milling & Cereal Co., C.C.A.N.D., 114F.2d 777, 779; State Highway Commission of Wyoming v. Utah Const. Co., (Wyo.) 49 S.Ct. 104, 106, 278 U.S. 194, 73 L.Ed. 262; a turnpike commission is a citizen, Hunkiti-Conkey Const. Co. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, D.C.Pa., 34 F.Supp. 26, 28; an association is not a citizen, Rife v. Lumber Underwriters, C.C.A.Tenn., 204 F. 32, 35; Village Milis Co. v. Houston Oil Co. of Texas, Tex.Civ. App., 186 S.W. 785, 788; domicile and citizen are synon-mous in federal courts, Earley v. Hershey Transit Co., D.C. Pa., 55 F.Supp. 981, 982; inhabitant, resident and citizen are synonymous, Standard Stoker Co. v. Lower, D.C.Md., 46 F.2d 678, 683.

In English Law

An inhabitant of a city. 1 Rolle, 138. The rep-resentative of a city, in parliament. 1 Bl.Comm. 174.
The word "subject" is used to designate an inhabitant of the country, or one amenable to the laws of the nation.
CITIZENSIIIP. The status of being a citizen ( q. v.).

In England
An incorporated town or borough which is or has been the see of a bishop. Co.Litt. 108; 1 Bl. Comm. 114; Cowell; 1 Steph.Comm. 115. State v. Green, 126 N.C. 1032, 35 S.E. 462.
There is said, however, to be no necessary connection be-tween a city and a see. Oxford Dict., citing Freeman.
A large town incorporated with certain privi-leges. The inhabitants of a city. The citizens. Worcester.
In America
A municipal corporation; Streat v. Vermilya, 268 Mich. 1, 255 N.W. 604, 606; also the territory within the corporate limits. Municipal Power Transmission Co. v. City of Lyndon, 127 Kan. 59, 272 P. 158, 160.
A large town or municipal corporation, State v. Haynes, 175 Ark. 645, 300 S.W. 380, 382; a political entity or sub-division for governmental purposes, Nolan v. Jones, 215 Ky. 238, 284 S.W. 1054, 1056; a public institution for self-gov-ernment, Loeb v. City of Jacksonville, 101 Fla. 429, 134 So. 205, 207; a public corporation for public purposes, Chase v. Inhabitants of Town of Litchfleld, 134 Me. 122, 182 A. 921, 924.
A state agency for carrying on local government. Hud-son Motor Car Co. v. City of Detroit, 282 Mich. 69, 275 N. W. 770, 773, 113 A.L.R. 1472; a voluntary association or corporation. State ex rel. McQueen v. Brandon, 244 Ala. 62, 12 So.2d 319, 322; Leviton v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 374 III. 594, 30 N.E.2d 497, 500.
The fundamental distinction between town and city or-ganization is that in the former all the qualified inhabit-ants meet together to deliberate and vote as individuals, each in his own right, while in the latter all municipal functions are performed by deputies; the one being direct, the other representative. In re Opinion of the Justices, 229 Mass. 601, 119 N.E. 778, 781.
The word "city," however, is of ten used to include an in-.corporated town. Noble v. State, 112 Tex.Cr.R. 676, 18 S. W.2d 619, 620; and to include villages, People v. City of Chicago, 349 III. 304, 182 N.E. 419, 431. It has also been held that, under statutes, the term includes all municipal corporations and corporate authorities, such as a board of park commissioners; People v. Kesner, 321 Ill. 230, 151 N. E. 481, 483; but that it does not include a village; Village of Depue v. Banschbach, 273 Ill, 574, 113 N.E. 156, 159.

In Medieval History

In the Middle Ages in Germany, fortified places in the enjoyment of market-jurisdiction.

The German as well as the French cities are a creation of the Middle Ages; there was an organic connection with the Roman town-svstem. Schrider, Lehrbuch des Deutchen Rechtsgeschlchte 588.

CITY COUNCIL. The name of a group of munici-pal officers constituting primarily a legislative and administrative body, but which is often charged with judicial or quasi judicial functions, as when sitting on charges involving the removal of an offi-cer for cause. Rutter v. Burke, 89 Vt. 14, 93 A. 842, 849.
CITY ELECTION. Any election in a city at which people of the city may vote, Wing v. Ryan, 6 N. Y.S.2d 825, 829, 255 App.Div. 163.
CITY OF LONDON COURT. A court having a local jurisdiction within the city of London. It is to all intents and purposes a county court, hav-ing the same jurisdiction and procedure.
CITY REAL ESTATE. Property owned and used for municipal purposes. McSweeney v. Bazinet, 55 N.Y.S.2d 558, 561, 269 App.Div. 213.
CITY WARRANT. A command of council to treasurer to pay amount. State v. McCarthy, 282 P. 1045, 1048, 86 Mont. 100.
CIUDADES. Sp. In Spanish law, cities; distin-guished from towns (pueblos) and villages (villas.) Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 537.
CIVIC. Pertaining to a city or citizen, or to citi-zenship. Cleveland Opera Co. v. Cleveland Civic Opera Ass’n, 22 Ohio App. 400, 154 N.E. 352, 353.
CIVIC ENTERPRISE. A project or undertaking in which citizens of a city co-operate to promote the common good and general welfare of the peo-ple of the city. James McCord Co. v. Citizens’ Hotel Co., Tex.Civ.App., 287 S.W. 906, 908.
CIVIL. Originally, pertaining or appropriate to a member of a civitas or free political community; natural or proper to a citizeñ. Also, relating to the community, or to the policy and government of the citizens and subjects of a state.
The word is derived from the Latin civilis, a cltizen. Byers v. Sun Savings Bank, 41 Okl. 728, 139 P. 948, 949, 52 L.R.A.,N.S., 320, Ann.Cas.1916D, 222. In law, it has var-ious signiflcations. In contradistinction to barbarous or savage, it indicates a state of society reduced to order and regular government. In contradistinction to criminal, it in-dicates the private rights and remedies of men. It is also used in contradlstinction to military, ecclesiastical, natural, or foreign. Story, Const. § 791; 1 Bla.Comm. 6. 125, 251; Montesquieu, Sp. of Laws, b. 1, c. 3; Rutherforth, Inst. b. 2, c. 2; id. c. 3; id. c. 8, p. 359; Heineccius, Elem. Jurlsp.Nat. b. 2, ch. 6.
A prisoner’s statutory obligation to pay for his keep and maintenance is civil. Auditor General v. Hall, 300 Mich. 215, 1 N.W.2d 516, 518, 139 A.L.R. 1022.
As to civil "Commotion," "Conspiracy," "Con-tempt," "Corporations," "Death," "Injury," "Lib-erty," "Obligation," "Officer," "Possession," "Rem-edy," "Rights," and "War," see those titles. See, also, the following titles beginning with "Civil."
CIVIL ACTION.

In general

An action wherein an issue is presented for
trial formed by averments of complaint and denials of answer or replication to new matter, White v. White, 98 Ind.App. 587, 186 N.E. 349, 351; an adversary proceeding for declaration, enforce-ment, or protection of a right, or redress, or pre-vention of a wrong, People v. Barker, 29 Cal.App. 2d Supp. 766, 77 P.2d 321, 323; Lee v. Lang, 140 Fla. 782, 192 So. 490, 491; Johnston v. State, 212 Ind. 375, 8 N.E. 590, 592. Every action other than a criminal action, City of Neenah v. Krueger, 206 Wis. 473, 240 N.W. 402, 404; Gillson v. Ven-dome Petroleum Corporation, D.C.La., 35 F.Supp. 815, 819.
Both actions at law and actions In equity. Klepinger v. Rhodes, 140 F.2d 697, 698, 78 U.S.App.D.C. 340.

In the Civil Law

A personal action which is instituted to compel payment, or the doing of some other thing which is purely civil. Pothier, Introd. Gen. aux Cont. 110

At Common Law

One which seeks the establishment, recovery, or redress of private and civil rights. One brought to recover some civil right, or to obtain redress for some wrong not being a crime or mis-demeanor. Wheeling Traction Co. v. Pennsyl-vania Co., D.C.Ohio, 1 F.2d 478, 479.
Civil sults relate to and affect only Individual rights whereas criminal prosecutions involve public wrongs. Can-cerní v. People, 18 N.Y. 128. They include all cases, both at law and in equity, which cannot legally be denominated "criminal cases." Fenstermacher v. State, 19 Or. 504, 25 P. 142; Welford v. Havard, 127 Miss. 83, 89 So. 812, 813.

So. 812, 813.
In Code Practice
The one form of action for enforcement or protection of private rights and prevention or redress of private wrongs. Code N.Y. § 69. It may also be brought for the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture.
"Civil action" implies adversary parties and an issue, and is designed for the recovery or vindication of a civil right or the redress of some civil wrong. Bopst v. Williams, 287 Mo. 317, 229 S.W. 796, 798. It is a generie terco, and does not necessarily imply jury trial. State Board of Medical Examiners v. Macy, 92 Wash. 614, 159 P. 801, 804.
CIVIL BILL COURT. A tribunal in Ireland with a jurisdiction analogous to that of the county courts in England. The judge of it is also chair-man of quarter sessions (where the jurisdiction is more extensive than in England), and per-forms the duty of revising barrister. Wharton.
CIVIL DAMAGE ACTS. Acts which provide in certain cases an action for damages to one injured because of the furnishing of liquor. Tarwater v. Atlantic Co., 176 Tenn. 510, 144 S.W.2d 746, 747.
CIVIL DAY. See the title Day.
CIVIL ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDING. The penalty actions under Emergency Price Control Act. Bowles v. Barde Steel Co., 177 Or. 421, 164 P.2d 692, 715, 162 A.L.R. 328.
CIVIL INFORMATION. A legal proceeding in chancery, older than the court of equity. Wilson v. State Water Supply Commission, 84 N.J.Eq. 150, 93 A. 732, 733.
CIVIL INQUEST. A proceeding to determine whether an individual is a criminal sexual psycho-pathic person within statute providing for confine-ment and treatment of such persons. People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 4 N.W.2d 18, 26.
CIVIL LAW. "Civil Law," "Roman Law" and "Roman Civil Law" are convertible phrases, mean-ing the same system of jurisprudence.
That rule of action which every particular na-tion, commonwealth, or city has established pecu-liarly for itself ; more properly called "municipal" law, to distinguish it from the "law of nature," and from international law. See Bowyer, Mod. Civil Law, 19; Sevier v. Riley, 189.Cal. 170, 244 P. 323, 325.
That division of municipal law which is occu-pied with the exposition and enforcement of civil rights as distinguished from criminal law.
The system of jurisprudence held and administered in the Roman empire, particularly as set forth in the compila-tion of Justinian and his successors,—comprising the In-stitutes, Code, Digest, and Novels, and collectively denom-inated the "Corpus Jurtis Civilis,"—as distinguished from the common law of England and the canon law.
The word "civil," as applied to the laws in force In Louisiana, before the adoption of the Civil Code, is not used in contradistinction to the word "criminal," but must be restricted to the Roman law. It is used in contradistinc-tion to the laws of Er.gland and those of the respective states. Jennison v. Warmack, 5 La. 493.
CIVIL LIABILITY. The amenability to civil ac-tion as distinguished from amenability to criminal prosecution. Com. v. Shimpeno, 160 Pa.Super. 104, 50 A.2d 39, 43. A sum of money assessed either as general, special or liquidated damages, either single, double or treble for violation such as over-charges. Lewis v. Anderson, D.C.Cal., 72 F.Supp, 119, 123.
CIVIL LIST. In English public law. An annual sum granted by parliament, at the commencement of each reign, for the expense of the royal house-hold and establishment, being a provision made for the crown out of the taxes in lieu of its proper patrimony. 2 Steph.Comm. 591; 1 Bl.Comm. 332.
CIVIL NUISANCE. At common law, anything done to hurt or annoyance of lands, tenements, or hereditaments of another. Brownsey v. Gen-eral Printing Ink Corporation, 118 N.J.L. 505, 193 A. 824, 826.
CIVIL OBLIGATION. One which binds in law, and may be enforced in a court of justice. Po-thier, Obl. 173, 191.
CIVIL OFFICE. An office, not merely military in its nature, that pertains to the exercise of the pow-ers or authority of civil government. State ex rel. Landis v. Futch, 122 Fla. 837, 165 So. 907, 909. Requisites are continuity, creation and definition of powers and duties by Constitution or Legisla-ture, or their authority, possession of govern-mental power, and independence unless controlled by superior officers. State ex rel. McIntosh v. Hutchinson, 187 Wash. 61, 59 P.2d 1117, 1118, 105. A.L.R. 1234.
CIVIL OFFICER. See Officer.

CIVIL RESPONSIBILITY. The liability to be called upon to respond to an action at law for an injury caused by a delict or crime, as opposed to criminal responsibility, or liability to be proceeded against in a criminal tribunal.
CIVIL RIGHTS. See Right.
CIVIL SERVICE. This term properly includes all functions under the government, except military functions. In general it is confined to functions in the great administrative departments of state. People v. Cram, 61 N.Y.S. 858, 29 Misc. 359. But in enlarged sense means all service rendered to and paid for by state, nation, or political subdi-visions thereof, except that pertaining to naval or military affairs. Long v. Wells, 186 Ga. 602, 198 S.E. 763, 768.
CIVIL SERVICE REFORM. Substitution of busi-ness principies and methods for spoils system in conduct of civil service, especially in rnatter of appointments. Ward v. Leche, 189 La. 113, 179 So. 52, 55.
CIVIL SIDE. When the same court has juris-diction of both civil and criminal matters, pro-ceedings of the first class are often said to be on the civil side; those of the second, on the criminal side.
CIVIL TOWNSIIIP. A legal subdivision of the county for governmental purposes. Appeal of Trustees of Iowa College, 185 Iowa 434, 170 N.W. 813, 814.
CIVIL YEAR. See Year.
CIVILIAN. One who is skilled or versed in the civil law. A doctor, professor, or student of the civil law. Also a private citizen, as distinguished from such as belong to the army and navy or (in England) the church.
CIVILIS. Lat. Civil, as distinguished from crimi-nal. Civilis actio, a civil action. Bract. fol. 101b.
CIVILISTA. In old English law. A civil lawyer, or civilian. Dyer, 267.
CIVILITER. Civilly. In a person’s civil character or position, or by civil (not criminal) process or procedure. This term is used in distinction or op-position to the word "crimina/iter,"–criminally,– to distinguish civil actions from criminal prose-cutions. 2 East, 104.
CIVILITER MORTUUS. Civilly dead; dead in the view of the law. The condition of one who has lost his civil rights and capacities, and is account-ed dead in law. Rasor v. Rasor, 173 S.C. 365, 175 S.E. 545.
CIVILIZATION.
In Practice
A law; an act of justice, or judgment which renders a criminal process civil; performed by turning an information into an inquest, or the contrary. Wharton.A term which covers several states of society; it is relative, and has no fixed sense, but implies an improved and progressive condition of the peo-ple, living under an organized government. Roche v. Washington, 19 Ind. 56, 81 Am.Dec. 376. It consists not merely in material achievements, in accomplishment and accumulation of wealth, or in advancement in culture, science, and knowledge, but also in doing of equal and exact justice. Stig-litz v. Schardien, 239 Ky. 799, 40 S.W.2d 315, 321.
CIVIS. Lat. In the Roman law. A citizen; as distinguished from incola, (an inhabitant;) origin or birth constituting the former, domicile the latter. Code, 10, 40, 7. And see U. S. v. Rhodes, 27 Fed.Cas. 788.
CIVITAS. Lat. In the Roman law. Any body of people living under the same laws; a state. Jus civitatis, the law of a state; civil law. Inst. 1, 2, 1, 2. Civitates fcederatce, towns in alliance with Rome, and considered to be free. Butl.Hor.Jur. 29.
Citizenship; one of the three status, conditions, or qualifications of persons. Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 131.
A term in the Anglo-Saxon land books, common-ly applied to Worcester, Canterbury and other such places, which are both bishop’s sees and the head places of large districts. Maitland, Domes-day and Beyond 183. See 17 L.Q.R. 274. Oxford Dict. s. v. City.
See City.
CLAIM, n. A broad, comprehensive word, Wheel-er v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, 211 Minn. 474, 1 N.W.2d 593, 596.
CLAIM, v. To demand as one’s own; to assert, Hill v. Henry, 66 N.J.Eq. 150, 57 Ati. 555. To state; to urge; to insist.
It may embrace or apply to a call, In re Heim’s Estate, 3 N.Y.S.2d 134, 138, 166 Misc. 931; a demand, Moulding-Brownell Corporation v. E. C. Delfosse Const. Co., 291 Ill. App. 343, 9 N.E.2d 459, 461, a pretense; a right or title, Orenberg v. Thecker, 143 F.2d 375, 377, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 149; Lawrence v. Miller, 2 N.Y. 245, 254; an account, In re Stratman’s Estate, 231 Iowa 480, 1 N.W.2d 636, 642; an action on account, Coleman v. Kansas City, 351 Mo. 254, 173 S.W.2d 572, 576; an assertion, Ritter v. Albuquerque Gas & Electric Co., 47 N.M. 329, 142 P.2d 919, 922; both the principal amount of judgment and interest thereon, Powell v. Link, C.C.A.Va., 114 F.2d 550, 554; cause of suit or cause of actlon, Jacobson v. Mutual Ben. Health & Ac-cident Ass’n, 73 N.D. 108, 11 N.W.2d 442, 446; challenge of property or ownership of a thing which is wrongfully with-heid, Douglas v. Beasley, 40 Ala. 147; Prigg v. Pennsyl-vania, 16 Pet. 615, 10 L.Ed. 1060; challenge of something as right, Uintah State Bank v. Ajax, 77 Utah, 455, 297 P. 434, 438. Claims ex delicto as well as ex contractu, Wil-liams v. Williams, 217 Ind. 581, 29 N.E.2d 557, 558. Debt, Tanner v. Best’s Estate, 40 Cal.App.2d 442, 104 P.2d 1084, 1087. But not all valid "claims" are "debts," State Rank-ing Co. v. Hinton, 178 Ga. 68, 172 S.E. 42, 47, 91 A.L.R. 596; existing right, Mellus v. Potter, 91 Cal.App. 700, 267 P. 563, 564; judgment, Jennings v. Loucks, 297 N.Y.S. 893, 896, 163 Misc. 791; legal capability to require a positive or negative act of another person, Kocourek, Jural Relations, 2d Ed., 7; legal claim, right. In re Heinemann’s Will, 201 Wls. 484, 230 N.W. 698, 700; means by or through which claimant obtalns possession or enjoyment of privilege or thing, Lawrence v. Miller, 2 N.Y. 245, 254; valid claim,

Tennessee Consol. Coal Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.6, 117 F.2d 452, 454.
In patent law, specification by applicant for patent of particular things in which he insists his invention is novel and. patentable; the clause in application in which ap-plicant defines precisely what his invention is. Westing-house Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Metropolitan Electric Mfg. Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 290 F. 661, 664.
Under Compensation Acts, a claim for which an amount of compensation may be deducible. Texas Employers Ins. Ass’n v. Booth, Tex.Civ.App., 113 S.W.2d 231, 241.
A demand for compensation, Georgia Casualty Co. v. Ward, Tex.Civ.App., 220 S.W. 380, 381; or for payment of medical expenses, Schmldt v. City of Lincoln, 137 Neb. 546, 290 N.W. 250, 253; A notice that claimant is claim-ing compensation and benefits, Kaplan v. Kaplan Knitting Milis, 248 N.Y. 10, 161 N.E. 204, 206; A provision that no claim for compensation shall be assignable before payment, covers both claims and awards. Pacific Electric R. Co. v. Commonwealth Bonding & Casualty Ins. Co., 55 Cal.App. 704, 204 P. 262, 263.
Under land laws, tract of land taken up by a preemp-tioner or other settler (and also his possession of it). Railroad Co. v. Abink, 14 Neb. 95, 15 N.W. 317.
Under mechanic’s Hen law of some states, a demand put on record by a mechanie or material-man against a build-ing for work or material contributed to its erection.
Under statute authorizing the courts to order a Bill of particulars of the "claim" of either party, "claim" is co-extensive with "case," and embraces all causes of action and all grounds of defenle, the pleas of both parties, and pleas in confession and avoidance, no less than complaints and counter-claims. Orvis v. Jennings, 6 Daly (N.Y.) 446.
When applied to estate of decedent, asserted but unad-judicated obligation, In re Franks’ Estate, 277 N.Y.S. 573, 154 Mlsc. 472; debt or demand of a pecuniary nature, Tinkham v. Tinkham, 112 Ind.App. 532, 45 N.E.2d 357, 360; debts already due and unmatured debts, Roth v. Ravich, 111 Conn. 649, 151 A. 179, 180, 74 A.L.R. 364.
Within statute concerning presentation of false claim to political unit or officer, one which upon its lace purports to be charge for which county would be Hable. State ex rel. Welling v. Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 87 Utah 416, 49 P.2d 950, 952.
Within World War Veterans’ Act any physical writing which furnishes the desired information, Cable v. United States, C.C.A.I11., 104 F.2d 541, 545; assertion of a present claim demand, Werner v. United States, C.C.A.N.Y., 86 F. 2d 113; Cannon v. United States, D.C.Pa., 45 F.Supp. 106, 108.
An adverse claim is one set up by a stranger to goods upon which the sheriff has levied an execu-tion or attachment. It is also applied to claims to real property.
For "Counter-claim" and "False Claim," and "False or Fraudulent Claim," see those titles.
CLAIM ACCRUED. Damage accrued. Megerell v. State, Ct.C1., 46 N.Y.S.2d 685, 688; Edlux Const. Corporation v. State, 300 N.Y.S. 509, 511, 252 App. Div. 373.
CLAIM BOND. A bond primarily in the nature of a forthcoming bond. Liability can be based thereon when the court adjudges the failure of the claimant in trial of right of property to estab-lish his right to it. Sanders v. Farrier, Tex.Civ. App., 271 S.W. 293, 298.
CLAIM JUMPING. The location on ground, know-ing it to be excess ground, within the staked boundaries of another mining claim initiated prior thereto, because law governing manner of mak-ing location had not been complied with, so that location covers the workings of the prior locators. Nelson v. Smith, 42 Nev. 302, 176 P. 261, 265.
CLAIM PROPERTY BOND. A bond filed by a de-fendant in cases of replevin, and of execution to procure return of goods. Snyder v. Frankenfield, 4 Pa.Dist.R. 767; Weaver v. Lawrence, 1 Dall. 156, 1 L.Ed. 79; 1 Dall.U.S. (4th Ed. by Brightly) 156, 157, note CLAIM AND DELIVERY. Action at law for re- covery of specific personal chattels wrongfully taken and detained, with damages which the tak-ing or detention has caused; a modification of common-law action of replevin. Railroad Co. v. Gila County, 8 Ariz. 292, 71 P. 913; Farmers & De-positors Bank v. Taylor, 290 Ky. 774, 162 S.W.2d 764, 765.
CLAIM IN EQUITY. In English practice. In sim-ple cases, the summary proceeding by claim was sometimes adopted. This summary practice was created by orders 22d April, 1850. See Smith, Ch. Pr. 664. By Consolid.Ord.1860, viii, r. 4, claims were abolished. Wharton.
CLAIM OF COGNIZANCE OR OF CONUSANCE. An intervention by a third person, claiming juris-diction or demanding judicature in cause, which plaintiff has commenced out of the claimant’s court. Now obsolete. 2 Wils. 409; 2 Bl.Comm. 350, note; 3 Bl.Comm. 298.
CLAIM OF LIBERTY. In English practice. A suit or petition to the queen, in the court of ex-chequer, to have liberties and franchises con-firmed there by the attorney general.
CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP, RIGHT AND TITLE. As regards adverse possession, claim of land as one’s own to hold it for oneself. Peters v. Gil-lund, Tex.Civ.App., 186 S.W.2d 1019, 1020. Claim of right, claim of title and claim of ownership are synonymous. Ewing v. Tanner, 193 S.E. 243, 247, 184 Ga. 773; City of Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 273 P. 908, 911. Claimant’s intention to claim in hostility to real owner, Bowden-Gazzam Co. v. Hogan, 22 Wash.2d 27, 154 P.2d 285, 289, 290. Color of title and claim of title are synony-mous. Sullivan v. Neel, 105 Mont. 253, 73 P.2d 206, 208; Walton v. Sikes, 165 Ga. 422, 141 S.E. 188, 190. Intention of disseisor to appropriate and use land as his own, irrespective of any sem-blance of color, or right, or title. Marion Inv. Co. v. Virginia Lincoln Furniture Corporation, 171 Va. 170, 198 S.E. 508, 513, 118 A.L.R. 939.
CLAIMANT. As used in escheat proceeding, per-sons interested in the estate as heirs. In re Peers’ Estate, 234 Iowa 403, 12 N.W.2d -894, 895. As used in statute regarding processing tax refunds, one from whom tax has been collected. Upchurch Packing Co. v. United States, D.C.Ga., 53 F.Supp. 791, 793. One who claims or asserts a right, de-mand or claim though sometimes "claimant" has a more restricted meaning. Weisgerber v. Work-men’s Compensation Bureau, 70 N.D. 165, 292 N.W. 627, 630, 128 A.L.R. 1482.

In admiralty practice. A person who lays claim to property seized on a libel in rem, and is au-thorized and admitted to defend the action. ‘The Conqueror, 17 S.Ct. 510, 166 U.S. 110, 41 L.Ed. 937; Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar, Bentzon, Claimant v. Boyle, 9 Cranch, 191, 3 L.Ed. 701.
CLAIMANT ADJUSTER. One who will obtain, secure, enforce, or establish a right, claim, or de-mand for an individual against an insurance company. Wilkey v. State ex rel. Smith, 244 Ala. 568, 14 So.2d 536, 543.
CLAM. Lat. In the civil law. Covertly; secretly.
CLAM FACTUM ID VIDETUR ESSE, QUOD QUISQUE, QUUM CONTROVERSIAM HABER-ET, HABITURUMVE SE PUTARET, FECIT. That appears to be covertly (secretly) done, which anyone did, when he had a legal dispute, or thought he would have one. Adams Gloss.
CLAM, VI, AUT PRECARIO. A technical phrase of the Roman law, meaning by force, stealth, or importunity.
CLAM DELINQUENTES MAGIS PUNIUNTUR QUAM PALAM. 8 Coke, 127. Those sinning sec-retly are punished more severely than those sin-ning openly.
CLAMEA ADMITTENDA IN ITINERE PER AT-TORNATUM. An ancient writ by which the king commanded the justices in eyre to admit the claim by attorney of a person who was in the royal serv-ice, and could not appear in person. Reg.Orig. 19.
CLAMOR. In old English law. A claim or com-plaint; an outcry; clamor.
In the civil law. A claimant. A debt; any-thing claimed from another. A proclamation; an accusation. Du Cange.
CLANDESTINE. Secret; hidden; concealed. The "clandestine importation" of goods is a term used in English statutes as equivalent to "smug-gling." Keck v. U. S., 19 S.Ct. 254, 172 U.S. 434, 43 L.Ed. 505. A clandestine marriage is (legally) one contracted without observing the conditions precedent prescribed by law, such as publication of bans, procuring a license, or the like. Hay v. State, 68 Fla. 458, 67 So. 107.
CLAP. Vulgar name for gonorrhea. Sally v. Brown, 220 Ky. 576, 295 S.W. 890, 891.
CLARE CONSTAT. (It clearly appears.) In Scotch law. The name of a precept for giving sei-sin of lands to an heir; so called from its initial words. Ersk.Inst. 3, 8, 71.
CLAREMETHEN. In old Scotch law. The war-ranty of stolen cattle or goods; the law regulat-ing such warranty. Skene.
CLARENDON, ASSIZE OF. A statute (1166) the principal feature of which was an improvement of judicial procedure in the case of criminals. It was a part of the same scheme of reform as the Constitution of Clarendon. See James C. Carter, The Law, etc., 65.
CLARENDON, CONSTITUTIONS OF. Certain statutes made in the reign of Henry II. of Eng-land, at a parliament held at Clarendon, (A. D. 1164,) by which the king checked the power of the pope and his clergy, and greatly narrowed the exemption they claimed from secular jurisdic-tion. 4 Bl.Comm. 422; Fitz Stephen 27; 2 Lin-gard 59; 1 Hume 382; Wilkins 321; 1 Poll. & M. 430-440, 461; 2 id. 196.
CLARIFICATIO. Lat. In old Scotch law. A making clear; the purging or clearing (clenging) of an assise. Skene.
CLASS. The order or rank according to which persons or things are arranged or assorted.
Also a body of persons uncertain in number, Weaver v. Liberty Trust Co., 183 A. 544, 548, 170 Md. 212; a group of persons, things, qualities, or activities, having common characteristics or at-tributes. Inter-County Rural Electric Co-op. Cor-poration v. Reeves, 294 Ky. 458, 171 S.W.2d 978, 982. Also grade, Commonwealth ex rel. Margiotti v. Sutton, 327 Pa. 337, 193 A. 250, 252. Also same descriptive properties. Cheek-Neal Coffee Co. v. Hal Diek Mf g. Co., Cust. & Pat.App., 40 F.2d 106, 107.
CLASS ACTION. An action brought on behalf of other persons similarly situated. Mitchell v. Wright, D.C.Ala., 62 F.Supp. 580, 582; Calabrese v. Chiumento, D.C.N.J., 3 F.R.D. 435, 437.
CLASS GIFT. A gift of aggregate sum to body of persons, uncertain in number at time thereof, to be ascertained at future time, Hepburn v. Win-throp, 83 F.2d 566, 570, 65 App.D.C. 309, 105 A.L.R. 310.
CLASS LEGISLATION. Legislation limited in op-eration to certain persons or classes of persons, natural or artificial, or to certain districts of ter-ritory or state, Vardaman v. McBee, 198 Miss. 251, 21 So.2d 661, 664. Legislation operating upon portion of particular class of persons or things. Shaw v. Fox, 246 Ky. 342, 55 S.W.2d 11.
The term is applied to enactments which divide the people or subjects of legislation into classes, with reference either to the grant of privileges or the imposition of burdens, upon an arbitrary, unjust, or invidious principie, or which make ar-bitrary discriminations between those persons or things coming within the same class. Leuthold v. Brandjord, 100 Mont. 96, 47 P.2d 41, 45; People v. Marcello, Mag.Ct.N.Y., 25 N.Y.S.2d 533, 537, 538, 539.
CLASS or REPRESENTATIVE ACTION. One in which one or more members of a class sue either for themselves or for themselves and other mem-bers of a class. Huester v. Gilmour, D.C.Pa., 13 F. Supp. 630, 631; City of Dallas v. Armour & Co., Tex.Civ.App., 216 S.W. 222, 224. The plaintiff in a representative action bef ore judgment is, as a rule, dominas litis, (q. v.,) and may discontinue or compromise the action as he pleases. Sweet.
CLASS REPRESENTATION. Where members of class sue or are sued on behalf of other members

judgment is conclusive for and against those mem-bers of class thus represented, in absence of fraud or collusion. Barnes v. Fort, 181 S.W.2d 881, 884, 181 Tenn. 522; Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Milis, 43 Ariz. 379, 31 P.2d 971, 982.
CLASS SUIT. See Class or Representative Ac-tion.
CLASSIARIUS. A seaman or soldier serving at sea.
CLASSICI. In the Roman law. Persons em-ployed in servile duties on board oí* vessels. Cod. 11, 12.
CLASSIFICATION. A grouping into classes. Davison v. Parke Austin & Lipscomb, 19 N.Y.S.2d 117, 121, 173 Misc. 782.
It is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particu-lars and differ from other things in those particulars. Southern Package Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 164 So. 45, 47, 174 Miss. 212; Anderson v. Board of Public Instruction of Hillsborough County, 102 Fla. 695, 136 So. 334. The putting together of like subjects or facts under common designation, Tuttle v. Board of Education of Salt Lake City, 77 Utah, 270, 294 P. 294, 299.
The word may have two meanings, one primarily signi-fying a division requlred by statutes, fundamental and sub-stantial, and the other secondary, signifying an arrange-ment or enumeration adopted for convenience only. In re Wichlta Falls & Southern Ry. Co., D.C.Tex., 30 F.Supp. 750, 751.
In the practice of the English chancery division, where an administration action, It appears to the judge (or chief clerk) that any of the parties form a class having the same interest, he may require them to be represented by one solicitor, to prevent expense of each attending by separate sollcitors. In practice the terco is also applied to the directions given by the chief clerk as to which of the parties are to attend on each of the accounts and in-quiries directed by the judgment. Sweet.
CLASSIFICATION OF RISKS. Term in fire in-surance to the nature and situation of the articles insured, and in accident insurance to the occupa-tion of the applicant. Hopkins v. Connecticut Gen-eral Life Ins. Co., 225 N.Y. 76, 121 N.E. 465, 467.
CLASSIFIED. Grouped in classes. People v. Johnson, 42 Cal.App.2d Supp. 827, 109 P.2d 770, 774.,
CLASSIFIED CIVIL SERVICE. The primary meaning is that there be classification, while sec-ondary meaning is mere arrangement or enumera-tion in schedule of titles of positions. Matter of Merriweather v. Roberts, 274 N.Y.S. 188, 190, 152 Misc. 57.
CLASSIFY. Group. Breslav v. New York & Queens Electric Light & Power Co., 291 N.Y.S. 932, 935, 249 App.Div. 181; Esquire, Inc., v. Walker, D.C.D.C., 55 F.Supp. 1015, 1021.
CLAUSE. A single paragraph or subdivision of a legal document, such as a contract, deed, will, con-stitution, or statute. Sometimes a sentence or part of a sentence. Bee Line Transp. Co. v. Connecti-cut Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, C.C.A.N.Y., 76 F.2d 759, 760.
CLAUSE IRRITANT. In Scotch law. By this clause, in a deed or settlement, the acts or deedsof a tenant for Life or other proprietor, contrary to the condifions of his right, become null and void; and by the "resolutive" clause such right becomes resolved and extinguished. Bell.

CLAUSE POTESTATIVE. In French law. The name given to the clause whereby one party to a contract reserves to himself the right to annul it.
CLAUSE ROLLS. In English law. Rolls which contain all such matters of record as were commit-ted to close writs; these rolls are preserved in the Tower.
CLAUSULA. A clause; a sentence or part of a sentence in a written instrument or law.
CLAUSULA DEROGATIVA. A clause in a will which provides that no will subsequently made is to be valid. The latter would still be valid, but there would be ground for suspecting undue in-fluence. Grotius.
CLAUSULA GENERALIS DE RESIDUO NON EA COMPLECTITUR QU’E NON EJUSDEM SINT GENERIS CUM IIS QUZE SPECIATIM DICTA FUERANT. A general clause of remain-der does not embrace those things which are not of the same kind with those which had been spe-cially mentioned. Lofft, Appendix, 419.
CLAUSULA GENERALIS NON REFERTUR AD EXPRESSA. 8 Coke, 154. A general clause does not refer to things expressed.
CLAUSULA QUIE ABROGATIONEM EXCLUDIT AB INITIO NON VALET. A clause [in a law] which precludes its abrogation is void from the beginning. Bac.Max. 77.
CLAUSULA VEL DISPOSITIO INUTILIS PER PRIESUMPTIONEM REMOTAM, VEL CAUSAM EX POST FACTO NON FULCITUR. A useless clause or disposition [one which expresses no more than the law by intendment would have sup-plied] is not supported by a remote presumption, [or foreign intendment of some purpose, in re-gard whereof it might be material,] or by a cause arising afterwards, [which may induce an opera-tion of those idle words.] Bac.Max. 82, regula 21.
CLAUSULZE INCONSUETAE SEMPER INDUC-UNT SUSPICIONEM. Unusual clauses [in an in-strument] always induce suspicion. 3 Coke, 81.
CLAUSUM. Lat. Close, closed up, sealed. In-closed, as a parcel of land.
In old English law. Close. Closed.
A writ was either clausum (close) or apertum (open). Grants were said to be by literce patentce (open grant) or literce clausce (close grant) ; 2 Bla.Comm. 346. Occurring in the phrase quare clausum fregit (Rucker v. McNeely, 4 Blackf. [Ind.] 181), it denotes in this sense only realty in which the plaintiff has some exclusive interest, whether for a limited or unlimited time or for special or for general purposes; 1 Chit.Pl. 174; Austin v. Sawyer, 9 Cow. (N.Y.) 39; 6 East, 606.
CLAUSUM FREGIT. L. Lat. (He broke the close.) In pleading and practice. Technical

words formerly used in certain actions of tres-pass, and still retained in the phrase quare claus-um fregit (q. v.).
CLAUSUM PASCHIFE. In English law. The mor-row of the utas, or eight days of Easter; the end of Easter; the Sunday after Easter-day. 2 Inst. 157.
CLAUSURA. In old English law. An inclosure. Clausura heyce, the inclosure of a hedge. Cowell.
CLAVES CURIAE. The keys of the court. They were the officers of the Scotch courts, such as clerk, doomster, and serjeant. Burrill.
CLAVES INSULTE. In Manx law. The keys of the Island of Man, or twelve persons to whom all ambiguous and weighty causes are referred.
CLAVIA. In old English law. A club or mace; tenure per serjeantiam clavice, by the serjeanty of the club or mace. Cowell.
CLAVIGERATUS. A treasurer of a church. CLAWA. A close, or small inclosure. Cowell.
CLEAN. Irreproachable; innocent of fraud or wrongdoing; free from defect in form or sub-stance; free from exceptions or reservations. It is a very elastic adjective, however, and is particular-ly dependent upon context. Clampitt v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. of Texas, Tex.Civ.App., 185 S.W. 342, 344.
CLEAN BILL OF HEALTH. One certifying that no contagious or infectious disease exists, or certi-fying as to healthy conditions generally without exception or reservation.
CLEAN BILL OF LADING. One without excep-tion or reservation as to the place or manner of stowage of the goods, and importing that the goods are to be (or have been) safely and prop-erly stowed under deck. The Delaware, 14 Wall. 596, 20 L.Ed. 779; The St. Johns N. F., C.C.A. N.Y., 272 F. 673, 674. One which contains nothing in the margin qualifying the words in the bill of lading itself. The Isla de Panay, C.C.A.N.Y., 292 F. 723, 730; Thomas Roberts & Co. v. Calmar S. S. Corp., D.C.Pa., 59 F.Supp. 203, 209.
CLEAN HANDS. Equitable relief may be denied on ground of deceit or impurity of motive, O’Brien v. Hamill, 264 N.Y.S. 557, 147 Misc. 709; fraud or wilful misconduct, Eresch v. Braecklein, C.C.A. Kan., 133 F.2d 12, 14; Margolis v. Burke, Sup., 53 N.Y.S.2d 157, 161, 162; unjust and unfair conduct, Dutch Maid Bakeries v. Schleicher, 58 Wyo. 374, 131 P.2d 630, 634; unlawful or inequitable conduct, Rhodes v. Miller, 179 So. 430, 432, 189 La. 288; Lodati v. Lodati, 52 N.Y.S.2d 119, 120, 268 App. Div. 1003; wrongdoing, Dales v. Muir, 351 Pa. 187, 40 A.2d 476, 477.
The maxim is confined to misconduct in relation to or connected with the matter in litigation. Teuscher v. Grogg, 136 Okl. 129, 276 P. 753, 760, 66 A.L.R. 143; Hart-man v. Cohn, 350 Pa. 41, 38 A.2d 22, 25. It is inapplicable where to withhold relief would offend public morais more than to grant relief, Furman v. Furman, 34 N.Y.S.2d 699

704, 178 Misc. 582; and where result will be to leave prop-erty in hands of one having no claim thereto or require further litigation, Harrell v. Allen, 183 Va. 722, 33 S.E.2d 222, 226. The act must prejudicially affect defendant, Wiley v. Wiley, 59 Cal.App.2d 840, 139 P.2d 950, 951. But it has been held that application of maxim is not limited to a case where the iniquitous action is one of which the mov-ing party may personally complain. Leo Feist, Inc. v. Young, D.C.Wis., 46 F.Supp. 622, 628.
CLEAN OIL. Oil which has 3 per cent. or less by volume of water and sediment. Alamitos Land Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 3 Ca1.2d 396, 44 P.2d 573, 575.
CLEAN WATER. Water that is not filthy or pol-luted. U. S. v. Durst, D.C.W.Va., 59 F.Supp. 891, 894.
CLEAR. Obvious; beyond reasonable doubt; per-spicuous ; plain.
Free from all limitation, qualification, question, or short-coming. Condorodis v. Kling, 33 Ohio App. 452, 169 N.E. 836, 838. Ex parte Williams, 128 Tex.Cr.R. 148, 79 S.W.2d 325, 326; Free from incumbrance, obstruction, burden, limitation, etc., Frank v. Murphy, 64 Ohio App. 501, 29 N.E. 2d 41, 43; Pillín, evident, free from doubt or conjecture, also unincumbered, free from deductions or drawbacks, Ketch v. Smith, 131 Okl, 263, 268 P. 715, 717. That which can be seen without dimness, Bremner v. Marc Eidlitz & Son, 118 Conn. 666, 174 A. 172, 174.
CLEAR AND CONVINCING PROOF. Generally, this phrase and its numerous variations mean proof beyond a reasonable, i. e., a well-founded doubt. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. City of San Antonio, Tex., D.C.Tex., 4 F.Supp. 570, 573. Some cases give a less rigcrous, but somewhat uncertain, meaning, viz., more than a preponder-ante but less than is required in a criminal case. O’Briant v. Lee, 212 N.C. 793, 195 S.E. 15, 20.
A higher degree of proof than weight of the evidence, Snyderwine v. McGrath, 343 Pa. 245, 22 A.2d 644, 647. In-dependent facts and circumstances which are, in opinion of court and jury, strong, Wright v. Austin, Tex.Civ.App., 175 S.W.2d 281, 284; it shall be found that witnesses are credible, that they distinctly remember facts to which they testify, that they narrate detalls exactly, and that their statements are true, McDonnell v. General News Bureau, C.C.A.Pa., 93 F.2d 898, 901. The degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the court a firm belief or conviction. In re Chappell, Ohio App., 33 N.E.2d 393, 397. Evidence that convinced a presumably unblased and unprejudiced jury, Pegues v. Dilworth, 134 Tex. 169, 132 S.W.2d 582, 586. Proof sufficient to convince ordinarily prudent minded people. Rowland v. Holt, 253 Ky. 718, 70 S.W.2d 5, 9. The proof need not be conclusive. Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Ca1.2d 412, 159 P.2d 958, 976.
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER. Immediately serious violence is expected or is advocated or past conduct furnishes reason to believe such advocacy is contemplated. United States v. Korner, D.C.Cal., 56 F.Supp. 242, 248.
CLEAR ANNUAL VALUE. The net yearly value to the possessor of the property, over and aboye taxes, interest on mortgages, and other charges and deductions. Shelton v. Campbell, 109 Tenn. 690, 72 S.W. 112.
CLEAR ANNUITY. The devise of an annuity "clear" means an annuity free from taxes (Hodg-worth v. Crawley, 2 Atk. 376) or free or clear of legacy or inheritance taxes. In re Bispham’s Es-tate, 24 Wkly.Notes Cas. (Pa.) 79.

CLEAR CHANCE. A chance is a clear chance if exercise of vigilante would have discovered help-less peril and avoided the injury. Leinbach v. Pickwick Greyhound Lines, 138 Kan. 50, 23 P.2d 449, 456, 92 A.L.R. 1.
CLEAR DAYS. If a certain number of clear days be given for the doing of any act, the time is to be reckoned exclusively, as well of the first day as the last. Hodgins v. Hancock, 14 Mees. & W. 120; State v. Marvin, 12 Iowa 502.
CLEAR EVIDENCE OR PROOF. Evidente which is positive, precise and explicit, which tends di-rectly to establish the point to which it is adduced and is sufficient to make out a prima facie case. Reynolds v. Blaisdell, 23 R.I. 16, 49 A. 42.
It necessarily means a clear preponderance. It may mean no more than a fair preponderance of proof but may be construed as requiring a higher degree of proof. It may convey the idea, under emphasis, of certainty. It may be understood as meaning beyond doubt. The expres-sion ís equivoca] and mischievous. Aubin v. Duluth St. Ry. Co., 169 Minn. 342, 211 N.W. 580, 583.
CLEAR LEGAL RIGHT. A right inferable as a matter of law from uncontroverted facts. Fed-eral Land Bank of Springfield v. Pickard, 9 N.Y.S. 2d 696, 707, 169 Misc. 753.
CLEAR MARKET PRICE. Fair market price. In re Spitly’s Estate, 124 Cal.App. 642, 13 P.2d 385, 386.
CLEAR MARKET VALUE. With regard to in-heritance tax, highest price obtainable. In re Nicklas’ Estate, 132 N.J.L. 450, 41 A.2d 122, 124; net value, Ilamlen v. Martin, 128 N.J.Eq. 393, 16 A.2d 457, 459; sum which property would bring on a fair sale by a willing seller not obliged to sell to a willing buyer not obliged to buy, or fair mar-ket value, or cash value, In re Ryerson’s Estate, 239 Wis. 120.
CLEAR RESIDUE. Addition of income from funds, used to pay decedent’s debts, administra-tion expenses, and general legacies, to residue of estate. In re Foster’s Will, 256 N.Y.S. 383, 385, 143 Misc. 191.
CLEAR TITLE. Good title, Clark v. Ray, Tex. Civ.App., 96 S.W.2d 808, 813; marketable title, Gantt v. Harper, 82 Mont. 393, 267 P. 296, 298; contra, Frank v. Murphy, 64 Ohio App. 501, 29 N.E. 2d 41, 43; one free from incumbrance, obstruction, burden, or limitation. Frank v. Murphy, 64 Ohio App. 501, 29 N.E.2d 41, 43.
For a clear deed, see Rohr v. Kindt, 3 Watts & S. (Pa.) 563, 39 Am.Dec. 53; clear of expense; 2 Ves. & B. 341; olear of assessments; Peart v. Phipps, 4 Yeates (Pa.) 386; olear bill of lading; William Zoller Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 272 Pa. 386, 116 A. 359, 362. See, also, Clean Bill of Lading.
CLEAR TITLE OF RECORD. Freedom from ap-parent defects, grave doubts, and litigious uncer-tainties; such title as a reasonably prudent per-son, with full knowledge, would accept. Tull v. Milligan, 173 Okl. 131, 48 P.2d 835, 842.
CLEAR VALUE. With regard to net value after payment of debts and expenses of administration

Bouse v. Hutzler, 180 Md. 682, 26 A.2d 767, 769, 141 A.L.R. 843; sum which, after deducting amount necessary for payment of such taxes, yielded the amount of the specific legacies where will di-rected that taxes should not be deducted from leg-acies. Bouse v. Hutzler, 180 Md. 682, 26 A.2d 767, 769, 141 A.L.R. 843.
CLEARANCE. In Maritime law. The right of a ship to leave port. The act of clearing or leav-ing port. The certificate issued by the collector of a port evidencing the power of the ship to leave port. Hamburg-American Steam Packet Co. v. U. S., C.C.A.N.Y., 250 F. 747, 759. Worcester, Dict.
In contract for exhibition of motion pictures, the interval of time between conclusion of exhibition in one theater and commencement of exhibition at another theater. Waxmann v. Columbia Pictures Corporation, D.C.Pa., 40 F.Supp. 108, 111.
CLEARANCE CARD. A letter given to an em-ployee by his employer, at the time of his dis-charge or end of service, showing the cause of such discharge or voluntary quittance, the length of time of service, his capacity, and such other facts as would give to those concerned information of his former employment. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Jenkins, 174 III. 398, 51 N.E. 811, 62 L.R.A. 922, 66 Am.St.Rep. 296.
CLEARING. The departure of a vessel from port, after complying with the customs and health laws and like local regulations.
In mercantile law. A method of making ex-changes and settling balances, adopted among banks and bankers.
CLEARING—HOUSE. A device or an association, usually unincorporated, for adjustment and pay-ment of daily balances between banks in a city. Andrew v. Farmers’ & Merchants’ Sav. Bank of Moravia, 215 Iowa 1336, 245 N.W. 226, 229.
CLEARING LOAN. One made to a bond dealer while an issue of bonds are being sold. In re Stone’s Will, 211 Wis. 518, 248 N.W. 446, 447.
CLEARING TITLE. Acts or proceedings neces-sary to render title marketable. Johnston v. Cox, 114 Fla. 243, 154 So. 206.
CLEARINGS. Method of making exchanges and settling balances among banks and bankers. An-drew v. Farmers’ & Merchants’ Sav. Bank of Moravia, 215 Iowa 1336, 245 N.W. 226, 228.
CLEARLY. Visible, unmistakable, in words of no uncertain meaning. Johnson v. Grady County, 50 Okl. 188, 150 P. 497.
Beyond a question or beyond a reasonable doubt, John-son v. Grady County, 50 Okl. 188, 150 P. 497, 502; honestly, straightforwardly, and frankly, Huntington Securities Cor-poration v. Busey, C.C.A.Ohio, 112 F.2d 368, 370; plainly, Huntington Securities Corporation v. Busey, C.C.A.Ohio, 112 F.2d 368, 370; without obscurlty, without obstruction, without entanglement or confusion, without uncertainty. Commonwealth v. Scovern, 292 Pa. 26, 140 A. 611, 614.
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. Findings when based upon substantial error in proceedings or misappli-

cation of law, Kauk v. Anderson, C.C.A.N.D., 137 F.2d 331, 333; or when unsupported by substantial evidence, or contrary to clear weight of evidence or induced by erroneous view of the law. Gasifier Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corporation, C.C.A. Mo., 138 F.2d 197, 199; Smith v. Porter, C.C.A. Ark., 143 F.2d 292, 294.
CLEARLY EXPRESSED IN TITLE. Title must so express subject that lawmakers and people may not be left in doubt as to matters treated. Home Insurance Co. of New York v. Dahmer, 167 Misc. 893, 150 So. 650, 651.
CLEARLY PROVED. Preponderance of the evi-dence. Olson v. Union Oil Co. of California, Cal. App., 25 Cal.App.2d 627, 78 P.2d 446, 447.
Proof sufficlent to satisfy mind of finder of fact., that its weight is such as to cause a reasonable person to accept the fact as established. In re Frihauf, 58 Wyo. 479, 135 P. 2d 427, 433.
CLEARLY REFLECTS THE INCOME. Any meth-od of accounting which clearly refiects a reason-able allowance for depreciation. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C. A.7, 114 F.2d 882, 885.
CLEMENT’S INN. An inn of chancery. See Inns. of Chancery.
CLEMENTINES. In canon law. The collection of decretals or constitutions of Pope Clement V., made by order of John XXII., his successor, who published it in 1317.
CLENGE. In old Scotch law. To clear or acquit of a criminal charge. Literally, to cleanse or clean.
CLEP AND CALL. In old Scotch practice. A solemn form of words prescribed by law, and used in criminal cases, as in pleas of wrong and unlaw.
CLERGY. The whole body of clergymen or minis-ters of religion. Also an abbreviation for "benefit of clergy." See Benefit of Clergy.
Regular clergy. Monks who lived secunclum regulas (ac-cording to the rules) of their respective houses or societies were so denominated in old English Law in contradistinc-tion to the parochial clergy, or "secular" clergy. 1 Chit. Bl. 387, note.
CLERGYABLE. In old English law. Allowing of, or entitled to, the benefit of clergy (privilegium clericale). Used of persons or crimes. 4 Bla. Com. 371. See Benefit of Clergy.
CLERGYMAN. Spiritual representative of church. In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 237 N.W. 589, 591.
CLERICAL. Pertaining to clergymen; or pertain-ing to the °ince or labor of a clerk.
CLERICAL ERROR. Generally, a mistake in writing or copying. 1 L.Raym. 183; Los Angeles Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Corporation v. Lós An-geles County, 22 Ca1.App.2d 418, 71 P.2d 282; Franklin v. State, 240 Ala. 57, 197 So. 58, 59.
It may include error apparent on face of instrument, record, indictment or information, In re Goldberg’s Es-tate, 10 Ca1.2d 709, 76 P.2d 508, 512; error in respect of matters of record, Shotwell v. State, 135 Tex.Cr.R. 366, 120

S.W.2d 97; errors, mistakes, or omissions by clerk, writer, counsel, or judge which are not the result of exercise of judicial function; Pacific Finance Corporation of Cali-fornia v. La Monte, 64 Idaho 438, 133 P.2d 921, 922; W11- son v. City of Fergus Falls, 181 Minn. 329, 232 N.W. 322, 323; failure of clerk to enter order, Keller v. Cleaver, 67 P.2d 131, 133,• 20 Cal.App.2d 364; omIssion in statutory provision, Craig v. State, 164 S.W.2d 1007, 1008, 204 Ark. 798; order fixing tax rate below statutory rate, In re Sagnow’s Estate, 266 N.Y.S. 785, 788, 148 Mlsc. 657; piar-ing of case on calendar without notice, New England Fur-niture & Carpet Co. v. Willcuts, D.C.Minn.. 55 F.2d 983, 987; purported order incongruous and irrelevant to rounding reciteis, Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of California, 14 Ca1.2d 704, 96 P.2d 796, 799; signature by Judge to judgment which does not express judicial desire or intention, Bastajian v. Brown, 19 Ca1.2d 209, 120 P.2d 9, 12.
CLERICAL MISPRISION. Mistake or fraud per-petrated by clerk of court which is susceptible of demonstration by face of record, or a clerical er-ror, which is an error by clerk in transcribing or otherwise apparent on the face of the record. Ballew v. Fowler, 285 Ky. 149, 147 S.W.2d 65, 66. But see Newman v. Ohio Valley Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 221 Ky. 616, 299 S.W. 559, 560.
CLERICAL TONSURE. The having the head shaven, which was formerly peculiar to clerks, or persons in orders, and which the coifs worn by serjeants at law are supposed to have been intro-duced to conceal. 1 B1.Comm. 24, note t; 4 El. Comm. 367.
CLERICALE PRIVILEGIUM. In old English law. The clerical privilege; the privilege or benefit of clergy.
CLERICI DE CANCELLARIA; CLERICI DE CURSU. Clerks of the chancery. See Cursitors.
CLERICI NON PONANTUR IN OFFICIIS. Co. Litt. 96. Clergymen should not be placed in of-fices; i. e., in secular offices. See Lofft, 508.
CLERICI PRiENOTARII. The six clerks in chan-cery. 2 Reeve, Eng.Law, 251.
CLERICO ADMITTENDO. See Admittendo Cleri-
CO.
CLERICO CAPTO PER STATUTUM MERCA-TORUM. A writ for the delivery of a clerk out of prison, who was taken and incarcerated upon the breach of a statute merchant. Reg.Orig. 147.
CLERICO CONVICTO COMMISSO GAOLJE IN DEFECTU ORDINARII DELIBERANDO. An an-cient writ, that lay for the delivery to his ordinary of a clerk convicted of felony, where the ordinary did not challenge him according to the privilege of clerks. Reg.Orig. 69.
CLERICO INFRA SACROS ORDINES CONSTI-TUTO, NON ELIGENDO IN OFFICIUM. A writ directed to those who had thrust a bailiwick or other office upon one in holy orders, charging them to release him. Reg.Orig. 143.
CLERICUS. In old English law. A clerk or priest; a person in holy orders; a secular priest; a clerk of a court. An officer of the royal house-hold, having charge of the receipt and payment of

moneys, etc. Fleta enumerates several of them, with their appropriate duties; as ciericus coquince, clerk of the kitchen; clericus panetr’ et butelr’, clerk of the pantry and buttery. Lib. 2, cc. 18, 19. In Roman law. A minister of religion in the Christian church; an ecclesiastic or priest. Cod. 1, 3; Nov. 3, 123, 137. A general term, including bishops, priests, deacons, and others of inferior order. Brissonius. Also of the amanuenses of the judges or courts of the king. Du Cange.
CLERICUS ET AGRICOLA ET MERCATOR, TEMPORE BELLI, UT ORET, COLAT, ET COM-MUTET, PACE FRUUNTUR. 2 Inst. 58. Clergy-men, husbandmen, and merchants, in order that they may preach, cultivate, and trade, enjoy peace in time of war.
CLERICUS MERCATI. In old English law. Clerk of the market. 2 Inst. 543.
CLERICUS NON CONNUMERETL’R IN DUABUS ECCLESIIS 1 Rolle. A clergyman should not be appointed to two churches.
CLERICUS PAROCHIALIS. In old English law. A parish clerk.
CLERIGOS. In Spanish law. Clergy; men cho-sen for the service of God. White, New Recop. b. 1, tit. 5, ch. 4.
CLERK. One who sells goods, waits on customers, or engages in clerical work such as bookkeeping, copying, transcribing, letter writing, tabulating, etc., a stenographer, etc., Appeal of Walker, 294 Pa. 385, 144 A. 288, 289; In re Goldman Stores, D.C.La., 3 F.Supp. 936, 937.
In New England, used to designate a corporation official who performs some of the duties of a secretary. As used in statute service on clerk of corporation, some general Mil-cer of the corporation, Baker v. New York Cent. R. Co., 16 N.Y.S.2d 78, 79, 258 App.Div. 854.
A person employed in a public office, or as an officer of a court, whose duty is to keep records or accounts. In re Allen, N.J.Sup., 95 A. 215, 216; Crawford v. Roloson, 254 Mass. 163, 149 N.E. 707, 709. See Clerk of Court.
A person serving a practicing solicitor under binding arti-cies in England, for the purpose of being admitted to prac-tice as a solicitor. Under exemption provision of Civil Service Law a rrivate or confldential clerk of elective judicial officer. Neary v. O’Connor, 18 N.Y.S.2d 634, 637, 173 Misc. 696.
A person in holy orders; a clergyman; an in-dividual attached to the ecclesiastical state, and who has the clerical tonsure. See 4 Bl.Comm. 366, 367.
CLERK OF ARRAIGNS. In English law. An as-sistant to the clerk of assise. His duties are in the crown court on circuit.
CLERK OF ASSISE. In English law. Officers who officiate as associates on the circuits. They record all judicial proceedings done by the judges on the circuit.
CLERK OF COURT. An officer of a court of jus« tice who has charge of the clerical part of its busi-ness, who keeps its records and seal, issues proc-

ess, enters judgments and orders, gives certified copies from the records, etc. Ross v. Heathcock, 57 Wis. 89, 15 N.W. 9; Gordon v. State, 2 Tex. App. 154. An assistant whose principal duty is tu make correct memorial of court’s orders and directions. People’s Ditch Co. v. Foothill Irr. Dist., 123 Cal.App. 251, 11 P.2d 86, 88.
CLERK OF ENROLLMENTS. In English law. The former chief officer of the English enrollment office, (q. v.) He now forms part of the staff of the central office.
CLERK OF THE CROWN IN CHANCERY. See Crown Office in Chancery.
CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. An officer of the English house of commons appointed by the crown. He makes entries, remembrances, and journals of the things done and passed in the house. He signs all orders of the house, indorses the bilis sent or returned to the lords, and reads whatever is required to be read in the house. He has the custody of all records and other docu-ments. May, Parl.Pr. 236.
CLERK OF THE MARKET. The overseer or superintendent of a public market. In old English law, he was a quasi judicial officer, having power to settle controversies arising in the market Be-tween persons dealing there. Called "clericus mercati." 4 Bl.Comm. 275.
CLERK OF THE PARLIAMENTS. One of the chief officers of the house of lords. He is appoint-ed by the crown, by letters patent. On entering office he makes a declaration to make true entries and records of the things done and passed in the parliaments, and to keep secret all such matters as shall be treated therein. May, Parl.Pr. 238.
CLERK OF THE PEACE. In English law. An of-ficer whose duties are to officiate at sessions of the peace, to prepare indictments, and to record the proceedings of the justices, and to perform a num-ber of special duties in connection with the affairs of the county.
CLERK OF THE PETTY BAG. See Petty Bag Office.
CLERK OF THE PRIVY SEAL. These officers at-tend the lord privy seal, or, in absence os -Lile lord privy seal, the principal secretary of state. Their duty is to write and make out all things that are sent by warrant from the signet to the privy seal, and which are to be passed to the great seal; and also to make out privy seals (as they are termed) upon any special occasion of his majesty’s affairs. Cowell.
CLERK OF THE SIGNET. An officer, in Eng-land, whose duty it is to attend on the king’s prin-cipal secretary, who has the custody of the privy signet, as well for the purpose of sealing his maj-esty’s private letters, as also grants which pass his majesty’s hand by bill signed. Cowell.
CLERK OF THE TABLE. An official of the Brit-ish House of Commons who advises the speaker on all questions of orderCLERKS OF INDICTMENTS. Officers attached to the central criminal court in England, and to each circuit. They prepare and settle indictments against offenders, and assist the clerk of arraigns.
CLERKS OF RECORDS AND WRITS. Officers formerly attached to the English court of chan-cery, whose duties consisted principally in sealing bilis of complaint and writs of execution, filing af-fidavits, etc. By the judicature (officers’) act, 1879, they have been transferred to the central office of the supreme court, under the title of "Masters of the Supreme Court," and the office has been abolished. Sweet.
CLERKS OF SEATS. In the principal registry of the probate division of the English high court, they discharge the duty of preparing and passing the grants of probate and letters of administra• tion, take bonds from administrators, receive caveats against a grant being made, etc. Sweet.
CLERKSHIP. The period which must be spent by a law-student in the office of a practising attor-ney before admission to the bar. 1 Tidd Pr. 61, et seq. In re Dunn, 43 N.J.Law, 359, 39 Am.Rep. 600.
In old English practice. The art of drawing pleadlngs and entering them on record in Latín, in the ancient court hand; otherwise called "skill of pleading in actions at the common law."
CLIENS. Lat. In the Roman law. A client or de-pendent. One who depended upon another as his patron or protector, adviser or defender, in sults at law and other difficulties. Dionys. ii. 10; Adams, Rom.Ant. 33.
CLIENT. A person who employs or retains an attorney, or counsellor, to appear for him in courts, advise, assist, and defend him in legal pro-ceedings, and to act for him in any legal business. McCreary v. Hoopes, 25 Miss. 428; McFarland v. Crary, 6 Wend., N.Y., 297; Cross v. Riggins, 50 Mo. 335. It should include one who disclosed confidential matters to attorney while seeking pro-fessional aid, whether attorney was employed or not. Sitton v. Peyree, 117 Or. 107, 241 P. 62, 64.
CLIENTELA. In old English law. Clientship, the state of a client; and, correlatively, protection, patronage, guardianship.
CLIFFORD’S INN. An inn of chancery. See Inns of Chancery.
CLINICAL TESTS. Observations made of patient by physician or surgeon without the aid of instru-ments, apparatus or chemical examinations for the discovery of the existente or progress of dis-ease or the patient’s condition. Peterson v. Wi-dule, 157 Wis. 641, 147 N.W. 966, 970, 52 L.R.A., N.S., 778.
CLIPPED SOVEREIGNTY. In the relations of the several states of the United States to other nations, the states have what is termed a clipped sovereignty. Anderson v. N. V. Transandine Handelmaatschappij, Sup., 28 N.Y.S.2d 547, 552.
Black’s Law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed.-21CLITO. In Saxon law. The son of a king or em-peror. The next heir to the throne; the Saxon adeling. Spelman.
CLOERE. A jail; a prison or dungeon.
CLOSE, v. To finish, terminate, complete, wind up; as, to "close" an account, a bargain, an es-tate, or public books, such as tax books. Bilafsky v. Abraham, 183 Mass. 401, 67 N.E. 318.
To shut up, so as to prevent entrance or access by any person; as in statutes requiring saloons to be "closed" at certain times, which further im-plies an entire suspension of business, Texas Co. v. Texarkana Mach. Shops, Tex.Civ.App., 1 S.W. 2d 928, 931.
CLOSE, n. A portion of land, as a field, inclosed, as by a hedge, fence, or other visible inclosure, 3 B1.Comm. 209, or by an invisible ideal boundary founded on limit of title.
The interest of a person In any particular píete oí ground, whether actually inclosed or not. Meade v. Wat. son, 67 Cal. 591, 8 Pac. 311.
In practice. The word means termination; winding up. Thus the close of the pleadings is where the pleadings are finished, i. e., when issue has been joined.
CLOSE, adj. In practice. Closed or sealed up. A term applied to writs and letters, as distin-guished from those that are open or patent.
CLOSE COPIES. Copies of legal documents which might be written closely or loosely at pleasure; as distinguished from office copies.
CLOSE CORPORATION. See Corporation.
CLOSE—HAULED. In admiralty law, this nauti-cal term means the arrangement or trim of a ves-sel’s sails when she endeavors to make a progress in the nearest direction possible towards that point of the compass from which the wind blows. But a vessel may be considered as close-hauled, although she is not quite so near to the wind as she could possibly lie. Chadwick v. Packet Co., 6 El. & Bl. 771.
CLOSE JAIL EXECUTION. A body execution which has indorsed in or upon it the statement that the defendant ought to be confined in close jail. Ex parte Thompson, 111 Vt. 7, 9 A.2d 107.
CLOSE MOLDS. Molds in two parts, called the drag and the case (or cope) forming together a two-part flask, one part being placed over the oth-er and each being impressed with one half of the matrix or pattern. Cole v. U. S., C.C.A.Colo., 269 F. 250, 252.
CLOSE ROLLS. Rolls containing the record of the close writs (litera clausce) and grants of the king, kept with the public records. 2 Bl. Comm. 346.
CLOSE SEASON. The season of the year or pe-riod of time in which the taking of particular game or fish is prohibited, or in which all hunting or fishing is forbidden by law. State v. Theriault, 70 Vt. 617, 41 A. 1030, 43 L.R.A. 290, 67 Am.St.Rep. 695. Cf. Fence-Month.
CLOSE TO. Near; very near; immediately ad-joining. Govier v. Brechler, 159 Wis. 157, 149 N. W. 740, 742.
CLOSE WRIT. See Writ.
CLOSED COURT. A term sometimes used to des-ignate the Common Pleas Court of England when only serjeants could argue cases, which practice persisted until 1833.
CLOSED SEASON. The same as "close season" (q. v.).
CLOSED SHOP. Such shop exists where worker must be member of union as condition precedent to employment. Miners in General Group v. Hix, 123 W.Va. 637, 17 S.E.2d 810, 813.
CLOSED SHOP CONTRACT. A contract requir-ing employer to hire only union members and to discharge non-union members and requiring that employees, as a condition of employment, remain union members. Silva v. Mercier, Cal.App., 187 P.2d 60, 64.
CLOTHING WOOL. Short-stapled wool prepared by carding, as distinguished from "combing wool," which is long-stapled wool prepared by combing. U. S. v. Stone & Downer Co., 12 Ct.Cust.App. 557, 558.
CLOTURE. The procedure in deliberative as-semblies whereby debate is closed.
Introduced in the English parilament in the session of 1882.
It is generally effected by moving the previous question. See Roberts, Rules of Order §§ 20, 58a.
CLOUD ON TITLE. An outstanding claim or in-cumbrance which, if valid, would affect or impair the title of the owner of a particular estate, and on its face has that effect, but can be shown by extrinsic proof to be invalid or inapplicable to the estate in que3tion. A conveyance, mortgage, judgment, tax-levy, etc., may all, in proper cases, constitute a cloud on title. Parker v. Vallerand, 136 Me. 519, 8 A.2d 594; Anderson v. Guenther, 144 Or. 446, 25 P.2d 146.
It is not necessary in West Virginia that claim be valid on its face. Gardner v. Buckeye Savings & Loan Co., 108 W.Va. 673, 152 S.E. 530, 532.
CLOUGH. A valley. Also an allowance for the turn of the scale, on buying goods wholesale by weight.
CLUB. A voluntary, incorporated or unincorpo-rated association of persons for purposes of a social, literary, or political nature, or the like. A club is not a partnership. 2 Mees. & W. 172.
Unincorporated Members’ Club. A society of persons each of whom contributes to the fund out of which the expenses of conducting the society are paid. Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 75 Fla. 792, 78 So. 693. 695, L.R.A.1918E, 639.
Unincorporated Proprietary Club. One the property and funds of which belong to a proprietor who usually conducts the club with a view to proflt. Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 75 Fla. 792, 78 So. 693, 695.
CLUB-LAW. Rule of violente; regulation by force; the law of arms.
CLUTCH. A device introduced in the transmis-sion, some place between the mechanism in which power is created and the rnechanism to which it is applied, and which serves to make and break the connection between the two. Eclipse Mach. Co. v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., C.C.A.Pa., 252 F. 80, 806.
CLYPEUS, or CLYPEUS. In old English law. A shield; metaphorically one of a noble family. Clypei prostrati, noble families extinct. Mat. Paris, 463.
C/O. A symbol meaning "tare of." Internation-al Store Co. v. Barnes, Mo.App., 3 S.W.2d 1039, 1041.
CO. A prefix meaning with, in conjunction, joint, jointly, unitedly, and not separately, e. g., co-trustees, co-executors, co-brokers. Brandenburger & Marx v. Heimberg, Mun.Ct.N.Y., 34 N.Y.S.2d 935, 938.
Also an abbrevtatlon for ”county," (Gilman v. Sheets, 78 Iowa 499, 43 N.W. 299.) and for ”company," (Railroad Co. v. People, 155 III. 299, 40 N.E. 599). It may also in-dicate a partnership (Jennette v. Coppersmith, 176 N.C. 82, 97 S.E. 54, 55).
COACH. Coach is a generic term. It is a kind of carriage, and is distinguished from other ve-hieles, chiefly, as being a covered box, hung on leathers, with four wheels. Turnpike Co. v. Neil, 9 Ohio 12; Turnpike Co. v. Frink, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 444. A term applied both to vehicles traveling over roads and upon rails. Bruce Transfer Co. v. Johnston, 287 N.W. 278, 280, 227 Iowa 50.
COADJUTOR. An assistant, helper, or ally; particularly a person appointed to assist a bishop who from age or inflrmity is unable to perform his duty. Olcott v. Gabert, 86 Tex. 121, 23 S.W. 985. Also an overseer, (coadjutor of an executor,) and one who disseises a person of land not to his own use, but to that of another.
CO-ADMINISTRATOR. One who is a joint ad-ministrator with one or more others.
COADUNATIO. A uniting or combining together of persons; a conspiracy. 9 Coke, 56.
CO-ADVENTURER. One who takes part with others in an adventure or in a venture or busi-ness undertaking attended with risk. McRee v. Quitman Oil Co., 16 Ga.App. 12, 84 S.E. 487; Eas-ter Oil Corporation v. Strauss, Tex.Civ.App., 52 S.W.2d 336, 344.
COAL NOTE. A species of promissory note, for-merly in use in the port of London, containing the phrase "value received in coals." By the statute 3 Geo. II. c. 26, §§ 7, 8, these were to be protected and noted as inland bilis of exchange. But this was repealed by the statute 47 Geo. III. sess. 2, c. 68, § 28.COALITION. In French law. An unlawful agree-ment among several persons not to do a thing except on some conditions agreed upon; particu-larly, industrial combinations, strikes, etc.; a con-spiracy.
CO-ASSIGNEE. One of two or more assignees of the same subject-matter.
COAST, v. To slide down hill upon snow or ice as on a sled; to ride, glide or move by or as by the force of gravity as on a bicycle without ped-aling. Samuelson v. Sherrill, 225 Iowa 421, 280 N. W. 596, 599.
COAST, n. The edge or margin of a country bounding on the sea.
The term inclucles small islands and reefs naturally con-nected with the adjacent land, and rising aboye the sur-face of the water, but not shoals perpetually covered by water. U. S. v. Pope, 28 Fed.Cas. 630; Hamilton v. Meni-fee, 11 Tex. 751.
This word is particularly appropriate to the edge of the sea, while "shore" may be used of the margino of inland waters.
COAST GUARD. In English law. A body of offi-cers and men raised and equipped by the commis-sioners of the admiralty for the defense of the coasts of the realm, and for the more ready man-ning of the navy in case of war or sudden emer-gency, as well as for the protection of the revenue against smugglers. Mozley & Whitley.
COAST WATERS. Tide waters navigable from the ocean by sea-going craft, the term embracing all waters opening directly or indirectly into the ocean and navigable by ships coming in from the ocean of draft as great as that of the larger ships which traverse the opon seas. The Britannia, 153 U.S. 130, 14 S.Ct. 795, 38 L.Ed. 660; The Vic-tory, D.C.Va., 63 F. 636; The Garden City, D.C. N.Y., 26 F. 773.
COASTER. A vessel plying exclusively between domestic ports, and usually engaged in domestic trade; not including pleasure yachts. Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674, 14 S.Ct. 264, 37 L.Ed. 1218.
COASTING. Sliding down hill or incline on sled or car or riding bicycle, without working the ped-als; Samuelson v. Sherrill, 225 Iowa 421, 280 N.W. 596, 599. Movement of sled or vehicle by momen-tum due to previously exerted force or force of gravity. Tyne v. a F. Goodrich Co., 297 N.Y.S. 425, 428, 252 App.Div. 24; Bryant v. Market St. Ry. Co., Cal.App., 158 P.2d 18, 22.
COASTING TRADE. In maritime law. Com-merce and navigation between different places along the coast of the United States. Commercial intercourse between different districts in different states, different districts in same state, or different places in same district, on sea-coast or on navi-gable river. Shannon v. Streckfus Steamers, 131 S.W.2d 833, 836, 279 Ky. 649.
COASTWISE. Vessels "plying coastwise" are those engaged in domestic trade, or plying be-tween port and port in the United States. San Francisco v. California Steam Nav. Co., 10 Cal. 504; Petition of Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., D.C.Wash., 278 F. 180, 202.
COAT ARMOR. Heraldic ensigns, introduced by Richard I. from the Holy Land, when- they were first invented. Originally painted on shields of the Christian knights who went to the Holy Land dur-ing the crusades, to identify them. Wharton.
COBRA-VENOM REACTION. In medical juris-prudence. A method of Serum-diagnosis of in-sanity from hmolysis by injections of venom of cobras or other serpents.
COCKBILL. To place the yards of a ship at an angle with the deck. Pub.St.Mass.1882, p. 1288.
COCKET. In English law. A seal belonging to the custom-house, or rather a scroll of parchment, sealed and delivered by the officers of the custom-house to merchants, as a warrant that their mer-chandises are entered; likewise a sort of measure. Fleta, lib. 2, c. ix.
COCKPIT. A name which used to be given to the judicial committee of the privy counci, the coun-cil-room being built on the old cockpit of Whitehall Place.
COCKSETUS. A boatman ; a cockswain. Cowell.
COCOTTE. A woman who leads a fast life, one who gives herself up for money. Alse a poached egg. Rovira v. Boget, 240 N.Y. 314, 148 N.E. 534, 535.
CODE. A collection, compendium or revision of laws. Chumbley v. People’s Bank & Trust Co., 60 S.W.2d 164, 166, 166 Tenn. 35. A complete sys-tem of positive law, scientifically arranged, and promulgated by legislative authority. Abbott; a system of rules. Wilentz v. Crown Laundry Service, 172 A. 331, 332, 116 N.J.Eq. 40. Any systematic body of law. Wall v. Close, 14 So.2d 19, 26, 203 La. 345.
A "Code" implies compilation of existing laws, systemat-le arrangement into chapters, subheads, tabl: of contents, and index, and revision to harmonize conflicto, supply omissions, and generally clarify and make complete body of laws designed to regulate completely subjects to which they relate. Gibson v. State, 214 Ala. 38, 106 So. 231, 135.
The collection of laws ‘and constitutions made by order of the Emperor Justinian is distinguished by the appella-tion of "The Code," by way of eminente. See Code of Justinian.
A code is to be distingulshed from a digest. Digesto of statutes consist of a collection of existing statutes, while a code is promulgated as one new law covering the whole field of jurisprudence.
Code civil. The code which embodies the civil law of France.
It was promulgated in 1804. When Napoleon became emperor, the name was changed to "Code Napoléon," by which it is still often designated, though it is now °Metal-ly styled by its original name of "Code Civil."
Code de commerce. A French code, enacted in 1807, as a supplement to the Code Napoléon, regulating commercial transactions, the laws of business, bankrupvies, and the jurisdiction and procedure of the courts dealing with these subjects.
Code de procédure civil. Tilat part of the Code Napoléon which regulates the system of courts, their organization,

civil procedure, special and extraordinary remedies, and the execution of judgments.
Code d’instruction criminelle. A French code, enacted in 1808, regulating criminal procedure.
Code Napoléon. See Code Civil.
Code noir. Fr. The black code. A body of laws which formerly regulated the institution of slavery in the French colonies. ‘
Code of Justinian. The Code of Justinian (Codex Justi-nianeus) was a collection of imperial constitutions, com-piled, by order of that emperor, by a commission, and pro-mulgated A, D. 529. It comprised twelve books, and was the first of the four compilations of law which make up the Corpus Juris Civilis. This name is of ten met in a connec-tion indicating that the entire Corpus Juris Civilis is intended, or, sometimes, the Digest; but its use should be conflned to the Codex.
Code péna/. The penal or criminal code of France, enacted in 1810.
CODEX. Lat. A code or collection of laws; par-ticularly the Code of Justinian. Also a roll or vol-ume, and a book written on paper or parchment.
CODEX GREGORIANUS. A collection of im-perial constitutions made by Gregorius, a Roman jurist of the fifth century, about the middle of the century. It contained the constitutions from Had-rian down to Constantine. Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 63.
CODEX HERMOGENIANUS. A collection of im-perial constitutions made by Hermogenes, a jurist of the fifth century. It was nothing more than a supplement to the Codex Gregorianus, (supra,) containing the constitutions of Diocletian and Maximilian. Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 63.
CODEX JUSTINIANEUS. A collection of im-perial constitutions, made by a commission of ten persons appointed by Justinian, A.D. 528.
CODEX REPETITZE PRiELECTIONIS. The new code of Justinian; or the new edition of the first or old code, promulgated A.D. 534, being the one
now extant. Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 78. Tayl.Civil Law, 22.
CODEX THEODOSIANUS. A code compiled by
the emperor Theodosius the younger, A.D. 438. 1 B1.Comm. 81.
It was a collection of all the imperial constitutions .then in force. It was the only body of civil law publicly re-ceIved as authentic in the western part of Europe till the twelfth century, the use and authority of the Code of Jus-tinian being during that interval confined to the East. 1 BI.Comm. 81.
CODEX VETUS. The old code. The first edition of the Code of Justinian; now lost. Mackeld. Rom.Law, § 70.
CODICIL. A supplement or an addition to a will; it may explain, modify, add to, subtract from, qualif y, alter, restrain or revoke provisions in will. In re Phelps’ Will, 232 N.Y.S. 418, 421, 133 Misc. 450; Butler University v. Danner, 114 Ind.App. 236, 50 N.E.2d 928, 932; In re Cazaurang’s Estate, 42 Cal.App.2d 796, 110 P.2d 138; Blackford v. An-derson, 226 Iowa 1138, 286 N.W. 735, 743; Adams v. Foley, 360 Ohio App. 295, 173 N.E. 197, 198.
Usually it does not supersede or totally revoke the will. Holcomb v. Holcomb, 159 So. 564, 566, 173 Miss. 192; but is

part of the will, Knebelkamp v. Acosta, 114 S.W.2d 737, 739, 272 Ky. 506; Succession of Patterson, 188 La. 635, 177 So. 692, 694; Simmons v. Gunn, 156 Va. 305, 157 S.E. 573, 574; and may conflrm, reexecute, revive or republish the will, Des Portes v. Des Portes, 157 S.C. 407, 154 S.E. 426, 429; In re Warne’s Estate, 302 Pa. 386, 153 A. 688, 690; United States v. Moore, 197 Ark. 664, 124 S.W.2d 807, 809. It must be executed with same solemnity as a will. Adams v. Foley, 36 Ohio App. 295, 173 N.E. 197, 198.
CODICILLUS. In the Roman law. A codicil; an informal and inferior kind of will, in use among the Romans.
CODIFICATION. Process of collecting and ar-ranging the laws of a country or state into a code, i. e., into a complete system of positive law, scien-tifically ordered, and promulgated by legislative authority.
COEMPTIO. One of the modes in which marriage was contracted among the Romans. Adams, Rom.Ant. 501.
CO-EMPTION. The act of purchasing the whole quantity of any commodity. Wharton.
CO-EQUAL. To be or become equal to; to have the same quantity, the same value, the same de-gree or rank, or the like, with; to be commensu-rate with. State ex rel. Com’rs of Land Office v. Board of Com’rs of Nowata County, 166 Okl. 78, 25 P.2d 1074, 1077.
COERCE. Compelled to compliance; constrained to obedience, or submission in a vigorous or forci-ble manner. Fluharty v. Fluharty, 8 W.W.Harr. 487, 193 A. 838, 840.
COERCION. Compulsion; constraint; compel-ling by force or arms. Fluharty v. Fluharty, Del. Super., 8 W.W.Harr. 487, 193 A. 838, 840; Santer v. Santer, 115 Pa.Super. 7, 174 A. 651, 652.
It may be actual, direct, or positive, as where physical force is used to compel act against one’s will, or implied, legal or constructive, as where one party 1s constrained by subjugation to other to do what his free will would refuse. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distributing Corporation v. Cocke, Tex.Civ.App., 56 S.W.2d 489; Fluharty v. Fluharty, 8 W. W.Harr. 487, 193 A. 838, 840. It may be actual or threat-ened exercise of power possessed, or supposedly possessed. In re New York Title & Mortgage Co., 271 N.Y.S. 433, 150 Misc. 827; Weir v. McGrath, D.C.Ohlo, 52 F.2d 201, 203.
As used in testamentary law, any pressure by which tes-tator’s action is restrained against his free will in the ex-ecution of his testament. Max Ams Mach. Co. v. Inter-national Ass’n of Machlnists, Bridgeport Lodge, No. 30, 92 Conn. 297, 102 A. 706, 709; Hughes v. Leonard, 66 Colo. 500, 181 P. 200, 203, 5 A.L.R. 817.
Duress and coercion are not synonymous though their meanings often shade into one another. McKenzie-Hague Co. v. Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corporation, C.C.A. Minn., 73 F.2d 78, 85.
CO-EXECUTOR. One who is a joint executor with one or more others. See, also, Joint Execu-tors.
COFFEE-HOUSE. A house of entertainment where guests are supplied with coffee and other refreshments, and sometimes with lodging. Cen-tury Dict. A coffee-house is not an inn. Thomp-son v. Lacy, 3 Barn. & Ald. 283; Com. v. Woods, 4 Ky.Law Rep. 262; Potson v. City of Chicago, 304 I1i 222, 136 N.E. 594, 596

COFFERER OP THE QUEEN’S HOUSEHOLD. In English law. A principal officer of the royal establishment, next under the controller, who, in the countinghouse and elsewhere, had a special charge and oversight of the other officers, whose wages he paid.
COGITATIONIS PCIENAM NEMO PATITUR. No one is punished for his thoughts. Dig. 48, 19, 18.
COGNAC. A distilled brandy, containing more than one-hall of 1 per centum of alcohol. Benson v. U. S., C.C.A.Tex., 10 F.2d 309, 310.
COGNATES. (Lat. cognati.) Relations by the mother’s side, or by females. Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 144. A common term in Scotch law. Ersk.Inst. 1, 7, 4.
COGNATI. Lat. In the civil law. Cognates; re-lations by the mother’s side. 2 Bl.Comm. 235. Relations in the line of the mother. Hale, Com. Law, c. xi. Relations by or through females.
COGNATIO. Lat.
In the civil law. Cognation. Relationship, or kindred generally. Dig. 38, 10, 4, 2; Inst. 3, 6, pr.
Relationshlp through females, as distinguished from agnatio, or relationshlp through males. Agnatio a patre sit, cognatio a matra. Inst. 3, 5, 4. See Agnatio.
In Canon law. Consanguinity, as distinguished from affinity. 4 Reeve, Eng.Law, 56-58. Consan-guinity, as including affinity. Id.
COGNATION. In the civil law. Signifies gen-erally the kindred which exists between two per-sons who are united by ties of blood or family, or both.
Civil cognation 1s that which proceeds alone from the Hes of familles, as the kindred between the adopted father and the adopted chlld.
Mixed cognation is that which unites at the same time the ties of blood and family, as that which exists between brothers the issue of the same lawful marriage. Inst. 3. 6; Dig. 38. 10.
Natural cognation is that which Is alone formed by ties of blood; such is the kindred of those who owe their origin to an illiclt connection, either In relation to their ascend-ants or coilaterals.
COGNATUS. Lat. In the civil law. A relation by the mother’s side; a cognate.
A relation, or kinsman, generally. COGNITIO.
In old English law. The acknowledgment of a fine; the certificate of such. acknowledgment.
In the Roman law. The judicial examination or hearing of a cause.
COGNITIONES. Ensigns and arms, or a military coat painted with arms. Mat.Par. 1250.
COGNITIONIBUS MITTENDIS. In English law. A writ to a justice of the common pleas, or other, who has power to take a fine, who, having taken the fine, defers to certify it, commanding him to certify it. Now abolished. Reg.Orig. 68

COGNITIONIS CAUSIE. In Scotch practice. A name given to a judgment or decree pronounced by a court, ascertaining the amount of a debt against the estate of a deceased landed proprietor, on cause shown, or alter a due investigation. Bell.
COGNITOR. In the Roman law. An advocate or defender in a prívate cause; one who defended the cause of a person who was present. Calvin. Lex.Jurid.
COGNIZABLE. Capable of being tried or exam-ined before a designated tribunal, State v. Wilmot, 51 Idaho 233, 4 P.2d 363, 364; within jurisdiction of court or power given to court to adjudicate contro-versy. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc. v. United Artists Corporation, C.C.A.Del., 113 F.2d 703, 707.
COGNIZANCE. Jurisdiction, or the exercise o! jurisdiction, or power to try and determine causes; judicial examination of a matter, or power and authority to make it. Clarion County v. Hospital, 111 Pa. 339, 3 A. 97:
Judicial notice or knowledge; the judicial hear-ing of a cause; acknowledgment; confession; recognition.
Claim of cognizance or of conusance. See Claim of Cognizance or of Conusance.
Judicial cognizance. See Judicial.
The term also applles to a power granted by the king to a city or town to hold pleas within 1t. 11 East, 543; 1 W. Bla. 454; 3 Bla.Com. 298. An acknowledgment by defend-ant or deforclant in fine that the land belongs to, or Is the right of, the complalnant, 12 Ad. & El. 259. An answer in replevin, by which defendant acknowledges taking of the goods and want of titie, but justifies on ground that the taking was by command of one entitled to the property. Lawes, Pl. 35; 2 Bla.Com. 350. Inhabltants of Sturbrldge v. Winslow, 21 Plck., Masa., 87; Noble v. Holmes, 5 H111, N.Y., 194.
COGNIZEE. The party to whom a fine was levied. 2 Bl.Comm. 351.
COGNIZOR. In old conveyancing. The party levying a fine. 2 Bl.Comm. 350, 351.
COGNOMEN.
In English law. A surname. A name added to the nomen proper, or name of the individual; a name descriptive of the family.
In Roman law. A man’s family name.
The first name (proenomen) was the proper name of the individual; the second (nomen) indicated the gens or tribe to which he belonged; while the third (cognomen) denoted his family or house. The agnomen was’ added on account of some particular event, as a further dlstinctlon. Vicat. See Cas. temp. Hardw. 286; 6 Co. 65.
COGNOMEN MAJORUM EST EX SANGUINE TRACTUM, HOC INTRINSECUM EST; AGNO-MEN EXTRINSECUM AB EVENTU. 6 Coke, 65. The cognomen is derived from the blood of an-cestors, and is intrinsic; an agnomen arises from an event, and is extrinsic.
COGNOVIT. Defendant has confessed judgment and justice of claim, Dyer v. Johnson, Tex.Civ. App., 19 S.W.2d 421, 422. Written authority of debtor and his direction for entry of judgment against him. Blott v. Blott, 227 Iowa 1108, 290 N.W. 74, 76, COGNOVIT ACTIONEM. (He has confessed the action.) A defendant’s written confession of ac-tion against him. It is usually upon condition; is supposed to be given in court; and impliedly au-thorizes plaintiff’s attorney to sign judgment and issue execution. Mallory v. Kirkpatrick, 54 N.J. Eq. 50, 33 A. 205.
COHABIT or COHABITATION. Dwelling to-gether. Hunt v. Hunt, 172 Miss. 732, 161 So. 119, 121, Johnson v. Commonwealth, 152 Va. 965, 146 S.E. 289, 291. Intercourse together as husband and wife. State v. Hoffman, 68 N.D. 610, 282 N.W. 407, 409. Living, or abiding or residing together as man and wife. Jones v. State, 182 Tenn. 60, 184 S.W.2d 167, 169; State v. Barlow, 107 Utah 292, 153 P.2d 647, 651; In re Miller’s Estate, 182 Okl. 534, 78 P.2d 819, 827.
It may mean copulation or sexual Intercourse, Bracks-mayer v. Bracksmayer, Sup., 22 N.Y.S.2d 110, 112; as in divorce statutes. Varnell v. Varnell, 182 S.W.2d 466, 467, 207 Ark. 711; De Berry v. De Berry, 115 W.Va. 604, 177 S.
E. 440, 441; or promiscuous and casual relations, as in pandering statute, Boykin v. U. S., 130 F.2d 416, 421, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 147. But in some circumstances occasional acts of sexual intercourse may be insufficient proof. Cutrer
v. State, 154 Miss. 80, 121 So. 106, 107.
COHABITING IN STATE OF ADULTERY OR FORNICATION. Living together as husband and wife. Martin v. State, 89 Ind.App. 107, 165 N.E. 763.
Proof must establish at least one act of sexual inter-course, or facts from which such act may reasonably be In-ferred. Warner v. State, 202 Ind. 479, 175 N.E. 661, 663, 74 A.L.R. 1357.
COILEREDES UNA PERSONA CENSENTUR, PROPTER UNITATEM JURIS QUOD HABENT. Co.Litt. 163. Co-heirs are deemed as one person, on account of the unity of right which they pos-sess.
COILERES. Lat. In civil and old English law. A co-heir, or joint heir.
COHAN RULE. Where part of expenditures by taxpayers are of deductible nature as ordinary and necessary business expense are unidentifiable, 50% of expenditures are allowed as deduction. Poletti v. C. I. R., C.A.Mo., 351 F.2d 345, 349.
CO-HEIR. One of several to whom an inheritance descends.
CO-HEIRESS. A joint heiress. A woman who has an equal share of an inheritance with another woman.
COHERER. In wireless telegraphy, the "detec-tor" or "coherer" and "wave responsive device" is a device by which the electromagnetic waves cause the indicator to respond. National Electric Signaling Co. v. Telefunken Wireless Telegraph Co. of United States, C.C.A.N.Y., 221 F. 629, 631.
COHUAGIUM. A tribute made by those who meet promiscuously in a market or fair. Du Cange.COIF. A title given to serjeants at law, who are called "serjeants of the coif," from the coif they wear on their heads. The use of this coif at first was to cover the clerical tonsure, many of the practicing serjeants being clergymen who had abandoned their profession. It was a thin Unen cover, gathered together in the form of a skull or helmet; the material being afterwards changed into white silk, and the form eventually into the black patch at the top of the forensic wig, which is now the distinguishing mark of the degree of serjeant at law. (Cowell; Foss, Judg.; 3 Steph. Comm. 272, note.) Brown.
COIN, v. To fashion pieces of metal into a pre-scribed shape, weight, and degree of fineness, and stamp them with prescribed devices, by authority of government, in order that they may circulate as money, Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 484, 20 L. Ed. 287; Thayer v. Hedges, 22 Ind. 301; Hague v. Powers, 39 Barb.(N.Y.) 466, or to invent words or phrases.
COIN, n. Pieces of gold, silver, or other metal, fashioned into a prescribed shape, weight, and de-gree of fineness, and stamped, by authority of gov-ernment, with certain marks and devices, and put into circulation as money at a fixed value, Com. v. Gallágher, 16 Gray, Mass., 240; Latham v. U. S.,
1 Ct.C1. 150; Borie v. Trott, 5 Phila., Pa., 403, or any metal dise, State v. Kelleher, 127 A. 503, 504,
2 W.W.Harr., Del., 559.
Strlctly speaking, coin differs from money, as the species differs from the genus. Money is any matter, whether metal, paper, beads, shells, etc., which has currency as a medium in commerce. Coin is a particular species, always made of metal, and struck according to a certain process called "coinage." Wharton.
COINAGE. The process or the function of coining metallic money; also the great mass of metallic money in circulation. Meyer v. Roosevelt, 25 How. Prac., N.Y., 105; U. S. v. Otey, C.C.Or., 31 F. 70.
COINSURANCE. A relative division of risk Be-tween the insurer and the insured, dependent upon the relative amount of the policy and the actual value of the property insured, and taking effect only when the actual loss is partial and less than the amount of the policy; the insurer being ha-ble to the extent of the policy for a loss equal to or in excess of that amount. Buse v. National Ben Franklin Ins. Co. of Pittsburg, Pa., 160 N.Y. S. 566, 568, 96 Misc. 229.
COITUS. Sexual intercourse; carnal copulation; coition.
COJUDICES. Lat. In old English law. Associate judges having equality of power with others.
COKE. Partially consumed bituminous coal, from which the volatile constituents have been burned away, or partly graphitized carbon, whose fiber has been affected by escaping and burning gases, so that it is lighter than coal, although its sub-stance is hard and dense. Mitchell v. Connells-ville Central Coke Co., C.C.A.Pa., 231 F. 131, 137; Otto Coking Co. v. Koppers Co., C.C.A.Del., 258 F. 122, 131

COLD BLOOD. Used in common parlante to des-ignate a willful, deliberate, and premeditated homicide. Skeggs v. State, 24 Ala.App. 307, 135 So. 431, 432.
COLD WATER ORDEAL. The trial which was anciently used for the common sort of people, who, having a cord tied about them under their arms, were cast into a river; if they sank to the bottom until they were drawn up, which was in a very short time, then were they held guiltless; but such as did remain upon the water were held culpable, being, as they said, of the water rejected and kept up. Wharton.
COLIBERTUS. In feudal law. One who, holding in free socage, was obliged to do certain services for the lord. A middle class of tenants between servile and free, who held their freedom of ten-ure on condition of performing certain services. Said to be the same as the conditionales. Cowell.
COLLAPSIBLE CORPORATION. In income tax law, for purpose of determining whether gain from the sale or exchange of stock is gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset or gain from the sale or exchange of property which is not a capital asset, a corporation formed or availed of principally for the manufacture, con-struction, or production of property, or for the holding of stock in a corporation so formed or availed of, with a view to the sale or exchange of stock by its shareholders, or a distribution to its shareholders, prior to the realization by such corporation of a substantial part of the net in-come to be derived from such property, and the realization by such shareholders of gain attributa-ble to such property. 26 U.S.C.A. § 117.
COLLATERAL. By the side; at the side; at-tached upon the side. N ot lineal, but upon a parallel or diverging line. Additional or auxil-iary; supplementary; co-operating; accompany-ing as a secondary fact, or acting as a secondary agent; related to, complementary; accompanying as a co-ordinate, City Investment & Loan Co. v. Wichita Hardware Co., Tex.Civ.App., 57 S.W.2d 222, 223; collateral security, Pepper v. Beville, 100 Fla. 97, 129 So. 334, 337.
As to collateral "Consanguinity," "Descent," "Es-toppel," "Guaranty," "Issue," "Limitation," "Neg-ligence," "Power," "Proceeding," and "Warranty," see those titles.
COLLATERAL ACT. In old practice. The name "collateral act" was given to any act (except the payment of money) for the performance of which a bond, recognizance, etc., was given as security.
COLLATERAL ANCESTORS. A phrase some-times used to designate uncles and aunts, and oth-er collateral antecessors, who are not strictly an-cestors. Banks v. Walker, 3 Barb.Ch. (N.Y.) 438, 446.
COLLATERAL ASSURANCE. That which is made over and aboye the principal assurance or deed itself.COLLATERAL or INDIRECT ATTACK. On a judicial proceeding, an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade it, or deny its force and effect, in some incidental proceeding not provided by law for the express purpose of attacking it. May v. Cas-ker, 188 Okl. 448, 110 P.2d 287, 290. On a judg-ment, any proceeding in which the integrity of a judgment is challenged, except those made in the action wherein the judgment is rendered or by ap-peal. Edward Thompson Co. v. Thomas, 49 F.2d 500, 60 App.D.C. 118; In re Peterson’s Estate, 12 Wash.2d 686, 123 P.2d 733, 751.
An attempt to impeach the judgment by mattcrs dehors the record in an action other than that in which it was rendered; an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade it, or deny its force and effect in some incidental proceeding not pro-vided by law for the express purpose of attacking it; any proceeding which is not instituted for the express purpose of annulling, correc*ing, or modifying such decree, or an objection, incidentally raised in the course of a proceeding, which presents an issue collateral to the issues made by the pleadings. Trustees of Somerset Academy v. Picher, C.C.A. Me., 90 F.2d 741, 743.
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL. The collateral de-termination of a question by a court having gen-eral jurisdiction of the subject. Small v. Haskins, 26 Vt. 209.
Conclusiveness of judgment In prior action where subse-quent action is upon a dlfferent cause of action. Babcock v. Babcock, 63 Cal.App.2d 94, 146 P.2d 279, 281.
Where complaint In a divorce action alleged that there was no communIty propbrty, and divorce decree found that all allegations of complaint were true and sustained by evidence, the decree was a conclusive determlnation that husband’s Insurance pollcies were not community property, and under the doctrine of "collateral estoppel" divorced wife was estopped from litigating that issue upon hus-band’s death. Maxwell v. Maxwell, 66 Cal.App.2d 549, 152 P.2d 530, 532.
COLLATERAL FACTS. Such as are outside the controversy, or are not directly connected with the principal matter or issue in dispute. Summerour v. Felker, 102 Ga. 254, 29 S.E. 448; Garner v. State, 76 Miss. 515, 25 So. 363; Jones v. State, 70 Ga.App. 431, 28 S.E.2d 373, 386.
COLLATERAL FRAUD. See Fraud.
COLLATERAL IMPEACHMENT. See Collateral Attack.
COLLATERAL INHERITANCE TAX. A tax levied upon the collateral devolution of property by will or under the intestate law. Perfection Tire & Rubber Co. v. Kellogg-Mackay Equipment Co., 194 Iowa 523, 187 N.W. 32, 33.
COLLATERAL KINSMEN. Those who descend from one and the same common ancestor, but not from one another.
COLLATERAL LINE. See Descent.
COLLATERAL PROMISE. A promise merely su-per-added to the promise of another, he remaining primarily hable. Fairbanka v. Barker, 115 Me. 11, 97 A. 3, 5; Miller v. Davis, 168 Ky. 661, 182 S.W. 839, 840.
COLLATERAL SECURITY. A security given in addition to the direct security, and subordinate to it, intended to guaranty its validity or convertibili-ty or insure its performance; so that, if the direct security fails, the creditor may fall back upon the collateral security. Butler v. Rockwell, 23 P. 462, 14 Colo. 125; McCormick v. Bank, C.C.Ind., 57 F. 110; Perfection Tire & Rubber Co. v. Kellogg-Mackay Equipment Co.,_194 Iowa 523, 187 N.W. 32, 33; Barbin v. Moore, 85 N.H. 362, 159 A. 409, 415, 83 A.L.R. 62.
Collateral security, In bank phraseology, means some se-curity addltional to the personal obligation of the borrow-er. Shoemaker v. Bank, 2 Abb., U.S., 423, Fed.Cas.No.12,- 801, or pledge of negotiable paper, shares of corporate stock, and the like. Turner v. Commercial Savings Bank, 17 Ga.App. 631, 87 S.E. 918; A. H. Averill Machinery Co. v. Bain, 50 Mont. 512,•148 P. 334.
COLLATERAL UNDERTAKING. "Collateral" and "original" have become the technical terms where-by to distinguish promises that are within, and such as are not within, the statute of frauds. El-der v. Warfield, 7 Har. & J., Md., 391; Turner v. Commercial Savings Bank, 17 Ga.App. 631, 87 S. E. 918.
COLLATERALIS ET SOCA. The ancient title of masters in chancery.
COLLATIO BONORUM. Lat. In the civil law. The obligation on successors to an inheritance to return to the common inheritance gifts received from the ancestor during his lifetime. In re Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 163 N.Y.S. 961, 967, 99 Misc. 420; In re Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 168 N.Y.S. 952, 956, 181 App.Div. 642. A joining to-gether or contribution of goods into a common fund.
This occurs where a portion of money, advanced by the father to a son or daughter, is brought into hotchpot, in or-der to have an equal distributory share of his personal es-tate at his death. See Collation.
COLLATIO SIGNORUM. In old English law. A comparison of marks or seals. A mode of testing the genuineness of a seal, by comparing it with another known to be genuine. Adams. See Bract. fol. 389b.
COLLATION. It is the bringing into the estate of an intestate an estimate of the value of ad-vancements made by the intestate to his or her children in order that the whole may be divided in accordance with the statute of descents. In re Howlett’s Estate, 275 Mich. 596, 267 N.W. 743, 744.
It is synonymous with "hotchpot." Moore v. Freeman, 50 Ohio St. 592, 35 N.E. 502.

Civil Law

The collation of goods is the supposed or real return to the mass of the succession which an heir makes of property which he received in ad-vance of his share or otherwise, in order that such property may be divided together with the other effects of the succession. Civ.Code La. art. 1227; Miller v. Miller, 105 La. 257, 29 So. 802; Succession of Thompson. 9 La.Ann. 96.
The fundamental basis of doctrine is legal presumption that ancestor intended absolute equality among his de-scendants in final distribution of his property, that dona-tion by hlm during his lifetime to any one of them was merely advancement d’hoirie or advance on donee’s heredi-tary share to establish him in life or for some other useful purpose, and that ancestor intended to reestabllsh equality among his descendants In final partition of his estate. Le Blanc v. Volker, La.App., 198 So. 398, 401.
Ecclesiastical Law
The act by which the bishop who has the be-stowing of a benefice gives it to an incumbent. 2 Bla.Com. 22.
Practice
The comparison of a copy with its original to ascertain its correctness; or the report of the offl-cer who made the comparison.
COLLATION OF SEALS. When upon the same label one seal was set on the back or reverse of the other. Wharton.
COLLATION TO A BENEFICE. In ecclesiastical law. This occurs where the bishop and patron are one and the same person, in which case the bishop cannot present the clergyman to himself, but does, by the one act of collation or conferring the bene-fice, the whole that is done in common cases both by presentation and institution. 2 Bl.Comm. 22.
COLLATIONE FACTA UNI POST MORTEM AL-TERIUS. A writ directed to justices of the com-mon pleas, commanding them to issue their writ to the bishop, for the admission of a clerk in the place of another presented by the crown, where there had been a demise of the crown during a suit; for judgment once passed for the king’s clerk, and he dying before admittance, the king may bestow his presentation on another. Reg. Orig. 31.
COLLATIONE HEREMITAGH. In old English law. A writ whereby the king conferred the keep-ing of an hermitage upon a clerk. Reg.Orig. 303, 308.
COLLECT. To gather together; to bring scat-tered things (assets, accounts, articles of prop-erty) into one mass or fund; to assemble.
To collect a debt or claim is to obtain payment or liquidation of it, either by personal solicitation or legal proceedings. Isler v. National Park Bank of New York, 239 N.Y. 462, 147 N.E. 66, 68.
COLLECT ON DELIVERY. See C. O. D.
COLLECTIBLE. Debts, obligations, demands, lia-bilities that one may be made to pay by means of legal process. Shanahan v. State, 142 Md. 616, 121 A. 636, 640.
COLLECTION AGENCY. A concern which col-lects all kinds of claims for others. McCarthy v. Hughes, 36 R.I. 66, 88 A. 984, 985, Ann.Cas.1915D, 26.
COLLECTION OF ILLEGAL FEES. Collection by public official of fees in excess of those fixed by law for certain services. Parker v. Morgan, 48 Utah 405, 160 P. 764, 765.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. As contemplated by National Labor Relations Act is a procedure looking toward making of collective agreements

between employer and accredited representatives of employees concerning wages, hours, and other conditions of employment, and requires that par-ties deal with each other with open and fair minds and sincerely endeavor to overcome obstacles exist-ing between them to the end that employment re-lations may be stabilized and obstruction to free fiow of commerce prevented. National Labor Re-lations Act § 8(5), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(5). Rapid Roller Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, C.C.A.7, 126 F.2d 452, 460.
The essence of "collective bargaining" is the freedom of choice of employees in selection of their bargaining rep-resentative. National Labor Relations Act § 1 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. National Labor Relations Board v. American Rolling Mili Co., C.C.A.6, 126 F.2d 38, 41.
"Collective bargaining," within provision of National Labor Relations Act provlding that a refusal to bargain collectively should be an unfair labor practice, does not require employer to reach an agreement, but does require sincere negotiations with representatives of employees. National Labor Relations Act § 8(5), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(5). National Labor Relations Board v. Biles Coleman Lumber Co., C.C.A.9, 98 F.2d 18, 22.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT. Agreement between an employer and a labor union whích regulates terms and conditions of employ-ment. Railway Mail Ass’n v. Murphy, 44 N.Y.S. 2d 601, 605, 608, 180 Misc. 868; McNeil v. Peoples Life Ins. Co., D.C.Mun.App., 43 A.2d 293, 294. See, also, "Collective Labor Agreement" and "Trade Agreement."
COLLECTIVE LABOR AGREEMENT. Also called "trade agreement". Bargaining agreement as to wages and conditions of work entered into by groups of employees, usually organized into a brotherhood or union on one side and groups of employers or corporations on the other side. Bris-bin v. E. L. Oliver Lodge No. 335 of Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 134 Neb. 517, 279 N.W. 277, 283; Rentschler v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 126 Neb. 493, 253 N.W. 694, 696, 95 A.L.R. 1.
It becomes a binding contract when it is adopted into and made a part of the individual contract of each em-ployee, and a breach of its terms will give rice to a cause of action by either party.
COLLECTOR. One appointed to receive taxes or other impositions: as; collector of taxes, collector of rtillitia fines, etc. A person appointed by a pri-vate person to collect the credits due him.
COLLECTOR OF DECEDENT’S ESTATE. A per-son temporarily appointed by the probate cóurt to collect rents, assets, interest, bilis receivable, etc., of a decedent’s estate, and act for the estate in all financial matters requiring immediate set-tlement. Such collector is usually appointed when there is protracted litigation as to the probate of the will, or as to the person to take out adminis-tration, and his duties cease as soon as an execu-tor or administrator is qualified.
COLLECTOR OF THE CUSTOMS. An officer of the United States, appointed for the term of four years. Act May 15, 1820, § 1; 3 Story, U.S.Laws, 1790 (19 U.S.C.A. § 5). Rev.Stat.U.S. § 2613 (19 U.S.C.A. § 5). His general duties are defined in § 2621 (19 U.S.C.A. § 33).

COLLECTION. Indorsement "for collection." See For Collection.
COLLEGA. In the civil law. One invested with joint authority. A colleague; an associate.
COLLEGATARIUS. Lat. In the civil law. A co-legatee. Inst. 2, 20, 8.
COLLEGATARY. A co-legatee; a person who has a legacy left to him in common with other per-sons.
COLLEGE. An organized assembly or collection of persons, established by law, and empowered to co-operate for the performance of some special function or for the promotion of some common ob-ject, which may be educational, political, ecclesias-tical, or scientific in its Character.
The assemblage of the cardinals at Rome is called a "college." So, in the United States, the body of presidential electors is called the "elec-toral college."
In the most common use of the word, it desigr nates an institution of learning (usually incorpo-rated) which offers instruction in the liberal arts and humanities and in scientific branches, but not in the technical arts or those studies preparatory to admission to the professions. Com. v. Banks, 198 Pa. 397, 48 A. 277; Chegaray v. New York, 13 N.Y. 229. Also applied to all kinds of institution from universities, or departments thereof to "bus-iness colleges," "ba.rber colleges," etc. State v. Erickson, 75 Mont. 429, 244 P. 287, 291.
In England, it is a civil corporation, company or society of men, having certain privileges, and endowed with certain revenues, founded by royal license. An assemblage of several of there col-leges is called a "university." Wharton.
COLLEGIA. In the civil law. The guild of a trade.
COLLEGIALITER. In a corporate capacity. 2 Kent, Comm. 296.
COLLEGIATE CHURCH. In English ecclesiasti-cal law. A church built and endowed for a socie-ty or body corporate of a dean or other president, and secular priests, as canons or prebendaries in the said church; such as the churches of West-minster, Windsor, and others. Cowell.
COLLEGIUM. Lat. In the civil law. A word having various meanings; e. g., an assembly, so-ciety, or company; a body of bishops; an army; a Class of men. But the principal idea of the word was that of an association of individuals of the same rank and station, or united for the pur-suit of some business or enterprise. Sometimes, a corporation, as in the maxim "tres faciunt col-legium" (1 Bl.Comm. 469), though the more usual and proper designation of a corporation was "uni-versitas."
COLLEGIUM AMMIRALITATIS. The college or society of the admiralty

COLLEGIUM EST SOCIETAS PLURIUM COR-PORUM SIMUL HABITANTIUM. Jenk.Cent. 229. A college is a society of several persons dwelling together.
COLLEGIUM ILLICITUM. One which abused its right, or assembled for any other purpose than that expressed in its charter.
COLLEGIUM" LICITUM. An assemblage or so-ciety of men united for some useful purpose or business, with power to act like a single individual. 2 Kent, Comm. 269.
COLLIDE. To strike or dash against; to come into collision; to clash. Collins v. Leahy, Mo. App., 102 S.W.2d 801, 809.
COLLIERY. This term is sufflciently wide to in-elude all contiguous and connected veins and seams of coal which are worked as one concern, without regard to the closes or pieces of ground under which they are carried, and apparently also the engines and machinery in such contiguous and connected veins. MacSwin. Mines, 25. Carey v. Bright, 58 Pa. 85.
It includes every operation and work, both under and aboye ground, used or to be used to mine and prepare coal. Moore v. Stevens Coal Co., 315 Pa. 564, 173 A. 661, 662.
COLLIGENDUM BONA DEFUNCTI. See Ad Colligendum, etc.
COLLISION. Striking together of two objects, .one of which may be stationary. Davilla v. Lib-erty Life Ins. Co., 114 Cal.App. 308, 299 P. 831, 834. Act or instante of colliding; state of having collided. Guenther v. American Indem. Co., 246 Wis. 478, 17 N.W.2d 570, 571.

Maritime Law

The act of ships or vessels striking together.
In Its strict sense, collision means the Impact of two vessels both moving, and Is distinguished from allision, which designates the striking of a moving vessel against one that is stationary. But collision is used in a broad sense, to include allision, and perhaps other species of encounters between vessels, or a vessel and other floating, though non-navigable, objects. Wright v. Brown, 4 Ind. 97, 58 Am.Dec. 622; London Assur. Co. v. Companhia De Moagens, 68 F. 258, 15 C.C.A. 379; Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 6 F.2d 736, 738, 43 A.L.R. 215.
The term is not inapplicable to cases where a stationary vessel is struck by one under way, strictly termed "alli-sion" ; or where one vessel is brought into contact with another by swinging at anchor. And even an injury received by a vessel at her moorings, in consequence of being violently rubbed or pressed against by a second ves-sel lying alongslde of her, in consequence of a collision against such second vessel by a third one under way, may be compensated for, under the general head of "collision," as well as an injury which is the direct result of a ”blow," properly so called. The Moxey, Abb.Adm. 73, Fed.Cas.No. 9,89

Automobile Insurance Law

The term denotes the act of colliding; striking together; violent contact. Long v. Royal Ins. Co., 180 Wash. 360, 40 P.2d 132, 133, 105 A.L.R. 1423. The term implies an impact or sudden con-tact of a moving body with an obstruction in its line of motion, whether bóth bodies are in motion or one stationary and the other, no matter which,
in motion. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. American Compounding Co., 211 Ala. 593, 100 So. 904, 906, 35 A.L.R. 1018; Rea v. Motors Ins. Cor-poration, 48 N.M. 9, 144 P.2d 676, 678, 679, 681.
But liability depends on what the automobile collides with and, of course, the cause of the collision and the tercos of the policy. Liability has been sustained where collision was with embankment, Pred v. Employers’ Indem-nity Corporation, 112 Neb. 161, 198 N.W. 864, 866, 35 A.L.R. 1003; and also denied, Fox v. Interstate Exch., 182 Wis. 28, 195 N.W. 842. Liability has also been denied where collision was with earth, after automobile had Bone over an embankment, Continental Casualty Co. v. Paul. 209 Ala. 166, 95 So. 814, 815, 30 A.L.R. 802 (contra Polstein v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 203 N.Y.S. 362, 122 Misc. 194); and with stump after skidding off the road, Ploe v. Inter-national Indemnity Co., 128 Wash. 480, 223 P. 327, 328, 35 A.L.R. 999. Liability has been sustained for damages caused by collision with sides of rut, Wood v. Southern Casualty Co., Tex.Civ.App., 270 S.W. 1055, 1057; and both sustained and denied where body or frame of automobile collided with the road through the breaking of an axle or other cause, Young v. New Jersey Ins. Co., D.C.Mont., 284 F. 492, 493; Great American Mut. Indemnity Co. v. Jones. 111 Ohio St. 84, 144 N.E. 596, 35 A.L.R. 1023; Great East-ern Casualty Co. v. Solinsky, 150 Tenn. 206, 263 S.W. 71, 74, 35 A.L.R. 1007. Liability has been sustained where elevator containing automobile fell, Freiberger v. Globe Indemnity Co., 199 N.Y.S. 310, 311, 205 App.Div. 116; National Fire Ins..Co of Hartford, Conn., v. Elliott, C.C.A. Mo., 7 F.2d 522, 527, 42 A.L.R. 1121; where standing car ran over precipice, St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. American Compounding Co., 211 Ala. 593, 100 So. 904, 906, 35 A.L.R. 1018; where scoop of steamshovel loading autotruck fell on latter, Universal Service Co. v. American Ins. Co., 213 Mich. 523, 181 N.W. 1007, 14 A.L.R. 183; but denied where second floor of garage fell upon automobile, O’Leary v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 196 S.W. 575. This subject is fully discussed in Blashfield, Cyc. of Automobile Law and Prac., Perm.Ed., §§ 3691-3698.
COLLISION CLAUSE. An additional provision for insurance, on the margin of the policy, cover-ing the contingency of a collision of the insured vessel with another vessel and the liability of the insured for the injury to such other vessel. Fire-man’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Globe Nav. Co., C.C.A. Wash., 236 F. 618, 631. Also known as "running clown" clause.
COLLISTRIGIUM. The pillory.
COLLOBIUM. A hood or covering for the shoul-ders, formerly worn by serjeants at law.
COLLOCATION. In French law. The arrange-ment or marshaling of the creditors of an estate in the order in which they are to be paid accord-ing to law. Merl. Répert.
COLLOQUIUM. One of the usual parts of the declaration in an action for slander. It is a gen-eral averment that the words complained of were spoken "of and concerning the plaintiff," or con-cerning the extrinsic matters alleged in the in-ducement, and its office is to connect the whole publication with the previous statement. Van Vechten v. Hopkins, 5 Johns., N.Y., 220, 4 Am.Dec. 339; Lukehart v. Byerly, 53 Pa. 421; Express Pub. Co. v. Wilkins, Tex.Civ.App., 218 S.W. 614, 616; Kee v. Armstrong, Byrd & Co., 75 Okl. 84, 182 P. 494, 498, 5 A.L.R. 1349.
An averment that the words In question are spoken of or concerning some usage, report, or fact which gives to words otherwise indifferent the peculiar defamatory mean-ing assigned to them. Carter v. Andrews, 16 Pick., Mass., 6; Moore v. Leverett, Tex.Civ.App., 33 S.W.2d 838, 842.

COLLUSION. Is an agreement between two or more persons to defraud a person of his rights by the forms of law, or to obtain an object forbidden by law. It implies the existence of fraud of some kind, the employment of fraudulent means, or of lawful means for the accomplishment of an unláw-ful purpose. May Hosiery Mills v. United States District Court in and for Dist. of Montana, C.C.A. Mont., 64 F.2d 450, 454.
A secret combination, conspiracy, or concert of action between two or more persons for fraudulent or deceitful purpose. W. E. Bowen Improvement Co. v. Van Hafften, 209 Mo.App. 629, 238 S.W. 147, 149; Daly v. Haight, 156 N.Y.S. 538, 541, 170 App.Div. 469.
A secret arrangement between two or more persons, whose interests are apparently conflicting, to make use of the forms and proceedings of law in order to defraud a third person, or to obtain that which justice would not give them, by deceiving a court or its officers. Railroad Co. v. Gay, 86 Tex. 571, 26 S.W. 599, 25 L.R.A. 52; Balch v. Beach, 119 Wis. 77, 95 N.W. 132. A secret agreement between two persons that ene should institute a suit against the other, in order to obtain the decision of a judicial tribunal for some sinister purpose. In re Insull iftility Investments, D.C.I11., 6 F.Supp. 653, 655.
In divorce proceedings, collusion is an agreement between husband and wife that one of them shall commlt, or appear to have committed, or be represented in court as having committed, acts constituting a cause of divorce, for the purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce. But it also means connivance or conspiracy in initiating or prosecuting the suit, as where there is a compact for mutual aid in carrying it through to a decree. Beard v. Beard, 65 Cal. 354, 4 P. 229: Pohlman v. Pohlman, 60 N.J.Eq. 28, 46 A. 658; McCauley v. McCauley, 88 N.J.Eq. 392, 103 A. 20, 23. Rosenzweig v. Rosenzweig, 246 N.Y.S. 231, 233, 231 App.Div. 13.
COLLUSIVE ACTION. An action not founded upon an actual controversy between the parties to it, but brought for purpose of securing a deter-mination of a point of law for the gratification of curiosity or to settle rights of third persons not parties. It will not be entertained. City and County of San Francisco v. Boyd, 22 Ca1.2d 685, 140 P.2d 666, 669, 670.
COLLYBISTA. In the civil law. A money-chang-er; a dealer in money.
COLLYBUM. In the civil law. Exchange.
COLNE. In Saxon and old English law. An ac-count or calculation.
COLONUS. In old European law. A husband-man; an inferior tenant ernployed in cultivating the lord’s land. A term of Roman origin, cor-responding with the Saxon ceorl. 1 Spence, Ch. 51.
COLONY. A dependent political community, con-sisting of a number of citizens of the same country who have emigrated therefrom to people another, and remain subject to the mother-country. U. S. v. The Nancy, 3 Wash.C.C. 287, Fed.Cas.No.15,854.
A settlement in a foreign country possessed and cultivated, either wholly or partially, by im-migrants and their descendants, who have a politi-cal connection with and subordination to the moth-er-country, whence they emigrated. In other words, it is a place peopled from some more an-cient city or country. Wharton.

Colonial Office

In the English government, this is the depart-ment of state through which the sovereign ap-points colonial governors, etc., and communicates with them. Until the year 1854, the secretary for the colonies was also secretary for war.

Colonial Laws

In America, this term designates the body of law in force in the thirteen original colonies be-fore the Declaration of Independence. In Eng-land, the term signifies the laws enacted by Cana-da and the other present British colonies.
COLOR. An appearance, semblance, or
simula-crum, as distinguished from that which is real. A prima facie or apparent right. Hence, a de-ceptive appearance; a plausible, assumed exterior, concealing a lack of reality; a disguise or pre-text. Railroad Co. v. Allfree, 64 Iowa 500, 20 N.W. 779; Broughton v. Haywood, 61 N.C. 383; Wilt v. Bueter, 186 Ind. 98, 111 N.E. 926, 929.
In pleading. Ground of action admitted to sub-sist in the opposite party by the pleading of one of the parties to an action, which is so set out as to be apparently valid, but which is in reality legally insufficient.
A term of the ancient rhetoricians, and early adopted into the language of pleading. It was an apparent or prima facie right; and the meaning of the rule that pleadings in confession and avoidance should give color was that they should confess the matter adversely alleged, to such an extent, at least, as to admit some apparent right in the opposite party, which required to be encountered and avoided by the allegation of new matter. Color \vas either express, i. e., inserted in the pleading, or irnplied, which was naturally inherent in the struclure of thé pleading. Steph.P1. 233; Alerten v. Bank, 5 Okl. 585, 49 P. 913. Wheeler v. Nickels, 168 Or. 604, 126 P.2d 32, 36.
The word also means the dark color of the skin showing the presence of negro blood; and hence it is equivalent to African descent or parentage. Johnson v. Board of Education of Wilson County, 166 N.C. 468, 82 S.E. 832, 834, L.R.A.1915A, 828.
COLOR OF AUTHORITY. That semblance or pre-sumption of authority sustaining the acts of a Pub-lic officer which is derived from his apparent title to the office or from a writ or other process in his hands apparently valid and regular. State v. Oates, 86 Wis. 634, 57 N.W. 296, 39 Am.St.Rep. 912.
COLOR OF LAW. The appearance or semblance, without the substance, of legal right. State v. Brechler, 185 Wis. 599, 202 N.W. 144, 148.
COLOR OF OFFICE. An act unjustly done by the countenance of an office, being grounded upon corruption, to which the. office is as a shadow and color. Plow. 64. Day v. National Bond & Invest-ment Co., Mo.App., 99 S.W.2d 117, 119.
A claim or assumption of right to do an act by virtue of an office, made by a person who is legally destitute of any such right. Feller v. Gates, 40 Or. 543, 67 P. 416, 56 L.R.A. 630, 91 Am.St.Rep. 492; Citizens’ Bank of Colquitt v. American Surety Co. of New York, 174 Ga. 852, 164 S.E. 817; Pon-tiac Trust Co. v. Newell, 266 Mich. 490, 254 N.W. 178, 181.

Such person must be at least officer de factor. Burrall v. Acker, 23 Wend., N.Y., 606, 35 Am.Dec. 582; Day v. National Bond & Investment Co., Mo.App., 99 S.W.2d 117, 119. See, also, Colore Otfiell.
COLOR OF TITLE. The appearance, semblance, or simulacrum of title. Also termed "apparent title." Any fact, extraneous to the act or mere will of the claimant, which has the appearance, on its face, of supporting his claim of a present title to land, but which, for some defect, in reality falls short of establishing it. Howth v. Farrar, C.C.A. Tex., 94 F.2d 654, 658; Saltmarsh v. Crommelin, 24 Ala. 352.
.Anything in wrIting purporting to convey title to the land, which defines the extent of the claim, it being imma-te/Jai how defective or lmperfect the writing may be, so that it is a sign, semblance, or color of title. Thelsen v. Qualley, 42 S.D. 367, 175 N.W. 556, 557. A title that is imperfect, but not so obviously so that It would be appar-ent to one not skIlled in the law. Ipock v. Gaskins, 161 N.C. 673, 77 S.E. 843, 847.
A writing upon its face professIng to pass Une but which does not, elther through want of title in the grantor or a defective mode of conveyance. Phllbin v. Carr, 75 Ind.App. 560, 129 N.E. 19, 24; Glass v. Lynchburg Shoe Co., 212 N.C. 70, 192 S.E. 899.
That which the law conslders prima facie a good title, but which, by reason of some defect, not appearing on its face, does not in fact amount to title. An absolute nulllty, as a void deed, judgment, etc., will not constitute color of tale. Causey v. White, 143 Ga. 7, 84 S.E. 58; Stearns Coal & Lamber Co. v. Boyatt, 168 Ky. 111, 181 S.W. 962, 964. That which is title In appearance but not in reality. Fffs-chen Bros. Commerclal Co. v. Noyes’ Estate, 76 Mont. 175, 246 P. 773, 779; Boland v. Heck, 179 Okl, 403, 65 P.2d 1213, 1215.
"Any instrument having a grantor and grantee, and con-taining a description of the lands intended to be conveyed, and apt words for their conveyance, gives color of title to the lands described. Such an Instrument purports to be a conveyance of the Une, and because it does not, for some reason, have that effect, It passes only color or the sem-blance of a tale." Brooks v. Bruyn, 35 III. 392.
"Color of title" is not synonymous with "claim of tale." To constitute "color of title" there must be a paper title to give color to the adverse possession, whereas, a "claim of Une" may be shown wholly by parol. Walton v. Sikes, 165 Ga. 422, 141 S.E. 188, 190.
COLORABLE. That which has or gives color. That which is in appearance only, and not in reali-ty, what it purports to be. Counterfeit, feigned, having the appearance of truth. Ellis v. Jones, 73 Colo. 516, 216 P. 257, 258.
COLORABLE ALTERATION. One which makes no real or substantial change, but is introduced only as a subterfuge or means of evading the pat-ent or copyright law.
COLORABLE CAUSE OR INVOCATION OF JU-RISDICTION. With reference to actions for ma-licious prosecution, a "colorable cause or invoca-tion of jurisdiction" means that a person, appar-ently qualified, has appeared before a justice and made a complaint under oath and in writing, stat-ing some facts which in connection with other facts constitute a criminal offense or bear a simili-tude thereto. Hotel Supply Co. v. Reid, 16 Ala. App. 563, 80 So. 137, 138.
COLORABLE CLAIM. In bankruptcy law, a claim made by one holding the property as an agent or bailee of the bankrupt; a claim in which as a matter of law, there is no adverseness. In re Iním, C.C.A.Wis., 202 F. 883, 884; In re Western Rope & Mfg. Co., C.C.A.Oki., 298 F. 926, 927.
COLORABLE IMITATION. In the law of trade-marks, this phrase denotes such a close or in-genious imitation as to be calculated to deceive or-dinary persons.
COLORABLE PLEADING. The practice of giving color in pleading.
COLORABLE TRANSACTION. One presenting an appearance which does not correspond with the reality, and, ordinarily, an appearance intend-ed to conceal or to deceive. Osborn v. Osborn, 102 Kan. 890, 172 P. 23, 24.
COLORE OFFICII. Lat. By color of office. Of-ficer’s acts unauthorized by officer’s position, though done in forro that purports that acts are done by reason of official duty and by virtue of office. Richards v. American Surety Co. of New York, 48 Ga.App. 102, 171 S.E. 924. See, also, Color of Office.
COLORED. By common usage in America, this term, in such phrases as "colored persons," "the colored race," "colored men," and the like, is used to designate negroes or persons of the African race, including all persons of mixed blood descend-ed from negro ancestry. Collins v. Oklahoma State Hospital, 76 Okl. 229, 184 P. 946, 949, 7 A.L.R. 895; Theophanis v. Theophanis, 244 Ky. 689, 51 S.W.2d 957.
But where a state Constitution provIded for separate schools for the wbi te and colored races, the term "white race" was held to be limited to the Caucaslan race, and the term "colored races" to embrace all other races. Rice v. Gong Lum, 139 Miss. 760, 104 So. 105, 107.
It has also been held that there is no legal technical signification to the phrase "colored person" which the courts are bound judicially to know. Pauska v. Daus, 31 Tex. 74.
COLPICES. Young poles, which, being cut down, are made levers or lifters. Blount.
COLPINDACH. In old Scotch law. A young beast or cow, of the age of one or two years; in later times called a "cowdasb."
COLT. An animal of the horse species, whether male or female, not more than four years old. Russ. & R. 416; Mallory v. Berry, 16 Kan. 295; Pullen v. State, 11 Tex.App. 91.
COM. An abbreviation for "company," exactly equivalent to "Co." Keith v. Sturges, 51 Ill. 142.
COMBARONES. In old English law. Fellow-barons; fellow-citizens ;—the citizens or freemen of the Cinque Ports being anciently called "bar-ons;" the term "combarones" is used in this sense in a grant of Henry III. to the barons of the port of Fevresham. Cowell.
COMBAT. A forcible encounter between two or more persons; a battle; a duel. Trial by battle.

Mutual Combat

One into which both the parties enter willingly or voluntarily; it implies a common intent to fight, but not necessarily an exchange of blows. Aldridge v. State, 59 Miss. 250; Tate v. State, 46 Ga. 158; State v. Moss, 24 N.M. 59, 172 P. 199; Findley v. State, 125 Ga. 583, 54 S.E. 106.
COMBATERR7E. A valley or piece of low ground between two hills. Kennett, Gloss.
COMBE. A small or narrow valley.
COMBINATION. A conspiracy, or confederation of men for unlawful or violent deeds. See Deu-pree v. Thornton, 97 Neb. 812, 151 N.W. 305, 307, L.R.A.1917C, 65.
In patent law. A union of different elements. A patent may be taken out for a new combina-tion of existing machines. Stevenson Co. v. Mc-Fassell, C.C.A.Pa., 90 F. 707, 33 C.C.A. 249; Moore v. Schaw, C.C.Cal., 118 F. 602; Moody v. Fiske, 2 Mas. 112, Fed.Cas.No.9,745.
In patent law. A composition of old or new elements, and it is patentable, if it produces new and useful results, though all its constituents were well known and in common use before it was made, provided the results are a product of the combination, and not a mere aggregate of several results. U. S. Industrial Chemical Co. v. Theroz Co., C.C.A.Md., 25 F.2d 387, 391.
The distInction between a "combination" and an "aggre-gation" lies In the presence or absence of mutuality of action; a "combination" essentlally requiring that there be some joint operatión performed by its elements, pro-ducIng a result due to thelr joint and cooperatIng action, whlle in an "aggregatlon" there Is a mere addlng together of separate contrlbutions, each operating independently oí the other. Ball v. Coker, C.C.A.S.C., 210 F. 278, 282; Mead Morrision Mfg. Co. v. Exeter Mach. Works, D.C.Pa., 215 F. 731.
COMBINATION IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE. A trust, pool, or other association of two’ or more individuals or corporations having for its object to monopolize the manufacture or traffic in a partic-ular commodity, to regulate or control the output, restrict the sale, establish and maintain the price, stifle or exclude competition, or otherwise to in-terfere with the normal course of trade under conditions of free competition. Northern Securi-ties Co. v. U. S., 193 U.S. 197, 24 S.Ct. 436, 48 L.Ed. 679; U. S. v. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 15 S.Ct. 249, 39 L.Ed. 325.
COMBINED CARBON. As used in the metallurgy of iron and steel, carbon in union with some one or more metallic constituents in the iron alloy. Pitts-burgh Iron & Steel Foundries Co. v. Seaman-Sleeth Co., C.C.A.Pa., 248 F. 705, 707.
COMBING WOOL. A longstapled wool, usually combed, employed in the manufacture of worsteds. Stone & Downer Co. v. U. S., 12 Ct.Cust.App. 62, 63; U. S. v. Stone & Downer Co., 12 Ct.Cust.App. 557. See Clothing Wool.
COMBUSTIBLE. Capable of undergoing combus-tion; apt to catch fire; inflammable. Hebrlee v. Hawley, 112 Kan. 398, 211 P. 129, 131.
COMBUSTIO. Burning. In old English law. The punishment inflicted upon apostates COMBUSTIO DOMORUM. Houseburning; arson. 4 Bl.Comm. 272.
COMBUSTIO PECUNLzE. Burning of money; the ancient method 01 testing mixed and corrupt money, paid into the exchequer, by melting it down.
COME. To present oneself; to appear in court. In modern practice, though such presence may be constructive only, the word is still used to indicate participation in the proceedings. Horner v. O’Laughlin, 29 Md. 472. Melfi v. Barney, R.I., 121 A. 67, 68.
Thus, a pleading may begin, "Now comes the defend-ant," etc. In case of a default, the technlcal language oí the record Is that the party "comes not, but makes default."
COMES, v. A word used in a pleading to indicate the defendant’s presence in court. See Come.
COMES, n. Lat. A follower, companion, or at-tendant; a count or earl.
COMES AND DEFENDS. This phrase, anciently used in the language of pleading, and still surviv-ing in some jurisdictions, occurs at the commence-ment of a defendant’s plea or demurrer; and of its two verbs the former signifies that he appears in court, the latter that he defends the action.
COMFORT. Benefit, consolation, contentment, ease, enjoyment, happiness, pleasure, or satisfac-tion. National Surety Co. v. Jarrett, 95 W.Va. 420, 121 S.E. 291.
COMFORTABLE SPEED. As applied to rallway trains, is a speed which has been developed by ex-perience and observation to mean that speed at which you can run a train around a curve, and the passengers will not feel any uncomfortable or unpleasant lurch in going around the curve. Ches-apeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Tanner, 165 Va. 406, 182 S.E. 239.
COMINUS. Lat. Immediately; hand-to-hand; in personal contact.
COMITAS. Lat. Courtesy; civility; comity. An indulgence or favor granted another nation, as a mere matter of indulgence, without any claim of right made. Comitas inter communitates; or comitas inter gentes; comity between communi-ties or nations; comity of nations. 2 Kent, Comm. 457.
COMITATU COMMISSO. A writ or commission, whereby a sheriff is authorized to enter upon the charges of a county. Reg.Orig. 295.
COMITATU ET CASTRO COMMISSO. A writ by which the charge of a county, together with the keeping of a castle, is committed to the sheriff.
COMITATUS. In old English law. A county or shire; the body of a county. The territorial juris-diction of a comes, i. e., count or earl. 1 Bla. Comm. 116. An earldom. 1 Ld.Raym. 13. The county court, a court of great antiquity and of great dignity in early times. 1 Spence, Eq.Jur. 42,66. Also, the retinue or train of a prince or high governmental official. Spelman. The retinue which accompanied a Roman proconsul to his province. Du Cange. The personal following of professional warriors. Taylor, Jurispr. 216.
COMITES. Counts or earls. Attendants or fol-lowers. Persons composing the retinue of a high functionary.
Persons who are attached to the suite of a pub-lic minister. As to their privileges, see Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 Dall. (Pa.) 117, 1 L.Ed. 59; U. S. v. Benner, Baldw. 240, Fed.Cas.No.14,568.
COMITES PALEYS. Counts or earls palatine; those who had the government of a county pala-tine.
COMITIA. In Roman law. An assembly, either (1) of the Roman curiw, in which case it was called the "comitia curiata vel calata"; or (2) of the Roman centuries, in which case it was called the "comitia centuriata" (called also comitia ma-jora); or (3) of the Roman tribes, in which case it was called the "comitia tributa." Only patri-cians were members of the first comitia, and only plebians of the last; but the comitia centuriata comprised the entire populace, patricians and ple-bians both, and was the great legislative assembly passing the leges, properly so called, as the senate passed the senatus consulta, and the comitia tribu-ta passed the plebiscita. Under the Lex Horten-sia, 287 B.C., the plebiscitum acquired the force of a lex. Brown.
COMITISSA. In old English law. A countess; an earl’s wife.
COMITIVA. In old English law. The dignity and office of a comes (count or earl) ; the same with what was afterwards called "comitatus."
Also a companion or fellow•traveler; a troop or company of robbers. Jacob.
COMITY. Courtesy; complaisance; respect; a willingness to grant a privilege, not as a matter of right, but out of deference and good will. Dow v. Lillie, 26 N.D. 512, 144 N.W. 1082, 1088, L.R.A. 1915D, 754; Cox v. Terminal R. Ass’n of St. Louis, 331 Mo. 910, 55 S.W.2d 685.

Comity of Nations (Lat. comitas gentium)

The most appropriate phrase to express the true foundation and extent of the obligation of the laws of one nation within the territories of another. Story, Confl.Laws, § 38. That body of rules which states observe towards one another from courtesy or mutual convenience, although they do not form part of international law. Holtz. Enc. s. v. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 16 S.Ct. 139, 40 L.Ed. 95; People v. Rushworth, 294 Ill. 455, 128 N.E. 555, 558; Second Russian Ins. Co. v. Miller, C.C.A.N.Y., 297 F. 404, 409.
It le derived altogether from the voluntary consent of the !atter; and it is Madmissible when It 1s contrary to Its
known pollcy, or prejudicial to its interests. In the silence of any positive rule affirming or denying or restraining the
operation of foreign laws, courts of justice presume the tacít adoption of them by their own government, unless repugnant to its policy, or prejudicial to its interests. It .is not the comity of the courts, but the comity of the nation, which is administered and ascertained in the same way, and guided by the same reasoning, by which all other principies of thé municipal law are ascertained and guided.
The recognition which one nation allows within its terri-tory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws. State ex rel. National Surety Corporation v. Price, 129 Neb. 433, 261 N.W. 894.
"The use of the word ‘comity’ as expressing the basls of jurisdiction has been criticized. It is, however, a mere question of definition. The principies lying behind the word are recognized. * * * The truth remains that jurisdiction depends upon the law of the forum, and this law in turn depends upon the public policy disclosed by the acts and declarations of the political departments of the government." Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259, 260.
Judicial Comity
The principie in accordance with which the courts of one state or jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another, not as a matter of obligation, but out of deference and respect. Franzen v. Zimmer, 35 N.Y.S. 612, 90 Hun 103; Stowe v. Bank, C.C.Me., 92 F. 96; Strawn Mercantile Co. v. First Nat. Bank, Tex. Civ.App., 279 S.W. 473, 474; Bobala v. Bobala, 68 Ohio App. 63, 33 N.E.2d 845, 849.
There is no statute or common-law rule by which one court Is bound to abide by the decisions of another court of equal rank. It does so simply for what may be called comity among judges. There is no common law or statu-tory rule to oblige a court to bow to its own decisions; it does so on the ground of judicial comity. (1884) 9 P.D. 98, per Erett, M. R.
Of such a use of the word, however, Dicey says: "The terco ‘comity’ • * * is open to the charge of implying that the júdge, when he applies foreign law to a particular case, does so as a matter of caprice or favor."
Comity ís not a rule of law, but one of practice, con-venience ami expediency. It is something more than mere courtesy, which implies only deference to the opinion of others, since ít has a substantial value In securíng uní-formity. of decision, and discouraging repeated litigation of the same question. But its obligation is not imperatíve. Comity persuades; but ít does not command. It declares not how a case shall be decided, but how It may with pro-priety be decided. Mast, Foos & Co. v. Mf g. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488, 20 S.Ct. 708, 44 L.Ed. 856: National Electric Sig-naling Co. v. Telefunken Wireless Telegraph Co. of United States, C.C.A.N.Y., 221 F. 629, 632; Lauer v. Freudenthal, 96 Wash. 394, 165 P. 98, 99

Comity of States
Simply a phrase designating the practice by which the courts of one state follow the decision of another on a like question, though not bound by law of precedents to do so. Larrick v. Walters, 39 Ohio App. 363, 177 N.E. 642, 645.
COMMA. A point used to mark the smallest structural divisions of a sentence, or a rhetorical punctuation mark indicating the slightest possible separation in ideas or construction. Travelers’ Ins. Co. v. Pomerantz, 124 Misc. 250, 207 N.Y.S. 81, 86.
COMMAND. An order, imperative direction, or behest. State v. Mann, 2 N.C. 4; Barney v. Hayes,

11 Mont. 571, 29 P. 282, 28 Am.St.Rep. 495. As applied to a fortress, "command" means actual control of the garrison for military purposes. As applied to a ship, it means actual control of the crew for nautical purposes. Hamilton v. U. S., C. C.A.Va., 268 F. 15, 19.
The term "instance," as used with reference to doing an act at one’s instance, does not imply the same degree of obligation to obey as does "command." Feore v. Tram-niel, 104 So. 808, 813, 213 Ala. 293.
COMMANDEMENT. In French law. A writ served by the huissier pursuant to a judgment or to an executory notarial deed. Its Object is to give notice to the debtor that if he does not pay the sum to which he has been condemned by the judgment, or which he engaged to pay by the no-tarial deed, his property will be seized and sold. Arg.Fr.Merc.Law, 550.
COMMANDER IN CHIEF. By article 2, § 2, of the constitution it is declared that the president shall be commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States. The term implies su-preme control of military operations during the progress of a war, not only on the side of strategy al 1 tactics, but also in reference to the political and international aspects of the war. See Flem-ing v. Page, 9 How. 603, 13 L.Ed. 276; Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635, 17 L.Ed. 459; Swaim v. U. S., 28 Ct. Cl. 173.
COMMANDERY. In old English law. A manor or chief messuage with lands and tenements there-to appertaining, which belonged to the priory of St. John of Jerusalem, in England; he who had the government of such a manor or house was styled the "commander," who could not dispose of it, but to the use of the priory, only taking thence his own sustenance, according to his degree. The manors and lands belonging to the priory of St. John of Jerusalem were given to Henry the Eighth by 32 Hen. VIII. c. 20, about the time of the dis-solution of abbeys and monasteries; so that the name only of commanderies remains, the power being long since extinct. Wharton.
COIVIMANDITAIRES. Special partners; partners en commandité. See Commandité.
COMMANDITÉ. In French law. A partnership in which some furnish money, and others furnish their skill and labor in place of capital.
A special or limited partnership, where the con-tract is between one or more persons who are general partners, and jointly and severally re-sponsible, and one or more other persons who merely furnish a particular fund or capital stock, and thence are called "commanditaires," or "com-mdnditaires," or "partners en commandité;" the business being carried on under the social name or firm of the general partners only, composed of the names of the general or complementary part-ners, the partners in commandité being liable to losses only to the extent of the funds or capital furnished by them. Story, Partn. § 78; 3 Kent, Comm. 34. The term includes a partnership con-taining dormant rather than special partners. Story, Partn. § 109.

COMMANDMENT.
An authoritative order of a judge or magisterial officer.
In criminal law. The act or offense of one who commands another to transgress the law, or do a nything contrary to law, as theft, murder, or the like. Particularly applied to the act of an acces-sary before the fact, in inciting, procuring, set-ting on, or stirring up another to do the fact or act. 2 Inst. 182.
COMMARCHIO. A boundary; the confines of land.
COMMENCE. To perform the first act of. Rob-inson v. Gordon Oil Co., 258 Mich. 643, 242 N.W. 795, 796. To institute. State v. Murphy, 120 Kan. 350, 243 P. 288, 289. To demand something by the institution of process in a court of justice. Ledonne v. Commerce Ins. Co. of Glen Falls, N.Y., 307 Pa. 1, 160 A. 612.
To commence an action or suit is to demand something by the institution of process in a court of justice. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 408, 5 L.Ed. 257.
To "bring" a suit is an equivalent term; an action 1s "commenced" when it is "brought," and vice versa. Gold-enberg v. Murphy, 108 U.S. 162, 2 S.Ct. 388. 27 L.Ed. 686; Hannaman v. Gordon, Tex.Com.App., 261 S.W. 1006, 1007.
An action ls "commenced" within the meaning of the statute of limitations as soon as the summons is signed and sealed in good faith, for the purpose of immediate service, and that purpose is not afterwards abandoned. Wilson v. Clear, 85 N.J.L. 474, 89 A. 1031. Compare Glenn v. Payne, 153 Tenn. 240, 280 S.W. 1019, 1021. Owen v. City of Eastland, 124 Tex. 419, 78 S.W.2d 178, 179.
A suit in a court of record is "commenced", so as to save suit from bar of statute of limitations, when the petition is Oled, even though process is not issued until the perlod of limitation has run, since plaintiff has done all he can toward commencement of the suit. Mo.St.Ann. § 724, p. 940. City of St. Louis v. Miller, 235 Mo.App. 987, 145 S.W.2d 504, 505.
A suit in equity ls not commenced until the issuance of a subpcena followed by a bona fide effort to serve it. U. S. v. Scheurman, D.C.Idaho, 218 F. 915, 919.
To commence drilling operations within the meaning of an oil and gas lease has reference to the first movement of the drill in penetrating the ground. Solberg v. Sunburst Oil & Gas Co., 73 Mont. 94, 235 P. 761, 763. But see Terry v. Texas Co. Tex.Civ.App., 228 S.W. 1019, holding that a ]essee, by placing timbers for the erection of a derrick, together with machinery, including a boller, on the ground where an oil well was to be drilled, complied with a pro-vision requiring hlm to "commence to drill." But com-pare Lauderdale Power Co. v. Perry, 202 Ala. 394, 80 So. 476, 480.
Criminal prosecution is "commenced" within statute of limitations when complaint is filed with magistrate in good faith and warrant issued. Hicks v. State, 54 Okl.Cr. 431, 23 P.2d 219.
Commencement of building or improvement, within the meaning of Lien Law, is the visible commencement of actual operations on the ground for the erection of the building, which every one can readily recognize as commencement of a building, and which is done with intention to con-tinue the work until building is completed. Se-curity Stove & Mf g. Co. v. Sellards, 133 Kan. 747, 3 P.2d 481, 482, 76 A.L.R. 1397

COMMENCEMENT OF A DECLARATION. That part of the declaration which follows the venue and precedes the circumstantial statement of the cause of action.
It formerly contalned a statement of the names of the parties, and the character in which they sue or are sued, if any other than their natural capacity; of the mode in which the defendant had been brought into court, and a brief statement of the form of action. In modem practice, however, In moat cases, it contains little else then the names and character of the parties.
COMMENDA. In French law. The delivery of a benefice to one who cannot hold the legal title, to keep and manage it for a time limited and ren-der an account of the proceeds. Guyot, Rép.Univ.
In Mercantile Law. An association in which the management of the property was intrusted to in-dividuals. Troub.Lim.Partn. c. 3, § 27.
COMMENDA EST FACULTAS RECIPIENDI ET RETINENDI BENEFICIUM CONTRA JUS POSI-TIVUM A SUPREMA POTESTATE. Moore, 905. A commendam is the power of receiving and re-taining a benefice contrary to positive law, by supreme authority.
COMMENDAM. In ecclesiastical law. The ap-pointment of a suitable clerk to hold a void or va-cant benefice or church living until a regular pas-tor be appointed. Hob. 144; Latch, 236.
In Commercial Law. A species of limited part-nership. The limited partnership (or Société en commandité) of the French law has been intro-duced into the Code of Louisiana under the title of "Partnership in Commendam." Civil Code La. art. 2810 (Civ.Code, art. 2839). See Mitchell, in 3 Sel.Essays, Anglo-Amer.L.H. 183; Commandité; Société.
COMMENDATIO. In the civil law. Commenda-tion, praise, or recommendation, as in the maxim "simplex comrnendatio non obligat," meaning that mere recommendation or praise of an article by the seller of it does not amount to a warranty of its qualities. 2 Kent, Comm. 485.
COMMENDATION. In feudal law. The act by which an owner of alodial land placed himself and his land under the protection of a lord, so as to constitute himself his vassal or feudal tenant.
COMMENDATORS. Secular persons upon whom ecclesiastical benefices were bestowed, as in Scot-land; called so because the benefices were com-mended and intrusted to their supervision. They are merely trustees.
COMMENDATORY. He who holds a church liv-ing or preferment in commendam.
COMMENDATORY LETTERS. In ecclesiastical law. Such as are written by one bishop to another on behalf of any of the clergy, or others of his diocese traveling thither, that they may be re-ceived among the faithful, or that the clerk may be promoted, or necessaries administered to others, etc. Wharton.
COMMENDATUS. In feudal law. One who in-trusts himself to the protection of another. Spel-man. A person who, by voluntary homage, put himself under the protection of a superior lord. Cowell.
COMMENT. The expression of the judgment passed upon certain alleged facts by a person who has applied his mind to them, and who while so commenting assumes that such allegations of fact are true. The assertion of a fact is not a "com-ment." Horn v. State, 106 Tex.Cr.R. 190, 292 S. W. 227, 228.
COMMENT UPON THE EVIDENCE. Means that trial judge is prohibited from conveying to jury trial judge’s personal opinion as to the truth or falsity of any evidence, but prohibition does not prohibit judges from giving counsel reasons for rulings on questions presented during progress of trial, or prohibit them in all cases from stat-ing, when necessary, the facts upon which they base their conclusions. State v. Brown, 19 Wash. 2d 195, 142 P.2d 257, 259, 260.
COMMERCE. The exchange of goods, produc-tions, or property of any kind. Jeu Jo Wan v. Nagle, C.C.A.Cal., 9 F.2d 309, 310.
Intercourse by way of trade and traffic between different peoples or states and the citizens or in. habitants thereof, including not only the purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities, but also the in-strumentalities and agencies by which it is pro-moted and the means and appliances by which it is carried on, and the transportation of persons as well as of goods, both by land and by sea. Bren-nan v. Titusville, 14 S.Ct. 829, 153 U.S. 289, 38 L. Ed. 719; Railroad Co. v. Fuller, 17 Wall. 568, 21 L.Ed. 710; Hoke v. United States, 33 S.Ct. 281, 283, 227 U.S. 308, 57 L.Ed. 523, 43 L.R.A.,N.S., 906, Ann.Cas.1913E, 905. Also interchange of ideas, sentiments, etc., as between man and man. U. S. v. Eason Oil Co., D.C.Okl., 8 F.Supp. 365, 368.
Commerce, ln its simplest signification, means an exchange of goods; but ln the advancement of soctety, labor, transportation, intelilgence, tare and various medi-ums of exchange, become commodities and enter into com-merce; the subject, the vehicle, the agent, and their various operations become the objects of commercial regulation. Lorenzettl v. American Trust Co., D.C.Cal., 45 F.Supp. 128, 132.
"Commerce" is not trefile alone, but is Intercourse between nations and parts of nations In all its branches. Blumenstock Bros. Advertising Agency v. Curtis Pub. Co., 252 U.S. 436, 40 S.Ct. 385, 387, 64 L.Ed. 649.
The words "commerce" and "trade" are often used interchangeably; but, strictly speaking, commerce relates to intercourse or dealings with foreign nations, states, or political communIties, while trade denotes business inter-course or mutual traffic within the limits of a state or natlon, or the buying, selling, and exchanging of articles between members of the same community. Hooker v. Van-dewater, 4 Denlo, N.Y., 353, 47 Am.Dec. 258; Jacob; Wharton.
—Commerce among the states. Transportation from one state to another, and also all commercial intercourse between the different states, and all component parts of such intercourse. Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 42 S.Ct. 106, 108, 66 L.Ed. 239.
—Commerce with foreign nations. Commerce be-tween citizens of the United States and citizens or

"trade" are often used interchangeably; but, strictly speaking, commerce relates to intercourse or dealings with foreign nations, states, or political communIties, while trade denotes business inter-course or mutual traffic within the limits of a state or natlon, or the buying, selling, and exchanging of articles between members of the same community. Hooker v. Van-dewater, 4 Denlo, N.Y., 353, 47 Am.Dec. 258; Jacob; Wharton.
—Commerce among the states. Transportation from one state to another, and also all commercial intercourse between the different states, and all component parts of such intercourse. Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 42 S.Ct. 106, 108, 66 L.Ed. 239.
—Commerce with foreign nations. Commerce be-tween citizens of the United States and citizens or
336
subjects of foreign governments; commerce which, either immediately or at some stage of its progress, is extraterritorial. U. S. v. Holliday, 3 Wall. 409, 18 L.Ed. 182; Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 573, 14 L.Ed. 545; Lord v. Steamship Co., 102 U.S. 544, 26 L.Ed. 224. The same as "foreign com-merce," which see infra.
Power of Congress to regulate "commerce with foreign nations" comprehends every species of commercial inter-course. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 1, § 8, el. 3. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois v. U. S., Cust. & Pat.App., 53 S.Ct. 509, 289 U.S. 48, 77 L.Ed. 1025.
—Commerce with Indian tribes. Commerce with individuals belonging to such tribes, in the nature of buying, selling, and exchanging commodities, without reference to the locality where carried on, though it be within the limits of a state. U. S. v. Holliday, 3 Wall. 407, 18 L.Ed. 182; U. S. v. Cisna, 25 Fed.Cas. 424.
—Domestic commerce. Commerce carried on wholly within the limits of the United States, as distinguished from foreign commerce. Also, com-merce carried on within the limits of a single state, as distinguished from interstate commerce. Louis-ville & N. R. Co. v. Tennessee R. R. Com’n, C.C. Tenn., 19 Fed. 701.
—Foreign commerce. Commerce or trade between the United States and foreign countries. Com. v. Housatonic R. Co., 143 Mass. 264, 9 N.E. 547; Foster v. New Orleans, 94 U.S. 246, 24 L.Ed. 122. The term is sometimes applied to commerce be-tween ports of two sister states not lying on the same coast, e. g., New York and San Francisco.
—Interna! commerce. Such as is carried on be-tween individuals within the same state, or be-tween different parts of the same state. Lehigh Val. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U.S. 192, 12 S.Ct. 806, 36 L.Ed. 672; Steamboat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Cow. (N.Y.) 713. Now more commonly called "in-trastate" commerce.
—International commerce. Commerce between states or nations entirely foreign to each other. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Tennessee R. R. Com’n, C.C.Tenn., 19 F. 701.
—Interstate commerce. Such as is carried on be-tween different states of the Union or between points lying in different states. See Interstate Commerce.
—Intrastate commerce. Such as is begun, carried on, and completed wholly within the limits of a single state. Contrasted with "interstate com-merce" (q. v.). State v. Reed, 53 Mont. 292, 163 P. 477, 479, Ann.Cas.1917E, 783. And see South-ern Pac. Co. v. State, 19 Ariz. 20, 165 P. 303, 306.
COMMERCIA BELLI. War contracts. Contracts between nations at war, or their subjects.
Agreements entered into by belligerents, either in time of peace to take effect in the event of war, or during the war itself, by which arrange-ment is made for non-hostile intercourse. They may take the form of armistices, truces, capitula-
COMMERCIAL
tions, cartels, passports, safe-conducts, safeguards. 1 Kent 159; 2 Opp. 274.
Contracts between citizens of one belligerent and those of another, or between citizens of one belligerent and the other belligerent. They may take the form of ransom bilis (q. v.), bilis of ex-change drawn by prisoners of war, or receipts for requisitions. 1 Kent 104.
COMMERCIAL. Relating to or connected with trade and traffic or commerce in general. "Zante Currents", C.C.Cal., 73 F. 189. Occupied with com-merce. Bowies v. Co-Operative G. L. F. Farm Products, D.C.N.Y., 53 F.Supp. 413, 415.
COMMERCIAL AGENCY. The same as a "mer-cantile" agency. In re United States Mercantile Reporting, etc., Co., 4 N.Y.S. 916, 52 Hun, 611. See Mercantile.
COMMERCIAL AGENT. An officer in the con-sular service of the United States, of rank inferior to a consul. Also used as equivalent to "commer-cial broker," see infra.
COMMERCIAL BROKER. One who negotiates the sale of merchandise without having the posses-sion or control of it, being distinguished in the lat-ter particular from a commission merchant. Ad-kins v. Richmond, 98 Va. 91, 34 S.E. 967, 47 L.R.A. 583, 81 Am.St.Rep. 705.
COMMERCIAL CORPORATION. One engaged in commerce in the broadest sense of that term; hence including a railroad company. Sweatt v. Railroad Co., 23 Fed.Cas. 530.
COMMERCIAL COURT. A name applied in Eng-lish practice to the trial of commercial causes in London and Liverpool before judges of the High Court. It is said to be "a mere piece of conven-íence in the arrangement of business." [1895] 2 Ch. 491.
COMMERCIAL DOMICILE. See Domicile.
COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENT. A place where commodities are exchanged, bought or sold. State ex rel. Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Smith, 342 Mo. 75, 111 S.W.2d 513, 515.
COMMERCIAL FRUSTRATION. Excuse of par-ty from performance if contract depends on ex-istence of given person or thing and such per-son or thing perishes, and if contract is rendered impossible by act of God, the law, or other party. Wood v. Bartolino, 48 N.M. 175, 146 P.2d 883, 885, 890.
In theory it amounts to no more than a condltion or term of a contract which the law implies to take the place of a covenant that it is assumed would have been inserted by the parties had the contingency which arose occurred to them at the time they made the contract. Lloyd v. Murphy, Cal.App., 142 P.2d 939, 942, 943. And doctrine is predicated upon premise of giving relief in a situation where parties could not reasonably protect themselves by terms of a contract against happening of subsequent events. Berline v. Waldschmidt, 159 Kan. 585, 156 P.2d 865, 867. Hence doctrine has no application where events were reasonably foreseeable and controllable by the par-ties.
Black’s Law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed.-2 2

COMMERCIAL INSOLVENCY. Inability of a businessman to pay his debts as they become due in the regular and ordinary course of business. Willing v. Eveloff, C.C.A.Pa., 94 F.2d 344, 346.
COMMERCIAL INSURANCE. See Insurance.
COMMERCIAL LAW. A phrase used to designate the whole body of substantive jurisprudence ap-plicable to the rights, intercourse, and relations of persons engaged in commerce, trade. or mer-cantile pursuits. It is not a very scientific or ac-curate term. As foreign commerce is carried on by means of shipping, the term has come to be used occasionally as synonymous with "maritime law;" but, in strictness, the phrase "commercial law" is wider, and includes many transactions or legal questions which have nothing to do with shipping or its incidents. Watson v. Tarpley, 18 How. 521, 15 L.Ed. 509; Williams v. Gold Hill MM. Co., C.C.Cal., 96 F. 464.
COMMERCIAL LETTER OF CREDIT. See Let-ter of Credit under the title Credit.
COMMERCIAL MARK. In French law. A trade-mark is specially or purely the mark of the manu-facturer or producer of the article, while a "com-mercial" mark is that of the dealer or merchant who distributes the product to consumers or the trade. La Republique Francaise v. Schultz, C.C. N.Y., 57 F. 41.
COMMERCIAL PAPER. Bills of exchange, prom-issory notes, bank-checks, and other negotiable in-struments for the payment of money, which, by their form and on their face, purport to be such instruments as are, by the law-merchant, recog-nized as falling under the designation of "commer-cial paper." In re Hercules Mut. L. Assur. Soc., 6 Ben. 35, 12 Fed.Cas. 12. Negotiable paper given in due course of business, whether the element of negotiability be given it by the law-merchant or by statute. In re Sykes, D.C.I11., 5 Biss. 113, Fed. Cas.No.13,708; Martin v. McAvoy, 130 Wash. 641, 228 P. 694; Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Citi-zens’ Nat. Bank, C.C.A.N.J., 228 F. 601, 604.
COMMERCIAL PARTNERSHIP. A "commercial and trading partnership" is one that buys and sells;—distinguished from one of employment and occupation. Reid v. Linder, 77 Mont. 406, 251 P. 157, 161.
COMMERCIAL RAILROADS. A term used to embrace those railroads intended to carry all freight and passenger traffic between one town or place and another, and usually not constructed upon streets and highways except for short dis-tances;—distinguished from street railways. An-halt v. Waterloo, C. F. & N. Ry. Co., 166 Iowa, 479, 147 N.W. 928, 931.
COMMERCIAL TRAVELER. A drummer; a traveling salesman who simply exhibits samples of goods kept for sale by his principal, and takes orders from purchasers for such goods, which goods are ttfterwards to be delivered by the prin-cipal to the purchasers, and payment for the goods

is to be made by the purchasers to the principal on such delivery. McKindly v. Dunham, 55 Wis. 515, 13 N.W. 485, 42 Am.Rep. 740.
An agent who sells by sample and on credit, is not Intrusted with the possession of the goods to be sold, has no implied authority to receive payment, and payment to whom will not discharge the purchawr. Butler v. Dorman, 68 Mo. 302, 30 Am.Rep. 795; Seiple v. Irwin, 30 Pa. 513; Kornemann v. Monaghan, 24 Mich. 36.
COMMERCIUM. Lat. In the civil law. Com-merce; business; trade; dealings in the nature of purchase and sale; a contract.
COMMERCIUM JURE GENTIUM COMMUNE ESSE DEBET, ET NON IN MONOPOLIUM ET PRIVATUM PAUCORUM QWESTUM CONVER-TENDUM. 3 Inst. 181. Cornmerce, by the law of nations, ought to be common, and not converted to monopoly and the private gain of a few.
COMMINALTY. The commonalty or the peopie.
COMMINATORIUM. In old practice. A clause sometimes added at the end of writs, admonishing the sheriff to be faithful in executing them. Bract. fol. 398.
COMMINGLE. To put together in one mass. Pfau v. State, 148 Ind. 539, 47 N.E. 927, 929.
COMMINUTED FRACTURE. One in which the bones have been somewhat crushed. Sang v. City of St. Louis, 262 Mo. 454, 171 S.W. 347, 349.
COMMISE. In old French law. Forfeiture; the forfeiture of a fief; the penalty attached to the ingratitude of a vassal. Guyot, Inst.Feod. c. 12.
COMMISSAIRE. In French law. A person who receives from a meeting of shareholders a special authority, viz., that of checking and examining the accounts of a manager or of valuing the ap-ports en nature, (q. v.) The name is also applied to a judge who receives from a court a special mission, e. g., to institute an inquiry, or to exam-ine certain books, or to supervise the operations of a bankruptcy. Arg.Fr.Merc.Law, 551.
COMMISSAIRES–PRISEURS. In French law. Auctioneers, who possess the exclusive right of selling personal property at public sale in the towns in which they are established; and they possess the same right concurrently with notaries, greffiers, and huissiers, in the rest of the arron-dissement. Arg.Fr.Merc.Law, 551.
COMMISSARIA LEX. A principie of the Roman law relative to the forfeiture of contracts. See Commissoria Lex.
COMMISSARIAT. The whole body of officers who make up the commissaries’ department of an army.
COMMISSARY.
In ecclesiastical law. One who is sent or dele-gated to execute some office or duty as the repre-sentative of his superior; an officer of the bishop, who exercises spiritual jurisdiction in distant parts of the diocese. 1 Holdsw.Hist.L. 369

In military law. An officer whose principal du-ties are to supply an army with provisions and stores. As to the rank and duties of such officers in the United States army, see 10 U.S.C.A. § 71 et seq.
COMMISSARY COURT. A Scotch ecclesiastical court of general jurisdiction, held before four com-missioners, members of the Faculty of Advocates, appointed by the crown.
COMMISSION. A warrant or authority or Let-ters patent, issuing from the government, or one of its departments, or a court, empowering a per-son or persons named to do certain acts, or to ex-ercise jurisdiction, or to perform the duties and exercise the authority of an office, (as in the case of an Officer in the army or navy.) Bledsoe v. Colgan, 138 Cal. 34, 70 P. 924.
Also, in private affairs, it signifies the authority or instructions under which one person transacts business or negotiates for another.
In a derivative sense, a body of persons to whom a commission is directed. A board or com-mittee officially appointed and empowered to per-form certain acts or exercise certain jurisdiction of a public nature or relation; as a "commission of assise."

Civil Law

A species of bailment, being an undertaking, without reward, to do something in respect to an article bailed; equivalent to "mandate

Commercial Law

The recompense or reward of an agent, factor, broker, or bailee, when the same is calculated as a percentage on the amount of his transactions or on the profit to the principal. In this sense, however, the word occurs perhaps more frequently in the plural. Gray v. Stern, 85 Wash. 645, 149 P. 26, 28. Jackson v. Stanfield, 137 Ind. 592, 37 N.E. 14, 23 L.R.A. 588. Sinclair Coal Co. v. Pittsburg and Ashland Coal and Dock Co., 178 Minn. 114, 226 N.W. 206, 208. But the term may mean simply a compensation; Smith v. Starke, 196 Mich. 311, 162 N.W. 998, 999; and does not necessarily imply a mere per centum valuation; Jenkins v. Locke-Paddon Co., 30 Cal.App. 52, 157 P. 537.
Also, a compensation to an administrator for the faithful discharge of his duties. In re Jula’s Estate, 3 N.J.Misc. 976, 130 A. 733, 735.

Criminal Law

Doing or perpetration; the performance of an act. Groves v. State, 116 Ga. 516, 42 S.E. 755, 59 L.R.A. 598.

Practice
An authority or writ issuing from a court, in relation to a cause before it, directing and au-thorizing a person or persons named to do some act or exercise some special function; usually to take the depositions of witnesses.
COMMISSION DAY. In English practice. The opening day of the assises.
COMMISSION DE LUNATICO INQUIRENDO. The same as a commission of lunacy, (see infra.) In re Misselwitz, 177 Pa. 359, 35 A. 722.
COMMISSION DEL CREDERE. In commercial law. Where an agent of a seller undertakes to guaranty to his principal the payment of the debt due by the buyer. Story, Ag. 28.
The phrase "del creciere" is borrowed from the Italian language, in which its signification is equivalent to our word "guaranty" or ”warranty."
COMMISSION GOVERNMENT. A method of municipal government in which the legislative power is in the hands of a few persons. State v. Ure, 91 Neb. 31, 135 N.W. 224. Gardner v. Board of Park Directors, 35 Cal.App. 597, 170 P. 672, 673 (mayor held not a "commissioner").
COMMISSION MERCHANT. A term which is synonymous with "factor." It means one who receives goods, chattels, or merchandise for sale, exchange, or other disposition, and who is to re-ceive a compensation for his services, to be paid by the owner, or derived from the sale, etc., of the goods. State v. Thompson, 120 Mo. 12, 25 S.W. 346. One whose business is to receive and sell goods for a commission, being intrusted with the possession of the goods to be sold, and usually selling in his own name. Hughes v. Young, 17 Tenn.App. 24, 65 S.W.2d 858, 864.
Factors are frequently called "commission merchants". and it is said that there is no difference in the meaning of these terms, the latter being perhaps more commonly used in America. Thompson v. Woodruff, 7 Cold. 410; Duguid v. Edwards, 50 Barb., N.Y., 288; Lyon v. Alvord, 18 Conn. 80.
A commission merchant or factor differs from a broker in that he may buy and sell in his own name without dis-closing his principal and has the goods in his possession: while the broker can only buy or sell in the name of his principal, and has no possession of the goods sold. Slack v. Tucker, 23 Wall. 321, 330, 23 L.Ed. 143; Perkins v. State, 50 Ala. 154, 156. A commission merchant has a lien upon the goods for his charges, advances, and commis-sions, while the broker has no control of the property and is responsible only for bad faith. A commission merchant or factor has a special property in the goods. Sutton v. Kiel Cheese & Butter Co., 155 Ky. 465, 159 S.W. 950, 951. A "factor" or "commission merchant" is one who has the actual or technical possession of goods or vares of another for sale, while a "merchandise broker" is one who nego-tiates the sale oí merchandise without having it in his pos-session or control, being simply an agent with very limited powers. Hughes v. Young, 17 Tenn.App. 24, 65 S.W.2d 858, 864

864.
See, also, Factor.
COMMISSION OF ANTICIPATION. In English law. An authority under the great seal to collect a tax or subsidy before the day.
COMMISSION OF APPRAISEMENT AND SALE. Where property has been arrested in an admiralty action in ?Tm, and ordered by the court to be sold, the order is carried out by a commission of ap-praisement and sale; in some cases (as where the property is to be released on ball and the value is disputed) a commission of appraisement only is required. Sweet.
COMMISSION OF ARRAY. In English law. A commission issued to send into every county offi-cers to muster or set in military order the inhabitants. The introduction of commissions of lieu-tenancy, which contained, in substance, the same powers as these commissions, superseded them. 2 Steph.Comm. (7th Ed.) 582.,
COMMISSION OF ASSIZE. In English practice. A commission which formerly issued from the king, appointing certain persons as commissioners or judges of assize to hold the assizes in associa-tion with discreet knights during those years in which the justices in eyre did not come. A com-mission issued to judges of the high court or court of appeal, authorizing them to sit at the assizes for the trial of civil actions.
COMMISSION OF BANKRUPT. A commission or authority formerly granted by the lord chancellor to such persons as he should think proper, to ex-amine the bankrupt in all matters relating to his trade and effects, and to perform various other important duties connected with bankruptcy mat-ters. But now, under St. 1 & 2 Wm. IV. c. 56, § 12, a fiat issues instead of such commission.
COMMISSION OF CHARITABLE USES. This commission issues out of chancery to the bishop and others, where lands given to charitable uses are misemployed, or there is any fraud or dis-pute concerning them, to inquire of and redress the same, etc.
COMMISSION OF DELEGATES. When any sen-tence was given in any ecclesiastical cause by the archbishop, this commission, under the great seal, was directed to certain persons, usually lords, bishops, and judges of the law, to sit and hear an appeal of the same to the king, in the court of chancery. But latterly the judicial committee of the privy council has supplied the place of this commission. Brown.
COMMISSION OF LUNACY. A commission is-suing from a court of competent jurisdiction, au-thorizing an inquiry to be made into the mental condition of a person who is alleged to be a luna-tic.
A writ issued out of chancery, or such court as may have iurlsdIction of the case, directed to a proper officer, to inquire whether a person named therein is a lunatic or not. In re Moore, 68 Cal. 281, 9 P. 164.
COMMISSION OF PARTITION. In the former English equity practice, this was a commission or authority issued to certain persons, to effect a division of lands held by tenants in common de-siring a partition; when the commissioners re-ported, the parties were ordered to execute mu-tual conveyances to conflrm the division. Com-missioners appointed to make partition are in the nature of arbitrators. Clough v. Cromwell, 250 Mass. 324, 145 N.E. 473, 474.
COMMISSION OF REBELLION. In English law. An attaching process, formerly issuable out of chancery, to enforce obedience to a process or de-cree; abolished in August, 1841.
COMMISSION OF ‘REVIEW. In English eccle-siastical law. A commission formerly sometimes granted in extraordinary cases, to revise the sentence of the court of delegates. 3 Bl.Comm. 67. Now out of use, the privy council being substitut-ed for the court of delegates, as the great court of appeal in all ecclesiastical causes. 3 Steph. Comm. 432.
COMMISSION OF THE PEACE. In English law. A commission from the crown, appointing certain persons therein named, jointly and severally, to keep the peace, etc. Justices of the peace are al-ways appointed by special commission under the great seal, the form of which was settled by all the judges, A. D. 1590, and continues with little alteration to this day. 1 Bl.Comm. 351; 3 Steph. Comm. 39, 40.
COMMISSION OF TREATY WITH FOREIGN PRINCES. Leagues and arrangements made Be-tween states and kingdoms, by their ambassadors and ministers, for the mutual advantage of the kingdoms in alliance. Wharton.
COMMISSION OF UNLIVERY. In an action in the English admiralty division, where it is neces-sary to have the cargo in a ship unladen in order to have it appraised, a commission of unlivery is issued and executed by the marshal. Williams & B. Adm. Jur. 233.
COMMISSION TO EXAMINE • WITNESSES. In practice. A commission issued out of the court in which an action is pending, to direct the taking of the depositions of witnesses who are beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
COMMISSION TO TAKE ANSWER IN CHAN-CERY. In English law. A commission issued when defendant lives abroad to swear him to such answer. 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, § 21. Obsolete. See Jud. Acts, 1873, 1875.
COMMISSION TO TAKE DEPOSITIONS. A written authority issued by a court of justice, giv-ing power to take the testimony of witnesses who cannot be personally produced in court. Tracy v. Suydam, 30 Barb. (N. Y.) 110.
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS. In the United States army and navy and marine corps, those of or aboye the rank of second lieutenant. Davis, Mil. L. 26. Those who hold their rank and office under commissions issued by the president, as distinguished from non-commissioned officers (in the army, including sergeants, corporals, etc.) and warrant officers (in the navy, including boat-swains, gunners, etc.) and from privates or en-listed men. Stephens v. Civil Service Commission of New Jersey, 101 N.J.Law 192, 127 A. 808, 811. See Babbitt v. U. S., 16 Ct.Cl. 202.
COMMISSIONER. A person to whom a commis-sion is directed by the government or a court. State v. Banking Co., 14 N.J.L. 437; In re Canter, 81 N.Y.S. 338, 40 Misc. 126.
In the governmental system of the United States, this term denotes an officer who is charged with the administration of the laws relating to sol/1e particular subject-matter, or the manage-ment of some bureau or agency of the government. Such are the commissioners of education, of patents, of pensions, of fisheries, of the general land-office, of Indian affairs, etc.
In the state governmental systems, also, and in England, the term is quite extensively used as a designation of various officers having a similar authority and similar duties.
In the commission form of municipal govern-ment, the term is applied to any of the several officers constituting the commission. Gardner v. Board of Park Directors, 35 Cal.App. 597, 170 P. 672, 673.
—Commissioners of bail. Officers appointed to take recognizances of bail in civil cases.
—Commissioners of bankrupts. The name given, under the former English practice in bankruptcy, to the persons appointed under the great seal to execute a commission of bankruptcy (g. v.).
—Commissioners of circuit courts. Officers ap-pointed by and attached to the former circuit courts of the United States, performing functions partly ministerial and partly judicial. In re Com’rs of Circuit Court, C.C.N.C., 65 F. 317. Their office was abolished by the Act of May 28, 1896 (34 Stat. 184) and they have been succeeded by "United States commissioners." See that title.
—Commissloners of deeds. Officers empowered by the government of one state to reside in an-other state, and there take acknowledgments of deeds and other papers which are to be used as evideriee or put on record in the former state.
—Commissioners of highways. Officers appointed in each county or township, in many of the states, with power to take charge of the altering, open-ing, repair, and vacating of highways within such county or township.
—Commissioner of patents. The title given by law to the head of the patent office. See 35 USCA § 2.
—Commissioners of sewers. In English law. Commissioners appointed under the great seal, and constituting a court of special jurisdiction; which is to overlook the repairs of the banks and walls of the seacoast and navigable rivers, or, with consent of a certain proportion of the owners and occupiers, to make new ones, and to cleanse such rivers, and the streams communicating there-with. St. 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 22, § 10; 3 Steph. Comm. 442.
—Commissioner of woods and forests. An officer created by act of parliament of 1817, to whom was transferred the jurisdiction of the chief jus-tices of the forest. Inderwick, The King’s Peace.
—County commissioners. See County.
COMMISSIONS. The compensation or reward paid to a factor, broker, agent, bailee, executor, trustee, receiver, etc., usually calculated as a per-centage on the amount of his transactions or the amount received or expended. See Commission COMMISSIVÉ. Caused by or consisting in acts of commission, as distinguished from neglect, suf-ferance, or toleration; as in the phrase "commis-sive waste," which is contrasted with "permissive waste." See Waste.
COMMISSORIA LEX. In Roman law. A law according to which a seller might stipulate that he should be freed from his obligation, and might rescind the sale, if the purchase price were not paid at the appointed time. Also a law by which a debtor and his pledgee might agree that, if the debtor did not pay at the day appointed, the pledge should become the absolute property of the creditor. This, however, was abolished by a law of Constantine. Cod. 8, 35, 3. See Dig. 18, 3; Mackeld. Rom.Law, §§ 447, 461; 2 Kent, Comm. 583.
COMMIT. To perpetrate, as a crime; to perform, as an act. Groves v. State, 116 Ga. 516, 42 S.E. 755, 59 L.R.A. 598.
To send a person to prison by virtue of a law-ful authority, for any crime or contempt, or to an asylum, workhouse, reformatory, or the like, by authority of a court or magistrate. People v. Beach, 122 Cal. 37, 54 P. 369.
To deliver a defendant to the custody of the sheriff or marshal, on his surrender by his bail. 1 Tidd, Pr. 285, 287.
COMMITMENT. In practice. The warrant or mittimus by which a court or magistrate directs an officer to take a person to prison. Authority for holding in prison one convicted of crime. Ex parte Haynes, 98 Tex.Cr.R. 609, 267 S.W. 490, 493. A process directed to a ministerial officer by which a person is to be confined in prison, usually issued by a court or magistrate. People ex rel. Wojek v. Henderson, 235 N.Y.S. 173, 178, 134 Misc. 228.
A warrant which does not dlrect an officer to commit a party to prison but only to receive him into custody and safely keep him for further examinatlon, is not a commit-ment. Gilbert v. U. S., 23 Ct.C1. 218.
The act of sending a person to prison by means of such a warrant or order. Allen v. Hagan, 170 N.Y. 46, 62 N.E. 1086.
A proceeding for the restraining and confining of insane persons for their own and the public’s protection. Vance v. Ellerbe, 150 La. 388, 90 So. 735, 740.
COMMITTED IN PRESENCE OF OFFICER. Un-der statutes authorizing arrest without warrant, when facts and circumstances occurring within officer’s observation, in connection with what, un-der circumstances, may be considered as common knowledge, give him probable cause to believe or reasonable grounds to suspect that such is the case. Noce v. Ritchie, 109 W.Va. 391, 155 S.E. 127, 128.
COMMITTEE. A person, or an assembly or board of persons, to whom the consideration, determina-tion, or management of any matter is committed or referred, as by a court. Lloyd v. Hart, 2 Pa. 473, 45 Am.Dec. 612; Farrar v. Eastman, 5 Me.

345; Blaisdeli v. Inhabitants of Town of York, 110 Me. 500, 87 A. 361, 370.
An individual or body to whom others have delegated or committed a particular duty, or who have taken on themselves to perform it in the ex-pectation of .their act being confirmed by the body they profess to represent or act for. 15 Mees. & W. 529.
The term is especially applied to the person or persons who are invested, by order of the proper court, with the guardianship of the person and estate of one who has been adjudged a lunatic.
In parliamentary law. A portion of a legisla-tive body, comprising one or more members, who are charged with the duty of examining some mat-ter specially referred to them by the house, or of deliberating upon it, and reporting to the house the result of their investigations or recommending a course of action.
A committee may be appointed for one special occasIon, or it may be appointed to deal with all matters which may be referred to it during a whole session or during the lige of the body. In the latter case, it is called a "standing comrnittee.- It is usually composed of a comparatively small number of members, but may include the whole house.
Joint committee. A joint committee of a legis-lative body comprising two chambers is a com-mittee consisting of representatives of each of the two houses, meeting and acting together as one committee.
Secret committee. A secret committee of the house of commons is a committee specially ap-pointed to investigate a certain matter, and to which secrecy being deemed necessary in further-ance of its objects, its proceedings are conducted with closed doors, to the exclusion of all persons not members of the committee. All other commit-tees are open to members of the house, although they may not be serving upon them. Brown.
COMMITTING MAGISTRATE. An inferior judi-cial officer who is invested with authority to con-duct the preliminary hearing of persons charged with crime, and either to discharge them for Jack of sufficient prima facie evidence or to commit them to jail to await trial or (in some jurisdic-tions) to accept bail and release them thereon. The term is said to be synonymous with "examin-ing court." State v. Rogers, 31 N.M. 485, 247 P. 828, 833.
COMMITTITUR. In practice. An order or min• ute, setting forth that the person named in it is committed to the custody of the sheriff.
COMMITTITUR PIECE. In English law. An in-strument in writing on paper or parchment, which charges a person, already in prison, in execution at the suit of the person who arrested him. 2 Chit.Archb.Pr. (12th Ed.) 1208.
COMMIXTIO, or COMMIXTION. In the civil law. The mixing together or confusion of things, dry or solid, belonging to different owners, as distin-guished from confusio, which has relation to liq-uids. Lec. Elém. du Dr. Rom. II 370, 371; Story, Bailm. § 40; 1 Bouvier, Inst. n. 506.

COMMODATE. Where property is loaned gratui-tously by owner for sole benefit, accommodation, and use of borrower, and specific thing loaned is to be returned. The Pegeen, D.C.Cal., 14 F.Supp. 748, 751. See, also, Commodatum.
COMMODATI ACTIO. Lat. In the civil law. An action of loan; an action for a thing lent. An ac-tion given for the recovery of a thing loaned, (commodatum,) and not returned to the lender. Inst. 3, 15, 2; Id. 4, 1, 16.
COMMODATO. In Spanish law. A contract by which one person lends gratuitously to another some object not consumable, to be restored to him in kind at a given period; the same contract as commodatum (q. y.).
COMMODATUM. A contract by which one of the parties binds himself to return to the other certain personal chattels which the latter delivers to him to be used by him without reward; loan for use. Slack v. Bryan, 299 Ky. 132, 184 S.W.2d 873, 876.
A gratuitous loan of goods to be temporarily used by the ballee, and returned in specie. Hanes v. Shapiro & Smith, 168 N.C. 24, 84 S.E. 33, 35. He who lends to another a thing for a definite time, to be enjoyed and used under cer-tain conditions, without any pay or reward, is called "com-modans;" the person who receives the thing is .called "commodatarius," and the contract is called "commo-datum." It differs from locutio and conductio, in this: that the use of the thing is gratuitous. Dig. 13, 6; Inst.
3, 2, 14; Story, Ballm, § 221. Coogs v. Bernard, 2 Ld.Raym: 909; Adams v. Mortgage Co., 82 Miss. 263, 34 So. 482, 17 L.R.A.,N.S., 138, 100 Am.St.Rep. 633; World’s Columbian Exposition Co. v. Republic of France, C.C.A. III., 96 F. 693, 38 C.C.A. 483.
COMMODITIES. Those things which are useful or serviceable, particularly articles of merchan-dise movable in trade. American League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. 6, 15, 86 Miác. 441.
Goods, wares, and merchandise of any kind; movables; articles of trade or commerce. Queen Ins. Co. v. State, 86 Tex. 250, 24 S.W. 397, 22 L.R. A. 483. Movable articles of value; things that are bought and sold. United States v. Sischo, D.C. Wash., 262 F. 1001, 1005. See, also, Commodity.
This word is a broader term than merchandise, and, In referring to commerce may include almost any article of movable or personal property. Pound v. Lawrence, Tex. Civ.App., 233 S.W. 359, 361; Shuttleworth v. State, 35 Ala. 415; State v. Henke, 19 Mo. 225.
Labor has been held not to be a commodity. Rohlf v. Kasemeier, 140 Iowa 182, 118 N.W. 276, 23 L.R.A., N.S., 1285. But it has been held that the supplying of telephone service is the supplying of a commodity of commerce; McKinley Telephone Co. v. Cumberland Telephone Co., 152 Wis. 359, 140 N.W. 38, 39; and it has aleo been thought that the privilege of receiving property by will or intestate succession is a commodity subject to the Massachusetts excise law; Dana v. Dana, 226 Mass. 297, 115 N.E. 418, 419.
COMMODITIES CLAUSE. A clause in the act of Congress, June 29, 1906 (49 USCA § 1 (8), provid-ing that it shall be unlawful for any railroad company to transport commodities (excepting timber and its manufactured products) manufac-tured, mined or produced by it, or under its au-thority, or which it may own in whole or in part, or in which it may have any interest, direct or indirect, except such articles or commodities as may be necessary and intended for its use in its business. U. S. v. R. Co., 31 S.Ct. 387, 220 U.S. 257, 55 L.Ed. 458.
COMMODITY. In the most comprehensive sense, convenience, accommodation, profit, benefit, ad-vantage, interest, commodiousness.
In the commercial sense, any movable or tangi-ble thing that is produced or used as the subject of barter or sale. People v. Epstean, 170 N.Y.S. 68, 79, 102 Misc. 476. See Commodities.
COMMODITY BATE. With reference to rail-roads, a rate which applies to a specific commodi-ty alone;—distinguished from a "class rate," meaning a single rate which applies to a number of articles of the same general character. Nor-folk Southern R. Co. v. Freeman Supply Corpora-tion, 145 Va. 207, 133 S.E. 817, 818.
COMMODORE. A grade in the United States navy, superior to a captain. Omitted from the active list. Act of March 3, 1899, c. 413, 30 Stat. 1004. See 34 USCA § 1.
COMMODUM EX INJURIA SUA NEMO HABERE DEBET. No person ought to have advantage from his own wrong. Jenk.Cent. 161; Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 3, n. 62.
COMMON, n. An incorporeal hereditament which consists in a profit which one man has in connec-tion with one or more others in the land of an-other. Trustees v. Robinson, 12 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 31; Thomas v. Inhabitants of Marshfield, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 364; 3 Kent 403; United States v. 1,010.8 Acres, More or Less, Situate in Sussex County, Del., D.C.Del., 56 F.Supp. 120, 132, 134,
In English law, is an incorporeal right which lies in grant, originally commencing on some agreement between lords and tenants, which by time has been formed into prescription, and continuas gond, although there be no deed or instrument to prove the original contract. 4 Coke, 37; 1 Crabb, Real Prop. p. 258, 1 268.
Common, or a right of common, is a right or privilege which several persons have to the produce of the lands or waters of another. Van Rensselaer v. Radcliff, 10 Wend., N.Y., 647, 25 Am. Dec. 582.
Also an uninclosed piece of land set apart for public or municipal purposes, in many cities and villages of the United States. Newell v. Hancock, 67 N.H. 244, 35 A. 253. United States v. 1,010.8 Acres, More or Less, Situate in. Sussex County, Del., D.C.Del., 56 F.Supp. 120, 122, 134.
—Common appendant. A right annexed to the possession of arable land, by which the owner is entitled to feed his beasts on the lands of another, usually of the owner of the manor of which the lands entitled to common are a part. 2 Bl.Comm. 33; Van Rensselaer v. Radcliff, 10 Wend. (N.Y.) 648.
—Common appurtenant. A right of feeding one’s beasts on the land of another, (in common with the owner or with others,) which is founded on a grant, or a prescription which supposes a grant. 1 Crabb, Real Prop. p. 264, § 277.
This kind of common arises from no connection of ten-ure, and is against common right; it may cornmence by grant within time of memory, or, In other words, may be created at the present day; it may be claimed as annexed to any kind of land, and may be claimed for beasts not commonable, as well as those that are. 2 BI.Comm. 33; Van Rensselaer v. Radcliff, 10 Wend., N.Y.,. 649.
—Common because of vicinage is where the in-habitants of two townships which lie contiguous to each other have usually intercommoned with one another, the beasts of the one straying mutual-ly into the other’s fields, without any molestation from either. 2 Bl.Comm. 33; Co. Litt. 122a; 4 Co. 38a; 10 Q.B. 581, 589, 604; Smith v. Floyd, 18 Barb. (N.Y.) 523.
This is, indeed, only a permissive right, intended to excuse what, in strictness, is a trespass in both, and te prevent a multiplicity of sults, and therefore either town-ship may inclose and bar out the other, though they have intercommoned time out of mind.
—Common in gross, or at large. A species of common which is neither appendant nor appur-tenant to land, but is annexed to a man’s person, being granted to him and his heirs by deed; or it may be claimed by prescriptive right, as by a par-son of a church or the like corporation sole. 2 Bl.Comm. 34. It is a separate inheritance, entire-ly distinct from any other landed property, vested in the person to whom the common right belongs. 2 Steph.Comm. 6; Mitchell v. D’Olier, 68 N.J.L. 375, 53 A. 467, 59 L.R.A. 949.
—Common of digging. Common of digging, or common in the soil, is the right to take for one’s own use part of the soil or minerals in another’s land; the most usual subjects of the right are sand, gravel, stones, and clay. It is of a very similar nature to common of estovers and of tur-bary. Elton, Com. 109.
—Common of estovers. A liberty of taking neces-sary wood for the use or furniture of a house or farm from off another’s estate, in common with the owner or with others. 2 Bl.Comm. 35. It may be claimed, like common of pasture, either by grant or prescription. 2 Steph.Comm. 10; Plowd. 381; Van Rensselaer v. Radcliff, 10 Wend. (N.Y.) 648.
—Common of fishery. The same as Common of piscary. See infra.
—Common of fowling. In some parts of the coun-try a right of taking wild animals (such as conies or wildfowl) from the land of another has been found to exist; in the case of wildfowl, it is called a "common of fowling." Elton, Com. 118.
—Common of pasture. The right or liberty of pasturing one’s cattle upon another man’s land. It may be either appendant, appurtenant, in gross, or because of vicinage. Van Rensselaer v. Rad-cliff, 10 Wend. (N.Y.) 647.
—Common of piscary. The right or liberty of fishing in another man’s water, in common with the owner or with other persons. 2 Bl.Comm. 34. A liberty or right of fishing in the water covering the soil of another person, or in a river running through another’s land. 3 Kent, Comm. 409. Har-din v. Jordan, 11 S.Ct. 808, 140 U.S. 371, 35 L.Ed. 428. It is quite different from a common fishery with which, however, it is frequently confounded. See Fishery.
—Common of shack. A species of common by vicinage prevailing in the counties of Norfolk, Lincoln, and Yorkshire, in England; being the right of persons occupying lands lying together in the same common field to turn out their cattle after harvest to feed promiscuously in that field. 2 Steph.Comm. 6, 7; 5 Coke, 65; 1 B. & Ald. 710.
—Common of turbary. In its modern sense the right of taking peat or turf from the waste land of another, for fuel in the commoner’s house. Wil-liams, Common, 187; Van Rensselaer v. Radcliff, 10 Wend. (N.Y.) 647; 4 Co. 37; 3 Atk. 189, Noy, 145; 7 East, 127.
—Common sans nombre. Common without num-ber, that is, without limit as to the number of cattle which may be turned on; otherwise called "common without stint." Bract. fols. 53b, 222b; 2 Steph.Comm. 6, 7; 2 Bl.Comm. 34. United States v. 1,010.8 Acres, More or Less, Situate in Sussex County, Del., D.C.Del., 56 F.Supp. 120, 133.
—Common, tenants in. See Tenants in Common.
—Common without stint. Another name for Common sans nombre. See supra.
COMMON, adj. Usual, ordinary, accustomed; shared among several; owned by several jointly. Roen v. State, 35 Neb. 676, 53 N.W. 595, 17 L.R.A. 821. Belonging or pertaining to many or to the majority; generally or prevalent, of frequent or ordinary occurrence or appearance; familiar by reason of frequency. Webb v. New Mexico Pub. Co., 47 N.M. 279, 141 P.2d 333, 335. Also, usual, customary, and habitual, professed, or confessed, and used indefinitely in various terms implying illegal or criminal conduct, such as common scold, common thief, etc. Levine v. State, 166 A. 300, 302, 110 N.J.L. 467.
As to common "Ball," "Barretor," "Carrier," "Chase," "Condedit," "Council," "Counts," "Day," "Debtor," "Diligente," "Drunkard," "Error," "Fishery," "Highway," "Informer," "Inn," "Intend-ment," "Intent," "Jury," "Labor," "Nuisance," "Oc-cupant," "Property," "School," "Scold," "Seal," "Seargeant," "Stock," "Traverse," "Vouchee," "Wall," see those titles.
—Common appearance. That which could be filed by the plaintiff, who could enter a rule on the de-fendant to plead, where the defendant, after due service of process on him, had removed from the jurisdiction without having entered an appear-ance, or could not be found. 12 Geo. II., c. 29; 1 Troub. & Haly, Pr. 159; Bender v. Ryan, 9 Wkly. Notes Cas. (Pa.) 144.
—Common assurances. The several modes or in-struments of conveyance established or authorized by the law of England. Called "common" because thereby every man’s estate is assured to him. 2 Bl.Comm. 294. The legal evidentes of the transla-tion of property, whereby every person’s estate is assured to him, and all controversies, doubts and difficulties are either prevented or removed. Wharton.
—Common causes or suits. A term anciently used to denote civil actions, or those depending between subject and subject, as distinguished from pleas of the crown. Dallett v. Feltus, 7 Phila. (Pa.) 627.
—Common condidit. See Condedit.
—Common danger. "Common danger" which gives a right to contribution in general average does not mean equal danger; hence, the fact that a part of the cargo of a stranded steamship is of a kind which is in little danger of injury does not relieve it of the liability to contribute. Willcox, Peck & Hughes v. American Smelting & Refining Co., D.C.N.Y., 210 F. 89, 91.
—Common design. In criminal law. Community of intention between two or more persons to do an unlawful act. State v. Hill, 273 Mo. 329, 201 S.W. 58, 60.
—Common enterprise. See Joint enterprise.
—Common fine. In old English law. A certain sum of money which the residents in a leet paid to the lord of the leet, otherwise called "head sil-ver," "cert money," (q. v.,) or "certum letce." Termes de la Ley; Cowell; Fleta; Wharton. A sum of money paid by the inhabitants of a manor to their lord, towards the charge of holding a court leet. Bailey, Dict.
—Common form. A will is said to be proved in common form when the executor proves it on his own oath; as distinguished from "proof by wit-nesses," which is necessary when the paper pro-pounded as a will is disputed. Hubbard v. Hub-bard, 7 Or. 42; Sutton v. Hancock, 118 Ga. 436, 45 S.E. 504.
—Common hall. A court in the city of London, at which all the citizens, or such as are free of the city, have a right to attend.
—Common learning. Familiar law or doctrine.. Dyer, 27b, 33.
—Common liquor dealer. In Florida, one who, be-ing charged with unlawfully engaging in and car-rying on the business of a dealer in liquors, has bien bef ore convicted of a like offense and duly sentenced therefor. Thomas v. State, 74 Fla. 200, 76 So. 780. See, also, Common thief, infra.
—Common peril. See Common danger, supra.
—Common place. Common picas. The English court of common pleas is sometimes so called in the old books.
—Common prayer. The liturgy, or public form of prayer prescribed by the Church of England to be used in all churches and chapels, and which the clergy are enjoined to use under a certain penalty.
—Common repute. The prevailing belief in a giv-en community as to the existente of a certain fac or aggregation of facts. Brown v. Foster, 41 S. C. 118, 19 S.E. 299.
—Common right. A term applied to rights, privi-leges, and immunities appertaining to and enjoyed by all citizens equally and in common, and which have their foundation in the common law. Co. Inst. 142a; Spring Valley Waterworks v. Schot-tler, 62 Cal. 106.
—Common seller. A common seller of any com-modity (particularly under the liquor laws of many states) is one who sells it frequently, usual-ly, customarily, or habitually; in some states, one who is shown to have made a certain number of sales, either three or five. State v. O’Conner, 49 Me. 596; State v. Nutt, 28 Vt. 598; Moundsville v. Fountain, 27 W.Va. 194; Com. v. Tubbs, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 2.
—Common sense. Sound practical judgment; that degree of intelligence and reason, as exer-cised upon the relations of persons and things and the ordinary affairs of life, which is possessed by the generality of mankind, and which would suf-fice to direct the conduct and actions of the in-dividual in a manner to agree with the behavior of ordinary persons.
—Common service. That service in which are engaged (with reference to the fellow-servant rule) all those who enter into the service of a common master, except those who become heads of and vested with absolute control of separate departments or branches of a great and diversified business. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Marone, C.C.A. Neb., 246 F. 916, 923.
The term, In its broadest and most obvious sense, would Include all activities prosecuted in the business of the master which have for their purpose the attainment of one common end; nevertheless, an employee, invested with the duty of overseeing, directing, and controlling workmen, is not a fellow servant with respect to the discharge of those duties, but is a representative of the master. Funk v. Ful-ton Iron Works Co., 311 Mo. 77, 277 S.W. 566, 569.
—Common thief. One who by practice and habit is a thief; or, in some states, one who has been convicted of three distinct larcenies at the same term of court. Stevens v. Com., 4 Mete. (Mass.) 364.
—Common use. This phrase, as used in an anti-trust law extending to contracts affecting the prices of articles or commodities in "common use," describes articles used by the people in general; such articles or commodities as are in general use or used to a great extent in the homes of the people; the articles which are produced to be sold to the people, to be consumed and used by the people in general, and to be found for sale in all the marts of trade. People v. Epstean, 102 Misc. 476, 170 N.Y.S. 68, 75. It suggests the opposite of casual use. Geis v. State, 126 Md. 265, 94 A. 909, 910.
—Common victualer. The keeper of a restaurant or public eating house, where the food sold is eat-en on the premises. Commonwealth v. Meckel, 221 Mass. 70, 108 N.E. 917

—Common weal. The public or common good or welf are.
—Common woman. One who is low, inferior, vul• gar, or coarse; also, one who is unchaste. But the term does not necessarily impute unchastity. Daniel v. Moncure, 58 Mont. 193, 190 P. 983, 985.
COMMON BAR. In pleading. (Otherwise called "blank bar.") A plea to compel the plaintiff to assign the particular place where the trespass has been committed. Steph.Pl. 256.
COMMON BENCH. The ancient name for the English court of common pleas. Its original title appears to have been simply "The Bench," but it was designated "Common Bench" to distinguish it from the "King’s Bench," and because in it were tried and determined the causes of common per-sons, i. e., causes between subject and subject, in which the crown had no interest.
COMMON ENEMY DOCTRINE. Recognized as to surface waters in but a few states, under which no natural easement or servitude exists in favor of the superior or higher land as to mere surface water, or such as falls or accumulates by rains or the melting of snow; and the proprietor of the inferior or lower tenement or estate may at his option lawfully obstruct or hinder the flow of such water thereon, and in so doing may turn back or off of his own lands, and onto and over the lands of other proprietors, such water, without liability by reason of such obstruction or diversion. Mil-ler v. Letzerich, 121 Tex. 248, 49 S.W.2d 404, 411, 85 A.L.R. 451.
COMMON HUMANITY DOCTRINE. Where a passenger becomes sick or is injured while en route, carrier owes duty under "common humanity doctrine" to render to passenger such reasonable care and attention as common humanity would dictate. Alabama Great S. R. Co. v. Taylor, 190 Miss. 69, 199 So. 310, 312.
COMMON KNOWLEDGE. Is what court may de-clare applicable to action without necessity of proof. It is knowledge that every intelligent per-son has, Strain v. Isaacs, 59 Ohio App. 495, 18 N. E.2d 816, 825. It includes matters of learning, experience, history, and facts of which judicial no-tice may be taken. Shelley v. Chilton’s Adm’r, 236 Ky. 221, 32 S.W.2d 974, 977.
COMMON LAW. As distinguished from the Ro-man law, the modem civil law, the canon law, and other systems, the common law is that body of law and juristic theory which wa. originated, developed, and formulated and is adr. iinistered in England, and has obtained among nost of the states and peoples of Anglo-Saxon stock. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674.
As distinguished from law created by the en• actment of legislatures, the common law compris-es the body of those principies and rules of action, relating to the government and security of per-sons and property, which derive their authority solely from usages and customs of immemorial antiquity, or from the judgments and decrees of the courts recognizing, affirming, and enforcing such usages and customs; and, in this sense, par-ticularly the ancient unwritten law of England. 1 Kent, Comm. 492. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cali Pub. Co., 21 S.Ct. 561, 181 U.S. 92, 45 L.Ed. 765; Barry v. Port Jervis, 72 N.Y.S. 104, 64 App. Div. 268; U. S. v. Miller, D.C.Wash., 236 F. 798, 800.
As distinguished from equity law, it is a body of rules and principies, written or unwritten, which are of fixed and immutable authority, and which must be applied to controversies rigorously and in their entirety, and cannot be modified to suit the peculiarities of a specific case, or colored by any judicial discretion, and which rests con-f essedly upon custom or statute, as distinguished from any claim to ethical superiority. Klever v. Seawall, C.C.A.Ohio, 65 F. 395, 12 C.C.A. 661.
As distinguished from ecclesiastical law, it is the system of jurisprudence administered by the purely secular tribunals.
As concerns its force and authority in the Unit-ed States, the phrase designates that portion of the common law of England (including such acts of parliament as were applicable) which had been adopted and was in force here at the time of the Revolution. This, so far as it has not since been expressly abrogated, is recognized as an organic part of the jurisprudence of most of the United States. Industrial Acceptance Corporation v. Webb, Mo.App., 287 S.W. 657, 660.
The "common law" of England, which is the rule of decision in all courts of Montana, in so far as it is not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of that state, means that body of jurisprudence as applied and modified by the courts of this country up to the time it was adopted in Montana. Herrin v. Sutherland, 74 Mont. 587, 241 P. 328, 330, 42 A.L.R. 937. See, also, Norvell-Wilder Hardware Co. v. McCamey, Tex. Civ.App., 290 S.W. 772. 773; Fletcher v. Los Angeles Trust & Savings Bank, 182 Cal. 177, 187 P. 425, 427.
The common law of England, adopted by Pol. Code Cal. § 4468, does not refer solely to the lex non scripta, the coro-mon law unmodified by statute, but contemplates the whole body of jurisprudence as it stood, influenced by statute at the time when the Code section was adopted, and also embraces equity. Martin v. Superior Court of California in and for Alameda County, 176 Cal. 289, 168 P. 135, 136, L.R.A.1918B, 313.
In a wider sense than any of the foregoing, the "common law" may designate all that part of the positive law, juristic theory, and ancient custom of any state or nation which is of general and universal application, thus marking off special or local rules or customs.
For "Federal Common Law," see that title.
As a compound adjective "common-law" is un-derstood as contrasted with or opposed to "statu-tory," and sometimes also to "equitable" or tú "criminal." See examples below.
COMMON—LAW ACTION. A civil suit, as dis-tinguished from a criminal prosecution or a pro-ceeding to enf orce a penalty or a pollee regula-tion; not necessarily an action which would lie at common law. Kirby v. Railroad Co., C.C.Iowa, 106 F. 551; U. S. v. Block, 24 Fed.Cas. 1,174.

COMMON—LAW ASSIGNMENTS. Such forms of assignments for the benefit of creditors as were known to the common law, as distinguished from such as are of modern invention or authorized by statute. Ontario Bank v. Hurst, C.C.A.Mich., 103 F. 231, 43 C.C.A. 193.
COMMON—LAW CHEAT. The obtaining of money or property by means of a false token, symbol, or device; this being the definition of a cheat or "cheating" at common law. State v. Renick, 33 Or. 584, 56 Pac. 275, 44 L.R.A. 266, 72 Am.St.Rep. 758.
COMMON—LAW CONTEMPT. A name sometimes applied to proceedings for contempt which are criminal in their nature, as distinguished from those which are intended as purely civil remedies ordinarily arising out of the alleged violation of some order entered in the course of a chancery proceeding. People v. Samuel, 199 Il1.App. 294, 297; People v. Buconich, 199 I11,App. 410, 412.
COMMON—LAW COURTS. In England, those ad-ministering the common law. Equitable L. Assur. Soc. v. Paterson, 41 Ga. 364, 5 Am.Rep. 535.
COMMON—LAW CRIME. One punishable by the force of the common law, as distinguished from crimes created by statute. In re Greene, C.C. Ohio, 52 F. 104.
COISIMON—LAW JURISDICTION. Jurisdiction of a court to try and decide such cases as were cog-nizable by the courts of law under the English common law; the jurisdiction of those courts which exercise their judicial powers according to the course of the common law. U. S. v. Power, 27 Fed.Cas. 607.
COMMON—LAW LARCENY. See Larceny.
COMMON—LAW LIEN. One known to or granted by the common law, as distinguished from statu-tory, equitable, and maritirne liens; also one aris-ing by implication of law, as distinguished from one created by the agreement of the parties. The Menominie, D.C.Minn., 36 F. 197; Tobacco Ware-house Co. v. Trustee, 117 Ky. 478, 78 S.W. 413, 64 L.R.A. 219.
It is a right extended to a person to retain that which is in his possession belonging to another, until the demand or charge of the person in pos-session is paid or satisfied. Whiteside v. Rocky Mountain Fuel Co., C.C.A.Colo., 101 F.2d 765, 769; Goldwater v. Mendelson, 8 N.Y.S. 627, 629, 170 Misc. 422.
COMMON—LAW MARRIAGE. One not solemniz-ed in the ordinary way, but created by an agree-ment to marry, followed by cohabitation; a con-summated agreement to marry, between persons legally capable of making marriage contract, per verba de prmsenti, followed by cohabitation. Col-lins v. Hoag and Rollins, 121 Neb. 716, 238 N.W. 351.
There must be a public and continued recognition of such relation by the parties as distinguished from occasional or incidental recognition. Whitaker v. Shenault, Tex.Civ. App.. 172 S.W. 202, 203.

COMMON-LAW MORTGAGE. One possessing the characteristics or fulfilling the requirements of a mortgage at common law; not known in Louisiana, where the civil law prevails; but such a mortgage made in another state and affecting lands in Louisiana, will be given effect there as a "conventional" mortgage, affecting third per-sons after due inscription. Gates v. Gaither, 46 La.Ann. 286, 15 So. 50.
COMMON-LAW PROCEDURE ACTS. Three acts of parliament, passed in the years 1852, 1854, and 1860, respectively, for the amendment of the pro-cedure in the common-law courts. The common-law procedure act of 1852 is St. 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76; that of 1854, St. 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125; and that of 1860, St. 23 & 24 Vict. c. 126. Mozley & Whit-ley.
COMMON-LAW REMEDY. This phrase, within the meaning of U. S. Judicial Code 1911, § 256 (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1100, see His-torical and Revision Notes under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333), was not limited to remedies in the com-mon-law courts, but embraced all methods of en-forcing rights and redressing injuries known to the common or statutory law. Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 94 A. 372, 375, L.R.A. 1916A, 436. See, also, Northern Pacific S. S. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Commission of California, 174 Cal. 346, 163 P. 199, 202. See Notes of Deci-sions under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333.
The "right of a common-law remedy," saved to suitors in actions maritlme in their nature arising under charter parties by U. S. Judicial Code 1911, § 24, par. 3 (see His-torical and Revision Notes under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333) did not include attempted changes by the states in the substan-tive admiralty law, but did include all means, other than proceedings in admiralty, which may be employed to enforce the right or to redress the injury involved, and included remedies in pais, as well as proceedings in court: judicial remedies conferred by statute, as well as those existing in the common law; remedies in equity, as well as those enforceable in a court of law. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 44 S.Ct. 274, 277, 264 U.S. 109, 68 L.Ed. 582.
COMMON-LAW TRADE-MARK. One appropriat-ed under common-law rules, regardless of statutes. Stratton & Terstegge Co. v. Stiglitz Furnace Co., 258 Ky. 678, 81 S.W.2d 1, 3.
COMMON-LAW WIFE. A woman who was party to a "common-law marriage," as aboye defined; or one who, having lived with a man in a relation of concubinage during his Efe, asserts a claim, after his death, to have been his wife according to the requirements of the common law. In re Brush, 49 N.Y.S. 803, 25 App.Div. 610.
COMMON LAWYER. A lawyer learned in the common law.
COMMON NIGHTWALKER. See Night Walkers.
COMMON NUISANCE. A danger or damage threatening the public. Canfield v. Quayle, 10 N. Y.S.2d 781, 784, 170 Misc. 621.
COMMON OPINION IS GOOD AUTHORITY IN LAW. Co.Litt. 186a; Bank of Utica v. Me sereau, 3 Barb.Ch. (N.Y.) 528, 577, 49 Am.Dec. 189

COMMON PLEAS. The name of a court of record having general original jurisdiction in civil suits.
COMMON PLEAS, THE COURT OF. See Court of Cornmon Pleas.
COMMON RECOVERY. In conveyancing. A spe-cies of common assurance, or mode of conveying lands by matter of record, formerly in fi equent use in England. It was in the nature and form of an action at law, carried regularly through, and ending in a recovery of the lands against the tenant of the freehold; which recovery, being a supposed adjudication of the right, bound all per-sons, and vested a free and absoluto fee-simple in the recoverer. 2 Bl.Comm. 357. Christy v. Burch, 25 Fla. 942, 2 So. 258. Common recoveries were abolished by the statutes 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 74.
They were resorted to when the object was to create an absolute bar of estates tail, and of the remainders and re-versions expectant on the determination of such estates. 2 Bla Comm. 357. Though it has been used in some of the states, this form of conveyance is practically obsolete, easier and less expensive modes of making conveyances having been substituted. Frost v. Cloutman, 7 N.H. 9, 26 Am. Dec. 723.
COMMONABLE. Entitled to common. Common-able beasts are either beasts of the plow, as hors-es and oxen, or such as manure the land, as kine and sheep. Beasts not commonable are swine, goats, and the like. Co. Litt. 122a; 2 Bl.Comm. 33.
COMMONALTY. The great body of citizens; the mass of the people, excluding the nobility.
The body of people composing a municipal cor-poration, excluding the corporate officers.
The body of a society or corporation, as dis-tinguished from the officers. 1 Perr. & D. 243.
Charters of incorporation of the various tradesmen’s soci-enes, etc., in England are usuallY, granted to the master, wardens, and commonalty of such corporation.
COMMONANCE. The commoners, or tenants and inhabitants, who have the right of common or commoning in open field. Cowell.
COMMONERS. In English law. Persons having a right of common. So called because they have a right to pasture on the waste, in common with the lord. 2 H.B1. 389.
COIVIIVIONS. The class of subjects in Great Britain exclusive of the royal family and the no-bility. They are represented in parliament by the house of commons.
Part of the demesne land of a manor, (or land the prophrty of which was in the lord, ) which, being uncultivated, was termed the "lord’s waste," and served for public roads and for common of pasture to the lord and his tenants. 2 Bl.Comm. 90.
Squares; pleasure grounds and spaces or open places for public use or public recreation owned by towns;—in modern usage usually called "parks." Jones v. City of Jackson, 104 Miss. 449, 61 So. 456, 457.
COMMONS, HOUSE OF. See House of Commons

COMMONTY. In Scotch law. Land possessed in common by different proprietors, or by those hav-ing acquired rights of servitude. Bell.
COMMONWEALTH. The public or common weal or welfare. This cannot be regarded as a techni-cal term of public law, though often used in poli-tical science. It generally designates, when so employed, a republican frame of government,-one in which the welfare and rights of the entire mass of people are the main consideration, ra-ther than the privileges of a class or the will of a monarch; or it may designate the body of citi-zens living under such a government.
Sometimes it may denote the corporate entity, or the government, of a jural society (or state) possessing powers of self-government in respect of its immediate concerns, but forming an integral part of a larger government, (or nation.) State v. Lambert, 28 S.E. 930, 44 W.Va. 308.
In this latter sense, it is the official Une of several of the United States (as Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Vir-ginia, and Kentucky), and would be appropriate to them 011. In the former sense, the word was used to designate the English government during the protectorate of Crom-well.
See Government; Nation; State.
COMMORANCY. The dwelling in any place as an inhabitant; which consists in usually lying there. 4 Bl.Comm. 273. In American law it is used to denote a mere temporary residente. Pul-len v. Monk, 82 Me. 412, 19 A. 909; Gilman v. In-man, 85 Me. 105, 26 A. 1049.
COMMORANT. Staying or abiding; dwelling temporarily in a place. One residing in a particu-lar town, city, or district. Barnes, 162.
COMMORIENTES. Several persons who perish at the same time in consequence of the same calamity.
COMMORTH, or COMORTH. A contribution which was gathered at marriages, and when young priests said or sung the first masses. Pro-hibited by 26 Hen. VIII. c. 6. Cowell.
COMMOTE. Half a cantred or hundred in Wales, containing fifty villages. Also a great seignory or lordship, and may include one or divers manors. Co. Litt. 5.
COMMOTION. A "civil commotion" is an insur-rection of the people for general purposes, though it may not amount to rebellion where there is a usurped power. 2 Marsh.Ins. 793; Boon Insur-ance Co., 40 Conn. 584; Grame v. Assur. Soc., 5 S.Ct. 150, 112 U.S. 273, 28 L.Ed. 716; Spruill v. Insurance Co., 46 N.C. 127.
A civil commotion is an uprising among a mass of people which occasions a serious and prolonged disturbance and infraction of civil ordér not at-taining the status of war or an armed insurrec-tion; it is a wild and irregular action of many persons assembled together. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., Hartford, Conn. v. War Eagle Coal Co., C.C. A.W.Va., 295 F. 663, 665. The term refers to political disorders, not to an economic disturbance. The Poznan, D.C.N.Y., 276 F. 418, 427.
COlVEVIIUNE, adj. Lat. See Communis.
COMMUNE, n. A self-governing town or village. The name given to the committee of the people in the French revolution of 1793; and again, in the revolutionary uprising of 1871, it signifled the attempt to establish absolute self-government in Paris, or the mass of those concerned in the at-tempt. In old French law, it signifled any muni-cipal corporation. And in old English law, the commonalty or common people. 2 Co.Inst. 540.
COMMUNE CONCILIUM. The King’s Council. See Privy Council.
COMMUNE CONCILIUM REGNI. The common council of the realm. One of the names of the English parliament. See Communitas Regni
COMMUNE FORUM. The common place of jus-tice. The seat of the principal courts, especially those that are fixed.
COMMUNE PLACITUM. In old English law. A common plea or civil action, such as an action of debt.
COMMUNE VINCULUM. A common or mutual bond. Applied to the common stock of consan-guinity, and to the feodal bond of fealty, as the common bond of union between lord and tenant. 2 Bl.Comm. 250; 3 Bl.Comm. 230.
COMMUNI CUSTODIA. In English law. An ob-solete writ which anciently lay for the lord, whose tenant, holding by knight’s service, died, and left his eldest son under age, against a stranger that entered the land, and obtained the ward of the body. Reg. Orig. 161.
COMMUNI DIVIDUNDO. In the civil law. An action which lies for those who have property in common, to procure a division. It lies where parties hold land in common but not in partner-ship. Calvin.
COMMUNIA. In old English law. Common things, res communes. Such as running water, the air, the sea, and sea shores. Bract. fol. 7b.
COMMUNIA PLACITA. In old English law. Common pleas or actions; those between one subject and another, as distinguished from pleas of the crown.
COMMUNIA PLACITA NON TENENDA IN SCACCARIO. An ancient writ directed to the treasurer and barons of the exchequer, forbidding them to hold pleas between common persons (i. e., not debtors to the king, who alone originally sued and were sued there) in that court, where neither of the parties belonged to the same. Reg. Orig. 187.
COMMUNL2E. In feudal law on the continent of Europe, this name was given to towns enfran

chised by the crown, about the twelfth century, and formed into free corporations by grants call-ed "charters of community."
COMMUNIBUS ANNIS. In ordinary years; on the annual average.
COMMUNICATE. To bestow, convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of infor-mation. Whitford v. North State Life Ins. Co., 163 N.C. 223, 79 S.E. 501, 502, Ann.Cas.1915B, 270; Prevost v. Morgenthau, 106 F.2d 330, 334, 70 App. D.C. 306.
COMMUNICATION. Information given, the shar-ing of knowledge by one with another; confer-ence; consultation or bargaining preparatory to making a contract. Intercourse; connection. Al-so, the Masonic equivalent for the word "meet-ing." State v. Goodwyn, 83 W.Va. 255, 98 S.E. 577.
Something said by one person to another;-so used in a statute provlding that neither a party nor his or her spouse shall be examined as a witness as to personal transactions or communications between witness and persons since de-ceased. Secor v. Siver, 188 Iowa, 1126, 161 N.W. 769, 772, 176 N.W. 981.
"Transactions and communications," within statute declaring lnadmissible testimony of interested witness con-cerning transactions and communications between himself and deceased person, embrace every variety of affairs which conform to the subject of negotiation, interviews, or actions between two persons, and include every method by which one person can derive impressions or information from the conduct, condition or language of another. Bright v. Vir-ginia & Gold Hill Water Co., C.C.A.Nev., 270 F. 410, 413.
The act of communicating;-so used in a statute declar-ing that no husband or wife shall be compelled to disclose any confidential communication made by one to the other during marriage. Whltford v. North State Life Ins. Co., 163 N.C. 223, 79 S.E. 501, 502, Ann.Cas.1915B, 270. In a broader sense, the word embraces all knowledge upon the part of either obtained by reason of the marriage relations, and which but for the confidence growing out of such rela-tion would not have been known. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Plerce’s Adm’r, 2/0 Ky. 216, 109 S.W.2d 616, 617.
As used In a statute providing that an attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client, "communication" is not restricted to mere words but includes acts as well. Ex parte McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 149 P. 566, 567, L.R.A. 1916C, 593, Ann.Cas.1916E, 327.

French Law

The production of a merchant’s books, by de-livering them either to a person designated by the court, or to his adversary, to be examined in all their parts, and as shall be deemed necessary to the suit. Arg. Fr. Merc. Law, 552.
-Confidential cornmunications. These are certain classes of communications, passing between per-sons who stand in a confidential or fiduciary rela-tion to each other, (or who, on account of their relative situation, are under a special duty of sec-recy and fidelity,) which the law will not permit to be divulged, or allow them to be inquired into in a court of justice, for the sake of public policy and the good order of society. Examples of such privileged relations are those of husband and wife and attorney and client. Hatton v. Robinson, ’14 Pick.Mass. 416, 25 Am.Dec. 415; Parker v. Carter, 4 Munf.Va. 287, 6 Am.Dec. 513; Parkhurst v. Ber-dell, 110 N.Y. 386, 18 N.E. 123, 6 Am.St.Rep. 384.

-PriVileged communication. In the law of evi-dence. A communication made to a counsel, soli-citor, or attorney, in professional confidence, and which he is not permitted to divulge; otherwise called a "confidential communication." 1 Starkie, Ev. 185.
In the law of libe! and siander. A defamatory statement made to another in pursuance of a duty, political, judicial, social, or personal, so that an action for libel or slander will not lie, though the-statement be false, unless in the last two cases actual malice be proved in addition. Bacon v. Railroad Co., 66 Mich. 166, 33 N.W. 181; 5 E. & B. 347.
When a communication is fairly made by one in the dls. charge of a public or private duty, legal, moral, or social, of perfect or imperfect obligation, or in the conduct of his own affairs, to one who has a corresponding interest to receive such communication, It is "privileged," Interna-tional & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Edmundson, Tex.Com.App., 222 S.W. 181, 183, if made in good faith and without actual malice, Baker v. Clark, 186 Ky. 816, 218 S.W. 280, 285. A "privileged communication" is one made in good faith, upon any subject-matter In which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has, or hon-estly believes he has, a duty, and which contains matter which, without the occasion upon which It Is made, would be defamatory and actionable. Peak v. Taubman, 251 Mo. 390, 158 S.W. 656, 663. In a "privileged communication" the words used, if defamatory and libelous, are excused, while in "fair comment" the words are not a defamation of plaintiff and not libelous. Van Lonkhuyzen v. Daily News Co., 203 Mich. 570, 170 N.W. 93, 99.
Privileged communications are either (1) absolutely priv-ileged, or (2) conditionally or qualifiedly privileged. Grantham v. Wilkes, 135 Miss. 777, 100 So. 673. An "abso-lutely privileged communication" is one made in the inter-est of the public service or the due administration of jus-tice, and Is practically limited to legislative and judicial proceed1ngs and other actions of state. Grantham v. Wilkes, 135 Miss. 777, 100 So. 673. By an "absolutely priv-ileged" publication is not to be understood a publication for which the publisher is in no wise responsible, but it means a publication in respect of which, by reason of the occasion upon which it Is made, no remedy can be had in a civil action for slander or libel, Peterson v. Cleaver, 105 Neb. 438, 181 N.W. 187, 189, 15 A.L.R. 447, even though the words are published maliciously and with knowledge of their falsity, Spencer v. Looney, 116 Va. 767, 82 S.E. 745, 747. A "qualifiedly privileged communication" Is a slanderous statement uttered in good faith upon a proper occasion and from a proper motive based upon an honest belief that it Is true, but, unlIke communications wholly privileged, the defendant has the burden of proving want of malice or 111 will. Peak v. Taubman, 251 Mo. 390, 158 S.W. 656, 665. A communication "qualifiedly privileged" is one which Is prima facie privileged only, and in which the privilege may be lost by proof of malice in the publi-cation. Spencer v. Looney, 116 Va. 767, 82 S.E. 745, 747. A communication made in good faith upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest or in reference to which he has a duty, either legal, moral, or social, if made to a person having a corresponding inter-est or duty, is "qualifiedly privileged." Peterson v. Clea-ver, 105 Neb. 438, 181 N.W. 187, 189, 15 A.L.R. 447; Mas-see v. Williams, C.C.A.Tenn., 207 F. 222, 230; German-American Ins. Co. v. Huntley, 62 Okl. 39, 161 P. 815, 818.
COMMUNINGS. In Scotch law. The negotia-tions preliminary to entering into a contract.
COMMUNIO BONORUM. In the civil law. A community of goods.
COMMUNION OF GOODS. In Scotch law. The right enjoyed by married persons in the movable goods belonging to them. Bell.
COMMUNIS, COMMUNE, adj. Lat. Common

COMMUNIS ERROR FACIT JUS. Common error makes law. 4 Inst. 240; Noy, Max. p. 37, max. 27. Common error goeth for a law. Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 3, no. 54. Common error sometimes passes cur-rent as law. Broom, Max. 139,440.
What was at first ilegal is presumed, when repeated many times, to have acquired the force of usage; • and then it would be wrong to depart from it. 1 Ld.Raym. 42; 6 Cl. & F. 172; 3 M. & S. 396; Goodman v. Eastman, 4 N.H. 458; Kent v. Kent, 2 Mass. 357; Davey v. Turner, 1 Dall. 13, 1 L.Ed. 15. The converse of this maxim is communis error non facit jus. A common error does not make law. 4 Inst. 242; 3 Term 725; 6 Term 564.
COMMUNIS OPINIO. Common opinion; general professional opinion. According to Lord Coke (who places it on the footing of observante or usage), common opinion is good authority in law. Co. Litt. 186a.
COMMUNIS PARLES. In the civil law. A com-mon or party wall. Dig. 8, 2, 8, 13.
COMMUNIS RIXATRIX. In old English law. A common scold, (q. v.) 4 Bl.Comm. 168.
COMMUNIS SCRIPTURA. In old English law. A common writing; a writing common to both parties; a chirograph. Glan. lib. 8, c. 1.
COMMUNIS STIPES. A common stock of de-scent; a common ancestor.
COMMUNISM. A system of social organization in which goods are held in common, the opposite of the system of private property; communalism, any theory or system of social organization in-volving common ownership of agents of produc-tion of industry, the latter of which theories is re-ferred to in the popular use of the word "com-munism" while the scientific usage sometimes con-forms to the first alone and sometimes alternates between the first and second; álso the principies and theories of the Communist Party, especially in Soviet Russia. Feinglass v. Reinecke, D.C.I11., 48 F.Supp. 438, 440.
Any theory or system of social organization involving common ownership of the .agents of production, and some approach to equality in the distribution of the products of industry. Websler, Dict. A system by which the state controls the means of production and the distribution and eonsumption of industrial products. Cent.Dict.
An equality of distribution of the physical means of life and enjoyment as a transition to a still higher standard of justice that all should work according to their capacity and receive according to their wants. 1 Mill, Pol.Ec. 248. .
COMMUNIST. A supporter of the Paris Com-mune; in 1871 Communard;, a member of the Communist Party in any country, especially Soviet Russia; one who belives in communism. Feing-lass v. Reinecke, D.C.I11., 48 F.Supp. 438, 440, 441.
Communist International. See Third Interna-tional.
COMMUNIST PARTY. A semipolitical party of reces t years representing the Socialist radical wing and holding of the tenets and beliefs of Communism. It has quite generally seceded from the Socialists, organizing in many countries but chiefly in Russia. Garriga v. Richfield, 20 N.Y.S. 2d 544, 547, 174 Misc. 315

COMMUNITAS REGNI ANGLLE. The general assembly of the kingdom of England. One of the ancient names of the English parliament. 1 Bl. Comm. 148. See, also, Commune Concilium Regni,
COMMUNITY. Neighborhood; vicinity, synony-mous with locality. Conley v. Valley Motor Tran-sit Co., C.C.A.Ohio, 139 F.2d 692, 693. People who reside in a locality in more or less proximity. State ex inf. Thompson ex rel. Kenneppe v. Scott, 304 Mo. 664, 264 S.W. 369, 370. A society or body of people living in the same place, under the same laws and regulations, who have common rights, privileges, or interests. In re Huss, 126 N.Y. 537, 27 N.E. 784, 12 L.R.A. 620; Sacred Heart Academy of Galveston v. Karsch, 122 S.W.2d 416, 417, 173 Tenn. 618.
It connotes a congerles of common interests arising from associations—social, business, rellgious, governmental, scholastic, recreational. Lukens Steel Co. v. Perkins, 107 F.2d 627, 631, 70 App.D.C. 354.
The term "community," as used in a statute provlding that cornmunities may be incorporated for the purpose of supplying inhabitants with water, should be construed to include all the inhabitants of a district having a community of interest in obtaining for themselves in common a water supply for dornestic use. Hamilton v. Rudeen, 112 Or. 268, 224 P. 92, 93.
In connectlon with the rule requiring, for purposes of impeachment, a knowledge of the character of the witness in the community or neighborhood in which he resides, the term "community" means, generally, where the person is well known and has established a reputation. Craven v. State, 22 Ala.App, 39, 111 So. 767, 769.\

Civil Law

A corporation or body politic. Dig. 3, 4.

French Law

A species of partnership which a man and a woman contract when they are lawfully married to each other. See, also, Community Property, infra.
Conventional community is that which is form-ed by express agreement in the contract of mar-riage.
By this contract the legal community which would other-wise subsist may be modified as to the proportions which each shall take, and as to the things which shall com-pose it.
Legal community is that which takes place by virtue of the contract of marriage itself.
The French system of community property was known as the dotal system, and the Spanish as the ganancial sys-tem. The conquest of Mexico by the Spaniards and their acquisition of the Florida territory resulted in the intro-duction on American sol’ ot the Spanish system, which now prevalls, usually in a somewhat modified form, in Texas, California, Nevada, Arizona, Washington, Idaho, New Mexico, Porto Rico, and the Philippines. Ballinger, Com.Property, § 6; Chavez v. McKnight, 1 N.M. 147. The Louislana Code has, with slight modifications, adopted the dotal system of the Code Nepoléon as regards the separate rights of husband and wife, but as to their common prop-erty, it retained the essential features of the Spanish ganancial system.

COMMUNITY ACCOUNT. A bank account con-sisting of separate and cornmunity funds com-mingled in such manner that neither can be dis-tinguished from the other. Smith v. Buss, 135 Tex. 566, 144 S.W.2d 529, 532.

COMMUNITY DEBT. One chargeable to the com-munity (of husband and wife) rather than to ei-ther of the parties individually. Calhoun v. Leary, 6 Wash. 17, 32 P. 1070.
COMMUNITY HOUSE. A house occupied by two or more families. Fox v. Sumerson, 338 Pa. 545, 13 A.2d 1, 2.
COMMUNITY OF INTEREST. Term as applied to relation of joint adventure means interest com-mon to both or all parties, that is, mixture or identity of interest in venture wherein each and all are reciprocally concerned and from which each and all derive material benefit and sustain a mutual responsibility. Carboneau v. Peterson, 1 Wash.2d 347, 95 P.2d 1043, 1055.
COMMUNITY OF PROFITS. This term, as used in the definition of a partnership, (to which a com-munity of profits is essential,) means a proprietor-ship in them as distinguished from a personal claim upon the other associate, a property right in them from the start in one associate as much as in the other. Moore v. Williams, 26 Tex.Civ. App. 142, 62 S.W. 977.
COMMUNITY PROPERTY. Property owned in common by a husband and wife as a kind of mari-tal partnership. Coleman v. Coleman, Tex.Civ. App., 293 S.W. 695, 699. Property acquired by husband and wife, or either, during marriage, when not acquired as the separate property of either. In re Lux’s Estate, 114 Cal. 73, 45 P. 1023; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 80 Tex. 101, 15 S.W. 705; Ames v. Hubby, 49 Tex. 705; Holyoke v. Jackson, 3 Wash.T. 235, 3 P. 841; Civ. Code Cal. § 687.
This partnership or community consiste of the profits of all the effects of which the husband has the administration and enjoyment, either of right or in fact, of the produce of the reciprocal industry and labor of both husband and wife, and of the estates which they may acquire during the marriage, either by donations made jointly to them both, or by purchase, or in any other similar way, even although the purchase be only in the naipe of one of the two, and not of both, because in that case the period of time when the purchase is made is alone attended to, and not the person who made the purchase. Rev.Civ.Code La. arts. 2402, 2404; Brown v. Cobb, 10 La. 172; Barnes v. Thomp-son, 154 La. 1036, 98 So. 637, 658.
COMMUTATION. Alteration; change; substitu-tion; the act of substituting one thing for an-other. Steinacher v. Swanson, 131 Neb. 439, 268 N.W. 317, 321.

Criminal Law

The change of a punishment from a greater to a less; as from hanging to imprisonment. Peo-ple v. Jenkins, 325 III. 372, 156 N.E. 290, 292. Fehl v. Martin, 155 Or. 455, 64 P.2d 631, 632.
Although both a pardon and a commutation are granted by the sovereign power; Goben v. State, 32 Okl.Cr. 237, 240 P. 1085, 1087; a "commutation" means merely a change of punishment, while a "pardon" avoids or termihates pun-ishment for crime; Lupo v. Zerbest, C.C.A.Ga., 92 F.2d 362, 364. A pardon bears no relation to the term of pun-ishment, and must be accepted or it is nugatory ; commu-tation removes no stain, restores no civil privilege, and may, be effected without the consent and against the will of the prisoner. In re Charles, 115 Kan. 323, 222 P. 606, 608; Chapman v. Scott, D.C.Conn., 10 F.2d 156, 159.

"Commutation" is also distinguishable from a "reprieve" or "respite," meaning simply the withholding of a sen-tence for an interval of time, a postponement of execution, ora ternporary suspension of execution. State v. District Court of Eighteenth Judicial Dist. in and for Blaine County, 73 Mont. 541, 237 P. 525, 527.

Civil Law

The conversion of the right to receive a variable or periodical payment into the right to receive a fixed or gross payment; a substitution of one sort of payment for another, or of money payment in lieu of a performance of a compulsory duty or labor. Commutation may be effected by private agreement, but it is usually done under a statute. Steinacher v. Swanson, 131 Neb. 439, 268 N.W. 317, 321.
COMMUTATION OF TAXES. Payment of a des-ignated lump sum (permanent or annual) for the privilege of exemption from taxes, or the settle-ment in advance of a specific sum in lieu of an ad valorem tax. Cotton Mfg. Co. v. New Orleans, 31 La.Ann. 440.
COMMUTATION OF TITHES. Signifies the con-version of tithes into a fixed payment in money.
COMMUTATION TICKET. A railroad ticket giv-ing the holder the right to travel at a certain rate for a limited number of trips (or for an unlimited number within a certain period of time) for a less amount than would be paid in the aggregate for so many separate trips. Interstate Commerce Com’n v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., C.C.Ohio, 43 F. 56.
COMMUTATIVE CONTRACT. In civil law. One in which each of the contracting parties gives and receives an equivalent; e. g., the contract of sale. Pothier, Obl. n. 13; State ex rel. Waterman v. J. S. Waterman and Co., 178 La. 340, 151 So. 422, 426. See Contrac

COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE. See Justice.
COMPACT, n. An agreement; a contract. Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, 92, 5 L.Ed. 547. Usually applied to conventions between nations or sover-eign states.
A contract between parties, which creates obligations and rights capable of being enforced, and contemplated as such between the parties, in their distinct and independent char-acters. Story, Const. b. 3, c. 3; Rutherf.Inst. b. 2, c. 6, § 1.
A mutual consent of parties concerned respecting some property or right that is the object of the stipulation, or sornething that is to be done or forborne. Chesapeake & O. Canal Co. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 4 Gill & J., Md., 1.
COMPACT, adj. Closely or firmly united or pack-ed, as the particles of solid bodies; firm; solid; dense; as a compact texture in rocks; also, lying in a narrow compass or arranged so as to econ-omize space; having a small surface or border in proportion to contents or bulk; close; as, a compact estate; a compact ‘order or formation of troops. Wails v. Board of Commissioners of Ok-mulgee County, 156 Okl. 165, 9 P.2d 946, 948. Con-centrated, or near to. Webster v. Toulon Tp. High School Dist. No. 4, 313 Ill. 541, 145 N.E. 118, 121; State v. Tindell, 210 P. 619, 621, 112 Kan. 256

COMPACT SCHOOL DISTRICT. One so closely united and so nearly adjacent to the school build-ing that all the students residing in the district may conveniently travel from their homes to the school building and return the same day in a rea-sonable length of time and with a reasonable de-gree of comfort. People ex rel. Tudor v. Vance, 29 N.E.2d 673, 675, 374 III. 415; People ex rel. Frailey v. McNeely, 32 N.E.2d 608, 610, 376 III. 64.
COMPANAGE. All kinds of food, except bread and drink. Spelman.
COMPANIES CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACT. An English statute, (8 Vict. c. 16,) passed in 1845, which consolidated the clauses of previous laws still remaining in force on the subject of public companies. It is considered as incorporated into all subsequent acts authorizing the execution of undertakings of a public nature by companies, unless expressly excepted by such later acts. Its purpose is declared by the preamble to be to avoid repeating provisions as to the constitution and management of the companies, and to secure greater uniformity in such provisions. Wharton.
COMPANION OF THE GARTER. One of the knights of the Order of the Garter.
COMPANIONS. In French law. A general term, comprehending all persons who compose the crew of a ship or vessel. Poth. Mar. Cont. no. 163.
COMPANULATE. This term, used to describe the shape of the cover of a lunch-box containing a thermos bottle, means bell-shaped. American Can Co. v. Goldee Mfg. Co., D.C.N.Y., 290 F. 523, 527.
COMPANY. A society or association of persons, in considerable number, interested in a common object, and uniting themselves for the prosecution usually of some commercial or industrial under-taking, or other legitimate business. Milis v. State, 23 Tex. 303; Smith v. Janesville, 52 Wis. 680, 9 N.W. 789.
The proper signification of the word "company," when applled to persons engaged in trade, denotes those united for the same purpose or in a joint concern. It is so com-monly used in this cense, or as indicating a partnership, that few persons accustomed to purchase goods at shops, where they are sold by retan, would misapprehend that such was its meaning. Palmer v. Pinkham, 33 Me. 32.
The term is not identical with "partnership," although every unincorporated society is, in its legal relations, a partnership. In common use a distinction is made, the name "partnership" being reserved for business associa-tions of a limited number of persons (usually not more than four or five) trading under a name composed of their individual names set out in succession; while "company" is appropriated as the designation of a society comprising a largor number of persons, with greater capital, and engaged In more extensive enterprises, and trading under a title not disclosing the names of the individuals. Attor-ney General v. Mercantile Marine Ins. Co., 121 Mass. 525.
Sometimes the word is used to represent those members of a partnership whose names do not appear In the name of the firm. See 12 Toullier, 97.
A number of persons united for performing or carrying on anything jointly. In re Tidewater Coal Exchange, C.C.A.N.Y., 280 F. 638, 643.
Thus, the term le not necessarlly limited to a trading or commercial body, but may lnclude an unincorporated

organization to promote fraternity among its members and provide mutual aid and proteetion through the payment of death benefits. In re Order of Sparta, D.C.Pa., 238 F. 437.
"Company" is a generic and comprehensive word, which may Include individuals, partnerships, and corporations. Asbury v. Town of Albemarle, 162 N.C. 247, 78 S.E. 146, 148. 44 L.R.A.,N.S., 1189; Ellerson v. Grove, C.C.A.N.C., 44 F.2d 493, 497, But not a municipality. City of Los An-geles, Cal., v. Elghth Judicial District Court, 58 Nev. 1, 67 P.20 1019, 1023.
The word is sometimos applicable to a single Individual. Harger v. Harger, 144 Ark. 375, 222 S.W. 736, 739. But compare Wood v. Wood, 78 Or. 181, 151 P. 969, 970, L.R.A. 1916C, 251, Ann.Cas.1918A, 226

Joint Stock Company

An association of individuals for purposes of profit, possessing a common capital contributed by the members composing it, such capital being commonly divided into shares of which each mem-ber possesses one or more, and which are trans-ferable by the owner. Shelf. Jt. St. Co. 1. One having a joint stock or capital, which is divided into numerous transferable shares, or consists of transferable stock. Lindl. Partn. 6. A partner-ship whereof the capital is divided, or agreed to be divided, into shares so as to be transferable without the express consent of the co-partners. Pars. Part. § 435. A quasi partnership, invested by statutes in England and many of the states with some of the privileges of a corporation. See Pennsylvania v. Mining Co., 10 Wall. 556, 19 L. Ed. 998; L.R. 4 Eq. 695. It lies midway between a corporation and a copartnership. Rocky Moun-tain Stud Farm Co. v. Lunt, 46 Utah, 299, 151 P. 521, 527.
A "joint-stock company" is an entirely different organi-zation from a "corporation," although it has many of the same characteristics and is often not improperly called a quasi corporation, especially under particular statutes, but in Kentucky it is still what it was at common law, namely, a hybrid midway between a corporation and a partnership, that is, it had directors and officers, artieles of assoclation, a common capital divided into shares which represented the Interests of the members and are transferable without the consent of the other members so that the death of a mem-ber does not dissolve the company—but, on the other hand, each member was Hable for the debts of the concern, so that such company had characteristics of both a corpora-tion and a partnership. Roller v. Madison, 172 Ky. 693, 189 S.W. 914, 915.

Lirnited Company

A company in which the liability of each share-holder is limited by the number of shares he has taken, so that he cannot be called on to contribute beyond the amount of his shares. In England, the memorandum of association of such company may provide that the liability of the directors, mana-ger, or managing director thereof shall be unlimit-ed. 30 & 31 Vict. c. 131; 1 Lindl. Partn. 383; Mozley & Whitley.

Public Company

In English law. A business corporation; a so-ciety of persons joined together for carrying on some commercial or industrial undertaking.

COMPARABLE ACCOMMODATION. Within the rule that it is the rent generally prevailing on the freeze date for comparable accommodations in a defense-rental area that determines rent that may be charged, two accommodations are "compara-ble" if they are sufficiently similar to be regarded by an expert as of substantially equal rental value or if they are sufficiently similar so that an ex-pert taking as a standard the rent prevailing for one and making allowances for such differences as would be reflected in rental value would be able to determine the appropriate corresponding rent for the other. Sirianni v. Bowles, Em.App., 148 F.2d 343, 344.
COMPARATIO LITERARUM. In the civil law. Comparison of writings, or handwritings. A mode of proof allowed in certain cases.
COMPARATIVE. Proceeding by the method of comparison; founded on comparison; estimated by comparison.
COMPARATIVE INTERPRETATION. That method of interpretation which seeks to arrive at the meaning of a statute or other writing by comparing its severa] parts and also by comparing it as a whole with other like documents proceeding from the same source and referring to the same general subject. Glenn v. York County, 6 Rich. (S.C.) 412.
COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE. The study of the principies of legal science by the compari-son of various systems of law.
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE. That doctrine in the law of negligence by which the negligence of the parties is compared, in the degrees of "slight," "ordinary," and "gross" negligence, and a recovery permitted, notwithstanding the con-tributory negligence of the plaintiff, when the negligence of the plaintiff is slight and the neg-ligence of the defendant gross, but refused when the plaintiff has been guilty of a want of ordinary care, thereby contributing to his injury, or when the negligence of the defendant is not gross, but only ordinary or slight, when compared, under the circumstances of the case, with the contribu-tory negligence of the plaintiff. 3 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 367. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Elsing, 37 Okl. 333, 132 P. 483, 486.
Where negligence by both parties is concurrent and con-tributes to injury, recovery is not barred under such doc-trine, but plaintiff’s damages are diminished proportion-ately, provided his fault is less than defendant’s, and that, by exercise of ordinary care, he could not have avoided consequences of defendant’s negligence atter it was or should have been apparent. Rogers v. McKinley, 48 Ga.App. 262, 172 S.E. 662, 664.
COMPARISON OF HANDWRITING. A compari-son by the juxtaposition of two writings, in order, by such comparison, to ascertain whether both were written by the same person.
A method of proof resorted to where the genu-ineness of a written document is disputed; it con-sists in comparing the handwriting of the disput-ed paper with that of another instrument which is proved or admitted to be in the writing of the party sought to be charged, in order to infer, from their Identity or similarity in thls respect, that they are the work of the same hand. Johnson v. Insurance Co., 105 Iowa, 273, 75 N.W. 101.
Black’s Law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed.-23

COMPARATIVE RECTITUDE. Doctrine wherein relief by divorce is granted to the party least in fault when both have shown grounds for divorce. Blankenship v. Blankenship, 51 Nev. 356, 276 P. 9, 10, 63 A.L.R. 1127.
Doctrine does not apply in Nevada.
COMPASCUUM. Belonging to commonage Jus compascuum, the right of common of pasture.
COMPASS, THE MARINER’S. An instrument used by mariners to point out the course of a ship at sea. It consists of a magnetized steel bar call-ed the "needie," attached to the under side of a card, upon which are drawn the points of the com-pass, and supported by a fine pin, upon which it turns freely in a horizontal plane.
COMPASSING. Imagining or contriving, or plot-ting. In English law, "compassing the king’s death" is treason. 4 Bl.Comm. 76.
COMPATERNITAS. In the canon law. A kind of spiritual relationship contracted by baptism.
COMPATERNITY. Spiritual affinity, contracted by sponsorship in baptism,
COMPATIBILITY. As applied to offices, such re-lation and consistency between the duties of two offices that they may be held and filled by one person.
COMPEAR. In Scotch law. To appear.
COMPEARANCE. In Scotch practice. Appear-ance; an appearance made for a defendant; an appearance by counsel. Bell.
COMPEL. To force. Temple Lumber Co. v. Liv-ing, Tex.Civ.App., 289 S.W. 746, 749. To oblige. Texas Electric Ry. v. Jones, Tex.Civ.App., 231 S. W. 823, 824.
In an allegation that plaintiff was compelled to pay license taxes, the word "compel" does not necessarily Import elements of compulsory payment. Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Teasley, 198 Ala. 673, 73 So. 969, 971; Sinnott v. District Court in and for Clarke County, 201 Iowa, 292, 207 N.W. 129, 131.
As to compelling a person to testify against himself, see State v. Backstrom, 117 Kan. 111, 230 P. 306, 308: U. S. v. Cooper, D.C.Iowa, 288 F. 604, 609; U. S. v. Kailas, D.C. flash., 272 F. 742, 751; U. S. v. Monia, III., 317 U.S. 424, 63 S.Ct. 409, 411, 87 L.Ed. 376.
COMPELLATIVUS. An adversary or accuser.
Compendia sunt dispendia. Co. Litt. 305. Abbre-viations (or abridgments) are detriments.
COMPENDIUM. An abridgment, synopsis, or di-gest.
COMPENSABLE DEATH. Within Workmen’s Compensation Acts is one which results to em-ployee from injury by accident arising out of and in course of employment. Slade v. Willis Hosiery Milis, 209 N.C. 823, 184 S.E. 844, 845.
COMPENSABLE INJURY. Within Workmen’s Compensation Acts is an injury for which com-pensation is payable, and date of such an injury is not time of the accident or occurrence causing injury, but the time when the right to compensa-tion accrues. S. G. Taylor Chain Co. v. Marianow-ski, 182 N.E. 584, 585, 95 Ind.App. 120. Muehl-hausen Spring Co. v. Szewczyk, 104 Ind.App. 161, 8 N.E.2d 104, 106.
COMPENSACION. In Spanish law. Compensa-tion; set-off. The extinction of a debt by another debt of eanal dignity between persons who have mutual claims on each other.
COMPENSATIO. Lat. In the civil law. Com-pensation, or set-off. A proceeding resembling a set-off in the common law, being a claim on the part of the defendant to have an amount due to him from the plaintiff deducted from his demand. Dig. 16, 2; Inst. 4, 6, 30, 39; 3 B1.Comm. 305.
COMPENSATIO CRIMINIS. (Set-off of crime or guilt.) In practice. The compensation or set-off of one crime against another; the plea of re-crimination in a suit for a divorce; that is, that the complainant is guilty of the same kind of of-fense with which the respondent is charged. See 1 Hagg.Cons. 144; 1 Hagg.Eccl. 714; Wood v. Wood, 2 Paige, Ch. (N.Y.) 108, 2 D. & B. 64; Bi-shop, Marr. & D. §§ 393, 394.
COMPENSATION. Indemnification; payment of damages; making amends; making whole; giv-ing an equivalent or substitute of equal value; that which is necessary to restore an injured par-ty to his former position; consideration or price of a privilege purchased; equivalent in money for a loss sustained; equivalent given for prop-erty taken or for an injury done to another; giv-ing back an equivalent in either money which is but the measure of value, or in actual value other-wise conferred; recompense in value; recompense or reward for some loss, injury, or service, es-pecially when it is given by statute; remunera-tion for the injury directly and proximately caus-ed by a breach of contract or duty; remunera-tion or satisfaction for injury or damage of every description; that return which is given for some-thing else. An act which a court orders to be done, or money which a court or other tribunal orders to be paid, by a person whose acts or omis-sions have caused loss or injury to another, in order that thereby the person damnified may re-ceive equal value for his loss, or be made whole in respect of his injury. Railroad Co. v. Denman, 10 Minn. 280 (Gil. 208); Hughson Condensed Milk Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 23 Cal.App.2d 281, 73 P.2d 290, 292. For "Extra Compensation" and "Fair and Reasonable Compensation", see these titles.
"Compensa tion" is a misleading term, and is used rnerely for lack of a word more nearly expressing the thought of the law which permits recovery for an imponderable and intangible thing for which there is no money equivalent. Stutsman v. Des Moines City Ry. Co., 180 Iowa, 524, 163 N.W. 580, 585.
The word "compensation," as used in Workmen’s Com-pensation Acts, means the money relief afforded an injured employee or his dependents according to the scale estab-lished and for the persons designated in the act, and not the compensatory damages recoverable in an action at law for a wrong done or a contract broken. Christensen v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 214 N.Y.S. 732, 740, 216 App.Div. 274.

Also that equivalent in money which is paid to the owners and occupiers of lands taken or injur-iously affected by the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Louisiana and F. Plank Road Co. v. Pickett, 25 Mo. 535, 539; Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Fox, 28 Utah 311, 78 P. 800, 801.

In the constitutional provision for "just compensation" for property taken under the power of eminent domain, this term means a payment in money. Any beneflt to the remaining property of the owner, arising from public: works for which a part has been taken, cannot be consid-ered as compensation. Railroad Co. v. Burkett, 42 Ala. 83.
As comparad with consideration and damages, compen-sation, in its most careful use, seems to be between them. Consideration is amends for something given by consent, or by the owner’s choice. Damages is amends exacted from a wrong-doer for a tort. Compensation is amends for some-thing which was taken without the owner’s choice, yet without commission of a tort. Thus, one should say, con-sideration for land sc>ld; compensation for land taken for a railway; damages for a trespass. But such distinctions are not uniform. Land damages is a common expression for compensation for lands taken for public use. Abbott.
"Compensation" is distinguishable from "damages," inasmuch as the former may mean the sum which will remunerate an owner for land actually taken, while the latter signifies an allowance made for injury to the residue: but such distinction is not ordinarily observed. Faulkner v. City of Nashville, 154 Tenn. 145, 285 S.W. 39, 43

The remuneration or wages given to an em-ployee or, especially, to an officer. Salary, pay, or emolument. Christopherson v. Reeves, 44 S.D. 634, 184 N.W. 1015, 1019; Higgins v. Glenn, 65 Utah, 406, 237 P. 513, 515.

The ordlnary meaning of the term "compensation," as applied to officers, is remuneration, In whatever form it may be given, whether it be salaries and fees, or both combined. State v. Bland, 91 Kan. 160, 136 P. 947, 949. It is broad enough to include other remuneration for oficial services; State ex rel. Emmons v. Farmer, 271 Mo. 306, 196 S.W. 1106, 1108; such as mileage or traveling expenses; Leckenby v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 65 Colo. 443, 176 P. 990, 492; and also the repayment of anmunts expended. Compare, however, People v. Chapman, 225 N.Y. 700, 122 N.E. 240; McCoy v. IIandlin, 35 S.D. 487, 153 N.W. 361, 371, L.R.A.1915E, 858, Ann.Cas.1917A, 1046.
But the term is not necessarlly synonymous with "sal-ary." See People v. Wemple, 115 N.Y. 302, 22 N.E. 272; Com. v. Carter, 21 Ky.L.Rep. 1509, 55 S.W. 701; Crawford County v. Lindsay, 11 Ill.App. 261; Kilgore v. People, 76
518.
A "reasonable compensation" is that which will fairly compensate the láborer when the character of the work and the effectiveness and abllity entering into the service are considered. Chapman v. A. H. Averill Machinery Co., 28 Idaho, 121, 152 P. 573, 575.
Compensation is not synonymous with "penslon," which is ordinarily a gratuity from the government or some of its suhordinate agencies in recognition of, but not in pay-ment for, past services. Dickey v. Jackson, 181 Iowa 1155, 165 N.W. 387, 389.

The Civil, Scotch, and French Law

Recoupment; set-off. The meeting of two debts due by two parties, where the debtor in the one debt is the creditor in the other; that is to say, where one person is both debtor and creditor to another, and therefore, to the extent of what is due to him, claims allowance out of the sum that he is due. Bell; 1 Mames, Eq. 395, 396.
In order for "compensation" to take place, the two debts must exist simultaneously and have as their object the payment of a sum of rocney or a certain quantity of con-sumable things of one and the same kind, and the debts must be equally liquidated and demandable. Blanchard v. Bank of Morgan City & Trust Co., La.App., 185 So. 120, 122.
Compensation 1s of three kinds,-legal, or by operation of law ; compensation by way of exception; and by recon-vention. Stewart v. Harper, 16 La.Ann. 181; Blanchard v. Cole, 8 La. 158; 8 Dig. 16, 2; Code, 4, 31; Inst. 4, 6, 30; Burge, Suret. b. 2, c. 6, p. 181; La.Civ. Code, arts. 2203-2208 (Civ.Code, arts. 2207-2211)

Criminal Law

Recrimination. See Compensatio Criminis; Re-crimination.
"Commutation" and "compensation" in statutes provid-ing for reduction of sentence for good behavior are used interchangeably. Ryan v. Lawes, 278 N.Y.S. 608, 154 Misc. 572.
COMPENSATION PERIOD. The period fixed by the Workmen’s Compensation Act during which the injured party is to receive compensation, un-less the board reduces the period by correspond-ingly increasing the amount of weekly compensa-tion. Southern Casualty Co. v. Boykin, Tex.Civ. App., 298 S.W. 639, 640.
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES. See Damages.
COMPERENDINATIO. In the Roman law. The adjournment of a cause, in order to hear the par-ties or their advocates a second time; a second hearing of the parties to a cause. Calvin.
COMPERTORIUM. In the civil law. A judicial inquest made by delegates or commissioners to find out and relate the truth of a cause. Wharton.
COMPERUIT AD DIEM. A plea in bar of an ac-tion of debt on a bail bond that the defendant ap-peared at the day required. For forms, see 5 Wentworth 470; Lilly, Entr. 114; 2 Chit. Pl. 527. See, generally, Comyns, Dig. Pleader (2 W. 31); 7 B. & C. 478.
COMPETE. To contend emulously, to strive for the position for which another is striving, to con-tend in rivalry. People v. Chew, 67 Colo. 394, 179 P. 812, 813; Commonwealth v. Shenandoah River Light & Power Corporation, 135 Va. 47, 115 S.E. 695, 698. See Competition.
COMPETENCY. In the law of evidence. The presence of those characteristics, or the absence of those disabilities, which render a witness legal-ly fit and qualified to give testimony in a court of justice;-applied, in the same sense, to docu-ments or other written evidence.
Competency dlffers from credibility. The former 1s a question which arises before considering the evidence giv-en by the witness; the latter concerns the degree of credlt to be given to his story. The former denotes the personal qualitleation of the witness; the latter his vera-city. A witness may be competent, and yet give incredible testimony; he may be incompetent, and yet his evidence, if recelved, be perfectly credible. Competency is for the court; credibility for the jury. Yet in some cases the term "credible" is used as an equivalent for "competent."

Thus, In a statute relating to the execution of wills, the term "credible witness" is held’to mean ene who is entitled to be examined and to give evidence in a court of justice; not necessarily one who is personally worthy of belief, but one who is not disqualifled by imbecility, interest, crime, or other cause. 1 Jarm.Wills, 124; Smith v. Jones, 68 Vt. 132, 34 A. 424; Com. v. Holmes, 127 Mass. 421, 34 Am.Rep. 391.
In French law. The right in a court to exercise jurisdiction in a particular case.
COMPETENT. Duly qualified; answering all re-quirements ; having sufficient ability or authority; possessing the requisite natural or legal qualifica-tions; able; adequate; suitable; sufficient; cap-able; legally fit. Levee Dist. v. Jamison, 176 Mo. 557, 75 S.W. 679; In re Fichter’s Estate, 279 N.Y. S. 597, 600, 155 Misc. 399. See, also, Incompeten-cy.
A testator may be said to be "competent." if he has mental capacity te understand the nature of hls act, to understand and recollect the nature and situation of hls property and his relations te persons having claims on his bounty and whose interests are affected by bis will. In re Smith’s Estate, 200 Cal. 152, 252 P. 325, 328.
\Vhen generally applied te arbitrators, the term does not mean "expert." Home Ins. Co. v. Walter, Tex.Civ.App., 230 S.W. 723, 724.
COMPETENT AND OMITTED. In Scotch prac-tice. A term applied to a plea which might have been urged by a party during the de pendence of a cause, but which had been omitted.
COMPETENT AUTHORITY. As applied to courts and public officers, this term irnports j uris-diction and due legal authority to deal with the particular matter in question. Mitchel v. U. S., 9 Pet. 735, 9 L.Ed. 283; Charles v. Charles, 41 Minn. 201, 42 N.W. 935.
COMPETENT EVIDENCE. That which the very nature of the thing to be proven requires, as, the production of a writing where its contents are the
subject of inquiry.
1 Greenl.Ev. § 2; Hill v. Hill,
216 Ala. 435, land, 45 Or.
113
254,
So. 306, 77 P. 129,
308; Goltra v. Pen-
133. Also, general.
ly, admissible or relevant, as the opposite of "in-competent." Ryan v. Town of Bristol, 63 Conn. 261, 27 A. 309, 312.
COMPETENT COURT. A court, either civil or criminal, having lawful jurisdiction. People ex rel. Fisher v. Morhous, 49 N.Y.S.2d 110, 116, 183 Misc. 51.
COMPETENT WITNESS. One who is legally qualified to be heard to testify in a cause. People v. Compton, 123 Cal. 403, 56 P. 44; Bank of Uvalde, Tex.Civ.App., 60 S.W.2d 888, 889. See Compe-tency.
As used In the statute relating to the execution of wIlls, the term means a person who, at the time of making the attestation, could legally testify in court to the facts which he attests by subscribing his neme to the will. In re Wiese’s Estate, 98 Neb. 463, 153 N.W. 556, L.1-1.A.1915E, 832.
COMPETITION. Rivalry. People ex rel. Broder-ick v. Goldfogle, 123 Misc. 399, 205 N.Y.S. 870, 877. The play of contending forces ordinarilv engender-ed by an honest desire for gain. U. S. \ . American Linseed Oil Co., 43 S.Ct. 607, 611, 262 U.S. 371, 67 L.Ed. 1035. The effort of two or more parties,acting independently, to secure the custom of a third party by the offer of the most favorable terms. It is the struggle between rivals for the same trade at the same time; the act of seeking or endeavoring to gain what another is endeavor-ing to gain at the same time. Lipson v. Socony Vacuum Corporation, C.C.A.Mass., 87 F.2d 265, 270.
As used in a statute taxing moneyed capital competing with national banks, "competition" means a condition of business rivalry which arises when moneyed capital is de-voted with reasonable continuity and regularity to opera-tions having for their primary and characteristic purpose, as distinguished from some incidental operations or details, the transaction of some branch of business which may be carried on by national banks, and it is not necessary that this employment shall bring capital into competition with all of such branches. People ex rel. Pratt v. Goldfogle, 242 N.Y. 277, 151 N.E. 452, 461. The terco involves the idea of struggling to obtain the same thing. First Nat. Bank v. City of Hartford, 187 Wis. 290, 203 N.W. 721, 729. See, also, First Nat. Bank v. City of Hartford, 47 S.Ct. 462, 466, 273 U.S. 548, 71 L.Ed. 767, 59 A.L.R. 1.
Unity of object with diverelty of method Is the essence of competition. Continental Securities Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., D.C.N.Y., 207 F. 4G7, 470.

Scotch Practice

The contest among creditors claiming on their respective diligences, or creditors claiming on their securities. Bell.

Unfair Competition in Trade

See Unfair.
COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE EXAMINA-TION. Examination which conforms to measures or standards which are sufficiently objective to be capable of being challenged and reviewed by other examiners of equal ability and experience. Fink v. Finegan, 270 N.Y. 356, 1 N.E.2d 462, 464.
COMPETITIVE BIDDING. Requires that all bid-ders be placed on a plane of equality, and that they bid upon the same terms and conditions. State Highway Commission of Kentucky v. King, 259 Ky. 414, 82 S.W.2d 443.
COMPETITIVE TRAFFIC. Traffic which, as to any one carrier, originates at a point served also by another carrier, which other carrier handles the traffic at equal line-haul rates from origin to destination. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, D.C.Minn., 41 F.Supp. 439, 441.
COldIPETITORS. Persons endeavoring to do the same thing and each offering to perform the act, furnish the merchandise, or render the service bet-ter or cheaper than his rival. Continental Secur-ities Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., D.C. N.Y., 207 F. 467, 470.
COMPILATION. A literary production composed of the works of others and arranged in a method-ical manner.
A compilation consists of selected extracts from different authors; an abridgment is a condensation of the views of one author. Story v. Holcombe, 4 McLean 306, 314, Fed. Cas.No.13,497.
COMPILE. To copy from various authors into one work. Story v. Holcombe, 23 Fed.Cas. 171, 174. See Compilation.

Such a collection of statutes differs from a code In this, that none of the laws so compiled derives any new force or undergoes any modification in lts relation to other stat-utes in part materia from the fact of the compilation, while a code is a re-enactment of the whole body of the positive law and is to be read and interpretad as one entire and homogeneous whole.
COMPILED STATUTES. A collection of the statutes existing and in force in a given state’, all laws and parts of laws relating to each subject-matter being brought together under one head, and the whole arranged systematically in one book, either under an alphabetical arrangement or some other plan of classification. Railway Co. v. State, 31 S.E. 531, 104 Ga. 831; Black, Interp. Laws, p. 363; Fidelity and Columbia Trust Co. v. Meek, 294 Ky. 122, 171 S.W.2d 41, 44.
COMPLAINANT. In practice. One who applies to the courts for legal redress; one who exhibits a bill of complaint. This is the proper designation of one suing in equity, though "plaintiff" is often used in equity proceedings as well as at law. Ben-efit Ass’n v. Robinson, 147 Ill. 138, 35 N.E. 168.
One who instigates prosecution or who prefers accusation against suspected person. State v. Snyder, 93 N.J.L. 18, 107 A. 167, 168.
COMPLAINT. In civil practice. In those states having a Code of Civil Procedure, the complaint is the first or initiatory pleading on the part of the plaintiff in a civil action. It corresponds to the declaration in the common-law practice. Code N.Y. § 141; McMath v. Parsons, 26 Minn. 246, 2 N.W. 703. Its purpose is to give defendant infor-mation of all material facts on which plaintiff re-lies to support his demand. Fox v. Cosgriff, 64 Idaho 448, 133 P.2d 930, 932.
The complaint shall contain: (1) The title of the cause, specifying the name of the court in which the action is brought, the name of the county in which the trial is re-quired to be had, and the names of the parties to the ac-
tion, plaintiff and defendant. (2) A plain and concise statement of the facts constituting a cause of action, with-out unnecessary repetition; and each material allegation shall be distinctly numbered. (3) A demand of the relief to which the plaintiff supposes himself entitled. If the recovery of money be demandad, the amount thereof must be stated. Code N.C.1883, § 233 (C.S. § 506).
Cross-complaint. In code practice. Whenever the de-fendant seeks affirmative relief against any party, relating to or depending upon the contract or transaction \,upon which the action is brought, or affecting the property to which the action relates, he may, in addition to his an-.swer, file at the same time, or by permission of the court subsequently, a cross-complaint.’ The cross-complaint must be served anon the parties affected thereby, and such par-ties may demur or answer thereto as to the original com-plaint. Standley v. Insurance Co., 95 Ind. 254; Harrison y, McCormick. 69 Cal. 616, 11 P. 456; Bank v. Ridpath, 29 Wash. 687, 70 P. 139. This is allowed when a defendant has a cause of action agalnst a co-defendant, or a person not a party to the action, and affecting the subject-matter of the action. The only real difference between a complaint and a cross-complaint is that the first is filed by the plaintiff and the second by the defendant. Both contain a state-ment of the facts, and each demando affirmative relief up-on the facts stated. The difference between a counter-claim and a cross-complaint is that in the former the defendant’s cause of action is against the plaintiff; and the latter, against a co-defendant, or one not a party- to the action; White v. Reagan, 32 Ark. 290.
In criminal law. A charge, preferred before a magistrate having jurisdiction, that a person named (or an unknown person) has committed a specified offense, with an offer to prove the fact, to the end that a prosecution may be instituted. It is a technical term, descriptive of proceedings before a magistrate. Hobbs v. Hill, 157 Mass. 556, 32 N.E. 862; In some instances "complaint" is in-terchangeable with "information." State v. Staf-ford, 26 Idaho, 381, 143 P. 528, 530; State v. Rit-zler, 17 Ohio App. 394, 395. And is often used in-terchangeably with "affidavit." Hebebrand v. State, 129 Ohio St. 574, 196 N.E. 412, 415.
COMPLETE, v. To finish; accomplish that which one starts out to do. Ries v. Williams, 190 Ky. 596, 228 S.W. 40, 41.
COMPLETE, adj. Full; entire; including every item or element of the thing spoken of, without omissions or deficiencies; as, a "complete" copy, record, schedule, or transcript. Bailey v. Martin, 119 Ind. 103, 21 N.E. 346.
Perfect; consummate; not lacking in any ele-ment or particular; as in the case of a "complete legal title" to land, which includes the possession, the right of possession, and the right of property. Dingey v. Paxton, 60 Miss. 1054; Ehle v. Quacken-boss, 6 Hill N. Y. 537; Versailles Tp. v. Ulm, 152 Pa.Super. 384, 33 A.2d 265, 267.
COMPLETE AND PERMANENT LOSS OF USE OF RIGHT ARM. Inability to use in any gainful activity. Bell & Zoller Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 322 III. 395, 153 N.E. 580, 582.
COMPLETE DETERMINATION OF CAUSE. De-termination of every issue so as to render decree or judgment res judicata. Consolidated Gas Co. of New York v. Newton, D.C.N.Y., 256 F. 238, 244.
COMPLETE FRACTURE OF ARM. Breaking of only one bone in forearm, insufficient. Columbia Mut. Life Assur. Co. v. Penn, 97 So. 673, 133 Miss. 266.
COMPLETE IN ITSELF. Of a legislative act, covering entire subject; not amendatory. Minier v. Burt County, 95 Neb. 473, 145 N.W. 977, 979.
COMPLETE LOSS OF SIGHT. A• destruction of ability to perceive, distinguish, and recognize ob-jects to such extent that what remains will not confer any of benefits of sight or vision to prac-tical and useful extent. Mulcahey v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 229 Mo.App. 610, 79 S.W.2d 759, 765.
COMPLETE PAYMENT. On a contract, the final payment. Robinson v. U. S., C.C.A.N.Y., 251 F. 461, 466.
COMPLETED. Finished; nothing substantial re-maining to be done; state of a thing that has been created, erected, constructed or done substantially according to contract. Fox & Co. v. Roman Cath-olic Bishop of the Diocese of Baker City, 107 Or. 557, 215 P. 178, 179; Taylor Bros. v. Gill, 259 P. 236, 238, 126 Okl. 293, 54 A.L.R. 979; Bayou Meto Drainage Dist. of Lonoke County v. Ingram, 165 Ark. 318, 264 S.W. 947, 9 COMPLETE» OIL WELL. A we1l finished or sunk to the depth necessary to find oil, or to such a depth as, in the absence of oil, precludes a prob-ability of finding it at a further depth. Howard v. Hughes, 294 Mich. 533, 293 N.W. 740, 743.
COMPLETION. The finishing or accomplishing in full of something theretofore begun; substan-tial performance of what one has agreed to do; state in which no essential element is lacking. Flad v. Murphysboro & S. I. R. Co., C.C.A.I11., 283 F. 386, 390.
COMPLICATED. Consisting of many parts or particulars not easily severable in thought; hard to understand or explain; involved, intricate, con-fused. Niemes v. Niemes, 97 Ohio St. 145, 119 N.E. 503, 505.
COMPLICATED FRACTURE. One where flesh and ligaments get between parts of broken bones, causing suppuration and preventing union of such parts. Sang v. City of St. Louis, 262 Mo. 454, 171 S.W. 347, 349.
COMPLICE. One who is united with others in an ill design; an associate; a confederate; an accom-plice.
COMPLY. To yield, to accommodate, or to adapt oneself to, to act in accordance with. Dragwa v. Federal Labor Union No. 23070, 41 A.2d 32, 36, 136 N.J.Eq. 172.
COMPOS MENTIS. Sound of mind. Having use and control of one’s mental faculties.
COMPOS SUL Having the use of one’s limbs, or the power of bodily motion. Si fuit ita compos sui quod itinerare potuit de loco in locum, if he had so far the use of his limbs as to be able to travel from place to place. Bract. fol. 14b.
COMPOSED OF. Formed of; consisting of. Hoskins Mfg. Co. v. General Electric Co., 212 F. 422, 428.
COMPOSITE WORK. Within Copyright Act means work to which a number of authors have contributed distinguishable parts. Copyright Act of 1909, § 24, 17 U.S.C.A. § 24. Shapirú, Bernstein & Co. v. Bryan, C.C.A.N.Y., 123 F.2d 697, 699.
COMPOSITIO MENSURARUM. The ordinance of measures. The title of an ancient ordinance, not printed, mentioned in the statute 23 Hen. VIII, c. 4; establishing a standard of measures. 1 Bl. Comm. 275.
COMPOSITIO ULNARUM ET PERTICARUM. The statute of ells and perches. The title of an English statute establishing a standard of meas-ures. 1 BI.Comm. 275.
COMPOSITION. An agreement, made upon a sufficient consideration, between an insolvent or embarrassed debtor and his creditors, whereby the latter, for the sake of immediate or sooner payment, agree to accept a dividend less than the whole amount of their claims, to be distributed pro rata, in discharge and satisfaction of the whole. Bank v. McGeoch, 92 Wis. 286, 66 N.W. 606; Pioneer Minerals Corporation v. Larabic Bros. Bankers, 99 Mont. 358, 43 P.2d 884, 886.
"Compos4lon" should be distinguished from "accord." The latter properly denotes an arrange-ment between a debtor and a single creditor for a discharge of the obligation by a part payment or on different terms. The former designates an ar-rangement between a debtor and the whole body of his creditors (or at least a considerable propor-tion of thern) for the liquidation of their claims by the dividend offered.

Ancient Law

Among the Franks, Goths, Burgundians, and other barbarous peoples, this was the name given to a sum of money paid, as satisfaction for a wrong or personal injury, to the person harmed, or to his family if he died, by the aggressor. It was originally made by mutual agreement of the parties, but afterwards established by law, and took the place of private physical vengeance.
COMPOSITION CHIPS. In the metal trade, "composition chips" or "turnings" are chips with-out aluminum. Ehrlich v. United Smelting & Aluminum Co., 252 Mass. 12, 147 N.E. 20.
COMPOSITION DEED. .An agreement embody-ing the terms of a composition between a debtor and his creditors.
COMPOSITION IN BANKRUPTCY. An arrange-ment between a bankrupt and his creditors, whereby the amount he can be expected to pay is liquidated, and he is allowed to retain his as-sets, upon condition of his making the payments agreed upen. Fisher Supply Co. v. Northwestern Gravel Co., 216 Iowa 909, 249 N.W. 664, 666, 667.
The difference between a common-law "composition with creditors" and a "composition in bankruptcy" Is that in a composition with creditors the creditors voluntarily release the principal debtor and therefore release co-debtors, while In the case of a bankruptcy composition the discharge Is by operation of law and not by act of the creditors who assent to the composition. Barker v. Ackers, 29 Cal.App.2d 162, 84 P.2d 264, 271.
COMPOSITION OF MATTER. In patent law, a substance composed of two or more different sub-stances, without reward to form. A mixture or chemical combination of materials. Jacobs v. Baker, 7 Wall. 295, 19 L.Ed. 200.
COMPOSITION OF TITHES, OR REAL COM-POSITION. This arises in English ecclesiastical law, when an agreement is made between the own-er of lands and the incumbent of a benefice, with the consent of the ordinary and the patron, that the lands shall, for the future, be discharged from payment of tithes, by reason of some land or other real recompense given in lieu and satis-faction thereof. 2 B1.Comm. 28; 3 Steph.Comm. 129.
COMPOTARIUS. In old English law. A party
accounting. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 71, 17.

COMPOUND, v. To compromise; to effect a composition with a creditor; to obtain discharge from a debt by the payment of a smaller sum. Bank v. Malheur County, 45 P. 781, 30 Or. 420, 35 L.R.A. 141. To put together as elements, in-gredients, or parts, to form a whole, to combine, to unite; to form or make up as a composite product by combining different elements, ingredi-ents, or parts, as to combine a medicine. Depart-ment of Treasury of Indiana v. Ridgely, 211 Ind. 9, 4 N.E.2d 557, 561, 108 A.L.R. 1067.
COMPOUND, n. A combination of two or more elements or things by means of human agency; an artificial or synthetic product. Monticelli Bros. v. U. S., 8 Ct.Cust.App. 21, 24.
COMPOUND INTEREST. Interest upon interest, i. e., when the interest of a sum of money is added to the principal, and then bears interest, which thus becomes a sort of secondary principal. Camp v. Bates, 11 Conn. 487; Woods v. Rankin, 2 Heisk. (Tenn.) 46; U. S. Mortg. Co. v. Sperry, C. C.Ill., 26 F. 730; American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., D.C.N.Y., 26 F.Supp. 954, 955.
COMPOUND LARCENY. See Larceny.
COMPOUNDER. In Louisiana. The maker of a composition, generally called the "amicable com-pounder."
COMPOUNDING A FELONY. The offense com-mitted by a person who, having been directly in-jured by a felony, agrees with the criminal that he will not prosecute him, on condition of the lat-ter’s making reparation, or on receipt of a reward or bribe not to prosecute.
The offense of taking a reward for forbearing to prosecute a felony; as where a party robbed takes his goods again, or other amends, upon an agreement not to prosecute. Rieman v. Morri-son, 106 N.E. 215, 217, 264 III. 279.
COMPRA Y VENTA. In Spanish law. Purchase and sale.
COMPREMESSO. In Italian. The instrument whereby parties agree to submit to arbitration a dispute between them. The equivalent of "com-promissum" under the Roman Law, the principies of which have been carried into the common law and are to be found in agreements of accord and satisfaction and compromise and settlement. Castelli v. Tolibia, 83 N.Y.S.2d 554, 562.
COMPRINT. A surreptitious printing of another book-seller’s copy of a work, to make gain thereby, which was contrary to common law, and is ille-gal. Wharton.
COMPRISE. To comprehend; include; contain; embrace; cover. Hoskins Mfg. Co. v. General Electric Co., D.C.Ill., 212 F. 422, 428.
COMPRIVIGNI. In the civil law. Children by a former marriage, (individually called "privigni," or "privignm") considered relatively to each other.Thus, the son of a husband by a former wife, and the daughter of a wife by a former husband, are the comprivigni of each other. Inst. 1, 10, 8.
COMPROMISE. An arrangement arrived at, either in court or out of court, for settling a dis-pute upon what appears to. the parties to be equi-table terms, having regard to the uncertainty they are in regarding the facts, or the law and the facts together. Colburn v. Groton, 66 N.H. 151, 28 A. 95, 22 L.R.A. 763; Isaacs v. Wishnick, 136 Minn. 317, 162 N.W. 297; Joyner v. City of Seat-tle, 144 Wash. 641, 258 P. 479, 481. A settlement of differences by mutual concessions or an ad-justment of matters in dispute by mutual conces-sions. Forker v. Berkes, 111 Ind.App. 92, 38 N. E.2d 296, 299; In re Cusimano’s Will, 22 N.Y.S.2d 677, 680, 681, 174 Misc. 1068.
It is essentlal to a compromise that there be mutual con-cesslons or yielding of opposIng claims. Scott v. Scott, 131 Okl. 144, 268 P. 245, 248; Hutson v. McConnell, 139 Okl. 240, 281 P. 760, 763.
In the civil law. An agreement whereby two or more persons mutually bind themselves to re-fer their legal dispute to the decision of a desig-nated third person, who is termed "umpire" or "arbitrator." Dig. 4, 8; Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 471.
OFFER OF COMPROMISE. See Offer, n.
COMPROMISE VERDICT. One which is reached only by the surrender of conscientious convictions on one material issue by some jurors in return for a relinquishment of matters in their like set-tled opinion on another issue, and the result is one which does not hold the approval of the en-tire panel. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co. v. Parnell, 53 Ga.App. 178, 185 S.E. 122, 126.
COMPROMISSARII SUNT JUDICES. Jenk. Cent. 128. Arbitrators are judges.
COMPROMISSARIUS. In the civil law. An ar-bitrator.
COMPROMISSUM. A submission to arbitration.
COMPROMISSUM AD SIMILITUDINEM JUDI-CIORUM REDIGITUR. A compromise is brought into affinity with judgments. Strong v. Strong, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 571.
COMPTE ARRÉTÉ. Fr. An account stated in writing, and acknowledged to be correct on its face by the party against whom it is stated. Pas-chal v. Union Bank of Louisiana, 9 La.Ann. 484.
COMPTER. In Scotch law. An accounting par-ty.
COMPTROLLER. A public oflicer of a state or municipal corporation, charged with certain du-ties in relation to the fiscal affairs of the same, principally to examine and audit the accounts of collectors of the public money, to keep records, and report the financial situation from time to time. There are also officers bearing this name in the treasury department of the United States. Beneficial Loan Soc. of New Orleans v. Straus, La. App., 148 So. 85, 87.

Comptroller in bankruptcy. An officer in Eng-land, whose duty it is to receive from the trustee in each bankruptcy his accounts and periodical statements showing the proceedings in the bank-ruptcy, and also to cali the trustee to account for any misfeasance, neglect, or omission in the dis-charge of his duties. Robs.Bankr. 13; Bankr.Act 1869, § 55.
Comptrollers of the Hanaper. In English law. Officers of the court of chancery; their offices were abolished by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 103.
State comptroller. A supervising officer of revenue in a state government, whose princi-pal duty is the final auditing and settling of all claims against the state. State v. Doron, 5 Nev. 413.
COMPULSA. A judicially attested copy of a tes-timonio. State v. Balli, Tex.Civ.App., 173 S.W.2d 522, 527.
COMPULSION. Constraint; objective necessity; duress. Forcible inducement to the commission of an act. Navigation Co. v. Brown, 100 Pa. 346. The act of compelling or the state of being com-pelled; the act of driving or urging by force or by physical or moral constraint; subjection to force. Fluharty v. Fluharty, Del.Super., 193 A. 838, 840.
The ”compulsion" whIch will excuse a criminal act must be present, imminent and Impending and of such a nature as to Induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serlous bodily harm. Browning v. State, 31 Ala.App. 137, 13 So.2d 54, 56.
To constitute "compulsion" or "coercion" rendering pay-ment involuntary, there must be some actual or threatened exercise of power possessed, or supposedly possessed, by payee over payer’s person or property, from which payer has no means of immediate relief except by advancing money. Wake Development Co. v. O’Leary, 118 Cal.App. 131, 4 P.2d 802, 803.
COMPULSORY, n. In ecclesiastical procedure, a compulsory is a kind of writ to compel the attend-ance of a witness, to undergo examination. Phil-lim. Ecc. Law, 1258.
COMPULSORY, adj. Involuntary; forced; co-erced by legal process or by force of statute.
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION. That which takes place where the consent of one of the par-ties is enforced by statutory provisions. Wood v. Seattle, 62 P. 135, 23 Wash. 1, 52 L.R.A. 369.
COMPULSORY NONSUIT. An involuntary non-suit. See Nonsuit.
COMPULSORY PAYMENT. One not made vol-untarily, but exacted by duress, threats, the en-forcement of legal process, or unconscionably taking advantage of another. Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Teasley, 73 So. 969, 971, 198 Ala. 673.
COMPULSORY PROCESS. Process to compel the attendance in court of a person wanted there as a witness or otherwise; including not only the ordinary subpcena, but also a warrant of arrest or attachment if needed. State v. Nathaniel, 52 La.Ann. 558, 26 So. 1008.

It means such coercive means as the courts, by virtue of their inherent powers or sanction of the law, are permitted to employ, Greene v. Ballard, 174 Ky. 808, 192 S.W. 841, 845; and includes right to have subpcena served, as well as issued (Const. § 11). Fugate v. Commonwealth, 202 Ky. 509, 260 S.W. 338, 340.
COMPULSORY SALE OR PURCHASE. A term sometimes used to characterize the transfer of title to property under the exercise of the power of eminent domain. In re Barre Water Co., 62 Vt. 27, 20 A. 109, 9 L.R.A. 195; United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in City of San Diego, San Diego County, D.C.Cal., 44 F.Supp: 936, 937.
COMPURGATOR. One of several neighbors of a person accused of a crime, or charged as a de-fendant in a civil action, who appeared and swore that they believed him on his oath. 3 Bl.Comm. 341.
COMPUTING SCALE. A balance having an in-dicator apparatus so arranged that, within the limits of weights and prices for which it is con-trived, one glance at a printed card, which is a part thereof, shows not only the weight of the article, but its price at a given rate per pound. Standard Computing Scale Co. v. Farrell, D.C.N. Y., 242 F. 87.
COMPUTO. Lat. To compute, reckon, or
ac-count. Used in the phrases insimul computas-sent, "they reckoned together," (see Insimul;) plene computavit, "he has fully accounted," (see Plene;) quod computet, "that he account," (see Quod Computet.)
COMPUTATION. The act of computing, num-bering, reckoning, or estimating. The account or estimation of time by rule of law, as distinguished from any arbitrary construction of the parties. CowelL
COMPUTUS. A writ to compel a guardian, ball-iff, receiver, or accountant to yield up his accounts. It is founded on the statute Westm. 2, c. 12; Reg. Orig. 135.
COMTE. Fr. A count or earl. In the ancient French law, the comte was an officer having j u-risdiction over a particular district or territory, with functions partly military and partly judicial.
CON. Adj. A slang or cant abbreviation for confidente, as a con man or a con game. Webster.
CON. Prep. With. Calef v. Calef, 54 Me. 365, 92 Am.Dec. 549.
CON—. A prefix meaning with, together. Web-ster.
CON BUENA FE. In Spanish law. With (or in) good faith.
CONACRE. In Irish practice. The payment of wages in land, the rent being.

CONATUS QUID SIT, NON DEFINITUR IN JURE. 2 Bulst. 277. What an attempt is, is not defined in law.
CONCEAL. To hide; secrete; withhold from the knowledge of others; to withdraw from observa-tion; to withhold from utterance or declaration; to cover or keep from sight. Hopper v. Hopkins, 162 Md. 448, 160 A. 166, 167.
The synonyms of conceal are "to hide; dIsguise, semble; secrete." To hide is generlc; "conceal" 15 slmp-ly not te make known what we wlsh to secrete; disguise or dissemble is to conceal by assuming some false appearance; to secrete is to hide in some place of secrecy. A man may conceal facts, disgulse his sentiments, dissemble his feel-ings, or secrete stolen goods. Darneal v. State, 14 Okl.Cr. 540, 174 P. 290, 292, 1 A.L.R. 638.
The word "conceal," according to the best lexlcograph-ers, significo to withhold or keep secret mental facts from another’s knowledge, as well as to hide or secrete physical objects from sight or observation. Gerry v. Dunham, 57 Me. 339.
CONCEALED. Not synonymous with "lying in wait." If a person conceals himself for the pur-pose of shooting another unawares, he is lying in wait; but a person may, while concealed, shoot another without committing the crime of mur-der. People v. Miles, 55 Cal. 207.
The term "concealed weapons" means weapons willful-ly or knowingly covered or kept from sight. Owen v. State, 31 Ala. 387.
CONCEALERS. In old English law. Such as find out concealed lands; that is, lands privily kept from the king by common persons having nothing to show for them. They are called "a troublesome, disturbant sort of men; turbulent persons." Cowell.
CONCEALMENT. A withholding of something which one knows and which one, in duty, is bound to reveal. Dolcater v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., D.C.N.Y., 25 F.Supp. 637, 641; Strauss v. Dubuque Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of Dubuque, Iowa, 132 Cal.App. 283, 22 P.2d 582.
The tercos "misrepresentation" and "concealment" have a known and deflnite meaning in the law of Insurance. Misrepresentation is the statement of something as fact which is untrue in fact, ami which the assured states, knowing it to be not true, with an intent to deceive the underwriter, or which he states positively as true, without knowing it to be true, and which has a tendency to mis-lead, such fact in either case being material to the risk. Concealment is the designed and lntentional withholding of any fact material to the risk, which the assured, in honesty and good faith, ought to communicate to the un-derwriter; mere silente on the part of the assured, es-pecially as to some matter of fact which he does not coñ-sider it important for the underwriter to know, is not to be considered as such concealment. If the fact so untruly stated or purposely suppressed is not material, that is, if the knowledge or ignorante of It would not naturally in-fluence the judgment of the underwriter in making the contract, or in estimating the degree and character of the risk, or in fixing the rate of the premlum, it is not a "misrepresentation" or "concealment," within the clause of the conditions annexed to policies. Daniels v. Insurance Co., 12 Cush. (Mass.). 416, 59 Am.Dec. 192; Sun Ins. Of-fice, Limited, of London v. Mallick, 160 Md. 71, 153 A. 35, 43.
CONCEALMENT MAY BE BASIS OF ESTOP-PEL. Lo Bue v. Porazzo, 48 Cal.App.2d 82, 119 P.2d 346, 348. Elements of such estoppel are concealment of material facts with knowledge

thereof, ignorante thereof on part of person to whom representations are made, or from whom facts are concealed, intention that such person shall act thereon, and action induced thereby on his part. Rhoads v. Rhoads, Mo., 119 S.W.2d 247, 252; Rosser v. Texas Co., 173 Oki. 309, 48 P. 2d 3r7, 330.
The doctrine of "estoppel by concealment and suppres-sion" appiies only where there has been reduction to prac-tice of invention. Bogoslowsky v. Huse, 142 F.2d 75, 76, 31 C.C.P.A.(Patents) 1034.
CONCEALMENT OF CAUSE OF ACTION. To constitute it so as to prevent running of limita-tions, some trick or artifice must be employed to prevent inquiry or elude investigation, or to mis-lead and hinder party who has a cause of action from obtaining information, and acts relied on must be of an affirmative character and fraudu-lent. Middleton v. Pruden, 57 Ga.App. 555, 196 S.E. 259, 262.
CONCEDER. Fr. In French law. To grant. See Concession.
CONCEDO. Lat. I grant. A word used in old Anglo-Saxon grants, and in statutes merchant.
CONOEPTION. The beginning of pregnancy, (q. v.).
CONCEPTUM. In the civil law. A theft (fur-tum) was called "conceptum," when the thing stolen was searched for, and found upon some person in the presence of witnesses. Inst. 4, 1, 4.
CONCERN. To pertain, relate, or belong to; be of interest or importante to; have connection with; to have reference to; to involve; to affect the interest of. People v. Photocolor Corporation, 281 N.Y.S. 130, 156 Misc. 47.
CONCERNING, CONCERNED. Relating to; pertaining to; affecting; involving; being sub-stantially engaged in or taking part in. U. S. v. Fulkerson, D.C.Cal., 74 F. 631; May v. Brown, 3 Barn. & C. 137; People v. Marty, 59 Cal.App. 503, 210 P. 964, 965.
CONCERT OF EUROPE. The union between the chief powers of Europe for purposes of concerted action in matters affecting their mutual interests. It is sometimes called the Primacy of the Great Powers. It has existed under various forms from the time of the Congress of Vienna, in 1815.
CONCERT—ROOM. A place in which musical, as distinguished from dramatic, performances are usually given. People ex rel. McShane v. Keller, 161 N.Y.S. 132, 138, 96 Misc. 92.
CONCERTED ACTION (or PLAN). Action that has been planned, arranged, adjusted, agreed on and settled between parties acting together pur-suant to some design or scheme. State v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co., 4 Boyce (Del.) 248, 88 A. 449, 451; Rock Creek Oil Corporation v. Moore, Tex. Civ.App., 41 S.W.2d 501, 504.
CONCESSI. Lat. I have granted. At common law, in a feoffment or estate of inheritance, this word does not imply a warranty; it only creates a covenant in a lease for years. Co.Litt. 384a. Koch v. Hustis, 113 Wis. 599, 87 N.W. 834; Vaugh-an’s Argument in Vaughan 126; Butler’s note, Co. Litt. 384. But see 1 Freem. 339, 414.
CONCESSIMUS. Lat. We have granted. A term used in conveyances, the effect of which was to create a joint covenant on the part of the grantors. 5 Co. 16; Bacon, Abr. Covenant.
CONCESSIO. In old English law. A grant. One of the old common assurances, or forms of conveyance.
CONCESSIO PER REGEM FIERI DEBET DE CERTITUDINE. 9 Coke, 46. A grant by the king ought to be made from certainty.
CONCESSIO VERSUS CONCEDENTEM LATAM INTERPRETATIONEM HABERE DEBET. A grant ought to have a broad interpretation (to be liberally interpreted) against the grantor. Jenk. Cent. 279.
CONCESSION. A grant; ordinarily applied to the grant of specific privileges by a government; French and Spanish grants in Louisiana. West-ern M. & M. Co. v. Peytona Coal Co., 8 W.Va. 446. A voluntary grant, or a yielding to a claim or demand; rebate; abatement. U. S. v. P. Koenig Coal Co., D.C.Mich., 1 F.2d 738, 740; Williams v. Belvedere Hotel Co., 137 Md. 665, 113 A. 335, 337, 14 A.L.R. 622.
CONCESSIT SOLVERE. He granted and agreed to pay. In English law. An action of debt upon a simple contract. It lies by custom in the may-or’s court, London, and Bristol city court.
CONCESSOR. In old English law. A grantor.
CONCESSUM. Accorded; conceded. This terco, frequently used in the old reports, signifies that the court admitted or assented to a point or prop-osition made on the argument.
CONCESSUS. A grantee.
CONCILIABULUM. A council house.
CONCILIATION. In French law. The formal-ity to which intending litigants are subjected in cases brought before the juge de paix. The judge convenes the parties and endeavors to reconcile them. Should he not succeed, the -case proceeds. In criminal and commercial cases, the preliminary of conciliation does not take place. Arg. Fr. Mere. Law, 552.

CONCILIUM. Lat. A council

Roman Law

A meeting of a section of the people to consider and decide matters especially affecting itself. Launspach, State and Family in Early Rome 70. Also argument in a cause, or the sitting of the court to hear argument; a motion for a day for the argument of a cause; a day allowed to a defendant to present his argument; an impárlance. State ex rel. Stueve v. Reynolds, 266 Mo. 12, 178 S.W. 468, 470.
CONCILIUM ORDINARIUM. In Anglo-Norman times. An executive and residuary judicial com-mittee of the Aula Regis, (q. v.).
CONCILIUM REGIS. An ancient English tribun-al existing during the reigns of Edward I. and Edward II., to which was referred cases of extra-ordinary difficulty. Co.Litt. 304.
CONCIONATOR. In old records. A common council man; a freeman called to a legislative hall or assembly. Cowell.
CONCLUDE. To finish; determine; to estop; to prevent.
CONCLUDED. Ended; determined; estopped; prevented from.
CONCLUSION. The end; the termination; the act of finishing or bringing to a close. The con-clusion of a declaration or complaint is all that part which follows the statement of the plaintiff’s cause of action. The conclusion of a plea is its final clause, in which the defendant either "puts himself upon the country" (where a material averment of the declaration is traversed and issue tendered) or offers a verification, which is proper where new matter is introduced. State v. Wa-ters, 1 Mo.App. 7.

Trial Praetice

It signifies making the final or concluding ad-dress to the jury or the court. The act of a man by which he has confessed a matter or thing which he can no longer deny.
This is, in general, the privilege of the party who has to sustain the burden of proof.
CONCLUSION AGAINST THE FORM OF THE STATUTE. The proper form for the conclusion of an indictment for an offense crea ted by statute is the technical phrase "against the forra of the statute in such case made and provided;" or, in Latin, contra forman?, statuti.
CONCLUSION OF FACT. An inference drawn from the subordinate or evidentiary facts. Mae-der Steel Products Co. v. Zanello, 109 Or. 562, 220 P. 155, 158. Reed v. Woodmen of the World, 94 Mont. 374, 22 P.2d 819, 822.
CONCLUSION OF LAW. Within the rule that pleadings should contain only facts, and not con-clusions of law, this means a proposition not ar-rived at by any process of natural reasoning from a fact or aombination of facts stated, but by the application of the artificial rules of law to the facts pleaded. Levins v. Rovegno, 71 Cal. 273, 12 P. 161.
CONCLUSION TO THE COUNTRY. In plead-ing. The tender of an issue to be tried by jury. Co. Litt. 126 a; 1 Saund. 103; 1 Chit. P1. 592; Com. Dig. Pleader, E, 32.

CONCLUSIVE. Shutting up a matter; shutting out all further evidente; not admitting of explan-ation or contradiction; putting an end to inquiry; final; irrefutable; decisive. Edwards v. Shreve-port Creosoting Co., 207 La. 699, 21 So.2d 878. Beyond question or beyond dispute; manifest; plain; clear; obvious; visible; apparent; indubi-table; palpable; and "notorious." Covington County v. Fite, 120 Miss. 421, 82 So. 308, 309.
As to conclusive "Presumption," and "Proof," see those titles.
CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE. That which is incon-trovertible, either because the law does not permit it to be contradicted, or because it is so strong and convincing as to overbear all proof to the contrary and establish the proposition in ques-tion beyond any reasonable doubt. Thompson Lumber Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (Com.Ct.) 193 F. 648, 682.
CONCORD. In the old process of levying a fine of lands, the concord was an agreement between the parties (real or feigned) in which the defor-ciant (or he who keeps the other out of posses-sion) acknowledges that the lands in question are the right of complainant; and, from the ac-knowledgment or admission of right thus made, the party who levies the fine is called the "cog-nizor," and the person to whom it is levied the "cognizee." 2 Bl.Comm. 350.
The term also denotes an agreement between two persons, one of whom has a right of action against the other, settling what amends shall be made for the breach or wrong; a compromise or an accord.

Old Practice

An agreement between two or more, upon a trespass committed, by way of amends or satis-faction for it. Plowd. 5, 6, 8.
CONCORDARE LEGES LEGIBUS EST OPTI-MUS INTERPRETANDI MODUS. To make laws agree with laws is the best mode of interpreting them. Halk. Max. 70.
CONCORDAT. In publie law. A compact or convention between two or more independent gov-ernments.
An agreement made by a temporal sovereign with the pope, relative to ecclesiastical matters.
In French law. A compromise effected by a bankrupt with his creditors, by virtue of which he engages to pay within a certain time a certain proportion of his debts, and by which the credi-tors agree to discharge the whole of their claims in consideration of the same. Arg. Fr. Merc. Law, 553.
CONCORDIA. Lat. In old English law. An agreement, or concord. Fleta, lib. 5, c. 3, § 5. The agreement or unanimity of a jury. Compel-iere ad concordiam. Fleta, lib. 4, e. 9, § 2.
CONCORDIA DISCORDANTIUM CANONUM. The harmony of the discordant canons. A col-lection of ecclesiastical constitutions made by

Gratian, an Italian monk, A.D. 1151; more com-monly known by the name of "Decretum Grati-ani."
CONCORDIA PARWE RES CRESCUNT ET OPULENTIA LITES. 4 Inst. 74. Small means increase by concord and litigations by opulence.
CONCUBARIA. A fold, pen, or place where cat-tle lie. Cowell.
CONCUBEANT. Lying together, as cattle.
CONCUBINAGE. A species of loose or informal marriage which took place among the ancients, and is yet in use in some countries. See Concu-binatus.
The act or practice of cohabiting, in sexual commerce, without the authority of law or a legal marriage. Succession of Lannes, 187 La. 17, 174 So. 94, 98.
The words concubinage and prostitution have no common law meaning, but in their popular sense cover all cases of lewd intercourse; People v. Cummons, 56 Mich. 544, 23 N.W. 215.
An exception against a woman suing for dower, on the ground that she was the concubine, and not the wife, of the man of whose land she seeks to be endowed. Britt. c. 107.
CONCUBINATUS. In Roman law. An informal, unsanctioned, or "natural" marriage, as contra-distinguished from the justce nuptice, or justum matrimonium, the civil marriage.
CONCUBINE. (1) A woman who cohabits with a man to whom she is not married. State v. Du-sin, 125 Kan. 400, 264 P. 1043, 1044. (2) A sort of inferior wife, among the Romans, upon whom the husband did not confer his rank or quality.
CONCUR. To agree; accord; act together; con-sent. In the practice of appellate courts, a "con-curring opinion" is one filed by one of the judges or justices, in which he agrees with the conclu-sions or the result of another opinion filed in the case (which may be either the opinion of the court or a dissenting opinion) though he states separately his views of the case or his reasons for so concurring. State v. Pierce, 175 Wash. 461, 27 P.2d 1083.
In Louisiana law. To join with other claimants in presenting a demand against an insolvent es-tate.
CONCURATOR. In the civil law. A joint or co-curator, or guardian.
CONCURRENCE. In French law. The posses-, sion, by two or more persons, of equal rights or privileges over the same subject-matter.
CONCURRENCE DELOYALE. A term of the French law nearly equivalent to "unfair trade competition;" and used in relation to the infringe-ment of rights secured by trade-marks, etc. It signifies a dishonest, perfidious, or treacherous rivalry in trade, or any manceuvre calculated to prejudice the good will of a business or the value of the name of a property or its credit or renown with the public, to the injury of a business com-petitor. Simmons Medicine Co. v. Mansfield Drug Co., 93 Tenn. 84, 23 S.W. 165.
CONCURRENT. Running together; having the same authority; acting in conjunction; agreeing in the same act or opinion; pursuit of same course; contributing to the same event; contem-poraneous. Brinkman v. Morgan, C.C.A.Kan., 253 F. 553, 554. Co-operating, accompanying, con-joined, associated, concomitant, joint and equal, existing together, and operating on the same sub-ject. Rose v. Sprague, 248 Ky. 635, 59 S.W.2d 554, 556. United in agreement. State ex rel. School Dist. No. 8, v. Lensman, 108 Mont. 118, 88 P.2d 63, 68.
As to concurrent "Cause," "Covenants," "Insur-ance," "Lease," "Negligente," "Resolution," and "Writs," see those titles.
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION. The jurisdie-tion of several different tribunals, each authoriz-ed to deal with the same subject-matter at the choice of the suitor. Cashman v. Viekers, 69 Mont. 516, 223 P. 897, 898.
CONCURRENT LIENS. Maritime liens are con-current when they are of the same rank, and for supplies or materials or services in preparation for the same voyage, or if they arise on different bottomry bonds to different holders for advances at the same time for the same repairs. The J. W. Tucker, D.C.N.Y., 20 F. 132.
CONCURRENT POWER. Political powers ex-ercised independently in the same field of leg-islation by both federal and state governments. State ex rel. School Dist. No. 8, v. Lensman, 108 Mont. 118, 88 P.2d 63, 68.
CONCURSO. In the law of Louisiana, the name of a suit or remedy to enable creditors to enforce their claims against an insolvent or failing debtor. Schroeder v. Nicholson, 2 La. 355. Litigation or opportunity of litigation between various credi-tors, each claiming adversely to one another to share in a fund or an estate, object being to as-semble in one accounting all claimants on the fund. Seal v. Gano, 160 La. 636, 107 So. 473, 474.
CONCURSUS. In the civil law. (1) A running together; a collision, as concursus creditorurn, a confiict among creditors. Graphic Arts Bldg. Co. v. Union Indemnity Co., 163 La. 1, 111 So. 470, 471; Miller v. Bonner, 163 La. 332, 111 So. 776, 778; (2) A concurrence, or meeting, as concursus ac-tionum, concurrence of actions.
A proceeding in Louisiana similar to interplead-er. See Louisiana Molasses Co. v. Le Sassier, 52 La.Ann. 2070, 28 So. 217.
CONCUSS. In Scotch law. To coerce.
CONCUSSIO. In the civil law. The offense of extortion by threats of violence. Dig. 47, 13.
CONCUSSION. In the civil law. The unlawful forcing of another by threats of violence to give something of value. It differs from robbery, in this: That in robbery the thing is taken by force, while in concussion it is obtained by threatened violente. Heinec.Elem. § 1071.
Tn medical jurisprudence. Concussion of the brain is a jarring of the brain substance, by a fall, blow, or other external injury, without lacer-ation of its tissue, or with only microscopical lac-eration. Mathews v. Hayne, La.App., 188 So. 462, 468.
CONDEDIT. In ecclesiastical law. The name of a plea entered by a party to a libel filed in the ec-clesiastical court, in which it is pleaded that the deceased made the will which is the subject of the suit, and that he was of sound mind. 2 Eng. Ecc. R. 438; 6 Eng. Ecc. R. 431.
CONDEMN. To find or adjudge guilty. 3 Leon. 68. To adjudge or sentence. 3 Bl.Comm. 291. To adjudge (as an admiralty court) that a vessel is a prize, or that she is unfit for service. 1 Kent, Comm. 102; 5 Esp. 65. To set apart or expropriate property for public use, in the exer-cise of the power of eminent domain. State v. Sayer, 43 S.D. 45, 177 N.W. 807, 809.
CONDEMNATION. In admiralty law. The judgment or sentence of a court having jurisdic-tion and acting in rem, by which (1) it is declared that a vessel which has been captured at sea as a prize was lawfully so seized and is hable to be treated as prize; or (2) that property which has been seized for an alleged violation of the revenue iaws, neutrality laws, navigatíon laws, etc., was lawfully so seized, and is, for such cause, forfeit-ed to the government; or (3) that the vessel which is the subject of inquiry is unfit and unsafe for navigation. Gallagher v. Murray, 9 Fed.Cas. 1087.
In the civil law. A sentence or judgment which condemns some one to do, to give, or to pay something, or which declares that his claim or pretensions are unfounded. Lockwood v. Saf-fold, 1 Ga. 72; State v. Harr, 24 Tenn.App. 298, 143 S.W.2d 893, 895.
In real property law. The process by which property of a prívate owner is taken for public use, without his consent, but upon the award and payment of just compensation, being in the nature of a forced sale and condemner stands to-ward owner as buyer toward seller. Atlanta, K. & N. R. Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., C.C.A.Tenn., 131 F. 666, 66 C.C.A. 601; Jones v. Oklahoma City, 192 Okl. 470, 137 P.2d 233, 237, 155 A.L.R. 375.
A "condemnation proceeding" is a special proceeding at law to determine in a single action the damages done by the taking, but it is not a civil action, or a civil process within the meaning of the statutes relating to civil process. In re New Haven Water Co., 86 Conn. 361, 85 A. 636, 638. The law authorizing it must be strictly construed, and every condition and requirement must be shown to have been complied with. Richter v. Rodgers, 327 Mo. 543, 37 S.W.2d 523, 528.
CONDEMNATION MONEY. In practice. The damages which the party failing in an action is adjudged or conde

As used in an appeal bond, this phrase means the damages which should be awarded against the appellant by the judgment of the court. It does not embrace damages not included in the judgment. Thomas v. Gethman, 91 Okl. 42, 215 P. 731, 732.
CONDESCENDENCE. In the Scotch law. A part of the proceedings in a cause, setting forth the facts of the case on the part of the pursuer or plaintiff.
CONDICTIO. In Roman law. A general term for actions of a personal nature, founded upon an obligation to give or do a certain and defined thing or service. It is distinguished from vindi-catio rei, which is an action to vindicate one’s right of property in a thing by regaining (or retaining) possession of it against the adverse claim of the other party.
CONDICTIO CERTI. An action which lies upon a promise to do a thing, where such promise or stipulation is certain, ( si cerca sit stipulatio.) Inst. 3, 16, pr.; Id. 3, 15, pr.; Dig. 12, 1; Bract. fol. 103b.
CONDICTIO EX LEGE. An action arising where the law gave a remedy, but provided no appropri-ate form of action. Calvin.
CONDICTIO INDEBITATI. An action which lay to recover anything which the plaintiff had given or paid to the defendant, by mistake, and which he was not bound to give or pay, either in fact or in law.
CONDICTIO REI FURTIV2E. An action which lay to recover a thing stolen, against the thief himself, or his heir. Inst. 4, 1, 19.
CONDICTIO SINE CAUSA. An action which lay in favor of a person who had given or promised a thing without consideration,’ (causa.) Dig. 12, 7; Cod. 4, 9.

CONDITIO. Lat. A condition.

CONDITIO BENEFICIALIS, QU’E STATUM CONSTRUIT, BENIGNE SECUNDUM VERBOR-UM INTENTIONEM EST INTERPRETANDA; ODIOSA AUTEM, QUE STATUM DESTRUIT, STRICTE SECUNDUM BERBORUM PROPRIE-TATEM ACCIPIENDA.8 Coke, 90. A beneficial condition, which creates an estate, ought to be construed favorably, according to the intention of the words; but a condition which destroys an estate is odious, and ought to be construed strict-ly according to the letter of the words.

CONDITIO DICITUR, CUM QUID IN CASUM IN-CERTUM QUI POTEST TENDERE AD ESSE AUT NON ESSE, CONFERTUR.Co. Litt. 201. It is called a "condition," when something is giv-en on an uncertain event, which may or may not come hito existente.

CONDITIO ILLICITA HABET1UR PRO NON ADJECTA. An unlawful condition is deemed as not annexed.

CONDITIO PRIECEDENS ADIMPLERI DEBET PRIUS QUAM SEQUATUR EFFECTUS. Co. Litt. 201. A condition precedent must be fulfill-ed before the effect can follow.
CONDITION. A future and uncertain event up-on the happening of which is made to depend the existence of an obligation, or that which subor-dinates the existence of liability under a contract to a certain future event. Standard Surety & Casualty Co. v. Wynn, Tex.Civ.App., 172 S.W.2d 789, 792; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 121 La. 152, 46 So. 193, 197.

Civil Law

The rank, situation, or degree of a particular person in some one of the different orders of so-ciety.
An agreement or stipulation in regard to some uncertain future event, not of the essential nature of the transaction, but annexed to it by the par-ties, providing for a change or modification of their legal relations upon its occurrence. Mack-eld. Rom. Law, § 184.
Classification. Conditions are of the following several kinds:
The casual condition is that which depends on chance, and is in no way in the power either of the creditor or of the debtor. Civ.Code La. art. 2023.
A mixed condition is one that depends at the same time on the will of one of the parties and on the will of a third person, or on the will of one of the parties and also on a casual event. Civ.Code La. art. 2025.
The potestative condition is that which makes the execution of the agreement depend on an évent which it is in the power of the one or the other of the contracting parties to bring about or to hinder. Civ.Code La. art. 2024.
A resolutory or dissolving condition is that which, when accomplished, operates the revoca-tion of the obligation, placing matters in the same state as though the obligation had not existed. It does not suspend the execution of the obliga. tion. It only obliges the creditor to restore what he has received in case the event provided for in the condition takes place. Civ.Code La. art. 2045; Moss v. Smoker, 2 La.Ann. 991.
A suspensive condition is that which depends, either on a future and uncertain event, or on an event which has actually taken place, without its being yet known to the parties. In the former case, the obligation cannot be executed till after the event; in the latter, the obligation has its ef-fect from the day on which it was contracted, but it cannot be enforced until the event be known. Civ.Code La. art. 2043; New Orleans v. Railroad Co., 18 S.Ct. 875, 171 U.S. 312, 43 L.Ed. 178; Moss v. Smoker, 2 La.Ann. 991. A condition which pre-vents a contract from going into operation until it has been fulfilled.

Conunon Law

The rank, situation, or degree of a particular person in some one of the different orders of so-ciety; or his status or situation, considered as a juridical person, arising from positive law or the institutions of society. Thill v. Pohlman, 76 Iowa, 638, 41 N.W. 385.
A clause in a contract or agreement which has for its object to suspend, rescind, or modify the principal obligation, or, in case of a will, to sus-pend, revoke, or modify the devise or bequest; a qualification, restriction, or limitation modifying or destroying the original act with which it is connected; an event, fact, or the like that is necessary to the occurrence of some other, though not its cause; a prerequisite. Towle v. Rem-sen, 70 N.Y. 303.
A modus or quality annexed by him that hath an estate, or interest or right to the same, where-by an estate, etc., may either be defeated, enlarg-ed, or created upon an uncertain event. Co.Litt. 201a.
A qualification or restriction annexed to a con-veyance of lands, whereby it is provided that in case a particular event does or does not happen, or in case the grantor or grantee does or omits to do a particular act, an estate shall commence, be enlarged, or be defeated. Anderson v. Palladine, 39 Cal.App. 256, 178 P. 553, 554.
An ”estate on condition" arises where an estate is grant-ed, either In fee simple or otherwise, with an express qualification annexed, whereby the estate granted shall either commence, be enlarged, or be defeated, upon per-formance or breach of such qualification or condition. Hall v. Quinn, 190 N.C. 326, 130 S.E. 18, 20. Moe v. Gier, 116 Cal.App. 403, 2 P.2d 852, 855.
Im insurance parlance, the printed conditions on the In-side of the policy which serve generaily as a limitation of risk or of liability or impose various conditions requiring compliance by the insured. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank of Baltimore v. Globe & Rutgers Fire 1ns. Co., D.C. Md., 7 F.Supp. 56, 68.
Mode or state of being; state or situation; es-sential quality; property; attribute. Consolidat-ed Arizona Smelting Co. v. Egich, 22 Ariz. 543, 199 P. 132, 134.
Classification. The different kinds of conditions known to the common law may be arranged and described as follows:
Express and Implied conditions are also called by the older writers, respectIvely, conditions in deed (or in fact, the Law French term being conditions en fait) and condi-tions in law. Co. Litt. 201a.
They are either express or implied, the former when incorporated in express tercos in the deed, contract, lease, or grant; the latter, when infer-red or presumed by law, from the nature of the transaction or the conduct of the parties, to have been tacitly understood between them as a part of the agreement, though not expressly men-tioned. 2 Crabb, Real Prop. p. 792; Bract.’fol. 47; Civ.Code La. art. 2026; Raley v. Umatilla County, 15 Or. 172, 13 P. 890, 3 Am.St.Rep. 142.
They are possible or impossible; the former when they admit of performance in the ordinary course of events; the latter when it is contrary

to the course of nature or human limitations that they should ever be performed.
They are lawful or unlawful; the former when their character is not in violation of any rule, principie, or policy of law; the latter when they, are such as the law will not allow to be made.
They are consistent or repugnant; the former When they are in harmony and concord with the other parts of the transaction; the latter when they contradict, annul, or neutralize the main pur-pose of the contract. Repugnant conditions are also called "insensible."
They are affirmative or negative; the former being a condition which consists in doing a thing; as provided that the lessee shall pay rent, etc., and the latter being a condition which consists in not doing a thing; as provided that the lessee shall not alien, etc. Shep. Touch. 118.
They are precedent or subsequent. A condition precedent is one which must happen or be per-formed before the estate to which it is annexed can vest or be enlarged; or it is one which is to be performed before some right dependent there-on accrues, or some act dependent thereon is per-formed. Federal Land Bank of Louisville v. Luck-enbill, 213 Ind. 616, 13 N.E.2d 531, 533. A "con-dition precedent" is one that is to be performed before the agreement becomes effective, and which calls for the happening of some event or the per-formance of some act after the terms of the con-tract have been agreed en, before the contract shall be binding on the panties. Rogers v. Malon-ey, 85 Or. 61, 165 P. 357, 358; Mercer-Lincoln Pine Knob Oil Co. v. Pruitt, 191 Ky. 207, 229 S.W. 374. A condition subsequent is one annexed to an es-tate already vested, by the performance of which such estate is kept and continued, and by the fail-ure or non-performance of which it is defeated; or it is a condition referring to a future event, upon the happening of which the obligation be-comes no longer binding upon the other party, if he chooses to avail himself of the condition. Co. Litt. 201; Carroll v. Carroll’s Ex’r, 248 Ky. 386, 58 S.W.2d 670, 672.
Conditions may also be positive (requiring that a specified event shall happen or an act be done) and restrictive or negative, the latter being such as impose an obligation not to do a particular thing, as, that a lessee shall not alien or sub-let or commit waste, or the like. Shep. Touch. 118.
They may be single, copulative, or disjunctive. Those of the first kind require the performance of one specified thing only; those of the second kind require the performance of divers acts or things; those of the third kind require the performance of one of several things. Shep. Touch. 118.
Conditions may also be independent, dependent, or mutual. They belong to the first class when each of the two conditions must be performed without any reference to the other; to the second class when the performance of one condition is not obligatory until the actual performance of the other; and to the third class when neither party need perform his condition unless the oth-er is ready and willing to perform his, or, in other words, when the mutual covenants go to the whole consideration on both sides and each is pre-cedent to the other. Huggins v. Daley, W.Va., 99 F. 609, 40 C.C.A. 12, 48 L.R.A. 320.
The following varieties may also be noted: A condition collateral is one requiring the, perform-ance of a collateral act having no necessary re-lation to the main subject of the agreement. A compulsory condition is one which expressly re-quires a thing to be done, as, that a lessee shall pay a specified sum of money on a certain day or his Tease shall be void. Shep. Touch. 118. Con-current conditions are those which are mutually dependent and are to be performed at the same time. Milwaukee Land Co. v. Ruesink, 50 Mont. 489, 148 P. 396, 401. A condition inherent is one annexed to the rent reserved out of the land whereof the estate is made, or rather, to the es-tate in the land, in respect of rent. Shep. Touch. 118.

French Law

The following peculiar distinctions are made: (1) A condition is casuelle when it depends on a chance or hazard; (2) a condition is potestative when it depends on the accomplishment of some-thing which is in the power of the party to ac-complish; (3) a condition is mixte when it de-pends partly on the will of the party and partly on the will of others; (4) a condition is suspen-sive when it is a future and uncertain event, or present but unknown event, upon which an ob-ligation takes or fails to take effect; (5) a con-dition is resolutofre when it is the event which undoes an obligation which has already had ef-fect as such. Brown.

Synonyms Distinguished

A "condition" is to be distinguished from a limitation, in that the latter may be to or for the benefit of a stranger, who may then take advan-tage of its determination, while only the grantor, or those who stand in his place, can take advan-tage of a condition. Hoselton v. Hoselton, 166 Mo. 182, 65 S.W. 1005; and in that a limitation ends the estate without entry or claim, which is not true of a condition. It also differs from a conditional limitation. In determining whether, in the case of estates greater than estates for years, the language constitutes a "condition" or a "conditional limitation," the rule applied is that, where an estate is so expressly limited by the words of its creation that it cannot endure for any longer time than until the condition happens on which the estate is to fail, this is limitation, but when the estate is expressly granted on condition in deed, the law permits it to endure beyond the time of the contingency happening, unless the grantor takes advantage of the breach of condi-tion, by making entry. Lonas v. Silver, 195 N.Y. S. 214, 215, 201 App.Div. 383; Yarbrough v. Yar-brough, 151 Tenn. 221, 269 S.W. 36, 38. It differs also from a covenant, which can be made by either grantor or grantee, while only the grantor can make a condition (Co. Litt. 70) ; De Grasse v. Ver-ona Mining Co., 185 Mich. 514, 152 N.W. 242, 246; The chief distinction between a condition subsequent in a deed and a covenant pertains to the remedy ín event of breach, which, in the former case, subjects the estate to a forfeiture, and in the latter is merely a ground for recovery of dam-ages. Bartell v. Senger, 160 Md. 685, 155 A. 174, 176. A charge is a devise of land with a bequest out of the subject-matter, and a charge upon the devisee personally, in respect of the estate de-vised, gives him an estate on condition. A con-dition also differs from a remainder; for, while the former may operate to defeat the estate be-fore its natural termination, the latter cannot take effect until the completion of the preceding es-tate.

CONDITIONAL. That which is dependent upon or granted subject to a condition.
As to conditional "Acceptance," "Appearance," "Bequest," "Contract," "Delivery," "Devise," "Fee," "Guaranty," "Judgment," "Legacy," "Lim-itation," "Obligation," "Pardon," "Privilege," and "Sale," see those titles.
CONDITIONAL CREDITOR. In the civil law. A creditor having a future right of action, or hav-ing a right of action in expectancy. Dig. 50, 16, 54.
CONDITIONAL INDORSEMENT. See Indorse-ment.
CONDITIONAL STIPULATION. In the civil law. A stipulation to do a thing upon condition, as the happening of any event.
CONDITIONALLY PRIVILEGED COMMUNICA-TION. One made in good faith on any subject matter in which the person publishing has an in-terest, or in reference to which he has a duty, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, even though it contains matter which oth-erwise would be actionable. Cook v. East Shore Newspapers, 327 Ill.App. 559, 64 N.E.2d 751, 760.
The essential elements of a "conditionally priv-ileged communication" are good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement limited in its scope to such purpose, a proper occasion, and publication in a proper manner to proper persons. Cook v. East Shore Newspaper, 327 Ill.App. 559, 64 N.E. 2d 751.
CONDITIONES QUFELIBET ODIOS/E; MAX-IME AUTEM CONTRA MATRIMONIUM ET COMMERCIUM. Any conditions are odious, but especially those which are against [in restraint ofl marriage and commerce. Lofft, Appendix, 644.
CONDITIONS OF SALE. The terms upon which sales are made at auction; usually written or printed and exposed in the auction room at the time of sale.
CONDOMINIA. In the civil law. Co-ownerships or limited ownerships, such as emphyteusis, su-perficies, pignus, hypotheca, ususfructus, usus, and habitatio. These were more than mere jura in re aliená, being portion of the dominium itself, although they are commonly distinguished from the dominium strictly so called. Brown.

CONDOMINIUM. System of separate ownership of individual units in multiple-unit building. Suss-kind v. 1136 Tenants Corp., 251 N.Y.S.2d 321, 327, 43 Misc.2d 588.
CONDONACION. In Spanish law. The remis-sion of a debt, either expressly or tacitly.
CONDONATION. The conditional remission or forgiveness, by means of continuance or resump-tion of marital cohabitation, by one of the married parties, of a known matrimonial offense commit-ted by the other, that would constitute a cause of divorce; the condition being that the offense shall not be repeated. Pain v. Pain, 37 Mo.App. 115; Betz v. Betz, 25 N.Y.Super.Ct. 696; State v. Man-os, 204 N.C. 52, 167 S.E. 493; Thum v. Thum, 105 Colo. 352, 98 P.2d 279, 280.
"Condonation," to constitute valid defense in divorce action, must he free, voluntary, and not induced by duress or fraud; "condonation" means pardon of offense, volun-tary overlooking or implied forgiveness by treating offend-er as if offense had not been committed. Panther v. Panth-er, 147 Okl. 131, 295 P. 219, 221. The term is also some-times applied to forgiveness of a past wrong, fault, injury, or breach of duty in other relations, as, for example, in that of master and servant. Leatherberry v. Odeli, C.C. N.C., 7 F. 648. Also, antenuptial unrhastity is capabte of "condonation." Wesley v. Wesley, 181 Ky, 135, 204 S.W. 165, 166.
CONDONE. To make condonation of.
CONDUCE. To contribute to as a result. Board of Com’rs of Mercer County v. Deitsch, 94 Ohio St. 1, 113 N.E. 745, 747.
CONDUCT, v. To manage; direct; lead; have direction; carry on; regulate; do business. W1- chita Film & Supply Co. v. Yale, 194 Mo.App. 60, 184 S.W. 119, 121; State v. Mahfouz, 181 La. 23, 158 So. 609; Scholz v. Leuer, 7 Wash.2d 76, 109 P.2d 294, 301.
CONDUCT, n. Personal behavior; deportment; mode of action; any positive or negative act. Kelly v. State, 151 Md. 87, 133 A. 899, 904; Lam-born v. New York Cotton Exch., 197 N.Y.S. 57, 60, 203 App.Div. 565.
CONDUCT, ESTOPPEL BY. An estoppel exists where a man by his own acts or acceptance is concluded from saying the truth. Menzenberger v. American State Bank, 101 Ind.App. 600, 198 N. E. 819. See, also, Equitable Estoppel.
The doctrine does not apply to an agreernent which is 11-legal. Miller v. California Roofing Co., 55 Cal.App.2d 136, 130 P.2d 740, 745.
Elements or essentials of estoppel are acts done which cannot be contravened without frand or gross misconduct, Tradesmens Nat. Bank of New Hoven v. Minor, 190 A. 270, 272, 122 Conn. 419; change of position to injury of party claiming benefit of estoppel, Mundt v. Mallon, 106 Mont. 244, 76 P.2d 326, 329; Thompson v. Hudgens, 159 S.E. 807, 811, 161 S.C. 450; false representation or concealment, Marshall v. Wilson, 175 Or. 506, 154 P.2d 547, 553; Hamil-ton v. Northeast Mut. Ins. Ass’n, Mo.App., 116 S.W.2d 159, 163; ignorance of facts of one claiming right of estoppel, McCarthy v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 58 Wyo. 308, 131 P.28 326, 330, 332; inclucement to do or forbear doing, some-thing one would not, or would, otherwise have done, O’Brien v. U. S., C.C.A.Ind., 51 F.2d 674, 678; intent to have other party act or conduct calculated to mislead, Woodrnen of the World Life Ins. Soc. v. Greathouse, 242 Ala. 532, 7 So.2d 89, 91; Marshall v. Wilson, 175 Or. 506,154 P.2d 547, 553; knowledge of party sought to be es-topped, McLearn v. Hill, 276 Mass. 519, 177 N.E. 617, 619, 77 A.L.R. 1039; mIsleading of person claiming estoppel, Dodd v. Rotterman, 161 N.E. 756, 761, 330 III. 362; State v. Abernathy, 159 Tenn. 175, 17 S.W.2d 17, 19; prejudice to party claiming estoppel, Combs v. Salyer, 165 S.W.2d 90, 43, 291 Ky. 592; Burlington Sav. Bank of Burlington, Vt., v. Rockwell, C.C.A.Idaho, 31 F.2d 27, 29; reliance upon conduct of one sought to be estopped, Wiedersum v. At-lantic Cement Products, 25 N.Y.S.2d 496, 501, 261 App.D1v. 305; State v. Smith, 135 Neb. 423, 281 N.W. 851, 856; rép-resentation or concealment of material facts, City Dairy Co. v. Uservo, Inc., 101 Ind.App. 375, 199 N.E. 457.
CONDUCT MONEY. In English practice. Mon-ey paid to a witness who has been subpcenaed on a trial, sufficient to defray the reasonable expenses of going to, staying at, and returning from the place of trial. Lush, Pr. 460; Archb. New Pr. 639.
CONDUCTI ACTIO. In the civil law. An action which the hirer (conductor) of a thing might have against the letter, (locator.) Inst. 3, 25, pr. 2.
CONDUCTIO. In the civil law. A hiring. Used generally in connection with the term locatio, a letting. Locatio et conductio, (sometimes united as a compound word, "locatio-conductio,") a let-ting and hiring. Inst. 3, 25; Bract. fol. 62, c. 28; Story, Bailm. §§ 8, 368.
CONDUCTOR. In the civil law. A hirer.
CONDUCTOR OPERARUM. In the civil law. A person who engages to perform a piece of work for another, at a stated price.
CONDUCTUS. A thing hired.
CONE. In geology. Area built up by a stream, near the mouth of a canyon of boulders, small stones, gravel, sand and other detritus. Haack v. San Fernando Mission Land Co., 177 Cal. 140, 169 P. 1021, 1022.
CONE AND KEY. In old English law. A woman at fourteen or fifteen years of age may take charge of her house and receive cone and key; that is, keep the accounts and keys. Cowell. Said by Lord Coke to be cover and keye, meaning that at that age a woman knew what in her house should be kept under lock and key. 2 Inst. 203.
CONFARREATIO. In Roman law. A sacrificial rite resorted to by marrying persons of high pat-rician or priestly degree, for the purpose of cloth-ing the husband with the manos over his wife; the civil modes of effecting the same thing being coemptio, (formal,) and usus mulieris, (in-formal.) Brown.
CONFECTIO. The making and completion of a written instrument. 5 Coke, 1.
CONFEDERACY.

Criminal Law

The association or banding together of two or more persons for the purpose of committing an act or furthering an enterprise which is forbidden by law, or which, though lawful in itself, becomes unlawful when made the object of the confederacy. State v. Crowley, 41 Wis. 284, 22 Am.Rep. 719; Watson v. Navigation Co., 52 How.Prac. (N.Y.)353. Conspiracy is a more technical term for this offense. The act of two or more who combine to-gether to do any damage or injury to another, or to do any unlawful act. Jacob. State v. Crow-ley, 41 Wis. 284, 22 Am.Rep. 719.

Equity Pleading

An improper combination alleged to have been entered into between the defendants to a bill in equity

International Law

A league or agreement between two or more In-dependent states whereby they unite for their mu-tual welfare and the furtherance of their common aims. The term may apply to a union so formed for a temporary or limited purpose, as in the case of an offensive and defensive alliance; but it is more commonly used to denote that species of poli-tical connection between two or more independent states by which a central government is created, invested with certain powers of sovereignty, (mostly external,) and acting upon the several component states as its units, which, however, retain their sovereign powers for domestic pur-poses and some others. See Federal Government.
CONFEDERATION. A league or compact for mutual support, particularly of princes, nations, or states. Such was the colonial government dur-ing the Revolution.
CONFERENCE. A meeting of several persons for deliberation, for the interchange of opinion, or for the removal of differences or disputes. Thus, a meeting between a counsel and solicitor to ad-vise on the cause of their client.
In the practice of legislative bodies, when the two houses cannot agree upon a pending measure, each appoints a committee of "conference," and the committees meet and consult together for the purpose of removing differences, harmonizing con-fiicting views, and arranging a compromise which will be accepted by both houses.

French Law

A concordance or Identity between two laws or two systems of laws.

International Law

A personal meeting between the diplomatic agents of two or more powers, for the purpose of making statements and explanations that will obviate the delay and difficulty attending the more formal conduct of negotiations.
CONFESS. To admit as true; to assent to; to concede. Guydon v. Taylor, 115 Ind.App. 685, 60 N.E.2d 750, 751. To admit the truth of a charge or accusation. Usually spoken of charges of tor-tious or criminal conduct.
CONFESSING ERROR. A plea to an assignment of error, admitting the same.
CONFESSIO. Lat. A confession. Confessio judicio, a confession made in or before a court.

CONFESSIO FACTA IN JUDICIO OMNI PRO-BATIONE MAJOR EST. A confession made in court is of greater effect than any proof. Jenk. Cent. 102.
CONFESSION. In criminal law. A voluntary statement made by a person charged with the commission of a crime or misdemeanor, communi-cated to another person, wherein he acknowledges himself to be guilty of the offense charged, and discloses the circumstances of the act or the share and participation which he had in it. Spicer v. Com., 21 Ky.L.Rep. 528, 51 S.W. 802. State v. Gib-son, 69 N.D. 70, 284 N.W. 209, 214, 215, 219; Sango v. State, 52 Okl.Cr. 359, 5 P.2d 400, 401; Edwards v. State, Okl.Cr.App., 288 P. 359, 361. Also the act of a prisoner, when arraigned for a crime or misdemeanor, in acknowledging and avowing that he is guilty of the offense charged.
"Confesslon" comprises whole criminal charge; where-as, "admission" relates only to particular fact or circum-stance covered thereby. State v. Davis, 212 Iowa 131, 235 N.W. 759, 761.

Classification

Confessions are divided into judicial and ex-trajudicial. The former are such as are made before a magistrate or court in the due course of legal proceedings; they include confessions made in preliminary examinations before magistrates. Mularkey v. State, 199 Wis. 269, 225 N.W. 933, 934. The latter are such as are made by a party elsewhere than in court or before a magistrate, 1 Green’. Ev. § 216, State v. Corey, 182 Minn. 48, 233 N.W. 590, 591; Foster v. State, 79 Okl.Cr. 183, 152 P.2d 929, 932; Louette v. State, 152 Fla. 495, 12 So.2d 168, 172; whether to an official or non-official person, Prather v. State, 76 Okl.Cr. 385, 137 P.2d 249, 252. One made by the party out of court, or to any person, official or otherwise, when made not in the course of a judicial examination or in-vestigation. State v. Stevenson, 98 Or. 285, 193 P. 1030, 1032.
An implied confession is where the defendant, in a case not capital, does not plead guilty but indirectly admits his guilt by placing himself at the merey of the court and asking for a light sen-tence. 2 Hawk. P. C. p. 469; State v. Conway, 20 R.I. 270, 38 A. 656. An indirect confession is one inferred from the conduct of the defendant. An involuntary confession is one induced by hope, promise, fear, violence, torture, or threat. Lyons v. State, 77 Okl.Cr. 197, 138 P.2d 142, 148; Lyons v. State, 140 P.2d 248. People v. Tielke, 259 III. 88, 102 N.E. 229, 231. A naked confession is an admission of the guilt of the party, but which is not supported by any evidence of the commission of the crime. A relativo confession, in the older criminal law of England, "is where the accused confesseth and appealeth others thereof, to be-come an approver," (2 Hale, P. C. c. 29,) or in other words to "turn king’s evidence." This is now obsolete, but something like it is practiced in modern law, where one of the persons accused or supposed to be involved in a crime is put on the witness stand under an implied promise of pardon. State v. Willis, 71 Conn. 293, 41 A. 820. A simple confession is merely a plea of guilty.
Black’s Law Dictionary Revisad 4th Ed.-2 4

State v. Willis, 71 Conn. 293, 41 A. 820. A volun-tary confession is one made spontaneously by a person accused of crime, free from the influence of any extraneous disturbing cause, and in par-ticular, not influenced, or extorted by violence, threats, or promises. State v. Clifford, 86 Iowa, 550, 53 N.W. 299, 41 Am.St.Rep. 518.
No confession induced by offlcial threat of prosecution 1s voluntary. Cannan v. U. S.’ C.C.A.Tex., 19 F.2d 823, 824; State v. Dolan, 86 N.J.L. 192, 90 A. 1034, 1035.
It need not be spontaneous nor proceed wholly at maker’s suggestion, but may be set in motion by externa’ causes, so long as such influences are not what the law deems improper. People v. Vinci, 295 111. 419, 129 N.E. 193, 195.
For extrajudicial confession, see, also, the title Extrajudicial.
CONFESSION AND AVOIDANCE. A plea in con-fession and avoidance is one which avows and confesses the truth of the averments of fact in the declaration, either expressly or by implication, but then proceeds to allege new matter which tends to deprive the facts admitted of their ordinary legal effect, or to obviate, neutralize, or avoid them. Bavarian Brewing Co. v. Retkowski, 113 A. 903, 907, 1 W.W.Harr. (Del.) 225; Brown v. Jones, 137 Or. 520, 3 P.2d 768, 769.
CONFESSION OF DEFENSE. In English prac-tice. Where defendant alleges a ground of de-fense arising since the commencement of the ac-tion, the plaintiff may deliver confession of such defense and sign judgment for his costs up to the time of such pleading, unless it be otherwise or-dered. Jud. Act 1875, Ord. XX, r. 3.
CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT. See Judgment.
CONFESSO, BILL TAKEN PRO. In equity prac-tice. An order which the court of chancery makes when the defendant does not file an answer, that the plaintiff may take such a decree as the case made by his bill warrants.
CONFESSOR. An ecclesiastie who receives auri-cular confessions of sins from persons under his spiritual charge, and pronounces absolution upon them. The secrets of the confessional are not privileged communications at common law, but this has been changed by statute in some states. See 1 Greeni. Ev. §§ 247, 248.
CONFESSORIA ACTIO. Lat. In the civil law. An action for enforcing a servitude. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 324.
CONFESSUS IN JUDICIO PRO JUDICATO HABETUR, ET QUODAMMODO SUA SENTEN-TIA DAMNATUR. 11 Coke, 30. A person confes-sing his guilt when arraigned is deemed to have been found guilty, and is, as it were, condemned by his own sentence.
CONFIDE. A synonym of the word "trust," and means to put into one’s trust or keeping. Burch v. McMillin, Tex., 15 S.W.2d 86, 90.
CONFIDENCE. Trust; reliance; ground of trust. In the construction of wills, this word is con-sidered peculiarly appropriate to create a trust

"It is as applicable to the subject of a trust, as nearly a synonym, as the English language is cap-able of. Trust is a confidence which one man reposes in another, and confidence is a trust." Appeal of Coates, 2 Pa. 133.
CONFIDENCE GAME. Obtaining of money or property by means of some trick, device, or swind-ling operation in which advantage is taken of the confidence which the victim reposes in the swind-ler. People v. Mutchler, 309 Ill. 207, 140 N.E. 820, 822, 35 A.L.R. 339; Roll v. People, 243 P. 641, 643, 78 Colo. 589; People v. Epstein, 338 III. 631, 170 N.E. 678, 679. For distinction between false pre-tenses and confidence game, see False Pretenses.
One obtaining property by unlawful means, other than by fraudulently obtaining and then abusing victim’s con-fldence, 15 not guilty of obtaining property by means of "confldence game." Homareto v. People, 111 Colo. 99, 137 P.2d 402, 404.
CONFIDENTIAL. Intrusted with the confidence of another or with his secret affairs or purposes; intended to be held in confidence or kept secret.
CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS. See Com-munication.
CONFIDENTIAL CREDITOR. This term has been applied to the creditors of a failing debtor who furnished him with the means of obtaining credit to which he was not entitled, involving in loss the unsuspecting and fair-dealing creditors. Gay v. Strickland, 112 Ala. 567, 20 So. 921.
CONFIDENTIAL RELATION. A fiduciary rela-tion. These phrases are used as convertible terms. It is a peculiar relation which exists between client and attorney, principal and agent, principal and surety, landlord and tenant, parent and child, guardian and ward, ancestor and heir, husband and wif e, trustee and cestui que trust, executors or adrninistrators and creditors, legatees, or distribu-tees, appointer and appointee under powers, and partners and part owners. In these and like cases, the law, in order to prevent undue advantage from the unlimited confidence or sense of duty which the relation naturally creates, requires the utmost degree of good faith in all transactions between the parties. Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Pratt, D.C.Kan., 22 F.Supp. 304, 305, 306. It is not confined to any specific association of parties. It appears when the circumstances make it cer-tain that the parties do not deal on equal terms, but on the one side there is an over-mastering influence, or, on the other, weakness, dependence, or trust, justifiably reposed. The mere existence of kinship does not, of itself, give rise to such relation. In re Null’s Estate, 302 Pa. 64, 153 A. 137. It covers every farm of rela-tion between parties wherein confidence is reposed by one in another, and former relies and acts upon representations of the other and is guilty of no derelictions on his own part. Peckham v. John-son, Tex.Civ.App., 98 S.W.2d 408, 416.
The term "confidential relations," within the exception to the rule that misrepresentations of law wlll not work an estoppel, is not confined to the strict fiduciary relation-shlp existing between those having definite, well-recognized legal relations of trust and confidence, but extends to every possible case in which a fiduciary relation exists as a fact, though it may be a moral, social, domestic, or merely per-sonal relation, and need not be a legal one. Robbins v. Law, 48 Cal.App. 555, 192 P. 118, 120; Hitchcock v. Tack-ett, 208 Ky. 803, 272 S.W. 52, 54.
CONFINEMENT. Confinement may be by either a moral or a physical restraint, by threats of vio-lence with a present force, or by physical re-straint of the person. Ex parte Snodgrass, 43 Tex. Cr.R. 359, 65 S.W. 1061.
Restraint by sickness in childbirth; lying-in for delivery of child, or possibly because of advanced pregnancy. Rose v. Commonwealth Beneficial Ass’n, 86 A. 673, 674, 4 Boyce (Del.) 144.

Solitary Confinement

See Solitary Confinement

CONFIRM. To complete or establish that which was imperfect or uncertain; to ratify what has been done without authority or insufficiently. Railway Co. v. Ransom, 15 Tex.Civ.App. 689, 41 S.W. 826. Vermont Shade Roller Co. v. Burling-ton Traction Co., 102 Vt. 489, 150 A. 138, 142. To make firm or certain; to give new assurance of truth or certainty; to put past doubt. State ex rel. Sherrill v. Milam, 113 Fla. 491, 153 So. 100.
CONFIRMARE EST ID FIRMUM FACERE QUOD PRIUS INFIRMUM FUIT. Co. Litt. 295. To confirm is to make firm that which was be-fore infirm.
CONFIRMARE NEMO POTEST PRIUS QUAM JUS El ACCIDERIT. No one can confirm before the right accrues to him. 10 Coke, 48.
CONFIRMAT USUM QUI TOLLIT ABUSUM. He confirms the use [of a thing] who removes the abuse [of it]. Moore, 764.
CONFIRMATIO. The conveyance of an estate, or the communication of a right that one hath in or unto lands or tenements, to another that hath the possession thereof, or soma other estate there-in, whereby a voidable estate is made sure and unavoidable, or whereby a particular estate is increased or enlarged. Shep. Touch. 311; 2 Bl. Comm. 325.
CONFIRMATIO CHARTARUM. Lat. Confirma-tion of the charters. A statute passed in the 25 Edw. I., whereby the Great Charter is declared to be allowed as the common law; all judgments contrary to it are declared void; copies of it are ordered to be sent to all cathedral churches and read twice a year to the people; and sentence of excommunication is directed to be as constantly denounced against all those that, by word or deed or counsel, act contrary thereto or in any degree infringe ít. 1 B1.Comm. 128.
CONFIRMATIO CRESCENS. An enlarging con-firmation; one which enlarges a rightful estate. Shep. Touch. 311.
CONFIRMATIO DIMINUENS. A diminishing confirmation. A confirmation which tends and serves to diminish and abridge the services where-by a tenant doth hold, operating as a release of part of the services. Shep. Touch. 311.
CONFIRMATIO PERFICIENS. A confirmation which makes valid a wrongful and defeasible ti tle, or makes a conditional estate absolute. Shep. Touch. 311.
CONFIRMATIO EST NULLA UBI DONUM PILE-CEDENS EST INVALIDUM. Moore, 764; Co. Litt. 295. Confirmation is void where the preced-ing gift is invalid.
CONFIRMATIO OMNES SUPPLET DEFECTUS, LICET ID QUOD ACTUM EST AB INITIO NON VALUIT. Co. Litt. 295b. Confirmation supplies all defects, though that which had been done was not valid at the beginning.
CONFIRMATION. A contract or written mem-orandum thereof, by which that which was infirm, difficult of proof, void, imperfect, or subject to be avoided is ratified, rendered valid and binding, made firm and unavoidable. Schifferdecker v. Busch, 225 N.Y.S. 106, 111, 130 Misc. 625.
It Implies a deliberate act, Intended to renew and ratify a transaction known to be voidable. Bauer v. Dotterer, 202 Ark. 1055, 155 S.W.2d 54, 57.
A conveyance of an estate or right in esse, whereby a voidable estate is made sure and un-avoidable, or whereby a particular estate is in-creased. Co. Litt. 295b. Beetem v. Garrison, 129 Md. 664, 99 A. 897, 900.
English Ecclesiastical Law
The ratification by the archbishop of the elec-tion of a bishop by dean and chapter under the king’s letter missive prior to the investment and consecration of the bishop by the archbishop. 25 Hen. VIII. c. 20.
CONFIRMATION OF SALE. The confirmation of a judicial sale by the court which ordered it is a signification in some way (usually by the entry of an order) of the court’s approval of the terms, price, and conditions of the sale. Johnson v. Cooper, 56 Miss. 618; Hyman v. Smith, 13 W.Va. 765.
CONFIRMAVL Lat. I have confirmed. The em-phatic word in the ancient deeds of confirmation. Fleta, lib. 3, c. 14, § 5.
CONFIRMEE. The grantee in a deed of confirma-tion.
CONFIRMOR. The grantor in a deed of confirma-tion.
CONFISCABLE. Capable of being confiscated or suitable for confiscation; liable to forfeiture. Camp v. Lockwood, 1 Dall. (Pa.) 393, 1 L.Ed. 194.
CONFISCARE. In civil and old English law. To confiscate; to claim for or bring into the fisc, or treasury. Bract. fol. 150.
CONFISCATE. To appropriate property to the use of the state. To adjudge property to be for-feited to the public treasury; to seize and con-

demn private forfeited property to public use. City of Portsmouth v. Public Utilities Commission, 108 Ohio St. 272, 140 N.E. 604, 606; Moscow Fire Iras. Co. of Moscow, Russia, v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 294 N.Y.S. 648, 663, 161 Misc. 903.
Formerly, it appears, this term was used as synonymous with "forfeit," but at present the distinction between the two terms is well marked. Confiscation supervenes upon forfelture. The person, by his act, forfelts his property; the state thereupon appropriates it, that is, conflscates it. Hence, to confiscate property implies that it has first been forfeited; but to forfeit property does not necessarily Im-ply that It wiil be confiseated.
CONFISCATEE. One whose property has been seized and sold under a confiscation act, e. g., for unpaid taxes. See Brent v. New Orleans, 41. La. Ann. 1098, 6 So. 793.
CONFISCATION. The act of confiscating; or of condemning and adjudging to the public treasury.
"Confiscation" 1s to be distinguished from "condemna-tion" as prize. The former is the act of the sovereign against a rebellious subject; the latter is the act of a bel-ligerent against another belligerent. Confiscation may be effected by such mearas, summary or arbitrary, as the sov-ereign, expressing lts will through lawful channels, may please to adopt. Condemnation as prize can only be made In accordance with principies of law recognized In the com-mon jurisprudence of the world. Both are Proceedings in rem, but confiscation recognizes the title of the original owner to the property, while in prize the tenure of the property is qualified, provisional, and destitute of absolute ownership. Winchester v. U. S., 14 Ct.C1. 48.
CONFISCATORY RATES. For utility are rates which do not afford net return suflicient to pre-serve utility’s property and to attract capital nec-essary to enable utility to discharge its public duties. Wichita Gas Co. v. Public Service Commis-sion of Kansas, D.C.Kan., 2 F.Supp. 792, 799. Retes which do not afford a reasonable return on value of property at time it is used in public serv-ice. State v. Tri-State Telephone and Telegraph Co., 204 Minn. 516, 284 N.W. 294, 305.
CONFISCATION ACTS. Certain acts of congress, enacted during the progress of the civil war (1861 and 1862) in the exercise of the war powers of the government and meant to strengthen its hands and aid in suppressing the rebellion, which author-ized the seizure, condemnation, and forfeiture of _"property used for insurrectionary purposes." Semmes v. U. S., 91 U.S. 27, 23 L.Ed. 193.
CONFISCATION CASES. The narre given to a group of fifteen cases decided by the United States supreme court in 1868, on the validity and con-struction of the confiscation acts of congress. Re-ported in 7 Wall. 454, 19 L.Ed. 196.
CONFISK. An old form of confiscate.
CONFITENS REUS. An accused person who ad-mits his guilt.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. Inconsistency or differ-ence between the municipal laws of different states or countries, arising in the case of persons who have acquired rights or a status, or made contracts, or incurred obligations, within the ter-ritory of two or more jurisdictions. Hence, that branch of jurisprudence, arising from the diversity of the laws of different nations, states or jurisdictions, in their application to rights and remedies, which reconciles the inconsistency, or decides which law or system is to govern in the particular case, or settles the degree of force to be accorded to the law of another jurisdiction, (the acts or rights in question having arisen un-der it,) either where it varíes from the domestic law, or where the domestic law is silent or not exclusively applicable to the case in point. In this sense it is often called "private International law," a term adopted by Westlake, by Woolsey, Internatl. Law (5th Ed.) § 73, and others, and characterized as "handy and manageable," but at bottom inaccurate, by Dicey, Conflict of Laws, Moore’s Ed. 12, who points out that the defect of the name "Conflict of Laws" is that the supposed conflict is fictitious and never really takes place, and that the expression has the further radical defect of concealing from view the circumstance that the question by the law of what country a given transaction shall be governed is often too plain to admit of doubt. 11, he says, the term applies to the conflict in the mind of a judge as to which of two systems of law should govern a given case, this amounts simply to saying that the term "conflict of laws" may be used as an in-accurate equivalent for the less objectionable phrase "choice of laws." Taylor, Jurisprudence, 611, after considering the opinion of many writers, concludes that the term "private international law" is subject to many objections. Holland, Jur-isprudence, 410, considers it "wholly indefensible," as does Gray, Nature, etc., of the Law, 124. Pol-lock, First Book of Jurispr. 99, prefers the Ger-man term—Internationales Privatrecht.
CONFLICT OF PRESUMPTIONS. In this con-flict certain rules are applicable, viz.: (1) Special take precedente of general presumptions; (2) constant of casual ones; (3) presume in favor of innocence; (4) of legality; (5) of validity; and, when these rules fail, the matter is said to be at large. Brown.
CONFLICTING EVIDENCE. It has been said that there is not, in a legal sense, a conflict of evidente unless there is a possibility that men o! ordinary reason and fairness would feel justifled in drawing differerit conclusions from the evi-dence before them. Seeley v. Osborne, 220 N.Y. 416, 116 N.E. 97.
CONFORMITY. Correspondence in form, man-ner, or use; agreement; harmony; congruity. Reasonover v. Reasonover, 122 Tex. 512, 58 S.W. 2d 817, 819.

English Ecclesiastical Law

Adherence to the doctrines and usages of the Church of England.
CONFORMITY ACT, or STATUTE. A term used to designate Act June 1, 1872, c. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 197, whence was derived Rev. St. U. S. § 914 pro-viding that the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding in civil causes, other than equity and admiralty causes, in the federal dis-
trict courts shall conform, as near as may be, to those existing in like causes in the courts of the state within which such district courts are held. Since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., the Conformity Act is no longer effective. De Rosmo v. Feeny, 1941, 38 F. Supp. 834; Hydraulic Press Mf g. Co. v. Williams, White & Co., C.C.A.I11.1947, 165 F.2d 489.
CONFORMITY, BILL OF. See Bill of Conformity.
CONFRAMIE. Fr. In old English law. A fra-ternity, brotherhood, or society. Cowell.
CONFRERES. Brethren in a religious house; fellows of one and the same society. Cowell.
CONFRONTATION. In criminal law, the act of setting a witness face to face with the prisoner, in order that the latter may malee any objection he has to the witness, or that the witness may identif y the accused. State v. Behrman, 114 N.C. 797, 19 S.E. 220, 25 L.R.A. 449.
The constitutional right of confrontation does not mean merely that witnesses are to be made visible to the ac-cused, but importe the constitutional privilege to croas-ex-amine them. State v. Crooker, 123 Me. 310, 122 A. 865, 866, 33 A. L. R. 821.
CONFUSIO. In the civil law. The inseparable intermixture of property belonging to different owners; it is properly conflned to the pouring together of fluids, but is sometimes also used of a melting together of metals or any compound formed by the irrecoverable commixture of dif-ferent substances.
It is distinguished from commtixtion by the fact that In the latter case a separation may be made, while in a case of confusio there cannot be. 2 Bl.Comm. 405.
CONFUSION. This terno, as used in the civil law and in compound terms derived from that source, means a blending or intermingling, and is equiva-lent to the term "merger" as used at common law. Palmer v. Burnside, 1 Woods, 182 Fed. Cas. No. 10,685.
CONFUSION OF BOUNDARIES. The title of that branch of equity jurisdiction which relates to the discovery and settlement of conflicting, dis-puted, or uncertain boundaries.
CONFUSION OF DEBTS. A mode of extinguish-ing a debt, by the concurrente in the same person of two qualities or adverse rights to the same thing which mutually destroy each other. This may occur in several ways, as where the creditor becomes the heir of the debtor, or the debtor the heir of the creditor, or either accedes to the title of the other by any other mode of transfer. Woods v. Ridley, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 198.
CONFUSION OF GOODS. The inseparable in-termixture of property belonging to different own-ers; properly confined to the pouring together of fluids, but used in a wider sense to designate any indistinguishable compound of elements belonging to different owners. The term "confusion" is ap-plicable to a mixing of chattels of one and the same general description, differing thus from "ac-cession," which takes place where various materials are united in one product. Confusion of goods arises wherever the goods of two or more persons are so blended as to have become undis-tinguishable. 1 Schouler, Pers. Prop. 41. Barker v. Stearns Coal & Lumber Co., 291 Ky. 184, 163 S.W.2d 466, 471.
CONFUSION OF RIGIITS. A union of the quali-ties of debtor and creditor in the same person. The effect of such a union is, generally, to extin-guiste the debt. 1 Salk. 306; Cro. Car. 551; 1 Ld. Raym. 515. 5 Term 381; Comyns, Dig. Baron et Feme (D) ; Baylor University v. Bradshaw, Tex. Civ.App., 52 S.W.2d 1094, 1101.
CONFUSION OF TITLES. A civil-law expression, synonymous with "merger," as used in the com-mon law, applying where two titles to the same property unite in the same person. Palmer v. Burnside, 1 Woods, 179, Fed. Cas, No. 10,685.
CONFUTE. To prove to be false, detective, or invalid. Wiley v. Baker, 219 Mich. 629, 190 N.W. 273, 278.
CONGÉ. Fr. In French law. Permission, leave, license; a passport or clearance to a vessel; a permission to arm, equip, or navigate a vessel.
CONGÉ D’ACCORDER. Leave to accord. A per-mission granted by the court, in the old process of levying a fine, to the defendant to agree with the plaintiff. Termes de la Ley; Cowell. See Licen-tia Concordandi; 2 Bla.Comm. 350.
CONGÉ D’EM-PARLER. Leave to imparl. The privilege of an imparlance, (licentia loquendi.) 3 Bl.Comm. 299.
CONGÉ D’ESLIRE. Also spelled congé d’élire, congé délire. Cowell; Termes de la Ley; 1 Bla. Comm. 379, 382. A permission or license from the British sovereign to a dean and chapter to elect a bishop, in time of vacation; or to an abbey or priory which is of royal foundation, to elect an abbot or prior.
CONGEABLE. L. Fr. Lawful; permissible; al-lowable. "Disseisin is properly where a man en-tereth into any lands or tenements where his en-try is not congeable, and putteth out him that hath the freehold." Litt. § 279. See Ricard v. Williams, 7 Wheat. 107, 5 L.Ed. 398.
CONGILDONES. In Saxon law. Fellow-members of a guild.
CONGIUS. An ancient measure containing about a gallon and a pint. Cowell.
CONGREGATE. To come together; to assemble; to meet. Board of Health of City of Paterson v. Clayton, 93 N.J.L. 64, 106 A. 813, 814.
CONGREGATION. An assembly or gathering; specifically, an assembly or society of persons who together constitute the principal supporters of a particular parish, or habitually meet at the same church for religious exercises. Laird v. State, 69 Tex.Cr.R. 553, 155 S.W. 260, 262.

Certain bureaus at Rome, where ecclesiastical matters are attended to.
CONGREGATIONAL SYSTEM OF CITURCH OR-GANIZATION. Where the local organization is the governing body and is sufficient unto itself. Doughty v. Herr, 97 Ind.App. 427, 185 N.E. 657, 658.
CONGRESS. In International Law. An assembly of envoys, commissioners, deputies, etc., from dif-ferent sovereignties who meet to concert measures for their common good, or to adjust their mutual concerns.
In American Law. The legislative assembly of the United States, composed of the senate and house of representatives (q. v.). U. S. Const. art. 1, § 1.
CONGRESSMAN. Strictly, a member of the Con-gress of the United States. But there is a strong tendency in popular usage to apply this term only to a member of the House of Representatives, as distinguished from a senator. State v. Kopriva, 49 N.D. 1040, 194 N.W. 704, 705.
CONGRESSUS. The extreme practical test of the truth of a charge of impotente brought against a husband by a wife. It is now disused. Causes Célébres, 6, 183.
CONJECTIO. In the civil law of evidence. A throwing together. Presumption; the putting of things together, with the inference drawn there-from.
CONJECTIO CAUSM. In the civil law. A state-ment of the case. A brief synopsis of the case given by the advocate to the judge in opening the trial. Calvin.
CONJECTURAL CHOICE, RULE OF. Where all theories of causation rest only on conjecture, no jury question is presented. Cummings v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 127 N.W.2d 842, 844, 372 Mich. 695.
CONJECTURE. A slight degree of credence, aris-ing from evidence too weak or too remote to cause belief. Weed v. Scofield, 73 Conn. 670, 49 A. 22; 1 Mascardus, De Prob. quEest. 14, n. 14. Supposi-tion or surmise. The idea of a fact, suggested by another fact; as a possible cause, concomitant, or result. Burrill, Circ. Ev. 27. An idea or notion founded on a probability without any demonstra-tion of its truth; an idea or surmise inducing a slight degree of belief founded upon some possible, or perhaps probable fact of which there is no posi-tive evidence. Oklahoma City v. Wilcoxson, 173 Okl. 433, 48 P.2d 1039, 1043. An explanation con-sistent with but not deducible as a reasonable in-ference from known facts or conditions. Southern Ry. Co. v. Dickson, 211 Ala. 481, 100 So. 665, 669. In popular use, synonymous with "guess." Fed-orawicz v. Citizens’ Electric Illtuninating Co., 246 Pa. 141, 92 A. 124, 125.
Also, the bringing together of the circumstanc-es, as well as the result obtained. Reynolds v. Maryland Casualty Co., 274 Mo. 83, 201 S.W. 1128, 1133.

CONJOINT ROBBERY. Where the act is com-mitted by two or more persons. Patterson v. State, 78 Okl.Cr. 244, 147 P.2d 179, 184.
CONJOINTS. Persons married to each other. Story, Confi. Laws, § 71; Wolffius, Droit de la Nat. § 858.
CONJUDEX. In old English law. An associate judge. Bract. 403.
CONJUGAL. Of or belonging to marriage or the married state; suitable or appropriate to the mar-ried state or to married persons; matrimonial; connubial. Swanson v. Swanson, 20 A.2d 617, 618, 128 Conn. 128, 135 A.L.R. 849.
CONJUGAL RIGHTS. Matrimonial rights; the right which husband and wife have to each other’s society, comfort, and affection.
CONJUGIUM. One of the names of marriage, among the Romans. Tayl. Civil Law, 284.
CONJUNCT. In Scotch law. Joint.
CONJUNCTA. In the civil law. Things joined together or united; as distinguished from dis-juncta, things disjoined or separated. Dig. 50, 16, 53.
CONJUNCTIM. Lat. In old English law. Joint-ly. Inst. 2, 20, 8.
CONJUNCTIM ET DIVISIM. L. Lat. In old Eng-lish law. Jointly and severally.
CONJUNCTIO. In the civil law. Conjunction; connection of words in a sentence. See Dig. 50, 16, 29, 142.
CONJUNCTIO MARITI ET FEMINiE EST DE JURE NATURJE. The union of husband and wife is of the law of nature.
CONJUNCTIVE. Connecting in a manner denot-ing ,union.
A grammatical term for particles which sérve for joining or connecting together. Thus, the word "and" is called a "conjunctive," and "or" a "disjunctive," conjunction.
CONJUNCTIVE DENIAL. Where several mater-ial facts are stated conjunctively in the complaint, an answer which undertakes to deny their ayer-ments as a whole, conjunctively stated, is called a "conjunctive denial." Doll v. Good, 38 Cal. 287.
CONJUNCTIVE OBLIGATION. See Obligation.
CONJURATIO. In Old English Law. A swearing together; an oath administered to several toge-ther; a combination or confederacy under oath. Cowell.
In Old European Law. A compact of the in-habitants of a commune, or municipality, con-firmed by their oaths to each other and which was the basis of the commune. Steph. Lect. 119.
CONJURATION. In old. English law. A plot or compact made by persons combining by oath to do any public harm. Cowell

The offense of having conference or commerce with ovil spirits, in order to discover some secret, or effect some purpose. Cowell.
Classed by Blackstone with witchcraft, enchantrnent, and sorcery, but distinguished from each of these by other writers. 4 Bl.Comm. 60; Cowell. Cooper v. Llvingston, 19 Fla. 693; Mozley & W. Law Dict.
CONJURATOR. In old English law. One who swears or is sworn with others; one bound by oath with others; a compurgator; a conspirator.
CONNECT. To join or fasten together as by something intervening; to associate as in occur-rence or in idea; to combine; to unite or link together, as in an electrical circuit; to establish a bond or relation between; to meet or make con-nections for transference of passengers or change of means of communication. City of Indepen-dence v. Board of Com’rs of Montgomery County, 140 Kan. 661, 38 P.2d 105.
CONNECTED. Joined; united by junction, by an intervening substance or medium, by dependence or relation, or by order in a series. State v. Pat-terson, 95 S.C. 463, 79 S.E. 309, 310.
With reference to buildings, the term does not generaily denote such a close union as is implied by the word "at-tached" or "annexed," but rather signiflez the connection effected by a flume; Plattsburg Gas & Electric Co. v. MI11- er, 206 N.Y.S. 42, 45, 123 Misc. 651; or by piping or tele-phone connections; Williams Mfg. Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 93 Vt. 161, 106 A. 657, 659.
A counterclalm, to be ”connected" with the subject of the action, must be directly connected, so that the parties could be supposcd to have foreseen and contemplated it in their mutual acts. Haberle-Crystal Spring Brewing Co. v. Handrahan, 165 N.Y.S. 251, 255, 100 Misc. 163; Placerville Gold Mining Co. v. Beal, 168 Cal. 682, 144 P. 748, 749.
As used in the Act to Regulate Commerce (Act Feb. 4, 1887, c. 104, § 15, 24 Stat. 384), as amended by Act June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 4, 34 Stat. 589 (49 USCA § 15), "conneet-ed with" transportation means "a part of" transportation. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. General Electric Co., 146 N.Y.S. 322, 327, 83 Misc. 529.
CONNECTION. The state of being connected or joined; union by junction, by an intervening sub-stance or medium, by dependence or relation, or by order in a series. State v. Patterson, 95 S.C. 463, 79 S.E. 309, 310. Annernen v. Penn, Cust. & Pat.App., 69 F.2d 653, 654.
A contract for a connection between rallroads means a physical joining of the rails so as to permit trains to pass from one set of rails to the other. Philip A. Ryan Lumber Co. v. Ball, Tex.Civ.App., 197 S.W. 1037, 1038. See. also, State v. Babcock, 161 Minn. 80, 200 N.W. 843, 844; Raynor v. New York & L. I. Traction Co., 149 N.Y.S. 151, 155, 86 Misc. 201.
CONNECTIONS. Relations by blood or marriage, but more commonly the relations of a person with whom one is connected by marriage. In this sense, the relations of a wife are "connections" of her husband. The term is vague and indefinite. See Storer v. Wheatley, 1 Pa. 507.
CONNEXITÉ. In French law. This exists when two actions are pending which, although not iden-tical as in lis pendens, are so nearly similar in object that it is expedient to have them both ad-judicated upon by the same judges. Arg. Fr. Merc. Law, 553.

CONNIVANCE. The secret or indirect consent or permission of one person to the commission of an unlawful or criminal act by another. State v. Gesell, 124 Mo. 531, 27 S.W. 1101. A winking at; voluntary blindness; an intentional failure to dis-cover or prevent the wrong; forbearance or pas-sive consent. Pierce v. Crisp, 260 Ky. 519, 86 S. W.2d 293, 296.
The corrupt consent of one party to the com-mission of the acts of the other constituting the cause of divorce. Dennis v. Dennis, 36 A. 34, 68 Conn. 186, 34 L.R.A. 449, 57 Am.St.Rep. 95; Man-ville v. Manville, Mo.App., 81 S.W.2d 382, 388.
A corrupt intent is essential. Ratcliff v. Rat-cliff, 221 Mo.App. 944, 288 S.W. 794, 796. But see Leavitt v. Leavitt, 229 Mass. 196, 118 N.E. 262, and 33 L.J.Mat.Cas. 161.
Connivance differs from condonation, though the same legal consequences may attend it. Connivance necessarIly involves criminality on the part of the individual who con-nives; condonation may take place without imputing the slightest blame to the party who forgives the injury. Con-nivance must be the act of the mind before the offense has been committed; condonation is the result of a deter-mination to forglve an injury which was not known until after it was inflicted. Turton v. Turton, 3 Hagg.Eccl. 350.
Connivance differs, also, from collusion: the former Is generally collusion for a particular purpose, while the lat-ter may exlst without connivance. 3 Hagg.Eccl. 130.
CONNIVE. To co-operate secretly with, or to have a secret or clandestine understanding with. People v. Munday, 293 III. 191, 127 N.E. 364, 368. To take part or co-operate privily with another, to aid or abet. People v. Munday, 215 III.App. 356, 377. To look upon with secret favor; it im-plies both knowledge and assent, either active or passive. State v. Furth, 82 Wash. 665, 144 P. 907, 910.
CONNOISSEMENT. In French law. An instru-ment, signed by the master of a ship or his agent, containing a description of the goods loaded on a ship, the persons who have sent them, the per-sons to whom they were sent, and the undertak-ing to transport them;—similar to the English and American bill of lading. Guyot, Répert. Univ.; Ord. de la Marine,l. 3, t. 3, art. 1.
CONNUBIUM. In the civil law. Marriage. Among the Romans, a lawful marriage as dis-tinguished from "concubinage" (q. v.), an inferior marriage.
CONOCIAMENTO. In Spanish law. A recogniz-ance. White, New Recop. b. 3, tit. 7, c. 5, § 3.
CONOCIMIENTO. In Spanish law. A Bill of lading. In the Mediterranean ports it is called "poliza de carga miento."
CONPOSSESSIO. In modern civil law. A joint possession. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 245.
CONQUEREUR. In Norman and old English law. The same as "conqueror" (q. v.).
CONQUEROR. In old English and Scotch law. The first purchaser of an estate; he who first brought an estate into his family, or into the family owning it. 2 Bl.Comm. 242, 243

CONQUEST. In feudal law. Conquest; acquisi-tion by purchase; any method of acquiring the ownership of an estate other than by descent. Al-
so an estate acquired otherwise than by inherit-ance.
In International law. The acquisition of the sovereignty of a country by force of arms, exer-cised by an independent power which reduces the vanquished to the submission of its empire. Cas-tillero v. U. S., 2 Black, 109, 17 L.Ed. 360; Ameri-can Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 7 L.Ed. 242.
In Scotch law. Purchase. Bell.
CONQUESTOR. Conqueror. The title given to William of Normandy.
CONQU’ETS. In French law. The name given to every acquisition which the husband and wife, jointly or severally, make during the conjugal community. Thus, whatever is acquired by the husband and wife, either by his or her industry or good fortune, inures to the extent of one-half for the benefit of the other. Merl. Repert. "Con-quét"; Merl. Quest., "Conquét." Picotte v. Cooley,
10 Mo. 312. In Louisiana, these gains are called acquéts.
CONQUISITIO. In feudal and old English law. Acquisition. 2 Bl.Comm. 242.
CONQUISITOR. In feudal law. A purchaser, acquirer, or conqueror. 2 Bl.Comm. 242, 243.
CONSANGUINEUS. Lat. A person related by
blood; a person descended from the same com-mon stock.
CONSANGUINEUS EST QUASI EODEM SAN-GUINE NATUS. Co. Litt. 157. A person related by consanguinity is, as it were, sprung from the same blood.
CONSANGUINEUS FRATER. In civil and feudal law. A half-brother by the father’s side, as dis-tinguished from frater uterinus, a brother by the mother’s side. 2 Bla.Comm. 231.
CONSANGUINITY. Kinship; blood relationship; the connection or relation of persons descended from the same stock or common ancestor. 2 Bl. Comm. 202; Rector v. Drury, 3 PM. (Wis.) 298; Sweezey v. Willis, 1 Brad.Surr.R. (N.Y.) 495.
consanguinity Is distinguished from "affinity," which is the connection existing in consequence of a marriage, be-tween each of the married persons and the kindred of the other. Sizemore v. Commonwealth, 210 Ky. 637, 276 S.W. 524, 525.
Lineal and Collateral Consang-ninity
Lineal consanguinity is that which subsists be-tween persons of whom one is descended in a direct line from the other, as between son, father, grandfather, great-grandfather, and so upwards in the direct ascending line; or between son, grandson, great-grandson, and so downwards in the direct descending line. Collateral consan-guinity is that which subsists between persons who have the same ancestors, but who do not descend (or ascend) one from the other. Thus, father and son are related by lineal consanguinity, uncle and nephew by collateral consanguinity. 2 Bl.Comm. 203; Capps v. State, 87 Fla. 388, 100 So. 172, 173.
CONSCIENCE. The moral sense; the faculty of judging the moral qualities of actions, or of dis-criminating between right and wrong; particular-ly applied to one’s perception and judgment of the moral qualities of his own conduct, but in a wider sense, denoting a similar application of the standards of morality to the acts of others. The sense of right and wrong inherent in every person by virtue of his existence as a social entity; good conscience being a synonym of equity. Van Graa-fieland v. Wright, 286 Mo. 414, 228 S.W. 465, 469. In law, especially the moral rule which requires probity, justice, and honest dealing between man and man, as when we say that a bargain is "against conscience" or "unconscionable," or that the price paid for property at a forced sale vas so inadequate as to "shock the conscience." This is also the meaning of the term as applied to the jurisdiction and principies of decision of courts of chancery, as in saying that such a court is a "court of conscience," that it proceeds "according to conscience," or that it has cognizance of "mat-ters of conscience." See 3 Bl.Comm. 47-56; People v. Stewart, 7 Cal. 143; Miller v. Miller, 187 Pa. 572, 41 A. 277.
As an element of equltable jurisdiction it Is not the prív-ate opinion of an individual court, but is rather to be re-garded as a metaphorical term, designating the common standard of civil right and expediency combined, based up-on general principies and limited by established doctrines, to which the court appeals and by which it tests the con-duct and rights of suitors. National City Bank of New York v. Gelfert, 284 N.Y. 13, 29 N.E.2d 449, 452.
CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT. When an issue is sent out of chancery to be tried at law, to "in-form the conscience of the court," the meaning is that the court is to be supplied with exact and dependable information as to the unsettled or disputed questions of fact in the case, in order that it may proceed to decide it in accordance with the principies of equity and good conscience in the light of the facts thus determined. Watt v. Starke, 101 U.S. 252, 25 L.Ed. 826.
CONSCIENCE, COURTS OF. Courts, not of rec-ord, constituted by act of parliament in the city of London, and other towns, for the recovery of small debts; otherwise and more commonly call-ed "Courts of Requests." 3 Steph.Comm. 451.
CONSCIENCE, RIGHT OF. As used in some con-stitutional provisions, this phrase is equivalent to religious liberty or freedom of conscience. Com. v. Lesher, 17 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 155; State v. Cum-mings, 36 Mo. 263.
CONSCIENTIA DICITUR A CON ET SCIO, QUASI SCIRE CUM DEO. 1 Coke, 100. Con-science is called from con and scio, to know, as it were, with God.
CONSCIENTIA REI ALIENI. In Scotch law. Knowledge of another’s property; knowledge that a thing is not one’s own, but belongs to another.
He who has this knowledge, and retains posses-sion, is chargeable with "violent profits."
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR. One who, by rea-son of religious training and belief, is conscien-tiously opposed to participation in war. Selec-tive Training & Service Act of 1940, § 5(g), 50 U.S.C.A. App., § 305(g). U. S. v. Kauten, C.C.A. N.Y., 133 F.2d 703.
One conscientiously opposed on religious grounds to par-ticipation in war need not be a member of a religlous sect whose creed forbids participation in war to be entitled to classincation as a conscientious objector. U. S. v. Bowles, C.0 A.N.J., 131 F.2d 818. It is sufficient if he has a con-scientious scruple against war in any form. U. S. ex rel. Phillíps v. Downer, C.C.A.N.Y., 135 F.2d 521, 524, 525.
CONSCIENTIOUS SCRUPLE. A conscientious scruple against taking an oath, serving as a juror in a capital case, doing military duty, or the like, is an objection or repugnante growing out of the fact that the person believes the thing demanded of him to be morally wrong, his conscience being the sole guide to his decision; it is thus distin-guished from an "objection on principie," which is dictated by the reason and judgment, rather than the moral sense, and may relate only to the pro-priety or expediency of the thing in question. People v. Stewart, 7 Cal. 143.
CONSCRIPTION. Drafting finto the military service of the state; compulsory military service falling upon all mak subjects evenly, within or under certain specified ages. Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. 267. Certain classes, however, may be ex-empt, and drafted men are sometimes released upon furnishing aeceptable substitutes or by the payment of a sum of money. Davis, Mil. Law 51.
CONSECRATE. In ecclesiastical law. To dedí-cate to sacred purposes, as a bishop by imposition of hands, or a church or churchyard by prayers, etc. Consecration is performed by a bishop or archbishop.
CONSECRATIO EST PERIODUS ELECTIONIS; ELECTIO EST PRZEAMBULA CONSECRATION-IS. 2 Rolle, 102. Consecration is the termination of election; election is the preamble of consecra-tion.
CONSECUTIVE. Successive; succeeding one an-other in regular order. Walsworth v. Casassa, 219 Mass. 200, 106 N.E. 847; to follow in uninter-rupted succession. People v. Hirschbein, 60 P.2d 532, 16 Ca1.App.2d 458.
CONSEDO. Sp. A term used in conveyances un-der Mexican law, equivalent to the English word "grant." Mulford v. Le Franc, 26 Cal. 103.
CONSEIL D’ÉTAT. Council of state. One of the oldest of French institutions, its origin dating back to 1302. It decides or advises upon state questions and measures proposed for legislation, submitted to it by the President of the Republic, by the members of the Cabinet, and by Parlia-ment. Coxe, Manual of French Law.
CONSEIL DE FAMILLE. In French law. A fam-ily council. Certain acts require the sanction of this body. For example, a guardian can neither accept nor reject an inheritance to which the minor has succeeded without its authority, (Code Nap. 461;) nor can he accept for the child a gift inter vivos without the like authority, (Code Nap. 463.)
CONSEIL DE PRUDIIOMMES. In French law. One of a species of trade tribunals, charged with settling differences between masters and work-men. They endeavor, in the first instance, to con-ciliate the parties. In default, they adjudicate upon the questions in dispute. Their decisions are final up to 200f. Beyond that amount, appeals lie to the tribunals of commerce. Arg. Fr. Merc. Law, 553.
CONSEIL JUDICIAIRE. In French law. When a person has been subjected to an interdiction on the ground of his insane extravdgance, but the interdiction is not absolute, but limited only, the court of first instance, which Brants the interdic-tion, appoints a council, called by this name, with whose assistance the party may bring or defend actions, or compromise the same, alienate his es-tate, make or incur loans, and the like. Brown.
CONSENSUAL CONTRACT. A term derived from the civil law, denoting a contract founded upon and completed by the mere consent of the contracting parties, without any external formal-ity or symbolic act to fix the obligation.
CONSENSUAL MARRIAGE. Marriage resting simply on consent per verba de prwsenti, between competent parties. Such marriage is valid. Fish-er v, Fisher, 250 N.Y. 313, 165 N.E. 460, 461, 61 A. L.R. 1523. See, also, Common-law Marriage.
CONSENSUS AD IDEM. An agreement of par-ties to the same thing; a meeting of minds.
CONSENSUS EST VOLUNTAS PLURIUM AD QUOS RES PERTINET, SIMUL JUNCTA. Lofft, 514. Consent is the conjoint will of several per-sons to whom the thing belongs.
CONSENSUS FACIT LEGEM. Consent makes the law. (A contract is law between the parties agreeing to be bound by it.) Branch, Princ.
CONSENSUS, NON CONCUBITUS, FACIT NUP-TIAS VEL MATRIMONIUM, ET CONSENTIRE NON POSSUNT ANTE ANNOS NUBILES. 6 Coke, 22. Consent, and not cohabitation (or coi-tion), constitutes nuptials or marriage, and per-sons cannot consent before marriageable years. 1 BI.Comm. 434; Co. Litt. 33a; Dig. 50, 17, 30. See 10 Cl. & F. 534; Broom, Max. 505.
CONSENSUS TOLLIT ERROREM. Co. Litt. 126. Consent (acquiescence) removes mistake. 2 Inst. 123; Rogers v. Cruger, 7 Johns. (N.Y.) 611; Kuh-ler v. Hoover, 4 Pa. 335; Wilkinson’s Appeal, 65 Pa. 190.
CONSENSUS VOLUNTAS MULTORUM AD QUOS RES PERTINET, SIMUL JUNCTA. Con-sent is the united will of several interested in one subject-matter. Davis, 48; Branch, Princ

CONSENT. A concurrence of wills, Voluntarily yielding the will to the proposition of another; acquiescence or compliance therewith. Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., D.C.Minn., 26 F.Supp. 366, 371. Agreement; the act or result of coming into harmony or accord. Glantz v. Gabel, 66 Mont. 134, 212 P. 858, 860.
Consent is an act of reason, accompanied with delibera-tion, the mind weighing as 1n a balance the good or evil on each side. 1 Story, Eq.Jur. § 222; Lervick v. White Top Cabs, La.App., 10 So.2d 67, 73. It means vo;untary agree-ment by a person in the possession and exercise of sufil-cient mentality to make an intelligent choice to do some-thing proposed by another. People v. Kangiesser, 44 Cal. App. 345, 186 P. 388, 389. It supposes a physical power to act, a moral power of acting, and a serious, determined, and free use of there powers. Fonblanque, Eq. b. 1, c. 2, s. 1; New Jersey Mfrs’ Casualty Ins. Co., 148 A. 790, 791, 106 N.J.L. 238. Consent is implied in every agreement. It is an act unclouded by fraud, duress, or sometimes oven mistake. Heine v. Wright, 76 Cal.App. 338, 244 P. 955, 956.
There is a dlfference between consenting and submitting. Every consent involves a submission; but a mere submis-sion does not necessarily involve consent. 9 Car. & P. 722.
"Consent" is an active acquiescence as distinguished from "assent," meaning a silent acquiescence. People v. Lowe, 205 N.Y.S. 77, 78, 209 App.Div. 498. "Consent" means an active circumstance of concurrence; "assent" is a passive act of concurrence before another does the act charged. Perryman v. State, 63 Ga.App. 819, 12 S.E.2d 388, 390. But the two terms may be used interchangeabiy. Bartlett v. Sundin, 169 N.Y.S. 391, 393, 182 App.Div. 117.
"Consent" 1s sometimes synonymous merely with "waiv-er." Dahlquist v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 52 Utah, 438, 174 P. 833, 844. See, also, Seegmiller v. Day, C.C.A.I11., 249 F. 177, 178: Toledo Fence & Post Co. v. Lyons, C.C.A.Ohio, 290 F. 637, 640.
As used in the law of rape "consent" means consent of the will, and submission under the influence of fear or ter-ror cannot amount to real consent. Hallmark v. State, 22 Okl. Cr. 422, 212 P. 322, 328. There must be an exercise of intelligence based on knowledge of its significante and moral quality and there must he a choice between resista anee and assent. State v. Schwab, 109 Ohio St. 532, 143 N. E. 29, 31. And if woman resists to the point where further resistance would be useless or until her resistance is over-come by force or violente, submission thereafter is not "consent". People v. Mcllvain, 130 P.2d 131, 135, 55 Cal. App.2d 322

See Assent.
Consent decree. See Decree. Consent judgment. See Judgment.
Express Consent. That directly given, either viva vote or in writing. It is positive, direct, un-equivocal consent, requiring no infeFence or im-plication to supply its meaning. Pacific Nat. Ag-ricultural Credit Corporation v. IIagerman, 40 N.M. 116, 55 P.2d 667, 670.
Express or Implied Consent. Under motor ve-hiele liability insurance law providil1 that policy should cover any person responsibie I r operation of insured vehicle with insured’s exrress or im-plied consent, words "express or impiied consent" primarily modify not the word "operat.on", but the word "responsible", and imply possession of ve-hiele with consent of owner and responsibility to him. Hurley v. Flanagan, 313 Mass. 567, 48 N. E.2d 621, 624.
Implied Consent. That manifested by signs, ac-tions, or facts, or by inaction or silente, which raise a presumption that the consent has been

given. Avery v. State, 12 Ga.App. 562, 77 S.E. 892. See State v. Horton, 247 Mo. 657, 153 S.W. 1051, 1053; White v. White, 84 N.J.Eq. 512, 95 A. 197, 199.
CONSENT RULE. An entry of record by the de-fendant, confessing the lease, entry, and ouster by the plaintiff, in an action of ejectment. A super-seded instrument, in which a defendant in an ac-tion of ejectment specified for What purpose he intended to defend, and undertook to confess not only the fictitious lease, entry, and ouster, but that he was in possession. See Ad.Eject. 233.
CONSENTIBLE MINES. See Line.
CONSENTIENTES ET AGENTES PARI PLENA PLECTENTUR. They who consent to an act, and they who do it, shall be visited with equal punish-ment. 5 Coke 80.
CONSENTIRE MATRIMONIO NON POSSUNT INFRA [ANTE] ANNOS NÚBILES. Parties can-not consent to marriage within the years of mar-riage, [before the age of consent.] 5 Coke 80; 6 Coke 22.
CONSEQUENCE. The result foliowing in natural sequence from an event which is adapted to pro-duce, or to aid in producing, such result;—the correlative of "cause." Board of Trustees of Fire-men’s Relief and Pension Fund for City of Tulsa v. Miller, 186 Okl. 586, 99 P.2d 146, 147.
In Consequence of
Thís phrase has been used as equivalent to the words, "in the event of." In re Spalding’s Estate, 84 Cal.App. 371, 258 P. 154, 155.
CONSEQUENTL’E NON EST CONSEQUENTIA. Bac.Max. The consequence of a consequence ex-ists not.
CONSEQUENTIAL CONTEMPT. The ancient name for what is now known as "constructive" contempt of court. Ex parte Wright, 65 Ind. 508. See Contempt.
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES. See Damages.
CONSEQUENTS. In Scotch law. Implied pow-ers or authorities. Things which follow, usually by implication of law. A commission being giv-en to execute any work, every power necessary to carry it on is implied. 1 Kames, Eq. 242.
CONSERVATOR. A guardian; protector; pre-server.
"When any person having property shall be found to be incapable of managing his affairs, by the court of probate in the district in which he resides, * * * it shall appoint some person to be his conservator, who, upon giving a pro-bate bond, shall have the charge of the person and estate of such incapable person." Gen.St.Conn.1875, p. 346, § 1 (Gen.St.1930, § 4815); Hutchins v. Johnson, 12 Conn. 376, 30 Am. Dec. 622.
One whose business it is to attend to the en-f orcement of certain statutes. See Conservators of the Peace, infra.
One whose duty requires him lo prevent and arrest for breaches of the peace in his presence, but not to arraigo

and try for them. Marcuchi v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 81 W.Va. 548, 94 S.E. 979, 980.
A delegated umpire or standing arbitrator, chosen to compose and adjust difficulties arising between two parties. Cowell.
CONSERVATOR TRUCIS. Lat. An official ap-poin ted under an English act of 1414 passed to prevent breaches of truces made, or of safe con-ducts granted, by the king. 2 Holdsw.Hist.E.L. 392; 4 Bla.Comm. 69.
CONSERVATORS OF RIVERS. Commissioners or trustees in whom the control of a certain river is vested, in England, by act of parliament.
CONSERVATORS OF THE PEACE. Officers au-thorized to preserve and maintain the public peace. In England, these officers were locally elected by the people until the reign of Edward III, when their appointment was vested in the king. Their duties were to prevent and arrest for breaches of the peace, but they had no power to arraign and try the offender until about 1360, when this au-thority was given to them by act of parliament, and "then they acquired the more honorable appel-lation of justices of the peace." 1 Bl.Comm. 351.
Even after thls time, however, many publIc officers were styled "conservators of the peace," not as a distinct oflice but by vlrtue of the duties and authorities pertaining to their offices. In this sense the term may include the king hlmself, the lord chancellor, justices of the king’s bench, master of the rolls, coroners, sherlffs, constables, etc. 1 Bl.Comm. 350. See Smith v. Abbott, 17 N.J.L. 358. In Texas, the constitution provides that county judges shall be conservators of the peace. Const.Tex. art. 4, § 15; Jones v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 65 S.W. 92. The Constitution of Delaware (1831) provides that: "The members of the senate and house of representatives, the chancellor, the judges, and the attorney-general shall, by virtue of their ollices, be conservators of the peace throughout the state; and the treasurer, secretary, and prothonotaries, regísters, recorders, sheriffs, and coroners, shall, by virtue of their offices, be conservators thereof within the counties respec-tively in which they reside."
CONSERVE. To save from Loss. U. S. v. Mam-moth Oil Co., D.C.Wyo., 5 F.2d 330, 351.

CONSIDER. To fix the mind on, with a view to careful examination; to examine; to inspect. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Richards, 204 N.Y.S. 246, 248, 123 Misc. 83. To deliberate about and ponder over. People v. Tru-Sport Pub. Co., 291 N.Y.S. 449, 457, 160 Misc. 628. To entertain or give heed to. Rodolf v. Board of Com’rs of Tulsa County, 122 Okl. 120, 251 P. 740, 741. See, also, Considered.
CONSIDERABLE. Worthy of consideration; re-quired to be observed. Gougar v. Buffalo Specialty Co., 26 Colo.App. 8, 141 P. 511, 514.
A "considerable" number, as of persons, does not neces-sarily mean a very great or any particular number of per-sons; the term "considerable" being merely relative. People v. Kings County Iron Foundry, 209 N.Y. 207, 102 N. E. 598, 599.
CONSIDERATIO CURVE. The judgment of the court.
CONSIDERATION. Practice. A technical term indicating that a tribunal has heard and judicially

determined matters submitted to it. Meaney v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 113 Or. 371, 232 P. 789, 791.

Contracts

The inducement to a contract. The cause, mo-tive, price, or impelling influence which induces a contracting party to enter into a contract. The reason or material cause of a contract. 2 Bla. Comm. 443; Cassinelli v. Stacy, 238 Ky. 827, 38 S.W.2d 980, 983.
Consideration is not to be confounded with motive. Con-sideration means something which is of value In the eye of the law, moving from the plaintiff, either of benefit to the plaintiff or of detriment to the defendant. Patteson, J., in Langd.Sel.Cas.Contr. 168; s. c. 2 Q.B. 851; Miller v. Bank of Holly Springs, 131 Miss. 55, 95 So. 129, 130, 31 A.L.R. 698. "Nothing is consideration that is not regard-ed as such by both parties." Schlecht v. Schlecht, 168 Minn. 168, 209 N.W. 883, 887. And "price" and "considera-tion," though sometimes the same, are not always Identi-cal. Oregon Home Builders v. Crowley, 87 Or. 517, 170 P. 718, 721.
The "inducement" for a contract is that which influences the act, while "consideration" means the parting with something by the one from whom it moves. E. F. Spears & Sons v. Winkle, 186 Ky. 585, 217 S.W. 691, 692.
-An act or forbearance, or the promise thereof, which is offered by one party to an agreement, and accepted by the other as an inducement to that other’s act or promise. Poll.Contr. 91.
Any benefit conferred, or agreed to be conferred, upon the promisor, by any other person, to which the promisor is not lawfully entitled, or any preju-dice suffered, or agreed to be suffered, by such person, other than such as he is at the time of consent lawfully bound to suffer, as an induce-ment to the promisor. Hence doing only of what one is already under obligation to do is not "con-sideration" for a contract. Hogan y. Supreme Camp of the American Woodmen, 146 Fla. 413, 1 So.2d 256, 258.
Any act of the plaintiff (or the promisee) from which the defendant (the promisor) or a stranger derives a benefit or advantage, or any labor, detri-ment, .or inconvenience sustained by the plaintiff, howéver small, if such act is performed or incon-venience suffered by the plaintiff by the consent, express or implied, of the defendant. 3 Scott, 250.
A benefit to the promisor, or a loss or detriment to the promisee. Harris v. Johnson, 75 Wash. 291, 134 P. 1048, 1050; Fowler v. Smith, 24 Ohio App. 324, 156 N.E. 913, 914. Or benefit to a third party. Wellshire Land Co. v. City and County of Denver, 103 Colo. 416, 87 P.2d 1. But nothing Is "consideration" that is not regarded as such by both par-ties. Michael v. Holland, 111 Ind.App. 34, 40 N.E.2d 362, 365.
Some right, interest, galn, advantage, benefit, or proflt to one party, usually the promisor, or some forbearance, detriment, prejudice, inconvenience, disadvantage, loss, or responsibility, act, or service given, suffered, or undertaken by the promisee. Exum v. Lynch, 125 S.E. 15, 17, 188 N.C. 392; Furman University v. Walter, 117 S.E. 356, 358, 124 S. C. 68, 33 A.L.R. 615; Robinson v. Oliver, 156 N.Y.S. 896, 898, 171 App.Div. 349; L.R. 10 Ex. 162; Train v. Gold, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 380; Bankers Trust Co. v. Economy Coal Co., 224 Iowa 36, 276 N.W. 16, 20.
Considerations are either executed or executory; express or implied; good or valuable. See defini-tions infra.

Adequate Consideration. See Adequate.

Concurrent Consideration. One which arises at the same time or where the promises are simul-taneous.
Continuing Consideration. One consistíng in acts or performances which must necessarily ex-tend over a considerable period of time.
Equitable or Moral Considerations. Considera-tions which are devoid of efficacy in point of strict law, but are founded upon a moral duty, and may be made the basis of an express promise.
Executed or Executory Considerations. The former are acts done or values given before or at the time of making the contract; the latter are promises to give or do something in future.
Express or Implied Considerations. The former are those which are specifically stated in a deed, contract, or other instrument; the latter are those inferred or supposed by the law from the acts or situation of the parties.
Express consideration is a consideration which Is dis-tinctly and specifically named in the written contract or la the oral agreement of the parties.
Failure of Consideration. See Failure of Consid-eration.
Fair and Valuable Consideration. See Fair and Valuable Consideration.
Fair Consideration. See Fair Consideration.
Good Consideration. Such as is founded on nat-ural duty and affection, or on a strong moral ob-ligation. Chit.Cont. 7. A consideration for love and affection entertained by and for one within degree recognized by law. Gay v. Fricks, 211 Ala. 119, 99 So. 846, 847. See, also, Berry v. Derry, 83 W.Va. 763, 99 S.E. 79.
Motives of natural duty, generosity, and prudence come under thls class. 2 Bla.Comm. 297; Doran v. McConlogue, 150 Pa. 98, 24 A. 357; Mascolo v. Montesanto, 61 Conn. 50, 23 A. 714, 29 Am.St.Rep. 170.
The term Is sometimes used in the sense of a considera-tion valid in point of law; and It then Includes a valuable or suffIcient as well as a meritorious consideration. Hodg-son v. Butts, 3 Cra. (U.S.) 140, 2 L.Ed. 391; Lang v. Johnson, 24 N.H. 302; Ambl. 598. Generally, however, good Is used In antithesls to valuable consideration (q. v.).
Gratuitous Consideration. One which is not founded upon any such loss, injury, or inconven-ience to the party to whom it moves as to make it valid in law.
¡ilegal Consideration. An act which if done, or a promise which if enforced, would be prejudicial to xhe public interest. Harriman, Cont. 101.
Implied Considerations. See Express or Implied Considerations, supra.
Impossible Consideration. One which cannot be performed.
Inadequate Consideration. See that title.
Legal Consideration. One recognized or permit-ted by the law as valid and lawful; as distin-guished from such as are niega! or immoral. The term is also sometimes used as equivalent to

"good" or "sufficient" consideration. See Samp-son v. Swift, 11 Vt. 315; Albert Lea College v. Brown, 88 Minn. 524, 93 N.W. 672, 60 L.R.A. 870.
Meritorious Consideration. See Good Considera-tion.
Moral Considerations. See Equitable or Moral Considerations, supra.
Nominal Consideration. One bearing no rela-tion to the real value of the contract or article, as where a parcel of land is described in a deed as being sold for "one dollar," no actual consideration passing, or the real consideration being concealed. This term is also sometimes used as descriptive of an inflated or exaggerated value placed upon prop-erty for the purpose of an exchange. Boyd v. Wat-son, 101 Iowa 214, 70 N.W. 123; Emmi v. Patane, 220 N.Y.S. 495, 498, 128 Misc. 901.
Past Consideration. An act done before the con-tract is made, which is ordinarily by itself no con-sideration for a promise. Anson, Cont. 82; Witt v. Wilson, Tex.Civ.App., 160 S.W. 309, 310.
As to time, considerations may be of the past, present, or future. Those whlch are present or future will support a contract not void for other reasons. Story, Contr. 71.
Pecuniary Consideration. A consideration for an act or forbearance which consists either in money presently passing or in money to be paid in the future, including a promise to pay a debt in full which otherwise would be released or dimin-ished by bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings. See Phelps v. Thomas, 6 Gray (Mass.) 328; In re Ekings, D.C.N.J., 6 F. 170.
Suificient Consideration. One deemed by the law of sufficient value to support an ordinary con-tract between parties, or one sufficient to support the particular transaction. Golson v. Dunlap, 73 Cal. 157, 14 P. 576.
Valuable Consideration. See Consideration.
Want of Consideration. See Want of Considera-tion.
CONSIDERATUM EST PER CURIAM. (It is con-sidered by the court.) The formal and ordinary commencement of a judgment. Baker v. State, 3 Ark. 491.
CONSIDERATUR. L. Lat. It is considered. Held to mean the same with consideratum est. 2 Strange, 874.
CONSIDERED. Deemed ; determined ; • adjudged ; reasonably regarded. State v. District Court. of Eighth Judicial Dist. in and for Cascade County, 64 Mont. 181, 208 P. 952, 955. See Consider.
Evidente may be said to have been "considered" when it has been reviewed by a court to determine whether any probative force should be given it. Taylor v. Gossett, Tex. Civ.App., 269 S.W. 230, 233.
CONSIGN. In the civil law. To deposit in the custody of a third person a thing belonging to the debtor, for the benefit of the creditor, under the authority of a court of justice. Poth.Obl. pt. 3, c. 1, art. 8.
In Commercial Law. To deliver goods to a car-rier to be transmitted to a designated factor or agent. Powell v. Wallace, 44 Kan. 656, 25 P. 42; Ide Mfg. Co. v. Sager Mfg. Co., 82 Ill.App. 685. To deliver or transfer as a charge or trust; to commit, intrust, give in trust; to transfer from oneself to the tare of another; to send or transmit goods to a merchant, factor, or agent for sale; to deposit with another to be sold, disposed of, or called for. Edwards v. Baldwin Piano Co., 79 Fla. 143, 83 So. 915, 918.
CONSIGNATION. In Scotch law. The payment of money into the hands of a third party, when the creditor refuses to accept of it. The person to whom the money is given is termed the "con-signatory." Bell.
In French law. A deposit which a debtor makes of the thing that he owes into the hands of a third person, and under the authority of a court of justice. 1 Poth.Obl. 536; Weld v. Hadley, 1 N. H. 304.
CONSIGNEE. In mercantile law. One to whom a consignment is made. The person to whom goods are shipped for sale. Lyon v. Alvord, 18 Conn. 80; Comm. v. Harris, 168 Pa. 619, 32 A. 92. One to whom goods are consigned, shipped, or otherwise transmitted. State v. Chadbourne, 132 Me. 5, 164 A. 630, 631. The one to whom the car-rier may lawfully make delivery in accordance with its contract of carriage. Great Northern Pac. S. S. Co. v. Rainier Brewing Co., C.C.A.Wash., 255 F. 762, 764; One to whom merchandise has been delivered. International Trust Co. v. Webster Nat. Bank, 258 Mass. 17, 154 N.E. 330, 332, 49 A. L.R. 267; Under a statute, the person who, under circumstances in which he might be entitled to the delivery of the goods, represents that he is so entitled, tenders a bond in the statutory form, and requests delivery. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. y. Bankers’ Surety Co., 115 Ark. 58, 172 S.W. 266, 268.
CONSIGNMENT. The act or process of consign-ing goods; the transportation of goods consigned; an article or collection of goods sent to a factor; goods or property sent, by the aid of a common carrier, from one person in one place to another person in another place; something consigned and shipped. See Consign. In re Taylor, D.C.Mich., 46 F.2d 326, 328.
Feature which distinguishes "conditional sale" from "consignment" is that in the former the purchaser under-takes an absolute obligation to pay for the goods, whereas the Iatter is nothing more than a bailment for sale. In re Sachs, D.C.Md., 31 F.2d 799, 800.
In stockyard parlance, all the livestock of one species de-livered in the name of one person to one market agency to be offered for sale during the trading hours of une day. Acker v. U. S., D.C.III., 12 F.Supp. 776, 780. Mutual Trans-fer Corporation of Galax v. Commonwealth, 172 Va. 622, 1 S.E.2d 477, 479.
CONSIGNOR. One who sends or makes a con-signment; a shipper of goods.
CONSILIA MULTORUM QU;ERUNT1UR IN MAG-NIS. 4 Inst. 1. The counsels of many are re-quired in great things.

CONSILIARIUS. In the civil law. A counsellor, as distinguished from a pleader or advocate. An assistant judge. One who participates in, the de-cisions. Du Cange.
CONSILIUM. A day appointed to hear the coun-sel of both parties. A case set down for argument.
It is commonly used for the day appointed for the argument of a demurrer, or errors assigned. 1 Tidd, Pr. 438; 2 Tidd, Pr. 684, 1122; 1 Sell.Pr. 336; 1 Archb.Pr. 191, 246.
CONSIMILI CASU. In practice. A writ of entry, framed under the provisions of the statute West-minster 2, (13 Edw. I.,) c. 24, which lay for the benefit of the reversiones, where a tenant by the curtesy aliened in fee or for Life. 3 Bla.Comm., 4th Dublín ed. 183 n.; Bac.Abr. Court of Chancery (A).
Many other new writs were framed under the provlslons of this statute; but this particular writ was known em-phatically by the title here defined. The wrlt is now practically obsoleto. See 3 Bla.Comm. 51.
CONSIST. To stand together, to be composed of or made up of. Hoskins Mfg. Co. v. General Elec-tric Co., D.C.Ill., 212 F. 422; In re Clark’s Estate, 100 Vt. 217, 136 A. 389, 393. See Consisting.
CONSISTENT. Having agreement with itself or something else; accordant; harmonious; con-gruous; compatible; compliable; not contradic-tory. Baldwin-Heckes Co. v. Kammerlohr, 123 Neb. 317, 242 N.W. 661, 663; Ryan v. Roach Drug Co., 113 Okl. 130, 239 P. 912, 914.
"Consistent with" means In harmony with. Shay y.
Roth, 64 Cal.App. 314, 221 P. 967, 969.
CONSISTING. Being composed or made up of. This word is not synonymous with "including;" for the latter, when used in connection with a num-ber of specified objects, always implies that there may be others which are not mentioned. In re Wright’s Estate, 166 Misc. 52, 2 N.Y.S.2d 25, 28.
CONSISTOR. A magistrate. Jacob L. D.
CONSISTORIUM. The state council of the Roman emperors. Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 58.
CONSISTORY. An assembly of cardinals con-voked by the pope.
A tribunal (prcetorium).
CONSISTORY COURTS. The courts of diocesan bishops held in their several cathedrals (before the bishop’s chancellor, or commissary, who is the judge) for the trial of all ecclesiastical causes aris-ing within their respective dioceses, and also for granting probates and administrations. Mozley & Whitley; 1 Holdsw.Hist.E.L. 369, citing L.R. 1902, 1 K.B. 816. From the sentence of these courts an appeal lies to the Provincial Court of the arch-bishop of each province respectively. 2 Steph. Comm. 230; 3 Steph.Comm. 430; 3 Bla.Comm. 64; 1 Woodd.Lect. 145; Halifax, An. b. 3, c. 10, n. 12.
CONSOBRINI. In the civil law. Cousins-german, in general; brothers’ and sisters’ children, con-sidered in their relation to each other.

CONSOCIATIO. Lat. An association, fellowshlp, or partnership. Applied by some of the older writers to a corporation, and even to a nation con-sidered as a body politic. Thomas v. Dakin, 22 Wend. (N.Y.) 104.
CONSOLATION. Comfort, contentment, ease, en-joyment, happiness, pleasure, satisfaction. Na-tional Surety Co. v. Jarrett, 95 W.Va. 420, 121 S.E. 291, 295.
CONSOLATO DEL MARE. The name of a code of sea-laws, said to have been compiled by order of the kings of Arragon (or, according to other authorities, at Pisa or Barcelona) in the fourteenth century, which comprised the maritime ordinances of the Roman emperors, of France and Spain, and of the Italian commercial powers. This compila-tion exercised a considerable influence in the f or-mation of European maritime law.
CONSOLIDATE. In a general sense, to unite into one mass or body, as to consolidate the forces of an army, or various funds. In parliamentary usage, to consolidate two bills is to unite them into one. In law, to consolidate benefices is to combine them into one. The term means some-thing more than to rearrange or redivide. Fair-view v. Durland, 45 Iowa 56.
To make solid or firm; to unite, compress, or pack together and form into a more compact mass, body, or system. Marfield v. Cincinnati, D. & T. Traction Co., 111 Ohio St. 139, 144 N.E. 689, 696, 40 A.L.R. 357. To cause to become united and ex-tinguished in a superior right or estate by both be-coming vested in the same person. Swaim v. Smith, 174 Tenn. 688, 130 S.W.2d 116, 120.
CONSOLIDATED FUND. In England. (Usually abbreviated to Consols.) A fund for the payment of the public debt.
CONSOLIDATED LAWS OR STATUTES. A col-lection or compilation into one statute or one code or volume of all the laws of the state in general, or of those relating to a particular subject; nearly the same as "compiled laws" or "compiled stat-utes." See Compilation. And see Ellis v. Parsell, 100 Mich. 170, 58 N.W. 839.
CONSOLIDATED ORDERS. The orders regulat-ing the practice of the English court of chancery, which were issued, in 1860, in substitution for the various orders which had previously been promul-gated from time to time.
CONSOLIDATION. Act of consolidating, or the status of being consolidated. O’Malley v. Wilson, 182 Ga. 97, 185 S.E. 109, 114.
In the civil law. The union of the usufruct with the estate out of which it issues, in the same person; which happens when the usufructuary ac-quires the estate, or vice versa. In either case the usufruct is extinct. Lec.El.Dr.Rom. 424.
In ecclesiastical law. The union of two or more benefices in one. Cowell.
In practice. The union of two or more actions, as in the same declaration, or for the purpose of trial or appellate review. See Consolídation of Actions.
In Scotch law. The junction of the property and superiority of an estate, where they have been disjoined. Bell.
Consolidation of actions. The act or process of uniting several actions into one trial and judg-ment, by order of a court, where all the actions are between the same parties, pending in the same court, and involving substantially the same sub-ject-matter, issues and defenses; or the court may order that one of the actions be tried, and the oth-ers decided without trial according to the judg-ment in the one selected. 249 N.Y.S. 33, 36, 139 Misc. 564; National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Chesa-peake and O. Ry. Co., D.C.Ky., 4 F.Supp. 25, 30.
it means the merging of two or more actions loto one so that they lose their separate Identity, whlle in trial of "several actions together" each retains its separate char-acter and requires the entry of a separate judgment. Ramswick v. Messerer, 200 Minn. 299, 274 N.W. 179; Reeves v. Philadelphia Gas Works Co., 107 Pa.Super. 422, 164 A. 132, 134, 107.
CONSOLIDATION OF BENEFICES. The act or process of uniting two or more of them into one.
CONSOLIDATIONS OF CORPORATIONS. Takes place when two or more corporations are extin-guished, and by the same process a new one is created, taking over the assets and assuming the ltabilities of those passing out of existence. A uni-fying of two or more corporations into a single new corporation having the combined capital, franchises, and powers of all its constituents. Alabama Power Co. v. McNinch, 68 App.D.C. 132, 94 F.2d 601, 611, 612. Freeman v. Hiznay, 349 Pa. 89, 36 A.2d 509; Murphy v. Niehus, 50 Ohio App. 299, 198 N.E. 197, 200.
Merger distinguished. In a "merger," one corporation absorbs the other and remains in existence while the other is dissolved, and in a "consolidation" a new corporation la created and the consolidating corporations are extin-guished. Von Welse v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A., 69 F.2d 439, 442; Alabama Power Co. v. McNinch, 94 F.2d 601, 610, 611, 612, 68 App.D.C. 132. See, also, Merger.
Consolidation rule. In practice. A rule or or-der of court requiring a plaintiff who has institut-ed separate suits upon several claims against the same defendant, to consolidate them in one action, where that can be done consistently with the rules of pleading. Brown v. Scott, 1 Dall. (Pa.) 147, 1 L.Ed. 74; Groff v. Musser, 3 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 264; 2 Archb.Pr. 180. The Federal courts are au-thorized to consolidate actions involving a com-mon question of law or fact. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 42, 28 U.S.C.A.
CONSOLS. An abbreviation of the expression "consolidated annuities," and used in modern times as a name of various funds united in one for the payment of the British national debt. Also, a name given to certain issues of bonds of the state of South Carolina. Whaley v. Gaillard, 21 S.C. 568. See Consolidated Fund.
CONSONANT STATEMENT. A prior declaration of a witness whose testimony has been attacked
and whose credibility stands impeached, which the court will allow to be proved by the person to whom the declaration was made in order to support the credibility of the witness and which but for the existence of such impeachment would ordinarily be excluded as hearsay. Common-wealth v. White, 16 A.2d 407, 409, 340 Pa. 139.
CONSORTIO MALORUM ME QUOQUE MALUM FACIT. Moore, 817. The company of wicked men makes me also wicked.
CONSORTIUM. Conjugal fellowship of husband and wife, and the right of each to the company, co-operation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation. McMillan v. Smith, 47 Ga.App. 646, 171 S.E. 169, 170; Shedrick v. Lath-rop, 106 Vt. 311, 172 A. 630, 632; Harris v. Kunkel, 227 Wis. 435, 278 N.W. 868, 869.
The term includes the exclusive right to the services of the spouse, and to his or her society, companionship, and conjugal affection. Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., 33 Ohio St. 101, 112 N.E. 204.
In its original application the term was not confined to society, companionship, and conjuga! affection, but in-dud-ed service as a prominent, if not the predominant, factor-not so much the service resulting in the performance of labor or the earning of wages as the service which con-tributed aid and assistance in ail the relations of domestic lite. Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307, 309, 37 A.L.R. 889.
In the civil law. A union of fortunes; a lawful Roman marriage. The joining of several persons as parties to one action.
In old English law, the term signified company or society, and in the language of pleading, as in the phrase per quod consortium amisit, it has sub-stantially the same meaning, viz., the companion-ship or society of a wife. 3 Bla.Comm. 140; Kel-ley v. Railroad Co., 168 Mass. 308, 46 N.E. 1063, 38 L.R.A. 631, 60 Am.St.Rep. 397.
CONSORTSHIP. In maritime law. An agree-ment or stipulation between the owners of dif-ferent vessels that they shall keep in company, mutually aid, instead of interfering with each oth-er, in wrecking and salvage, and share any money awarded as salvage, whether earned by one vessel or both. Andrews v. Wall, 3 How. 571, 11 L.Ed. 729.
CONSPICUOUS PLACE. Within the meaning of a statute relating to the posting of notices, a "con-spicuous place" means one which is reasonably cal-culated to impart the information in question. Didier v. Webster Mines Corporation, 49 Nev. 5, 234 P. 520, 523.
CONSPIRACY. In criminal law. A combination or confederacy between two or more persons formed for the purpose of committing, by their joint efforts, some unlawful or criminal act, or some act which is innocent in itself, but becomes unlawful when done by the concerted action of the conspirators, or for the purpose of using crim-inal or unlawful means to the commission of an act not in itself unlawful. Pettibone v. U. S., 148 U.S. 197, 13 S.Ct. 542, 37 L.Ed. 419; Mitchell v. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co., C.C.A.W.Va., 214 F. 685, 708; Hamilton v. Cooley, 184 N.E. 568, 571,

99 Ind.App. 1; Browning v. Browning, 226 Mo. App. 322, 41 S.W.2d 860, 868.
A combination, or an agreement between two or more persons, for accomplishing an unlawful end or a lawful end by unlawful means. 4 B. & Ad. 345; Cumberland Tele-phone & Telegraph Co. v. Stevens, D.C.Miss., 274 F. 745, 746; Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., C.C.A.Wis., 82 F.2d 68, 72; Morrison v. Goodspeed, 100 Colo. 470, 68 P.2d 458, 464.
A partnership in criminal purposes. Marino v. United States, C.C.A.Cal., 91 F.2d 691, 113 A.L.R. 975.
The essence of "conspiracy" 1s an agreement, together with an overt act, to do an unlawful act, or do a lawful act in an unlawful manner. Cooper v. O’Connor, 99 F.26 1:15, 142, 68 App.D.C. 100, 118 A.L.R. 1440. Mere knowl-edge, acquiescence, approval, or atternpt on part of one to perpetrate illegal net is insufficient. People v. Link, 365 El. 266, 6 N.E.2d 201.
A conspiracy may be a continuing one; actors maY drop out, and others drop in; the details of operation may chango from time to time; the members need nut know each other or the part played by others; a member need not know all the details of the plan or the operations; he must, however, know the purpose of the conspiracy and agree to becume a party to a plan to effectuate that pur-pose. Craig v. U. S.. C.C.A.Cal., 81 F.2d 816, 822.
A consultation or agreement between two or more persons, either falsely to ace.use another of a crime punishable by law; or wrongfully to injure or prejudice a third person, or any body of men, in any manner; or to commlt any offense punishable by law; or to do any act with intent to prevent the course of justice; or to effect a legal pur-pose with a corrupt íntent, or by improper means. Hawk. P.C. e. 72, § 2; Archb.Crim.Pl. 390, adding also combina-tions by journeymen to raise wages. State v. Murphy, 6 Ala. 765, 41 Am. Dec. 79.

Civil and Criminal Conspiracies

The term "civil" is used to designate a conspira-cy which will furnish ground for a civil action, as where, in carrying out the design of the con-spirators, overt acts are done causing legal dam-age, the person injured has a right of action. It is said that the gist of civil conspiracy is the in-jury or damage. While criminal conspiracy does not require such overt acts, yet, so far as the rights and remedies are concerned, all criminal conspiracies are embraced within the civil con-spiracies. Martha Milis v. Moseley, 50 Ga.App. 536, 179 S.E. 159.
Accurately speaking, there is no such thing as a civil ac-tion for conspiracy. The better view is that the damage sustained, and not the conspiracy is the gist of the action. The combination may be of no consequence except as bear-ing upon rules of evidente or the persons liable. Dahlquist v. Mattson, 40 Idaho, 378, 233 P. 883, 885.
The essence of a "civil conspiracy" is a concert or com-bination to defraud or cause other injury to person or prop-erty, which resulta in damage to the person or property- of plaintiff. Conner v. Bryce, Sup., 170 N.Y.S. 94, 95.
CONSPIRATIONE. An ancient writ that lay against conspirators. Reg.Orig. 134; Fitzh.Nat. Brev. 114.
CONSPIRATORS. Persons guilty of a conspira-cy. State v. Collins, 88 Mont. 514, 294 P. 957, 961, 73 A.L.R. 861.
Where two or more persons enter on a cotnmon enter-prise or adventure and criminal offense is contemplated each is a "conspirator". Kelly v. State, 31 Ala.App. 1.94, 13 So.2d 691, 692.
Those who bind themselves by oath, eovenant, or other alliance that each of them shall aid the other falsely and maliciously to indlct persons; or falsely to move and maintain pleas, etc. 33 Edw. I. St. 2. Besides these, thereare conspirators in treasonable purposes; as for plotting against the government. Wharton.
CONSPIRE. To engage in conspiracy. Wright v. United States, C.C.A.La., 48 C.C.A. 37, 108 F. 805, 809.
It candes with it the idea of agreement, concurrente and combination, and hence is inapplicable to a single person or thing, and one cannot agree or conspire with another who does not agree or conspire with him. Horton v. John-son, 192 Ca. 338, 15 S.E.2d 605, 615.
CONSTARLE. In American law. >An officer of a municipal corporation (usually elected) whose duties are similar te those of the sheriff, though his powers are less and his jurisdiction smaller. He is to preserve the public peace, execute the process of magistrates’ courts, and of some other tribunals, serve writs, attend the sessions of the criminal courts, have the custody of juries, and discharge other functions sometimes assigned to him by the local law or by statute. Allor v. Wayne County, 43 Mich. 76, 4 N.W. 492.
In English law. A public civil officer, whose proper and general duty is to keep the peace within his district, though he is frequently charg-ed with additional duties. 1 Bl.Cornm. 356. There are "high," "petty." and "special" consta-bles. See the definitions, infra.
In Medieval law. A high functionary under the French and English kings, the dignity and importance of whose office was second only to that of the monarch. He was in general the lead-er of the royal armies, and had cognizance of all matters pertaining to war and arms, exercising both civil and military jurisdiction. He was also charged with the conservation of the peace of the nation. Thus there was a "Constable of France" and a "Lord High Constable of England." Rich v. Industrial Commission, 80 Utah 511, 15 P.2d 641, 644.
Constable of a castle. In English law. An of-neer having chame of a castle; a warden, or keep-er; otherwise called a "castellain." Stat. Westm. 1, c. 7 (3 Edw. I.); Spelman, Gloss.
Constable of England. (Called, also, "Mar-shal.") His office consisted in the care of the common peace of the realm in deeds of arms and matters of war. Lamb. Const. 4; 3 Steph. Comm. 47; 4 Bla. Comm. 92.
Constable of Scotland. An officer who was for-merly entitled to command all the king’s armies in the absence of the king, and to take cognizance of all crimes committed within four miles of the king’s person or of parliament, the privy council, or any general convention of the states of the kingdom. The office was hereditary in the family of Errol, and was abolished by the 20 Geo. III, c. 43. Bell; Ersk. Inst. 1, 3, 37.
Constable of the exchequer. An officer men-tioned in Fleta, lib. 2, c. 31, and in 51 Hen. III, stat. 5, cited by Cowell.
High constables. In England, officers appointed in every hundred or franchise, whose proper duty seems to be to keep the king’s peace within their respective hundreds. 1 Bl.Comm. 356; 3 Steph. Comm. 47; Coke, 4th Inst. 267.
High constable of England, lord. His office has been disused (except only upen great and solemn occasions, as the coronation, or the like) since the attainder of Stafford, Duke of Buckingham, in the reign of Henry VII.
Petty constables. Inferior officers in every town and parish, subordinate to the high con-stable of the hundred, whose principal duty is the preservation of the peace, though they also have other particular duties assigned to them by act of parliament, particularly the service of the summonses and the execution of the warrants of justices of the peace. 1 Bl.Comm. 356; 3 Steph. Comm. 47, 48.
Special constables. Persons appointed (with or without their consent) by the magistrates to exe-cute warrants on particular occasions, as in the case of riots, etc.
C,ONSTABLEWICK. In English law. The terri-torial jurisdiction of a constable; as bailiwick is of a bailiff or sheriff. 5 Nev. & M. 261.
CONSTABULARIUS. An officer of horse; an of-ficer having charge of foot or horse; a naval commander; an officer having charge of military affairs generally. Spelman.
In England bis power was early diminished and restrict-ed to those duties which related to the preservation of the king’s peace. The office is now abolished in England, ex-cept as a matter of ceremony, and in France. Guyot, Rip.
Cowell.
CONSTANT. Fixed or invariable; uniform. Webster. Continually recurring, regular, steady. Pfisterer v. Key, 218 Ind. 521, 33 N.E.2d 330, 335.
CONSTANTLY. In a constant manner; uniform-ly; continuously. Pfisterer v. Key, 218 Ind. 521, 33 N.E.2d 330, 335.
An instruction that a traln crew knew that a rallroad right of way had been "constantly," frequently, and regu-larly used by a considerable number of persons at a par-ticular hour of the day was not subject to the criticism that the word "constantly" imported an uninterrupted and continuous presence oí such persons on the track, so that at no moment of time it would be vacant of pedestrians. Grauer v. Alabama Great Southern R. Co., 209 Ala. 568, 96 So. 915, 919.
CONSTAT. It is clear or evident; it appears; it is certain; there is no doubt. Non constat, it does not appear.
A certificate which the clerk of the pipe and auditors of the exchequer made, at the request of any person who intended to plead or move in that court, for the discharge of anything. The ef-fect of it was the certifying what appears (con-stat) upon record, touching the matter in ques-tion. Wharton.
A certificate by an officer that certain matters therein stated appear of record. Wilcox v. Ray, 2 N.C. 410.
An exemplification under the great seal of the enrolment of letters patent. Co. Litt. 225.
CONSTAT D’HUISSIER. In French law. An af-fidavit made by a huissier, setting forth the ap-pearance, form, quality, color, etc., of any article upon which a suit depends. Arg. Fr. Merc. Law, 554.
CONSTATE. To establish, constitute, or ordain.
"Constating instruments" of a corporation are its charter, organic law, or the grant of powers to it. See examples of the use of the term, Green’s Brice, Ultra Vires, p. 39; Ackerman v. Halsey, 37 N.J.Eq. 363.
CONSTITUENT. He who gives authority to an-other to act for him.
The term is used as a correlative to "attorney," to denote one who constitutes another his agent or invests the other with authority to act for him. Kunz v. Lowden, C.C.A.Kan., 124 F.2d 911, 913.
It is also used in the language of politics, as a correlative to "representative," the constituents of a legislator being those whom he represents and whose interests he is to care for in public affairs; usually the electors of his district.
CONSTITUERE. Lat. To appoint, constitute, es-tablish, ordain, or undertake. Used principally in ancient powers of attorney, and now supplanted by the English word "constitute."
CONSTITUIMUS. A Latin term, signifying we constitute or appoint.
CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES. Officers prop-erly appointed under the constitution for the gov-ernment of the people.
CONSTITUTIO. In the Civil law. An imperial ordinance, decree, or constitution, distinguished from Lex, Senatus-Consultum, and other kinds of law and having its effect from the sole will of the emperor. Dig. 1, 4, 1, Cooper’s notes. An establishment or settlement. Used of controver-sies settled by the parties without a trial. Calvin. A sum paid according to agreement. Du Cange.

In Old English Law

An ordinance or statute. A provision of a statute.
CONSTITUTIO DOTIS. Establishment of dower.
CONSTITUTION. The organic and fundamental law of a nation or state, which may be written or unwritten, establishing the character and concep-tion of its government, laying the basic principies to which its internal life is to be conformed, organ-izing the government, and regulating, distribut-ing, and limiting the functions of its different departments, and prescribing the extent and man-ner of the exercise of sovereign powers. A char-ter of government deriving its whole authority from the governed. Fairhope Single Tax Corpo-ration v. Melville, 193 Ala. 289, 69 So. 466, 470. See, also, Browne v. City of New York, 213 App. Div. 206, 211 N.Y.S. 306.
In a more general sense, any fundamental or important law or edict; as the Novel Constitutlons of Justlnian; the Constitutions of Clarendon.

CONSTITUTION. In American law. The writ-ten instrument agreed upon by the people of the Union or of a particular state, as the absolute rule of action and decision for all departments and oflicers of the government in respect to all the points covered by it, which must control until it shall be changed by the authority which estab-lished it, and in opposition to which any act or or-dinance of any such department or officer is null and void. Cooley, Const. Lim. 3.
CONSTITUTIONAL. Consistent with the con-stitution; authorized by the constitution; not con-flicting with any provision of the constitution or fundamental láw of the state. Dependent upon a constitution, or secured or regulated by a con-stitution; as "constitutional monarchy," "consti-tutional rights."
CONSTITUTIONAL ALCALDE. A person of official status under Mexican law corresponding in many respects in dignity and authority to a jus-tice of the peace under the American system of government. Tietzel v. Southwestern Const. Co., 48 N.M. 567, 154 P.2d 238, 242.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION. A duly con-stituted assembly of delegates or representatives of the people of a state or nation for the purpose of framing, revising, or amending its constitution. Bass v. Albright, Tex.Civ.App., 59 S.W.2d 891, 894.
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT. A court named or described and expressly protectal by Constitution, or recognized by name or definite description in Constitution but given no express protection there-by. Gorham v. Robinson, 57 R.I. 1, 186 A. 832.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (1) That branch of the public law of a state which treats of the or-ganization and frame of government, the organs and powers of sovereignty, the distribution of po-litical and governmental authorities and functions, the fundamental principies which are to regulate the relations of government and subject, and which prescribes generally the plan and method according to which the public affairs of the state are to be administered. (2) That department of the science of law which treats of constitutions, their establishment, construction, and interpreta-tion, and of the validity of legal enactments as tested by the criterion of conformity to the funda-mental law. (3) A constitutional law is one which is consonant to, and agrees with, the con-stitution; one which is not in violation of any provision of the constitution of the particular state.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY OR FREEDOM. Such freedom as is enjoyed by the citizens of a country or state under the protection of its consti-tution; the aggregate of those personal, civil, and political rights of the individual which are guar-anteed by the constitution and secured against in-vasion by the government or any of its agencies. People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 106, 9 Am.Rep. 103.
constitution, as distinguished from the incumbents of offices created by the legislature. Foster v. Jones, 79 Va. 642, 52 Am.Rep. 637.
CONSTITUTIONAL PSYCHOPATHIC INFERI-ORITY. Individuals who show a lifelong and con-stitutional tendency not to conform to the customs of the group, and who habitually misbehave, and have no sense of responsibility to their fellowmen or to society as a whole. These individuals fail to learn by experience and are inadequate, incom-patible, and inefficient. State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 205 Minn. 545, 287 N.W. 297, 300; Wilson v. Walters, Cal.App., 112 P.2d 964.
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT. A right guaranteed to the citizens by the Constitution and so guaran-teed as to prevent legislative interference there-with. Delaney v. Plunkett, 146 Ga. 547, 91 S.E. 561, 567, L.R.A.1917D, 926, Ann.Cas.1917E, 685.
CONSTITUTIONES. Laws promulgated, i. e., en-acted, by the Roman Emperor. They were of various kinds, namely, the following: (1) Edicta; (2) decreta; (3) rescripta, called also "epistolce." Sometimes they were general, and intended to form a precedent for other like cases; at other times they were special, particular, or individual, (personales,) and not intended to form a prece-dent. The emperor had this power of irresponsi. ble enactment by virtue of a certain lex regia, whereby he was made the fountain of justice and of merey. Brown.
CONSTITUTIONES TEMPORE POSTERIORES POTIORES SUNT HIS QUJE IPSAS PRIECES-SERUNT. Dig. 1, 4, 4. Later laws prevail over those which preceded them.
CONSTITUTIONS OF CLARENDON. See Ciar-endon.
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE FOREST. See Char-ta de Foresta.
CONSTITUTOR. In the civil law. One who, by a simple agreement, becomes responsible for the payment of another’s debt. Inst. 4, 6, 9.
CONSTITUTUM. In the civil law. An agree-ment to pay a subsisting debt which exists with-out any stipulation, whether of the promisor or another party. It differs from a stipulation in that it must be for an exlsting debt. Du Cange.
A day appointed for any purpose. A form of appeal. Calvinus, Lex.
CONSTITUTUM ESSE EAM DOMUM
QUE NOSTRUM DEBERE EXISTIMARI, UBI QUISQUE SEDES ET TABULAS HABERET, SUARUMQUE RERUM CONSTITUTIONEM FE-CISSET. It is settled that that is to be considered the home of each one of us where he may have his habitation and account-books, and where he CONSTITUTIONAL OFFICER. One whose ten- may have made an establishment of bis business. ure and terco of office are fixed and defined by the I Dig. 50, 16, 203.
Black’s Law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed.-25

CONSTRAINT. This term is held to be exactly equivalent with "restraint." Edmondson v. Har-ris, 2 Tenn.Ch. 427.
An abridgement of liberty or hindrance of the will, identical in meaning with the word "com-pulsion." Edmondson v. Harris, 2 Tenn.Ch. 427.
In Scotch law. Duress.
CONSTRUCT. To build; erect; put together; make ready for use. State v. Abele, 119 Ohio St. 210, 162 N.E. 807, 809. To adjust and join mate-rials, or parts of, so as to form a permanent whole. Kinney v. Ehrensperger, 16 Ala.App. 289, 77 So. 439, 440. To put together constituent parts of something in their proper place and order. State ex rel. St. Louis County y. State Highway Com-mission, 315 Mo. 707, 286 S.W. 1, 2.
"Construct" is distinguishable from "maintain," which means to keep up, to keep from change, to preserve. State v. Olympia Light & Power Co., 91 Wash. 519, 158 P, 85, 89. Under a broad lnterpretation, however, "construct" may he synonymous with maintain, repair, or improve. Independ-ent Highway Dist. No. 2 of Ada County v. Ada County, 24 Idaho 416, 134 P. 542, 545.
CONSTRUCTIO LEGIS NON FACIT INJURIAM. The construction of the law (a construction made by the law) works no injury. Co. Litt. 183; Broom, Max. 603. The law will make such a con-struction of an instrument as not to injure a par-ty.
CONSTRUCTION. The process, or the art, of determining the sense, real meaning, or proper explanation of obscure or ambiguous terms or provisions in a statute, written instrument, or oral agreement, or the application of such subject to the case in question, by reasoning in the light de-rived from extraneous connected circumstances or laws or writings bearing upon the same or a connected matter, or by seeking and applying the probable aim and purpose of the provision. Koy v. Schneider, 110 Tex. 369, 221 S.W. 880, 884.
As applied to statutes, constitutions, contracts, etc., the term necessarily presupposes doubt, obscurity, or ambigui-ty. Cohn-Hall-Marx Co. v. Vanosdall, 25 Ohio App. 360, 157 N.E. 908, 909.
Drawing conclusions respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct expression of the term. Lie-ber, Leg. & Pol. Herm. 20; Roberts, v. Portland Water Dist., 124 Me. 63, 126 A. 162, 163.
This term is properly distinguished from interpretation, although the two are often used synonymously. In strict-ness, lnterpretation is limited to exploring the written text, while construction goes beyond and may call in the aid of extrinsic considerations, as aboye indicated.
The process of bringing together and correlat-ing a number of independent entities, so as to form a definite entity. The Dredge A, D.C.N.C., 217 F. 617, 631.
The creation of something new, as distinguished from the repair or improvement of something al-ready existing. Cabell v. City of Portland, 153 Or. 528, 57 P.2d 1292, 1297. The act of fitting an object for use or occupation in the usual way, and for some distinct purpose. Paterson N. & R. R. Co. v, City of Paterson, 81 N.J.Eq. 124, 86 A. 68, 69. See Construct

Construction, court of. A court of equity or of common law, as the case may be, is called the court of construction with regard to wills, as op-posed to the court of probate, whose duty is to de-cide whether an instrument be a will at afi. Now, the court of probate may decide that a given in-strument is a will, and yet the court of construc-tion may decide that it has no operation, by rea-son of perpetuities, illegality, uncertainty, etc. Wharton.
Equitable construction. A construction of a law, rule, or remedy which has regard more to the equities of the particular transaction or state of affairs involved than to the strict application of the rule or remedy; that is, a liberal and ex-tensive construction, as opposed to a literal and restrictive. Smiley v. Sampson, 1 Neb. 91.
By "equity of a statute" is intended the rule of construc-tion which admits within the operation of a statute a class of cases which are neither named nor excluded, but which, from their analogy to those that are named, are clearly and justly within the spirit and general meaning of the law; such cases are said to be "within the equity of the statute."
The modern doctrine is that to construe a statute liberal-ly or according to its equity is nothing more than to give effect to it according to the intention of the lawmaker as indicated by its terms and purposes. Read v. Dingess, C. C.A.W.Va., 60 F. 21, 29, 8 C.C.A. 389.
Strict and liberal construction. Strict (or liter-al) construction is construction of a statute .or other instrument according to its letter, which recognizes nothing that is not expressed, takes the language used in its exact and technical mean-ing, and admits no equitable considerations or implications. Warner v. King, 267 Ill. 82, 107 N.E. 837, 839.
Liberal (or equitable) construction, on the other hand, expands the meaning of the statute to meet cases which are clearly within the spirit or rea-son of the law, or within the ovil which it was de-signed to remedy, provided such an interpreta-tion is not inconsistent with the language used; it resolves all reasonable doubts in favor of the applicability of the statute to the particular case. Black, Interp.Laws, 282; Causey v. Guilford Coun-ty, 192 N.C. 298, 135 S.E. 40, 46. It means, not that the words should be forced out of their na-tural meaning, but simply that they should re-ceive a fair and reasonable interpretation with re-spect to the objects and purposes of the instru-ment. Lawrence v. McCalmont, 2 How. 426, 11 L.Ed. 326.
CONSTRUCTIVE. That which is established by the mind of the law in its act of construing facts, conduct, circumstances, or instruments; that which has not the character assigned to it in its own essential nature, but acquires such charac-ter in consequence of the way in which it is re-garded by a rule or policy of law; hence, infer-red, implied, made out by legal interpretation;-the word "legal" being sometimes used in lieu of "constructive." Middleton v. Parke, 3 App.D. C. 160.
As to constructive "Bailment," "Breaking," "Contempt," "Contracts," "Conversion," "Delivery," "Escape," "Fraud," "Larceny," "Malice," "Notice," "Possession," "Seisin," "Service of Pro-cess," "Total Loss," "Treason," and "Trusts," see those titles.
CONSTRUCTIVE ASSENT. An assent or con-sent imputed to a party from a construction or interpretation of his conduct; as distinguished from one which he actually expresses.
CONSTRUCTIVE AUTHORITY. Authority in-ferred or assumed to have been given because of the grant of some other antecedent authority. Middleton v. Parke, 3 App.D.C. 160.
CONSTRUCTIVE BREAKING INTO A HOUSE. A breaking made out by construction of law. As where a burglar gains an entry into a house by threats, fraud, or conspiracy. 2 Russ. Crimes, 9, 10; Hawkins v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 33, 143 S.W.2d 853, 854.
CONSTRUCTIVE CRIME. Where, by a strained construction of a penal statute, it is made to in-elude an act not otherwise punishable, it is said to be a "constructive crime," that is, one built up by the court with the aid of inference and implica-tion. Ex parte McNulty, 77 Cal. 164, 19 P. 237, 11 Am.St.Rep. 257.
CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION. As the term is used with réference to breach of the covenants of warranty and of quiet enjoyment, it means the in-ability of the purchaser to obtain possession by reason of a paramount outstanding title. Fritz v. Pusey, 31 Minn. 368, 18 N.W. 94.
With reference to the relation of landlord and tenant, there is a "constructive eviction" when the former, with-out intent to oust the ]atter, does some act which deprives the tenant of the beneficia’ enjoyment of the demised prem-ises or materially lmpairs such enjoyment. Santrizos v. Public Drug Co., 143 Minn. 222, 173 N.W. 563, 564. Any disturbance of the tenant’s possession by the landlord whereby the premises are rendered unfit or unsuitable for occupancy in whole or in substantial part for the purposes for which they were leased amounts to a constructivo evic-tion, if the tenant so elects and surrenders his possession. Murry v. Merchants’ Southwest Transfer & Storage Co., 98 Okl. 270, 225 P. 547, 549. There must be injurious inter-ference with tenant’s possession, substantial deprivation of tenant’s beneficial use of premises, and material impair-ment of tenant’s beneficial enjoyment of premises, so that he is compelled to vacate. Ben Hur Holding Corporation v. Fox, 263 N.Y.S. 695, 147 Misc. 300.
CONSTRUCTIVE FORCE. This has been said to be an acquiescence to an act obtained through duress or fear of personal violente. Shepherd v. State, 135 Ala. 9, 12, 33 So. 266.
With regard to rape, the force necessary to con-stitute the offense need not be actual, but may be constructive or implied. 52 C.J. p. 1018.
As regards robbery, a taking by force is the gist of the crime, but the force may be either ac-tual or constructive. 54 C.J. p. 1016. " `Construc-tive force’ is anything which produces fear suf-ficient to suspend the power of resistance and pre-vent the free exercise of the will." Montsdoca v. State, 84 Fla. 82, 93 So. 157, 159, 27 A.L.R. 1291. "Actual force is applied to the body, constructive is by threatening words or gestures and operates
on the mind." Tones v. State, 48 Tex.Cr. 363, 88 S.W. 217, 122 Am.St.Rep. 759, 1 L.R.A.,N.S., 1024.
CONSTRUCTIVE LOSS. One resulting from such injuries to the property, without its destruc-tion, as render it valueless to the assured or pre-vent its restoration to the original condition except at a cost exceeding its value.
CONSTRUCTIVE MORTGAGE. A deed absolute on its face but intended as a mortgage is some-times referred to as a "constructive mortgage," or, more commonly perhaps, as an "equitable mortgage." See Mortgage.
CONSTRUCTIVE TAKING. A phrase used in the law to characterize an act not amounting to an actual appropriation of chattels, but which shows an intention to convert them to his use; as if a person intrusted with the possession of goods deals with them contrary to the orders of the owner.
CONSTRUCTIVE VACANCY IN PUBLIC OF- FICE. When the incumbent has no legal right or claim to continue in office, but can be legally re-placed by another functionary. State ex rel. Sat-terthwaite v. Stover, 5 W.W.Harr. 85, 159 A. 239, 241.
CONSTRUCTIVE WILLFULNESS. Intentional disregard of a known duty necessary to the safety of a person, and an entire absence of tare for the life, the person, or the property of others, such as exhibits a conscious indifference to consequenc-es. Collins v. Missouri-Illinois R. Co., 233 III. App. 545, 551; Hughes v. Medendorp, 294 Ill.App. 424, 13 N.E.2d 1015, 1018.
CONSTRUE. To put together; to arrange or marshal the words of an instrument. To ascer-tain the meaning of language by a process of ar-rangement and inference. See Construction.
CONSTUPRATE. To ravish, debauch, violate, rape. See Harper v. Delp, 3 Ind. 230; Koenig v. Nott, 2 Hilt. (N.Y.) 329.
CONS’UETUDINARIUS. In ecelesiastical law. A ritual or book, containing the rites and forms of divine offices or the customs of abbeys and monas-teries.
CONSUETUDINARY LAW. Customary law. Law derived by oral tradition from a remote an-tiquity. Bell.
CONSUETUDINES. In old English law. Cus-toms. Thus, consuetudines et assisa forestce, the customs and assise of the forest.
CONSUETUDINES FEUDORUM. (Lat. feudal customs.) A compilation of the law of feuds or fiefs in Lombardy, made A.D. 1170. It is of great authority. •
CONSUETUDINIBUS ET SERVICIIS. In old English law. A writ of right close, which lay against a tenant who deforced his lord of the rent or service due to him. Reg. Orig. 159; Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 151.

CONSUETUDO. Lat. A custom; .an established usage or practice. Co. Litt. 58, 58b; Tolls; du-ties; taxes.
CONSUETUDO ANGLICANA. The custom of England; the ancient common law, as distinguish-ed from lex, the Roman or civil law.
CONSUETUDO CONTRA RATIONEM INTRO-DUCTA POTIUS USURPATIO QUAM CONSUE-TUDO APPELLARI DEBET. A custom introduc-ed against reason ought rather to be called a "usurpation" than a "custom." Co.Litt. 113.
CONSUETUDO CURIFE. The custom or practice of a court. Hardr. 141.
CONSUETUDO DEBET ESSE CERTA; NAM INCERTA PRO NULLÁ HABETUR. Dav. 33. A custom should be certain; for an uncertain cus-tom is considered null.
CONSUETUDO EST ALTERA LEX. Custom is another law. 4 Coke, 21.
CONSUETUDO EST OPTIMUS INTERPRES LE-GUM. 2 Inst. 18. Custom is the best expounder of the laws.
CONSUETUDO ET COMMUNIS ASSUETUDO VINCIT LEGEM NON SCRIPTAM, SI SIT SPE-CIALIS; ET INTERPRETATUR LEGEM SCRIP-TAM, SI LEX SIT GENERALIS. Jenk. Cent. 273. Custom and common usage overcomes the un-written law, if it be special; and interprets the written law, if the law be general.
CONSUETUDO EX CERTA CAUSA RATIONA-BILI USITATA PRIVAT COMMUNEM LEGEM. A custom, grounded on a certain and reasonable cause, supersedes the common law. Litt. § 169; Co. Litt. 113; Broom, Max. 919.
CONSUETUDO, LICET SIT MAGNZE AUCTORI-TATIS, NUNQUAM TAMEN, PRZEJUDICAT MANEFEST1E VERITATI. A custom, though it be of great authority, should never prejudice man-ifest truth. 4 Coke, 18.
CONSUETUDO LOCI OBSERVANDA EST. Litt. 169. The custom of a place is to be observed.
CONSUETUDO MANERII ET LOCI OBSERVAN-DA EST. 6 Coke, 67. A custom of a manor and place is to be observed.
CONSUETUDO MERCATORUM. Lat. The cus-tom of merchants, the same with lex mercatoria.
CONSUETUDO NEQUE INJURIA ORIRI NE-QUE TOLLI POTEST. Lofft, 340. Custom can neither arise from nor be taken away by injury.
CONSUETUDO NON TRAHITUR IN CONSE-QUENTIAM. 3 Keb. 499. Custom is not drawn into consequence. 4 Jur. (N.S.) Ex. 139.
CONSUETUDO PRIESCRIPTA ET LEGITIMA VINCIT LEGEM. A prescriptive and lawful cus-tom overcomes the law. Co. Litt. 113; 4 Coke, 21

CONSUETUDO REGNI ANGLIFE EST LEX AN-GEL/E. Jenk. Cent. 119. The custom of the king-dom of England is the law of England. See 2 Bl. Comm. 422.
CONSUETUDO SEMEL REPROBATA NON PO-TEST AMPLIUS INDUCI. A custom once disal-lowed cannot be again brought forward, [or re-lied on]. Dav. 33.
CONSUETUDO TOLLIT COMMUNEM LEGEM. Co. Litt. 33b. Custom takes away the common law.
CONSUETUDO VINCIT COMMUNEM LEGEM. Custom overrules common law. 1 Rop. H. & W. 351; Co. Litt. 33b.
CONSUETUDO VOLENTES DUCIT, LEX NO-LENTES TRAIIIT. Custom leads the willing, law compels [drags] the unwilling. Jenk. Cent. 274.
CONSUL.

International Law

An officer of a commercial character, appointed by the different states to watch over the mer-cantile interests of the appointing state and of its subjects in foreign countries. There are usually a number of consuls in every mari-time country, and they are usually subject to a chief consul, who is called a "consul general." Schunior v. Russell, 18 S.W. 484, 83 Tex. 83.

Old English Law

An ancient title of an earl.

Roman Law

During the republic, the name "consul" was given to the chief executive magistrate, two of whom were chosen annually. The office was con-tinued under the empire, but its powers and pre-rogatives were greatly reduced. The name is sup-posed to have been derived from consulo, to con-sult, because these officers consulted with the senate on administrative measures.
The word "consul" has two meanings: (1) It denotes an officer of a particular grade in the consular service; (2) it has a broader generic sense, embracing all consular offl-cers. Dainese v. U. S., 15 Ct.Cl. 64.
See, also, Foreign Service Act of 1946, 22 U.S.C.A. § 801 et seq.
CONSULAR COURTS. Courts held by the con-suls of one country, within the territory of an-other, under authority given by treaty, for the settlement of civil cases. In some instances they have also a criminal jurisdiction, but in this re-spect are subject to review by the courts of the home government. See Rev.St. U.S. § 4083 (22 U.S.C.A. § 141.)
CONSULTA ECCLESIA. In ecclesiastical law. A church full or provided for. Cowell.
CONSULTARY RESPONSE. The opinion of a court of law on a special case CONSULTATION. A writ whereby- a cause which has been wrongfully removed by prohibi-tion out of an ecclesiastical court to a temporal court is returned to the ecclesiastical court. Phillim. Ecc. Law, 1439. Deliberation of persons on some subject. State v. District Court of Third Judicial Dist. in and for Powell County, 85 Mont. 215, 278 P. 122, 125.
A conference between the counsel engaged in a case, to discuss its questions or arrange the method of conducting it.
In French law. The opinion of counsel upon a point of law submittted to them.
CONSULTO. Lat. In the civil law. Designed-ly; intentionally. Dig. 28, 41.
CONSU1IER. One who uses economic goods and so diminishes or destroys their utilities; opposed to producer. Ex parte Mehlman, 127 Tex.Cr.R. 257, 75 S.W.2d 689, 690.
CONSUMMATE, adj. Completed; as distinguish-ed from initiate, or that which is merely begun. The husband of a woman seised of an estate of inheritance becomes, by the birth of a child, ten-ant by the curtesy initiate, and may do many acts to charge the lands, but his estate is not consummate till the death of the wife. 2 Bl. Comm. 126, 128; Co. Litt. 30a.
CONSUMMATE. v. To finish by completing what was intended; bring or carry to utmost point or degree; carry or bring to completion; finish; perfect; fulfill; achieve. American Mer-cantile Corporation v. Spielberg, C.C.A.N.Y., 262 F. 492, 496; Purcell v. Firth, 175 Cal. 746, 167 P. 379, 380; Oregon Home Builders v. Montgomery Inv. Co., 94 Or. 349, 184 P. 487, 492; Dahlinger v. Com-missioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A., 51 F.2d 662, 663.
CONSUMMATE LIEN. A term which may be us-ed to describe the lien of a judgment when a mo-tion for a new trial has been denied (the lien hav-ing theretofore been merely inchoate). Sterling v. Parker-Washington Co., 185 Mo.App. 192, 170 S.W. 1156, 1159.
CONSUMMATION. The completion of a thing; the completion of a marriage between two affianc-ed persons by cohabitation. Sharon v. Sharon, 79 Cal. 633, 22 P. 26.
CONSUMPTION. Act or process of consuming; waste; decay; destruction; and using up of any-thing, as food, heat, or time. Moore v. Pleasant Hasler Const. Co., 50 Ariz. 370, 72 P.2d 573, 578. Destruction by use. Revzan v. Nudelman, 370 III. 180, 18 N.E.2d 219, 222.
CONTAGIOUS ABORTION. A disease of cows generally contracted through the digestive tract from infected food which causes premature birth of calves. Gesme v. Potter, 118 Or. 621, 247 P. ,765, 766.
CONTAGIOUS DISEASE. One capable of being transmitted by mediate or immediate contact. Ex parte Liang Buck Chew, D.C.Mass., 296 F. 183. See Infection.
CONTANGO. A double bargain, consisting of a sale for cash of stock previously bought which the broker does not wish to carry, and a repur-chase for the re-settlement two weeks ahead of the same stock at the same price as at the sale plus interest accrued up to the date of that settle-ment. The rate of interest is called a "contango" and contango days are the two days during the settlement when these arrangements are in effect.
CONTEK. L. Fr. A contest, dispute, disturbance, opposition, Britt. c. 42; Kelham. Conteckours; brawlers; disturbers of the peace. Britt. c. 29.
CONTEMNER. One who has committed con-tempt of court. Wyatt v. People, 17 Colo. 252, 28 P. 961.
CONTEMPLATE. To view or consider with con-tinued attention; to regard thoughtfully; to have in view as contingent or probable as an end or in-tention. Wright v. Fuel Oil Co., Mo., 342 Mo. 173, 114 S.W.2d 959, 962. To ponder, to study, to plan, to meditate, to refiect. In re Thompson’s Es-tate, 72 Utah, 17, 269 P. 103, 115.
CONTEMPLATION. The act of the mind in con-sidering with attention. Continued attention of the mind to a particular subject. Consideration of an act or series of acts with the intention of doing or adopting them. The consideration of an event or state of facts with the expectation that it will transpire.
CONTEMPLATION OF BANKRUPTCY. Con-templation of the breaking up of one’s business or an inability to continue it; knowledge of, and action with reference to, a condition of bankruptcy or ascertained insolvency, coupled with an inten-tion to commit what the law declares to be an "act of bankruptcy," or to make provision against the consequences of insolvency, or to defeat the general distribution of assets which would take place under a proceeding in bankruptcy. Buck-ingham v. McLean, 13 How. 167, 14 L.Ed. 90; In re Carmichael, D.C.Iowa, 96 F. 594.
CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH. The apprehen-sion or expectalion of approaching dissolution; not that general expectation which every mortal entertains, but the apprehension which arises from some presently existing sickness or physical condition or from some impending danger. As applied to transfers of property, the phrase "in contemplation of death" means that thought of death is the impelling cause of transfer and that motive which induces transfer is of sort which leads to testamentary disposition and is practi-cally equivalent to "causa mortis." In re Cornell’s Estate, 73 N.Y.S. 32, 66 App.Div. 162; Nicholas v. Martin, 128 N.J.Eq. 344, 15 A.2d 235, 243; Pate v. C. I. R., C.C.A.8, 149 F.2d 669, 670.
CONTEMPLATION OF INSOLVENCY. Knowl-edge of, and action with reference to, an exist-ing or contemplated state of insolvency, with a design to make provision against its results or to defeat the operation of the insolvency laws. Flockhart Foundry Co. v. Cox Automatic Pipe Bending Co., 95 N.J.Eq. 382, 123 A. 151, 152.
CONTEMPORANEA EXPOSITIO. Lat. Contem-poraneous exposition, or construction; a con-struction drawn from the time when, and the cir-cumstances under which, the subject-matter to be construed, as a statute or custom, originated.
CONTEMPORANEA EXPOSITIO EST OPTIMA ET FORTISSIMA IN LEGE. Contemporaneous exposition is the best and strongest in the law. 2 Inst. 11. A statute is best explained by follow-ing the construction put upon it by judges who lived at the time it was made, or soon after. 10 Coke, 70; Broom, Max. 682.
CONTEMPT. A willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority.
CONTEMPT OF COURT. Any act which is cal-culated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct court in administration of justice, or which is calculated to lessen its authority or its dignity. Ex parte Hobrook, 133 Me. 276, 177 A. 418, 420. Commit-ted by a person who does any act in willful con-travention of its authority or dignity, or tending to impede or frustrate the administration of jus-tice, or by one who, being under the court’s au-thority as a party to a proceeding therein, will-fully disobeys its lawful orders or fails to com-ply with an undertaking which he has given. Snow v. Hawkes, 183 N.C. 365, 111 S.E. 621, 622, 23 A.L.R. 183

Classifieation

Contempts are of two kinds, direct and con-structive.
Direct contempts are those committed in the immediate view and presence of the court (such as insulting language or acts of violence) or so near the presence of the court as to obstruct or interrupt the due and orderly course of proceed-ings. These are punishable summarily. They are also called "criminal" contempts, but that terco is better used in contrast with "civil" con-tempts. See infra. State v. McClaugherty, 33 W.Va. 250, 10 S.E. 407. Pelletier v. Glacier County, Mont., 107 Mont. 221, 82 P.2d 595, 597.
Constructive (or indirect) contempts are those which arise from matters not occurring in or near the presence of the court, but which tend to ob-struct or defeat the administration of justice, and the terco is chiefiy used with reference to the failure or refusal of a party to obey a lawful or-der, injunction, or decree of the court laying upon him a duty of action or forbearance. Maryott v. Maryott, 124 Neb. 274, 246 N.W. 343.
Constructive contempts were formerly called -consequen-tial,- and this terco is still in occasional use.
Coritempts are also classed as civil or criminal. The former are those quasi contempts which consists in the failure to do something which the party is ordered by the court to do for the bene-fit or advantage of another party to the proceed-ing before the court, while criminal contempts are acts done in disrespect of the court or its process or which obstruct the administration of justice or tend to being the court into disrespect. A civil contempt is not an offense against the dig-nity of the court, but against the party in whose behalf the mandate of the court was issued, and a fine is imposed for his indemnity. But criminal contempts are offenses or injuries offered to the court, and a fine or imprisonment is imposed upon the contemnor for the purpose of punishment. Staley v. South Jersey Realty Co., 90 A. 1042, 1043, 83 N.J.Eq. 300, L.R.A.1917B, 113, Ann.Cas.1916E, 955; Fenton v. Walling, C.C.A.Cal., 139 F.2d 608, 609.
CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS, LEGISLATURE, or PARLIAMENT. Whatever obstructs or tends to obstruct the due course of proceeding of either house, or grossly reflects on the character of a member of either house, or imputes to him what it would be a libel to impute to an ordinary per-son, is a contempt of the house, and thereby a breach of privilege. Sweet.
CONTEMPTIBILITER. Lat. Contemptuously.
In old English law. Contempt, contempts. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 60, § 35.
CONTENEMENTUM. See Wainagium; Content-ment.
CONTENTIOUS. Contested; adversary; litigat-ed between adverse or contending parties; a ju-dicial proceeding not merely ex parte in its char-acter, but comprising attack’ and defense as be-, tween opposing parties, is so called. The litigious proceedings in ecclesiastical courts are sometimes said to belong to its "contentious" jurisdiction, in contradistinction to what is called its "voluntary" jurisdiction, which is exercised in the granting of licenses, probates of wills, dispensations, facul-tes, etc.
CONTENTIOUS JURISDICTION. In English ec-clesiastical law. That branch of the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts which is exercised upon adversary or contentious (opposed, litigated) pro-ceedings.
CONTENTIOUS POSSESSION. In stating the rule that the possession of land necessary to give rise to a title by prescription must be a "conten-tious" one, it is meant that it must be based on opposition to the title of the rival claimant (not in recognition thereof or subordination thereto) and that the opposition must be based on good grounds, or such as might be made the subject of litigation. Railroad Co. v. McFarlan, 43 N.J. L. 621.
CONTENTMENT, CONTENEMENT. A man’s countenance or credit, which he has together with, and by reason of, his freehold; or that which is necessary for the support and maintenance of men, agreeably to their several qualities or states of life. Wharton; Cowell.
Comfort; consolation; ease; enjoyment; hap-piness; pleasure; satisfaction. National Surety Co. v. Jarrett, 95 W.Va. 420, 121 S.E. 291, 295.

CONTENTS. The contents of a promissory note or other commercial instrument or chose in ac-tion means the specific sum naméd therein and payable by the terms of the instrument. Trading Co. v. Morrison, 20 S.Ct. 869, 178 U.S. 262, 44 L. Ed. 1061.
CONTENTS AND NOT CONTENTS. In parlia-mentary law. The "contents" are those who, in the house of lords, express assent to a bill; the "not" or "non contents" dissent. May, Parl. Law, cc. 12, 357.
CONTENTS UNKNOWN. Words sometimes an-nexed to a bill of lading of goods in cases. Their meaning is that the master only means to ac-knowledge the shipment, in gond order, of the cas-es, as to their external condition. Miller v. Rail-road Co., 90 N.Y. 433, 43 Am.Rep. 179.
CONTERMINOUS. Adjacent; adjoining; having a Common boundary; coterminous.
CONTEST, v. To make defense to an adverse claim in a court of law; to oppose, resist, or dis-pute the case made by a plaintiff. Pratt v. Breck-inridge, 112 Ky. 1, 65 S.W. 136; Parks v. State, 100 Ala. 634, 13 So. 756. To strive, to win or hold; to controvert, litigate, call in question, challenge; to defend, as a suit or other proceeding. Equita-ble Life Assur. Soc. of the United States v. First Nat. Bank of Birmingham, C.C.A.Ala., 113 F.2d 272, 274.
CONTESTATIO LITIS. In Roman law. Con-testation of suit; the framing an issue; joinder in issue. The formal act of both the parties with which the proceedings in jure were closed when they led to a judicial investigation, and by which the neighbors whom the parties brought with them were calied to testify. Mackeld, Rom.Law, § 219.
In old English law. Coming to an issue; the issue so produced. Crabb, Eng.Law, 216.
CONTESTATIO LITIS EGET TERMINOS CON-TRADICTARIOS. An issue requires terms of contradiction. Jenk. Cent. 117. To constitute an issue, there must be an affirmative on one side and a negative on the other.
CONTESTATION OF SUIT. In an ecclesiastical cause, that stage of the suit which is reached when the defendant has answered the libel by giving in an allegation.
CONTESTED ELECTION. This phrase has no technical or legally defined meaning. An election may be said to be contested whenever an objection is formally urged against it which, if found to be true in fact, would invalidate it. This is true both as to objections founded upon some constitutional provision and to such as are based on statutes. Robertson v. State, 109 Ind. 116, 10 N.E. 600.
CONTEXT. The context of a particular sentence or clause in a statute, contract, will, etc., com-prises those parts of the text which immediately precede and follow it. The context may some-
times be scrutinized, to aid in the interpretation of an obscure passage.
CONTIGUOUS. In close proximity; near, though not in contact; neighboring; adjoining; near in succession; in actual close contact; touching; bounded or traversed by. The term is not synony-mous with "vicinal." Ehle v. Tenney Trading Co., 56 Ariz. 241, 107 P.2d 210, 212.
CONTIGUOUS AND COMPACT. In respect of school district, territory so closely united and so nearly adjacent to the school building that all the children residing in the district, their ages con-sidered, may conveniently travel from their honres to the school building and return in a reasonable time and with a reasonable degree of comfort. People v. Simpson, 308 Ill. 418, 139 N.E. 890, 893; People v. Dodds, 310 III. 607, 142 N.E. 241, 242.
CONTINENCIA. In Spanish law. Continency or unity of the proceedings in a cause. White, New Recop. b. 3, tit. 6, c. 1.
CONTINENS. In the Roman law. Continuing; holding together. Adjoining buildings were said to be continentia.
CONTINENTAL. Pertaining or relating to a con-tinent; characteristic of a continent; as broad in scope or purpose as a continent. Continental Ins. Co. v. Continental Fire Ass’n, C.C.Tex., 96 F. 848.
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS. The first national legislative assembly in the United States, which met in 1774, in pursuance of a recommendation made by Massachusetts and adopted by the other colonies. In this congress all the colonies were represented except Georgia. The delegates were in some cases chosen by the legislative assemblies in the states; in others by the people directly. The powers of the congress were undefined, but it proceeded to take measures and pass resolu-tions which concerned the general welfare and had regard to the inauguration and prosecution of the war for independence. Black, Const.Law (3d Ed.) 40; 1 Story, Const. §§ 198-217.
CONTINENTAL CURRENCY. Paper money is-sued under the authority of the continental con-gress. Wharton v. Morris, 1 Dall. 125, 1 L.Ed. 65.
CONTINENTIA. In old English practice. Contin-uance or connection. Applied to the proceedings in a cause. Bract. fol. 362b.
CONTINGENCY. Quality of being contingent or casual; the possibility of coming to pass; an event which may occur; a possibility; a casualty. Vandegrift v. Riley, 30 P.2d 516, 523, 220 Cal. 340. A fortuitous event, which comes without de-sign, foresight, or expectation. People v. Yonkers, 39 Barb. (N.YJ 272; American Ins. Co. v. Black, 46 Ga.App. 471, 168 S.E. 85.
CONTINGENCY OF A PROCESS. In Scotch law. Where two or more processes are so connected that the circumstances of the one are likely to throw light on the others, the process first en-rolled is consiclered as the leading process, and those subsequently brought into court, if not brought in the same division, may be remitted to it, ob contingentiam, on account of their nearness or proximity in character to it. The effect of re-mitting processes in this manner is merely to bring them before the same division of the court or same lord ordinary. In other respects they remain distinct. Bell.
CONTINGENCY WITH DOUBLE ASPECT. A re-mainder is said to be "in a contingency with dou-ble aspect," when there is another remainder limit-ed on the same estate, not in derogation of the first, but as a substitute for it in case it should fail. Fearne, Rem. 373.
CONTINGENT. Possible, but not assured; doubt-ful or uncertain, conditioned upon the occurrence of some future event which is itself uncertain, or questionable. Verdier v. Roach, 96 Cal. 467, 31 P. 554, synonymous with provisional. Robinson v. Edler, C.C.A.Nev., 78 F.2d 817, 819.
This term, when applied to a use, remainder, devise, be-Quest, or other legal right or interest, implies that no present interest exists, and that whether such interest or right over will exist depends upon a future uncertain event. Temison v. Blowers, 5 Barb. (N.Y.) 692.
As to contingent "Damages," "Fee," "Legacy," "Limitation," "Remainder," "Trust," and "Use," see those titles.
CONTINGENT CLAIM. One which has not ac-crued and which is dependent on some future event that may never happen. Hospes v. Car Co., 48 Minn. 174, 50 N.W. 1117, 15 L.R.A. 470, 31 Am. St.Rep. 637; Hicks v. Wilbur, 38 R.I. 268, 94 A. 872, 874; Cotting v. Hooper, Lewis & Co., 220 Mass. 273, 107 N.E. 931; In re Lexington Surety & In-demnity Co., 272 N.Y. 210, 5 N.E.2d 204, 205.
CONTINGENT ESTATE, INTEREST or RIGHT. An estate, interest or right which depends for its effect upon an event which may or may not hap-pen; as an estate limited to a person not in esse, or not yet born. 2 Crabb, Real Prop. p. 4, § 946; Avery v. Curtiss, 108 Okl. 154, 235 P. 195, 197; Kahn v. Rockhill, 132 N.J.Eq. 188, 28 A.2d 34, 36.
CONTINGENT FUND. One set up by a munici-pality to pay expense items which will necessarily arise during the year but cannot appropriately be classified under any of the specific purposes for which other taxes are levied. First Nat. Bank of Norman v. City of Norman, 182 Okl. 7, 75 P.2d 1109, 1110.
CONTINGENT INTEREST IN PERSONAL PROPERTY. A future interest not transmissible to the representatives of the party entitled there-te, in case he dies before it vests in possession. Mozley & Whitley.
Thus, if a testator leaves the income of a fund to his wife for life, and the capital of the fund to be distributed among such of his children as shall be living at her death, the interest of each chlld during the widow’s life-time is contingent, and in case of his death is not transmisslble to his representatives. Mozley & Whitley.
CONTINGENT LIABILITY. One which is not now fixed and absolute, but which will become so in case of the occurrence of some future and uncertain event. Warren Co. v. C. L R., C.C.A. Ga., 135 F.2d 679, 684, 685.
CONTINUAL CLA1M. In old English law. A for-mal claim made by a party entitled to enter upon any lands or tenements, but deterred from such entry by menaces, or bodily fear, for the purpose of preserving or keeping alive his right. It was called "continual," because it was required to be repeated once in the space of every year and day. It had to be made as near to the land as the party could approach with safety, and, when made in due form, had the same effect with, and in all re• spects amounted to, a legal entry. Litt. §§ 419-423; Co.Litt. 250a; 3 Bl.Comm, 175.
CONTINUANCE. The adjournnlent or postpone-ment of an action pending in a court, to .a subse-quent day of the same or another term. Com. v. Maloney, 145 Mass. 205, 13 N.E. 482. Ferber v. Brueckl, 332 Mo. 892, 17 S.W.2d 524, 527.
Also the entry of a continuance made upon the record of the court, for the purpose of formally evidencing the postponement, or of connecting the parts of the record so as to make one continu-ous whole.
CONTINUANDO. In pleading. A form of alle-gation in which the trespass, criminal offense, or other wrongful act complained of is charged to have been committed on a specified day and to have "continued" to the present time, or is averred to have been committed at divers days and times within a given period or on a specified day and on divers other days and times between that day and another. This is called "laying the time with a continuando." State v. Brown, 10 Okl.Cr. 52, 133 P. 1143, 1144.
CONTINUING. Enduring; not terminated by a single act or fact; subsisting for a definite period or intended to cover or apply to successive similar obligations or occurrences.
As to continuing "Breach," "Consideration," "Conspiracy," "Covenant," "Damages," "Guaran-ty," "Nuisance," and "Offense," see those titles.
CONTINUOUS. Uninterrupted ; unbroken; not intermittent or occasional; so persistently repeat-ed at short intervals as to constitute virtually an unbroken series. Ingraham v. Hough, 46 N.C. 43. Connected, extended, or prolonged without cessa-tion or interruption of sequence. Sullivan v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Boston, Mo. App., 110 S.W.2d 870, 877.
As to continuous "Crime" and "Easements," see those titles.
CONTINUOUS ADVERSE USE. Is interchange-able with the term "uninterrupted adverse use." Davidson v. Nicholson, 59 Ind. 411.
CONTINUOUS INJURY. One recurring at re-peated intervals, so as to be of repeated occur-rence; not necessarily an injury that never ceases. Wood v. Sutcliffe, 8 Eng.Law & Eq. 217.

CONTINUOUSLY. Uninterruptedly; in unbroken sequence; without intermission or cessation; without intervening time; with continuity or con-tinuation. U. S. v. Wooten, C.C.A.N.M., 40 F.2d 882, 887.
CONTIONES. General meetings of the Roman people. Launspach, State and Family in Early Rome 69.
CONTRA. Against, confronting, opposite to; on the other hand; on the contrary.
The word is used in many Latín phrases, as appears by the following titles. In the books of reports, contra, ap-pended to the name of a judge or counsel, Indicates that he heid a view of the matter in argument contrary to that next before advanbed. Also, after citation of cases in sup-port of a position, contra Is of ten prefIxed to eltations of cases opposed to it.
CONTRA BONOS MORES. Against good morals. Contracts contra bonos mores are void.
CONTRA FORMAM COLLATIONIS. In old Eng-lish law. A writ that issued where lands given in perpetual alms to lay houses of religion, or to an abbot and convent, or to the warden or master of a hospital and his convent, to find certain poor men with necessaries, and do divine service, etc., were alienated, to the disherison of the house and church. By means of this writ the donor or his heirs could recover the lands. Reg.Orig. 238; Fitz. Nat.Brev. 210.
CONTRA FORMAM DONI. Against the form of the grant. See Formedon.
CONTRA FORMAM FEOFFAMENTI. In old English law. A writ that lay for the heir of a ten-ant, enfeoffed of certain lands or tenements, by charter of feoffment from a lord to make certain services and suits to his court, who was after-wards distrained for more services than were mentioned in the charter. Reg.Orig. 176; Old Nat.Brev. 162.
CONTRA FORMAM STATUTI. In criminal plead-ing. (Contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided.) The usual conclusion of every indictment, etc., brought for an offense created by statute.
CONTRA JUS BELLI. Lat. Against the law of war. 1 Kent.Comm. 6.
CONTRA JUS COMMUNE. Against common right or law; contrary to the rule of the common law. Bract. fol. 48b.
CONTRA LEGEM FACIT QUI ID FACIT QUOD LEX PROHIBIT; IN FRAUDEM VERO QUI, SALVIS VERBIS LEGIS, SENTENTIAM EJUS CIRCUMVENIT. He does contrary to the law who does what the law prohibits; he acts in fraud of the law who, the letter of the law being inviolate, uses the law contrary to its intention. Dig. 1, 3, 29.
CONTRA LEGEM TERR/E. Against the law of the land.
CONTRA NEGANTEM PRINCIPIA NON EST DISPUTANDUM. There is no disputing against one who denles first principies. Co.Litt. 343.
CONTRA NON VALENTEM AGERE NULLA CURRIT PRIESCRIPTIO. No prescription runs against a person unable to bring an action. Broom, Max. 903.
CONTRA OMNES GENTES. Against all people. Formal words in old covenants of warranty. Fle-ta, lib. 3, c. 14, § 11.
CONTRA PACEM. Against the peace. A phrase used in the Latin forms of indictments, and also of actions for trespass, to signify that the offense alleged was committed against the public peace, i. e., involved a breach of the peace. The full for-mula was contra pacem domini regis, against the peace of the lord the king. In modern pleading, in this country, the phrase "against the peace of the commonwealth" or "of the people" is used.
CONTRA PROFERENTEM. Against the party who proffers or puts forward a thing. J. Zim-mern’s Co. v. Granade, 212 Ala. 172, 102 So. 210, 211.
CONTRA TABULAS. In the civil law. Against the will, (testament.) Dig. 37, 4.
CONTRA VADIUM ET PLEGIUM. In old Eng-lish law. Against gage and pledge. Bract. fol. 15b.
CONTRA VERITATEM LEX NUNQUAM ALI-QUID PERMITTIT. The law never suffers any-thing contrary to truth. 2 Inst. 252.
CONTRABAND. Against law or treaty; prohibit-ed. Goods exported from or imported into a country against its laws. Brande. Articles, the importation or exportation of which is prohibited by law. State v. Butler, 148 S.C. 495, 146 S.E. 418, 419.
CONTRABAND OF WAR. Certain classes of merchandise, such as arms and ammunition, which, by the rules of international law, cannot lawfully be furnished or carried by a neutral na-tion to either of two belligerents; if found in transit in neutral vessels, such goods may be seized and condemned for violation of neutrality. The Peterhoff, 5 Wall. 58, 18 L.Ed. 564; Richard-son v. Insurance Co., 6 Mass. 114, 4 Am.Dec. 92.
A recent American author on International law says that, "by the term ‘contraband of war,’ we now understand a Class of articles of commerce which neutrals are prohibited from furnishing to either one of the belligerents, for the reason that, by so doing, injury is done to the other bellig-erent;" and he treats of the subject, chiefly, in lts relation to commerce upen the high seas. Hall, Int.Law, 570, 592; Eirod v. Alexander, 4 Heisk. (Tenn.) 345.
CONTRABAND OIL. Oil produced contrary to state laws. Panama Refining Co. v. Railroad Com-mission of Texas, D.C.Tex., 16 F.Supp. 289, 291.
CONTRACAUSATOR. A criminal; one prosecut-ed for a crime.

CONTRACT. A promissory agreement between two or more persons that creates, modifies, or de-stroys a legal relation. Buffalo Pressed Steel Co. v. Kirwan, 138 Md. 60, 113 A. 628, 630; Mexican Petroleum Corporation of Louisiana v. North Ger-man Lloyd, D.C.La., 17 F.2d 113, 114.
An agreement, upon sufficient consideration, to do or not to do a particular thing. 2 Bl.Comm. 442; 2 Kent, Comm. 449. Justice v. Lang, 42 N.Y. 496, 1 Am.Rep. 576; Rabon v. State Finance Cor-poration, 203 S.C. 183, 26 S.E.2d 501, 502.
An agreement between two or more parties, preliminary Step in making of which is offer by one and acceptance by other, in which minds of parties meet and concur in under-standing of terms. Lee v. Travelers’ Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 173 S.C. 185, 175 S.E. 429.
A deliberate engagement between competent parties, up-on a legal consideration, to do, or abstain from doing, some act. Wharton; Smith v. Thornhill, Tex.Com.App, 25 S.W.2d 597, 599.
It is agreement creating obligation, in which there must be competent parties, subject-matter, legal consideration, mutuality of agreement, and mutuality of obligation, and agreement must not be so vague or uncertain that terms are not ascertainable. H. Liebes & Co. v. Klengenberg, C. C.A.Cal., 23 F.2d 611, 612.
A contract or agreement is either where a promise is made on one side and assented to on the other; or where two or more persons enter into engagement with each other by a promise on either side. 2 Steph.Comm. 54.
The writing which contains the agreement of parties, with the terms and conditions, and which serves as a proof of the obligation.

Certain and Hazardous

Certain contracts are those in which the thing to be done is supposed to depend on the will of the party, or when, in the usual course of events, it must happen in the manner stipulated. Hazardous contracts are those in which the performance of that which is one of its objects depends on an un-certain event. Civ.Code La. 1776.

Classification

Contracts may be classified on several different jnethods, according to the element in them which is brought into prominence. The usual classifica-tions are as follows:

Commutative and Independent

Commutative contracts are those in which what is done, given, or promised by one party is consid-ered as an equivalent to or in consideration of what is done, given, or promised by the other. Civ.Code La. 1768; Ridings v. Johnson, 9 Sup.Ct. 72, 128 U.S. 212, 32 L.Ed. 401. Independent con-tracts are those in which the mutual acts or prom-ises have no relation to each other, either as equivalents or as considerations. Civ.Code La. 1769.

Conditional Contract

An executory contract the performance of which depends upon a condition. It is not simply an executory contract, since the latter may be an ab-solute agreement to do or not to do something, but it is a contract whole very existence and per-formance depend upon a contingency. Railroad
Co. v. Jones, 2 Cold. (Tenn.) 584; French v. Os-mer, 67 Vt. 427, 32 A. 254.

Consensual and Rea

Consensual contracts are such as are founded upon and completed by the mere agreement of the contracting parties, without any external formali-ty or symbolic act to fix the obligation. Real con-tracts are those in which it is necessary that there should be something more than mere consent, such as a loan of money, deposit or pledge, which, from their nature, require a delivery of the thing, (res.) Inst. 3, 14, 2; Id. 3, 15; Halifax, Civil Law, b. 2, c. 15, No. 1. In the common law a contract respecting real property (such as a lease of land for years) is called a "real" contract. 3 Coke, 22a.

Constructive Contract

Constructive contracts are such as arise when the law prescribes the rights and liabilities of per-sons who have not in reality entered into a con-tract at all, but between whom circumstances make it just that one should have a right, and the other be subject to a liability, similar to the rights and liabilities in cases of express contract. Dono-van v. Kansas City, 352 Mo. 430, 175 S.W.2d 874, 884.

Divisible and Indivisible

The effect of the breach of a contract depends in a large degree upon whether it is to be regarded as indivisible or divisible; i. e. whether it forms a whole, the performance of every part of which is a condition precedent to bind the other party, or is composed of several independent parts, the performance of any one of which will bind the other party pro tanto. The only test is whether the whole quantity of the things concerned, or the sum of the acts to be done, is of the essence of the contract. It depends, therefore, in the last resort, simply upon the intention of the parties. Integrity Flooring v. Zandon Corporation, 130 N.J.L. 244, 32 A.2d 507, 509.
When a consideration is entire and indivisible, and it is against law, the contract is void in toto. Frazier v. Thompson, 2 Watts & S. (Pa.) 235. When the consideration is divisible, and part of it is illegal, the contract is void only pro tanto. Harr.Contr. 132; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 220, 17 L.Ed. 530

Entire and Severable

which is entire on both sides. The entire fulfill-ment of the promise by either is a condition preced-ent to the fulfillment of any part of the promise by the other. Whenever, therefore, there is a contract to pay the gross sum for a certain and definite consideration, the contract is entire. A severable contract is one the consideration of which is, by its terms, susceptible of apportion-ment on either side, so as to correspond to the un-ascertained consideration on the other side, as a contract to pay a person the worth of his services so long as he will do certain work; or to give a certain price for every bushel of so much corn as

corresponds to a sample. Orenstein v. Kahn, 13 Del.Ch. 376, 119 A. 444, 446; Integrity Flooring v. Zandon Corporation, 130 N.J.L. 244, 32 A.2d 507, 509; Ruby v. United Sugar Cos., 56 Ariz. 535, 109 P.2d 845, 848.
Where a contract consiste of many parta; which may be considered as parts of one whole, the contract is entire. When the parts may be consídered as so many distinct con-tracts, entered into at one time, and expressed in the same lnstrument, but not thereby made one contract, the con-tract le a separable contract. But, if the consideration of the contract is single and entire, the contract must be heid to be entire, although the subject of the contract may con-sist of several distinct and wholly Independent ítems. 2 Pars.Cont. 517.

Executed and Executory

Contracts are also distinguished into executed and executory; executed, where nothing remains to be done by either party, and where the transac-tion is completed at the moment that the arrange-ment is made, as where an article is sold and de-livered, and payment therefor is made on the spot; executory, where some future act is to be done, as where an agreement is made to build a house in six months, or to do an act on or before some future day, or to lend money upon a certain inter-est, payable at a future time. Farrington v. Ten-nessee, 95 U.S. 683, 24 L.Ed. 558; Fox v. Kitton, 19 III. 532; Mather v. Mather, 25 Ca1.2d 582, 154 P.2d 684, 686.
But executed contracts are not properly contracts at all, except remlniscently. The term denotes rights in property which have been acquired by means of contract; but the parties are no longer bound by a contractual tie. Mettel v. Gales, 12 S.D. 632, 82 N.W. 181.
Express and Implied

An express contract is an actual agreement of the parties, the terms of which are openly uttered or declared at the time of making it, being stated in distinct and explicit- language, either orally or in writing. 2 BI.Comm. 443; 2 Kent, Comm. 450; Linn v. Ross, 10 Ohio 414, 36 Am.Dec. 95; A. J. Yawger & Co. v. Joseph, 184 Ind. 228; 108 N.E. 774, 775; In re Pierce, Butler & Pierce Mfg. Co., D.C.N.Y., 231 F. 312, 318.
An implied contract is one not created or evi-denced by the explicit agreement of the parties, but inferred by the law, as a matter of reason and justice from their acts or conduct, the circum-stances surrounding the transaction making it a reasonable, or even a necessary, assumption that a contract existed between them by tacit understand-ing. Miller’s Appeal, 100 Pa. 568, 45 Am.Rep. 394; Landon v. Kansas City Gas Co., C.C.A.Kan., 10 F.2d 263, 266; Caldwell v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 230 S.W. 566, 568, 148 Ark. 474; Cameron, to Use of Cameron, v. Eynon, 332 Pa. 529, 3 A.2d 423, 424; American La France Fire Engine Co., to Use of American La France & Foamite Industries, v. Borough of Shenandoah, C.C.A.Pa., 115 F.2d 806, 867.
Implied contracts are sometimes subdIvIded Into those "implied in fact" and those "Implied in law," the former being covered by the deflnition just given, while the latter are obligations imposed upon a person by the law, not in pursuance of his intention and agreement, either expressed or implied, but even against his will and design. because the circumstances between the partles are such as to ren-. der it just that the one should have a right, and the other a corresponding liability, similar to those which would arise from a contract between them. This kind of obliga-tion therefore rests on the principie that whatsoever it is certain a man ought to do that the law will suppose him to have promised to do. And hence it is said that, while the liability of a party to an exprese contract arises directly from the contract, lt is just the reverse in the case of a contract "Implied in law," the contract there being im-plied or arising from the liability. Bliss v. Hoyt, 70 Vt. 534, 41 A. 1026; Kellum v. Browning’s AdMr, 231 Ky. 308, 21 S.W.2d 459, 465. But obligations of t’Oís kind are not properly contracts at all, and should not be so denominat-ed. There can be no true contract without a mutual and concurrent Intention of the parties. Such obligatións are more properly described as "quasi contracts." Union Life Ins. Co. v. Glasscock, 270 Ky. 750, 110 S.W.2d 681, 686, 114 A.L.R. 373

Fair and Reasonable Contract

See Fair and Reasonable Contract.

Gratuitous and Onerous

Gratuitous contracts are those of which the Ob-ject is the benefit of the person with whom it is made, without any profit or advantage received or promised as a consideration for it. It is not, hoW-ever, the less gratuitous if it proceed either from gratitude for a benefit before received or from the hope of receiving one thereafter, although such benefit be of a pecuniary nature. Onerous con-tracts are those in which something is given or promised as a consideration for the engagement or gift, or some service, interest, or condition is im-
posed on what is given or promised, although un-equal to it in value. Civ.Code La.1773, 1774; Peni-
tentiary Co. v. Nelms, 65 Ga. 505, 38 Am.Rep. 793. A gratuitous contract is sometimes called a con-tract of beneficence. Howe, Studies in the Civil Law 107

Joint and Severa’

A joint contract is one made by two or more promisors, who are jointly bound to fulfill its obligations, or made to two or more promisees, who are jointly entitled to require performance of the same. A contract may be "several" as to any one of several promisors or promisees, if he has a legal right (either from the terms of the agree-ment or the nature of the undertaking) to enf orce his individual interest separately from the other parties. Jens-Marie Oil Co. v. Rixse, 72 Okl. 93, 178 P. 658. Generally all contracts are joint where the interest of the parties for whose benefit they are created is joint, and separate where that
interest is separate. Shurtleff v. Udall, 97 Vt. 156, 122 A. 465, 468.

Mutual Interest, Mixed, etc.

Contracts of "mutual interest" are such as are entered into for the reciprocal interest and utility of each of the parties; as sales, exchange, part-nership, and the like. "Mixed" contracts are those by which one of the parties confers a benefit on the other, receiving something of inferior value in return, such as a donation subject to a charge. Contracts "of beneficence" are those by which only one of the contracting parties is benefited; as loans, deposit and mandate. Poth.Obl. 1, 1, 1, 2.

Parol

A contract not entirely in writing. Louisville, N. A. and C. Ry. Co. v. Reynolds, 118 Ind. 170, 173, 20 N.E. 711.
A written contract, which leaves some essential term thereof to be shown by perol, Is only "parol contract" not enforceable under statute of fraud. Sheldmyer v. Bias, 112 Ind.App. 522, 45 N.E.2d 347, 349.

Personal Contract

A contract relating to personal property, or one which so far involves the element of personal knowledge or skill or personal confidente that it can be performed only by the person with whom made, and therefore is not binding on his execu-tor. See Janin v. Browne, 59 Cal. 44; Lucas v. J. H. Gross Motor Car Co., 27 Ohio App. 183, 161 N.E. 362, 363.

Pre-contract

An obligation growing out of a contract or con-tractual relation, of such a nature that it debars the party from legally entering into a similar con-tract at a later time with any other person; par-ticularly applied to marriage.

Principal and Accessory

A principal contract is one entered into by both parties on their own account or in the several qualities they assume. It is one which stands by itself, justifies its own existence, and is not sub-ordinate or auxiliary to any other. Accessory contracts are those made for assuring the per-formance of a prior contract, either by the same parties or by others, such as suretyship, mortgage, and pledge. Civ.Code La. art. 1771.

Quasi Contracts

In the civil law. A contractual relation aris-ing out of transactions between the parties which give them mutual rights and obligations, but do not involve a specific and express convention or agreement between them. Keener, Quasi Contr. 1; Elbert County v. Brown, 16 Ga.App. 834, 86 S.E. 651, 665. The lawful and purely voluntary acts of a man, from which there results any ob-ligation whatever to a third person, and some-times a reciprocal obligation between the parties. Civ. Code La. art. 2293.
Persons who have not contracted with each other are often regarded by the Roman law, under a certain state of facts, as if they had actually concluded a convention be-tween themselves. The legal relation which then takes place between these persons, which has always a similarity to a contract obligation, is therefore termed "obligatio quasi ex contractu." Such a relation arises from the con-ducting of affairs without authority, (negotiorum gestio,) from the payment of what was not due, (solutio indebiti,) from tutorshlp and curatorship, and from taking possession of an Inherltance. Mackeld.Rom.Law § 491.
Legal fiction invented by common law courts to permit recovery by contractual remedy of assumpsit in cases where, in fact, there is no con-tract, but where circumstances are such that jus-tice warrants a recovery as though there had been a promise. Clark v. Peoples Savings and Loan Ass’n of De Kalb County, 221 Ind. 168, 46 N.E.2d 681, 682, 144 A.L.R. 1495. It is not based on intention or consent of the parties, but is founded on considerations of justice and equity, and on doc-trine of unjust enrichment. Bruggeman v. Inde-pendent School Dist., No. 4, Union Tp., Mitchell County, 227 Iowa 661, 289 N.W. 5, 8, 11.
It is not in fact a contract, but an obligation which the law creates in absence of any agreement, when and because the acts of the parties or others have placed in the posses-sion of one person money, or its equivalent, under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not to retain it. Grossbier v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 173 Wis. 503, 181 N.W. 746, 748; It is an implica-tion of law. First Nat. Bank v. Matlock, 99 Okl. 150, 226 P. 328, 331, 36 A.L.R. 1088; Caldwell v. Missourl State Life Ins. Co., 148 Ark. 474, 230 S.W. 566, 568.
It is what was formerly known as the contract Implied In law; ft has no reference to the lntentions or expres-sions of the parties. The obligation is imposed despite, and frequently in frustratlon of their intention. Town of Balkan v. Village of Buhl, 158 Minn. 271, 197 N.W. 266, 35 A. L. R. 470.

Record, Specialty, Simple

Contracts of record are such as are declared and adjudicated by courts of competent jurisdic-tion, or entered on their records, including judg-ments, recognizances, and statutes staple. Harde-man v. Downer, 39 Ga. 425. These are not prop-erly speaking contracts at all, though they may be enforced by action like contracts. Specialties, or special contracts, are contracts under seal, such as deeds and bonds. Ludwig v. Bungart, 26 Misc. Rep. 247, 56 N.Y.S. 51. All others are included in the description "simple" contracts; that is, a simple contract is one that is not a contract of record and not under seal; it may be either writ-ten or oral, in either case, it is called a "parol" contract, the distinguishing feature being the lack of a seal. Stackpole v. Arnold, 11 Mass. 30, 6 Am. Dec. 150; 4 B. & Ald. 588; 2 Bla.Comm. 472.

Special Contract

A contract under seal; a specialty; as distin-guished from one merely oral or in writing not sealed. But in common usage this term is often used to denote an express or explicit contract, one which clearly defines and settles the reciprocal rights and obligations of the parties, as distin-guished from one which must be made out, and its terms ascertained, by the inference of the law from the nature and circumstances of the transac-tion.
A special contract may rest In parol, and does not mean a contract by specialty; it Is defined as one with peculiar provisions not found in the ordinary contracts relating to the same subject-matter. Mldland Roofing Mfg. Co. v. Pickens, 96 S.C. 286, 80 S.E. 484, 485.

Subcontract

A contract subordinate to another contract, made or intended to be made between the con-tracting parties, on one part, or some of them, and a stranger. 1 H.B1. 37, 45. One made under a prior contract. Mobley v. Leeper Bros. Lumber Co., 89 Okl. 95, 214 P. 174, 175.
Where ‘a person has contracted for the performance of certain work (e. g., to build a house,) and he In turn en-gages a third party to perform the whole or a part of that which is included In the original contract, (e. g., to do the carpenter work,) his agreement with such third person is called a "subcontract," and such person Ls called a "subcontractor." Central Trust Co. v. Railroad Co., C.C.Ky., 54 F. 723: Lester v. Houston, 101 N.C. 605, 8 S.E. 366. The term "subcontractor" means one who has contracted with the original contractor for the performance of all or a part of the work or services which such contractor has himself contracted to perform. Republic Supply Co. v. Allen, Tex.Civ.App., 262 S.W. 113, 114.

One which no sensible man not under delusion, duress, or in distress would make, and such as no honest and fair man would accept. Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Noll, 115 Ind.App. 289, 58 N.E.2d 947, 949, 950.

Unilateral and Bilateral

A unilateral contract is one in which one party makes an express engagement or undertakes a performance, without receiving in return any ex-press engagement or promise of performance from the other. Bilateral (or reciprocal) con-tracts are those by which the parties expressly enter into mutual engagements, such as sale or hire. Civ. Code La. art. 1765; Poth. Obl. 1, 1, 1, 2; Kling Bros. Engineering Works v. Whiting Corporation, 320 Ill.App. 630, 51 N.E.2d 1004, 1007. When the party to whom an engagement is made makes no express agreement on his part, the con-tract is called unilateral, even in cases where the law attaches certain obligations to his acceptance. La. Civ. Code, art. 1765. A contract is also said to be "unilateral" when there is a promise on one side only, the consideration on the other side being executed. McMahan v. McMahon, 122 S.C. 336, 115 S.E. 293, 294, 26 A.L.R. 1295.

Usurious Contract
See that title.

Written Contract
A "written contract" is one which in all its terms is in writing. Fey v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 147 Kan. 31, 75 P.2d 810, 813; and instrument signed by one party is orally accepted by other, Reeves Furniture Co. v. Simms, Tex.Civ.App., 59 S.W.2d 262, 263.
CONTRACT, ESTOPPEL BY. There are two sorts of "estoppel by contract," estoppel to deny truth of facts agreed on and settled by force of entering into contract, and estoppel arising from acts done under or in performance of contract. In re Schofield’s Estate, 101 Colo. 443, 73 P.2d 1381. Finch v. Smith, 177 Okl. 307, 58 P.2d 850, 851.
"Estoppel by contract" is intended to embrace all cases In which there is an actual or virtual undertaking to treat a fact as settled. Jackson v. United Gas Public Service Co., 198 So. 633, 640, 196 La. 1. It means party is bound by terms of own contract untll set aside or annulled for fraud, accident, or mistake. United Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. Fowler, Tex.Civ.App., 38 S.W.2d 128, 131.
CONTRACT OF BENEVOLENCE. A contract rnade for the beneflt of one of the contracting parties only, as a mandate or deposit.
CONTRACT OF RECORD. A contract of record s one which has been declared and adjudicated by a court having jurisdiction, or which is entered pf record in obediente to, or in carrying out, the ludgments of a court.
CONTRACT OF SALE. A contract by which one of the contracting parties, called the "seller," en-ters into an obligation to the other to cause him to have freely, by a title of proprietor, a thing, for the price of a certain sum of money, which the other contracting party, called the "buyer," on his part obliges himself to pay. Topzant v. Koshe, 242 Wis. 585, 9 N.W.2d 136, 138.
CONTRACT SYSTEM. As applied to state pris-ons, this phrase signifles that the labor of the prisoners is utilized by private persons or con-tractors, who thus secure the profits of such labor. People v. Hawkins, 157 N.Y. 1, 51 N.E. 257, 260, 42 L.R.A. 490, 68 Am.St.Rep. 736.
CONTRACTION. Abbreviation; abridgment or shortening of a word by omitting a letter or Let-ters or a syllable, with a mark over the place where the elision occurs. This was customary in records written in the ancient "court hand," and is frequently found in the books printed in black-letter.
CONTRACTOR. This term is strictly applicable to any person who enters into a contract (Kent v. Railroad Co., 12 N.Y. 628), but is commonly re-served to designate one who, for a fixed price, undertakes to procure the performance of works on a large scale, or the furnishing of goods in large quantities, whether for the public or a com-pany or individual. McCarthy v. Second Parish, 71 Me. 318, 36 Am.Rep. 320.
One who in pursuit of independent business undertakes to perform a job or piece of work, re-taining in himself control of means, method and manner of accomplishing the desired result. Mar-ion Malleable Iron Works v. Baldwin, 82 Ind.App. 206, 145 N.E. 559, 560.
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION. The obligation which arises from a contract or agreement.
CONTRACTUS. Lat. Contract; a contract; con-tracts.
CONTRACTUS BONIE FIDEL In Roman law. Contracts of good faith. Those contracts which, when brought into litigation, were not determined by the rules of the strict law alone, but allowed the judge to examine into the bona Pides of the transaction, and to hear equitable considerations against their enforcement. In this they were op-posed to contracts stricti juris, against which equitable defenses could not be entertained.
CONTRACTUS CIVILES. In Roman law. Civil contracts. Those contracts which were recognized as actionable by the strict civil law of Rome, or as being founded upon a particular statute, as distinguished from those which could not be en-f orced in the courts except by the aid of the preetor, who, through his equitable powers, gave an action upon them. The latter were called "contractus prcetorii."

CONTRACTUS EST QUASI ACTUS CONTRA ACTUM. 2 Coke, 15. A contract is, as it were, act against act.
CONTRACTUS EX TURPI CAUSA, VEL CON-TRA BONOS MORES, NULLUS EST. A contract founded on a base consideration, or against good morals, is null. Hob. 167.
CONTRACTUS LEGEM EX CONBENTIONE AC-CIPIUNT. Contracts receive legal sanction from the agreement of the parties. Dig. 16, 3, 1, 6.
CONTRADICT. In practice. To disprove. To prove a fact contrary to what has been asserted by a witness.
CONTRADICTION IN TERMS. A phrase of which the parts are expressly inconsistent, as e. g., "an innocent murder;" "a fee-simple for lif e."
CONTRZESCRITURA. In Spanish law. A coun-ter-writing; counter-letter. A document executed at the same time with an act of sale or other instrument, and operating by way of defeasance or otherwise modifying the apparent effect and purport of the original instrument.
CONTRAETATIO REI ALIENPE ANIMO FU-RANDI, EST FURTUM. The touching or remov-ing of another’s property, with an intention of stealing, is theft. Jenk. Cent. 132.
CONTRAFACTIO. Counterfeiting; as contra f ac-tio sigilli regis, counterfeiting the king’s seal. Cowell.
CONTRAINTE PAR CORPS. In French law. The civil process of arrest of the person, which is imposed upon vendors falsely representing their property to be unincumbered, or upon persons mortgaging property which they are aware does not belong to them, and in other cases of moral heinousness. Brown.
CONTRALIGATIO. In old English law. Coun-ter-obligation. Literally, counter-binding. Est enim obligatio quasi contraligatio. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 56, § 1.
CONTRAMANDATIO. A countermanding. Con-tramandatio placiti, in old English law, was the respiting of a defendant, or giving him further time to answer, by countermanding the day fixed for him to plead, and appointing a new day; a sort of imparlance.
CONTRAMANDATUM. A lawful excuse, which a defendant in a suit by attorney alleges for him-self to show that the plaintiff has no cause of com-plaint. Blount.
CONTRAPLACITUM. In old English law. A counter-plea. Townsh. Pl. 61.
CONTRAPOSITIO. In old English law. A plea or answer. Blount. A counter-position.
CONTRARIENTS. This word was used in the time of Edw. II. to signify those who were oppos-ed to the government, but were neither rebels nor traitors. Jacob.
CONTRARIORUM CONTRARIA EST RATIO. Hob. 344. The reason of contrary things is con-trary.
CONTRAROTULATOR. A controller. One
whose business it was to observe the money which the collectors had gathered for the use of the king or the people. Cowell.
CONTRAROTULATOR PIFIE. An officer of the exchequer that writeth out summons twice every year, to the sheriffs, to levy the rents and debts of the pipe. Blount.
CONTRARY. Against; opposed or in opposition to; in conflict with.
CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE. Against the evidence; against the weight of the evidence. Olson v. Elliott, 245 Wis. 279, 15 N.W. 37, 39.
CONTRARY TO LAW. Illegal; in violation of statute or legal regulations at a given time. Feathers of Wild Birds v. U. S., C.C.A.N.Y., 267 F. 964, 967; Goldberg v. U. S., C.C.A.Minn., 277 F. 211, 215. In respect of verdict. In conflict with the law contained in court’s instructions. Chet-opa Motor Co. v. Douglas, 132 Okl. 92, 269 P. 365, 366.
CONTRAT. In French law. Contracts are of the following varieties: (1) Bilateral, or synal-lagmatique, where each party is bound to the oth-er to do what is just and proper; or (2) unilater-al, where the one side only is bound; or (3) com-mutatif, where one does to the other something which is supposed to be an equivalent for what the other does to him; or (4) aléatoire, where the consideration for the act of the one is a mere chance; or (5) contrat de bienfaisance, where the one party procures to the other a purely gratui-tous benefit; or (6) contrat d titre onereux, where each party is bound under some duty to the other. Brown.
CONTRATALLIA. In old English law. A coun-ter-tally. A term used in the exchequer. Mem. in Scacc. M. 26 Edw. 1.
CONTRATENERE. To hold against; to with. hold. Whishaw.
,CONTRAVENING EQUITY. A right or equity, in another person, which is inconsistent with and opposed to the equity sought to be enforced or recognized.
CONTRAVENTION. In French Law. An act which violates the law, a treaty, or an agreement which the party has made. That infraction of the law punished by a fine which does not exceed fif-teen francs and by an imprisonment not exceeding three days. Pen.Code, 1.
In Scotch law. The act of breaking through any restraint imposed by deed, by covenant, or by a court.
CONTRECTARE. Lat. In the civil law. To handle; to take hold of; to meddle with.
In old English law. To treat. Vel mala con-trectet; or shall ill treat. Fleta, lib. 1, c. 17, 4.

CONTRECTATIO. In the civil and old English law. Touching; handling; meddling. The act of removing a thing from its place in such a man-ner that, if the thing be not restored, it will amount to theft.
CONTRECTATIO REI ALIENZE, ANIMO FUR-ANDI, EST FURTUM. Jenk. Cent. 132. The touching or removing of another’s property, with an intention of stealing, is theft.
CONTREFACON. In French law. The offense of printing or causing to be printed a book, the copyright of which is held by another, without au-thority from him. Merl. Repert.
CONTRE-MAITRE. In French marine law. The chief officer of a vessel, who, in case of the sick-ness or absence of the master, commanded in his place. Literally, the countermaster.
CONTRIBUTE. To lend assistance or aid, or give something, to a common purpose; to have a share in any act or effect; to discharge a joint obliga-tion. Christman v. Reichholdt, 15.1o.App., 150 S. W.2d 527, 532; James McCord Co. v. Citizens Ho-tel Co., Tex.Civ.App., 287 S.W. 906; Park v. Mis-sionary Soc., 62 Vt. 19, 20 A. 107.
As applied to negligence signifies causal connection Be-tween injury and negligence, which transcends and is dis-tinguished from negligent acts or omissions which play so minor a part in producing injuries that law does not rec-ognize them as legal causes. • Connellan v. Coffey, 122 Conn. 136, 187 A. 901, 903.
CONTRIBUTION. In the civil law. A partition by which the creditors of an insolvent debtor di-vide among themselves the proceeds of his prop-erty proportionably to the amount of their re-spective credits. Code La. art. 3556, par. 9. Division which is made among the heirs of the succession of the debts with which the succes-sion is charged, according to the proportion which each is bound to bear. Civ.Code La. art. 1420.
In common law. The sharing of a loss or pay-ment among several. The act of any one or sev-eral of a number of co-debtors, co-sureties, etc., in reimbursing one of their number who has paid the whole debt or suffered the whole liability, each to the extent of his proportionate share. Ca-nosia Tp. v. Grand Lake Tp., 80 Minn. 357, 83 N. W. 346; Ratte v. Ratte, 260 Mass. 165, 156 N.E. 870, 871. Right of one who has discharged a common liability to recover of another also hable, the aliquot portion which he ought to pay or bear. St. Lewis v. Morrison, D.C.Ky., 50 F.Supp. 570, 572, 573. Parten v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 283 N.W. 408, 412, 204 Minn. 200, 120 A.L.R. 962; Chapman v. Lamar-Rankin Drug Co., 64 Ga.App. 493, 13 S.E.2d 734, 737. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co. of New York v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 124 Conn. 227, 199 A. 93, 94.
In maritime law. Where the property of one of several parties interested in a vessel and cargo has been voluntarily sacrificed for the common safety, (as by throwing goods overboard to light-en the vessel,) such loss must be made good by the contribution of the others, which is termed "gen-
eral average." 3 Kent, Comm. 232-244; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 490.
CONTRIBUTION TO CAPITAL. A fund or prop-erty contributed by shareowners as financial basis for prosecution of corporation’s business, and sig-nifies resources whose dedication to users of the corporation is made the foundation for issuance of capital stock and which became irrevocably de-voted to satisfaction of all obligations of corpo-ration. Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.6, 131 F.2d 619, 623.
CONTRIBUTIONE FACIENDA. In old English law. A writ that lay where tenants in common were bound to do some act, and one of them was put to the whole burthen, to compel the rest to make contribution. Reg. Orig. 175; Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 162.
CONTRIBUTORY, n. A person liable to contrib-ute to the assets of a company which is being wound up, as being a member or (in some cases) a past member thereof. Mozley & Whitley.
CONTRIBUTORY, adj. Joining in the promotion of a given purpose; lending assistance to the pro-duction of a given result. Armstrong v. Green, 113 Okl. 254, 241 P. 789, 791.
As to contributory "Infringement" and "Negli-gence," see those titles.
CONTROL, y. To exercise restraining or direct-ing influence over; regulate; restrain; domin-ate; curb; to hold from action; overpower; coun, teract; govern. Owen v. Trail, 302 Me. 292, 258 S. W. 699, 702; Hopkins v. Howard’s Ex’x, 266 Ky. 685, 99 S.W.2d 810, 812.
To control a thing is to have the right to exercise a cli-recting or governing influence over it. Trust Co. of New Jersey v. Greenwood Cernetery, 21 N.J.Misc. 169, 32 A.2d 519, 523.
CONTROL, n. Power or authority to manage, direct, superintend, restrict, regulate, direct, gov-ern, administer, or oversee. State v. First State Bank of Jud, 52 N.D. 231, 202 N.W. 391, 402.
The "control" involved in determining whether "prin-cipal and agent relationship" or "master and servant re-lationship" is involved must be accompanied by power or right to arder or direct. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corpo-ration v. Vicars, 221 Ind. 387, 47 N.E.2d 972, 975.
Driver must at Mil times have automobile under control, means having it under such control that it can be stopped before doing Injury to any person in any situation that lo reasonably likely to arise under the circumstances. Kindt v. Reading Co., 352 Pa. 419, 43 A.2d 145, 147.
CONTROL OF CARBON. Such a chemical action upon the carbon in an alloy as will keep it large-ly in a combined graphitic state. Pittsburgh Iron, & Steel Foundries Co. v. Seaman-Sleeth Co., D.C. Pa., 236 F. 756, 760.
CONTROLLER. A comptroller, which see.
CONTROLMENT. In old English law. The con-trolling or checking of another officer’s account; the keeping of a counter-roll.
CONTROVER. In old English law. An inventor or deviser of false news. 2 Inst. 227

CONTROVERSIES ARISING IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS. Within Bankruptcy Act § 24a, 11 U.S.C.A. § 47(a), investing Circuit Courts of Appeals with appellate jurisdiction, include those matters arising in the course of a bankruptcy pro-ceeding, which are not mere steps in the ordinary administration of the bankrupt estate, but present distinct and separable issues, between the trustee and adverse claimants concerning the right and title to the bankrupt’s estate. Handlan v. Ben-nett, C.C.A.W.Va., 51 F.2d 21, 23.
CONTROVERSY. A litigated question; advers-ary proceeding in a court of law; a civil action or suit, either at law or in equity; a justiciable dis-pute. Barber v. Kennedy, 18 Minn. 216 (Gil. 196); State v. Guinotte, 156 Mo. 513, 57 S.W. 281, 50 L. R.A. 787.
It differs from "case," which Includes all sults, criminal as well as civil; whereas "controversy" ls a civil and not a criminal proceeding. Chisholm v. Georgla, 2 Dall. 419, 431, 432, 1 L.Ed. 440.
CONTROVERT. To dispute; to deny; to oppose or contest; to take issue on. Reese v. Adamson, 297 Pa. 13, 146 A. 262, 263.
CONTUBERNIUM. In Roman law. The marri-age of slaves; a permitted cohabitation.
CONTUMACE CAPIENDO. In English law. Ex-communication in all cases of contempt in the spiritual courts is discontinued by 53 Geo. III, c. 127, § 2, and in lieu thereof, where a lawful cita-tion or sentence has not been obeyed, the judge shall have power, after a certain period, to pro-nounce such person contumacious and in con• tempt, and to signify the same to the court of chancery, whereupon a writ de contumace capien-do shall issue from that court, which shall have the same force and effect as formerly belonged, in case of contempt, to a writ de excommunicato cap-iendo. (2 & 3 Wm. IV, c. 93; 3 & 4 Vict. c. 93.) Wharton; 1 Holdsw. Hist. Engl. Law App. XVIII. See Excommunication.
CONTUMACY. The refusal or intentional omis-sion of a person who has been duly cited before a court to appear and defend the charge laid against him, or, if he is duly before the court, to obey some lawful order or direction made in the cause. In the former case it is called "presumed" contumacy; in the latter, "actual." The term is chiefly used in ecclesiastical law. See 3 Curt. Ecc. 1.
CONTUMAX. One accused of a crime who refus-es to appear and answer to the charge. An out-law.
CONTUMELY. Rudeness compounded of haugh-tiness and contempt; scornful insolence; despite-ful treatment; disdain, contemptuousness in act or speech; disgrace. United States v. Strong, D. C.Wash., 263 F. 789, 796.
CONTUSE. To bruise; to injure or disorganize a part of without breaking the skin. Ansley v. Travelers Ins. Co., 27 Tenn.App. 720, 173 S.W.2d 702, 704.
CONTUSION. In medical jurisprudence. A bruise; an injury to any external part of the body by the impact of a fall or the blow of a blunt instrument, without laceration of the flesh, and either with or without a tearing of the skin, but in the former case it is more properly called a "contused wound." Gasperino v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, Mo.App., 107 S.W. 819, 827.
CONTUTOR. Lat. In the civil law. A co-tutor, or co-guardian. Inst. 1, 24, 1.
CONUSANCE. In English law. Cognizance or jurisdiction. Conusance of pleas. Termes de la Ley.
CONVSANCE, CLADI OF. See Cognizance.
CONUSANT. Cognizant; acquainted with; hav-ing actual knowledge; as, if a party knowing of an agreement in which he has an interest makes no objection to it, he is said to be conusant. Co. Litt. 157.
CONUSEE. See Cognizee. CONUSOR. See Cognizor.
CONVALESCENCE. Gradual recovery of health or physical strength after illness. Romesburg v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 147 Kan. 378, 76 P.2d 829, 831.
CONVENABLE. In old English law. Suitable; agreeable; convenient; fitting. Litt. § 103.
CONVENE. In the civil law. To bring an action.
CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY. If there is a reasonable need apparent for use of the serv-ice, and if a common carrier is not unduly inter-fered with, nor the public highways unduly bur-dened, a case of "convenience and necessity" ex-ists with respect to an application for a license to operate as a contract motor carrier. Short Way Lines v. Black, 182 S.W.2d 17, 19, 298 Ky. 67.
CONVENIENT. Proper; just; suitable; fit; adapted; proper; becoming appropriate. Finlay .v. Dickerson, 29 Ill. 20; Railway Co. v. Smith, 19 S.Ct. 565, 173 U.S. 684, 43 L.Ed. 858; Prina v. Board of Sup’rs of Graham County, 16 Ariz. 252, 143 P. 567, 568.
CONVENIT. Lat. In civil and old English law. It is agreed; it was agreed.
CONVENT. The fraternity of an abbey or pri• ory, as societas is the number of fellows in a col-lege. A religious house, now regarded as a mere-ly voluntary association, not importing civil death. 33 Law J. Ch. 308.
An association or community of recluses devoted to a religious life under a superior; a body of monks, friars, or nuns, constituting one local community; now usually restricted to a convent of nuns; as, to go into a convent. Sacred Heart Academy of Galveston v. Karsch, 122 S.W.2d 416, 417, 173 Tenn. 618.
CONVENTICLE. A private assembly or meeting for the exercise of religion. The word was first an appellation of reproach to the religious assemblies of Wycliffe in the reigns of Edward III, and Richard II., and was afterwards applied to a meet-ing of dissenters from the established church. As this word in strict propriety denotes an unlawful assembly, it cannot be justly applied to the as-sembling of persons in places of worship licensed according to the requisitions of law. Wharton.
CONVENTIO. Canon Law. The act of summon-ing or calling together the parties by summoning the defendant.
The Civil Law. A compact, agreement, or con-vention. An agreement between two or more per-sons respecting a legal relation between them. Mackeld. Rom. Law, §§ 385, 386.
The term ts one of very wide scope, and applies to all classes of subjects In which an engagement or business relation may be founded by agreement. It is to be dis-tinguished from the negotiations or prellminary transac-tions on the Object of the convention and fixing its extent, which are not binding so long as the convention is not con-cluded.
In contracts. An agreement; a covenant.
CONVENTIO IN UNUM. In the civil law. The agreement between the two parties to a contract upon the sense of the contract proposed: It is an essential part of the contract, following the polli-citation or proposal emanating from the one, and followed by the consension or agreement of the other.
CONVENTIO PRIVATORUM NON POTEST PUBLICO JURI DEROGARE. The agreement of private persons cannot derogate from public right, i. e., cannot prevent the application of general rules of law, or render valid any contravention of law. Co. Litt. 166a; Wing. Max. p. 746, max. 201.
CONVENTIO VINCIT LEGEM. The express agreement of parties overcomes [prevails against] the law. Story, Ag. § 368.
CONVENTION. In English law. An extraor-dinary assembly of the houses of lords and com-mons, without the assent or summons of the sov-ereign. It can only be justified ex necessitate rei, as the parliament which restored Charles II., and that which disposed of the crown and kingdom to William and Mary. Wharton. Also the name of an oíd writ that lay for the breach of a covenant.
In Roman law. An agreement between parties; a pact. A convention was a mutual engagement between two persons, possessing all the subjective requisites of a contract, but which did not give rise to an action, nor receive the sanction of the law, as bearing an "obligation," until the objec-tive requisite of a solemn ceremonial, (such as stipulatio) was supplied. In other words, con-vention was the informal agreement of the par-ties, which formed the basis of a contract, and which became a contract when the external for-malities were superimposed. See Maine, Anc. Law, 313.
"The divIsion of conventions into contracts and pacts was important in the Roman law. The former were such con-ventions as already, by the older civil law, founded an obli-gation and action; all the other conventions were termed
Black’s Law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed.-26
‘pacts.’ These generally did not produce an actionable obligation. Actionability was subsequently given to several pacts, whereby they received the same power and efilcacy that contracts received." Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 395.
In legislation. An assembly of delegates or representatives chosen by the people for special and extraordinary legislative purposes, such as the framing or revision of a state constitution. Also an assembly of delegates chosen by a pol-itical party, or by the party organization in a larg-er or smaller territory, to nominate candidates for an approaching election. In re Opinion of the Justices, 132 Me. 491, 167 A. 176, 179.
In public and International law. A pact or agreement between states or nations in the na-ture of a treaty; usually applied (a) to agree-ments or arrangements preliminary to a formal treaty or to serve as its basis, or (b) internation-al agreements for the regulation of matters of common interest but not coming within the sphere of politics or commercial intercourse, such as in ternational postage or the protection of submar-Me cables. U. S. v. Hunter, C.C.Mo., 21 F. 615..
Constitutional convention. See Constitution.. Judicial convention. See Judicial.
CONVENTIONAL. Depending on, or arising from, the mutual agreement of parties; as dis-tinguished from legal, which means created by, or arising from, the act of the law. De Vita v. Pianisani, 217 N.Y.S. 438, 440, 127 Misc. 611.
As to conventional "Estates," "Interest," "Mort-gage," "Subrogation," and "Trustees," see those d-iles.
CONVENTIONAL LEEN. A lien is conventional where the lien, general or particular (Cro. Car. 271; 6 Term. 14; 2 Kent 637) is raised by the ex-press agreement and stipulation of the parties, in circumstances where the law alone would not create a lien from the mere relation of the par-ties or the details of their transaction.
CONVENTIONE. The name of a writ for the breach of any covenant in writing, whether real or personal. Reg.Orig. 115; Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 145.
CONVENTIONS. This name is sometimes given to compacts or treaties with foreign countries as to the appreherlsion and extradition of fugitive offenders. See Extradition.
CONVENTUAL CHURCIL In ecclesiastical law. That which consists of regular clerks, professing some order or religion; or of dean and chapter; or other societies of spiritual men.
CON’VENTUALS. Religious men united in a con-vent or religious house. Cowell.
CONVENTUS. Lat. A coming together; a con• vention or assembly. Conventus magnatum vel procerum (the assembly of chief men or peers) was one of the names of the English parliament. 1 Bl. Comm. 148.
In the civil law. The term meant a gather• ing together of people; a crowd assembled for any purpose; also a convention, pact, or bargain.

CONVENTUS JURIDICUS. In the Roman law. A court of sessions held in the Roman provinces, by the president of the province, assisted by a cer-tain number of counsellors and assessors, at fixed periods, to hear and determine suits, and to pro-vide for the civil aelministration of the province. Schm. Civil Law, Introd. 17.
CONVERSANT. One who is in the habit of be-ing in a particular place is said tó be conversant there. Barnes, 162. Acquainted; familiar.
CONVERSANTES. In old Englísh law. Conver-sant or dwelling; commorant.
CONVERSATION. Manner of living; habits of life; conduct; as in the phrase "chaste life and conversation." Bradshaw v. People, 153 III. 156, 38 N.E. 652. Criminal conversation means se-duction of another man’s wife, considered as an actionable injury to the husband. Prettyman v. Williamson, 1 Pennewill (Del.) 224, 39 A. 731; Crocker v. Crocker, C.C.Mass., 98 F. 702.
CONVERSE. The transposition of the subject and predicate in a proposition, as: "Everything is good in its place." Converse, "Nothing is good which is not in its place." Wharton.
CONVERSION. Equity. The exchange of prop-erty from real to personal or from personal to real, which takes place under some circumstances in the consideration of the law, such as, to give effect to directions in a will or settlement, or to stipulations in a contract, although no such change has actually taken place, 1 Bro.C.C. 497; 1 Lead.Cas.Eq. 619; 1 Lead. Cas.Eq. 872; Law-rence v. Elliott, 3 Redf.Sur. (N.Y.) 235; Dodge v. Williams, 46 Wis. 70, 1 N.W. 92, 50 N.W. 1103; Mattison v. Stone, 99 S.C. 151, 82 S.E. 1046, 1047; and by which exchange the property so dealt with becomes invested with the properties and attributes of that into which it is supposed to have been converted; Seymour v. Freer, 8 Wall. 214, 19 L.Ed. 306; Haward v. Peavey, 128 Ill. 430, 21 N.E. 503, 15 Am.St.Rep. 120.
Although it is sometimes necessary for certain purposes of devolution and transfer to regard the property in its changed condition as though the change has not absolutely taken place; Davidson v. Bright, 267 Pa. 580, 110 A. 301, 302.
A qualifled conversion Is one dlrected for some particu-lar purpose; Harker v. Reilly, 4 Del.Ch. 72.

Law

An unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or the exclusion of the owner’s rights. Stickney v. Munroe, 44 Me. 197; Baldwin v. Cole, 6 Mod. 212; In re Di Crocco’s Estate, 12 N. Y.S.2d 276, 278, 170 Misc. 826; Powell v. A. K. Brown Motor Co., 20 S.E.2d 636, 637, 200 S.C. 75. Any unauthorized act which deprives an owner of his property permanently or for an indefinite time. Forbush v. San Diego Fruit & Produce Co., 46 Idaho, 231, 266 P. 659, 663.

Also one who aids and abets another in keeping property from its rightful owner is guilty of "conversion". Edwards v. Max Thieme Chevrolet Co., La.App., 191 So. 569, 571, 572.
Constructive conversion. An implied or virtual conversion, which takes place where a person does such acts in reference to the goods of an-other as amount in law to the appropriation of the property to himself. Scruggs v. Scruggs, C.C. Mo., 105 F. 28; Laverty v. Snethen, 68 N.Y. 524, 23 Am.Rep. 184; Wade v. Ray, 67 Okl. 39, 168 P. 447, 449, L.R.A.1918B, 796.
Direct conversion. The act of actually ap-propriating the property of another to his own beneficial use and enjoyment, or to that of a third person, or destroying it, or altering its nature. Ross v. Lewis, 23 N.M. 524, 169 P. 468, 469; or wrongfully assuming title in himself; Cass v. Ocean Park Bath Co., 45 Cal.App. 656, 188 P. 616, 617; there must be a positive wrong or act of mal-feasance; American Surety Co. of New York v. Hill County, Tex.Civ.App., 254 S.W. 241, 245.
CONVEY. To pass or transmit the title to prop-erty from one to another; to transfer property or the title to property by deed or instrument un-der seal. Used popularly in sense of "assign," "sale," or "transfer." Crookshanks v. Ransbarg-er, 80 W.Va. 21, 92 S.E. 78, 82; McQuiddy Print-ing Co. v. Hirsig, 23 Tenn.App. 434, 134 S.W.2d 197, 205.
Convey relates properly to the dlsposition of real prop-erty, not to personal. Dickerman v. Abrahams, 21 Barb., N.Y., 551, 561. To convey real estate is, by an appropriate instrument, to transfer the legal title to it from the present owner to another. Abendroth v. Greenwich, 29 Conn. 356.
CONVEYANCE. In pleading. Introduction or inducement.
In real property law. In the strict legal sense, a transfer of legal title to land. In the popular sense, and as generally used by lawyers, it de-notes any transfer of title, legal or equitable. Chupco v. Chapman, 76 Okl. 201, 170 P. 259, 266. The transfer of the title of land from one person or class of persons to another. Klein v. McNam-ara, 54 Miss. 105; Alexander v. State, 28 Tex. App. 186, 12 S.W. 595; In re Loes’ Will, 55 N.Y.S. 2d 723, 726. An instrument in writing under seal, (anciently termed an "assurance,") by which some estate or interest in lands is transferred from one person to another; such as a deed, mortgage, etc. 2 Bl. Comm. 293, 295, 309.
Conveyance includes every instrument In wrlting by which any estate or interest in real estate is created, aliened, mortgaged, or assigned, or by which the title to any real estate may be affected in law or equity, except last wills and testaments, leases for a term not exceeding three years, and executory contracts for the sale or pur-chase of lands. Stearns Lighting & Power Co. v. Central Trust Co., C.C.A.Mich., 223 F. 962, 966; Shralberg v. Han-son, 138 Minn. 80, 163 N.W. 1032, 1033.
General
Absolute or conditional conveyance. An abso-lute conveyance is one by which the right or prop-erty in a thing is transferred, free of any condi-tion or qualification, by which it might be defeated

or changed; as an ordinary deed of lands, in con-tradistinction to a mortgage, which is a condi-tional conveyance. Burrill; Falconer v. Buffalo, etc., R. Co., 69 N.Y. 491; Brown v. United States, C.C.A.Pa., 95 Fed.2d 487, 489.
Fraudulent conveyance. See Fraudulent.
Mesne conveyance. An intermediate convey-ance; one occupying an intermediate position in a chain of title between the first grantee and the present holder.
Primary conveyances. Those by means where-of the benefit or estate is created or first Grises; as distinguished from those whereby it may be en-larged, restrained, transferred, or extinguished. The term includes feoffment, gift, grant, lease, exchange, and partition, and is opposed to deriva-tive conveyances, such as release, surrender, con-firmation, etc. 2 Bl. Comm. 309.
Secondary conveyances. The name given to that class of conveyances which presuppose some other conveyance precedent, and only serve to en-large, confirm, alter, restrain, restore, or transfer the interest granted by such original conveyance. 2 Bl. Comm. 324. Otherwise termed "derivative conveyances" (q. v.).
Voluntary conveyance. A conveyance without valuable consideration; such as a deed or settle-ment in favor of a wife or children. Gentry v. Field, 143 Mo. 399, 45 S.W. 286; Shannon v. Duf-field, 218 Ky. 770, 292 S.W. 322, 323; English v. Brown, D.C.N.J., 219 F. 248, 256.
CONVEYANCER. One whose business it is to draw deeds, bonds, mortgages, wills, writs, or oth-er legal papers, or to examine titles to real estate. 14 St. at Large, 118.
He who draws conveyances; especially a barrlster who confines himself to drawing conveyances, and other cham-ber practice. Mozley & Whitley.
CONVEYANCING. A term including both the science and art of transferring titles to real es-tate from one man to another.
Conveyancing is that part of the lawyer’s business which relates to the alienation and transmission of property and other rights from one person to another, and to the fram-ing of legal documents intended to create, define, transfer, or extinguish rights. It therefore includes the investiga-tion of the title to land, and the preparation of agreements, wills, articles of association, prívate statutes operating as conveyances, and many other instruments in addition to conveyances properly so called. Sweet; Livermore v. Bag-ley, 3 Mass. 505.
CONVEYANCING COUNSEL TO THE COURT OF CHANCERY. Certain counsel, not fewer than six in number, appointed by the lord chancellor, for the purpose of assisting the court of chan-cery, or any judge thereof, with their opinion in matters of title and conveyancing. Mozley & Whitley.
CONVICIA SI IRASCARIS TUA DIVULGAS; SPRETA EXOLESCUNT. 3 Inst. 198. If you be moved to anger by insults, -you publish them; if despised, they are forgotten.
CONVICIUYL In the civil law. The name of a species of slander or injury uttered in public, and
which charged some one with some act contra bonos mores.
CONVICT, v. To condemn after judicial investi-gation; to find a man guilty of a criminal charge. The word was formerly used also in the sense of finding against the defendant in a civil case.
Formerly a man was sald to be convict when he had been found guilty of treason or felony, but before judgment had been passed on him, after which he was said to be attaint, (q. v.). Co.Litt. 390b.
CONVICT, n. One who has been finally condemn-ed by a court. One who has been adjudged guilty of a crime or misdemeanor. Usually spoken of condemned felons or the prisoners in penitentiar-
ies. Molineux v. Collins, 177 N.Y. 395, 69 N.E. 727, 65 L.R.A. 104.
CONVICTED. Means that a judgment of final condemnation has been pronounced against the accused. Gallagher v. State, 10 Tex.App. 469;
Neibling v. Terry, 177 S.W.2d 502, 504, 352 Mo. 396, 152 A.L.R. 249.
CONVICTION. In a general sense, the result of a criminal trial which ends in a judgment or sen-tence that the prisoner is guilty as charged.
The act of convicting a person, or state of being con-victed, of a criminal offense. Hershey v. People, 91 Colo. 113, 12 P.2d 345, 347. Finding a person guilty by verdict of a jury. 1 Bish.Crim.Law, § 223; Emmertson v. State Tax Commission of Utah, 93 Utah 219, 72 P.2d 467, 470, 113 A.L.R. 1174.
A record of the summary proceedings upon any penal statute before one or more justices of the peace or other persons duly authorized, in a case where the offender has been convicted and sen-tenced. Holthouse. In respect of pardoning pow-er, verdict of guilty. State v. Garrett, 135 Tenn, 617, 188 S.W. 58, L.R.A.1917B, 567. Contra, Ex parte White, 28 Okl.Cr. 180, 230 P. 522.
In ordinary phrase, the meaning of the word "convic-tion" Is the finding by the jury of a verdict that the accused is guilty. But, in legal parlante, It of ten denotes the final judgment of the court. Blaufus v. People, 69 N.Y. 109, 25 Am.Rep. 148; Marino v. Hibbard, 243 Mass. 90, 137 N.E. 369; Commonwealth v. Mlnnich, 250 Pa. 363, 95 A. 565, 567, L.R.A.1916B, 950.
The ordinary legal meaning of "conviction," when used to designate a particular stage of a criminal prosecution triable by a jury, Is the confession of the accused in open court or the verdict returned against him by the jury, which ascertains and publishes the fact of his guilt; while "judgment" or ”sentence" is the appropriate word to denote the action of the court before which the trial is had, declarMg the consequences to the convict of the fact thus ascertained. A pardon granted after verdict of guilty, but before sentence, and pending a hearing upon exceptions taken by the accused during the trial, le granted after con-viction, within the meaning of a constitutional restriction upon granting pardon before conviction. When, indeed, the word "conviction" is used to describe the effect of the guilt of the accused as judicially proved in one case, when pleaded or given in evidente in another, it is sometimes used in a more comprehensive sense, including the judg-ment of the court upon the verdict or confession of guilt; as, for instante, in speaking of the plea of autrefois con-vict, or of the effect of guilt, judicially ascertained, as a disqualification of the convict. Com. v. Lockwood, 109 Mass. 323, 12 Am.Rep. 699; In re Anderson, 34 Cal.App.2d 48, 92 P.2d 1020, 1022. Attorney General ex rel. O’Hara v. Montgomery, 275 Mich. 504, 267 N.W. 550, 554.

Farmer Conviction. A previous trial and con-viction of the same offense as that now charged; pleadable in bar of the prosecution. State v. Ellsworth, 131 N.C. 773, 42 S.E. 699, 92 Am.St.Rep. 790; Williams v. State, 13 Teg.App. 285, 46 Am. Rep. 237.
Summary Conviction. The conviction of a per-son, (usually for a minor misdemeanor,) as the result of his trial before a magistrate or court, without the intervention of a jury, which is au-thorized by statute in England and in many of the states. In these proceedings there is no in-tervention of a jury, but the party accused is ac-quitted or condemned by the suffrage of such person only as the statute has appointed to be his judge. A conviction reached on such a magis-trate’s trial is called a "summary conviction." Brown; Blair v. Com., 25 Grat. (Va.) 853.
CONVINCING PROOF. Such as is suificient to establish the proposition in question, beyond hesi-tation, ambiguity, or reasonable doubt, in an un-prejudiced mind. Evans v. Rugee, 57 Wis. 623, 16 N.W. 49; French v. Day, 89 Me. 441, 36 A. 909. See Clear.
CONVIVIUM. A tenure by which a tenant was bound to provide meat and drink for his lord at least once in the year. Cowell.
CONVOCATION. In ecclesiastical law. The gen-eral assembly of the clergy to consult upon ec-clesiastical matters.
CONVOY. A naval force, under the command of an officer appointed by government, for the pro-tection of merchant-ships and others, during the whole voyage, or such part of it as is known to re-quire such protection. Marsh. Ins. b. 1, c. 9, § 5; Park, Ins. 388; Peake, Add. Cas. 143n; 2 H. Bl. 551.
CO-OBLIGOR. A joint obligor; one bound joint-ly with another or others in a bond or obligation.
COOL BLOOD. In the law of homicide. Calmness or tranquillity; the undisturbed possession of one’s faculties and reason; the absence of vio-lent passion, fury, or uncontrollable excitement.
COOLING TIME. Time to recover "cool blood" after severe excitement or provocation; time for the mind to become so calm and sedate as that it is supposed to contemplate, comprehend, and cool-ly act with reference to the consequences likely to ensue. May v. People, 8 Colo. 210, 6 P. 816; Keiser v. Smith, 71 Ala. 481, 46 Am.Rep. 342.
CO-OPERATE. To act jointly or concurrently toward a common end. Darnell v. Equity Life Ins. Co.’s Receivers, 179 Ky. 465, 200 S.W. 967, 970.
CO-OPERATION. In economics. The combined action of numbers. It is of two distinct kinds: (1) Such co-operation as takes place when sever-al persons help each other in the same employ-ment; (2) such co-operation as takes place when severa’ persons help each other in different em-
ployments. These may be termed "simple co-operation" and "complex co-operation." Mill, Pol. Ec. 142.
In patent law. Unity of action to a common end or a common result, not merely joint or sim-ultaneous action. Boynton Co. v. Morris Chute Co., C.C.N.J., 82 F. 444; Fastener Co. v. Webb, C. C.Ohio, 89 F. 987; Holmes Burglar Alarm Tel. Co. v. Domestic, etc., Tel. Co., C.C.N.J., 42 F. 227.
CO-OPERATIVE ASSOCIATION. A union of in-dividuals commonly laborers, farmers, or small capitalists, formed for the prosecution in common of some productive enterprise, the profits being shared in accordance with the capital or labor contributed by each. Mooney v. Farmers’ Mer-cantile & Elevator Co. of Madison, 138 Minn. 199, 164 N.W. 804, 805.
CO-OPERATIVE NEGLIGENCE. Contributory negligence. Otte v. Miller, 24 S.E.2d 90, 93, 125 W.Va. 317.
COOPERTIO. In oid English law. The head or branches of a tree cut down; though coopertio arborum is rather the bark of timber trees felled, and the chumps and broken wood. Cowell.
COOPERTUM. In forest law. A covert; a thicket (dumetum) or shelter for wild beasts in a forest. Spelman.
COOPERTURA. In forest law. A thicket, or covert of wood.
COOPERTUS. Covert; covered.
CO-OPTATION. A concurring choice; the elec-tion, by the members of a close corporation, of a person to fill a vacancy.
CO-ORDINATE. Equal, of the same order, rank, degree or importance; not subordinate. Empire Ins. Co. of Texas v. Cooper, Tex.Civ.App., 138 S. W.2d 159, 164. Adjusted to, in harmony with. JEolian-Skinner Organ Co. v. Shepard Broadcast-ing Service, C.C.A.Mass., 81 F.2d 392, 395. As to courts of "co-ordinate jurisdiction," see Jurisdic-tion.
Co-ordinate and subordinate are terms of ten applied as a test to ascertain the doubtful meaning of clauses in an act of parliament, If there be two, one of which is gram-matically governed by the other, it le said to be "subor-dinate" to it; but, if both are equally governed by some third clause, the two are called "co-ordinate." Wharton.
CO-ORDINATE JURISDICTION. That which is possessed by courts of equal rank, degree, or au-thority, equally competent to deal with the matter in question, whether belonging to the same or dif-ferent systems; concurrent jurisdiction.
COPABCENARY. A species of estate, or tenan-cy, which exists where lands of inheritance de-scend from the ancestor to two or more persons. It arises in England either by common law or particular custom. By common law, as where a person, seised in fee-simple or fee-tail, dies, and his next heirs are two or more females, his daugh-ters, sisters, aunts, cousins, or their representatives; in this case they aH inherit, and these co-heirs, are then called "coparceners," or, for brev-ity, "parceners" only. Litt. §§ 241, 242; 2 Bl. Comm. 187. By particular custom, as where lands descend, as in gavelkind, to all the males in equal degree, as sons, brothers, uncles, etc. Litt. § 265; 1 Steph. Comm. 319. An estate which several persons hold as one heir, whether male or female. This estate has the three unities of time, title, and possession; but the interests of the coparcen-ers may be unequal. 1 Washb. Real Prop. 414; 2 Bl. Comm. 188; 4 Kent 366; Flynn v. Herye, 4 Mo.App. 360.
Whtle joint tenancies refer to persons, the idea of copar-cenary refers to the estate. The titie to it 1s always by descent. The respective shares may be unequal; as, for instante, one daughter and two granddaughters, children of a deceased daughter, may take by the same act of de-scent. As to strangers, the tenants’ seisln is a joint one, but, as between themselves, each is seised of his or her own Share, on whose death It goes to the heirs, and not by survivorship. The right of possession of coparceners Te In common, and the possession of one is, in general, the possession of the others. 1 Washb.Real Prop. •414.
COPARCENERS. Persons to whom an estate of inheritance descends jointly, and by whom it is held as an entire estate. 2 Bl. Comm. 187.
COPARTICEPS. In old English law. A copar-cener.
COPARTNER. One who is a partner with one or more other persons; a member of a partnership.
COPARTNERSHIP. A partnership.
COPARTNERY. In Scotch law. The contract of copartnership. A contract by which the several partners agree concerning the communication of loss or gain, arising from the subject of the con-tract. Bell.
COPE. A custom or tribute due to the crown or lord of the soil, out of the lead mines in Derby-shire; also a hill, or the roof and covering of a house; a church vestment.
COPEMAN, or COPESMAN. A chapman, (q. v.).
COPESMATE. A merchant; a partner in mer-chandise.
COPIA. Lat. In civil and old English law. Op-portunity or means of access.
In old English law. A copy. Copia libelli, the copy of a libel. Reg. Orig. 58.
COPIA LIBELLI DELIBERANDA. The name of a writ that lay where a man could not get a copy of a libel at the hands of a spiritual judge, to have -the same delivered to him. Reg. Orig. 51.
COPIA VERA. In Scotch practice. A true copy. Words written at the top of copies of instruments.
COPPA. In English law. A crop or cock of grass, hay, or corn, divided luto titheable por-tions, that it may be more fairly and justly tithed.
COPPER AND SCALES. See Mancipatio.
COPPER MATTE. A product of smelting copper ore in a furnace consisting almost entirely of a mixture of iron sulphide and copper sulphide. It requires further treatment to break up and re-move iron sulphide, and then convert remaining copper sulphide which is called white metal to metallic copper. United Verde Copper Co. v. Peirce-Smith Converter Co., C.C.A.Del., 7 F.2d 13. Also known as "regulus of copper." U. S. v. Consolidated Kansas City Smelting & Refining Co,. 8 Ct.Cust.App. 226, 227.
COPPICE, or COPSE. A small wood consisting of underwood, which may be cut at twelve or fif-teen years’ growth for fuel.
COPROLALIA. In medical jurisprudence. A disposition or habit of using obscene language, developing unexpectedly in the particular indivi-dual or contrary to his previous history and habits, recognized as a sign of insanity or of aphasia.
COPULA. The corporal consummation of mar-riage. Copula, (in logic,) the link between sub-ject and predicate contained in the verb.
COPULATIO VERBORUM INDICAT ACCEPTA-TIONEM IN EODEM SENSU. Coupling of words together shows that they are to be understood in the same sense. 4 Bacon’s Works, p. 26; Broom, Max. 588.
COPULATIVE TERM. One which is placed be-tween two or more others to join them together.
COPY. The transcript or double of an original writing; as the copy of a patent, charter, deed, etc. Nations v. Lowenstern, 27 N.M. 613, 204 P. 60, 62; State Text-Book Commission v. Weathers, 184 Ky. 748, 213 S.W. 207, 210; In re Janes’ Es-tate, 18 Ca1.2d 512, 116 P.2d 438, 441.
Carbon copies. Carbon copies made at the same time and with the same device as the orig-inal are not "copies" but duplicate originals. Martin & Lanier Paint Co. v. Daniels, 27 Ga.App. 302, 108 S.E. 246, 247; Liberty Nat. Bank and Trust Co. v. Louisville Trust Co., 295 Ky. 825, 175 S.W.2d 524, 528.
Exemplifications are copies verified by the great seal or by the seal of a court. West Jersey Trac-tion Co. v. Board of Public Works, 57 N.J.Law, 313, 30 A. 581.
Examined copies are those which have been compared with the original or with an of cial rec-ord thereof.
Office copies are those made by offlcers intrust-ed with the originals and authorized for that pur-pose. Id., Stamper v. Gay, 3 Wyo. 322, 23 P. 69. See, also, Office.
In the law of copyrights. A reproduction or dup-lication of a thing, or that which comes so near to the original as to give to every person seeing it the idea created by the original. McConnor v. Kaufman, D.C.N.Y., 49 F.Supp. 738, 744.
COPYHOLD. A species of estate at will, or cus-tomary estate in England, the only visible title which are made out by the steward of the manor, on a tenant’s being admitted to any parcel of land, or tenement belonging to the manor. It is an estate at the will of the lord, yet such a will as is agreeable to the custom of the manor, which customs are preserved and evidenced by the rolls of the several courts baron, in which they are entered. 2 Bl.Comm. 95. In a larger sense, copy-hold is said to iMport every customary tenure, (that is, every tenure pending on the particular custom of a manor,) as opposed to free socage, or freehold, which may now (since the abolition of knight-service) be considered as the general or common-law tenure of the country. 1 Steph. Comm. 210.
Copyhold eommissioners. Commissioners ap-pointed to carry into effect various acts of par-liament, having for their principal objects the compulsory commutation of manorial burdens and restrictions, (fines, heriots, rights to timber and minerals, etc.,) and the compulsory enfranchise-ment of copyhold lands. 1 Steph. Comm. 643; Elton, Copyh.
Copyholder. A tenant by copyhold tenure, (by copy of court-roll.) 2 Bl. Comm. 95.
Privileged copyholds. Those copyhold estates which are said to be held according to the cus-tom of the manor, and not at the will of the lord, as common copyholds are. They include custom-ary freeholds and ancient demesnes. t Crabb, Real Prop. p. 709, § 919.
COPYRIGHT. The right of literary property as recognized and sanctioned by positive law. An intangible, incorporeal right granted by statute to the author or originator of certain literary or artistic productions, whereby he is invested, for a limited period, with the sole and exclusive priv-ilege of multiplying copies of the same and pub-lishing and selling them. In re Rider, 16 R.I. 271, 15 A. 72; Mott Iron Works v. Clow, C.C.A.I11., 82 F. 316, 27 C.C.A. 250; Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N.Y. 536, 7 Am.Rep. 480; Stuff v. La Budde Feed & Grain Co., D.C.Wis., 42 F.Supp. 493, 497; Schill v. Remington Putnam Book Co., 179 Md. 83, 17 A.2d 175.
International copyright is the right of a sub-ject of one country to protection against the re-publication in another country of a work which he originally published in his own country. Sweet.
CORAAGIUM, 9r CORAAGE. Measures of corn. An unusual and extraordinary tribute, arising only on special occasions. They are thus distin-guished from services. Mentioned in connection with hidage and carvage. Cowell.
CORAM. Lat. Before; in presence of. Applied to persons only. Townsh. Pl. 22.
CORAM DOMINO REGE. Before our lord the king. Coram domino rege ubicumgue tune fuerit Anglice, before our lord the king wherever he shall then be in England.
CORAM IPSO REGE. Before the king himself. The old narre of the court of king’s bench, which was originally held before the king in person. 3 Bl.Comm. 41.
CORAM NOBIS. Before us ourselves, (the king, i. e., in the king’s or queen’s bench.) Applied to writs of error directed to another branch of the same court, e. g., from the full bench to the court at nisi prius. 1 Archb. Pr. K. B. 234. See Writ of Error.
CORAM NON JUDICE. In presence of a person not a judge. When a suit is brought and deter-mined in a court which has no jurisdiction in the matter, then it is said to be coram non judice, and the judgment is void. Manufacturing Co. v. Holt, 51 W.Va. 352, 41 S.E. 351.
CORAM PARIBUS. Befóre the peers or freehold-ers. The attestation of deeds, like all other solemn transactions, was originally done only coram paribus. 2 Bl.Comm. 307. Coram paribus de vicineto, before the peers or freeholders of the neighborhood. Id. 315.
CORA1I SECTATORIBUS. Before the suitors. Cro. Jac. 582.
CORAM VOBIS. Before you. A writ of error directed by a court of review to the cotirt which tried the cause, to correct an error in fact. 3 Md. 325; 3 Steph.Comm. 642. See Writ of Error.
CORD. A measure of wood containing 128 cubic feet, otherwise expressed as a pile of wood 8 feet long, 4 feet high, and 4 feet wide. Sacks v. State, 83 Tex.Cr.R. 560, 204 S.W. 430.
CO-RESPONDENT. A person summoned to an-swer a bill, petition, or libel, together with an-other respondent. Now chiefiy used to designate the person charged with adultery with the re-spondent in a suit for divorce for that cause, and joined as a defendant with such party. Lowe v. Bennett, 27 Misc. 356, 58 N.Y.S. 88. Mortensen v. Los Angeles Examiner, 112 Cal.App. 194, 296 P. 927, 930.
CORIUM FORISFACERE. To forfeit one’s skin, applied to a person condemned to be whipped; anciently the punishment of a servant. Corium perdere, the same. Corium redimere, to com-podnd for a whipping. Wharton.
CORN. In English law, a general term for any sort of grain; but in America it is properly ap-plied only to maize. Sullins v. State, 53 Ala. 476; Kerrick v. Van Dusen, 32 Minn. 317, 20 N.W. 228; Com. v. Pine, 3 Pa.Law J. 412.
In the memorandum clause in policías of insurance it Includes pease and beans, but not rice. Park, Ins. 112; Scott v. Bourdillion, 2 Bos. & P., N. R., 213.
CORN LAWS. A species of protective tariff form-erly in existence in England, imposing import-duties on various kinds of grain. The corn laws were abolished in 1846.

CORN MEAL. An unmixed meal made from en-tire grains of corn. Miller Grain & Commission Co. v. International Sugar Feed No. 2 Co., 197 Ala. 100, 72 So. 368.
CORN RENT. A rent in wheat or malt paid on college leases by direction of St. 18 Eliz. c. 6. 2 BI.Comm. 609.
CORN WHISKY. An intoxicating whisky or liq-uor made from corn or containing a corn product, otherwise known as "moonshine," "white mule," "hootch," "corn liquor," "moonshine corn whisky." State v. Bilyeu, Mo.Sup., 295 S.W. 104, 105; State v. Pinto, 312 Mo. 99, 279 S.W. 144, 148; Mullins v. Commonwealth, 115 Va. 945, 79 S.E. 324, 327.
CORNAGE. A species of tenure in England, by which the tenant was bound to blow a horn for the sake of alarming the country on the approach of an enemy. It was a species of grand serjeanty. Bac. Abr. "Tenure," N.
CORNER. A combination among the dealers in a specific commodity, or outside capitalista, for the purpose of buying up the greater portion of that commodity which is upon the market or may be brought to market, and holding the same back from sale, until the demand shall so far outrun the limited supply as to advance the price ab-normally. Kirkpatrick v. Bonsall, 72 Pa. 158; Wright v. Cudahy, 168 III. 86, 48 N.E. 39; United States v. Patten, C.C.N.Y., 187 F. 664, 668.
A "comer" is a condition arising when a much greater quantity of any given commodity is sold for future deliv-ery within a given period than can be purchased in the market. The buyers, who are called in the slang of the exchanges, the "longs," then insist on delivery, and thus succeed in running up the prices to a fictitious point, at which the deals are "rung out" between the dealers ny the payment oí differences, or, where the buyers insist, by actual delivery. Kent v. Miltenberger, 13 Mo.App. 503, 506.
Surveying. An angle made by two boundary Enes; the common end of two boundary Enes, which run at an angle with each other.
Lost comer. One whose location as established by the government surveyors cannot be found. The mere fact that evidence of the physical loca-tion cannot now be seen, or that no one who saw the marked comer is produced, does not neces-sarily make the comer a lost one. Goroski v. Tawney, 121 Minn. 189, 141 N.W. 102, 103; Coop-er v. Quade, 191 Iowa, 461, 182 N.W. 798, 799; Fehrman v. Bissell Lumber Co., 188 Wis. 82, 204 N.W. 582.
Obliterated cerner. One where no visible evidence remalns oí the work of the original surveyor in establish-ing it. Fellows v. Wlllett, 98 Okl. 248, 224 P. 298, 300; Fehrman v. Bissell Lumber Co., 188 Wis. 82, 204 N.W. 582.
CORNET. A commissioned officer of cavalry, abolished in England in 1871, and not existing in the United States army.
CORODIO HABENDO. The name of a writ to exact a corody of an abbey or religious house.
CORODIUM. In old English law. A corody.
CORODY. In old English law. A sum of money or allowance of meat, drink, and clothing due to the crown from the abbey or other religious house, whereof it was founder, towards the sus-tentation of such one of its servants as is thought fit to receive it. It differs from a pension, in that it was allowed towards the maintenance of any of the king’s servants in an abbey; a pension be-ing given to one of the king’s chaplains, for his better maintenance, till he may ba provided with a benefice. Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 250. See 1 Bl.Comm. 283.
COROLLARY. In Logic. A collateral or secon-dary consequence, deduction, or inference.
CORONA. The crown. Placita coronce; pleas of the crown; criminal actions or proceedings, in which the crown was the prosecutor.
CORONA MALA. In old English law. The clergy who abuse their character were so called. Blount.
CORONARE. In old records. To give the ton-sure, which was done on the crown, or in the form of a crown; to make a man a priest. Cowell.
CORONARE FILIUM. To make one’s son a priest. Homo coronatus was one who had re-ceived the first tonsure, as preparatory to superior orders, and the tonsure was in form of a corona, or crown of thorns. Cowell.
CORONATION. It "is but a royal ornament and solemnization of the royal descent, but no part of the title." By the laws of England there can be no interregnum; 7 Co.Rep. 10b.
CORONATION OATIL The oath administered to a sovereign at the ceremony of crowning or in-vesting him with the insignia of royalty, in ac-knowledgment of his right to govern the king-dom, in which he swears to observe the laws, cus-toms, and privileges of the kingdom, and to act and do all things conformably thereto. Wharton.
CORONATOR. A coroner, (q. v.) Spelman.
CORONATORE ELIGENDO. The name of a writ issued to the sheriff, commanding him to proceed to the election of a coroner.
CORONATORE EXONERANDO. In English law. The name of a writ for the removal of a coroner, for a cause which is to be therein assigned, as that he is engaged in other business, or incapaci-tated by years or sickness, or has not a sufficient éstate in the county, or lives in an inconvenient part of it.
CORONER. The name of an ancient officer of the common law, whose office and functions are continued in modern English and American ad-ministration. The coroner is an officer belonging to each county, and is charged with duties both judicial and ministerial, but chiefly the former. I,t is his special province and duty to make inquiry into the causes and circumstances of any death happening within his territory which occurs through violente or suddenly and with marks of suspicion. This examination (called the "coroner’s inquest") is held with a jury of proper persons upon view of the dead body. See Bract. fol. 121; 1 Bl.Comm. 346-348; 3 Steph.Comm. 33. In Eng-land, another branch of his judicial office is to inquire concerning shipwrecks, and certify wheth-er wreck or not, and who is in possession of the goods; and also to inquire concerning treas-ure trove, who were the finders, and where it is, and whether any one be suspected of having found and concealed a treasure. 1 Bl.Comm. 349. It be-longs to the ministerial office of the coroner to serve writs and other process, and generally to discharge the duties of the sheriff, in case of the incapacity of that officer or a vacancy in his office. On the office and functions of coroners, see, fur-ther, Cox v. Royal Tribe, 42 Or. 365, 71 Pac. 73, 60 L.R.A. 620; Lancaster County v. Holyoke, 37 Neb. 328, 55 N.W. 950, 21 L.R.A. 394.
CORONER’S COURT. In England. A tribunal of record, where a coroner holds his inquiries. Cox v. Royal Tribe, 42 Or. 365, 71 P. 73, 60 L.R.A. 620.
CORONER’S INQUEST. An inquisition or exam-ination into the causes and circumstances of any death happening by violente or under suspicious conditions within his territory, held by the coron-er with the assistance of a jury. Boisliniere v. County Com’rs, 32 Mo. 378; Ehlers v. Blood, 175 Misc. 72, 22 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 1005.
CORPORAL. Relating to the body; bodily. Should be distinguished from corporeal (q. v.)
CORPORAL IMBECILITY. Physical inability to perform completely the act of sexual intercourse; not necessarily congenital, and not invariably a permanent and incurable impotente. Griffeth v. Griffeth, 162 III. 368, 44 N.E. 820.
CORPORAL °ATM An oath, the external solem-nity of which consists in laying one’s hand upon the Gospels while the oath is administered to him. More generally, a solemn oath. Jackson v. State, 1 Ind. 185; State v. Norris, 9 N.H. 102; Com. v. Jarboe, 89 Ky. 143, 12 S.W. 138.
The terms "corporal oath" and "solemn oath" are, in Indiana, at least, used synonymously; and an oath taken with the uplifted hand may be properly -.deserlbed by either term.
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT. Physical punish-ment as distinguished from pecuniary punishment or a fine; any kind of punishment of or inflicted on the body, such as whipping or the pillory; the term may or may not include imprisonment, ac-cording to the context. Ritchey v. People, 22 Colo. 251, 43 P. 1026; Fowler v. American Mail Line, C. C.A.Cal., 69 F.2d 905, 907.
The use of rubber hose or other weapon to suppress a threatened riot or to prevent prisoner from doing bodily harm to an officer or another inmate is not corporal punish-ment. O’Brien v. Olson, 42 Cal.App.2d 449, 109 P.2d 8, 16.0
CORPORAL TOUCH. Bodily touch; actual phys-ical contact; manual apprehension CORPORALE SACRAMENTUM. In old English law. A corporal oath.
CORPORALIS INJURIA NON RECIP1T
MATIONEM DE FUTURO. A personal injury does not receive satisfaction from a future course of proceeding, [is not left for its satisfaction to a future course of proceeding.] Bac. Max. reg. 6; Broom, Max. 278.
CORPORATE. Belonging to a corporation; as a corporate name. Incorporated; as a corporate body.
CORPORATE ACT OR MINISTERIAL ACT OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. For which it can be held fiable is act which is done by virtue of powers exercised for municipality’s own advan-tage or in negligent performance of duty speci-fically imposed by statute. Broome v. City of Charlotte, 208 N.C. 729, 182 S.E. 325, 326.
CORPORATE ALTER EGO, DOCTRINE OF. Means that courts ignoring forms and looking to substance will regard stockholders as owners of corporation’s property, or as the real parties in interest whenever it is necessary to do so to prevent fraud which might otherwise be perpe-trated, to redress a wrong which might otherwise go without redress, or to do justice which might otherwise fail. Geary v. Cain, 79 Utah 268, 9 P. 2d 396, 398.
CORPORATE AUTHORITIES. The title given in statutes of several states to the aggregate body of officers of a municipal corporation, or to cer-tain of those officers (excluding the others) who are vested with authority in regard to the par-ticular matter spoken of in the statute, as, taxa-tion, bonded debt, regulation of the sale of liquors, etc. See People v. Knopf, 171 Ill. 191, 49 N.E. 424; State v. Andrews, 11 Neb. 523, 10 N.W. 410; White v. Papillion Drainage Dist., 96 Neb. 241, 147 N.W. 218, 219; Schaeffer v. Bonham, 95 III. 382.
CORPORATE BODY. This term, or its equiva-lent "body corporate," is applied to private cor-porations aggregate; not including municipal cor-porations. Cedar County v. Johnson, 50 Mo. 225; East Oakland Tp. v. Skinner, 94 U.S. 256, 24 L.Ed. 125; County Board of Education for Houston County v. Hunt, 29 Ga.App. 665, 116 S.E. 900.
CORPORATE BONDS. A written promise by a corporation under sea] to pay a fixed sum of money at some future time named, with stated interest payable at some fixed time or intervals, given in return for money or its equivalent re-ceived by the corporation, sometimes secured, and sometimes not. Hammond Lumber Co. v. Adams, 7 Ca1.2d 24, 59 P.2d 1030, 1031.
CORPORATE FRANCHISE. The right to exist and do business as a corporation; the right or privilege granted by the state or government to the persons forming an aggregate private cor-poration, and their successors, to exist and do busi-ness as a corporation and to exercise the rights and powers incidental to that forro of organizaton or necessarily implied in the grant. Bank of California v. San Francisco, 142 Cal. 276, 75 Pac. 832, 64 L.R.A. 918; State on inf. Wear v. Business Men’s Athletic Club, 178 Mo.App. 548, 163 S.W. 901, 907.
CORPORATE LEGAL INDIVIDUAL. Municipal corporation possesses two kinds of power, govern-mental and public, and proprietary and private, and in exercise of former, corporation is a "muni-cipal government," while as to latter, it is a "cor-porate legal individual." Herkimer County v. Vil-lage of Herkimer, 251 App.Div. 126, 295 N.Y.S. 629, 633.
CORPORATE NAME. When a corporation is erected, a name is always given to it, or, suppos-ing none to be actually given, will attach to it by ,implication, and by that name alone it must sue and be sued, and do all legal acts, though a very minute variation therein is not material, and the name is capable of being changed (by competent authority) without affecting the identity or capa-city of the corporation. Wharton.
CORPORATE PURPOSE. In reference to muni-cipal corporations, and especially to their powers of taxation, a "corporate purpose" is one which shall promote the general prosperity and the wel-fare of the municipality. Dickinson v. Salt Lake City, 57 Utah 530, 195 P. 1110, 1111; City of Quit-man v. Jelks & McLeod, 139 Ga. 238, 77 S.E. 76; People ex rel. Moshier v. City of Springfield, 370 III. 541, 19 N.E.2d 598, 602; or a purpose necessary or proper to carry into effect the object of the creation of the corporate body, People v. School Trustees, 78 III. 140; or one which is germane to the general scope of the objects for which the corporation was created or has a legitimate con-nection with those objects and a manifest relation thereto. Weightman v. Clark, 103 U.S. 256, 26 L. Ed. 392; Denman v. City of Tacoma, 170 Wash. 406, 16 P.2d 596, 597.
CORPORATION. An artificial person or legal en-tity created by or under the authority of the laws of a state or nation, composed, in some rare in-stances, of a single person and his successors, being the incumbents of a particular office, but ordinarily consisting of an association of numer-ous individuals, who subsist as a body politic un-der a special denomination, which is regarded in law as having a personality and existence distinct from that of its several members, and which is, by the same authority, vested with the capacity of continuous succession, irrespective of changes in its membership, either in perpetuity or for a limit-ed term of years, and of acting as a unit or single individual in matters relating to the common pur-pose of the association, within the scope of the powers and authorities conferred upon such bodies by law. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 636, 657, 4 L.Ed. 629; U. S. v. Trinidad Coal Co., 137 U.S. 160, 11 S.Ct. 57, 34 L.Ed. 640; Andrews Bros. Co. v. Youngstown Coke Co., 86 F. 585, 30 C.C.A. 293; Porter v. Railroad Co., 76 III. 573; Nebraska Wheat Growers’ Ass’n v. Smith, 115 Neb. 177, 212 N.W. 39, 44; State v. ThistleDown Jockey Club, 114 Ohio St. 582, 151 N.E. 709, 711; Congdon v. Congdon, 160 Minn. 343, 200 N.W. 76, 87; Forest City Mfg. Co. v. International La-dies’ Garment Workers’ Union, Local No. 104, 233 Mo.App. 935, 111 S.W.2d 934; In re Crown Heights Hospital, 183 Misc. 563, 49 N.Y.S.2d 658, 660; Froe-lich and Kuttner, of Manila, P. I., v. Sutherland, 57 App.D.C. 294, 22 F.2d 870, 872.
A franchise possessed by one or more individ-uals, who subsist as a body politic, under a special denomination, and are vested by the policy of the law with the capacity of perpetual succession, and of acting in several respects, however numerous the association may be, as a single individual. 2 Kent, Comm. 267.
An artificial person or being, endowed by law with the capacity of perpetual succession; consisting either of a single individual, (termed a "corporation sole,") or of a collection of several individuals, (which is termed a "cor-poration aggregate.”) 3 Steph.Comm. 166; 1 131.Comm. 467, 469. An intellectual body, created by law, composed of individuals united under a common name, the members of which succeed each other, so that the body continues always the same, notwithstanding the change of the indi-viduals who compose it, and which, for certain purposes, is considered a natural person. Civil Code La. art. 427.
"corporation" is more nearly a method than a thing, and the law, in deallng with a corporation, need not define It as a person or entity, or even as an embodiment of func-tions, rlghts, and duties. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Pierson, 222 N.Y.S. 532, 543, 130 Misc. 110.
The statement that a "corporation" is an artificial per-son or entity, apart from its members, 1s merely a descrip-tion, in figurative language, of a corporation viewed as a collective body. McIntosh v. Dakota Trust Co., 52 N.D. 752, 204 N.W. 818, 825, 40 A.L.R. 1021.
A corporation is a collection of natural persons, joined together by their voluntary action or by legal cornpulsion, by or under the authority of an act of the Legislature, consisting either of a special charter or of a general per-missive statute, to accomplish some purpose, pecuniary, ideal, or governmental, authorized by the charter or gov-erning statute. State v. Knights of Ku Klux Klan, 117 Kan. 564, 232 P. 254, 257, 37 A.L.R. 1267.

Classification

According to the accepted definitions and rules, corporations are classified as follows:
Public and prívate. A public corporation is one created by the state for political purposes and to act as an agency in the administration of civil government, generally within a particular terri-tory or subdivision of the state, and usually in-vested, for that purpose, with subordinate and lo-cal powers of legislation; such as a county, city, town, or school district. These are also some-times called "political corporations." Goodwin v. East Hartford, 70 Conn. 18, 38 A. 876; Dean v. Davis, 51 Cal. 409; Ten Eyck v. Canal Co., 18 N.J. Law, 200, 37 Am.Dec. 233; Murphy v. Mercer County, 57 N.J.Law, 245, 31 A. 229; Van Campen v. Olean General Hospital, 210 App.Div. 204, 205 N.Y.S. 554, 555; Providence Engineering Corpora-tion v. Downey Snipbuilding Corporation, C.C.A. N.Y., 294 F. 641, 646; National Bank of Commerce in New Orleans v. Board of Sup’rs of La. State University and Agricultural and Mechanical cor-lege, 206 La. 913, 20 So.2d 264, 269.
Private corporations are those founded by and composed of private individuals, for prívate purposes, as distinguished from governmental pur-poses, and having no political or governmental franchises or duties. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R. Co., C.C.Cal., 18 F. 385, 402; People v. McAdams, 82 III. 361; Providence En-gineering Corporation v. Downey Shipbuilding Corporation, C.C.A.N.Y., 294 F. 641, 648.
The true distinction between public and private cor-porations is that the former are organized for govern-mental purposes, the latter not. The term "public" has sometímes been applied to corporations of which the gov-ernment owned the entice stock, as in the case of a state bank. But bearing in mind that "public" is here equiva-lent to "political," It will be apparent that this is a mis-nomen Again the fact that the business or operatlons of a corporation may directly and very extensively affect the general public (as in the case of a railroad company or a bank or an lnsurance company) is no reason for calling it a public corporation. If organized by prívate persons for their own advantage,—or even if organized for the benefit of the public generally, as in the case of a free public hospital or other charitable institution,—it is none the less a prívate corporation, if it does not possess govern-mental powers or functions. The uses may in a sense be called "public," but the corporation is "private," as much so as if the franchises were vested in a single person. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 562, 4 L.Ed. 629; Ten Eyek v. Canal Co., 18 N.J.Law, 204, 37 Am.Dec. 233. It is to be observed, howe,ver, that those corporations whICh serve the public or contribute to the comfort and convenience of the general public, though owned and man-aged by private Interests, are now (and quite appropri-ately) denominated "public-service corporations." See infra. Another distinction between public and prívate cor-porations is that the former are not voluntary associations (as the latter are) and that there is no contractual rela-tion between the government and a public corporation or between the Individuals who compose It. Mor.Priv.Corp. § 3; Goodwin v. East Hartford, 70 Conn. 18, 38 A. 876.
The tercos "public" and "municipal," as applied to cor-porations, are not convertible. All municipal corporations are public, but not vice versa. Brown v. Board of Educa-tion, 108 Ky. 783, 57 S.W. 612. But there may also be "public" corporations which are not "municipal" even in this wider sense of the latter term. Such, according to some of the authorities, are the "irrIgation distrlets" now known in several of the western states. Irrigation Dist. v. Collins, 46 Neb. 411, 64 N.W. 1086. Compare Herring v. Modesta Irrigation Dist., C.C.Cal., 95 F. 705.
Ecclesiastical and lay. In the English law, all corporations private are divided into ecclesiasti-cal and lay, the former being such corporations as are composed exclusively of ecclesiastics or-ganized for spiritual purposes, or for administer-ing property held for religious uses, such as bish-ops and certain other dignitaries of the church and (formerly) abbeys and monasteries. 1 Bl. Comm. 470. Lay corporations are those composed of laymen, and existing for secular or business purposes. This distinction is not recognized in American law. Corporations formed for the pur-pose of maintaining or propagating religion or of supporting public religious services, according to the rites of particular denominations, and inci-dentally owning and administering real and per-sonal property for religious uses, are called "re-ligious corporations," as distinguished from busi-ness corporations; but they are "lay" corpora-tions, and not "ecclesiastical" in the sense of the English law. Robertson v. Bullions, 11 N.Y. 243.
Eleemosynary and civil. Lay corporations are classified as "eleemosynary" and "civil;" the for-mer being such as are created for the distrihution of alms or for the administration of charities or for purposes falling under the description of "charitable" in its widest sense, including hospi-tals, asylums, and colleges; the latter being or-ganized for the facilitating of business transac-tions and the profit or advantage of the members. 1 Bl.Comm. 471; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 660, 4 L.Ed. 629.
In the law of Louisiana, the term "civil" as applied to corporations, Is used in a different sense, being contrasted with "religious." Civil corporations are those which relate to temporal police; such are the corporations of the cities, the companies for the advancement of commerce and agri-culture, literary societies, colleges or universities founded for the instruction of youth, and the like. Religious cor-porations are those whose establishment relates only to rellgion; such are the congregations of the different reli-gious persuasions. Clv.Code La. art. 431.
Aggregate and sole. A corporation sole is one consisting of one person only, and his successors in some particular station, who are incorporated by ‘law in order to give them some legal capaci-ties and advantages, particularly that of perpe-tuity, which in their natural persons they could not have had. In this sense, the sovereign in Eng-land is a sole corporation, so is a bishop, so are some deans distinct from their several chapters, and so is every parson and vicar. 3 Steph.Comm. 168, 169; First Parish v. Dunning, 7 Mass. 447; Reid v. Barry, 93 Fla. 849, 112 So. 846, 859.
A corporation aggregate is one composed of a number of individuals vested with corporate pow-ers; and a "corporation," as the word is used in general popular and legal speech, and as defineci at the head of this title, means a "corporation aggregate."
Domestic and foreign. With reference to the laws and the courts of any given state, a "domes-tic" corporation is one created by, or organized un-der, the laws of that state; a "foreign" corpora-tion is one created by or under the laws of anoth-er state, government, or country. In re Grand Lodge, 110 Pa. 613, 1 A. 582; Fowler v. Chilling-worth, 94 Fla. 1, 113 So. 667, 669; In re Ewles’ Estate, 105 Utah 507, 143 P.2d 903, 905.
Close and open. A "close" corporation is one in which the directors and officers have the power to fill vacancies in their own number, without allow-ing to the general body of stockholders any choice or vote in their election. An "open" corporation is one in which all the members or corporators have a vote in the election of the directors and other officers. McKim v. Odom, 3 Bland, Md., 416.
A close corporation is one which fills its own vacancies or In which power of voting is held through manipuiation under fixed and virtually perpetual proxies. Brooks v. Willcuts, C.C.A.Minn., 78 F.2d 270, 273.
Subsidiary and parent. Subsidiary corporation is one in which another corporation (called par-ent "corporation) owns at least a majority of the shares, and thus has control. Wheeler v. New York, N. H. and H. R. Co., 112 Conn. 510, 153 A. 159, 160; International Order of Twelve Knights and Daughters of Tabor v. Fridia, Tex.Civ.App., 91 S.W.2d 404.Other Compound and Descriptive Terms
A business corporation. One formed for the purpose of transacting business in the widest sense of that term, including not only trade and commerce, but manufacturing, mining, banking, insurance, transportation, and practically every form of commercial or industrial activity where the purpose of the organization is pecuniary prof-it; contrasted with religious, charitable, educa-tional, and other like organizations, which are sometimes grouped in the statutory law of a state under the general designation of "corporations not for profit." Winter v. Railroad Co., 30 Fed.Cas. 329; McLeod v. College, 69 Neb. 550, 96 N.W. 265.
Corporation de facto. One existing under color of law and in pursuance of an effort made in good faith to organize a corporation under the statute; an association of men claiming to be a legally in-corporated company, and exercising the powers and functions of a corporation, but without actual lawful authority to do so. Foster v. Hare, 26 Tex. Civ.App. 177, 62 S.W. 541; Cedar Rapids Water Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 118 Iowa, 234, 91 N.W. 1081; Tulare Irrig. Dist. v. Shepard, 185 U.S. 1, 22 S.Ct. 531, 46 L.Ed. 773; Evens v. Anderson, 132 Minn. 59, 155 N.W. 1040, 1041.
Its elements are a law or charter authorizing such a corporatlon, an attempt in good faith to comply with law authorizing its incorporation, and unintentional omission of essential requirements of the law or charter, and exer-cise in good faith of corporate functions under the law or charter. Richmond v. Town of Largo, 155 Fla. 226, 19 So.2d 791, 793.
Corporation de jure. That which exists by rea-son of full compliance by incorporators with re-quirements of an existing law permitting organiza-tion of such corporation; it is impregnable to as-sault in the courts from any source. Henderson v. School Dist. No. 44, 75 Mont. 154, 242 P. 979, 980.
Joint-stock corporation. This differs from a joint-stock company in being regularly incorporat-ed, instead of being a mere partnership, but re-sembles it in having a capital divided finto shares of stock. Most business corporations (as distin-guished from eleemosynary corporations) are of this character.
A "joint-stock corporation" is one organized under a general statute authorizing the creation of such corpora-tions and providing the procedure for creating it, and Is distinguished from a "corporation" created by special resolution or act of the Legislature, which resolution or act is the charter of the corporation, when accepted, and the corporation organized thereunder, and the corporation is a chartered corporation, as distinguished from a joint-stock corporation. Barber v. Morgan, 89 Conn. 583, 94 A. 984, 986, Ann.Cas.1916E, 102.
Migratory corporation. A corporation, organ-ized under laws of another state than that of in-corporators’ residence for purpose of doing all or greater part of their business in state of their residence or in other state than that of incorpora-tion. Toklan Royalty Corporation v. Tiffany, 193 OkI. 120, 141 P.2d 571, 573.
Moneyed corporations are, properly speaking, those dealing in money or in the business of re-ceiving deposits, loaning money, and exchange; but in a wider sense the term is applied to all busi-ness corporations having a money capital and em-ploying it in the conduct of their business. Mu-tual Ins. Co. v. Erie County, 4 N.Y. 444; In re California Pac. R. Co., 4 Fed.Cas. 1,060; Ilobbs v. National Bank, C.C.A.N.Y., 101 F. 75, 41 C.C.A. 205.
Municipal corporations. See that title.
Public-service corporations. Those whose op-erations serve the needs of the general public or conduce to the comfort and convenience of an en-tire community, such as railroads, gas, water, and electric light companies. The business of such companies is said to be "affected with a public interest," and for that reason they are subject to
legislative regulation and control to a greater ex-tent than corporations not of this character. Washington & C. Ry. Co. v. Mobile & O. R. Co., C.C.A.Ala., 255 F. 12, 14.
Quasi corporations. Organizations resembling corporations; municipal societies or similar bodies which, though not true corporations in all respects, are yet recognized, by statutes or im-memorial usage, as persons or aggregate corpora-tions, with precise duties which may be enforced, and privileges which may be maintained, by suits at law. They may be considered quasi corpo-rations, with limited powers, co-extensive with the duties imposed upon them by statute or usage, but restrained from a general use of the authority which belongs to those metaphysical persons by the common law. Scates v. King, 110 III. 456; Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U.S. 552, 23 L.Ed. 440.
This term is lacking In definiteness and precision. It appears to be applied Indiscriminately (a) to all kinds of municipal corporations, the word "quasi" being introduced because it is said that these are not voluntary organiza-tions like private corporations, but created by the legisla-ture for its own purposes and without reference to the wishes of the people of the territory affected; (b) to all municipal corporations except clties and incerporated towns, the latter being considered the only true municipal corporations because they exist and act under charters or statutes of incorporation while counties, school districts, and the Ilke are merely created or set off under general laws; (c) to municipal corporations possessing only a low order of corporate existence or the most limited range of corporate powers, such as hundreds in England, and coun-ties, villages, and school districts in America.
A term applied to those bodies, or municipal socleties, which, though not vested with the general powers of cor-porations, are yet recognized, by statutes or immemorial usage, as persons, or aggregate corporations, with precise duties, which may be enforced, and privileges, which may be maintained, by suits at law. State v. Hagen, 136 La. 868, 67 So. 935, 936.
There Is a well-defined and marked distinction between municipal corporations proper and political or quasi cor-porations. Cities, towns, and villages are municipal cor-porations proper, while counties, townships, school dis-tricts, road districts, and the like are quasi corporations. City of East Cleveland v. Board of Education of City School Dist. of East Cleveland, 112 Ohio St. 607, 148 N. E. 350, 351.
"Quest corporation" is a phrase used to designate bodies which possess a limited number of corporate powers, and which are low down in the scale or grade of corporate existence, and is generaily applied to a body which exer-cises certain functions of a corporate character, but which has not been created a corporation by any statute, general or special. Eakle v. Board of Education of Independent School Dist. of Henry, 97 W.Va. 434, 125 S.E. 165, 167.

Quasi public corporation. This term is some-times applied to corporations which are not strict-ly public, in the sense of being organized for gov-ernmental purposes, but whose operations con-tribute to the comfort, conveniente, or welf are of the general public, such as telegraph and tele-phone companies, gas, water, and electric light companies, and irrigation companies. More com-monly and more correctly styled "public-service corporations." Wiemer v. Louisville Water Co., C.C.Ky., 130 F. 251; Campbell v. Watson, 62 N.J. Eq. 396, 50 A. 120; Burgess v. City of Brockton, 235 Mass. 95, 126 N.E. 456, 460; Van Valkenburgh v. Ford, Tex.Civ.App., 207 S.W. 405, 414; Borough of Mt. Union v. Kunz, 290 Pa. 356, 139 A. 118, 121.
There Is a large class oí private corporations which on account of special franchises conferred on them owe a duty to the public which they may be compelled to perform. This class of corporations is known as public service cor-porations, and in legal phraseology as "(lilas( public cor-porations," or corporations affected with a public interest. A "quasi public corporation" may be said to be a private corporation which has given to it certain powers of a pub-lic nature, such, for Instante, as the power of eminent domain, in order to enable it to dlscharge its duties for the public beneflt, in which respect it differs from an ordinary prívate corporation, the powers of which are given and exercised for the exclusive advantage of its stockhold-ers. State ex rel. Coco v. Riverside Irr. Co., 142 La. 10, 76 So. 216, 218.
The term Is also applied to corporations of that class sometimes called "quasi municipal corporations," such as school districts; Courtright v. Consolidated Independent School Dist. of Mapleton, 203 Iowa, 26, 212 N.W. 368 369: road distrícts; Road Improvement Dist. No. 7 of Poinsett County, Ark., v. Guardian Savings & Trust Co., C.C.A. Ark., 298 F. 272, 274; Taylor Coal Co. v. Board of Drain-age Com’rs of Ohio County, 189 Ky. 793, 225 S.W. 368, 369; irrigation districts; Bonneville Irr. Dist. v. Ririe, 57 Utah, 306, 195 P. 204, 205; and counties, townshlps, etc. Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Board of Com’rs of Everglades Drain-age Dist., 77 Fla. 742, 82 So. 346, 350.
Spiritual corporations. Corporations, the mem-bers of which are entirely spiritual persons, and incorporated as such, for the furtherance of reli-gion and perpetuating the rights of the church.
Trading corporations. A commercial corpora-tion engaged in buying and selling. The word "trading," is much narrower in scope than "busi-ness," as applied to corporations, and though a trading corporation is a business corporation, there are many business corporations which are not trading companies. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 669, 4 L.Ed. 629; Adams v. Railroad Co., 1 Fed.Cas. 92.
Tramp corporations. Companies chartered in one state without any intention of doing business therein, but which carry on their business and op-erations wholly in other states. State v. Georgia Co., 112 N.C. 34, 17 S.E. 10, 19 L.R.A. 485.
Synonyms
The words "company" and "corporation" are commonly used as interchangeable terms. In strictness, however, a company is an association of persons for business or other purposes, em-bracing a considerable number of individuals, which may or may not be incorporated. In the former case, it is legally a partnership or a joint-stock company; in the latter case, it is properly called a "corporation." Goddard v. Railroad Co., 202 III. 362, 66 N.E. 1066. For the particulars in which corporations differ from "Joint-Stock Com-panies" and "Partnerships," see those titles.
CORPORATION ACT. In English law. The stat-ute 13 Car. II. St. 2, c. 1; by which it was pro-vided that no person should thereafter be elected to office in any corporate town that should not, within one year previously, have taken the sacra-ment of the Lord’s Supper, according to the cites of the Church of England; and every person so elected was also required to take the oaths of al-legiance and supremacy. 3 Steph.Comm. 103, 104; 4 Bl.Comm. 58. This statute is now repealed. 4 Steph.Comm. 511.
CORPORATION COURTS. Certain courts in Vir-ginia described as follows: "For each city of the state, there shall be a court called a `corporation court,’ to be held by a judge, with like qualifica-tions and elected in the same manner as judges of the county court." Code Va.1887, § 3050, Code 1919, § 5905.
CORPORATOR. A member of a corporation ag-gregate. Grant, Corp. 48; Seaborn v. Wingfield, 56 Nev. 260, 48 P.2d 881, 883.
CORPORE ET ANIMO. Lat. By the body and by the mind; by the physical act and by the men-tal intent. Dig. 41, 2, 3.
CORPOREAL. A term descriptive of such things as have an objective, material existence; percepti-ble by the senses of sight and touch; possessing a real body. Opposed to incorporeal and spiritual. Sullivan v. Richardson, 33 Fla. 1, 14 So. 692; Bour-land v. State, 133 Tex.Cr.R. 544, 112 S.W.2d 720, 721.
There Is a distinction between "corporeal" and "corpo-ral." The former term means "possessing a body," that is, tangible, physical, material; the latter rneans "relating to or affecting a body," that is, bodily, externa’. Corpo-real denotes the nature or physical existence of a body; corporal denotes its exterior or the co-ordination of it with some other body. Hence we speak of "corporeal heredita-ments," but of "corporal punishment," "corporal touch," "corporal oath," etc.
CORPOREAL IIEREDITAMENTS. See Heredita-ments.
CORPOREAL PROPERTY. Such as affects the senses, and may be seen and handled, as opposed to incorporeal próperty, which cannot be seen or handled, and exists only in contemplation. Moz-ley & Whitley.
Thus a house is corporeal, but the annual rent payable for its occupation is incorporeal. Corporeal property is, if movable, capable of manual transfer; if immovable, pos-session of it may be delivered up. But incorporeal prop-erty cannot he so transferred, but some other means must be adopted for its transfer, of which the most usual is an instrument in writing.
In Roman law, the dlstinction between things corporeal and incorporeal rested on the cense of touch; tangible objects only were considered corporeal. In modero law. all things which may be perceived by any of the bodily senses are termed corporeal, although a common definition of the word includes nierely that which can be touched and seen. 14a C.J. 1424 (citing Ahbott’s Dict.). Marnett Oil & Gas Co. v. Munsey, Tex.Civ.App., 232 S.W. 867, 869; Sulllvan v. Richardson, 33 Fía. 1, 116, 14 So. 692.

The term "property," however, is a generle term of extensive application. 32 Cyc. 647. In its strict legal sense, "property" is nothing but the right of dominion, possession, and disposition which may be acquired over physical things. Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 III. 66, 35 N.E. 62, 22 L.R.A. 340; Fears v. State, 102 Ga. 274, 29 S.E. 463; De Lauder v. Baltimore County, 94 Md. 1, 50 A. 427. It follows that from that point of view, there Is no such thing as "tangible" property or "corporeal" property, and the only ineaniríg which can in law be given to the expreseion "corporeal property" is the right to possess, use, occupy, and enjoy corporeal things and take the profits thereof. Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Emmerson, 298 III. 394, 131 N.E. 645, 648, 16 A.L.R. 507.
CORPS DIPLOMATIQUE. In international law. Ambassadors and diplomatic persons at any court or capital.
CORPSE. The dead body of a human being. 1 Russ. & R. 366, n.; 2 Terco 733; 1 Leach 497; Com. v. Loring, 8 Pick., Mass., 370; Dig. 47. 12. 3. 7; 11. 7. 38; Code, 3. 44. 1; Co. 3d Inst. 203; 1 Russ.Cr. 629.
CORPUS. (Lat.) Body; an aggregate or mass, ( of men, laws, or articles;) physical substance, as distinguished from ihtellectual conception; the principal sum or capital, as distinguished from in-terest or income. In re Barron’s Will, 163 Wis. 275, 155 N.W. 1087, 1089; United States Trust Co. of New York v. Heye, 181 App.Div. 544, 168 N.Y.S. 1051, 1057; Macy v. Ladd, 128 Misc. 732, 219 N.Y.S. 449, 460; In re Schley, 181 ,App.Div. 931, 173 N.Y.S. 317, 319.
A substantial or positive fact, as distinguished from what is equivocal and ambiguous. The cor-pus delicti (body of an offense) is the fact of its having been actually committed. Best, Pres. 269- 279. ‘
A corporeal act of any kind, (as distinguished from animus or mere intention,) on the part of him who wishes to acquire a thing, whereby he obtains the physical ability to exercise his Power over it whenever he pleases. The word occurs frequently in this sense in the civil law. Mackeld. Rom.Law, § 248.
Corpus comitatus. The body of a county. The whole county, as distinguished from a part of it, or any particular place in it. U. S. v. Grush, 5 Mason, 290, Fed.Cas.No.15,268.
Corpus corporatum. A corporation; a corporate body, other than municipal.
Corpus cum causa. (The body with the cause.) An English writ which issued out of chancery, to remove both the body and the record, touching the cause of any man lying in execution upon a judgment for debt, into the king’s bench, there to remain until he satisfied the judgment. Cowell; Blount.
Corpus delicti. The body of a crime. The body (material substance) upon which a crime has been committed, e. g., the corpse of a murdered man, the charred remains of a house burned down. In a derivative sense, the substance or foundation of a crime; the substantial fact that a crime has been committed. People v. Dick, 37 Cal. 281;White v. State, 49 Ala. 347; Goldman v. Com., 100 Va. 865, 42 S.E. 923; State v. Schyhart, Mo. Sup., 199 S.W. 205, 211; State v. Brown, 103 S.C. 437, 88 S.E. 21, 22, L.R.A.1916D, 1295; State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 83 P.2d 1010, 1014. When applied to any particular offense, the actual com-mission by some one of particular offense charged. Gorum v. State, 60 Okl.Cr. 248, 63 P.2d 765, 766.
Corpus pro corpore. In old records. Body for body. A phrase expressing the liability of manu-captors. 3 How.State Tr. 110.
CORPUS CHRISTI DAY. In English law. A feast instituted in 1264, in honor of the sacrament. 32 Hen. VIII. c. 21.
CORPUS HUMANUM NON RECIPIT ilESTIMA-TIONEM. The human body does not admit of valuation. Hob. 59.
CORPUS JURIS. A body of law. A term used to signify a book comprehending several collections of law. There are two principal collections to which this name is given ; the Corpus Juris Civilis, and the Corpus Juris Canonici. Also name of an encyclopEedic statement of the principles of Anglo-American law.
Corpus juris canonici. The body of the canon law. A compilation of the canon law, comprising the decrees and canons of the Roman Church, con-stituting the body of ecclesiastical law of that church.
Corpus juris civilis. The body of the civil law. The system of Roman jurisprudence compiled and codified under the direction of the emperor Jus-tinian, in A.D. 528-534. This collection comprises the Institutes, Digest, (or Pandects,) Code, and Novels. The name is said to have been first ap-plied to this collection early in the seventeenth century.
CORRECT ATTEST. These words, used before the signatures of bank directors to reports made to the commissioner of banking, mean not alone to bear witness, but to afllrm to be true or germ-ine, and such words are appropriately used for the affirmation of persons in their officio’ capacity to attest the truth of a writing. Eland State Bank v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., ,165 Wis. 493, 162 N.W. 662, 663.
CORRECTED POLICY. Policy issued after inves-tigation of risk to correct misstatements in policy first issued. Sherri v. National Surety Co., of New York, 243 N.Y. 266, 153 N.E. 70, 71.
CORRECTION. Discipline; chastisement admin-istered by a master or other person in authority to one who has committed an offense, for the pur-pose of curing his faults or bringing hirn into prop-er subjection.
CORRECTION, HOUSE OF. A prison for the ref-ormation of petty or juvenile offenders.
CORRECTOR OF THE STAPLE. In old English law. A clerk belonging to the staple, to write and record the bargains of merchants there made.

CORREGIDOR. In Spanish law. A magistrate who took cognizance of various misdemeanors, and of civil matters. 2 White, New Recop. 53.
CORREL Lat. In the civil law. Co-stipulators; joint stipulators.
CORREI CREDENDI. In the civil and Scotch law. Joint creditors ; creditors in solido. Poth. Obi. pt. 2, c. 4, art. 3, § 11.
CORRE! DEBENDI. In Scotch law. Two or more persons bound as principal debtors to another. Ersk.Inst. 3, 3, 74.
CORRELATIVE. Having a mutual or reciprocal relation, in such sense that the existence of one necessarily implies the existence of the other. Father and son are correlative terms. Claim and duty are correlative terms.
CORRESPONDENCE. Interchange of written communications. The letters written by a person and the answers written by the one to whom they are addressed.
CORROBORATE. To strengthen; to add weight or credibility to a thing by additional and con-firming facts or evidence. Lassiteo v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 171 N.C. 283, 88 S.E. 335, 337; Bradley v. State, 19 Ala.App. 578, 99 So. 321, 322; Holmes v. State, 70 Tex.Cr.R. 423, 157 S.W. 487, 493; State v. Fullerton Lumber Co., 35 S.D. 410, 152 N.W. 708, 715; Kincaid v. State, 131 Tex.Cr. R. 101, 97 S.W.2d 175, 177.
The expression "corroboratlng circumstances" clearly does not mean facts which, independent of a confession, will warrant a conviction; for then the verdict would stand not on the confession, but upon those Independent circumstances. To corroborate is to strengthen, to confirni by additional security, to add strength. The testimony of a witness is said to be corroborated when it is shown to correspond with the representation of some other witness, or to comport with some facts otherwlse known or estab-lished. Corroborating circumstances, then, used in refer-ence to a confession, are such as serve to strengthen it, to render it more probable; such, in short, as may serve to impress a jury with a belief in its truth. State v. Guild, 10 N. J. Law, 163, 18 Am. Dec. 404.
CORROBORATING EVIDENCE. Evidence sup-plementary to that already given and tending to strengthen or confirm it; additional evidence of a different character to the same point. In re Cardoner’s Estate, 27 N.M. 105, 196 P. 327, 328; State v. Smith, 75 Mont. 22, 241 P. 522, 523; People v. Follette, 74 Cal.App. 178, 240 P. 502, 519; Rad-cliffe v. Chavez, 15 N.M. 258, 110 P. 699, 701.
CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE. See Corroborat-ing Evidence.
CORRUPT. Spoiled; tainted; vitiated; de-praved; debased. Webster.
CORRUPT INTENT. A "corrupt intent," as an element of usury, consists in the charging or re-ceiving of excessive interest with knowledge that it is prohibited by law and the purpose to violate the law. Ector v. Osborne, 179 N.C. 667, 103 S.E. 388, 389, 13 A.L.R. 1207; Teshner v. Roome, 106 Or. 382, 212 P. 473, 474. But see Dege v. Produce Exchange Bank of St. Paul, 212 Minn. 44, 2 N.W.
2d 423, 425, which only requires intent to receive more than the law permits for forbearance of money, but does not require that taker knows that he is violating usury law.
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT. The Act of June 25, 1910, c. 392, 36 Stat. 822, which, like the Eng-lish act of 1883 and supplements, dealt with "cor-rupt and illegal practices" in connection with elections, and which was repealed by the "Federal Corrupt Practices Act" of Feb. 28, 1925, c. 368, Title III, 2 U.S.C.A. § 241 et seq.
CORRUPTIO OPTIMI EST PESSIMA. Corrup-tion of the best is worst. Jacobs v. Beecham, 221 U.S. 263, 31 S.Ct. 555, 55 L.Ed. 729.
CORRUPTION. Illegality; a vicious and fraudu-lent intention to evade the prohibitions of the law; something against or forbidden by law; moral turpitude or exactly opposite of honesty involving intentional disregard of law from im-proper motives. State v. Barnett, 60 Okl.Cr. 355, 69 P.2d 77, 87.
An act done with an intent to give some advan-tage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others. Johnson v. U. S., C.C.A.Alaska, 260 F. 783, 786.
The act of an official or flduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. U. S. v. Johnson, C.C.Ga., 26 F. 682; Worsham v. Murchison, 66 Ga. 719; U. S. v. Edwards, C.C.Ala., 43 F. 67.
CORRUPTION OF BLOOD. In English law. The consequence of attainder, being that the at-tainted person could neither inherit lands or other hereditaments from his ancestor, nor retain those he already had, nor transmit them by descent to any heir, because his Blood was considered in law to be corrupted. Avery v. Everett, 110 N.Y. 317, 18 N.E. 148, 1 L.R.A. 264; 1 Steph.Comm. 446. This was abolished by St. 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 106, and 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23, and is unknown in America. Const.U.S. art. 3, § 3.
CORRUPTLY. When used in a statute, this term generally imports a wrongful design to acquire some pecuniary or other advantage. Grebe v. State, 112 Neb. 715, 201 N.W. 143, 144; Bosselman v. U. S., C.C.A.N.Y., 239 F. 82, 86; State v. Ship-man, 202 N.C. 518, 163 S.E. 657.
CORSELET. Ancient armor which covered the body.
CORSE-PRESENT. In old English law. A mor-tuary, thus terfned because, when a mortuary belame due on the death of a man, the best or second-best beast was, according to custom, offered or presented to the priest, and carried with the co-pse. In Wales a corse-present was due upon the death of a clergyman to the bishop of the dio-cese, till abolished by 12 Anne St. 2, c. 6. 2 Bl. Comm. 426; Stat. 21 Hen. VIII. cap. 6; Cowell.
CORSNED, In Saxon law. The morsel of execra. tion. A species of ordeal in use among the Sax-ons, performed by eating a piece of bread over which the priest had pronounced a certain im-precation. If the accused ate it freely, he was pro-nounced innocent; but, if it stuck in his throat, it was considered as a proof of his guilt. Crabb, Eng.Law, 30; 1 Reeve, Eng.Law, 21; 4 Bl.Comm. 345; Spelman, Gloss. 439.
CORTES. The name of the legislative assemblies, the parliament or congress, of Spain and Portugal.
CORTEX. The bark of a tree; the outer covering of anything.
CORTIS. A court or yard before a house.
CORTULARIUM, or CORTARIUM. In old rec-ords. A yard adjoining a country farm.
CORVÉE. In French law. Gratuitous labor ex-acted from the villages or communities, especially for repairing roads, constructing bridges, etc. State v. Covington, 125 N.C. 641, 34 S.E. 272.
CORVÉE SEIGNEURIALE. Services due the lord of the manor. Guyot, Rép.Univ.; 3 Low.C. 1.
COSA JUZGADA. In Spanish law. A cause or matter adjudged, (res judicata.) White, New Recop. b. 3, tit. 8, note.
COSAS COMUNES. In Spanish law. A term cor-responding to the res communes of the Roman law, and descriptive of such things as are open to the equal and common enjoyment of all per-sons and not to be reduced to private ownership, such as the air, the sea, and the water of running streams. Hall, Mex.Law, 447; Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 707.
COSBERING. See Coshering.
COSDUNA. In feudal law. A custom or tribute.
COSEN, COZEN. In old English law. To cheat. "A cosening knave." 3 Leon. 171.
COSENAGE. (Also spelled "Cosinage," "Cousin-age.") In old English law. A writ that lay for the heir where the tresail, i. e., the father of the besail, or great-grandfather, was seised of lands in fee at his death, and a stranger entered upon the land and abated. Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 221; 3 Bla. Comm. *186.
Kindred; cousinship; relationship; affinity. Stat. 4 Hen. III. cap. 8; 3 Bla.Comm. 186; Co. Litt. 160a.
COSENING. In old English law. An offense, mentioned in the old books, where anything was done deceitfully, whether belonging to contracts or not, which could not be properly termed by any special name. The same as the stellionatus of the civil law. Cowell; West.Symb. pt. 2, Indict-ment, § 68; Blount; 4 Bla.Comm. 158.
COSHERING. In old English law. A feudal pre-rogative or custom for lords to lie and feast them-selves at their tenants’ houses. Cowell.
COSMOPATH1C. Open to the access of super-normal knowledge or emotion supposedly from a
preternatural world;— applied to methods of heal-ing. Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 221 Mass. 184, 108 N.E. 893, 895, Ann.Cas.1916A, 858.
COSMUS. Clean. Blount.
COSS. A term used by Europeans in India to de-note a road-measure of about two miles, but dif-fering in different parts. Wharton.
COST. Expense. Barton v. Bowlin, 111 Ark. 123, 163 S.W. 502, 504. The price paid, as for an ani-de purchased for exportation, with all incidental charges paid at the place of exportation. Goodwin v. U. S., 2 Wash.C.C. 493, Fed.Cas.No.5,554. The amount originally expended in performing a par-ticular act or operation, or for production or con-struction, as of a building. Kempf v. Ranger, 132 Minn. 64, 155 N.W. 1059, 1060; Hoggson Bros. v. Spiekerman, 161 N.Y.S. 930, 933, 175 App.Div. 144. Cost is sometimes used as equivalent to "value." Loughney v. Klein, C.C.A.Pa., 221 F. 197, 199.
Cost-book. In English law. A book in which a number of adventurers who have obtained per-mission to work a lode, and have agreed to share the enterprise in certain proportions, enter the agreement, and from time to time the receipts and expenditures of the mine, the names of the share-holders, their respective accounts with the mine, and transfers of shares. These associations are called "Cost-Book Mining Companies," and are governed by the general law of partnership. Lindl.Partn. *147.
Cost-plus contract. One which fixes the amount to be paid the contractor on a basis, generally, of the cost of the material and labor, plus an agreed percentage thereof. The Spica, C.C.A.N.Y., 289 F. 436, 445.
Cost price. That which is actually paid for goods. Buck v. Burk, 18 N.Y. 337; Esterman-Ver-kamp Co. v. Rouse, 211 Ky. 791, 278 S.W. 124, 127.
Costs of collection. Strictly, expenses involved in endeavoring to make collection, as of a promis-sory note; but as used in or with reference to such notes, the phrase is synonymous with attorney’s Pees. McClain v. Continental Supply Co., 66 Okl. 225, 168 P. 815, 818; Wood v. Ferguson, 71 Mont. 540, 230 P. 592, 594. It does not refer to costs of suit, which are recoverable by law. Cox v. Hagan, 125 Va. 656, 100 S.E. 666, 674.
CO-STIPULATOR. A joint promisor.
COSTS. A pecuniary allowance, made to the suc-cessful party, (and recoverable from the losing party,) for his expenses in prosecuting or defend-ing a suit or a distinct proceeding within a suit. Stevens v. Bank, 168 N.Y. 560, 61 N.E. 904; Ben-nett v. Kroth, 37 Kan. 235, 15 P. 221, 1 Am.St.Rep. 248; Pezel v. Yerex, 56 Cal.App. 304, 205 P. 475, 478; In re Leary’s Estate, 172 Misc. 286, 14 N.Y.S. 2d 960, 961.
Expenses pending sun as allowed or taxed by the court. Jones v. Adkins, 170 Ark. 208, 280 S.W. 389, 394.
Fees and charges required by law to be paid to the courts or some of their officers, the amount of which is fixed by law. Blair v. Brownstone Oil & Refining Co., 20 Cal.App. 316, 128 P. 1022.
Costs and fees were originally altogether different in their nature. The one is an allowance to a party for expenses incurred in prosecuting or defending a suit; the other, a compensation to an officer for services rendered in the progress of a cause. Therefore, while an executor or admlnistrator was not personally liable to his adversary for costs, yet, if at his instance an officer performed serv-ices for hím, he had a personal demand for his fees. Mus-ser v. Good, 11 Serg. & R., Pa., 247. Moreover, costs are an incident to the judgment; lees are compensation to public officers for services rendered IndIviduals not in the course of litigation. Tillman v. Wood, 58 Ala. 579.
In Georgia, however, it ls held that "costs," include. all charges fixed by statute as compensation for services ren-dered by ofiicers of the court in the progress of the cause. Walton County v. Dean, 23 Ga.App. 97, 97 S.E. 561, 562.
There is no general or controllIng provision or principie of law to the effect that attorney fees that may by statute be recovered by the winning party against the losing party in a suit or action are, or should be regarded as, costs in the case. "Costs" do not include attorney fees unless such lees are by a statute denominated costs or are by statute allowed to be recovered as costs in the case. State ex rel. Royal Ins. Co. v. Barrs, 87 Fla. 168, 99 So. 668, 669; McRostie v. City of Owatonna, 152 Minn. 63, 188 N.W. 52, 54; Littlefield v. Scott, Tex.Civ.App., 244 S.W. 824, 826; Calman v. Cox, Mo.App., 296 S.W. 845, 846; City of Los Angeles v. Abbott, 217 Cal. 184, 17 P.2d 993, 996.
But the word "costs" is frequently understood as Includ-ing attorney fees. McClain v. Continental Supply Co., 66 Okl. 225, 168 P. 815, 817; Lívesley v. Strauss, 104 Or. 356, 207 P. 1095; Lonoke County v. Reed, 122 Ark. 111, 182 S.W. 563, 564; J. I. Case Plow-Works v. J. I. Case Thresh-ing Mach. Co., 162 Wis. 185, 155 N.W. 128, 138.
In England, the term "costs" is also used to designate the charges which an attorney or solici-. tor is entitled to make and recover from his client,, as his remuneration for professional services,, such as legal advice, attendances, drafting and copying documents, conducting legal proceedings, etc.
Bill of Costs. A certified, itemized statement of the amount of costs in an action or suit.
Certificate for Costs. In English practice, a cer-tificate or memorandum drawn up and signed by the judge before whom a case was tried, setting out certain facts, the existente of which must be thus proved before the party is entitled, under the statutes, to recover costs.
Cost Bond, or Bond for Costs. A bond given by a party to an action to secure the eventual pay-ment of such costs as may be awarded against him.
Costs de Incremento. Increased costs, costs of increase. Costs adjudged by the court in addi-tion to those assessed by the jury. Day v. Wood-worth, 13 How. 372, 14 L.Ed. 181.
Those extra expenses incurred which do not sopear on the face of the proceedings, such as witnesses’ expenses, lees to counsel, attendances, court fees, etc. Wharton.
Costs cf the Day. Costs which are incurred in preparing for the trial of a cause on a specified day, consisting of witnesses’ fees, and other fees of attendance. Archb.N.Prac. 281; Ad.Eq. 343.
Costs to Abide Event. When an order is made by an appellate court reversing a judgment, with "costs to abide the event," the costs intended by
the order include those of the appeal, so that, if the appellee is finally successful, he is entitled to tax the costs of the appeal. First Nat. Bank v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 84 N.Y. 469; Casualty Co. of America v. A. L. Swett Electric Light & Power Co., 121 Misc. 268, 200 N.Y.S. 796, 801.
Double Costs. The ordinary single costs of suit, and one-half of that amount in addition. 2 Tidd, Pr. 987. "Double" is not used here in its ordinary sense of "twice" the amount. Van Aulen v. Deck-er, 2 N.J.Law, 108; Gilbert v. Kennedy, 22 Mich. 19. But see Moran v. Hudson, 34 N.J.Law, 531. These costs are now abolished in England by St. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 97. Wharton.
Final Costs. Such costs as are to be paid at the end of the suit; costs, the liability for which de-pends upon the final result of the litigation. Good-year v. Sawyer, C.C.Tenn., 17 F. 8.
Interlocutory Costs. In practice. Costs accru-ing upon proceedings in the intermediate stages of a cause, as distinguished from final costs; such as the costs of motions. 3 Chit.Gen.Pr. 597; Good-year v. Sawyer, C.C.Tenn., 17 F. 6.
Security for Costs. In practice. A security which a defendant in an action may require of a plaintiff who does not reside within the jurisdic-tion of the court, for the payment of such costs as may be awarded to the defendant. 1 Tidd, Pr. 534. Ex parte Louisville & N. R. Co., 124 Ala. 547, 27 So. 239.
Treble Costs. A rate of costs given in certain actions, consisting, according to its technical im-port, of the common costs, half of these, and hall of the latter. 2 Tidd, Pr. 988. The word "treble," in this application, is not understood in its literal sense of thrice the amount of single costs, but signifies merely the addition together of the three sums fixed as aboye. Id. Treble costs have been abolished in England, by St. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 97. In American law. In Pennsylvania and New Jersey the rule is different. When an act of assembly gives treble costs, the party is allowed three times the usual costs, with the exception that the fees of the officers are not to be trebled when they are not regularly or usually payable by the defendant. Shoemaker v. Nesbit, 2 Rawle, Pa., 203; Welsh v. Anthony, 16 Pa. 256; Mairs v. Sparks, 5 N.J.Law, 516.
COSTUMBRE. In Spanish law. Custom; an un-written law established by usage, during a long space of time. Las Partidas, pt. 1, tit. 2, 1. 4.
CO—SURETIES. Joint sureties; two or more sureties to the same obligation. State of Arkan-sas v. Pufahl, C.C.A.Ark., 52 F.2d 116, 120; French v. Young, 292 Mich. 443, 290 N.W. 861, 862, 863.
COTA. A cot or hut. Blount.
COTAGIUM. In old English law. A cottage.
COTARIUS. In old English law. A cottager, who held in free socage, and paid a stated fine or rent in provisions or money, with some occasional per-soof which is fixed by law. Blair v. Brownstone Oil & Refining Co., 20 Cal.App. 316, 128 P. 1022.
Costs and fees were originally altogether different in their nature. The one is an allowance to a party for expenses incurred in prosecuting or defending a suit; the other, a compensation to an officer for services rendered in the progress of a cause. Therefore, while an executor or admlnistrator was not personally liable to his adversary for costs, yet, if at his instance an officer performed serv-ices for hím, he had a personal demand for his fees. Mus-ser v. Good, 11 Serg. & R., Pa., 247. Moreover, costs are an incident to the judgment; lees are compensation to public officers for services rendered IndIviduals not in the course of litigation. Tillman v. Wood, 58 Ala. 579.
In Georgia, however, it ls held that "costs," include. all charges fixed by statute as compensation for services ren-dered by ofiicers of the court in the progress of the cause. Walton County v. Dean, 23 Ga.App. 97, 97 S.E. 561, 562.
There is no general or controllIng provision or principie of law to the effect that attorney fees that may by statute be recovered by the winning party against the losing party in a suit or action are, or should be regarded as, costs in the case. "Costs" do not include attorney fees unless such lees are by a statute denominated costs or are by statute allowed to be recovered as costs in the case. State ex rel. Royal Ins. Co. v. Barrs, 87 Fla. 168, 99 So. 668, 669; McRostie v. City of Owatonna, 152 Minn. 63, 188 N.W. 52, 54; Littlefield v. Scott, Tex.Civ.App., 244 S.W. 824, 826; Calman v. Cox, Mo.App., 296 S.W. 845, 846; City of Los Angeles v. Abbott, 217 Cal. 184, 17 P.2d 993, 996.
But the word "costs" is frequently understood as Includ-ing attorney fees. McClain v. Continental Supply Co., 66 Okl. 225, 168 P. 815, 817; Lívesley v. Strauss, 104 Or. 356, 207 P. 1095; Lonoke County v. Reed, 122 Ark. 111, 182 S.W. 563, 564; J. I. Case Plow-Works v. J. I. Case Thresh-ing Mach. Co., 162 Wis. 185, 155 N.W. 128, 138.
In England, the term "costs" is also used to designate the charges which an attorney or solici-. tor is entitled to make and recover from his client,, as his remuneration for professional services,, such as legal advice, attendances, drafting and copying documents, conducting legal proceedings, etc.
Bill of Costs. A certified, itemized statement of the amount of costs in an action or suit.
Certificate for Costs. In English practice, a cer-tificate or memorandum drawn up and signed by the judge before whom a case was tried, setting out certain facts, the existente of which must be thus proved before the party is entitled, under the statutes, to recover costs.
Cost Bond, or Bond for Costs. A bond given by a party to an action to secure the eventual pay-ment of such costs as may be awarded against him.
Costs de Incremento. Increased costs, costs of increase. Costs adjudged by the court in addi-tion to those assessed by the jury. Day v. Wood-worth, 13 How. 372, 14 L.Ed. 181.
Those extra expenses incurred which do not sopear on the face of the proceedings, such as witnesses’ expenses, lees to counsel, attendances, court fees, etc. Wharton.
Costs cf the Day. Costs which are incurred in preparing for the trial of a cause on a specified day, consisting of witnesses’ fees, and other fees of attendance. Archb.N.Prac. 281; Ad.Eq. 343.
Costs to Abide Event. When an order is made by an appellate court reversing a judgment, with "costs to abide the event," the costs intended by
the order include those of the appeal, so that, if the appellee is finally successful, he is entitled to tax the costs of the appeal. First Nat. Bank v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 84 N.Y. 469; Casualty Co. of America v. A. L. Swett Electric Light & Power Co., 121 Misc. 268, 200 N.Y.S. 796, 801.
Double Costs. The ordinary single costs of suit, and one-half of that amount in addition. 2 Tidd, Pr. 987. "Double" is not used here in its ordinary sense of "twice" the amount. Van Aulen v. Deck-er, 2 N.J.Law, 108; Gilbert v. Kennedy, 22 Mich. 19. But see Moran v. Hudson, 34 N.J.Law, 531. These costs are now abolished in England by St. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 97. Wharton.
Final Costs. Such costs as are to be paid at the end of the suit; costs, the liability for which de-pends upon the final result of the litigation. Good-year v. Sawyer, C.C.Tenn., 17 F. 8.
Interlocutory Costs. In practice. Costs accru-ing upon proceedings in the intermediate stages of a cause, as distinguished from final costs; such as the costs of motions. 3 Chit.Gen.Pr. 597; Good-year v. Sawyer, C.C.Tenn., 17 F. 6.
Security for Costs. In practice. A security which a defendant in an action may require of a plaintiff who does not reside within the jurisdic-tion of the court, for the payment of such costs as may be awarded to the defendant. 1 Tidd, Pr. 534. Ex parte Louisville & N. R. Co., 124 Ala. 547, 27 So. 239.
Treble Costs. A rate of costs given in certain actions, consisting, according to its technical im-port, of the common costs, half of these, and hall of the latter. 2 Tidd, Pr. 988. The word "treble," in this application, is not understood in its literal sense of thrice the amount of single costs, but signifies merely the addition together of the three sums fixed as aboye. Id. Treble costs have been abolished in England, by St. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 97. In American law. In Pennsylvania and New Jersey the rule is different. When an act of assembly gives treble costs, the party is allowed three times the usual costs, with the exception that the fees of the officers are not to be trebled when they are not regularly or usually payable by the defendant. Shoemaker v. Nesbit, 2 Rawle, Pa., 203; Welsh v. Anthony, 16 Pa. 256; Mairs v. Sparks, 5 N.J.Law, 516.
COSTUMBRE. In Spanish law. Custom; an un-written law established by usage, during a long space of time. Las Partidas, pt. 1, tit. 2, 1. 4.
CO—SURETIES. Joint sureties; two or more sureties to the same obligation. State of Arkan-sas v. Pufahl, C.C.A.Ark., 52 F.2d 116, 120; French v. Young, 292 Mich. 443, 290 N.W. 861, 862, 863.
COTA. A cot or hut. Blount.
COTAGIUM. In old English law. A cottage.
COTARIUS. In old English law. A cottager, who held in free socage, and paid a stated fine or rent in provisions or money, with some occasional per-sonal services. See Coterellus.nal services. See Coterellus.

COTENANCY. A tenancy by several distinct titles but by unity of possession, or any joint ownership or common interest with its grantor. Shepard v. Mt. Vernon Lumber Co., 192 Ala. 322, 68 So. 880, 881, 15 A.L.R. 23. The term is broad enough to comprise both tenancy in common and joint ten-ancy. Caldwell v. Farrier, Tex.Civ.App., 248 S.W. 425, 427.
COTERELLI. Anciently, a kind of peasantry who were outlaws; robbers. Blount.
COTERELLUS. In feudal law. A cottager; a servile tenant, who held in mere villenage; his person, issue, and goods were disposable at the lord’s pleasure. A coterellus, therefore, occupied a fess favorable position than a cotarius (q. v.), for the latter held by socage tenure. Cowell.
COTERIE. A fashionable association, or a knot of persons forming a particular circle. The origin of the term was purely commercial, signifying an association, in which each member furnished his part, and bore his Share in the profit and loss. Wharton.
COTESWOLD. In old records. A place where there is no wood.
COTLAND. In old English law. Land held by a cottager, whether in socage or villenage. Cowell; Blount.
COTSETHLA. In old English law. The little seat or mansion belonging to a small farm.
COTSETHLAND. The seat of a cottage with the land belonging to it. Spelman.
COTSETUS. A cottager or cottage-holder who held by servile tenure and was bound to do the work of the lord. Cowell.
COTTAGE. In English law. A small dwelling-house that has no land belonging to it. Shep. Touch. 94; Emerton v. Selby, 2 Ld.Raym. 1015; Scholes v. Hargreaves, 5 Term, 46; Hubbard v. Hubbard, 15 Adol. & E. (N.S.) 240; Gibson v. Brockway, 8 N.H. 470, 31 Am.Dec. 200. It has been held that the term includes a two-family house, not being limited to a structure for the use of only one family. Jones v. Mulligan, N.J.Ch., 121 A. 608, 609.
COTTIER TENANCY. A species of tenancy in Ireland, constituted by an agreement in writing, and subject to the following terms: That the ten-ement consists of a dwelling-house with not more than half an acre of land; at a rental not exceed-ing £5 a year; the tenancy to be for not more than a month at a time; the landlord to keep the house in good repair. Landlord and Tenant Act, Ireland, 23 & 24 Vict. c. 154, § 81.
COTTOLENE. A registered trade-mark name for cooking fat. Imperial Cotto Sales Co. v. N. K. Fairbanks Co., 50 App.D.C. 250, 270 F. 686, 687.
COTTON. A term which is applicable to such substance in whatever state it exists after it has been gathered and bef ore it is manufactured into some article of merchandise, whether the seed
Black’s Law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed. —27

have been removed at the gin or whether it is lint cotton in the seed or in the bale. Freeman v. State, 156 Ark. 592, 247 S.W. 51.
COTTON GIN. A term sometimes used as synony-mous with ginhouse. State v. Rodgers, 168 N.C. 112, 83 S.E. 161, 162.
COTTON LINTERS. Called also "linters." An inferior grade of cotton, obtained by reginning cot-ton seed. Commercial Union Assur. Co., Limited, of London, England, v. Creek Cotton Oil Co., 96 Okl. 189, 221 P. 499, 501.
COTTON MILL OF FACTORY. One which manu-factures cotton from the raw state into a finished product. Dumas v. State, 17 Ala.App. 492, 86 So. 162, 163.
COTTON NOTES. Receipts given for each bale of cotton received on storage by a public ware-house. Fourth Nat. Bank v. St. Louis Cotton Compress Co., 11 Mo.App. 337.
COTTON SEASON. The season for buying and selling cotton between September 1 and the follow-ing May 1. Morris v. Hellums Co., 131 Ark. 585, 199 S.W. 927, 928.
COTUCA. Coat armor.
COTUCHANS. A term used in Domesday for peasants, boors, husbandmen.
COUCHANT. Lying down; squatting. Couchant and levant (lying down and rising up) is a term applied to animals trespassing on the land of one other than their owner, for one night or longer. 3 Bl.Comm. 9.
COUCHER, or COURCHER. A factor who con-tinues abroad for traffic, (37 Edw. III. c. 16;) also the general book wherein any corporation, etc., register their acts, (3 & 4 Edw. VI. c. 10.)
COULISSE. The stockbrokers’ curb market in Paris.
COUNCIL. An assembly of persons for the pur-pose of concerting measures of state or municipal policy; hence called "councillors."
In American Law. The legislative body in the government of cities or boroughs. An advisory body selected to aid the executive; particularly in the colonial period (and at present in some of the United States) a body appointed to advise and as-sist the governor in his executive or judicial ca-pacities or both. Opinion of the Justices, 14 Mass. 470; Opinion of the Justices, 3 Pick., Mass., 517; In re Adams, 4 Pick., Mass., 25; Answers of the Justices, 70 Me. 570.
Common Council. In American law. The lower or more numerous branch of the legislative assem-bly of a city. In English law. The councillors of the city of London. The parliament, also, was anciently called the "common council of the realm." Fleta, 2, 13.
Privy Council. See that title.

Select Council. The name given, in some states, to the upper house or branch of the council of a City.
COUNCIL OF CONCILIATION. By the Act 30 & 31 Vict. c. 105, power is given for the crown to
grant licenses for the formation of councils of conciliation and arbitration, consisting of a certain number of masters and workmen in any trade or employment, having power to hear and determine all questions between masters and workmen which may be submitted to them by both parties, arising out of or with respect to the particular trade or manufacture, and incapable of being otherwise settled. They have power to apply to a justice to enforce the performance of their award. The members are elected by persons engaged in the trade. Davis, Bldg.Soc. 232; Sweet.
COUNCIL OF JUDGES. Under the English judi-cature act, 1873, § 75, an annual council of the judges of the supreme court is to be held, for the purpose of considering the operation of the new practice, offices, etc., introduced by the act, and of reporting to a secretary of state as to any al-terations which they consider should be made in the law for the administration of justice. An ex-traordinary council may also be convened at any time by the lord chancellor. Sweet.
COUNCIL OF THE BAR. A body composed of members of the English bar which governs the bar. It hears complaints against barristers and reports its findings with recommendations to the benchers of the Inn of Court of which the barrister is a member, who alone can act. Leaming, Phila. Lawy. in Lond. Courts 67.
COUNCIL OF THE NORTH. A court instituted by Henry VIII. in 1537, to administer justice in Yorkshire and the four other northern counties. Under the presidency of Stratford, the court showed great rigor, bordering, it is alleged, on harshness. It was abolished by 16 Car. I., the same act which abolished the Star Chamber. Brown.
COUNSEL. 1. In practice. An advocate, coun-sellor, or pleader. 3 Bl.Comm. 26; 1 Kent, Comm. 307. One who assists his client with advice, and pleads for him in open court. One who has been admitted as an attorney and counsellor at law. Baker v. State, 9 Okl.Cr. 62, 130 P. 820, 821. See Counsellor.
Counsellors who are associated with those reg-ularly retained in a cause, either for the purpose of advising as to the points of law involved, or pre-paring the case on its legal side, or arguing ques-tions of law to the court, or preparing or conduct-ing the case on its appearance before an appellate tribunal, are said to be "of counsel."
2. Knowledge. A grand jury is sworn to keep secret "the commonwealth’s counsel, their fel-lows’, and their own."
3. Advice given by one person to another in regard to a proposed line of conduct, claim, or con-tention. State v. Russell, 83 Wis. 330, 53 N.W. 441.
The words ”counsel" and "advise" may be, and fre-quently are, used in criminal law to describe the offense of a person who, not actually doing the felonious act, by his will contributed to it or procured it to be done. Omer v. Com., 95 Ky. 353, 25 S.W. 594.
Counsel’s signature. This is required, in some jurisdictions, to be affixed to pleadings, etc., as affording the court a means of judging whether they are interposed in good faith and upon legal grounds. It has been held that the word "counsel" in this connection denotes a person capable of testifying, and that a certificate bearing only the firm signatures of partnerships of attorneys is in-sufficient. Benedict v. Seiberling, D.C., 17 F.2d 831, 838.
Junior counsel. The younger of the counsel em-ployed on the same side of a case, or the one lower in standing or rank, or who is intrusted with the less important parts of the preparation or trial of the cause.
COUNSELLOR. An advocate or barrister. A member of the legal profession whose special func-tion is to give counsel or advice as to the legal aspects of judicial controversies, or their prepara-tion and management, and to appear in court for the conduct of trials, or the argument of causes, or presentation of motions, or any other legal business that takes him into the presence of the court.
In some of the states, the two words "counsellor" and "attorney" are used interchangeably to designate all lawyers. In others, the latter term alone is used, "coun-sellor" not being recognized as a technical name. In still others, the two are associated together as the full legal titie of any person who has been admitted to practice in the courts; while In a few they denote different grades, it being prescribed that no one can become a counsellor until he has been an attorney for a specified time and has passed a second examination.
In the practice of the United States supreme court, the term denotes an officer who is employed by a party in a cause to conduct the same on its trial on his behalf. He differs from an attorney at law.
In the supreme court of the United States, the two degrees of attorney and counsel were at first kept separate, and no person was permitted to practice in both capacities, but the present practice is otherwise. Weeks, Attys. at Law, 54. It is the duty of the counsel to draft or review and correct the special pleadings, to manage the cause on trial, and, during the whole course of the suit, to apply established principies of law to the exigencies of the case. 1 Kent, Comm. 307.
COUNT, v. In pleading. To declare; to recite; to state a case; to narrate the facts constituting a plaintiff’s cause of action. In a special sense, to set out the claim or count of the demandant in a real action.
To plead orally; to plead or argue a case in court; to recite or read in court; to recite a count in court.
Count upon a statute. To make express refer-ence to it, as by the words "against the form of the statute" (or "by the force of the statute") "in such case made and provided." Richardson v. Fletcher, 74 Vt. 417, 52 A. 1064.
"Pleading the statute" is stating the facts which bring the case within it, and "counting" on it is making express reference to it by apt terms to show the source of right relied on. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. State, 73 Fla. 609, 74 So. 595, 599,

COUNT, n. In pleading. The plaintiff’s state-ment of his cause of action. The different parts of a declaration, each of which, if it stood alone, would constitute a ground for action. Used also to signify the several parts of an indictment, each charging a distinct offense. Boren v. State, 23 Tex.App. 28, 4 S.W. 463; Bailey v. Mosher, C. C.A.Neb., 63 F. 490, 11 C.C.A. 304; Ryan v. Riddle, 109 Mo.App. 115, 82 S.W. 1117.
"Count" and "charge" when used relative to allegations In an indictment or information are synonymous. State v. Thornton, 142 La. 797, 77 So. 634, 636; State v. Puckett, 39 N.M. 511, 50 P.2d 964, 965.
Count sur concessit solvere. A claim based upon a promise to pay;—a count in the mayor’s court of London. Under it the plaintiff can sue for any liquidated demand, but not for money due under a covenant. Particulars defining more precisely the nature of the claim must be delivered with the declaration. Odger, C. n 1029.
Common counts. Certain general counts or forms inserted in a declaration in an action to recover a money debt, not founded on the circum-stances of the individual case, but intended to guard against a possible variante, and to enable the plaintiff to take advantage of any ground of liability which the proof may disclose, within the general scope of the action. Nugent v. Teauchot, 67 Mich. 571, 35 N.W. 254.
In the action of assumpsit, these counts are as follows: For goods sold and delivered, or bargained and sold; for work done; for money lent ; for money paid; for money received to the use of the plaintiff; for interest; or for money due on an account stated.
General count. One stating in a general way the plaintiff’s claim. Wertheim v. Casualty Co., 72 Vt. 326, 47 A. 1071.
Money counts. A species of common counts, so called from the subject-matter of them; embrac-ing the indebitatus assumpsit count for money lent and advanced, for money paid and expended, and for money had and received, together with the insimul computassent count, or count for money due on an account stated. 1 Burrill, Pr. 132.
Omnibus count. A count which combines in one all the money counts with one for goods sold and delivered, work and labor, and an account stated. Webber v. Tivill, 2 Saund. 122; Griffin v. Murdock, 88 Me. 254, 34 A. 30.
Several counts. Where a plaintiff has several distinct causes of action, he is allowed to pursue them cumulatively in the same action, subject to certain rules which the law prescribes. Wharton.
Special count. As opposed to the common counts in pleading, ‘a special count is a statement of the actual facts of the particular case, or a count in which the plaintiff’s claim is set forth with all needed particularity. Wertheim v. Cas-ualty Co., 72 Vt. 326, 47 A. 1071.
COUNT. (Fr. comte; from the Latin comes.) An earl.
It gave way as a distinct title to the Saxon earl, but was retained in countess, viscount, and as the basis of county. Termes de la ley; 1 Bla.Comm. 398.
COUNT-OUT. In English parliamentary law. Forty members form a house of commons; and, though there be ever so many at the beginning of a debate, yet, if during the course of it the house should be deserted by the members, till reduced below the number of forty, any one member may have it adjourned upon its being counted; but a debate may be continued when only one member is left in the house, provided no one choose to move an adjournment. Wharton.
The words "count and count-out" refer to the count of the house of commons by the speaker. Forty members, Including the speaker, are required to constitute a quorum. Each day after parliament is opened, the speaker counts the house. If forty members are not present he watts till four o’clock, and then counts the house again. If forty members are not then present, he at once adjourns it to the following meeting day. May, Parl.Prac. 219.
COUNTEE. In old English law. The most emi-nent dignity of a subject before the Conquest. He was prcefectus or prcepositus comitatus, and had the charge and custody of the county; but this authority is now vested in the sheriff. 9 Coke, 46.
COUNTENANCE. In old English law. Credit; estimation. Wharton. Also, encouragement; aid-ing and abetting. Cooper v. Johnson, 81 Mo. 487.
COUNTER, n. (Spelled, also, "Compter.") The name of two prisons formerly standing in London, but now demolished. They were the Poultry Counter and Wood Street Counter. Cowell; Whish.L.D.; Coke, 4th Inst. 248.
COUNTER, adj. Adverse; antagonistic; oppos-ing or contradicting; contrary. Silliman v. Eddy, 8 How.Prac., N.Y., 122.
Counter-affidavit. An affidavit made and pre-sented in contradiction or opposition to an affidavit which is made the basis or support of a motion or application.
Counter-bond. In old practice. A bond of in-demnity. 2 Leon. 90.
Counterclaim. See that title.
Counter-deed. A secret writing, either before a notary or under a private seal, which destroys, invalidates, or alters a public one.
Counter•letter. A species of instrument of de-feasance common in the civil law. It is executed by a party who has taken a deed of property, ab-solute on its face, but intended as security for a loan of money, and by it he agrees to reconvey the property on payment of a specified sum. The two instruments, taken together, constitute what is known in Louisiana as an "antichresis," (q. v,). Karcher v. Karcher, 138 La. 288, 70 So. 228, 229; Livingston v. Story, 11 Pet. 351, 9 L.Ed. 746.
Counter-mark. A sign put upon goods already marked; also the several marks put upon goods belonging to several persons, to show that they must not be opened, but in the presence of all the owners or their agents.
Counter-plea. See Plea.

Counter-security. A security given to one who has entered into a bond or become surety for another; a countervailing bond of indemnity.
COUNTERCLAIM. A claim presented by a de-fendant in opposition to or deduction from the claim of the plaintiff. A species of set-off or re-coupment introduced by the codes of civil pro-cedure in many of the states, of a broad and lib-eral character. Quoted in Wollan v. McKay, 24 Idaho, 691, 135 P. 832, 837.
It is an offensive as well as a defensive plea, which Is not necessarily confined to the justice of plaintiff’s claim, and it represents the right of the defendant to have the claims of the parties counterbalanced in whole or in part, with judgment to be entered for the excess, if any. Olsen v. McMaken & Pentzien, 139 Neb. 506, 297 N.W. 830, 833.
Its sole requisites are that it must tend to defeat or diminish plaintiff’s demand, and that demands must be reciprocal. Bond v. Farmers & Mer-chante Nat. Bank, Los Angeles, 64 Cal.App.2d 842, 149 P.2d 722, 724; Dobbins v. Horsfall, 58 Cal.
App.2d 23, 136 P.2d 35, 38.
It is in effect a new suit In which the party named as defendant under the bill is plaintiff and the party named as plaintiff under the bIll is defendant. Roberts Min. & Mill. Co. v. Schrader, C.C.A.Nev., 95 F.2d 522, 524.
The term is broader In meaning than set-off or recoup-ment, and includes them both. Williams v. Williams, 192 N.C. 405, 135 S.E. 39, 40; Frlcke v. W. E. Fuetterer Bat-tery & Supplies Co., 220 Mo.App. 623, 288 S.W. 1000, 1002; Curtis-Warner Corporation v. Thirkettle, 99 N.J.Eq. 806, 134 A. 299, 302; Otto v. Lincoln Sav. Bank of Brooklyn, 51 N.Y.S.2d 561, 563, 268 App.Div. 400; ./Etna Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 200 N.C. 251, 156 S.E. 515, 516.
The counterclaim 1s a substitute for the cross-b111 in equity. McAnarney v. Lembeck, 97 N.J.Eq. 361, 127 A. 197, 198; Vidal v. South American Securities Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 276 F. 855. It is but another name for a cross-petition, and may be so styled, especially in actions prosecuted by equi-table proceedings. Taylor v. Wilson, 182 Ky. 592, 206 S.W. 865, 866; Clark v. Duncanson, 79 Okl. 180, 192 P. 806, 809, 16 A.L.R. 450.
Under rule 30 of Federal rules in equity see Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rules 8, 13, 28 U.S.C.A., "counterclaim" means any claim, not such as to constitute a set-off, which, in equity, a defendant mlght assert against the plaintiff in the same suit. Terry Steam Turbine Co. v. B. F. Sturte-vant Co., D.C.Mass., 204 F. 103, 105.
A counterclaim may be any cause of action In favor of defendants or some of them against plaintiffs or some of them, a person whom a plaintiff represents or a plaintiff and another person or persons alleged to be liable. New York Civ.Prac.Act, § 266,
A "counterclaim" must be a cause of action, and seeks affirmative relief, while a defense merely defeats the plain-tiff’s cause of action by a denial or confession and avoid-ance, and does not admit of affirmative relief to the defend-ant. Lovett v. Lovett, 93 Fla. 611, 112 So. 768, 780; Secar v. Slver, 165 Iowa, 673, 146 N.W. 845, 847.
COUNTEREXTENSIÓN. In surgery, in connec• tion with "Buck’s extension" process, which is some uniform, continuous force or pull applied to the leg or foot below a break, to overcome the na-tural contraction of the muscles of the thigh, which have a strong tendency to pull the broken ends together and cause them to slip by each oth-er and overlap, especially when the break is ob-ligue across bone, "counterextension" denotes the pull upwards holding the body against the exten-sion downwards, effected by a splint appliance, on the upper end of which is a ring fitting around
the thigh and against the patient’s groin. Sweet v. Douge, 145 Wash. 142, 259 P. 25.
COUNTERFEIT. In criminal law. To forge; to copy or imitate, without authority or right, and with a view to deceive or defraud, by passing the copy or thing forged for that which is original or genuine. Most commonly applied to the fraud-ulent and criminal imitation of money. State v. McKenzie, 42 Me. 392; U. S. v. Barrett, D.C.N.D., 111 F. 369; DeRose v. People, 64 Colo. 332, 171 P. 359, L.R.A.1918C, 1193; Metropolitan Nat. Bank v. National Surety Co., D.C.Minn., 48 F. 2d 611, 612.
COUNTERFEIT COIN. Coin not genuine, but re-sembling or apparently intended to resemble or pass for genuine coin, including genuine coin pre-pared or altered so as to resemble or pass for coin of a higher denomination. U. S. v. Hopkins, D.C.N.C., 26 F. 443; U. S. v. Bogart, 24 Fed.Cas. 1185; U. S. v. Gellman, D.C.Minn., 44 F.Supp. 360, 363.
COUNTERFEITER. In criminal law. One who unlawfully makes base coin in imitation of the true metal, or forges false currency, or any in-strument of writing, bearing a likeness and simili-tude to that which is lawful and genuine, with an intention of deceiving and imposing upon man-kind. Thirman v. Matthews, 1 Stew., Ala., 384.
COUNTER—FESANCE. The act of forging.
COUNTER LETTER. An agreement to reconvey where property has been passed by absolute deed with the intention that it shall serve as security only. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana v. Futral, 204 La. 215, 15 So.2d 65, 73.
COUNTERMAND. A change or revocation of or-ders, authority, or instructions previously issued. It may be either express or implied; the former where the order or instruction already given is explicitly annulled or recalled; the latter where the party’s conduct is incompatible with the fur-ther continuance of the order or instruction, as where a new order is given inconsistent with the former order.
COUNTERPART. In conveyancing. The cor-responding part of an instrument; a duplicate or copy. Where an instrument of conveyance, as a lease, is executed in parts, that is, by having sev-eral copies or duplicates made and interchange-ably executed, that which is executed by the gran-tor is usually called the "original," and the rest are "counterparts"; although, where all the par-ties execute every part, this renders them all orig-inals. 2 Bl. Comm. 296; Shep. Touch. 50. Roose-velt v. Smith, 17 Misc.Rep. 323, 40 N.Y.S. 381. See Duplicate.
In granting lots subject to a ground-rent reserved to the grantor, both parties execute the deeds, of which there are two copies ; although both are original, one of them is sometimes called the counterpart. See 12 Vin.Abr. 104: Dane, Abr.Index; 7 Com.Dig. 443; Merlín, Rép. Double Ecrit.

COUNTERPART WRIT. A copy of the original writ, authorized to be issued to another county when the court has jurisdiction of the cause by reason of the fact that some of the defendants are residents• of the county or found therein. White v. Lea, 9 Lea, Tenn., 450.
COUNTER-ROLLS. In English law. The rolls which sheriffs have with the coroners, containing particulars of their proceedings, as well of ap-peals as of inquests, etc. 3 Edw. I. c. 10.
COUNTERSIGN. As a noun, the signature of a secretary or other subordinate officer to any writ-ing signed by the principal or superior to vouch for the authenticity of it. Fifth Ave. Bank v. Railroad Co., 137 N.Y. 231, 33 N.E. 378, 19 L.R.A. 331; Gurnee v. Chicago, 40 III. 167.
As a verb, to sign in addition to the signature of another in order to attest the authenticity. Winsor v. Hunt, 29 Ariz. 504, 243 P. 407, 411; Hen-ning v. American Ins. Co., 108 Kan. 194, 194 P. 647, 648; Waldo Bros. Co. v. Downing, 131 Me. 410, 163 A. 787, 789.
COUNTERVAIL. To counterbalance; to avail against with equal force or virtue; to compensate for, or serve as an equivalent of or substitute for.
COUNTERVAIL LIVERY. At common law, a re-lease was a form of transfer of real estate where some right to it existed in one person but the ac-tual possession was in another; and the posses-sion in such case was said to "countervail livery," that is, it supplied the place of and rendered unnecessary the open and notorious delivery of possession required in other cases. Miller v. Emans, 19 N.Y. 387.
COUNTERVAILING EQUITY. See Equity.
COUNTEUR. In the time of Edward I, a plead-er; also called a Nurrator, and Serjeant-Counteur. See Countors.
COUNTEZ. L. Fr. Count, or reckon. In old prac-tice. A direction formerly given by the clerk of a court to the crier, after a jury was sworn, to number them; and which Blackstone says was given in his time, in good English, "count these." 4 Bl. Comm. 340, note (u.).
COUNTING UPON A STATUTE. See Count Upon a Statute.
COUNTORS. Advocates, or serjeants at law, whom a man retains to defend his cause and speak for him in court, for their fees. 1 Inst. 17.
COUNTRY. The portion of the earth’s surface occupied by an independent nation or people, or the inhabitants of such territory.
In its primary meaning "country" signifles "place:" and, in a larger sense, the territory or dominions occupied by a conimunity; or even waste and unpeopled sections or regions of the earth. But its metaphorical meaning is no less definite and well understood; and in common par-lance, in historical and geographical writings, in diplo-macy, legislation, treaties, and international codes, the word is employed to denote the population, the nation, the state, or the government, having possession and dominion
over a territory. Stairs v. Peaslee, 18 How. 521, 15 L.Ed. 474; U. S. v. Recorder, 1 Blatchf. 218, 225, 5 N.Y.Leg.Obs. 286, Fed.Cas.No.16,129.
The word "country" as used in treaties made by the United States government, In so far as it applies to the United States, means the states of such country. Pagano v. Cerri, 93 OhIo St. 345, 112 N.E. 1037, 1039, L.R.A.1917A, 486.
In pleading and practice. The inhabitants of a district from which a jury is to be summoned; pais; a jury. 3 BI.Comm. 349; 4 Bl. Comm. 349; Steph. Pl. 73, 78, 230.
COUNTRY WHENCE HE CAME. Within stat« ute providing for deportation of aliens means country of alien’s nativity, where domicile has not been acquired elsewhere. Immigration Act 1924, § 13, 8 U.S.C.A. § 213; 8 U.S.C.A. § 156. Schenck ex rel. Capodilupo v. Ward, C.C.A.Mass., 80 F.2d 422, 426.
Term means the country territorially rather than gov-ernmentally from which the ellen carne. Immigration Act 1917, § 20, 8 U.S.C.A. § 156. Moraitls v. Delany,
46 F.Supp. 425, 430.
But deportation to "country whence alien carne" would be complied with if the alien was returned to political dominion in exile and control of coun-try from whence he carne. Delany v. Moraitis, C.C.A.Md., 136 F.2d 129, 130, 131, 132, 133.
COUNTY. One of the civil divisions of a country for judicial and political purposes. 1 Bla. Comm. 113.
Etymologlcally, it denotes that portion of the country under the immediate government of a count or earl. 1 Bla. Comm. 116.
One of the principal subdivisions of the kingdom of England and of most of the states of the American Union, denoting a distinct portion of territory organized by itself for political and judicial purposes. In modem use, the word may denote either the territory marked off to form a county, or the citizens resident within such territory, taken collectively and considered as invested with political rlghts, or the county regarded as a municipal corporation possess-ing subordinate governmental powers, or an organized jural soclety invested with speciflc rights and duties. Eagle v. Beard, 33 Ark. 501; Wooster v. Plymouth, 62 N.H. 208; In re Becker, 179 App.Div. 789, 167 N.Y.S. 118, 119; Greb v. King County, 187 Wash. 587, 60 P.2d 690, 692.
In the English law, thls word signifles the same as Mire, -county being derived from the French, and shire from the Saxon. Both these words signlfy a circuit or portion of the realm into which the whole land is divided, for the better government thereof and the more easy administra-tion of justice. There is no part of England that is not within some county; and the shírereeve (sheriff) was the governor of the province, under the comes, earl, or count.
Counties are political subdivisions of the state, created to aid in the administration of state law for the purpose of local self-government. Hunt v. Mohave County, 18 Ariz. 480, 162 P. 600, 602; Board of Com’rs of Osborne County v. City of Osborne, 104 Kan. 671, 180 P. 233, 234; Divide County v. Baird, 55 N.D. 45, 212 N.W. 236, 243, 51 A.L.R. 296; Dolezal v. Bostick, 41 Okl. 743, 139 P. 964, 968; Mid-dlesex County v. City of Waltham, 278 Mass. 514, 180 N.E. 318, 319, and hence not "municipal corporations." Housing Authority of Birmingham Dist. v. Morris, 244 Ala. 557, 14 So.2d 527, 535.
Counties are held in some jurisdictions to be municipal corporations. Mosier v. Cowan, 295 Mich. 27, 294 N.W. 85, 86; Pacific Fruit & Produce Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission, D.C.Or., 41 F.Supp. 175, 179; and are some-times said to be involuntary municipal corporations. Per-kins v. Board of Com’rs of Cook County, 271 III. 449, 111 N.E. 580, 584, Ann.Cas.1917A, 27. Other cases, seeking to distinguish between the two, say that counties are agencies or political subdivisions of the state for governmental purposes, and not, llke municipal corporations, IncorporatIons of the inhabitants of specifled regions for purposes of local government. Dillwood v. Riecks, 42 Cal.App. 602, 184 P. 35, 37; Bexar County v. Linden, 110 Tex. 339, 220 S.W. 761. Counties are also said to be merely quasi corpora-tions. Breathitt County v. Hagins, 183 Ky. 294, 207 S.W. 713, 714; MacKenzie v. Douglas County, 91 Or. 375, 178 P. 350, 352; Jefferson County ex rel. Grauman v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 274 Ky. 91, 118 S.W.2d 181, 184.
"Vicinage," in its primary and literary meaning, denotes a neighborhood or vicinity; a "county,"- on the other hand, is a definitely designated territory. Commonwealth v. Collins, 268 Pa. 295, 110 A. 738, 739.
Body of the county. The county at large, as distinguished from any particular place within it; a county considered as a territorial whole. Fluke v. State, 27 Okl.Cr. 234, 226 P. 118, 120.
County affairs. Those relating to the county in its organic and corporate capacity and included within its governmental or corporate powers. Scarbrough v. Wooten, 23 N.M. 616, 170 P. 743, 744. Such as affect the people of the county in question. Bradford v. Cole, .95 Okl. 35, 217 P. 470, 471.
County attorney. The public prosecutor. Kyt-ka v. Weber County, 48 Utah, 421, 160 P. 111, 113.
A constitutional officer, acting under oath, vested with authority, and it is his duty to inquire into alleged viola-tions of law, to institute criminal proceedings, and to rep-resent the state in matters and proceedings in his county, he signs all informations, and may make application for leave to file information before examination, commitment, or admission to bail. State ex rel. Juhl v. District Court of First Judicial Dist. in and for Jefferson County, Mont,, 107 Mont. 309, 84 P.2d 979, 981, 120 A.L.R. 353.
County board of equalization. A body created for the purpose of equalizing values of property subject to taxation., Overland Co. v. Utter, 44 Idaho, 385, 257 P. 480, 482.
County board of supervisors. Is not the coun-ty, but a body of town and city officers acting for and on behalf of county in such matters as have been turned over to them by law. Cort v. Smith, 249 App.Div. 1, 291 N.Y.S. 54, 60.
County bonds. Broadly, any bonds issued by county officials to be paid for by a levy on a spe-cial taxing district, whether or not coextensive with the county. Forrey v. Board of Com’rs of Madison County, 189 Ind. 257, 126 N.E. 673.
County bridge. A bridge of the larger class, erected by the county, and which the county is 11- able to keep in repair. Boone County v. Mutchler, 137 Ind. 140, 36 N.E. 534.
County business. All business pertaining to the county as a corporate entity. City of Astoria v. Cornelius, 119 Or. 264, 240 P. 233, 235. All busi-ness of the county, and any other business of such county connected with or interrelated with the business of any other county properly within the jurisdiction of the county commissioners’ court. Glenn v. Dallas County Bois d’Arc Island Levee Dist., Tex.Civ.App., 275 S.W. 137, 145.
County conunissioners. Officers of a county, charged with a variety of administrative and ex-ecutive duties, but principally with the manage-
ment of the financial affairs of the county, its po-lice regulations, and its corporate business. Sometimes the local laws give them limited ju-dicial powers. In some states they are called "supervisors." Com. v. Krickbaum, 199 Pa. 351, 49 A. 68.
In Georgia, the term is used interchangeably with "com-missioners of roads and revenue." Morris v. Smith, 153 Ga. 438(2), 112 S.E. 468; Rhodes v. Jernigan, 155 Ga. 523, 117 S.E. 432, 434.
County corporate. A city or town, with more or less territory anhexed, having the privilege to be a county of itself, and not to be comprised in any other county; such as LondOn, York, Bris-tol, Norwich, and other cities in England. 1 Bl. Comm. 120. See State v. Finn, 4 Mo.App. 347. They differ in no material points from other counties.
County court. A court of high antiquity in England, incident to the jurisdiction of the sher-iff. It is not a court of record, but may hold pleas of debt or damages, under the value of forty shill-ings. The freehulders of the county (anciently termed the "suitors" of the court) are the real judges in this court, and the sheriff is the minis-terial officer. See 3 Bl. Comm. 35, 36; 3 Steph. Comm. 395. But in modern English law the name is appropriated to a system of tribunals estab-lished by the statute 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, having a limited jurisdiction, principally for the recovery of small debts. It is also the name of certain tribunals of limited jurisdiction in the county of Middlesex, established under the statute 22 Geo. II. c. 33. In American law. The name is used in many of the states to designate the ordinary courts of record having jurisdiction for trials at nisi prius. Their powers generally comprise or-dinary civil jurisdiction, also the charge and tare of persons and estates coming within legal guar-dianship, a limited criminal jurisdiction, appel-late jurisdiction over justices of the peace, etc.
County farm bureaus. Governmental agencies intrusted with the duty of disseminating among farmers scientific knowledge of an educational nature for the improvement of agriculture. State v. Miller, 104 Neb. 838, 178 N.W. 846, 848.
County funds. This term may include township funds, the legal title of which is in the county, which holds them for disbursement in accordance for the purpose for which they are created. Fi-delity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Wilkinson County, 109 Miss. 879, 69 So. 865, 868. See, also, State v. McGraw, 74 Mont. 152, 240 P. 812, 817. Compare Board of Education v. Wake County, 167 N.C. 114, 83 S.E. 257, 258.
County general fund. A fund raised to meet the expenses incident to county government. County Board of Education v. Austin, 169 Ark. 436, 276 S.W. 2, 5.
County jail. A place of incarceration for the punishment of minor offenses and the custody of transient prisoners, where the ignominy of con-finemeat is devoid of the infamous character which an imprisonment in the state jail or peni-tentiary carries with it. U. S. v. Greenwald, D.C. Cal., 64 F. 8.
County line. This term, when used in a stat-ute providing that the trial for an offense com-mitted on a county line may be in either county divided by such line, is not to be given the geo-metrical definition of a "line" as having neither breadth nor thickness, but includes all of a fenced public highway dividing two counties, so that a prosecution for robbery committed upon the high-way may be maintained in either county, regard-less of the side of the center line of the highway upon which the offense was committed. Stone v. People, 71 Colo. 162, 204 P. 897, 898.
County line bridge. A bridge over a stream constituting the boundary line between two coun• ties, one end of which bridge is in one county and the other end in another county. Newberry v. Hall County, 52 Ga.App. 472, 183 S.E. 664, 665.
County officers. Those whose general author-ity and jurisdiction are confined within the limits of the county in which they are appointed, who are appointed in and for a particular county, and whose duties apply only to that county, and through whom the county performs its usual po-litical functions. State v. Burns, 38 Fla. 367, 21 So. 290; State v. Glenn, 7 Heisk., Tenn., 473; In re Carpenter, 7 Barb., N.Y., 34; Hamilton v. Mon-roe, Tex.Civ.App., 287 S.W. 304, 306; State ex rel. Osborn v. Eddington, 208 Ind. 160, 195 N.E. 92.
Public °t’Icen who ffil a position usually provided for In the organization of counties and county governments, and are selected by the county to represent it continuously and as part of the regular and permanent administration of public power In carrying out certain acts with the per-formance of which It is charged in behalf of the public. Coulter v. Pool, 187 Cal. 181, 201 P. 120, 123.
County palatine. A term bestowed upon cer-tain counties in England, the lords of which in former times enjoyed especial privileges. They might pardon treasons, murders, and felonies. All writs and indictments ran in their names, as in other counties in the king’s; and all offenses were said to be done against their peace, and not, as in other places, contra pacem dontini regis. But these privileges have in modern times nearly dis-appeared. 1 Holdsw. Hist. E. L. 49; 4 Inst. 205.
County powers. Such only as are expressly provided by law or which are necessarily implied from those expressed. Hersey v. Nelson, 47 Mont. 132, 131 P. 30, 32, Ann.Cas.1914C, 963.
County property. That which a county is au-thorized to acquire, hold, and sell. State v. Brown, 73 Mont. 371, 236 P. 548, 549; State v. Po-land, 61 Mont. 600, 203 P. 352, 353.
County purposes. Those exercised by the coun-ty acting as a municipal corporatiOn. Conrad v. Shearer, 197 Iowa 1078, 198 N.W. 633, 634.
As regards the rate of taxation, all purposes for which county taxation may be levied. Test whether a tax is levied for county purposes is whether it is for strictly county uses, for which county or its inhabitants alone would benefit, or is it for a purpose in which entire state
is concerned and will profit. Public Utilities Commission v. Manley, 99 Colo. 153, 60 P.2d 913, 917. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Wright, 34 Ga.App. 88, 128 S.E. 234, 235. With reference to budgets, all legitimate components of a county budget. Garrison v. Jersey City, 92 N.J.Law, 624, 105 A. 460, 462. The term has been held to apply only to the constantly recurring expenditures, such as salaries of county officers. Obenchain v. Daggett, 68 Or. 374, 137 P. 212, 214. But it has also been held not to be equiva-lent to "current expenses." Seaboard Air-Line Ry. Co. v. Wright, 157 Ga. 722, 122 S.E. 35, 36.
County rate. In English law. An imposition levied on the occupiers of lands, and applied to many miscellaneous purposes, among which the most important are those of defraying the ex-penses connected with prisons, reimbursing to private parties the costs they have incurred in prosecuting public offenders, and defraying the expenses of the county pollee. 15 & 16 Vict. c. 81.
County road. One which lies wholly within one county, and which is thereby distinguished from a state road, which is a road lying in two or more counties. State v. Wood County, 17 Ohio, 186.
County-seat. A county-seat or county-town is the chief town of a county, where the county buildings and courts are located and the county business transacted. Williams v. Reutzel, 60 Ark. 155, 29 S.W. 374; In re Allison, 13 Colo. 525, 22 P. 820, 10 L.R.A. 790; McGregor v. Cain, 177 Ark. 474, 7 S.W.2d 13, 14.
The county town as the seat of government. Dunne v. Rock Island County, 283 III. 628, 119 N.E. 591, 595. The place where the courthouse is situated, and the district and county courts are held. Turner v. Tucker, 113 Tex. 434, 258 S.W. 149, 150.
County sessions. In England, the court of gen-eral quarter sessions of the peace held in every county once in every quarter of a year. Mozley & Whitley.
County site. The seat of government of the county. Board of Revenue of Covington County v. Merrill, 193 Ala. 521, 68 So. 971, 977. The court-house site. Board of Revenue of Jefferson County v. Huey, 195 Ala. 83, 70 So. 744, 746.
County tax. Tax exclusively for county pur-poses, in which state has no sovereign interest or respohsibility, and which has no connection with duties of county in its relation to state. Amos v. Mathews, 99 Fla. 1, 126 So, 308, 323.
County-town. The county-seat; the town in which the seat of government of the county is lo-cated. State v. Cates, 105 Tenn. 441, 58 S.W. 649.
County treasury. Not the physical place of deposit, but the funds deposited to the credit of the county. State v. Kurtz, 110 Ohio St. 332, 144 N.E. 120, 123.
County warrant. An order or warrant drawn by some duly authorized officer of the county, di-rected to the county treasurer and directing him to pay out of the funds of the county a designated sum of money to a named individual, or to his or-der or to bearer. Savage v. Mathews, 98 Ala. 535, 13 So. 328; Crawford v. Noble County, 8 Okl. 450, 58 P. 616; Quinn v. Reed, 130 Ark. 116, 197

S.W. 15, 16; Tyler v. Shelby County, Tex., C.C.A. Tex., 47 F.2d 103, 105.
Foreign county. Any county having a judicial and municipal organization separate from that of the county where matters arising in the former county are called in question, though both may lie within the same state or country.
COUPLED WITH AN INTEREST. This phrase, in the law of agency, has reference to a writing creating,.conveying to, or vesting in the agent an interest in the estate or property which is the subject of the agency, as distinguished from the proceeds or profits resulting from the exercise of the agency. George H. Rucker & Co. v. Glennan, 130 Va. 511, 107 S.E. 725, 728.
COUPONS. Interest and dividend certificates; also those parts of a commercial instrument which are to be cut, and which are evidente of some-thing connected with the contract mentioned in the instrument. They are generally attached to certificates of loan, where the interest is payable at particular periods, and, when the interest is paid, they are cut off and delivered to the payer. Wharton. Toon v. Wapinitia Irr. Co., 117 Or. 374, 243 P. 554, 556.
In England, they are known as warrants or div-idend warrants, and the securities to which they belong, debentures; 13 C. B. 372.
Coupons are written contracts for the payment of a d2finite sum of money on a given day, and being drawn and executed in a forro, and mode for the purpose, that they may be separated from the bonds and other instru-ments to which they are usually attached, it is held that they are negotiable and that a sult may be maintained on them without the necesslty of producing the bonds. Each matured coupon upon a negotiable bond 1s a separable promise, distinct from the promises to pay the bonds or the other coupons, and Oyes rise to a separate cause of action. Aurora v. West, 7 Wall. 88, 19 L.Ed. 42. Haven v. Depot Co., 109 Mass. 88; Thompson v. Perrine, 106 U.S. 589, 1 S.Ct. 564, 27 L.Ed. 298.
Coupon bonds. Bonds to which are attached coupons for the several successive installments of interest to maturity. Benwell v. Newark, 55 N. J.Eq. 260, 36 A. 668; Tennessee Bond Cases, 114 U.S. 663, 5 S.Ct. 974, 29 L.Ed. 281.
Coupon notes. Promissory notes with coupons attached, the coupons being notes for interest written at the bottom of the principal note, and designed to be cut off severally and presented for payment as they mature. Williams v. Moody, 95 Ga. 8, 22 S.E. 30.
COUR DE CASSATION. The supreme judicial tribunal of France, having appellate jurisdiction only. For an account of its composition and pow-ers, see Jones, French Bar, 22; Guyot. Repert. Univ.
COURSE. In surveying, the direction of a line with reference to a meridian.
COURSE OF BUSINESS. What is usually done in the management of trade or business. Idom v. Weeks & Russell, 135 Miss. 65, 99 So. 761, 764; In re Malschick, D.C.Pa., 217 F. 492, 494.
In Workmen’s Compensation Acts, the usual course oí business of the employer covers the normal operations which form part of the ordinary business carrled on, and not including incidental and occasional operations having for their purpose the preservation of the premises or the appliances used in the business. Walker v. Industrial Accident Commission, 177 Cal. 737, 171 P. 954, 955, L.R.A. 1918F, 212.
Commerclal paper is said to be transferred, or sales alleged to have been fraudulent may be shown to have been made, "in the course of business," or "in the usual and ordinary course of business," when the circumstances of the transaction are such as usually and ordinarily attend dealings of the same kind and do not exhibit any signs of haste, secrecy, or fraudulent intention. Walbrun v. Bab-bitt, 16 Wall. 581, 21 L.Ed. 489; Brooklyn, etc.., R. Co. v. National Bank, 102 U.S. 14, 26 L.Ed. 61.
COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT. Those words as applied to compensation for injuries within the purview of Workmen’s Compensation Acts, refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place. Fogg’s Case, 125 Me. 168, 132 A. 129, 130; Brady v. Oregon Lumber Co., 117 Or. 188, 243 P. 96, 99, 45 A.L.R. 812; Walker v. Hyde, 43 Idaho, 625, 253 P. 1104, 1105; Wilson v. Town of Mooresville, 222 N.C. 283, 22 S.E.2d 907, 910. A workman is in course of employ-ment when, within time covered by employment, he is doing something which he might reasonably do while so employed at proper place. Dambold v. Industrial Commission, 323 III. 377, 154 N.E. 128, 129; In re Employers’ Liability Assur. Cor-poration, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N.E. 697, L.R.A.1916A, 306; Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foundry Co., 198 N.C. 723, 153 S.E. 266, 269; In re McCrary, 109 Neb. 796, 192 N.W. 237, 239.
In order that an injury may arise out of and In the course of employment, it must be received while the work-man is doing the duty he is employed to perform and also as a natural incident of the work fiowing therefrom as a natural consequence and directly connected therewith. Di Salvio v. Menihan Co., 225 N.Y. 123, 121 N.E. 766, 767. "In course of employment," as used in Workmen’s Com-pensation Act, means in service of master, and is not syn-onymous with "during the period covered by his actual employment." An injury, to be within course of employ-ment, must occur during hours of employment, which includes hours of leisure set apart In working hours for rest, recreation, or refreshment, but not time when employee is off premises, not engaged in employer’s busi-ness, or at borne preparing for work, or coming to or leaving work. ShoSier v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 290 Pa. 480, 139 A. 192, 193. An employee, even after closing time, is in the "course of employment" until a suitable oppor-tunity has been given for him to leave the place of work. Field v. Charmette Knitted Fabric Co., 245 N.Y. 139, 156 N.E. 642, 643; Munn v. Industrial Board, 274 III. 70, 113 N.E. 110, 112.
The expression "In the course of his employment," In the rule that a master is liable for the torts of his servant done in the course of his employment, means while engaged in the service of the master, while engaged gen-erally in the master’s work, as distinguished from acts done when the servant steps outside of his employment to do an act for himself, not connected with his master’s business. Sina v. Carlson, 120 Minn. 283, 139 N.W. 601, 602. And see Birmingham Ledger Co. v. Buchanan, 10 Ala.App. 527, 65 So. 667, 670.
See, also, Arising Out of and in the Course of Employment.
COURSE OF RIVER. The course of a river is a line parallel with its banks; the terco is not syn-onymous with the "current" of the river. Attor-ney General v. Railroad Co., 9 N.J.Eq. 550.

COURSE OF THE VOYAGE. By this term is un-derstood the regular and customary track, if such there be, which a ship takes in going from one port to another, and the shortest way. Marsh. Ins. 185; Phill. Ins. 981.
COURSE OF TRADE. What is customarily or ordinarily done in the management of trade or business.
COURSE OF VEIN. In mining, the "course of the vein" appearing on the surface is the course of its apex, which is generally inclined and un-dulated and departs more or less materially from the strike. Stewart Mining Co. v. Bourne, C.C.A. Idaho, 218 F. 327, 329.
COURSE OF VESSEL. In navigation, the "course" of a vessel is her apparent course, and not her heading at any given moment. The East-ern Glade, C.C.A.N.Y., 101 F.2d 4, 6. It is her ac-tual course. Liverpool, Brazil & River Plate Steam Nav. Co. v. U. S., D.C.N.Y., 12 F.2d 128, 129.
COURT. A space which is uncovered, but which may be partly or wholly inclosed by buildings or walls. Smith v. Martin, 95 Okl. 271, 219 P. 312, 313. When used in conneetion with a street, in-dicates a short street, blind alley, or open space like a short street inclosed by dwellings or other buildings facing thereon. City of Miami v. Saun-ders, 151 Fla. 699, 10 So.2d 326, 329.

Legislation

A legislative assembly. Parliament is called in the old books a court of the king, nobility, and commons assembled. Finch, Law, b. 4, c. 1, p. 233; Fleta, lib. 2, c. 2.
The application of the term—which originally denoted the place of assembling—to denote the assemblage, resem-bles the similar application of the Latin term curia, and is readlly explained by the fact that the earlier courts were merely assemblages, in the court-yard of the baron or of the king himself, of those who were qualified and whose duty it was so to appear at stated times or upon summons. Traces of this usage and constitution of courts still remain In the courts baron, the various courts for the trial of Impeachments in England and the United States, and In the control exercised by the parliament of England and the legislatures of the various states of the United States over the organization oí courts of justice, as constituted in modem times. This meaning oí the word has also been retained in the titles of some deliberative bodies, such as the "general court" of Massachusetts, i. e., the legislature.

International Law

The person and suite of the sovereign; the place where the sovereign sojourns with his regal re-tinue, wherever that may be. The English gov-ernment is spoken of in diplomacy as the court of St. James, because the palace of St. James is the official palace.

Practice

An organ of the government, belonging to the judicial department, whose function is the appli-cation of the laws to controversies brought before it and the public administration of justice. White County v. Gwin, 136 Ind. 562, 36 N.E. 237, 22 L.
R.A. 402; Bradley v. Town of Bloomfield, 85 N.J. Law, 506, 89 A. 1009.
The presence of a sufficient number of the mem-bers of such a body regularly convened in an au-thorized place at an appointed time, engaged in the full and regular performance of its functions. Brumley v. State, 20 Ark. 77; Wightman v. Kars-
ner, 20 Ala. 446.
A body in the government to which the admin-istration of justice is delegated. A body organiz-ed to administer justice, and including both judge and jury. Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. Lynch, Tex.Com.App., 221 S.W. 959, 960; People ex rel. Thaw v. Grifenhagen, Sup., 154 N.Y.S. 965, 970; Peterson v. Fargo-Moorhead St. Ry. Co., 37 N.D. 440, 164 N.W. 42, 49.
A tribunal officially assembled under authority of law at the appropriate time and place, for the administration of justice. In re Carter’s Estate, 254 Pa. 518, 99 A. 58.
An agency of the sovereign created by it directiy or indirectly under its authority, consisting oí one or more officers, established and maintained for the purpose of hearing and determinlng issues of law and fact regarding legal rlghts and alleged violations thereof, and of applying the sanctions of the law, authorized to exercise its powers in due course of law at times and places previously deter-mined by lawful authority. Isbill v. Stovall, Tex.Civ.APP., 92 S.W.2d 1067, 1070.
An incorporeal, political being, composed of one or more judges, who sit at fixed times and places, attended by proper officers, pursuant to lawful authority, for the administration of justice. State v. Le Blond, 108 Ohio St. 126, 140 N.E. 510, 512. An organized body with deflned powers, meeting at certain times and places for the hear-Ing and decision of causes and other matters brought before it, and aided in this, its proper business, by Its proper officers, viz., attorneys and counsel to present and manage the business, clerks to record and attest Its acts and decisions, and ministerial officers to execute its cona-mands, and secure due order in its proceedings. Ex parte Gardner, 22 Nev. 280, 39 P. 570; Hertzen v. Hertzen, 104 Or. 423, 208 P. 580, 582.
It is a passlve forum for adjusting disputes and has no power to investigate facts or to initiate proceedings. Sale v. Railroad Commission, 15 Ca1.2d 612, 104 P.2d 38, 41.
The place where justice is judicially administer-ed. Co. Litt. 58a; 3 Bl. Comm. 23. Railroad Co. v. Harden, 113 Ga. 456, 38 S.E. 950; Croft v. Croft, 119 N.J.Eq. 468, 182 A. 853.
The judge, or the body of judges, presiding over a court.
The words "court" and "judge," or "judges," are fre-quently used in statutes as synonymous. When used with reference to orders made by the court or judges, they are to be so understood. State v. Caywood, 96 Iowa, 367, 65 N.W. 385; Sale v. Railroad Commission, 15 Ca1.2d 612, 104 P.2d 38, 41.
The word "court" is often employed in statutes other-wise than in its strlct technical sense, and is applied to various tribunals not judicial in their character, State v. Howat, 107 Kan. 423, 191 P. 585, 589; for example, In New Jersey, the "court of pardons"; In re Court of Pardons, 97 N.J.Eq. 555, 129 A. 624, 625.

Classification

Courts may be classified and divided according to several methods, the following being the more usual:
Courts of record and courts not of record. The former being those whose acts and judicial pro-ceedings are enrolled, or recorded, for a perpetual

memory and testimony, and which have power to fine or imprison for contempt. Error lies to their judgments, and they generally possess a seal. Courts not of record are those of inferior dignity, which have no power to fine or imprison, and in which the proceedings are not enrolled or record-ed. 3 Bl. Comm. 24; 3 Steph. Comm. 383; The Thomas Fletcher, C.C.Ga., 24 F. 481; Ex parte Thistleton, 52 Cal. 225; Erwin v. U. S., D.C.Ga., 37 F. 488, 2 L.R.A. 229; Heininger v. Davis, 96 Ohio St. 205, 117 N.E. 229, 231.
A "court of record" is a judicial tribunal hakling attri-butes and exercising functions independently of the person of the magistrate designated generally to hoid it, and proceeding according to the course of common law, its acts and proceedings being enrolled for a perpetual memorial. Jones v. Jones, 188 Mo.App. 220, 175 S.W. 227, 229; Ex parte Gladhill, 8 Mete., Mass., 171, per Shaw, C. J. See, also, Ledwith v. Rosalsky, 244 N.Y. 406, 155 N.E. 688, 689.
Courts may be at the same time of record for some pur-poses and not of record for others. Lester v. Redmond, 6 Hill, N.Y., 590; Ex parte Gladhill, 8 Mete., Mass., 168.
Superior and inferior courts. The former being courts of general original jurisdiction in the first instance, and which exercise a control or super-vision over a system of lower courts, either by ap-peal, error, or certiorari; the latter being courts of small or restricted jurisdiction, and subject to the review or correction of higher courts. Some-times the former term is used to denote a par-ticular group or system of courts of high powers, and all others are called "inferior courts."
To constitute a courl a superior court as to any class of actions, within the common-law meaning of that term, its jurisdiction of such actions must be unconditional, so that the only thing requisite to enable the court to take cog-nizance of them is the acquisition of jurisdiction of the persons of the parties. Simons v. De Bare, 4 Bosw., N.Y.; 547.
An inferior court is a court whose judgments or decrees can be reviewed, on appeal or writ of error, by a higher tribunal, whether that tribunal be the circuit or supreme court. Nugent v. State, 18 Ala. 521.
Civil and criminal courts. The former being such as are established for the adjudication of con-troversies between subject and subject, or the as-certainment, enforcement, and redress of private rights; the latter, such as are charged with the administration of the criminal laws, and the pun-ishment of wrongs to the public.
Equity courts and law courts. The former be-ing such as possess the jurisdiction of a chancel-lor, apply the rules and principies of chancery law, and follow the procedure in equity; the latter, such as have no equitable powers, but administer justice according to the rules and practice of the common law.
As to the division of courts according to their jurisdiction, see Jurisdiction.
As to several names or kinds of courts not spe-cifically described in the titles immediately fol-lowing, see Arches Court, Appellate, Circuit Courts, Consistory Courts, County, Customary Court-Baron, Ecclesiastical Courts, Federal Courts, Forest Courts, High Commission Court, Instance Court, Justice Court, Justiciary Court, Legislative Courts, Maritime Court, Mayor’s Court,
Moot Court, Municipal Court, Orphans’ Court, Po-lice Court, Prerogative Court, Prize Court, Pro-bate Court, Superior Courts, Supreme Court, and Surrogate’s Court.
As to court-hand, court-house, court-Lands, court rolls, courtyard, see those titles in their alphabetic-al order infra.
General
Court aboye, court below. In appellate prac-tice, the "court aboye" is the one to which a cause is removed for review, whether by appeal, writ of error, or certiorari; while the "court below" is the one from which the case is removed. Going v. Schnell, 6 Ohio Dec. 933.
Court in bank. A meeting of all the judges of a court, usually for the purpose of hearing argu-ments on demurrers, points reserved, motions for new trial, etc., as distinguished from sessions of the same court presided over by a single judge or justice.
Court of competent jurisdiction. One having power and authority of law at the time of acting to do the particular act. Ex parte Plaistridge, 68 Okl. 256, 173 P. 646, 647.
One having jurisdiction under the state Constitution and laws to determine the question in controversy. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n v. Nunamaker, Tex.Civ.App., 267 S.W. 749, 751. A court for the administration of justice as established by the Constitution or statute. Bradley v. Town of Bloomfield, 85 N.J.Law, 506, 89 A. 1009.
Court of limited jurisdiction. When a court of general jurisdiction proceeds under a special statute, it is a "court of limited jurisdiction" for the purpose of that proceeding, and its jurisdic-tion must affirmatively appear. Osage Oil & Re-fining Co. v. Interstate Pipe Co., 124 Okl. 7, 253 P. 66, 71.
De facto court. One established, organized, and exercising its judicial functions under authority of a statute apparently valid, though such statute may be in fact unconstitutional and may be after-wards so adjudged; or a court established and acting under the authority of a de facto govern-ment. 1 Bl. Judgm. § 173; In re Manning, 139 U.S. 504, 11 S.Ct. 624, 35 L.Ed. 264; Gildemeister v. Lindsay, 212 Mich. 299, 180 N.W. 633, 635.
Full court. A session of a court, which is at-tended by all the j udges or justices composing it.
Spiritual courts. In English law. The ecclesi-astical courts, or courts Christian. See 3 Bl. Comm. 61.
COURT—BARON. In English law. A court which, although not one of record, is incident to every manor, and cannot be severed therefrom. It was ordained for the maintenance of the serv-ices and duties stipulated for by lords of manors, and for the purpose of determining actions of a personal nature, where the debt or damage was under forty shillings. Wharton; 1 Poll. & Maitl. Hist. E. L. 580.
Customary court-baron is one appertaining en-tirely to copyholders. 3 Bl.Cornm. 33.

Freeholders’ court-baron is one held before the freeholders who owe suit and service to the man-or. It is the court-baron proper.
Coke (lst Inst. 58a) speaks of the Court Baron as being of the two natures just indicated. Blackstone, 3 Comm. 33, says that, though In their nature distinct, they are fre-quently confounded together. Later writers doubt if there were two courts; 1 Poll. & Maitl.Hist.E.L. 580.
COURT CHRISTIAN. The ecclesiastical courts in England are often so called, as distinguished from the civil courts. 1 Bl. Comm. 83; 3 Bl. Comm. 64; 3 Steph. Comm. 430.
COURT FOR CONSIDERATION OF CROWN CASES RESERVED. A court established by St. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 78, composed of such of the judges of the superior courts of Westminster as were able to attend, for the consideration of questions of law reserved by any judge in a court of oyer and terminer, gaol delivery, or quarter sessions, be-fore which a prisoner had been found guilty by verdict. Such question is stated in the form of a special case. Mozley & Whiteley; 4 Steph. Comm. 442. The trial judge was empowered to "state a case" for the opinion of that court. He could not be compelled to do so, and only a ques-tion of law could be raised. If the court consid-ered that the point had been wrongly decided at the trial, the conviction would be quashed. By Act of 1907, the Court of Criminal Appeal was created and the Court for Crown Cases Reserved was abolished.
COURT FOR DIVORCE AND MATRIMONIAL CAUSES. This court was established by St. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, which transferred to it all juris-diction then exercisable by any ecclesiastical court in England, in matters matrimonial, and also gave it new powers. The court consisted of the lord chancellor, the three chiefs, and three senior puisne judges of the common-law courts, and the judge ordinary, who together constituted, and still constitute, the "full court." The judge ordi-nary heard almost all matters in the first instance. By the judicature act, 1873, § 3, the jurisdiction of the court was transferred to the supreme court of judicature. Sweet.
COURT FOR THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS. The style of a court having jurisdiction for re-view, by appeal or writ of error. The name was formerly used in New York and South Carolina.
COURT FOR THE RELIEF OF INSOLVENT DEBTORS. In English law. A local court which had its sittings in London only, which received the petitions of insolvent debtors, and decided upon the question of granting a discharge. See 3 Steph. Com. 426; 4 id. 287. Abolished by the Bankruptcy Act of 1861.
COURT FOR THE TRIAL OF IMPEACHMENTS. A tribunal empowered to try any officer of gov-ernment or other person brought to its bar by the process of impeachment. In England, the house of lords constitutes such a court; in the United States, the senate; and in the several states, usu-ally the upper house of the legislative assembly.
COURT-HAND. In old English practice. The peculiar hand in which the records of courts were written from the earliest period down to the reign of George II. Its characteristics were great strength, compactness, and undeviating uniform-ity; and its use undoubtedly gave to the ancient record its acknowledged superiority over the mod-em, in the important quality of durability.
The vvriting of this hand, with its peculiar ab-breviations and contractions, constituted, while it was in use, an art of no little importante, being an indispensable part of the profession of "clerk-ship," as it was called. Two sizes of it were em-ployed, a large and a small hand; the former, called "great court-hand," being used for initial words or clauses, the placita of records, etc. Bur-rill.
COURT-HOUSE. The building occupied for the public sessions of a court, with its various offices. The building occupied and appropriated according to law for the holding of courts. Board of Sup’rs of Stone County v. O’Neal, 130 Miss. 57, 93 So. 483, 484. Johnson City Buick -Co. v. Johnson, 165 Tenn. 349, 54 S.W.2d 946.
The term may be used of a place temporarlly occupied for the sessions of a court, though not the recular court-house. Harris v. State, 72 Miss. 960, 18 So. 387, 33 L.R.A. 85; Vigo County v. Stout, 136 Ind. 53, 35 N.E. 683, 22 L. R. A. 398.
The word may be synonymous with "county site" and signify the seat of government. Board of Revenue of Jefferson County v. Huey, 195 Ala. 83, 70 So. 744, 746.
COURT, HUNDRED. See Hundred Court.
COURT-LANDS. Domains or lands kept in the lord’s hands to serve his family.
COURT-LEET. The name of an English court of record held once in the year, and not oftener, within a particular hundred, lordship, or manor, before the steward of the leet; being the king’s court granted by charter to the lords of ‘those hundreds or manors. Its office was to view the frankpledges,—that is, the freemen within the liberty; to present by jury crimes happening with-in the jurisdiction; and to punish trivial misde-meanors. It has now, however, for the most part, fallen into total desuetude; though in some man-ors a court-leet is still periodically held for the transaction of the administrative business of the manor. Mozley & Whitley; Odgers, C. L. 965; Powell, Courts Leet; 1 Reeve, Hist. Eng. Law; Inderwick, King’s Peace, 11; 1 Poll. & Maitl. 568; 4 Steph. Com. 306.
COURT-MARTIAL. A military court, convened under authority of government and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.A. § 801 et seq., for trying and punishing offenses committed by members of the armed forces.
Such courts exist and have their jurisdiction by virtue of the military law, the court being con-stituted and empowered to act in each instance by authority from a commanding officer.

COURT OF ADMIRALTY. A court having ju-risdiction of causes arising under the rules ot ad-miralty law. See Admiralty.
High Court of Admiralty. In English law. This was a court which exercised jurisdiction in prize cases, and had general jurisdiction in mar-time causes, on the instance side. Its proceedings were usually in rem, and its practice and princi-pies derived in large measure from the civil law. The judicature acts of 1873 transferred all the powers and jurisdiction of this tribunal to the probate, divorce, and admiralty division of the high court of justice.
COURT OF ANCIENT• DEMESNE. In English law. A court of peculiar constitution, held by a bailiff appointed by the king, in which alone the tenants of the king’s demesne could be impleaded. 2 Burrows, 1046; 1 Spence, Eq.Jur. 100; 2 Bl. Comm. 99; 1 Steph. Comm. 224; 1 Poll. & Maitl. 367.
COURT OF APPEAL, IBS MAJESTY’S. The chief appellate tribunal of England. It was es-tablished by the judicature acts of 1873 and 1875, and is invested with the jurisdiction formerly ex-ercised by the court of appeal in chancery, the ex-chequer chamber, the judicial committee of the privy council in admiralty and lunacy appeals, and with general appellate jurisdiction from the high court of justice.
COURT OF APPEALS. In American law. An appellate tribunal which, in Kentucky, Maryland, the District of Columbia, and New York, is the court of last resort. In Virginia and West Vir-ginia, it is known as the "supreme court of ap-peals"; in Connecticut, the Supreme Court of Er-rors; in Massachusetts and Maine, the Supreme Judicial Court. In other states the court of last resort is known as the Supreme Court. In Texas the Cou’rts of Civil Appeals are inferior to the su-preme court.
The United States is divided into eleven judicial circuits in each of which there is established a court of appeals known as the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 41, 43.
COURT OF APPEALS IN CASES OF CAPTURE. A court erected by act of congress under the ar-ticles of confederation which preceded the adop-tion of the constitution. It had appellate juris-diction in prize causes.
COURT OF ARBITRATION OF THE CHAMBER OF CONIMERCE. A court of arbitrators, creat-ed for the convenience of merchants in the city of New York, by act of the legislature of New York. It decides disputes between members of the chamber of commerce, and between members and outside merchants who voluntarily submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court.
COURT OF ARCHDEACON. The most inferior of the English ecclesiastical courts, from which an appeal generally lies to that of the bishop (i. e., to the Consistory Court). 3 Bl. Comm. 64; 1 Holdsw, Hist. E. L 369.
COURT OF ASSISTANTS. A court in Massa-chusetts organized in 1630, consisting of the gov-ernor, deputy governor and assistants. It exer-cised the whole power both legislative and judicial of the colony and an extensive chancery jurisdic-tion as well. S. D. Wilson in 18 Am.L.Rev. 226.
COURT OF ATTACH1VIENTS. The lowest of the three courts held in the forests. It has fallen in-to total disuse.
It was held before the verderers of the forest once In every forty clays, to view the attachments by the foresters for offences against the vert and the venison. It had cog-nizance only of small trespasses. Larger ones were enrolled and heard by the Justices In Eyre. 1 Holdsw. Hist. E. L. 343.
COURT OF AUDIENCE. An ecclesiastical court, in which the primates once exercised in person a considerable part of their jurisdiction. Such courts seem to be now obsolete, or at least to be only used on the rare occurrence of the trial of a bishop. Phillim. Ecc. Law, 1201, 1204; 1 Holdsw. Hist. E. L. 371.
COURT OF AUGMENTATION. An English court created in the time of Henry VIII (27 Hen. VIII, c. 27), with jurisdiction over the property and revenue of certain religious foundations, which had been made over to the king by act of parliament, and over suits relating to the same.
It was called "The Court of the Augmentatlons of the Revenues of the King’s Crown" (from the augmentation oí
the revenues of the crown derived from the suppression of the monasteries), and was dissolved in the reign of Queen Mary, but the Office of Augmentation remained long af ter; the records of the court are now at the Public Record Office. Cowell.
COURT OF BANKRUPTCY. An English court of record, having original and appellate jurisdic-tion in matters of bankruptcy, and invested with both legal and equitable powers for that purpose. The Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849. By the judicature acts, 1873 and 1875, the court of bankruptcy was consolidated into the supreme court of judicature.
In the United States, the Bankruptcy Act, I 1 (10), 11 U.S.C.A. § 1(10), as amended, provides that "’courts of bankruptcy’ shall include the dis-trict courts of the United States and of the Ter-ritories and possessions to which this title is or may hereafter be applicable, and the District Court of the United States for the District of Co-lumbia."
COURT OF BROTHERHOOD. An assembly of the mayors or other chief officers of the principal towns of the Cinque Ports in England, originally administering the chief powers of those ports, now almost extinct. Cent. Dict.
COURT OF CHANCERY. A court having the ju-risdiction of a chancellor; a court administering equity and proceeding according to the forms and principles of equity. In England, prior to the ju-dicature acts, the style of the court possessing the largest equitable powers and jurisdiction was the "high court of chancery." In some of the United States, the title "court of chancery" is applied to a court possessing general equity powers, distinct from the courts of common law. Parmeter v. Bourne, 8 Wash. 45, 35 P. 586; Bull v. Interna-tional Power Co., 84 N.J.Eq. 209, 93 A. 86, 88.
The terms "equity" and "chancery," "court of equity" and "court of chancery," are constantly used as synony-mous in the United States. It ís presumed that thls custom arises from the circumstance that the equity jurisdictlon which is exercised by the courts of the various states is assimIlated to that possessed by the English courts of chan-cery. Indeed, in some of the states it Is made identical therewith by statute. so far as conformable to our institu-tions. Wagner v. Armstrong, 93 Ohio St. 443, 113 N.E. 397, 401.
COURT OF CHIVALRY. In English law. The name of a court anciently held as a court of hon-or merely, before the earl-marshal, and as a crim-inal court before the lord high constable, jointly with the earl-marshal. (But it is• also said that this court was heid by the constable, and after that office reverted to the crown in the time of Henry VIII., by the earl-marshal. Davis, Mil. Law 13.) 3 Bl.Comm. 68; 4 Broom & H. Comm. 360, note; 3 Bl. Comm. 103; 3 Steph. Comm. 335, note 1; 7 Mod. 137.
It had jurisdiction as to contracts and other matters touching deeds of arcos or war, as well as pleas of life or member. It also corrected encroachments In matters of
coat-armor, precedency, and other distinctions of famílies. It is now Brown entlrely out of use, on account of the feebleness of its jurisdiction and want of power to enforce its judgments, as it could neither fine nor ímprison, not being a court of record.
COURT OF CLAIMS. One of the courts of the United States, established in 1855. U. S. v. Klein, 13 Wall., U.S., 128, 144, 20 L.Ed. 519. It consists of a chief justice and four associates, and holds one annual session. It is located at Washington. Its jurisdiction extends to all claims against the United States arising out of any contract with the government or based on an act of congress or regulation of the executive, and all claims referred to it by either house of congress, as well as to claims for exoneration by a disbursing officer. Its judgments are, in certain cases, reviewable by the United States supreme court. It has no equity powers. Its decisions are reported and published.
This name is also given, In some of the states, either to a special court or to the ordinary county court sitting "as a court of claims," having the special duty of auditing and ascertaining the claims agalnst the county and expenses incurred by It, and provicling for their payment by appro-prlatlons out of the county levy or annual tax. Meri-weather v. Muhlenburg County Court, 120 U.S. 354, 7 S.Ct. 563, 30 L.Ed. 653.
COURT OF COMMISSIONERS OF SEWERS. The name of eertain English courts created by commission under the great seal pursuant to the statute of sewers (23 Hen. VIII. c. 5).
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. In English law. One of the four superior courts at Westminster, which existed up to the passing of the judicature acts. It was also styled the "Common Bench." It was one of the courts derived from the breaking up of the aula regis, and had exclusive jurisdic-tion of all real actions and of communia placita, or common pleas, i. e., between subject and sub-ject. It was presided over by a chief justice with four puisne judges (later flve, by virtue of 31 & 32
Vict. c. 125, § 11, subsec. 8). Appeals lay anciently to the king’s bench, but afterwards to the exche-quer chamber. See 3 Bl.Comm. 37, et seq. Its jurisdiction was altogether confined to civil mat-ters, having no cognizance in criminal cases, and was concurrent with that of the queen’s bench and exchequer in personal actions and ejectment. Wharton.
In American law. The name sometimes given to a court of original and general jurisdiction for the trial of issues of fact and law according to the principies of the common law. Moore v. Barry, 30 S.C. 530, 9 S.E. 589, 4 L.R.A. 294.
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY OF NEW YORK. The oldest court in the state of New York, no longer in ex-istence.
COURT OF CONCILIATION. A court which proposes terms of adjustment, so as to avoid liti-gation. Kashefsky v. Futernick, 153 Misc. 733, 276 N.Y.S. 253.
COURT OF CONSCIENCE. The same as courts of request, (q. v.). This name is also frequently applied to the courts of equity or of chancery, not as a name but as a description. Harper v. Clayton, 84 Md. 346, 35 A. 1083, 35 L.R.A. 211. And see Consciente.
COURT OF CONVOCATION. In English eccle-siastical law. A court, or assembly, comprising all the high officials of each province and repre-sentatives of the minor clergy. It is in the na-ture of an ecclesiastical parliament; and, so far as its judicial functions extend, it has jurisdic-tion of cases of heresy, schism, and other purely ecclesiastical matters. An appeal líes to the king in council. 2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 92; Cowell; Bac. Abr. Ecclesiastical Courts, A, 1; 1 Bla. Comm. 279; 2 Steph. Com. 525, 668; 2 Burn, Eccl. Law, 18. Convocation exercises no jurisdiction at the present day. 1 Holdsw. Hist. E. L. 373.
COURT OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS. In some states, a court of record in each county. Thus, in Alabama, it is composed of the judge of probate, as principal judge, and four commisslon-ers, who are elected at the times prescribed by law, and hold office for four years.
COURT OF CUSTOMS AND PATENT APPEALS. The tale given by Act Mar. 2, 1929, c. 488, § 1, 45 Stat. 1475, to a court of the United States created by Act Aug. 5, 1909, c. 6, § 28, 36 Stat. 91, 105, and then known as the Court of Customs Appeals, con-sisting of a presiding judge and four associate judges. In patent and trade-mark cases it has the appellate jurisdiction which prior to April 1, 1929, was vested in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. Act Mar. 2, 1929, c. 488, § 2 (a, d) , 45 Stat. 1476. As to its jurisdiction over appeals from the "Customs Court," see that title.
COURT OF DELEGATES. An English tribunal composed of delegates appointed by royal com-mission, and formerly the great court of appeal in all ecclesiastical causes. The powers of the court were, by 2 & 3 Wm. IV. c. 92, transferred to the privy council. Brown; 3 Bl. Comm. 66; 1 Holdsw. Hist. E. L. 373.
A commission of review was formerly granted, in extra-ordinary cases, to revise a sentence of the court of dele-gates, when that court had apparently been led into material error.
COURT OF EQUITY. A court which has juris-diction in equity, which administers justice and decides controversies in accordance with the rules, principies, and precedents of equity, and which follows the forms and procedure of chancery; as distinguished from a court having the jurisdic-tion, rules, principies, and practice of the common law. Thomas v. Phillips, 4 Smedes & M., Miss., 423.
COURT OF ERROR. An expression applied es pecially to the court of exchequer chamber and the house of lords, as taking cognizance of error brought. Mozley & Whitley; 3 Steph. Comm. 333. It is applied in some of the United States to the court of last resort in the state; and in its most general sense denotes any court having power to review the decisions of lower courts on appeal, error, certiorari, or other process. See Court of Appeals.
COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS. The court of last resort in the state of New Jersey is so named. Formerly, the same title was given to the highest court of appeal in New York.
COURT OF EXCHEQUER. In English law. A very ancient court of record, set up by William the Conqueror as a part of the aula regis, and afterwards one of the four superior courts at Westminster. It was, however, inferior in rank to both the king’s bench and the common pleas. It was presided over by a chief baron and four puisne barons. It was originally the king’s treas-ury, and was charged with keeping the king’s accounts and collecting the royal revenues. But pleas between subject and subject were anciently heard there, until this was forbidden by the Ar-ticula super Chartas, (1290,) after which its ju-risdiction as a court only extended to revenue cases arising out of the non-payment or withhold-ing of debts to the crown. But the privilege of suing and being sued in this court was extended to the king’s accountants, and later, by the use of a convenient fiction to the effect that the plaintiff was the king’s debtor or accountant, the court was thrown open to all suitors in personal actions. The exchequer had formerly both an equity side and a common-law side, but its equity jurisdiction was taken away by the statute 5 Vict. c. 5, (1842,) and transferred to the court of chancery. The judicature act (1873) transferred the business and jurisdiction of this court to the "Exchequer Div-ision" of the "High Court of Justice."
In Scotch law. A court which formerly had jurisdiction of matters of revenue, and a limited jurisdiction over cases between the crown and its vassals where no questions of title were involv-ed.
COURT OF EXCHEQUER CHAMBER. The name of a former English court of appeal, inter-mediate between the superior courts of common law and the house of lords. When sitting as a court of appeal from any one of the three supe-rior courts of common law, it was composed of judges of the other two courts. 3 Bl.Comm. 56, 57; 3 Steph.Comm. 333, 356. By the judicature act (1873) the jurisdiction of this court is trans-ferred to the court of appeal.
COURT OF FACULTIES. A tribunal of the arch-bishop in England.
It does not hold pleas in any sults, but creates rights to pews, monuments, and other mortuary matters. It had also various other powers under 25 Hen. VIII. c. 21. Co. 4th Inst. 337; 2 Chit.Gen.Pr. 507.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE. A court of pri-mary jurisdiction. Courts of this title may be found in the jurisprudence of the Philippine Is-lands. 15 C.J. 688.
COURT OF GENERAL QUARTER SESSIONS OF THE PEACE. In American law. A court of criminal jurisdiction in New Jersey.
In English law. A court of criminal jurisdic-tion, in England, held in each county once in every quarter of a year, but in the county of Middlesex twice a month. 4 Steph. Comm. 317-320. When held at other times than quarterly, the sessions are called "general sessions of the peace." See
2 Odgers, C.L. 966.
COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS. The name given in some states to a court of general orig-inal jurisdiction in criminal cases.
COURT OF GREAT SESSIONS IN WALES. A court formerly held in Wales; abolished by 11 Geo. IV. and 1 Wm. IV. c. 70, and the Welsh judi-cature incorporated with that of England. 3 Steph. Comm. 317, note; 3 Bla. Comm. 77.
COURT OF GUESTLING. An assembly of the membérs of the Court of Brotherhood (supra) to-gether with other representatives of the corporate members of the Cinque Ports, invited to sit with the mayors of the seven principal towns. Cent. Dict.
COURT OF HIGH COMMISSION. In English law. An ecclesiastical court of formidable juris-diction, for the vindication of the peace and dig-nity of the church, by reforming, ordering, and correcting the ecclesiastical state and persons, and all manner of errors, heresies, schisms, abuses, offenses, contempts, and enormities. 3 Bl. Comm. 67. It was erected by St. 1 Eliz. c. 1, and abolish-ed by 16 Car. I, c. 11. 1 Holdsw. Hist. E. L. 375.
COURT OF HONOR. A court having jurisdiction to hear and redress injuries or affronts to a man’s honor or personal dignity, of a nature not cogniza-ble by the ordinary courts of law, or encroach-ments upon his rights in respect to heraldry, coat-armor, right of precedence, and the like. It was one of the functions of the Court of Chivairy (q. v.) in England to sit and act as a court of honor.
3 Bl. Comm. 104.

The name is also given in some European countries to a tribunal of army officers (more or less distinctly recognized by law as a "court") convened for the purpose of inquir-ing into complaints affecting the honor of brother officers and punishing derelíctions from the code of honor and deciding on the causes and occasions for fighting duels, in which officers are concerned, and the manner of conduct-ing them.
COURT OF HUSTINGS. In English law. The county court of London, held before the mayor, recorder, and sheriff, but of which the recorder, is, in effect, the role judge. No actions can be brought in this court that are merely personal. 3 Steph.Comm. 293, n.; 449, note 1; 3 Bla.Comm. 80, n.; Madox, Hist. Exch. c. 20; Co. 2d Inst. 327. Since the abolition of all real and mixed ac-tions except ejectment, the jurisdiction of this court has fallen into comparative desuetude. Pulling on Cust. Lond.
In American Law. A local court in some parts of Virginia. Smith v. Commonwealth, 6 Grat. 696.
COURT OF INQUIRY. In English law. A court sometimes appointed by the crown to ascertain whether it be proper to resort to extreme meas-ures against a person charged before a court-martial. 2 Steph.Comm. 590; 1 Coler.Bla.Comm. 418, n.; 2 Brod. & B. 130. Also a court for hearing the complaints of private soldiers. Moz. & W. Dict.; Simmons, Cts.Mart. § 341.
In American law. Formerly, a court consti-tuted by authority of the articles of war, invested with the power to examine into the nature of any transaction of, or accusation or imputation against, any officer or soldier, when demanded by him. Rev.St. § 1342, arts. 115, 116. Repealed by Act June 4, 1920, c. 227, § 4, 41 Stat. 812.
They were not strIctly courts, having no power to try and determine guilt or Innocence. They were rather agencies created by statute to investígate facts and report thereon. They could not compel the attendance of wit-nesses nor require them to testIfy. Davis, Mil. Law 220,
COURT OF JUSTICE SEAT. In English law. The principal of the forest courts. Called also Court of the Chief Justice in Eyre (q. v.).
COURT OF JUSTICIARY. A Scotch court of general criminal jurisdiction of all offenses com-mitted in any part of Scotland, both to try causes and to review decisicns of inferior criminal courts. It is composed of five lords of session with the lord president or justice-clerk as president. It also has appellate jurisdiction in civil causes in-volving small amounts. An appeal lies to the house of lords.
COURT OF KING’S BENCH. In English law. The supreme court of common law in the king-dom, now merged in the high court of justice under the judicature act of 1873, § 16.
It was one of the successors of the curia regís and received its name, It is said, because the king formerly sat In It in person. During the reign of a queen it was called the Queen’s Bench, and during Cromwell’s Protectorate It was called the Upper Bench.
COURT OF LAW. In a wide sense, any duly con-stituted tribunal administering the laws of the state or nation; in a narrower sense, a court pro-
ceeding according to the course of the common law and governed by its rules and principies, as contrasted with a "court of equity."
COURT OF LODEMANAGE. An ancient court of the Cinque Ports, having jurisdiction in mari-time matters, and particularly over pilots (iode-men).
COURT OF MAGISTRATES AND FREEHOLD-ERS. In American law. The name of a court formerly established in South Carolina for the trial of slaves and free persons of color for crim-inal offenses.
COURT OF MARSHALSEA. In English law, the court or seat of the marshal. A court originally held before the steward and marshal of the king’s house, instituted to administer justice between the king’s domestic servants. It had jurisdiction of all trespasses committed within the verge of the king’s court, where one of the parties was of the royal household; and of all debts and contracts, when both parties were of that establishment. It was abolished by 12 & 13 Viet. c. 101, § 13. Mozley & Whitley.
COURT OF NISI PRIUS. In American law. Though this term is frequently used as a general designation of any court exercising general, orig-inal jurisdiction in civil cases, (being used inter-changeably with "trial-court,") it belonged as a legal title only to a court which formerly existed in the city and county of Philadelphia, and which was presided over by one of the judges of the su-preme court of Pennsylvania. This court was abolished by the constitution of 1874. See Courts of Assize and Nisi Prius.
COURT OF ORDINARY. In some of the United States (e. g., Georgia) the name given to the pro-bate or surrogate’s court, or the court having the usual jurisdiction in respect to the proving of wills and the administration of decedents’ estates. Veach v. Rice, 131 U.S. 293, 9 S.Ct. 730, 33 L.Ed. 163. Such a court formerly existed in New Jer-sey, South Carolina, and Texas. 2 Kent 409.
COURT OF ORPHANS. In English law. The court of the lord mayor and aldermen of London, which has• the care of those orphans whose parent died in London and was free of the city. It is now said to be fallen into disuse. 2 Steph. Comm. 313; Pull. Cust. Lond. 196, Orphans’ Court.
In American law. In Pennsylvania (and per-haps some other states) the name "orphans’ court" is applied to that species of tribunal which is elsewhere known as the "probate court" or "surrogate’s court."
COURT OF OYER AND TERMLNER. In English law. A court for the trial of cases of treason and felony. The commissioners of assise and nisi prius are judges selected by the king and ap-pointed and authorized under the great seal, in-cluding usually two of the judges at Westminster, and sent out twice a year into most of the coun-ties of England, for the trial (with a jury of the county) of causes then depending at Westminster,

both civil and criminal. They sit by virtue of several commissions, each of which, in reality, constitutes them a separate and distinct court. The commission of oyer and terminer gives them authority for- the trial of treasons and felonies; that of general gaol delivery empowers them to try every prisoner Chen in gaol for whatever of-fense; so that, altogether, they possess full crim-inal jurisdiction.
In American law. This name is generally used (sometimes, with additions) as the title, or part of the title, of a state court of criminal j urisdic-tion, or of the criminal branch of a court of gen-eral jurisdiction, being commonly applied to such courts as may try felonies, or the higher grades of crime. Such courts exist in Delaware and Pennsylvania. They were abolished in New York and New Jersey in 1895.
COURT OF OYER AND TERMINER AND GEN-ERAL GAOL (or JAIL) DELIVERY, In Amer-ican law. A court of criminal juriedietien in the state of Pennsylvania. It is held at the "Same time with the court of quarter sessions, as a general rule, and by the same judges. Const.Pa. art. 5,
1; 17 P.S. §1 371, 391, 471.
In English law. A tribunal for the examina-ton and trial of criminals. 3 Steph. Comm. 352.
COURT OF PALACE AT WESTMINSTER. This court had jurisdiction of personal actions arising within twelve miles of the palace at Whitehall. Abolished by 12 & 13 Vict. c. 101, 3 Steph. Comm. 317, note. See Court of the Steward and Mar-shal.
COURT OF PASSAGE. An inferior court, pos-sessing a very ancient jurisdiction over causes of action arising within the borough of Liverpool. It appears to have been also called the "Borough Court of Liverpool." It has the same jurisdic-tion in admiralty matters as the Lancashire coun-ty court. Rosc. Adm. 75.
COURT OF PECULIARS. A spiritual court in England, being a branch of, and annexed to, the Court of Arches. It has a jurisdiction over all those parishes dispersed through the province of Canterbury, in the midst of other dioceses, which are exempt from the ordinary’s jurisdiction, and subject to the metropolitan only. All ecclesiastic-al causes arising within these peculiar or exempt jurisdictions are originally cognizable by this court, from which an appeal lies to the Court of Arches. 3 Steph. Comm. 431; 4 Reeve, Eng. Law, 104. Most of such courts have been abolished by legislation. 1 Holdsw. Hist. Eng. Law 352. See, also, Arches Court.
COURT OF PIEPOUDRE. (Also spelled Pipow-der, Pie Powder, Py-Powder, Piedpoudre, etc.) The lowest (and most expeditious) of the courts of justice known to the older law of England. It is supposed (by Cowell and Blount) to have been so called from the dusty feet of the suitors. For another conjecture as to the origin of the name, see Co. 4th Inst. 472. It was a court of record in-cident to every fair and market, was held by the
steward, and had jurisdiction to administer jus-tice for all commercial injuries and minor of-fenses done in that same fair or market, (not a preceding one.) Inderwick, King’s Peace 105. An appeal lay to the courts at Westminster. This court long ago fell into disuse. 3 Bl. Comm. 32; Barrington, Stat. 337; 3 Steph. Comm. 317, n.; Skene, de verb. sig. Pede pulverosus; Bracton 334; 22 L.Q.R. 244; 1 Holdsw. Hist. E. L. 309. See, however, Odgers, C. L. 1021,
COURT OF PLEAS. A court of the county pala-tine of Durham, having a local common-law juris-diction. It was abolished by the judicature act, which transferred its jurisdiction to the high court. Jud.Act 1873, § 16; 3 Bl.Comm. 79.
COURT OF POLICIES OF ASSURANCE. A court established by statute 43 Eliz. c. 12, to de, termine in a summary way all causes between merchants, concerning policies of insurance, Crabb, Eng. Law, 503. The court was formally-abolished by stat. 26 & 27 Vict. c. 125. 3 Bl.Comm, 74; 3 Steph. Comm. 317, n.
COURT OF PRIVATE LAND CLAIMS. A fed-eral court created by act of Congress in 1891 (26 Stat. 854), to hear and determine claims by pri-vate parties to lands within the public domain, where such claims originated under Spanish or Mexican grants, and had not already been con-firmed by Congress or otherwise adjudicated. The existence and authority of this court were to tease and determine at the end of the year 1895.
COURT OF PROBATE. In English law. The name of a court established in 1857, under the probate act of that year, (20 & 21 Vict. c. 77,) to be held in London, to which court was transfer-red the testamentary jurisdiction of the ecclesi, astical courts. 2 Steph. Comm. 192. By the judi-cature acts, this court is merged in the high court of justice.
In American law. A court having jurisdic-tion over the probate of wills, the grant of admin• istration, and the supervision of the management and settlement of the estates of decedents, includ-ing the collection of assets, the aliowance of claims, and the distribution of the estate. In some states the probate courts also have juris-diction of the estates of minors, including the ap-pointment of guardians and the settlement of their accounts, and of the estates of lunatics, habi-tual drunkards, and spendthrifts. Pons v. Pons, 132 La. 370, 61 So. 406, 407. And in some states these courts possess a lirnited jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases. They are also called in some jurisdictions "orphans’ courts" and "surrogate’s courts."
COURT OF PYPOWDER, PY—POWDER, or PY-POWDERS. See Court of Plepoudre,
COURT OF QUARTER SESSIONS OF THE PEACE. In American law. A court of criminal jurisdiction in the state of Pennsylvania, having power to try misdemeanors, and exercising certain functions of an administrative nature. There is one such court in each county of the state. Its sessions are, in general, held at the same time and by the same judges as the court of oyer and terminer and general jail delivery. Const.Pa. art. 5, § 1; 17 P.S. §§ 331, 361.
COURT OF QUEEN’S BENCH. See Court of King’s Bench.
COURT OF RECORD. See Court, supra.
COURT OF REGARD. In English law. One of the forest courts, in England, held every third year, for the lawing or expeditation of dogs, to prevent them from running after deer. It is now obsolete. 3 Steph. Comm. 440; 3 Bl. Comm. 71, 72.
COURT OF SESSION. The name of the highest court of civil jurisdiction in Scotland. It was composed of fifteen judges, now of thirteen. It sits in two divisions. The lord president and three ordinary lords form the first division; the lord justice clerk and three other ordinary lords form the second division. There are five permanent lords ordinary attached equally to both divisions; the last appointed of whom officiates on the bilis, i. e., petitions preferred to the court during the session, and performs the other duties of junior lord ordinary. The chambers of the parliament house in which the first and second divisions hold their sittings are called the "inner house;" those in which the lords ordinary sit as single judges to hear motions and causes are collectively called the "outer house." The nomination and appoint-ment of the judges is in the crown. Wharton.
COURT OF SESSIONS. Courts of criminal ju-risdiction existing in California, New York, and one or two other of the United States.
COURT OF SHEPWAY. A court held before the lord warden of the Cinque Ports. A writ of er-ror lay from the mayor and jurats of each port to the lord warden in this court, and thence to the queen’s bench. The civil jurisdiction of the Cin-que Ports is abolished by 18 & 19 Vict. c. 48.
COURT OF SPECIAL SESSIONS. A generic term, applicable to those courts which have no stated terms and are not continuous, but which are organized only for the trial of each particular case and become functus officio when judgment is ren-dered therein. People v. Wagner, 45 N.Y.S.2d 314, 316.
COURT OF STANNARIES. In English law. A court established in Devonshire and Cornwall, for the administration of justice among the miners and tinners, that they might not be drawn away from their business to attend suits in distant courts. The stannary court is a court of record, with a special jurisdiction. 3 Bl. Comm. 79.
COURT OF STAR CHAMBER. This was an Eng-lish court of very ancient origin, but new-modeled by St. 3 Hen. VII. c. 1, and 21 Hen. VIII. c. 20, con-sisting of divers lords, spiritual and temporal, be-ing privy councillors, together with two judges of
Black’s Law DletIonary Revised 4th Ed.-28
the courts of common law, without the interven-tion of any jury. The jurisdiction extended legal-ly over riots, perjury, misbehavior of sheriffs, and other misdemeanors contrary to the laws of the land; yet it was afterwards stretched to the as-serting of all proclamations and orders of state, to the vindicating of illegal commissions and grants of monopolies; holding for honorable that which it pleased, and for just that which it pro-fited, and becoming both a court of law to deter-mine civil rights and a court of revenue to enrich the treasury. It was finally abolished by St. 16 Car. I, c. 10, to the general satisfaction of the whole nation. Brown.
COURT OF SURVEY. A court for the hearing of appeals by owners or masters of ships, from orders for the detention of unsafe ships, made by the English board of trade, under the merchánt shipping art, 1876, § 6.
COURT OF SWEINMOTE (spelled, also, Swain-mote, Swain-gemote; Saxon, swang, an attend-ant, a freeholder, and mote or gemote, a meeting). One of the old forest courts, held before the ver-derers, as judges, by the steward, thrice in every year,—the sweins or freeholders within the forest composing the jury. This court had jurisdiction to inquire into grievances and oppressions corn-mitted by the officers of the forest, and also to re-ceive and try presentments certified from the court of attachments, certifying the cause, in turn, under the seals of the jury, in case of conviction, to the court of justice seat for the rendition of judgment. Cowell; 3 Bla. Com. 71, 72; 3 Steph. Com. 317, n. See Inderwick, King’s Peace 150; Forest Laws.
COURT OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE IN EYRE. The highest of the courts of the forest, held every three years, by the chief justice, to inquire of pur-prestures or encroachments, assarts, or cultiva-tion of forest land, claims to franchises, parks, warrens, and vineyards in the forest, as well as claims of the hundred, claims to the goods of fel-ons found in the forest, and any other civil ques-tions that might arise within the forest
But it had no criminal jurisdiction, except of of-fenses against the forest laws. It was called also the court of justice seat. Inderwick, King’s Peace. Since the Restoration the forest laws have fallen into disuse. The office was abolished in 1817.
COURT OF THE CLERK OF THE MARKET. An English court of inferior jurisdiction held in every fair or market for the punishment of mis-demeanors committed therein. The jurisdiction over weights and measures formerly exercised was taken away by stat. 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 63; 9 M. & W. 747. 4 Steph. Comm. 323.
COURT OF THE CORONER. In English law. A court of record, to inquire, when any one dies in prison, or comes to a violent or sudden death, by what manner he carne to his end. 4 Steph. Comm. 323; 4 Bl. Comm. 274. Now generally known as, an inquest. See Coroner.

COURT OF THE COUNTIES PALATINE. In English law. A species of private court which formerly appertained to the counties palatine of Lancaster and Durham. 1 Holdsw. Hist. E. L. 47; 1 Steph. Hist. C. L. 138; Coke, 4 Inst. 239; 1 Harg. L. Tr. 378.
COURT OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER. A court of special jurisdiction, held before the chan-cellor of the duchy or his deputy, concerning all matters of equity relating to lands holden of the king in right of the duchy of Lancaster. 3 Bl. Comm. 78.
COURT OF THE EARL MARSHAL. In the reign of William the Conqueror the marshal was next in rank to the constable, in command of the army. When the constable’s office ceased, his duties de-volved upon the earl marshal. The military Court of the Constable carne to be known as the Marshal’s Court, or, in its modern form, Court-Martial. Aside from its criminal jurisdiction, it had much to do with questions relating to fiefs and military tenures, though not to property rights involved therein. Davis, Mil. Laws of U. S. 14. See Hale, Hist. C. L. 36; Grose, Mil. Antiq. See Court of Chivalry; Courts-Martial; Constable of England.
COURT OF THE LORD HIGH ADMIRAL. In the earlier part of the 14th century, the Admiral possessed a disciplinary jurisdiction over his fieet. After 1340 it is reasonable to suppose that the Admiral could hold an independent court and ad-minister justice in piracy and other maritime cases. There were at first several admirals and several courts. From the early 15th century there was one Lord High Admiral and one Court of Admiralty. 1 Holdsw. Hist. E. L. 313.
COURT OF THE LORD HIGH STEWARD. In English law. A court instituted for the trial, dur-ing the recess of parliament, of peers indicted for treason or felony, or for misprision of either. This court is not a permanent body, but is creat-ed in modern times, when occasion requires, and for the time being, only; and the lord high stew ard, so constituted, with such of the temporal lords as may take the proper oath, and act, con-stitute the court.
All peers who have a right to sit and vote in Parliament must be summoned. They are the sole judges of fact, and the majorlty, which must consist of twelve at least, decides. The Lord High Steward has a vote, and is judge of all matters of law.
COURT OF THE LORD HIGH STEWARD OF THE UNIVERSITIES. In English law. A court constituted for the trial of scholars or privileged persons connected with the university at Oxford or Cambridge who are indicted for treason, felony, or mayhem. 3 Bla. Comm. 83; 4 id. 277; 1 Steph. Comm. 67; 3 id. 341; 4 id. 261.
COURT OF THE OFFICIAL PRINCIPAL. This court, the Court of the "Official Principal" of the Archbishop of Canterbury, is more commonly called the Arches Court, or Court of the Arches. See Arches Court.
COURT OF THE STEWARD AND MARSHAL. A high court, formerly held in England by the steward and marshal of the king’s household, hav-ing jurisdiction of all actions against the king’s peace within the bounds of the household for twelve miles, which circuit was called the "verge." Crabb, Eng. Law, 185. It had also jurisdiction of actions of debt and covenant, where both the parties were of the household. 2 Reeve, Eng.Law, 235, 247. This court was created by Charles I., and abolished in 1849. It was held in the bor-ough of Southwark, and was called also the "pal-ace court," having jurisdiction of all personal ac-tions arising within twelve miles of the royal pal-ace of Whitehall, exclusive of London.
COURT OF THE STEWARD OF THE KING’S HOUSEHOLD. In English law. A court which had jurisdiction of all cases of treason, misprision of treason, mur;der, manslaughter, bloodshed, and other malicious strikings whereby blood is shed, occurring in or within the limits of any of the pal-aces or houses of the king, or any other house where the royal person is abiding. It was created by statute 33 Hen. VIII, c. 12, but long ago fell into disuse. 4 Bl. Comm. 276, 277, and notes.
COURT OF WARDS AND LIVERIES. A court of record, established in England in the reign of Henry VIII. For the survey and management of the valuable fruits of tenure, a court of record was created by St. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 46, called the "Court of the King’s Wards." To this was annexed, by St. 33 Hen. VIII, c. 22, the "Court of Liveries;" so that it then became the "Court of Wards and Liv-eries." 4 Reeve, Eng. Law, 258. This court was not only for the management of "wards," prop-erly so called, but also of idiots and natural fools in the king’s custody, and for licenses to be grant-ed to the king’s widows to marry, and fines to be made for marrying without his license. Id. 259. It was abolished by St. 12 Car. II. c. 24. Crabb, Eng. Law, 468; 4 Reeve, Hist. E. L. 259; Crabb, Hist. E. L. 468; 1 Steph. Com. 183; 4 id. 40; 2 Bla. Com. 68; 3 id. 258.
COURT ROLLS. The rolls of a manor, contain-ing all acts relating thereto. While belonging to the lord of the manor, they are not in the nature of public books for the benefit of the tenant.
COURTS OF APPEALS. A system of courts of the United States (one in each circuit) created by act of congress, composed of three or more judges (provision being made also for the allotment of the justices of the supreme court among the cir-cuits), and having appellate jurisdiction as defin-ed by statute. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 41-48, 1291-1294.
Court of Appeals of tbe District of Columbia was held to be Clrcuit Court of Appeals, Swift & Co. v. U. S., App.D.C., 276 U.S. 311, 48 S.Ct. 311, 313, 72 L.Ed. 587.
COURTS OF ASSIZE AND NISI PRIUS. Courts in England composed of two or more commis-sioners, called "judges of assize," (or of "assize and nisti prius,") who are twice in every year sent by the king’s special commission, on circuits all round the kingdom, to try, by a jury of the respective counties, the truth of such matters of fact as are there under dispute in the courts of Westminster Hall. 3 Steph. Comm. 421, 422; 3 Bl. Comm. 57; 2 Odger, Com. Law, 985.
COURTS OF CINQUE PORTS. In English law. Courts of limited local jurisdiction formerly heid before the mayor and jurats (aldermen) of the Cinque Ports. Their jurisdiction was not affected by the Judicature Act of 1873. 1 Holdsw. Hist. E. L. 305; 3 Bla. Comm. 79; 2 Steph. Comm. 499.
COURTS OF THE FOREST. Courts heid for the enforcement of the forest laws. Inderwick, King’s Peace. See Forest Courts.
COURTS OF THE FRANCHISES. Jurisdictions in the early Norman period which rested upon royal grants—often assumed. Edward E, in 1274, sent out commissioners to enquire by what war-rant different landowners were exercising their jura regalia. There were many varieties of lesser franchises. Some of these franchises were recog-nized as existing by the County Courts Acts, 1846-1888. 1 Holdsw. Hist. E. L. 61.
COURTS OF PRINCIPALITY OF WALES.
species of private courts of a limited though ex-tensive jurisdiction, which, upon the thorough reduction of that principality and the settling of its polity in the reign of Henry VIII, were erect-ed all over the country. These courts, however, have been abolished by 1 Wm. IV. c. 70; the prin-cipality being now divided into two circuits, which the judges visit in the same manner as they do the circuits in England, for the purpose of dis-posing of those causes which are ready for trial. Brown.
COURTS OF REQUEST. Inferior courts, in Eng-land, having local jurisdiction in claims for small debts, established in various parts of the kingdom by special acts of parliament. They were abol-ished in 1846, and the modern county courts (q. y.) took their place. 3 Steph. Comm. 283, 449; 1 Holdsw. H. E. L. 208; Bac. Abridg.; Select Cases in the Court of Requests (Selden Society, Publ. vol. 12).
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES comprise the following: The senate of the United States, sitting as a court of impeachment; the supreme 3ourt; the courts of appeals; the district courts; :he court of claims; the court of customs and Datent appeals; the customs court; the tax court 1f the United States; and provisional courts; ;ourts of territories and outlying possessions.
COURTS OF THE UNIVERSITIES of Oxford and Cambridge have jurisdiction in all personal ac-
tions to which any member or servant of the re-spective university is a party, provided that the cause of action arose within the liberties of the university, and that the member or servant was resident in the university when it arose, and when the action was brought. 3 Steph.Comm. 299; St. 25 & 26 Vict. c. 26, § 12, St. 19 & 20 Vict. c. 17. Each university court also has a criminal juris-diction in all offenses committed by its members. 4 Steph. Comm. 325.
COURTS OF WESTMINSTER HALL. The su-perior courts, both of law and equity, were for centuries fixed at Westminster, an ancient palace of the monarchs of England. Formerly, all the superior courts were held before the king’s cap-ital justiciary of England, in the aula re gis, or such of his palaces wherein his royal person re-sided, and removed with his household from one end of the kingdom to another. This was found to occasion great inconvenience to the suitors to remedy which it was made an article of the great charter of liberties, both of King John and King Henry III., that "common pleas should no longer follow the king’s court, but be held in some cer-tain place," in consequence of which they have ever since been heid (a few necessary removals in times of the plague excepted) in the palace of Westminster only. The courts of equity also sit at Westminster, nominally, during term time, al-though, actually, only during the first day of term, for they generally sit in courts provided for the purpose in, or in the neighborhood of, Lin-coln’s Inn. Brown.
COURTESY. See Curtesy.
COURTYARD. A corrupted form of "curtilage," signifying a space of land about a dwelling house, which not only might be inclosed, but within which appurtenant buildings anal structures might be erected. In re Lafayette Ave. in City of New York, 118 Misc.Rep. 161, 193 N.Y.S. 802, 804.
COUSIN. Kindred in the fourth degree, being the issue (male or female) of the brother or sister of one’s father or mother. Harris v. Harris, 97 N. J.Eq. 190, 127 A. 108, 109; In re Hering’s Estate, 137 Misc. 867, 244 N.Y.S. 138.
Those who descend from the brother or sister of the father of the person spoken of are called "paternal cous-ins;" "maternal cousins" are those who are descended from the brothers or sisters of the mother. Cousins-ger-man are first cousins. Sanderson v. Bayley, 4 Myl. & C. 59.
In English wrlts, commissions, and other formal Instru-ments lssued by the crown, the word signifies any peer of the degree of an earl. The appellation is as ancient as the reign of Henry IV., who, being related or allied to every earl then in the kingdom, acknowledged that connection in all his Letters and pubilc acts; from which the use has descended to his successors, though the reason has long ago falled. Mozley & Whitley.
First cousins. Cousins-german; the children oí, one’s uncle or aunt. Sanderson v. Bayley, 4 Mylne & C. 59.
Second cousins. Persons who are related to each other by descending from the same great-grandfather or great-grandmother. The children of one’s first cousins are his second cousins. These are sometimes called "first cousins once re-moved." Slade v. Fooks, 9 Sim. 387; Corpora-tion of Bridgnorth v. Collins, 15 Sim. 541.
Quarter cousin. Properly, a cousin in the fourth degree; but the term has come to express any remote degree of relationship, and even to bear an ironical signification in which it denotes a very trifiing degree of intimacy and regard. Often corrupted into "cater" cousin.

COUSINAGE. See Cosinage.
COUSTOM. (Fr. Coutum.) Custom; duty; toll; tribute. 1 Bl. Comm. 314.
COUSTOUMIER. (Otherwise spelled "Coustu-mier" or "Coutumier.") In old French law. A collection of customs, unwritten laws, and forms of procedure. Two such volumes are of especial importance in juridical history, viz., the Grand Coustumier de Normandie, and the Coutumier de France or Grand Coutumier.
COUTHUTLAUGH. A person who willingly and knowingly received an outlaw, and cherished or concealed him; for which offense he underwent the same punishment as the outlaw himself. Bract. 128b ; Spelman.
COUVERTURE. In French law. The deposit ("margin") made by the client in the hands of the broker, either of a sum of money or of securities, in order to guaranty the broker for the payment of the securities which he purchases for the client. Arg.Fr.Merc.Law, 555.
COVENABLE. A French word signifying con-venient or suitable; as covenably endowed. An-ciently written "convenable." Termes de la Ley.
COVENANT

Practice

The name of a common-law form of action ex contractu, which lies for the recovery of damages for breach of a covenant, or contract under seal. Stickney v. Stickney, 21 N.H. 68; Utilities Produc-tion Corporation v. Southwestern Natural Gas Co., Del., 1 Terry 401, 11 A.2d 275, 276. .

Law of Contracts

An agreement, convention, or promise of two or more parties, by deed in writing, signed, sealed, and delivered, by which either of the parties pledges himself to the other that something is either done or shall be done, or stipulates for the truth of certain facts. Commonwealth v. Robin-son, 1 Watts, Pa., 160; Kent v. Edmondston, 49 N.C. 529; Schram v. Coyne, C.C.A.Mich., 127 F.2d 205, 209; Sabin v. Hamilton, 2 Ark. 485, 490 (see, however, the later case of Dyer v. Gill, 32 Ark. 410, pointing out that by virtue of statute in Ar-kansas, the distinction between sealed and un-sealed instruments, with reference to contracts between individuals, has been abolished).
An agreement between two or more parties, reduced to writing and executed by a sealing and delivery thereof, whereby some of the parties named therein engage, or one of them engages, with the other, or others, or some of them, therein also named, that some act hath or hath not already been done, or for the performance or non-perform-ance of some speclfled duty. De Bolle v. Insurance Co., 4 Whart., Pa., 71, 33 Am. Dec. 38.
In common parlance, any agreement, whether under seal or not. 15 C.J. 1209; 7 R.C.L. 1084; Jenkins v. John Taylor Dry Goods Co., 352 Mo. 660, 179 S.W.2d 54, 58.
In effect, this has become the legal meaning In many atetes, in which prívate seals have been abollshed by stat-ute. For a number of these state statutes, see 66 L.R.A.

686, 687. In those states it Is commonly held that the affix-ing of a sea!, when unnecessary to the validity of the instrument, has no effect, and may be disregarded. 24 R.C.L. 689. "Seals are a rellc of that period when men, as a rule, could not write," and a covenant may "be created in this state [Georgia] by a writing not under seal." Atlanta, K. & N. Ry. Co. v. McKinney, 124 Ga. 929, 53 S.E. 701, 703, 6 L.R.A.,N.S., 43

Classification

Covenants may be classified according to severa! distinct principies of division. According as one or other of these is adopted, they are:
Express or implied. The former being those which are created by the express words of the parties to the deed declaratory of their intention, while implied covenants are those which are in-ferred by the law from certain words in a deed which imply (though they do not express) them. Express covenants are also called covenants "in deed," as distinguished from covenants "in law." McDonough v. Martin, 88 Ga. 675, 16 S.E. 59, 18 L. R.A. 343; Garstang v. Davenport, 90 Iowa 359, 57 N.W. 876.
Dependent, concurrent, and independent. Cove-nants are either dependent, concurrent, or mutual and independent. The first depends on the prior performance of some act or condition, and, until the condition is performed, the other party is not hable to an action on his covenant. In the second, mutual acts are to be performed at the same time; and if one party is ready, and offers to perform his part, and the other neglects or refuses to perform his, he who is ready and offers has fulfilled his engagement, and may maintain an action for the default of the other, though it is not certain that either is obliged to do the first act. The third sort is where either party may re-cover damages from the other for the injuries he may have received by a breach of the cove-nants in his favor; and it is no excuse for the defendant to allege a breach of the covenants on the part of the plaintiff. Bailey v. White, 3 Ala. 330; Gray v. Smith, C.C.Cal., 76 F. 534; Lowery v. May, 213 Ala. 66, 104 So. 5, 8; Roberts v. Steel-man, C.C.A.N.J., 1 F.2d 180, 182..
Mutual and independent covenants are such as do not go to the whole consideratlon on both sides, but only to a part, and where separate action lie for breaches on either side to recover damages for the lnjury sustained by breach. Lowery v. May, 213 Ala. 66, 104 So. 5, 8; Mg Run Coal Co. v. Employers’ Indemnity Co., 163 Ky. 596, 174 S.W. 25, 26.
Covenants are dependent where performance by one par-ty is conditioned on and subject to performance by the other, and in such case the party who seeks performance must show performance or a tender or readlness to per-form on his part; but covenants are independent when actual performance of one Is not dependent on another, and where, In consequence, the remedy of both sides Is by action. Roberts v. Steelman, C.C.A.N.J., 1 F.2d 180, 182.
Principal and auxiliary. The former being those which relate directly to the principal matter of the contract entered finto between the parties; while auxiliary covenants are those which do not re-late dlrectly to the principal matter of contract between the parties, but to something connected with it.

inherent and collateral. The former being such as immediately affect the particular property, while the latter affect some property collateral thereto or some matter collateral to the grant or tease. Shep.Touch. 161.
A covenant inherent 1s one whlch Is conversant about the land, and knit to the estate in the land; as, that the thing demised shall be quletly enjoyed, shall be kept in repair, or shall not be alienad. A covenant collateral Is one wh1ch Is conversant about some collateral thing that doth noth-ing at all, or not so lmmedlately, concern the thing grant-ed; as to pay a sum of money in gross, etc.
Joint or several. The former bind both or all the covenantors together; the latter bind each of them separately. A covenant may be both joint and several at the same time, as regards the cove-nantors; but, as regards the covenantees, they cannot be joint and several for one and the same cause, (5 Coke, 19a,) but must be either joint or several only. Brown. See Capen v. Barrows, 1 Gray, Mass., 379; In re Slingsby, 5 Coke, 18b.
Covenants are usually joint or several according as the interests of the covenantees are such; but the words of the covenant, where they are unamblguous, will decide, although, where they are ambiguous the nature of the interests as being joint or several Is left to decide.
General or speciflc. The former relate to land generaily and place the covenantee in the position of a specialty creditor only; the latter relate to particular lands and give the covenantee a Hen thereon. Brown.
Executed or executory. The former being such as relate to an act already performed; while the latter are those whose performance is to be fu-ture. Shep.Touch. 161.
Affirmative or negative. The former being those in which the party binds himself to the ex-istence of a present state of facts as represented or to the future performance of some act; while the latter are those in which the covenantor obliges himself not to do or perform some act.
Declaratory or obligatory. The former being -those which serve to limit or direct uses; while the latter are those which are binding on the party himself. 1 Sid. 27; 1 Keb. 337.
Real and personal. A real covenant is one which binds the heirs of the covenantor and passes to assignees or purchasers; a covenant the obliga-tion of which is so connected with the realty that he who has the latter is either entitled to the bene-fit of it or is fiable to perform it; a covenant which has for its object something annexed to, or inherent in, or connected with, land or other real property, and runs with the land, so that the grantee of the land 1s invested with it and may sue upon it for a breach happening in his time. 4 Kent, Comm. 470; 2 Bl.Comm. 304; Chap-man v. Holmes, 10 N.J.Law, 20; Skinner v. Mitch-ell, 5 Kan.App. 366, 48 P. 450; Oil Co. v. Hinton, 159 Ind. 398, 64 N.E. 224; Davis v. Lyman, 6 Conn. 249.
In the oíd books, a covenant real is also defined to be a covenant by which a man binds hlmself to pass a thing real, as lands or tenements. Termes de la Ley; 3 Bl. Comm. 156; Shep.Touch. 161. A personal covenant, on the
other hand, is one which, matead of being a charge upon real estate of the covenantor, only binds himself and his personal representatives in respect to assets. 4 Kent, Comm. 470; Carter v. Denman, 23 N.J.Law, 270; Hadley v. Bernero, 97 Mo.App. 314, 71 S.W. 451. The phrase may also mean a covenant whIch 1s personal to the covenantor, that 15, one ~eh he must perform In person, and cannot procure another person to perform for him. De Sanno v. Earle, 273 Pa. 265, 117 A. 200, 202; Pearson v. Rlchards, 106 Or. 78, 211 P. 167, 171. "Real covenants" relate to realty and have for thelr main object some beneflt thereto, inuring to beneflt of and becoming binding on subsequent grantees, while "personal covenants" do not run with land. Bank of Hoxie v. Meriwether, 166 Ark. 39, 265 S.W. 642, 645. Very considerable confuslon exists emana the author-Mes In the use of the term real covenants. The definition of Blackstone whlch determines the character of covenants from the insert.ton or noninsertion of the word "heir" by the covenantor, la pretty generaily rejected.
Transitiva or Intransitive. The former being those personal covenants the duty of performing which passes over to the representatives of the covenantor; while the latter are those the duty of performing which is limited to the covenantee himself, and does not pass over to his representa-tive. Bac.Abr.Cov.
Disjunctive covenants. Those which are for the performance of one or more of several things at the election of the covenantor or covenantee, as the case may be. Platt, Cov. 21.
Absolute or conditional. An absolute covenant is one which is not qualified or limited by any con-dition.
Other Compound and Descriptive Terms
Continuing covenant. One which indicates or necessarily implies the doing of stipulated acts successively or as often as the occasion may re-quire; as, a covenant to pay rent by installments, to keep the premises in repair or insured, to culti-vate land, etc. McGlynn v. Moore, 25 Cal. 395.
Full covenants. As this term is used in Ameri-can law, it includes the following: The covenants for seisin, for right to convey, against incum-brances, for quiet enjoyment, sometimes for fur-ther assurance, and almost always of warranty, this last often taking the place of the covenant for quiet enjoyment, and indeed in many states being the only covenant in practical use. Rawle, Cov. for Title, § 21.
Mutual covenants. A mutual covenant is one where either party may recover damages from the other for the injury he may have received from a breach of the covenants in his favor. Pailey v. White, 3 Ala. 330.
Separate covenant. A several covenant; one which binds the several covenantors each for him-self, but not jointly.
Usual covenants. An agreement on the part of a seller of real property to give the usual cove-nants binds him to insert in the grant covenants of "seisin," "quiet enjoyment," "further assurance," "general warranty," and "against incumbrances." Wilson v. Wood, 17 N.J.Eq. 216, 88 Am.Dec. 231; Drake v. Barton, 18 Minn. 467, Gil. 414.

The result of the authorities appears to be that In a case where the agreement is silent as to the particular cove-nants to be inserted In the lease, and provides merely for the lease containing "usual covenants," or, which is the same thing, In an open agreement without any reference to the covenants, and there are no special circumstances justifying the introduction of other covenants, the follow-Ing are the only ones which either party can insist upon, namely : Covenants by the lessee (1) to pay rent; (2) to pay taxes, except such as are expressly payable by the landlord; (3) to keep and deliver up the premises In repair; and (4) to allow the lessor to enter and vlew the state of repair; and the usual qualified covenant by the lessor for quiet enjoyment by the lessee. 7 Ch.Div. 561.

Specific Covenants
Covenants against incumbrances. A covenant that there are no incumbrances on the land con-veyed; a stipulation against all rights to or in-terests in the land which may subsist in third persons to the diminution of the value of the es-tate granted. Bank v. Parisette, 68 Ohio St. 450,
67 N.E. 896; Shearer v. Ranger, 22 Pick., Masst, 447; Matzger v. Arcade Building & Realty Co., 102 Wash. 423, 173 P. 47.
Covenant for further assurance. An undertak-ing, in the form of a covenant, on the part of the vendor of real estate to do such further acts for the purpose of perfecting the purchaser’s title as the latter may reasonably require. This cove-nant is deemed of great importance, since it re-lates both to the vendor’s title of and to the in-strument of conveyance to the vendee, and op-erates as well to secure the performance of all acts necessary for supplying any defect in the former as to remove all objections to the sufficien-cy and security of the latter. Platt, Cov.; Rawle, Cov. §§ 98, 99. See Sugd.Vend. 500; Armstrong v. Darby, 26 Mo. 520.
Covenant for quiet enjoyment. An assurance against the consequences of a defective title, and of any disturbances thereupon. Platt, Cov. 312; Rawle, Coy. 125. Gulf Refining Co. v. Fetschan, C.C.A.Ohio, 130 F.2d 129, 132.
A covenant that the tenant or grantee of an estate shall enjoy the possession of the premises in peace and without disturbance by hostile claimants. Poposkey v. Munkwitz,
68 Wis. 322, 32 N.W. 35, 60 Am.Rep. 858; Stewart v. Drake, 9 N.J.Law, 141; Christy v. Bedell, 10 Kan.App. 435, 61 P. 1095.
Covenants for title. Covenants usually inserted in a conveyance of land, on the part of the gran-tor, and binding him for the completeness, se-curity, and continuance of the title transferred to the grantee. They comprise "covenants for seisin, for right to convey, against incumbrances, or quiet enjoyment, sometimes for further assurance, and almost always of warranty." Rawle, Coy. § 21.
Covenants in gross. Such as do not run with the land.
Covenant not to sue. A covenant by one who had a right of action at the time of making it against another person, by which he agrees not to sue to enforce such right of action. Pacific States Lumber Co. v. Bargar, C.C.A.Or., 10 F.2d 335, 337; McDonald v. Goddard Grocery Co., 184 Mo.App. 432, 171 S.W. 650, 651.
Covenant of non-claim. A covenant sometimes employed, particularly in the New England states, and in deeds of extinguishment of ground rents in Pennsylvania, that neither the vendor, nor his heirs, nor any other person, etc., shall claim any title in the premises conveyed. Rawle, Cov. § 22.
Covenant of right to convey. An assurance by the covenantor that the grantor has sufficient capacity and title to convey the estate which he by his deed undertakes to convey.
Covenant of seisin. An assurance to the pur-chaser that the grantor has the very estate in quantity and quality which he purports to con-vey. 11 East, 641; Rawle, Cov. § 58; Burton v. Price, 105 Fla. 544, 141 So. 728, 729.
It is said that the covenant of seisin Is not now In use in England, being embraced In that of a right to convey; but it is used in several of the United States. 2 Washb. Real Prop. •ros.
Covenant of warranty. An assurance by the grantor of an estate that the grantee shall enjoy the same without interruption by virtue of para-mount title. King v. Kilbride, 58 Conn. 109, 19 A. 519; Blair v. Morris, 212 Ala. 91, 101 So. 745, 746; Biwer v. Martin, 294 III. 488, 128 N.E. 518, 522.
Covenant running with land. A covenant which goes with the land, as being annexed to the es-tate, and which cannot be separated from the land, and transferred without it. 4 Kent, Comm. 472, note.
A covenant is said to run with the land, when not only the original parties or their representatives, but each suc-cessive owner of the land, Will be entitled to its benefit, or be liable (as the case may be) to its obligation. 1 Steph. Comm. 455. Or, in other words, it is so called when either the liabillty to perform it or the right to take advantage cf it passes to the assignee of the land. Tillotson v. Prichard, 60 Vt. 94, 14 A. 302, 6 Am.St.Rep. 95; Spencer’s Case, 3 Coke, 31. One which lonches and ronceros the land itself, so that its benefit or obligation pasees with the ownership. Local Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Oklahoma City v. Erkroat, 186 Okl. 660, 100 P.2d 261, 262.
Covenant running with title. A covenant which goes with the title. Stipulation in a lease granting to lessee the option of renewing it for another specified period was such a covenant. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Carter, La.App., 2 So.2d 680, 682.
Covenant to convey. A covenant by which the convenantor agrees to convey to the covenantee a certain estate, under certain circumstances.
Covenant to renew. An executory contract, giving lessee the right to renew on compliance with the terms specified in the renewal clause, if any, or, if none, on giving notice, prior to termi-nation of the lease, of his desire to renew, where-upon the contract becomes executed as to him. Freiheit v. Broch, 98 Conn. 166, 118 A. 828, 830.
Covenant to stand seised. A conveyance adapted to the case where a person seised of land in pos-session, reversion, or vested remainder, proposes to convey it to his wife, child, or kinsman. In its terms it consists of a covenant by him, in consid-
Covenants against incumbrances. A covenant that there are no incumbrances on the land con-veyed; a stipulation against all rights to or in-terests in the land which may subsist in third persons to the diminution of the value of the es-tate granted. Bank v. Parisette, 68 Ohio St. 450,
67 N.E. 896; Shearer v. Ranger, 22 Pick., Masst, 447; Matzger v. Arcade Building & Realty Co., 102 Wash. 423, 173 P. 47.
Covenant for further assurance. An undertak-ing, in the form of a covenant, on the part of the vendor of real estate to do such further acts for the purpose of perfecting the purchaser’s title as the latter may reasonably require. This cove-nant is deemed of great importance, since it re-lates both to the vendor’s title of and to the in-strument of conveyance to the vendee, and op-erates as well to secure the performance of all acts necessary for supplying any defect in the former as to remove all objections to the sufficien-cy and security of the latter. Platt, Cov.; Rawle, Cov. §§ 98, 99. See Sugd.Vend. 500; Armstrong v. Darby, 26 Mo. 520.
Covenant for quiet enjoyment. An assurance against the consequences of a defective title, and of any disturbances thereupon. Platt, Cov. 312; Rawle, Coy. 125. Gulf Refining Co. v. Fetschan, C.C.A.Ohio, 130 F.2d 129, 132.
A covenant that the tenant or grantee of an estate shall enjoy the possession of the premises in peace and without disturbance by hostile claimants. Poposkey v. Munkwitz,
68 Wis. 322, 32 N.W. 35, 60 Am.Rep. 858; Stewart v. Drake, 9 N.J.Law, 141; Christy v. Bedell, 10 Kan.App. 435, 61 P. 1095.
Covenants for title. Covenants usually inserted in a conveyance of land, on the part of the gran-tor, and binding him for the completeness, se-curity, and continuance of the title transferred to the grantee. They comprise "covenants for seisin, for right to convey, against incumbrances, or quiet enjoyment, sometimes for further assurance, and almost always of warranty." Rawle, Coy. § 21.
Covenants in gross. Such as do not run with the land.
Covenant not to sue. A covenant by one who had a right of action at the time of making it against another person, by which he agrees not to sue to enforce such right of action. Pacific States Lumber Co. v. Bargar, C.C.A.Or., 10 F.2d 335, 337; McDonald v. Goddard Grocery Co., 184 Mo.App. 432, 171 S.W. 650, 651.
Covenant of non-claim. A covenant sometimes employed, particularly in the New England states, and in deeds of extinguishment of ground rents in Pennsylvania, that neither the vendor, nor his heirs, nor any other person, etc., shall claim any title in the premises conveyed. Rawle, Cov. § 22.
Covenant of right to convey. An assurance by the covenantor that the grantor has sufficient capacity and title to convey the estate which he by his deed undertakes to convey.
Covenant of seisin. An assurance to the pur-chaser that the grantor has the very estate in quantity and quality which he purports to con-vey. 11 East, 641; Rawle, Cov. § 58; Burton v. Price, 105 Fla. 544, 141 So. 728, 729.
It is said that the covenant of seisin Is not now In use in England, being embraced In that of a right to convey; but it is used in several of the United States. 2 Washb. Real Prop. •ros.
Covenant of warranty. An assurance by the grantor of an estate that the grantee shall enjoy the same without interruption by virtue of para-mount title. King v. Kilbride, 58 Conn. 109, 19 A. 519; Blair v. Morris, 212 Ala. 91, 101 So. 745, 746; Biwer v. Martin, 294 III. 488, 128 N.E. 518, 522.
Covenant running with land. A covenant which goes with the land, as being annexed to the es-tate, and which cannot be separated from the land, and transferred without it. 4 Kent, Comm. 472, note.
A covenant is said to run with the land, when not only the original parties or their representatives, but each suc-cessive owner of the land, Will be entitled to its benefit, or be liable (as the case may be) to its obligation. 1 Steph. Comm. 455. Or, in other words, it is so called when either the liabillty to perform it or the right to take advantage cf it passes to the assignee of the land. Tillotson v. Prichard, 60 Vt. 94, 14 A. 302, 6 Am.St.Rep. 95; Spencer’s Case, 3 Coke, 31. One which lonches and ronceros the land itself, so that its benefit or obligation pasees with the ownership. Local Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Oklahoma City v. Erkroat, 186 Okl. 660, 100 P.2d 261, 262.
Covenant running with title. A covenant which goes with the title. Stipulation in a lease granting to lessee the option of renewing it for another specified period was such a covenant. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Carter, La.App., 2 So.2d 680, 682.
Covenant to convey. A covenant by which the convenantor agrees to convey to the covenantee a certain estate, under certain circumstances.
Covenant to renew. An executory contract, giving lessee the right to renew on compliance with the terms specified in the renewal clause, if any, or, if none, on giving notice, prior to termi-nation of the lease, of his desire to renew, where-upon the contract becomes executed as to him. Freiheit v. Broch, 98 Conn. 166, 118 A. 828, 830.
Covenant to stand seised. A conveyance adapted to the case where a person seised of land in pos-session, reversion, or vested remainder, proposes to convey it to his wife, child, or kinsman. In its terms it consists of a covenant by him, in consid eration of his natural love and affection, to stand seised of the land to the use of the intended trans-feree. Before the statute of uses this would mere-ly have raised a use in favor of the convenantee; but by that act this use is converted into the legal estate, and the covenant therefore operates as a conveyance of the land to the covenantee. It is now almost obsolete. 1 Steph.Comm. 532; Wil-liams, Seis. 145; French v. French, 3 N.H. 261; Jackson v. Swart, 20 Johns., N.Y., 85.
COVENANTEE. The party to whom a covenant is made. Shep.Touch. 160.
COVENANTOR. The party who makes a cove-nant. Shep.Touch. 160.
COVENANTS PERFORMED. In Pennsylvania practice. This is the name of a plea to the action of covenant whereby the defendant, upon informal notice to the plaintiff, may give anything in evi-dence which he might have pleaded. With the addition of the words "absque hoc" it amounts to a denial of the allegations of the declaration; and the further addition of "with leave," etc., imports an equitable defense, arising out of special cir-cumstances, which the defendant means to offer in evidente. Zents v. Legnard, 70 Pa. 192; Stewart v. Bedell, 79 Pa. 336.
COVENT. A contraction, in the old books, of the word "convent."
COVENTRY ACT. The name given to the statute 22 & 23 Car. II. c. 1, which provided for the pun-ishment of assaults with intent to maim or dis-figure a person. It was so named from its being occasioned by an assault on Sir John Coventry in the street as was supposed, for some obnoxious words uttered by him in parliament. 4 Bl.Comm. 207; State v. Cody, 18 Or. 506, 23 P. 891.
COVER, v. In insurance. To protect by means of insurance; sometimes orally pending issuance of policy. Barrette v. Casualty Co. of America, 79 N.H. 59, 104 A. 126, 127; Michigan Idaho Lum-ber Co. v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 35 N.D. 244, 160 N.W. 130, 136; Muntz v. Travelers Mut. Casualty Co., 229 Iowa 1015, 295 N.W. 837, 841.
COVER INTO. The phrase "covered into the treasury," as used in acts of congress and the practice of the United States treasury department, means that money has actually been paid into the treasury in the regular manner, as distin-guished from merely depositing it with the treas-urer. U. S. v. Johnston, 124 U.S. 236, 8 S.Ct. 446, 31 L.Ed. 389.
COVERING DEED. A trust deed executed by a trading company to secure an issue of debentures: Simonson, Debentures, 38.
COVERT. Covered, protected, sheltered. A pound covert is one that is closed or covered over, as distinguished from pound overt, which is open overhead. Co.Litt. 47b; 3 Bl.Comm. 12. A feme covert is so called, as being under the wing, pro-tection, or cover of her husband. 1 Bl.Comm. 442.
COVERT BARON, or COVERT DE BARON. Un-der the protection of a husband; married. 1 Bl. Comm. 442. La feme que est covert de baron, the woman which is covert of a husband. Litt. § 670.
COVERTURE. The condition or state of a mar-ried woman. Sometimes used elliptically to de-scribe the legal disability arising from a state of coverture. Osborn v. Horine, 19 Ill. 124; Roberts v. Lund, 45 Vt. 86.
COVIN. A secret conspiracy or agreement be-tween two or more persons to injure or defraud another. Mix v. Muzzy, 28 Conn. 191; Anderson v. Oscamp, Ind.App., 35 N.E. 707; Hyslop v. Clarke, 14 Johns., N.Y., 465; Co.Litt. 357b; Co-myns, Dig. Covin, A; 1 Viner, Abr. 473.
COVINOUS. Deceitful; fraudulent; having the nature of, or tainted by covin.
COW. Female of bovine genus of animals. Strict-ly, one that has calved. Often loosely used to in-dude heifer, or young Female that has not calved. 2 East, Pl.Cr. 616; 1 Leach 105. See Taylor v. State, 6 Humph., Tenn., 285; Tombigbee Valley R. Co. v. Wilks, 6 Ala.App. 473, 60 So. 559; Mathis v. State, 70 Fla. 194, 69 So. 697, 698; Parsons v. Kimmel, 206 Mich. 676, 173 N.W. 539, 540.
COWARDICE. Pusillanimity; fear; misbehavior through fear in relation to some duty to be per-formed before an enemy. O’Brien Ct.M. 142; Coi! v. State, 62 Neb. 15, 86 N.W. 925.
CRACKING. The conversión, by means of heat and usually pressure, of the complex hydrocarbon molecules of heavier oils into the molecular struc-ture of the desired lighter oils. Universal Oil Products Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., D.C.Del., 20 F.2d 995.
CRAFT. A general term, now commonly applied to all kinds of sailing vessels, though formerly restricted to the smaller vessels. The Wenonah, 21 Grat., Va., 697; Reed v. Ingham, 3 El. & B. 898.
A trade or occupation of the sort requiring skill and training, particularly manual skill combined with a knowledge of the principies of the art; also the body of persons pursuing such a calling; a guild. Ganahl v. Shore, 24 Ga. 23, Cole v. Com-monwealth, 169 Va. 868, 193 S.E. 517, 519.
Guile, artful cunning, trickiness. Not a legal term in this sense, though often used in connec-tion with such terms as "fraud" and "artifice."
CRANAGE. A liberty to use a crane for drawing up goods and wares of burden from ships and ves-sels, at any creek of the sea, or wharf, unto the land, and to make a profit of doing so. It also sig-nifies the money paid and taken for the service. Tomlins.
CRANK. A term vulgarly applied to a person of eccentric, ill-regulated, and unpractical mental habits; a person half-crazed; a monomaniac; not necessarily equivalent to "insane person," "luna-tic," or any other term descriptive of complete mental derangement, and not carrying any impli-cation of hornicidal mania. Walker v. Tribune Co., C.C.Ill., 29 F. 827.
CRASSUS. Large; gross; excessive; extreme. Crassa ignorantia, gross ignorance. Fleta, lib. 5, c. 22, § 18.
Crassa negligentia. Gross neglect; absence of ordinary care and diligente. Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 72, 37 Am.Rep. 546.
CRASTINO. Lat. On the morrow, the day after. The return-day of writs; because the first day of the term was always some saint’s day, and writs were returnable on the day after. 2 Reeve, Eng. Law, 56.
CRATES. An iron gate before a prison. 1 Vent. 304.
CRAVE. To ask or demand; as to crave oyer. See Oyer.
CRAVEN. In old English law. A word of dis-grace and obloquy, pronounced on either cham-pion, in the ancient trial by battle, proving re-creant, i. e., yielding. Glanville calls it "infestum et inverecundum verbum." His condemnation was amittere liberam Zegem, i. e., to become infamous, and not to be accounted Ziber et legalis homo, be-ing supposed by the event to have been proved forsworn, and not fit to be put upon a jury or ad-mitted as a witness. Wharton.
CRAZY. A broken, shattered, or deranged con-dition of the mind; insane. Bates v. Oden, 198 Ala. 569, 73 So. 921. Thompson v. State, 104 Tex. Cr.R. 637, 285 S.W. 826, 830.
CREAMER. A foreign merchant, but generally taken for one who has a stall in a fair or market. Blount.
CREAMUS. Lat. We create. One of the words by which a corporation in England was formerly created by the king. 1 Bl.Comm. 473.
CREANCE. In French law. A claim; a debt; also belief, credit, faith.
CREANCER. One who trusts or gives credit; a creditor. Britt. cc. 28, 78.
CREANSOR. A creditor. Cowell.
CREATE. To being into being; to cause to ex-ist; to produce; as, to create a trust in lands, to create a corporation. Edwards v. Bibb, 54 Ala. 481; McClellan v. McClellan, 65 Me. 500; Pickett v. Board of Com’rs of Fremont County, 24 Idaho 200, 133 P. 112, 114; People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79, 91.
To create a charter or a corporation is to make one which never existed before, whIle to renew one is to give vitality to one which has been forfeited or has expired; and to extend one is to give an existing charter more time than originally limíted. Indianapolls v. Navin, 151 Ind. 139, 51 N.E. 80, 41 L.R.A. 344; State v. Powell, 109 Ohio St. 383, 142 N.E. 401, 403; Town of Westernport v. Green, 144 Md. 85, 124 A. 403.
CREDENTIALS. In International law. The in-struments which authorize and establish a public minister in his character with the state or prince to whom they are addressed. If the state or prince receive the minister, he can be received only in the quality attributed to him in his credentials. They are, as it were, his letter of attorney, his mandate patent, mandatum manifestum. Vattel, liv. 4, c. 6, § 76.
CREDIBILITY. Worthiness of belief; that quali-ty in a witness which renders his evidence wor-thy of belief. Alter the competence of a witness is allowed, the consideration of his credibility arises, and not before. 3 Bl.Comm. 369; 1 Bur-rows, 414, 417; Smith v. Jones, 68 Vt. 132, 34 A. 424; Loeb v. State, 133 Miss. 883, 98 So. 449, 451; Dewein v. State, 120 Ark. 302, 179 S.W. 346, 347. As to the distinction between competency and credibility, see Competency.
CREDIBLE. Worthy of belief; entitled to credit. See Competency.
Credible person. One who is trustworthy and entitled to be believed; in law and legal proceed-ings, one who is entitled to have his oath or affi-davit accepted as reliable, not only on account of his gond reputation for veracity, but also on ac-count of his intelligence, knowledge of the cir-cumstances, and disinterested relation to the mat-ter in question. Also one who is competent to tes-tify. Dunn v. State, 7 Tex.App. 605; Territory v. Leary, 8 N.M. 180, 43 P. 688; Loeb v. State, 133 Miss. 883, 98 So. 449, 451; Burleson v. State, 131 Tex.Cr.R. 576, 100 S.W.2d 1019, 1020.
Credible witness. One who is competent to give evidence; also one who is worthy of belief. Peck v. Chambers, 44 W.Va. 270, 28 S.E. 706; Savage v. Bulger, 77 S.W. 717, 25 Ky.Law.Rep. 1269; Appeal of Clark, 114 Me. 105, 95 A. 517, Ann.Cas. 1917A, 837; Hill v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 322 Ill. 42, 152 N.E. 545, 546; Burleson v. State, 131 Tex.Cr.R. 576, 100 S.W.2d 1019, 1020.
CREDIBLY INFORMED. The statement in a pleading or affidavit, that one is "credibly in-formed and verily believes" such and such facts, means that, having no direct personal knowledge of the matter in question, he has derived his in-formation in regard to it from authentic sources or from the statements of persons who are not only "credible," in the sense of being trustworthy, but also informed as to the particular matter or conversant with it.
CREDIT. The ability of a business man to bor-row money, or obtain goods on time, in conse-quence of the favorable opinion held by the com-munity, or by the particular lender, as to his sol-vency and reliability. People v. Wasservogle, 77 Cal. 173, 19 P. 270; In re Ford, D.C.Wash., 14 F.2d 848, 849; State ex rel. Globe-Democrat Pub. Co. v. Gehner, 316 Mo. 694, 294 S.W. 1017, 1018. That influence connected with certain social posi-tions. 20 Toullier, n. 19. Time allowed to the buyer of goods by the seller, in which to make payment for them. The correlative of a debt; that is, a debt considered from the creditor’s standpoint, or that which is incoming or due to one. Mountain State Motor Car Co. v. Solof, 97 W.Va. 196, 124 S.E. 824, 825. That which is due to a person, as distinguished from debit, that which is due by him. Claim or cause of action for specific sum of money. Richard v. American Union Bank, 204 N.Y.S. 719, 722, 123 Misc.Rep. 92; Thaden v. Bagan, 139 Minn. 46, 165 N.W. 864, 865; Richard v. American Union Bank, 204 N.Y. S. 719, 722, 123 Misc.Rep. 92; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Edwards, C.C.A.N.Y., 8 F.2d 851, 856; Hum-phreys v. County Court, 90 W.Va. 315, 110 S.E. 701, 702, 703.
A sum credited on the books of a company to person who appears to be entitled to it. Coons v. Home Life Ins. Co. of New York, 291 Ill.App. 313, 9 N.E.2d 419, 421. The credit of an individual is the trust reposed In him by those who deal with him that he is of ability to meet his engage-ments; and he is trusted because through the tribunals of the country he may be made to pay. The credit of a government is founded on a belief of its ability to comply with its engagements, and a confidente in its honor, that It will do that voluntarily which it cannot be compelled to do. Owen v. Branch Bank, 3 Ala. 258.
Bill of Credit. See Bill.
Letter of Credit. An open or sealed letter, from a merchant in one place, directed to an-other, in another place or country, requiring him, 11 a person therein named, or the bearer of the letter, shall have occasion to buy commodities, or to want money to any particular or unlimited amount, either to procure the same or to pass his promise, bill, or bond for it, the writer of the letter undertaking to provide him the money for the goods, or to repay him by exchange, or to give him such satisfaction as he shall require, either for himself, or the bearer of the letter. 3 Chit.Com.Law, 336. Powerine Co. v. Russel Inc., 103 Utah 441, 135 P.2d 906, 909, 910, 912.
A written instrument, addressed by one person to another, requesting the latter to give credit to the person in whose favor it Is drawn. Mechanics Bank v. New York & N. H. R. Co., 13 N.Y. 599; Lafargue v. Harrison, 70 Cal. 380, 9 P. 261, 59 Am.Rep. 416. A letter of credit is in the nature of a negotiable instrument, and is a letter whereby a person requests another to advance money or give credit to a third person, and promises to repay person making advancement. Second Nat. Bank of Toledo v. M. Samuel & Sons, C.C.A.N.Y., 12 F.2d 963, 966, 53 A.L.R. 49; Border Nat. Bank of Eagle Pass, Tex., v. American Nat. Bank of San Francisco, Cal., C.C.A.Tex., 282 F. 73, 77; Liggett v. Levy, 233 Mo. 590, 136 S.W.2d 299, 301, Ann.Cas.1912C, 70; General and special. A general letter of credit is one addressed to any and all persons, without naming any one In particular, while a special letter of credit is addressed to a particular individual, firm, or corporation by name. Birckhead v. Brown, 5 Hill, N.Y., 642; American Steel Co. v. Irving Nat. Bank, C.C.A.N.Y., 266 F. 41, 43. A "con-firmed irrevocable letter of .credit,’• an "irrevocable let-ter," or a "confirmed credit" is a contract to pay on com-pliance with its termo, and needs no formal acknowledg-ment or acceptance other than is therein stated. Lamborn v. Natlonal Park Bank of New York, 240 N.Y. 520, 148 N.E. 664, 665.
Line of Credit. See Line.
Personal Credit. Personal credit is that credit which a person possesses as an individual, and which is founded on the opinion entertained of his character and business standing.
CRÉDIT. Fr. Credit in the English sense of the term, or more particularly, the security for a loan or advancement.
CRÉDIT FONCIER. A company or corporation formed for the purpose of carrying out improve-ments, by means of loans and advances on real estate security.
CRÉDIT MOBILIER. A company or association formed for carrying on a banking business or for the construction of public works, building of rail-roads, operation of mines, or other such enter-prises, by means of loans or advances on the security of personal property. Barrett v. Sav-ings Inst., 64 N.J.Eq. 425, 54 A. 543,
CREDITED. The alternative to paid. Lynch-burg Trust & Savings Bank v. Commissioner of Internad Revenue, C.C.A.4, 68 F.2d 356, 358.
CREDITOR. A person to whom a debt is owing by another person who is the "debtor." Wool-verton v. Taylor Co., 43 III.App. 424; Insurance Co. v. Meeker, 37 N.J.Law. 300; Walsh v. Miller, 51 Ohio St. 462, 38 N.E. 381; Rooney v. Inheri. tance Tax Commission of Kansas, 143 Kan. 143, 53 P.2d 500, 501. One who has a right to require the fulfillment of an obligation or contract. Mohr v. Minnesota Elevator Co., 40 Minn. 343, 41 N.W. 1074; Murphy v. Jos. Hollander, Inc., 131 N.J.L. 165, 34 A.2d 780, 783; one to whom money is due, and, in ordinary acceptation, has reference to financial or business transactions. State v. Ord State Bank, 117 Neb. 189, 220 N.W. 265, 266; The antonym of "debtor." Erickson v. Grande Ronde Lumber Co., 162 Or. 556, 92 P.2d 170, 177; The word is susceptible of latitudinous construction. Commerce Trust Co. v. Farmers’ Exchange Bank of Gallatin, 332 Mo. 979, 61. S.W.2d 928, 89 A.L.R. 373.
The foregoing Is the strict legal sense of the term; but in a wider sense It means one who has a legal right to demand and recover from another a sum of money on any account whatever, and hence may include the owner of any right of action against another, whether arising on con-tract or for a tort, a penalty, or a forfeiture. Bongard v. Block, 81 III. 186, 25 Am.Rep. 276; one having a claim for tort, Chalmers v. Sheehy, 132 Cal. 459, 64 P. 709, 84 Am.St. Rep. 62; an antenuptial agreement as constituting wife a "creditor" of husband’s estate. In re Wilson’s Estate, 346 Pa. 562, 31 A.2d 106, 108; parties claiming as trust funds deposito in insolvent bank, Dewey v. Commercial State Bank, 141 Kan. 356, 41 P.2d 1006, 1007.
The term "creditor," within the common-law and stat-utes that conveyances with intent to defraud creditors shall be void, includes every one having right to require the performance of any legal obligation, contract, or guarantY, or a legal right to damages growing out of contract or tort, Hernton v. Short, 121 Ark. 383, 181 S.W. 142, 144; and includes not merely the holder of a fixed and certain pres-ent debt, but every one having a right to require the per-formance of any legal obligation, contract, or guaranty, or a legal right to damages growing out of contract or tort, and includes one entitied to damages for breach of contract to convey real estate, notwithstanding the abandonment of his action for specific performance, In re Littleton’s Estate, 223 N.Y.S. 470, 479, 129 Mise.Rep. 845; Mackenzie Oil CO. v. Omar Oil & Gas Co., 14 Del.Ch. 36, 120 A. 852, 854; holders of judgment for conversion, Bays v. Brown, 160 Or. 594, 86 P.2d 951, 954; a "person having any claim, whether matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, abso-lute, fixed or contingent." Richards v. „Iones, 18 Del.Ch. 227, 142 A. 832, 833. Those having a cause of action for damages for wrongful death. Evers v. Evers, 146 Neb. 101,

18 N.W.2d 673, 678; in its broad sense the word "creditor" means one who has any legal liability upon a contract, express or implied, or in tort: in its narrow sense, the term is limited to one who holds a demand which ts certain and liquidated. Superior Plating Works v. Art Metal Crafts Co., 218 Ill.App. 148, 150.
.PlaintIff, in action to recover damages for a tort commit-ted against him, is a "creditor" of defendant, within mean-ing of that term as it Is employed in Shannon’s Code, § 3143, denouncing conveyances and transfers of property col-lusively made with lntent to delay, hinder, or defraud credltors. Oliphant v. Moore, 155 Tenn. 359, 293 S.W. 541, 542.
In statutes the term has various special meanings, dependent upon context, purpose of statute, etc. Toof v. City Nat. Bank of Paducah, Ky., C.C.A.Ky., 206 F. 250, 252; a bank taking chattel mortgage for pre-existing debt. Lindig v. Johnson City State Bank, Tex.Com.App., 41 S.W.2d 222, 224. An assignee of conditional seller taking trucks as creditor of purchaser, John W. Snyder, Inc., v. Aker, 134 Misc. 721, 236 N.Y.S. 28, 30. One who had recov-ered verdict against principal on attachment bond, Amer Realty Co. v. Spack, 280 Mass. 96, 181 N.S. 753, 754; the recelver of an insolvent national bank suing to enforce statutory stockholder’s liability for beneflt of creditors as a "creditor", Coffey v. Fisher, C.C.A.Tenn., 100 F.2d 51, 53; person to whom letters of administration granted. State ex rel. Gentry v. O’Byrne, 221 Ind. 282, 46 N.E.2d 687, 690. One, seeking to recover from a special adminis-trator for conversion, United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Krow, 184 Okl. 444, 87 P.2d 950, 954; holders of participation certificates in mortgage, In re R. A. Security Holdings, D.C.N.Y., 46 F.Supp. 254, 255; persons who seize property under a legal process. Neils v. Bohlsen, 181 Minn. 25, 231 N.W. 248; state and political subdivisions, to which the forfeit Is payable, International Harvester Co. v. Gully, 188 Miss. 115, 194 So. 472, 473. The National Labor Rela-tions Board, seeking enforcement of a back pay allowance, National Labor Relations Board v. Killoren, C.C.A.Mo., 122 F.2d 609, 612. The United States which filed for record, Underwood v. United States, D.C.Tex., 37 F.Supp. 824, 826. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which had pur-chased over 86 per cent. of outstanding bonds of insolvent lrrigation district, pursuant to plan to refinance entire bond indebtedness of district, West Coast Life Ins. Co. v. Merced Irr. Dist., C.C.A.Cal., 114 F.2d 654, 668, 669.

Classification
A creditor is called a "simple contract creditor," a "specialty creditor," a "bond creditor," or other-wise, according to the nature of the obligation giv-ing rise to the debt.
Attaching creditor.
One who has caused an attachment to be issued and levied on property of his debtor.
Catholic creditor
In Scotch law, one whose debt is secured on all or on several distinct parts of the debtor’s prop-erty. The contracted term (designating one who is not so secured) is "secondary creditor."
Certificate creditor
A creditor of a municipal corporation who re-ceives a certificate of indebtedness for the amount of his claim, there being no funds on hand to pay him. Johnson v. New Orleans, 46 La.Ann. 714, 15 So. 100.
Confidential creditor
A term sometimes applied to creditors of a failing debtor who furnished him with the means of obtaining credit to which his real circumstan-
ces did not entitle him, thus involving loss to other creditors not in his confidente. Gay v. Strickland, 112 Ala. 567, 20 So. 921.
Creditor at largo
One who has not established his debt by the recovery of a judgment or has not otherwise secured a lien on any of the debtor’s property. U. S. v. Ingate, C.C.Ala., 48 F. 254; Wolcott v. Ashenfelter, 5 N.M. 442, 23 P. 780, 8 L.R.A. 691.
Domestic creditor
One who resides in the same state or country in which the debtor has his domicile or his prop-erty.
Double creditor
See Double Creditor.
Execution creditor
One who, having recovered a judgment against the debtor for his debt or claim, has also caused an execution to be issued thereon. Chalmers & Williams v. Surprise, 70 Ind.App. 646, 123 N.E. 841, 844.
Executor creditor
In Scotch law. A creditor of a decedent who obtains a grant of administration on the estate, at least to the extent of so much of it as will be sufficient to discharge his debt, when the execu-tor named in the will has declined to serve, as also those other persons who would be preferen-tially entitled to administer.
Existing credltors
See Existing Creditors.
Foreign creditor
One who resides in a state or country foreign to that where the debtor has his domicile or his property.
General creditor
A creditor at large (supra), or one who has no lien or security for the payment of his debt or claim. Wolcott v. Ashenfelter, 5 N.M. 442, 23 P. 780, 8 L.R.A. 691.
Joint creditors
Persons jointly entitled to require satisfaction of the same debt or demand.
Judgment creditor
See Judgment Creditor.
Junior creditor
One whose claim or demand accrued at a date• later than that of a claim or demand held by another creditor, who is called correlatively the "senior" creditor.
Petitioning creditors
As used In Bankruptcy Act, § 64b, 11 U.S.C.A. § 104, authorizing one reasonable attorney’s fee.

All creditors petitioning for adjudication, or seek-ing relief consistent with original petition by sup-plemental or intervening petition, in view of sec-don 59f, 11. U.S.C.A. § 95. In re Marcuse & Co., C.C.A.I11., 11 F.2d 513, 516.
Principal creditor
One whose claim or demand very greatly ex-ceeds the claims of all other creditors in amount is sometimes so called. See In re Sullivan’s Es-tate, 25 Wash. 430, 65 P. 793.
Secured creditor See Secured Creditor.
Single creditor See Single Creditor.
Subsequent creditor
One whose claim or demand accrued or carne into existence af ter a given fact or transaction, such as the recording of a deed or mortgage or the execution of a voluntary conveyance. McGhee
v. Wells, 57 S.C. 280, 35 S.E. 529, 76 Am.St.Rep. 567.
Warrant creditor
A creditor of a municipal corporation to whom is given a municipal warrant for the amount of his claim, because there are no funds in hand to pay it. Johnson v. New Orleans, 46 La.Ann. 714, 15 So. 100

CREDITOR BENEFICIARY. A third person to whom performance of promise comes in satisfac-tion of legal duty. Breaux v. Banker, Tex.Civ. App., 107 S.W.2d 382, 389; Vail v. Reuben H. Don-nelley Corporation, 56 Ohio App. 219, 10 N.E.2d 239, 241.
Company transporting material for school building under contract with subcontractor. J. T. Jackson Lumber Co. v. Union Transfer & Storage Co., 246 Ky. 653, 55 S.W.2d 670. Person entitled to enforce contract under which he is enti-tled to benefit. Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Ca1.2d 232, ’73 P.2d 1163, 1169. Situation in which rela-tionship between promisee and beneficiary is that of debtor and creditor. McCulloch v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., D.C.Minn., 53 F.Supp. 534, 542.
The lessor has a right of action for breach of parent lease as a "creditor beneficiary" against a sublessee or an assignee of the lease who has agreed with the original lessee to assume the parent lease. Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal.2d 232, 73 P.2d 1163.
CREDITORS’ BILL OR SUIT.
A suit by judgment creditor in equity for pur-pose of reaching property which cannot be reach-ed by execution at law. B. L. E. Realty Corpora-tion v. Mary Williams Co., 101 Fla. 254, 134 So. 47, 49; Ex parte Roddey, 171 S.C. 489, 172 S.E. 866, 868, 92 A.L.R. 1430; Hamburger Apparel Co.
v. Werner, 17 Wash.2d 310, 135 P.2d 311, 315; City of Newark v. Jos. Hollander, Inc., 136 N.J. Eq. 539, 42 A.2d 872, 875. A proceeding to en-force the security of a judgment creditor against the property or interests of his debtor. This ac-tion proceeds upon the theory that the judgment is in the nature of a lien, such as may be en-
forced in equity. Hudson v. Wood, C.C.Ky., 119 F. 775; Fink v. Patterson, C.C.Va., 21 F. 602; W. G. Press & Co. v. Fahy, 313 Ill. 262, 145 N.E, 103, 104; San Bernardino County Sav. Bank v. Denman, 186 Cal. 710, 200 P. 606, 603; Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U.S. 36, 48 S.Ct. 268, 72 L.Ed. 457.
Stríctly, it 1s a bill by which a creditor seeks to satisfy his debt out of some equltable estate of the defendant, whlch is not fiable to levy and sale under an execution at law. But there is another sort of a creditors’ 1)111, very nearly allied to the former, by means of which a party seeks to remove a fraudulent conveyance out of the way of his execution. But a naked bIll to set asido a fraudulent deed, which seeks no dlscovery of any property, chose in action, or other thíng alleged to belong to the defendant, and which ought to be subjected to the payrnent of the judgment, is not a creditors’ bill. Newman v. Willetts, 52 Ill, 98; Yates v. Council, 137 Miss. 381, 102 So. 176, 177.
A "class action" 1s one ln which one or more members of a numerous class, having a common interest, may sue In behalf of themselves and all other members of the class and such actions are sometimes called "creditors’ suits" and "stockholders’ sults". Farmers Co-op. 011 Co. v. Socony-Vacuum 011 Co., D.C.Iowa, 43 F.Supp. 735, 737.
In English Practice, a bill in equity, filed by one or more creditors, for an account of the assets of a decedent, and a legal settlement and dlstribution of his estate among themselves and such other creditors as may come in under the decree.
CREDITORUM APPELLATIONE NON III TAN-TUM ACCIPIUNTUR QUI PECUNIAIII CRED-IDERUNT, SED OMNES QUIBUS EX QUALIBET CAUSA DEBETUR. Under the head of "cred-itors" are included, not alone those who have lent money, but all to whom from any cause a debt is owing. Dig. 50, 16, 11.
CREDITRIX. A female creditor.
CREDITS. A term of universal application to obligations due and to become due. Colbert v. Superior Confection Co., 154 Okl. 28, 6 P.2d 791,
793.
A term used in taxation statutes to designate certain forms of personal property. It includes every claim and demand for money and every sum of money receivable at stated periods, due or to become due, but not unaccrued rents to issue out of land. State v. Royal Mineral Ass’n, 132 Minn. 232, 156 N.W. 128, 130, Ann.Cas.1918A, 145. Legacies matured by the lapse of one year from the date of testator’s death were included in term "credits". City of Newark v. Lehman’s Estate, Tax App., 18 N.J.Misc. 510, 14 A.2d 792,
794. Shares of corporate stock were included. Holmes y. Borgen, 200 Minn. 97, 273 N.W. 623, 626.

Mutual Credits

a credit by the other party, founded on and trust-ing to such debt, as a means of discharging it. King v. King, 9 N.J.Eq. 44. Credits given by two persons mutually; i. e., each giving credit to the other. It is a more extensive phrase than "mu-tual debts." Thus, the sum credited by one may be due at once, that by the other payable in fu-turo; yet the credits are mutual, though the trans-action would not come within the meaning of "mutual debts." 1 Atk. 230; Atkinson v. Elliott, 7 Term.R. 378.
CREED. The word "creed" has been defined as "confession or articles of faith," "formal declara-tion of religious belief," "any formula or confes-sion of religious faith," and "a system of religious belief." Cummings v. Weinfeld, 177 Misc. 129, 30 N.Y.S.2d 36, 38.
CREEK. In maritime law. Such little inlets of the sea, whether within the precinct or extent of a port or without, as are narrow passages, and have shore on each side of them. Call.Sew. 56. A small stream less than a river. Baker v. City of Boston, 12 Pick. 184, 22 Am.Dec. 421. The term imports a recess, cove, bay, or inlet in the shore of a river, and not a separate or independ-ent stream; though it is sometimes used in the latter meaning. Schermerhorn v. Railroad Co., 38 N.Y. 103.
CREMATION. The act or practice of reducing a corpse to ashes by means of tire. Act Pa. 1891, June 8; P.L. 212, 35 P.S. §§ 1121-1123; L.R. 12 Q.B.D. 247; L.R. 20 Ch.D. 659. See 43 Alb.L.J. 140. See Dead Body.
CREMENTUM COMITATÜS. The increase of a county. The sheriffs of counties anciently an-swered in their accounts for the improvement of the king’s rents, aboye the viscontiel rents, under this title.
CREPARE OCULUM. In Saxon law. To put out an eye; which had a pecuniary punishment of fifty shillings annexed to it.
CREPUSCULUM. Twilight. In the law of burg-lary, this terms means the presence of sufficient light to discern the face of a man; such light as exists immediately before the rising of the sun or directly alter its setting. 4 Bla.Com. 224; Co. 3d Inst. 63; 1 Russell, Cr. 820; 3 Greenl.Ev. § 75.
CRESCENTE MALITIA CRESCERE DEBET ET PcENA. 2 Inst. 479. Vice increasing, punishment ought also to increase.
CREST. A term used in heraldry; it signifies the devices set over a coat of arms.
CRETINISM. In medical jurisprudence. A form of imperfect or arrested mental development, which may amount to idiocy, with physical de-generacy or deformity or lack of development; endemic in Switzerland and some other parts of Europe, but the term is applied to similar states occurring elsewhere.
CRETINUS. In old records. A sudden stream or torrent; a rising or inundation.
CRETIO. Lat. In the civil law. A certain num-ber of days allowed an heir to deliberate whether he would take the inheritance or not. Calvin.
CREW. Usually referred to and is primarily thought of as those who are on board and aiding in the navigation. Gulf Oil Corporation v. Mc-15/lanigal, D.C.W.Va., 49 F.Supp. 75, 78; Norton v. Warner Co., Pa., 321 U.S. 565, 64 S.Ct. 747, 751, 88 L.Ed. 931; Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. v. Rothensies, C.C.A.Pa., 137 F.2d 60, 62. "Crew" does not have an absolutely unvarying legal sig-nificance or any well-defined factual significance. Schantz v. American Dredging Co., C.C.A.Pa., 138 F.2d 534, 537. The aggregate of seamen who man a ship or vessel, including the master and officers; or it may mean the ship’s company, exclusive of the master, or exclusive of the master and all other officers. See U. S. v. Winn, 3 Sumn. 209, 28 Fed.Cas. 733; The Buena Ventura, D.C.N.Y., 243 F. 797, 799; The Herdis, D.C.Md., 22 F.2d 304, 306.
CREW LIST. In maritime law. A list of the crew of a vessel; one of a ship’s papers. This instrument is required by act of congress, and sometimes by treaties. Rev.St.U.S. §§ 4374, 4375, 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 322, 323. It is necessary for the protection of the crews of every vessel, in the course of the voyage, during a war abroad. Jac. Sea Laws, 66, 69, note.
CRIER. An officer of a court, who makes proc-lamations. His principal duties are to announce the opening of the court and its adjournment and the fact that certain special matters are about to be transacted, to announce the admission of per-sons to the bar, to call the names of jurors, wit-nesses, and parties, to announce that a witness has been sworn, to proclaim silence when so di-rected, and generally to make such proclamations of a public nature as the judges orden.
CRIEZ LA PEEZ. Rehearse the concord, or peace. A phrase used in the ancient proceedings for levying fines. It was the form of words by which the justice before whom the parties ap-peared directed the serjeant or countor in attend-ance to recite or read aloud the concord or agree-ment between the parties, as to the lands intend. ed to be conveyed. 2 Reeve, Eng.Law, 224, 225.
CRIM. CON. An abbreviation for "criminal con-versation," of very frequent use, denoting adult-ery. Rash v. Pratt, 111 A. 225, 228, 1 W.W.Harr., Del., 18; Hargraves v. Ballou, 47 R.I. 186, 131 A. 643, 645.
The term In its general and comprehensive sense, Is syn-onymous with "adultery"; but in its more limited and technical signification it may be defined as adultery in the aspect of a tort. Turner v. Heavrin, 182 Ky. 65, 206 S.W. 23, 4 A.L.R. 562.
CRIME. A positive or negative act in violation of penal law; an offense against the State. Wil-kins v. U. S., C.C.A.Pa., 96 F. 837, 37 C.C.A. 588; People v. Williams, 24 Mich. 163, 9 Am.Rep. 119.

Crime" and "misdemeanor," properly speaking, Lre synonymous terms; though in common usage crime" is made to denote such offenses as are of L deeper and more atrocious dye. 4 Bl.Comm. 5; )eople v. Schiaffino, 73. Cal.App. 357, 238 P. 725; luetling v. State, 199 Ind. 630, 158 N.E. 593, 594; lIcIntyre v. Commonwealth, 154 Ky. 149, 156 S. V. 1058, 1059; Commonwealth v. Smith, 266 Pa. 111, 109 A. 786, 788, 9 A.L.R. 922; Ex parte Brady, 16 Ohio St. 512, 157 N.E. 69, 70; An act com-nitted or omitted in violation of a public law. ity of Mobile v. McCown Oil Co., 226 Ala. 688, 48 So. 402, 405. Crimes are those wrongs which he government notices as injurious to the pub-ic, and punishes in what is called a "criminal )roceeding," in its own name. 1 Bish.Crim.Law,
43; In re Jacoby, 74 Ohio App. 147, 57 N.E.2d )32, 934, 935. A crime may be defined to be any Ict done in violation of those duties which an ndividual owes to the community, and for the )reach of which the law has provided that the Iffender shall make satisfaction to the public. 3e11. A crime or public offense is an act com-nitted or omitted in violation of a law forbidding >r commanding it, and to which is annexed, upon .onviction, either of the following punishments: 1) Death; (2) imprisonment; (3) fine; (4) re-noval from office; or (5) disqualification to hold Ind enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit in lis state. Pen.Code Cal. § 15. "Crime" is strict-y a violation of law either human or divine; in )resent usage the term is commonly applied to ;nave offenses against the laws of the state. Van tiper v. Constitutional Government League, 1 Nash.2d 635, 96 P.2d 588, 591, 125 A.L.R. 1100.
• crime or misdemeanor shall consist in a viola-
ion of a public law, in the commission of which .here shall be a union or joint operation of act tnd intention, or criminal negligente. Code Ga. L882, § 4292, Pen.Code 1910, § 31.

Synonyms

According to Blackstone, the word "crime" de-lotes such offenses as are of a deeper and more ttrocious dye, while smaller faults and omissions >f less consequence are called "misdemeanors." 3ut the better use appears to be to make crime
term of broad and general import, including )oth felonies and misdemeanors, and hence cov-!ring all infractions of the criminal law. In this vense it is not a technical phrase, strictly speak-ng, (as "felony" and "misdemeanor" are,) but a ,onvenient general term. In this sense, also, "of-‘ense" or "public offense" should be used as syn-)nymous with it.
The distinction between a crime and a tort or civil injury is that the former is a breach and violation of the public right and of duties due to he whole community considered as such, and
n its social and aggregate capacity; whereas the atter is an infringement or privation of the civil
ights of individua]s merely. Brown.
A crime, as opposed to a civil injury, is the Tiolation of a right, considered in reference to the !vil tendency of such violation, as regards the .ommunity at large. 4 Steph.Comm. 4.

Varieties of Crimes

Capital crime. See Capital, adj.

Common law crimes

Such crimes as are punishable by the force of the common law, as distinguished from crimes created by statute. Wilkins v. U. S., C.C.A.Pa., 96 F. 837, 37 C.C.A. 588; In re Greene, C.C.Ohio, 52 F. 111. These decisions (and many others) hold that there are no common-law crimes against the United States.

Constructive crime

See Constructive Crime.

Continuous crime

One consisting of a continuous series of acts, which endures atter the period of consummation, as, the offense of carrying concealed weapons. In the case of instantaneous crimes, the statute of limitations begins to run with the consummation, while in the case of continuous crimes it only begins with the cessation of the criminal conduct or act. U. S. v. Owen, D.C.Or., 32 F. 537.

Crime against nature

The offense of buggery or sodomy. State v. Vicknair, 52 La.Ann. 1921, 28 So. 273; Ausman v. Veal, 10 Ind. 355, 71 Am.Dec. 331. The strict com-mon-law meaning has been greatly enlarged by statute. Borden v. State, 36 Okl.Cr. 69, 252 P. 446, 447; State v. Murry, 136 La. 253, 66 So. 963, 964; State v. Long, 133 La. 580, 63 So. 180; Fraz-ier v. Grob, 194 Mo.App. 405, 183 S.W. 1083, 1084; State v. Griffin, 175 N.C. 767, 94 S.E. 678, 679. See Bestiality; Sodomy.
At common law the term "crime against nature" embraced both sodomy and "bestiality", deflned as a con-nection between a human being and a brute of the opposite sex. State v. Poole, 59 Ariz. 44, 122 P.2d 415, 416. Within the statute it is the perverted act of uniting the mouth of one particlpant with the sexual organ of the other, with a view of gratifying the sexual desire, and a mere kiss or lick of the prívate organ, even though lewdly done, is not a "copulation" within the statute. People v. Angier, 44 Cal.App.2d 417, 112 P.2d 659, 660.
Crime agalnst the other (husband or wife)
As used in 22 Okl.St.Ann. 702, providing that neither husband nor wife shall be a witness against the other except in a prosecution for a "crime committed against the other," the phrase denotes a public offense by husband or wife that is a direct violation of the rights of the other. Hunter v. State, 10 Okl.Cr. 119, 134 P. 1134, 1136, L.R.A. 1915A, 564. It does not make the wife a competent witness in a prosecution against the husband for incest. Lacey v. State, 27 Okl.Cr. 42, 224 P. 994, 995.
Murder by wife of husband’s child, O’Loughlin v. Peo-ple, 90 Colo. 368, 10 P.2d 543, 546. Rape against stepdaugh-ter. State V. Goff, 64 S.D. 80, 264 N.W. 665, 666.

Crimes mala in se

arson, rape, murder, and breaches of peace. Col& man v. State ex rel. Carver, 119 Fla. 653, 161 So. 89, 90.

Crimes mala prohibita

"Crimes mala prohibita" embrace things pro-hibited by statute as infringing on others’ rights, though no moral turpitude may attach, and con-stituting crimes only because they are so prohib-ited. Coleman v. State ex rel. Carver, 119 Fla. 653, 161 So. 89, 90.

High crimes

High crimes and misdemeanors are such im-moral and unlawful acts as are nearly allied and equal in guilt to felony, yet, owing to some tech-nical circumstance, do not fall within the defini-tion of "felony." State v. Knapp, 6 Conn. 417, 16 Am.Dec. 68. They are the more serious or ag-gravated misdemeanors; those more nearly allied and equal in guilt to felony, but which do not fall within its definition. Firmara v. Gardner, 86 Conn. 434, 85 A. 670, 672.

Infamous crime

A crime which entails infamy upon one who has committed it. Butler v. Wentworth, 84 Me. 25, 24 A. 456, 17 L.R.A. 764. The term "infamous" —i. e., without f ame or good report—was applied at common law to certain crimes, upon the con-viction of which a person became incompetent to testify as a witness, upon the theory that a per-son would not commit so heinous a crime unless he was so depraved as to be unworthy of credit. These crimes are treason, felony, and the crimen }casi. Abbott. A crime punishable by imprison-ment in the state prison or penitentiary, with or without hard labor, is an infamous crime, within the provision of the fifth amendment of the con-stitution that "no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury." Mackin v. U. S., 117 U.S. 348, 6 S.Ct. 777, 29 L. Ed. 909; Brede v. Powers, 263 U.S. 4, 44 S.Ct. 8, 68 L.Ed. 132. It is not the character of the crime but the nature of the punishment which renders the crime "infamous." Weeks v. United States, C.C.A.N.Y., 216 F. 292, 298, L.R.A. 1915B, 651. But see Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, 111 A. 861, 864. Whether an offense is in-famous depends on the punishment which may be imposed therefor, not on the punishment which was imposed. United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 42 S.Ct. 368, 370, 66 L.Ed. 700; De Jianne v. U. S., C.C.A.N.J., 282 F. 737, 740; Le Clair v. White, 117 Me. 335, 104 A. 516, 517. Under the constitu-tion of Rhode Island, a crime, to be "infamous," must come within the "crimen falsi," such as forg-ery, perjury, suborriation of perjury, offenses af-fecting the public administration of justice, or such as would affect civil or political rights, dis-qualifying or rendering a person incompetent to be a witness or furor. State v. Bussay, 38 R.I. 454, 96 A. 337, 339. By the Revised Statutes of New York the term "infamous crime," when used in any statute, is directed to be construed as in cluding every offense punishable with death or by imprisonment in a state prison, and no other.

Quasi crimes

This term embraces all offenses not crimes or misdemeanors, but that are in the nature of crimes,—a class of offenses against the public which have not been declared crimes, but wrongs against the general or local public which it is proper should be repressed or punished by for-feitures and penalties. This would embrace all qui tam actions and forfeitures imposed for the neglect or violation of a public duty. A quasi crime would not embrace an indictable offense, whatever might be its grade, but simply forfeit-ures for a wrong done to the public, whether vol-untary or involuntary, where a penalty is given, whether recoverable by criminal or civil process. Wiggins v. Chicago, 68 III. 375. Also, offenses for which some person other than the actual per-petrator is responsible, the perpetrator being pre-sumed to act by command of the responsible par-ty. Sometimes, injuries which have been unin-tentionally caused. Torts. McCaleb v. Fox Film Corporation, C.C.A.La., 299 F. 48, 50.

Statutory crimes

Those created by statutes, as distinguished from such as are known to, or cognizable by, the com-mon law.
CRIMEN. Lat. Crime. Also an accusation or charge of crime.
Crimen furti. The crime or offense of theft.
Crimen incendii. The crime of burning, which included not only the modern crime of arson, but also the burning of a man, a beast, or other chat-tel. Britt. c. 9; Crabb, Eng.Law, 308.
Crimen innominatum. The nameless crime; the crime against nature; sodomy or buggery.
Crimen raptus. The crime of rape. Crimen roberix. The offense of robbery.
Flagrans crimen; Locus criminis; Particeps criminis. See those titles.
CRIMEN FALSI. The term involves the element of falsehood, and includes everything which has a tendency to injuriously affect the administra-tion of justice by the introduction of falsehood and fraud. Commonwealth v. Schambers, 110 Pa. Super. 61, 167 A. 645, 646; Commonwealth v. Jones, 334 Pa. 321, 5 A.2d 804, 805. A crime less than felony that by its nature tends to cast doubt on the veracity of one who commits it. Common-wealth v. Gold, 155 Pa.Super. 364, 38 A.2d 486, 489. This phrase .is also used as a general desig-nation of a class of offenses, including all such as involve deceit or falsification; e. g., forgery, counterfeiting, using false weights or measures, perjury, etc. Includes forgery, perjury, suborna-tion of perjury, and offenses affecting the public administration of justice. Matzenbaugh v. Peoele, 194 III. 108, 62 N.E. 546, 88 Am.St.Rep. 134; Johnston v. Riley, 13 Ga. 97.
At common law. Any crime which rendered the perpe-:rator 1ncompetent to be a witness, such as forgery, per-ury, subornation of perjury and other crimes affecting the Administration of justice. Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab ‘.2o. 95 Conn. 500, 111 A. 861, 862; Maxey v. United States, ld.A.Ark., 207 F. 327, 331; Webb v. State, 29 Ohio St. 351, 158.
In the civil law, the crime of falsifying; which might >e committed either by writing, as by the forgery of a will other instrument; by words, as by bearing false wit-iess, or perjury; and by acts, as by counterfeiting or Ldulterating the public money, dealing with false weights ,nd measures, counterfeiting seals, and other fraudulent Lnd decertful practices. Dig. 48, 10; Hallifax, Civil Law, ). 3, c. 12, nn. 56-59.
In Scotch law. It has been defined: "A fraudulent imi-anon or suppression of truth, to the prejudice of inother." Ersk.Inst. 4, 4, 66.
.;RIMEN FALSI DICITUR, CUM QUIS ILLICI-[`LIS, CUI NON FUERIT AD H/EC DATA AT1C-CORITAS, DE SIGILLO REGIS, RAPTO VEL NVENTO, BREVIA, CARTASVE CONSIGNA-ITERIT. Fleta, lib. 1, c. 23. The crime of forgery s when any one illicitly, to whom power has not >een given for such purposes, has signed writs or .harters with the king’s seal, either stolen or ound.
RIMEN LZESFE MAJESTATIS. In criminal aw. The crime of lese-majesty, or injuring najesty or royalty; high treason. The term was ised by the older English law writers to denote iny crime affecting the king’s person or dignity.
It is borrowed from the civil law, in which it ignified the undertaking of any enterprise igainst the emperor or the republic. Inst. 4, 18, 1.
:RIMEN LIESM MAJESTATIS OMNIA ALIA ;ÉIMINA EXCEDIT QUOAD PCENAM. 3 Inst. 10. The crime of treason exceeds all other rimes in its punishment.
;RIMEN OMNIA EX SE NATA VITIAT. Crime ‘Mates everything which springs from it. Hen-y v. Bank of Salina, 5 Hill, N.Y., 523, 531.
;RIMEN TRAHIT PERSONAM. The crime car-ies the person, (i. e., the commission of a crime vives the courts of the place where it is com-mitted jurisdiction over the person of the offend-r.) People v. Adams, 3 Denio, N.Y. 190, 210, 45 km.Dec. 468.
1RIMINA MORTE EXTINGUUNTUR. Crimes Lre extinguished by death.
;RIMINAL, n. One who has committed a crim-nal offense; one who has been legally convicted f a crime; one adjudged guilty of crime. Mol-neux v. Collins, 177 N.Y. 395, 69 N.E. 727, 65 L.R. L. 104. Synonymous with word "crook." Weiner Leviton, 230 App.Div. 312, 244 N.Y.S. 176, 178.
;RIMINAL, adj. That which pertains to or is onnected with the law of crimes, or the admin-ltration of penal justice, or which relates to or ,as the character of crime. Charleston v. Beller, 5 W.Va. 44, 30 S.E. 152; Van Riper v. Constitu-
tional Government League, 1 Wash.2d 635, 96 P.2d 588, 591, 125 A.L.R. 1100. The word is defined as of the nature of or involving a crime; more gen-erally, of the nature of a grave offense; wicked. Van Riper v. Constitutional Government League, 1 Wash.2d 635, 96 P.2d 588, 591, 125 A.L.R. 1100.

Criminal abortion
See Abortion.
Criminal act
A term which is equivalent to crime; or is sometimes used with a slight softening or gloss-ing of the meaning, or as importing a possible question of the legal guilt of the deed. The in-tentional violation of statute designed to protect human life is criminal act. State v. Agnew, 202 N.C. 755, 164 S.E. 578, 579.
Criminal action
The proceeding by which a party charged with a public offense is accused and brought to trial and punishment is known as a "criminal action." Pen.Code Cal. § 683. A criminal action is (1) an action prosecuted by the state as a party, against a person charged with a public offense, for the punishment thereof; (2) an action prosecuted by the state, at the instance of an individual, to pre-vent an apprehended crime, against his person or property. Code N.C. 1883, § 129, C.S. § 395.
Criminal assault and battery
An accused may be guilty of a "criminal as-sault and battery" if he intentionally does an act which by reason of its wanton and grossly negligent character exposes another to personal injury and in fact causes injury. State v. Lin-ville, 150 Kan. 617, 95 P.2d 332, 334.
Criminal case
An action, sun, or cause instituted to punish an infraction of the criminal laws. State v. Smalls, 11 S.C. 279; People v. Iron Co., 201 III. 236, 66 N. E. 349; Wilburn v. State, 140 Ga. 138, 78 S.E. 819, 820; Hankamer v. Templin, 143 Tex. 572, 187- S. W.2d 549, 550. The phrase has various meanings according to context and purpose of constitutional provision or statute. Ex parte Tahbel, 46 Cal. App. 755, 189 P. 804, 806; Childs v. City of Bir-mingham, 19 Ala.App. 71, 94 So. 790; Barnett v.. Atlanta, 109 Ga. 166, 34 S.E. 322.
Criminal charge
An accusation of crime, formulated in a written complaint, information, or indictment, and taking shape in a prosecution. U. S. v. Patterson, 150 U. S. 65, 14 S.Ct. 20, 37 L.Ed. 999; Eason v. State, 11 Ark. 482; People v. Ross, 235 Mich. 433, 209 N.W. 663, 666.
Criminal contempt proceeding
"Criminal contempt proceedings" are brought to preserve the power and vindícate the dignity and integrity of the court and to punish for dis-obedience of its orders. O’Malley v. United States, C.C.A.Mo., 128 F.2d 676, 683

CRDUNAL
Criminal conversation
Defilement of the marriage bed, sexual inter-course of an outsider with husband or wife, or a breaking down of the covenant of fidelity. Young v. Young, 236 Ala. 627, 184 So. 187, 190, 191. Adult-ery, considered in its aspect of a civil injury to the husband entitling him to damages; the tort of debauching or seducing of a wife. Of ten ab-breviated to crim. con.
Criminal court
One where criminal cases are tried and de-termined, not one where civil cases are tried, or persons charged with criminal offenses are held for action by proper authority. Hobart v. First Criminal Judicial Dist. of Court of Bergen Coun-ty, 10 N.J.Misc. 723, 160 A. 674, 675.
Criminal gross negligente
"Gross negligente" is culpable or criminal when accompanied by acts of commission or omission of a wanton or willful nature, showing a reck-less or indifferent disregard of the rights of oth-ers, under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce injury, or which make it not improbable that injury will be occasioned, and the oflender knows or is charged with knowledge of the prob-able result of his acts; "culpable" meaning de-serving of blame or censure. Bell v. Common-wealth, 170 Va. 597, 195 S.E. 675, 681.
Criminal information
A criminal suit brought, without interposition of a grand jury, by the proper officer of the king or state. Cole, Cr.Inf.; 4 Bla.Com. 398.
Criminal insanity
Want of mental capacity and moral freedom te do or abstain from doing particular act. State v. Schafer, 156 Wash. 240, 286 P. 833, 838.
Criminal instrumentality rule
Where the wrong is accomplished by a crime, the crime and not the negligent act of the party which made it possible is the "proximate cause". Foutch v. Alexandria Bank & Trust Co., 177 Tenn. 348, 149 S.W.2d 76, 85.
Criminal intent
The intent to commit a crime; malice, as evi-denced by a criminal act; an intent to deprive or defraud the true owner of his property. People v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co., 165 App.Div. 711, 151 N.Y.S. 547, 549; State v. Howard, 162 La. 719, 111 So. 72, 76.
Criminal malversation
A broad category of corrupt official practices. Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, C.A.Fla., 311 F.2d 547, 562.
Criminal Motive
"Criminal motive" is the inducement, existing in the minds of persons, causing them to intend, and afterward to commit, crime. State v. Rich-ardson, 197 Wash. 157, 84 P.2d 699, 703.
Criminal Procedure
The method pointed out by law for the appre-hension, trial, or prosecution, and fixing the pun-ishment, of those persons who have broken or violated, or are supposed to have broken or vio-lated, the laws prescribed for the regulation of the conduct of the people of the community, and who have thereby laid themselves hable to fine or imprisonment or other punishment. 4 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 730.
Criminal Proceeding
One instituted and conducted for the purpose either of preventing the commission of crime, or for fixing the guilt of a crime already committed and punishing the offender; as distinguished from a "civil" proceeding, which is for the redress of a private injury. Mossew v. United States, C.C.A. N.Y., 266 F. 18, 22, 11 A.L.R. 1261. Strictly, a "criminal proceeding" means some step taken be-fore a court against some person or persons charged with some violation of the criminal law. McGoldrick v. Downs, 184 Misc. 168, 53 N.Y.S.2d 333, 336.
Criminal Process
Process which issues to compel a person to en. swer for a crime or misdemeanor. Mowlan v. State, 197 Ind. 517, 151 N.E. 416, 417. Also process issued to aid in the detection or suppression of crime, such as search warrants—the primary pur-pose of the search being to obtain evidence for use in a criminal prosecution. Sugar Valley Land Co. v. Johnson, 17 Ala.App. 409, 85 So. 871, 874.
Criminal Prosecution
An action or proceeding instituted in a proper court on behalf of the public, for the purpose of securing the conviction and punishment of one ac-cused of crime. Harger v. Thomas, 44 Pa. 128, 84 Am.Dec. 422; Ex parte Pepper, 185 Ala. 284, 64 So. 112, 113; State v. District Court of Fifth Ju-dicial Dist. in and for Madison County, 53 Mont. 350, 165 P. 294, 296; McGoldrick v. Downs, 184 Misc. 168, 53 N.Y.S.2d 333, 336. A prosecution in a court of justice, in narre of the Government, against one or more individuals accused of crime. United States v. Safeway Stores, Tex., C.C.A.Kan., 140 F.2d 834, 839.
As to criminal "Conspiracy," "Contempt," "In-formation," "Jurisdiction," "Negligence," "Oper-ation," see those titles.
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION. That which exists for the trial and punishment of criminal offenses; the authority by which judicial offlcers take cog-nizance of and decide criminal cases. Ellison v.

Criminal law

That branch or division of law which treats of crimes and their punishments. In the plural—"criminal laws"—the term may denote the laws which define and prohibit the various species of crimes and establish their punishments. U. S. v. Reisinger, 128 U.S. 398, 9 S.Ct. 99, 32 L.Ed. 480; Washington v. Dowling, 92 Fla. 601, 109 So. 588, 591.
CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT ACT. This act was passed in 1871, 34 & 35 Vict. c. 32, to prevent and punish any violente, threats, or molestation, on the part either of master or workmen, in the various relations arising between them. 4 Steph. Comm. 241.
CRIMINAL LAW CONSOLIDATION ACT. The statutes 24 & 25 Vict. cc. 94-100, passed in 1861, for the consolidation of the criminal law of Eng-land and Ireland. 4 Steph. Comm. 297. These important statutes amount to a codification of the modern criminal law of England.
CRIMINAL LETTERS. In Scotch law. A proc-ess used as the commencement of a criminal pro-ceeding, in the nature of a summons issued by the lord advocate or his deputy. It resembles a crim-inal information at common law.
CRIMINAL LIBEL. A libel which is punishable criminally; one which tends to excite a breach of the peace. 3 Greenl. Ev. 1 164; Walker v. Wickens, 49 Kan. 42, 30 P. 181; Kennerly v. Hen-nessy, 68 Fla. 138, 66 So. 729, 19 A.L.R. 1468. The malicious defamation of a person made public by any printing or writing tending to provoke him to wrath and to deprive him of the benefits of public confidente and social intercourse.
CRIMINALIST. One versed in criminal law, one addicted to criminality, and, also, a psychiatrist dealing with criminality. People v. Taylor, 312 P.2d 731, 734, 152 C.A.2d 29; Douglas v. State, 163 So.2d 477, 486, 42 Ala.App. 314.
CRIMINALITER. Lat. Criminally. This term is used, in distinction or opposition to the word "civiliter," civilly, to distinguish a criminal liabil-ity or prosecution from a civil one.
CRIMINATE. To charge one with crime; to fur-nish ground for a criminal prosecution; to expose a person to a criminal charge. A witness cannot be compelled to answer any question which has a tendency to criminate him. Stewart v. John-son, 18 N.J.Law, 87; Kendrick v. Comm., 78 Va. 490.
CRIMINOLOGY. The science which treats of crimes and their prevention and punishment.
CRIMP. One who decoys and plunders sailors under cover of harboring them. Wharton.
CRIPPLING. The word "crippling" is equivalent of words "physical disability" and is defined as to
Black’s Law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed.-29
deprive of use of limbs, particularly of leg or foot, to deprive of strength, activity or capability for service or use and to disable. People v. Lock-wood, 308 Mich. 618, 14 N.W.2d 517, 518; Baker v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 327 Mo. 986, 39 S.W.2d 535, 545.
CRITICISM. Permitted "criticism" as distin-guished from "defamation" deals only with such things as invite public comment, and does not fol-low a public man into his private lile, and pry into his domestic concerns. Devany v. Shulman, 184 Misc. 613, 53 N.Y.S.2d 401, 403.
CRO, CROO. In old Scotch law. A weregild. A composition, satisfaction, or assythment for the slaughter of a man.
CROCIA. The crosier, or pastoral staff.
CROCIARIUS. A cross-bearer, who went before the prelate. Wharton.
CROCKARDS, CROCARDS. A foreign coin of base metal, prohibited by statute 27 Edw. I. St. 3, from being brought into the realm. 4 Bl. Comm. 98; Crabb, Eng. Law, 176.
CROFT. A little close adjoining a dwelling-house, and inclosed for pasture and tillage or any par-ticular use. Jacob. A small place fenced off in which to keep farm-cattle. Spelman. The word is now entirely obsolete.
CROISES. Pilgrims; so cailed as wearing the sign of the cross on their upper garments. Britt. c. 122. The knights of the order of St. John of Jerusalem, created for the defense of the pilgrims. Cowell; Blount.
CROITEIR. A crofter; one holding a croft.
CROOK. A person given to crooked or fraudu-lent practices, a swindler, sharper, thief, forger, or the like. Rubenstein v. Lee, 56 Ga.App. 49, 1.92 S.E. 85, 87; Sinclair Refining Co. v. Fuller, 190 Ark. 426, 79 S.W.2d 736, 739. Term "crook" has been defined as a professional rogue; a criminal; or one consorting with criminals; a person recog-nized by the authorities as belonging to the crim-inal class; swindler; sharp; cheat. Gaare v. Melbostad, 186 Minn. 96, 242 N.W. 466, 467.
CROOKED. Deviating from rectitude or upright-ness; not straightforward; dishonest; wrong; perverse. A "crook" is a dishonest person; one who is crooked in conduct; a tricky or underhand schemer; a thief or swindler. Villemin v. Brown, 193 App.Div. 777, 184 N.Y.S. 570, 571; Pandolfo v. Bank of Benson, C.C.A.Ariz., 273 F. 48, 51.
CROP. The products of the harvest; emble-ments. Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Dehaven, Pa., 5 A. 65; Verbeck v. Peters, 170 Iowa, 610, 153 N.W. 215, 216. Such products of the soil as, are annually planted, severed, and saved by manual labor, as cereals, vegetables, grass maturing for harvest or harvested, etc., but not grass on lands used for pasturage. Moore v. Hope Natural Gas

Co., 76 W.Va. 649, 86 S.E. 564, 567. In its more general signification, means all products of the soil that are grown and raised annually and gath-ered during a single season. In this sense the term includes fructus industriales and fructus na-turales. The word is also used, however, in a more restricted sense, as synonymous with fruc-tus industriales or emblements. Etymology of word "crop" appears to be from the Saxon "crop" or "cropp," which signified a cluster of ears of corn or grapes; another derivation is from the Welch "cropiad," which meant a fathering or tak-ing hold of. It is from this derivation that the word has been held to mean only products after they have been severed from the soil. A t times a distinction has been drawn between fructus in-dustriales and fructus naturales. Kennedy v. Spalding, 143 Kan. 76, 53 P.2d 804, 806; Miethke v. Pierce County, 173 Wash. 381, 23 P.2d 405; Wed-dle v. Parrish, 135 Or. 345, 295 P. 454, 455.
In a broader sense, any product of the soil. Ellís, McKinnon & Brown v. Hopps, 30 Ga.App. 453, 118 S.E. 583; Buchanan v. Jencks, 38 R.I. 443, 96 A. 307, 309, 2 A.L.R. 986.
CROPPER. One who, having no interest in the land, works it in consideration of receiving a por-tion of the crop for his labor. Wood v. Garrison, 23 Ky.Law Rep. 295, 62 S.W. 728; Maltbie v. Olds, 88 Conn. 633, 92 A. 403, 405; Davis v. State, 84 Tex. Cr.R. 282, 206 S.W. 690; Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. Denning, 128 Okl. 145, 261 P. 929, 930.
The difference between a tenant and a cropper is: A tenant has an estate in the land for the term, and, consequently, he has a right of prop-erty in the crops. Until division, the right of property and of possession in the whole is the tenant’s. A cropper has no estate in the land; and, although he has in some sense the possession of the crop, it is the possession of a servant only, and is, in law, that of the landlord, who must divide off to the cropper his share. Harrison v. Ricks, 71 N.C. 7; O’Brien v. Webb, D.C.Cal., 279 F. 117, 120; Cook-Reynolds Co. v. Wilson, 67 Mont. 147, 214 P. 1104, 1105; Halsell v. First Nat. Bank, 109 Okl. 220, 235 P. 532, 533; Gibbons v. Huntsinger, 105 Mont. 562, 74 P.2d 443.
CROSS. A mark made by persons who are un-able to write, to stand instead of a signature. A mark usually in the form of an X, by which voters are commonly required to express their selection. There are four principal forms of the cross: The St. Andrew’s cross, which is made in the form of an X ; the Latin cross, t , as used in the cruci-fixion; St. Anthony’s cross, which is made in the form of a T; and the Greek cross, +, which is made by the intersection at right angles of unes at their center point. Hunt v. Campbell, 19 Ariz. 254, 169 P. 596, 610.
As an adjective, the word is applied to various demands and proceedings which are connected in subject-matter, but opposite or contradictory in purpose or object.
As a verb it means to pass or extend from one side to the other, as to cross a stream. People v. Hawkins, 51 Cal.App.2d Supp. 781, 124 P.2d 691, 692.
As to cross "Appeal," "Bill," "Complaint," "Re-mainder," "Rules," see those titles.
CROSS-ACTION. An action brought by one who is defendant in a suit against the party who is plaintiff in such suit, upon a cause of action grow-ing out of the same transaction which is there in controversy, whether it be a contract or tort. An independent suit brought by defendant against plaintiff. National Stock Yards Nat. Bank v. Val-entine, Tex.Civ.App., 39 S.W.2d 907, 908.
CROSS-CLAIM. A "cross-claim" is one brought by a defendant against a plaintiff in the same ac-tion or against a codefendant or both concerning matters in question in the original petition, and its purposes are to discover facts in aid of defense, to bring in new matter in aid of defense, to obtain some affirmative relief concerning matters in is-sue, to obtain full relief for all parties and a com-plete determination of all controversies arising out of matters alleged in original petition, and to have affirmative relief against either plaintiff or code-fendant in the nature of an original petition. Farr v. Detroit Trust Co., C.C.A.Mich., 116 F.2d 807, 811.
CROSS-DEMAND. Where a person against whom a demand is made by another, in his turn makes a demand against that other, these mutual demands are called "cross-demands." A set-off is a familiar example. Musselman v. Galligher, 32 Iowa, 383.
CROSS-ERRORS. Errors being assigned by the respondent in a writ of error, the errors assigned on both sides are called "cross-errors."
CROSS-EXAMINATION. In practice. The exam-ination of a witness upon a trial or hearing, or upon taking a deposition, by the party opposed to the one who produced him, upon his evidente
giv-
en in chief, to test its truth, to I urther develop it, or for other purposes.
CROSS-LAY. The winding of the outer strands of a rope in a reverse direction to the inner strands, the "lay" of a .strand of rope being the length of rope within which such strand makes one complete turn. Macomber & Whyte Rope Co. v. Hazard Mfg. Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 211 F. 976, 977.
CROSS-SALE. Where a floor broker, holding oi-ders from different customers to buy and sell on the same terms, críes out the transaction and makes the sale and purchase to himself at the price shown by the last sale shown on the ex-change, the transaction is called a "cross-sale or trade," and is illegal under rules of exchange, re-quiring two brokers to every purchase or sale. Cohen v. Rothschild, 182 App.Div. 408, 169 N.Y.S. 659, 664.
CROSSED CHECK. See Check.
CROSSING. A portion of a street over which pe-destrians may lawfully cross from one side to the other. Under Laws N.J.1915, P.L. p. 285, § 1, defining crossings to be all duly indicated cross-ings, marked by pavement or otherwise, at inter-section of streets, the most direct route across the street from curb to curb is a "crossing," where no paved crossing is there necessary. Ferris v. McArdle, 92 N.J.Law, 580, 106 A. 460, 461.
With reference to railroads, that portion of the right of way covered by intersection with a street or highway. International-Great Northern R. Co. v. Mallard, Tex.Civ.App., 262 S.W. 789, 791. In a broader sense, the term includes embankments constructed as necessary approaches to a railroad track, St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 118 Ark. 72, 175 S.W. 415, 416, and approaches or embankments reasonably necessary to enable crossings or bridges to be used, Payne v. Stockton, 147 Ark. 598, 229 S.W. 44, 47. For "Farm Cross-ing", see that title.
CROWD. "Crowd" is indefinite, since difference in time and place may shape its meaning, but there is always implied in the word numbers with reference to the hour and location. People, on Complaint of Liroff, v. Phillips, 245 N.Y. 401, 157 N.E. 508, 509.
CROWN. The sovereign power in a monarchy, especially in relation to the punishment of crimes. "Felony is an offense of the crown." Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 16.
An ornamental badge of regal power worn on the head by sovereign princes. The word is fre-quently used when speaking of the sovereign him-self, or the rights, duties, and prerogatives belong-ing to him. Also a silver coin of the value of five shillings. Wharton.
The facings and backings made to be sold to dentists to be set by them with appropriate fas-tenings in the jaws of their patients, when so in place are commonly called "crowns" or "artificial crowns." S. S. White Dental Mfg. Co. v. Dental Co. of America, D.C.Pa., 263 F. 719, 720.
Ship’s crown is convex arc of vessel’s deck from side to side. The Indien, C.C.A.Cal., 71 F.2d 752, 757.
CROWN CASES. In English law. Criminal prosecutions on behalf of the crown, as represent-ing the public; causes in the criminal courts.
CROWN CASES RESERVED. In English law. Questions of law arising in criminal trials at the assizes, (otherwise than by way of demurrer,) and not decided there, but reserved for the considera-tion of the court of criminal appeal.
CROWN COURT. In English law. The court in which the crown cases, or criminal business, of the assizes is transacted.
CROWN DEBTS. In English law. Debts due to the crown, which are put, by various statutes, up-)n a different footing from those due to a subject.
CROWN LANDS. The demesne lands of the rown. In England and Canada, lands belonging 😮 the sovereign personally or to the government )r nation, as distinguished from such as have passed into private ownership.
CROWN LAW. Criminal law in England is some-Ames so termed, the crown being always the prose-:utor in criminal proceedings. 4 Bl.Comm. 2.
CROWN OFFICE. The criminal side of the court of king’s bench. The king’s attorney in this court is called "master of the crown office." 4 Bl.Comm. 308.
CROWN OFFICE IN CHANCERY. One of the of-fices of the English high court of chancery, now transferred to the high court of justice. The prin-cipal official, the clerk of the crown, is an officer of parliament, and of the lord chancellor, in his non-judicial capacity, rather than an officer of the courts of law.
CROWN PAPER. A paper containing the list of criminal cases, which await the hearing or decision of the court, and particularly of the court of king’s bench; and it then includes all cases arising from informations quo warranto, criminal informations, criminal cases brought up from inferior courts by writ of certiorari, and cases from the sessions. Brown.
CROWN SIDE. The criminal department of the court of king’s bench; the civil department or branch being called the "plea side." 4 Bl.Comm. 265.
CROWN SOLICITOR. In England, the solicitor to the treasury acts, in state prosecutions, as so-licitor for the crown in preparing the prosecution. In Ireland there are officers called "crown
solici-tors" attached to each circuit, whose duty it is to get up every case for the crown in criminal prose-cutions. They are paid by salaries. There is no such system in England, where prosecutions are conducted by solicitors appointed by the parish, or other persons bound over to prosecute by the magistrates on each committal; but in Scotland the still better plan exists of a crown prosecutor (called the "procurator-fiscal," and being a subor-dinate of the lord-advocate) in every county, who prepares every criminal prosecution. Wharton.
CROWNER. In old Scotch law. Coroner; a coroner. "Crowner’s quest," a coroner’s inquest.
CROY. In old English law. Marsh land. Blount.
CRUCE SIGNATI. In old English law. Signed or marked with a cross. Pilgrims to the holy land, or crusaders; so called because they wore the sign of the cross upon their garments. Spelman.
CRUDE. A flexible term depending largely on context. In natural state; raw; unrefined; not artificially altered; unfinished. U. S. v. Richard & Co., 8 Ct.Cust.App. 304, 305; Nortmann-Duffke v. Federal Crushed Stone Co., 167 Minn. 333, 209 N.W. 17, 18; Ishimitsu Co. v. U. S., 12 Ct.Cust.App. 477, 479.
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. See Punishment.
CRUELTY. The intentional and malicious inflic-tion of physical suffering upon living creatures, particularly human beings; or, as applied to the latter, the wanton, malicious, and unnecessary infliction of pain upon the body, or the feelings and emotions; abusive treatment; inhumanity;

outrage. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 95 Conn. 57, 110 A. 455, 456.
Chiefly used in the law of divorce, in such phrases as "cruel and abusive treatment," "cruel and barbarous treatment," or "cruel and inhuman treatment," as to the meaning of which, and of "cruelty" in this sense, see Rudnick v. Rudnick, 288 Mass. 256, 192 N.E. 501; Martin v. Martin, 154 Pa.Super. 313, 35 A.2d 546, 548; Price v. Price, 181 Miss. 539, 179 So. 855, 857; Campbell v. Campbell, 129 Pa.Super. 106, 194 A. 760, 763; Avdoyan v. Avdoyan, 265 App.Div. 763, 40 N.Y.S.2d 665, 668; Lowry v. Lowry, 170 Ga. 349, 153 S.E. 11, 14, 70 A.L.R. 488.
For "Extreme and Repeated Cruelty," see that title.
As between husband and wife. Those acts which affect the lite, the health, or even the comfort, of the party aggrieved and give a reasonable apprehension of bodily hurt, are called "cruelty." What merely wounds the feel-ings 1.s seldom admitted to be cruelty, unless the act be accompanied with bodlly injury, either actual or menaced. Mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of language, a want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion, will not amount to legal cruelty; a fortiori, the denial of little indulgences and par-ticular accommodations, which the delicacy of the world is apt to number among its necessaries, is not cruelty. The negative descrlptions of cruelty are perhaps the best, under the infante variety of cases that may occur, by showing what is not cruelty. Evans v. Evans, 1 Hagg.Const. 35; Westmeath v. Westmeath, 4 Eng.Ecc. 238, 311, 312.
Cruelty includes both willfulness and malicious temper 01 mind with which an act is done, as well as a high degree of pain inflicted. Acts merely accidental, though they inflict great pain, are not "cruel," in the sense of the word as used in statutes against cruelty. Comm. v. McClellan, 101 Mass. 34.

Cruelty to Animals

The infliction of physical pain, suffering, or death upon an animal, when not necessary for purposes of training or discipline or (in the case of death) to procure food or to release the animal from incurable suffering, but done wantonly, for mere sport, for the indulgente of a cruel and vin-dictive temper, or with reckless indifference to its pain. State v. Porter, 112 N.C. 887, 16 S.E. 915; State v. Bosworth, 54 Conn. 1, 4 A. 248; McKinne v. State, 81 Ga. 164, 9 S.E. 1091; Waters v. People, 23 Colo. 33, 46 P. 112, 33 L.R.A. 836.

Legal Cruelty

See Legal Cruelty.
CRUISE. A voyage undertaken for a given pur-pose; a voyage for the purpose of making cap-tures jure bellti. The Brutus, 2 Gall. 538, Fed. Cas.No.2,060.
A voyage or expedition in quest of vessels or fleets of the enemy which may be expected to sail in any particular track at a certain season of the year. The region in which these cruises are per-formed is usually termed the "rendezvous," or "cruising latitude." Bouvier.
A report of a timber surveyor showing the character and amount of timber in a stand. Jones v. United States, C.C.A.Or., 265 F. 235, 239.

CRUSH. To break by means of pressure. Yagun-chok v. Rutledge, 219 Mich. 82, 188 N.W. 412, 413.
It has been defined to mean to compress or bruise between two hard bodies; to squeeze or force by pressure so as to destroy the natural con-dition, shape, or integrity of the parts, or to force together into a mass. Atlantic Oil Producing Co. v. Malone, 152 Okl. 68, 3 P.2d 874, 875.
CRY. To call out aloud; to proclaim; to publish; to sell at auction. "To cry a tract of land." Carr v. Gooch, 1 Wash., Va., 335 (260).
A clamor raised in the pursuit of an escaping felon. 4 BI.Comm. 293. See Hue and Cry.
CRY DE PAIS, or CRI DE PAIS. The hue and cry raised by the people in ancient times, where a felony had been committed and the constable was absent.
CRYER. An auctioneer. Carr v. Gooch, 1 Wash., Va., 337, (262.) One who calls out aloud; one who publishes or proclaims. See Crier.
CRYPTA. A chapel or oratory underground, or under a church or cathedral. Du Cange.
CUCKING—STOOL. An engin of correction for common scolds, which in the Saxon language is said to signify the scolding-stool, though now it is frequently corrupted into ducking-stool, because the judgment was that, when the woman was placed therein, she should be plunged in the water for her punishment. It was also variously called a "trebucket," "tumbrel," or "castigatory." 3 Inst. 219; 4 Bl.Comm. 169; Brown. James v. Comm., 12 Serg. & R., Pa., 220.
CUCKOLD. A man whose wife is unfaithful; the husband of an adulteress. It is explained that the word alludes to the habit of the female cuck-old, which lays her eggs in the nests of other birds to be hatched by them. To make a cuckold of a man is to seduce his wife. Hall v. Huffman, 159 Ky. 72, 166 S.W. 770.
CUEILLETTE. A term of French maritime law. See A Cueillette.
CUI ANTE DIVORTIUM (L. Lat. The full phrase was, Cui ipsa ante divortium contradicere non potuit, whom she before the divorce could not gainsay). A writ which anciently lay in favor of a woman who had been divorced from her hus-band, to recover lands and tenements which she had in fee-simple, fee-tail, or for life, from him to whom her husband had aliened them during mar-riage, when she could not gainsay it; Fitzh.N.B. 240; 3 Bla.Com. 183, n.; Stearns, Real Act. 143; Booth, Real Act. 188. Abolished in 1833.
CUI BONO. For whose good; for whose use or benefit. "Cui bono is ever of great weight in all agreements." Parker, C. J., 10 Mod. 135. Some-times translated, for what good, for what useful purpose.
CUI IN VITA (L. Lat. The full phrase was, Cui in vita sua ipsa contradicere non potuit, whom in

his lifetime she could not gainsay). ‘A writ of entry which lay for a widow against a person to whom her husband had in his lifetime aliened her Lands. Fitzh.N.B. 193. It was a method of estab-lishing the fact of death, being a trial with wit-nesses, but without a jury. The object of the writ was to avoid a judgment obtained against the hus-band by confession or default. It is obsolete in England by force of 32 Hen. VIII, c. 28, § 6. See 5 Co. 8, 9. As to its use in Pennsylvania, see 3 Binn.Appx.; Rep.Comm. on Penn.Civ.Code, 1835, 30. Abolished in England, 1833. Blaakstone is said to have shown little knowledge of its history; Thayer, Evidence.
CUI JURISDICTIO DATA EST, EA QUOQUE CONCESSA ESSE VIDENTUR, SINE QUIBUS IURISDICTIO EXPLICAR! NON POTEST. To whomsoever a jurisdiction is given, those things also are supposed to be granted, without which the jurisdiction cannot be exercised. Dig. 2, 1, 2. The grant of jurisdiction implies the grant of all powers necessary to its exercise. 1 Kent, Comm. 339.
CUI JUS EST DONANDI, EIDEM ET VENDENDI ET CONCEDENDI JUS EST. He who has the right of giving has also the right of selling and granting. Dig. 50, 17, 163.
CUILIBET INT ARTE SUA PERITO EST CRE-DENDUM. Any person skilled in his peculiar art
profession is to be believed, [i. e., when he speaks of matters connected with such art.] Co. Litt. 125a. Credence should be given to one ;killed in his peculiar profession. Broom.Max. 332; 1 Bla.Com. 75; Phill.Ev.Cowen & H. notes, 759; 1 Hagg.Ecc. 727; 11 Cl. & F. 85.
CUILIBET LICET JURI PRO SE INTRODUCTO RENUNCIARE. Any one may waive or renounce Che benefit of a principle or rule of law that exists Only for his protection.
CUI LICET GUOD MAJUS, NON DEBET QUOD MINUS EST NON LICERE. He who is allowed to lo the greater ought not to be prohibited from do-ing the less. He who has authority to do the more important act ought not to be debarred from doing what is of less importante. 4 Coke 23.
CUICUNQUE ALIQUIS QUID CONCEDIT CON-CEDERE VIDETUR ET ID, SINE QUO RES IPSA ESSE NON POTUIT. Whoever grants anything to another is supposed to grant that also without which the thing itself would be of no effect. 11 Co. 52; Broom, Max. 479; Hob. 234; Vaugh. 109; [1 Exch. 775; Shep.Touch. 89; Co.Litt. 56 a.
CUI PATER EST POPULUS NON HABET ILLE PATREM. He to whom the people is father has not a father. Co.Litt. 123.
JUIQUE IN SUA ARTE CREDENDUM EST. Everyone is to be believed in his own art. Dick-inson v. Barber, 9 Mass. 227, 6 Am.Dec. 58.
CUJUS EST COMMODUM EJUS DEBET ESSE 1NCOMMODUM. Whose is the advantage, his also ;hould be the disadvantage.
CUJUS EST DARE, EJUS EST DISPONERE, Wing.Max. 53. Whose it is to give, his it is to dls. pose; or, as Broom says, "the bestower of a gift has a right to regulate its disposal." Broom, Max. 459, 461, 463, 464.
CUJUS EST DIVISIO, ÁLTERIUS EST ELECTIO. Whichever [of two partes] has the division, [of an estate,] the choice [of the shares] is the oth-er’s. Co.Litt. 166b. In partition between copar-ceners, where the division is made by the eldest, the rule in English law is that she shall choose her share last. Id.; 2 Bl.Comm. 189; 1 Steph. Comm. 323.
CUJUS EST DOMINIUM EJUS EST PERICUL-UM. The risk lies upon the owner of the subject. Tray.Lat.Max. 114.
CUJUS EST INSTITUERE, EJUS EST ABRO. GARE. Whose right it is to institute, his right it is to abrogate. Broom, Max. 878, note.
CUJUS EST SOLUM EJUS EST USQUE AD CCELUM. Whose is the soil, his it is up to the sky. Co.Litt. 4a. He who owns the soil, or surface of the ground, owns, or has an exclusive right to, everything which is upon or aboye it to an indefi-nite height. 9 Coke 54; Shep.Touch. 90; 2 Bl. Comm. 18; 3 Bl.Comm. 217; Broom.Max. 395.
CUJUS EST SOLUM, EJUS EST USQUE AD CCELUM ET AD INFEROS. To whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also to the sky and to the depths. The owner of a piece of land owns every-thing aboye and below it to an indefinite extent. Co.Litt. 4; Shell Oil Co. v. Manley Oil Corpora-tion, D.C.I11., 37 F.Supp. 289, 292.
CUJUS JURIS (i. e., JURISDICTIONIS) EST PRINCIPALE, EJUSDEM JURIS ERIT ACCES-SORIUM. 2 Inst. 493. An accessory matter is subject to the same jurisdiction as its principal.
CUJUS PER ERROREM DATI REPETITIO EST, EJUS CONSULTO DATI DONATIO EST. He who gives a thing by mistake has a right to recover it back; but, if he gives designedly, it is a gift. Dig. 50, 17, 53.
CUJUSQUE REI POTISSIMA PARS EST PRIN-CIPIUM. The .chiefest part of everything is the beginning. Dig. 1, 2, 1; 10 Coke, 49a.
CUL DE SAC. (Fr. the bottom of a sack.) A blind alley; a street which is open at one end only. Bartlett v. Bangor, 67 Me. 467; Talbott v. Railroad Co., 31 Grat., Va., 691; Hickok v. Platts-burg, 41 Barb., N.Y., 135; Beckham v. State, 64 Ca1,App.2d 487, 149 P.2d 296, 300.
CULAGIUM. In old recoFds. The laying up a ship in a dock, in order to be repaired. Cowell; Blount.
CULPA. Lat. A term of the civil law, meaning fault, neglect, or negligente. There are three de-grees of culpa,—lata culpa, gross fault or neglect; levis culpa, ordinary fault or neglect; levissima culpa, slight fault or neglect,—and the definitions of these degrees are precisely the same as those in our law. Story, Bailm. § 18. This term is to be distinguished from dolus, which means fraud, guile, or deceit.
CULPA CARET QUI SCIT SED PROHIBERE NON POTEST. He is clear of blame who knows, but cannot prevent. Dig. 50, 17, 50.
CULPA EST IMMISCERE SE REL AD SE NON PERTINENTI. 2 Inst. 208. It is a fault for any one to meddle in a matter not pertaining to him.
CULPA LATA DOLO MQUIPARATUR. Gross negligente is held equivalent to intentional wrong.
CULPA TENET [TENEAT] SUOS AUCTORES. Misconduct binds [should bind] its own authors. It is a never-failing axiom that every one is ac-countable only for his own delicts. Ersk.Inst. 4, 1, 14.
CULPABILIS. Lat. In old English law. Guilty. Culpabilis de intrusione,—guilty of intrusion. Fle-ta, lib. 4, c. 30, § 11. Non culpabilis, (abbreviated to non cut.) In criminal procedure, the plea of "not guilty." See Culprit.
CULPABLE. Blamable; censurable; involving the breach of a legal duty or the commission of a fault. The term is not necessarily equivalent to "criminal," for, in present use, and notwithstand-ing its derivation, it implies that the act or conduct spoken of is reprehensible or wrong but not that it involves malice or a guilty purpose. "Culpable" in fact connotes fault rather than guilt. Railway Co. v. Clayberg, 107 III. 651; Cain v. State, 55 Ga. App. 376, 190 S.E. 371, 374.
As to culpable "Homicide," "Ignorante," "Neg-lect," and "Negligence," "Wantonness," see those titles.
It also means that which is deserving of moral blame. Mercury Motor Transport v. State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Com’r, 197 Miss. 387, 21 So.2d 25, 28.
CULPZE P(ENA PAR ESTO. P(ENA AD MEN-SURAM DELICTI STATUENDA EST. Let the punishment be proportioned to the crime. Punish-ment is to be measured by the extent of the of-fense.
CULPRIT. A person who is indicted for a crimi-nal offense, but not yet convicted. It is not, how-ever, a technical term of the law; and in its ver-nacular usage it seems to imply only a light de-gree of censure or moral reprobation.
Blackstone believes it an abbreviation of the old forms of arraignment, whereby, on the pris-oner’s pleading not guilty, the clerk would re-spond, "culpabilis, prit," i. e., he is guilty and the crown is ready. It was (he says) the viva voce replication, by the clerk, on behalf of the crown, to the prisoner’s plea of non culpabilis; prit being a technical word, anciently in use in the formula of joining issue. 4 Bl.Comm. 339.
But a more plausible explanation is that given by Donaldson, (cited Whart.Lex.,) as follows: The clerk asks the prisoner, "Are you guilty, or
not guilty?" Prisoner "Not guilty." Clerk, "Qu’il paroit, [may it prove so.] How will you be tried?" Prisoner, "By God and my country." These words being hurried over, carne to sound, "culprit, how will you be tried?" The ordinary derivation is from culpa.
CULRACH. In old Scotch law. A species of pledge or cautioner, (Scottice back borgh,) used in cases of the replevin of persons from one man’s court to another’s. Skene.
CULTIVATE. The word "cultivate" means to till, prepare for crops, manure, plow, dress, sow and reap, manage and improve in husbandry. Miller v. Richey, Tex.Civ.App., 173 S.W.2d 490, 493.
CULTIVATED. A field on which a crop of wheat is growing is a cultivated field, although not a stroke of labor may have been done in it since the seed was put in the ground, and it is a cultivated field after the crop is removed. It is, strictly, a cultivated piece of ground. Combs v. Rockingham County Com’rs, 170 N.C. 87, 86 S.E. 963, 964; An-gus Cattle Co. v. McLeod, 98 Neb. 108, 152 N.W. 322, 323.
CULTIVATOR. A cropper, which see. Pearson v. Lafferty, 197 Mo.App. 123, 193 S.W. 40, 41.
CULTURA. A parcel of arable land. Blount.
CULVERTAGE. In old English law. A base kind of slavery. The confiscation or forfeiture which takes place when a lord seizes his tenant’s estate. Blount; Du Cange.
CUM ACTIO FUERIT MERE CRIMINALIS, IN-STITUI POTERIT AB INITIO CRIMINALITER VEL CIVILITER. When an action is merely crim-inal, it can be instituted from the beginning either criminally or civilly. Bract. 102.
CUM ADSUNT TESTIMONIA RERUM, QUID OPUS EST VERBIS? When the proofs of facts are present, what need is there of words? 2 Bulst. 53.
CUM ALIQUIS RENUNCIAVERIT SOCIETATI, SOLVITUR SOCIETAS. When any partner re-nounces the partnership, the partnership is dis-solved. Tray. Lat. Max. 118.
CUM CONFITENTE SPONTE MITIUS EST AGENDUM. 4 Inst. 66. One confessing willing-ly should be dealt with more leniently.
CUM COPULA. Lat. With copulation, e., sex-ual intercourse. Used in speaking of the valid-ity of a marriage contracted "per verba de fu-turo cum copula," that is, with words referring to the future (a future intention to have the mar-riage solemnized) and consummated by sexual connection.
CUM DE LUCRO DUORUM QUPERITUR, MELI-OR EST CAUSA POSSIDENTIS. When the ques-tion is as to the gain of two persons, the cause of him who is in possession is the better. Dig. 50,

CUM DUO INTER SE PUGNANTIA REPERIUN-TUR IN TESTAMENTO, ULTIMUM RATUM EST. Where two things repugnant to each other. are found in a will, the last shall stand. Co. Litt. 112b; Shep. Touch. 451; Broom, Max. 583.
CUM DUO JURA CONCURRUNT IN UNA PER-SONA /EQUUM EST AC SI ESSENT IN DUO-BUS. When two rights meet in one person, it is the same as if they were in two persons.
CUM GRANO SALIS. (With a grain of salt.) With allowance for exaggeration.
CUM IN CORPORE DISSENTITUR, APPARET NULLAM ESSE ACCEPTIONEM. When there is a disagreement in the substance, it appears that there is no acceptance. Gardner v. Lane, 12 Allen, Mass., 44.
CUM IN TESTAMENTO AMBIGUE AUT ETIAM PERPERAM SCRIPTUM EST BENIGNE INTER-PRETAR’ ET SECUNDUM ID QUOD CREDI-BILE EST COGITATUM CREDENDUM EST. Dig. 34, 5, 24. Where an ambiguous, or even an erroneous, expression occurs in a will, it should be construed liberally, and in accordance with the testator’s probable meaning. Broom, Max. 568.
CUM LEGITIME NUPTLIE FACTIE SUNT, PA-TREM LIBERI SEQUUNTUR. Children born under a legitimate marriage follow the condition of the father.
CUM ONEREr With the burden; subject to an incumbrance or charge. What is taken cum onere is taken subject to an existing burden or charge.
CUM PAR DELICTUM EST DUORUM, SEMPER ONERATUR PETITOR ET MELIOR HABETUR POSSESSORIS CAUSA. Dig. 50, 17, 154. When both parties are in fault the plaintiff must always fail, and the cause of the person in possession be preferred.
CUM PERA ET LOCULO. With satchel and purse. A phrase in old Scotch law.
CUM PERTINENTIIS. With the appurtenances. Bract. fol. 73b.
CUM PRIVILEGIO. The expression of the mon-opoly of Oxford, Cambridge, and the royal print-ers to publish the Bible.
CUM QUOD AGO NON VALET UT AGO, VAL-EAT QUANTUM VALERE POTEST. 4 Kent, Comm. 493. When that which I do is of no effect as I do it, it shall have as much effect as it can; i. e., in some other way.
CUM TESTAMENTO ANNEXO. L. Lat. With the will annexed. A term applied to administra-tion granted where a testator makes an incom-plete will, without naming any executors, or where he narres incapable persons, or where the executors named refuse to act. If the executor has died, an administrator de bonis non cum testa-mento annexo (of the gbods not [already1 admin-
istered upon with the will annexed) is appointed. Often abbreviated d. b. n. c. t. a. 2 Bl. Comm. 503, 504.
CUMULATIVE. Additional; heaping up; in-creasing; forming an aggregate. The word sig-nifies that two things are to be added together, instead of one being a repetition or in substitu-tion of the other. People v. Superior Court, 10 Wend., N.Y., 285; Regina v. Eastern Archipelago, Co., 18 Eng. Law & Eq. 183.
As to cumulative "Dividend," "Legacy," "Punish-ment" and "Sentences," see those titles.
CUMULATIVE EVIDENCE. Additional or cor-roborative evidence to the same point. That which goes to prove what has already been established by other evidence. Glidden v. Dunlap, 28 Me. 383; Parker v. Hardy, 24 Pick., Mass., 248; Wal-ler v. Graves, 20 Conn. 310; Roe v. Kalb, 37 Ga. 459; Purcell Envelope Co. v. United States, 48 Ct.C1. 66, 73.
All evldence material to the issue, after any such evi-dence has been given, is in a certain sense cumulative; that is, ís added to what has been given before. It tends to sustain the íssue. But cumulative evidence, in legal phrase, means evidence from the same or a new witness, simply repeating, in substance and effect, or adding to, what has been before testified to. Parshall v. Kllnck, 43 Barb., N.Y., 212. Evidente Is not cumulativa merely because ft tends to establish the same ultimate or prtin-cipally controverted fact. Cumulative evidence is addi-tional evidence of the same kind to the same point. Able v. Frazier. 43 Iowa, 177; Harlan v. Texas Fuel & Supply Co., Tex.Civ.App., 160 S.W. 1142, 1146.

Cumulative Offense

One which can be committed only by a repeti-tion of acts of the same kind but committed on different days. The offense of being a "common seller" of intoxicatirig liquors is an example. Wells v. Com., 12 Gray., Mass., 328.

Cumulative Remedy

A remedy created by statute in addition to one which still remains in force. Railway Co. v. Chi-cago, 148 III. 141, 35 N.E. 881; State v. Barboglio, 63 Utah, 432, 226 P. 904, 907; Phillip Levy & Co. v. Davis, 115 Va. 814, 80 S.E. 791, 794; Wulff-Hansen & Co. v. Silvers, Cal.App., 120 P.2d 677, 680.

Cumulative Voting

A system of voting, by which the elector, hay-ing a number of votes equal to the number of of-ficers to be chosen, is allowed to concentrate the whole number of his votes upon one person, or to distribute them as he may see fit. For exam-ple, if ten directors of a corporation are to be elected, then, under this system, the voter may cast ten votes for one person, or five votes for each of two persons, etc. It is intended to secure representation of a minority. Bridgers v. Sta-ton, 150 N.C. 216, 63 S.E. 892; Chicago Macaroni Mfg. Co. v. Boggiano, 202 Ill. 312, 67 N.E. 17; Attorney General v. McVichie, 138 Mich. 387, 101 N.W. 552.
CUNADES. In Spanish law. Affinity; alliance; relation by marriage. Las Partidas, pt. 4, tit. 6, 1, 5.

CUNEATOR. A coiner. Du Cange. Cuneare, to coin. Cuneus, the die with which to coin. Cuneata, coined. Du Cange; Spelman.
CUNNILINGUS. An act of sex perversion com-mitted with the mouth and the female sexual or-gan. State v. Murry, 136 La. 253, 66 So. 963, 965.
CUNTEY-CUNTEY. In old English law. A kind of trial, as appears from Bract. lib. 4, tract 3, ca. 18, and tract 4, ca. 2, where it seems to mean, one by the ordinary jury.
CUR. A common abbreviation of curia.
CURA. Lat. Care; charge; oversight; guar-dianship.
In the civil law a specles of guardlanship which com-menced at the age of puberty (when the guardlanship called "tutela" expired,) and continued to the completion of the twenty-flfth year. Inst. 1, 23, pr.; Id. 1, 25, pr.; Hallifax, Civil Law, b. 1, c. 9.
CURAGULOS. One who takes care of a thing.
CÚRATE. In ecclesiastical law. Properly, an in-cumbent who has the cure of souls, but now gen-erally restricted to, signify the spiritual assistant of a rector or vicar in his cure. An officiating temporary minister in the English church, who represents the proper incumbeI.`; being regular-ly employed either to serve in his absence or as his assistant, as the case may be. 1 Bl. Comm. 393; 3 Steph. Comm. 88; Brande.
Perpetual Curacy, the offIce of a curate In a parish where there is no spirltual rector or vicar, but where a clerk (curate) is appointed to ofliciate there by the impropriator. 2 Burn.Ecc.Law, 55. The church or benefice filled by a curate under these circumstances is also so called.
CURATEUR. In French law. A person charged with supervising the administration of the affairs of an emancipated minor, of giving him advice, and assisting him in the important acts of such administration. Duverger.
CURATIO. In the civil law. The power or duty of managing the property of him who, either on account of infancy or some defect of mind or body, cannot manage his own affairs. The duty of a curator or guardian. Calvin.
CURATIVE. Intended to cure (that is, to obviate the ordinary legal effects or consequences of) de-fects, errors, omissions or irregularities. Meigs v. Roberts, 162 N.Y. 371, 56 N.E. 838, 76 Am.St. Rep. 322.
The word is defined as relating to, or employed in, the cure of diseases; tending to cure; a rem-edy. State v. Stoddard, 215 Iowa, 534, 245 N.W. 273, 275, 86 A.L.R. 616.
Applied particularly to statutes, a "curative act" being a retrospective law passed in order to validate legal pro-ceedings, the acts of public officers, or private deeds or contracts, which would otherwise be void for defects or irregularities or for want of conformIty to existing legal requirements. Meigs v. Roberts, 162 N.Y. 371, 56 N.E. 838, 76 Am.St.Rep. 322; one intended to give legal effect to some past act or transaction which is ineffective because of neglect to comply with some requirement of law. Anderson v. Lehmkuhl, 119 Neb. 451, 229 N.W. 773, 777; Carie v. Gehl, 193 Ark. 1061, 104 S.W.2d 445, 447; also one enacten to cure past irregularities not jurisdictional. Dun-
kum v. Maceck Bldg. Corporation, 256 N.Y. 275, 176 N.E. 392, 396. Applied to evidence curative admissibility is the doctrine that an opponent may reply with similar evidence whenever it is needed for removing an unfair prejudice which might otherwise have ensued. Biener v. St. Louis Public Service Co., Mo.App., 160 S.W.2d 780, 786.
CURATOR. In the Civil Law. A person who is appointed to take care of anything for another. A guardian. One appointed to take care of the estate of a minor aboye a certain age, a lunatic, a spendthrift, or other person not regarded by the law as competent to administer it for himself. The title was also applied to a variety of public officers in Roman administrative law. Sproule v. Davies, 69 App.Div. 502, 75 N.Y.S. 229; Le Blanc v. Jackson, Tex.Civ.App., 161 S.W. 60, 66; Daniels v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 135 Pa.Super. 450, 5 A.2d 608, 611.

In Scotch Law

The term means a guardian.

In Louisiana

A person appointed to take care of the estate of an absentee.

In Missourl

The term "curator" has been adopted from the civil law, and it is applied to the guardian of the estate of the ward as distinguished from the guar-dian of his person. Duncan v. Crook, 49 Mo. 117.

Curator ad hoc

In the civil law. A guardian for this purpose; a special guardian.

Curator ad litem

Guardian for the suit. In English law, the cor-responding phrase is "guardian ad litem."

Curator bonis

In the civil law. A guardian or trustee appoint-ed to take care of property in certain cases; as for the benefit of creditors. Dig. 42, 7. In Scotch law. The term is applied to guardian for minors, lunatics, etc.

Curatores viartml

Surveyors of the highways.
CURATORSHIP. The office of a curator. Cura-torship differs from tutorship, (q. v.) in this; that the latter is instituted for the protection of prop-erty in the first place, and, secondly, of the person; while the former is intended to protect, first, the person, and secondly, the property. 1 Lec. El. Dr. Civ. Rom. 241.
CURATRIX. A woman who has been appointed to the office of curator; a female guardian. Cross’ Curatrix v. Cross’ Legatees, 4 Grat., Va., 257.
CURATUS NON HABET TITULUM. A curate has no title, [to tithes.] 3 Bulst. 310.
CURE. The act of healing; restoration to health from disease, or to soundness after injury. State

v. Gibson, 199′ Iowa 177, 201 N.W. 590; State v. Stoddard, 215 Iowa, 534, 245 N.W. 273, 275, 86 A. L.R. 616. Under rule that a vessel and her owner must provide maintenance, and cure for seaman injured or falling ill while in service, "cure" is care, including nursing and medical attention dur-ing such period as the duty continues. Calmar S. S. Corporation v. Taylor, Pa., 303 U.S. 525, 58 S. Ct. 651, 653, 82 L.Ed. 993.
CURE BY VERDICT. The rectification or ren-dering nugatory of a defect in the pleadings by the rendition of a verdict; the court will presume, after a verdict, that the particular thing omitted or defectively stated in the pleadings was duly proved at the trial. State v. Keena, 63 Conn. 329, 28 A. 522; Treanor v. Houghton, 103 Cal. 53, 36 P. 1081.
CURE OF SOULS. In ecclesiastical law. The ec-clesiastical or spiritual charge of a parish, includ-ing the usual and regular duties of a minister in charge. State v. Bray, 35 N.C. 290.
CURFEW. An institution supposed to have been introduced into England by order of William the Conqueror, which consisted in the ringing of a bell or bells at eight o’clock at night, at which signal the people were required to extinguish all lights in their dwellings, and to put out or rake up their fires, and retire to rest, and all companies to disperse. The word is probably derived from the French couvre feu, to cover the fire. The cur-few is spoken of in 1 Social England 373, as hav-ing been ordained by William I, in order to pre-vent nightly gatherings of the people of England. But the custom is evidently older than the Nor-man; for we find an order of King Alfred that the inhabitants of Oxford should at the ringing of that bell cover up their fires and go to bed. And there is evidente that the same practice pre-vailed at this period in France, Normandy, Spain, and probably in most of the other countries of Europe. Henry, Hist. of Britain, vol. 3, 567. It was doubtless intended as a precaution against fires, which were very frequent and destructive when most houses were built of wood. It ap-pears to have met with so much opposition that in 1103 we find Henry I, repealing the enactment of his father on the subject; and Blackstone says that, though it is mentioned a century afterwards, it is rather spoken of as a time of night than as a still subsisting custom. Shakespeare frequently refers to it in the same sense.
CURIA. In old European law. A court. The palace, household, or retinue of a sovereign. A judicial tribunal or court held in the sovereign’s palace. A court of justice. The civil power, as distinguished from the ecclesiastical. A manor; a nobleman’s house; the hall of a manor. A piece of ground attached to a house; a yard or court-yard. Spelman. A lord’s court held in his manor. The tenants who did suit and service at the lord’s court. A manse. Cowell.

In Roman Law

A division of the Roman people, said to have been made by Romulus. They were divided into
three tribes, and each tribe into ten curice, mak-ing thirty curice in all. Spelman. The place or building in which each curia assembled to offer sacred rites. The place of meeting of the Roman senate; the senate house. The senate house of a province; the place where the decuriones as-sembled. Cod. 10, 31, 2. See Decurio.
CURIA ADMIRALITATIS. The court of admiral-ty.
CURIA ADVISARI VULT. L. Lat. The court will advise; the court will consider. A phrase frequently found in the reports, signifying the resolution of the court to suspend judgment in a cause, after the argument, until they have delib-erated upon the question, as where there is a new or difficult point involved. It is commonly ab-breviated to cur. adv. vult, or c. a. v.
CURIA BARONIS, OR BARONUM. In old Eng-lish law. A court-baron. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 53.
CURIA CANCELLARIZE OFFICINA JUSTITLE. 2 Inst. 552. The court of chancery is the work-shop of justice.
CURIA CHRISTIANITATIS. The ecclesiastical court.
CURIA CLAUDENDA. The name of a writ to compel another to make a fence or wall, which he was bound to make, between his land and the plaintiff’s. Reg. Orig. 155. Now obsolete.
CURIA COMITATUS. The county court (q. v.)
CURIA CURSUS AQUZE. A court held by the lord of the manor of Gravesend for the better manage-ment of barges and boats plying on the river Thames between Gravesend and Windsor, and also at Gravesend bridge, etc. 2 Geo. II, c. 26.
CURIA DOMINI. In old English law. The lord’s court, house, or hall, where all the tenants met at the time of keeping court. Cowell.
CURIA LEGITIME AFFIRMATA. A phrase us-ed in old Scotch records to show that the court was opened in due and lawful manner.
CURIA MAGNA. In old English law. The great court; one of the ancient names of parliament.
CURIA MAJORIS. In old English law. The mayor’s court. Calth. 144.
CURIA MILITUM. A court so called, anciently held at Carisbrook Castle, in the Isle of Wight. Cowell.
CURIA PALATII. The palace court. It was abol-ished by 12 & 13 Vict. c. 101.
CURIA PARLIAMENTI SUIS PROPRIIS LEG-IBUS SUBSISTIT. 4 Inst. 50. The court of par-liament is governed by its own laws.
CURIA PEDIS PULVERIZATI. In old English law. The court of piedpoudre or piepouders. 3 Bl. Comm. 32. See Court of Piepoudre.

CURIA
CURIA PENTICIARUM. A court held by the sheriff of Chester, in a place there called the "Pen-dice" or "Pentice;" probably it was so called from being originally held under a pent-house, or open shed covered with boards. Blount.
CURIA PERSON1E. In old records. A parson-age-house, or manse. Cowell.
CURIA REGIS. The king’s court. A term ap-plied to the aula regis, the bancus, or communis bancus, and the iter or eyre, as being courts of the king, but especially to the aula regis, (which title see.)
CURIALITY. In Scotch law. Curtesy. Also the privileges, prerogatives, or, perhaps, retinue, of a court.
CURING TITLE. "Clearing", "curing", "straight-ening out", or "removing cloud from" title denotes acts or proceedings necessary to render title mar-ketable. Johnston v. Cox, 114 Fla. 243, 154 So. 206.
CURIOSA ET CAPTIOSA INTERPRETATIO IN LEGE REPROBATUR. A curious [overnice or subtle] and captious interpretation is reprobated in law. 1 Balst. 6.
ClURNOCK. In old English law. A measure con-taining four bushels or half a quarter of corn. Cowell; Blount.
CURRENCY. Coined money and such banknotes or other paper money as are authorized by law and do in fact circulate from hand to hand as the medium of exchange. Griswold v. Hepburn, 2 Duv., Ky., 33; Insurance Co. v. Kupfer, 28 Ill. 332, 81 Am.Dec.’ 284. Certificates of deposit are "Currency." State ex rel. Cole v. Trimble, 307 Mo. 57, 269 S.W. 959, 961; Millikan v. Security Trust Co., 187 Ind. 307, 118 N.E. 568, 570. Gold certificate held "currency". Nortz v. U. S., Ct.CI., 294 U.S. 317, 55 S.Ct. 428, 79 L.Ed. 907, 907 A.L.R. 1346.
The term "money" is synonymous with "currency," and imports any currency, token, bank notes, or other circulat-ing medium In general use as the representative of value. People v. Miller, 292 Ill.App. 643, 11 N.E.2d 827.
CURRENT. Running; now in transit; whatever is at present in course of passage; as "the cur-rent month." Wharton v. Morris, 1 Dall. 124, 1 L.Ed. 65; Miller v. White, Tex.Civ.App., 264 S.W. 176, 178; Richardson v. Board of Education of City of Ashland, 208 Ky. 464, 271 S.W. 549, 550; American Fruit Growers v. United States, C.C.A. Cal., 105 F.2d 722, 726.
A continuous movement in the same direction, as a tluid or stream. Buckeye Incubator Co. v. Blum, D.C.Ohio, 17 F.2d 456, 458.
Passing in time or belonging to the time actual-ly passing, now passing, present in its course, as the current month, and as applied to current ob-ligations it denotes the obligations then passing or present in its progress, the service rendered and the compensation therefor measured by the time of the occurrence of the event. Pecos Mer-
cantile Co. v. Texlite, Inc., Tex.Civ.App., 65 S.W.2d 811, 812.
The word "current," when used as an adjective, has many meanings, and deflnition depends largely on word which lt modifies, or subject-matter with which it ls asso-ciated. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Keller, C.C.A., 59 F.2d 499, 501.
CURRENT ACCOUNT. An open, running, or un-settled account between two parties. Tucker v. Quimby, 37 Iowa 19; Franklin v. Camp, 1 N.J.Law, 196; Wilson v. Calvert, 18 Ala. 274; Leland v. Johnson, 227 Iowa 520, 288 N.W. 595, 597; Miller v. Boyce, 219 Iowa 534, 258 N.W. 764.
CURRENT CATALOGUES. Under contract to sell automobiles as shown in current catalogues, "cur-rent catalogues" means such catalogues as should from time to time be issued, and not merely the catalogues in existence on execution of the con-tract. Imperial Motorcar Co. v. Skinner, 16 Ala. App. 443, 78 So. 641, 642.
CURRENT DEBT FUND RULE. The "current debt fund rule" is that creditors who have supplied labor, materials, or equipment essential to opera-tion of railroad before adjudication of insolvency will be entitled to lien on properties prior to lien of pre-existing mortgages, if current operating revenues have been diverted to payment of princi-pal or interest on mortgages, or to enhancement of mortgage security before current operating ex-penses have been met. Village of Stiliwater v. Hudson Valley Ry. Co., 255 N.Y. 144, 309, 174 N.E. 306.
CURRENT EXPENSES. Ordinary, regular, and continuing expenditures for the maintenance of property, the carrying on of an office, municipal government, etc. State v. Board of Education, 68 N.J.Law, 496, 53 A. 236; Babcock v. Goodrich, 47 Cal. 510; St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Forbess, 111 Okl. 48, 237 P. 596, 597.
In connection with municipal flnances, the usual, ordi-nary, running, and Incidental expenses of a municipality. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. City of Topeka, 95 Kan. 747, 149 P. 697. The term is equlvalent to "running expenses," meaning any continuing regular expenditures in connection with the business. Meridian Line Drainage Dist. v. Wiss, 258 Ill. 600, 101 N.E. 941, 942.
CURRENT FUNDS. This phrase means gold or silver, or something equivalent thereto, and con-vertible at pleasure into coined money. Bull v. Bank, 123 U.S. 105, 8 S.Ct. 62, 31 L.Ed. 97; Hen-derson v. Farmers’ Sav. Bank of Harper, 199 Iowa 496, 202 N.W. 259, 261.
CURRENT LIABILITIES. The phrase "current liability" cardes with it the idea of a liability that is presently enforceable. Warren Co. v. Commis-sioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.Ga., 135 F.2d 679, 684, 685.
CURRENT MAINTENANCE. "Current mainte-nance" is defined as the expense occasioned in keeping the physical property in the condition re-quired for continued use during its service life. Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., III., 292 U.S. 151, 54 S.Ct. 658, 78 L.Ed. 1182.

CURRENT MONEY. The currency of the coun-try; whatever is intended to and does actually circulate as currency; every species of coin or currency. Miller v. McKinney, 5 Lea, Tenn., 96. In this phrase the adjective "current" is not synon-ymous with "convertible." It is employed to de-scribe money which passes from hand to hand, from person to person, and circulates through the community, and is generally received. Money is current which is received as money in the common business transactions, and is the common medium in barter and trade. Ferrell v. State, 68 Tex.Cr.R. 487, 152 S.W. 901, 905; Kupfer v. Marc, 28 III. 388; Conwell w. Pumphrey, 9 Ind. 135, 68 Am.Dec. 611.
CURRENT OBLIGATIONS. The word "current" means passing in time or belonging to the time actually passing, now passing, present in its course, as the current month, and as applied to current obligations it denotes the obligations then passing or present in its progress, the service rendered and the compensation therefor measured by the time of the occurrence of the event. Pecos Mercantile Co. v. Texlite, Inc., Tex.Civ.App., 65 S.W.2d 811, 812.
CURRENT PRICE. This term means the same as "market value," "market price," "going price," the price that runs or flows with the market. Hoff v. Lodi Canning Co., 51 Cal.App. 299, 196 P. 779, 780; Ford v. Norton, 32 N.M. 518, 260 P. 411, 414, 55 A.L.R. 261; Cases of Champagne, 23 Fed. Cas. 1168.
CURRENT RATE OF WAGES. Minimum, maxi-mum, and intermediate amounts, indeterminately varying from time to time and dependent on the class and kind of work done, the efficiency of the workman, etc. Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 128, 70 L.Ed. 322.
"CURRENT REVENDES". Defined as including taxes for ensuing year and all liquid assets, such as delinquent taxes, licenses, fines, and other reve-nues which, in judgment of authorities, are col-lectible. Athens Nat. Bank v. Ridgebury Tp., 303 Pa. 479, 154 A. 791, 792.
CURRENT VALUE. The current value of import-ed commodities is their common market price at the place of exportation, without reference to the price actually paid by the importer. Tappan v. U. S., 23 Fed.Cas. 690.
CURRENT WAGES. Such as are paid periodical-ly, or from time to time as the services are ren-dered or the work is performed; more particular-ly, wages for the current period, hence not includ-ing such as are past-due. Sydnor v. Galveston, Tex.App., 15 S.W. 202; Bell v. Indian Live Stock Co., Tex., 11 S.W. 346, 3 L.R.A. 642; Bruton v. Tearle, 7 Ca1.2d 48, 59 P.2d 953, 957, 106 A.L.R. 580.
CURRENT YEAR. The year now running. Doe v. Dobell, 1 Adol. & El. 806; Clark v. Lancaster County, 69 Neb. 717, 96 N.W. 593. Ordinarily, a calendar year in which the event under discussion
took place; Buffalo County v. Bowker, 197 N.W. 620, 622, 111 Neb. 762; Clark v. Tennessee Chemi-cal Company, 167 Ga. 248, 145 S.E. 73, 75; Empire Petroleum Co. v. Southern Pipe Line Co., 174 Ark. 33, 294 S.W. 5, 6; unless the context shows a dif-ferent intention; Miller v. White, Tex.Civ.App., 264 S.W. 176, 178; People v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 324 III. 85, 154 N.E. 438, 439.
CURRICULUM. The year; of the course of a year; the set of studies for a particular period, appointed by a university.
CURRIT QUATUOR PEDIBUS. L. Lat. It runs upon four feet; or, as sometimes expressed, it runs upon all fours. A phrase used in arguments to signify the entire and exact application of a case quoted. "It does not follow that they run quatuor pedibus." 1 W.Bl. 145.
CURRIT TEMPUS CONTRA DESIDES ET SUI JURIS CONTEMPTORES. Time runs against the slothful and those who neglect , their rights. Bract. fols. 100b, 101.
CURSING. Malediction; imprecation; execra-tion; profane words intended to convey hate and to invoke harm; swearing. Johnson v. State, 15 Ala.App. 194, 72 So. 766.
CURSITOR BARON. An officer of the court of exchequer, who is appointed by patent under the great seal to be one of the barons of the exche-quer. The office was abolished by St. 19 & 20 Vict. c. 86.
CURSITORS. Clerks in the chancery office, whose duties consisted in drawing up those writs which were of course, de cursu, whence their name. They were abolished by St. 5 & 6 Wm. IV, c. 82. Spence, Eq.Jur. 238; 4 Inst. 82.
CURSO. In old .records. A ridge. Cursones terne, ridges of land. Cowell.
CURSOR. An inferior officer of the papal court.
CURSORY EXAMINATION. An inspection for defects visible or ascertainable by ordinary exami-nation. Coll v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 3 N.J.Misc. 869, 130 A. 225, 226.
CURSUS CURIAE EST LEX CURIAE. 3 Bulst. 53. The practice of the court is the law of the court.
CURTAIL. "Curtail" means to cut off the end or any part of; hence to shorten, abridge; diminish; lessen, reduce; and has no such meaning as abol-ish. State v. Edwards, 207 La. 506, 21 So.2d 624, 625.
CURTESY. The estate to which by common law a man is entitled, on the death of his wife, in the lands or tenements of which she was seised in possession in fee-simple or in tail during her cover-ture, provided they have had lawful issue born alive which might have been capable of inheriting the estate. It is a freehold estate for the term of his natural life. 1 Washb.Real Prop. 127; 2 Bl. Comm. 126; Co.Litt. 30a; Dozier v. Toalson, 180 Mo. 546, 79 S.W. 420, 103 Am.St.Rep. 586;

Templeton v. Twitty, 88 Tenn. 595, 14 S.W. 435; Decker v. Decker, 205 Ky. 69, 265 S.W. 483, 485.

Initiate and consummate

has in his wife’s estate after the birth of issue rcapable of inheriting, and before the death of the wife; after her death, it becomes an estate "by the curtesy consummate." Wait v. Wait, 4 Barb., N.Y. 205; Churchill v. Hudson, C.C.Mo., 34 F. 14; Pattison v. Baker, 148 Tenn. 399, 255 S.W. 710, 29 A.L.R. 1334; Bucci v. Popovich, 93 N.J. Eq. 121, 115 A. 95, 96; Hopper v. Gurtman, 126 N.J. 263, 18 A.2d 245, 246, 250, 133 A.L.R. 621.
CURTEYN. The name of King Edward the Con-fessor’s sword. It is said that the point of it was broken, as an emblem of merey. (Mat. Par. in Hen. III.) Wharton.
CURTILAGE. The inclosed space of ground and buildings immediately surrounding a dwelling-house. 1 Chit.Gen.Pr. 175; United States v. Vla-hos, D.C.Or., 19 F.Supp. 166, 169.
In its most comprehensive and proper legal sig-nification, it includes all that space of ground and buildings thereon which is usually inclosed within the general fence immediately surrounding a prin-cipal messuage and outbuildings, and yard closely adjoining to a dwelling-house, but it may be large enough for cattle to be levant and couchant there-in. 1 Chit.Gen.Pr. 175.
The curtilage of a dwelling-house is a space, necessary and convenient and habitually used for the family purposes, and the carrying on of do-mestic employments. It includes the garden, if there be one, and it need not be separated from other lands by fence. State v. Shaw, 31 Me. 523; Derrickson v. Edwards, 29 N.J.Law, 474, 80 Am. Dec. 220; Bare v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 783, 94 S.E. 168, 172; State v. Lee, 120 Or. 643, 253 P. 533, 534.
A piece of ground commonly used with the dwelling house. Fugate v. Commonwealth, 294 Ky, 410, 171 S.W.2d 1020, 1021. A small piece of land, not necessarily inclosed, around the dwelling house, and generally includes the buildings used for domestic purposes in the conduct of family affairs. Bruner v. State, 47 Okl.Cr. 241, 288 P. 369, 370; a courtyard or the space of ground adjoining the dwelling house necessary and convenient and habitually used for family purposes and the carrying on of domestic employments. Jones v. Commonwealth, 239 Ky. 110, 38 S.W.2d 971, 973. A piece of ground within the common inclosure belonging to a dwelling house, and enjoyed with it, for its more convenlent occupation. Italian-American Building & Loan Ass’n of Passaic County v. Russo, 132 N.J.Eq. 319, 28 A.2d 196, 198; People v. Gedney, 10 Hun., N.Y., 154. In Michigan it has been extended to include more than an inclosure near the house. People v. Taylor, 2 Mich. 250.
CURTILES TERR1E. In old English law. Court lands. Cowell. See Court Lands.
CURTILLIUM. A curtilage; the arca or space within the inclosure of a dwellinghouse. Spelman.
CURTIS. A garden; a space about a house; a house, or manor; a court, or palace; a court of justice; a nobleman’s residence. Spelman.
CUSSEDNESS. "Wantonness" is a synonym for what is popularly known as "cussedness," and "cussedness" is a disposition to perversity. Uni-versal Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bassett, 130 Ohio St. 567, 200 N.E. 843, 845.
CUSSORE. A term used in Hindostan for the discount or allowance made in the exchange of rupees, in contradistinction to batta, which is the sum deducted. Enc.Lond.
CUSTA, CUSTAGIUM, CUSTANTIA. Costs.
CUSTODE ADMITTENDO, CUSTODE AMOVEN-DO. Writs for the admitting and removing of guardians.
CUSTODES.

In Roman Law

Guardians; observers; inspectors. Persons who acted as inspectors of elections, and who counted the votes given. Tayl.Civil Law, 193.

In Old English Law

Keepers; guardians; conservators.
CUSTODES LIBERTATIS ANGLA/E AUCTORI-TATE PARLIAMENTI. The style in which writs and all judicial processes were made out during the great revolution, from the execution of King Charles I. till Oliver Cromwell was declared pro-tector.
CUSTODES PACIS. Guardians of the peace. 1 Bl.Comm. 349.
CUSTODIA LEGIS. In the custody of the law. Stockwell v. Robinson, 9 Houst., Del., 313, 32 A. 528; Troll v. City of St. Louis, 257 Mo. 626, 168 S.W. 167, 178; Hopping v. Hopping, 233 Iowa 993, 10 N.W.2d 87, 152 A.L.R. 436.
CUSTODIAM LEASE. In English law. A grant from the crown under the exchequer seal, by which the custody of lands, etc., seised in the king’s hands, is demised or committed to some person as custodee or lessee thereof. Wharton.
CUSTODY. The tare and keeping of anything; as when an article is said to be "in the custody of the court." People V. Burr, 41 How.Prac., N.Y., 296; Emmerson v. State, 33 Tex.Cr.R. 89, 25 S.W. 290; Roe v. Irwin, 32 Ga. 39. Also the detainer of a man’s person by virtue of lawful process or authority; actual imprisonment. In a sentence that the defendant "be in custody until," etc., this term imports actual imprisonment. Smith v. Com., 59 Pa. 320; Turner v. Wilson, 49 Ind. 581; Ex parte Powers, D.C.Ky., 129 F. 985. Detention; charge; control; possession. The term is very elastic and may mean actual imprisonment or physical detention or mere power, legal or physi-cal, of imprisoning or of taking manual posses-sion. Jones v. State, 26 Ga.App. 635, 107 S.E. 166; J. O. Nessen Lumber Co. v. Ray H. Bennett Lum-ber Co., 223 Mich. 349, 193 N.W. 789, 790; State ex rel. Bricker v. Griffith, Ohio App., 36 N.E.2d 489, 491; Willoughby v. State, 87 Tex.Cr.R. 40, 219 S.W. 468, 470; Carpenter v. Lord, 88 Or. 128,

171 P. 577, 579, L.R.A.1918D, 674; Little v. State, 100 Tex.Cr.R. 167, 272 S.W. 456, 457; Randazzo v. U. S., C.C.A.Mo., 300 F. 794, 797.
The word is defined as the care and possession of a thing, and means the keeping, guarding, care, watch, inspection, preservation or security of a thing, and carries with it the idea of the thing being within the immediate personal care and control of the person to whose custody it is subjected; charge; immediate charge and control, and not the final, absolute control of ownership, implying responsibility for the protection and preservation of the thing in custody. Southern Carbon Co. v. State, 171 Misc. 566, 13 N.Y.S.2d 7, 9.
"Custody" of property means such a relation towards it as would constitute possession if the person having custody han. it on his own account. State v. Columbus State Bank, 124 Neb. 231, 246 N.W. 235, 238. "Custody" means a keep-ing, guardianship, the state of being held in keeping or under guard, restraint of liberty, imprlsonment, and "fet-ter" is a synonym. Browder v. Cook, D.C.Idaho, 59 F.Supp. 225, 231.
CUSTODY OF THE LAW. Property is in the cus-tody of the law when it has been lawfully taken by authority of legal process, and remains in the possession of a public officer (as, a sheriff) or an officer of a court (as, a receiver) empowered by law to hold it. Gilman v. Williams, 7 Wis. 334, 76 Am.Dec. 219; McFarland Carriage Co. v. Solanes, C.C.La., 108 P. 532; Allan v. Hargadine-McKit-trick Dry Goods Co., 325 Mo. 400, 28 S.W.2d 670, 673.
CUSTOM. A usage or practice of the people, which, by common adoption and acquiescence, and by long and unvarying habit, has become compulsory, and has acquired the force of a law with respect to the place or subject-matter to which it relates. Adams v. Insurance Co., 95 Pa. 355, 40 Am.Rep. 662; King v. Shelton, Tex.Civ. App., 252 S.W. 194, 195; Conahan v. Fisher, 233 Mass. 234, 124 N.E. 13, 15; Lawrence v. Portland Ry., Light & Power Co., 91 Or. 559, 179 P. 485, 486; U. S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Cor-poration v. Levensaler, 53 App.D.C. 322, 290 F. 297, 300.
A "custom" is a practice or course of acting. Goslln V. Kurn, 351 Mo. 395, 173 S.W.2d 79, 86.
Ordinary or usual way of doing a thing, habit; practice. Adelman v. Altman, 209 Mo.App. 583, 240 S.W. 272, 276; Kent v. Town of Patterson, 141 N.Y.S. 932, 933, 80 Misc. Rep. 560; Maeder Steel Products Co. v. Zanello, 109 Or. 562, 220 P. 155, 161; Carter v. Sloux City Service Co., 160 Iowa 78, 141 N.W. 26, 29.
It results from a long series of actions, constantly repeated, which have, by such repetition and by uninter-rupted acquiescence, acquired the force of a tacit and com-mon consent. LoulsvIlle & N. R. Co. v. Reverman, 243 Ky. 702, 49 S.W.2d 558, 560.
A law not written, established by long usage, and the consent of our ancestors. Termes de la Ley; Cowell; Bract,fol. 2. Portuguese Beneficia]; Ass’n v. Xavier, 59 R.I. 265, 195 A. 231, 233. If it be universal, it is common law; if particular to this or that place, it is then properly cus-tom. 3 Salk. 112.
Customs result from a long serles of actions constantly repeated, which have, by such repetition, and by unin-terrupted acquiescence, acquíred the force of a tacit and common consent. Civil Code La..art. 3.
It dlffers from prescription, which is personal and ls annexed to the person of the owner of a particular estate; whlle the other is local, and relates to a particular district. An instance of the latter occurs where the question is upon the manner of conducting a particular branch of trade at a certain place; of the former, where a certain person and his ancestors, or those whose estates he has, have been entitled to a certain advantage or privilege, as to have common of pasture in a certain Glose, or the like. The distinction has been thus expressed "While prescription is the making of a right, custom is the making of a law." Lawson, Usages & Cust. 15, note 2.

Classification

Customs are general, local or particular. Gen-eral customs are such as prevail throughout a country and become the law of that country, and their existence is to be determined by the court. Bodfish v. Fox, 23 Me. 95, 39 Am.Dec. 611. Or as applied to usages of trade and business, a general custom is one that is followed in all cases by all persons in the same business in the same terri-tory, and which has been so long established that persons sought to be charged thereby, and all others living in the vicinity, may be presumed to have known of it and to have acted upon it as they had occasion. Sturges v. Buckley, 32 Conn. 267; Railroad Co. v. Harrington, 192 III. 9, 61 N.E. 622. Local customs are such as prevail only in some particular district or locality, or in some city, county, or town. Clough v. Wing, 2 Ariz. 371, 17 P. 457. Particular customs are nearly the same, being such as affect only the inhabitants of some particular district. 1 Bl,Comm. 74.

Custom of Merchants

A system of customs or rules relative to bilis of exchange, partnership, and other mercantile mat-ters, and which, under the name of the "lex merca-toria," or "law merchant," has been ingrafted in-to and made a part of, the common law. 1 Bl. Comm. 75; 1 Steph.Comm. 54; 2 Burrows, 1226, 1228.

Custom of York

A custom of intestacy in the province of York similar to that of London. Abolished by 19 & 20 Vict. c. 94.

Customs and Services

Annexed to the tenure of lands are those which the tenants thereof owe unto their lords, and which, if withheld, the lord might anciently have resorted to "a writ of customs and services" to compel them. Cowell. But at the present day he would merely proceed to eject the tenant as upon a forfeiture, or claim damages for the subtrac-tion. Brown.

Customs of tondon

Certain particular customs, peculiar to that city, with regard to trade, apprentices, widows, orphans and a variety of other matters; con-trary to the general law of the land, but con-firmed by act of parliament. 1 Bl.Comm. 75.

Special Custom

A particular or local custom; one which, in respect to the, sphere of its observante, does not extend throughout the entire state or country, but is conflned to some particular district or locality. 1 BI.Comm. 67; Bodfish v. Fox, 23 Me. 95, 39 Am. Dec. 611.

CUSTOM. DUTIES. Taxes on the importation and exportation of commodities; the tariff or tax as-sessed upon merchandise, imported from, or ex-ported to a foreign country. United States v. Sischo, D.C.Wash., 262 F. 1001, 1005.
CUSTOM-HOUSE. In administrative law. The house or office where commodities are entered for importation or exportation; where the duties, bounties, or drawbacks payable or receivable upon such importation or exportation are paid or re-ceived; and where ships are cleared out, etc.
CUSTOM-HOUSE BROKER. One whose occupa-tion it is, as an agent, to arrange entries and other custom-house papers, or transact business, at any port of entry, relating to the importation or ex-portation of goods, wares, or merchandise. 14 St. at Large, 117. A person authorized by the commissioners of customs to act for parties, at their option, in the entry or clearance of ships and the transaction of general business. Whar-ton ; State v. William J. Oberle, Inc., La.App., 140 So. 239, 240.
CUSTOMARILY. Means usually, habitually, ac-cording to the customs, general practice or usual order of things, regularly. Fuller Brush Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 99 Utah 97, 104 P.2d 201, 203, 129 A.L.R. 511.
CUSTOMARY. According to custom or usage; founded on, or growing out of, or dependent on, a custom (q. y.); ordinary; usual; common. Kent v. Town of Patterson, 80 Misc.Rep. 560, 141 N.Y.S. 932, 933; Montgomery v. O’Donnell, 178 Iowa 588, 159 N.W. 1025, 1026; Woods v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 205 Ala. 236, 87 So. 681, 686, 27 A.L.R. 834.
CUSTOMARY COURT-BARON. See Court-Baron.
CUSTOMARY DISPATCH. In charter party. Due diligente according to lawful, reasonable and well-known custom of port or ports involved. Con-text and conditions existing or contemplated will, of course, affect the meaning of the phrase. Was-son v. Stetson, Cutler & Co., D.C.Mass., 214 F. 329, 333; Taisho Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha v. Gano Moore Co., D.C.Del., 14 F.2d 985, 986.
CUSTOMARY ESTATES. Estates which owe their origin and existence to the custom of the manor in which they are held. 2 Bl.Comm. 149.
CUSTOMARY FREEHOLD. In English law. A variety of copyhold estate, the evidentes of the title to which are to be found upon the court rolls; the entries declaring the holding to be according to the custom of the manor, but it is not said to be at the will of the lord. The incidents are similar to those of common or pure copyhold. 1 Steph. Comm. 212, 213, and note.
CUSTOMARY INTERPRETATION. See Interpre-tation.
CUSTOMARY SERVICES. Such as are due by ancient custom or prescription only.
CUSTOMARY TENANTS. Tenants holding by custom of the manor.
CUSTOME SERRA PRISE STRICTE. Custom shall be taken [is to be construed] strictly. Jenk. Cent. 83.
CUSTOMER. One who regularly or repeatedly makes purchases of, or has business dealings with, a tradesman or business house. Aiken Mills v. United States, D.C.S.C., 53 F.Supp. 524, 526; Ark-wright Corporation v. United States, D.C.Mass., 53 F.Supp. 359, 361. Ordinarily, one who has had repeated business dealings with another. Lyons v. Otter Tail Power Co., 70 N.D. 681, 297 N.W. 691, 693; Gallopin v. Continental Casualty Co., 290 III. App. 8, 7 N.E.2d 771, 774. A buyer, purchaser, or patron. Nichols v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corporation, 70 Ga.App. 169, 27 S.E.2d 764, 766.
CUSTOMERS’ GOODS. The words "customers’ goods," as used in statement of claim on fire pol-icy referring to merchandise destroyed as "cus-tomers’ goods," in their ordinary sense, mean goods belonging to insured’s customers in his custody as a bailee for the purpose of his trade. Sagransky v. Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 92 Pa.Super. 500, 502.
CUSTOMER’S MAN. One who has duty to greet customers of broker, when they appear in office on business, to assist them in placing their orders, and generally to see that their wants are taken care of. Fenner & Beane v. Lincoln, Tex.Civ.App., 101 S.W.2d 305, 308; an employee of a brokerage house who solicits from the investing public or-ders for the purchase and sale of commodities and securities to be executed upon various com-modities and securities exchanges in the United States. Gould v. Witter, 10 Wash.2d 553, 117 P. 2d 210, 211. The term includes all employees who are regularly engaged in the solicitation of mar-ginal business or the handling of customers’ ac-counts, or who advise with customers about the purchase and sale of securities. Clothier v. Beane, 187 Okl. 693, 105 P.2d 752, 756.
CUSTOMS. This term is usually applied to those taxes which are payable upon goods and merchan-dise imported or exported. Story, Const. § 949; Pollock v. Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 15 S.Ct. 912, 39 L.Ed. 1108; Marriott v. Brune, 9 How. 632, 13 L. Ed. 282.
The duties, toll, tribute, or tariff payable upon merchandise exported or imported. These are called "customs" from having been paid from time immemorial. Expressed in law Latin by custuina, as distinguished from consuetudines, which are usages merely. 1 Bl. Comm. 314.
CUSTOMS CONSOLIDATION ACT. The statute 16 & 17 Vict. c. 107, which has been frequently amended. See 2 Steph. Comm. 563.
CUSTOMS COURT. By virtue of Act May 28, 1926, c. 411, § 1, 44 Stat. 669, 19 U.S.C.A. § 405a, the "United States Customs Court" became the title of what had theretof ore been known as the "Board of General Appraisers." Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U.S. 438, 49 S.Ct. 411, 73 L. Ed. 789. Its decisions are appealable to the "Court of Customs and Patent Appeals" (q. v.) in all cas-es as to the construction of the law and facts re-specting the classification of merchandise and the rate of duty imposed thereon, and the Pees and charges connected therewith, and all appealable questions as to the court’s jurisdiction, and as to the laws and regulations governing the collec-tion of the customs revenues.
CUSTOS. Lat. A custodian, guard, keeper, or warden; a magistrate.
CUSTOS BREVIUM. The keeper of the writs. A principal clerk belonging to the courts of queen’s bench and common pleas, whose office it was to keep the writs returnable into those courts. The office was abolished by 1 Wm. IV, c. 5.
CUSTOS FERARUM. A gamekeeper. Townsh. Pl. 265.
CUSTOS HORREI REGII. Protector of the royal granary. 2 Bl. Comm. 394.
CUSTOS MARIS. In old English law. Warden of the sea. The title of a high naval officer among the Saxons and after the Conquest, corresponding with admiral.
CUSTOS MORUM. The guardian of morals. The court of queen’s bench has been so styled. 4 Steph. Comm. 377.
CUSTOS PLACITORUM CORONIE. In old Eng-lish law. Keeper of the pleas of the crown. Bract. fol. 14b. Cowell supposes this office to have been the same with the custos rotulorum. But it seems rather to have been another name for "coroner." Crabb, Eng. Law, 150; Bract. fol. 136b.
CUSTOS ROTULORUM. Keeper of the rolls. An officer in England who has the custody of the rolls or records of the sessions of the peace, and also of the commission of the peace itself. He is always a justice of the quorum in the county where appointed and is the principal civil officer in the county. 1 Bl. Comm. 349; 4 Bl. Comm. 272.
CUSTOS SPIRITUALIUM. In English ecclesias-tical law. Keeper of the .spiritualities. He who exercises the spiritual jurisdiction of a diocese dur-ing the vacancy of the see. Cowell.
CUSTOS STATUM ILIEREDIS IN CUSTODIA EX-ISTENTIS MELIOREM, NON DETERIOREM, FACERE POTEST. 7 Coke, 7. A guardian can make the estate of an existing heir under his guardianship better, not worse.
CUSTOS TEMPORALIUM. In English ecclesias-tical law. The person to whom a vacant see or abbey was given by the king, as supreme lord. His office was, as steward of the goods and proflts, to give an account to the escheator, who did the like to the exchequer.
CUSTOS TERIVE. In old English law. Guar-dian, warden, or keeper of the land.
CUSTUMA ANTIQUA SIVE MAGNA. (Lat. An-cient or great duties.) The duties on wool, sheep-skin, or wool-pelts and leather exported were so called, and were payable by every merchant, stran-ger as well as native, with the exception that mer-chant strangers paid one-half as much again as natives. 1 Bl. Comm. 314.
CUSTUMA PARVA ET NOVA. (Small and new customs.) Imposts of 3d. in the pound, due for-merly in England from merchant strangers only, for all commodities, as well imported as exported. This was usually called the "aliens duty," and was first granted in 31 Edw. I. 1 Bl. Comm. 314;
4 Inst. 29.
CUT. A wound made with a sharp instrument. State v. Patza, 3 La.Ann. 512; State v. Cody, 18 Or. 506, 23 Pac. 891; State v. Mairs, 1 N.J.Law, 453; the term is not limited to severance by use of a sharp instrument, but also means to fell, and in industry, to reduce by or as by removing a part. Waselinko v. Volpe Coal Co., 152 Pa.Super. 156, 31 A.2d 444, 445.

In Mining

A surface opening in the ground intersecting a vein. McLaughlin v. Bardsen, 50 Mont. 177, 145 P. 954, 955.
CUT-OVER LAND. Land which has been logged; from which desired timber has been removed. Carlisle-Pennell Lumber Co. v. Joe Creek Shingle Co., 131 Wash. 501, 230 P. 425; Tennessee Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New River Lumber Co., C.C.A.Tenn.,
5 F.2d 559, 560.
CUT SHELL. One in which the part containing the shot is nearly severed from the part contain-ing powder, so as to be projected in a unit, and inflict a more dangerous wound than if the shot were scattered. White v. State, 195 Ala. 681, 71 So. 452, 454.
CUTCHERRY. In Hindu law. Corrupted from Kachari. A court; a hall; an office ; the place where any public business is transacted.
CUTH, COUTH. Sax. Known, knowing. Uncuth, unknown. See Couthutlaugh; Uncuth.
CUTHRED. A knowing or skillful counsellor.
CUTLER. Either a man who makes edged tools or one who grinds them. American Stainless Steel Co. v. Ludlum Steel Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 290 F. 103, 106.
CUTPURSE. One who steals by the method of cutting purses; a common practice when men wore their purses at their girdles, as was once the custom. Wharton.
CUTTER OF THE TALLIES. In old English law. An offlcer in the exchequer, to whom it belonged to provide wood for the tallies, and to cut the sum paid upon them, etc.
CUTWAL, KATWAL. The chief officer of police or superintendent of markets in a large town or city in India.

CWT. A hundred-weight; one hundred and twelve pounds. Helm v. Bryant, 11 B. Mon. (Ky.) 64.
CY. In law French. Here. (Cy-apres, hereafter; cy-devant, heretofore.) Also as, so.
CYCLE. A measure of time; a space in which the same revolutions begin again; a periodical space of time. Enc. Lond. In electrical nomencla-ture is two successive reversals of directions of electromotive force or current or full period of al-ternative current. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., Cust. & Pat.App., 39 F. 2d 684, 685.
CYCLONE. "A violent storm, often of vast ex-tent, characterized by high winds rotating about a calm center of low atmospheric pressure. Pop-ularly, any violent and destructive windstorm." Tupper v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co., 156 Minn. 65, 194 N.W. 99, 100; Cedergren v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co., C.C.A. Minn., 292 F. 5, 6; the term includes the hurri-cane, typhoon, bagino, and other tropical storms. Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Hall, 90 Colo. 581, 11 P. 2d 215, 216.
CYNE—BOT, or CYNE—GILD. The portion belong-ing to the nation of the mulct for slaying the king, the other portion or were being due to his family. Blount.
CYNEBOTE. A mulct anciently paid by one who killed another, to the kindred of the deceased. Spelman.
CYPHONISM. That kind of punishment used by the ancients, and still used by the Chinese, called by Staunton the "wooden collar," by which the neck of the malefactor is bent or weighed down. Enc. Lond.
CY—PRES. As near as [possible]. The rule of cy-pres is a rule for the construction of instru-ments in equity, by which the intention of the party is carried out as near as may be, when it would be impossible or illegal to give it literal effect. Thus, where a testator attempts to create a perpetuity, the court will endeavor, instead of making the devise entirely void, to explain the will in such a way as to carry out the testator’s general intention as far as the rule against per-petuities will allow. So in the case of bequests to charitable uses; and particularly where the language used is so vague or uncertain that the testator’s design must be sought by construction. Beekman v. Bonsor, 23 N.Y. 308, 80 Am.Dec. 269; Doyle v. Whalen, 87 Me. 414, 32 A. 1022, 31 L. R.A. 118; Philadelphia v. Girard, 45 Pa. 28, 84 Am. Dec. 470; People v. Braucher, 258 III. 604, 101 N. E. 944, 946, 47 L.R.A., N.S., 1015; Tincher v. Ar-nold, C.C.A.I11., 147 F. 665; Crane v. Morristown School Foundations, 120 N.J.Eq. 583, 187 A. 632, 635.
CYRCE. In Saxon law. A church.
CYRICBRYCE. A breaking into a church. Blount.
CYRICSCEAT. (From cyric, church, and sceat, a tribute). In Saxon law. A tribute or payment due to the church. Cowell.
CYROGRAPHARIUS. In old English law. A cy-rographer; an officer of the bancus, or court of common bench. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 36.
CYROGRAPHUM. A chirograph, (which see.)
CZAR. (Also written zar, tsar, tzar, etc.) The title of the former emperors of Russia, derived from the old Slavonic cesar, king or emperor, which, although long held to be derived from the Roman title Caesar, is almost certainly of Tartar origin. 8 Encyc. Americana, 378. The Slavonic word ultimately represents the Latin Caesar, but carne, according to Miklosich, through the medium of a Germanic language in which the word had the general sense "emperor." 2 New English Dict. (Oxford, 1893), page 1308.
In the beginning of the 10th century the Bulgarian prince Symeon assumed this title, which remained at-tached to the Bulgarian crown. In 1346 it was adopted by Stephen Duschan, king of Serbia. Among the Russians the Byzantine emperors were so called, as were also the khans of the Mongols that ruled in Russia. Ivan III, grand prince of Moscow, held the tale, and Ivan IV, the Terrible, In 1547, caused himself to be crowned as czar. In 1721 the Senate and clergy conferred on Peter I, in the name of the nation, the titie Emperor of Russia, for which in Russia the Latln word imperator is used. 8 Encyc.Americana, 378. Peter the Great introduced the titie imperator, "em-peror," and the official style then became ”Emperor of all the Russias, Tsar of Poland, and Grand Duke of Finland"; but the Russian popular appellation continued to be tacar (the preferable modem spelling). 2 New English Met. 1308. The last tsar was Nicholas II, who abdicated on March 15, 1917, and was Tater executed.
CZAREVITCH. (Also spelled czarewich, tsare-vitch, and, after the Polish, czarowitz, czarowitch, etc. 2 New English Dict. 1308.) A son of the Russian czar and czarina. Originally a title. Webster, Dict. The word was used as a title during the time of Peter I and his son, Alexis, after whose death imperial princes were called grand dukes. 6 New Internatl. Encyc. 420.
CZAREVNA, TSARE’VNA. A daughter of the Russian czar. Originally a title. Webster, Dict. As a title, however, the word has been superseded, since the time of Paul I (1754-1801), by that of grand duchess. G New Internad Encyc. 420; 2 New English Dict. 1308. See Czarevitch; Cesarev-na.
CZARINA. The title of former empresses of Russia.
CZARITZA, TSARITSA. The Russian title for which czarina is in ordinary English use. 2 New English Dist. 1308.

BLACK ‘S LAW DICTIONARY – Section D

The fourth letter of the English alphabet. It is used as an abbreviation for a number of words, the more important and usual of which are as follows:
1. Digestum, or Digesta, that is, the Digest or Pandects in the Justinian collections of the civil law. Citations to this work are sometimes indi-cated by this abbreviation, but more commonly by "Dig."
2. Dictum. A remark or observation, as in the phrase "obiter dictum," (q. v.).
3. Demissione. "On the demise." An action of ejectment is entitled "Doe d. Stiles v. Roe;" that is, "Doe, on the demise of Stiles, against Roe."
4. "Doctor." As in the abbreviated forms of certain academical degrees. "M. D.," "doctor of medicine;" "LL.D.," "doctor of laws;" "D. C. L.," "doctor of civil law."
5. "District." Thus, "U. S. Cir. Ct. W. D. Pa." stands for United States Circuit Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.
6. "Dialogue." Used only in citations to the work called "Doctor and Student."
In the Roman system of notation, this letter stands for five hundred; and, when a horizontal dash or stroke is placed aboye it, it denotes five thousand.
D. B. Deflned as day book, double biased, double breasted and, if capitalized, it means Doomsday Book, though there is no authoritative definition of d/b or d/b/a as a symbol or abbreviation in a legal document. City of St. Louis v. Stubley, Mo.App., 154 S.W.2d 407, 410.
D. B. A. Abbreviation for "doing business as." Lieberman v. Atlantic Mut. Iris. Co., 385 P.2d 53, 55, 62 Wash.2d 922.
D. B. E. An abbreviation for de bene esse, (q. y.).
D. B. N. An abbreviation for de bonis non; de-scriptive of a species of administration.
D. C. An abbreviation standing either for "Dis-trict Court," or "District of Columbia."
D. E. R. I. C. An abbreviation used for De ea re ita censuere, (concerning that matter have so de-creed,) in recording the decrees of the Roman senate. Tayl. Civil Law, 564, 566.
D. J. An abbreviation for "District Judge."
D. P. An abbreviation for Domus Procerum, the house of lords.
D. S. An abbreviation for "Deputy Sheriff." Jones County Land Co. v. Fox, 120 Miss. 798, 83 So. 241, 242.
D. S. B. An abbreviation for debitum sine brevi, or debit sans breve.
D. W. L In genealogical tables, a common ab• breviation for "died without issue."
DA TUA DUM TUA SUNT, POST MORTEM TUNC TUA NON SUNT. 3 Bulst. 18. Give the things which are yours whilst they are yours; aft-er death they are not yours.
DABIS? DABO. Lat. (Will you give? I will give.) In the Roman law. One of the forms of making a verbal stipulation. Inst. 3, 15, 1; Bract. fol. 15b.
DACION. In Spanish law. The real and effective delivery of an object in the execution of a contract.
DACTYLOGRAPHY. Dactylography is the scien-tific study of finger prints as a means of identi-fication. State v. Steffen, 210 Iowa, 196, 230 N.W. 536, 537, 78 A.L.R. 748.
DAGGE. A kind of gun. 1 How. State Tr. 1124, 1125.
DAGGER. Any straight knife, worn on person and capable of inflicting death, except pocket knife. Dagger is a generic term covering dirk, stil-etto, poniard, etc. People v. Syed Shah, 91 Cal. App. 716, 205 P.2d 1081, 1083.
DAGUS, or DAIS. The raised floor at the upper end of a hall.
DAILY. Every day; every day in the week; every day in the week except one. A newspaper which is published six days in each week is a "daily" newspaper. Richardson v. Tobin, 45 Cal. 30; Tribune Pub. Co. v. Duluth, 45 Minn. 27, 47 N.W. 309; City of Bellingham v. Bellingham Pub. Co., 116 Wash. 65, 198 P. 369; State ex rel. Item Co. v. Commissioner of Public Finances of City of New Orleans, 161 La. 915, 109 So. 675, 676.
DAILY BALANCES, AVERAGE DAILY BAL-ANCE. In school depository law. "Daily bal-ances" means the various balances for the differ-ent days in the period for which interest is to be paid, and the "average daily balance" for the in-terest period means the sum of these daily bal-ances divided by the number of days in the inter-est period. Jones v. Marrs, 114 Tex. 62, 263 S.W. 570, 574.
DAILY OCCUPATION. The same as "usual oc-cupation". International Brotherhood of Boiler Makers, Iron Shipbuilders & Helpers of America v. Huval, 133 Tex. 136, 126 S.W.2d 476, 478.
DAILY RATE OF PAY. As used in Workmen’s Compensation Law. Means one-sixth of the aver-age weekly earnings of the employee during a six-day week. Boyett v. Urania Lumber Co., 8 La. App. 132, 133.
DAILY WAGES. As used in statute authorizing compensation for loss of an eye, means amount
Black’s Law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed.-30

which could be earned by working ordinary num-ber of hours, irrespective of enforced idleness dur-ing working hours and overtime employment. Carlson v. Condon-Kiewit Co., 135 Neb. 587, 283 N.W. 220, 221.
DAIRY. An establishment for the sale or dis-tribution of milk or milk products. State v. Mc-Cosh, 134 Neb. 780, 279 N.W. 775, 777.
DAKER, or DIKER. Ten hides. Blount.
DALE and SALE. Fictitious names of places, us-ed in the English books, as examples "The manor of Dale and the manor of Sale, lying both in Vale."
DALUS, DAILUS, DAILIA. A certain measure of land; such narrow slips of pasture as are left between the plowed furrows in arable land. Cow-ell.
DAM. A construction of wood, stone, reinforced concrete or other materials, made across a stream for the purpose of penning back the waters. This word is used in two different senses. It properly means the work or structure, raised to obstruct the flow of the water in a river; but, by a well-settled usage, it is often applied to designate the pond of water created by this obstruction. Burn-ham v. Kempton, 44 N.H. 89; Colwell v. Water Power Co., 19 N.J.Eq. 248; Mining Co. v. Hancock, 101 Cal. 42, 31 P. 112; State ex rel. Priegel v. Northern States Power Co., 242 Wis. 345, 8 N.W. 2d 3b0, 352.
DAMAGE. Loss, injury, or deterioration, caused by the negligente, design, or accident of one per-son to another, in respect of the latter’s person or property. The word is to be distinguished from lts plural,-"damages,"-which means a compen-sation in money for a loss or damage. An injury produces a right in them who have suffered any damage by it to demand reparation of such dam-age from the authors of the injury. By damage, we understand every loss or diminution of what is a man’s own, occasioned by the fault of anoth-er. 1 Ruth. Inst. 399.
The harm, detriment, or loss sustained by rea-son of an injury. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Fields, 188 Miss. 725, 195 So. 489, 490.
Synonymous with "condemnation money." State v. Hale, Tex.Civ.App., 96 S.W.2d 135, 139. "Injury". Dohr-ing v. Kansas City, 228 Mo.App. 519, 71 S.W.2d 170, 171. "Loss." Glinz v. State, 70 N.D. 776, 298 N.W. 238, 239; Wells v. Thomas W. Garland, Inc., Mo., 39 S.W.2d 409, 411.
DAMAGE-CLEER. A fee assessed of the tenth part in the common pleas, and the twentieth part in the queen’s bench and exchequer, out of all damages exceeding five marks recovered in those courts, in actions upon the case, covenant, tres-pass, etc., wherein the damages were uncertain; which the plaintiff was obliged to pay to the pro-thonotary or the officer of the court wherein he recovered, bef ore he could have execution for the damages. This was originally a gratuity given to the prothonotaries and their clerks for drawing special writs and pleadings; but it was taken
away by statute, since which, if any ofiker in these courts took any money in the name of dain-age-cleer, or anything in lieu thereof, he forfeited treble the value. Wharton.
DAMAGE FEASANT or FAISANT. Doing dam-age. A term applied to a person’s cattle or beasts found upon another’s land, doing damage by tread-ing down the grass, grain, etc. 3 Bl. Comm. 7, 211; Tomlins. This phrase seems to have been introduced in the reign of Edward III, in place of the older expression "en son damage," (in damno suo.) Crabb, Eng. Law, 292.
DAMAGE TO PERSON. Bodily or physical
in-jury directly resulting from wrongful act, wheth-er lying in trespass or trespass on the case, and does not include torts directly affecting the per-son but affecting only the feelings and reputation. Young v. Aylesworth, 35 R.I. 259, 86 A. 555, 556; Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n v. Jimenez, Tex.Civ. App., 267 S.W. 752, 758; Howard v. Lunaburg, 192 Wis. 507, 213 N.W. 301, 303; Wilson v. Grace, 273 Mass. 146, 173 N.E. 524, 528.
DAMAGE TO TWO PERSQNS. In bond for pay-ment of damages that limited amount payable for any one accident. Where-widow sued to re-cover damages to deceased and his estate and also her pecunary loss, there was "damage to two persons" within the bond. Ehlers v. Gold, 169 Wis. 494, 173 N.W. 325, 327.
DAMAGED. Made less valuable, less useful, or less desirable. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Mumford, 208 Ind. 655, 197 N.E. 826, 835.
Synonymous with term "injuriously affected" within eminent domaln statutes. Alabama Power Co. v. City of Guntersville, 235 Ala. 136, 177 So. 332, 337, 114 A.L.R. 181; term "injuriously affected" as used In condemnation stat-utes, 1s synonymous. Hirt v. City of Casper, 56 Wyo. 57, 103 P.2d 394, 398.
DAMAGED GOODS. Goods, subject to duties, which have received some injury either in the voy-age home or while bonded in warehouse.
DAMAGES. A pecuniary compensatiOn or indem-nity, which may be recovered in the courts by any person who has suffered loss,‘ detriment, or injury, whether to his person, property, or rights, through the unlawful act or omission or negli-gence of another. Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 17 S.Ct. 265, 41 L.Ed. 632; Wainscott v. Loan Ass’n, 98 Cal. 253, 33 P. 88; Strong v. Neidermeier, 230 Mich. 117, 202 N.W. 938, 940; Greer v. Board of Com’rs of Knox County, 33 Ohio App. 539, 169 N. E. 709, 710.
Compensation for the loss or injury suffered. Holmes Electric Protective Co. of Philadelphia v. Goldstein, 147 Pa. Super. 506, 24 A.2d 161, 165; In re Rushford’s Estate, 111 Vt. 494, 18 A.2d 175, 176; Brown v. Cummins Distilleries Corporation, D.C.Ky., 56 F.Supp. 941, 942. A just compen-sation or reparation for a loss or injury sustained. Mc-Naghten Loan Co. v. Sandifer, 137 Kan. 353, 20 P.2d 523, 526. All factors going to make up total amount which plaintiff may recover under correct principies of law. Bfn-der v. Harris, 267 Mass. 162, 166 N.E. 707, 708. Reasonable compensation for legal injury. Sechrist v. Bowman, 307 Pa. 301, 161 A. 332, 335. The award made to a person be-cause of a legal wrong done to him by another. Eklund v. Evans, 211 Minn. 164, 300 N.W. 617, 619. The estimated reparation In money for detriment or injury sustained, and as payment for or indemnity for injuries. Sycamore Pre-serve Works v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 284 I1l.App. 445, 1 N.E.2d 522, 526. The pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury sustained, Fogle v. Frazel, 201 La. 899, 10 So.2d 695, 698. A sum awarded as a fair meas-ure of compensation to plaintiff, the amount being, as near as can be estimated, that by which he is the worse for the defendant’s wrongdoing. Chafln v. Gay Coal & Coke Co., 113 W.Va. 823, 169 S.E. 485, 487. A sum of money assessed by a jury on finding for the plaintiff or successful party in an action, as a compensation for the injury done him by the opposite party. 2 Bl.Comm. 438; Co.Litt. 257a; 2 Tidd, Pr. 869, 870. In its early significatlon the term in-cluded "costs", the terms are now regarded as distinct, State ex rel. Marcri v. City of Bremerton, 8 Wash.2d 93, 111 P.2d 612, 616. Synonymous with: "compensation", Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pitman, 70 Ga.App. 670, 29 S.E.2d 102; "condemnation money", Eldridge v. Sutton, 171 Okl. 11, 41 P.2d 680, 682; "judgment", Stearns v. Ritchie, 128 Me. 368, 147 A. 703, 705. In the ancient usage, the word "damages" was employed in two significations. According to Coke, its proper and general sense included the costs of sun. while its strict or relative sense was exclusive of costs. 10 Coke, 116, 117; Co.Litt. 257a; 9 East, 299. The latter meaning has alone survived

Actual damages

Real, substantial and just damages, or the amount awarded to a complainant in compensa-tion for his actual and real loss or injury, as op-posed on the one hand to "nominal" damages, and on the other to "exemplary" or "punitive" damages. Ross v. Leggett, 61 Mich. 445, 28 N.W. 695, 1 Am.St.Rep. 608; Gatzow v. Buening, 106 Wis. 1, 81 N.W. 1003, 49 L.R.A. 475; Osborn v. Leach, 135 N.C. 628, 47 S.E. 811, 66 L.R.A. 648; Winans v. Chapman, 104 Kan. 664, 180 P. 266, 267. Synonymous with "compensatory damages" and with "general damages." Ringgold v. Land, 212 N.C. 369, 193 S.E. 267, 268; News Leader Co. v. Kocen, 173 Va. 95, 3 S.E.2d 385, 391, 122 A.L.R. 842; Anderson v. Alcus, Tex.Civ.App., 42 S.W.2d 294, 29

Affirmative damages

In admiralty law, the damages which a respond-ent in a libel for injuries to a vessel may recover, which may, be in excess of any amount which the libellant would be entitled to claim. Ebert v. The Reuben Doud, D.C.Wis., 3 F. 520.

Civil damages

Those awarded against a liquor-seller to the relative, guardian, or employer of the person to whom the sales were made, on a showing that the plaintiff has been thereby injured in person, prop-erty, or means of support. Headington v. Smith, 113 Iowa 107, 84 N.W. 982.

Compensatory damages

Compensatory damages are such as will com-pensate the injured party for the injury sustain-ed, and nothing more; such as will simply make good or replace the loss caused by the wrong or injury. McKnight v. Denny, 198 Pa. 323, 47 A. 970; Wade v. Power Co., 51 S.C. 296, 29 S.E. 233, 64 Am.St.Rep. 676; Gatzow v. Buening, 106 Wis. 1, 81 N.W. 1003, 49 L.R.A. 47

Consequential damages

Such damage, loss, or injury as does not flow directly and immediately from the act of the par-
ty, but only from some of the consequences or re-sults of such act. Swain v. Copper Co., 111 Tenn. 430, 78 S.W. 93; McKibbin v. Pierce, Tex.Civ.App., 190 S.W. 1149, 1151; Mawson v. Vess Beverage Co., Mo.App., 173 S.W.2d 606, 613; U. S. v. Chi-cago, B. & Q. R. Co., C.C.A.Minn., 82 F.2d 131, 136, 106 A.L.R. 942.
The term means sometimes damage which is so remote as not to be actionable; sometimes damage which, though somewhat remote, is actionable; or damage which, though actionable, does not follow immediately, in point of time, upon the doing of the act complained of. Eaton v. Rail-road Co., 51 N.H. 504, 12 Am.Rep. 147

Contingent damages

Where a demurrer has been filed to one or more counts in a declaration, and its consideration is postponed, and meanwhile other counts in the same declaration, not demurred to, are taken as issues, and tried, and damages awarded upon them, such damages are called "contingent dam-ages."

Continuing damage

Are such as accrue from the same injury, or from the repetition of similar acts, between two specified periods of time.

Damages ultra

Additional damages claimed by a plaintiff not satisfied with those paid finto court by the defend-ant.

Direct damages

Direct damages are such as follow immediately upon the act done; .Eaton v. Railroad Co., 51 N.H. 504, 12 Am.Rep. 147; City of Dublin v. Ogburn, 142 Ga. 840, 83 S.E. 939; McKibbin d. Pierce, Tex. Civ.App., 190 S.W. 1149, 1151; Washington & O. D. Ry. v. Westinghouse Electric & Mf g. Co., 120 Va. 620, 89 S.E. 131, 133.

Double damages

Twice the amount of actual damages as found by the verdict of a jury allowed by statute in some cases of injuries by negligente, fraud, or tres-pass. Cross v. United States, 6 Fed.Cas. 892; Daniel v. Vaccaro, 41 Ark. 329.

Excessive damages

Damages awarded by a jury which are grossly in excess of the amount warranted by law on the facts and circumstances of the case; unreason-able or outrageous damages. Taylor v. Giger, Hardin, Ky., 587; Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Gray, 114 In d. 340, 16 N.E. 787.

Exemplary damages

Exemplary damages are damages on an in-creased scale, awarded to the plaintiff over and aboye what will barely compensate him for his property loss, where the wrong done to him was aggravated by circumstances of violente, oppres-sion, malice, fraud, or wanton and wicked conduct on the part of the defendant, and are intended to solace the plaintiff for mental anguish, laceration of his feelings, shame, degradation, or other ag-gravations of the original wrong, or else to pun-ish the defendant for his evil behavior or to make an example of him, for which reason they are also called "punitive" or "punjtory" damages or "vindictive" damages, and (vulgarly) "smart-mon-ey." Springer v. Fuel Co., 196 Pa.St. 156, 46 A. 370; Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 17 S.Ct. 265, 41 L.Ed. 632; Gillingham v. Railroad Co., 35 W.Va. 588, 14 S.E. 243, 14 L.R.A. 798; Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 P. 119, 49 Am.Rep. 366. It is said that the idea of punishment does not enter into the definition; the term being employed to mean an increased award in view of supposed aggrava-tion of the injury to the feelings of plaintiff by the wanton or reckless act of defendant. Brause v. Brause, 190 Iowa 329, 177 N.W. 65, 70.

Fair damages

See Fair Damages.

Fee damages

Damages sustained by and awarded to an abut-ting owner of real property occasioned by the construction and operation of an elevated rail-road in a city street, are so called, because com-pensation is made to the owner for the injury to, or deprivation of, his easements of light, air, and access, and these are parts of the fee. Dode v. Railway Co., 70 Hun, 374, 24 N.Y.S. 422; People v. Barker, 165 N.Y. 305, 59 N.E. 151

General damages

General damages are such as the law itself implies or presumes to have accrued from the wrong complained of, for the reason that they are its immediate, direct, and proximate result, or such as necessarily result from the injury, or such as did in fact result from the wrong, directly and proximately, and without reference to the special character, condition, or circumstances of the plaintiff. Mood v. Telegraph Co., 40 S.C. 524, 19 S.E. 67; Hopkins v. Veo, 98 Vt. 433, 129 A. 157, 158; United States Frumentum Co. v. Lauhoff, C.C.A.Mich., 216 F. 610, 617; Kane v. New Idea Realty Co., 104 Conn. 508, 133 A. 686, 687.

Imaginary damages

This term is sometimes used as equivalent to "exemplary," "vindictive," or "punitive" damages. Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 P. 119, 49 Am. Rep. 366.

Inadequate damages

Damages are called "Inadequate," within the rule that an injunction will not be granted where adequate damages at law could be recovered for the injury sought to be prevented, when such a recovery at law would not compensate the par-ties and place them in the position in which they formerly stood. Insurance Co. v. Bonner, 7 Colo. App. 97, 42 P. 681.

Intervening damages

Such damages to an appellee as result from the delay caused by the appeal. McGregor v. Balch,
17 Vt. 568; Roberts v. Warner, 17 Vt. 46, 42 Am. Dec. 478.
Irreparable damages
In the law pertaining to injunctions, damages for which no certain pecuniary standard exists for measurement. Philadelphia Ball Club, Lim-ited, v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973, 58 L.R.A. 227. Damages not easily ascertainable at law. Krich v. Zemel, 96 N.J.Eq. 208, 124 A. 449, 450. With reference to public nuisances which a pri-vate party may enjoin, the term includes wrongs of a repeated and continuing character, or which occasion damages estimable only by conjecture, and not by any accurate standard. Bernard v. Willamette Box & Lumber Co., 64 Or. 223, 129 P. 1039, 1042.
Land damages
A term sometimes applied to the amount of compensation to be paid for land taken under the power of eminent domain or for injury to, or depreciation of, land adjoining that taken. Peo-ple v. Hilts, 27 Misc.Rep. 290, 58 N.Y.S. 434; In re Lent, 47 App.Div. 349, 62 N.Y.S. 227.

Liquidated damages and penalties

The term is applicable when the amount of the damages has been ascertained by the judgment in the action, or when a specific sum of money has been expressly stipulated by the parties to a bond or other contract as the amount of damages to be recovered by either party for a breach of the agreement by the other. Keeble v. Keeble, 85 Ala. 552, 5 So. 149; Eakin v. Scott, 70 Tex. 442, 7 S.W. 777; Cochrane v. Forbes, 267 Mass. 417, 166 N.E. 752, 753; Varno v. Tindall, 164 Tenn. 642, 51 S.W. 2d 502, 503; Norwood Morris Plan Co. v. Mc-Carthy, 295 Mass. 597, 4 N.E.2d 450, 454, 107 A.L. R. 1215; Factory Realty Corporation v. Corbin-Holmes Shoe Co., 312 Mass. 325, 44 N.E.2d 671, 674. The purpose of a penalty is to secure per-formance, while the purpose of stipulating dam-ages is to fix the amount to be paid in lieu of per-formance. Christianson v. Haugland, 163 Minn. 73, 203 N.W. 433, 434; Davidow v. Wadsworth Mfg. Co., 211 Mich. 90, 178 N.W. 776, 777, 12 A.L.R. 605; Forsyth v. Central Foundry Co., 240 Ala. 277, 198 So. 706, 710. The essence of a penalty is a stipulation as in terrorem while the essence of liquidated damages is a genuine covenanted pre-estimate of such damages. Shields v. Early, 132 Miss. 282, 95 So. 839, 840. For other cases per-taining to the distinction between a penalty and liquidated damages, see Fiscal Court of Franklin County v. Kentucky Public Service Co., 181 Ky. 245, 204 S.W. 77, 79; In re Liberty Doll Co., D.C. N.Y., 242 F. 695, 701; Miller v. Blockberger, 111 Ohio St. 798, 146 N.E. 206, 209; Armstrong v. Ir-win, 26 Ariz. 1, 221 P. 222, 225, 32 A.L.R. 609

Necessary damages

A term said to be of much wider scope in the law of damages than "pecuniary." It embraces all those consequences of an injury usually de-nominated "general" damages, as distinguished from special damages; whereas the phrase "pecuniary damages" covers a smaller class of dam-ages within the larger class of "general" damages. Browning v. Wabash Western R. Co., Mo., 24 S. W. 746.

Nominal damages

Nominal damages are a trifling sum awarded to a plaintiff in an action, where there is no sub-stantial loss or injury to be compensated, but still the law recognizes a technical invasion of his rights or a breach of the defendant’s duty, or in cases where, although there has been a real injury, the plaintiff’s evidente entirely fails to show its amount. Seeling v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 287 Mo. 343, 230 S.W. 94, 102; City of Rainier v. Masters, 79 Or. 534, 155 P. 1197, 1198, L.R.A. 1916E, 1175; Springer v. Fuel Co., 196 Pa. 156, 46 A. 370.

Pecuniary damages

Such as can be estimated in and compensated by money; not merely the loss of money or sal-able property or rights, but all such loss, depriva-tion, or injury as can be made the subject of cal-‘ culation and of recompense in money. Walker v. McNeill, 17 Wash. 582, 50 P. 518; Davidson Bene-dict Co. v. Severson, 109 Tenn. 572, 72 S.W. 967

Permanent damages

Damages awarded on theory that cause of in-jury is fixed and that the property will always remain subject to it. Chambers v. Spruce Light-ing Co., 81 W.Va. 714, 95 S.E. 192, 194.

Presumptive damages

A term occasionally used as the equivalent of "exemplary" or "punitive" damages. Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 P. 119, 49 Am.Rep. 366.

Prospective damages

Damages which are expected to follow from the act or state of facts made the basis of a plain-tiff’s suit; damages which have not yet accrued, at the time of the trial, but which, in the nature of things, must necessarily, or most probably, re-sult from the acts or facts complained of.

Proximate damages

Proximate damages are the immediate and di-rect damages and natural results of the act com-plained of, and such as are usual and might have been expected. Remote damages are those at-tributable immediately to an intervening cause, though it forms a link in an unbroken chain of causation, so that the remote damage would not have occurred if its elements had not been set in motion by the original act or event. Pielke v. Railroad Co., 5 Dak. 444, 41 N.W. 669; Chambers v. Everding & Farrell, 71 Or. 521, 143 P. 616, 619

Remote damages

The unusual and unexpected result, not reason-ably to be anticipated from an accidental or un-usual combination of circumstances-a result be-yond which the negligent party has no control

Chambers v. Everding & Farrel, 71 Or. 521, 143 P. 616, 620.
Damage is said to be too remote to be action-able when it is not the legal and natural conse-quence of the act complained of.
The tercos "remote damages" and "consequential dam-ages" are not synonymous nor to be used interchangeably; all remote damage is consequential, but it is by no means true that all consequential damage is remote. Eaton v. Railroad Co., 51 N.H. 511, 12 Am.Rep. 147; Chambers Y. Everding & Farrell, 71 Or. 521, 143 P. 616, 620.

Special damages

Those which are the actual, but not the neces-sary, result of the injury complained of, and which in fact follow it as a natural and proximate consequence in the particular case, that is, by reason of special circumstances or conditions. Wallace v. Ah Sam, 71 Cal. 197, 12 P. 46, 60 Am. Rep. 534; Lawrence v. Porter, C.C.A.Mich., 63 F. 62, 11 C.C.A. 27, 26 L.R.A. 167; Huyler’s v. Ritz-Carlton Restaurant & Hotel Co. of Atlantic City, D.C.Del., 6 F.2d 404, 406. Those which are the natural, but not the necessary, result of the in-jury. Butte Floral Co. v. Reed, 65 Mont. 138, 211 P. 325, 330; Ralph N. Blakeslee Co. v. Rigo, 94 Conn. 481, 109 A. 173, 175; Erick Bowman Remedy Co. v. Jensen Salsbery Laboratories, C.C.A.Minn., 17 F.2d 255, 259, 52 A.L.R. 1187.

Speculative damages

Prospective or anticipated damages from the same acts or facts constituting the present cause of action, but which depend upon future develop-ments which are contingent, conjectural, or im-probable.

Substantial damages

A sum, assessed by way of damages, which is worth having; opposed to nominal damages, which are assessed to satisfy a bare legal right. Wharton. Considerable in amount and intended as a real compensation for a real injury.

Temporary damages

Damages allowed for intermittent and occa-sional wrongs, such as injuries to real estate, where cause thereof is removable or abatable. Chambers v. Spruce Lighting Co., 81 W.Va. 714, 95 S.E. 192, 194.

Unliquidated damages

Such as are not yet reduced to a certainty in respect of amount, nothing more being estab-lished than the plaintiff’s right to recover; or such as cannot be fixed by a mere mathematical calculation from ascertained data in the case. Cox v. McLaughlin, 76 Cal. 60, 18 P. 100, 9 Am. St.Rep. 164; Cook Pottery Co. v. Parker, 86 W. Va. 580, 104 S.E. 51, 53; United Cigarette Mach. Co. v. Brown, 119 Va. 813, 89 S.E. 850, 855, L.R.A. 1917A, 1190; Simons v. Douglas Ex’r, 189 Ky. 644, 225 S.W. 721, 723.
DAMAIOUSE. In old English law. Causing dam-age or loss, as distinguished from torcenouse, wrongful. Britt. c. 61

DAME. In English law. The legal designation of the wife of a knight or baronet.
DAMN, v. To invoke condemnation, curse, sesear, condemn to eternal punishment, or consign to perdition. Orf v. State, 147 Miss. 160, 113 So. 202.
DAMNA. Damages, both inclusive and exclusive of costs.
DAMNATUS. In old English law. Condemned; prohibited by law; unlawful. Damnatus coitus, an unlawful sexual connection.
DAMNI INJURL ACTIO. An, action given by the civil law for the damage done by one who intentionally injured the slave or beast of another. Calvin.
DAMNIFICATION. That which causes damage or loss.
DAMNIFY. To cause damage or injurious loss to a person or put him in a position where he must sustain it. A surety is "damnified" when a judgment has been obtained against him. McLean v. Bank, 16 Fed.Cas. 278.
DAMNOSA ILEREDITAS. In the civil law. A losing inheritance; an inheritance that was a charge, instead of a benefit. Dig. 50, 16, 119.
The term has also been metaphorically applied to that species of property of a bankrupt which, so far from being valuable, would be a charge to the creditors; for example, a term of years where the rent would exceed the revenue. 7 East, 342; 3 Camp. 34U; 1 Esp.N.P. 234; Provident L. & Trust Co. v. Fidelity, etc., Co., 203 Pa. 82, 52 A. 34.
DAMNUM. Lat.
In the Civil Law
Damage; the loss or diminution of what is a man’s own, either by fraud, carelessness, or acci-dent.

In Pleading and Old English Law

Damage; loss.
DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA. Loss, hurt, or harm without injury in the legal sense, that is, without such breach of duty as is redressible by an action. A loss which does not give rise to an action for damages against the person causing it. West Virginia Transp. Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 50 W.Va. 611, 40 S.E. 591, 56 L.R.A. 804; J. A. & C. E. Bennett v. Winston-Salem Southbound Ry. Co., 170 N.C. 389, 87 S.E. 133, 134, L.R.A.1916D, 1074; Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Railroad Commission of Wisconsin, 162 Wis. 383, 156 N.W. 614, 619, L. R.A.1916E, 748; Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Mumford, 208 Ind. 655, 197 N.E. 826, 834; Ala-bama Power Co. v. Ickes, App.D.C., 302 U.S. 464, 58 S.Ct. 300, 303, 82 L.Ed. 374.
DAMNUM FATALE. Fatal damage; damage from bate; loss happening from a cause beyond human control, (quod ex fato contingit,) or an act of God, for which bailees are not fiable; such as
shipwreck, lightning, and the like. Dig. 4, 9, 3, 1; Story, Bailm. 1 465. The civilians included in the phrase "damnum fatale" all those accidents which are summed up in the common-law expx:ession, "Act of God or public enemies;" though, perhaps, it embraced some which would not now be admit-ted as occurring from an irresistible force. Thick-stun v. Howard, 8 Blackf. Ind. 535.
DAMNUM INFECTUM. In Roman law. Damage not yet committed, but threatened or impending. A preventive interdict might be obtained to pre-vent such damage from happening; and it was treated as a quasi-delict, because of the immin-ence of the danger.
DAMNUM REI AMISSAE. In the civil law. A loss arising from a payment made by a party in consequence of an error of law. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 178.
DAMNUM SINE INJURIÁ ESSE POTEST. Lofft, 112. There may be damage or injury infiicted without any act of injustice.
DAN. Anciently the better sort of men in Eng-land had this title; so the Spanish Don. The old term of honor for men, as we now say Master or Misten. Wharton.
DANCEHALL. A place maintained for promiscu-ous and public dancing, the rules for admission to which are not based upon personal selection or invitation. State v. Loomis, 75 Mont. 88, 242 P. 344, 347; People v. Dever, 237 Ill.App. 65, 69.
DANEGELT, DANEGELD. A tribute originally of 1s. and afterwards of 2s., which carne to be im-posed upon every hide of land through the realm, levied by the Anglo-Saxons, for maintaining (it is supposed) such a number of forces as were thought sufficient to clear the British seas of Danish pirates, who greatly annoyed their coasts, or to buy off the ravages of Danish invaders. It continued a tax until the time of Stephen, and was one of the rights of the crown. Wharton; Web-ster, Dict. The Danegeld was levied as a land-tax by the Norman kings; it disappears under that name after 1163, but in fact continued under the name of tallage. 3 New English Dict. 26.
DANELAGE. A system of laws, introduced by the Danes on their invasion and conquest of Eng-land, which was principally maintained in some of the midland counties, and also on the eastern coast. 1 Bl.Comm. 65; 4 Bl.Comm. 411; 1 Steph. Comm. 42.
DANGER. Jeopardy; exposure to loss or injury; peril. U. 5. v. Mays, 1 Idaho, 770; State v. Londe, 345 Mo. 185, 132 S.W.2d 501, 506.
DANGER ZONE. The "danger zone" within con-templation of the humanitarian doctrine depends upon the facts in the particular case. Brown v. Alton R. Co., Mo.App., 132 S.W.2d 713, 727; Brown v. Alton R. Co., 236 Mo.App. 26, 151 S.W.2d 727, 742.

Dangers of Navigation

The same as "dangers of the sea" or "perils of the sea." See Dangers of the sea, infra.

Dangers of the River

This phrase, as used in bilis of lading, means vnly the natural accidents incident to river navi-gation, and does not embrace such as may be avoided by the exercise of that skill, judgment, or foresight which are demanded from persons in a particular occupation. Hill v. Sturgeon, 35 Mo. 213, 86 Am.Dec. 149. It includes dangers arising from unknown reefs which have suddenly formed in the channel, and are not discoverable by care and skill. Hill v. Sturgeon, 35 Mo. 213, 86 Am. Dec. 149; Hibernia Ins. Co. v. Transp. Co., 120 U. S. 166, 7 S.Ct. 550, 30 L.Ed. 621; Johnson v. Friar, 4 Yerg. 48, 26 Am.Dec. 215.

Dangers of the Road

This phrase, in a bill of lading, when it refers to inland transportation, means such dangers as are immediately caused by roads, as the over-turning of carriages in rough and precipitous places. 7 Exch. 743.

Dangers of the Sea

The expression "dangers of the sea" means those accidents peculiar to navigation that are of an extraordinary nature, or arise from irresistible force or overwhelming power, which cannot be guarded against by the ordinary exertions of hu-man skill and prudence. The Portsmouth, 9 Wall. 682, 19 L.Ed. 754; Hibernia Ins. Co. v. Transp. Co., 120 U.S. 166, 7 S.Ct. 550, 30 L.Ed. 621; The Mau-mee, D.C.N.C., 260 F. 862, 870; equivalent to "dangers of navigation." Norris Grain Co. v. Great Lakes Transit Corporation, C.C.A.I11., 70 F. 2d 32, 34.
DANGERIA. In old English law. A money pay-ment made by forest-tenants, that they might have liberty to plow and sow in time of pannage, or mast feeding.
DANGEROUS. Attended with risk; perilous; hazardous; unsafe. Scales v. Lewellyn, 172 N.C. 494, 90 S.E. 521, 522; King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217, 204 S.W. 296, 297, L.R.A.1918F, 293; Bentson v. Brown, 186 Wis. 629, 203 N.W. 380, 382, 38 A.L. R. 1417; Davis v. East Contra Costa Irr. Dist., Cal.App., 109 P.2d 986, 989.
DANGEROUS MACHINE. A machine is "dan-gerous" in such sense that the employer is required to guard it, if, in the ordinary cóurse of human affairs, danger may be reasonably anticipated from the use of it without protection. Simon v. St. Louis Brass Mfg. Co., 298 Mo. 70, 250 S.W. 74, 76.
DANGEROUS PER SE. A thing that may inflict injury without the immediate application of hu-man aid or instrumentality. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629, 632, 16 A. L.R. 255.
DANGEROUS PLACE. One where there is con-siderable risk, or danger, or peril, one where ac-cidents or injuries are very apt to occur. Henrie v. Rocky Mountain Packing Corp., Utah, 196 P.2d 487, 489.
DANGEROUS WEAPON. One dangerous to life; one by the use of which a fatal wound may prob-ably or possibly be given. As the manner of use enters into the consideration as well as other cir-cumstances, the question is of ten one of fact for the jury, but not infrequently one of law for the court. U. S. v. Reeves, C.C.Tex., 38 F. 404; Par-man v. Lemmon, 119 Kan. 323, 244 P. 227, 229, 44 A.L.R. 1500; State v. Penton, 157 La. 68, 102 So. 14, 15; deadly weapon distinguished State v. Wal-den, 41 N.M. 418, 70 P.2d 149, 150; Crawford v. State, 174 Md. 175, 197 A. 866, 867.
DANISM. The act of lending money on usury.
DANO. In Spanish law. Damage; the deteriora-tion, injury, or destruction which a man suffers with respect to his person or his property by the fault (culpa) of another. White, New Recop. b. 2, tit. 19, c. 3, § 1.
DANS ET RETINENS, NIHIL DAT. One who gives and yet retains does not give effectually. Tray. Lat. Max. 129. Or, one who gives, yet re-tains, [possession,] gives nothing.
DAPIFER. A steward either of a king or lord. Spelman.
DARE. Lat. In the civil law. To transfer prop-erty. When this transfer is made in order to dis-charge a debt, it is datio solvendi animo; when in order to receive an equivalent, to create an ob-ligation, it is datio contrahendi animo; lastly, when made donandi animo, from mere liberality, it is a gift, dono datio.
DARE AD REMANENTIAM. To give away in fee, or forever.
DARRAIGN. To clear a legal account; to an-swer an accusation; to settle a controversy.
DARREIN. L. Fr. Last.
DARREIN CONTINUANCE. The last continu-ance.
DARREIN PRESENTMENT. In old English law. The last presentment. See Assise of darrein pre-sentment.
DARREIN SEISIN. Last seisin. A plea which lay in some cases for the tenant in a writ of right. See 1 Rosc. Real Act. 206; Hunt v. Hunt, 3 Mete. Mass. 184; Jackson, Real Act. 285. See 1 Roscoe, Real Act. 206; .2 Prest. Abstr. 345.
DASH. The em dash (-) or the en dash (-) is often used to indicate the omission of the inter-mediate terms of a series which are to be supplied in reading, being thus often equivalent to * * * inclusive; thus Mark iv, 3-20 (that is, verses 3

to 20, inclusive); the years 1880-1888 (that is, 1880 to 1888). Booe v. Sims, 139 Ark. 595, 215 S.W. 659, 660.
DATA. In old practice and conveyancing. The date of a deed; the time when it was given; that is, executed. Grounds whereon to proceed; facts from which to draw a conclusion.
DATE. The specification or mention, in a written instrument, of the time (day, month and year) when it was made. Also the time so specified. Interior Linseed Co. v. Becker-Moore Paint Co., 273 Mo. 433, 202 S.W. 566, 569; In re Carpenter’s Estate, 172 Cal. 268, 156 P. 464, 465, L.R.A.1916E, 498; State v. Beckley, 192 Wis. 367, 212 N.W. 792, 793; Heller v. Sweeney, 101 N.J.Eq. 150, 135 A. 264, 265.
The word is derived from the Latin word "da-tum" meaning given and is defined as the time given or specified-in some way ascertained and fixed. The time when an instrument was made, acknowledged, delivered or recorded; the clause or memorandum which specifies that fact; and the time from which its operation is to be reckon-ed. In re Irvine’s Estate, 114 Mont. 577, 139 P.2d 489, 490, 491, 47 A.L.R. 882.
That part of a deed or writing which expresses the day of the month and year in which it was made or given. 2 Bl.Comm. 304; Tomlins.
The primary signification of date is not time in the abstract, nor time taken absolutely, but time given or specified; time in some way ascertained and fixed. When we speak of the date of a deed, date of issue of a bond or date of a policy, we do not mean the time when it was actually executed, but the time of its execution, as given or stated in the deed itself. The date of an item, or of a charge in a book-account, is not necessarily the time when the article charged was, in fact, fur-nished, but rather the time given or set down in the account, in connection with such charge. And so the expression "the date of the last work done, or materials furnished," in a mechanic’s lien law, may be taken, in the absence of anything in the act indicating a different intention, to mean the time when such work was done or materials fur-nished, as specified in the plaintiff’s written claim. Bement v. Manufacturing Co., 32 N.J.Law, 513; Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Hurni Pack-ing Co., 263 U.S. 167, 44 S.Ct. 90, 68 L.Ed. 235, 31 A.L.R. 102; Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Hurni Packing Co., C.C.A.Iowa, 280 F. 18, 20; Turner v. Roseberry Irr. Dist., 33 Idaho, 746, 198 P. 465, 467.
The precise meaning of date, however, depends upon context, since there are numerous instances when it means actual as distinguished from conventional time. Buck-hannon & N. R. Co. v. Great Scott Coal & Coke Co., 75 W. Va. 423, 83 S.E. 1031, 1033; London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Empire Plow Co., 115 Ohlo St. 684, 155 N.E. 382, 384; National Liberty Ins. Co. v. Norman, C.C.A.N.C., 11 F.2d 59, 61; Cantrell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 189 Wash. 99, 63 P.2d 509, 510.
DATE CERTAINE. In French law. A deed is said to have a date certaine (fixed date) when it has been subjected to the formality of registra-
tion; alter this formality has been complied with, the parties to the deed cannot by mutual consent change the date thereof. Arg. Fr. Merc. Law, 555.
DATE OF INJURY. Means inception date of the injury and is regarded as coincident with date of occurrence or happening of accident which caused such injury. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America v. Williams, 129 Tex. 51, 99 S.W.2d 905, 907; As-sociated Indemnity Corporation v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 124 Cal.App. 378, 12 P.2d 1075, 1076; Larson v. Industrial Commission, 224 Wis. 294, 271 N.W. 835, 836. Date of the compen-sable injury and not date of accident or occur-rence from which incapacity resulted. Rossi v. Thomas F. Jackson Co., 120 Conn. 456, 181 A. 539.
"DATE OF ISSUE." When applied to notes, bonds, etc., of series, usually means an arbitrary date fixed as beginning of term for which they run, without reference to precise time when conven-ience or state of market may permit their sale or delivery, date which bonds and stocks bear, and not date when they were actually issued in sense of being signed and delivered and put finto circula-tion. Whetstone v. City of Stuttgart, 193 Ark. 88, 97 S.W.2d 641, 643.
The words in lile policy were held not to mean the date of actual execution or the delivery date, but the date set forth in the policy itself. Potts v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 133 Pa.Super. 397, 2 A.2d 870, 872.
DATIO. In the civil law. A giving, or act of giv-ing. Datio in solutum; a giving in payment; a species of accord and satisfaction. Called, in modern law, "dation."
DATION. In the civil law. A gift; a giving of something. It is not exactly synonymous with "donation," for the latter implies generosity or liberality in making a gift, while dation may mean the giving of something to which the recipient is already entitled.
DATION EN PAIEMENT. In French law. A giving by the debtor and receipt by the creditor of something in payment of a debt, instead of a sum of money. It is somewhat like the accord and satisfaction of the common law. 16 Toullier, no. 45; Poth. Vente, no. 601.
DATIVE. A word derived from the Roman law, signifying "appointed by public authority." Thus, in Scotland, an executor-dative is an executor ap-pointed by a court; corresponding or equivalent to an English administrator or "administrator with the will annexed." Mozley & Whitley. In old English law. In one’s gift; that may be given and disposed of at will and pleasure.
DATUM. A first principie; a thing given; a date.
DATUR DIGNIORI. It is given to the more worthy. 2 Vent. 268.
DAUGHTER. An immediate female descendant. People v. Kaiser, 119 Cal. 456, 51 P. 702. May in-elude the issue of a daughter. Buchanan v. Lloyd,

One on which process cannot ordinarily issue or be served or returned and on which the courts do not ordinarily sit. Whitney v. Blackburn, 17 Or. 564, 21 P. 874, 11 Am.St.Rep. 857. More prop-erly "non-juridical day.’.’

Solar Day

A term sometimes used as meaning that por-tion of the day when the sun is aboye the horizon, but properly it is the time between two complete (apparent) revolutions of the sun, or between two consecutive positions of the sun over any given terrestrial meridian, and hence, according to the usual method of reckoning, from noon to noon at any given place.
DAY-BOOK. A tradesman’s account book; a book in which all the occurrences of the day are set down. It is usually a book of original en-tries.
DAY CERTAIN. A fixed or appointed day; a specified particular day; a day in term. Regina v. Conyers, 8 Q.B. 991.
DAY FIXED FOR TRIAL. Has been held to mean return day of summons or any later day to which trial is adjourned and on which it is ac-tually held. Okin v. Shafman, N.J., 11 N.J.Misc. 462, 166 A. 730.
DAY IN COURT. The time appointed for one whose rights are called judicially in question, or liable to be affected by judicial action, to appear in court and be heard in his own behalf. This phrase, as generally used, means not so much the time appointed for a hearing as the opportun-ity to present one’s claims or rights in a proper forensic hearing before a competent tribunal. See Ferry v. Car Wheel Co., 71 Vt. 457, 45 A. 1035, 76 Am.St.Rep. 782.
A litigant has his "day in court" when he has been duly cited to appear and has been afforded an opportunity to appear and to be heard. Cohen v. City of Houston, Tex.Civ.App., 185 S.W.2d 450, 452; In re Hampton’s Estate, 55 Cal.App.2d 543, 131 P.2d 565, 573; State ex reí. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Bowen, 130 Ohio St. 347, 199 N.E. 355, 363.
DAY OF ATONEMENT. See Yom Kippur. DAYERIA. A dairy. Cowell.
DAYLIGHT. That portion of time before sun-rise, and after sunset, which is accounted part of the day, (as distinguished from night,) in defining the offense of burglary. 4 Bl.Comm. 224; Cro. Jac. 106.
DAY-RULE, or DAY-WRIT. In English law. A permission granted to a prisoner to go out of prison, for the purpose of transacting his busi-ness, as to hear a case in which he is concerned at the assizes, etc. Abolished by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 22, § 12.
DAYS IN BANK. (L. Lat. dies in banco.) In practice. Certain stated days in term appointed for the appearance of parties, the return of pro-cess, etc., originally peculiar to the court of com-mon pleas, or bench, (bank,) as it was anciently called. 3 Bl.Comm. 277.
By the common law, the defendant is allowed three full days in which to make his appearance in court, exclusive of the day of appearance or return-day named in the writ; 3 Bl.Comm. 278. Upon his appearance, time is usually granted him for pleading; and this is called giving him day, or, as it is more familiarly expressed, a contin-uance. 3 Bl.Comm. 316. When the suit is ended by discontinuance or by judgment for the defend-ant, he is discharged from further attendance, and is said to go thereof sine die, without day. See Continuance.
DAYS OF GRACE. A number of days allowed, as a matter of favor or grace, to a person who has to perform some act, or make some payment, after the time originally limited for the purpose has elapsed. In oíd practice. Three days allowed to persons summoned in the English courts, be-yond the day named in the writ, to make their appearance; the last day being called the "quarto die post." 3 Bl.Comm. 278. In mercantile law. A certain number of days (generally three) al-lowed to the maker or acceptor of a bill, draft, or note, in which to make payment, after the expira.- tion of the time expressed in the paper itself. Originally these days were granted only as a matter of grace or favor, but the allowance of them became an established custom of merchants, and was sanctioned by the courts, (and in some cases prescribed by statute,) so that they are now demandable as of right. Bell v. Bank, 115 U.S. 373, 6 S.Ct. 105, 29 L.Ed. 409; Renner v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 581, 6 L.Ed. 166.
DAYSMAN. An arbitrator, umpire, or elected judge. Cowell.
DAYTIME. The time during which there is the light of day, as distinguished from night or night-time. That portion of the twenty-four hours dur-ing which a man’s person and countenance are distinguishable. Trull v. Wilson, 9 Mass. 154; Rex v. Tandy, 1 Car. & P. 297; Linnen v. Banfield, 114 Mich. 93, 72 N.W. 1; U. S. v. Syrek, D.C.Mass., 290 F. 820, 821; Deese v. City of Lodi, 21 Cal.App. 2d 631, 69 P.2d 1005, 1008.
DAYWERE. In oíd English law. A term applied to land, and signifying as much arable ground as could be plowed up in one day’s work. Cowell.
DE. A Latin preposition, signifying of; by; from; out of; affecting; concerning; respecting.
DE ACQUIRENDO RERUM DOMINIO. Of (about) acquiring` the ownership of things. Dig. 41, 1; Bract. lib. 2, fol. 8b.
DE ADMENS1URATIONE. Of admeasurement. Thus, de admensuratione dotis was a writ for the admeasurement of dower, and de admensuratione pasturce was a writ for the admeasurement of pasture.
DE ADVISAMENTO CONSILII NOSTRI. L. Lat. With or by the advice of our council. A phrase used in the old writs of summons to parliament. Crabb, Eng.Law, 240.
DE "EQUITATE. In equity. De jure stricto, nihil possum vendicare, de cequitate tamen, nullo modo hoc obtinet; in strict law. I can claim nothing, but in equity this by no means obtains. Fleta, lib. 3, c. 2, § 10.
DE 1-ESTIMATO. In Roman law. One of the in-nominate contracts, and, in effect, a sale of land or goods at a price fixed, (cestimato,) and guaran-tied by some third party, who undertook to find a purchaser.
DE I-ETATE PROBANDA. For proving age. A writ which formerly lay to summon a jury in order to determine the age of the heir of a tenant in ca pite who claimed his estate as being of full age. Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 257; Reg.Orig. 294.
DE ALEATORIBUS. About gamesters. The narre of a title in the Pandects. Dig. 11, 5.
DE ALLOCATIONE FACIENDA, Breve. Writ for making an allowance. An old writ directed to the lord treasurer and barons of the exchequer, for allowing certain officers (as collectors of cus-toms) in their accounts certain payments made by them. Reg.Orig. 192.
DE ALTO ET BASSO. Of high and low. A phrase anciently used to denote the absolute sub-mission of all differences to arbitration. Cowell.
DE AMBITU. Lat. Concerning bribery. A phrase descriptive of the subject-matter of sev-eral of the Roman laws; as the Lex Aufidia, the Lex Pompeia, the Lex Tullia, and others. See Ambitus.
DE AMPLIORI GRATIA. Of more abundant or especial grace. Townsh.P1. 18.
DE ANNO BISSEXTILI. Of the bissextile or leap year. The title of a statute passed in the twenty-first year of Henry III., which in fact, however, is nothing more than a sort of writ or direction to the justices of the bench, instructing them how the extraordinary day in the leap year was to be reckoned in cases where persons had a day to appear at the distance of a year, as on the essoin de malo lecti, and the like. It was thereby directed that the additional day should, together with that which went before, be reckoned only as one, and so, of course, within the preced-ing year. 1 Reeve, Eng.Law, 266.
DE ANNUA PENSIONE, Breve. Writ of annual pension. An ancient writ by which the king, hav-ing a yearly pension due him out of an abbey or priory for any of his chaplains, demanded the same of the abbot or prior, for the person named in the writ. Reg.Orig. 265b, 307; Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 231 G.
DE ANNUO REDITU. For a yearly rent. A writ to recover an annuity, no matter how pay-able, in goods or money. 2 Reeve, Eng.Law, 258.
DE APOSTATA CAPIENDO, Breve. Writ for taking an apostate. A writ which anciently lay against one who, having entered and professed some order of religion, left it and wandered up and down the country, contrary to the rules of his order, commanding the sheriff to apprehend him and deliver him again to his abbot or prior. Reg.Orig. 71b, 267; Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 233, 234.
DE ARBITRATIONE FACTA. (Lat. Of arbitra-tion had.) A writ formerly used when an action was brought for a cause which had been settled by arbitration. Wats.Arb. 256.
DE ARRESTANDIS BONIS NE DISSIPENTUR. And old writ which lay to seize goods in the hands of a party during the pendency of a suit, to pre-vent their being made away with. Reg.Orig. 126b.
DE ARRESTANDO IPSUM QUI PECUNIAM RE-CEPIT. A writ which lay for the arrest of one who had taken the king’s money to serve in the war, and hid himself to escape going. Reg.Orig. 24b.
DE ARTE ET PARTE. Of art and part. A phrase in old Scotch law. See Art and Part.
DE ASPORTATIS RELIGIOSORUM. Concerning the property of religious persons carried away. The title of the statute 35 Edward I. passed to check the abuses of clerical possessions, one of which was the waste they suffered by being drain-ed into foreign countries. 2 Reeve, Eng.Law, 157; 2 Inst. 580.
DE ASSISA PROROGANDA. (Lat. For prorog-uing assise.) A writ to put off an assise, issuing to the justices, where one of the parties is en-gaged in the service of the king.
DE ATTORNATO RECIPIENDO. A writ which lay to the judges of a court, requiring them to receive and admit an attorney for a party. Reg. Orig. 172; Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 156.
DE AUDIENDO ET TERMINANDO. For hearing and determining; to hear and determine. The name of a writ, or rather commission granted to certain justices to hear and determine cases of heinous misdemeanor, trespass, riotous breach of the peace, etc. Reg.Orig. 123, et seq.; Fitzh.Nat. Brev. 110 B. See Oyer and Terminer.
DE AVERIIS CAPTIS IN WITHERNAMIUM. Writ for taking cattle in withernam. A writ which lay where the sheriff returned to a pluries writ of replevin that the cattle or goods, etc., were eloined, etc.; by which he was commanded to take the cattle of the defendant in withernam, (or reprisal,) and detain them until he could replevy the other cattle. Reg.Orig. 82; Fitzh. Nat.Brev. 73, E. F. See Withernam.
DE AVERIIS REPLEGIANDIS. A writ to re-pievy beasts. 3 Bl.Comm. 149. DE AVERIIS RETORNANDIS. For returning the cattle. A term applied to pledges given in the old action of replevin. 2 Reeve, Eng.Law, 177.
DE BANCO. Of the bench. A term formerly ap-plied in England to the justices of the court of common pleas, or "bench," as it was originally styled.
DE BENE ESSE. Conditionally; provisionally; in anticipation of future need. A phrase applied to proceedings which are taken ex parte or pro-visionally, and are allowed to stand as well done for the present, but which may be subject to future exception or chailenge, and must then stand or fall according to their intrinsic merit and regularity.
Thus, "in certain cases, the courts will allow evidence to be taken out of the regular course, in order to prevent the evidence being lost by the death or the absence of the witness. This is called `taking evidence de bene esse,’ and is looked upon as a temporary and conditional examina-tion, to be used only in case the witness cannot afterwards be examined in the suit in the regular way." Hunt, Eq. 75; Haynes, Eq. 183; Mitf. Eq. P1. 52, 149; Willis v. Bank of Hardinsburg & Trust Co., 160 Ky. 808, 170 S.W. 188, 189.
Examination de bene esse
A provisional examination of a witness an examination of a witness whose testimony is important and might oth-erwlse be lost, held out of court and before the trial, with the proviso that the deposition so taken may be used on the trial In case the witness is unable to attend in person at that time or cannot be produced.
DE BIEN ET DE MAL. L. Fr. For good and evil. A phrase by which a party accused of a crime anciently put himself upon a jury, indicat-ing his entire submission to their verdict; also the name of the special writ of jail delivery for-merly in use in England, which issued for each particular prisoner, of course. It was superseded by the general commission of jail delivery.
DE BIENS LE MORT. L. Fr. Of the goods of the deceased. Dyer, 32.
DE BIGAMIS. Concerning men twice married. The title of the statute 4 Edw. I. St. 3; so called from the initio.’ words of the fifth chapter. 2 Inst. 272; 2 Reeve, Eng.Law, 142.
DE BONE MEMORIE. L. Fr. Of good memory; of sound mind. 2 Inst. 510.
DE BONIS ASPORTATIS. For goods taken away; for taking away goods. The action of trespass for taking personal property is tech-nically called "trespass de bonis asportatis." 1 Tidd, Pr. 5.
DE BONIS NON. An abbreviation of De bonis non admintistratis, (q. v.). 1 Strange, 34.
DE BONIS NON ADMINISTRATIS. Of the goods not administered. When an administrator is appointed to succeed another, who has left the estate partially unsettled, he is said to be granted
"administration de bonis non;" that is, of the goods not already administered. McNair v. How-le, 123 S.C. 252, 116 S.E. 279, 285.
DE BONIS NON AMOVENDIS. Writ for not re-moving goods. A writ anciently directed to the sheriffs of London, commanding them, in cases where a writ of error was brought by a defend-ant against whom a judgment was recovered, to see that his goods and chattels were safely kept without being removed, while the error remained undetermined, so that execution might be had of them, etc. Reg.Orig. 131b; Termes de la Ley.
DE BONIS PROPRIIS. Of his own goods. The technical name of a judgment against an ad-ministrator or executor to be satisfied from his own property, and not from the estate of the de-ceased, as in cases where he has been guilty of a devastavit or of a false plea of plene admintis-travit.
DE BONIS TESTATORIS, or INTESTATI. Of the goods of the testator, or intestate. A term applied to a judgment awarding execution against the property of a testator or intestate, as distin-guished from the individual property of his exec-utor or administrator. 2 Archb.Pr.K.B. 148, 149.
DE BONIS TESTATORIS AC SI. (Lat. From the goods of the testator, if he has any, and, if not, from those of the executor.) A judgment ren-dered where an executor falsely pleads any mat-ter as a release, or, generally, in any case where he is to be charged in case his testator’s estate is insufficient. 1 Williams’ Saund. 336b; Bac. Abr. "Executor," B, 3; 2 Archb.Pr.K.B. 148.
DE BONO ET MALO. See De Bien et De Mal.
DE BONO GESTU. For good behavior; for good abearance.
DE CIETERO. Henceforth.
DE CALCETO REPARANDO. Writ for repairing a causeway. An old writ by which the sheriff was commanded to distrain the inhabitants of a place to repair and maintain a causeway, etc. Reg. Orig. 154.
DE CAPITALIBUS DOMINIS FEODI. Of the chief lords of the fee.
DE CAPITE MINUTIS. Of those who have lost their status, or civil condition. Dig. 4, 5. The name of a title in the Pandects. See Capitis De-minutio.
DE CARTIS REDDENDIS. (For restoring char-ters.) A writ to secure the delivery of charters or deeds; a writ of detinue. Reg. Orig. 159b.
DE CATALLIS REDDENDIS. (For restoríng chattels.) A writ to secure the return specifically of chattels detained from the owner. Cowell.
DE CAUTIONE ADMITTENDA. Writ to take caution or security. A writ which anciently lay against a bishop who held an excommunicated person in prison for his contempt, notwithstand ing he had offered sufficient security (idoneam cautionem) to obey the commands of the church; commanding him to take such security and re-lease the prisoner. Reg. Orig. 66; Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 63, C.
DE CERTIFICANDO. A writ requiring a thing to be certified. A kind of certiorari. Reg. Orig. 151, 152.
DE CERTIORANDO. A writ for certifying. A writ directed to the sheriff, requiring him to cer-tify to a particular fact. Reg. Orig. 24.
DE CHAMPERTIA. Writ of champerty. A writ directed to the justices of the bench, command-ing the enforcement of the statute of champertors. Reg. Orig. 183; Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 172.
DE CHAR ET DE SANK. L. Fr. Of flesh and blood. Affaire rechat de char et de sank. Words used in claiming a person to be a villein, in the time of Edward II. Y. B. P. 1 Edw. II. p. 4.
DE CHIMINO. A writ for the enforcement of a right of way. Reg. Orig. 155.
DE CIBARIIS UTENDIS. Of victuals to be used. The title of a sumptuary statute passed 10 Edw. III. St. 3, to restrain the expense of entertain-ments. Barring. Ob. St. 240.
DE CLAMEA ADMITTENDA IN ITINERE PER ATTORNATUM. See Clamea Admittenda, etc.
DE CLARO DIE. By daylight. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 76, § 8.
DE CLAUSO FRACTO. Of close broken; of breach of close. See Clausum Fregit.
DE CLERICO ADMITTENDO. See Admittendo Clerico.
DE CLERICO CAPTO PER STATUTUM MER-CATORIUM DELIBERANDO. Writ for deliver-ing a clerk arrested on a statute merchant. A writ for the delivery of a clerk out of prison, who had been taken and imprisoned upon the breach of a statute merchant. Reg. Orig. 147b.
DE CLERICO CONVICTO DELIBERANDO. See Clerico Convicto, etc.
DE CLERICO INFRA SACROS ORDINES CON-STITUTO NON ELIGENDO IN OFFICIUM. See Clerico Infra Sacros, etc.
DE CLERO. Concerning the clergy. The title of the statute 25 Edw. III. St. 3; containing a varie-ty of provisions on the subject of presentations, indictments of spiritual persons, and the like. 2 Reeve, Eng. Law, 378.
DE COMBUSTIONE DOMORUM. Of house burn-ing. One of the kinds of appeal formerly in use in England. Bract. fol. 146b; 2 Reeve, Eng. Law, 38.
DE COMMUNI DIVIDLTNDO. For dividing a thing held in common. The name of an action given by the civil law. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 499.
DE COMON DROIT. L. Fr. Of common right; that is, by the common law. Co. Litt. 142a.
DE COMPUTO. Writ of account. A writ com-manding a defendant to render a reasonable ac-count to the plaintiff, or show cause to the con-trary. Reg. Orig. 135-138; Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 117, E. The foundation of the modern action of ac-count.
DE CONCILIO CURVE. By the advice (or direc-tion) of the court.
DE CONFLICTU LEGUM. Concerning the con-flict of laws. The title of several works written on that subject. 2 Kent, Comm. 455.
DE CONJUNCTIM FEOFFATIS. Concerning per-sons jointly enfeoffed, or seised. The title of the statute 34 Edw. I., which was passed to prevent the delay occasioned by tenants in novel disseisin, and other writs, pleading that some one else was seised jointly with them. 2 Reeve, Eng. Law, 243.
DE CONSANGUINEO, and DE CONSANGUINI-TATE. Writs of cosinage, (q. v.).
DE CONSILIO. In old criminal law. Of counsel; concerning counsel or advice to commit a crime. Fleta, lib. 1, c. 31, § 8.
DE CONSILIO CURVE. By the advice or direc-tion of the court. Bract. fol. 345b.
DE CONTINUANDO ASSISAM. Writ to continue an assise. Reg. Orig. 217b.
DE CONTUMACE CAPIENDO. Writ for taking a contumacious person. A writ which issues out of the English court of chancery, in cases where a person has been pronounced by an ecclesiastical court to be contumacious, and in contempt. Shelf. Mar. & Div. 494-496, and notes. It is a commit-ment for contempt. Id.
DE COPIA LIBELLI DELIBERANDA. Writ for delivering the copy of a libel. An ancient writ directed to the judge of a spiritual court, com-manding him to deliver to a defendant a copy of the libel filed against him in such court. Reg. Orig. 58. The writ in the register is directed to the Dean of the Arches, and his commissary. Id.
DE CORONATORE ELIGENDO. Writ for elect-ing a coroner. A writ issued to the sheriff in Eng-land, commanding him to proceed to the election of a coroner, which is done in full county court, the freeholders being the electors. Sewell, Sher-iffs, 372.
DE CORONATORE EXONERANDO. Writ for discharging or removing a coroner. A writ by which a coroner in England may be removed from office for some cause therein assigned. Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 163, 164; 1 Bl.Comm. 348.
DE CORPORE COMITATUS. From the body of the county at large, as distinguished from a par-ticular neighborhood, (de vicineto.) 3 BI.Comm. 360. Used with reference to the composition of a jury. State v. Kemp, 34 Minn. 61, 24 N.W. 349.

DE CORRODIO HABENDO. Writ for having a corody. A writ to exact a corody from a religious house. Reg. Orig. 264, Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 230. See Corody.
DE CUJUS. Lat. From whom. A term used to designate the person by, through, from, or under whom another claims. Brant v. New Orleans, 41 La.Ann. 1098, 6 So. 793.
DE CURIA CLAUDENDA. An obsolete writ, to require a defendant to fence in his court or land about his house, where it was left open to the injury of his neighbor’s freehold. 1 Crabb, Real Prop. 314; Rust v. Low, 6 Mass. 90.
DE CURSU. Of course. The usual, necessary, and formal proceedings in an action are said to be de cursu; as distinguished from summary pro-ceedings, or such as are incidental and may be taken on summons or motion. Writs de cursu are such as are issued of course, as distinguished from prerogative writs.
DE CUSTODE ADMITTENDO. Writ for admit-ting a guardian. Reg. Orig. 93b, 198.
DE CUSTODE AMOVENDO. Writ for removing a guardian. Reg. Orig. 198.
DE CUSTODIA TERR1E ET III-EREDIS, Breve. L. Lat. Writ of ward, or writ of right of ward. A writ which lay for a guardian in knight’s serv-ice or in socage, to recover the possession and custody of the infant, or the wardship of the land and heir. Reg. Orig. 161b; Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 139, B; 3 BI.Comm. 141.
DE DEBITO. A writ of debt. Reg. Orig. 139.
DE DEBITORE IN PARTES SECANDO. In Ro-man law. "Of cutting a debtor in pieces." This was the name of a law contained in the Twelve Tables, the meaning of which has occasioned much controversy. Some commentators have con-cluded that it was literally the privilege of the creditors of an insolvent debtor (all other means failing) to cut his body into pieces and ‘distribute it among them. Others contend that the language of this law must be taken figuratively, denoting a cutting up and apportionment of the debtor’s es-tate.
The latter view has been adopted by Montesquieu, Bynk-ershoek, Heineccius, and Taylor. (Esprit des Lois, liv. 29, c. 2; Bynk.Obs.Jur.Rom. 1. 1, c. 1; Heinecc.Ant.Rom. lib. 3, tit. 30, § 4; Tayl.Comm. in Leg.Decemv.) The literal meaning, on the other hand, is advocated by Aulus Gellius and other writers of antiquity, and receives support from an expression (semoto omni cruciatu) in the Roman code itself. (Aul.Gel.Noctes Atticze, lib. 20, c. 1; Code, 7, 7, 8.) This is also the opinion of Gibbon, Gravina, Pothier, Hugo, and Niebuhr. (3 Gib.Rom.Emp., Am.Ed., p. 183; Grav. de Jur.Nat.Gent. et XII. Tab. § 72; Poth.Introd.Pand.; Hugo, Hist. du Droit Rom. tom. 1. p. 233, § 149; 2 Nieb. Hist.Rom. p. 597; 1 Kent, Comm. 523, note.) Burrill.
DE DECEPTIONE. A writ of deceit which lay against one who acted in the name of another whereby the latter was damnified and deceived. Reg. Orig. 112.
DE DEONERANDA PRO RATA PORTIONIS. A writ that lay where one was distrained for ‘rent
that ought to be paid by others proportionably with him. Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 234; Termes de la Ley.
DE DIE IN DIEM. From day to day. Bract. fol. 205b.
DE DIVERSIS REGULIS JURIS ANTIQUI. Of divers rules of the ancient law. A celebrated title of the Digests, and the last in that collection. It consists of two hundred and eleven rules or max-ims. Dig. 50, 17.
DE DOLO MALO. Of or founded upon fraud. Dig. 4, 3. See Actio de Dolo Malo.
DE DOMO REPARANDA. A writ which lay for one tenant in common to compel his cotenant to contribute towards the repair of the common property.
DE DONIS. Concerning gifts, (or more fully, de donis conditionalibus, concerning conditiona I gifts.) The name of a celebrated English statute, passed in the thirteenth year of Edw. I., and con-stituting the first chapter of the statute of Westm. 2, by virtue of which estates in fee-simple con-ditional (formerly known as "dona conditionalia") were converted into estates in fee-tail and ren-dered inalienable, thereby strengthening the Pow-er of the nobles. See 2 Bl.Comm. 112.
DE DOTE ASSIGNANDA. Writ for assigning dower. A writ which lay for the widow of a ten-ant in cespite, commanding the king’s escheater to cause her dower to be assigned to her. Reg. Orig. 297; Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 263, C.
DE DOTE UNDE NIHIL HABET. A writ of dow-er which lay for a widow where no part of her dower had been assigned to her. It is not much used; but a form closely resembling it is some-times used in the United States. 4 Kent, Comm. 63., Stearns, Real Act. 302; 1 Washb. Real Prop. 230.
DE EJECTIONE CUSTODLzE. A writ which lay for a guardian who had been forcibly ejected from his wardship. Reg. Orig. 162.
DE EJECTIONE FIRME. A writ which lay at the suit of the tenant for years against the lessor, reversioner, remainderman, or stranger who had himself deprived the tenant of the occupation of the land during his term. 3 BI.Comm. 199. By a gradual extension of the scope of this form of action its object was made to include not only damages for the unlawful detainer, but also the possession for the remainder of the term, and eventually the possession of land generally. And, as it turned on the right of possession, this in-volved a determination of the right of property, or the title, and thus arose the modern action of ejectment.
DE ESCUETA. Writ of escheat. A writ which a lord had, where his tenant died without heir, to recover the land. Reg. Orig. 164b; Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 143, 144, E.

DE ESCAMBIO MONEIVE. A writ of exchange of money. An ancient writ to authorize a mer-chant to make a bill of exchange, (literas cam-bitorias facere.) Reg. Orig. 194.
DE ESSE IN PEREGRINATIONE. Of being on a journey. A species of essoin. 1 Reeve, Eng. Law, 119.
DE ESSENDO QUIETUM DE TOLONIO. A writ which lay for those who were by privilege free from the payment of toll, on their being molested therein. Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 226; Reg. Orig. 258b.
DE ESSONIO DE MALO LECTI. A writ which issued upon an essoin of malum lecti being cast, to eXamine whether the party was in fact sick or not. Reg. Orig. 8b.
DE ESTOVERIIS IIABENDIS. Writ for having estovers. A writ which lay for a wife divorced a mensa et thoro, to recover her alimony or es-tovers. 1 Bl.Comm. 441; 1 Lev. 6.
DE ESTREPAMENTO. A writ which lay to pre-vent or stay waste by a tenant, during the pen-dency of a suit against him to recover the lands. Reg. Orig. 76b. Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 60.
DE EU ET TRENE. L. Fr. Of water and whip of three cords. A term applied to a neife, that ís, a bond woman or female villein, as employed in servile work, and subject to corporal punish-ment. Co. Litt. 25b.
DE EVE ET DE TREVE. A law French phrase, equivalent to the Latin de ayo et de tritavo, de-scriptive of the ancestral rights of lords in their villeins. Literally, "from grandfather and from great-grandfather’s great-grandfather." It occurs in the Year Books.
DE EXCOMMUNICATO CAPIENDO. A writ com-manding the sheriff to arrest one who was ex-communicated, and imprison him till he should be-come reconciled to the church. 3 Bl.Comm. 102. Smith v. Nelson, 18 Vt. 511.
DE EXCOMMUNICATO DELIBERANDO. A writ to deliver an excommunicated person, who has made satisfaction to the church, from prison. 3 Bl.Comm. 102.
DE EXCOMMUNICATO RECAPIENDO. Writ for retaking an excommunicated person, where he had been liberated from prison without making satis-faction to the church, or giving security for that purpose. Reg. Orig. 67.
DE EXCUSATIONIBUS. "Concerning excuses." This is the title of book 27 of the Pandects, (in the Corpus Juris Civilis.) It treats of the circum-stances which excuse one from filling the office of tutor or curator. The bulk of the extracts are from Modestinus.
DE EXECUTIONE FACIENDA IN WITHER. NAMIUM. Writ for making execution in wither-nam. Reg. Orig. 82b. A species of capias in wi-thernam.
DE EXECUTIONE JUDICII. A writ directed to a sheriff or bailiff, commanding him to do execution upon a judgment. Reg. Orig. 18; Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 20.
DE EXEMPLIFICATIONE. Writ of exemplifica-tion. A writ granted for the exemplification of an original. Reg. Orig. 290b.
DE EXONERATIONE SECTFE. Writ for exon-eration of suit. A writ that lay for the king’s ward to be discharged of all suit to the county court, hundred, leet, or court-baron, during the time of his wardship. Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 158; New Nat. Brev. 352.
DE EXPENSIS CIVIUM ET BURGENSIUM. An obsolete writ addressed to the sheriff to levy the expenses of every citizen and burgess of parlia-ment. 4 Inst. 46.
DE EXPENSIS MILITUM LEVANDIS. Writ for levying the expenses of knights. A writ directed to the sheriff for levying the allowance for knights of the shire in parliament. Reg. Orig. 191b, 192.
DE FACTO. In fact, in deed, actually. This phrase is used to characterize an officer, a govern-ment, a past action, or a state of affairs which must be accepted for all practical purposes, but is illegal or illegitimate. In this sense it is the con-trary of de jure, which means rightful, legitimate, just, or constitutional. Thus, an officer, king, or government de facto is one who is in actual pos-session of the office or supreme power, but by usurpation, or without lawful title; while an offi-cer, king, or governor de jure is one who has just claim and rightful title to the office or power, but has never had plenary possession of it, or is not in actual possession. 4 Bl.Comm. 77, 78. MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416, 33 S.Ct. 955, 57 L.Ed. 1260; Wheatley v. Consolidated Lumber Co., 167 Cal. 441, 139 P. 1057, 1059. So a wife de facto is one whose marriage is voidable by decree, as dis-tinguished from a wife de jure, or lawful wife. 4 Kent, Comm. 36. But the term is also frequently used independently of any distinction from de jure; thus a blockade de facto is a blockade which is actually maintained, as distinguished from a mere paper blockade. 1 Kent, 44. As to de facto "Corporation," "Court," "Domicile," "Govern-ment," and "Officer," see those titles.
In old English law it means respecting or con-cerning the principal act of a murder, which was technically denominated factum. See Fleta, lib. 1, c. 27, § 18.
DE FACTO CONTRACT. One which has purport-ed to pass the property from the owner to an-other. Bank v. Logan, 74 N.Y. 575; Edmunds v. Transp. Co., 135 Mass. 283.
DE FAIRE ÉCHELLE. In French law. A clause commonly inserted in policies of marine insurance, equivalent to a license to touch and trade at in-termediate ports. American Ins. Co. v. Griswold 14 Wend., N.Y. 491.

DE FALSO JUDICIO. Writ of false judgment. Reg.Orig. 15; Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 18. See False Judg-ment.
DE FALSO MONETA. Of false money. The title of the statute 27 Edw. I. ordaining that per-sons importing certain coins, called "pollards," and "crokards," should forfeit their lives and goods, and everything they could forfeit. 2 Reeve, Eng.Law, 228, 229.
DE FIDE ET OFFICIO JUDICIS NON RECIPI-TUR QUIESTIO, SED DE SCIENTIA, SIVE SIT ERROR JURIS, SIVE FACTI. Concerning the fidelity and official conduct of a judge, no question is [will be] entertained; but [only] concerning his knowledge, whether the error [committed] be of law or of fact. Bac.Max. 68, reg. 17. . The bona Mes and honesty of purpose of a judge cannot be questioned, but his decision may be impugned for error either of law or fact. Broom, Max, 85. The law doth so much respect the certainty of judgments, and the credit and authority of judges, that it will not permit Any error to be assigned which impeacheth them in their trust and office, and in willful abuse of the same; but only in ig-norance and mistaking either of the law, or of the case and matter of fact. Bac.Max. ubi supra. Thus, it cannot be assigned for error that a judge did that which he ought not to do; as that he entered a verdict for the plaintiff, where the jury gave it for the defendant. Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 20, 21; Bac.Max. ubi supra; Hardr. 127, arg.
DE FIDEI LiESIONE. Of breach of faith or fidelity. 4 Reeve, Eng.Law, 99.
DE FINE FORCE. L. Fr. Of necessity; of pure necessity. See Fine Force.
DE FINE NON CAPIENDO PRO PULCHRE PLACITANDO. A writ prohibiting the taking of fines for beau pleader. Reg.Orig. 179.
DE FINE PRO REDISSEISINA CAPIENDO. A writ which lay for the release of one imprisoned for a re-disseisin, on payment of a reasonable fine. Reg.Orig. 222b.
DE FINIBUS LEVATIS. Concerning fines levied. The title of the statute 27 Edw. I. requiring fines thereafter to be levied, to be read openly and solemnly in court. 2 Inst. 521.
DE FORISFACTURA MARITAGII. Writ of for-feiture of marriage. Reg.Orig. 163, 164.
DE FRANGENTIBUS PRISONAM. Concerning those that break prison. The title of the statute 1 Edw. II. ordaining that none from thenceforth who broke prison should have judgment of lif e or limb for breaking prison only, unless the cause for which he was taken and imprisoned required such a judgment if he was lawfully convicted thereof. 2 Reeve, Eng.Law, 290; 2 Inst, 589.
DE FURTO. Of thef t. One of the kinds of crim-inal appeal formerly in use in England. 2 Reeve, Eng.Law, 40.
DE GESTU ET FAMA. Of behavior and reputa-tion. An old writ which lay in cases where a person’s conduct and reputation were impeached.
DE GRATIA. Of grace or favor, by favor. De speciali gratia, of special grace or favor.
DE GRATIA SPECIALI CERTA SCIENTIA ET MERO MOTU, TALIS CLAUSULA NON VALET LN HIS IN QUIBUS PRJESUMITIUR PRINCIPEM ESSE IGNORANTEM. 1 Coke, 53. The clause "of our special grace, certain knowledge, and mere motion," is of no avail in those things in which it is presumed that the prince was ignorant.
DE GROSSIS ARBORIBUS DECIMiE NON DA-BUNTUR SED DE SYLVIA CIEDUA DECIIILE DABUNTUR. 2 Rolle, 123. Of whole trees, tithes are not given; but of wood cut to be used, tithes are given.
DE HEREDE DELIBERANDO ILLI QUI HABET CUSTODIAM TERR/E. Writ for delivering an heir to him who has wardship of the land. A writ directed to the sheriff, to require one that had the body of him that was ward to another to deliver him to the person whose ward he was by reason of his land. Reg.Orig. 161.
DE HEREDE RAPTO ET ABDUCTO. Writ con-cerning an heir ravished and carried away. A writ which anciently lay for a lord who, having by right the wardship of his tenant under age could not obtain his body, the same being carried away by another person. Reg.Orig. 163; Old Nat.Brev. 93.
DE ILERETICO COMBURENDO. (Lat. For burning a heretic.) A writ which formerly issued from the secular courts for the execution, by burning, of a heretic, who had been convicted in the ecclesiastical courts of heresy, had abjured, and had relapsed into heresy. It is said to be very ancient. Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 269; 4 Bl.Comm. 46. See Heeretico Comburendo.
DE HOMAGIO RESPECTUANDO. A writ for respiting or postponing homage. Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 269, A.
DE HOMINE CAPTO IN WITHERNAM. (Lat. For taking a man in withernam.) A writ to take a man who had carried away a bondman or bond-woman into another country beyond the reach of a writ of replevin.
DE HOMINE REPLEGIANDO. (Lat. For re-plevying a man.) A writ which lies to replevy a man out of prison, or out of the custody of a pri-vate person, upon giving security to the sheriff that the man shall be forthcoming to answer any charge against him. Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 66; 3 Bl. Comm. 129. This writ has been superseded al-most wholly, in modern practice, by that of ha-beas corpus; but it is still used, in some of the states, in an amended and altered form. See 1 Kent, Comm. 404n; 34 Me. 136.
DE IDENTITATE NOMINIS. A writ which lay for one arrested in a personal action and committed to prison under a mistake as to his iden-tity, the proper defendant bearing the same name. Reg.Orig. 194.
DE IDIOTA INQUIRENDO. An old common-law writ, long obsolete, to inquire whether a man be an idiot or not. 2 Steph.Comm. 509.
DE IIS QUI PONENDI SUNT IN ASSISIS. Of those who are to be put on assises. The title of a statute passed 21 Edw. I. defining the qualifica-tions of jurors. Crabb, Eng.Law, 167, 189; 2 Reeve, Eng.Law, 184.
DE INCREMENTO. Of increase; in addition. Costs de incremento, or costs of increase, are the costs adjudged by the court in civil actions, in addition to the damages and nominal costs found by the jury. Gilb.Com.Pl. 260.
DE INFIRMITATE. Of infirmity. The principal essoin in the time of Glanville; afterwards called "de malo." 1 Reeve, Eng.Law, 115. See De Malo; Essoin.
DE INGRESSU. A writ of entry. Reg.Orig. 227b, et seq.
DE INJURIA. Of [his own] wrong. In the tech-nical language of pleading, a replication de in-juria is one that may be made in an action of tort where the defendant has admitted the acts complained of, but alleges, in his plea, certain new matter by way of justification or excuse; by this replication the plaintiff avers that the defendant committed the grievances in question "of his own wrong, and without any such cause," or motive or excuse, as that alleged in the plea, (de injuria sua propria absque tali causa;) or, admitting part of the matter pleaded, "without the rest of the cause" alleged, (absque residuo causce.) In form it is a species of traverse, and it is frequently used when the pleading of the defendant, in an-swer to which it is directed, consists merely of matter of excuse of the alleged trespass, griev-anee, breach of contract, or other cause of action. Its comprehensive character in putting in issue all the material facts of the defendant’s plea has also obtained for it the title of the general replica-tion. Holthouse.
DE INOFFICIOSO TESTAMENTO. Concerning an inofiicious or undutiful will. A title of the civil law. Inst. 2, 18.
DE INTEGRO. Anew; a second time. As it was before.
DE INTRUSIONE. A writ of intrusion; where a stranger entered atter the death of the ten-ant, to the injury of the reversioner. Reg.Orig. 233b.
DE JACTURA EVITANDA. For avoiding a loss. A phrase applied to a defendant, as de lucro cap-tando is to a plaintiff. Jones v. Sevier, 1 Litt., Ky., 51, 13 Am.Dec. 218.
DE JUDAISMO, STATUTUM. The name of a statute passed in the reign of Edward I. which
Black’s Law Dictionary Revisad 4th Ed.-31
enacted severe and arbitrary penalties, against the Jews.
DE JUDICATO SOLVENDO. For payment of the amount adjudged. A term applied in the Scotch law to bail to the action, or special bail.
DE JUDICIIS. Of judicial proceedings. The title of the second part of the Digests or Pandects, in-cluding the fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh books. See Dig. Procem. § 3.
DE JUDICIO SISTL For appearing in court. A term applied in the Scotch and admiralty law, to bail for a defendant’s appearance.
DE JURE. Of right; legitimate; lawful; by right and just title. In this cense it is the con-trary of de facto (which see.) It may also be contrasted with ¿ gratia, in which case it means "as a matter of right," as de gratia means "by grace or favor." Again it may be contrasted with de cequitate; here meaning "by law," as the lat-ter means "by equity." See Government.
DE JURE DECIMARUM, ORIGINEM DUCENS DE JURE PATRONATUS, TUNC COGNITIO SPECTAT AT LEGEM CIVILEM, i. e., COMMUN-EM. Godb. 63. With regard to the right of tithes, deducing its origin from the right of the patron, then the cognizance of them belongs to the civil law; that is, the common law.
DE JURE JUDICES, DE FACTO JURATORES, RESPONDENT. The judges find the law, the jury the facts. See Co.Litt. 295; Broom, Max. 99.
DE LA PLUIS BEALE, or BELLE. L. Fr. Of the most fair. A term applied to a species of dower, which was assigned out of the fairest of the husband’s tenements. Litt. 1 48. See Dower de la Plus Belle.
DE LATERE. From the side; on the side; col-laterally; of collaterals. Cod. 5, 5, 6.
DE LEGATIS ET FIDEI COMMISSIS. Of leg-acies and trusts. The name of a title of the Pan-dects. Dig. 30.
DE LEPROSO AMOVENDO. Writ for removing a leper. A writ to remove a leper who thrust himself into the company of his neighbors in any parish, in public or private places, to their annoy-ance. Reg.Orig. 267; Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 234, E; New Nat.Brev. 521.
DE LIBERA FALDA. Writ of free fold. A spe-cies of quod permittat. Reg.Orig. 155.
DE LIBERA PISCARIA. Writ of free fishery. A species of quod permittat. Reg.Orig. 155.
DE LIBERO PASSAGIO. Writ of free passage. A species of quod permittat. Reg.Orig. 155.
DE LIBERTATE PROBANDA. Writ for proving liberty. A writ which lay for such as, being de-manded for villeins or niefs, offered to prove themselves free. Reg.Orig. 87b; Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 77, F.

DE LIBERTATIBUS ALLOCANDIS. A writ of various forms, to enable a citizen to recover the liberties to which he was entitled. Fitzh.Nat. Brev. 229; Reg.Orig. 262.
DE LICENTIA TRANSFRETANDI. Writ of per-mission to cross the sea. And old writ directed to the wardens of the port of Dover, or other sea-port in England, commanding them to permit the persons named in the writ to cross the sea from such port, on certain conditions. Reg.Orig. 193b.
DE LUNATICO INQUIRENDO. The name of a writ directed to the sheriff, directing him to in-quire by good and lawful men whether the party charged is a lunatic or not. Den ‘7. Clark, 10 N.J. L. 217, 18 Am.Dec. 417; Hart v. Deamer, 6 Wend., N.Y., 497; In re Lindsley, 44 N.J.Eq. 564, 15 A. 1, 6 Am.St.Rep. 913.
DE MAGNA ASSISA ELIGENDA. A writ by which the grand assise was chosen and sum-moned. Reg.Orig. 8; Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 4.
DE MAJORI ET MENTOR’ NON VARIANT JURA. Concerning greater and less laws do not vary. 2 Vern. 552.
DE MALO. Of illness. This phrase was frequent-ly used to designate several species of essoin, (q. v.,) such as de malo lecti, of illness in bed; de malo veniendi, of illness (or misfortune) in coming to the place where the court sat; de malo villce, of illness in the town where the court sat.
DE MANUCAPTIONE. Writ of manucaption, or mainprise. A writ which lay for one who, being taken and imprisoned on a charge of felony, had offered bail, which had been refused; requiring the sheriff to discharge him on his finding sufí-1- cient mainpernors or bail. Reg.Orig. 268b; Fitzh. Nat.Brev. 249, G.
DE MANUTENENDO. Writ of maintenance. A writ which lay against a person for the offense of maintenance. Reg.Orig. 189, 182b.
DE MEDIETATE LINGU7E. Of the half tongue; hall of one tongue and half of another. This phrase describes that species of jury which, at common law, was allowed in both civil and crim-inal cases where one of the parties was an alien, not speaking or understanding English. It was composed of six English denizens or natives and six of the alien’s own countrymen.
DE MEDIO. A .writ in the nature of a writ of right, which lay where upon a subinfeudation the mesne (or middle) lord suffered his under-tenant or tenant paravail to be distrained upon by the lord paramount for the rent due him from the mesne lord. Booth, Real Act, 136.
DE MELIORIBUS DAMNIS. Of or for the better damages. A term used in practice to denote the election by a plaintiff against which of several defendants (where the damages have been as-sessed separately) he will take judgment. 1 Arch. Pr.K.B. 219; Knickerbacker v. Colver, 8 Cow., N.Y., 111.
Judgment de melioribus damnis (of, or for, the better damages). Where, in an action against sev-eral persons for a joint tort, the jury by mistake sever the damages by giving heavier damages against one defendant than against the others, the plaintiff may cure the defect by taking judg-ment for the greater damages (de melioribus damnis) against that defendant, and entering a nolle prosequi (q. v.) against the others. Sweet.
DE MERCATORIBUS. "Concerning merchants." The name of a statute passed in the eleventh year of Edw. I. (1233,) more commonly called the "Statute of Acton Burnel," authorizing the recognizance by statute merchant. See 2 Reeve, Eng.Law, 160-162; 2 Bl.Comm. 161.
DE MINIMIS NON CURAT LEX. The law does not care for, or take notice of, very small or tri-fling matters. The law does not concern itself about trifles. Cro.Eliz. 353. Thus, error ir. cal-culation of a fractional part of a penny will not be regarded. Hob. 88. So, the law will not, in general, notice the fraction of a day. Broom, Max. 142.
DE MINIS. Writ of threats. A writ which lay where a person was threatened with personal violence, or the destruction of his property, to compel the offender to keep the peace. Reg.Orig. 88b, 89; Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 79, G, 80.
DE MITTENDO TENOREM RECORDI. A writ to send the tenor of a record, or to exemplify it under the great seal. Reg.Orig. 220b.
DE MODERATA MISERICORDIA CAPIENDA. Writ for taking a moderate amercement. A writ, founded on Magna Charla, (c. 14,) which lay for one who was excessively amerced in a court not of record, directed to the lord of the court, or his bailiff, commanding him to take a moderate amercement of the party. Reg.Orig. 86b; Fitzh. Nat.Brev. 75, 76.
DE MODO DECEVIANDI. Of a modus of tithing. A term applied in English ecclesiastical law to a prescription to have a special manner of tith-ing. 2 Bl.Comm. 29; 3 Steph.Comm. 130.
DE MOLENDINO DE NOVO ERECTO NON JAC-ET PROHIBITIO. Cro.Jac. 429. A prohibition lies not against a newly-erected mill.
DE MORTE HOMINIS NULLA EST CUNCTATIO LONGA. Where the death of a human being is concerned, [in a matter of life and death,] no delay is [considered] long. Co.Litt. 134.
DE NATIVO HABENDO. A writ which lay for a lord directed to the sheriff, commanding him to ap-prehend a fugitive villein, and restore him, with all his chattels, to the lord. Reg.Orig. 87; Fitzh. Nat.Brev. 77.
DE NATURA BREVIIEVI. (Lat.) Concerning the nature of writs. The title of more than one text-book of English Medieval law. Maitland, 2 Sel. Essays in Anglo-Amer. Leg. Hist. 549. See Regis-ter of Writs.

DE NOMINE PROPRIO NON EST CURANDUM CUM IN SUBSTANTIA NON ERRETUR; QUIA NOMINA MUTABILIA SUNT, RES AUTEM IMMOBILES. 6 Coke, 66. As to the prop-er narre, it is not to be regarded where it errs not in substance, because names are changeable, but things immutable.
DE NON APPARENTIBUS, ET NON EXISTEN-TIBUS, EADEM EST RATIO. 5 Coke, 6. As to things not apparent, and those not existing, the rule is the same. Bennehan v. Webb, 28 N.C. 61; U. S. v. Wilkinson, 12 How., U.S., 253, 13 L.Ed. 974, Fed.Cas.No. 16,696; 5 Co. 6; 6 Bingh. N.C. 453; 7 Cl. & F. 872; 5 C.B. 53; 8 Id. 286; 1 Term 404; Quarles v. Quarles, 4 Mass. 685; 8 Id. 401; Broom, Max. 163, 166.
DE NON DECIMANDO. Of not paying tithes. A term applied in English ecclesiastical law to a prescription or claim to be entirely discharged of tithes, and to pay no compensation in lieu of them. 2 Bl. Comm. 31.
DE NON PROCEDENDO AD ASSISAM. A writ forbidding the justices from holding an assise in a particular case. Reg.Orig. 221.
DE NON RESIDENTIA CLERICI REGIS. An ancient writ where a parson was employed in the royal service, etc., to excuse and discharge him of non-residence. 2 Inst. 264.
DE NON SANE MEMORIE. L. Fr. Of unsound memory or mind; a phrase synonymous with non compos mentis.
DE NOVI OPERIS NUNCIATIONE. In the civil law. A form of interdict or injunction which lies in some cases where the defendant is about to erect a "new work" (q. v.) in derogation or in-jury of the plaintiff’s rights.
DE NOVO. Anew; afresh; a second time. Arch-er v. High, 193 Miss. 361, 9 So.2d 647, 648; Dun-can v. Mack, 59 Ariz. 36, 122 P.2d 215, 217. A venire de novo is a writ for summoning a jury for the second trial of a case which has been sent back from aboye for a new trial. Slaughter v. Martin, 9 Ala.App. 285, 63 So. 689, 690; Parker v. Lewis, 45 Okl. 807, 147 P. 310, 311.
DE NULLO, QUOD EST SUA NATURA INDI. VISIBILE, ET DIVISIONEM NON PATITUR, NULLAM PARTEM HABEBIT VIDUA, SED SAT-ISFACIAT El AD VALENTIAM. Co. Litt. 32. A widow shall have no part of that which in its own nature is indivisible, and is not susceptible of divi-sion, but let the heir satisfy her with an equiva-lent.
DE NULLO TENEMENTO, QUOD TENETUR AD TERMINUM, FIT HOMAGII, FIT TAMEN INDE FIDELITATIS SACRAMENTUM. In no tenement which is held for a term of years is there an avail of homage; but there is the oath of fealty. Co. Litt. 67b.
DE ODIO ET ATIA. A writ anciently called "breve de bono et malo," addressed to the sheriff
to inquire whether a man eommitted to prison upon suspicion of murder were committed on just cause of suspicion, or only upon malice and ill will (propter odium et atiam); and if, upon the inquisition, due cause of suspicion did not appear, then there issued another writ for the sheriff to admit him to bail. 3 Bl.Comm. 128; Reg.Orig. 133.
DE OFFICE. L. Fr. Of office; in virtue of office; officially; in the discharge of ordinary duty.
DE ONERANDO PRO RATA PORTIONE. Writ for charging according to a rateable proportion. A writ which lay for a joint tenant,’or tenant in common, who was distrained for more rent than his proportion of the land carne to. Reg.Orig. 182; Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 234, H.
DE PACE ET LEGALITATE TENENDA. For keeping the peace, and for good behavior.
DE PACE ET PLAGIS. Of peace, (breach of peace,) and wounds. One of the kinds of criminal appeal formerly in use in England, and which lay in cases of assault, wounding, and breach of the peace. Bract. fol. 144; 2 Reeve, Eng.Law, 33.
DE PACE ET ROBERIA. Of peace [breach of peace] and robbery. One of the kinds of criminal appeal formerly in use in England, and which lay in cases of robbery and breach of the peace. Bract. fol. 146; 2 Reeve, Eng.Law, 37.
DE PALABRA. Span. By word; by parol. White, New Recop. b. 2, tit. 19, c. 3, § 2.
DE PARCO FRACTO. A writ or action for dam-ages caused by a pound-breach (q. v.). It has long been obsolete. Co.Litt. 47b; 3 Bl.Comm. 146.
DE PARTITIONE FACIENDA. A writ which lay to make Partition of lands or tenements held by several as coparceners, tenants in common, etc. Reg.Orig. 76; Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 61, R; Old Nat.Brev. 142.
DE PERAMBULATIONE FACIENDA. A writ which lay where there was a dispute as to the boundaries of two adjacent lordships or towns, di-rected to the sheriff, commanding him to take with him twelve discreet and lawful knights of his county and make the perambulation and set the bounds and limits in certainty. Fitzh.Nat. Brev. 309, D.
DE PIGNORE SURREPTO FURTI, ACTIO. In the civil law. An action to recover a pledge stolen. Inst. 4, 1, 14.
DE PIPA VINI CARIANDA. A writ of trespass for carrying a pipe of wine so carelessly that it was stove, and the contents lost. Reg.Orig. 110. Alluded to by Sir William Jones in his remarks on the case of Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld.Raym. 909. Jones, Bailm. 59.
DE PLACITO. Of a plea; of or in an action. Formal words used in declarations and other pro-ceedings, as descriptive of the particular action brought.

DE PLAGIS ET MAHEMIO. Of wounds and mayhem. The name of a criminal appeal for-merly in use in England, in cases of wounding and maiming. Bract. fol. 144b; 2 Reeve, Eng. Law, 34. See Appeal.
DE PLANO. Lat. On the ground; on a level. A term of the Roman law descriptive of the meth-od of hearing causes, when the prtor stood on the ground with the suitors, instead of the more formal method when he occupied a bench or tri-bunal; hence informal, or summary.
DE PLEGIIS ACQUIETANDIS. Writ for acquit-ting or releasing pledges. A writ that lay for a surety, against him for whom he had become sure-ty for the payment of a certain sum of money at a certain day, where the latter had not paid the money at the appointed day, and the surety was compelled to pay it. Reg.Orig. 158; Fitzh.Nat. Brev. 137, C; 3 Reeve, Eng.Law, 65.
DE PONENDO SIGILLUM AD EXCEPTIONEM. Writ for putting a seal to an exception. A writ by which justices were formerly commanded to put their seals to exceptions taken by a party in a suit. Reg.Orig. 182.
DE POST DISSEISINA. Writ of post disseisin. A writ which lay for him who, having recovered lands or tenements by proecipe quod reddat, on default, or reddition, was again disseised by the former disseisor. Reg.Orig. 208; Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 190.
DE PRPEROGATIVA REGIS. The statute 17 Edw. I., St. 1, c. 9, defining the prerogatives of the crown on certain subjects, but especially directing that the king shall have ward of the lands of idiots, taking the profits without waste, and finding them necessaries. 2 Steph.Comm. 529.
DE PlUESENTI. Of the present; in the present tense. See Per Verba de Prsenti.
DE PROCEDENDO AD JUDICIUM. A writ pro-ceeding out of chancery and ordering the judges of any court to proceed to judgment. 3 Bla.Com. 109.
DE PROPRIETATE PROBANDA. Writ for prov-ing property. A writ directed to the sheriff, to inquire of the property or goods distrained, where the defendant in an action of replevin claims the property. 3 Bl.Comm. 148; Reg.Orig. 85b.
DE QUARANTINA HABENDA. At common law, a writ which a widow entitled to quarantine might sue out in case the heir or other persons ejected her. It seems to have been a summary process, and required the sheriff, if no just cause were shown against it, speedily to put her into posses-sion. Aiken v. Aiken, 12 Or. 203, 6 P. 682.
DE QUIBUS SUR DISSEISIN. An ancient writ of entry.
DE QUO, and DE QUIBUS. Of which. Formal words in the simple writ of entry, from which it was called a writ of entry "in the quo," or "in the quibus." 3 Reeve, Eng.Law, 33.
DE QUOTA LITIS. In the civil law. A contract by which one who has a claim difficult to recover agrees with another to give a part, for the pur-pose of obtaining his services to recover the rest. 1 Duval, note 201.
DE RAPTU VIRGINUM. Of the ravishment of maids. The name of an appeal formerly in use in England in cases of rape. Bract. fol. 147; 2 Reeve, Eng.Law, 38.
DE RATIONABILI PARTE BONORUM. A writ which lay for the widow (and children) of a de-ceased person against his executors, to recover a third part of the deceased’s personalty, after pay-ment of his debts, or to recover their reasonable part or share of his goods. 2 Bl.Comm. 492; Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 122, L; Hopkins v. Wright, 17 Tex. 36.
DE RATIONABILIBUS DIVISIS. Writ for fixing reasonable boundaries. A writ which lay to settle the boundaries between the lands of persons in dif-ferent towns, where one complained of encroach-ment. Reg.Orig. 157b; Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 128, M; Rosc.Real Act. 31; 3 Reeve, Eng.Law, 48.
DE REBUS. Of things. The title of the third part of the Digests or Pandects, comprising books 12-19, inclusive.
DE REBUS DUBIIS. Of doubtful things or mat-ters. Dig. 34, 5.
DE RECORDO ET PROCESSU MITTENDIS. Writ to send the record and process of a cause to a superior court; a species of writ of error. Reg. Orig. 209.
DE RECTO. Writ of right. Reg.Orig. 1, 2; Bract. fol. 327b. See Writ of Right.
DE RECTO DE ADVOCATIONE. Writ of right of advowson. Reg.Orig. 29b. A writ which lay for one who had an estate in an advowson to him and his heirs in fee-simple, if he were disturbed to present. Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 30, B. Abolished by St. 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 27.
DE RECTO DE RATIONABILI PARTE. Writ of right, of reasonable part. A writ which lay be-tween privies in blood, as between brothers in gav-elkind, or between sisters or other coparceners for lands in lee-simple, where one was deprived of his or her share by another. Reg.Orig. 3b; Fitzh. Nat.Brev. 9, B. Abolished by St. 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 27.
DE RECTO PATENS. Writ of right patent. Reg. Orig. 1.
DE REDISSEISINA. Writ of redisseisin. A writ which lay where a man recovered by assise of novel disseisin land, rent, or common, and the like, and was put in possession thereof by verdict, and afterward was disseised of the same land, rent, or common, by him by whom he was dis-seised before. Reg. Orig. 206b; Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 188, B.

DE REPARATIONE FACIENDA. A writ by which one tenant in common seeks to compel an-other to aid in repairing the property held in com-mon. 8 Barn. & C. 269.
DE RESCUSSU. Writ of rescue or rescous. A writ which lay where cattle distrained, or per-sons arrested, were rescued from those taking them. Reg. Orig. 117, 118; Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 101, C, G.
DE RETORNO HABENDO. For having a return; to have a return. A term applied to the judgment for the defendant in an action of replevin, award-ing him a return of the goods replevied; and to the writ or execution issued thereon. 2 Tidd, Pr. 993, 1038; 3 Bl. Comm. 149. Applied also to the sureties given by the plaintiff on commencing the action. Id. 147.
DE RIEN CULPABLE. L. Fr. Guilty of noth-ing; not guilty.
DE SA VIE. L. Fr. Of his or her life; of his own life; as distinguished from pur cutre vie, for another’s life. Litt. §§ 35, 36.
DE SALVA GARDIA. A writ of safeguard allow-ed to strangers seeking their rights in English courts, and apprehending violence or injury to their persons or property. Reg. Orig. 26.
DE SALVO CONDUCTU. A writ of safe conduct. Reg. Orig. 25b, 26.
DE SCACCARIO. Of or concerning the exche-quer. The title of a statute passed in the fifty-first year of Henry III. 2 Reeve, Eng. Law, 61.
DE SCUTAGIO HABENDO. Writ for having (or to have) escuage or scutage. A writ which an-ciently lay against tenants by knight-service, to compel them to serve in the king’s wars or send substitutes or to pay escuage; that is a sum of money. Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 83, C. The same writ lay for one who had already served in the king’s army, or paid a fine instead, against those who held of him by knight-service, to recover his es-cuage or scutage. Reg. Orig. 88; Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 83, D, F.
DE SE BENE GERENDO. For behaving himself well; for his gond behavior. Yelv. 90, 154.
DE SECTA AD MOLENDINUM. Of suit to a mili. A writ which lay to compel one to continue his custom (of grinding) at a mili. 3 BI. Comm. 235; Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 122, M.
DE SIMILIBUS AD SIMILIA EADEM RATIONE PROCEDENUM EST. From like things to like things we are to proceed by the same rule or rea-son, [i. e., we are allowed to argue from the anal-ogy of cases.] Branch, Princ.
DE SIMILIBUS IDEM EST JUDICANDUM. Of [respecting] like things, [in like cases,] the judg-ment is to be the same. 7 Coke, 18.
DE SON TORT. L. Fr. Of his own wrong. A stranger who takes upon him to act as an execu-
tor without any just authority is called an "execu-tor of his own wrong," (de son tort.) 2 Bi. Comm. 507; 2 Steph. Comm. 244.
An executor de son tort is an executor of his own wrong. A person who assumes to act as executor of an estate out any lawful warrant or authority, but who, by his intermeddling, makes himself Hable as an executor to a certain extent. If a stranger takes upon him to act as executor without any just authority, (as by intermeddling with the goods of the deceased, and many other transac-tions,) he is called in law an "executor of his own wrong," de son tort. 2 Bl.Comm. 507. Allen v. Hurst, 120 Ga. 763, 48 S.E. 341; In re Pedroli’s Estate, 47 Nev. 313, 21 P. 241, 242, 31 A.L.R. 841; Walker v. Portland Savings Bank, 113 Me. 353, 93 A. 1025, L.R.A.1915E, 840; Lowery v. Lowery, 225 Ala. 376, 143 So. 556, 557.
DE SON TORT DEMESNE. Of his own wrong. The law French equivalent of the Latin phrase dé injuria (q. v.).
DE STATUTO MERCATORIO. The writ of stat-ute merchant. Reg. Orig. 146b.
DE STATUTO STAPUL2E. The writ of statute staple. Reg. Orig. 151.
DE SUPERONERATIONE PASTIUR/E. Writ of surcharge of pasture. A judicial writ which lay for him who was impleaded in the county court, for surcharging a common with his cattle, in a case where he was formerly impleaded for it in the same court, and the cause was removed into one of the courts at Westminster. Reg. Jud. 36b.
DE TABULIS EXHIBENDIS. Of showing the tablets of a will. Dig. 43, 5.
DE TALLAGIO NON CONCEDENDO. Of not allowing talliage. The name given to the stat-utes 25 and 34 Edw. I., restricting the power of the king to grant talliage. 2 Inst. 532; 2 Reeve, Eng. Law, 104.
DE TEMPORE CUJUS CONTRARIUM MEMOR-IA HOMINUM NON EXISTIT. From time whereof the memory of man does not exist to the contrary. Litt. § 170.
DE TEMPORE IN TEMPUS ET AD OMNIA TEMPORA. From time to time, and at all times. Townsh. Pl. 17.
DE TEMPS DONT 1VIEMORIE NE COURT. L. Fr. From time whereof memory runneth not; time out of memory of man. Litt. §§ 143, 145, 170.
DE TESTAMENTIS. Of testaments. The title of the fifth part of the Digests or Pandects; com-prising the twenty-eighth to the thirty-sixth books, both inclusive.
DE THEOLONIO. A writ which lay for a person who was prevented from taking toll. Reg. Orig. 103.
DE TRANSGRESSIONE. A writ of trespass. Reg. Orig. 92.
DE TRANSGRESSIONE, AD AUDIENDUM ET TERMINANDUM. A writ or commission for the hearing and determining any outrage or misde-meanor.

DE UNA PARTE. A deed de una parte is one where only one party grants, gives, or binds him-self to do a thing to another. It differs from a deed inter partes, (q. v.) 2 Bouv. Inst. no. 2001.
DE UXORE RAPTA ET ABDUCTA. A writ which lay where a man’s wife had been ravished and carried away. A species of writ of trespass. Reg. Orig. 97; Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 89, 0; 3 Bl. Comm. 139.
DE VASTO. Writ of waste. A writ which might be brought by him who had the immediate estate of inheritance in reversion or remainder, against the tenant for life, in dower, by curtesy, or for years, where the latter had committed waste in lands; calling upon the tenant to appear and show cause why he committed waste and destruc-tion in the place named, to the disinherison (ad exhceredationem) of the plaintiff. Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 55, C; 3 Bl. Comm. 227, 228. Abolished by St. 3 & 4 Wm. IV, c. 27. 3 Steph. Comm. 506.
DE VENTRE INSPICIENDO. A writ to inspect the body, where a woman feigns to be pregnant, to see whether she is with child. It lies for the heir presumptive to examine a widow suspected to be feigning pregnancy in order to enable a supposititious heir to obtain the estate. 1 Bl. Comm. 456; 2 Steph. Comm. 287. It lay also where a woman sentenced to death pleaded preg-nancy. 4 Bl. Comm. 395. This writ has been rec-ognized in America. 2 Chand. Crim. Tr. 381.
DE VERBO IN VERBUM. Word for word. Bract. fol. 138b. Literally, from word to word.
DE VERBORUM SIGNIFICATIONE. Of the sig-nification of words. An important title of the Digests or Pandects, (Dig. 50, 16,) consisting en-tirely of definitions of words and phrases used in the Roman law.
DE VI LAICA AMOVENDA. Writ of (or for) removing lay force. A writ which lay where two parsons contended for a church, and one of them entered into it with a great number of laymen, and held out the other vi et armis; then he that was holden out had this writ directed to the sher-iff, that he remove the force. Reg. Orig. 59; Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 54, D.
DE VICINETO. From the neighborhood, or vic-inage. 3 Bl.Comm. 360. A term applied to a jury.
DE WARRANTIA CHARTM. Writ of warranty of charter. A writ which lay for him who was enfeoffed, with clause of warranty, [in the char-ter of feoffment,] and was afterwards impleaded in an assise or other action, in which he could not vouch or call to warranty; in which case he might have this writ against the feoffor, or his heir, to compel him to warrant the land unto him. Reg. Orig. 157b; Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 134, D. Abolished by St. 3 & 4 Wm. IV, c. 27.
DE WARRANTIA DIEL A writ that lay where a man had a day in any action to appear in prop-er person, and the king at that day, or before, em-ployed him in some service, so that he could not
appear at the day in court. It was directed to the justices, that they should not record him to be in default for his not appearing. Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 17, A; Termes de la Ley.
DEACON. In ecclesiastical law. A minister or servant in the church, whose office is to assist the priest in divine service and the distribution of the sacrament. It is the lowest degree of holy orders in the Church of England. 2 Steph. Comm. 660.
DEAD BODY. A corpse. The body of a human being, deprived of life, but not yet entirely disin-tegrated. Meads v. Dougherty County, 98 Ga. 697, 25 S.E. 915.
DEAD—BORN. A dead-born child is to be consid-ered as if it had never been conceived or born; in other words, it is presumed it never had life, it being a maxim of the common law that mor-tuus exitus non est exitus (a dead birth is no birth). Co. Litt. 29 b. See Marsellis v. Thalhim-er, 2 Paige, Ch., N.Y., 35, 21 Am.Dec. 66; 4 Ves. 334. This is also the doctrine of the civil law. Dig. 50. 16. 129; La.Civ.Code, art. 28; Domat, liv. prél. t. 2, s. 1, nn. 4, 6.
DEAD FREIGHT. The amount paid by a char-terer for that part of the vessel’s capacity which he does not occupy although he has contracted for it. Gray v. Carr, L. R. 6 Q. B. 528; Phillips v. Rodie, 15 East 547.
When the charterer of a vessel has shipped part of the goods on board, and is not ready to shtp the remainder, the master, unless restrained by his special contract, may take other goods on board, and the amount which is not supplied, required to complete the cargo, is considered dead freight. The dead freight is to be calculated accord-ing to the actual capacity of the vessel. 3 Chit.Com.Law 399: 2 Stark. 450; McCull.Com.Dic.
"Dead freight" is the compensation payable to the ship-owner when the charterer has failed to ship a full cargo, and "freight" is recompense the shlpowner is to receive for carrying the cargo into its pont of discharge. Kish v. Taylor (1912) A.C. 604, 613, citing Carver’s Carriage By Sea, par. 666.
DEAD LETTER. A term sometimes applied to an act that has become obsolete by long disuse.
DEAD LETTERS. Letters which the postal de-partment has not been able to deliver to the per-sons for whom they were intended. They are sent to the "dead-letter office," where they are opened, and returned to the writer if his address can be ascertained.
DEAD MAN’S PART. In English law, that por-tion of the effects of a deceased person which, by the custom of London and York, is allowed to the administrator; being, where the deceased leaves a widow and children, one-third; where he leaves only a widow or only children, one-half; and, where he leaves neither, the whole. This portion the administrator was wont to apply to his own use, till the statute 1 Jac. II, c. 17, declared that the same should be subject to the statute of dis-tributions. 2 Bl. Comm. 518; 2 Steph. Comm. 254; 4 Reeve, Eng.Law, 83. A similar portion in Scotch law is called "dead’s part," (q. v.)

DEAD-PLEDGE. A mortgage, mortuum vadium.
DEAD RENT. In English law. A rent payable on a mining lease in addition to a royalty, so call-ed because it is payable although the mine may not be worked.
DEAD STORAGE. The storage, especially of au-tomobiles in public garages, where automobiles not in use are to remain uninterruptedly for a time, sometimes for the season. Hogan v. O’Brien, 123 Misc. 865, 206 N.Y.S. 831.
DEAD USE. A future use.
DEAD WIRE. One which never carries electric-ity, or which, at some particular time, is not charged with an electric current. City of Shaw-nee v. Sears, 39 Okl. 789, 137 P. 107, 110, 50 L.R. A.,N.S., 885.
DEAD’S PART. In Scotch law. The part re-maining over beyond the shares secured to the widow and children by law. Of this the testator had the unqualified disposal. Bell; Stair, Inst. lib. iii. tit. 4, § 24; Paterson, Comp. §§ 674, 848, 902.
DEADHEAD. A term applied to persons other than the officers, agents, or employees of a rail-road company who are permitted by the company to travel on the road without paying any fare therefor. Gardner v. Hall, 61 N.C. 21.
DEADLY FEUD. In old European law. A pro-fession of irreconcilable hatred Ull a person is re-venged even by the death of his enemy.
DEADLY WEAPON. Such weapons or instru-ments as are made and designed for offensive or defensive purposes, or for the destruction of life or the infliction of injury. Commonwealth v. Branham, 8 Bush (Ky.) 387. One likely to pro-duce death or great bodily harm. People v. Fu-qua, 58 Cal. 245; State v. Hedrick, 99 W.Va. 529, 130 S.E. 295, 298.
One which, from the manner used, is calculated or likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. Harris v. State, 72 Tex.Cr.R. 491, 162 S.W. 1150, 1151; Burgess v. Commonwealth, 176 Ky. 326, 195 S.W. 445.
Any weapon dangerous to life, or with which death may be easily and readily produced. Par-man v. Lemmon, 119 Kan. 323, 244 P. 227, 229, 44 A.L.R. 1500; People v. Dwyer, 324 III. 363, 155 N.E. 316, 317.
The term may denote any instrument so used as to be likely to produce death or great bodily harm, and hence may include an automobile, especially within the meaning of statutes pertaining to assault. Williamson v. State, 92 Fla. 980, 111 So. 124, 125, 53 A.L.R. 250. But an automo-bile, when used innocently or negligently so as to be like-ly to produce death or bodily injury, or to actually pro-duce them without criminal liability, has been heid not to be a deadly weapon within the meaning of the criminal law. People v. Cash, 326 Ill. 104, 157 N.E. 76, 79; State v. Clark, 196 Iowa, 1134, 196 N.W. 82, 84.
DEADLY WEAPON PER SE. A weapon which of itself is deadly or one which would ordinarily re-sult in death by its use. Baylor v. State, 151 Tex. Cr.R. 365, 208 S.W.2d 558, 561.
DEALER
DEADMAN. As applied to a lifting appliance, a piece of timber placed across an opening in the ground to which a snatch hook is attached. The Teddy, D.C.N.Y., 226 F. 498, 500.
DEAF AND DUMB. A man that is born deaf, dumb, and blind is looked upon by the law as in the same state with an idiot, he being supposed -incapable of any understanding. 1 Bl. Comm. 304. See, however, Alexier v. Matzke, 151 Mich. 36, 115 N.W. 251, 123 Am.St.Rep. 255. Neverthe-less, a deaf and dumb person may be tried for felony if the prisoner can be made to understand by means of signs. 1 Bish. Cr. L. § 395; Com-monwealth v. Hill, 14 Mass. 207; State v. Harris, 53 N.C. 136, 78 Am.Dec. 272; 1 Houst.Cr.Rep. 291; Felts v. Murphy, 201 U.S. 123, 26 S.Ct. 366, 50 L. Ed. 689.
DEAFFOREST. See Disafforest.
DEAL, n. An arrangement to attain a desired result by a combination of interested parties; Gaut v. Dunlap, Tex.Civ.App., 188 S.W. 1020, 1021; Ball v. Davenport, 170 Iowa 33, 152 N.W. 69, 71; the prime object being usually the purchase, sale, or exchange of property for a profit; Chambers v. Johnston, 180 Ky. 73, 201 S.W. 488, 493. Also, an act of buying and selling; a bargain. Oregon Home Builders v: Montgomery Inv. Co., 94 Or. 349, 184 P. 487, 493.
A "deal" between two parties includes any transaction of any kind between them, and when applied to a transaction concerning a house or block, the term does not necessarlly imply an agreement to sell or convey, for the agreement might be to rent or lease the property. Osborne v. Moore, 112 Tex. 361, 247 S.W. 498, 499.
DEAL, v. To traffic; to transact business; to trade. See Borg v. International Silver Co., C.C. A.N.Y., 11 F.2d 147, 150. Also, to act between two persons, to intervene, or to have to do with. State v. Morro, 313 Mo. 114, 280 S.W. 697, 699.
To "deal" in a commodity, however, such as automobiles, within the meaning of a privilege tax statute, means some-thing more than the making of an occasional sale in a mu-nicipality where the seller has no place of business, and no stock of automobiles on hand. City of Pascagoula v. Carter, 136 Miss. 750, 101 So. 687, 688.
As to dealing in futures, see Futures.
DEALER. In the popular sense, one who buys to sell,-not one who buys to keep, or makes to sell. Commonwealth v. Lutz, 284 Pa. 184, 130 A. 410, 411; Moore v. State, 148 Ga. 457, 97 S.E. 76, 77; In re I. Rheinstrom & Sons Co., D.C.Ky., 207 F. 119, 136.
The term includes one who carries on the business of selling goods, wares, and merchandise, manufactured by him at a store or warehouse apart from his own shop, or manufactory. Atlartic Refining Co. v. Van Valkenburg, 265 Pa. 456, 109 A. 208, 209.
A "dealer," as in narcotics, is one who sells promiscuous-ly,-one who is ready and willing to sell to anyone apply-ing to purchase, if unaware that they are officers or under-cover men. Taylor v. U. S., C.C.A.Mo., 19 F.2d 813, 815.
Under Blue Sky Laws, a "dealer" is one making succes-sive sales as a business. People v. guiri, 213 Mich. 651, 182 N.W. 136, 138, 15 A.L.R. 253; State v. Barrett, 121 Or. 57, 254 P. 198, 200. Compare, also, Commonwealth v. Silver-man, 220 Mass. 552, 108 N.E. 358, Ann.Cas.1917A, 948.
For various definitions under particular statutes, see State v. Perkins, 88 Vt. 121, 92 A. 1, 2 (dealer in evergreen trees); Texas Co. v. State, 31 Ariz. 485, 254 P. 1060, 1063, 53 A.L.R. 258 (dealer in gasoline); Pierce v. Hutchinson, 241 Mass. 557, 136 N.E. 261, 263 (dealer in motor vehicles).
Makers of an accommodation note are deemed dealers with whoever discounts it. Vernon v. Manhattan Co., 17 Wend., N.Y., 524.
Dealers’ talk. That picturesque and laudatory style affected by nearly every trader in setting forth the attractive qualities of the goods he offers for sale. Prince v. Brackett, Shaw & Lunt Co., 125 Me. 31, 130 A. 509, 511. The puffing of goods to induce the sale thereof; not regarded in law as fraudulent unless accompanied by some artífice to deceive the purchaser and throw him off his guard or some concealment of intrinsic defects not eas-ily díscoverable. Kimball v. Bangs, 144 Mass. 321, 11 N.E. 113; Williams v. Fouche, 164 Ga. 311, 138 S.E. 580, 581.
Real estate dealer. One who, on his own count and as a business independent of that of another real estate agent, engages for a consid-eratjon to aid others, whether the owners of the property or their agents, in selling real estate which is offered for sale. Horsley v. Woodley, 12 Ga.App. 456, 78 S.E. 260, 261.
DEALINGS. Transactions in the course of trade or business;—held to include payments to a bank-rupt. Moody & M. 137; 3 Car. & P. 85.
DEAN. In English ecclesiastical law. An eccle-siastical dignitary who presides over the chapter of a cathedral, and is next in rank to the bishop. So called from having been originally appointed to superintend ten canons or prebendaries. 1 Bl. Comm. 382; Co. Litt. 95; Spelman.
There are several kinds of deans, namely: Deans of chapters; deans of peculiars; rural deans; deans in the colleges; honorary deans; deans of provinces.
DEAN AND CHAPTER. In ecclesiastical law. The council of a bishop, to assist him with their advice in the religious and also in the temporal affairs of the see. 3 Co. 75; 1 Bla. Comm. 382; Co. Litt. 103, 300; Termes de/a Ley; 2 Burn, Eccl. Law 120.
DEAN OF THE ARCHES. The presiding judge of the Court of Arches. He is also an assistant judge in the court of admiralty. 1 Kent, Comm. 371; 3 Steph. Comm. 727.
DEATH. The cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by physicians as a total stoppage of the circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital functions consequent there-on, such as respiration, pulsation, etc.
This is "natural death," in contradistinction to "civil death," and, also, to "violent death," See those tales, infra.
Civil death. The state of a person who, though possessing natural life, has lost al’ his civil rights, and as to them, is considered as dead. Quick v. Western Ry. of Alabama, 207 Ala. 376, 92 So. 608, 609. At common law, the extinction of civil rights and relations, so that the property of a person declared civilly dead passes to his heirs as if dead in fact. Holmes v. King, 216 Ala. 412, 113 So. 274, 276.
The "civil death" spoken of in the books, is of two kinds: (1) Where there is a total extinctlon of the civil rights and relations of the party, so that he can neither take nor hold property, and his heirs succeed to his estate in the same manner as if he were really dead, or the estate is forfeited to the crown. (2) Where there la an incapacity to hold property, or to sue in the king’s courts, attended with forfeiture of the estate to the crown. Of the first kind, are the cases of monks professed, and abjuration of the realm; all the other cases are of the second kind. Strlctly speaking, there but two cases of civil death; those of a monk professed, and an abjuration of the realm. In re Erskine, C.C.A.Ind., 1 F.2d 149, 152. See, generally, Chit.Crim.Law 723; Co.Litt. §§ 133, 199, note; Littleton § 200; 1 Bl.Comm. 132; Avry v. Everett, 110 N.Y. 317, 18 N.E. 148, 1 L.R.A. 264; In re Donnelly’s Estate, 125 Cal. 417, 58 P. 61, 73 Am.St.Rep. 62.
In New York a person sentenced to imprisonment is thereafter deemed civilly dead under Penal Law § 511. See Platner v. Sherwood, 6 Johns.Ch., N.Y., 118; Troup v. Wood, 4 Johns.Ch., N.Y., 228, 260.
Death-bed. In Scotch law. A state of sickness which ends in death. Ersk. Inst. 3, 8, 95.
Death-bed deed. In Scotch law. A deed made by a person while laboring under a distemper of which he afterwards died. Ersk. Inst. 3, 8, 96. A deed is understood to be in death-bed, if, before signing and delivery thereof, the grantor was sick, and never convalesced thereafter. 1 Forbes, Inst. pt. 3, b. 2, c. 4, tit. 1, I 1. But it is not necessary that he should be actually confined to his bed at the time of making the deed. Bell.
Death duty. A charge or toll which the state makes upon the right to transmit or to receive property on the death of the owner. In re Heck’s Estate, 120 Or. 80, 250 P. 735, 736. The usual name in England for an inheritance tax.
Death warrant. A warrant from the proper executive authority appointing the time and place for the execution of the sentence of death upon a convict judicially condemned to suffer that penal-ty.
Death watch. A special guard set to watch a prisoner condemned to death, for some days be-fore the time for the execution, the special pur-pose being to prevent any escape or any attempt to anticipate the sentence.
Natural death. A death which occurs by the unassisted operation of natural causes, as distin-guished not only from "civil death," but also from "violent death" (q. y.)
Presumptive death. That which is presumed from proof of a long continued absence unheard from and unexplained. The general rule, as now understood, is that the presumption of the dura-tion of life ceases at the expiration of seven years from the time when the person was last known to be living; and atter the lapse of that period there is a presumption of death. Smith v. Knowlton, 11 N.H. 197; Chamb. Best Ev. 304, note, collecting the cases; 4 U.C.Q.B. 510; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 41; 5 B. & Ad. 86; Maley v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 258 Pa. 73, 101 A. 911, L.R.A.1918A, 563. In most of the states the subject is regulated by statute. The better opinion 1s that there 1s no presumption as to the time of death. Davie v. Brlggs, 97 U.S. 628, 24 L.Ed. 1086;,, Chamb.Best Ev. 305; 2 Brett, Com. 941; 2 M. & W. 894. But 1t has been heid that death 1s presumed to take place at the end of the seven years’ absence; Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engineers v. Nash, 144 Md. 623, 125 A. 441; Apitz v. Supreme Lodge Knights and Ladies of Honor, 274 III. 196, 113 N.E. 63, L.R.A.1917A, 183; or at a time of peril, Conner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 166 N.Y.S. 985, 179 App.Div. 596.
Violent death. One caused or accelerated by the interferente of human agency;—distinguished from "natural death."
DEATH’S PART. See Dead’s Part; Dead Man’s Part.
DEATHSMAN. The executioner; hangman; he that executes the extreme penalty of the law.
DEATH TRAP. A structure or situation involving imminent risk of death or a place apparently safe but actually very dangerous to life. Benson v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 200 S.W. 2d 233, 240.
DEBASING. This word, in a statute making it slander to charge another with being guilty of some "debasing act which may exclude him from society," has reference to those repulsive acts which would cause him to be shunned or avoided, in the same way as would a contagious disease. Morris v. Evans, 22 Ga.App. 11, 95 S.E. 385, 386.
DEBAUCH. To corrupt one’s manners; to make lewd; to mar or spoil; to entice; and, when used of a woman, to seduce, or corrupt with lewdness. Litton v. Woliver, 126 Va. 32, 100 S.E. 827, 828; State v. Howard, 264 Mo. 386, 175 S.W. 58, 59. Originally, the term had a limited signification, meaning to entice or draw one away from his work, employment, or duty; and from this sense its application has enlarged to include the corrup-tion of manners and violation of the person. In itS modem legal sense, the word carries with it the idea of "carnal knowledge," aggravated by as-sault, violent seduction, ravishment. Koenig v. Nott, 2 Hilt., N.Y., 323. And see State v. Curran, 51 Iowa, 112, 49 N.W. 1006. See, also, Debauchery.
DEBAUCHERY. In general, excessive indulgente in sensual pleasures; in a narrower sense, sexual immorality or excesses, or the unlawful indul-gence of lust. Suslak v. United States, C.C.A. Mont., 213 F. 913, 917; Gillette v. United States, C.C.A.N.D., 236 F. 215, 217.
In the White Slave Act, Act June 25, 1910, c. 395, 36 Stat. 825, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2421 et seq., making it an offense to pro-cure the interstate transportation of a girl for the pur-pose of prostitution and debauchery, "debauchery" is not limited to the meaning of seduction, but includes a pur-pose to expose her to such influence as will naturally and inevitably so corrupt her Character as to lead her to acts of sexual immorality, or, if she is already a sexually cor-rupt woman, a purpose that she shall engage or continue more or less habitually in sexually immoral practices. Van Pelt v. United States, C.C.A.Va., 240 F. 346, 348, L.R. A.1917E, 1135.
DEBENTURE. A certificate given by the collec-tor of a port, under the United States customs laws, to the effect that an importer of merchan-dise therein named is entitled to a drawback,
(q. v.,) specifying the amount and time when pay-able. See Act Cong. March 2, 1799, § 80, 1 St. at Large 687.
An instrument in use in some government de-partments, particularly in England, by which the government is charged to pay to a creditor or his assigns the sum found due on auditing his ac-counts. Brande; Blount.
A security for a loan of money issued by a Pub-lic company, usually creating a charge on the whole or a part of the company’s stock and prop-erty, though not necessarily in the form of a mortgage. They are subject to certain regula-tions as to the mode of transfer, and ordinarily have coupons attached to facilitate the payment of interest. They are generally issued in a series, with provision that they shall rank parí passu in proportion to their amounts. See Bank v. Atkins, 72 Vt. 33, 47 A. 176; Cavanagh, Mon. Sec. 267; 56 L.J.R.Ch.D. 815; Brice, Ultra Vires (2d Ed.) 279.
A charge in writing on certain property, with the repayment at a time fixed, of money lent by a person therein named at a given interest.
Any instrument (other than a covering or trust deed) which either creates or agrees to create a debt in favor of one person or corporation, or several persons or corporations, or acknowledges such debt. Simonson, Debentures, 5.
A debenture is distinguished (1) from a mortgage which 1s an actual transfer of property, (2) from a bond which does not dlrectly affect property, and (3) from a mere charge on property which is individualized and does not form part of a series of similar charges; Cav.Mon.Sec. 267, citing L.R. 10 Ch.D. 530, 681; 15 Ch.D. 465; 21 Ci.D. 762; L.R. 7 App.Cas. 673; Jones, Corp. B. & M. § 32; 10 H.L.C. 191; L.R. 2 Ch.D. 337.
DEBENTURE INDENTURE. An indenture con-taining obligations not secured by a mortgage or other collateral; a key instrumént in the process of long term debt financing for general business corporations. Its effect is to put the debenture-holder in substantially the same practical position as a bondholder secured by a first mortgage. See "Business Lawyer" (April 1966, pp. 678, 679, 680).
DEBENTURE STOCK. A stock or fund repre-senting money borrowed by a company or Public body, in England, and charged on the whole or part of its property. An issue of stock usually irredeemable and transferable in any amount, not including a fraction of a pound.
The terininability and fixity in amount of debentures being inconvenient to lenders has led tu their being in many cases superseded by debenture stock. Whart. Lex.
Debet esse finis litium. There ought to be an end of suits; there should be some period put to litigation. Jenk. Cent. 61.
DEBET ET DETINET. (Lat. He owes and de-tains.) Words anciently used in the original writ, (and now, in English, in the plaintiff’s declara-tion,) in an action of debt, where it was brought by one of the original contracting parties who per-sonally gave the credit, against the other who per-sonally incurred the debt, or against his heirs, if they were bound to the payment; as by the ob-ligee against the obligor, by the landlord against the tenant, etc. The declaration, in such cases, states that the defendant "owes to," as well as "detains from," the plaintiff the debt or thing in question; and hence the action is said to be "in the debet et detinet." Where the declaration merey3 states that the defendant detains the debt, (as in actions by and against an executor for a debt due to or from the testator,) the action is said to be "in the detinet" alone. Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 119, G.; 3 Bl. Comm. 155.
DEBET ET SOLET. (Lat. He owes and is used to.) Where a man sues in a writ of right or to recover any right of which he is for the first time disseised, as of a suit at a mili or in case of a writ of quod permittat, he brings his writ in the debet et solet. Reg. Orig. 144a; Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 122, M.
Debet quis juri subjacere ubi delinquit. One [every one] ought to be subject to the law [of the place] where he offends. 3 Inst. 34. This maxim is taken from Bracton. Bract. fol. 154b. Finch, Law, 14, 36; Wing. Max. 113; 3 Co. 231; 8 Scott N. R. 567.
DEBET SINE BREVE. (Lat. He owes without declaration filed.) Used in relation to a confes-sion of judgment.
Debet sua cuique domus esse perfugium tutis-simum. Every man’s house should be a perfect-ly safe refuge. Clason v. Shotwell, 12 Johns., N.Y., 31, 54.
Debile fundamentum failit opus. A weak foun-dation frustrates [or renders vain] the work [built upon it.] Shep. Touch. 60; Noy, Max. 5, max. 12; Finch, Law, b. 1, ch. 3. When the foundation fails, all goes to the ground; as, where the cause of action fails, the action itself must of necessity fail. Wing. Max. 113, 114, max. 40; Broom, Max. 180.
DEBIT. A sum charged as due or owing. The term is used in book-keeping to denote the left page of the ledger, or the charging of a person or an account with all that is supplied to or paid out for him or for the subject of the account. Also, the balance of an account where it is shown that something remains due to the party keeping the account.
In industrial insurance nomenclature, a certain identified territory in which a solicitor operates by soliciting new business and taking care, as through collection of the debit accounts, of the company’s patrons for insurance theretofore writ-ten; such insurance being usually written in small amounts on the weekly payment plan. Jones v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 173 Mo.App. 1, 155 S.W. 1106, 1107.
DEBITA FUNDL L. Lat. In Scotch law. Debts secured upon land. Ersk. Inst. 4, 1, 11.
DEBITA LAICORUM. L. Lat. In old English law. Debts of the laity, or of lay persons. Debts recoverable in the civil courts. Crabb. Eng. Law, 107.
Debita sequuntur personam debitoris. Debts follow the person of the debtor; that is, they have no locality, and may be collected wherever the debtor can be found. 2 Kent, Comm. 429; Story, Confi. Laws, § 362; Halkers, Max. 13.
DEBITOR. In the civil and old English law. A debtor.
Debitor non prresumitur donare. A debtor is not presumed to make a gift. Whatever disposi-tion he makes of his property is supposed to be in satisfaction of his debts. 1 Kames, Eq. 212. Where a debtor gives money or goods, or grants land to his creditor, the natural presumption is that he means to get free from his obligation, and not to make a present, unless donation be ex-pressed. Ersk. Inst. 3, 3, 93; Dig. 50, 16, 108; 1 P. Wms. 239; Wh. & Tud. L. Cas. Eq. 378.
Debitorum pactionibus creditorum petitio nec tolli nec minui potest. 1 Poth. Obl. 108; Broom, Max. 697, Sart. Max. 115. The rights of creditors can neither be taken away nor diminished by agreements among (or of) the debtors.
DEBITRIX. A female debtor.
DEBITUM. Something due, or owing, a debt.
Debitum et contractus sunt nullius loci. Debt and contract are of [belong to] no place; have no particular locality. 7 Co. 61. The obligation in these cases is purely personal, and actions to enforce it may be brought anywhere. 2 Inst. 231; Story, Confi. Laws, 1 362; 1 Smith, Lead. Cal. 340, 363; 7 M. & G. 1019, n.
DEBITUM IN PRIESENTI SOLVENDUM IN FU-TURO. A debt or obligation complete when con-tracted, but of which the performance cannot be required till some future period.
DEBITUM SINE BREVI. L. Lat. Debt without writ; debt without a declaration. In old practice, this term denoted an action begun by original bill, instead of by writ. In modern usage, it is some-times applies to a debt evidenced by confession of judgment without suit. The equivalent Norman-French phrase was "debit sans breve." Both are abbreviated to d. s. b.
DEBT. A sum of money due by certain and ex-, press agreement; as by bond for a determinate sum, a bill or note, a special bargain, or a rent reserved on a lease, where the amount is fixed and specific, and does not depend upon any subse-quent valuation to settle it. 3 B1Comm. 154; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U.S. 701, 4 S.Ct. 663, 28 L.Ed. 569; Neilson v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 101 Or. 262, 199 P. 948, 951; Shultz v. Ritterbusch, 38 Okl. 478, 134 P. 961, 968; W. S. Tyler Co. v. Deutsche Dampfschifffahrts Gesell-schaft Hansa, Bremen, Germany, D.C.Ohio, 276 F. 134, 136.

An unconditional promise to pay a thied sum at a specl-fled time. Lowery v. Fuller, 221 Mo.App. 495, 281 S.W. 968, 972. A contractual obligation to pay in the future for consid-erations received in the present. Lesser v. Warren Borough, 237 Pa. 501, 85 A. 839, 841, 43 L.R.A.,N.S., 839. The word "debt" carries with it the requirement of certalnty, the foundation of promise by express contract, and necessarily amplíes legality. Clinton Mining & Mineral Co. v. Beacon, C.C.A.Pa., 266 F. 621, 622, 14 A.L.R. 263.
The word "debt," In the deflnition of a mortgage as a hypothecation or pledge of property as security for a debt, means a duty or obligation to pay, for the enforcement of which an action lies. Stollenwerck v. Marks & Gayle, 188 Ala. 587, 65 So. 1024, 1027, Ann.Cas.1917C, 981; Gibson v. Hopkins, 80 W.Va. 756, 93 S.E. 826, 827.
Standing alone, the word "debt" is as appllcable to a sum of money which has been promised at a future day, as to a sum of money now due and payable. To distinguish between the two, It may be said of the former that It is a debt owing, and of the latter that it is a debt due. A sum of money which is certainly and in all events payable is a debt, without regard to the fact whether it be payable now or at a future time. A sum payable upon a contingen-cy, however, is not a debt, or does not become a debt un-til the contingency has happened. People v. Arguello, 37 Cal. 524.
A sum of money arising upon a contract, ex-press or implied. Kimpton v. Bronson, 45 Barb. N.Y., 618; Johnson v. Garner, D.C.Nev., 233 F. 756, 767. Also, the obligation to pay a sum cer-tain; Indian Refining Co. v. Taylor, 195 Ind. 223, 143 N.E. 682, 689; or a sum which may be ascer-tained by simple mathematical calculation from known facts; H. G. Kilbourne Co. v. Standard Stamp Affixer Co., 216 Mass. 118, 103 N.E. 469, 470; regardless of whether the liability arises by contract or is implied or imposed by law; State v. Latham, 136 Tenn. 30, 188 S.W. 534, 535; Lind-strom v. Spicher, 53 N.D. 195, 205 N.W. 231, 233, 41 A.L.R. 968.
A "debt" is a specified sum of money owing to one per-son from another, including not only the obligation of the debtor to pay, but the right of the creditor to receive and enforce payment. Angola Brick & Tile Co. v. Millgrove School Tp., Steuben County, 73 Ind.App. 557, 127 N.E. 855, 856; Dewey v. Denson, 31 Ga.App. 352, 120 S. E. 805, 807.
A fixed and certain obligation to pay money or some other valuable thing or things, either in the present or in the future. Burke v. Boulder Mill-ing & Elevator Co., 77 Colo. 230, 235 P. 574, 575.
In a still more general sense, that which is due from one person to another, whether money, goods, or services. Holman v. Hollis, 94 Fla. 614, 114 So. 254, 255; State v. State Board of Exam-iners, 74 Mont. 1, 238 P. 316, 323.
A "debt" is an obligation arising otherwise than by sen-tence by a court for a breach of the public peace or for crime. Ruggles v. State, 120 Md. 553, 87 A. 1080, 1084.
In a broad sense, any duty to respond to an-other in money, labor, or service; it may even mean a moral or honorary obligation, unenforce-able by legal action. U. S. Sugar Equalization Board v. P. De Ronde & Co., C.C.A.DeI., 7 F.2d 981, 984.
Also, sometimes, an aggregate of separate debts, or the total sum of the existing claims against a person or company. Thus we speak of the "na-tional debt," the "bonded debt" of a corporation, etc.
The word "debt" has no fixed legal ineaning: Electric Reduction Co. y. Lewellyn, C.C.A.Pa., 11 P.28 493, 494: but takes shades of meaning from the occasion of its use
and color from accompanying words; Morrow y. Hayes, 226 Mich. 301, 197 N.W. 554, 555.
The word is of large import, Including not only debts by specialty, and debts of record, or judgments (Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson Shipyards Corporation, C.C.A.N.Y., 6 F.2d 752, 755; Schooley v. Schooley, 184 Iowa 835, 169 N. W. 56, 57, 11 A.L.R. 110; Bronson v. Syverson, 88 Wash. 264, 152 P. 1039, 1040, L.R.A.1916B, 993; Rosenberg v. Ros-enberg, 152 Md. 49, 135 A. 840), 8ut also obligations aris-ing under simple contract, to a very wide extent; and in its popular sense includes all that is due to a man under any form of obligation or promise. McCrea v. First Nat. Bank, 162 Minn. 455, 203 N.W.220; JEtna Ins. CO. V. Rob-ertson, 126 Miss. 387, 88 So. 883, 890.

Synonyms

The term "demand" le of much broader import than "debt," and embraces rights of action belonging to the debtor beyond those which could appropriately be called "debts." In this respect the term "demand" is one of very extensive import. In re Denny, 2 Hill, N.Y., 223.
Nevertheless, "debt" may be synonymous with "claim": In re Littleton’s Estate, 223 N.Y.S. 470, 479, 129 Misc. 845; and may include any kind of a just demand. Goldberg v. Parker, 87 Conn. 99, 87 A. 555, 557, 46 L.R.A.,N.S., 1097, Ann.Cas.1914C, 1059.
The word dues is equivalent to "debts," or that whIch is owing and has a contractual significance. State v. Mort-gage Security Co., 154 Minn. 453, 192 N.W. 348, 350.
"Debt" is not exactly synonymous with "duty." A debt is a legal liability to pay a specific sum of money; a duty is a legal obligation to perform some act. Allen v. Dick-son, Minor, Ala., 120.
"Obligation" is a broader term than "debt." Bovee v. Boyle, 25 Colo.App. 165, 136 P. 467, 469. Every obligation is not a debt, though every debt is an obligation. Lind-strom v. Spicher, 53 N.D. 195, 205 N.W. 231, 233, 41 A.L.R. 968; In re Moorehead’s Estate, 289 Pa. 542, 137 A. 802, 806, 52 A.L.R. 1251.
The words "debt" and "liability" are not necessarily synonymous. As applied to the pecuniary relations of parties, liability is a term of broader significance than debt. Coulter Dry Goods Co. v. Wentworth, 171 Cal. 500, 153 P. 939, 940. Liability is responsibility; the state of one who is bound in law and justice to do something which may be enforced by action. This liability may arise from contracts either express or implied, or in consequence of torts committed. McElfresh v. Kirkendall, 36 Iowa 226. "Liability" ordinarily means an obligation which may or may not ripen into a debt. Irving Bank-Columbia Trust Co. v. New York Rys. Co., D.C.N.Y., 292 F. 429, 433. Yet "debt" may sometimes include varlous kinds af liabilities. See Allen v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 247 Mass. 334, 142 N. E. 100, 103; Carroll v. Bowling, 151 Md. 59, 133 A. 851, 854.

In General

Active debt. One due to a person. Used in the civil law.
Ancestral debt. One of an ancestor which the law compels the heir to pay. Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. 25, 10 L.Ed. 873; A. & E. Encyc.
Debt by simple contract. A debt or demand founded upon a verbal or implied contract, or upon any written agreement that is not under seal.
Debt by specialty or special contract. A debt due, or acknowledged to be due, by some deed or instrument under seal; as a deed of covenant or sale, a lease reserving rent, or a bond or obliga-tion. 2 Bl.Comm. 465; In re Harris, 101 N.J.Eq. 5, 137 A. 215, 216; Kerr v. Lydecker, 51 Ohio St. 240. 37 N.E. 267, 23 L.R.A. 842; Marriott v. Thomp-son, Willes, 189.

Debt ex mutuo. A species of debt or obligation mentioned by Glanville and Bracton, and which arose ex mutuo, out of a certain kind of loan. Glan. lib. 10, c. 3; Bract. fol. 99. See Mutuum; Ex Mutuo.
Debt of record. A debt which appears to be due by the evidence of a court of record, as by a judg-ment or recognizance. 2 Bl.Comm. 465.
Doubtful debt. One of which the payment is un-certain. Clef des Lois Romaines.
In Practice
The name of a common-law action, which lies to recover a certain specific sum of money, or a sum that can readily be reduced to a certainty. 3 Bl.Comm. 154; 3 Steph.Comm. 461; 1 Tidd, Pr. 3; Drennen Motor Car Co. v. Evans, 192 Ala. 150, 68 So. 303; Bullard v. Bell, 1 Mass. 243, Fed.Cas.No. 2,121; U. S. v. Claflin, 97 U.S. 546, 24 L.Ed. 1082; Baum v. Tonkin, 110 Pa. 569, 1 A. 535.
It Is thus distinguished from assumpsit, which lies as well where the sum due is uncertain as where it is certain, and from covenant, which líes only upon contracts evi-denced in a certain manner.
It is said to lie in the debet and detinet, (when it is stated that the defendant owes and detains,) or in the detinet, (when it is stated merely that he detains.) Debt in the detinet for goods differs from detinue, because it is not essential in this action, as in detinue, that the specific property in the goods should have been vested in the plaintiff at the time the action is brought. Dyer, 24b.
Existing debt. See Existing Debt.
Fraudulent debt. A debt created by fraud. Such a debt implies confidence and deception. It implies that it arose out of a contract, express or implied, and that fraudulent practices were em-ployed by the debtor, by which the creditor was defrauded. Howland v. Carson, 28 Ohio St. 628.
liypothecary debt. One which is a lien upon an estate.
Judgment debt. See Judgment Debt.
Legal debts. Those that are recoverable in a court of common law, as debt on a bill of ex-change, a bond, or a simple contract. Rogers v. Daniell, 8 Allen, Mass., 348; Guild v. Walter, 182 Mass. 225, 65 N.E. 68.
Liquid debt. One which is immediately and un-conditionally due.
Mutual debts. Money due on both sides between two persons. Such debts must be due to and from same persons in same capacity. Dole v. Chatta-briga, 82 N.H. 396, 134 A. 347, 348. Cross debts in the same capacity and right, and of the same kind and quality. Lippitt v. Thames Loan & Trust Co., 88 Conn. 185, 90 A. 369, 374.
Passive debt. A debt upon which, by agreement between the debtor and creditor, no interest is payable, as distinguished from active debt; i. e., a debt upon which interest is payable. In this sense,
the terms "active" and "passive" are applied to certain debts due from the Spanish government to Great Britain. Wharton. In another sense of the wards, a debt is "active" or "passive" accord-ing as the person of the creditor or debtor is re-garded; a passive debt being that which a man owes; an active debt that which is owing to him. In this meaning every debt is both active and passive,—active as regards the creditor, passive as regards the debtor.
Privileged debt. One which is to be paid before others in case a debtor is insolvent.
Public debt. That which is due or owing by the government of a state or nation. The terms "pub-lic debt" and "public securities," used in legisla-tion, are terms generally applied to national or state obligations and dues, and would rarely, if ever, be construed to include town debts or obli-gations; nor would the term "public revenue" ordinarily be applied to funds arising from town taxes. Morgan v. Cree, 46 Vt. 773, 14 Am.Rep. 640.
Pure debt. In Scotch law. A debt due now and unconditionally is so called. It is thus distin-guished from a future debt,—payable at a fixed day in the Future,—and a contingent debt, which will only become due upon the happening of a cer-tain contingency.
Simple contract debt. One where the contract upon which the obligation arises is neither ascer-tained by matter of record nor yet by deed or spe-cial instrument, but by mere oral evidence the most simple of any, or by notes unsealed, which are capable of a more easy proof, and therefore only better than a verbal promise. 2 Bl.Comm. 466.
Solvent debts. In Pennsylvania, the "solvent debts" which a city may deduct from its gross in-debtedness pursuant to Act April 20, 1874, P.L. 65, in ascertaining its borrowing capacity, are debts due it directly, payment of which it can enforce as one of its quick assets for the liquidation of any of its obligations. McGuire v. City of Philadelphia, 245 Pa. 287, 91 A. 622, 623.
Specialty debt. See Debt by Specialty or Special Contráct, supra.
DEBTEE. A person to whom a debt is due; a creditor. 3 Bl.Comm. 18; Plowd. 543. Not used.
DEBTOR. One who owes a debt; he who may be compelled to pay a claim or demand. Anyone ha-ble on a claim, whether due or to become due. Cozart v. Barnes, C.C.A.S.C., 240 F. 935, 938.
The term may be used synonymously with "obllgor," "mortgagor," and the llke. McDuffle v. Faulk, 214 Ala. 221, 107 So. 61, 62.

Common Debtor

In Scotch law. A debtor whose effects have been arrested by several creditors. In regard to these creditors, he is their common debtor, and by this term is distinguished in the proceedings that take place in the competition. Bell

Debtor’s Act 1869

The statute 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62, abolishing im-prisonment for debt in England, and for the pun-ishment of fraudulent debtors. 2 Steph.Comm. 159-164. Not to be confounded with the Bankrupt-cy Act of 1869. Mozley & Whitley

Debtor’s Summons

In English law. A summons issuing from a court having jurisdiction in bankruptcy, upon the creditor proving a liquidated debt of not less than £50, which he has failed to collect after reasonable effort, stating that if the debtor fail, within one week, if a trader, and within three weeks if a non-trader, to pay or compound for the sum specified, a petition may be presented against him praying that he may be adjudged a bankrupt. Bankruptcy Act 1869, § 7; Robs.Bankr.; Mozley & Whitley.
DECALOGUE. The ten commandments which, according to Exodus XX, 1-18, were given by God to Moses. The Jews called them the "Ten Words," hence the name.
DECANATUS. A deanery. Spelman. A com-pany of ten persons. Calvin.
Also (and in this sense sometimes spelled De-cania, or Decana), a town or tithing, consisting originally of ten families of freeholders. Ten tithings compose a hundred. 1 Bla.Comm. 114; Medley, Orig.Illus.Eng.Const.Hist.
DECANIA. The office, jurisdiction, territory, or command of a decanus, or dean. Spelman.
DECANUS.
In Ecciesiastical and Old European Law
An officer having supervision over ten; a dean. A term applied not only to ecclesiastical, but to civil and military, officers. Decanus monasticus; a monastic dean, or dean of a monastery; an of-ficer over ten monks. Decanus in majori ecclesice; dean of a cathedral church, presiding over ten prebendaries. Decanus episcopi; a bishop’s or rural dean, presiding over ten clerks or parishes. Decanus friborgi; dean of a friborg. An officer among the Saxons who presided over a friborg, tithing, decennary, or association of ten inhabi-tants; otherwise called a "tithing man," or "bors-holder," his duties being those of an inferior judicial officer. Du Cange; Spelman, Gloss.; Calvinus, Lex. Decanus militaris; a military offi-cer having command of ten soldiers. Spelman.

In Roman Law

or "mess" of ten soldiers. Also an officer at Con-stantinople having charge of the burial of the dead. Nov.Jus. 43, 59; Du Cange.
DECAPITATION. The act of beheading. A mode of capital punishment by cutting off the head.
DECEASE, n. Death; not including civil death, (see Death.) In re Zeph’s Estate, 50 Hun, 523, 3 N.Y.S. 460.
DECEASE, v. To die; to depart life, or from Efe. This has always been a common term in Scotch law. "Gif ane man deceasis." Skene.
DECEASED. A dead person. In re Kite’s Estate, 194 Iowa, 129, 187 N.W. 585, 587, 24 A.L.R. 850.
DECEDENT. A deceased person, especially one who has lately died. Etymologically the word de-notes a person who is dying, but it has come to be used in law as signifying any deceased person, testate or intestate. In re Zeph’s Estate, 50 Hun, 523, 3 N.Y.S. 460.
DECEIT. A fraudulent and cheating misrepresen-tation, artifice, or device, used by one or more per-sons to deceive and trick another, who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of the party imposed upon. People v. Chadwick, 143 Cal. 116, 76 P. 884; French v. Vining, 102 Mass. 132, 3 Am.Rep. 440; In re Post, 54 Hun, 634, 7 N.Y.S. 438.
A fraudulent misrepresentation or contrivance, by which one man deceives another, who has no means of detecting the fraud, to the injury and damage of the latter.
A subtle trick or device, whereunto may be referred all manner of craft and collusion used to deceive and defraud another by any means whatsoever, which hath no other or more proper narre than deceit to distinguish the offense. [West Symb. § 68]; Jacob.
A "deceit" ís either: (1) The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true; (2) the assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who has no reasonable ground for believIng It to be true; (3) the suppression of a fact, by one who is bound to disclose it, or who gives information of other facts which are likely to mislead for want of communica-tion of that fact; or (4) a premiso, made without any in-tention of performing it. Civ.Code Cal. § 1710; Civ.Code S.D. § 1293 (Comp.Laws 1929, § 797).
To constitute "deceit," the statement must be untrue, made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless and conscious ignorance thereof, especially tf parties are not on equal terms, made with intent that plaintiff act there-on or In a manner apparently (Med to induce him to act thereon, – and plaintiff must act in relance on the state-ment in the manner contemplated, or manifestly probable, to his injury. Corley Co. v. Griggs, 192 N.C. 171, 134 S.E. 406, 407; Pain v. Kiel, C.C.A.Mo., 288 F. 527, 529. See, also, Crossman v. Bacon & Robinson Co.’ 119 Me. 105, 109 A. 487, 489; Alpine v. FrIend Bros., 244 Mass. 164, 138 N. E. 553, 554; Hood v. Wood, 61 Ok). 294, 161 P. 210, 213.
The essentlal elements of "deceit" are representation, falslty, sclenter, deception, and injury. Ochs v. Woods, 221 N.Y. 335, 117 N.E. 305, 306.

In Old English Law

The name of an original writ, and the action founded on it, which lay to recover damages for any injury committed deceitfully, either in the name of another, (as by bringing an action in an-other’s name, and then suffering a nonsuit, where-by the plaintiff became hable to costs,) or by a fraudulent warranty of goods, or other personal
injury committed contrary to good faith and hon-esty. Reg.Orig. 112-116; Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 95, E, 98.
Also the name of a judicial writ which formerly lay to recover lands which had been lost by de-fault by the tenant in a real action, in consequence of his not having been summoned by the sheriff, or by the collusion of his attorney. Rosc.Real Act. 136; 3 Bl.Comm. 166.

In General

Deceitful plea. A sham plea; one alleging as facts things which are obviously false on the face of the plea. Gray v. Gidiere, 4 Strob., S.C., 443.
DECEM TALES. (Ten such; or ten tales, jurors.) In practice. The name of a writ which issues in England, where, on a trial at bar, ten jurors are necessary to make up a full panel, commanding the sheriff to summon the requisite number. 3 Bl.Comm. 364; Reg.Jud. 30b; 3 Steph.Comm. 602.
DECEMVIRI LITIBUS JUDICANDIS. Lat. In the Roman law. Ten persons (five senators and five equites) who acted as the council or assistants of the preetor, when he decided on matters of law. Hallifax, Civil Law, b. 3, c. 8. According to oth-ers, they were themselves judges, appointed by Augustus to act in certain cases. Calvinus, Lex.; Anthon, Rom.Ant.
DECENCY. Propriety of action, speech, dress, etc. Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Bell, 100 Misc. 281, 167 N.Y.S. 124, 128.
DECENNA. In old English law. A tithing or decennary; the precinct of a frank-pledge; con-sisting of ten freeholders with their families. Spelman.
DECENNARIUS. Lat. One who held one•half a virgate of land. Du Cange. One of the ten free-holders in a decennary. Id.; Calvin. Decennier. One of the decennary, or ten freeholders making up a tithing. Spelman; Du Cange, Decenna; 1 Bla.Comm. 114.
DECENNARY. A tithing, composed of ten neigh-boring families. 1 Reeve, Eng.Law, 13; 1 Bl. Comm. 114.
King Alfred, for the better preservation e! the peace, divided England into counties, the counties into hundreds, and the hundreds into tithings or decennaries: the in-habitants whereof, living together, were sureties or pledges for each other’s gond behavior.
DECEPTION. The act of deceiving; intentional misleading by falsehood spoken or acted. Smith v. State, 13 Ala.App. 399, 69 So. 402, 403.
DECEPTIONE. A writ that lieth properly against him that deceitfully doth anything in the name of another, for one that receiveth damage or hurt thereby. It is either original or judicial. Fitzh. N.B.
Deceptis non deciplentibus, jura subvenlunt. The laws help persons who are deceived, not those deceiving. Tray. Lat. Max. 149.
DECERN. In Scotch law. To decree. "Decernit and ordainit." 1 How. State Tr. 927. "Decerns." ShaW, 16.
DECESSUS. In the civil and old English law. Death; departure.
Decet tamen principem servare leges quibus ipse servatus est. It behooves, indeed, the prince to keep the laws by which he himself is preserved.
DECIDE. To "decide" includes the power and right to deliberate, to weigh the reasons for and against, to see which preponderate, and to be gov-erned by that preponderance. Darden v. Lines, 2 Fla. 571; In re Milford & M. R. Co., 68 N.H. 570, 36 A. 545.
DECIES TANTUM (Ten times as much). The name of an ancient writ that was used against a juror who had taken a bribe in money for his ver-dict. The injured party could thus recover ten times the amount of the bribe.
DECIMPE. In ecclesiastical law. Tenths, or tithes. The tenth part of the annual profit of each living, payable formerly to the pope. There were several valuations made of these livings at dif-ferent times. The decimce (tenths) were appro-priated to the crown, and a new valuation estab-lished, by 26 Hen. VIII., c. 3. 1 Bl.Comm. 284. See Tithes.
Decimm debentur paroche. Tithes are due to the parish priest.
Dechnw de decimatis solvi non debent. Tithes are not to be paid from that which is given for tithes.
Decirme de jure divino et canonica institutione pertinent ad personam. Dal. 50. Tithes belong to the parson by divine right and canonical institu-tion.
Decimre non debent solvi, ubi non est anima ren-ovatio; et ex annuatis renovantibus simui semei. Cro. Jac. 42. Tithes ought not to be paid where there is not an annual renovation, and from annual renovations once only.
DECIMATION. The punishing of every tenth soldier by lot, for mutiny or other failure of duty. This was termed "decimatio legionis" by the Ro-mans. Sometimes only the twentieth man was punished, (vicesimatio,) or the hundredth, (cen-tesimatio.)
DECIME. A French coin of the value of the tenth part of a franc, or nearly_ two cents.
DECINERS. Those that had the oversight and check of ten friburgs for the maintenance of the king’s peace. Cunningham.
Decipi quam fallece est tutius. It is safer to be deceived than to deceive. Lofft, 396.
DECISION. A popular rathez than technical or legal word; a comprehensive term having no fixed, legal meaning. It may be employed as referring to ministerial acts as well as to those that are ju-dicial or of a judicial character, Palmer Pub. Co. v. Smith, 130 Tex. 346, 109 S.W.2d 158, 159; such as decision of architects, Independent School Dist. No. 35, St. Louis County, v. A. Hedenberg & Co., 214 Minn. 82, 7 N.W.2d 511, 515; of county commissioners, Houser v. Olmstead, 57 S.D. 41,

230 N.W. 224, 225; or of industrial commission, Rosenquist v. O’Neil & Preston, 187 Minn. 375, 245 N.W. 621.
A judgment or decree pronounced by a court in settlement of a controversy submitted to it and by way of authoritative answer to the questions raised before it. Adams v. Railroad Co., 77 Miss. 194, 24 So. 317, 60 L.R.A. 33; Board of Education v. State, 7 Kan.App. 620, 52 P. 466.
A judgment given by a competent tribunal. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Richards, 123 Misc. 83, 204 N.Y.S. 246, 248.
The findings of fact and conclusions of law which must be in writing and filed with the clerk. Stewart Mining Co. v. Ontario Mining Co., 23 Idaho, 724, 132 P. 787, 791; Wilcox v. Sway, 69 Cal.App.2d 141, 160 P.2d 154, 156.
A finding, as by a court, upon elther a question of law or fact arising in a case. Vermont Marble Co. v. Eastman, 91 Vt. 425, 101 A. 151, 160. The court’s finding or findings. Volderauer v. State, 195 Ind. 415, 143 N.E. 674, 676; Chambers v. Farnham, 39 Cal.App. 17, 179 P. 423, 424.
A determination of a judicial or quasi judicial nature. Codington County v. Board of Com’rs of Codington County, 51 S.D. 131, 212 N.W. 626, 628.
Statement by trial justice atter trial before court with-out jury does not constltute "decision." Shaul v. Fideltty & Deposlt Co. of Maryland, 131 Misc. 401, 227 N.Y.S. 163, 168. A "decision" involves reaching a conclusion. Lam-bros v. Young, 145 F.2d 341, 343, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 247.
The term is broad enough to cover both final judgments and Interlocutory orders. Stout v. Stout, 68 Ind.App. 278, 131 N.E. 245, 246. And though sometimes limited to the sense of judgment; Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Mus-se111, 102 Ohlo St. 10, 130 N.E. 32, 33; the term is at other times understood as meaning simply the first step leading to a judgment; Dorney v. Ives, 36 R.I. 276, 90 A. 164, 165; or as an order for judgment; Collins v. Beiland, 37 Cal. App. 139, 173 P. 601, 602. The word may also include var-bous rulings, as well as orders. U. S. v. Thompson, 251 U. S. 407, 40 S.Ct. 289, 291, 64 L.Ed. 333; Marr v. Marr, 194 Cal. 332, 228 P. 534, 535.
The words "decision" and judgment" may be used in-terchangeably, but in the abstract there 1s a shade of dif-ference between the two. Smith v. State, 196 Ga. 595, 27 S.E.2d 369, 373.
"Decision" Is not necessarlly synonymous with "opin-ion." A decision of the court Is its judgment; the opin-ion is the reasons given for that judgment, or the expres-sion of the views of the judge. Craig v. Bennett, 158 Ind. 9, 62 N.E. 273; But the two words are sometimes used interchangeably. Plerce v. State, 109 Ind. 535, 10 N.E. 302; Keller v. Summers, 262 Mo. 324, 171 S.W. 336, 337.
The French lawyers call the opinlons which they give on questions propounded to them, declsions. See Inst. 1, 2, 8; Dig. 1, 2, 2.
DECISIVE, or DECISORY, OATII. See Oath.
DECISION ON MERITS. A decision determining the validity of a written instrument or passing on a controversy with respect to the interpretation thereof which bars subsequent suit on same cause of action. Eulenberg v. Torley’s Inc., 56 Cal.App. 2d 653, 133 P.2d 15, 17.
DECLARANT. A person who makes a declara-tion.
DECLARATION.

In Pleading

The first of the pleadings on the part of the plaintiff in an action at law, being a formal and
methodical specification of the facts and circum-stances constituting his cause of action. It com-monly comprises several sections or divisions, called "counts," and its formal parts f ollow each other in this order: Title, venue, commencement, cause of action, counts, conclusion. The declara-tion, at common law, answers to the "libel" in ec-clesiastical and admiralty law, the "bill" in equity, the "petition" in civil law, the "complaint" in code pleading, and the "count" in real actions. U. S. v. Ambrose, 108 U.S. 336, 2 S.Ct. 682, 27 L.Ed. 746; Railway Co. v. Nugent, 86 Md. 349, 38 A. 779, 39 L.R.A. 161; Dixon v. Sturgeon, 6 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 28; 1 Chit.Pl. 248; Co.Litt. 17 a, 303 a; Bacon, Abr. Pleas (B) ; Comyns, Dig. Pleader, C, 7; Lawes, Pl. 35; Steph.P1. 36; Leslie v. Men-delson, 302 Mich. 95, 4 N.W.2d 481, 484.
It may be general or special: for example, in debt on a bond, a declaration counting on the penal part only is gen-eral; one which sets out both the bond and the condition and assigns the breach is special; Gould, Pl. c. 4, § 50.

In Evidente

An unsworn statement or narration of facts made by a party to the transaction, or by one who has an interest in the existente of the facts re-counted. Also, similar statements made by a per-son since deceased, which are admissible in evi-dence in some cases, contrary to the general rule, e. g., "dying declarations" (see that subtitle, in-fra).

In Practice

The declaration or declaratory part of a judg-ment, decree, or order is that part which gives the decision or opinion of the court on the question of law in the case. Thus, in an action raising a question as to the construction of a will, the judg-ment or order declares that, according to the true construction of the will, the plaintiff has become entitled to the residue of the testator’s estate, or the like. Sweet.

In Scotch Practice

The statement of a criminal or prisoner, taken before a magistrate. 2 Alis. Crim. Pr. 555; 2 Hume 328; Arkl. Just. 70; Paterson, Comp. II 952, 970.

In General

A "declaration" is a statement made out of court. Dawson v. Davis, 125 Conn. 330, 5 A.2d 703, 704.
Declaration against interest. Such declarations are evidence’ of the fact declared, and are there-fore distinct from admissions, which amount to a waiver of proof. Jelser v. White, 183 N.C. 126, 110 S.E. 849, 850. They are statements which, when made, conflict with the pecuniary interest of the person making them, who need not have been a party, privy or witness to the suit in which they are offered. Elliotte v. Lavier, 299 Mich. 373, 300 N.W. 116, 118.
Declaration in chief. A declaration for the prin-cipal cause of action. 1 Tidd, Pr. 419.

Declaration of dividend. The act of a corpora-tion in setting aside a portion of the net or sur-plus proceeds for distribution among the stock-holders according to their respective interests. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Glenn, D.C.Ky., 36 F.Supp. 552, 554. See, also, Dividend.
Declaration of homestead. A creature of, and its validity dPpends upon, compliance with home-stead statute. It is merely an act of the owner whereby he avails himself of, and secures, a right or privilege given him by statute; it is neither a conveyance nor a contract, and there is no trans-fer of, or change in, title, nor any agreement of transfer or change. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Alloway, 173 Wash. 404, 23 P.2d 408. See, also, Homestead.
Declaration of independence. A formal decla-ration or announcement, promulgated July 4, 1776, by the congress of the United States of America, in the name and behalf of the people of the col-onies, asserting and proclaiming their independ-ence of the British crown, vindicating their preten-sions to political autonomy, and anouncing them-selves to the world as a free and independent na-tion.
Declaration of intention. A declaration made by an alien, as a preliminary to naturalization, be-fore a court of record, to the effect that it is his intention in good faith to becóme a citizen of the United States, and to renounee forever ah allegi-anee and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty whereof at the time he may be a citizen or subject. 8 U.S.C.A. § 731.
Declaration of right. See Bill of Rights.
Declaration of trust. The act by which the per-son who holds the legal title to property or an es-tate acknowledges and declares that he holds the same in trust to the use of another person or for certain specified purposes. The narre is also used to designate the deed or other writing embodying such a declaration. Griffith v. Maxfield, 66 Ark. 513, 51 S.W. 832. See Baker v. Baker, 123 Md. 32, 90 A. 776, 779 (bank deposit); Del Giorgio v. Powers, 27 Cal.App.2d 668, 81 P.2d 1006, 1012 (mining claim); Bingen v. First Trust Co. of St. Paul, C.C.A.Minn., 103 F.2d 260, 264 (letter).
Declaration of war. A public and formal proc-lamation by a nation, through its executive or leg-islative department, that a state of war exists be-tween itself and another nation, and forbidding all persons to aid or assist the enemy.
An act of Congress is necessary to the commencement of a foreign war and la in ltself a "declaration" and flxes the date of the war. West v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 202 S.C. 422, 25 S.E.2d 475, 477, 145 A.L.R. 1461; Rosenau v. Idaho Mut. Ben. Ass’n, 65 Idaho 408, 145 P.2d 227, 230.
Dying declarations. Statements made by a per-son who is lying at the point of death, and is con-scious of his approaching dissolution, in reference to the manner in which he received the injuries of which he is dying, or other immediate cause of his death, and in reference to the person who in-flicted such injuries or the connection with such injuries of a person who is charged or suspected of having committed them; which statements are admissible in evidente in a trial for homicide (and occasionally, at least in some jurisdictions, in oth-er cases) where the killing of the declarant is the crime charged to the defendant. Shepard v. U. S., Kan., 290 U.S. 96, 54 S.Ct. 22, 78 L.Ed. 196; See generally Simons v. People, 150 III. 66, 36 N.E. 1019; Frier v. State, 92 Fla. 241, 109 So. 334, 335; Lucas v. Commonwealth, 153 Ky. 424, 155 S.W. 721, 722; Edwards v. State, 113 Neb. 698, 204 N.W. 780, 783; People v. Selknes, 309 III. 113, 140 N.E. 852, 854. Also Barsch v. Hammond, 110 Colo. 441, 135 P.2d 519, 521 (motorist); Waller v. Common-wealth, 178 Va. 294, 16 S.E.2d 808, 813 (shooting); State v. Brown, 209 Minn. 478, 296 N.W. 582, 586 (abortion).
Statements made by deceased while on Operating table were inadrnissible as "dying declarations" where there was no statement by deceased himself that he knew that death was approaching. People v. Hall, 260 App.Div. 421, 22 N.Y. S.2d 973, 976.
Self-serving declaration. One made by a party in his own interest at some time and place out of court;-not including testimony which he gives as witness at the trial. Brosnan v. Boggs, 101. Or. 472, 198 P. 890, 892.
DECLARATION OF LONDON. A declaration concerning the laws of naval war, agreed upon February 26, 1909, by the powers assembled at the London Naval Conference.
The preamble states that the Deciaration was made in view of the desirabillty of an agreement upon the rules to be applied by the International Prize Court established by the Second Hague Conference. A preliminary provislon states that it ls agreed that the rules adopted "correspond In substance with the generally recognized principies of International law." The subjects dealt with by the Dec-laration include Biockade, Contraband, Unneutral Service, Destruction of Neutral Prizes, Transfer to Neutral Flag, Enemy Character, Convoy, Search, and Compensation, Higglns, 538-613.
DECLARATION OF PARIS. The name given to an agreement announcing four important rules of international law effected between the principal European powers at the Congress of Paris in 1856. These rules are: (1) Privateering is and remains abolished; (2) the neutral flag covers enemy’s goods, except contraband of war; (3) neutral goods, except contraband of war, are not hable to confiscation under a hostile flag; (4) blockades, to be binding, must be effective.
DECLARATION OF ST. PETERSBURG. A dec-laration made at St. Petersburg in 1868 on behalf of certain of the powers in relation to the prohibi-tion of the use of explosive bullets in time of war,
DECLARATOR. In Scotch law. An action whereby it is sought to have some right of prop-erty, or of status, or other right judicially ascer-tained and declared. Bell.
DECLARATOR OF TRUST. An action resorted to against a trustee who holds property upon ti-tles ex facie for his own benefi DECLARATORY. Explanatory; designed to fix or elucidate what before was uncertain or doubt-ful.
DECLARATORY ACTION. In Scotch law. An action in which the right of the pursuer (or plain-tiff) is craved to be declared, but nothing clairned to be done by the defender (defendant.) Ersk. Inst. 5, 1, 46. Otherwise called an "action of de-clarator."
DECLARATORY DECREE. In practice. A bind-ing declaration of right in equity without conse-quential relief.
DECLARATORY JTJDGMENT. One which sim-ply declares the rights of the parties or expresses the opinion of the court on a question of law, with-out ordering anything to be done. Its distinctive characteristics are that no executory process fol-lows as of course, nor is it necessary that an ac-tual wrong, giving rise to action for damages, should have been done, or be immediately threat-ened. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huff-man, La., 319 U.S. 293, 63 S.Ct. 1070, 87 L.Ed. 1407; Petition of Kariher, 284 Pa. 455, 131 A. 265, 268; Village of Bay v. Gelvick, 58 Ohio App. 51, 15 N.E. 2d 786, 791. It must deal with real dispute of real fact. Rauh v. Fletcher Savings & Trust Co., 207 Ind. 638, 194 N.E. 334, 335. It is distinguished from other actions in that it does not seek execu-tion or performance from the defendant or op-posing party. Brindley v. Meara, Ind., 209 Ind. 144, 198 N.E. 301, 101 A.L.R. 682; Gutensohn v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., C.C.A.Mo., 140 F. 2d 950.
DECLARATORY PART OF A LAW. That which clearly defines rights to be observed and wrongs to be eschewed.
DECLARATORY STATUTE. One enacted for the purpose of removing doubts or putting an end to conflicting decisions in regard to what the law is in relation to a particular matter. It may either be expressive of the common Iaw, 1 El. Comm. 86; Gray v. Bennett, 3 Mete., Mass., 527; In re Un-garo’s Will, 88 N.J.Eq. 25, 102 A. 244, 246, or may declare what shall be taken to be the true mean-ing and intention of a previous statute, though in the latter case such enactments are more com-monly called "expository statutes." McMahon v. Maddox, Tex.Civ.App., 297 S.W. 310, 312.
A statute enacted to put an end to a doubt as to what is the common law, or the meaning of an-other statute, and which declares what it is and ever has been. Nelson v. Sandkamp, 227 Minn. 177, 34 N.W.2d 640, 642, 5 A.L.R.2d 1136.
To allege or affirm. State v. Hostetter, Mo.Sup., 222 S.W. 750, 754. To solemnly assert a fact be-fore witnesses, e. g., where a testator declares a paper signed by him to be his last will and testa-ment. Lane v. Lane, 95 N.Y. 498.
This also is one of the words customarlly used in the promise given by a person who is offirmed as a witness,— "sincerely and truly declare and affirm." Hence, to make a positive and solemn asseveration. Bassett v. Denn, 17 N. J. Law, 433.
With reference to pleadings, it means to draw up, serve, and file a declaration; e. g., a "role to declare." Also to allege in a declaration as a ground or cause of action; as "he declares upon a promissory note."
DECLINATION. In Scotch law. A pica to the jurisdiction, on the ground that the judge is in-terested in the suit.
DÉCLINATOIRES. In French law. Pleas to the jurisdiction of the court; also of lis pendens, and of connexité, (q. v.).
DECLINATORY EXCEPTIONS are such dilatory exceptions as merely decline the jurisdiction of the judge before whom the action is brought, Code Proc. La. 334. A plea to the jurisdiction ra-tionae personae. Diamond T. Motor Trucks v„ Heck, La.App., 13 So.2d 512, 514.
DECLINATORY PLEA. In English practice. The plea of sanctuary, or of benefit of elergy, be-. fore trial or conviction. 2 Hale, P.C. 236; 4 El, Comm. 333. Now abolished. 6 & 7 Geo. IV, c. 28, § 6; Mozl. & W. Dict.; 4 Steph. Comm. 400, note; Id. 436, note.
DECLINATURE. In Scotch practice. An objec-tion to the jurisdiction of a judge. Bell.
DECLINE. A failing process, a tendency to a worse state; to become gradually impaired; a, failing off or downward tendency. Exum v. Laub, C.C.A.Tex., 87 F.2d 73, 74; Buffalo County v. Phelps County, 129 Neb. 268, 261 N.W. 360.
DECOCTION. The act of boiling a substance in water, for extracting its virtues. The operation of boiling certain ingredients in a huid for the purpose of extracting the parts soluble at that temperature. Also the liquor in which a substance has been boiled; water impregnated with the principies of any animal or vegetable substance boiled in it. Webster; Sykes v. Ma.gone, C.C.N.Y., 38 F. 497.
In an Inffictment "decoction" and "Infusion" are ejusdem generis; and if one Is alleged to have been administered, instead of the other, the variante Is immaterlal. 3 Camp, 74.
DECOCTOR. In the Roman law. A bankrupt; a spendthrift; a squanderer of public funds. Cal-vin.
DECLARE. To make known, manifest, or clear. Lasier v. Wright, 304 Ill. 130, 136 N.E. 545, 552, 28 A.L.R. 674. To signify, to show in any man-ner either by words or acts. Edwardson v. Ger-wien, 41 N.D. 506, 171 N.W. 101, 102. To publish; to utter; to announce clearly some opinion or res-olution. Knecht v. Ins. Co., 90 Pa. 121, 35 Am. DECOLLATIO. In old English and Scotch law, Rep. 641. As to "declare" a dividend. A. T. Jer- Decollation; the punishment of beheading. Fleta. gins Trust v. Rogan, D.C.Cal., 40 F.Supp. 40, 42. lib. 1, c. 21, § 6.

DECOMPOSED. A state of decomposition. United States v. 1851 Cartons, More or Less, etc., D.C.Colo., 55 F.Supp. 343, 346; A. O. Anderson & Co. v. U. S., C.C.A.Wash., 284 F. 542, 544. A sep-aration hito components; specifically, decay or dissolution. In re Vett2r, Cust. & Pat.App., 96 F.2d 999, 1000.
DÉCONFES. In French law. A name formerly given to those persons who died without confes-sion, whether they refused to confess or whether they were criminals to whom the sacrament was refused. Droit de -Canon, per M. 1’Abbé André; Dupin, Óloss. to Loisel’s Institutes.
DECORATE. To beautify. To do something, as to a house as such, to improve the condition of the house, or of a room. Grasell v. Brodhead, 175 App.Div. 874, 162 N.Y.S. 421, 423. The addi-tion of something becoming or beautiful. Upsal Street Realty Co. v. Rubin, 326 Pa. 327, 192 A. 481, 483.
DECORATOR. One whose business is the decora-tion of dwellings or public edifices. Grasell v. Brodhead, 175 App.Div. 874, 162 N.Y.S. 421, 423.
DECOY. To inveigle, entice, tempt, or lure; as, to decoy a person within the jurisdiction of a court so that he may be served with process, or to decoy a fugitive criminal to a place where he may be ar-rested without extradition papers, or to decoy one away from his place of residence for the purpose of kidnapping him and as a part of that act. In all these uses, the word implies enticement or lur-ing by means of some fraud, trick, or temptation, but excludes the idea of force. Eberling v. State, 136 Ind. 117, 35 N.E. 1023; John v. State, 44 P. 51, 6 Wyo. 203.
Also, a "decoy pond." See that title, infra.
DECOY LETTER. A letter prepared and mailed for the purpose of detecting a criminal, particu-larly one who is perpetrating frauds upon the pos-tal or revenue laws. U. S. v. Whittier, 5 Dill. 39, Fed. Cas. No. 16,688.
DECOY POND. A pond used for the breeding and maintenance of water-fowl. Keeble v. Hick-eringshall, 3 Salk. 10; 11 Mod. 74, 130; Holt 14; 11 East 571.
DECREE.

In. Practice

The judgment of a court of equity or ad-miralty, answering for most purposes to the judgment of a court of common law. A de-cree in equity is a sentence or order of the court, pronounced on hearing and understanding all the points in issue, and determining the rights of 011 the parties to the suit, according to equity and good conscience. 2 Daniell, Ch.Pr. 986; Woos-ter v. Handy, C.C.N.Y., 23 F. 49, 56; Motion Pic-ture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., D.C., N.Y., 232 F. 263, 265; Bull v. International Power Co., 84 N.J.Eq. 209, 93 A. 86, 88; Alford v. Leon-ard, 88 Fla. 532, 102 So. 885, 890. It is a declara-tion of the court announcing the legal consequenc-
es of the facts found. Robertson v. Talrnadge, Tex.Civ.App., 174 S.W. 627, 629.
A decree, as distinguished from an order, is final, and is made at the hearing of the cause, whereas an order is in-terlocutory, and is made on motion or petition. Wherever an order may, in a certain event resulting from the direc-tion contained in the order, lead to the termination of the suit in like manner as a decree made at the hearing, it is called a "decretal order." Brown.
A judgment at law, as distinguished from a decree in equity, was either simply for the plaintiff or for the de-fendant. There could be no qualifications or modifications. But such a judgment does not always touch the true justice of the cause or put the parties In the position they ought to occupy. This result was attained by the decree of a court of equity which could be so moulded, or the execu-tion of which could be so controlled and suspended, that the relative duties and rights of the partles could be se-cured and enforced. Bisph.Eq. § 7.
The words "judgment" and "decree," however, are often used synonymously; Finnell v. Finnell, 113 Okl. 269, 230 P. 912, 913; especially now that the Codes have abolished the distinction between law and equity; Henderson v. Arkansas, 71 Okl. 253, 176 P. 751, 753. But of the two terms, "judgment" is the more comprehensive, and in-eludes ”decree." Coleman v. Los Angeles County, 180 Cal. 714, 182 P. 440, 441.
Decision of an administrative boara though based on facts adduced on a hearing, Dal Maso v. Board of Com’rs of Prince George’s County, 182 Md. 200, 34 A.2d 464, 466, or rescript from reviewing court are not decrees. City of Boston v. Santosuosso, 308 Mass. 189, 31 N.E.2d 564, 568

Classification

Decrees in equity are either fina/ or interlocu-tory. A final decree is one which fully and finally disposes of the whole litigation, determining all questions raised by the case, and leaving nothing that requires further judicial action. Sawyer v. White, 125 Me. 206, 132 A. 421, 422; Draper Corpo-ration v. Stafford Co., C.C.A.Mass., 255 F. 554, 555; Burgin v. Sugg, 210 Ala. 142, 97 So. 216, 217′ An interlocutory decree is a provisional or prelimin-ary decree, which is not final and does not deter-mine the suit, but directs some further proceed-ings preparatory to the final decree. It is a decree pronounced for the purpose of ascertaining mat-ter of law or fact preparatory to a final decree. 1 Barb. Ch. Pr. 326, 327; Wooster v. Handy, C.C. N.Y., 23 F. 49, 56; Beebe v. Russell, 19 How. 283, 15 L.Ed. 668; Cornely v. Marckwald, 131 U.S. 159, 9 S.Ct. 744, 33 L.Ed. 117. Where something more than the ministerial execution of the decree as rendered is left to be done, the decree is interlocu-tory, and not final, even though it settles the equi-ties of the bill. Lodge v. Twell, 135 U.S. 232, 10 S.Ct. 745, 34 L.Ed. 153. The difficulty of exact definition is mentioned in McGourkey v. Ry. Co., 146 U.S. 536, 13 S.Ct. 170, 36 L.Ed. 1079. See, also, Keystone Manganese & Iron Co. v. Martin, 132 U. S. 91, 10 S.Ct. 32, 33 L.Ed. 275; Leyhe v. McNam-ara, Tex.Com.App., 243 S.W. 1074, 1076.

In French Law

Certain acts of the Legislature or of the sover-eign which have the force of law are called "de-crees"; as the Berlin and Milan decrees.

In Scotch Law

A final judgment or sentence of court by which the question at issue between the parties is de-cided.

In General
Consent decree. One entered by consent of the parties; it is not property a judicial sentence, but is in the nature of a solemn contract or agreement of the parties, made under the sanction of the court, and in effect an admission by them that the decree is a just determination of their rights upon the real facts of the case, if such facts had been proved. Alíen v. Richardson, 9 Rich.Eq., S.C., 53; Schmidt v. Mining Co., 28 Or. 9, 40 P. 1014, 52 Am. St.Rep. 759; Hodgson v. Vroom, C.C.A.N.Y., 266 F. 267, 268; Barnes v. American Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 130 S.E. 902, 911. It binds only the consenting parties; Myllius v. Smith, 53 W.Va. 173, 44 S.E. 542; and is not binding upon the court; Ex parte Loung June, D.C.N.Y., 160 F. 251, 259. Parties thereto must be competent to contract. Consaer v. Wisniewski, 293 Ill.App. 529, 13 N.E.2d 93, 94.
Decree dative. In Scotch law. An order of a probate court appointing an administrator.
Decree nisi. A provisional decree, which will be made absolute on motion unless cause be shown against it. In English practice, it is the order made by the court for divorce, on satisfactory proof being given in support of a petition for dis-solution of marriage; it remains imperfect for at least six months, (which period may be short-ened by the court down to three,) and then, unless sufficient cause be shown, it is made absolute on motion, and the dissolution takes effect, subject to appeal. Wharton. It effects a conditional di-vorce, becoming absolute only upon the happen-ing of a prescribed contingency. Grant v. Grant, 84 N.J.Eq. 81, 92 A. 791, 793.
Decree of constitution. In Scotch practice. A decree by which a debt is ascertained. Bell. In technical language, a decree which is requisite to found a title in the person of the creditor, whether that necessity arises from the death of the debtor or of the creditor. Id.
Decree of distribution. An instrument by which heirs receive property of a deceased; it is a final determination of the parties to a proceeding. Fischer v. Dolwig, 29 N.D. 561, 151 N.W. 431, 432; In re Bradford’s Estate, 128 N.J.Eq. 372, 16 A.2d 268, 270.
Decree of forthcoming. In Scotch law. A de-cree made after an arrestment (q. v.) ordering the debt to be paid or the effects of the debtor to be delivered to the arresting creditor. Bell.
Decree of insolvency. One entered in a probate court, declaring the estate in question to be in-solvent, that is, that the assets are not sufficient to pay the debts in full. Bush v. Coleman, 121 Ala. 548, 25 So. 569; Walker v. Newton, 85 Me. 458, 27 A. 347.
Decree of locality. In Scotch law. The decree of a teind court allocating stipend upon different heritors. It is equivalent to the apportionment of a tithe rent-charge. Decree of modification. In Scotch law. A de-cree of the teind court modifying or fixing a stipend.
Decree of nullity. One entered in a suit for the annulment of a marriage, and adjudging the mar-riage to have been null and void ab initio. See Nullity.
Decree of registration. In Scotch law. A pro-ceeding giving immediate execution to the credi-tor; similar to a warrant of attorney to confess j udgment.
Decree pro confesso. One entered in a court of equity in favor of the complainant where the de-fendant has made no answer to the bill and its allegations are consequently taken "as confessed." Ohio Cent. R. Co. v. Central Trust Co., 133 U.S. 83, 10 S.Ct. 235, 33 L.Ed. 561; Equity Rules 16, 17, see Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rules 6, 55, 28 U.S.C.A.; Freem. Judg. § 11; 1 Dan.Ch.Pr. 5th Am. ed. 517, n. It is merely an admission of the allega-tions of the bill well pleaded. Remington v. Bar-ney, 35 R.I. 267, 86 A. 891, 892; Majure v. John-son, 192 Miss. 810, 7 So.2d 545, 549.
Deficiency decree. In a mortgage foreclosure suit, a decree for the balance of the indebtedness after applying the proceeds of a sale of the mort-gaged property to such indebtedness. Commercial Bank of Ocala v. First Nat. Bank, 80 Fla. 685, 87 So. 315, 316.
For "Execution of decree," see Execution of Judgment or Decree.
DECREET. In Scotch law. The final judgment or sentence of a court.
DECREET ABSOLVITOR. A decree dismissing a claim, or acquitting a defendant. 2 Kames, Eq. 367.
DECREET ARBITRAL. An award of arbitratórs. 1 Kames, Eq. 312, 313; 2 Kames, Eq. 367.
DECREET COGNITIONIS CAUSA. When a cred-itor brings his action against the heir of his debtor in order to constitute the debt against him and at-tach the lands, and the heir appears and renounces the succession, the court then pronounces a de-cree cognitionis causa. Bell.
DECREET CONDEMNATOR. One where the decision is in favor of the plaintiff. Ersk.Inst. 4, 3, 5.
DECREET OF VALUATION OF TEINDS. A sen-tence of the court of sessions, (who are now in the place of the commissioners for the valuation of teinds,) determining the extent and value of teinds. Bell.
DECREMENTUM MARIS. Lat. In oíd English law. Decrease of the sea; the receding of the sea from the land. Callis, Sewers, (53,) 65. See Reliction.
DECREPIT. This term designates a person who is disabled, incapable, or incompetent, either from physical or mental weakness or defects, whether produced by age or other causes, to such an ex-tent as to render the individual comparatively helpless in a personal conflict with one possessed of ordinary health and strength. Hall v. State, 16 Tex.App. 11, 49 Am.Rep. 824; Lutz v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 236, 179 S.W.2d 979, 980. The term in-eludes a blind man. Lewing v. State, 135 Tex.Cr. R. 485, 121 S.W.2d 599, 600.
DECRETA. In the Roman law. Judicial sen-tences given by the emperor as supreme judge.
Decreta coneiliorum non ligant reges nostros. Moore, 906. The decrees of councils bind not our kings.
DECRETAL. The granting or denying of remedy sought. State v. Reagan County Purchasing Co., Tex.Civ.App., 186 S.W.2d 128, 134.
DECRETAL ORDER. A preliminary order that determines no question upon the merits and es-tablishes no right. Electrical Research Products v. Vitaphone Corporation, 20 Del.Ch. 417, 171 A. 738.
DECRETALES BONIFACII OCTAVI. A supple-mental collection of the canon law, published by Boniface VIII. in 1298, called, also, "Liber Sextus Decretalium," (Sixth Book of the Decretals.)
DECRETALES GREGORII NONI. The decretals of Gregory the Ninth. A collection of the laws of the church, published by order of Gregory IX. in 1227. It is composed of five books, subdivided into titles, and each title is divided into chapters. They are cited by using an X, (or extra;) thus "Cap. 8 X de Regulis J’iris," etc.
DECRETALS. In ecclesiastical law. Letters of the pope, written at the suit or instance of one or more persons, determining some point or question in ecclesiastical law, and possessing the force of law, within the Roman Catholic Church. The de-cretals form the second part of the body of canon law.
This is also the title of the second of the two great divisions of the canon law, the first being called the "Decree," (decretum.)
DECRETO. In Spanish colonial law. An order emanating from some superior tribunal, promul-gated in the name and by the authority of the sovereign, in relation to ecclesiastical matters. Schm.Civil Law, 93, note.
DECRETUM.

In the Civil Law

A species of imperial constitution, being a judg-ment or sentence given by the emperor upon hear-ing of a cause (quod imperator cognoscens de-crevit). Inst. 1, 2, 6.

In Canon Law

An ecclesiastical law, in contradistinction to a secular law, (lex.) 1 Mackeld.Civil Law, p. 81, § 93, (Kaufmann’s note.)
DECRETUIVI GRATIANI. Gratian’s decree, or decretum. A collection of ecclesiastical law in three books or parts, made in the year 1151, by Gratian, a Benedictine monk of Bologna, being the oldest as well as the first in order of the col-lections which together form the body of the Ro-man canon law. 1 BI.Comm. 82; 1 Reeve, Eng. Law, 67.

DECROWNING. The act of depriving of a crown.
DECRY. To cry down; to deprive of credit. "The king may at any time decry or cry down any coin of the kingdom, and make it no longer current." 1 BI.Comm. 278.
DECURIO. Lat. A decurion. In the provincial administration of the Roman empire, the de-curions were the chief men or official personages of the large towns. Taken as a body, the de-curions of a city were charged with the entire control and administration of its internal affairs; having powers both magisterial and legislative. See 1 Spence, Eq.Jur. 54.
DEDBANA. In Saxon law. An actual homicide or manslaughter.
DEDI. (Lat. I have given.) A word used in deeds and other instruments of conveyance when such instruments were made in Latin, and anciently held to imply a warranty of title. Deakins v. Hol-lis, 7 Gill & J., Md., 315.
DEDI ET CONCESSI. I have given and granted. The operative words of conveyance in ancient charters of feoffment, and deeds of gift and grant; the English "given and granted" being still the most proper, though not the essential, words by which such conveyances are made. 2 B1.Comm. 53, 316, 317; 1 Steph.Comm. 164, 177, 473, 474.
DEDICATE. To appropriate and set apart one’s private property to some public use; as to make a private way public by acts evincing an intention to do so.
DEDICATION. In real property law. An appro-priation of land to some public use, made by the owner, and accepted for such use by or on behalf of the public. Harris v. City of St. Helens, 72 Or. 377, 143 P. 941, 943, Ann.Cas.1916D, 1073. A deliberate appropriation of land by its owner for any general and public uses, reserving to himself no other rights than such as are compatible with the full exercise and enjoyment of the public uses to which the property has been devoted. Longley v. City of Worcester, 304 Mass. 580, 24 N. E.2d 533, 537; Consolidated Realty Co. v. Rich-mond Hotel & Building Co., 253 Ky. 463, 69 S.W.2d 985. See Alden Coal Co. v. Challis, 200 III. 222, 65 N.E. 665 (streets in company owned village)
Du Pont v. Miller, 310 140, 141 N.E. 423, 425 (artificial waterway) ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Georgia R. & Banking Co., D.C.Ga., 227 F. 276, 285 (right of way for telegraph lines) ; Man-ning v. House, 211 Ala. 570, 100 So. 772, 774; Me-bane v. City of Wynne, 127 Ark. 364, 192 S.W. 221

222. (Streets on platted land); Johnston v. Me-dina Improvement Club, 10 Wash.2d 44, 116 P.2d 272, 277, (park and recreation purposes).

By Adverse User

A dedication may arise from an adverse exclu-sive use by the public under a claim of right with the knowledge, actual or imputed, and ac-quiescence of the owner. Carpenter v. City of St. Joseph, 263 Mo. 705, 174 S.W. 53, 56; Dickinson v. Ruble, 211 Minn. 373, 1 N.W.2d 373, 374, 375; Clark v. State, 25 Ala.App. 467, 140 So. 178, 179.

Tax Revenues

Statute dedicating certain tax revenues to hos-pital to be remitted directly from Secretary of State made a "dedication" rather than an "appro-priation." State ex rel. Porterie v. Charity Hos-pital of Louisiana at New Orleans, 182 La. 268, 161 So. 606.

Express Common-Law Dedication

An "express common-law dedication" is one where the intent is expressly manifested, such as by ordinary deeds, recorded plats not executed pursuant to statute or defectively certified so as not to constitute a statutory dedication. Board of Com’rs of Garfield County v. Anderson, 167 Okl. 253, 29 P.2d 75, 78.

Express or Implied

A dedication may be express, as where the in-tention to dedicate is expressly manifested by a deed or an explicit oral or written declaration of the owner, or some other explicit manifestation of his purpose to devote the land to the public use. An implied dedication may be shown by some act or course of conduct on the part of the owner from which a reasonable inference of intent may be drawn, or which is inconsistent with any other theory than that he intended a dedication. Hurley v. West St. Paul, 83 Minn. 401, 86 N.W. 427; Por-ter v. City of Stuttgart, 135 Ark. 48, 204 S.W. 607, 608; H. A. Hilmer Co. v. Behr, 264 III. 568, 106 N.E. 481, 486; Village of Benld v. Dorsey, 311 Ill. 192, 142 N.E. 563, 565; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Bennett, C.C.A.Miss., 296 F. 436, 437; City of Brownsville v. West, Tex.Civ.App., 149 S.W.2d 1034, 1037, 1038.

Common-Law or Statutory

described, and may be either express or implied. A statutory dedication is one made under and in conformity with the provisions of a statute regu-lating the subject, and is of course necessarily ex-press. Poindexter v. Schaffner, Tex.Civ.App., 162 S.W. 22, 23; Kaufman v. City of Butte, 48 Mont. 400, 138 P. 770, 771; Neill v. City of Glendale, 106 Cal.App. 553, 289 P. 877, 879.
Where complete statutory dedication does not exist, sale of lots by reference to plat constitutes common-law "dedi-cation." Byam v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 328 Mo. 813, 41 S.W.2d 945, 949.

In Copyright Law

The first publication of a work, without having secured a copyright, is a dedication of it to the public; that having been done, any one may re-publish it. Bartlett v. Crittenden, 5 McLean, 32, Fed.Cas.No.1,076; Deward & Rich v. Bristol Sav-ings & Loan Corporation, C.C.A.Va., 120 F.2d 537, 540 (partial publication).
Where copyrighted lectures were not delivered to the general public, but only to paying audiences and classes, they were not abandoned or dedicated to the public. Na-tional Institute for Improvement of Memory v. Nutt, D.C. Conn., 28 F.2d 132, 134.

DEDICATION-DAY. The feast of dedication of churches, or rather the feast day of the saint and patron of a church, which was celebrated not only by the inhabitants of the place, but by those of all the neighboring villages, who usually carne thither; and such assemblies were allowed as lawful. It was usual for the people to feast and to drink on those days. Cowell.
ET CONCESSIMUS: (Lat. We have given and granted.) Words used by the king, or where there were more grantors than one, in-stead of dedi et concessi.
DEDIMUS POTESTATEM. (We have given pow-er.) In English practice. A writ or commission issuing out of chancery, empowering the persons named therein to perform certain acts, as to ad-minister oaths to defendants in chancery and take their answers, to administer oaths of office to jus-tices of the peace, etc. 3 Bl.Comm. 447. It was anciently allowed for many purposes not now in use, as to make an attorney, to take the acknowl-edgment of a fine, etc.
In the United States, a commission to take tes-timony is sometimes termed a "dedimus potesta-tem." Buddicum v. Kirk, 3 Cranch, 293, 2 L.Ed. 444; Sergeant’s Lessee v. Biddle, 4 Wheat. 508, 4 L.Ed. 627.
DEDIMUS POTESTATEM DE ATTORNO FACI-ENDO. In old English practice. A writ, issued by royal authority, empowering an attorney to appear for a defendant. Prior to the statute of Westminster 2, a party could not appear in court by attorney without this writ.
DEDITION. The act of yielding up anything; surrender.
DEDITITII. In Roman law. Criminals who had been marked in the face or on the body with fire or an iron, so that the mark could not be erased, and subsequently manumitted. Calvin.
DEDUCTIBLE. That which may be taken away or subtracted; an item which may be subtracted from income for tax purposes, such as a deducti-ble debt. In re Hermann’s Estate, 349 Pa. 230, 36 A.2d 804, 806; a deductible expense. Pacific Southwest Realty Co. v. McColgan, 53 Cal.App. 2d 549, 128 P.2d 86, 87, or; a deductible loss. Hel-vering v. Gordon, C.C.A.4, 134 F.2d 685, 689; Bick-erstaff v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C. A.Ga., 128 F.2d 366, 367

DEDUCTION. That which is deducted; the part taken away; abatement; as a deduction from the yearly rent. Don Lee, Inc., v. United States, D.C. Cal., 42 F.Supp. 884, 885; Pittsburgh Brewing Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.3, 107 F.2d 155, 156.
In Probate Law
By "deduction" is understood a portion or thing which an heir has a right to take from the mass of the succession before any partition takes place. Civil Code La. art. 1358.
Taxation
As used in Internal Revenue Code, relating to tax on corporations, "deduction" refers to items which may be subtracted from a corporation’s gross income in arriving at net income. McKesson & Robbins v. Walsh, 130 Conn. 460, 35 A.2d 865.
An amount refunded by corporation to federal govern-ment under Renegotiation Act as excess profits from war contracts is not a "deduction" from corporation’s gross in-come subject to state taxation, but must be considered in determinlng corporation’s true gross income. Southern Weav1ng Co. v. Query, 206 S.C. 307, 34 S.E.2d 51, 54.
Trial
Argument oí counsel based on the evidence is not improper as unsworn testimony, but is war-ranted as a "deduction" from the testimony. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., 115 S. W.2d 1238, 1242.
DEDUCTION FOR NEW. In marine insurance. An allowance or drawback credited to the insur-ers on the cost of repairing a vessel for damage arising from the perils of the sea insured against. This allowance is usually one-third, and is made on the theory that the parts restored with new materials are better, in that proportion than they were before the damage.
DEED. A conveyance of realty, a writing signed by grantor, whereby title to realty is transferred from one to another. National Fire Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 170 Okl. 593, 41 P.2d 645, 647; Mitchell v. Nicholson, 71 N.D. 521, 3 N.W.2d 83, 85, 139 A.L.R. 1175.
In order that an instrument may be operative as a "deed," it must pass a present interest, although it is not necessary that grantee take a present estate in property conveyed. Blair v. Blair, 111 Vt. 53, 10 A.2d 188, 189.
The term is also used as synonymous with "fact," "actuality," or "act of parties." Thus a thing "in deed" is one that has been really or ex-pressly done; as opposed to "in law," which means that it is merely implied or presumed to have been done. Powell v. Powell, 196 Ga. 694, 27 S.E.2d 393, 396, 397.
At Common Law
At common law, a sealed instrument, containing a contract or covenant, delivered by the party to be bound thereby, and accepted by the party to whom the contract or covenant runs. Co. Litt. 171; 2 Bl.Comm. 295; Shepp. Touchst. 50. A writ-ing containing a contract sealed and delivered. 3 Washb. Real Prop. 239; Sanders v. Riedinger,
30 App.Div. 277, 284, 51 N.Y.S. 937, 942. An in-strument in writing, upon paper or parchment, between parties able to contract, subscribed, seal-ed, and delivered. 4 Kent, Comm. 452; Interstate R. Co. v. Roberts, 127 Va. 688, 105 S.E. 463, 464. There is authority, however, that signing is un-necessary to validity of deed. Bowling v. Wil-kerson, D.C.Ky., 19 F.Supp. 584, 587.
A writing under seal by which lands, tenements, or hereditaments are conveyed for an estate not less than freehold. 2 Bl.Comm. 294.
A dded implies, at common law, a sealed instru-ment. 2 Bl.Comm. 295; Rondot v. Rogers Tp., 39 C.C.A. 462, 99 F. 202, 209; Strain v. Fitzgerald, 128 N.C. 396, 38 S.E. 929, 930; Williams v. State, 25 Fla. 734, 6 So. 831, 832, 6 L.R.A. 821; e. g., a bond is a deed for the reason that it is sealed by the obligor. In re Contest of Election of Burns, 315 Pa. 23, 171 A. 888, 889. But the term is also applied to similar instruments, not under seal, executed in jurisdictions in which the use of seals is un-known (see Steigenberger v. Carr, 3 M. & G., 191, 199, 42 ECL 107, 133 Reprint. 1111), or in which seals have been rendered unnecessary by statute. See Henderson v. Howard, 147 Ga. 371, 94 S.E. 251; Gibbs v. McGuire, 70 Miss. 646, 12 So. 829.

Modern Rule

A written instrument, signed, sealed, and deliv-ered, by which one person conveys land, tene-ments, or hereditaments to another. This is its ordinary modern meaning, at least in those juris-dictions which adhere to the common-law rule ‘ making a seal essential to the validity and opera. tive effect of a deed of conveyance. McMee v Henry, 163 Ky. 729, 174 S.W. 746, 747; Dunham v. Marsh, 52 N.J.Eq. 256, 30 A. 473, 474; Hood v. Fletcher, 31 Ariz. 456, 254 P. 223, 224.
The term may include a mortgage of real estate. Lock-ridge v. McCommon, 90 Tex. 234, 38 S.W. 33, 35 (citing Heliman v. Howard, 44 Cal. 110); Daly v. Minnesota Loan & Investment Co., 43 Minn. 517, 45 N.W. 1100, 1101; Mor-gan v. Wickliffe, 115 Ky. 226, 72 S.W. 1122. But, contra, see Eaton v. White, 18 Wis. 517, 519; National Bank of Columbus v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co., 62 Chin St. 564, 57 N.E. 450. Similarly a lease for years under seal may be a deed. Hutchinson v. Bramhall, 42 N.J.Eq. 372, 7 A. 873, 875. And a lease exceeding twenty-one years is held to be within the term. St. Vincent’s Roman Cathollc Congregation of Plymouth v. Kingston Coal Co., 221 Pa. 349, 70 A. 838, 839. But a stipulation for a deed prohibit-ing drilling for oil or gas was held not to include a lease. Test 011 Co. v. La Tourette, 19 Okl. 214, 91 P. 1025, 1029.
The essential difference between a "deed" and a "will" 1s that the former passes a present interest and the latter passes no interest until after the death of the maker. Willis v. Fiveash, Tex.Civ.App., 297 S.W. 509, 510; Harber v. Harber, 152 Ga. 98, 108 S.E. 526; Henderson v. Hender-son, 210 Ala. 73, 97 So. 353, 372; Bowdoin College v. Mer-rltt, C.C.Cal., 75 F. 480, 483. A will is "an instrument by which a person makes a disposition of his property to take effect after his decease, which is in its own nature ambula-tory and revocable duzIng his Life. It is this ambulatory quality which forMs the characteristic of wills; for, though a disposition by deed may postpone the possession or en-joyment, or even the vesting, until the death of the dis-posing party, yet the postponement is in such case pro-duced by the express tercos, and does not result from the nature of the instrument." In re Hall’s Estate, 149 Cal. 143, 84 P. 839, 840; Robb v. Washington & Jefferson Coi-lege, 185 N.Y. 485, 78 N.E. 359, 361 (quoting and adopting definition in Jarman, Wilis, p. 17). The main test, how-e ver, whether a writing is a will or deed, 1s the animus testandi. Belgrade v. Carter, Tex.Civ.App., 146 S.W. 964, 965; McLain v. Garrison, 39 Tex.Civ.App. 431, 88 S.W. 484, 89 S.W. 284 (clting Gillham v. Mustin, 42 Ala. 366; Tra-wick v. Davis, 85 Ala. 345, 5 So. 83); Ecklar’s Adm’r v. Robinson, 96 S.W. 845, 846, 29 Ky.Law Rep. 1038. Harber v. Harber, 152 Ga. 98, 108 S.E. 520. "Deeds" are irrevoca-ble and take effect by delivery, while "wills" are always revocable during testamentary capacity and take effect only after testator’s death. Self v. Self, 212 Ala. 512, 103 So. 591, 592. If a document cannot be revoked or impaired by the grantor, it is a "deed," but if the grantor recites an unqualified power of revocation, it is a "will." Craft v. Moon, 201 Ala. 11, 75 So. 302, 303. An instrument purport-ing to convey title to lands on its delivery 15 a deed and not a will, though possession be deferred until the gran-tor’s death. Lovenskoild v. Casas, Tex.Civ.App., 196 S.W. 629, 631.
A deed is distinguished from a contract in that a deed is a mere transfer of title to realty, and is the act of but one of the parties, made pursuant to a previous contract either in parol or in writing. Collins v. Lyon, Inc., 181 Va. 230, 24 S.E.2d 572, 579. Accordingly; want of considera-tion of itself will not warrant setting aside a deed, though want of consideratíon would be good defense to an execu-tory contract. Lawson v. Boo, 227 Iowa 100, 287 N.W. 282, 284. However, a deed is a contract, for the purpose of reformation in equity to make it truly speak the legally ascertained intention of the parties. Sawyer Coal & Ice Co. v. Kinnett-Odom Co., 192 Ga. 166, 14 S.E.2d 879, 883.
Deed for a nominal sum. In effect the same as a deed of gift. Bertelsen v. Bertelson, 49 Cal.App. 2d 479, 122 P.2d 130, 133.
Deed in fee. A deed conveying the title to land in fee simple with the usual covenants. Rudd v. Savelli, 44 Ark. 152; Moody v. Spokane & U. H. St. Ry. no., 5 Wash. 699, 32 P. 751.
Deed indented, or indenture. In conveyancing. A deed executed or purporting to be executed in parts, between two or moré parties, and distin-guished by having the edge of the paper or parch-ment on which it is written indented or cut at the top in a particular manner. This was formerly done at the top or side, in a line resembling the teeth of a saw; a formality derived from the an-cient practice of dividing chirographs; but the cut-ting is now made either in a waving line, or more commonly by notching or nicking the paper at the edge. 2 Bl.Comm. 295, 296; Litt. § 370; Smith, Cont. 12.
Deed of covenant. Covenants are sometimes entered into by a separate deed, for title, or for the indemnity of a purchaser or mortgagee, or for the production of title-deeds. A covenant with a penalty is sometimes taken for the payment of a debt, instead of a bond with a condition, but the legal remedy is the same in either case.
Deed of gift. A deed executed and delivered without consideration.
Thus a conveyance to church mission board for which board agreed to educate a relative of gran-tors for the ministry should grantors die before his education was completed, was not a strict "deed of gift". Forbes v. Board of Missions of M. E. Church, South, 17 Ca1.2d 332, 110 P.2d 3, 7.
Deed of release. One releasing property from the incumbrance of a mortgage or similar pledge upon payment or performance of the conditions; more specifically, where a deed of trust to one or more trustees has been executed, pledging real
property for the payment of a debt or the per-formance of other conditions, substantially as in the case of a mortgage, a deed of release is the conveyance executed by the trustees, after pay-ment or performance, for the purpose of divesting themselves of the legal title and revesting it in the original owner. See Swain v. McMillan, 30 Mont. 433, 76 Pac. 943.
Deed of separation. An instrument by which, through the medium of some third person acting as trustee, provision is made by a husband for separation from his wife and for her separate maintenance. Whitney v. Whitney, 15 Misc. 72, 36 N.Y.S. 891, 892.
Deed of settlement. A deed formerly used in England for the formation of joint stock com-panies constituting certain persons trustees of the partnership property and containing regulations for the management of its private affairs. They are now regulated by articles of association.
Deed of trust. An instrument in use in many states, taking the place and serving the uses of a common-law mortgage, by which the legal title to real property is placed in one or more trustees, to secure the repayment of a sum of money or the performance of other conditions. Bank v. Pierce, 144 Cal. 434, 77 P. 1012; In re Sherman, D.C.Va., 12 F.Supp. 297, 298, 299. Though differing in form from mortgage, it is essentially a security. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass’n v. Bank of Amador County, 135 Cal.App. 714, 28 P.2d 86, 88. In re Title Guaranty Trust Co., Mo.App., 113 S.W.2d 1053, 1057. See Trust Deed.
Deed poll. A deed which is made by one party only. See Hawkins v. Corbit, 83 Okl. 275, 201 P. 649, 653. A deed in which only the party making it executes it or binds himself by it as a deed. 3 Washb. R. P. 311. It was originally so called be-cause the edge of the paper or parchment was polled or cut in a straight line, wherein it was distinguished from a deed indented or indenture. As to a special use of this term in Pennsylvania in colonial times, see Herron v. Dater, 120 U.S. 464, 7 S.Ct. 620, 624, 30 L.Ed. 748 (citing Evans v. Patterson, 71 U.S. 224, 4 Wall. 224, 18 L.Ed. 393),
Deed to lead uses. A deed made before a fine or common recovery, to show the object thereof.
As to "execution of deed," see Execution of In-strument.
Gratuitous deed. One made without considera-tion. 2 Steph.Com. 47. As to "Quitclaim" deed, "Tax" deed, "Trust" deed, and "Warranty" deed, see those titles.
DEED, ESTOPPEL BY. Such as arises from the provisions of a deed. Erickson v. Wiper, 33 N.D. 193, 157 N.W. 592, 598; Green v. Clark, 13 Vt. 158; Reinhard v. Virginia Lead Min. Co., 107 Mo. 616, 18 S.W. 17, 28 Am.St.Rep. 441.
A preclusion against the competent parties to a valid sealed contract and their privies to deny lb force and ef-fect by any evidence of inferior solemnity. Hort v. Ana-conda Copper Mining Co., 69 Mont. 354, 222 P. 419, 421

Such an estoppel occurs where a party has executed a deed, that is, a writing under seal (as a bond) reciting a certain fact, and is thereby precluded from afterwards denying, in any action brought upon that instrument, the fact so recited. Steph.P1. 197. A man shall always be estopped by his own deed, or not permitted to ayer or prove anything In contradiction to what he has once so solemnly and deliberately avowed. 2 Bl.Comm. 295; Plowd. 434; Hudson v. Winslow Tp., 35 N.J.Law, 441; Taggart v. Risley, 4 Or. 242; Appeal of Waters, 35 Pa. 526, 78 Am. Dec. 354.
A warranty deed by one having only a contingent re-mainder passes title, by way of "estoppel" to grantee, as soon as remainder vests by happening of contingency. Thames v. Goode, 217 N.C. 639, 9 S.E.2d 485, 488.
"Estoppel by deed" Is a bar precluding party from deny-Ing truth of his deed. Talley v. Howsley, Tex.Civ.App., 170 S.W.2d 240, 243. It is limited to an action founded on the deed ltself. Hughes v. Cobb, 195 Ga. 213, 23 S.E.2d 701, 715. It applies to the maker of the deed, and does not ordinarily apply to the grantee. Hughes v. Cobb, 195 Ga. 213, 23 S.E.2d 701, 715. It arises only when suit is on the deed or concerning a right arising out of the deed and Be-tween parties or privies to the deed. Robert v. O’Connell, 269 Mass. 532, 169 N.E. 487, 488. It arises only where there Is express representation as to ownership, title, or interest in questlon, or where there are express warranties thereto. Petition of Testan, 156 Misc. 449, 281 N.Y.S. 96. It cannot be lnvoked by one through whose imposition a statement was inserted in the deed. Capitol Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. David B. Roberts, Inc.. 129 Conn. 194, 27 A.2d 116, 119, 141 A.L.R. 1179. It precludes a party thereto and his privies as against other party and his privies. Sammons v. Brun-son, Tex.Civ.App., 25 S.W.2d 685, 688.
A distinct and precise assertion or admisslon of fact is necessary. Cook v. Farley, 195 Miss. 638, 15 So.2d 352, 357.
Inducement to change course to one’s disadvantage is essential. Funderburk v. Magnolia Sugar Co-op., La.App., 8 So.2d 374, 377.
The effect of doctrine is same as if In deed ltself, there had been inserted express provision that it conveyed not only all title then possessed but all that might there-after be acquired. Meyers v. American Oil Co., 192 Miss. 180, 5 So.2d 218, 220.
DEEM. To hold; consider; adjudge; condemn; determine; treat as if; construe. Douglas v. Edwards, C.C.A.N.Y., 298 F. 229, 237; In re Schmidt’s Estate, 134 Wash. 525, 236 P. 274, 275; In re Green’s Estate, 99 Misc. 582, 164 N.Y.S. 1063, 1083; Harder v. Irwin, D.C.N.Y., 285 F. 402, 404; First Nat. Bank v. Dodd, 118 Or. 1, 245 P. 503, 504. But see Kleppe v. Odin Tp., McHenry County, 40 N.D. 595, 169 N.W. 313, 314, which gives "deemed" the force of only a "disputable presumption," or of prima facie evidence. When, by statute, cer-tain acts are "deemed" to be a crime of a par-ticular nature, they are such crime, and not a semblante of it, nor a mere fanciful approxima-tion to or designation of the offense. Com. v. Pratt, 132 Mass. 247; Commonwealth v. Brue, 284 Pa. 294, 131 A. 367, 368.
DEEMSTERS. Judges in the Isle of Man, who decide all controversies without process, writings, or any charges. These judges are chosen by the people, and are said by Spelman to be two in num-ber. Spelman.
DEER-FALD. A park or fold for deer.
DEER-HAYES. Engines or great nets made of cord to catch deer. 19 Hen. VIII, c. 11.
DEFACE. To mar or destroy the face (that is, the physical appearance of written or inscribed
characters as expressive of a definite meaning) of a written instrument, signature, inscription, etc., by obliteration, erasure, cancellation, or superin-scription, so as to render it illegible or unrecogniz-able. Linney v. State, 6 Tex. 1, 55 Am.Dec. 756. See Cancel, In re Parsons’ Will, 195 N.Y.S. 742, 745, 119 Misc. 26. Also used in respect of injury to monument, buildings and other structures. Saf-fell v. State, 113 Ark. 97, 167 S.W. 483. So, to de-face the flag carries the meaning of dishonor, which imputes a lively sense of shaming or an equivalent acquiescent callousness. State v. Schlueter, 127 N.J.L. 496, 23 A.2d 249, 251.
DE FACTO. In fact; actually; indeed; in reality. Ridout v. State, 161 Tenn. 248, 30 S.W.2d 255, 257, 71 A.L.R. 830. Thus, an office, position or status existing under a claim or color of right such as a deputy county clerk. Heron v. Gaylor, 49 N.M. 62, 157 P.2d 239, 241; deputy clerk of court. State v. Brandon, 186 S.C. 448, 197 S.E. 113, 115; cor-porate office. In re Hillmark Associates, D.C.N. Y., 47 F.Supp. 605, 606; corporation, Municipal Bond & Mortgage Corporation v. Bishop’s Harbor Drainage Dist., 133 Fla. 430, 182 So. 794, 797; Ebeling v. Independent Rural Telephene Co., 187 Minn. 604, 246 N.W. 373; court, Marckel Co. v. Zitzow, 218 Minn. 305, 15 N.W.2d 777, 778; de-positary, School Di.s.t. No. 1, Itasco County, v. Ai-ton, 173 Minn. 428, 217 N.W. 496, 499; deputy sher-iff, Malone v. Howell, 140 Fla. 693, 192 So. 224, 227; fire district commissioner, Petition of Board of Fire Com’rs of Columbia-Litchfield Fire Dist, Sup., 29 N.Y.S.2d 605, 619; grand jury, McDonald v. Colden, 181 Misc. 407, 41 N.Y.S.2d 323, 327; guardian, State ex rel. Symons v. East Chicago State Bank, 106 Ind.App. 4, 17 N.E.2d 491, 494; judge, Annoni v. Blas Nadal’s Heirs, C.C.A.Puerto Rico, 94 F.2d 513, 515; officer, Eaker v. Common. School Dist. No. 73 of Butler County, Mo.App., 62 S.W.2d 778, 783; police officer, People ex rel. Mitchell v. Armspach, 314 Ill.App. 573, 41 N.E.2d 781; trustee, In re Wohl’s Estate, 36 N.Y.S.2d 926, 930.
DE FACTO GOVERNMENT. One that maintains itself by a display of force against the will of the rightful legal government and is successful, at least temporarily, in overturning the institutions of the rightful legal government by setting up its own in lieu thereof. Wortham v. Walker, 133 Tex. 255, 128 S.W.2d 1138, 1145.
DEFALCATION. The act of a defaulter; mis-appropriation of trust funds or money held in any fiduciary capacity; failure to properly account for such funds. Usually spoken of officers of corpo-rations or public officials. In re Butts, D.C.N.Y., 120 F. 970; Crawford v. Burke, 201 Ill. 581, 66 N.E. 833.
Also set-off. The diminution of a debt or claim by deducting from it a smaller claim held by the debtor or payor. Iron Works v. Cuppey, 41 Iowa, 104; Houk v. Foley, 2 Pen. & W., Pa., 250; McDonald v. Lee, 12 La. 435.
Colloquially, perhaps, the word "defalcation" ordlnarlly implies some moral dereliction. As used in the Bankruptcy Act, It may demand some portion of misconduct, but it 1s not synonymous with "embezzlement." The act of a re-ceiver In a mortgage foreclosure suit in withdrawing and spending an amount allowed him by an order passing his intermediate account without waiting for the time for ap-peal to expire or consulting plaintiff as to whether it in-tended to appeal, is a "defalcation-. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Herbst, C.C.A.X.Y., 93 F.2d 510, 511, 512, 114 A.L.R. 769.
DEFALK. To set off one claim against another; to deduct a debt due to one from a debt which one owes. Johnson v. Signal Co., 57 N.J.Eq. 79, 40 A. 193; Burris v. Boone, 4 Boyce, Del., 148, 86 A. 730. This verb corresponds only to the second meaning of "defalcation" as given aboye; a pub-lic officer or trustee who misappropriates or em-bezzles funds in his hands is not said to "defalk."
DEFAMACAST. Defamation by broadcast. Amer-ican Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson, 126 S.E.2d 873, 879, 106 Ga.App. 230.
DEFAMATION. The taking from one’s reputa-tion. The offense of injuring a person’s charac-ter, fame, or reputation by false and malicious statements. The term seems to include both libel and slander. In general, see Shaw Cleaners & Dy-ers v. Des Moines Dress Club, 215 Iowa, 1130, 245 N.W. 231, 86 A.L.R. 839; Snavely v. Booth, 6 W. W.Harr. 378, 176 A. 649; Washer v. Bank of Amer-ica Nat. Trust & Savings Ass’n, 128 P.2d 799. Li-bel. Seested v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 326 Mo. 559, 31 S.W.2d 1045, 1052. Slander. Con-nelly v. McKay, 176 Misc. 685, 28 N.Y.S.2d 327, 329.
The distinction between "criticism" and "defamation" is that criticism deals only with such things as invite public attention or call for public comment, and does not follow a man into his prívate life, or pry into his domestic con-cerns, and it never attacks the individual, but only his
work. Schwimmer v. Commercial Newspaper Co., 131 Misc. 552, 228 N.Y.S. 220, 221.
The fundamental ditference between a right to "privacy" and a right to freedom from "defamation" is that the former directly concerns one’s own peace of mind whereas the latter concerns primarily one’s reputation. Themo v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27 N.E.2d 753, 755.
DEFAMATORY. Calumnious; containing de-famation; injurious to reputation; libelous; slanderous; words which produce any perceptible injury to the reputation of another. Sheridan v. Davies, 139 Kan. 256, 31 P.2d 51, 54.
DEFAMATORY PER QUOD. In respect of words: Those which require an allegation of facts, aside from the words contained in the article, by way of innuendo, to show wherein the words used libel the plaintiff, in order to state a cause of ac-tion in a complaint. Rowan v. Gazette Printing Co., 74 Mont. 326, 239 P. 1035, 1037.
DEFAMATORY PER SE. In respect of words: Those which by themselves, and as such, without reference to extrinsic proof, injure the reputation of the person to whom they are applied. Manley v. Harer, 73 Mont. 253, 235 P. 757, 758; Conrad v. Allis-Chalmers Mf g. Co., 228 Mo.App. 817, 73 S. W.2d 438, 446.
DEFAMES. L. Fr. Infamous. Britt. c. 15.
DEFAULT. By its derivation, a failure. Mead-ows v. Continental Assur. Co., C.C.A.Tex., 89 F. 2d 256. An omission of that which ought to be
done. Town of Milton v. Bruso, 111 Vt. 82, 10 A. 2d 203, 205. Specifically, the omission or failure to perform a legal duty. Easterwood v. Willing-ham, Tex.Civ.App., 47 S.W.2d 393, 395; to observe a promise or discharge an obligation, Bradbury v. Thomas, 27 P.2d 402, 135 Cal.App. 435; or to per-form an agreement, Eastman v. Morgan, D.C.N.Y., 43 F.Supp. 637, 641. The term also embraces the idea of dishonesty, In re State, 210 Wis. 9, 245 N. W. 844, 845, and of wrongful act, Greco v. S. S. Kresge Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E.2d 557, 562, 115 A.L.R. 1020; or an act or omission discreditable to one’s profession, Hilkert v. Canning, 58 Ariz. 290, 119 P.2d 233, 236

In Practice

Omission; neglect or failure of any party to take step required of him in progress of cause. Indi-ana State Board of Medical Registration and Examination v. Pickard, 93 Ind.App. 171, 177 N.E. 870, 872. When a defendant in an action at
omits to plead within the time allowed him for that purpose, or fails to appear on the trial, he is said to make default, McCabe v. Tom, 35 Ohio App. 73, 171 N.E. 868, 869, and the judgment en-tered in the former case is technically called a "judgment by default." 3 Bl.Comm. 396; 1 Tidd, Pr. 562.
A "default" in an action at law is somewhat similar to the entry of a decree in equity that the bill be taken for confessed, neither being a final disposition. Felton v. Felton, 128 Conn. 564, 196 A. 791, 793.

In General

Default of issue. Failure to have living chil-dren or descendants at a given time or fixed point. George v. Morgan, 16 Pa. 106; In re Van Cleef, 92 Misc. 689, 157 N.Y.S. 549, 551.
Defaulter. One who makes default. One who misappropriates money held by him in an official or fiduciary character, or fails to account for such money.
Judgment by default. See Judgment.
DEFEASANCE. An instrument which defeats the force or operation of some other deed or es-tate. That which is in the same deed is called a "condition"; and that which is in another deed is a "defeasance." Com. Dig. "Defeasance." Bein-dorf v. Thorpe, 90 Okl. 191, 203 P. 475, 477; In re A. Roth Co., C.C.A.I11., 118 F.2d 156, 158.
A "defeasance" is a collateral deed made at the same time as a feoffment or other conveyance, containing certain conditions upon the performance of which the estate then created may be defeated or totally undone. Bach v. First Nat. Bank, 99 Ind.App. 590, 193 N.E. 696, 697.

In Conveyancing

A collateral deed made at the same time with a feoffment or other conveyance, containing certain conditions, upon the performance of which tir estate then created may be defeated or totally un-done. 2 Bl.Comm. 327; Co. Litt. 236, 237.
An instrument accompanying a ho recogniz-
ance, or judgment, containing a co’icition which,

when performed, defects or undoes it. 2 Bl. Comm. 342; Miller v. Quick, 158 Mo. 495, 59 S.W. 955.
DEFEASIBLE. Subject to be defeated, annulled, revoked, or undone upon the happening of a future event or the performance of a condition subse-quent, or by a conditional limitation. Usually spoken of estates and interests in land. For in-stance, a mortgagee’s estate is defeasible (hable to be defeated) by the mortgagor’s equity of re-demption. Penick v. Atkinson, 139 Ga. 649, 77 S.E. 1055, 1057, 46 L.R.A.,N.S., 284; Murphy v. Mur-phy, 182 Ky. 731, 207 S.W. 491, 493.
DEFEASIBLE FEE. An estate in fee that is li-able to be defeated by some future contingency; e. g., a vested remainder which might be defeated by the death of the remainderman before the time fixed for the taking effect of the devise. Giltner’s Trustee v. Talbott, 253 Ky. 474, 69 S.W.2d 981; Daly v. Pate, 210 N.C. 222, 186 S.E. 348, 349.
DEFEASIBLE TITLE. One that is Hable to be annulled or made void, but not one that is already void or an absolute nullity. Elder v. Schumacher, 18 Colo. 433, 33 P. 175.
DEFEASIVE. Describes counterclaim which, if it prevails, will defeat right of plaintiffs to recover. Hayden v. Collins, 90 Utah, 238, 63 P.2d 223, 225.
DEFEAT. To prevent, frustrate, or circumvent; as in the phrase "hinder, delay, or defeat credi-tors." Coleman v. Walker, 3 Mete., Ky., 65, 77 Arn.Dec. 163; Reuff-Griffin Decorating Co. v. Wilkes, 191 S.W. 443, 446, 173 Ky. 566.
To overcorne or prevail against in any contest; as in speaking of the "defeated party" in an action at law. Wood v. Bailey, 21 Wall. 642, 22 L.Ed. 689. Or "defeated candidate" in an election. Nor-cop v. Jordan, 216 Cal. 764, 17 P.2d 123, 124.
To annul, undo, or terminate; as, a title or es-tate. See Defeasible.
DEFECT. The want or absence of some legal requisite; deficiency; imperfection; insufficiency. Sappenfield v. National Zinc Co., 94 Kan. 22, 145 P. 862, 863; Galloway v. City of Winchester, 299 Ky. 87, 184 S.W.2d 890, 892, 893. The want or ab-sence of something necessary for completeness or perfection; a Jack or absence of something es-sential to completeness; a deficiency in some-thing essential to the proper use for the purpose for which a thing is to be used. Roberts v. Rog-ers, 129 Neb. 298, 261 N.W. 354; Terrell v. City of Orangebur•g, 176 S.C. 518, 180 S.E. 670.
Thus, a bamboo vaulting pole which was not straight and was unbalanced had a "defect." MeCormick V. Lowe & Campbell Athletic Goods Co., 235 Mo.App. 612, 144 S.W. 2d 866, 876.
DEFECT IN TfIGHWAY OR STREET. Ordinar-ily anything in the condition or state of highway or street that renders it unreasonably safe for travel. Payne v. State Highway Commission, 136 Kan. 561, 16 P.2d 509, 511. Thus courts have held as highway or street defects corrugations, Chen-ey v. State Highway Commission, 142 Kan. 149, 45
P.2d 864, 866; spike in cross walk, Fay v. City of Green Bay, 240 Wis. 36, 1 N.W.2d 767, 768, a hol-low, Adams v. Town of Bolton, 297 Mass. 459, 9 N.E.2d 562, 111 A.L.R. 856, and anything that may reasonably be expected te interfere with safe use of sidewalk by pedestrian. City of Birmingham v. Wood, 240 Ala. 138, 197 So. 885, 887.
DEFECT IN MACIIINERY. Under Code 1907, § 3910, subd. 1, making the master hable for in-jury from defects in the condition of works or machinery, it is essential that there be inherent condition of a permanent nature which unfits machine for its uses, some weakness of construc-tion with reference to the proposed uses, some misplacement of parts, or the absence of some part, some innate abnormal quality rendering its use dangerous, or some obstacle to the use or the way of use which is part of the condition of the machinery itself. Caldwell-Watson Foun-dry & Machine Co. v. Watson, 183 Ala. 326, 62 So. 859, 862.
DEFECT OF FORM. An imperfection in the style, manner, arrangement, or non-essential parts of a legal instrument, plea, indictment, etc., as distinguished from a "defect of substance." See infra.
DEFECT OF PARTIES. In pleading and practice. Insufficiency of the parties before a court in any given proceeding to give it jurisdiction and author-ity to decide the controversy, arising from the omission or failure to join plaintiffs or defendants who should have been brought in; never applied to a superiluity of parties or the improper addi-tion of plaintiffs or defendants. Porter Const. Co. v. Berry, 136 Or. 80, 298 P. 179, 182; Salisbury v. Berry Motor Co., 122 Neb. 605, 241 N.W. 86, 87; De Pass v. City of Spartanburg, 190 S.C. 22, 1 S.E.2d 904, 908. It is not synonymous with "mis-joinder of parties". Okmulgee Supply Co. v. Rot-man, 144 Okl. 293, 291 P. 1, 2.
DEFECT OF SUBSTANCE. An imperfection in the body or substantive part of a legal instru-rnent, plea, indictment, etc., consisting in the omission of something which is essential to be set forth. Sweeney v. Greenwood Index-Journal Co., D.C.S.C., 37 F.Supp. 484, 487.
DEFECTIVE. Lacking in some particular which is essential to the completeness, legal sufficiency, or security of the object spoken of; as a "de-fective" highway or bridge (Mennito v. Town of Wayland, Sup., 56 N.Y.S.2d 654, 664; Warren County v. Battle, 48 Ga.App. 240, 172 S.E. 673, 674) ; car coupler (McAllister v. St. Louis Mer-chante’ Bridge Terminal Ry. Co., 324 Mo. 1005, 25 S.W.2d 791, 795) ; machinery (Riccio v. Town of Plainville, 106 Conn. 61, 136 A. 872, 873; Chaney v. Village of Riverton, 104 Neb. 189, 177 N.W. 845, 846, 10 A.L.R. 244; Bryan v. City of West Palm. Beach, 75 Fla. 19, 77 So. 627); writ or recogni-zance (State v. Lavalley, 9 Mo. 836; McArthur v. Boynton, 19 Colo.App. 234, 74 P. 542) ; or title (Copertini v. Oppermann, 76 Cal. 181, 18 P. 256) ; service of process or return of service (Tioga CoalCorporation v. Miman, 125 W.Va. 58, 22 S.E.2d 873, 876; State ex rel. Briggs v. Barns, 121. Fla. 857, 164 So. 539, 542).
DEFECTIVE OR INSUFFICIENT SPECIFICA-TIONS BY PATENTEE. Any failure either to describe or to claim the complete invention upon which the application for patent is founded. Robert v. Krementz, C.C.A.N.J., 243 F. 877, 881.
DEFECTIVE TITLE. With respect to negotiable paper within Negotiable Instruments Law, the title of a person who obtains instrument or any signature thereto by fraud, duress, or force and fear, or other unlawful means, or for an illegal consideration, or when he negotiates it in breach of faith or under such circumstances as amount to fraud. Stevens v. Pierce, 79 Okl. 290, 193 P. 417, 18 A.L.R. 7; (fraud) German-American Nat. Bank v. Kelley, 183 Iowa, 269, 166 N.W. 1053; ‘Commercial Security Co. v. Jack, 29 N.D. 67, 150 N.W. 460, 461.
DEFECTUS. Lat. Defect; default; want; im-perfection; disqualification.

Challenge Propter Defectum

A challenge to a juror on account of some legal ,disqualification, such as infancy, etc. See Chal-lenge.

Defectus Sanguinis

Failure of the blood, i. e., failure or want of issue.
DEFEND. To prohibit or forbid. To deny. To contest and endeavor to defeat a claim or de-mand made against ene in a court of justice. Boehmer v. Irrigation Dist., 117 Cal. 19, 48 P. 908. To oppose, repel, or resist.
To protect, to shield, to make a stand for, or uphold by force or argument, vindicate, to main-tain or keep secure, to guaranty, to agree to in-demnify. Powell v. U. S., D.C.Va., 60 F.Supp. 433, 439.
Although a contract between mortgagee and mortgagor’s creditor who purchased mortgaged automobile that creditor will "defend" mortgagee against all suits, etc., was held lo be contract to defend litigation, not to indemnify. Hall v. Cannon, 90 Colo. 465, 9 P.2d 1057.
DEFENDANT. The person defending or deny-ing; the party against whom relief or recovery is sought in an action or suit. Graham Bros. Ak-tiebolag v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 126 Misc. 32, 212 N.Y.S. 380, 381; Atlantic Mut. In-surance Co. v. Alexandre, D.C.N.Y., 16 F. 279, 281; Siekmann v. Kern, 136 La. 1068, 68 So. 128. See, also, Ferguson v. Montgomery, 148 Ark. 83, 229 S.W. 30, 36 (election contest); Boyd v. Lambert, 58 Okl. 497, 160 P. 586, 587 (injunction bond); Alexander v. United States, C.C.A.Mo., 95 F.2d 873, 879 (joinder); Welty v. Schmutte, 128 Neb. 415, 258 N.W. 873 (mortgage foreclosure); Loft, Inc. v. Corn Products Refining Co., C.C.A.Ind., 103 F.2d 1, 5 (anti-trust prosecution).
Thus, railroads, on appeal by city to state district court from order of Minnesota Railroad and Warehouse Commis-sion requiring grade separation, were held defendants en titied to remove cause to federal court. In re Chicago, M. St. P. & P. R. Co., D.C.Minn., 50 F.2d 430, 434.
In common usage, this term la applied to the party put upon his defense, or summoned to answer a charge or com-plaint, in any specles of action, civil or criminal, at law or In equity, Strictly, however, it does not apply to the per-son against whom a real action is brought. for in that pro-ceeding the technical usage is to call the parties respective-ly the "demandant" and the "tenant."
Defendant in error. The distinctive term appro-priate to the party against whom a writ of error is sued out.
Principal defendant. One who has an interest in the controversy presented by the bill, and whose presence is requisite to the complete and partial adjudication of the controversy. Bird v. Sleppy, 265 Pa. 295, 108 A. 618, 619.
DEFENDARE. To answer for; to be responsible for. Medley.
DEFENDEMUS. Lat. A word used in grants and donations, which binds the donor and his heirs to defend the donee, if any one go about to lay any incumbrance on the thing given other than what is contained in the deed of donation. Bract. 1. 2, c. 16.
DEFENDER. (Fr.) To deny; to defend; to conduct a suit for a defendant; to forbid; to prevent; to protect.
In Scotch and canon law. A defendant.
DEFENDER OF THE FAITH. A peculiar title belonging to the sovereign of England, as that of "Catholic" to the king of Spain, and that of "Most Christian" to the king of France. These titles were originally given by the popes of Rome; and that of Defensor Fidei was first conferred by Pope Leo X. on King Henry VIII., as a reward for writing against Martin Luther; and the bull for it bears date quinto Idus Octob., 1521. Enc. Lond.
DEFENDERE SE PER CORPUS SUUM. To of-fer duel or combat as a legal trial and appeal. Abolished by 59 Geo. III. 1 46. See Battel.
DEFENDERE UNICA MANU. To wage law; a denial of an accusation upon oath. See Wager of Law.
DEFENDIT VIM ET INJURIAM. He defends the force and injury. Fleta, lib. 5, c. 39, § 1.
DEFENDOUR. L. Fr. A defender or defendant; the party accused in an appeal. Britt. c. 22.
DEFENERATION. The act of lending money on usury.
DEFENSA. In old English law. A park or place fenced in for deer, and defended as a property and peculiar for that use and service. Cowell.
DEFENSE. That which is offered and alleged by the party proceeded against in an action or suit, as a reason in law or fact why the plaintiff should not recover or establish what he seeks; what is put forward to diminish plaintiff’s cause of action or defeat recovery. 2rEtna Life Ins. Co. v. Braukman, C.C.A.Colo., 70 F.2d 647, 649; Lind-say v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 25 S.W.2d 1113, 1115.
More properly what is sufficient when offered for this purpose. In either of these senses it may be
either a denial, justification, or confession and avoidance of the facts averred as a ground of action, or an exception to their sufficiency in point of law. Whitfield v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., C.C.Mo., 125 F. 270; Eagle Savings & Loan Ass’n v. West, 71 Ohio App. 485, 50 N.E.2d 352, 356; Paillet v. Vroman, 52 Cal.App.2d 297, 126 P. 2d 419, 421; (challenge to jurisdiction) Trades-mens Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Charlton Steam Shipping Co., D.C.Pa., 3 F.R.D. 363, 364; (denial) Levine v. Behn, 282 N.Y. 120, 25 N.E.2d 871, 873; (legal insufficiency) Dysart v. Remington Rand, D.C.Conn., 31 F.Supp. 296, 297; (payment) Hoad-ley v. W. T. Rawleigh Co., 112 Ind.App. 563, 44 N. E.2d 231, 232; (statute of limitations) • Waggoner v. Feeney, 220 Ind. 543, 44 N.E.2d 499, 502.
In a stricter sense, defense is used to denote the answer made by the defendant to the plain-tiff’s action, by demurrer or plea at law or an-swer in equity. This is the meaning of the term in Scotch law. Ersk. Inst. 4, 1, 66. However, it has been held that the filing of a demurrer is not the making of a defense within meaning of the statute providing that, if no defense be made, the plaintiff cannot have judgment for any relief not specifically demanded, but, if defense be made, he may have judgment for other relief, under a prayer therefor. Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. City of Bellevue, 284 Ky. 405, 144 S.W.2d 1046, 1047.
Half defense was that which was made by the form "de-fends the force and injury, and says," (defendit vira et in-juriam, et dicit.)
Full defense was that which was made by the form "de-fends the force and injury when and where it shall behoove him, and the damages, ami whatever else he ought to de-fend," (defendit vim et injuriam guando et ubi curia con-sideravit, et damna et quicquid quod ipse defendere debet, et dicit,) commonly shortened into ”defends the force and injury when," etc. Gilb.Com.P1. 188; 8 Term, 632; 3 Bos. & P. 9, note; Co.Litt. 1278.
In matrimonial suits, in England, defenses are divided into absolute, i. e., such as, being established to the satis-faction of the court, are a complete answer to the petition, so that the court can exercise no discretion, but is bound to dismiss the petition: and discretionary, or such as, be-ing established, leave to the court a discretion whether it Will pronounce a decree or dismiss the petition. Thus, in a suit for dissolution, condonation is an absolute, adultery by the petitioner a discretionary, defense. Browne, Div. 30.
Defense is not something by means of which party who interposes it can obtain relief for him-self. Crisman v. Corbin, 169 Or. 332, 128 P.2d 959, 964.
Defense, as respects right to counsel to conduct defense of one charged with crime, includes every step in proceedings from time of arraignment until acquittal or conviction. State v. Hudson, 55 R.I. 141, 179 A. 130, 135, 100 A.L.R. 313.
Defense also means the forcible repelling of an attack made unlawfully with force and violente, such as the defense of the nation in time of war. United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land in Village
of Farmingdale, Town of Babylon, Suffolk Coun-ty, N. Y., D.C.N.Y., 43 F.Supp. 561, 567.
In old statutes and records, the term means pro-hibition; denial or refusal. Enconter le defense et le commandement de roy; against the prohibi-tion and commandment of the king. St. Westm. 1, c. 1. Also a state of severalty, or of several or exclusive occupancy; a state of inclosure.
Affidavit of Defense See Affidavit.
Affirmative Defense See that title.
Equitable Defense
See that title.
Frivolous Defense
One which at first glance can be seen to be merely pretensive, setting up some ground which cannot be sustained by argument. Dominion Nat. Bank v. Olympia Cotton Milis, C.C.S.C., 128 F. 182.
Legal Defense
(1) A defense which is complete and adequate in point of law. (2) A defense which may be set up in a court of law; as distinguished from an "equitable defense," which is cognizable only in a court of equity or court possessing equitable powers.
Meritorious Defense
One going to the merits, substance, or essen-tials of the case, as distinguished from dilatory or technical objections. Cooper v. Lumber Co., 61 Ark. 36, 31 S.W. 981.
Partial Defense
One which goes only to a part of the cause of action, or which only tends to mitigate the dam-ages to be awarded. Carter v. Bank, 33 Misc. 128, 67 N.Y.S. 300.
Peremptory Defense
A defense which insists that the plaintiff never had the right to institute the suit, or that, if he had, the original right is extinguished or deter-mined. 4 Bouv. Inst. No. 4206.
Personal Defense
In negotiable instruments law. A defense which, though not good as against a holder in due course, is good against certain parties, be-cause of their participation in or knowledge of certain transactions or facts from which such de-fense arises. Such defenses include all defenses that are not real or absolute defenses. Bauer and Simpson, Law of Business, 2d Ed., p. 329.
Pretermitted Defense
One which was available to a party and of which he might have had the benefit if he had

tion, to swerve, to deviate. Grip Nut Co. v. Mac-Lean-Fogg Lock Nut Co., D.C.I11., 34 F.2d 41, 42.
DEFLORATION. Seduction or debauching. The act by which a woman is deprived of her virginity.
DEFORCE.
In English Law
To withhold wrongfully; to withhold the pos-session of lands from one who is lawfully entitled to them. 3 Bl.Comm. 172; Phelps v. Baldwin, 17 Conn. 212.
In Scotch Law
To resist the execution of the law; to oppose by force a public officer in the execution of his duty. Bell.
DEFORCEMENT. Deforcement is where a man wrongfully holds lands to which another person is entitled. It theref ore includes disseisin, abate-ment, discontinuance, and intrusion. Co. Litt. 277b, 331b; Hopper v. Hopper, 21 N.J.L. 543. But it is applied especially to cases, not falling under those heads, where the person entitled to the free-hold has never had possession; thus, where a lord has a seignory, and lands escheat to him propter defectum sanguinis, but the seisin is withheld from him, this is a deforcement, and the person who withholds the seisin is called a "deforceor." 3 Bl.Comm. 172.
In Scotch Law
The opposition or resistance made to messen-gers or other public officers while they are actual-ly engaged in the exercise of their offices. Ersk. Inst. 4, 4, 32.
DEFORCIANT. One who wrongfully keeps the owner of lands and tenements out of the posses-sion of them. 2 Bl.Comm. 350.
DEFORCIARE. L. Lat. To withhold lands or tenements from the rightful owner. This is a word of art which cannot be supplied by any other word. Co. Litt. 331b.
DEFORCIATIO. L. Lat. In old English law. A distress, distraint, or seizure of goods for satis-f action of a lawful debt. Cowell.
DEFORMITY. A deformed or misshapen condi-tion; an unnatural growth, or a distorted or mis-shapen part or member; disfigurement; as a bod-ily deformity. People v. Lehrman, 251 App.Div. 451, 296 N.Y.S. 580, 582.
In insurance. Representations in application for insurance that applicant never had any "infirmity" or "deformity" must be construed as meaning de-formity or infirmity of substantial character ap-parently materially impairing applicant’s health, which, if known, probably would have deterred company from issuing policy. (Life insurance) Eastern Dist. Piece Dye Works v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., 234 N.Y. 441, 138 N.E. 401, 404, 405, 26 A.L.R. 1505; (accident insurance) Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Mathews, 57 Ga.App. 446, 195 S.E. 887, 892.
DEFOSSION. The punishrnent of being buried alive.
DEFRAUD. To practice fraud; to cheat or trick. State v. Harroun, 199 Mo. 519, 98 S.W. 467, 470; James v. State, 43 Ga.App. 324, 158 S.E. 644, 645. To deprive a person of property or any interest, estate, or right by fraud, deceit, or artifice. State v. Vandenburg, 9 W.W.Harr. 498, 2 A.2d 916, 919. But not by force or intimidation. Hammer-schmidt v. U. S., 265 U.S. 182, 44 S.Ct. 511, 68 I,. Ed. 968; Norton v. U. S., C.C.A.CaI., 92 F.2d 753, 756.
DEFRAUDACION. In Spanish law. The crime committed by a person who fraudulently avoids the payment of some public tax.
DEFRAUDATION. Privation by fraud.
DEFUNCT. Deceased; a deceased person. A common term in Scotch law. A corporation which has ceased to function. Tozier v. Woodworth, 135 Me. 46, 188 A. 771, 773.
The term is synonymous with "dead." Farmers Union Co-op. Brokerage v. Palisade Farmers Un-ion Local No. 714, 69 S.D. 126, 7 N.W.2d 293, 295.
DEFUNCTUS. Lat. Dead. "Defunctus sine prole," dead without (leaving) issue.
DEGASTER. L. Fr. To waste.
DEGRADATION. A deprivation of dignity; dis-mission from office. An ecclesiastical censure, whereby a clergyman is divested of his holy or-ders. There are two sorts by the canon law,-one summary, by word only; the other solemn, by stripping the party degraded of those orna-ments and rights which are the ensigns of his degree. Degradation is otherwise called "deposi-tion," but the canonists have distinguished Be-tween these two terms, deeming the former as the greater punishment of the two. There is like-wise a degradation of a lord or knight at common law, and also by act of parliament. Wharton.
DEGRADATIONS. A term for waste in the French law.
DEGRADING. Reviling; holding one up to pub-lic obloquy; lowering a person in the estimation of the public.
DyGREE

In General

The state or civil condition of a person, State v. Bishop, 15 Me. 122; An honorable state or condi-tion to which a student is advanced in testimony of proficiency in arts and sciences. Common-wealth v. New England College of Chiropractic, 221 Mass. 190, 108 N.E. 895, 896; The grade or dis-tance one thing may be removed from another. Superior Lloyds of America v. Foxworth, Tex. Civ.App., 178 S.W.2d 724, 725.
They are of pontifical origin. See 1 Schmidt, Thesaurus. 144; • Vicat, Doctores; Minshew, Dict. Bacheler; Merlin Répertoire Univ.; Van Espen. pt. 1, tit. 10; Giannone. Istoria di Napoli, liba xl. c. 2, for a full account of this matter.

In the Law of Descent and Family Relations
A step or grade, i. e., the distance, or number of removes, which separates two persons who are re-lated by consanguinity. Thus we speak of a bro-ther as being in the second degree of kindred. Calvert v. Beck, 240 Ala. 442, 199 So. 846, 847.

In Criminal Law

The term "degree" denotes a division or classi-fication of one specific crime into several grades or stadia of guilt, according to the circumstances attending its commission. Thus, in some states, there may be "murder in the second degree."
DEHORNER. A rubbing alcohol addict. Powell v. State, 179 Md. 399, 18 A.2d 587, 590.
DEHORS. L. Fr. Out of; without; beyond; foreign to; unconnected with. Blackford v. An-derson, 226 Iowa 1138, 286 N.W. 735, 746. Dehors the record; foreign to the record. 3 Bl.Comm. 387.
DEHYDRATE. To deprive or to be free of water or elements of water or to suffer loss of water. In re Benner, Cust. & Pat.App., 46 F.2d 383, 384.
DEI GRATIA. Lat. By the grace of God. A phrase used in the formal title of a king or queen, importing a claim of sovereignty by the favor or commission of God. In ancient times it was in-corporated in the titles of inferior officers, (espe-cially ecclesiastical,) but in later use was reserved as an assertion of "the divine right of kings."
DEI JUDICIUM. The judgment of God. The old Saxon trial by ordeal, so called because it was thought to be an appeal to God for the justice of a cause, and it was believed that the decision was according to the will and pleasure of Divine Prov-idence. Wharton.
DEJACION. In Spanish law. Surrender; re-lease; abandonment; e. g., the act of an insolvent in surrendering his property for the benefit of his creditors, of an heir in renouncing the succession, the abandonment of insured property to the un-derwriters.
DEJERATION. A taking of a solemn oath.
DEL BIEN ESTRE. L. Fr. In old English prac-tice. Of well being; of form. The same as de bene esse. Britt. c. 39.
DEL CREDERE. In mercantile law. A phrase borrowed from the Italians, equivalent to our word "guaranty" or "warranty," or the Scotch term "warrandice;" an agreement by which a factor, when he sells goods on credit, for an addi-tional commission, (called a "del credere commis-sion,") guaranties the solvency of the purchaser and his performance of the contract. Such a fac-tor is called a "del credere agent." He is a mere surety, hable to his principal only in case• the purchaser makes default. Story, Ag. 28; Lemnos Broad Silk Works v. Spiegelberg, 217 N.Y.S. 595, 597, 127 Misc. 855; Commercial Investment Trust v. Stewart, 235 Mich. 502, 209 N.W. 660, 661; Com-
monwealth v. Thorne, Neale & Co., 264 Pa. 408, 1(77 A. 814, 815; State v. Tuffs, 54 Mont. 20, 165 P. 1107, 1108.
DÉLAISSEMENT. In French marine law. Aban-donment. Emerig. Tr. des Ass. ch. 17.
DELATE. In Scotch law. To accuse. Delated, accused. Delatit off arte and parte, accused of being accessary to. 3 How. St. Tr. 425, 440.
DELATIO. In the civil law. An accusation or information.
DELATOR. An accuser; an informer; a syco-phant.
DELATURA. In old English law. The reward of an informer. Whishaw.
DELAY. To retard; obstruct; put off; postpone; defer; procrastinate; prolong the time of or be-fore; hinder; interpose obstacles; as, when it is said that a conveyance was made to "hinder and delay creditors." Mercantile Co. v. Arnold, 108 Ga. 449, 34 S.E. 176; Ellis v. Valentine, 65 Tex. 532; Blair v. Blair, 122 Me. 500, 120 A. 902, 905. The term does not imply dishonesty or involve moral wrong. Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank v. Kontz, 185 Ga. 131, 194 S.E. 536, 544.
DELAY RENTAL. Rent, usually on oil and gas leases, paid for additional time in which to utilize land. It does not depend on oil or gas produced, does not exhaust substance of land, and resembles a bonus payment, which is an advance royalty. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Wilson, C. C.A.Tex., 76 F.2d 766, 769; State v. Magnolia Pe-troleum Co., Tex.Civ.App., 173 S.W.2d 186, 190.
DELECTUS PERSONIE. Lat: Choice of the per-son. Johnston v. Winn, Tex.Civ.App., 105 S.W.2d 398, 400. By this term is understood the right of a partner to exercise his choice and preference as to the admission of any new members to the firm, and as to the persons to be so admitted, if any. People v. Herbert, 162 Misc. 817, 295 N.Y.S. 251, 253. The doctrine does not apply to corpora-tions. Adams v. St. Clair, 185 Miss. 416, 188 So. 559, 560.

In Scotch Law

convention. Manston v. McIntosh, 58 Minn. 525, 60 N.W. 672, 28 L.R.A. 605.
The representative in congress of one of the organized territories of the United States. To send as an agent or representative; to commit to the tare or management of another.
DELEGATES, THE HIGH COURT OF. In Eng-lish law. Formerly the court of appeal from the ecclesiastical and admiralty courts. Abolished up-on the judicial committee of the privy council be-ing constituted the court of appeal in such cases.
DELEGATION. A sending away; a putting into commission; the assignment of a debt to another; the intrusting another with a general power to act for the good of those who depute him; a body of delegates.

At Common Law

The transfer of authority by one person to an-other; the act of making or commissioning a dele-gate.
The whole body of delegates or representatives sent to a convention or assembly from one dis-trict, place, or political unit are collectively spo-ken of as a "delegation."

In the Civil Law

A species of novation which consists in the change of one debtor for another, when he who is indebted substitutes a third person who obligates himself in his stead to the creditor, or to the per-son appointed by him so that the first debtor is acquitted and his obligation extinguished, and the creditor contents himself with the obligation of the Second. debtor. Delegation is essentially dis-tinguished from any other species of novation, in this: that the former demands the consent of all three parties, but the latter that only of the two parties to the new debt. 1 Domat, § 2318; Adams v. Power, 48 Miss. 454.
Delegation is novation effected by the interven-tion of another person whom the debtor, in order to be liberated from his creditor, gives to such creditor, or to hirn whom the creditor appoints; and such person so given becomes obliged to the creditor in the place of the original debtor. Burge, Sur. 173.
Perfect delegation exists when the debtor who makes the obligation is discharged by the creditor.
Imperfect delegation exists when the creditor retalns his rlghts against the original debtor. 2 Duvergnoy, n. 169.
Delegatus non potest delegare. A delegate can-not delegate; an agent cannot delegate his func-tions to a subagent without the knowledge or con-sent of the principal; the person to whom an office or duty is delegated cannot lawfully devolve the duty on another, unless he be expressly authorized so to do. 9 Coke, 77; Broom, Max. 840; 2 Kent, Comm. 633; 2 Steph.Comm. 119; Blake v. Allen, 221 N.C. 445, 20 S.E.2d 552, 554.
DÉLESTAGE. In French marine law. A dis-charging of ballast (lest) from a vessel.
Black’s Law Dictionary Revisad 4th Ed.-33
DELETE. In Scotch law. To erase; to strike out.
DELETERIOUS. Hurtful, morally or physically; injurious, as influence; poisonous; unwholesome. State v. Crabtree Co., 218 Minn. 36, 15 N.W.2d 98.
Thus struvite crystals which developed In jar of wet shrlmp alter packing, O’Hare v. Petersen, 174 l’Use. 481, 21 N.Y.S.2d 487, 491, and bones in fish and fragments of shell In oysters constitute "deleterious substances". Unit-ed States v. 1232 Cases American Beauty Brand Oysters, D.C.Mo., 43 F.Supp. 749, 751.
DELF. A quarry or mine. 31 Eliz. c. 7.
Deliberandum est diu quod statuendum est semel. 12 Coke, 74. That which is to be resolved once for all should be long deliberated upon.
DELIBERATE, v. To weigh, ponder, discuss, re• garcl upon, consider. Cole v. List & Weatherly Const. Co., La.App., 156 So. 88, 90. To examine, to consult, in order to form an opinion. McGregor v. State, 83 Tex.Cr.R. 35, 201 S.W. 184, 186. To weigh in the mind; to consider the reasons for and against; to consider maturely; reflect upon; as to deliberate a question; to weigh the argu-ments for and against a proposed course of ac-tion. People v. Thomas, 25 Ca1.2d 880, 156 P.2d 7, 17, 18.
DELIBERATE, adj. Well advised; carefully con-sidered; not sudden or rash; circumspect; slow in determining. McClendon v. Louisiana Cent. Lumber Co., 17 La.App. 246, 135 So. 754, 756. Willful rather than merely :%ntentional. Cole v. List & Weatherly Const. Co., La.App., 156 So. 88, 90. Formed, arrived at, or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of con-siderations, as a deliberate judgment or plan; carried on coolly and steadily, especially accord-ing to a preconceived design; given to weighing facts and arguments with a view to a choice or decision; careful in considering the consequences of a step; slow in action; unhurried; character-ized by reflection; dispassionate; not rash. Peo-ple v. Thomas, 25 Ca1.2d 880, 156 P.2d 7, 17, 18. The word carries with it an implication of some obstinacy, headstrongness, foolish daring, or in-tentional wrongdoing. Brown v. Kansas City Bridge Co., La.App., 191 So. 755, 757.
By the use of this word, In descrlbing a crime, the Idea Is conveyed that the perpetrator weighs the motives for the act and its consequences, the nature of the crime, or other things connected with his intentions, with a view to a de-cision thereon; that he carefully conslders all these; and that the act is not suddenly committed. It implies that the perpetrator must be capable of the exercise of such mental powers as are called into use by deliberation and the con-sideration and weighing of motives and consequences. In re Nunns, 188 App.Div. 424, 176 N.Y.S. 858, 865; TenkIns v. Carman Mfg. Co., 79 Or. 448, 155 P. 703, 705.
"Deliberation" and "premeditation" are of the same char-acter of mental operations, differing only in degree. De-liberation is but prolonged premeditation. In othe^ words, in law, deliberation Is premeditation in a cool state of the blood, or, where there has been heat of passlon, it Is pre-meditatIon continued beyond the perlod within which there has been time for the blood to cool, in the given case. De-liberation Is not only to think of beforehand, which may be but for an Instant, but the inclination to do the act is considered, weighed, pondered upon, for such a length of time after a provocatIon is given as the jury may flnd was sufficient for the blood to cool. One in a heat of passion may premedítate without deliberating. Deliberation is only exercised in a cool state of the blood, while premedita-tion may be either in that state of the blood or in the heat of passion. State v. Hall, 40 N.M. 128, 55 P.2d 740, 742; People v. Thomas, 25 Ca1.2d 880, 156 P.2d 7, 17; State v. Payne, 213 N.C. 719, 197 S.E. 573, 579,
DELIBERATELY. Willfully; with premeditation; intentionally; purposely; in cold blood. Ayer-heart v. State, 158 Ark. 639, 238 S.W. 620, 621; State v. Young, 314 Mo. 612, 286 S.W. 29, 34; Csanyi v. Csanyi, 93 N.J.Eq. 11, 115 A. 76, 78; State v. Johnson, 92 Kan. 441, 140 P. 839, 840.
DELIBERATION. The act or process of deliberat-ing. The act of weighing and examining the rea-sons for and against a contemplated act or course of conduct or a choice of acts or means. See De-
liberate.
DELICATESSEN. Prepared foods, such as cooked meats, relishes, preserves and the like. North Ave. Market v. Keys, 164 Md. 185, 164 A. 152, 154. Also, a store that sells such prepared foods. Park-er v. Levin, 285 Mass. 125, 188 N.E. 502, 503, 90 A.
L.R. 1446.
Delicatus debitor est odiosus in lege. A luxuri-ous debtor is odious in law. 2 Bulst. 148. Impris-onment for debt has now, however, been generally
abolished.
DELICT. In the Roman and civil law. A wrong or injury; an offense; a violation of public or private duty.
It will be observed that this word, taken ln its most gen-eral sense, is wider in both directions than our English term "tort." On the one hand, it includes those wrongful acts which, while directly affecting some individual or his property, yet extend in their injurious consequences to the peace or security of the community at large, and hence rise to the grade of crimes or mlsdemeanors. These acts were termed in the Roman law "public delicts;" while those for which the only penalty exacted was compensation to the person primarily injured were denominated "private delicts." On the other hand, the term appears to have included injurious actions which transpired without any malicious intention on the part of the doer. Thus Pothier gives the narre "quasi delicts" to the acts of a person who, without malignity, but by an inexcusable imprudence, causes an injury to another. Poth.Obl. 116. But the term is used in modem jurisprudence as a convenient synonym of "tort.

Qua si Delict

An act whereby a person, without malice, bu( by fault, negligente, or imprudence not legally excusable, causes injury to another. They were four in numher, viz.: (1) Qui judex litem suam fecit, being the offense of partiality or excess in the judex, (juryinan.) (2) Dejectuin cffusumve aliquid, being the tort committed by one’.e servant in emptying or throwing something out uf au attic or upper story upon a person passing beneath. (ti) D111111111,1 infec-tuni, being the offense of hanging dangerous artieles over the heads of persone passing along the king’s highway. (4) ‘forte committed by one’s agente in the course of their employtnent. Brown.
DELICTUAL FAULT. An act, productive of ob-ligations, which takes place between persons jurid-ically strangers to each other; it supposes the absence of obligation and its result is the creation of one. Reserve Ins. Co. v. Fabre, 149 So.2d 413, 416, 243 La. 982.
DELICTUM. Lat. A delict, tort, wrong, injury, or offense. Actions ex delicto are such as are
founded on a tort, as distinguished from actions on contract.
Culpability, blameworthiness, or legal delin-quency. The word occurs in this sense in the maxim, "In parí delicto melior est conditio de-fendentis" (which see).
A challenge of a juror propter delictum is for some crime or misdemeanor that affects his credit and renders him infamous. 3 Bl.Comm. 363; 2 Kent, Comm. 241.
DELIMIT. To mark or lay out the limits or boundary line of a territory or country; to fix or to mark the limits of; to demarcate; bound. Walling v. Yeakley, C.C.A.Colo., 140 F.2d 830, 832.
DELIMITATION. The act of fixing, marking off, or describing the limits or boundary line of a territory, country, authority, right, statutory ex-ception or the like. See Delimit.
DELINQUENCY. Failure, omission, violation of duty. State or condition of one who has failed to perform his duty. Travelers’ Protective Ass’n of America v. Ziegler, Tex.Civ.App., 250 S.W. 1115, 1116; Robinson v. Miller, 317 III. 501, 148 N.E. 319, 322. Synonymous with misconduct and of-fense. Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 296 N.W. 636, 639.
Delinquens per iram provocatus puniri debet mi-tius. 3 Inst. 55. A delinquent provoked by anger ought to be punished more mildly.
DELINQUENT, n. In the civil law. He who has been guilty of some crime, offense, or failure of duty.
DELINQUENT, adj. As applied to a debt or claim, it means simply due and unpaid at the time appointed by law or fixed by contract; as, a de-linquent tax. Chauncey v. Wass, 35 Minn. 1, 30 N.W. 826; Gallup v. Schmidt, 154 Ind. 196, 56 N. E. 450. As applied to a person, it commonly means that he is grossly negligent or in willful default in regard to his pecuniary obligations, or even that he is dishonest and unworthy of credit. Boyce v. Ewart, Rice S. C., 140; Ferguson v. Pitts-burgh, 159 Pa. 435, 28 Atl. 118; Grocers’ Ass’n v. Exton, 18 Ohio Cir.Ct.R. 321.
DELINQUENT CHILD. An infant of not more than specified age, Phillips v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 20 S.W.2d 790, 791, who has violated any law or who is incorrigible; (prostitute) Bolker v. State, 134 Neb. 255, 278 N.W. 377, 379; (thief) Rose v. State, 137 Tex.Cr.R. 316, 129 S.W.2d 639, 640; (felony) State v. Connally, 190 La. 175, 182 So. 318, 319.
Although the terms dependent child and delin-quent child, as used in juvenile court law, are largely synonymous, State v. Clevenger, 161 Wash. 306, 296 P. 1054; a neglected and dependent child is not necessarily a delinquent child. In re San-tillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503, 513.
DELINQUENT JUVENILE. See Delinquent Child.

DELINQUENT TAXES. Past due and unpaid tax-es. Ryan v. Roach Drug Co., 113 Okl. 130, 239 P. 912, 918; Cornell v. Maverick Loan & Trust Co., 95 Neb. 9, 144 N.W. 1072, 1074.
DELIRIUM. In medical jurisprudence. Delirium is that state of the mirad in which it acts without being directed by the power of volition, which is wholly or partially suspended. This happens most perfectly in dreams. But what is commonly call-ed "delirium" is always preceded or attended by a feverish and highly diseased state of the body. The patient in delirium is wholly unconscious of surrounding objects, or conceives them to be dif-ferent from what they really are. His thoughts seem to drift about, wildering and tossing amidst distracted dreams. And his observations, when he makes any, as of ten happens, are wild and in-coherent; or, from excess of pain, he sinks into a low muttering, or silent and death-like stupor. The law contemplates this species of mental de-rangement as an intellectual eclipse; as a dark-ness occasioned by a cloud of disease passing over the mirad; and which must soon terminate in health or in death. Supreme Lodge v. Lapp, 25 Ky.Law Rep. 74, 74 S.W. 656; Sommerville v. Greenhood, 65 Mont. 101, 210 P. 1048, 1054; Grand Lodge, A. O. U. W. of Arkansas, v. Mode, 157 Ark. 62, 247 S.W. 386, 388; (distinguished from insane delusion) Schoenhoff v. Haering, 327 Mo. 837, 38 S.W.2d 1011, 1015.
DELIRIUM FEBRILE. In medical jurisprudence. A form of mental aberration incident to fevers, and sometimes to the last stages of chronic dis-eases.
DELIRIUM TREMENS. A disorder of the ner-vous system, involving the brain and setting up an attack of temporary delusional insanity, some-times attended with violent excitement or mafia, caused by excessive and long continued indulgence in alcoholic liquors, or by the abrupt cessation of such use after a protracted debauch. Horn- v. Commonwealth, 292 Ky. 587, 167 S.W.2d 58, 61; Hartin v. Hysee Inghram Tire Co., 153 Pa.Super. 121, 33 A.2d 471, 473. See Insanity.
DELITO. In Spanish law. Crime; a crime, of-fense, or delict. White, New Recop. b. 2, tit. 19, c. 1, § 4.
DELIVERANCE. In practice. The verdict.ren-dered by a jury.

Second Deliverance

In practice. A writ allowed a plaintiff in re-plevin, where the defendant has obtained judg-ment for return of the goods, by default or non-suit, in order to have the same distress again de-livered to him, on giving the same security as be-f ore. 3 B1.Comm. 150; 3 Steph.Comm. 668.
DELIVERY. The act by which the res or sub-stance thereof is placed within the actual or con-structive possession or control of another. Poor v. American Locomotive Co., C.C.A.I11., 67 F.2d 626, 630.
What constitutes delivery depends largely on the intent of the parties. It is not necessary that delivery should be by manual transfer. Miller v. Hospelhorn, 176 Md. 356, 4 A.2d 728, 733.
"Delivery" required in conveyance of personal qhattels as against all but vendos, is delivery in its natural sense; that is, a change of possession. Goodhue v. State St. Trust Co., 267 Mass. 28, 165 N.E. 701, 705.
In General
The transfer from one person to another of the res or a right or interest therein, which means more than physical transfer of possession, Mur-phy v. Smith, 291 Mass. 93, 195 N.E. 912; Pure Oil Co. v. Evans, 369 Ill. 416, 17 N.E.2d 23, 24. Although in the popular sense, in the case of a contract or lease or the like, it implies a trans-fer of the tangible contract. Lease, Roberts v. Cyr, 136 Me. 39, 1 A.2d 281, 282; release for in-jury, Pevesdorf v. Union Electric Light & Power Co., 333 Mo. 1155, 64 S.W.2d 939; check, Irving Trust Co. v. Leff, 253 N.Y. 359, 171 N.E. 569; bank passbook, Brooks v. Mitchell, 163 Md. 1, 161 A. 261, 266, 84 A.L.R. 547.
Absolute and conditional. An absolute delivery, as distinguished from conditional delivery or de-livery in escrow, is one which is complete upon the actual transfer of the instrument from the possession of the grantor. Dyer v. Skadan, 128 Mich. 348, 87 N.W. 277, 278, 92 Am.St.Rep. 461. A conditional delivery is one which passes the thing subject to delivery from the possession of the grantor, but is not to be completed by possession of the grantee, or a third person as his agent, un-til the happening of a specified event. Silliman v. Dobner, 165 Minn. 87, 205 N.W. 696, 697.
Actual and constructive. Actual delivery consists in the giving real possession to the vendee or his servants or special agents who are identified with him in law and represent him. Carr v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., Mo.App., 284 S.W. 184, 185. It is a formal immediate tradition of the prop-erty to the vendee. Bridgham v. Hinds, 120 Me. 444, 115 A. 197, 199, 21 A.L.R. 1024. It contem-plates a manual transfer of the property. Callan v. Mutual Life Iras. Co., La.App., 147 So. 110, 111.
Constructive delivery is a general term, compre-hending all those acts which, although not truly conferring a real possession of the thing sold on the vendee, have been held, by construction of law, equivalent to acts of real delivery.
Constructive• delivery includes symbolic or substituted delivery and all those traditiones fictce which have been admitted into the law as sufficient to vest the absolute property in the vendee and bar the rights of lien and stop-page in transitu, such as marking and setting apart the goods as belonging to the vendee, charging him with ware-house rent, etc. See In re Nesto, C.C.A.Pa., 270 F. 503. A constructive delivery of personalty takes place when the goods are set apart and notice given to the person to whom they are to be delivered. The Titania, C.C.A., 131 F. 229, 65 C.C.A. 215, or when, without actual transfer of the goods or their symbol, the conduct of the parties is such as to be inconsistent with any other supposition than that there has been a change in the nature of the holding. Swafford v. Spratt, 93 Mo.App. 631, 67 S.W. 701.
Delivery bond. A bond given upon the seizure of goods (as under the revenue laws) conditioned for their restoration to the defendant, or the payment of their value, if so adjudged.
Delivery order. An order addressed, in England, by the owner of goods to a person holding them on his behalf, requesting him to deliver them to a person named in the order. Delivery orders are chiefly used in the case of goods held by dock companies, wharfingers, etc. National Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Mann, 251 Mass. 238, 146 N.E. 791, 793.
Failure to make delivery, see Failure to Make Delivery.
Second delivery. The legal delivery by the de-positary of a deed placed in escrow. Thornhill v. Olson, 31 N.D. 81, 153 N.W. 442, 445, L.R.A.1916A, 493, Ann.Cas.1917E, 427.
Symbolical delivery. The constructive delivery of the subject-matter of a sale, where it is cumber-some or inaccessible, by the actual delivery of some article which is conventionally accepted as the symbol or representative of it, or which ren-ders access to it possible, or which is the evidence of the purchaser’s title to it; as the key of a warehouse, or a bill of lading of goods on ship-board. Hall v. Kansas City Terra Cotta Co., 97 Kan. 103, 154 P. 210, 212, L.R.A.1916D, 361, Ann. Cas.1918D, 605

In Conveyancing

The final and absolute transfer of a deed, prop-erly executed, to the grantee, or to some person for his use, in such manner that it cannot be re-called by the grantor. Gatchell v. Gatchell, 127 Me. 328, 143 A. 169, 170; Arndt v. Lapel, 214 Iowa 594, 243 N.W. 605, 610; delivery to a stranger, Hall v. Hall, 292 Ky. 772, 168 S.W.2d 10, 14; or depositary, Stalting v. Stalting, 52 S.D. 309, 217 N.W. 386, 389.

In Law of Sales

The tradition or transfer of the possession of personal property from one person to another. Bowles v. Beucher, D.C.Mass., 53 F.Supp. 984, 987; delivery of a bill of sale or written evidence of title as sufficient delivery, Smith v. Acorn, D.C. Mun.App., 32 A.2d 252, 255; by carrier, Rice & Lockwood Lumber Co. v. Boston & M. R. R., 308 Mass. 101, 31 N.E.2d 219, 221, 222, 223.
"Delivery" occurs whenever, at time and place fixed by law or agreed on by parties, seller does everything neces-sary to put goods completely and unconditionally at buyer’s disposal. Fox v. Young, Tex.Civ.App., 91 S.W.2d 857, 859

In Medical Jurisprudence

The act of a woman giving birth to her off-spring. Blake v.•Junkins, 35 Me. 433.
DELUSION. In medical jurisprudence. An in-sane delusion is an unreasoning and incorrigible belief in the existence of facts which are either impossible absolutely, or, at least, impossible un-der the circumstances of the individual. It is never the result of reasoning and reflection; it is not generated by them, and it cannot be dispelled by them; and hence it is not to be confounded
with an opinion, however fantastic.the latter may be. Guiteau’s Case, D.C.D.C., 10 Fed. 161, 170; Davidson v. Piper, 221 Iowa 171, 265 N.W. 107, 109; McKinnon v. State, 51 Ga.App. 549, 181 S.E. 91; Hallucination as a delusion, Petroleum Casualty Co. v. Kincaid, Tex.Civ.App., 93 S.W.2d 499, 501; belief in the impossible, In re Leedom’s Estate, 347 Pa. 180, 32 A.2d 3; as respects testamentary capacity, In re McDowell’s Estate, 103 N.J.Eq. 346, 143 A. 325, 326.

Systematized Delusion

One based on a false premise, pursued by a logical process of reasoning to an insane conclu-sion ; there being one central delusion around which other aberrations of the mind converge; Taylor v. McClintock, 87 Ark. 243, 112 S.W. 405. See Insanity.
DEM. An abbreviation for "demise;" e. g., Doe dem. Smith, Doe, on the demise of Smith.
DEMAIN. See Demesne.
DEMAND, v. In practice. To claim as one’s due; to require; to ask relief. To summon; to call in court. "Although solemnly demanded, comes not, but makes default." Fossett v. State, 34 Okl.Cr. 106, 245 P. 668, 669.
DEMAND, n. A peremptory claim to thing of right, differing from claim, in that it presupposes that there is no defense or doubt upon question of right, Golden v. Golden, 155 Okl. 10, 8 P.2d 42, 45; Anderson v. Commercial Credit Co., 110 Mont. 333, 101 P.2d 367, 369; National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Dove, 141 Tex. 464, 174 S.W.2d 245, 247.
The assertion of a legal right; a legal obliga-tion asserted in the courts; a word of art of an extent greater in its signification than any other word except "claim." Nunn v. Titche-Goettinger Co., Tex.Civ.App., 196 S.W. 890, 892. Demand for payment. Peterson v. Rodgers, 51 Ariz. 502, 78 P.2d 480, 482; assessment upon corporate stock of deceased. Smith v. Fechheimer, 124 Fla. 757, 169 So. 395, 398; presentment of statement, Davi-son v. Klaess, 280 N.Y. 252, 20 N.E.2d 744, 746. However, under some statutes "demand" has a more restricted meaning. Hillside Securities Co. v. Minter, 300 Mo. 380, 254 S.W. 188, 193.
A debt or amount due. Inhabitants of Town of Frankfort v. Waldo Lumber Co., 128 Me. 1, 145 A. 241, 243; Caldwell v. Morfa, D.C.Tex., 24 F.2d 106, 107.
An imperative request preferred by one person to another, under a claim of right, requiring the latter to do or yield something or to abstain from some act. Zimmerman v. Hicks, C.C.A., 7 F.2d 443, 445; Norwood Nat. Bank v. Piedmont Pub. Co., 106 S.C. 472, 91 S.E. 866, 867; school district’s request that depositary honor checks for salaries. School District of City of Lansing v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 266 Mich. 189, 253 N.W. 263; demand for extradition, Ex parte King, 139 Me. 203, 28 A.2d 562, 564. The seeking alter a commodity or service. It is not something static, but necessarily contains the idea of "competition" and a realization that markets are as much limited by sales efforts as by capacity to produce. Mendota Coal & Coke Co. v. Eastern Ry. & Lumber Co., C.C.A.Wash., 53 F.2d 77, 82.
—Compulsory demand. "Compulsory demand" by the true owner of an article, justifying sur-render and recovery by the one who surrenders it as against his vendor, means when the true owner presents his claim and establishes his paramount title. Jordan v. Van Duzee, 139 Minn. 103, 165 N.W. 877, 879, L.R.A. 1918B, 1136.
—Cross-demand. A demand that is preferred by one party to an action in opposition to a demand already preferred against him by his adversary. Drovers’ State Bank v. Elliott, 97 Kan. 64, 154 P. 255, 256.
—Demand in reconvention. A demand which the defendant institutes in consequence of that which the plaintiff has brought against him. Used in Louisiana. Equivalent to a "counterclaim" else-where. McLeod v. Bertschey, 33 Wis. 177, 14 Am. Rep. 755.
—Demand note. A note that is due at once; one on which suit may be brought without any formal demand. Wilson v. Stark, 146 Miss. 498, 112 So. 390, 392.
—Legal demand. A demand properly made, as to form, time, and place, by a person lawfully au-thorized. Foss v. Norris, 70 Me. 118.
—On demand. A promissory note payable "on demand" is a present debt, and is payable without any actual demand, or, if a demand is necessary, the bringing of a suit is enough. Appeal of An-dress, 99 Pa. 424.
—Personal demand. A demand for payment of a Bill or note, made upon the drawer, acceptor or maker, in person. See 1 Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 589.
—Reasonable public demand for a bank. Such a desire upon the part of the community for the bank as will make its coming welcome and insure an amount of business sufficient to promise it success. It may come from the natural desire of the community and upon its own initiative, or it may be the result of propaganda. State v. State Securities Commission, 145 Minn. 221, 176 N.W. 759, 760.
DEMAND NOTE. A note which expressly states that it is payable on demand, on presentation or at sight; a note in which no time for payment is expressed, Cassity v. Cassity, 147 Kan. 411, 76 P.2d 862, 866; Kent v. Lampman, 59 Ca1.App.2d 407, 139 P.2d 57, 59; Tarlton v. Johnson, Mo.App., 138 S.W.2d 49, 52; a note issued, accepted or in-dorsed when overdue, as regards person so issu-ing, accepting or indorsing it. Nees v. Hagan, 22 Tenn.App. 28, 118 S.W.2d 566, 568; DeLoach v. Adams Loan & Investment Co., 62 Ga.App. 61, 7 S.E.2d 580, 581. DEMANDA. In Spanish law. The petition of a plaintiff, setting forth his demand. Las Partidas, pt. 3, tit. 10, 1. 3.
DEMANDANT. The plaintiff or party suing in a real action. Co. Litt. 127.
DEMANDRESS. A female demandent.
DEMEANOR. As respects a witness or other person, relates to physical appearance. People v. Vaughan, 131 Cal.App. 265, 21 P.2d 438. It em-braces such facts as the tone of voice in which a witness’ statement is made, the hesitation or read-iness with which his answers are given, the look of the witness, his carriage, his evidentes of sur-prise, his gestures, his zeal, his bearing, his ex-pression, his yawns, the use of his eyes, his 1 urtive or meaning glances, or his shrugs, the pitch of his voice, his self-possession or embarrassment, his air of candor or seeming levity. Rains v. Rains, 17 N.J.Misc. 310, 8 A.2d 715, 717.
DEMEASE. In old English law. Death.
DEMEMBRATION. In Scotch law. Maliciously cutting off or otherwise separating one limb from another. 1 Hume, 323; Bell.
DEMENS. One whose mental faculties are en-feebled; one who has lost his mind; distinguished from amens, one totally insane. 4 Coke, 128.
DEMENTED. Of unsound mind.
DEMENTENANT EN AVANT. L. Fr. From this time forward. Kelham.
DEMENTIA. See Insanity.
DEMENTIA PRAECOX. A term used to include a wide range of mental disorders which occur in early life. It is also called adolescent insanity and schizophrenia. Dementia praecox includes three types, namely, primary dementia, catatonia, and hebephrenia. Loftin v. Yancey, 182 Okl. 313, 77 P.2d 107, 108; Honrath v. New York Life Ins. Co., 65 S.D. 480, 275 N.W. 258, 259, 112 A.L.R. 1272; Lee v. United States, C.C.A.Ga., 91 F.2d 326, 330. Also, see Insanity.
DEMESNE. Domain; dominical; held in one’s own right, and not of a superior; not allotted to tenants.
In the language of pleading, own; proper; or-iginal. Thus, son assault demesne, his own as-sault, his assault originally or in the first place.

Ancient Demesn

A man is said to be seised in his demesne as of fee of a corporeal inheritance, because he has a property, dominicum or demesne, in the thing itself. But when he has no dominion in the thing itself, as in the case of an incorporeal heredita-ment, he is said to be seised as of fee, and not in his demesne as of lee. 2 BI. Comm. 106; Little-ton, § 10; Barnet v. Ihrie, 17 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 196.

Demesne Lands

In English law. Those lands of a manor not granted out in tenancy, but reserved by the lord for his own use and occupation. Lands set apart and appropriated by the lord for his own private use, as for the supply of his table, and the main-tenarice of his family; the opposite of tenemental Tenancy and demesne, however, were not in every sense the opposites of each other; lands held for years or at will being included among demesne lands, as well as those in the lord’s ac-tual possession. Spelman; 2 Bl. Comm. 90.

Demesne Lands of the Crown

That share of lands reserved to the crown at the original distribution of landed property, or which carne to it afterwards by forfeiture or otherwise. 1 Bl. Comm. 286; 2 Steph. Comm. 550.

a demesne.
DEMI. French. Half; the hall. Used chiefly in composition.
As to demi "Mark," "Official," "Vill," see those titles.
DEMI-SANGUE, or DEMY-SANGUE. Half-blood. DEMIDIETAS. In old records. A half or moiety.
DEMIES. In some universities and colleges this term is synonymous with "scholars."
DEMINUTIO. In the civil law. A taking away; loss or deprivation. See Capitis Deininutio.
DEMISE, v. In conveyancing. To convey or create an estate for years or life; to lease. The usual and operative word in leases: "Have grant-ed, demised, and to farm let, and by these pres-ents do grant, demise, and to farm let." 2 Bl. Comm. 317; 1 Steph. Comm. 476; Co. Litt. 45a; Carr, v. King, 24 Cal.App. 713, 142 P. 131, 133.
DEMISE, n. In conveyancing. A conveyance of an estate to another for life, for years, or at will; most commonly for years; a lease. 1 Steph. Comm. 475. Priddy v. Green, Tex.Civ.App., 220 S.W. 243, 248. Originally a posthumous grant; commonly a lease or conveyance for a term of years; sometimes applied to any conveyance, in fee, for life, or for years. Pub. St. Mass. 1882, p. 1289.
"Demise" is synonymous with "lease" or "let." The use of the term in a lease imports a covenant for quiet enjoy-ment. Evans v. Williams, 291 Ky. 484, 165 S.W.2d 52, 55; Slxty-Third & Halsted Realty Co. v. Chicago City Bank & Trust Co., 299 III.App. 297, 20 N.E.2d 162, 167; and implies a covenant by lessor of good right and title to make the lease. Evans v. Williams, 291 Ky. 484, 165 S.W.2d 52, 55.
A charter of a barge without motive power ac-companied by bargee paid by owner, The Nat. E. Sutton, D.C.N.Y., 42 F.2d 229, 232; Harbor Tow-boat Co. v. Lowe, D.C.N.Y., 47 F.Supp. 454, 456; or of a tug or other vessel under circumstances making charterer owner pro hac vice, Davison Chemical Corporation v. The Henry W. Card, D.C.
N.Y., 51 F.Supp. 380, 382; Conners Marine Co. v. Wathen, D.C.N.Y., 43 F.Supp. 283, 284. Under a demise charter, there is but a hiring of the vessel, under which no title passes to the charterer but merely the right to possess and control it for a limited period. McGahern v. Koppers Coal Co., C.C.A.Pa., 108 F.2d 652, 653.
The word is also used as a synonym for "de-cease" or "death." In England it is especially employed to denote the death of the sovereign.
—Demise and redemise. In conveyancing. Mu-tual leases made from one party to another on each side, of the same land, or something out of it; as when A. grants a lease to B. at a nominal rent (as of a pepper corn), and B. redemises the same property to A. for a shorter time at a real, substantial rent. Jacob; Whishaw.
—Demise of the crown. The natural dissolution of the king is generaily so called; an expression which signifies merely a transfer of property. By demise of the crown we mean only that, in consequence of the disunion of the king’s natural body from his body politic, the kingdom is trans-ferred or demised to his successor, and so the royal dignity remains perpetual. 1 Bl. Comm. 249; Plowd. 234.
—Several demises. In English practice. In the action of ejectment, it was formerly customary, in case there were any doubt as to the legal es-tate being in the plaintiff, to insert in the declara-tion several demises from as many different per-sons; but this was rendered unnecessary by the provisions of the common-law procedure acts.
—Single demise. A declaration in ejectment might contain either one demise or several. When it contained only one, it was called a "declaration with a single demise."
DEMISI. Lat. I have demised or leased. Demisi, concessi, et ad firmam tradidi; have demised, granted, and to farm let. The usual operative words in ancient leases, as the corresponding Eng-lish words are in the modern forms. 2 Bl. Comm. 317, 318; Koch v. Hustis, 113 Wis. 599, 87 N.W. 834.
DEMISSIO. L. Lat. A demise or letting. Chief-ly used in the phrase ex demissione (on the de-mise), which formed part of the title of the cause in the old actions of ejectment, where it signified that the nominal plaintiff (a fictitious person) held the estate "on the demise" of, that is, by a lease from, the real plaintiff.
DEMOBILIZATION. In military law. The dis-missal of an army or body of troops from active service.
DEMOCRACY. That form of government in which the sovereign power resides in and is ex-ercised by the whole body of free citizens, as dis-tinguished from a monarchy, aristocracy, or oli-garchy. According to the theory of a pure de-mocracy, every citizen should participa te directly

assembly should comprise the whole people. But the ultimate lodgment of the sovereignty being the distinguishing feature, the introduction of the representative system does not remove a govern-ment from this type. However, a government of the latter kind is sometimes specifically described as a "representative democracy."
Town forro of government constitutes pure democracy as distinguished from representative government. Commonwealth v. Town of Hud-son, 315 Mass. 335, 52 N.E.2d 566, 572.
Democracy is loosely used of governments in which the sovereign powers are exercised by all the people or a large number of them, or speciflcally, in modern use, of a representative government where there is equality of rights without hereditary or arbltrary differences in rank or privilege; and is distinguished from aristocracy. * * * In modern representative democracies, as the United States and France, though the governing body, that is, the elec-torate, is a minority of the total population, the principie on which the government is based is popular sovereignty, which distinguishes them from aristocracies. Webster’s New Int.Dict.
DEMOCRATIC. Of or pertaining to democracy, or to a political party called "democratic," par-ticularly, in the United States, the Democratic party, which succeeded the Anti-federalist, or Re-publican, party.
DEMOLISH. To throw or pull down; to raze; to destroy the fabrication of; to pulí to pieces; hence to ruin; destroy. Star Mfg. Co. v. Quarr-les, 172 Okl. 550, 46 P.2d 497, 498. To destroy totally or to commence the work of total destruc-tion with the purpose of completing the same. 50 L.J.M.C. 141. It is not synonymous with "re-move." Durrett v. Woods, 155 La. 533, 99 So. 430, 431.
DEMONETIZATION. The disuse of a particular metal for purposes of coinage. The withdrawal of the value of a metal as money.
DEMONSTRATE. To teach by exhibition of samples; to derive from admitted premises by steps of reasoning which admit of no doubt; to prove indubitably. Espenhain v. Barker, 121 Or. 621, 256 P. 766, 768. To show or prove value or merits by operation. J. A. Fay & Egan Co. v. Mims, 151 S.C. 484, 149 S.E. 246, 248.
DEMONSTRATIO. Lat. Description; addition; denomination. Occurring of ten in the phrase, "Falsa demonstratio non nocet," (a false descrip-tion does not harm.) 2 Bla. Comm. 382, n.; 2 P. Wms. 140; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 291; Wigr. Wills 208, 233.
DEMONSTRATION. Description; pointing out. That which is said or written to designate a thing or person.

Evidente

Absolutely convincing proof. That proof which excludes all possibility of error. Treadwell v. Whittier, 80 Cal. 574, 22 P. 266, 5 L.R.A. 498, 13 Am.St.Rep. 175

False Demonstration See False Demonstration

DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE. That evidence addressed directly to the senses without interven-tion of testimony. Kabase v. State, 31 Ala.App. 77, 12 So.2d 758, 764.
Demonstrative evidence of negligente has been applied to that kind of negligente which is usually expressed by res ipsa loquitur.
DEMONSTRATIVE LEGACY. See Legacy.
DEMOTION. A reduction to lower rank or grade, or to lower type of position, though holder’s sal-ary remains the same. Reed v. City Council of City of Roseville, 60 Cal.App.2d 628, 141 P.2d 459, 463. Assistant fire chief reduced in rank, Mc-Carthy v. Steinkellner, 223 Wis. 605, 270 N.W. 551; under Teachers’ Tenure Act. Smith v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 334 Pa. 197, 5 A.2d 535, 539; indefinite suspension without pay. City of Knox-ville v. Smith, 176 Tenn. 73, 138 S.W.2d 422, 424.
DEMPSTER. In Scotch law. A doomsman. One who pronounced the sentence of court. 1 How. State Tr. 937.
DEMUR. To present a demurrer; to take an exception to the sufficiency in point of law of a pleading or state of facts alleged. See Demurrer.
DEMURRABLE. Subject to a demurrer. A plead-ing, petition, or the like, is said to be demurrable when it does not state such facts as support the claim, prayer, or defense put forward. 5.Ch. Div. 979.
DEMURRAGE. In maritime law. The sum which is fixed by the contract of carriage, or which is allowed, as remuneration to the owner of a ship for the detention of his vessel beyond the number of days allowed by the charter-party for loading and unloading or for sailing. .Also the detention of the vessel by the freighter beyond such time. See 3 Kent, Comm. 203; 2 Steph. Comm. 185. Continental Grain Co. v. Armour Fertilizer Works, D.C.N.Y. 22 F.Supp. 49, 54; Yone Suzuki v. Central Argentine Ry., C.C.A.N. Y., 27 F.2d 795, 804. The term has been adopted in railroad practice. Central R. Co. of N. J. v. Gallena-Poole, Inc., 107 N.J.Eq. 267, 152 A. 251, 252; Sibley, L. B. & S. Ry. Co. v. Braswell Sand & Gravel Co., L.a.App., 199 So. 427, 428.
The sum agreed to be paid to the ship for delay caused without her fault, and which ordinarily does not begin to run until the lay days have been used up. Earn Line S. S. Co. v. Manati Sugar Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 269 F. 774, 776. The amount agreed upon or allowed by law for unreasonable detention. Clyde v. Wood, 179 N.Y.S. 252, 255, 189 App. Div. 737; W. R. trace & Co. v. Hansen, C.C.A.Wash., 273 F. 486, 496.
"Demurrage" is only an extended freight or reward to the vessel, in compensation for the earnings she is improp-erly caused to lose. Every improper detention of a vessel may be considered a demurrage, and compensation under that narre be obtained for it. Donaldson v. McDowell, Holmes, 290, Fed.Cas.No.3,985.
"Demurrage" is a claim for damages for failure of the consignee to accept delivery of the goods. Little v. One Cargo of Lumber, D.C.Fla., 2 F.2d 608, 609.
DEMURRANT. One who demurs; the party who, in pleading, interposes a demurrer.

In Equity

An allegation of a defendant, which, admitting the matters of fact alleged by the bill to be true, shows that as they are therein set forth they are insufficient for the plaintiff to proceed upon or to oblige the defendant to answer; or that, for some reason apparent on the face of the bill, or on account of the omission of some matter which ought to be contained therein, or for want of some circumstances which ought to be attendant thereon, the defendant ought not to be compelled to answer to the whole bill, or to some certain part thereof. Mitf. Eq. Pl. 107. See, also, Gold• smith v. Mead Johnson & Co., 176 Md. 682, 7 A.2d 176, 179.
A general demurrer In equity, as a separate entity from a demurrer on specific grounds, tests the equity of a bill la the same manner as a motion to dismiss for want of equity, and, in considerIng the bill on such a demurrer, amendable defects are taken as amended. Johnson v. Pugh, 193 So. 317, 239 Ala. 12.
By Federal Butes of Civil Procedure, demurrers, pleas and exceptions for insufficiency of a pleading are abolished; every defence in law shall be made by motion or by answer; motions going to jurisdiction, venue, process, or failure to state a claim are to be disposed of before trial, unless the court orders otherwise.

In Pleading

The formal mode of disputing the sufficiency in law of the pleading of the other side. In effect it is an allegation that, even if the facts as stated in the pleading to which objection is taken be true, yet their legal consequences are not such as to put the demurring party to the necessity of answering them or proceeding further with the cause. Green v. Carter, 28 Ohio App. 492, 162 N. E. 814, 815; State v. Broad River Power Co., 177 S.C. 240, 181 S.E. 41; Mountain Park Institute v. Lovill, 198 N.C. 642, 153 S.E. 114, 116; State v. California Packing Corporation, 105 Utah 191, 145 P.2d 784.
A "demurrer" is not an absolute admission of any fact but simply admits those facts that are well pleaded. Commonwealth ex rel. Duff v. Keenan, 347 Pa. 574, 33 A.2d 244, 248.
An objection made by one party to his opponent’s plead-ing, alleging that he ought not to answer it, for some defect in law in the pleading. It admits the facts, and refers the law arising thereon to the court. R. L. Davies & Co. v. Blomberg, 185 N.C. 496, 117 S.E. 497.
It importa that the objecting party will not proceed,’ but will wait the judgment of the court whether he is bound so to do. Co.Litt. 71b; Steph.P1. 61; Kramer v. Barth, 139 N.Y.S. 341, 344, 79 Misc. 80.

Classification and Varieties

A general demurrer is a demurrer framed in general terms, without showing specifically the nature of the objection, and which is usually re-sorted to where the objection is to matter of sub-stance. Steph.Pl. 140-142; 1 Chit.Pl. 663. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Arnold, 51 Ga.App. 562, 180 S.E. 906, 907.
Thus, a demurrer on the ground that the complaint sets forth no cause of action, is a general demurrer, Alabama Power Co. v. Curry, 228 Ala. 444, 153 So. 634; and a motion to dismiss a bill on ground that there is no equity apparent
on the face thereof or that court has no jurisdiction la treated as a general demurrer. People v. Sterling, 357 III. 354, 192 N.E. 229, 231.
A general demurrer to an indictment challenges only matters of form and substance appearing -on lts Pace. It is one which raises an objection that averments are insuf-ficient in law to support the action or defense without specifying any particular cause or defect, and is sufficient only to reach matters of substance. Mountain Park Insti-tute v. Lovill, 198 N.C. 642, 153 S.E. 114, 116.
A motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is equivalent to a general demurrer. Louisiana Farmers’ Protective Union v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. of America, D.C.Ark., 40 F.Supp. 897, 908.
• A special demurrer goes merely to structure or form of pleading which it attacks, and usually only to some portion thereof, and must distinctly specify wherein defect lies. Huff v. Palmer, 356 III. 563, 191 N.E. 199, 202; Cameron v. Evans Securities Corp., 119 Cal.App. 164, 6 P.2d 272, 274; It is one which excepts to the sufficiency of the pleadings on the opposite side, and shows speci-fically the nature of the objection, and the par-ticular ground of the exception. 3 Bouv. Inst. no. 3022. Dairy Regior. Land Corporation v. Hard-ing, Tex.Civ.App., 266 S.W. 181, 182; Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 107 Utah 114, 152 P.2d 98, 105.
Whlle general demurrer on specific grounds relating to different allegations of bill may be called "special demur-rer," which attacks different parts of bill speclfically, such demurrer falls, if bill is good as pleading and remaining allegations are sufficient to support relief prayed. Forcum v. Symmes, 106 Fla. 510, 143 So. 630, 631.
A speaking demurrer is one which, in order to sustain itself, requires the aid of a fact not ap-pearing on the face of the pleading objected to, or, in other words, which alleges or assumes the existence of a fact not already pleaded, and which constitutes the ground of objection and is con-demned both by the common law and the code system of pleading. Ellis v. Perley, 200 N.C. 403, 157 S.E. 29, 30. Ferris v. Union Sav. Bank, 45 Ga.App. 544, 165 S.E. 450; Preston A. Blair Co. v. Rose, 56 Idaho 114, 51 P.2d 209, 212; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Perrin, 184 Miss. 249, 183 So. 917, 920; Town of Randolph v. Lyon, 106 Vt. 495, 175 A. 1, 2; Whaley v. First Nat. Bank, 229 Ala. 153, 155 So. 574.
A speaking demurrer is one which alleges some new matter, not disclosed by the pleading against which the demurrer is aimed and not judicially known or legally presumed to be true. Blythe v. Enslen, 219 Ala. 638, 123 So. 71, 73; Kansas Life Ins. Co. v. First Bank of Truscott, Tex.Civ. App., 47 S.W.2d 675, 677; In re Ferris’ Estate,
Iowa, 14 N.W.2d 889, 894.
A parol demurrer (not properly a demurrer at all) was a staying of the pleadings; a suspension of the proceedings in an action during the non-age of an infant, especially in a real action. Now abolished. 3 Bl. Comm. 300.
Demurrer book. In practice. A record of the issue on a demurrer at law, containing a tran-script of the pleadings, with proper entries; and intended for the use of the court and counsel on the argument. 3 Bl. Comm. 317; 3 Steph. Comm. 581.

Demurrer ore tenus. An objection to the in-troduction of any evidence on the ground that the complaint or petition fails to state a cause of ac-tion. Cleveland v. Bateman, 21 N.M. 675, 158 P. 648, 652, Ann.Cas.1918E, 1011; Peerless Fixture Co. v. Frick, Mo.App., 133 S.W.2d 1089, 1090. This name is sometimes given to a ruling on an ob-jection to evidence, but is not properly a demurrer at all. Mandelert v. Land Co., 104 Wis. 423, 80 N.W. 726; It should be considered as a general demurrer only. Dawkins v. People’s Bank & Trust Co., 117 Okl. 181, 245 P. 594, 596.
Demurrer to evidence. This proceeding is an-alogous to a demurrer to a pleading. It is an ob-jection or exception by one of the parties in an ac-tion at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufflcient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the issue. Upon joinder in demurrer, the jury is discharged, and the case is argued to the court in banc, who gives judgment upon the facts as shown in evidence. See 3 Bl. Comm. 372; State v. Moody, 150 N.C. 847, 64 S.E. 431, 432. The practice has been largely superseded by mo-tions for nonsuit and directed verdict. Hopkins v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 96 Tenn. 409, 34 S.W. 1029, 1034, 32 L.R.A. 354. Thus, a motion to non-suit, Herrick v. Barzee, 96 Or. 357, 190 P. 141, 145; Perkins v. Maiden, 57 Cal.App.2d 46, 134 P.2d 30, 34, a motion to dismiss at close of plaintiff’s evi-dence for failure to prove essential facts, Mans-field v. Reserve Oil Co., 38 N.M. 187, 29 P.2d 491, 492; Fewkes v. Borah, 376 III. 596, 35 N.E.2d 69, 72, have been held to be, and a defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, made at close of the evi-dence, is equivalent to, a "demurrer to the evi-dence" for insufficiency to sustain a verdict for plaintiff. Milis v. Richardson, 126 Me. 244, 137 A. 689, 690. A motion to exclude evidence has the effect of a demurrer to the evidence, the chief points of difference being the stage of the pro-ceeding at which each is available and the conse-quences resulting from deferring the motion to exclude. Thornhill v. Thornhill, 172 Va. 553, 2 S.E.2d 318, 319. For a discussion of the subject see Hopkins v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. R., 96 Tenn. 409, 34 S.W. 1029, 32 L.R.A. 354.
Demurrer to interrogatories. Where a witness objects to a question propounded (particularly on the taking of a deposition) and states his reason for objecting or refusing to answer, it is called a "demurrer to the interrogatory," though the term cannot here be understood as used in its technical sense. 2 Swanst. 194; Gresl. Eq. Ev. 61; 2 Atk. 524; 1 Y. & J. 132.
DEMY SANKE, DEMY SANGUE. Half-blood. A corruption of demi-sang.
DEN. A valley. Blount. A hollow place among woods. Cowell.
DEN AND STROND. In old English law. Lib-erty for chips or vessels to run aground, or come ashore (strand themselves). Cowell.
DENARIATE. In old English law. As much land as is worth one penny per annum.
DENARIL An ancient general term for any sort of pecunia numerata, or ready money. The French use the word "denier" in the same sense, —payer de ses propres deniers.
DENARII DE CARITATE. In English law. Cus-tomary oblations made to a cathedral church at Pentecos t.
DENARII S. PETRI. (Commonly called "Peter’s Pence.") An annual payment on St. Peter’s feast of a penny from every family to the pope, during the time that the Roman Catholic religion was established in England.
DENARIUS. The chief silver coin among the Romans, worth 8d.; it was the seventh part of a Roman ounce. Also an English penny. The den-arius was first coined five years before the first Punic war, B. C. 269. In later times a copper coin was called "denarius." • Smith, Dict. Antiq.
DENARIUS DEL (Lat. "God’s penny.") Earnest money; money given as a token of the comple-tion of a bargain. It differs from arrhce in this: that arrhce is a part of the consideration, while the denarius Dei is no part of it. The latter was given away in charity; whence the name. 1 Du-vergnoy, n. 132; 3 Duvergnoy, n. 49; Répert. de Jur., Denier á Dieu.
DENARIUS TERTIUS COMITATUS. In old English law. A third part or penny of the county paid to its earl, the other two parts being reserved to the crown.
DENIAL. A traverse in the pleading of one party of an allegation of fact set up by the other; a defense. See Flack v. O’Brien, 43 N.Y.S. 854, 19 Misc. 399; Mott v. Baxter, 29 Colo. 418, 68 P. 220. A deprivation, as the denial of a constitutional right, U. S. v. Carolene Products Co., III., 58 S.Ct. 778, 783, 304 U.S. 144, 82 L.Ed. 1234, or a denial of civil rights. State of New Jersey v. Weinberger, D.C.N.J., 38 F.2d 298, 302. A refusal or re-jection, as the denial of a claim on a war risk policy by Veterans’ Administration, U. S. v. Green, C.C.A.Tenn., 84 F.2d 449. 450; Morris v. U. S., C.C.A.Miss., 96 F.2d 731, 732, or of a claim for workmen’s compensation. Commercial Cas-ualty Ins. Co. v. Hilton, Tex.Civ.App., 55 S.W.2d 120, or of probation. People v. Lopez, 43 Cal. App.2d 854, 110 P.2d 140, 144. A disavowal. Peo-ple v. Bell, 96 Cal.App. 503, 274 P. 393, 396; Mas-sell v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 38 Ga.App. 601, 144 S.E. 806, 807.

General and Specitle

In code pleading, a general denial is one which puts in issue all the material averments of the complaint or petition, and permits the defendant to prove any and all facts tending to negative those averments or any of them. Telford v. Iowa Guarantee Mortg. Corp., 58 S.D. 261, 235 N.W. 663, 665. A specific denial is a separate denial applic-able to one particular allegation of the complaint. Gas Co. v. San Francisco, 9 Cal. 470; An answer by way of a general denial is the equivalent of, and substitute for, the general, issue under the common-law system of pleading. It gives to the defendant the same right to require the plaintiff to establish by proof all the material facts nec-essary to show his right to a recovery as was given by that plea. Kline v. Harris, 30 N.D. 421, 152 N.W. 687, 688, Ann.Cas.1917D, 1176.
DENIER. L. Fr. In old English law. Denial; refusal. Denier is when the rent (being demand-ed upon the land) is not paid. Finch, Law, b. 3, c. 5.
DENIER A DIEU. In French law. Earnest mon-ey; a sum of money given in token of the com-pletion of a bargain. The phrase is a translation of the Latin Denarius Dei, (q. v.).
DENIZATION. The act of making one a den-izen; the conferring of the privileges of citizen-ship upon an alien born. Cro. Jac. 540. See Den-izen.
DENIZE. To make a man a denizen or citizen.
DENIZEN. In English law. A person who, being an alien born, has obtained, ex donatione regis, letters patent to make him an English subject,— a high and incommunicable branch of the royal prerogative. A denizen is in a kind of middle state between an alien and a natural-born sub-ject, and partakes of the status of both of these. 1 Bl. Comm. 374; 7 Coke 6; Ex parte Gilroy, D.C. N.Y., 257 F. 110, 128.
The term is used to signify a person who, being an alien by birth, has obtained letters patent making him an Eng-lish subject. The king may denize, but not naturalize, a man; the latter requiring the consent of parliament, as under the naturalization act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict. c. 14. A denizen holds a position midway between an alien and a natural-born or naturalized subject, being able to take lands by purchase or devise, (which an alien could not until 1870 do,) but not able to take lands by descent, (which a natural-born or naturalized subject may do.) Brown.
The denizen becomes a British subject from the date of the letters while a naturalized person is placed in a posi-tion equivalent to that of a natural-born subject; Dicey, Confi.Laws 164.
The word is also used in this sense in South Carolina. See McClenaghan v. McClenaghan, 1 Strob.Eq., S.C., 319, 47 Am. Dec. 532.
In American law. A dweller; a stranger ad-mitted to certain rights in a foreign country or as one who lives habitually in a country but is not a native born citizen; one holding a middle state between an alien and a natural born sub-ject. United States ex rel. Zdunic v. Uhl, D.C. N.Y., 46 F.Supp. 688, 691. One who has some relation to the enemy nation which is not lost by the alien’s presence within the United States. United States ex rel. Zdunic v. Uhl, C.C.A.N.Y., 137 F.2d 858, 861; United States ex rel. D’Esquiva v. Uhl, C.C.A.N.Y., 137 F.2d 903, 905.
Thus, one who lived and worked in Austria in 1938 at time Germany obtained control of Austrian government, and continued to live there until leaving for the United States in 1939, at which time he was issued a German pass-port, was a "denizen" of Germany, within Enemy Alien Act. United States ex rel. Zdunic v. Uhl, D.C.N.Y., 47 F.Supp. 520.
A denizen, in the primary, but obsolete, sense of the word, is a natural-born subject of a coun-try. Co. Litt. 129a; Levy v. McCartee, 6 Pet. 102, 116, 8 L.Ed. 334.
DENMAN’S (LORD) ACT. An English statute, for the amendment of the law of evidence, (6 & 7 Vict. c. 85,) which provides that no person offered as a witness shall thereafter be excluded by reason of incapacity, from crime or interest, from giving evidence.
DENMAN’S (MR.) ACT. An English statute, for the amendment of procedure in criminal trials, (28 & 29 Vict. c. 18,) allowing counsel to sum up the evidence in criminal as in civil trials, provided the prisoner be defended by counsel.
DENOMBREMENT. In French feudal law. A minute or act drawn up, on the creation of a fief, containing a description of the fief, and all the rights and incidents belonging to it. Guyot, Inst. Feud. c. 3.
DENOMINATIO FIERI DEBET A DIGNIORI-BUS. Denomination should be made from the more worthy.
DENOMINATION. The act of naming. A society of individuals known by the same name, usually a religious society.
DENOMINATIONAL. adj. Of, or pertaining to, a denomination; sectarian. Wesley Foundation at Seattle v. King County, 185 Wash. 12, 52 P.2d 1247, 1250; Constitutional Defense League v. Wa-ters, 308 Pa. 150, 162 A. 216, 217.
DENOUNCE. To declare (an act or thing) to be a crime and prescribe a punishment for it. State v. De Hart, 109 La. 570, 33 So. 605. The word is also used (not technically but popularly) as the equivalent of "accuse" or "inform against."
The term is frequently used in regard to treat-ies, indicating the act of one nation in giving no-tice to another nation of its intention to terminate an existing treaty between the two nations. The French dénoncer means to declare, to lodge an information against. Bellows, Fr. Dict.

DENOUNCEMENT.
In Mexican Mining Law

Denouncement is an application to the author-ities for a grant of the right to work a mine, either on the ground of new discovery, or on the ground of forfeiture of the rights of a former owner, through abandonment or contravention of the mining law. Cent. Dict. See Castillero v. U. S., 2 Black, 109, 17 L.Ed. 360; Stewart v. King, 85 Or. 14, 166 P. 55, 56.
A "denouncement" is an application for the acquisition of land for mining purposes, under certain rules prescribed by Mexican laws. The application is called the "denounce-ment," and, when approved by the Mexican government, is called "concession" or "title," sometimes "patent." It is then a grant given by the government to use the land applied for, for the purpose of mining, and is ‘called the "title." Winningham v. Dyo, Tex.Com.App., 48 S.W.2d 600, 603.

In Spanish and Mexican Law
A judicial proceeding for the forfeiture of land held by an alien.
Though real property might be acqulred by an allen In fraud of the law,—that is, without observing lts require-ments,—he nevertheless retalned his right and Une to it, but was Hable to be deprived ont by the proper proceed-ing of denouncement, whlch In its substantive character-istics was equlvalent to the inquest of Office found, at com-mon law. De Merle v. Mathews, 26 Cal. 477.
The "denouncement of a new work" is a pro-ceeding to obtain an order of court, in the nature of an injunction, against the construction of a new building or other work, which, if completed, would injuriously affect the plaintiff’s property. Von Schmidt v. Huntington, 1 Cal. 55.
DENSHIRING OF LAND. (Otherwise called "burn-beating.") A method of improving land by casting parings of earth, turf, and stubble into heaps, which when dried are burned into ashes for a compost. Cowell.
DENTIFRICE. Any preparation used for cleans-ing the teeth. In re Edmand, Cust. & Pat.App., 39 F.2d 723.
DENTIST. One whose business it is to diagnose and treat imperfections or diseases of human teeth. People v. Hewson, 181 App.Div. 212, 168 N.Y.S. 104. Defined by the California Dental Act as any person who shall for remuneration per-form an operation of any kind, or treat diseases of the human teeth. Jacobs v. Board of Dental Examiners of California, 189 Cal. 709, 209 P. 1006, 1007.
DENTISTRY. A special department of medical science, dealing with the treatment of the diseases, etc., of human teeth. Commonwealth v. Heller, 277 Pa. 539, 121 A. 558, 559. The term includes the supplying of dentures, bridges and other artificial substitutes to the user or prospective user there-of. Curtis v. State, 78 Okl.Cr. 282, 147 P.2d 465, 468. Winner v. Kadow, 373 III. 192, 25 N.E.2d 882, 883.
DENUMERATION. The act of present payment.
DENUNCIA DE OBRA NUEVA. In Spanish law. The denouncement of a new work; being a pro-ceeding to restrain the erection of some new work, as, for instance, a building which may, if com-pleted, injuriously affect the property of the com-plainant; it is of a character similar to the inter-dicts of possession. Escriche; Von Schmidt v. Huntington, 1 Cal. 63.

In the Civil Law

The act by which an individual informs a public officer, whose duty it is to prosecute offenders, that a crime has been committed. See 1 Bro.Civ. Law 447; Ayliff e, Parerg. 210; Pothier, Proc.Cr. sect. 2, 1 2.
The giving of an information in the ecclesiastic-al courts by one who was not the accuser.

The act by which a person is declared to be a rebel, who has disobeyed the charge given on .let-ters of horning. Bell.
DENUNTIATIO. In old English law. A public notice or summons. Bract. 202b.
DENY. To traverse. Perry v. Tumlin, 161 Ga. 392, 131 S.E. 70, 73. To refuse to grant a petition or protest. Safeway Stores v. Brown, Em.App., 138 F.2d 278, 280.
DEODAND. (L. Lat. Deo dandum, a thing to be given to God.) In English law. Any personal chattel which was the immediate occasion of the death of any reasonable creature, and which was forfeited to the crown to be applied to pious uses, and distributed in alms by the high almoner. 1 Hale, P.C. 419; Fleta, lib. 1, c. 25; 1 Bl.Comm. 300; 2 Steph.Comm. 365. See Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate, 135 Tenn. 509, 188 S.W. 54, L.R.A.1916F, 935.
DEOR HEDGE. In old English law. The hedge inclosing a deer park.
DEPART. To divide or separate actively. The de-parters of gold and silver were no more than the dividers and refiners of those metals. Cowell.
To go away, especially with reference to per-manent visits. Pezzoni v. Pezzoni, 38 Cal.App. 209, 175 P. 801, 802. To withdraw from. Pomeroy v. National City Co., 209 Minn. 155, 296 N.W. 513, 517, 133 A.L.R. 766; City Co. of New York v. Stern, C.C.A.Minn., 110 F.2d 601, 603. To depart, as from the state, is not necessarily synonymous with the phrase "leave the state," or the phrase "absent from the state." Williams v. Williams, 57 Cal.App. 36, 206 P. 650, 652; Aronow v. Bishop, 112 Mont. 611, 120 P.2d 423, 424.

In Maritime Law

To leave a port; to be out of a port. To depart imports more than to sail, or set sail. A warranty in a policy that a vessel shall depart on or before a particular day is a warranty not only that she shall sail, but that she shall be out of the port on or before that day. 3 Maule & S. 461; 3 Kent Comm. 307, note. "To depart" does not mean merely to break ground, but fairly to set forward upon the voyage. Moir v. Assur. Co., 6 Taunt. 241; Young v. The Orpheus, 119 Mass. 185; The Helen Brown (D.C.) 28 F. 111

In Pleading

To forsake or abandon the ground assumed in a former pleading, and assume a new one. See Departure.
DEPARTMENT. One of the territorial divisions of a country. The term is chiefiy used in this sense in France, where the division of the country into departments is somewhat analogous, both ter-ritorially and for governmental purposes, to the division of an American state into counties. The United States have been divided into military de-

partments, including certain portions of the coun-try. Parker v. U. S., 1 Pet. 293, 7 L.Ed. 150.
Generally, a branch or division of governmental administration. Glendinning v. Curry, 153 Fla. 398, 14 So.2d 794, 802.
One of the divisions of the executive branch of government. Used in this sense in the United States, where each department is charged with a specific class of duties, and comprises an or-ganized staff of officials; e. g., the department of state, department of war, etc.
With reference to state or municipal administration, a "bureau" is merely a division of a department. In re McLaughlin, 210 N.Y.S. 68, 72, 124 Misc. 766.
Also, a division of a business, or of something comparable thereto. See State v. Arkansas Lum-ber Co., 126 Ark. 107, 189 S.W. 671; U. S. v. Elgin, I. & E. Ry. Co., III., 56 S.Ct. 841, 298 U.S. 492, 80 L.Ed. 1300.
DEPARTMENT STORE. Generally, a store in which a variety of merchandise is arranged in or offered for sale from severa]. departments or sec-tions, but the term cannot be applied with any cer-tainty to a particular business and is too indefinite to be used as a classification for the purpose of taxation. Barker Bros. v. City of Los Angeles, 10 Ca1.2d 603, 76 P.2d 97.
DEPARTURE. A deviation or divergente, from a standard rule or measurement. Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Tubbs Mfg. Co., D.C.Mich., 216 F. 401, 409. From a permitted use of vehicle or route, Reddy-Waldhauer-Maffett Co. v. Spivey, 53 Ga.App. 117, 185 S.E. 147, 148. Jeffries v. Jodawelky, 304 Mich. 421, 8 N.W.2d 121, 122. From employment or work, United Employers Casualty Co. v. Barker, Tex.Civ.App., 148 S.W.2d 260, 263; Hartford Ac-cident & Indemnity Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11, 15, 72 App.D.C. 52.
A variante between pleading and proof. Kint-ner v. U. S., C.C.A.Colo., 71 F.2d 961, 962.

In Maritime Law

A deviation from the course prescribed in the policy of insurance.

In Pleading

The statement of matter in a replication, rejoin-der, or subsequent pleading, as a cause of action or defense, which is not pursuant to the previous pleading of the same party, and which does not support and fortify it. 2 Williams, Saund. 84a, note 1; 2 Wils. 98; Co.Litt. 304a; Hanna v. Royce, 119 Or. 450, 249 P. 173, 175.
A departure occurs when party departs from cause or defense first made and has recourse to another. Living-ston v. Malever, 103 Fla. 200, 137 So. 113, 118; Clonts v. State, 19 Ala.App. 130, 95 So. 562; Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 56 Okl. 188, 155 P. 524, 525; Burrell v. Masters, 65 Colo. 310, 176 P. 316, 317. Or, in other words, when the second pleading contains matter not pursuant to the former, and which does not support and fortify it. Hence a departure obviously can never take place till the replication. Steph.P1. 410. Each subsequent pleading must pursue or support the former one: i. e., the replication rnust support the declaration, and the rejoinder the plea, without departing out of It. 3 Bl.Comm. 310. An amend-
ment to a petition changing the cause of action is not, technically, a "departure." King v. Milner, 63 Colo. 407, 167 P. 957, 960; MacGerry v. Rodgers, 144 Wash. 375, 258 P. 314, 315.
DEPARTURE IN DESPITE OF COURT. In old English practice. The tenant in a real action, having once appeared, was considered as con-structively present in court until again called upon. Hence if, upon being demanded, he failed to appear, he was said to have "departed in despite [i. e., contempt] of the court." Co.Litt. 139a; 8 Co. 62a; 1 Rolle, Abr. 583; Metc.Yelv. 211.
DEPASTURE. In old English law. To pasture. "If a man depastures unprofitable cattle in his ground." Bunb. 1, case 1.
DEPECULATION. A robbing of the prince or commonwealth; an embezzling of the public treas-ure.
DEPENDABLE, adj. Trustworthy or reliable, An-derson v. Wyoming Development Co., 60 Wyo. 417, 154 P.2d 318, 340; Evidence, Taylor v. Latimer, D.C.Mo., 47 F.Supp. 236, 238.
DEPENDENCE. A state of looking to another for support, maintenance, food, clothing, comfort and protection of a home and care. Central Life Assur. Soc. (Mutual) v. Gray, Tex., 32 S.W.2d 259, 261; Soderstrom v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., Mo.App., 141 S.W.2d 73, 79.
DEPENDENCY. A territory distinct from the country in which the supreme sovereign power resides, but belonging rightfully to it, and subject to the laws and regulations which the sovereign may think proper to prescribe. U. S. v. The Nan-cy, 3 Wash.C.C. 286, Fed.Cas.No.15,854; Posadas v. National City Bank of N. Y., Phil.Islands, 56 S.Ct. 349, 350, 296 U.S. 497, 80 L.Ed. 351.
It differs from a colony, because it is not set-tled by the citizens of the sovereign or mother state; and from possession, because it is held by other title than that of mere conquest.
A relation between two persons, where one is sustained by another or looks to or relies on aid of another for support or for reasonable neces-sanies consistent with dependent’s position in lif e. Peterson v. Industrial Commission, 331 III. 254, 162 N.E. 846, 847.
DEPENDENT, n. One who derives support from another; Milkovich v. Industrial Comm., 91 Utah, 498, 64 P.2d 1290, 1293; Texas Employers Ins. Ass’n v. Arnold, Tex.Civ.App., 62 S.W.2d 609, 611; not merely persons who derive a benefit from the earnings of the deceased; [1899] 1 Q.B. 1005; Havey v. Erie R. Co., 88 N.J.Law, 684, 96 A. 995, 996. One who depends on or is sustained by an-other, or who relies on another for support or favor. King v. Illinois Steel Corporation, 92 Ind. App. 456, 176 N.E. 161, 162.
DEPENDENT, adj. Deriving existence, support, or direction from another; conditioned, in respect to force or obligation, upon an extraneous act or fact Under a statute relating to dependent children, "depend-ent" is synonymous with "neglected," but not with "delin-quent." People v. Ellis, 185 Ill.App. 417, 420; Dumes v. Deckard, 105 Ind.App. 674, 17 N.E.2d 481, 484.
Under a California juvenile act, a "dependent person" is one under the age of 21 years who is in danger of growing up to lead an idle, dissolute, or immoral life. People v. Cruse, 24 Cal.App. 497, 141 P. 936.
Dependent conditions. Mutual covenants which go to the whole consideration on both sides. Long v. Addix, 184 Ala. 236, 63 So. 982, 984; Palmer v. Fox, 274 Mich. 252, 264 N.W. 361, 104 A.L.R. 1057.
Dependent contract. One which depends or is conditional upon another. One which it is not the duty of the contractor to perform until some obligation contained in the same agreement has been performed by the other party. Ham. Parties, 17, 29, 30, 109.
Dependent covenant. See Covenant.
Dependent promise. One which it is not the duty of the promisor to perform until some ob-ligation contained in the same agreement has been performed by the other party. Hamm.Partn. 17, 29, 30, 109; Harr.Const. 152.
DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION. The doctrine which regards as mutually dependent the acts of one destroying a will and thereupon sub-stituting another instrument for distribution of es-tate, when both acts are result of one plan, so that, if second act, through incompleteness or other de-fect, fails to accomplish its intended purpose, and it thereby becomes evident that testator was misled when he destroyed his will, act of destruction is regarded as bereft of intent of revocation and way for probate of destroyed will is opened. Flanders v. White, 142 Or. 375, 18 P.2d 823, 827; In re Nelson’s Estate, 183 Minn. 295, 236 N.W. 459, 461.
DEPENDING. In practice. Pending or undeter-mined; in progress. See 5 Coke, 47.
Under a statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781, note, permitting the taking of testimony by deposition de bene esse, a cause 1s "depending" from the time of the lssuance of the original writ. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Bates Expanded Steel Truss Co., D.C.Del., 296 F. 281, 283.
In patent law. A convenient means of saying that the parts of a device were so attached as to have a right-angle relationship to each other, not a gravitational hanging of one part upon another. Alemite Mfg. Corporation v. Rogers Products Co., C.C.A.N.J., 42 F.2d 648, 651.
DEPESAS. In Spanish-American law. Spaces of ground in towns reserved for commons or public pasturage. 12 Pet. 443, note, 9 L.Ed. 1150..
DEPLETABLE ECONOMIC INTEREST. The in-terest in mineral land which is subject to deple-tion by the removal of the minerals by operation of an oil well, mine, or the like. 26 U.S.C.A.Int. Rev.Code § 114. Spalding v. U. S., C.C.A.Cal., 97 F.2d 697, 700; U. S. v. Spalding, C.C.A.Cal.,, 97 F.2d 701, 704.
DEPLETE. To reduce or lessen, as by use, ex-haustion, or waste. McKnight v. U. S., C.C.A.Cal., 78 F.2d 931, 933.
DEPLETION. An emptying, exhausting or wast-ing of assets. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. City of Texarkana, D.C.Ark., 17 F.Supp. 447, 460. For tax purposes, a return of capital, not a spe-cial bonus for enterprise. Untermyer v. Commis-sioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A., 59 F.2d 1004. A reduction during taxable year of oil, gas or other mineral deposits or reserves as result of produc-tion. Darby-Lynde Co. v. Alexander, C.C.A.Okl., 51 F.2d 56.
DEPOLYMERIZATION. In connection with the devulcanizing of vulcanized rubber, the act of breaking into smaller aggregations the rubber molecules, which cpnsist of hydrogen and carbon, thus rendering the waste rubber plastic. Phila-delphia Rubber Works Co. v. United States Rub-ber Reclaiming Works, D.C.N.Y., 225 F. 789, 791.
DEPONE. In Scotch practice. To depose; to make oath in writing.
DEPONENT. In practice. One who deposes (that is, testifies or makes oath, now in writing) to the truth of certain facts; one who gives under oath testimony which is reduced to writing; one who makes oath to a written statement. The party making an affldavit is generally so called, though in the United States the term "affiaht" is also comrnonly applied to such party, the terms, when used with reference to one making an affidavit, are synonymous. Walden v. Crego’s Estate, 238 Mich. 564, 285 N.W. 457, 461.
The word "depone," from which is derived "deponent," has relation to the mode In which the oath 1s admInistered, (by the witness placing his hand upon the book of the holy evangellsts,) and not as to whether the testimony 1s delivered orally or reduced to writing. "Deponent" is included In the term "witness," but "witness" 1s more general. Bliss v. Shuman, 47 Me. 248.
DEPONER. In old Scotch practice. A deponent. 3 How. State Tr. 695.
DEPOPULATIO AGRORUM. In old English law. The crime of destroying, ravaging, or laying waste a country. 2 Hale, P. C. 333; 4 Bl.Comm. 373.
DEPOPULATION. In old English law. A species of waste by which the population of the kingdom was diminished. Depopulation of houses was a public offense. 12 Coke, 30, 31.
DEPORTATIO. Lat. In the civil law. A kind of banishment, where a condemned person was sent or carried away to some foreign country, usually to an island, (in insulam deportatur,) and thus taken out of the number of Roman citizens.
DEPORTATION. Banishment to a foreign coun-try, attended with confiscation of property and deprivation of civil rights. A punishment derived from the deportatio (q. v.) of the Roman law, and still in use in France.

In American Law

The removal or sending back of an alien to the country from which he carne, the removal from the country of an alien considered inimical to pub-lic welfare; the removal of an alien out of the country simply because his presence is deemed inconsistent with the public welfare, and without any punishment being imposed or contemplated. Yonejiro Nakasuji v. Seager, D.C.Cal., 3 F.Supp. 410, 413.
"The removal of an alien out of the country, simply because his presence is deemed inconsistent with the pub-lic welfare, and without any punishment being imposed or contemplated, either under the laws of the country out of which he is sent, or under those of the country to which he Is taken." It differs from transportation, which Is by way of punishment of one convicted of an offence against the laws of the country; and from extradition (q. v.), which is the surrender to another country of one accused of an offence against its laws, there to be tried, and, if found guilty, punished. Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., 149 U.S. 698, 13 S. Ct. 1016, 37 L. Ed. 905.
"Deportation," as distinguished from "exclusion," is deprIving a person already in the United States of a privl-lege which he, at least at the time, is enjoying; whereas "exclusion" Is the denial of entry, and does not deprive one of any liberties he had theretofore enjoyed. Ex parte Domingo Corypus, D.C., 6 F.2d 336.

In !toman Law

A perpetual banishment, depriving the banished of his rights as a citizen; it differed from relega-tion (q. v.) and exile, (q. y.) 1 Brown, Civil & Adm. Law, 125, note; Inst. 1, 12, 1, and 2; Dig. 48, 22, 14, 1.
DEPOSE. To deprive an individual of a public employment or office against his will. Wolfflus, Inst. 11063. The term is usually applied to the deprivation of all authority of a sovereign.

In ‘Modem Usage

To make a deposition; to give evidence in the shape of a deposition; to make statements which are written down and sworn to; to give testimony which is reduced to writing by a duly-qualified officer and sworn to by the deponent. To say (in a deposition) under oath. Webb v. Iowa-Nebraska Coal Co., 198 Iowa 776, 200 N.W. 225, 226. To bear witness, to state of oath, or give testimony. Fa-vello v. Bank of America Nat. T. & S. Ass’n, 24 Cal.App.2d 342, 74 P.2d 1057, 1059

In Practice
In ancient usage, to testify as a witness; to give evidence under oath.
DEPOSIT, v. To commit to custody, or to lay down; to place; to put; to let fall (as sediment); Jefferson County ex reí. Grauman v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 273 Ky. 674, 117 S.W.2d 918, 924; to lodge for safe-keeping or as a pledge, to intrust to the care of another. White v. Greenlee, 330 Mo. 135, 49 S.W.2d 132, 134.
DEPOSIT, ti. A naked ballment of goods to be kept for the depositor without reward, and to be returned when he shall require it. Jones, Bailm. 36, 117; Rozelle v. Rhodes, 116 Pa. 129, 9 Atl. 160,
2 Am.St.Rep. 591; Occidental Life Ins. Co. V. Bo-gan, C.C.A.Cal., 141 F.2d 1011, 1012.
A bailment of goods to be kept by the balice without reward, and delivered according to the object or purpose of the original trust. Story, Bailm. § 41; Elbert Sales Co. v. Granite City Bank, 55 Ga.App. 835, 192 S.E. 66, 67.
In general, an act by which a person receives the prop-erty of another, binding himself to preserve it and return it in kind. Henry Rose Mercantile & Mfg. Co. v. Stearns, 159 La. 957, 106 So. 455, 458.
The delivery of chattels by one person to another to keep for the use of the bailar.
The giving of the possession of personal property by one person to another, with his consent, to keep for the use and benefit of the first or of a third person. Moumal v. Parkhurst, 89 Or. 248, 173 P. 669, 671.
Something intrusted to the care of another, either for a permanent or a temporary disposition. Davidson v. U. S., C.C.A.Pa., 292 F. 750, 751, aff. U. S. v. Davidson, D.C.Pa., 285 F. 661.
Also, money lodged with a person as an earnest or security for the performance of some contract, to be forfeited if the depositor fails in his under-taking. It may be deemed to be part payment, and to that extent may constitute the purchaser the actual owner of the estate. Larson v. Metcalf, 201 Iowa, 1208, 207 N.W. 382, 384, 45 A.L.R. 344.
Classification
According to the classiflcation of the civil law, deposita are of the following severa! sarta: (1) Necessary, made upan some sudden emergency, and from some pressing necessity; as, for Instante, in case of a tire, a shlpwreck, or other overwhelming calamlty, when property is con-flded to any person whom the depositor may meet without proper opportunity for reflection or choice, and thence it is called "miserabile depositum." (2) Voluntary, which arases from the mere consent and agreement of the parties. Dig. 16, 3, 2; Story, Bailm. § 44. The common law has made no such division.
There is another class of deposits called "involuntary," which may be without the assent or even knowledge of the depositor; as lumber, etc., left upon another’s land by the subsidence of a flood. An "involuntary" deposit is one made by the accidental leaving or placing of personal prop-erty in the possession of any person without negligente on the part of the owner. Copelin v. Berlin Dyeworks & Laundry Co., 168 Cal. 715, 144 P. 961, 963, L.R.A.1915C, 712.
The civilians again divide deposits luto "simple depos-ita," made by one or more persons having a common Inter-est, and "sequestrations," made by one or more persona, each of whom has a different and adverse interest in con-troversy touching it; and these last are of two sorts,— "conventional," or such as are made by the mere agree-ment of the parties without any judicial act; and "judi-cial," or such as are made by arder of a court in the course of some proceeding. Thus, under Louisiana stat-utes, it 1s said that the difference between "sequestration" and "deposit" 1s that the former may have for its object both movable and immovable property, while the latter is conflned to movables. Reines v. Dunson, 145 La. 1011, 83 So. 224, 226.
There is another class of deposits called "Irregular," as when a person, having a sum of money which he does not think safe in his own hands, confldes it to another, who is to return to him, not the same money, but a like sum when he shall demand it. Poth. du Depot. 82, 83; Story, Bailm. § 84. A regular deposit 1s a strict or special deposit; a deposit which must be returned in specie; i. e., the thing deposited must be returned. A quasi deposit le a kind of implied or involuntary deposit, which takes place where party comes lawfully to the possession of another person’s property, by flnding it. Story, Bailm. § 85. Particularly with reference to money, deposita are also classed as gen-eral or spqcia/. A general deposit is where the money deposited is not itself to be returned, but an equivalent in money (that is, a ince sum) is to be returned. It is equiva-lent to a loan, and the money deposited becomes the property of the depositary. City of Canby v. Bank of Canby, 192 Minn. 571, 257 N.W. 520.
A special deposlt is a deposit in which the Identical thing deposited is to be returned to the depositor. The par-ticular object of this kind of deposlt is safekeeping. Koet-ting v. State, 88 Wis. 502, 60 N.W. 822. Marine Bank v. Fulton Bank, 69 U.S. 252, 2 Wall. 252, 17 L.Ed. 785. In banklng law, this kind of deposit is contrasted with a "general" deposlt, as aboye; but in the civil law it is the antíthesis of an "irregular" deposit. A gratuitous or naked deposit is a bailment of goods to be kept for the depositor without hire or reward on either side, or one for whích the depositary receives no consideration beyond the mere possession of the thing deposited. Properly and originally, all deposits are of this description; for according to the Ro-man law, a bailment of goods for which hire or a price is to be paid, is not called "depositum" but "locatio." If the owner of the property pays for its custody or care, it is a "locatio custodiee:" if, on the other hand, the bailee
pays for the use of it, ít 1s "locatio (See Locatio.) But in the modern law of those states which have been in-fluenced by the Roman jurisprudence, a gratuitous or nak-ed deposit is distinguished from a "deposit for hire," in which the bailee is to be paid for hls services in keeping the artícle. There is also a specific deposit, which exists where money or property is given to a bank for some specific and particular purpose, as a note for collection, money to pay a particular note, or property for some other specific purpose. Officer v. Officer, 120 Iowa 389, 94 N.W. 947, 98 Am.St.Rep. 365.
In Banking Law
The act of placing or lodging money in the cus-tody of a bank or banker, for safety or conven-ience, to be withdrawn at the will of the depositor or under rules and regulations agreed on. Also, the money so deposited, or the credit which the depositor receives for it. State Banking Board v. James, Tex.Civ.App., 264 S.W. 145, 149.
"Deposit," accordíng to its commonly accepted and gen-erally understood meaning among bankers and by the public, íncludes not only deposits payable on demand and subject to check, but deposits not subject to check, for whlch certificates, whether interest-bearing or not, may be issued, payable on demand, or on certain notice, or at a fixed future time. Tones v. O’Brien, 58 S.D. 213, 235 N. W. 654, 659.
In Insurance Law
The delivery by a lile insurance company of securities to state commissioner of insurance as required by statutes. Central Life Assur. Soc. v. Birmingham, D.C.Iowa, 48 F.Supp. 863, 865.
In Mining
A quantity of ore or mineral substances occur-ring naturally in the earth; as, a deposit of gold, oil, etc. See Colorado Gold Dredging Co. v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 60 Colo. 412, 153 P. 765.
In General
Deposit account. An account of sums lodged with a bank not to be drawn upon by checks, and usually not to be withdrawn except after a fixed notice.
Deposit company. A company whose business is the safe-keeping of securities or other valuables deposited in boxes or saf es in its building which are leased to the depositors.
Deposit of title-deeds. A method of pledging real property as security for a loan, by placing
the title-deeds of the land in the keeping of the lender as pledgee.
Deposit slip. An acknowledgment that the amount named therein has been received by the bank; it is a receipt intended to furnish evidente as between the depositor and depositary that on a given date there was deposited the sum named therein, the time of deposit, and amount deposited, being also shown. In re Ruskay, C.C.A.N.Y., 5 F.2d 143, 147.
DEPOSITAR Y. The party receiving a deposit; one with whom anything is lodged in trust, as "de-pository" is the place where it is put. A trustee; fiduciary; one to whom goods are bailed to be held without recompense. Stand. Dict. The ob-ligation on the part of the depositary is that he keep the thing with reasonable care, and, upon request, restore it to the depositor, or otherwise deliver it, according to the original trust. Brun-ner v. Edwards, 337 Pa. 513, 12 A.2d 36, 37.
DEPOSITATION. In Scotch law. Deposit or de positum, the species of bailment so called. Bell.
DEPOSITION. The testimony of a witness taken upon interrogatories, not in open court, but in pursuance of a commission to take testimony is-sued by a court, or under a general law on the subject, and reduced to writing and duly authen-ticated, and intended to be used upon the trial of an action in court. It is sometimes used as sy-nonymous with "affidavit" or "oath," but its techni-cal meaning does not include such terms. State v. Lord, 42 N.M. 638, 84 P.2d 80, 94.
A written declaration under oath, made upon notice to the adverse party for the purpose of en-abling him to attend and cross-examine; or upon written interrogatories. N. S. Sherman Machine & Iron Works v. R. D. Cole Mfg. Co., 51 Okl. 353, 151 P. 1181, 1182. It is the giving of notice to the adverse party which especially distinguishes a dep-osition from an affidavit. Zinner v. Louis Meyers & Son, 181 Misc. 344, 43 N.Y.S.2d 319, 320.
The term sometimes is used in a special sense to denote a statement made orally by a person on oath before an examiner, commissioner, or officer of the court, (but not in open court,) and taken down in writing by the examiner or under his direction. Sweet.
In Ecclesiastical law. The act of depriving a clergyman, by a competent tribunal, of his orders, to punish him for some offense and to prevent his acting in future in his clerical charac-ter. Ayl. Par. 206.
DEPOSITION DE BENE ESSE. Testimony to be read at the trial, so far as relevant and competent, as though the witness were present in court. Mil-print, Inc., v. Macleod Laboratories, 127 N.J.L. 333, 22 A.2d 566, 567.
DEPOSITO. In Spanish law. Deposit; the spe-cies of bailment so called. Schm. Civil Law, 193.
A real contract by which one person confides to the custody of another an object on the condition that it shall be returned to him whenever he shall require it.
DEPOSITOR. One who makes a deposit.
In banking law, one who delivers and leaves money with a bank on his order or subject to check. Lummus Cotton Gin Co. v. Walker, 195 Ala. 552, 70 So. 754, 756; Austin v. Avant, Tex. Civ.App., 277 S.W. 409, 410.
DEPOSITORY. The place where a deposit (q. v.) is placed and kept.
Sometimes, also, a depositary; one with whom something is deposited. Jones v. Marrs, 114 Tex. 62, 263 S.W. 570, 573.
United States depositories. Banks selected and designated to receive deposits of the public funds of the United States.
DEPOSITUM. Lat. In the civil law. One of the forms of the contract of bailment, being a naked bailment of goods to be kept for the use of the bailor without reward. Coe v. Ricker, 214 Mass. 212, 101 N.E. 76, 78, 45 L.R.A.,N.S., 30, Ann.Cas. 1914B, 1178. See Deposit.
One of the four real contracts spechled by Justlnian, and having the followlng characteristics: (1) The depositary or deposítee is not hable for negligence, however extreme, but only for fraud, dolus; (2) the property remalns In the depositor, the depositary having only the possesslon. Precarium and sequestre were two varleties of the depos-itum.
DEPOT. ‘A railroad freight or passenger station; a place on the fine of a railroad where passengers may enter and leave the trains and where freight is deposited for delivery; a place where the car-rier is accustomed to receive merchandise, deposit it, and keep it ready for transportation or delivery. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Williamson, 195 Ark. 487, 112 S.W.2d 957, 958. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Ricks, 146 Va. 10, 135 S.E. 685, 688.
A place for the deposit of goods; a warehouse, or a storehouse. Weyman v. City of Newport, 153 Ky. 487, 156 S.W. 109, 111.
A place where military supplies or stores are kept or troops assembled. U. S. v. Caldwell, 19 Wall. 264, 22 L.Ed. 114.
—Depot grounds. Station grounds. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. McCall, 48 Okl. 602, 150 P. 173, 174. The place where passengers get off and on trains, where goods are loaded and unloaded, and all grounds necessary, convenient, and actually used for such purposes by the public and by the railway company, including the place where cars are switched and trains made up, also where tracks are used for storing cars, and where the public require open and free access to the railroad for the purpose of such business. Prince v. Chi-cago & N. W. Ry. Co., 165 Wis. 212, 161 N.W. 765, 766.
DÉPÓT. In French law. The depositum of the Roman and the deposit of the English law. It is ot two kinds, being either (1) dépót simply so called, and which may be either voluntary or nec-essary, and (2) séquestre, which is a deposit made
either under an agreement of the parties, and to abide the event of pending litigation regarding it, or by virtue of the direction of the court or a judge, pending litigation regarding it. Brown; Civ.Code La. 2926.
DEPRAVE. To defame; vilify; exhibit contempt for. In England it is a criminal offense to "de-prave" the Lord’s Supper or the Book of Common Prayer. Steph.Crim.Dig. 99.
DEPRAVED MIND. An inherent deficiency of moral sense and rectitude, equivalent to statutory phrase "depravity of heart" defined as highest grade of malice. Ramsey v. State, 114 Fla. 766, 154 So. 855.
A mlnd which may become inflamed by liquor and pas-sion to such a degreP that it ceases to care for human life and safety is a ”depraved mind." State v. Weltz, 155 Minn. 143, 193 N.W. 42, 44.
DEPRECIATION. A fall in value; reduction of worth. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Anderson, C.C.A. N.Y., 263 F. 527, 529. The deterioration, or the loss or lessening in value, arising from age, use, and improvements, due to better methods. Boston & A. R. Co. v. New York Cent. R. Co., 256 Mass. 600, 153 N.E. 19, 23; Miles v. People’s Telephone Co., 166 Wis. 94, 163 N.W. 652, 655.
DEPRECIATION RESERVE. An account kept on the books, as of a public utility, to offset the de-preciation of the property due to time and use. People ex rel. Adirondack Power & Light Corpora-tion v. Public Service Commission, 193 N.Y.S. 186, 191, 200 App.Div. 268. It does not represent the actual depreciation of its properties which is to be deducted from the reproduction cost new to as-certain the present value for rate purposes; but only what observation and experience suggest as likely to happen, with a margin over. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Railroad Com-mission of South Carolina, D.C.S.C., 5 F.2d 77, 96.
DEPREDATION. The act of plundering, robbing, or pillaging. Deal v. U. S., 274 U.S. 277, 47 S.Ct. 613, 615, 71 L.Ed. 1045.
In French law. Pillage, waste, or spoliation of goods, particularly of the estate of a decedent.
DEPRESSION. A period of economic stress; de-flation; panic. Trust Co. of N. J. v. Jefferson Trust Co., 14 N.J.Misc. 656, 186 A. 732; McCuiston v. Haggard, 21 Tenn.App. 277, 109 S.W.2d 413.
A hole or hollow. Rice v. Kansas City, Mo.App., 16 S.W.2d 659, 661.
DEPRIVATION. In English ecclesiastical law. The taking away from a clergyman of his benefice or other spiritual promotion or dignity, either by sentence declaratory in the proper court for fit and sufficient causes or in pursuance of divers penal statutes which declare the benefice void for some nonfeasance or neglect, or some malfeasance or crime. 3 Steph.Comm. 87, 88; Burn, Ecc.Law, tit. "Deprivation." See Ayliffe, Parerg. 206; 1 ala. Comm. 393. See Degradation.
In American law. A taking away; confiscation; as the deprivation of a constitutional right. Thus a taking of property without due process of law; Sundlun v. Zoning Board of Review of City of Pawtucket, 50 R.I. 108, 145 A. 451, 454; or of lib-erty. Lynch v. City of Muskogee, D.C.Okl., 47 F.Supp. 589, 592.
DEPRIVE. To take. The term has this meaning in a constitutional provision that no person shall be "deprived of his property" without due process of law, and denotes a taking altogether, a seizure, a direct appropriation, dispossession of the owner. Brown v. City of Atlanta, 167 Ga. 416, 145 S.E. 855, 857. It connotes want of consent. Sandel v. State, 104 S.E. 567, 571, 115 S.C. 168, 13 A.L.R. 1268.
DEPUTIZE. To appoint a deputy; to appoint or commission one to act as deputy to an officer. In a general sense, the term is descriptive of empower-ing one person to act for another in any capacity or relation, but in law it is almost always restricted to the substitution of a person appointed to act for an officer of the law.
DEPUTY. A substitute; a person duly authorized by an officer to exercise some or all of the func-tions pertaining to the office, in the place and stead of the latter. Byrnes v. Windels, 265 N.Y. 403, 193 N.E. 248, 249. One appointed to substitute for an-other with power to act for him in his name or behalf. Saxby v. Sonnemann, 149 N.E. 526, 528, 318 III. 600; Waggoner v. State, 183 Miss. 510, 184 So. 633, 634.
A deputy differs from an assignee, in that an assignee has an interest in the office itself, and does all things in his own name, for whom his grantor shall not answer, ex-cept in special cases; but a deputy has not any interest in the office, and is only the shadow of the officer in whose name he acts. And there is a distinction in doing an act by an agent and by a deputy. An agent can °n’y bind his principal when he does the act in the name of the princi-pal. But a deputy may do the act and sign his own name, and it binds his principal; for a deputy has, in law, the whole power of his principal. Wharton.
Deputy consul. See Consul.
Deputy lieutenant. The deputy of a lord lieu-tenant of a county in England.
Deputy sheriff. One appointed to act in the place and stead of the sheriff in the official busi-ness of the latter’s office. A general deputy (some-times called "undersheriff"; see Shirran v. Dallas, 21 Cal.App. 405, 132 P. 454, 458; Delfelder v. Teton Land & Investment Co., 46 Wyo. 142, 24 P.2d 702, is one who, by virtue of his appointment, has au-thority to execute all the ordinary duties of the of-fice of sheriff, and who executes process without any special authority from his principal. A spe-cial deputy, who is an offieer pro hac vice, is one appointed for a special occasion or a special serv-ice, as, to serve a particular writ or to assist in keeping the peace when a riot or tumult is expect-ed or in progress. He acts under a specific and not a general appointment and authority. Allen v. Smith, 12 N.J.Law, 162; Wilson v. Russell, 4 Dak. 376, 31 N.W. 645.
Deputy steward. A steward of a manor may depute or authorize another to hold a court; and
Black’s Law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed.-34
the acts done in a court so holden will be as legal as if the court had been holden by the chief stew• ard in person. So an under steward or deputy may authorize another as subdeputy, pro hac vice, to hold a court for him; such limited authority not being inconsistent with the rule delegatus non potest delegare. Wharton.
Special deputy. One appointed to exercise some special function or power of the official or person for whom he is appointed. Saxby v. Sonnemann, 318 III. 600, 149 N.E. 526, 528.
DERAIGN. Apparently, literally, to confound, and disorder, or to turn out of course, or displace; as deraignment or departure out of religion, in St. 31 Hen. VIII. c. 6. In the common law, the word is used generally in the sense of to prove; viz., to deraign a right, deraign the warranty, etc. Glanv. lib. 2, c. 6; Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 146. Perhaps this word "deraign," and the word "deraignment," de-rived from it, may be used in the sense of to prove and a proving, by disproving of what is asserted in opposition to truth and fact. Jacob. It is used as referring to a decree "which deraigns his title from a false source." Paxson v. Brown, 61 F. 874, 884, 10 C.C.A. 135.
DERAILER. A small but heavy iron device at-tached to a rail which opens and closes over the rail by a lever, so as to derail or turn off the track cars approaching the closed derailer from the ex-pected direction. Brady v. Southern Ry. Co., 64 S.Ct. 232, 234, 320 U.S. 476, 88 L.Ed. 239.
DERAILMENT. The act of going off or the state of being off the rails of a railroad. Graham v. Insurance Co. of North America, 220 Mass. 230, 107 N.E. 915.
DERANGEMENT. See Insanity.
DERECHO. In Spanish law. Law or right. De-recho comun, common law. The civil law is so called. A right. Derechos, rights. Also, spe-cifically, an impost laid upon goods or provisions, or upon persons or lands, by way of tax or con-tribution. Noe v. Card, 14 Cal. 576, 608.
DERELICT. Forsaken; abandoned; deserted; cast away.
Personal property abandoned or thrown away by the owner in such manner as to indicate that he intends to make no further chaira thereto. 2 Bl.Comm. 9; 2 Reeve, Eng.Law, 9; Thompson v. One Anchor and Two Anchor Chains,- D.C.Wis., 221 F. 770, 772.
Land left uncovered by the receding of water from its formes bed. 2 Rolle, Abr. 170; 2 Bl. Comm. 262; 1 Crabb, Real Prop. 109.

In Maritime Law

A boat or vessel found entirely deserted or abandoned on the sea without hope or intention of recovery or return by the master or crew, whether resulting from wreck, accident, necessity, or vol-untary abandonment. U. S. v. Stone, C.C.Tenn., 8 F. 232-243; Cromwell v. The Island City, 1 Black 121, 17 L.Ed. 70; The Hyderabad, D.C.Wis., 11 F. 749-754; The No. 105, Belcher Oil Co. v. Griffin, C.C.A.Fla., 97 F.2d 425, 426; Mengel Box Co. v. Joest, 127 Miss. 461, 90 So. 161, 163.
Quasi Derelict
When a vessel, without being abandoned, is no longer under the control or direction of those on board, (as where part of the crew are dead, and the remainder are physically and mentally in-capable of providing for their own safety,) she is said to be quasi derelict. Sturtevant v. Nicho-laus, 1 Newb.Adm. 449, Fed.Cas.No.13,578. When the crew have left their vessel temporarily, with the intention of returning to resume possession, she is not technically a derelict, but is what may be termed a "quasi derelict." The Alcazar, D.C. N.C., 227 F. 633, 650.
DERELICTION. The gaining of land from the water, in consequence of the sea shrinking back below the usual water mark; the opposite of alluvion (q. v.) Dyer, 326b; 2 Bl.Comm. 262; 1 Steph.Comm. 419; Linthicum v. Coan, 64 Md. 439, 2 A. 826, 54 Am.Rep. 775; Also, land left dry by running water retiring imperceptibly from one of its shores and encroaching on the other. Slattery v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 138 La. 793, 70 So. 806. See Reliction; Accretion.
In the Civil Law
The voluntary abandonment of goods by the owner, without the hope or the purpose of retu-n-ing to the possession. Jones v. Nunn, 12 Ga. 473; Livermore v. White, 74 Me. 456, 43 Am.Rep. 600.
"Dereliction" or "renunciabon" of property at sea as well as on land requires both the intention to abandon and externa’ action. The No. 105, C.C.A.Fla., 97 F.2d 425, 426.
Derivativa potestas non potest esse major Noy, Max.; Wing.Max. 66. The derivative power cannot be greater than the primitive. The power which is derived cannot be greater than that from which it is derived. Finch.Law, b. 1, c. 3, p. 11.
DERIVATIVE. Coming from another; taken from something preceding; secondary; that which has not its origin in itself, but owes its existente to something foregoing. Anything obtained or deduced from another. State v. Wong Fong, 75 Mont. 81, 241 P. 1072.
DERIVATIVE ACTION. A suit by a shareholder to enforce a corporate cause of action. The cor-poration is a necessary party, and the relief which is granted is a judgment against a third person in favor of the corporation. Price v. Gurney, Ohio, 65 S.Ct. 513, 516, 324 U.S. 100, 89 L.Ed. 776.
DERIVATIVE CONVEYANCES. Conveyances which presuppose some other conveyance prece-dent, and only serve to enlarge, confirm, alter, re-strain, restore, or transfer the interest granted by such original conveyance. They are releases, con-firmations, surrenders, assignments, and defeas-ances. 2 Bl.Comm. 324.
DERIVE. To receive, as from a .source or origin. Crews v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C. A.10, 89 F.2d 412, 416. To proceed from property, sever from capital, however invested or employed, and to come in, receive or draw ‘by taxpayer for his separate use, benefit, and disposal. Staples v. United States, D.C.Pa., 21 F.Supp. 737, 739.
DERIVED. Received. Langstaff v. Lucas, D.C., 9 F.2d 691, 693. See, also, Connell v. Harper, 202 Ky. 406, 259 S.W. 1017, 1019.
DEROGATION. The partial repeal or abolishing of a law, as by a subsequent act which limits its scope or impairs its utility and force. Distin-guished from abrogation, which means the entire repeal and annulment of a law. Dig. 50, 17, 102.
DEROGATORY CLAUSE. In a will, this is a sen-tence or secret character inserted by the testator, of which he reserves the knowledge to himself, with a condition that no will he may make there-after should be valid, unless this clause be insert-ed word for word. This is done as a precaution to guard against later wills being extorted by vio-lence, or otherwise improperly obtained. By the law of England such a clause would be void, as tending to make the will irrevocable. Wharton.
Derogatur legi, cum pars detrahitur; abrogatur legi, cuco prorsus tollitur. To derogate from a law is to take away part of it; to abrogate a law is to abolish it entirely. Dig. 50, 17, 102.
DESAFUERO. In Spanish law. An irregular ac-tion committed with violente against law, custom, or reason.
DESAMORTIZACION. In Mexican law. The desamortizacion of property is to take it out of mortmain, (dead hands;) that is, to unloose it from the grasp, as it were, of ecclesiastical or civil corporations. The term has no equivalent in Eng-lish. Hall, Mex.Law, § 749.
DESCEND. To pass by succession; as when the estate vests by operation of law in the heirs im-mediately upon the death of the ancestor. Tra-hern v. Woolwine, 109 W.Va. 623, 155 S.E. 909, 910. The term, as used in some statutes, includes an acquisition by devise. Cordon v. Gregg, 164 Or. 306, 101 P.2d 414, 415.
To pass down from generation to generation. Weedin v. Chin Bow, C.C.A.Wash., 7 F.2d 369.
To go;—often used as a word of transfer. Gor-don v. Cadwalader, 164 Cal. 509, 130 P. 18, 20.
As used in wills, the word "descend" is of ten regarded as a general expresslon equivaient to the words "go to" or "belong to," and as lndicating a passing of title by the force of the will rather than of the statute. Klingman v. Gilbert, 90 Kan. 545, 135 P. 682, 684; Carter v. Reserve Gas Co., 84 W.Va. 741, 100 S.E. 738, 742.
DESCENDANT. One who is descended from an-other; a person who proceeds from the body of another, such as a child, grandchild, etc., to the
remotest degree. The term is the opposite of "ascendant," (q. v.) Rasmusson v. Unknown Wife of Hoge, 293 III. 101, 127 N.E. 356, 359; State v. Yturria, 204 S.W. 315, 316, 109 Tex. 220, L.R.A. 1918F, 1079. In the plural, the term means off-spring or posterity in general; Carter Oil Co. v. Scott, D.C.Okl., 12 F.2d 780, 783. Issue. Burkley v. Burkley, 266 Pa. 338, 109 A. 687, 688; In re Tinker’s Estate, 91 Okl. 21, 215 P. 779, 781. Also, all those to whom an estate descends, whether it be in a direct or collateral line from the intestate. Oakley v. Davey, 49 Ohio App. 113, 195 N.E. 406.
One on whom the law has cast the property by descent. Smith v. Thom, 158 Ky. 655, 166 S.W. 182. An heir. Lee v. Roberson, 297 III. 321, 130 N.E. 774, 778. In this sense, the term is frequent-ly held to include an adopted child. In re Cad-well’s Estate, 26 Wyo. 412, 186 P. 499, 501. For "Family," see that title.
Descendants is a gond term of description in a will, and includes all who proceed from the body of the person named; as grandchildren and great-grandchildren. Amb. 397; 2 H11.Real Prop. 242

Lineal Descendant

One who is in the line of descent from the an-cestor. Green v. Hussey, 228 Mass. 537, 117 N.E. 798. Lawful issue. Bassier v. J. Connelly Const. Co., 227 Mich. 251, 198 N.W. 989, 991. The term may include an adopted child; Denton v. Miller, 110 Kan. 292, 203 P. 693, 694; who is as lawfully in the line of descent as if placed there by birth; Fisher v. Gardnier, 183 Mich. 660, 150 N.W. 358. Contra: State v. Yturria, 109 Tex. 220, 204 S.W. 315, 316, L.R.A.1918F, 1079.
DESCENDER. Descent; in the descent. See For-medon.
DESCENDEBLE. Capable of passing by descent, or of being inherited or transmitted by devise, (spoken of estates, titles, offices, and other prop-erty.) Collins v. Smith, 105 Ga. 525, 31 S.E. 449.
DESCENT. Hereditary succession. Succession to the ownership of an estate by inheritance, or by any act of law, as distinguished from "purchase." Title by descent is the title by which one person, upon the death of another, acquires the real es-tate of the latter as his heir at law. 2 B1.Comm. 201; Adams v. Akerlund, 168 Ill. 632, 48 N.E. 454; In re Yahola’s Heirship, 142 Okl. 79, 285 P. 946. The title by inheritance is in all cases called descent, although by statute law the title is some-times made to ascend.
"Descent" in its broadest sense signifies an inheritance cast upon any one capable of recelving It, whether heir at common law or not. Kicey v. Kicey, 114 N.J.Eq. 116, 168 A. 424, 426.
The division among those legally entitled there-to of the real property of intestates.
Classiftcation
Descents are of two sorts, lineal and collateral. Lineal descent is descent in a direct or right line, as from father or grandfather to son or grandson. In re Herrick’s Estate, 273 N.Y.S. 803, 152 Misc. 9. Collateral descent is descent in a collateral or obligue line, that is, up to the common ancestor and then down from him, as from brother to brother, or between cousins. Levy v. McCartee, 6 Pet. 112, 8 L.Ed. 334. They are also distinguished into mediata and immediate descends. But these terms are used in different senses, A descent may be said to be a mediate or immedi-ate descent of the estate or right; or it may be said to be mediate or immediate, in regard to the mediateness or im-
mediateness of the pedigree or consanguinity. Thus, a de-scent from the grandfather, who dies in possession, to the grandchild, the father being then dead, or from the uncle to the nephew, the brother being dead, is, in the former sense, in law, immediate descent, although the one is collateral and the other lineal; for the heir is in the per, and not in the per and cui. On the other hand, with reference to the line of pedigree or consanguinity, a descent is of ten said to be Immediate, when the ancestor from whom the party derives his blood is immediate, and with-out any Intervening link or degrees; and mediate, when the klndred is derived from him mediante altero, another ancestor intervenIng between them. Thus a descent In lineals from father to son is in this sense immediate; but a descent from grandfather to grandson, the father being dead, or from uncle to nephew, the brother being dead, is deemed mediate; the father and the brother being, In these latter cases, the medium delerens, as it is called, of the descent or consanguinity. Furenes v. Mickelson, 86 Iowa, 508, 53 N.W. 416.
Descent was denoted, in the Roman law, by the terco "successio," which is also used by Bracton, from which has been derived the succession of the Scotch and French jurisprudence.

Line of Descent

The order or series of persons who have de-scended one from the other or all from a common ancestor, considerad as placed in a line of suc-cession in the order of their birth, the line show-ing the connection of all the blood-relatives.
Collateral line. A line of descent connecting persons who are not directly related to each other as ascendants or descendants, but whose relation-ship consists in common descent from the same ancestor.
Direct line. A line of descent traced through those persons only who are related to each other directly as ascendants or descendants. State ex rel. Walton v. Yturria, 109 Tex. 220, 204 S.W. 315, 316, L.R.A.1918F, 1079.
Maternal line. A line of descent or relationship between two persons which is traced through the mother of the younger.
Paternal line. A similar line of descent traced through the father.
For "Family," see that title.
DESCENT CAST. The devolving of realty upon the heir on the death of his ancestor intestate.
Another narre for what the older writers called a "descent which tolls entry." When a person had acquired land by disseisin, abatement, or intru-sion, and died seised of the land, the descent of it to his heir took away or tolled the real owner’s right of entry, so that he could only recover the land by an action. Co.Litt. 237 b; Rap. & L. Dict.
DESCRIBE. To narrate, express, explain. Boyn-ton Real Estate Co. v. Woodbridge Tp., 94 N.J. Law, 226, 109 A. 514, 515. Of land, to give the metes and bounds. Livingston v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 100 S.C. 18, 84 S.E. 303.
DESCRIPTIO PERSONIE. Lat. Description of the person. By this is meant a word or phrase used merely for the purpose of identifying or pointing out the person intended, and not as an DESCRIPTIO
intimation that the language in connection with which it occurs is to apply to him only in the of-ficial or technical character which might appear to be indicated by the word. . Forrester v. Cant-ley, 227 Mo.App. 325, 51 S.W.2d 550, 551.
In wills, it frequently happens that the word heir is used as a descriptio personce. A legacy "to the eldest son" of A would be a designation of the person. See 1 Roper, Leg. c. 2.
DESCRIPTION. A delineation or account of a particular subject by the recital of its characteris-tic accidenta and qualities. Ayliffe, Pand. 60.
A written enumeration of items composing an estate, or of its condition, or of titles or docu-ments; like an inventory, but with more particu-larity, and without involving the idea of an ap-praisement.
An exact written account of an article, mechan-ical device, or process which is the subject of an application for a patent.
A method of pointing out a particular person by referring to his relationship to some other person or his character as an officer, trustee, executor, etc.
That part of a conveyance, advertisement of sale, etc., which identifies the land or premises in-tended to be affected. Argyle v. Bonneville Irr. Dist., 74 Utah, 480, 280 P. 722, 727.
A fair portrayal of the chief features of the pro-posed law in words of plain meaning, so that it can be understood by the persons entitled to vote, Sawyer Stores v. Mitchell, 103 Mont. 148, 62 P.2d 342, 348; In re Opinion of the Justices, Mass., 9 N.E.2d 189, 192.
That part of affidavit for search warrant describ-ing the place to be searched. Turner v. State, 39 Okl.Cr. 74, 263 P. 476.
DESCRIPTIVE. Containing a description; serv-ing or aiming to describe; having the quality of representing. Sawyer Stores v. Mitchell, 103 Mont. 148, 62 P.2d 342, 348.
Descriptive words are not susceptible of exclu-sive adoption by any one as part of a corporate name. Sterling Products Corporation v. Sterling Products, D.C.N.Y., 43 F.Supp. 548, 550; are not registerable under the Trade-Mark Act § 2; 15 U.S.C.A. § 1052. Judson Dunaway Corp. v. Hy-gienic Products Corp., 178 F.2d 461; and cannot ordinarily form the basis for an injunction against their use by another on ground of unfair competi-tion. Merlino v. Schmetz, 66 R.I. 425, 20 A.2d 266, 268.
DESECRATE. To violate sanctity of, to profane, or to put to unworthy use. City of Shreveport v. Harris, 178 La. 685, 152 So. 330.
The calling on householders after 10 a. m. on Sunday by members of an organized religious order for purpose of propagandizing their religious views by spoken and print-ed words, however unwelcome to householders, did not, in itself, constitute a desecration of the Sabbath. State v. Mead, 230 Iowa 1217, 300 N.W. 523, 524.
DESERT. To leave or quit with an intention to cause a permanent separation; to forsake utter-
ly; to abandon. It is essentially willful in nature. Stevens v. Stevens, 304 III. 297, 136 N.E. 785, 787; Stover v. Stover, 94 N.J.Eq. 703, 120 A. 788, 789.
DESERTER. As applied to seamen, one continu-ally and intentionally absent from the ship, con-stituting a quitting of the service of the vessel. The Strathearn, D.C.Fla., 239 F. 583, 586. Com-pare Mystic S. S. Co. v. Stromland, C.C.A.Va., 20 F.2d 342, 344; The Ella Pierce Thurlow, D.C.Va., 18 F.2d 675, 676.
Under the regulations of the Navy Department, a "de-serter" is one who is absent without leave and with a manifest intention not to return, while a "straggler" is one absent without leave, with the probability that he does not intend to desert, but, if his absence continues for 10 days, he becomes a deserter. Reed v. United States, C.C.A. N.Y., 252 F. 21, 22.
As applied to the matrimonial heme, one who by his words, conduct, demeanor, and attitude pro-duces an intolerable condition which f orces the other spouse to withdraw from the joint habita-tion to a more peaceful one. West v. West, 264 Ky. 826, 95 S.W.2d 789, 790.
DESERTION. The act by which a person aban-dons and forsakes, without justification, or unau-thorized, a station or condition of public or social life, renouncing its responsibilities and evading
its duties. •
A willful abandonment of an employment or du-ty in violation of a legal or moral obligation. Stoneburner v. Theodoratos, Cal.App., 30 P.2d 1001, 1003.

Obstinate Desertion

See that title.

In Maritime Law

The act by which a seaman deserts and aban-dona a ship or vessel, in which he had engaged to perform a voyage, before the expiration of his time, and without leave. By desertion, in the mari-time law, is meant, not a mere unauthorized ab-sence from the ship without leave, but an unau-thorized absence from the ship, with an intention not to return to her service, or, as it is often ex-pressed, animo non revertendi; that is, with an intention to desert. The Cripple Creek, D.C.Pa., 52 F.Supp. 710, 712; (strike) The Youngstown, C. C.A.La., 110 F.2d 968, 970.

In Matrimonial and Divorce Law

An actual abandonment or breaking off of matri-monial cohabitation, by either of the parties, and a renouncing or refusal of the duties and obliga-tions of the relation, with an intent to abandon or forsake entirely and not to return to or resume marital relations, occurring without legal justi-fication either in the consent or the wrongful con-duct of the other party. State v. Baker, 112 La. 801, 36 So. 703. Williams v. Williams, 29 N.E. 98, 130 N.Y. 193, 14 L.R.A. 220, 27 Am.St.Rep. 517.
The willful forsaking and desertion of duties of parenthood, and leaving child in a dependent condition. Bowling v. State, 62 Ga. 540, 8 S.E.2d 697.

In Military Law

An offense which consists in the abandonment of his post and duties by a person commissioned or enlisted in the army or navy, without leave and with the intention not to return. Hollingsworth v. Shaw, 19 Ohio St. 432, 2 Am.Rep. 411; In re Sutherland, D.C., 53 F. 551. There is a difference between desertion and simple "absence without leave;" in order to constitute the former, there must be an intention not to return to the service. Hanson v. South Scituate, 115 Mass. 336. See De-serter.
DESERVING. Worthy or meritorious, without regard to condition or circumstances. In no sense of the word is it limited to persons in need of as-sistance, or objects which come within the class of charitable uses. Nichols v. Allen, 130 Mass. 211, 39 Am.Rep. 445.
DESHONORA. In Spanish law. Dishonor; in-jury; slander. Las Partidas, pt. 7, tit. 9, 1. 1, 6.
DESICCATE. To exhaust or remove moisture from; dry thoroughly; especially to free from moisture with view to preserving. In re Benner, Cust. & Pat. App., 46 F.2d 383, 384.
DESIGN. To form plan or scheme of, conceive and arrange in mind, originate mentally, plan out, contrive. Also, the plan or scheme conceived in mind and intended for subsequent_ execution, pre-liminary conception of idea to be carried into ef-fect by action, contrivance in accordance with pre-conceived plan. State v. Pickus, 63 S.D. 209, 257 N.W. 284. A project, an idea. 3 H. & N. 301. See, also, Designed.
As a term of art, the giving of a visible form to the conceptions of the mind, or invention. Binns v. Woodruff, 4 Wash.C.C. 48, Fed. Cas. No. 1,424.

In Evidente

Purpose or intention, combined with plan, or implying a plan in the mind. Burrill, Circ.Ev. 331; State v. Grant, 86 Iowa 216, 53 N.W. 120.

In Patent Law

The drawing or depiction of an original plan or conception for a novel pattern, model, shape, or configuration, to be used in the manufacturing or textile arts or the fine arts, and chiefly of a decorative or ornamental character. "Design pat-ents" are contrasted with "utility patents," but equally involve the exercise of the inventive or originative faculty. Gorham Co. v. White, 14 Wall. 524, 20 L.Ed. 731; Western Electric Manu-facturing Co. v. Odell, D.C.I11., 18 F. 321; Binns v. Woodruff, 3 Fed.Cas. 424; Henderson v. Tompkins, C.C.Mass., 60 F. 758.
"Design, in the view of the patent law, is that character-istic of a physical substance which, by means of Enes, images, configuration, and the like, taken as a whole, makes an impression, through the eye, upon the mind of the observer. The essence of a design resides not in the elements individually, nor in their method of arrangement, but in the tout ensemble—in that indefinable whole that awakens some sensation in the observer’s mind. Impres-sions thus imparted may he complex or simple: " * *. Fut whatever the impression, there is attached in the mind of the observer. to the object observed, a sense of uniqueness and eharacter." Pelouze cale & i‘lfg. t’o. y. American Cutlery Cu., 102 F. 916, 919, 43 C.C.A. 52; I3ay-ley & Sous y. Itraunstein tiros. Co., D.C.N.Y., 246 F. 314, 317.
DESIGNATE. To indicate or set apart for a pur-pose or duty—with, to or for—as, to designate an officer for a command. Mutual Discount Corpo-ration v. Nagy, 111 N.J.L. 592, 169 A. 185, 186. To nominate. Sredzinski v. Schmieding, 283 N. Y.S. 332, 334, 245 App.Div. 398.
Designatio justiciariorum est a rege; jurisdictio yero ordinaria a lege. 4 Inst. 74. The appoint-ment of justices is by the king, but their ordinary jurisdiction by the law.
DESIGNATING PETITION. Means used to desig-nate a candidate for a party nomination at a pri-mary election or for election to party position. Potash v. Molik, 230 N.Y.S.2d 544, 548, 35 Misc.2d 1.
DESIGNATIO PERSONJE. The description of a person or a party to a deed or contract. See, also, Descriptio Persone.
Designatio unius est exclusio alteirlus, et expres-sum facit cessare tacitum. Co. Litt. 210. The specifying of one is the exclusion of another, and that which is expressed makes that which is un-derstood to tease. (The appointment or designa-tion of one is the exclusion of the other; and that which is expressed prevails over that which is implied.)
DESIGNATION. An addition to a name, as of title, profession, trade, or occupation, to distin-guiste the person from others. Inglis v. Pontius, 102 Ohio St. 140, 131 N.E. 509, 511, 512.
A description or descriptive expression by which a person or thing is denoted in, a will without us-ing the name.
Also, an appointment or assignment, as to a particular office. Santa Barbara County v. Jans-sens, 177 Cal. 114, 169 P. 1025, 1027, L.R.A.1918C, 558; Cunio v. Franklin County, 315 Mo. 405, 285 S.W. 1007, 1008.
The act of pointing out, distinguishing by marks of description, or calling by a distinctive title. Thrailkill v. Smith, 106 Ohio St. 1, 138 N.E. 532, 534; West v. Edward Rutledge Timber Co., C.C. A.Idaho, 221 F. 30, 35; State v. Madison State Bank of Virginia City, 77 Mont. 498, 351 P. 548, 549; Carlyle v. State Highway Commission, 193 N.C. 36, 136 S.E. 612, 620.
DESIGNED. Contrived or taken to be employed for a particular purpose. People v. Dorrington 221 Mich. 571, 191 N.W. 831, 832. Fit, adapted, prepared, suitable, appropriate. Thomas v. State, 34 Okl.Cr. 49, 244 P. 816. Intended, adapted, or designated. The term may be employed as in-dicating a bad purpose with evil intent. Bruce v. Sibeck, Cal.App., 78 P.2d 741, 743.
DESIGNEDLY. Sometimes equivalent to the words "wilfully," "knowingly," "unlawfully," and "feloniously." State v. Avery, m Kan. 588, 207 P. 838, 840, 23 A.L.R. 453.
DESIRE. To ask, to request. Fossett v. State, 34 Okl.Cr. 106, 245 P. 668, 669. Ordinarily, to wish for more or less earnestly. Woods v. Postal Tel-egraph-Cable Co., 205 Ala. 236, 87 So. 681, 684, 27 A.L.R. 834. Sometimes, to empower or author-ize. Walters’ Guardian v. Ransdell, 218 Ky. 267, 291 S.W. 399, 400. According to context or cir-cumstances, the word may import a request or even a demand. Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. Humphrys, C.C.A.Ohio, 97 F.2d 849, 857, 121 A. L.R. 163.
This term, used !n a will In relatlon to the management and distribution of property, has been Interpreted by the courts with different shades of meaning, varying from the mere expression of a preference to a positive command. See In re Bearinger’s Estate, 336 Pa. 253, 9 A.2d 342, 343; Beakey v. Knutson, 90 Or. 574, 174 P. 1149, 1150.
The word ”desire" may be as effective as If the word "devine" or "bequeath" had been used. Drinkard v. Hughes, Tex.C1v.App., 32 S.W.2d 935, 936.
The word "desire," in a will, raises a trust, where the objects of that desire are specified; Vandyck v. Van Beuren, 1 Cai. (N.Y.) 84.
DÉSISTEMENT. The name of a doctrine under which the court, in construing a foreign will, ap-plies the law of the forum on the theory that there is a hiatus. In re Tallmadge, 181 N.Y.S. 336, 341, 109 Misc. 696.
DESLINDE. A term used in the Spanish law, denoting the act by which the boundaries of an estate or portion of a country are determined.
DESMEMORIADOS. In Spanish law. Persons deprived of memory. White, New Recop. b. 1, tit. 2, c. 1, § 4.
DESPACHEURS. In maritime law. Persons ap-pointed to settle cases of average.
DESPATCHES. Ofiicial communications of persons on the affairs of government.
DESPERATE. Hopeless; worthless. This term is used in inventories and schedules of assets, par-ticularly by executors, etc., to describe debts or clairns which are considered impossible or hope-less of collection. See Schultz v. Pulver, 11 Wend. (N.Y.) 365; Darrow v. Rohrer, 71 Colo. 417, 207 P. 861; Toll. Ex. 248; 2 Wms. Ex. 644; 1 Chitt. Pr. 580.
DESPERATE DEBT. A hopeless debt; an irre-coverable obligation.
DESPITE. Contempt. Despitz, contempts. Kel-ham.
DESPITUS. Contempt. See Despite. A con-temptible person. Fleta, lib. 4, c. 5.
DESPOIL. This word involves, in its significa-tion, violente or clandestine means by which one is deprived of that which he possesses. Its Span-ish equivalent, despojar, is a term used in Mexi-can law. Sunol v. Hepburn, 1 Cal. 268.
DESPOJAR. A possessory action of the Mexican law. It is brought to recover possession of im-movable property, of which one has been despoil-ed (despojado) by another. See, also, Despoil.
DESPONSATION. The act of betrothing persons to each other.
DESPOSORIO. In Spanish law. Espousals; mu-tual promises of future marriage. White, New Recop. b. 1, tit. 6, c. 1, § L
DESPOT. This word, in its original and most simple acceptation, signifies master and supreme lord; it is synonymous with monarch; but taken in bad part, as it is usually employed, it signifies a tyrant. In some states, despot is the title giv-en to the sovereign, as king is given in others. Enc. Lond.
DESPOTISM. That abuse of government where the sovereign power is not divided, but united in the hands of a single man, whatever may be his official title. It is not, properly, a form of gov-ernment. Toullier, Dr.Civ.Fr. tit. prél. n. 32; Rutherf. Inst. b. 1, c. 20, § 1.
"Despotism" is not exactly synonymous with "autocracy," for the former involves the idea of tyranny or abuse of power, which is not neces-sarily implied by the latter. Every despotism is autocratic; but an autocracy is not necessarily despotic.
DESRENABLE. L. Fr. Unreasonable. Britt. c. 121.
DESSAISISSEMENT. In French law. When a person is declared bankrupt, he is immediately deprived of the enjoyment and administration of all his property; this deprivation, which extends to all his rights, is called "dessaisissement." Arg. Fr. Merc. Law, 556.
DESTINATION. The purpose to which it is in-tended an article or a fund shall be applied. A testator gives a destination to a legacy when he prescribes the specific use to which it shall be put.
The port at which a ship is to end her voyage is called her "port of destination." Pardessus, no. 600.
The phrases "port of destination" and "port of dis-charge’. are not equivalent; U. S. v. Barker, 5 Mason 404, Fed.Cas.No.14,516. See Sheridan v. Ireland, 66 Me. 65.
DESTINATION DU PÉRE DE FAMILLE. A use which owner has intentionally established on one part of his property in favor of another part, and which is equal to a title with respect to perpetual and apparent servitudes thereon. Woodcock v. Baldwin, 51 La.Ann. 989, 26 So. 46.

DESTITUTE. Not possessing the necessaries of life and in a condition of extreme want. Moorman v. State, 129 Miss. 864, 93 So. 368. Necessitous. Ex parte Strong, 95 Tex.Cr.R. 250, 252 S.W. 767, 769. Having no money or other property avail-able for one’s maintenance or support. Norridge-wock v. Solon, 49 Me. 385; Woods v. Perkins, 43 La.Ann. 347, 9 So. 48.
DESTITUTE OR NECESSITOUS CIRCUM-STANCES. Circumstances in which one needs the necessaries of life, which cover not only prim-itive physical needs, things absolutely indispensa-ble to human existence and decency, but those things, also, which are in fact necessary to the particular person left without support. State v. Waller, 90 Kan. 829, 136 P. 215, 217, 49 L.R.A.,N.S., 588.
A wife may be in "destitute or necessitous circurn-stances" though she is being given shelter and food by a child or by sympathizing relatives, friends, or strangers, if she does not have property or money avallable for such necesslties or ordinary comforts of life as her husband can reasonably furnish. State v. Sharp, 111 A. 909, 910, 1 W.W. Harr., Del., 148; Brandel v. State, 161 Wis. 532, 154 N.W. 997.
Young children, without property, are in "destitute or necessitous circumstances," within the Delaware Nonsup-port Act (Rev.Code 1915, §1 3033-3046), when the father can, but does not, and the mother cannot out of her in-dependent means, provide for them, though the mother and children are supported by the maternal grandmother or grandfather. State v. Nelson, 114 A. 863, 864, 1 W.W. Harr. (Del.) 436; Donaghy v. State, 100 A. 696, 710, 6 Boyce (Del.) 467.
DESTROY. As used in policies of insurance, leases, and in maritime law, and under various statutes, this term is often applied to an act which renders the subject useless for its intended pur-pose, though it does not literaily demolish or an-nihilate it. Davis v. Parker, 200 Ky. 847, 255 S.W. 836 (leased buildings); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 190 Ky. 78, 226 S.W. 113, 117 (rail-road station); George v. McManus, 27 Cal.App. 414, 150 P. 73, 74 (automobile).
To "destroy" a vessel within the meaning of an act of congress means to unflt the vessel for service, beyond the hope of recovery by ordinary means. U. S. v. Johns, 1 Wash.C.C. 363, Fed.Cas.No.15,481; U. S. v. Johns, 4 Dall. 412, 1 L.Ed. 888.
The contents of a glass and bottle, emptied into a pail of water immediately when accused saw two uniformed pollee officers enter his building, are "destroyed" within the meaning of a statute making it unlawful to secrete or destroy any fluids on premises being searched for the pur-pose of preventing seizure. Pltkunas v. State, 183 Wis. 90, 197 N.W. 191, 192.
Land covered by spotl dirt from drainage channel is de-stroyed within constitutional provision that land destroyed for drainage purposes shall be paid for at a price not to exceed assessed value for preceding year. Scott v. Red River-Bayou Pierre Levee & Drainage Dist. of Louisiana, La.App., 7 So.2d 429, 433.
In relation to wills, contracts, and other docu-ments, the term "destroy" does not import the an-nihilation of the instrument or its resolution into .other forms of matter, but a destruction of its legal efficacy, which may be by cancellation, oblit-erating, tearing into fragments, etc. In re Kapp’s Estate, 317 Pa. 253, 176 A. 501, 502.
DESTRUCTION. A term used in old English law, .generally in connection with waste, and having,
according to some, the same meaning. 1 Reeve, Eng. Law, 385; 3 Bl.Comm. 223. Britton, how ever, snakes a distinction between waste of woods and destruction of houses. Britt. c. 66.
DESUBITO. To weary a person with continual barkings, and then to bite; spoken of dogs. Leg Alured, 26, cited in Cunningham’s Dict.
DESUETUDE. Disuse; cessation, or discontinu-ance of use;—especially in the phrase, "to fall into desuetude." Applied to obsolete statutes. James v. Comm., 12 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 227.
DETACHIARE. To seize or take into custody another’s goods or person by writ of attachment or course of law. Cunningham.
DETAIL, v. To enumerate minutely, particular-ize. In re California Land Buyers Syndicate, D.C. Cal., 22 F.Supp. 183, 186.
DETAIL, n. An -individual part, an item, a par-ticular. Board of Education of Prince George’s County v. County Com’rs of Prince George’s County, 131 Md. 658, 102 A. 1007, 1010.
One who belongs to the army, but is only de-tached, or set apart, for the time to some particu-lar duty or service, and who is Hable at any time to be recalled to his place in the ranks. In re Strawbridge, 39 Ala. 379.
DETAIN. To retain as the possession of person-alty. First Nat. Bank v. Yocom, 96 Or. 438, 189 P. 220, 221. To arrest, to check, to delay, to hin-der, to hold, or keep in custody, to retard, to re-strain from proceeding, to stay, to stop. People v. Smith, 17 Cal.App.2d 468, 62 P.2d 436, 438.
DETAINER. The act (or the juridical fact) -of withholding from a person lawfully entitled the possession of land or goods, or the restraint of a man’s personal liberty against his will; deten-tion.
The wrongful keeping of a person’s goods is called an "unlawful detainer" although the original taking may have been lawful. As, if one distrains another’s cattle, damage feasant, and before they are impounded the owner tenders sufficient amends; now, though the original taking was lawful, the subsequent detention of them after tender of amends is not lawful, and the owner has an action of re-plevin to recover them, in which he will recover damages for the detention, and not for the caption, because the orig-inal taking was lawful. 3 Steph.Comm. 548.

In Praetice

A writ or instrument, issued or made by a com-petent officer, authorizing the keeper of a prison to keep in his custody a person therein named. A detainer may be lodged against one within the walls of a prison, on what account soever he is there. Com.Dig. "Process," E, (3 B.) This writ was superseded by 1 & 2 Vict. e. 110, §§ 1, 2.

Forcible Detainer

See that title.
DETAINMENT. This term is used in policies of marine insurance, in the clause relating to "ar-rests, restraints, and detainments." The last two words are construed as equivalents, each meaning the effect of superior force operating directly on the vessel. Schmidt v. Insurance Co., 1 Johns., N.Y., 262, 3 Am.Dec. 319.
DETECTION. A discovery or laying open of that which was hidden; investigation. Meunier v. Bernich, La.App., 170 So. 567, 572.
DETECTIVE. One whose business it is to watch, and furnish information concerning, alleged wrongdoers by investigating their haunts and habits. One whose business it is to detect crim-inals or discover matters of secret and pernicious import for the protection of the public. Smith v. S. H. Kress & Co., 210 Ala. 436, 98 So. 378, 380.

Private Detective

One engaged by individuals for private protec-tion. Smith v. S. H. Kress & Co., 210 Ala. 436, 98 So. 378, 380.
DETECTOR. Any device, or piece of apparatus, which, when energized, actuated, or acted upon by or by means of the so-called Hertzian waves, en-able men, through the senses of hearing or sight, to understand signals based upon the intentional-ly regulated emission or propagation of the waves aforesaid. Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. of America v. De Forest Radio Telephone & Tele-graph Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 243 F. 560, 561. In wire-less telegraphy, the "detector" or "coherer" and "wave responsive device" is a device by which the electromagnetic waves cause the indicator to respond. National Electric Signaling Co. v. Tele-funken Wireless Telegraph Co. of United States, C.C.A.N.Y., 221 F. 629, 631.
DETENTIO. In the civil law. That condition of fact under which one can exercise his power over a corporeal thing at his pleasure, to the exclu-sion of all others. It forms the substance of pos-session in all its varieties. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 238.
DETENTION. The act of keeping back or with-holding, either accidentally or by design, a person or thing. State v. Crappel, 181 La. 715, 160 So. 309. See Detainer.
DETENTION IN A REFORMATORY, as a pun-ishment or measure of prevention, is where a juve-nile offender is sentenced to be sent to a reform-atory school, to be there detained for a certain period of time. 1 Russ. Crimes, 82.
DETER. To discourage or stop by fear, to stop or prevent from acting or proceeding by danger, difficulty, or other consideration which disheartens or countervails the motive for the act. Haynes-worth v. Hall Const. Co., 44 Ga.App. 807, 163 S.E. 273, 277.
DETERIORATION. Of a commodity, a constitu-tional hurt or impairment, involving some degen-eration in the substance of the thing, such as that arising from decay, corrosion, or disintegration. The mere soiling of a commodity with sea water or other foreign substance, resulting in a purely
superficial hurt or impairment removable by the simple process of cleansing, cannot be said to be "deterioration" within the ordinary meaning of that term. Rosen-Reichardt Brokerage Co. v. London Assur. Corporation, 214 Mo.App. 672, 264 S.W. 433, 436.
Of values, a decline. Laxson v. Scarborough, Tex.Civ.App., 221 S.W. 1029.
DETERMINABLE. Liable to come to an end up-on the happening of a certain contingency. 2 Bl. Comm. 121.
Susceptible of being determined, found out, definitely decided upon, or settled. Utah State Nat. Bank v. Smith, 180 Cal. 1, 179 P. 160, 161.
As to determinable "Fee" and "Freehold," see those titles.
DETERMINATE. That which is ascertained; what is particularly designated.
As used in Good Time Law covering prlsoners confined for a determinate, the term, signifies a definite number of years fixed by the court. Hinkle v. Dowd, Ind., 58 N.E. 2d 342, 343.
DETERMINATE OBLIGATION. See Obligation.
DETERMINATION. The decision of a court of justice. It implies an ending or finality, the end-ing of a controversy or. suit. People v. Jackson, 181 N.Y.S. 226, 191 App.Div. 269. The ending or expiration of an estate or interest in property, or of a right, power, or authority. The coming to an end in any way whatever. Hanchett Bond Co. v. Glore, 208 Mo.App. 169, 232 S.W. 159, 160.
Also, an estimate. Unton v. Liverpool, London & Globe Ins. Co., 166 Minn. 273, 207 N.W. 625, 626.
As respects an assessment, the term implies judgment and decision after weighing the facts; Appeal of Hoskins Mfg. Co., 270 Mich. 592, 259 N.W. 334, not mere arithmetical computation. Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 404, 190 N.E. 606, 608.
DETERMINATION OF WILL. A phrase used of the putting an end to an estate at will. 2 Bl. Comm. 146.
DETERMINE. To come to an end. To bring to an end. 2 Bl.Comm. 121; 1 Washb. Real Prop. 380.
To bring to a conclusion, to settle by authorita• tive sentence, to decide. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Richards, 123 Misc. 83, 204 N.Y.S. 246, 248. To adjudicate on an issue presented. Glenn v. Mit• chell, 71 Colo. 394, 207 P. 84, 85.
To estimate. Twin Falls Salmon River Land & Water Co. v. Caldwell, C.C.A.Idaho, 242 F. 177, 184.
To decide, and analogous to "adopt" or "ac-cept." Goldberger v. City of Perth Amboy, 16 N. J.Misc. 814, 197 A. 267, 269.
DETESTATIO. Lat. In the civil law. A sum. moning made, or notice given, in the presence of witnesses, (denuntiatio lacta man testatione.) Dig. 50, 16, 40.

DETINET. Lat. He detains. In old English law. A species• of action of debt, which lay for the specific recovery of goods, under a contract to de-liver them. 1 Reeves, Eng. Law, 159.

In Pleading

An action of debt is said to be in the detinet when it is alleged merely that the defendant with-holds or unjustly detains from the plaintiff the thing or amount demanded.
An action of replevin is said to be in the de-tinet when the defendant retains possession of the property until after judgment in the action. Bull, N.P. 52; Chit.P1. 145.
DETINUE. In practice. A form of action which lies for the recovery, in specie, of personal chat-téls from one who acquired possession of them lawfully, but retains it without right, together with damages for the detention. 3 Bl.Comm. 152. Sinnott v. Feiock, 165 N.Y. 444, 59 N.E. 265, 53 L. R.A. 565, 80 Am.St.Rep. 736.
The action of detinue is defined in the old books as a remedy founded upon the delivery of goods by the owner to another to keep, who afterwards refuses to redeliver them to the bailor; and it is said that. to authorize the maintenance of the action, it is necessary that the defend-ant should have come lawfully finto the possession of the chattel, either by delivery to him or by finding it. In fact, ft was once understood to be the law that detinue does not lie where the property had been tortiously taken. But it is, upon principie, very uniniportant in what manner the defendant’s possession commenced, since the gist of the action is the wrongful detainer, and not the original tak-ing.
It Is only incumbent upon the plaintlff to prove property in himself, and possession in the defendant. At present, the action of detinue is proper in every case where the owner prefers recovering the specific property to damages for its conversion, and no regard is had to the manner in which the defendant acquired the possession. Tiefel Bros. & Wlnn v. Maxwell, Tex.Civ.App., 154 S.W. 319, 320.
DETINUE OF GOODS IN FRANK MARRIAGE. A writ formerly available to a wife after a di-vorce, for the recovery of the goods given with her in marriage. Mozley & Whitley.
DETINUIT. In pleading. An action of replevin is said to be in the detinuit when the plaintiff ac-quires possession of the property claimed by means of the writ. The right to retain is, of course, subject in such case to the judgment of the court upon his title to the property claimed. Bull, N.P. 521.
DETOUR. A temporary turning aside from us-ual or regular route, course or procedure or from a task or employment. Reddy-Waldhauer-Maf-fett Co. v. Spivey, 53 Ga.App. 117, 185 S.E. 147, 148.
A temporary road or a longer road in temporary use because of an obstruction on regularly used road.
DETOURNEMENT. The misappropriation by a servánt of funds the property of his master; fraudulent abstraction of documents; or "abus de confiance" which is fraudulently misusing or spending to anybody’s prejudice goods, cash, bilis, documents, or contracts handed over for a spe-
cial object. See Embezzlement. The Washington D.C.N.Y., 19 F.Supp. 719, 722.
DETRACTARI. To be torn in pieces by horses. Fleta, 1. 1, c. 37.
DETRACTION. The removal of property from one state to another upon a transfer of the title to it by will or inheritance. Frederickson v. Lou-isiana, 23 How. 445, 16 L.Ed. 577.
DETRIMENT. Any loss or harm suffered in per-son or property; e. g., the consideration for a contract may consist not only in a payment or other thing of value given, but also in loss or "detriment" suffered by the promisee. In that connection, "detriment" means that the promisee has, in return for the promise, forborne some legal right which he otherwise would have been entitled to exercise. Wallace v. Cook, 190 Ky. 262, 227 S.W. 279, 281; or that he has given up something which he had a right to keep, or done something which he had a right not to do. Irving v. Irwin, 133 Cal.App. 374, 24 P.2d 215.
DETUNICARI. To discover or lay open to the world. Matt. Westm. 1240.
DEUNX, pl. DEUNCES. Lat. In the Roman law. A division of the as, containing eleven uncice or duodecimal parts; the proportion of eleven-twelfths. 2 Bl.Comm. 462, note. See As.
Deus solus haeredem facere potest, non horno. God alone, and not man, can make an heir. Co. Litt. 7b; Broom, Max. 516; 5 B. & C. 440, 454.
DEUTEROGAMY. The act, or condition, of one who marries after the death of a former wife or husband.
DEVADIATUS, or DEVADIATUS. An offender without sureties or pledges. Cowell.
DEVASTATION. Wasteful use of the property of a deceased person, as for extravagant funeral or other unnecessary expenses. 2 Bl.Comm. 508.
DEVASTAVERUNT. They have wasted. A term applied in old English law to waste by executors and administrators, and to the process issued against them therefor. Cowell. See Devastavit.
DEVASTAVIT. Lat. He has wasted. The act of an executor or administrator in wasting the goods of the deceased; mismanagement of the estate by which a loss occurs; Grigg v. Hanna, 283 Mich. 443, 478 N.W. 125; a breach of trust or misappropriation of assets held in a fiduciary char-acter; any violation or neglect of duty by an executor or administrator, involving loss to the decedent’s estate, which makes him personally responsible to heirs, creditors, or legatees. Mc-Glaughlin v. McGlaughlin, 43 W.Va. 226, 27 S.E. 378.
Also, if plaintlff, in an action against an executor or ad-ministrator, has obtained judgment, the usual execution runs de bonis testatoris; but, if the sheriff returns such a writ nulla bona testatoris neo proprio, the plaintiff may, forthwith, upon thls return, sue out an execution against the property or person of the executor or administrator, In as full a manner as in an action against him, sued in his own right. Such a return is called a "clevastavit." Brown.
DEVELOP. To progress to a more advanced state or condition, as an injury. Rabin v. Cen-tral Business Men’s Ass’n, 116 Kan. 280, 226 P. 764, 766, 38 A.L.R. 26. To bring, or attempt to bring, to a state of fruition; to continue the work in hand, as in operating under an oil and gas lease, in a manner that would discover oil, if it existed, and promote its production. Lacer v. Sumpter, 198 Ky. 752, 249 S.W. 1026, 1027. To unfold more completely; to evolve the possibilities or power of; to make active; to perfect; advance; fur-ther; to make; to increase; to promote the growth of. Leingang v. Geller, Ward & Hasner Hardware Co., 335 Mo. 549, 73 S.W.2d 256, 261.
DEVELOPED WATER. Such subterrariean or underground water as is discovered and brought to the surface by the exploitation of man, and which otherwise would run to waste. Rock Creek Ditch & Flume Co. v. Miller, 17 P.2d 1074, 1077, 93 Mont. 248, 89 A.L.R. 200; Jones v. Warmsprings Irr. Dist., 162 Or. 186, 91 P.2d 542.
DEVENERUNT. A writ, now obsolete, directed to the king’s escheators when any of the king’s tenants in ca pite dies, and when his son and heir dies within age and in the king’s custody, com. manding the escheators, that by the oaths of twelve good and lawful men they shall inquire what lands or tenements by the death of the ten-ant have come to the king. Dyer, 360; Termes de la Ley; Keilw. 199a; Blount; Cowell.
DEVEST. To deprive; to take away; to with-draw. Usually spoken of an authority, power, property, or title; as the estate is devested.
Devest is opposite to invest. As to invest sig-nifies to deliver the possession of anything to an-other, so to devest signifies to take it away. Ja-cob.
It is sometimes written "divest" but "devest" has the support of the best authority. Burrill

In General

A change made in the progress of a work from the original terms or design or method agreed upon. Ward v. City of Monrovia, 16 Ca1.2d 815, 108 P.2d 425, 429.
A voluntary departure by railroad carrier, with-out necessity or reasonable cause, from the regu-lar or usual route or from a stipulated or cus-tomary mode of carriage. Ward v. Gulf, M. & N. R. Co., 23 Tenn.App. 533, 134 S.W.2d 917, 924.

In Insurance

Varying from the risks insured against, as de-scribed in the policy, without necessity or just cause, after the risk has begun. 1 Phil.Ins. §
977, et 1 Arn.Ins. 415, et seq. Hostetter v. Park, 137 ‘U.S. 30, 11 Sup.Ct. 1, 34 L.Ed. 568. Any unnecessary or unexcused departure from the usual or general mode of carrying on the voy age insured. 15 Amer. Law Rey. 108; Shackman v. Cunard White Star, D.C.N.Y., 31 F.Supp. 948, 951.
A voluntary departure without reasonable cause from the course of the voyage insured, or an un-reasonable delay in pursuing the voyage, or the commencement of an entirely different voyage. The Chester Valley, C.C.A.La., 110 F.2d 592, 594; The Willdomino v. Citro Chemical Co. of America, 272 U.S. 718, 47 S.Ct. 261, 262, 71 L.Ed. 491.

In the Law of Master and Servant

A departure on the part of a servant from his master’s service, for some purpose of his own. Jeffries v. Jodawelky, 304 Mich. 421, 8 N.W.2d 121, 122. The liability of the master to third per-sons injured by the servant depends on the de-gree of deviation and all the attending circum-stances. Johnson v. Maryland Cas. Co., C.C.A. Wis., 125 F.2d 337, 338. To exonerate the master, the deviation must be so substantial as to amount to an entire departure, and must be for purposes entirely personal to the servant. Thomas v. Lockwood Oil Co., 174 Wis. 486, 182 N.W. 841, 843. Contra, it is held that the test is whether master impliedly consented to route taken, and there can be no such thing as a slight deviation. Kalin-owski v. Odlewany, 289 Mich. 684, 287 N.W. 344, 345. As to a distinction between "deviation," "tem-porary abandonment," and "complete abandon-ment," see Dockweiler v. American Piano Co., 94 Misc. 712, 160 N.Y.S. 270, 273.
DEVICE. An invention or contrivance; any re-sult of design; as in the phrase "gambling device," which means a machine or contrivance of any kind for the playing of an unlawful game of chance or hazard. State v. Blackstone, 115 Mo. 424, 22 S.W. 370. Also, a plan or project; a scheme to trick or deceive; a stratagem or arti-fice; as in the laws relating to fraud and cheat-ing. State v. Smith, 82 Minn. 342, 85 N.W. 12. Also an emblem, pictorial representation, or dis-tinguishing mark or sign of any kind; as in the laws prohibiting the marking of ballots used in public elections with "any device." Baxter v. El-lis, 111 N.C. 124, 15 S.E. 938, 17 L.R.A. 382.
In a statute against gaming devices, this term is to be understood as meaning something formed by design, a con-trivance, an invention. It is to be distinguished from "sub-stitute," which means something put in the place of anoth-er thing, or used instead of something else. Henderson v. State, 59 Ala. 91.

In Patent Law

A plan or contrivance, or an application, ad-justment, shaping, or combination of materials or members, for the purpose of accomplishing a par-ticular result or serving a particular use, chiefly by mechanical means and usually simple in char-acter or not highly complex, but involving the exercise of the inventive faculty.
DEVIL ON THE NECK. An instrument of tor-ture, formerly used to extort confessions, etc. It was made of several irons, which were fastened to the neck and legs, and wrenched together so as to break the back. Cowell.
DEVILLING. A term used in London of a bar-rister recently admitted to the bar, who assists a junior bariister in his professional work, without compensation and without appearing in any way in the matter.
DEVISABLE. Capable of being devised. 1 Pow. Dev. 165; 2 BI.Comm. 373.
DEVISAVIT VEL NON. In practice. The name of an issue sent out of a court of chancery, or one which exercises chancery jurisdiction, to a court of law, to try the validity of a paper asserted and denied to be a will, to ascertain whether or not the testator did devise, or whether or not that pa-per was his will. 7 Brown, Parl.Cas, 437; 2 Atk. 424; Asay v. Hoover, 5 Pa. 21, 45 Am.Dec. 713.
DEVISE. A testamentary disposition of land or realty; a gift of real property by the last will and testament of the donor. Scholle v. Scholle, 113 N.Y. 261, 21 N.E. 84; Murchison v. Wallace, 156 Va. 728, 159 S.E. 106, 108.

Classification

Devises are contingent or vested; that is, after the death of the testator. Contingent, when the vesting of any estate in the devisee is made to depend upon some future event, in which case, if the event never occur, or until it does occur, no estate vests under the devise. But, when the future event is referred to merely to determine the time at which the devisee shall come into the use of the estate, this does not hinder the vesting of the estate at the death of the testator. 1 Jarm.Wills, c. 26. Devises are also classed as general or specific. A general devise is one which passes lands of the testator without a particular enumeration or description of them; as, a devise of "all my lands" or "all my other lands." In a more restricted dense, a general devise is one which grants a parcel of land without the addition of any words to show how great an estate is meant to be given, or without words indicating either a grant in perpetuity or a grant for a limited term; in this case it is construed as granting a life estate. Hitch v. Patten, 8 Houst. (Del.) 334, 16 A. 558, 2 L.R.A. 724. Specific devises are devises of lands particularly specified in the tercos of the devise, as opposed to general and residu-ary devises of land, in which the local or other particular descriptions are not expressed. For example, "I devise my Hendon Hall estate" is a specific devise ; but "I devise all my lands," or, "all other my lands," is a general devise or a residuary devise. But all devises are (in effect) specific, even residuary devises being so. L.R. 3 Ch. 420; Id. 136. At common law, all devises of land were deemed to be "specific" whether the land was identified in the devise or passed under the residuary clause. In re Sutton’s Estate, 11 Del.Ch. 460, 97 A. 624, 626. A conditional devise is one which depends upon the occurrence of some uncertain event, by which it is either to take effect or be defeated. An executory devise of lands is such a disposition of them by •will that thereby no estate vests at the death of the devisor, but only on some future contingency. It differs from a remainder in three very material points: (1) That it needs not any particular estate to support lt; (2) that by it a fee-simple or other less estate may be limited after a fee-simple; (3) that by this means a remainder may be limited of a chattel interest, after a particular estate for life created in the same. 2 Bl.Comm. 172. In a stricter sense, a limitation by will of a future contingent interest in lands, contrary to the rules of the common law. 4 Kent, Comm. 263; 1 Steph.Comm. 564; Dean v. Crews, 77 Fla. 319, 81 So. 479. A limitation by will of a future estate or interest in land, which cannot, conslstently with the rules of law, take effect as a remainder. 2 Pow.Dev. (by Jar-man,) 237; Bean v. Atkins, 87 Vt. 376, 89 A..643, 646. See Poor v. Consldine, 6 Wall. 474, 18 L.Ed. 869; Glover v. Condell, 163 III. 566, 45 N.E. 173, 35 L.R.A. 360. A future interest taking effect as a fee in derogation of a defeasible
fee devised or conveyed to the lInt taker, when created by will, Is an "executory devise," and, when created by deed, Is a "conditional limitation," and In either event is given effect as a shifting or springing use. McWilliams v. Have-ly, 214 Ky. 320, 283 S.W. 103, 104.
The estates known as a contingent remainder and an "ex-ecutory devise" are both interests or estates in land to take effect in the future and depend upon a future con-tingency; an "executory devise" being an interest which the rules of law do not permit to be created in convey-ances, but allow in case of wills. It follows a fee estate created by a will. A contingent remainder may be created by will or other conveyance and must follow a particular or temporary estate created by the same instrument of conveyance. Wilkins v. Rowan, 107 Neb. 180, 185 N.W. 437, 439. Lapsed devise. A devise which fails, or takes no ef-fect, in consequence of the death of the devisee before the testator; the subject-matter of it being considered as not disposed of by the will. 1 Steph.Comm. 559; 4 Kent, Comm. 541. Murphy v. McKeon, 53 N.J Eq. 406, 32 A. 374. Residuary devise. A devise of all the residue of the testa-tor’s real property, that is, all that remains over and aboye the other devise Synonyms
The term "devise" is properly restricted to real prop-erty; testamentary dispositions of personal property being properly called "bequests" or "legacies." Borgner v. Brown, 133 Ind. 391, 33 N.E. 92.
To contrive; plan; scheme ; invent; prepare. Stockton v. United States, C.C.A.I11., 205 F. 462, 464, 46 L.R.A.,N.S., 936.
DEVISEE. The person to whom lands or other real property are devised or given by will. 1 Pow. Dev. c. 7. In re Lewis’ Estate, 39 Nev. 445, 159 P. 961, 962, 4 A.L.R. 241.

Residuary Devisee

The person named in a will, who is to take all the real property remaining over and aboye the other devises.

DEVISOR. A giver of lands or real estate by will; the maker of a will of lands; a testator.
DEVOIR. Fr. Duty. It is used in the statute of 2 Rich. II. c. 3, in the sense of duties or customs.
DEVOLUTION. The transfer or transition from one person to another of a right, liability, title, estate, or office. Francisco v. Aguirre, 94 Cal. 180, 29 P. 495.

In Ecclesiastical Law

The forfeiture of a right or power (as the right of presentation to a living) in consequence of its non-user by the person holding it, or of some other act or omission on his part, and its resulting transfer to the person next entitled.

In Scotch Law

The transference of the right of purchase, from the highest bidder at an auction sale, to the next highest, when the former fails to pay his bid or furnish security for its payment within the time appointed. Also, the reference of a matter in con-troversy to a third person (called "oversmaii") by two arbitrators to whom it has been submitted and who are unable to agree.
DEVOLUTIVE APPEAL. In the Iaw of Louisi-ana, one which does not suspend the execution of the judgment appealed from. Brock v. Police Jury of Rapides Parish, 198 La. 787, 4 So.2d 829, 832.
DEVOLVE. To pass or be transferred from one person to another; to fall on, or accrue to, one person as the successor of another; as a title, right, office, liability. The term is said to be pecu-liarly appropriate to the passing of an estate from a person dying to a person living. Babcock v. Maxwell, 29 Mont. 31, 74 P. 64; Fitzpatrick v. McAlister, 121 Okl. 83, 248 P. 569, 573; People ex rel. Robin v. Hayes, 149 N.Y.S. 250, 252, 163 App. Div. 725. See Devolution.
DEVULCANIZE. Of rubber. A more or less perfect restoration of vulcanized rubber to a state in which it might be used as crude rubber. Phil-adelphia Rubber Works Co. v. Portage Rubber Co., D.C.Ohio, 227 F. 623, 627.
DEVY. L. Fr. Dies; deceases. Bendloe, 5.
DEXTANS. Lat. In Roman law. A division of the as, consisting of ten uncice; ten-twelfths, or five-sixths. 2 Bl.Comm. 462, note m.
DEXTRARIUS. One at the right hand of another.
DEXTRAS DARE. To shake hands in token of friendship; or to give up oneself to the power of another person.
DI COLONNA. In maritime law. The contract which takes place between the owner of a ship, the captain, and the mariners, who agree that the voy-age shall be for the benefit of all. The term is used in the Italian law. Emerig. Mar. Loans, § 5. DI. ET FI. L.Lat. In old writs. An abbrevia-tion of dilecto et fideli, (to his beloved and faith-ful.)
DIACONATE. The office of a deacon. DIACONUS. A deacon.
DIAGNOSIS. A medical term, meaning the dis-covery of the source of a patient’s illness or the determination of the nature of his disease from a study of its symptoms. Said to be little more than a guess enlightened by experience. Swan v. Railroad Co., 29 N.Y.S. 337, 79 Hun 612; People v. Jordan, 172 Cal. 391, 156 P. 451, 454.
The art or act of recognizing the presence of disease from its symptoms, and deciding as to its character, also the decision reached, for deter-mination of type or condition through case or specimen study or conclusion arrived at through critical perception or scrutiny. A "clinical diag-nosis" is one made from a study of the symptoms only, and a "physical diagnosis" is one made by means of physical measure, such as palpation and inspection. Williams v. Elias, 140 Neb. 656, 1 N.W.2d 121, 123.
DIAGONAL, n. A right line drawn from the one angle to another not adjacent of a figure of four or more sides and dividing it into two parts. Sem-erad v. Dunn County, 35 N.D. 437, 160 N.W. 855, 858. DIAGONAL, adj. Joining two not adjacent an-gles of a quadrilateral or multilateral figure run–ning across from comer to comer; crossing at an angle with one of the sides. Semerad v. Dunn. County, 35 N.D. 437, 160 N.W. 855, 858.
DIALECTICS. That branch of logic which teach-es the rules and modes of reasoning.
DIALLAGE. A rhetorical figure in which argu-ments are placed in various points of view, and then turned to one point. Enc.Lond.
DIALOGUS DE SCACCARIO. Dialogue of or about the exchequer. An ancient treatise on the court of exchequer, attributed by some to Ger-vase of Tilbury, by others to Richard Fitz Nigel, bishop of London in the reign of Richard I. It is quoted by Lord Coke under the name of Ock-ham. Crabb, Eng. Law, 71.
DIANATIC. A logical reasoning in a progres-sive manner, proceeding from one subject to an-other. Enc. Lond.
DIARIUM. Daily food, or as much as will suf-fice for the day. Du Cange.
DIATHERMY. Heat treatment by electricity. Biener v. St. Louis Public Service Co., Mo.App., 160 S.W.2d 780, 788.
DIATIM. In old records. Daily; every day; from day to day. Spelman.
DICA. In old English law. A tally for accounts, by number of cuts, (taillees,) marks, or notches. Cowell. See Tallia; Tally.
DICAST. An officer in ancient Greece answering in some respects to our juryman, but combining, on trials had before them, the functions of both judge and jury. The dicasts sat together in num-bers varying, according to the importance of the case, from one to five hundred.
DICE. Small cubes of bone or ivory, marked with figures or devices on their several sides, used in playing certain games of chance. See Wetmore v. State, 55 Ala. 198.
DICTA. Opinions of a judge which do not em-body the resolution or determination of the court. Deer Island Fish & Oyster Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 166 Miss. 162, 146 So. 116, 119. See Dictum.
DICTATE. To order or instruct what is to be said or written. To pronounce, word by word, what is meant to be written by another. Hamil-ton v. Hamilton, 6 Mart., N.S., La., 143. See Die-tation.
DICTATION. In Louisiana, this term is used in a technical sense, and means to pronounce orally what is destined to be written at the same time by another. It is used in reference to nuncupative wills. Prendergast v. Prendergast, 16 La.Ann. 220, 79 Am.Dec. 575. The dictation of a will re-fers to the substance, and not the style, and it is sufficient if the will, as written, conveys the Iden-tity of thought expressed by the testator, though not the identity of words used by him. Succes-sion of Beattie, 163 La. 831, 112 So. 802, 803.
DICTATOR. A magistrate invested with unlimit-ed power, and created in times of national distress and peril. Among the Romans, he continued in office for six months only, and had unlimited pow-er and authority over both the property and lives of the citizens.
One in whom supreme authority in any line is invested, one who rules as dictator, and one who prescribes for others authoritatively. Houston Printing Co. v. Hunter, Tex.Civ.App., 105 S.W.2d 312, 317.
DICTATORSHIP OF PROLETARIAT. The class power of the revolutionary proletariat (unskilled laborers without property) arising upon destruc-tion of the state. People v. Gitlow, 234 N.Y. 132, 136 N.E. 317, 322.
DICTORES. Arbitrators.
DICTUM.

In General

A statement, remark, or observation. Gratis dictum; a gratuitous or voluntary representation; one which a party is not bound to make. 2 Kent, Comm. 486. Simplex dictum; a mere assertion; an assertion without proof. Bract. fol. 320.
The word is generally used as an abbreviated forro of obiter dictum, "a remark by the way;" that is, an observation or remark made by a judge in pronouncing an opinion upon a cause, con-cerning some rule, principie, or application of law, or the solution of a question suggested by the case at bar, but not necessarily involved in the case or essential to its determination; any state-ment of the law enunciated by the court merely by way of illustration, argument, analogy, or sug-gestion. See Railroad Co. v. Schutte, 103 U.S. 118, 143, 26 L.Ed. 327; City of Lincoln v. Steffens-meyer, 134 Neb. 613, 279 N.W. 272, 119 A.L.R. 914; Deer Island Fish & Oyster Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 166 Miss. 162, 146 So. 116, 119.
Statements and commerás in an opinion con-cerning some rule of law or legal proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of the case in hand are obiter dicta, and lack the force of an adjudication. Wheeler v. Wilkin, 98 Colo. 568; 58 P.2d 1223, 1226; Roquemore v. Sov-ereign Camp, W.O.W., 226 Ala. 279, 146 So. 619, 622.
Dicta are opinions of a judge which do not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and made without argument, or full consideration of the point, are not the professed deliberate determinations of the judge himself. Obiter dicta are such opinions uttered by the way, not upon the point or question pending, as if turning aside for the time from the main topic of the case to collateral sub-jects. Rohrbach v. Insurance Co., 62 N.Y. 47, 58, 20 Am. Rep. 451.

In Old English Law

Dictum rneant an arbitrament, or the award of arbitrators.

In French Law

The report of a judgment made by one of the judges who has given it. Poth.Proc.Civil, pt. 1, c. 5, art. 2.
DICTUM DE KENILWORTH. The edict or dec-laration of Kenilworth. An edict or award Be-tween King Henry III. and all the barons and others who had been in arms against him; and so called because it was made at Kenilworth Cas-tle in Warwickshire, in the fifty-first year of his reign, containing a composition of five years’ rent for the lands and estates of those who had f or-feited them in that rebellion. Elount; 2 Reeve, Eng.Law, 62.
DIE, v. To expire; cease to live; the equivalent to the phrase "lose his life." Hershey v. Agnew, 83 Colo. 89, 262 P. 526, 528.
DIE, n. A mold. Cole v. United States, C.C.A. Colo., 269 F. 250, 251.
DIE WITHOUT ISSUE. See Dying Without Issue.
DIEI DICTIO. Lat. In Roman law. This name was given to a notice promulgated by a magistrate of his intention to present an impeachment against a citizen bef ore the people, specifying the day appointed, the name of the accused, and the crime charged.
DIEM CLAUSIT EXTREMUM. (Lat. He has closed his Last day,—died.) A writ which formerly lay on the death of a tenant in ca pite, to ascer-tain the lands of which he died seised, and re-claim them into the king’s hands. It was direct-ed to the king’s escheators. Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 251, K; 2 Reeve, Eng.Law, 327.
A writ awarded out of the exchequer af ter the death of a crown debtor, the sheriff being com-manded by it to inquire by a jury when and where the crown debtor died, and what chattels, debts, and lands he had at the time of his decease, and to take and seize them into the crown’s hands. 4 Steph.Comm. 47, 48.
DIES. Lat. A day; days. Days for appearance in court. Provisions or maintenance for a day. The king’s rents were anciently reserved by so many days’ provisions. Spelman; Cowell; Blount.
DIES A QUO. (The day from which.) In the civil law. The day from which a transaction be-gins; the commencement of it; the conclusion be-ing the dies ad que?n. Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 185.
DIES AMORIS. A day of favor. The name given to the appearance day of the term on the fourth day, or quarto die post. It was the day given by the favor and indulgence of the court to the de-f endant for his appearance, when all parties ap-peared in court, and had their appearance record-ed by the proper officer. Wharton.
DIES CEDIT. The day begins; dies venit, the day has come. Two expressions in Roman law which signify the vesting or fixing of an interest, and the interest becoming a present one. San-dars’ Just.Inst. (5th Ed.) 225, 232.

DIES COMMUNES IN BANCO. Regular days for appearance in court; called, also "common re-turn-days." 2 Reeve, Eng.Law, 57.
DIES DATUS. A day given or allowed, (to a de-fendant in an action;) amounting to a continu-ance. But the name was appropriate only to a continuance before a declaration filed; if after-wards allowed, it was called an "imparlance."
DIES DATUS IN BANCO. A day given in the bench, (or court of common pleas.) Bract. fols. 257b, 361. A day given in bank, as distinguished from a day at nisi prius. Co.Litt. 135.
DIES DATUS PARTIBUS. A day given to the parties to an action; an adjournment or continu-ance. Crabb, Eng.Law, 217.
DIES DATUS FRECE PARTIUM. A day given on the prayer of the parties. Bract. fol. 358; Gilb. Comm.P1. 41; 2 Reeve, Eng.Law, 60.
PIES DOMINICUS. The Lord’s day; Sunday.
Dies dominicus non est juridicus. Sunday is not a court day, or day for judicial proceedings, or legal purposes. Co.Litt. 135a; Noy, Max. 2; Wing. Max. 7, max. 5; Broom, Max. 21.
DIES EXCRESCENS. In old English law. The added or increasing day in leap year. Bract. fols. 359, 359b.
DIES FASTI. In Roman law. Days on which the courts were open, and justice could be legally administered; days on which it was lawful for the pretor to pronounce (fari) the three words, "do," "dico," "addico." Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 39, and note; 3 Bl.Comm. 424, note; Calvin. Hence called "triverbial days," answering to the dies juri-dici of the English law.
DIES FERIATL In the civil law. Holidays. Dig. 2, 12, 2, 9.
DIES GRATUE. In old English practice. A day of grace, courtesy, or favor. Co.Litt. 134b. The quarto die post was sometimes so called. Id. 135a.
Dies inceptus pro completo habetur. A day be-gun is held as complete.
Dies incertus pro conditione habetur. An uncer-tain day is held as a condition.
DIES INTERCISI. In Roman law. Divided days; days on which the courts were open for a part of the day. Calvin.
DIES JURIDICUS. A lawful day for the transac-tion of judicial or court business; a day on which the courts are or may be open for the transaction of business. Didsbury v. Van Tassell, 56 Hun, 423, 10 N.Y.Supp. 32.
DIES LEGITIMUS. In the civil and old English law. A lawful or law day; a term day; a day of appearance.
DIES MARCIIIIE. In old English law. The day of meeting of English and Scotch, which was an-
nually held on the marches or borders to adjust their differences and preserve peace.
DIES NEFASTI. In Roman law. Days on which the courts were closed, and it was unlawful to administer justice; answering to the dies non juridici of the English law. Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 39, note.
DIES NON. An abbreviation of Dies non juridi-cus, (q. v.).
DIES NON JURIDICUS. In practice. A day not juridical; not a court day. A day on which courts are not open for business, such as Sundays and some holidays. Havens v. Stiles, 8 Idaho, 250, 67 P. 921, 56 L.R.A. 736, 101 Am.St.Rep. 195.
DIES PACIS. (Days of peace.) The year was formerly divided into the days of the peace of the church and the days of the peace of the king, in-cluding in the two divisions all the days of the year. Crabb, Eng.Law, 35.
DIES SOLARIS. In old English law. A solar day, as distinguished from what was called "dies lunaris," (a lunar day; ) both composing an arti-ficial day. Bract. fol. 264. See Day.
DIES SOLIS. In the civil and old English law. Sunday, (literally, the day of the sun.) See Cod. 3, 12, 7.
PIES UTILES. Juridical days; useful or avail-able days. A term of the Roman law, used to des-ignate those especial days occurring within the limits of a prescribed period of time upon which it was lawful, or possible, to do a specific act.
DIET. A general legislative assembly is some-times so called on the continent of Europe.

In Scotch Practice

The sitting of a court. An appearance day. A day fixed for the trial of a criminal cause. A crim-inal cause as prepared for trial.
DIETA. A day’s journey; a day’s work; a day’s expenses.
DIETS OF COMPEARANCE. In Scotch law. The days within which parties in civil and criminal prosecutions are cited to appear. Bell.
DIEU ET MON DROIT. Fr. God and my right. The motto of the royal arms of England, first as-sumed by Richard I.
DIEU SON ACTE. L. Fr. In old law. God his act; God’s act. An event beyond human foresight or control. Termes de la Ley.
DIFFACERE. To destroy; to disfigure or deface.
DIFFERENCE. In an agreement for submission to arbitration, a disagreement or dispute. Fravert v. Fesler, 11 Colo.App. 387, 53 Pac. 288; Pioneer Mfg. Co. v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 106 N.C. 28, 10 S.E. 1057.
As respects contract specifications or material described therein, a state of being unlike. McGarry Contracting Co. v. Board of Education of City of New York, 284 N.Y. 218, 30 N.E.2d 482.
In mathematics, the magnitude or quantity by which one magnitude or quantity differs from an-other of the same kind; the remainder left after subtracting the one from the other. Riley Stoker Corporation v. Jeffrey Mfg. Co., 62 Ohio App. 199, 23 N.E.2d 519, 522.
Difficile est ut unus homo vicem duorum sus-tineat. 4 Coke, 118. It is difficult that one man should sustain the place of two.
DIFFICULT. For the meaning of the phrase "difficult and extraordinary case," as used in New York statutes and practice, see Standard Trust Co. v. New York, etc., R. Co., 178 N.Y. 407, 70 N.E. 925; Realty Associates v. Packard Motor Car Co. of New York, 119 Misc. 292, 196 N.Y.S. 198, 200; Cohen v. Texas Co., D.C.N.Y., 23 F.2d 128, 129.
DIFFORCIARE. In old English law. To deny, or keep from one. Difforciare rectum, to deny justice to any one, after having been required to do it.
DIFFUSE. To spread widely; scatter; disperse. Ex parte Hinkelman, 183 Cal. 392, 191 P. 682, 683, 11 A.L.R. 1222.
DIGAMA, or DIGAMY. Second marriage; mar-riage to a second wife after the death of the first, as "bigamy," in law, is having two wives at once. Originally, a man who married a widow, or mar-ried again after the death of his wife, was said to be guilty of bigamy. Co.Litt. 40b, note.
DIGEST. A collection or compilation, embodying the chief matter of numerous books in one, dis-posed under proper heads or titles, and usually by an alphabetical arrangement, for facility in ref-erence.
As a legal term, "digest" is to be distinguished from "abridgment." The latter is a summary or epitome of the contents of a single work, in which, as a rule, the original order or sequence of parts is preserved, and in which the principal labor of the compiler is in the matter of consoli-dation. A digest is wider in its scope; is made up of quotations or paraphrased passages; and has its own sys-tem of classification and arrangement. An "index" mere-ly points out the places where particular matters may be found, without purporting to give such matters In extenso. A "treatise" or "commentary" is not a compilation, but an original composition, though it may include quotations and excerpts.
A reference to the "Digest," or "Dig.," is always understood to designate the Digest (or Pandects) of the Justinian collection; that being the digest par eminence, and the authoritative compilation of the Roman law.
The American Digest System embraces the Cen-tury, First, Second, Third, Fourth Decennials, and General Digest. It covers the decisions of all American courts of last resort, State and Federal, from 1658 to date, under one uniform classifica-tion. The First Decennial, Second Decennial, Third Decennial, Fourth Decennial and General Digest, are Key-Numbered. There are also the United States Supreme Court Digest, covering all cases in that court, and the Federal Digest, coy-
ering the Federal Reporter, Federal Supplement and the Supreme Court Reporter.
DIGESTA. Digests. One of the titles of the Pan-dects of Justinian. Inst. Prcem, 1 4. Bracton uses the singular, "Digestum." Bract. fol. 19.
DIGESTS. The ordinary name of the Pandects of Justinian, which are now usually cited by the ab-breviation "Dig." instead of "Ff.," as formerly.. Sometimes called "Digest," in the singular.
DIGGING. Has been held as synonymous with "excavating," and not confined to the removal of earth. Sherman v. New York, 1 N.Y. 316.
DIGNITARY. In canon law. A person holding an ecclesiastical benefice or dignity, which gave him some pre-eminence aboye mere priests and canons. To this class exclusively belonged all bishops, deans, archdeacons, etc.; but it now includes all the prebendaries and canons of the church. Brande.
DIGNITY. In English law. An honor; a title, station, or distinction of honor. Dignities are a species of incorporeal hereditaments, in which a person may have a property or estate. 2 131.Comm. 37; 1 BI.Comm. 396; 1 Crabb, Real Prop. 468, et seq.
DIJUDICATION. Judicial decision or determina-tion.
DIKE. A bank, as of earth, thrown up to forro a barrier, line of demarcation, or the like; especially an embankment to prevent inundation. Parker v. Department of Labor and Industries, 14 Wash.2d 481, 128 P.2d 497, 500.
DIKING. Leveling land in arid regions, pdrticu-larly sagebrush land. An essential operation in the conversion of such land into farms or or-chards. Craig v. Crystal Realty Co., 89 Or. 25, 173 P. 322, 325.
DILACION. In Spanish law. A space of time granted to a party to a suit in which to answer a demand or produce evidence of a disputed fact.
DILAPIDATION. A species of ecclesiastical waste which occurs whenever the incumbent suf-fers any edifices of his ecclesiastical living to go to ruin or decay. It is either voluntary, by pulling down, or permissive, by suffering the church, parsonage-houses, and other buildings thereunto belonging, to decay. And the remedy for either lies either in the spiritual court, where the canon law prevails, or in the courts of common law. It is also held to be good cause of deprivation if the bishop, parson, or other ecclesiastical person dilap-idates buildings or cuts down timber growing on the patrimony of the church, unless for necessary repairs; and that a writ of prohibition will also lie against him in the common-law courts. 3 Bl. Comm. 91.
The term is also used, in the law of landlord and tenant, to signify the neglect of necessary re-pairs to a building, or suffering it to fall into a or any part of it. Wall Estate Co. v. Standard Box Co., 20 Cal.App. 311, 128 P. 1020, 1021.
Dilationes in lege sunt odiosw. Delays in law are odious. Branch, Princ.
DILATORY. Tending or intended to cause delay or to gain time or to put off a decision.
DILATORY DEFENSE. In chancery practice. One the object of which is to dismiss, suspend, or obstruct the suit, without touching the merits, until the impediment or obstacle insisted on shall be removed. 3 B1.Comm. 301, 302.
DILATORY EXCEPTIONS are such as do not tend to defeat the action, but only to retard its progress.
DILATORY PLEAS. A class of defenses at com-mon law, founded on some matter of fact not con-nected with the merits of the case, but such as might exist without impeaching the right of action itself. They were either pleas to the jurisdiction, showing that, by reason of some matter therein stated, the case was not within the jurisdiction of the court; or pleas in suspension, showing some matter of temporary incapacity to proceed with the suit; or pleas in abatement, showing some matter for abatement or quashing the declaration. 3 Steph.Comm. 576. Parks v. McClellan, 44 N.J. Law, 513, 558; Shaw v. Southern Ry. Co., 17 Ga. App. 78, 86 S.E. 95.
DILIGENCE. Prudence; vigilant activity; at-tentiveness; or care, of which there are infinite shades, from the slightest momentary thought to the most vigilant anxiety. People v. Hewitt, 78 Cal.App. 426, 248 P. 1021, 1024. The law recog-nizes only three degrees of diligence: (1) Com-mon or ordinary, which men, in general, exert in respect of their own concerns; the standard is necessarily variable with respect to the facts, al-though it may be uniform with respect to the principie. (2) High or great, which is extraor-dinary diligence, or that which very prudent per-sons take of their own concerns. (3) Low or slight, which is that which persons of less than common prudence, or indeed of no prudence at all, take of their own concerns. Brown & Flowers v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 197 Ala. 71, 72 So. 366, 367.
The civil law is in perfect conformity with the common law. It lays down three degrees of dili-
gence,—ordinary, (diligentia;) extra ordinary, (exactissima diligentia;) slight, flevissima diligen-tia.) Story, Bailm. 19.
There may be a high degree of diligence, a common de-gree of diligence, and a slight degree of diligence, with their corresponding degrees of negligence, and these can be clearly enough defined for all practical purposes, and, with a view to the business of life, seem to be all that are really necessary. Common or ordinary diligence is that degree of dílígence which men In general exerclse in re-spect to theif own concerns; high or great diligence is of course extraordinary diligence, or that which very prudent persons take of their own concerns; and low or slight dili-gence is that which persons of less than common prudence, or indeed of any prudence at all, take of their own con-cerns.
Ordinary negligence is the want of ordinary diligence; slight, or less than ordinary, negligence is the want of great diligence; and gross or more than ordinary negli-gence is the want of slight diligence. Railroad Co. v. Rol-lins, 5 Kan. 180.
In Scotch Law and Practice
Process of law, by which persons, lands, or ef-fects are seized in execution or in security for debt. Ersk. Inst. 2, 11, 1. Brande. Process for enforcing the attendance of witnesses, or the pro-duction of writings. Ersk. Inst. 4, 1, 71.
Other Classifications and Compound Terms
—Due diligence. Such a measure of prudence, ac-tivity, or assiduity, as is properly to be expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a reasonable and prudent man under the particular circum-stances; not measured by any absolute standard, but depending on the relative facts of the special case. Perry v. Cedar Falls, 87 Iowa, 315, 54 N.W. 225.
—Extraordinary diligence. That extreme meas-ure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection use for securing and preserving their own property or rights. Rail-road Co. v. Huggins, 89 Ga. 494, 15 S.E. 848; Rail-road Co. v. White, 88 Ga. 805, 15 S.E. 802.
—Great diligence. Such a measure of care, pru-dence, and assiduity as persons of unusual pru-dence and discretion exercise in regard to any and all of their own affairs, or such as persons of or-dinary prudence exercise in regard to very im-portant affairs of their own. Litchfield v. White, 7 N.Y. 438, 57 Am.Dec. 534.
—High diligence. The same as great diligence. —Low diligence. The same as slight diligence.
—Necessary diligence. That degree of diligence which a person placed in a particular situation must exercise in order to entitle him to the pro-tection of the law in respect to rights or claims growing out of that situation, or to avoid being left without redress on account of his own cul-pable carelessness or negligence. Garahy v. Bay-ley, 25 Tex.Supp. 302; Sanderson v. Brown, 57 Me. 312.
—Ordinary diligence is that degree of care which men of common prudence generally exercise in their affairs, in the country and the age in which they live. Zell v. Dunkle, 156 Pa. 353, 27 A. 38.
—Reasonable diligence. A fair, proper and due degree of care and activity, measured with refer-ence to the particular circumstances; such dili-gence, care, or attention as might be expected from a man of ordinary prudence and activity. Ford v. Engleman, 118 Va. 89, 86 S.E. 852, 855.
—Special diligence. The measure of diligence and skill exercised by a good business man in his particular specialty, which must be commensurate with the duty to be performed and the individual circumstances of the case; not merely the dili gente of an ordinary person or non-specialist. Brady v. Jefferson, 5 Houst (Del.) 79.
DILIGENT. Attentive and persistent in doing a thing; ‘steadily applied; active; sedulous; labori-ous; unremitting; untiring. People v. Mancuso, 255 N.Y. 463, 175 N.E. 177, 179, 76 A.L.R. 514.
DILIGIATUS. (Fr. De lege e jectus, Lat.) Out-lawed.
DILLIGROUT. In old English law. Pottage for-merly made for the king’s table on the coronation day. There was a tenure in serjeantry, by which lands were held of the king by the service of find-ing this pottage at that solemnity.
DIME. A copper-nickel ciad (formerly silver) coin of the United States, of the value of ten cents, or one-tenth of the dollar.
DIMIDIA, DIMIDIUM, DIMIDIUS. Half; a half; the half.
DIMIDIETAS. The moiety or half of a thing.
DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY DOCTRINE. A misnomer for doctrine under which proof of mental derangement short of insanity is submitted as evidence of lack of deliberate or premeditated design. State v. Franco, 347 P.2d 312, 314, 66 N.M. 289, 78 A.L.R.2d 908.
DIMINUTIO. In the civil law. Diminution; a taking away; loss or deprivation. Diminutio cap-itis, loss of status or condition. See Capitis Dim-inutio.
DIMINUTION. Incompleteness. A word signify-ing
that the record sent up from an inferior to a superior court for review is incomplete, or not fully certified. In such case the party may sug-gest a "diminution of the record," which may be rectified by a certiorari. 2 Tidd, Pr. 1109; Stepp v. Stepp, 195 Ga. 595, 25 S.E.2d 6, 8.
DIMISI. In old conveyancing. I have demised. Dimisi, concessi, et ad firmam tradidi, have de-mised, granted, and to farm let. The usual words of operation in a lease. 2 B1.Comm. 317, 318.
DIMISIT. In old conveyancing. [He] has de-mised. See Dimisi.
DIMISSORIZE LITTERM. In the civil law. Let-ters dimissory or dismissory, commonly called "apostles," (quce vulgo apostoli dicuntur.) Dig. 50, 16, 106. See Apostoli, Apostles.
DIMISSORY LETTERS. Where a candidate for holy orders has a title of ordination in one dio-cese in England, and is to be ordained in another, the bishop of the former diocese gives letters di-missory to the bishop of the latter to enable him to ordain the candidate. Holthouse.
DINARCHY. A government of two persons. DINERO.

In Roman Law

A civil division of the Roman empire embracing several provinces. Calvin.
Black’s Law Dictionary Revisad 4th to.-35

In Spanish Law

Money. Dinero contado, money counted. White, New Recop. b. 2, tit. 13, c. 1, § 1.
DIOCESAN. Belonging to a diocese; a bishop, as he stands related to his own clergy or fiock.
DIOCESAN COURTS. In English law. The con-sistorial courts of each diocese, exercising general jurisdiction of all matters arising locally within their respective limits, with the exception of places subject to peculiar jurisdiction; deciding all mat-ters of spiritual discipline,—suspending or depriv-ing clergymen,—and administering the other branches of the ecclesiastical law. 2 Steph.Com. 672.

DIOCESAN MISSION. A mission which does missionary work in single diocese. Domestic & Foreign Missionary Soc. v. Crippled Children’s Hospital, 163 Va. 114, 176 S.E. 193.
DIOCESE. The territorial extent of a bishop’s ju-risdiction. The circuit of every bishop’s jurisdic-tion. Co. Litt. 94; 1 Bl.Comm. 111.
DIOICHIA. The district over which a bishop ex-ercised his spiritual functions.
DIP, v. To immerse for a short time in any liq-uid; to place in fluid and withdraw again; the act of dipping or immersing; a plunge; a brief bath, as the dip of the oars; a dip in the sea. Standard Dictionary, "dip." Covington County v. Picker-ing, 123 Miss. 20, 85 So. 114, 115.
DIP, n. In mining law. The line of declination of strata; the angle which measures the deviation of a mineralized vein or lode from the vertical plane; the slope or slant of a vein, away from the perpendicular, as it goes downward into the earth; distinguished from the "strike" of the vein, which is its extension in the horizontal plane, or its lengthwise trend or course with reference to the points of the compass. King v. Mining Co., 9 Mont. 543, 24 P. 200.

In Animal Husbandry

A liquid preparation into which infected animals may be plunged for eradication of fever ticks, or other sanitary or medical purposes. Ungles-Hog-gette Mf g. Co. v. Farmers’ Hog & Cattle Powder Co., C.C.A.Neb., 232 F. 116, 117.
DIPLOMA. In the civil law. A royal charter; letters patent granted by a prince or sovereign. Calvin.
An instrument given by colleges and societies on the conferring of any degrees. State v. Gregory, 83 Mo. 130, 53 Am.Rep. 565.
A license granted to a physician, etc., to prac-tice his art or profession. See Brooks v. State, 88 Ala. 122, 6 So. 902.
DIPLOMACY. The science which treats of the relations and interests of nations with nations.

Negotiation or intercourse between nations through their representatives. The rules, cus-toms, and privileges of representatives at foreign courts.
DIPLOMATIC AGENT, In International law. A general name for all classes of persons charged with the negotiation, transaction, or superintend-ente of the diplomatic business of one nation at the court uf another. See Rev.St.U.S. § 1674 (22 USCA §1 40, 51).
DIPLOMATICS. The science of diplomas, or of ancient writings and documents; the art of judg-ing of ancient charters, public documents, dip-lomas, etc., and discriminating the true from the false. Webster.
DIPPING. The practice of taking snuff by rub-bing teeth or gums with stick or brush dipped in snuff. Federal Trade Commission v. American Snuff Co., C.C.A., 38 F.2d 547, 550.
DIPSOMANIA. In medical jurisprudence. A mental disease characterized by an uncontrollable desire for intoxicating drinks. An irresistible im-pulse to indulge in intoxication, either by alcohol or other drugs. Ballard v. State, 19 Neb. 614, 28 N.W. 271; State v. Wallace, 170 Or. 60, 131 P.2d 222, 223.
DIPSOMANIAC. A person subject to dipsoman-ía. One who has an irresistible desire for alco-holic liquors. Taylor v. Koenigstein, 128 Neb. 809, 260 N.W. 544. See Insanity.
DIPTYCHA. Diptychs; tablets of wood, metal, or other substance, used among the Romans for the purpose of writing, and folded like a book of two leaves. The diptychs of antiquity were es-pecially employed for public registers. They were used in the Greek, and afterwards in the Roman, church, as registers of the names of those for whom supplication was to be made, and are rank-ed among the earliest monastic records. Burrill.
DIRECT, v. To point to; guide; order; com-mand; instruct. In re Durkee’s Estate, 47 N.Y.S. 2d 721, 725, 726, 183 Misc. 382.
To advise; suggest; request. Bowden v. Cum-berland County, 123 Me. 359, 123 A. 166, 168.
To assume the role of a director, one whose di-rections are binding. Gentle v. Frederick, 234 Ala. 184, 174 So. 606, 607.
DIRECT, adj. Immediate; proximate; by the shortest course; without circuity; operating by an immediate connection or relation, instead of operating through a medium; the opposite of in-direct. Trexler Lumber Co. v. Allemannia Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 289 Pa. 13, 136 A. 856, 853; Western Assur. Co. v. Hann, 201 Ala. 376, 78 So. 232, 234; Carter v. Carter Coal Co., App.D.C., 298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855, 80 L.Ed. 1160.
In the usual or natural course or line; immedi-ately upwards or downwards; as distinguished from that which is out of the line, or on the side of it; the opposite of collaterai.
In the usual or regular course or order, as dis-tinguished from that which diverts, interrupts, or opposes; the opposite of cross or contrary.
Without any intervening medium, agency or in-fluence; unconditional. General Finance Co. v. Powell, 118 P.2d 751, 753, 112 Mont. 535.
DIRECT ATTACK. A direct attack on a judg-ment or decree is an attempt, for sufficient cause, to have it anrfulled, reversed, vacated, corrected, declared void, or enjoined, in a proceeding institut-ed for that specific purpose, such as an appeal, writ of error, bill of review, or injunction to re-strain its execution; distinguished from a collat-eral attack, which is an attempt to impeach the validity or binding force of the judgment or decree as a side issue or in a proceeding instituted for some other purpose. Morrill v. Morrill, 20 Or. 96, 25 P. 362; In re Melgaard’s Will, 200 Minn. 493, 74 N.W. 641, 649. A direct attack on a judicial proceeding is an attempt to void or correct it in some manner provided by law.
DIRECT CAUSE. The active, efficient cause that sets in motion a train of events which brings about a result without ,the intervention of any force started and working actively from a new and in-dependent source. Anderson v. Steinle, 289 III. App. 167, 6 N.E.2d 879. See, Cause.
DIRECT EVIDENCE. Is that means of proof which tends to show the existence of a fact in question, without the intervention of the proof of any other fact, and is distinguished from cir-cumstantial evidence, which is often called "in-direct." See Brown; State v. Calder, 23 Mont. 504, 59 P. 903.
Direct evidence means evidence which in the first in-stance applies directly to the factum probandum, or which immediately points to a question at issue, or is evidence of the precise fact in issue and on trial by witnesses who can testify that they saw the acts done or heard the words spoken which constituted the precise fact to be proved. Garner v. New Jersey Fidelity & Plate Glass Ins. Co., Mo. App., 200 S.W. 448, Greenl.Ev. § 13; 1 Stark, Ev. 19; Tayl, Ex. 84.
Proof of facts by witnesses who saw acts done or heard words spoken. Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Warden, 125 Tex. 193, 78 S.W.2d 164, 167, 125 Tex. 193.
DIRECT EXAMINATION. In practice. The first interrogation or examination of a witness, on the merits, by the party on whose behalf he is called.
This is to be distinguished from an examination in pais, or on the voir dice, which is merely prcliminary, and is had when the competency of the witness is challenged; from the cross-examination, which is conducted by the adverse party; and from the redirect examination which follows the cross-examination, and is had by the party who first examined the witness.
DIRECT INJURY. A wrong which directly re-sults in the violation of a legal right and which must exist to permit a court to determine the constitutionality of an act of Congress. Wallace v. Ganley, 95 F.2d 364, 366, 68 App.D.C. 235.
DIRECT INTEREST. A direct interest, such as would render the interested party incompetent to testify in regard to the matter, is an interest which is certain, and not contingent or doubtful. Rine v. Rine, 100 Neb. 225, 158 N.W. 941, 943. A mat-ter which is dependent alone on the successful prosecution of an execution cannot be considered as uncertain, or otherwise than direct, in this sense. In re Van Alstine’s Estate, 26 Utah, 193, 72 P. 942.
Direct line. See Descent.
DIRECT LOSS. One resulting immediately and proximately from the occurrence and not remote-ly from some of the consequences or effects there-of. Ermentrout v. Insurance Co., 63 Minn. 305, 65 N.W. 635, 30 L.R.A. 346, 56 Am.St.Rep. 481. See Loss.
DIRECT PAYMENT. One which is absolute and unconditional as to the time, amount, and the per-sons by whom and to whom it is to be malle. Peo-ple v. Boylan, C.C.Colo., 25 F. 595; Hurd v. McClel-lan, 14 Colo. 213, 23 P. 792.
As to direct "Consanguinity," "Contempt," "Damages," "Ex aminat ion," "Interrogatories," "Tax," and "Trust," see those titles.
DIRECT TAX. One that is imposed directly upon property, according to its value. It is generally spoken of as a property tax or an ad valorem tax. City of De Land v. Florida Public Service Co., 161 So. 735, 739, 119 Fla. 804.
Under federal law. One that must be appor-tioned among the states according to population; a capitation tax, or a tax on real estate. Common-wealth of Pennsylvania ex rel. Schnader v. Fix, D.C.Pa., 9 F.Supp. 272, 276.
DIRECTION. The act of governing; manage-ment; superintendence. Denton v. Yazoo & M.
V. R. Co., Miss., 284 U.S. 305, 52 S.Ct. 141, 142, 76 L.Ed. 310. Also the body of persons (called "di-rectors") who are charged with the management and administration of a corporation or institution.
The charge or instruction given by the court to a jury upon a point of law arising or involved in the case, to be by them applied to the facts in evidence.
The clause of a bill in equity containing the ad-dress of the bill to the court.
That which is imposed by directing; a guiding or authoritative instruction; order; command. State ex rel. Johnson v. Tilley, 137 Neb. 173, 288 N.
W. 521, 524; Hughes v. Van Bruggen, 44 N.M. 534, 105 P.2d 494, 496.
The line or course upon which anything is mov-ing or aimed to move. Ruff v. Federal Tea Co., 129 Conn. 455, 29 A.2d 441, 442.
DIRECTLY. In a direct way without anything intervening; not by secondary, but by direct, means. Clark v. Warner, 85 Okl. 153, 204 P. 929, 934; Olsen v. Standard Oil Co., 188 Cal. 20, 204 P. 393, 396.
DIRECTOR OF THE MINT. An officer having the control, management, and superintendence of the United States mint and its branches. He is appointed by the president, by and with the advice and consent of the senate.
DIRECTOR. One who, or that which directs; as one who directs or regulates, guides or orders; a manager or superintendent, or a chief administra-tive official. State ex inf. McKittrick v. Bode, 342 Mo. 162, 113 S.W.2d 805, 808.
DIRECTORS. Persons appointed or elected ac-cording to law, authorized to manage and direct the affairs of a corporation or company. The whole of the directors collectively form the board of directors. Jones Min. Co. v. Cardiff MM. Co., 56 Utah, 449, 191 P. 426, 428.
DIRECTORY, adj. A provision in a statute, rule of procedure, or the like, which is a mere direction or instruction of no obligatory force, and involv-ing no invalidating consequence for its disregard, as opposed to an imperative or mandatory provi-sion, which must be followed. In ré Opinion of the Justices, 124 Me. 453, 126 A. 354, 363. The general rule is that the prescriptions of a statute relating to the performance of a public duty are so far directory that, though neglect of them may be punishable, yet it does not affect the validity of the acts done under them, as in the case of a statute requiring an officer to prepare and deliver a document to another officer on or bef ore a cer-tain day. And see Pearse v. Morrice, 2 Adol. & El. 94; Nelms v. Vaughan, 84 Va. 696, 5 S.E. 704.
A "directory" provision in a statute is one, the observ-ante of which 1s not necessary to the validity 01 the pro-ceeding to which it relates; State v. Barnell, 109 Ohio St. 246, 142 N.E. 611, 613; one which leavcs it optional with the departrnent or oflicer to which it is addressed to obey or not as he may see ilt; In re Thompson, 94 Neb. 658, 144 N.W. 243, 244.
Statutory requisitions are deemed "directory" only when they relate to some immatertai matter where a compliance is matter of conveniente rather than of substance. This mode of getting rld of a statutory provision by calling it "directory" 1s not only unsatisfactory, on account of the vagueness of the rule itself, but it is the exercise of a dispensing power by the courts, which approaches so near legislative discretion that it ought to be resorted to with reluctance, only in extraordinary cases, where great public mischief would otherwise ensue, or important private in-terests demand the application of the rule. Ellis v. Till-man, 125 Miss. 678, 88 So. 281, 283.
Directory calls. Those which merely direct the neighborhood where the different calls may be found, whereas "locative calls" are those which serve to fix boundaries. Cates v. Reynolds, 143 Tenn. 667, 228 S.W. 695, 696.
Directory statute. Under a general classifica-tion, statutes are either "mandatory" or "direc-tory," and, if mandatory, they prescribe, in addi-tion to requiring the doing of the things specified, the result that will follow if they are not done, whereas, if directory, their terms are limited to what is required to be done. Hudgins v. Moores-ville Consol. School Dist., 312 Mo. 1, 278 S.W. 769, 770. A statute is mandatory when the provision of the statute is the essence of the thing required to be done; otherwise, when it relates to form and manner, and where an act is incident, or after ju-risdiction acquired, it is directory merely. State v. Kozer, 108 Or. 550, 217 P. 827, 832.
Directory trust. Where, by the terms of a trust, the fund is directed to be vested in a particular

manner till the period arrives at which it is to be appropriated, this is called a "directory trust." It is distinguished from a discretionary trust, in which the trustee has a discretion as to the man-agement of the fund. Deaderick v. Cantrell, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 272, 31 Am.Dec. 576.
DIRECTORY, n. Book containing names, addres-ses, and occupations of inhabitants of city. Also any list or compilation, usually in book or pamph-let form, of persons, firms or corporations forming some class separate and distinct from others, e. g., telephone directory, hotel directory, etc. American Travel & Hotel Directory Co. v. Gehring Publishing Co., D.C., 4 F.2d 415.
DIRIBITORES. In Roman law. Officers who dis-tributed ballots to the people, to be used in voting. Tayl. Civil Law, 192.
DIRIMENT IMPEDIMENTS. In canon law. Ab-solute bars to marriage, which would make it null ab initio.
DIRT. Filth or excrement; garden loam; earth or soil, especially when loose; dust; garden earth. Highley v. Phillips, 176 Md. 463, 5 A.2d 824, 827.
DISABILITY. The want of legal capability to perform an act. Berkin v. Marsh, 18 Mont. 152, 44 Pac. 528, 56 Am.St.Rep. 565.
A crippled condition. Kimbrough v. National Protective Ins. Ass’n, 225 Mo.App. 913, 35 S.W.2d 654, 657.
At the present day, disability is generally used to indi-cate an incapacity for the full enjoyment of ordinary le-gal rights; thus married women, persons under age, insane persons, and felons convict are said to be under disability. Sometimes the term is used in a more limited sense, as when it signifles an impediment to marriage, or the re-straints placed upon clergymen by reason of their spiritual avocations. Mozley & Whltley.
Classification
Disability is either general or ‘special; the for-mer when it incapacitates the person for the per-formance of all legal acts of a general class, or giving to them their ordinary legal effect; the latter when it debars him from one specific act. State ex rel. Sathre v. Moodie, 258 N.W. 558, 567, 65 N.D. 340. Disability is also either personal or absolute; the former where it attaches to the particular person, and arises out of his status, his previous act, or his natural or juridical in-capacity; State ex rel. Olson v. Langer, 65 N.D. 68, 256 N.W. 377; the latter where it originates with a particular person, but extends also to his descendants or successors. Lord de le Warre’s Case, 6 Coke, la; Avegno v. Schmidt, 5 Sup.Ct. 487, 113 U.S. 293, 28 L.Ed. 976. Considered with special reference to the capacity to contract a marriage, disability is either canonical or civil; a disability of the former class makes the mar-riage voidable only, while the latter, in general, avoids it entirely. However, it has been held that, in the absence of statute, a court does not have j u-risdiction to annul a marriage for a canonical dis-ability. D. v. D., 2 Terry 263, 20 A.2d 139, 141. The term civil disability is also used as equiva
lent to legal disability, both these expressions meaning disabilities or disqualifications created by positive law, as distinguished from physical dis-abilities. Stieffel v. Valentine Sugars, 188 La. 1091, 179 So. 6, 15. A physical disability is a dis-ability or incapacity caused by physical defect or infirmity, or bodily imperfection, or mental weak-ness or alienation; as ,distinguished from civil dis-ability, which relates to the civil status or con-dition of the person, and is imposed by the law.
Absence of competent physical, intellectual, or moral powers; impairment of earning capacity; Loss of physical function that reduces efficiency; inability to work. Rorabaugh v. Great Eastern Casualty Co., 117 Wash. 7, 200 P.2d 587, 590.

Temporary Disability

Temporary, as distinguished from permanent, disability is a condition that exists until the in-jured employee is as far restored as the permanent character of the injuries will permit. Consolidat-ed Coal Co. of St. Louis v. Industrial Commission, 311 111. 61, 142 N.E. 498, 500.

Total Disability

Total disability to follow insured’s usual occu-pation arises where he is incapacitated from per-forming any substantial part of his ordinary du-ties, though still able to perform a few minor du-ties and be present at his place of business. Fi-delity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Bynum, 221 Ky. 450, 298 S.W. 1080, 1082. "Total disability" within an accident policy does not mean absolute physical disability to transact any business per-taining to insured’s occupation, but disability from performing substantial and material duties con-nected with it. Jacobs v. Loyal Protective Ins. Co., 97 Vt. 516, 124 A. 848, 852; Brown v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 136 S.C. 90, 134 S.E. 224-225. The term may also apply to any impairment of mind or body rendering it impossible for insured to follow continuously a substantially gainful oc-cupation without seriously impairing his health, the disability being permanent when of such na-ture as to render it reasonably certain to continue throughout the lifetime of insured. Starnes v. U. S., D.C.Tex., 13 F.2d 212, 213. See, also, Wholly Disabled.
DISABLE. Ordinarily, to take away the ability of, to render incapable of proper and effective ac-tion. Federal Union Life Ins. Co. of Cincinnati, Ohio v. Richey’s Adm’x, 256 Ky. 262, 75 S.W.2d 767, 768.
In the old language of pleading, to disable is to take advantage of one’s own or another’s disabili-ty. Thus, it is "an express maxim of the common law that the party shall not disable himself ;" but "this disability to disable himself * * * is personal." 4 Coke, 123b.
DISABLING STATUTES. These are acts of par-liament, restraining and regulating the exercise of a right or the power of alienation; the term is specially applied to 1 Eliz. c. 19, and similar acts restraining the power of ecclesiastical corporations to malle leases. DISADVOCARE. To deny a thing.
DISAFFIRM. To repudiate; to revoke a consent once given; to recall an affirmance. To refuse one’s subsequent sanction to a former act; to dis-claim the intention of being bound by an antece-dent transaction.
DISAFFIRMANCE. The repudiation of a former transaction. The refusal by one who has the legal pówer to refuse, (as in the case of a voidable con-tract,) to abide by his former acts, or accept the legal consequences of them. It may either be "express" (in words) or "implied" from acts in-consistent with a recognition of validity of former transaction. Ryan v. Morrison, 40 Okl. 49, 135 P. 1049, 1050.
DISAFFOREST. To restore to their former condi-tion lands which have been turned into forests. To remove from the operation of the forest laws. 2 Bl.Comm. 416.
DISAGREEMENT. Difference of opinion or want of uniformity or concurrente of views; as, a dis-agreement among the members of a jury, among the judges of a court, or between arbitrators. Dar-nell v. Lyon, 85 Tex. 466, 22 S.W. 304.
In Real Property Law
The refusal by a grantee, lessee, etc., to accept an estate, lease, etc., made to him; the annulling of a thing that had essence before. No estate can be vested in a person against his will. Conse-quently no one can become a grantee, etc., without his agreement. The law implies such an agree-ment until the contrary is shown, but his disagree-ment renders the grant, etc., inoperative. Whar-ton.
DISALT. To disable a person.
DISALLOW. To refuse to allow, to deny the va-lidity of, to disown or reject. Stewart v. Yellow-tail, D.C.Mont., 35 F.Supp. 798, 799.
DISAPPROPRIATION. In ecclesiastical law. This is where the appropriation of a benefice is severed, either by the patron presenting a clerk or by the corporation which has the appropriation being dissolved. 1 BI.Comm. 385.
DISAPPROVE. To pass unfavorable judgment upon; to refuse official approbation to; to disal-low; to decline to sanction; to refuse to confirm, ratify or consent to. Stewart v. Yellowtail, D.C. Mont., 35 F.Supp. 798, 799.
DISASTER. A sudden and ruinous misfortune, hence, one who had been pronounced by eminent physicians to be afflicted with dementia praecox, who had nervous breakdown, and who was with-out funds or ability to earn them by either mental or physical exertion, was overtaken by disaster. Robison v. Elston Bank & Trust Co., 113 Ind.App. 633, 48 N.E.2d 181, 188.
DISAVOW. To repudiate the unauthorized acts of an agent; to deny the authority by which he assumed to act.
DISBAR. In England, to deprive a barrister per-manently of the privileges of his position; it is analogous to striking an attorney off the rolls. In America, the word describes the act of a court in rescinding an attorney’s license to practice at its bar. Gresham v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 44 Cal.App.2d 664, 112 P.2d 965, 967.
DISBOCATIO. In old English law. A conversion of wood grounds into arable or pasture; an assart-ing. Cowell. See Assart.
DISBURSEMENTS. Money paid out or expended for which one is entitled to a credit upon render-ing an account of his doings. Tinkler v. Powell, 23 Wyo. 352, 151 P. 1097, 1098.
The term is also used under the codes of civil procedure, to designate the expenditures neces-sarily made by a party in the progress of an ac-tion, aside from the fees of officers and court costs, which are allowed, eo nomine, together with costs. Fertilizer Co. v. Glenn, 48 S.C. 494, 26 S.E. 796; Sasser v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 258 App.Div. 340, 16 N.Y.S.2d 401, 402, 403.
DISCARCARE. In old English law. To dis-charge, to unload; as a vessel. Careare et discar-care; to charge and discharge; to load and un-load. Cowell.
DISCARGARE. In old European law. To dis-charge or unload, as a wagon. Spelman.
DISCEPTIO CAUS2E. In Roman law. The argu-ment of a cause by the counsel on both sides. Calvin.
DISCHARGE. To release, Clark v. Sperry, 125 W.Va. 718, 25 S.E.2d 870, 872; liberate, People ex rel. La Velle v. Trophagen, 236 N.Y.S. 214, 216, 134 Misc. 604; annul, Glaser v. Haskin, 140 Or. 392, 13 P.2d 1071, 1074; unburden; disincumber; dis-miss, The Losmar, D.C.Md., 20 F.Supp. 887, 891; extinguish an obligation, Mazur v. Stein, 314 III. App. 529, 41 N.E.2d 979, 981; remove from employ-ment, Bourne v. Board of Education of City of Roswell, 46 N.M. 310, 128 P.2d 733, 735.

In the Law of Contracts

To cancel or unloose the obligation of a con-tract; to make an agreement or contract null and inoperative. As a noun, the word means the act or instrument by which the binding force of a con-tract is terminated, irrespective of whether the contract is carried out to the full extent contem-plated (in which case the discharge is the result of performance) or is broken off before complete execution. Rivers v. Blom, 163 Mo. 442, 63 S.W. 812.
Discharge is a generic term; its principal species are re-scission, release, accord and satisfaction, performance, judgment, composition, bankruptcy, merger (q, y,), Leake, Cont. 413.
As applied to demands, claims, rights of action, incumbrances, etc., to discharge the debt or claim is to extinguish it, to annul its obligatory force, to satisf y it. And here also the term is generic; thus a debt, a mortgage, a legacy, may be discharged by payment or performance, or by any act short of that, lawful in itself, which the credi-tor accepts as sufficient. Blackwood v. Brown, 29 Mich. 484; Rangely v. Spring; 28 Me. 151. To discharge a person is to liberate him from the binding force of an obligation, debt, or claim.
There 1s a distinction between a "debt dIscharged" and a "debt paid." When discharged the debt still exlsts though divested of its character as a legal obligation dur-ing the operation of the discharge. Something of the original vitality of the debt continues to exist which may be transferred, even though the transferee takes it sub-ject to its disability incident to the discharge. The fact that it carries something which may be a consideration for a new promise to pay, so as to make an otherwise worth-less promise a legal obligation, makes it the subject of transfer by assignment. Stanek v. White. 172 Minn. 390, 215 N.W. 784.
Discharge by operation of law is where the discharge takes place, whether it was intended by the parties or not; thus, if a creditor appoints his debtor his executor, the debt is discharged by operation of law, because the executor cannot have an action against himself. Co.Litt. 264b, note 1; Williams, Ex’rs, 1216; Chit.Cont. 714.

In Bankruptcy Practice

The discharge of the bankrupt is the step which regularly follows the adjudication of bankruptcy and the administration of his estate. By it he is released from the obligation of all his debts which were or might be proved in the proceedings, so that they are no longer a charge upon him, and so that he may thereafter engage in business and acquire property without its being hable for the satisfaction of such former debts. Pitcairn v. Scully, 252 Pa. 82, 97 A. 120, 121.

In Civil Practice

To discharge a rule, an order, an injunction, a certificate, process of execution, or in general any proceeding in a court, is to cancel or annul it, or to revoke it, or to refuse to confirm its original provisional force. Nichols v. Chittenden, 14 Colo. App. 49, 59 P. 954.
To discharge a jury is to relieve them from any further consideration of a cause. This is done when the continuance of the trial is, by any cause, rendered impossible; also when the jury, after deliberation, cannot agree on a verdict.

In Criminal Practice

The act by which a person in confinement, held on an accusation of some crime or misdemeanor, is set at liberty. The writing containing the order for his being so set at liberty is also called a "dis-charge." In re Eddinger, 236 Mich. 668, 211 N.W. 54.

In Military Law

The release or dismissal of a soldier, sailor, or marine, from further military service, either at the expiration of his term of enlistment, or previ-ous thereto on special application therefor, or as a punishment. An "honorable" discharge is one granted at the end of an enlistment and accom-panied by an official certificate of good conduct during the service. A "dishonorable" discharge is a dismissal from the service for bad conduct or as a punishment imposed by sentence of a court-mar-tial for offenses against the rnilitary law. There is also in occasional use a form of "discharge without honor," which implies censure, but is not in itself a punishment. U. S. v. Sweet, 23 S.Ct. 638, 189 U.S. 471, 47 L.Ed. 907.
A discharge from the army is the discharge given one who was actually in military service, as distinguished from a mere discharge from draft. Patterson v. Lamb, App.D.C., 67 S.Ct. 448, 329 U.S. 539, 91 L.Ed. 485.
A discharge from draft is the discharge given selectees who reported for military service in World War I and were rejected at camp after induction for unfitness, dependency and the like. Thus a selectee who reported on November 11, 1918 but was told that draft call was cancelled because of the armistice was properly given a discharge from draft, rather than a discharge from the army and could not claim veterans’ rIghts. Patterson v. Lamb, App.D.C., 67 S.Ct. 448, 329 U.S. 539, 91. L.Ed. 485.
DISCIPLINE. Instruction, comprehending the communication of knowledge and training to ob-serve and act in accordance with rules and orders. In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 237 N.W. 589.
Correction, chastisement, punishment, penalty. Rules and regulations. Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 179 Iowa, 342, 161 N.W. 290, 292, L.R.A.1917D, 273.
DISCLAIMER. The repudiation or renunciation of a claim or power verted in a person or which he had formerly alleged to be his. The refusal, or rejection of an estate or right offered to a per-son. The disavowal, denial, or renunciation of an interest, right, or property imputed to a person or alleged to be his. Also the declaration, or the instrument, by which such disclaimer is published. Moores v. Claekamas County, 40 Or. 536, 67 P. 662.

Of Estate

The act by which a party refuses to accept an estate which has been conveyed to him. Thus, a trustee who releases to his fellow-trustees his estate, and relieves himself of the trust, is said to disclaim. Kentucky Union Co. v. Cornett, 112 Ky. 677, 66 S.W. 728.
A renunciation or a denial by a tenant of his landlord’s title, either by refusing to pay rent, denying any obligation to pay, or by setting up a title in himself or a third person, and this is a distinct ground of forfeiture of the lease or other tenancy, whether of land or tithe. See 16 Ch. Div. 730.

In Patent Law

When the title and specifications of a patent do not agree, or when part of that which it covers is not strictly patentable, because neither new nor useful, the patentee is empowered, with leave of the court, to enter a disclaimer of any part of either the title or the specification, and the dis-claimer is then deemed to be part of the letters patent or specification, so as to render them valid for the future. Permutit Co. v. Wadham, C.C.A. Mich., 15 F.2d 20, 21.

In Pleading

A renunciation by the defendant of all claim to the subject of the demand made by the plaintiff’s Bill. Wilson v. McCoy, 93 W.Va. 667, 117 S.E. 473, 475.
DISCLAMATION. In Scotch law. Disavowal of tenure; denial that one holds lands of another. Bell.
DISCLOSE. To bring into view by uncovering, to lay bare, to reveal to knowledge, to free from secrecy or ignorance, or make known. State v. Krokston, 187 Mo.App. 67, 172 S.W. 1156, 1157.
DISCLOSURE. Revelation; the impartation of that which is secret. Commonwealth v. Chesa-peake & O. Ry. Co., 137 Va. 526, 120 S.E. 506, 509.
That which is disclosed or revealed. Webster, Dict.
In patent law, the specification; the statement of the subject-matter of the invention, or the manner in which it operates. Westinghouse Elec-tric & Mfg. Co. v. Metropolitan Electric Mfg. Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 290 F. 661, 664.
What any patentee has invented is theoretically what he discloses, and the "disclosure" is the specification while a "claim" is a definition of that which has been disclosed in the specification; the disciosure telling how to do that of which the claimant attempts definition. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Metropolitan Electric Mfg. Co., C.C. A.N.Y., 290 F. 661, 664.
DISCOMMON. To deprive commonable lands of their commonable quality, by inclosing and ap-propriating or improving them.
DISCONTINUANCE.

In Practice

The termination of an action, in consequence of the plaintiff’s omitting to continue the process or proceedings by proper entries on the record. 3 BI.Comm. 296; 1 Tidd, Pr. 678; 2 Arch.Pr.K.B. 233. Hadwin v. Railway Co., 67 S.C. 463, 45 S.E. 1019.
In practice, a discontinuance is a chasm or gap left by neglecting to enter a continuance. By our practice, a neglect to enter a continuance, even in a defaulted action, by no means puts an end to it, and such actions may al-ways be brought forward. Taft v. Northern Transp. Co., 56 N.H. 416; Porter v. Watkins, 196 Ala. 333, 71 So. 687, 688.
The cessation of the proceedings in an action where the plaintiff voluntarily puts an end to it, either by giving notice in writing to the defendant before any step has been taken in the action sub-sequent to the answer, or at any other time by order of the court or a judge; a non-suit; dis-missal. Payne v. Buena Vista Extract Co., 124 Va. 296, 98 S.E. 34, 39.
In practice, discontinuance and dismissal import the same thlng, viz., that the cause is sent out of court. Thurman v. James, 48 Mo. 235

In Public Works

Refers to the termination or abandonment of a project, structure, highway, or the like. Fulton County v. Board of Hudson River Regulating Dist., 248 N.Y.S. 8, 10, 231 App.Div. 408.
Ending, causing to cease, ceasing to use, giving up, leaving off. Keenan v. Broad River Power Co., 163 S.C. 133, 161 S.E. 330, 331.

In Zoning Ordinances

Synonymous with abandonment. State ex rel. Schaetz v. Manders, 206 Wis. 121, 238 N.W. 835, 837.
DISCONTINUANCE OF AN ESTATE. The ter-mination or suspension of an estate-tail, in con-sequence of the a’ct of the tenant in tail, in con-veying a larger estate in the land than he was by law entitled to do. 2 Bl.Comm. 275; 3 BI.Comm. 171. An alienation made or suffered by tenant in tail, or by any that is seised in autre droit, whereby the issue in tail, or the heir or successor, or those in reversion or remainder, are driven to their action, and cannot enter. Co. Litt. 325a. The cesser of a seisin under an estate, and the acquisition of a seisin under a new and necessarily a wrongful title. Prest. Merg. c. ii.
Discontinuare nihil aliud significat quam inter-mittere, desuescere, interrumpere. Co. Litt. 325. To discontinue signifies nothing else than to in-termit, to disuse, to interrupt.

DISCONTINUANCE. Occasional ; intermittent ; characterized by separate repeated acts; as, dis-continuous easements and servitudes. See Ease-ment.
DISCONVENABLE. L. Fr. Improper; unfit. Kelham.
DISCOUNT. In a general sense, an allowance or deduction made from a gross sum on any account whatever. In a more limited and technical sense, the taking of interest in advance. Cooper v. Na-tional Bank of Savannah, 21 Ga.App. 356, 94 S. E. 611, 614.
By the language of the commercial world and the settled practice of banks, a discount by a bank means a drawback or deduction made upon its ad-vances or loans of money, upon negotiable paper or other evidences of debt payable at a future day, which are transferred to the bank. See, also, Valley Mortg. Co. v. Patterson, 30 AIa.App. 492, 8 So.2d 213, 214.
Although the discounting of notes or bilis, in its most comprehensive sense, may mean lending money and taking notes in payment, yet, in its more ordinary .sense, the dis-counting of notes or bilis means advancing a consideration for a bill or note, deducting or discounting the interest which will accrue for the time the note has to run. In re Worth Lighting & Fixture Co., D.C.N.Y., 292 F. 769, 772.
Discounting by a bank means lending money upon a note, and deducting the lnterest or premium in advance. Meserole Securities Co. v. Cosman, 253 N.Y. 130, 170 N.E. 519, 521.
Discount, as we have seen, la the difference between the price and the amount of the debt, the evidence of which is transferred. That difference represents Interest charged, he1ng at the same rate, accordIng to which the price paid, if invested until the maturity of the debt, will just produce 1ts amount. Napier v. John V. Farwell Co., 60 Colo. 319, 153 P. 694, 695.

Commission Equivalent

Where agreement provides for underwriting shares at "discount" of certain per cent., word "discount" is equivalent to commission. Stewart v. G. L. Miller & Co., 161 Ga. 919, 132 S.E. 535, 538, 45 A.L.R. 559.
Discounting a note and buying it are not identical in meaning, the latter expression being used to denote the transaction when the seller does not Intlorse the note, and 1s not accountable for it. Bank v. Baldwin, 23 Minn. 206, 23 Am.Rep. 683.

In Practice

A set-off or defalcation in an action. Vin. Abr. "Discount." But see Trabue’s Ex’r v. Harris, 1 Mete. (Ky.) 597.
DISCOUNT BROKER. A bill broker; one who discounts bilis of exchange and promissory notes, and advances money on securities.
DISCOVER. To uncover that which was hidden, concealed, or unknown from every one. Stano-lind Oil & Gas Co. v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 114 S. W.2d 699, 706.
To get first sight or knowledge of; to get knowl-edge of what has existed but has not theretofore been known to the discoverer. Shellmar Products Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., C.C.A.I11., 87 F.2d 104, 108.
DISCOVERED PERIL, DOCTRINE OF. A name for the doctrine otherwise known as that of the "last clear chance." See that title.
DISCOVERT. Not married; not subject to the disabilities of a coverture. It applies equally to a maid and a widow.
DISCOVERY. In a general sense, the ascertain-ment of that which was previously unknown; the disclosure or coming to light of what was pre-viously hidden; the acquisition of notice or knowl-edge of given acts or facts; as, in regard to the "discovery" of fraud affecting the running of the statute of limitations, or the granting of a new trial for newly "discovered" evidence. Parker v. Kuhn, 21 Neb. 413, 32 N.W. 74, 59 Am.Rep. 852. Howton v. Roberts, 49 S.W. 340, 20 Ky.Law Rep. 1331

In International Law

As the foundation for a claim of national own-ership or sovereignty, discovery is the finding of a country, continent, or island previously un-known, or previously known only to its uncivilized inhabitants. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 409, 10 L.Ed. 997.

In Mining Law

As the basis of the right to locate a mining claim upon the public domain, discovery means the flnding of mineralized rock in place. U. S. v. Sale Investment Gold Mining Co., C.C.A.S.D., 258 F. 872, 877; Dalton v. Clark, 129 Cal.App. 136, 18 P.2d 752.

In Patent Law

The flnding out some substance, mechanical de-vice, improvement, or application, not previously known. Dunbar v. Meyers, 94 U.S. 197, 24 L.Ed. 34. It is something less than invention, and may be the result of industry, application, or be per-haps merely fortuitous. A. O. Smith Corporation v. Petroleum Iron Works Co. of Ohio, C.C.A.Ohio, 73 F.2d 531, 538.

In Practice

The disclosure by the defendant of facts, titles, documents, or other things which are in his ex-clusive knowledge or possession, and which are necessary to the party seeking the discovery as a part of a cause or action pending or to be brought in another court, or as evidence of his rights or title in such proceeding. Tucker v. U. S., 151 U.S. 164, 14 S.Ct. 299, 38 L.Ed. 112; Kelley v. Boettcher, 85 F. 55, 29 C.C.A. 14.
Also used of the disclosure by a bankrupt of his property for the benefit of creditors.
A favored equitable remedy to secure evidence in the other party’s possession. C. F. Simonin’s Sons v. American Can Co., D.C.Pa., 22 F.Supp. 784, 786.
DISCOVERY, BILL OF. In equity pleading. A bill for the discovery of facts resting in the knowl-edge of the defendant, or of deeds or writings, or other things in his custody or power; but seek-ing no relief in consequence of the discovery, though it may pray for a stay of proceedings at law till the discovery is made. Story, Eq. Pl. §§ 311, 312, and notes; Mitf. Eq. Pl. 53.
DISCOVERY VEIN. See Vein.
DISCREDIT. To destroy or impair the credibility of a person; to impeach; to lessen the degree of credit to be accorded to a witness or document, as by impugning the veracity of the one or the genuineness of the other; to disparage or weaken the reliance upon ‘the testimony of a witness, or upon documentary evidence, by any means what-ever.
DISCREETLY. Prudently; juchciously; with dis-cernment. Parks v. City of Des Moines, 195 Iowa, 972, 191 N.W. 728, 731.
DISCRÉPANCY. A difference between two things which ought to be identical, as between one writ-ing and another; a variance, (q. v.) Also discord, discordance, dissonance, dissidence, unconformity, disagreement, difference. State v. Superior Court of King County, 138 Wash. 488, 244 P. 702, 703.
DISCRETELY. Separately; disjunctively. Parks v. City of Des Moines, 195 Iowa, 972, 191 N.W. 728,

Discretio est discernere per legem quid sit justum. 10 Coke, 140. Discretion is to know through law what is just.
Discretio est scire per legem quid sit justum. Dis-cretion consists in knowing what is just in law. Le Roy v. New York, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 352, 356.
DISCRETION. Power or privilege of the court to act unhampered by legal rule. Osborn v. Unit-ed States Bank, 9 Wheat. 866, 6 L.Ed. 204; Mur-ray v. Buell, 74 Wis. 14, 41 N.W. 1010, 11 L.R.A. 446.
When applied to public functionarles, discretion means a power or right conferred upon them by law of acting oflicially in certain clgcumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others. This discretion un-doubtedly is to some extent regulated by usage, or, if the term Is preferred, by fixed principies. But by this is to be understood nothing more than that the same court can-not, consistently with its own dignity, and with its char-acter and duty of administering impartial justice, decide in different ways two cases in every respect exactly alike. The question of fact whether the two cases are alike in every color, circumstance, and feature is of necessity to be submitted to the judgment of some tribunal. State v. Tindell, 112 Kan. 256, 210 P. 619, 622. Board of Permanent Road Com’rs of Hunt County v. Johnson, Tex.Civ.App., 231 S.W. 859, 860.
Judicial Discretion, Legal Discretion
These tercos are applied to the discretionary action of a judge or court, and mean discretion as aboye defined, that is, discretion bounded by the rules and principies of law, and not arbitrary, capricious, or unrestrained. "Judicial discretion" is substantially synonymous with judicial pow-er. Griffin v. State, 12 Ga.App. 615, 77 S.E. 1080, 1083. It is not the indulgence of a judicial whim, but the ex-ercise of judicial judgment, based on facts and guided by law, Smith v. Hill, C.C.A., 5 F.2d 188, or the equitable decision of what Is just and proper under the circum-stances, People v. Pfanschmidt, 262 III. 411, 104 N.E. 804, 816, Ann.Cas.1915A, 1171. It is simply the technical name of the decision of certain questions of fact by the court. Nawn v. Boston & M. R. R., 77 N.B. 299, 91 A. 181, 182.
Lord Coke defines judicial discretion to be "discernere per legem quid sit justum," to see what would be just ac-cording to the laws in the premises. It does not mean a wild self-willfulness, which may prompt to any and every act; but this judicial discretion ís guided by the law, (see what the law declares upon a certain statement of facts, and then decide in accordance with the law,) so as to do substantial equity and justice. Faber v. Gruner, 13 Mo. 543. It is a legal discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law and is not to give effect to the. wíll of the judge, but to that of the law. McGurty v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 158 N.Y.S. 285, 286, 172 App. Div. 46.
True, ít is a matter of discretion; but then the discre-tion Is not willful or arbitrary, but legal. And, although its exercise be not purely a matter of law, yet it "involves a matter of law or legal inference," in the language of the Code, and an appeal will lie. Lovinier v. Pearce, 70 N.
C. 171.
Legad discretion, is the exercise of discretion where there are two alternative provisions of law applicable, under ei-ther of which court could proceed. Shannon v. Hendrix-son, Ohio App., 32 N.E.2d 431, 432.
In criminal law and the law of torts, it means the capacity to distinguish between what is right and wrong, lawful or unlawful, wise or foolish, sufficiently to render one amenable and responsi-ble for his acts. Towle v. State, 3 Fla. 214.
Wise conduct and management; cautious dis-cernment, especially as to matters of propriety
and self-control; prudence; circumspection; wari-ness. Arkansas Valley Town & Land Co. v. At-chison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 49 Okl. 282, 151 P. 1028, 1031.
DISCRETIONARY DAMAGES. Those which are measureable by enlightened conscience of impar-tial jurors. Southern Ry. Co. v. Groover, 41 Ga. App. 746, 154 S.E. 706, 707.
DISCRETIONARY POWER. One which is not imperative or, if imperative, the time, manner, or extent of execution of which is left to donee’s discretion; the power to do or to refrain from doing a certain thing. City of San Antonio v. Zog-heib, Tex.Civ.App., 70 S.W.2d 333, 334.
DISCRETIONARY TRUSTS. Such as are not marked out on fixed lines, but allow a certain amount of discretion in their exercise. Those which cannot be duly administered without the application of a certain degree of prudence and judgment. Greenwich Trust Co. v. Tyson, 129 Conn. 211, 27 A.2d 166, 172.
DISCRIMINATION. With reference to common carriers (especially railroads), a breach of the carrier’s duty to treat all shippers alike, and af-ford them equal opportunities to market their product. Cox v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 240 Pa. 27, 87 A. 581, 583. A carrier’s failure to treat all alike under substantially similar conditions. Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Murray, 176 Ky. 593,
195 S.W. 1119, 1120.
"Discrimination" is a term well understood in the nom-enclature of transportation over railroads. It implies to charge shippers of freight, as compensation for carrying the same over railroads, unequal sums of money for the same quantity of freight for equal distances; more for a shorter than a longer distante, more in proportibn of dis-tance for a shorter than a longer distance; more for freights called local freights than those designated other-wise; more for the former in proportion to distance such freights may be carried than the latter. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. State, 85 Okl. 223, 206 P. 236, 239.
In constitutional law, the effect of a statute which confers particular privileges on a class ar-bitrarily selected from a large number of persons, all of whom stand in the same relation to the privileges granted and between whom and those not favored no reasonable distinction can be found. Franchise Motor Freight Ass’n v. Seavey,
196 Cal. 77, 235 P. 1000, 1002.
In general, a failure to treat all equally; fa-voritism. Employment, Mische v. Kaminski, 127 Pa.Super. 66, 193 A. 410, 416; Board of Com’rs of Huron County v. State ex rel. Clarke, 127 Ohio St. 341, 188 N.E. 551, 552; Selective service, Unit-ed States ex rel. Lynn v. Downer, C.C.A.N.Y., 140 F.2d 397, 401; marriages between negroes or mu-lattoes and white persons, Jackson v. City and County of Denver, 109 Colo. 196, 124 P.2d 240, 241; differential in teachers’ salaries based solely on the ground of race and color, Thomas v. Hibbitts, D.C.Tenn., 46 F.Supp. 368, 371; taxation, Atlantic Pipe Line Co. v. Brown County, D.C.Tex., 12 F. Supp. 642, 647.

In the Civil Law

A proceeding, at the instance of a surety, by which the creditor is obliged to exhaust the prop-erty of the principal debtor, towards the satis-faction of the debt, before having recourse to the surety; and this right of the surety is termed the "benefit of discussio

In Scotch Law

The ranking of the proper order in which heirs are hable to satisfy the debts of the deceased. Bell.
DISEASE. Deviation from the healthy or nor-mal condition of any of the functions or tissues of the body; an alteration in the state of the body or of some of its organs, interrupting or disturb-ing the performance of the vital functions, and causing or threatening pain and weakness;
¡11-ness; sickness; disorder; malady; bodily in-firmity. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Nicholson, C.C.A.N.Y., 9 F.2d 7, 14; Merriam v. Hamilton, 64 Or. 476, 130 P. 406, 407.
In construing a policy of life insurance, it is generally true that, before any temporary ailment can be called a "disease," it must be such as to indicate a vice in the constitution, or be so serious as to have some bearing upon general health and the continuance of life, or such as, according to common understanding, would be called a "dis-ease." Delaney v. Modern Acc. Club, 121 Iowa 528, 97 N.W. 91, 63 L.R.A. 603; Metropolitan Casu-alty Ins. Co. v. Cato, 113 Miss. 303, 74 So. 118, 119.
An uicer is a "disease" or "infection," within Work-men’s Compensation Law, § 3, subd. 7, declaring that "In-jury," or "personal injury," as used in the act, means only accidental Injuries arising out of and in the course of employment and such disease or infectlon as may nat-urally and unavoldably result therefrom. Pinto v. Chelsea Fibre Milis, 186 N.Y.S. 748, 750, 196 App.Div. 221; For "Existing Disease" see that title.
DISEASE COMMON TO BOTH SEXES. Malady, sickness, or illness that both males and females have. National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Weaver, Tex.Civ.App., 226 S.W. 754, 757.
DISENTAILING DEED. In English law. An en-rolled assurance barring an entail, pursuant to 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 74.
DISFIGUREMENT. That which impairs or in-jures the beauty, symmetry, or appearance of a person or thing; that which renders unsightly, misshapen, or imperfect, or deforms in some man-ner. Vukelich v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 62 Utah, 486, 220 P. 1073, 1075; Lee v. Common-wealth, 135 Va. 572, 115 S.E. 671, 673.
DISFRANCHISE. To deprive of the rights and privileges of a free citizen; to deprive of charter-ed rights and immunities; to deprive of any fran-chise, as of the right of voting in elections, etc. Webster.
In any election where the party system furnishes the means by which the citizen’s right of suffrage is made ef-fective, denial of his party’s right to participate in the election accomplishes the "disfranchisement of voters" or compels them, if they vote, to vote for representatives (Ir political parties other than that to which they belong, and the deprivation of the right of selection is a deprivation of the right of franchise. Communist Party of United States of America v. Peek, 20 Ca1.2d 536, 127 P.2d 889, 894.
DISFRANCHISEMENT. The act of disfranchis-ing. The act of depriving a member of a cor-poration of his right as such, by expulsion. 1 Bouv. Inst. no. 192. In re Koch, 257 N.Y. 318, 178 N.E. 545, 546.
It differs from amotion (q. v.) which is appli-cable to the removal of an officer from office, leav-ing him his rights as a member. Ang. & A. Corp. 237.
In a more popular sense, the taking away of the elective franchise (that is, the right of voting in public elections) from any citizen or class of citizens.
DISGAVEL. In English law. To deprive lands of that principal quality of gavelkind tenure by which they descend equally among all the sons of the tenant. 2 Wood. Lect. 76; 2 Bl. Comm. 85.
DISGRACE. Ignominy; shame; dishonor. No witness is required to disgrace himself. 13 How. State Tr. 17, 334; Bander v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 337, 47 N.E.2d 595, 600.
DISGRADING. In old English law. The de-priving of an order or dignity.
DISGUISE, v. To change the guise or appear-ance of, especially to conceal by unusual dress; to hide by a counterfeit appearance; to affect or change by liquor; to intoxicate. Darneal v. State, 14 Okl.Cr. 540, 174 P. 290, 292, 1 A.L.R. 638.
DISGUISE, n. A counterfeit habit; a dress in-tended to conceal the person who wears it. Web-ster. Also slight intoxication. Darneal v. State, 14 Okl.Cr. 540, 174 P. 290, 292, 1 A.L.R. 638.
Anything worn upon the person with the in-tention of so altering the wearer’s appearance that he shall not be recognized by those familiar with him, or that he shall be taken for another person.
A person lying in ambush, or concealed behind bushes, is not in "disgulse," within the meaning of a atatute declar-ing the county hable in damages to the next of kin of any one murdered by persons in disguise. Dale County v. Gunter, 46 Ala. 118, 142.
DISHERISON. Disinheritance; depriving one of an inheritance. Obsolete. See Abernethy v. Or-ton, 42 Or. 437, 71 P. 327, 95 Am.St.Rep. 774.
DISHERITOR. One who disinherits, or puts an-other out of his reehold. Obsolete.
DISHONESTY. Disposition to lie, cheat or de-fraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity. Al-sup v. State, 91 Tex.Cr.R. 224, 238 S.W. 667, 669.
DISHONOR. In mercantile law and usage. To refuse or decline to accept a bill of exchange, or to refuse or neglect to pay a bill or note at matur-ity. Shelton v. Braithwaite, 7 Mees. & W. 436; Brewster v. Arnold, 1 Wis. 276.

Notice of Dishonor

A notice given by the holder to the drawer of a bill, or to an indorser of a bill or note, that it has been dishonored by nonacceptance on pre-sentment for acceptance, or by nonpayment at its maturity. 2 Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 970.
As respects the flag, to deface or defile, imput-ing a lively sense of shaming or an equivalent acquiescent callousness. State v. Schlueter, 127 N.J.L. 496, 23 A.2d 249, 251 from prison.
DISINFECTED. Made free from injurious or contagious diseases. Clampitt v. St. Louis South-western Ry. Co. of Texas, Tex.Civ.App., 185 S.W. 342, 344.
DISINIIERISON. In the civil law. The act of depriving a forced heir of the inheritance which the law gives him.
Disinherison is a testamentary disposition and not a mere penalty for lack of filial respect, but such a testamentary disposition is not self-operative and something more than its mere appearance in a will is required to give it effect. Successions of Lissa, 198 La. 129, 3 So.2d 534, 542.
DISINHERITANCE. The act by which the owner of an estate deprives a person, who would other-wise be his heir, of the right to inherit it. Cope-land v. Johnson, 101 Okl. 228, 224 P. 986, 988.
DISINTER. To exhume, unbury, take out of the grave. People v. Baumgartner, 135 Cal. 72, 66 P. 974.
DISINTERESTED. Not concerned, in respect to possible gain or loss, in the result of the pending proceedings; impartial, not biased or prejudiced. McGilvery v. Staples, 16 A. 404, 81 Me. 101; Kraft v. Tenningkeit, 204 Iowa, 15, 214 N.W. 562, 563.
DISINTERESTED WITNESS. One who has no interest in the cause or matter in issue, and who is lawfully competent to testify. Fitzhugh v. Nirschl, 77 Or. 514, 151 P. 735, 736. In re Pale-thorp’s Estate, 249 Pa. 389, 94 A. 1060, 1065.
DISJUNCTIM. Lat. In the civil law. Separate-ly; severally. The opposite of con junctim, (q. v.) Inst. 2, 20, 8.
DISJUNCTIVE ALLEGATION. A statement in a pleading or indictment which expresses or charges a thing alternatively, with the conjunc-tion "or;" for instante, an averment that defend-ant "murdered or caused to be murdered," etc., would be of this character. Hand v. Hand, 23 N. J.Misc. 118, 41 A.2d 270, 271.
DISJUNCTIVE TERM. One which is placed be-tween two contraries, by the affirming of one of which the other is taken away; it is usually ex-pressed by the word "or."
DISLOCATION. To put out of proper place. Gal-lagher v. Monroe, 222 Mich. 202, 192 N.W. 609.
DISLOYAL. Not true to; unfaithful; United States v. Krafft, C.C.A.N.J., 249 F. 919, 925, L.R.A.
1918F, 402; uncooperative, Sullivan v. Warner Bros. Theatres, 42 Cal.App.2d 660, 109 P.2d 760, 762.
DISMES. Tenths; tithes, (q. y.). The original form of "dime," the name of the American coin.
DISMISS. To send away; to discharge; to cause to be removed temporarily or permanently; to relieve from duty. To dismiss an action or suit is to send it out of court without any further consideration or heariná. School District No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Parker, 82 Colo. 385, 260 P. 521, 522; People ex rel. Tims v. Bingham, Sup., 166 N.Y.S. 28, 29; Nichols v. Sunderland, 77 Cal. App. 627, 247 P. 614, 618.
DISMISSAL. An order or .judgment finally dis-posing of an action, suit, motion, etc., by sending it out of court, though without a trial of the is-sues involved. Brackenridge v. State, 27 Tex. App. 513, 11 S.W. 630, 4 L.R.A. 360. The term is of ten used to indicate an adjudication on the merits. Knox v. Crump, 15 Ga.App. 697, 84 S.E. 169, 173; Butler v. McSweeney, 222 Mass. 5, 109 N.E. 653, 655. Although use of the term frequent-ly signifies that it is not decision on merits. Wight v. Wight, 272 Mass. 154, 172 N.E. 335, 336.
A release or discharge from employment. Tag-gart v. School Dist. No. 52, Carroll County, Mo. App., 88 S.W.2d 447, 449; Gentner v. Board of Ed-ucation of Los Angeles City High School Dist., 219 Cal. 135, 25 P.2d 824.
DISMISSAL AGREED. A dismissal entered in accordance with the agreement of the parties, afnounting to an adjudication of the matters in dispute between them or to a renunciation by the complainant of the claims asserted in his plead-ings. Root v. Water Supply Co., 46 Kan. 183, 26 P. 398; Lindsay v. Allen, 112 Tenn. 637, 82 S.W. 171.
Dismissal agreed made In Supreme Court of Appeals upon a writ of error to a judgment of the Circuit Court has no reference to the controversy between the parties, but leaves the judgment standing and purges error, releases error, and bars another writ of error. Fletcher V. Parker, 53 W. Va. 422, 44 S.E. 422.
DISMISSAL COMPENSATION. The payment of a specific sum, made by employer to employee for permanently terminating employment rela-tionship primarily for reasons beyond employee’s control. Gayner v. The New Orleans, D.C.Cal., 54 F.Supp. 25, 28.
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE. An adjudica-tion on the merits, and final disposition, barring the right to bring or maintain an action on the same claim or cause. Pulley v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 122 Kan. 269, 251 P. 1100, 1101. It is res judicata as to every matter litigated. Ro-den v. Roden, 29 Ariz. 549, 243 P. 413, 415. A judg-ment of dismissal and a judgment of nonsuit have the same legal effect. Suess v. Motz, 220 Mo.App. 32, 285 S.W. 775, 776.
Temporary or permanent removal from office; termination of a servant’s employment. Nichols v. Sunderland, 77 Cal.App. 627, 247 P. 614, 618. DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Dismissal, as of a bill in equity, without prejudice to the right of the complainant to sue again on the same cause of action. The effect of the words "with-out prejudice" is to prevent the decree of dismis-sal from operating as a bar to a subsequent suit. Northrup v. Jay, 262 Mich. 463, 247 N.W. 717, 718.
DISMISSED. A judgment of "Dismissed," with-out qualifying words indicating a right to take further proceedings, is presumed to be dismissed on the merits; Durant v. Essex Co., 7 Wall. 107, 19 L.Ed. 154. But a bill "dismissed" on motion of complainant does not bar a second suit; Ex parte Loung June, D.C.N.Y., 160 F. 251, 259.
DISMISSED FOR WANT OF EQUITY. A phrase used to indicate a decision on the merits, as dis-tinguished from one based upon some formal de-fect. The dismissal may be because the ayer-ments of complainant’s bill have been found un-true in fact, or because they are insufficient to entitle complainant to the relief sought. Rein-man v. Little Rock, 35 S.Ct. 511, 513, 237 U.S. 171, 59 L.Ed. 900.
DISMORTGAGE. To redeem from mortgage.
DISORDER. Turbulent or riotous behavior; im-moral or indecent conduct. The breach of the public decorum and morality.
Usually, a slight, partial, and temporary physi-cal ailment. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mc-Combs, 188 Ark. 52, 64 S.W.2d 333.
DISORDERLY. Contrary to the rules of good order and behavior; violative of the public peace or good order; turbulent, riotous, or indecent.
DISORDERLY CONDUCT. A term of loose and indefinite meaning (except as occasionally defined in statutes), but signifying generally any be-havior that is contrary to law, and more particu-larly such as tends to disturb the public peace or decorum, scandalize the community, or shock the public sense of morality. People v. Keeper of State Reformatory, 176 N.Y. 465, 68 N.E. 884; City of Mt. Sterling v. Holly, 108 Ky. 621, 57 S.W. 491.
DISORDERLY HOUSE. In criminal law. A house the inmates of which behave so badly as to become a nuisance to the neighborhood. It has a wide meaning, and includes bawdy houses, com-mon gaming houses, and places of a like char-acter. 1 Bish. Crim.Law, § 1106. State v. Ever-hardt, 203 N.C. 610, 166 S.E. 738, 741; gaming, Martin v. State, 62 Ga.App. 902, 10 S.E.2d 254, 255; prostitution, State v. Berman, 120 N.J.L. 381, 199 A. 776, 777.
DISORDERLY PERSONS. Such as are danger-ous or hurtful to the public peace and welfare by reason of their misconduct or vicious habits, and are therefore amenable to pollee regulation. The phrase is chiefly used in statutes, and the scope of the term depends on local regulations. See 4 Bl. Comm. 169. One who violates peace and good order of society, State v. Harlowe, 174 Wash. 227,
24 P.2d 601; one who abandons a child, People v. Gross, 291 N.Y.S. 597, 602, 604, 161 Misc. 514; giving false fire alarm, Piliszek v. Burlington County Court of Special Sessions, 129 N.J.L. 604, 30 A.2d 578; spiritualist pastor telling fortune, People v. Plaskett, 13 N.Y.S.2d 682, 683, 171 Misc. 563; vagrant, People v. Marciano, Mag.Ct., 17 N.Y.S.2d 722, 723.
DISPARAGARE. In old English- law. To bring together those That are unequal, (dispares con-ferre;) to connect in an indecdrous and unworthy manner; to connect in marriage those that are unequal in blood and parentage.
DISPARAGATIO. In old English law. Dispar-agement. Hceredes maritentur absgue disparaga-tione, heirs shall be married without disparage-ment. Magna Charta (9 Hen. III.) c. 6.
DISPARAGATION. L. Fr. Disparagement; the matching an heir, etc., in marriage, under his or her degree or condition, or against the rules of decency. Kelham.
DISPARAGE. To connect unequally; to match unsuitably.
DISPARAGEMENT. In old English law. An injury by union or comparison with some person or thing of inferior rank or excellence.
Marriage without disparagement was marriage to one of suitable rank and character. 2 B1.Comm. 70; Co. Litt. 82b. Shutt v. Carloss, 36 N.C. 232.
Matter which is intended by its publisher to be understood or which is reasonably understood to cast doubt upon the existence or extent of an-other’s property in land, chattels or intangible things, or upon their quality. Restatement, Torts, § 629

Of Goods

A statement about a competitor’s goods which is untrue or misleading and is made to influence or tends to influence the public not to buy. Ed-win L. Wiegand Co. v. Harold E. Trent Co., C.C.A. Pa., 122 F.2d 920, 924.
DISPARAGIUM. In old Scotch law. Inequality in blood, honor, dignity, or otherwise. Skene de Verb. Sign.
Disparata non debent jungi. Things unlike ought not to be joined. Jenk. Cent. 24, Marg.
DISPARK. To dissolve a park. Cro. Car. 59. To convert it into ordinary ground.
DISPATCH, or DESPATCH. A message, letter, or order sent with speed on affairs of state; a telegraphic message.
Celerity; expedition; speed. Stockman v. Bos-ton & M. R. R., 117 Me. 35, 102 A. 560, 562.
In Maritime Law
Diligente, due activity, or proper speed in the discharge of a cargo; the opposite of delay. Sleeper v. Puig, 22 Fed.Cas. 321.

Customary Dispatch
Such as accords with the rules, customs, and usages of the port where the discharge is made.
Dispatch Money
Dispatch money, which arises purely from contract, is a premium paid charterer by vessel for days saved that may be used in completing voyage. The Driebergen, C.C. A.Fla., 60 F.2d 367, 371.
Quick Dispatch
Speedy discharge of cargo without allowance for the customs or rules of the port or for delay from the crowded state of the harbor or wharf. Mott v. Frost, D.C.S.C., 47 F. 82; Bjorkquist v. Certain Steel Rail Crop Ends, D.C. Md., 3 F. 717; Davis v. Wallace, 7 Fed.Cas. 182.
DISPAUPER. When a person, by reason of his poverty, is admitted to sue in forma pauperis, and afterwards, before the suit be ended, ac-quires any lands, or personal estate, or is guilty of anything whereby he is hable to have this privilege taken from him, then he loses the right to sue in forma pauperis, and is said to be dispau-pered. Wharton.
DISPEL. To .drive away by scattering, to clear away, to banish, to dissipate. Karle v. Cincin-nati St. Ry. Co., 69 Ohio App. 327, 43 N.E.2d 762, 767.
DISPENSARY. A "dispensary" is a place where a drug is prepared or distributed. People v. Co-hen, 94 Misc. 355, 157 N.Y.S. 591, 593.
Dispensatio est mali prohibiti provida relaxatio, utilitate seu necessitate pensata; et est de jure domino regi concessa, propter impossibilitatem prwvidendi de omnibus particularibus. A dispen-sation is the provident relaxation of a malum pro-hibitum weighed from utility or necessity; and it is conceded by law to the king on account of the impossibility of foreknowledge concerning all par-ticulars. 10 Coke, 88.
Dispensatio est vulnus, quod vulnerat jus com-mune. A dispensation is a wound, which wounds common law. Dav. Ir. K. B. 69.
DISPENSATION. An exemption from some laws; a permission to do something forbidden; an allowance to omit something commanded; the canonistic name for a license. Sweeney v. In-dependent Order of Foresters, 190 App.Div. 787, 181 N.Y.S. 4, 5.
A relaxation of law for the benefit or advantage of an individual. In the United States, no power exists, except in the legislature, to dispense with law; and then it is not so much a dispensation as a change of the law.
DISPENSE. Etymologically, "dispense" means to weigh out, pay out, distribute, regulate, man-age, control, etc., but when used with "with," it has, among other meanings, that of "doing with-out," and "doing away with," being synonymous with "abolish." United States v. Reynolds, D.C. Mont., 244 F. 991.
DISPERSONARE. To scandalize or disparage. Blount.
DISPLACE. To crowd out; to take the place of. Ford v. Department of Water and Power of City of Los Angeles, 4 Cal.App.2d 526, 41 P.2d 188, 189.
This term, as used in shipping articles, means "disrate," and does not import authority of the master to discharge a second mate, notwithstand-ing a usage in the whaling trade never to disrate an officer to a seaman. Potter v. Smith, 103 Mass. 68.
DISPLAY. An opening or unfolding, exhibition, manifestation, ostentatious show, exhibition for effect, parade. 20th Century Lites v. Goodman, 64 Cal.App.2d Supp., 938, 149 P.2d 88, 91.
As applied to printing, means a varying ar-rangement of lines, as by the use of unequal lengths or different styles or sizes of type faces; also matter thus printed. Display advertising means advertising not under specific headings in newspapers, magazines and trade papers. Rust v. Missouri Dental Board, 348 Mo. 616, 155 S.W.2d 80, 85.
DISPONE. In Scotch law. To grant or convey. A technical word essential to the conveyance of heritable property, and for which no equivalent is accepted, however clear may be the meaning of the party. Paters. Comp.
DISPONO. Lat. To dispose of, grant, or convey. Disponet, he grants or alienates. Jus disponendi, the right of disposition, i. e., of transferring the title to property.
DISPOSABLE PORTION. That portion of a man’s property which he is free to dispose of by will to beneficiaries other than his wife and chil-dren. By the ancient common law, this amounted to one-third of his estate if he was survived by both wife and children. 2 Bl. Comm. 492; Hop-kins v. Wright, 17 Tex. 36. In the civil law (by the Lex Falcidia) it amounted to three-fourths. Mackeld. Rom. Law, §§ 708, 771.
DISPOSAL. Sale, pledge, giving away, use, con-sumption or any other disposition of a thing. C. B. Norton Jewelry Co. v. Maddock, 115 Kan. 108, 222 P. 113, 114. To exercise control over; to di-rect or assign for a use; to pass over into the con-trol of some one else; to alienate, bestow, or part with. Popp v. Munger, 131 Okl. 282, 268 P. 1100, 1102.
DISPOSE OF. To alienate or direct the owner-ship of property, as disposition by will. Used also of the determination of suits. Carnagio v. State, 106 Fla. 209, 143 So. 162. Called a word of large extent.
To exercise finally, in any manner, one’s pow-er of control over; to pass into the control of someone else; to alienate, relinquish, part with, or get rid of; to put out of the way; to finish with; to bargain away. Carpenter v. Lothringer, 224 Iowa 439, 275 N.W. 98, 103; Roe v. Burt, 66 Okl. 193, 168 P. 405, 406.
Of ten used in restricted sense of "sale" only, er so restricted by context. Roby v. Herr, 194 Ky. 622, 240 S.W. 49, 51; Merchants’ Nat. Bank of Mandan v. First Nat. Bank, C.C.A.N.D., 238 F. 502, 507.

DISPOSING
DISPOSING CAPACITY OR MIND. These are alternative or synonymous phrases in the law of wills for "sound mind," and "testamentary ca-pacity" (q. v.). Lockhart v. Ferguson, 243 Mass. 226, 137 N.E. 355, 356.
DISPOSITION. In Scotch law. A deed of alien-ation by which a right to property is conveyed. Bell.
An attitude; a willingness. In re Schaefer’s Estate, 207 Wis. 404, 241 N.W. 382, 386.
The parting with, alienation of, or giving up property. Long v. Commissioner of Internal Rev-enue, C.C.A., 96 F.2d 270, 271; Ashwander v. Ten-nessee Valley Authority, Ala., 56 S.Ct. 466, 479, 297 U.S. 288, 80 L.Ed. 688. A destruction of prop-erty. Pioneer Cooperage Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A., 53 F.2d 43, 44.
DISPOSITIVE FACTS. Jural facts, or those acts or events that create, modify or extinguish jural relations. Kocourek, Jural Relations (2d Ed.) p. 17.
DISPOSSESS. To oust from land by legal pro-cess; to eject, to exclude from realty. Matthews v. Deason, Tex.Civ.App., 200 S.W. 855, 856.
DISPOSSESS PROCEEDINGS. Summary pro-cess by a landlord to oust the tenant and regain possession of the premises for nonpayment of rent or other breach of the conditions of the lease. Of local origin and colloquial use in New York.
DISPOSSESSION. Ouster; a wrong that carnes with it the amotion of possession. An act where-by the wrongdoer gets the actual occupation of the land or hereditament. It includes abatement, intrusion, disseisin, discontinuance, deforcement. 3 Bl. Comm. 167.
DISPROVE. To refute; to prove to be false or erroneous; not necessarily by mere denial, but by affirmative evidence to the contrary. Irsch v. Irsch, 12 N.Y.Civ.Proc.R. 182.
DISPUNISHABLE. In old English law. Not an-swerable. Co. Litt. 27b, 53. 1 Steph. Comm. 245. Not punishable. "This murder is dispunishable." 1 Leon. 270.
DISPUTATIO FORI. In the civil law. Discus-sion or argument bef ore a court. Mackeld. Rom. Law, g 38; Dig. 1, 2, 2, 5.
DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION. A species of evi-dence that may be accepted and acted upon when there is no other evidence to uphold contention for which it stands; and when evidence is intro-duced supporting such contention, evidence takes place of presumption, and there is no necessity for indulging in any presumption. Noble v. Key System, 10 Cal.App.2d 132, 51 P.2d 887, 889.
A rule of law to be laid down by the court, which shifts to the party against whom it oper-ates the burden of evidence merely. City of Montpelier v. Town of Calais, 114 Vt. 5, 39 A.2d 350, 356. See Presumptions.
DISPUTE. A conflict or controve-rsy; a conflict of claims or rights; an assertion of a right, claim, or demand on one side, met by contrary claims or allegations on the other. Keith v. Levi, C.C.Mo., 2 F. 745; Ft. Pitt Gas Co. v. Borough of Sewick-ley, 198 Pa. 201, 47 A. 957.
Matter in Dispute
The subject of litlgation; the matter for which a sult ls brought and upon which issue is joined, and in relation to which jurors are called and witnesses examined. Lee v. Watson, 1 Wall. 339, 17 L.Ed. 557; Smith v. Adams, 130 U. S. 167, 9 S.Ct. 566, 32 L.Ed. 985.
DISQUALIFY. To divest or deprive of qualifica-tions; to incapacitate; to render ineligible or un-fit; as, in speaking of the "disqualification" of a judge by reason of his interest in the case, of a juror by reason of his holding a fixed preconceived opinion, or of a candidate for public Office by rea-son of non-residente, lack of statutory age, pre-vious commission of crime, etc. Carroll v. Green, 148 Ind. 362, 47 N.E. 223; Coats v. Benton, 80 Okla. 93, 194 P. 198, 200, 19 A.L.R. 1038.
DISRATE. In maritime law. To deprive a sea-man or petty officer of his "rating" or rank; to reduce to a lower rate or rank.
DISRATIONARE, or DIRATIONARE. To j ustify ; to clear one’s self of a fault; to traverse an in-dictment; to disprove. Enc. Lond.
DISREGARD. To treat as unworthy of regard or notice; to take no notice of; to leave out of consideration; to ignore; to overlook; to fail to observe. Cunningham v. Fredericks, 106 Conn. 665, 138 A. 790, 793.
DISREPAIR. The state of being in need of re-pair or restoration after decay or injury. Wyom-ing Coal Mining Co. v. Stanko, 22 Wyo. 110, 138 P. 182, 183.
DISREPUTE. Loss or want of reputation; ill character; disesteem; discredit. U. S. v. Ault, D. C.Wash., 263 F. 800, 810; U. S. v. Strong, D.C. Wash., 263 F. 789, 796.
DISSASINA. In old Scotch law. Disseisin; dis-possession. Skene.
DISSECTION. The act of cutting into pieces an animal or vegetable for the purpose of ascertain-ing the structure and use of its parts„ The ana-tomical examination of a dead body by cutting into pieces or exscinding one or more parts or organs. Wehle v. Accident Ass’n, 31 N.Y.S. 865, 11 Misc. 36; Rhodes v. Brandt, 21 Hun (N.Y.) 3. Anatomy; the act of separating into constituent parts for the purpose of critica! examination.
DISSEISE. To dispossess; to deprive.
DISSEISEE. One who is wrongfully put out of possession of his lands; one who is disseised.
DISSEISIN. Dispossession; a deprivation of pos-session; a privation of seisin; a usurpatiorr of the right of seisin and pos session, arld an exercise of such powers and privileges of ownership as to keep out or displace him to whom these right

fully belong. 3 Washb. Real Prop. 125; Sweeney v. Dahl, 140 Me. 133, 34 A.2d 673, 675, 151 A.L.R. 356.
It is a wrongful putting out of him that is seised of the freehold, not, as in abatement or intrusion, a wrongful entry, where the possession was va-cant, but an attack upon him who is in actual possession, and turning him out. It is an ouster from a freehold in deed, as abatement and in-trusion are ousters in law. 3 Steph.Comm. 386.
When one man invades the possession of another, and by force or surprise turns him out of the occupatlon of his lands, this is termed a "disseisin," being a deprivation of that actual seisin or corporal possession of the freehold which the tenant before enjoyed. In other words, a dissei-sin is said .to be when one enters intending to usurp the possession, and to oust another from the freehold. To con-stitute an entry a disseisin, there must be an ouster of the freehold, elther by taking the profits or by claiming the inheritance. Brown.
Accordlng to the modern authoritles, there seems to be no legal difference between the words "seisin" and "pos-session," although there is a difference between the words "disseísin" and "dispossesslon;" the former meaning an estate gained by wrong and injury, whereas the latter may be by right or: by wrong; the former denoting an ouster of the disseisee, or some act equivalent to ít, where-as by the latter no such act is implled. Slater v. Rawson, 6 Mete. (Mass.) 439.
Equitable disseisin is where a person is wrong-fully deprived of the equitable seisin of land, e. g., of the rents and profits. 2 Meriv. 171; 2 Jac. & W. 166.
Disseisin by election is where a person alleges or admits himself to be disseised when he has not really been so.
Disseisinam satis facit, qui uti non permittit pos-sessorem, vel minus commode, licet omnino non expellat. Co. Litt. 331. He makes disseisin enough who does not permit the possessor to en-joy, or makes his enjoyment less beneficial, al-though he does not expel him altogether.
DISSEISITRIX. A female disseisor; a disseisor-ess. Fleta, lib. 4, c. 12, § 4.
DISSEISITUS. One who has been disseised.
DISSEISOR. One who puts another out of the possession of his lands wrongfully. A settled tres-passer on the land of another. Flinn v. Blake-man, 254 Ky. 416, 71 S.W.2d 961, 968.
DISSEISORESS. A woman who unlawfully puts another out of his land.
DISSEMBLE. To conceal by assuming some false appearance. Darneal v. State, 14 Okl.Cr. 540, 174 P. 290, 292, 1 A.L.R. 638.
DISSENSUS. Lat. In the civil law. The mutual agreement of the parties to a simple contract obligation that it shall be dissolved or annulled; technically, an undoing of the consensus which created the obligation. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 541.
DISSENT. Contrariety of opinion; refusal to agree with something already stated or adjudged or to an act previously performed. The term is most commonly used in American law to denote the explicit disagreement of one or more judges of a court with the decision passed by the majority upon a case before them. In such event, the non-concurring judge is reported as "dissenting." Mere failure of a justice to vote is not a dissent. Charles W. Sommer & Bro. v. Al-bert Lorsch & Co., 254 N.Y. 146, 172 N.E. 271, 272. A dissent may or may not be accompanied by an opinion.

Dissenting Opinion
The opinfon in which a judge announces his dissent from the conclusions held by the majorlty of the court, and ex-pounds his own vlews.
In Ecclesiastical Law
A refusal to conform to the rites and ceremo-nies of the established church. 2 Burn, Eccl. Law 165.
DISSENTER. One who refuses to conform to the rites and ceremonies of the established church; a non-conformist. 2 Burn, Eccl. Law 165.
DISSENTERS. Protestant seceders from the es-tablished church of England. They are of many denominations, principally Presbyterians, Inde-pendents, Methodists, and Baptists; but, as to church government, the Baptists are Independ-ents.
DISSENTIENTE. (Lat. dissenting.) Used with the name or names of one or more judges, it in-dicates a dissenting opinion in a case. Nemine dissentiente. No one dissenting; unanimous.
DISSIGNARE. In old law. To break open a seal. Whishaw.
Dissimilium dissimilis est ratio. Co. Litt. 191. Of dissimilars the rule is dissimilar.
Dissimulatione tollitur injuria. An injury is ex-tinguished by the forgiveness or reconcilement of the party injured. Ersk. Inst. 4, 4, 108.
DISSOLUTE. Loosed from restraint, unashamed, lawless, loose in morals and conduct, recklessly abandoned to sensual pleasures, profligate, wan-ton, lewd, debauched, thus, evidente that defend-ants danced in nude at a smoker authorized their conviction as dissolute persons. People v. Scott, 113 Cal.App. 778, 296 P. 601, 603.
DISSOLUTION.
In Contracts
The dissolution of a contract is the cancellation or abrogation of it by the parties themselves, with the effect of annulling the binding force of the agreement, and restoring each party to his orig-inal rights. In this sense it is frequently used in the phrase "dissolution of a partnership." Willis-ton v. Camp, 9 Mont. 88, 22 P. 501.
In Practice
The act of rendering a legal proceeding nuil, abrogating or revoking it; unloosing its constrain-ing force; as when an injunction is dissolved by the court. Jones v. Hill, 6 N.C. 131.

Of Corporations
The dissolution of a corporation is the termina-tion of its existence as a body politic. This may take place in several ways; as by act of the legis-lature, where that is constitutional; by surrender or forfeiture of its charter; by expiration of its charter by lapse of time; by proceedings for wind-ing it up under the law; by loss of all its mem-bers or their reduction below the statutory limit. New York Title & Mortgage Co. v. Friedman, 276 N.Y.S. 72, 153 Misc. 697; Bruun v. Katz Drug Co., 351 Mo. 731, 173 S.W.2d 906, 909.
De Facto Dissolution
That which takes place when corporation, by reason of lnsolvency or for other reason, suspends all operations and goes into liquIdation. Hidden v. Edwards, 313 Mo. 642, 285 S.W. 462, 468.
Of Marriage
The act of terminating a marriage; divorce; but the term does not include annulment. Delhi v. Jones, 170 Tenn. 217, 94 S.W.2d 47, 48.
DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT. The crown may dissolve parliament either in person or by proclamation; the dissolution is usually by pro-clamation, after a prorogation. No parliament may Last for a longer period than seven years. Septennial Act, 1 Geo. I. c. 38. Under 6 Anne, c. 37, upon a demise of the crown, parliament be-carne ipso facto dissolved six months afterwards, but under the Reform Act, 1867, its continuance is now nowise affected by such demise. May, Parl. Pr. (6th Ed.) 48. Brown.
DISSOLVE. To terminate; abrogate; cancel; annul; disintegrate. To release or unloose the binding force of anything. As to "dissolve a cor-poration," to "dissolve an injunction." See Dis-solution.
DISSOLVING BOND. A bond given to obtain the dissolution of a legal writ or process, particularly an attachment or an injunction, and conditioned to indemnify the opposite party or to abide the judgment to be given. See Sanger v. Hibbard, 2 Ind. T. 547, 53 S.W. 330.
DISSUADE. In criminal•law. To advise and pro-cure a person not to do an act.
To dissuade a witness from giving evidence against a person indicted is an indictable offense at common law. Hawk. P. C. b. 1, c. 21, § 15. People v. Hamm, 250 N.Y.S. 603, 605, 140 Misc. 335.
DISTANCE. A straight line along a horizontal plane from point to point and is measured, from the nearest point of one place to the nearest point of another. Evans v. U. S., C.C.A.N.Y., 261 F. 902, 904.
It may however be a broken line and represent-ed by country roads or railroad track. State v. Mostad, 34 N.D. 330, 158 N.W. 349, 350.
DISTILL. To subject to a process of distillation, i. e., vaporizing the more volatile parts of a sub-stance and then condensing the vapor so formed. In law, the term is chiefiy used in connection with
the manufacture of intoxicating liquors. Williams v. State, 161 Ark. 383, 256 S.W. 354.
DISTILLED LIQUOR or DISTILLED SPIRITS. A term which includes all potable alcoholic liq-uors obtained by the process of distillation (such as whisky, brandy, rum, and gin) but excludes fermented and malt liquors, such as wine and beer. Sarlls v. U. S., 14 S.Ct. 720, 152 U.S. 570, 3S L.Ed. 556; Commonwealth v. Nickerson, 236 Mass. 281, 128 N.E. 273, 283, 10 A.L.R. 1568; Maresca v. U. S., C.C.A.N.Y., 277 F. 727, 740.
DISTILLER. One who produces distilled spirits, or who brews or makes mash, wort, or wash, fit for distillation or for the production of spirits, or who, by any process of evaporization, separates alcoholic spirit from any fermented substance, or who, making or ke,eping mash, wort, or wash, has also in his possession or use a still. U. S. v. Ridenour, D.C.Va., 119 F. 411; Motlow v. U. S., C. C.A.Mo., 35 F.2d 90, 91.
DISTILLERY. The strict meaning of "distillery" is a place or building where alcoholic liquors are distilled or manufactured; not every building where the process of distillation is used. U. S. v. Blaisdell, 24 Fed.Cas. 1162; Atlantic Dock Co. v. Leavitt, 54 N.Y. 35, 13 Am.Rep. 556.
DISTILLING APPARATUS. Under National Pro-hibition Act, tit. 2, § 25 (27 USCA § 39) "distilling apparatus" is not limited to a completed still ful-ly equipped and ready for operation, but may cover a 15-gallon pot and coil of copper tubing or worm, which, when connected by gooseneck, would produce a completed still. Rossman v. U. S., C. C.A.Ohio, 280 F. 950, 952.
DISTINCT. Clear to the senses or mind; easily perceived or understood; plain; unmistakable. Hill v. Norton, 74 W.Va. 428, 82 S.E. 363, 367, Ann. Cas.1917D, 489.
Evidently not identical; observably or decidedly different. Bayne v. Kansas City, Mo.App., 263 S. W. 450, 451.
Distinguished by nature or station; not the same; different in the place or the like; separate; individual; that which is capable of being distin-guished; actually divided or apart from other things. Gavin v. Webb, Tex.Civ.App., 99 S.W.2d 372, 379.
DISTINCTE ET APERTE. In old English prac-tice. Distinctly and openly. Formal words in writs of error, referring to the return required to be made to them. Reg. Orig. 17.
DISTINCTIVELY. Characteristically, or peculiar-ly, but not necessarily exclusively. Western Un-ion Telegraph Co. v. Green, 153 Tenn. 522, 284 S. W. 898, 899, 48 A.L.R. 313.
Distinguenda sunt tempora. The time is to be con-sidered. 1 Cáke, 16a; Bloss v. Tobey, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 327; Owens v. Missionary Society, 14 N.Y. 380, 393, 67 Am.Dee. 160.

Distinguenda sunt tempora; alud est facere, alud perficere. Times must be distinguished; it is one thing to do, another to perfect. 3 Leon. 243; Branch. Princ.
Distinguenda sunt tempora; distingue tempora et concordabis leges. Times are to be distinguish-ed; distinguish times, and you will harmonize laws. 1 Coke, 24. A maxim applied to the con-struction of statutes.
DISTINGUISH. To point out an essential dif-ference; to prove a case cited as applicable, inap-plicable.
DISTINGUISHING MARK. Any deliberate mark-ing of ballot by voter that is not made in attempt to indicate his choice of candidates and which is also effective as mark by which his ballot may be distinguished. Hanson v. Emanuel, 210 Minn. 271, 297 N.W. 749, 752, 753, 754.
DISTORT. To twist out of natural or regular shape, to twist aside physically, to force or put out of true posture, to twist, wrest, or deform. Grip Nut Co. v. MacLean-Fogg Lock Nut Co., D.C.Il1., 34 F.2d 41, 42.
DISTRACTED PERSON. A term used in the stat-utes of Illinois and New Hampshire to express a state of insanity. Snyder v. Snyder, 142 III. 60, 31 N.E. 303.
DISTRACTIO. Lat. In the civil law. A separa-tion or division into parts; also an alienation or sale. Sometimes applied to the act of a guardian in appropriating the property of his ward.
DISTRACTIO BONORUM. The sale at retail of the property of an insolvent estate, under the management of a curator appointed in the interest of the creditors, and for the purpose of realizing as much as possible for the satisfaction of their claim. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 524.
DISTRACTIO PIGNORIS. The sale of a thing pledged or hypothecated, by the creditor or pledgee, to obtain satisfaction of his claim on the debtor’s failure to pay or redeem. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 348.
DISTRACTION RULE. If plaintiff’s attention is diverted from known danger by a sufficient cause, under this rule the question of contributory negli-gence is for jury. Deane v. Johnston, Fla., 104 So.2d 3, 9.
DISTRAHERE. To sell; to draw apart; to dis-solve a contract; to divorce. Calvin.
DISTRAIN. To take as a pledge property of an-other, and keep it until he performs his obligation or until the property is replevied by the sheriff. It was used to secure an appearance in court, pay-ment of rent, performance of services, etc. 3 Bl. Comm. 231; Also, any detention of personal prop-erty, whether lawful or unlawful, for any purpose. Wolfe v. Montgomery, 41 S.D. 267, 170 N.W. 158.
Distress is now generally used.
Black’s Law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed.-36
DISTRAINER, or DISTRAINOR. He who seizes a distress.
DISTRAINT. Seizure; the act of distraining or making a distress. Regional Agr. Credit Corp. v. Griggs County, 73 N.D. 1, 10 N.W.2d 861, 866.
DISTRESS. The taking a personal chattel out of the possession of a wrong-doer into the custody of the party injured, to procure a satisfaction for a wrong committed; as for non-payment of rent, or injury done by cattle. 3 Bl.Comm. 6, 7; Co. Litt. 47. The taking of beasts or other personal property by way of pledge, to enforce the per-formance of something due from the party dis-trained upon. 3 BI.Comm. 231. Hall v. Marshall, 145 Or. 221, 27 P.2d 193. The taking of a defend-ant’s goods, in order to compel an appearance in court. 3 Bl.Comm. 280; 3 Steph.Comm. 361, 363.
The seizure of personal property to enforce pay-ment of taxes, to be followed by its public sale if the taxes are not voluntarily paid. Marshall v. Wadsworth, 64 N.H. 386, 10 A. 685; also the thing taken by distraining, that which is seized to pro-cure satisfaction. And in old Scotch law, a pledge taken by the sheriff from those attending fairs or markets, to secure their good behavior, and re-turnable to them at the close of the fair or market if they had been guilty of no wrong.
Distress infinite. One that has no bounds with regard to its quantity, and may be repeated from time to time, until the stubbornness of the party is conquered. Such are distresses for fealty or suit of court, and for compelling jurors to attend. 3 Bl.Comm. 231.
A power of attorney by which landlord dele-gates exercise of his right to his duly authorized agent. In re Koizim, D.C.N.J., 52 F.Supp. 357, 358.
Distress warrant. A writ authorizing an officer to make a distraint; particularly, a writ authoriz-ing the levy of a distress on the chattels of a ten-ant for non-payment of rent. Commercial Credit Co. of Baltimore v. Vineis, 98 N.J.Law, 376, 120 A. 417, 418.
Grand distress, writ of. A writ formerly issued in the real action of quare impedit, when no ap-pearance had been entered after the attachment; it commanded the sheriff to distrain the defend-ant’s lands and chattels in order to compel ap-pearance. It is no longer used, 23 & 24 Vict. c. 126, § 26, having abolished the action of quare impedit, and substituted for it the procedure in an ordinary action. Wharton.
Second distress. A supplementary distress for rent in arrear, allowed by law in some cases, where the goods seized under the first distress are not of sufficient value to satisfy the claim.
DISTRESS AND DANGER. The "distress" and "danger" to which a ship needs to be exposed to entitle its rescuer to salvage need not be actual or immediate, or the danger imminent and ab-solute. It is sufficient if at the time the assistance is rendered, the ship has encountered any damage

or misfortune which might possibly expose her to destruction if the services were not rendered, or if a vessel is in a situation of actual apprehension though not of actual danger. The Urko Mendi, D.C., 216 F. 427, 429.
DISTRIBUTE. To deal or divide out in propon tion or in shares. Buchan v. Buchan, 177 N.Y.S. 176, 177, 108 Misc. 31; Foreman v. United States, C.C.A., 255 F. 621, 623.
DISTRIBUTEE. An heir; a person entitled to share in the distribution of an estate. This term is admissible to denote one of the persons who are entitled, under the statute of distributions, to the personal estate of one who is dead intestate. Allen v. Foth, 210 Ky. 343, 275 S.W. 804, 805.
DISTRIBUTION. In probate practice. The appor-tionment and division, under authority of a court, of the remainder of the estate of an intestate, after payment of the debts and charges, among those who are legally entitled to share in the same. Rogers v. Gillett, 56 Iowa, 266, 9 N.W. 204.
Statute of Diatributions
A law prescrIbIng the manner of the distribution of the estate of an intestate among his heIrs or relatives. Such statutes exist In MI the states.
In general. The giving out or division among a number, sharing or parceling out, allotting, dis-pensing, apportioning. People v. Dime Sav. Bank, 350 III. 503, 183 N.E. 604, 608.
DISTRIBUTIVE. That which exercises or accom-plishes distribution; apportions, divides, and as-signs in separate items or shares.
DISTRIBUTIVE FINDING OF THE ISSUE. The jury are bound to give their verdict for that par-ty who, upon the evidence, appears to them to have succeeded in establishing his side of the is-sue. But there are cases in which an issue may be found distributively, i. e., in part for plaintiff, and in part for defendant. Thus, in an action for goods sold and work done, if the defendant plead-ed that he never was indebted, on which issue was joined, a verdict might be found for the plain-tiff as to the goods, and for the defendant as to the work. Steph. Pl. (7th Ed.) 77d.
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE. See Justice.
DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE. The share or portion which a given heir receives on the legal distribu-tion of an intestate estate; Van Buren v. Plain-field Trust Co., 130 N.J.Eq. 244, 22 A.2d 189, 191, or from a dissolved partnership. Helvering v. Enright’s Estate, 61 S.Ct. 777, 781, 312 U.S. 636, 85 L.Ed. 1093. Sometimes, by an extension of meaning, the share or portion assigned to a given person on the distribution of any estate or fund, as, under an assignment for creditors or under insolvency proceedings.
DISTRICT. One of the portions into which an entire state or country, county, municipality or other political subdivision or geographical terri-tory is divided, for judicial, political, or adminis-
trative purposes. Briggs v. Stevens, 119 Or. 138, 248 P. 169; State ex rel. Schur v. Payne, 57 Nev. 286, 63 P.2d 921, 925.
The United States are divided into judicial dis-tricts, in each of which is established a district court. They are also divided into election dis-tricts, collection districts, etc.
The circuit or territory within which a person may be compelled to appear. Cowell. Circuit of authority; province. Enc. Lond.
District attorney. The prosecuting officer of the United States government in each of the federal judicial districts. Also, under the state govern-ments, the prosecuting officer who representa the state in each of its judicial districts. In some states, where the territory is divided, for judicial purposes, into sections called by some other name than "districts," the same officer is denominated "county attorney" or "state’s attorney." Hill Coun-ty v. Sheppard, 142 Tex. 358, 178 S.W.2d 261, 263; State v. Henry, 196 La. 217, 198 So. 910, 914.
District clerk. The clerk of a district court of either a state or the United States.
District courts. Courts of the United States, each having territorial jurisdiction over a district, which may include a whole state or only part of it. Each of these courts is presided over by one judge, who must reside within the district. These courts have original jurisdiction over all admiral-ty and maritime causes and all proceedings in bankruptcy, and over all penal and criminal mat-ters cognizable under the laws of the United States, exclusive jurisdiction over which is not vested either in the supreme or circuit courts. Also inferior courts in Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Kan-sas, Louisiana, Minnnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming, are also called "district courts." Their jurisdiction is for the most part similar to that of county courts (q. v.).
District judge. The judge of a United States district court; also, in some states, the judge of a district court of the state.
District parishes. Ecclesiastical divisions of par-ishes in England, for all purposes of worship, and for the celebration of marriages, christenings, churchings, and burials, formed at the instante of the queen’s commissioners for building new churches. See 3 Steph.Comm. 744.
District registry. By the English judicature act, 1873, § 60, it is provided that to facilitate pro-ceedings in country districts the crown may, from time to time, by- order in council, create district registries, and appoint district registrars for the purpose of issuing writs of summons, and for other purposes. Documents sealed in any such district registry shall be received in evidence without further proof, (section 61;) and the dis-trict registrars may administer oaths or do other things as provided by rules or a special order of the court, (section 62.) Power, however, is given

to a judge to remove proceedings from a district registry to the office of the high court. Section 65. By arder in council of 12th of August, 1875, a number of district registries have been estab-lished in the places mentioned in that order; and the prothonotaries in Liverpool, Manchester, and Preston, the district registrar of the court of ad-miralty at Liverpool, and the county court regis-trars in the other places named, have been ap-pointed district registrars. Wharton.
As to "Fire," "Judicial," "Land," "Levee," "Min-eral," "Mining," "Road," "School," and "Taxing," districts, see those titles.
DISTRICT MESSENGER SERVICE. The service is not that of a common carrier, but the furnish-ing of messengers to be used by the employer in any way in which they could be properly em-ployed, in the course of which the messenger be-comes for the time the servant of the employer and the company is not fiable for his dishonesty in the ordinary course of his employment unless there was failure to use proper care in his selec-tion; Haskell v. Messenger Co., 190 Mass. 189, 76 N.E. 215, 2 L.R.A.,N.S., 1091, 112 Am.St.Rep. 324, 5 Ann.Cas. 796.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. A territory situated on the Potomac river, and being the seat of gov-ernment of the United States. It was originally ten miles square, and was composed of portions of Maryland and Virginia ceded by those states to the United States; but in 1846 the tract coming from Virginia was retroceded. Legally it is neith-er a state nor a territory, but is made subject, by the constittrtion, to the exclusive jurisdiction of con gress.
DISTRICTIO. Lat. A distress; a distraint. Cowell.
DISTRINGAS. In English practice. A writ di-rected to the sheriff of the county in which a de-fendant resides, or has any goods or chattels, com-manding him to distrain upon the goods and chat-tels of the defendant for forty shillings, in order to compel his appearance. 3 Steph.Comm. 567. This writ issues in cases where it is found im-practicable to get at the defendant personally, so as to serve a summons upon him. Id.
A distringas is also used in equity, as the first process to compel the appearance of a corporation aggregate. St. 11 Geo. IV. and 1 Wm. IV. c. 36.
A forro of execution in the actions of detinue and assise of nuisance. Brooke, Abr. pl. 26; Bar-net v. Ihrie, 1 Rawle (Pa.) 44.
DISTRINGAS JURATORES. A writ commanding the sheriff to have the bodies of the jurors, or to distrain them by their lands and goods, that they may appear upon the day appointed. 3 Bl.Comm. 354. It issues at the same time with the venire, though in theory afterwards, founded on the sup-posed neglect of the juror to attend. 3 Steph. Comm. 590.
DISTRINGAS NUPER VICE COMITEM. A writ to distrain the goods of one who lately filled the
office of sheriff, to compel him to do some act which he ought to have done before leaving the office; as to bring in the body of a defendant, or to sell goods attached under a fi. fa.
DISTRINGAS VICE COMITEM. A writ, of dis-tringas, directed to the coroner, may be issued against a sheriff if he neglects to execute a writ of venditioni exponas. Arch. Pr. 584.
DISTRINGERE. In feudal an’ old English law. To distrain; to coerce or compel. Spelman; Cal-vin.
DISTURB. To throw into disorder; to move from a state of rest or regular order; to interrupt a settled state of, to throw out of course or order. Stinchcomb v. Oklahoma City, 81 Okl. 250, 198 P. 508, 510.
DISTURBANCE. Any act causing annoyance, disquiet, agitation, or derangement to another, or interrupting his peace, or interfering with him In the pursuit of a lawful and appropriate occupa-tion or contrary to the usages of a sort of meeting and class of persons assembled that interferes with its due progress or irritates the assembly in whole or in part. State v. Mancini, 91 Vt. 507, 101 A. 581, 583.
A wrong done to an incorporeal hereditament by hindering or disquieting the owner in the en-joyment of it. Finch, 187; 3 El. Comm. 235.
DISTURBANCE OF COMMON. The doing any act by which the right of another to his common is incommoded or diminished; as where one who has no right of common puts his cattle into the land, or where one who has a right of common puts in cattle which are not commonable, or sur-charges the common; or where the owner of the land, or other person, incloses or otherwise ob-structs it. 3 Bl. Comm. 237-241; 3 Steph. Comm. 511, 512.

DISTURBANCE OF FRANCHISE. The disturb-ing or incommoding a man in the lawful exercise of his franchise, whereby the profits arising from it are diminished. 3 Bl. Comm. 236; 3 Steph. Comm. 510; 2 Crabb, Real Prop. § 2472a.
DISTURBANCE OF PATRONAGE. The hin-drance or obstruction of a patron from presenting his clerk to a benefice. 3 Bl. Comm. 242; 3 Steph. Comm. 514.
DISTURBANCE OF PUBLIC OR RELIGIOUS WORSIIIP. Any acts or conduct which interfere with the peace and good order of an assembly of persons lawfully met together for religious
cises. Minter v. State, 104 Ga. 743, 30 S.E. 989, 991; Stafford v. State, 154 Ala. 71, 45 So. 673, 674.
DISTURBANCE OF PEACE. Interruption of the peace, quiet, and good order of a neighborhood or community, particularly by unnecessary and dis-tracting noises. Platt v. Gieenwood, 69 P.2d 1032, 1034, 50 Ariz. 158; Levert v. Katz & Besthoff, 164 La. 1094, 115 So. 281, 283.

DISTURBANCE OF TENURE. In the law of tenure, disturbance is where a stranger, by men-aces, force, persuasion, or otherwise, causes a tenant to leave his tenancy; this disturbance of tenure is an injury to the lord for which an action will lie. 3 Steph. Comm. 414.
DISTURBANCE OF WAYS. This happens where a person who has a right of way over another’s ground by grant or prescription is obstructed by inclosures or other obstacles, or by plowing
across by which means he cannot enjoy his right of way, or at least in so commodious a man-ner as he might have done. 3 Bl. Comm. 241.
DISTURBER. If a bishop refuse or neglect to examine or admit a patron’s clerk, without reason assigned or notice given, he is styled a "disturb-er" by the law, and shall not have any title to present by lapse; for no man shall take advan-tage of lis own wrong. 2 Bl. Comm. 278.
DITCII. The words "ditch" and "drain" have no technical or exact meaning. They both may mean a hollow space in the ground, natural or artificial, where water is collected or passes off; also, en-tire irrigation project. Dickey v. Bullock, 28 Wyo. 265, 202 P. 1104, 1105.
DITCHING, DIKING, or TILING. Every kind of work necessary to convert parts of arid lands, particularly sagebrush lands, into farms and or-chards,—the word "diking" as applied to arid re-gions implying a leveling of the land, and the term "clearing land" as applied to arid regions covered with sagebrush meaning not only the removal or the destruction of the brush but the plowing or breaking up of the roots as well. Craig v. Crystal Realty Co., 89 Or. 25, 173 P. 322; 324.
DITES OUSTER. L. Fr. Say over. The form of awarding a respondeas ouster, in the Year Books, M. 6 Edw. III. 49.
DITTAY. In Scotch law. A technical term in civ-il law, signifying the matter of charge or ground of indictment against a person accused of crime. Taking up dittay is obtaining informations and presentments of crime in order to trial. Skene, de Verb. Sign.; Bell.
DIVERGE. To extend from a common point in different directions. Daylight Inv. Co. v. St. Louis Merchants’ Bridge Terminal Ry. Co., Mo.Sup., 176 S.W. 7, 8.
DIVERS. Various, several, sundry; a collective term grouping a number of unspecified persons, objects, or acts. Harris v. Zanone, 93 Cal. 59, 28 P. 845; Hilton Bridge Const. Co. v. Foster, 57 N.Y. S. 140, 141, 26 Misc. 338.
DIVERSION. A turning aside or altering the natural course of a thing. The term is chiefiy applied to the unauthorized changing the course of a water course to the prejudice of a lower pro-prietor, Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Ca1.2d 19, 119 P.2d 1, 5; Syret v. Tropic & East Fork Irr.
Co., 97 Utah 56, 89 P.2d 474, 475; or to unauthor-ized or illegal use of corporate funds; Farracy v. Security Nat. Bank of Dallas, Tex., 4 S.W.2d 331, 335.; Hornstein v. Paramount Pictures, 37 N.Y.S. 2d 404, 407; of estate or trust funds; Bray Bros. v. Marine Trust Co. of Buffalo, 35 N.Y.S.2d 356; or of alcohol. U. S. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., D.C.Md., 15 F.Supp. 791, 801.
DIVERSITÉ DES COURTS. A treatise on courts and their jurisdiction, written in French in the reign of Edward III. as is supposed, and by some attributed to Fitzherbert. It was first printed in 1525, and again in 1534. Crabb, Eng. Law, 330, 483.
DIVERSITY. In criminal pleading. A plea by the prisoner in bar of execution, alleging that he is not the same who was attainted, upon which a jury is immediately impaneled to try the collat-eral issue thus raised, viz., the identity of the per-son, and not whether he is guilty or innocent, for that has been already decided. 4 Bl. Comm. 396.
DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP. A phrase used with reference to the jurisdiction of the federal courts, which, under U.S.Const. art. 3, § 2, extends to cases between citizens of different states, desig-nating the condition existing when the party on one side of a lawsuit is a citizen of one state, and the party on the other side is a citizen of another state. When this is the basis of jurisdiction, all the persons on one side of the controversy must be citizens of different states from all the persons on the other side. Albert Pick & Co. v. Cass-Putnam Hotel Co., D.C.Mich., 41 F.2d 74; Soptich v. St. Joseph Nat. Croation Beneficiary Ass’n, D. C.Kan., 34 F.2d 566.
DIVERSO INTUITU. Lat. With a different view, purpose, or design; in a different view or point of view; by a different course or process. 1 W. Bl. 89; 4 Kent Comm. 211, note.
DIVERSORIUM. In old English law. A lodging or inn. Townsh. Pl. 38.
DIVERT. To turn aside; to turn out of the way; to alter the course of things. Usually applied to water-courses. Ang. Water-Courses, § 97 et seq. Sometimes to roads. 8 East, 394.
DIVES. In the practice of the English chancery division, "dives costs" are costs on the ordinary scale, as opposed to the costs formerly allowed to a successful pauper suing or defending in f or-
md which consisted only of his costs out of pocket. Daniell, Ch. Pr. 43.
DIVEST. Equivalent to devest, (q. v.).
DIVESTITIVE FACT. Any act or event that ex-tinguishes or modifies a jural relation. Kocourek, Jural Relations (2d ed.) 17.
DIVIDE. To cut into parts, disunite, separate, keep apart. The term is synonymous with dis-tribute. Watters y. First Nat. Bank, 233 Ala. 2271 171 So. 280, 28

Divide et impera, cum radix et vertex imperli in obedientium consensu rata sunt. 4 Inst. 35. Di-vide and govern, since the foundation and crown of empire are established in the consent of the obedient.
DIVIDEND. A fund to be divided. The share al-lotted to each of several persons entitled to share in a division of profits or property. Thus, divi-dend may denote a fund set apart by a corpora-tion out of its profits, to be apportioned among the shareholders, or the proportional amount falling to each. Hadley v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 36 F.2d 543, 544, 59 App.D.C. 139; Pen-ington v. Commonwealth Hotel Const. Corp., 17 Del.Ch. 394, 155 A. 514, 517, 75 A.L.R. 1136; Lewis v. O’Malley, D.C.Neb., 49 F.Supp. 173, 179. In bankruptcy or insolvency practice, a dividend is a proportional payment to the creditors out of the insolvent estate. United States Fidelity & Guar-antee Co. v. Sweeney, C.C.A.Mo., 80 F.2d 235, 241.
So-called dividend paid by lile insurer is not in fact a "dividend" but is the excess payment of premiums over actual cost. Scholem v. Pruden-tial Ins. Co. of America, 15 N.Y.S.2d 947, 948, 172 Misc. 664.
"Dividends," common or preferred, are what shareholder earns from property without liability in case dividends are not paid. Commonwealth v. Phlladelphla Rapid Transit Co., 287 Pa. 190, 134 A. 455, 458.

Cumulative Dividend

A dividend, usually preferred, which if not earned or paid, pursuant to agreement must be paid at some subsequent date. Lockwood v. Gen-eral Abrasive Co., 205 N.Y.S. 511, 513, 210 App.Div. 141

Dividend Addition

Something added to the policy in the form of paid-up insurance, and does not mean unappor-tioned assets or surplus. State Life Ins. Co. of Indianapolis v. McNeese, 106 Ind.App. 378, 19 N.E.2d 854, 857. The term does not refer to divi-dends added directly to the loan value. Ander-son v. Liberty Life Ins. Co. of Topeka, 149 Kan. 447, 87 P.2d 499, 502.

Ex Dividend

A phrase used by stock brokers, meaning that a sale of corporate stock does not carry with it the seller’s right to receive his proportionate share of a dividend already declared and shortly payable.

dividend already declared and shortly payable.
Extraordinary Dividends
See Extraordinary Dividends.
Liquidation Dividend See Liquidation Dividend.
Preferred Dividend
One paid on the preferred stock of a corpora-tion; a dividend paid to one class of sharehold-ers in priority to that paid to another. Jefferson Banking Co. v. Trustees of Martin Institute, 146
Ga. 383, 91 S.E. 463, 468.

Scrip Dividend

One paid in scrip, or in certificates of the own-ership of a corresponding amount of capital stock of the cornpany thereafter to be issued. Bailey v. Railroad Co., 22 Wall. 604, 22 L.Ed. 840.

Stock Dividend

One paid in stock, that is, not in money, but in a proportional number of shares of the cap-ital stock of the company, which is ordinarily in-creased for this purpose to a corresponding ex-tent. Thomas v. Gregg, 78 Md. 545, 28 A. 565, 44 Am.St.Rep. 310. A stock dividend is not in the ordinary sense a dividend, which is a cash distri-bution to stockholders ,of profits on their invest-ments, but rather it is an increase in the number of shares declared out of profits, the increased number representing exactly the same property as was represented by the smaller number of shares. Booth v. Gross, Kelley & Co., 30 N.M. 465, 238 P. 829, 831, 41 A.L.R. 868. It is really nothing more than a process in corporation book-keeping. Hayes v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., Mo.Sup., 298 S.W. 91, 98.

In Old English Law

The term denotes one part of an indenture, (q. v.).
DIVIDENDA. In old records. An indenture; one counterpart of an indenture.
DIVINARE. Lat. To divine; to conjecture or guess; to foretell. Divinatio, a conjecturing or guessing.
Divinatio, non interpretatio est, qua; omnino re-cedit a litera. That is guessing, not interpretation. which altogether departs from the letter. Bac. Max. 18, (in reg. 3,) citing Yearb. 3 Hen. VI. 20.
DIVINE LAWS. Those ascribed to God. Borden v. State, 11 Ark. 527, 44 Am.Dec. 217.
DIVINE RIGHT OF RINGS. The right of a king to rule as posited by the patriarchal theory of government, especially under the doctrine that no misconduct and no dispossession can forfeit the right of a monarch or his heirs to the throne, and to the obedience of the people. Webster, Dict. This theory "was in its origin directed, not against popular liberty, but against papal and ecclesiasti-cal claims to supremacy in temporal as weil as spiritual affairs." Figgis, "The Theory of the Divine Right of Kings."
DIVINE SERVICE. Divine service was the name of a feudal tenure, by which the tenants were obliged to do some special divine services in cer-tain; as to sing so many masses, to distribute such a sum in alms, and the like. (2 Bl. Comm. 102; 1 Steph. Comm. 227.) It differed from tenure in frankalmoign, in this: that, in case of the tenure by divine service, the lord of whom the lands were holden might distrain for its nonper-formance, whereas, in case of frankalmoign, the lord has no remedy by distraint for neglect of theservice, but merely a right of complaint to the visitor to correct it. Mozley & Whitley.
DIVINITY STUDENT. A student in a seminary in preparation for ministry, priesthood or rab-binate. United States ex rel. Rubin v. Magruder, D.C.R.I., 55 F.Supp. 947, 955.
DIVISA. In old English law. A device, award, or decree; also a devise; also bounds or limits of division of a parish or farm, etc. Cowell. Also a court held on the boundary, in order to settle disputes of the tenants.
Divisibilis est semper divisibilis. A thing divis-ible may be forever divided.
DIVISIBLE. That which is susceptible of being divided.
DIVISIBLE CONTRACT. One which is in its na-ture and purposes susceptible of division and ap-portionment, having two or more parts in respect to matters and things contemplated and embraced by it, not necessarily dependent on each other nor intended by the parties so to be. Horseman v. Horseman, 43 Or. 83, 72 P. 698; Stavisky v. Gen-eral Footwear Co., City Ct.N.Y., 185 N.Y.S. 760, 761.
DIVISIBLE OBLIGATION. See Obligation.
DIVISIBLE OFFENSE. One that includes one or more offenses of lower grade, e. g., murder includes assault, battery, assault with intent to kill, and other offenses. Williams v. State, 20 Ala.App. 604, 104 So. 280, 281.
DIVISIM. In old English law. Severally; sep-arately. Bract. fol. 47.
DIVISION. In English law. One of the smaller subdivisions of a county. Used in Lincolnshire as synonymous with "riding" in Yorkshire.
The separation of members of a legislative body to take a vote. An operating section of a railroad. Burton v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nav. Co., 148 Or. 648, 38 P.2d 72. A separation of an administrative body or court for the con-ducting of the business thereof. Foss v. Com-missioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A. 1, 75 F.2d 326, 329.
DIVISION OF OPINION. In the practice of ap-pellate courts, this term denotes such a disagree-ment among the judges that there is not a major-ity in favor of any one view, and hence no de-cision can be rendered on the case. But it some-times also denotes a division into two classes, one of which may comprise a majority of the judges; as when we speak of a decision having proceeded from a "divided court."
DIVISIONAL COURTS. Courts in England, con-sisting of two or (in special cases) more judges of the high court of justice, sitting to transact certain kinds of business which cannot be disposed of by one judge.
DIVISUM IMPERIUM. Lat. A divided jurisdic-tion. Applied, e. g., to the jurisdiction of courts of common law and equity over the same subject.
1 Kent, Comm. 366; 4 Steph. Comm. 9.
DIVORCE. The legal separation of man and wife, effected, for cause, by the judgment, of a court, and either totally dissolving the marriage rela-tion, or suspending its effects so far as concerns the cohabitation of the parties. Atherton v. Ath-erton, 181 U.S. 155, 21 S.Ct. 544, 45 L.Ed. 794. Sometimes it includes "annulment." Millar v. Millar, 175 Cal. 797, 167 P. 394, 398, L.R.A. 1918B, 415, Ann.Cas.1918E, 184.
The dissolution is termed "divorce from the bond of matrimony," or, in the Latin forro of the expression, "a vinculo matrimonii;" the suspension, "divorce from bed and board," "a mensa et thoro." The former divorce puts an end to the marriage; the ]atter leaves ft in full force.
2 Bish.Mar. & Div. § 225.
The term "divorce" is now applied, in England, both to decrees of nullity and decrees of dissolution of marriage, while in America it is ordinarily used only in cases of divorce a mensa or a vinculo, a decree of nullity of mar-riage being granted for the causes for which a divorce a vinculo was formerly obtainable in England.
Divorce a mensa et thoro. A divorce from table and bed, or from bed and board. A partial or qualified divorce, by which the parties are separated and forbidden to live or cohabit to-gether, without affecting the marriage itself. 1. Bl. Comm. 440; 3 Bl. Comm. 94; 2 Steph. Comm. 311; 2 Bish. Mar. & Div. § 225; Fisher v. Harris-on, 165 Va. 323, 182 S.E. 543, 544, 104 A.L.R. 102.
Divorce a vinculo matrimonii. A divorce from the bond of marriage. A total divorce of husband and wife, dissolving the marriage tic, and releas-ing the parties wholly from their matrimonial obligations. 1 Bl. Comm. 440; 2 Steph. Comm. 310, 311; 2 Bish. Mar. & Div. § 225; De Roche v. De Roche, 12 N.D. 17, 94 N.W. 770.
Divorce suit. A "divorce suit" is a civil pro-ceeding founded on a matrimonial wrong, where-in the married parties are plaintiff and defend-ant, and the government, or public, occupies, without being mentioned in the pleadings, the position of a third party, resulting in a triangle and otherwise sui generis action of tort. Galle-more v. Gallemore, 94 Fla. 516, 114 So. 371, 372.
Foreign divorce. A divorce obtained out of the state or country where the marriage was solemn-ized. 2 Kent, Comm. 106, et seq.
Limited divorce. A divorce from bed and board; or a judicial separation of husband and wife not dissolving the marriage tie. Yost v. Yost, 143 Neb. 80, 8 N.W.2d 686.
DIVORTIUM DICITUR A DIVERTENDO, QUIA vir divertitur ab uxore. Co. Litt. 235. Di-vorce is called from divertendo, because a man is diverted from his wife.

DIVULGE. To disclose or make known, as to divulge a telephone message. United States v. Gruber, C.C.A.N.Y., 123 F.2d 307, 309.
DIXIÉME. Fr. Tenth; the tenth part. Ord.Mar. liv. 1, tit. 1, art. 9.

In Old French Law

An income tax payable to the crown. Steph. Lect. 359.
DO. Lat. I give. The ancient and aptest word of feoffment and of gift. 2 Bl. Comm. 310, 316; Co. Litt. 9.
DO, DICO, ADDICO. Lat. I give, I say, I ad-judge. Three words used in the Roman law, to express the extent of the civil jurisdiction of the pretor. Do denoted that he gave or granted actions, exceptions, and judices; dice, that he pronounced judgment; addico, that he adjudged the controverted property, or the goods of the debtor, etc., to the plaintiff. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 39.
DO, LEGO. Lat. I give, I beqüeath; or I give and bequeath. The formal words of making a bequest or legacy, in the Roman law. Titio et Seio hominem Stichum do, lego, I give and be-queath to Titius and Seius my man Stichus. Inst. 2, 20, 8, 30, 31. The expression is literally re-tained in modern wills.
DO UT DES. Lat. I give that you may give; give [you] that you may give [me.] A formula in the civil law, constituting a general division under which those contracts (termed "innomi-nate") were classed in which something was given by one party as a consideration for some-thing given by the other. Dig. 19, 4; Id. 19, 5, 5; 2 Bl. Comm. 444.
DO UT FACIAS. Lat. I give that you may do; I give [you] that you may do or make [for me.] A formula in the civil law, under which those contracts were classed in which one party gave or agreed to give money, in consideration the other party did or performed certain work. Dig. 19, 5, 5; 2 Bl. Comm. 444.
In this and the foregoing phrase, the conjunction "ut" is
not to be taken as the technical means of expressing a consideration. In the Roman usage, thls word imported
a modus, that is, a qualification; while a consideration (causa) was more aptly expressed by the word "quia."
DOCIMASIA PULMONUM. In medical juris-prudence. The hydrostatic test used chiefly in cases of alleged infanticide to determine whether the child was born alive or dead. See Hydrostatic Test.
DOCK, v. To curtail or diminish, as to dock an entail.
DOCK, n. The cage or inclosed space in a crim-inal court where prisoners stand when brought in for trial.
The space, in a river or harbor, inclosed be-tween two wharves. City of Boston v. Lecraw, 17 How. 434, 15 L.Ed. 118.
A slip or waterway extending between two piers or projecting wharfs for the reception of ships, sometimes including the piers themselves. Wescott v. American Creosoting Co., 97 A. 493, 494, 86 N.J.Eq. 104.
"A dock is an artificial basin in connection with a har-bor, used for the receptlon of vessels in the taking on or discharging of their cargoes, and provided with vates for preventing the rise and fall of the waters occasioned by the tides, and keeping a uniform level within the docks." Perry v. Haines, 24 S.Ct. 8, 191 U.S. 17, 48 L.Ed. 73.
DOCK—MASTER. An officer invested with pow-ers within the docks, and a certain distance there-from, to direct the mooring and removing of ships, so as to prevent obstruction to the dock entrances. Mozley & Whiteley.
DOCK WARRANT. In English law. A warrant given by dock-owners to the owner of merchan-dise imported and warehoused on the dock, upon the faith of the bilis of lading, as a recognitión of his title to the goods. It is a negotiable in-strument. Pull. Port of London, p. 375.
DOCKAGE. A charge against vessels for the privilege of mooring to the wharves or in the slips. People v. Roberts, 92 Cal. 659, 28 Pac. 689. A pecuniary compensation for the use of a dock while a vessel is undergoing repairs. Ives v. The Buckeye State, 13 Fed.Cas. 184; The In-domable, C.C.A.N.Y., 279 F. 827, 831; Wilkens v. Trafikaktiebolaget Grangesberg Okelosund, C.C. A.Tex., 10 F.2d 129, 131.
DOCKET, v. To abstract and enter in a book. 3 Bl. Comm. 397, 398. To make a brief entry of any proceeding in a court of justice in the docket.
DOCKET, n. A minute, abstract, or brief entry; or the book containing such entries. A small piece of paper or parchment having the effect of a larger. Blount. A file. Touchstone Live Stock Co. v. Easters, 172 Ga. 454, 157 S.E. 683, 684.

In Practice

A formal record, entered in brief, of the Pro-ceedings in a court of justice. Brinn v. Wooding, 298 N.Y.S. 971, 975, 164 Misc. 850.
A book containing an entry in brief of all the important acts done in court in the conduct of each case, from its inception to its conclusion.
The name of "docket" or "trial docket" is sometimes given to the list or calendar of causes set to be tried at a specified term, prepared by the clerks for the use of the court and bar.

Kinds of Dockets

An appearance docket is one in which the ap-pearances in actions are entered, containing also a brief abstract of the successive steps in each action. A bar docket is an unofficial paper con-sisting of a transcript of the docket for a term of court, printed for distribution to members of the bar. Gifford v. Cole, 57 Iowa, 272, 10 N.W. 672. An execution docket is a list of the execu-tions sued out or pending in the sheriff’s office. A judgment docket is a list or docket of the judg-ments entered in a given court, methodically kept by the clerk or other proper officer, open to pub-lic inspection, and intended to afford official notice to interested parties of the existence or lien of judgments.

In General

Docket fee. An attorney’s fee, of a fixed sum, chargeable with or as a part of the costs of the action, for the attorney of the successful party; so called because chargeable on the docket, not as a fee for making docket entries. Bank v. Neill, 13 Mont. 377, 34 Pac. 180; Goodyear v. Sawyer, C.C., 17 Fed. 2.
Docket, striking a. A phrase formerly used in English bankruptcy practice. It referred to the entry of certain papers at the bankruptcy office, preliminary to the proser.altion of the fiat against a trader who had become bankrupt. These pa-pers consisted of the affidavit, the bond, and the petition of the creditor, and their object was to obtain from the lord chancellor his fiat, author-izing the petitioner to prosecute his complaint against the bankrupt in the bankruptcy courts. Brown.
DOCTOR, v. To prescribe or treat medically or to treat as a doctor or physician. Haines v. In-diana Trust Co., 95 Ind.App. 651, 131 N.E. 89, 91.
DOCTOR, n. A learned man; one qualified to give instruction of the higher order in a science or art; particularly, one who has received the high-est academical degree in his art or faculty, as, a doctor of laws, medicine, or theology. In col-loquial language, however, the term is practically restricted to practitioners of medicine. Harrison v. State, 102 Ala. 170, 15 So. 563; State v. Mc-Knight, 131 N.C. 717, 42 S.E. 580, 59 L.R.A. 187. But it is not synonymous with surgeon. State v. Miller, 59 N.D. 286, 229 N.W. 569, 574.
DOCTOR AND STUDENT. The title of a work written by St. Germain in the reign of Henry VIII, in which many principies of the common law are discussed in a popular manner. It is in the forro of a dialogue between a doctor of divinity and a student in law, and has always been considered a book of merit and authority. 1 Kent, Comm. 504; Crabb, Eng. Law, 482.
DOCTORS’ COMMONS. An institution near St. Paul’s Churchyard, in London, where, for a long time previous to 1857, the ecclesiastical and ad-miralty courts used to be held.
DOCTRINAL INTERPRETATION. See Interpre-tation.
DOCTRINE. A rule, principie, theory, or tenet of the law; as, the doctrine of merger, the doc-trine of relation, etc.
DOCUMENT. An instrument on which is record-ed, by means of letters, figures, or marks, matter which may be evidentially used. In this sense the term "document" applies to writings; to words printed, lithographed, or photographed; to seals, plates, or stones on which inscriptions are cut or
engraved; to photographs and pictures: to mans or plans. The inscription may be of stone or gems, or on wood, as well as on paper or parch-ment. 1 Whart. Ev. § 614; Johnson Steel Street-Rail Co. v. North Branch Steel Co., C.C.Pa., 48 F. 194; Arnold v. Water Co., 18 R.I. 189, 26 A. 55, 19 L.R.A. 602. It has various statutory meanings. Hays v. Hinkle, Tex.Civ.App., 193 S.W. 153, 155; Cohn v. U. S., C.C.A.N.Y., 258 F. 355, 361; Smith v.. Lingelbach, 177 Wis. 170, 187 N.W. 1007, 1008.
In the plural, the deeds, agreements, title-pa-pers, letters, receipts, and other written instru-ments used to prove a fact.

In the Civil Law

Evidence delivered in the forms established by law, of whatever nature such evidence may be. The term is, however, applied principally to the testimony of witnesses. Sav. Dr. Rom. § 165.

In General

Ancient documents. Deeds, wills, and other writings more than thirty years old are so called; they are presumed to be genuine without expresa. proof, when coming from the proper custody.
Foreign document. One which was prepared or executed in, or which comes from, a foreign state or country.
Judicial documents. Proceedings relating to litigation. They are divided into (1) judgments, decrees, and verdicts; (2) depositions, examina-tions, and inquisitions taken in the course of a legal process; (3) writs, warrants, pleadings, etc., which are incident to any judicial proceedings. See 1 Starkie, Ev. 252.
Public document. A state paper, or other in-strument of public importance or interest, issued or published by authority of congress or a state legislature. Also any document or record, evi-dencing or connected with the public business or the administration of public affairs, preserved in or issued by any department of the government. See Hammatt v. Emerson, 27 Me. 335, 46 Am. Dec. 598. One of the publications printed by order of congress or either house thereof. Mc-Call v. U. S., 1 Dak. 328, 46 N.W. 608. Broadly„ any document open to public inspection. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 31 S.Ct. 342, 55 L.Ed.. 389, Ann.Cas.1912B, 1312.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE. Evidence sup-plied by writings and documents of every kind_ in the widest sense of the term; evidence derived from conventional symbols (such as letters) by which ideas are represented on material sub-stances. Such evidence as is I urnished by written instruments, inscriptions, ,documents of all kinds, and also any inanimate objects admissible for the purpose, as distinguished from "oral" evidence„ or that delivered by human beings viva voce. People v. Purcell, 22 Cal.App.2d 126, 70 P.2d 706„.

DODRANS. Lat. In Roman law. A subdivision of the as, containing vine uncice; the proportion of nine-twelfths, or three-fourths. 2 Bl.Comm. 462, note.
DOE, JOHN. The name of the fictitious plaintiff in the action of ejectment. 3 Steph. Comm. 618.
DOED-BANA. In Saxon law. The actual per-petrator of a homicide.
DOER. In Scotch law. An agent or attorney. 1 Kames, Eq. 325.
DOG-DRAW. In old forest law. The manifest deprehension of an offender against venison in a forest, when he was found drawing atter a deer by the scent of a hound led in his hand; or where a person had wounded a deer or wild beast, by shooting at him, or otherwise, and was caught with a dog drawing after him to receive the same. Manwood, Forest Law, 2, c. 8.
DOG-LATIN. The Latin of illiterate persons; Latin words put together on the English gram-matical system.
DOGGER. In maritime law. A light ship or ves-sel. Cowell.
Dogger-fish, fish brought in ships.
Dogger-men, fishermen that belong to dogger-ships.
DOGMA. In the civil law. A word occasionally used as descriptive of an ordinance of the senate. See Nov. 2, 1, 1; Dig. 27, 1, 6.
DOGS. Steel rods with clamps or tongs thereon, for carrying heavy steel rails. Jefferson v. Denk-mann Lumber Co., 148 So. 237, 239, 167 Miss. 246.
DOING. The formal word by which services were reserved and expressed in old conveyances; as "rendering" (reddendo) was expressive of rent. Perk. c. 10, §§ 625, 635, 638. As used in La.Civ. Code, art. 1931, the word signifies activity. Noel Estate v. Louisiana Oil Refining Corporation, 188 La. 45, 175 So. 744, 746.
DOING BUSINESS. Within statutes on service of process on foreign corporations, equivalent to conducting or managing business. Wichita Film & Supply Co. v. Yale, 194 Mo.App. 60, 184 S.W. 119. A foreign corporation is "doing business", making it amenable to process within state, if it does business therein in such a manner as to warrant the inference that it is present there. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., D.C.N.C., 292 F. 169, 171. Or that it has subjected itself to the jurisdiction and laws in which the service is made. W. J. Armstrong Co. v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 129 Minn. 104, 151 N.W. 917, 919, L.R.A.1916E, 232, Ann.Cas.1916E, 335; The doing of business is the exercise in the state of some of the ordinary functions for which the corpora-tion was organized. Davis & Worrell v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, 153 Ark. 626, 241 S.W. 44, 46. What constitutes "doing business" depends on the facts in each particular case.
Walton N. Moore Dry Goods Co. v. Commercial Industrial Co., C.C.A.,Cal., 282 F. 21, 25. The activities of the corporation, however, must rep-resent a more or less continuous effort; Knapp v. Bullock Tractor Co., D.C.Cal., 242 F. 543, 550; Johnson v. Cass & Emerson, 91 Vt. 103, 99 A. 633, 635; or be of a systematic and regular nature; Home Lumber Co. v. Hopkins, 107 Kan. 153, 190 P. 601, 605, 10 A.L.R. 879.
The transaction of single piece of business is not enough. Wood & Selick v. American Grocery Co., 96 N.J.Law, 218, 114 A. 756, 757; Anderson v. Morris & E. R. Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 216 F. 83, 87. To the contrary. Tripp State Bank of Tripp v. Jerke, 45 S.D. 448, 188 N.W. 314, 315.
No general definition can be made of phrase "doing busi-ness" in statutes relating to foreign corporations. Each case must be determined on its own facts, by considering objective of statute in which phrase is found, its purpose and orientation to the carrying on of business, nature of activities, their magnitude, multiplicity of contracts, and possibility that incidents may occur and liabilities be cre-ated, especially where entrence into state is in ordinary prosecution of corporation’s business. State Highway and Public Works Commission v. Diamond S. S. Transp. Corp., 225 N.C. 198, 34 S.E.2d 78, 80, 81.
Ordinarlly the phrase means engagIng in activities in pursuit of gain. Welch Holding Co. v. Galloway, 161 Or. 515, 89 P.2d 559; People v. Jones, 16 N.Y.S.2d 558, 559, 172 Misc. 368.
The followIng transactlons and businesses illustrate, what constitutes or does not constitute "doing business": advertising, Society Milion Athena v. National Bank of Greece, 1 N.Y.S.2d 155, 2 N.Y.S.2d 155; Delghan v. Bev-erage Retailer Weekly & Trade Newspaper Corporation, 18 N.J.Misc. 705, 16 A.2d 612, 613; bringing of actions, R. L. Witters Associates v. Ebsary Gypsum Co., D.C.Fla., 19 F. Supp. 646, 648; Schneider v. Greater M. & S. Circuit, 259 N.Y.S. 319, 144 Misc. 534; broadcasting system, Hoffman v. Carter, 118 N.J.L. 379, 192 A. 825; State ex rel. Colum-bia Broadcasting Co. v. Superior Court for King County, 1 Wash.2d 379, 96 P.2d 248, 250; consignment, Oyler v. J. P. Seeburg Corporation, D.C.Tex., 29 F.Supp. 927; Thew Shovel Co. v. Superior Court in and for City and County of San Francisco, 35 Cal.App.2d 183, 95 P.2d 149, 151, 152; holding companies, Wilhelm v. Consolidated Oil Corpora-tion, D.C.Okl., 11 F.Supp. 444, 447: Cliffs Corporation v. Evatt, 138 Ohio St, 336, 35 N.E.2d 144, 151; insurance, Sasnett v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Ass’n, C.C.A.Iowa, 90 F.2d 514; Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Pink, 288 N.Y. 291, 43 N.E.2d 49, 53; newspapers, Layne v. Tribune Co., 71 F.2d 223, 224, 63 App.D.C. 213; Neely v. Philadelphia In-quirer Co., 62 F.2d 873. 874, 61 App.D.C. 334; railroads, Klabzuba v. Southern Pac. Co., D.C.Wash., 33 F.2d 359, 360; Gadboury v. Central Vermont Ry. Co., 231 N.Y.S. 630, 632, 225 App.Div, 145; solicitation, Mandel Bros. v. Henry A. O’Neil, Inc., C.C.A.S.D., 69 F.2d 452, 455; Bank v. Charles Meyers & Co., 182 Md. 556, 35 A.2d 110, 113.
Illustrations of what constitutes "doing business" within various taxing statutes follow: Capital stock tax, Good-year Inv. Corporation v. Campbell, C.C.A.Ohio, 139 F.2d 188, 190, 191: Refrigeration Discount Corporation v. Metz-ger, D.C.Pa., 10 F.Supp. 748, 749; excise tax, Harmar Coal Co. v. Heiner, D.C.Pa., 26 F.2d 729, 730; Queens Run Re-fractories Co. v. Commonwealth, 270 Mass. 19, 169 N.E. 515, 516; franchlse tax, Stone v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., C.C.A.Miss., 103 F.2d 544, 548; Ciiffs Corporation v. Evatt, 138 Ohio St. 336, 35 N.E.2d 144, 151; income tax, Blair v. Wilson Syndicate Trust, C.C.A., 39 F.2d 43, 45; Welch Holding Co. v. Galloway, 161 Or. 515, 89 P.25 559, 564.
DOITKIN, or DOIT. A base coin of small value, prohibited by St. 3 Hen. V. c. 1. We still retain the phrase, in the common saying, when we would undervalue a man, that he is not ,rth a doit.

DOLE. A part, share, or portion, as of a meadow. To "dole out" anything is to deal or distribute in small portions. Holthouse. In Scotch law, crim-inal intent; evil design. Bell, Dict. voc. "Crime."
DOLÉANCE. A peculiar appeal in the Channel Islands. It is a personal charge against a judi-cial officer, either of misconduct or of negligence. L. R. 6 P. C. 155. It still exists in a modified form. L. R. 5 A. C. 348. See 48 L. Jour. 281.
DOLES, or DOOLS. Slips of pasture left be-tween the furrows of plowed land.
DOLG. Sax. A wound. Spelman.
DOLG—BOTE. A recompense for a scar or wound. Cowell.
DOLI. Lat. See Dolus.
DOLI CAPAX. Capable of malice or criminal in-tention; having sufficient discretion and intelli. gente to distinguish between right and wrong, and so to become amenable to the criminal laws.
DOLI INCAPAX. Incapable of criminal inten-tion or malice; not of the age of discretion; not possessed of sufficient discretion and intelligence to distinguish between right and wrong to the extent of being criminally responsible for his actions.
BOLLAR. The unit employed in the United States in calculating money values. It is of the value of one hundred cents. People v. Alba, 46 Cal.App.2d 859, 117 P.2d 63. Money or currency issued by lawful authority and intended to pass and circulate as such. Neufield v. United States, 118 F.2d 375, 387, 73 App.D.C. 174.
DOLLY. A kind of handbarrow or handcart, con-sisting essentially of a strong, braced frame ter-minating in a pair of handles at one end and sup-ported on a pair of small heavy wheels with broad rim. A small heavy rectangular frame supported on four small wheels used instead of rollers for moving heavy objects as on a floor. McGillivary v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 19 Wash, 2d 582, 143 P.2d 550, 552. See, Box Dolly.
DOLO. In Spanish law. Bad or mischievous de-sign. White, New R ,cop. b. 1, tit. 1, c. 1, § 3.
DOLO FACIT QUI PETIT QUOD REDDITURUS EST. He acts with guile who demands that which he will have to return. Broom, Max. 346.
DOLO MALO PACTUMSE NON SERVATURUM. Dig. 2, 14, 7, § 9. An agreement induced by fraud cannot stand.
DOLORDIETER. An instrument used by a phy-sician to measure a patient’s pain threshold. The instrument emits a ray of light which is shined into one’s eye at various degrees of brightness. Dolorimetry is the science of measuring pain.
DOLOSUS VERSATUR IN GENERALIBUS. A person intending to deceive deals in general terms. Wing. Max. 636; 2 Coke, 34a; 6 Clark & F. 699; Broom, Max. 289.
DOLUM EX INDICIIS PERSPICUIS PROBARI CONVENIT. Fraud should be proved by clear tokens. Code, 2, 21, 6; 1 Story, Cont. § 625.
DOLUS. In the civil law. Guile; deceitfulness; malicious fraud. A fraudulent address or trick used to deceive some one; a fraud. Dig. 4, 3, 1. Any subtle contrivance by words or acts with a design to circumvent. 2 Kent, Comm. 560; Code, 2, 21.
Such acts or omissions as operate as a deception upon the other party, or violate the just confidente reposed by him, whether there be a deceitful in-tent (malus animus) or not. Poth. Traité de Dé-pót, nn. 23, 27; Story, Bailm. § 20a; 2 Kent, Comm. 506, note.
Fraud, willfulness, or intentionality. In that use it is opposed to culpa, which is negligence merely, in greater or less degree. The polícy of the law may sometimes treat extreme culpa as if it were dolus, upon the maxim culpa dolo com-paratur. A person is always Hable for dolus pro-ducing damage, but not always for culpa produc-ing damage, even though extreme. Brown.
DOLUS AUCTORIS NON NOCET SUCCESSORI. The fraud of a predecessor prejudices not his suc-cessor.
DOLUS BONUS, DOLUS MALUS. In a wide cense, the Roman law distinguishes between "good," or rather "permissible" dolus and "bad" or fraudulent dolus. The former is justifiable or allowable deceit; it is that which a man may em-ploy in self-defense against an unlawful attack, or for another permissible purpose, as when one dissembles the truth to prevent a lunatic from injuring himself or others. The latter exists where one intentionally misleads another or takes advantage of another’s error wrongfully, by any form of deception, fraud, or cheating. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 179; Broom, Max. 349; 2 Kent, Comm. 560, note.
DOLUS CIRCUITU NON PURGATUR. Fraud is not purged by circuity. Bac. Max. 4; Broom, Max. 228.
DOLUS DANS LOCUM CONTRACTUI. Fraud (or deceit) giving rise to the contract; that is, a fraudulent misrepresentation made by one of the parties to the contract, and relied upon by the other, and which was actually instrumental in in-ducing the latter to enter into the contract.
DOLUS EST MACHINATIO, CUM ALIUD DIS-SIMULAT ALIUD AGIT. Lane, 47. Deceit is an artifice, since it pretends one thing and does an-other.
DOLUS ET FRAUS NEMINI PATROCINENTUR, (PATROCINARI DEBENT.) Deceit and fraud shall excuse or benefit no man. Yearb. 14 Hen. VIII. 8; Best, Ev. p. 469, § 428; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 395.

DOLUS LATET IN GENERALIBUS. Fraud lurks in generalities. Tray. Lat. Max. 162.
DOLUS VERSATUR IN GENERALIBUS. Fraud deals in generalities. 2 Coke, 34a; 3 Coke, 81a.
DOM. PROC. An abbreviation of Domus Pro-cerum or Domo Procerum; the house of lords in England. Sometimes expressed by the letters D. P.
DOMAIN. The complete and absolute ownership of land; a paramount and individual right of property in land. People v. Shearer, 30 Cal. 658. Also the real estate so owned. The inherent sov-ereign power claimed by the legislature of a state, of controlling private property for public uses, is termed the "right of eminent domain." 2 Kent, Comm. 339. See Eminent Domain.
A distinction has been made between "property" and "domain." The former is said to be that quality which is conceived to be in the thing itself, considered as belonging to such or such person, exclusively of all others. By the latter is understood that right which the owner has of dis-posing of the thing. Hence "domain" and "property" are .said to be correlative terms. The one is the active right to dispose of ; the other a passive quality which follows the thing and places it at the disposition of the owner. 3 Toullier, no. 83.
National domain is sometimes applied to the ‘aggregate of the property owned directly by a nation. Civ. Code La. art. 486. Public domain embraces all lands, the title to which is in the United States, including as well land occupied for the purposes of federal buildings, arsenals, dock-yards, etc., as land of an agricultural or mineral character not yet granted to private own-ers. Day Land & Cattle Co. v. State, 68 Tex. 526, 4 S.W. 865.
DOMBEC, DOMBOC. (Sax. From dom, judgment, and bec, boc, a book.) Dome-book or doom-book. A name given among the Saxons to a code of laws. Several of the Saxon kings published dombocs, but the most important one was that attributed to Alfred. Crabb, Com. Law, 7. This is some-times confounded with the celebrated Domesday-Book. See Dome-Book; Domesday.
DOME. (Sax.) Doom; sentence; judgment. An oath. The homager’s oath in the black book of Ilereford. Blount.
DOME-BOOK. A book or code said to have been compiled under the direction of Alfred, for the general use of the whole kingdom of England; containing, as is supposed, the principal maxims of the common law, the penalties for misdemean-ors, and the forms of judicial proceedings. It is said to have been extant so late as the reign of Edward IV., but is now lost. 1 Bl.Comm. 64, 65.
DOMESDAY, DOMESDAY-BOOK. (Sax.) An an-cient record made in the time of William the Con-queror, and now remaining in the English excheq-uer, consisting of two volumes of unequal size, containing minute and accurate surveys of the lands in England. 2 Bl.Comm. 49, 50. The work was begun by five justices in each county in 1081, and finished in 1086.
DOMESMEN. (Sax.) An inferior kind of judges. Men appointed to doom (judge) in matters in con-troversy. Cowell. Suitors in a court of a manor in anCient demesne, who are judges there. Blount; Whishaw; Termes de la Ley.
DOMESTIC, n. A domestic, or, in full, domestic servant, is a servant who resides in the same house with the master. The term does not extend to workmen or laborers employed out of doors. Ex parte Meason, 5 Bin. (Pa.) 167; Richardson v. State, 43 Tex. 456; Anderson v. Ueland, 197 Minn. 518, 267 N.W. 517, 518.
The Louisiana Civil Code enumerates as domestics those who receive wages and stay in the house of the person paying and employing them, for his own service or that of his family; such as valets, footmen, cooks, butlers, and others who reside in the house. Persons employed in pub-lic houses are not included. Cook v. Dodge, 6 La.Ann. 276.
The term is sometimes extended, however, to include servants who do not reside in the same house as the master. Catto v. Plant, 106 Conn. 236, 137 A. 764, 766 (gardner): Douglas v. State, 88 Tex.Cr.R. 295, 225 S.W. 536, 538 (house porter).
DOMESTIC, adj. Pertaining, belonging, or relat-ing to a home, a domicile, or to the place of birth, origin, creation, or transaction. Catto v. Plant, 106 Conn. 236, 137 A. 764, 765; In re Savin’s Es-tate, 131 N.J.Eq. 563, 26 A.2d 270, 273.
As to domestic "Administrators," "Attachment," "Bill of Exchange," "Commerce," "Corporations," "Creditors," "Factors," "Fixtures," "Judgment," and "Manufactures," see those titles.
DOMESTIC ANIMALS. Such as are habituated to live in or about the habitations of men, or such as contribute to the support of a family or the wealth of the community. This term includes horses, (State v. Gould, 26 W.Va. 264; Osborn v. Lenox, 2 Allen [Mass.l 207,) male goat, (Young v. Blaum, La.App., 146 So. 168, 169) ; cattle (Ya-zoo & Mississippi R. Co. v. Gordon, 184 Miss. 885, 186 So. 631, 632; parrot (K. G. O. Construction Co. v. King, N.J.Dist.Ct., 12 N.J.Misc. 291, 171 A. 164, 165.
DOMESTIC COURTS. Those existing and having jurisdiction at the place of the party’s residence or domicile. Dickinson v. Railroad Co., 7 W.Va. 417.
DOMESTIC PURPOSES. As regards rights of riparian owner, extends to culinary purposes and to purposes of cleansing, washing, feeding, and supplying an ordinary quantity of cattle. Cowell v. Armstrong, 290 P. 1036, 1038, 210 Cal.App. 218. It includes consumption and sustenance of hu-man being and does not necessarily exclude oc-cupants of hotels, apartments, boarding houses, etc. Prather v. Hoberg, 24 Ca1.2d 549, 150 P.2d 405, 412.
DOMESTIC SERVANT. See Domestic.
DOMESTICATED. Made domestic or converted to domestic use. Commonwealth v. Flynn, 285 Mass. 136, 188 N.E. 627, 628, 92 A.L.R. 206.
DOMESTICUS. In old European law. A senes-chal, steward, or manor domo; a judge’s assistant; an assessor, (q. v.). Spelman.

DOMICELLA. In old English law. A damsel. Fleta, lib. 1, c. 20, § 80.
DOMICELLUS. In old English law. A better sort of servant in monasteries; also an appella-tion of a king’s bastard.
DOMICILE. That place where a man has his true, fixed, and permanent home and principal establishment, and to which whenever he is absent he has the intention of returning. Kurilla v. Roth, 132 N.J.L. 213, 38 A.2d 862, 864; In re Stabile, 348 Pa. 587, 36 A.2d 451, 458; Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber Co. v. Wilson, D.C.La., 38 F.Supp. 629, 631, 632. Not for a mere special or temporary pur-pose, but with the present intention of making a permanent home, for an unlimited or indefinite period. In re Garneau, 127 F. 677, 62 C.C.A. 403; In re Gilbert’s Estate, 15 A.2d 111, 117, 118, 18 N.J. Misc. 540; In re Schultz’ Estate, 316 Ill.App. 540, 45 N.E.2d 577, 582. Davis v. Davis, Ohio App., 57 N.E.2d 703, 704.
In international law, a residence at a particu-lar place, accompanied with positive or presump-tive proof of an intention to continue there for an unlimited time. State v. Collector of Borden-town, 32 N.J.Law, 192; Graham v. Graham, 81 N. W. 44, 9 N.D. 88; Phillimore, Int. Law 49.
The word "domicile" is derived from latín ”domus", meaning home or dwelling house, and domicile is legal conception of "home". In re Schultz’ Estate, 316 Iil.App. 540, 45 N.E.2d 577, 582, 316 Iil.App. 540.
The established, fixed, permanent, or ordlnary dwelling-place or place of residence of a person, as distinguished from his temporary and transient, though actual, place of resldence. It is his legal residence, as distinguished from his temporary place of abode; or his home, as distin-guished from a place to which business or pleasure may temporarily call him. Towson v. Towson, 126 Va. 640, 102 S.E. 48, 52.
"Cltizenship," "habltancy," and "residence" are several-ly words which in the particular case may mean precisely the same as domicile. Baker v. Keck, D.C.I11., 13 F.Supp. 487. Earley v. Hershey Transit Co., D.C.Pa., 55 F.Supp. 981, 982; Dodd v. Lorenz, 210 Iowa 513, 231 N.W. 422, 424; Commonwealth ex rel. Fortney v. Bobrofskie, 329 Pa. 44, 196 A. 489, 490; Perkins v. Guaranty Trust Co., of New York, 274 N.Y. 250, 8 N.E.2d 849, 852.
"Domicile" and "residence," however, are frequently distinguished, in that domicile is the heme, the fixed place of habitation; while residence is a transient place of dwell-ing. Fisher v. Jordan, C.C.A.Tex., 116 F.2d 183, 186; Minick v. Minick, 111 Fla. 469, 149 So. 483, 488; Hartzler v. Radeka, 265 Mich. 451, 251 N.W. 554.
Domicile may be deemed to be of three sorts,—domicile by birth, domicile by choice, and domicile by operation of law. The first is the common case of the place of birth, domicilium originis; the second is that which is voluntari-ly acquired by a party, proprio motu; the last is conse-quential, as that of the wife arising from marriage. Story, Confi. Laws, § 46. And see Railroad Co. v. Kimbrough, 115 Ky. 512, 74 S.W. 229; Johnson v. Harvey, 261 Ky. 522, 88 S.W.2d 42, 46, 47.
Abandonment of domicile, see Abandonment

Commercial Domicile

A domicile acquired by the maintenance of a commercial establishment; a domicile which a citizen of a foreign country may acquire by con-ducting business in another country. 1 Kent, 82. See Dicey, Dom. 341; The Dos Hermanos, 2 Wheat. 76, 4 L.Ed. 189.

De Facto Domicile

In French law, permanent and fixed residence in France of an alien who has not acquired French citizenship nor taken steps to do so, but who in-tends to make his home permanently or indefinite-ly in that country; called domicile "de facto" because domicile in the full sense of that term, as used in France, can only be acquired by an act equivalent to naturalization. In re Cruger’s Will, 36 Misc. 477, 73 N.Y.S. 812.

Domestic Domicile

A name sometimes used for "municipal domi-cile" (q. v.). Hayward v. Hayward, 65 Ind.App. 440, 115 N.E. 966, 970.

Domicile of Choice

The essentials of "domicile" of choice are the fact of physical presence at a dwelling place and the intention to make that place home. New York Trust Co. v. Riley, Del., 16 A.2d 772, 776, 783, 785; In re Eisenberg’s Estate, 31 N.Y.S.2d 380, 384, 385, 386, 177 Misc. 655; Prince v. New York Life Ins. Co., D.C.Mass., 24 F.Supp. 41, 42.

Domicile of Corporation

Place considered by law as center of corporate affairs and place where its functions are dis-charged. Fisher & Van Gilder v. First Trust Joint-Stock Land Bank, 210 Iowa 531, 231 N.W. 671, 672, 69 A.L.R. 1340.

Domicile of Origin

The home of the parents. Phillim. Dom. 25, 101. That which arises from a man’s birth and connections. 5 Ves. 750. The domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or what is termed the "domicile of origin," constitutes the domicile of an infant, and continues until abandoned, or until the acquisition of a new domicile in a dif-ferent place. Struble v. Struble, Tex.Civ.App., 177 S.W.2d 279, 283.

Domicile of Succession

As distinguished from a commercial, political, or forensic domicile, the actual residence of a per-son within some jurisdiction, of such a character as shall, according to the well•established prin-cipies of public law, give direction to the succes-sion of his personal estate. Smith v. Croom, 7 Fla. 81.

Elected Domicile

The domicile of parties fixed in a contract Be-tween them for the purposes of such contract. Woodworth v. Bank of America, 19 Johns., N.Y., 417, 10 Am.Dec. 239.

Foreign Domicile

A domicile established by a citizen or subject of one sovereignty within the territory of another

Matrimonial Domicile

A name sometimes used for "municipal domi-cile" (q. v.). Hayward v. Hayward, 65 Ind.App. 440, 115 N.E. 966, 970.

Domicile of Choice

Domicile of Corporation

Domicile of Origin

Domicile of Succession

Elected Domicile

The domicile of parties fixed in a contract Be-tween them for the purposes of such contract. Woodworth v. Bank of America, 19 Johns., N.Y., 417, 10 Am.Dec. 239.

Foreign Domicile

The domicile of parties fixed in a contract Be-tween them for the purposes of such contract. Woodworth v. Bank of America, 19 Johns., N.Y., 417, 10 Am.Dec. 239.

Foreign Domicile

A domicile established by a citizen or subject of one sovereignty within the territory of another.

Matrimonial Domicile

The place where a husband and wife have es-tablished a home, in which they reside in the relation of husband and wife, and where the matri-monial contrkct is being performed. Gould v. Gould, 201 App.Div. 670, 194 N.Y.S. 745, 747.

Municipal Domicile

One which as distinguished from "national dom-icile" and "quasi national domicile" (see those titles, infra), has reference to residence in a coun-ty, township, or municipality. Hayward v. Hay-ward, 65 Ind.App. 440, 115 N.E. 966, 970.

National Domicile

The domicile of a person, considered as being within the territory of a particular nation, and not with reference to a particular locality or sub-division of a nation.

Natural Domicile

The same as domicile of origin or domicile by birth. Johnson v. Twenty-One Bales, 13 Fed.Cas. 863.

Necessary Domicile

That kind of domicile which exists by operation of law, as distinguished from voluntary domicile or domicile of choice. Phillim. Dom. 27-97.

Quasi National Domicile

One involving residence in a state. Hayward v. Hayward, 65 Ind.App. 440, 115 N.E. 966, 970. See National Domicile, supra.
DOMICILED. Established in a given domicile; belonging to a given state or jurisdiction by right of domicile.
DOMICILIARY. Pertaining to domicile; relating to one’s domicile. Existing or created at, or con-nected with, the domicile of a suitor or of a de-cedent.
DOMICILIARY ADMINISTRATION. Administra-tion in state where person was domiciled at time of death is deemed principal or primary adminis-tration and is ordinarily termed "domiciliary ad-ministration." First Nat. Bank v. Blessing, 231 Mo.App. 288, 98 S.W.2d 149, 151, 231 Mo.App. 288.
DOMICILIATE. To establish one’s domicile; to take up one’s fixed residence in a given place. To establish the domicile of another person whose legal residence follows one’s own.
DOMICILIATION. In Spanish law. The acquisi-tion of domiciliary rights and status, nearly equi-valent to naturalization, which may be accom-plished by being born in the kingdom, by conver-sion to the Catholic faith there, by taking up a permanent residence in some settlement and mar-rying a native woman, and by attaching oneself to the soil, purchasing or acquiring real property and possessions. Yates v. Iams, 10 Tex. 168.
DOMICILIUM. Lat. Domicile (q. v.).
DOMIGERIUM. In old English law. Power over another; also danger. Bract. 1. 4, t. 1, c. 10.
DOMINA (DAME). A title given to honorable women, who anciently, in their own right of in-heritance, held a barony. Cowell.
DOMINANT ESTATE OR TENEMENT. That to which a servitude or easement is due, or for the benefit of which it exists. A term used in the civil and Scotch law, and thence in ours, relating to servitudes, meaning the tenement or subject in favor of which the service is constituted; as the tenement over which the servitude extends is called the "servient tenement." Union Falls Pow-er Co. v. Marinette County, 238 Wis. 134, 298 N.W. 598, 600, 601, 134 A.L.R. 958.
DOMINATE. To master, to rule, or to control. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. National Labor Re-lations Board, C.C.A.5, 113 F.2d 85, 88, 90.
DOMINATIO. In old English law. Lordship.
DOMINICA PALMARUM. (Dominica in ramis palmarum.) L. Lat. Palm Sunday. Townsh. Pl. 131; Cowell; Blount.
DOMINICAL. That which denotes the Lord’s day, or Sunday.
DOMINICAN NUNS. An order of nuns founded by St. Dominic under a modifled form of St. Aug-ustine’s rule, chiefly employed in teaching girls. Sacred Heart Academy of Galveston v. Karsch, 173 Tenn. 618, 122 S.W.2d 416, 417.
DOMINICIDE. The act of killing one’s lord or master.
DOMINICUM. Lat. Domain; demain; demesne. A lordship. That of which one has the lordship or ownership. That which remains under the lord’s immediate charge and control. Spelman; Blount.
In Domesday Book it meant the home farm as distin-guished from the holdings of the tenants. Vinogradoff, Engl.Soc. In Eleventh Century 253.
Property; domain; anything pertaining to a lord. Cowell. In Ecclesiastical law. A church, or any other building consecrated to God. Du Cange.
DOMINICUM ANTIQUUM. In old English law. Ancient demesne. Bract. fol. 369b.
DOMINIO. Sp. In Spanish law. A term corres-ponding to and derived from the Latin dominium (q. v.). Dominio alto, eminent domain; dominio directo, immediate ownership; dominio utile, beneficial ownership. Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 556.
DOMINION. Ownership, or right to property or perfect or complete property or ownership. Whe-lan v. Henderson, Tex.Civ.App., 137 S.W 2d 150, 153. Title to an article of property which arises from the power of disposition and the right of claiming it. Baker v. Westcott, 73 Tex. 129, 11 S.W. 157, 8 East, 579. See, also, State v. John-son, 34 S.D. 601, 149 N.W. 730, 734.
Sovereignty or lordship; as the dominion of the seas. Moll. de Jure Mar. 91, 92

In the civil law, with reference to the title to property which is transferred by a sale of it, dominion is said to be either "proximate" or "remote," the former being the kind of title vesting in the purchaser when he has acquired both the ownership and the possession of the article, the latter describing the nature of his title when he has legiti-mately acquired the ownership of the property but there has been no delivery. Coles v. Perry, 7 Tex. 109.
DOMINIUM. In the civil and old English: law. Ownership; property in the largest sense, includ-ing both the right of property and the right of possession or use.
The mere right of property, as distinguished from the possession or usufruct. Dig. 41, 2, 17, 1; Calvin. The right which a lord had in the fee of his tenant. In this sense the word is very clearly distinguished by Bracton from dominicum.
The estate of a feoffee to uses. "The feoffees to use shall have the dominium, and the cestui que use the disposition." Latch. 137.
Sovereignty or dominion. Dominium maris, the sovereignty of the sea.
DOMINIUM DIRECTUM.
In the civil law. Strict ownership; that which was founded on strict law, as distinguished from equity. In later law. Property without use; the right of a la.ndlord. Tayl. Civil Law 478. In feudal law. Right or proper ownership;—the right of a superior or lord, as distinguished from that of his vassal or tenant. The title or prop-erty which the sovereign in England is considered as possessing in all the lands of the kingdom, they being holden either immediately or mediate-ly of him as lord pararnount.
DOMINIUM DIRECTUM ET UTILE. The com-plete and absolute dominion in property; the unjan of the title and the exclusive use. Fairfax v. Hunter, 7 Cranch, 603, 3 L.Ed. 453.
DOMINIUM EMINENS. Eminent domain.
DOMINIUM NON. POTEST ESSE IN PENDEN-TI. Lordship cannot be in suspense, i. e., prop-erty cannot remain in abeyance. Haik. Law Max. 39.
DOMINIUM PLENUM. Full ownership; the un-ion of the dominium directum with the dominium utile. Tayl. Civil Law, 478.
DOMINIUM UTILE. In the civil law. Equitable or prEetorian ownership; that which was found-ed on equity. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 327, note. In later law. Use without property; the right of a tenant. Tayl. Civil Law, 478. In feudal law. Useful or beneficial ownership; the usufruct, or right to the use and profits of the soil, as dis-tinguished from the dominium directum (q. y.) or ownership of the soil itself ; the right of a vas-sal or tenant. 2 B1.Comm. 105.
DOMINO VOLENTE. Lat. The owner being will-ing; with the consent of the owner.
DOMINUS.
the king’s title as lord paramount. 1 B1.Comm. 367. Dominus capitalis, a chief lord. Dominus medius, a mesne or intermediate lord. Dominus ligius, liege lord or sovereign. Id.
Lord or sir; a title of distinction. It usually denoted a knight or clergyman; and, according to Cowell, was sometimes given to a gentleman of quality, though not a knight, especially if he were lord of a manor.
The owner or proprietor of a thing, as distin-guished from him who uses it merely. Calvin. A master or principal, as distinguished from an agent or attorney. Story, Ag. § 3.
In the civil law. A husband. A family. Vicat.
DOMINUS CAPITALIS LOCO HezEREDIS HA-BETUR, QUOTIES PER DEFECTUM VEL DE-LICTUM EXTINGUITUR SANGUIS SUI TENEN-TIS. Co. Litt. 18. The supreme lord takes the place of the heir, as often as the blood of the tenant is extinct through deficiency or crime.
DOMINUS LITIS. Lat. The master of the suit; i. e., the person who was really and directly in-terested in the suit as a party, as distinguished from his attorney or advocate. But the term is also applied to one who, though not originally a party, has made himself such, by intervention or otherwise, and has assumed entire control and responsibility for one side, and is treated by the court as Hable for costs. Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Bowers, 181 Va. 542, 25 S.E.2d 361, 363.
It is also said that the attorney himseif, when the cause
has been tried, becomes the dominus litis. Vicat.
DOMINUS NAVIS. In the civil law. The owner of a vessel. Dig. 39, 4, 11, 2; Wharton.
DOMINUS NON MARITABIT PUPILLUM NISI SEMEL. Co. Litt. 9. A lord cannot give a ward in marriage but once.
DOMINUS REX NULLUM HABERE POTEST PAREM, MULTO MINUS SUPERIOREM. The king cannot have an equal, much less a superior. 1 Reeve, Eng. Law, 115.
DOMITZE. Lat. Tame; domesticated; not wild. Applied to domestic animals, in which a man may have an absolute property. 2 B1.Comm. 391.
DOMMAGES INTÉRÉTS. In French law. Dam-ages.
DOMO REPARANDA. A writ that lay for one against his neighbor, by the anticipated fall of whose house he feared a damage and injury to his own. Reg. Orig. 153.
DOMUS. Lat. In the civil and old English law. A house or dwelling; a habitation. Inst. 4, 4, 8; Townsh.P1. 183-185. Shreveport Long Leaf Lum-ber Co. v. Wilson, D.C.La., 38 F.Supp. 629, 631. See Domicile.
In feudal and ecclesiastical law. A lord, or DOMUS CAPITULARIS. In old records. A chal:). feudal superior. Dominus rex, the lord the king; ter-house; the chapter-house. Dyer, 26b.

DOMUS CONVERSORUM. An ancient house built or appointed by King Henry III. for such Jews as were converted to the Christian faith; but King Edward III., who expelled the Jews from the kingdom, deputed the place for the custody of the rolls and records of the chancery. Jacob.
DOMUS DEI. The house of God; a name applied to many hospitals and religious houses.
DOMUS MANSIONALIS. A mansion house. 1 Hale, P.C. 558; State v. Brooks, 4 Conn. 446; State v. Sutcliffe, 4 Strob. (S.C.) 376.
DOMUS PROCERUM. The house of lords, ab-breviated into Dom. Proc., or D. P.
DOMUS SUA CUIQUE EST TUTISSIMUM RE-FUGIUM. To every man his own house is his safest refuge. 5 Coke, 91b; 11 Coke, 82; 3 Inst. 162. The house of every one is to him as his cas-tle and fortress, as well for his defense .against injury and violence as for his repose. 5 Coke, 91b; Say. 227; Broom, Max. 432. A man’s dwell-ing-house is his castle, not for his own personal protection merely, but also for the protection of his family and his property therein. 19 How.St. Tr. 1030.
DOMUS TUTISSIMUM CUIQUE REFUGIUM AT-QUE RECEPTACULUM SIT. A man’s house should be his safest refuge and shelter. The habi-tation of each one is an inviolable asylum for him. A maxim of the Roman law. Dig. 2, 4, 18.
DONA CLANDESTINA SUNT SEMPER SUS-PICIOSA. 3 Coke, 81. Clandestine gifts are al-ways suspicious. Noy, Max., 9th Ed. 152; 4 B. & C. 652; 1 M. & S. 253; Broom, Max. 289, 290.
DONARI VIDETUR, QUOD NULLO JURE CO-GENTE CONCEDITUR. Dig. 50, 17, 82. A thing is said to be given when it is yielded otherwise than by virtue of right (that is considered to be given which is granted when no law compels).
DONATARIUS. A donee; one to whom some-thing is given. See Donee.
DONATIO. Lat. A gift. A transfer of the title to property to one who receives it without paying for it. Vicat. The act by which the owner of a thing voluntarily transfers the title and possession of the same from himself to another person, with-out any consideration. See Indiana N. & S. R. W. Co. v. City of Attica, 56 Ind. 476.
Its literal translation, "gift," has acquired in real law a more limlted meaning, being applied to the conveyance of estates tail. 2 Bl.Comm. 316; Littleton, § 59; West, Symb. § 254; 4 Cruise, Dig. 51.
By the civil law (adopted into the English and American law) donations are either inter vivos (between living per-sons) or mortis causa (in anticipation of death.) As to these forms, see infra. A donatio or gift as between living persons is called donatio mera or pura when it is a simple gift without compulsion or consideration, that is, resting solely on the generosity of the donor, as in the case of most charltable gifts. It is called donatio remuneratoria when given as a reward for past services, but still not un-der any legal compulsion, as in the case of pensions and land-grants. It is called donatio sub modo (or modalis) when given for the attainment of some special object or on condition that the donee shall do something not specially
for the benefit of the donor, as in the case of the endow-ment of hospitals, colleges, etc., coupled with the condition that they shall be established and maintained. Mackeld. Rom.Law, § 466; Fisk v. Flores, 43 Tex. 340; Noe v. Card, 14 Cal. 576. The following tercos are also used: Donatio conditionalis, a conditional gift; donatio relata, a gift made with reference to some service already done, (Fisk v. Flores, 43 Tex. 340;) donatio stricta et eoarctura, a re-stricted gift, as an estate tail.
DONATIO INOFFICIOSA. An inofficious (un-dutiful) gift; a gift of so great a part of the don-or’s property that the birthright portion of his heirs is diminished. Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 469.
DONATIO INTER VIVOS. A gift between the living. The ordinary kind of gift by one person to another. 2 Kent, Comm. 438; 2 Steph.Comm. 102. A term derived from the civil law. Inst. 2, 7, 2. A donation inter vivos (between living per-sons) is an act by which the donor divests himself at present and irrevocably of the thing given in favor of the donee who accepts it. Succession of Brand, 162 La. 880, 111 So. 267, 268.
There are three kinds of "donations inter vivos", namelY, "gratuitous donations", "onerous donations", and "re-munerative donations", the first being based on mere 111)- erality, the second being burdened with charges imposed by the donee. and the third being recompense for services rendered. White v. White, La.App., 7 So.2d 255, 257.
DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA. A gift made by a person in sickness, who, apprehending his dis-solution near, delivers, cfr causes to be delivered, to another the possession of any personal goods, to keep as his own in case of the donor’s desease. 2 Bl.Comm. 514. The civil law defines it to be a gift under apprehension of death; as when any-thing is given upon condition that, if the donor dies, the donee shall possess it absolutely, or re-turn it if the donor should survive or should re-pent of having made the gift, or if the donee should die before the donor. Adams v. Nicholas, 1 Miles (Pa.) 109-117. A gift in view of death is one which is made in contemplation, fear, or peril of death, and with intent that it shall take effect only in case of the death of the giver. Prender-gast v. Drew, 103 Conn. 88, 130 A. 75, 76. A do-nation mortis causa (in prospect of death) is an act to take effect when the donor shall no longer exist, by which he disposes of the whole or a part of his property, and which is revocable.
DONATIO NON PRiESUMITUR. A gift is not presumed. Jenk.Cent. 109.
DONATIO PERFICITUR POSSESSIONE ACCI-PIENTIS. A gift is perfected [made complete] by the possession of the receiver. Jenk.Cent. 109, case 9. A gift is incomplete until possession is de-livered. 2 Kent, Comm. 438; Ewing v. Ewing, 2 Leigh (Va.) 337.
DONATIO PRINCIPIS INTELLIGITUR SINE PRIEJUDICIO TERTII. Dav.Ir.K.B. 75. A gift of the prince is understood without prejudice to a third party.
DONATIO PROPTER NUPTIAS. A gift on ac-count of marriage. In Roman law, the bride-grootn’s gift to the bride in anticipation of mar-riage and to secure her dos was called "donatioDOMUS CONVERSORUM. An ancient house built or appointed by King Henry III. for such Jews as were converted to the Christian faith; but King Edward III., who expelled the Jews from the kingdom, deputed the place for the custody of the rolls and records of the chancery. Jacob.
DOMUS DEI. The house of God; a name applied to many hospitals and religious houses.
DOMUS MANSIONALIS. A mansion house. 1 Hale, P.C. 558; State v. Brooks, 4 Conn. 446; State v. Sutcliffe, 4 Strob. (S.C.) 376.
DOMUS PROCERUM. The house of lords, ab-breviated into Dom. Proc., or D. P.
DOMUS SUA CUIQUE EST TUTISSIMUM RE-FUGIUM. To every man his own house is his safest refuge. 5 Coke, 91b; 11 Coke, 82; 3 Inst. 162. The house of every one is to him as his cas-tle and fortress, as well for his defense .against injury and violence as for his repose. 5 Coke, 91b; Say. 227; Broom, Max. 432. A man’s dwell-ing-house is his castle, not for his own personal protection merely, but also for the protection of his family and his property therein. 19 How.St. Tr. 1030.
DOMUS TUTISSIMUM CUIQUE REFUGIUM AT-QUE RECEPTACULUM SIT. A man’s house should be his safest refuge and shelter. The habi-tation of each one is an inviolable asylum for him. A maxim of the Roman law. Dig. 2, 4, 18.
DONA CLANDESTINA SUNT SEMPER SUS-PICIOSA. 3 Coke, 81. Clandestine gifts are al-ways suspicious. Noy, Max., 9th Ed. 152; 4 B. & C. 652; 1 M. & S. 253; Broom, Max. 289, 290.
DONARI VIDETUR, QUOD NULLO JURE CO-GENTE CONCEDITUR. Dig. 50, 17, 82. A thing is said to be given when it is yielded otherwise than by virtue of right (that is considered to be given which is granted when no law compels).
DONATARIUS. A donee; one to whom some-thing is given. See Donee.
DONATIO. Lat. A gift. A transfer of the title to property to one who receives it without paying for it. Vicat. The act by which the owner of a thing voluntarily transfers the title and possession of the same from himself to another person, with-out any consideration. See Indiana N. & S. R. W. Co. v. City of Attica, 56 Ind. 476.
Its literal translation, "gift," has acquired in real law a more limlted meaning, being applied to the conveyance of estates tail. 2 Bl.Comm. 316; Littleton, § 59; West, Symb. § 254; 4 Cruise, Dig. 51.
By the civil law (adopted into the English and American law) donations are either inter vivos (between living per-sons) or mortis causa (in anticipation of death.) As to these forms, see infra. A donatio or gift as between living persons is called donatio mera or pura when it is a simple gift without compulsion or consideration, that is, resting solely on the generosity of the donor, as in the case of most charltable gifts. It is called donatio remuneratoria when given as a reward for past services, but still not un-der any legal compulsion, as in the case of pensions and land-grants. It is called donatio sub modo (or modalis) when given for the attainment of some special object or on condition that the donee shall do something not specially
for the benefit of the donor, as in the case of the endow-ment of hospitals, colleges, etc., coupled with the condition that they shall be established and maintained. Mackeld. Rom.Law, § 466; Fisk v. Flores, 43 Tex. 340; Noe v. Card, 14 Cal. 576. The following tercos are also used: Donatio conditionalis, a conditional gift; donatio relata, a gift made with reference to some service already done, (Fisk v. Flores, 43 Tex. 340;) donatio stricta et eoarctura, a re-stricted gift, as an estate tail.
DONATIO INOFFICIOSA. An inofficious (un-dutiful) gift; a gift of so great a part of the don-or’s property that the birthright portion of his heirs is diminished. Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 469.
DONATIO INTER VIVOS. A gift between the living. The ordinary kind of gift by one person to another. 2 Kent, Comm. 438; 2 Steph.Comm. 102. A term derived from the civil law. Inst. 2, 7, 2. A donation inter vivos (between living per-sons) is an act by which the donor divests himself at present and irrevocably of the thing given in favor of the donee who accepts it. Succession of Brand, 162 La. 880, 111 So. 267, 268.
There are three kinds of "donations inter vivos", namelY, "gratuitous donations", "onerous donations", and "re-munerative donations", the first being based on mere 111)- erality, the second being burdened with charges imposed by the donee. and the third being recompense for services rendered. White v. White, La.App., 7 So.2d 255, 257.
DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA. A gift made by a person in sickness, who, apprehending his dis-solution near, delivers, cfr causes to be delivered, to another the possession of any personal goods, to keep as his own in case of the donor’s desease. 2 Bl.Comm. 514. The civil law defines it to be a gift under apprehension of death; as when any-thing is given upon condition that, if the donor dies, the donee shall possess it absolutely, or re-turn it if the donor should survive or should re-pent of having made the gift, or if the donee should die before the donor. Adams v. Nicholas, 1 Miles (Pa.) 109-117. A gift in view of death is one which is made in contemplation, fear, or peril of death, and with intent that it shall take effect only in case of the death of the giver. Prender-gast v. Drew, 103 Conn. 88, 130 A. 75, 76. A do-nation mortis causa (in prospect of death) is an act to take effect when the donor shall no longer exist, by which he disposes of the whole or a part of his property, and which is revocable.
DONATIO NON PRiESUMITUR. A gift is not presumed. Jenk.Cent. 109.
DONATIO PERFICITUR POSSESSIONE ACCI-PIENTIS. A gift is perfected [made complete] by the possession of the receiver. Jenk.Cent. 109, case 9. A gift is incomplete until possession is de-livered. 2 Kent, Comm. 438; Ewing v. Ewing, 2 Leigh (Va.) 337.
DONATIO PRINCIPIS INTELLIGITUR SINE PRIEJUDICIO TERTII. Dav.Ir.K.B. 75. A gift of the prince is understood without prejudice to a third party.
DONATIO PROPTER NUPTIAS. A gift on ac-count of marriage. In Roman law, the bride-grootn’s gift to the bride in anticipation of mar-riage and to secure her dos was called "donatioDOMUS CONVERSORUM. An ancient house built or appointed by King Henry III. for such Jews as were converted to the Christian faith; but King Edward III., who expelled the Jews from the kingdom, deputed the place for the custody of the rolls and records of the chancery. Jacob.
DOMUS DEI. The house of God; a name applied to many hospitals and religious houses.
DOMUS MANSIONALIS. A mansion house. 1 Hale, P.C. 558; State v. Brooks, 4 Conn. 446; State v. Sutcliffe, 4 Strob. (S.C.) 376.
DOMUS PROCERUM. The house of lords, ab-breviated into Dom. Proc., or D. P.
DOMUS SUA CUIQUE EST TUTISSIMUM RE-FUGIUM. To every man his own house is his safest refuge. 5 Coke, 91b; 11 Coke, 82; 3 Inst. 162. The house of every one is to him as his cas-tle and fortress, as well for his defense .against injury and violence as for his repose. 5 Coke, 91b; Say. 227; Broom, Max. 432. A man’s dwell-ing-house is his castle, not for his own personal protection merely, but also for the protection of his family and his property therein. 19 How.St. Tr. 1030.
DOMUS TUTISSIMUM CUIQUE REFUGIUM AT-QUE RECEPTACULUM SIT. A man’s house should be his safest refuge and shelter. The habi-tation of each one is an inviolable asylum for him. A maxim of the Roman law. Dig. 2, 4, 18.
DONA CLANDESTINA SUNT SEMPER SUS-PICIOSA. 3 Coke, 81. Clandestine gifts are al-ways suspicious. Noy, Max., 9th Ed. 152; 4 B. & C. 652; 1 M. & S. 253; Broom, Max. 289, 290.
DONARI VIDETUR, QUOD NULLO JURE CO-GENTE CONCEDITUR. Dig. 50, 17, 82. A thing is said to be given when it is yielded otherwise than by virtue of right (that is considered to be given which is granted when no law compels).
DONATARIUS. A donee; one to whom some-thing is given. See Donee.
DONATIO. Lat. A gift. A transfer of the title to property to one who receives it without paying for it. Vicat. The act by which the owner of a thing voluntarily transfers the title and possession of the same from himself to another person, with-out any consideration. See Indiana N. & S. R. W. Co. v. City of Attica, 56 Ind. 476.
Its literal translation, "gift," has acquired in real law a more limlted meaning, being applied to the conveyance of estates tail. 2 Bl.Comm. 316; Littleton, § 59; West, Symb. § 254; 4 Cruise, Dig. 51.
By the civil law (adopted into the English and American law) donations are either inter vivos (between living per-sons) or mortis causa (in anticipation of death.) As to these forms, see infra. A donatio or gift as between living persons is called donatio mera or pura when it is a simple gift without compulsion or consideration, that is, resting solely on the generosity of the donor, as in the case of most charltable gifts. It is called donatio remuneratoria when given as a reward for past services, but still not un-der any legal compulsion, as in the case of pensions and land-grants. It is called donatio sub modo (or modalis) when given for the attainment of some special object or on condition that the donee shall do something not specially
for the benefit of the donor, as in the case of the endow-ment of hospitals, colleges, etc., coupled with the condition that they shall be established and maintained. Mackeld. Rom.Law, § 466; Fisk v. Flores, 43 Tex. 340; Noe v. Card, 14 Cal. 576. The following tercos are also used: Donatio conditionalis, a conditional gift; donatio relata, a gift made with reference to some service already done, (Fisk v. Flores, 43 Tex. 340;) donatio stricta et eoarctura, a re-stricted gift, as an estate tail.
DONATIO INOFFICIOSA. An inofficious (un-dutiful) gift; a gift of so great a part of the don-or’s property that the birthright portion of his heirs is diminished. Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 469.
DONATIO INTER VIVOS. A gift between the living. The ordinary kind of gift by one person to another. 2 Kent, Comm. 438; 2 Steph.Comm. 102. A term derived from the civil law. Inst. 2, 7, 2. A donation inter vivos (between living per-sons) is an act by which the donor divests himself at present and irrevocably of the thing given in favor of the donee who accepts it. Succession of Brand, 162 La. 880, 111 So. 267, 268.
There are three kinds of "donations inter vivos", namelY, "gratuitous donations", "onerous donations", and "re-munerative donations", the first being based on mere 111)- erality, the second being burdened with charges imposed by the donee. and the third being recompense for services rendered. White v. White, La.App., 7 So.2d 255, 257.
DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA. A gift made by a person in sickness, who, apprehending his dis-solution near, delivers, cfr causes to be delivered, to another the possession of any personal goods, to keep as his own in case of the donor’s desease. 2 Bl.Comm. 514. The civil law defines it to be a gift under apprehension of death; as when any-thing is given upon condition that, if the donor dies, the donee shall possess it absolutely, or re-turn it if the donor should survive or should re-pent of having made the gift, or if the donee should die before the donor. Adams v. Nicholas, 1 Miles (Pa.) 109-117. A gift in view of death is one which is made in contemplation, fear, or peril of death, and with intent that it shall take effect only in case of the death of the giver. Prender-gast v. Drew, 103 Conn. 88, 130 A. 75, 76. A do-nation mortis causa (in prospect of death) is an act to take effect when the donor shall no longer exist, by which he disposes of the whole or a part of his property, and which is revocable.
DONATIO NON PRiESUMITUR. A gift is not presumed. Jenk.Cent. 109.
DONATIO PERFICITUR POSSESSIONE ACCI-PIENTIS. A gift is perfected [made complete] by the possession of the receiver. Jenk.Cent. 109, case 9. A gift is incomplete until possession is de-livered. 2 Kent, Comm. 438; Ewing v. Ewing, 2 Leigh (Va.) 337.
DONATIO PRINCIPIS INTELLIGITUR SINE PRIEJUDICIO TERTII. Dav.Ir.K.B. 75. A gift of the prince is understood without prejudice to a third party.
DONATIO PROPTER NUPTIAS. A gift on ac-count of marriage. In Roman law, the bride-grootn’s gift to the bride in anticipation of mar-riage and to secure her dos was called "donatioDOMUS CONVERSORUM. An ancient house built or appointed by King Henry III. for such Jews as were converted to the Christian faith; but King Edward III., who expelled the Jews from the kingdom, deputed the place for the custody of the rolls and records of the chancery. Jacob.
DOMUS DEI. The house of God; a name applied to many hospitals and religious houses.
DOMUS MANSIONALIS. A mansion house. 1 Hale, P.C. 558; State v. Brooks, 4 Conn. 446; State v. Sutcliffe, 4 Strob. (S.C.) 376.
DOMUS PROCERUM. The house of lords, ab-breviated into Dom. Proc., or D. P.
DOMUS SUA CUIQUE EST TUTISSIMUM RE-FUGIUM. To every man his own house is his safest refuge. 5 Coke, 91b; 11 Coke, 82; 3 Inst. 162. The house of every one is to him as his cas-tle and fortress, as well for his defense .against injury and violence as for his repose. 5 Coke, 91b; Say. 227; Broom, Max. 432. A man’s dwell-ing-house is his castle, not for his own personal protection merely, but also for the protection of his family and his property therein. 19 How.St. Tr. 1030.
DOMUS TUTISSIMUM CUIQUE REFUGIUM AT-QUE RECEPTACULUM SIT. A man’s house should be his safest refuge and shelter. The habi-tation of each one is an inviolable asylum for him. A maxim of the Roman law. Dig. 2, 4, 18.
DONA CLANDESTINA SUNT SEMPER SUS-PICIOSA. 3 Coke, 81. Clandestine gifts are al-ways suspicious. Noy, Max., 9th Ed. 152; 4 B. & C. 652; 1 M. & S. 253; Broom, Max. 289, 290.
DONARI VIDETUR, QUOD NULLO JURE CO-GENTE CONCEDITUR. Dig. 50, 17, 82. A thing is said to be given when it is yielded otherwise than by virtue of right (that is considered to be given which is granted when no law compels).
DONATARIUS. A donee; one to whom some-thing is given. See Donee.
DONATIO. Lat. A gift. A transfer of the title to property to one who receives it without paying for it. Vicat. The act by which the owner of a thing voluntarily transfers the title and possession of the same from himself to another person, with-out any consideration. See Indiana N. & S. R. W. Co. v. City of Attica, 56 Ind. 476.
Its literal translation, "gift," has acquired in real law a more limlted meaning, being applied to the conveyance of estates tail. 2 Bl.Comm. 316; Littleton, § 59; West, Symb. § 254; 4 Cruise, Dig. 51.
By the civil law (adopted into the English and American law) donations are either inter vivos (between living per-sons) or mortis causa (in anticipation of death.) As to these forms, see infra. A donatio or gift as between living persons is called donatio mera or pura when it is a simple gift without compulsion or consideration, that is, resting solely on the generosity of the donor, as in the case of most charltable gifts. It is called donatio remuneratoria when given as a reward for past services, but still not un-der any legal compulsion, as in the case of pensions and land-grants. It is called donatio sub modo (or modalis) when given for the attainment of some special object or on condition that the donee shall do something not specially
for the benefit of the donor, as in the case of the endow-ment of hospitals, colleges, etc., coupled with the condition that they shall be established and maintained. Mackeld. Rom.Law, § 466; Fisk v. Flores, 43 Tex. 340; Noe v. Card, 14 Cal. 576. The following tercos are also used: Donatio conditionalis, a conditional gift; donatio relata, a gift made with reference to some service already done, (Fisk v. Flores, 43 Tex. 340;) donatio stricta et eoarctura, a re-stricted gift, as an estate tail.
DONATIO INOFFICIOSA. An inofficious (un-dutiful) gift; a gift of so great a part of the don-or’s property that the birthright portion of his heirs is diminished. Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 469.
DONATIO INTER VIVOS. A gift between the living. The ordinary kind of gift by one person to another. 2 Kent, Comm. 438; 2 Steph.Comm. 102. A term derived from the civil law. Inst. 2, 7, 2. A donation inter vivos (between living per-sons) is an act by which the donor divests himself at present and irrevocably of the thing given in favor of the donee who accepts it. Succession of Brand, 162 La. 880, 111 So. 267, 268.
There are three kinds of "donations inter vivos", namelY, "gratuitous donations", "onerous donations", and "re-munerative donations", the first being based on mere 111)- erality, the second being burdened with charges imposed by the donee. and the third being recompense for services rendered. White v. White, La.App., 7 So.2d 255, 257.
DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA. A gift made by a person in sickness, who, apprehending his dis-solution near, delivers, cfr causes to be delivered, to another the possession of any personal goods, to keep as his own in case of the donor’s desease. 2 Bl.Comm. 514. The civil law defines it to be a gift under apprehension of death; as when any-thing is given upon condition that, if the donor dies, the donee shall possess it absolutely, or re-turn it if the donor should survive or should re-pent of having made the gift, or if the donee should die before the donor. Adams v. Nicholas, 1 Miles (Pa.) 109-117. A gift in view of death is one which is made in contemplation, fear, or peril of death, and with intent that it shall take effect only in case of the death of the giver. Prender-gast v. Drew, 103 Conn. 88, 130 A. 75, 76. A do-nation mortis causa (in prospect of death) is an act to take effect when the donor shall no longer exist, by which he disposes of the whole or a part of his property, and which is revocable.
DONATIO NON PRiESUMITUR. A gift is not presumed. Jenk.Cent. 109.
DONATIO PERFICITUR POSSESSIONE ACCI-PIENTIS. A gift is perfected [made complete] by the possession of the receiver. Jenk.Cent. 109, case 9. A gift is incomplete until possession is de-livered. 2 Kent, Comm. 438; Ewing v. Ewing, 2 Leigh (Va.) 337.
DONATIO PRINCIPIS INTELLIGITUR SINE PRIEJUDICIO TERTII. Dav.Ir.K.B. 75. A gift of the prince is understood without prejudice to a third party.
DONATIO PROPTER NUPTIAS. A gift on ac-count of marriage. In Roman law, the bride-grootn’s gift to the bride in anticipation of mar-riage and to secure her dos was called "donatioante nuptias;" but by an ordinance of Justinian such gift might be made after as well as bef ore marriage, and in that case it was called "donatio propter nuptias." Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 572.
DONATION. A gift. Milis v. Stewart, 76 Mont. 429, 247 P. 332, 334, 47 A.L.R. 424; Darnell v. Eq-uity Life Ins. Co.’s Receiver, 179 Ky. 465, 200 S. W. 967, 972; Fairfield v. Huntington, 23 Ariz. 528, 205 P. 814, 815, 22 A.L.R. 1438. United Brother-hood of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. Rogers, 165 Okl. 131, 25 P.2d 57. See Donatio.
As sometimes used, however, the term does not necessari-ly mean an absolute gift without any condition or consid-eration whatever. International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Ander-son County, Tex.Civ.App., 174 S.W. 305, 315.
A donation of real estate is certainly not a mortgage or privilege, but is a transfer of property of a peculiar kind, subject to revocation, sometimes without cause, and always subject to reduction at the suit of the forced helrs of the donor. Bank of Delphi v. Lea, 139 La. 730, 72 So. 187, 188.
In ecclesiastical law. A mode of acquiring a benefice by deed of gift alone, without presenta-tion, institution, or induction. 3 Steph.Comm. 81.
DONATION LANDS. Lands granted from the public domain to an individual as a bounty, gift, or donation; particularly, in early Pennsylvania history, lands thus granted to soldiers of the revo-lutionary war.
DONATIONUM ALIA PERFECTA, ALIA IN-CEPTA ET NON PERFECTA, UT SI DONATIO LECTA FUIT ET CONCESSA, AO TRADITIO NONDUM FUERIT SUBSECUTA. Some gifts are perfect, others incipient and not perfect as if a gift were read and agreed to, but delivery had not then followed. Co.Litt. 56.
DONATIVE ADVOWSON. In ecclesiastical law. A species of advowson, where the benefice is con-ferred on the clerk by the patron’s deed of dona-tion, without presentation, institution, or induc-tion. 2 Bl.Comm. 23; Termes de la Ley.
DONATIVE TRUST. May be created by transfer of property in trust as gift for benefit of another person or by proper declaration of legal owner of property that he will hold it in trust for another’s benefit and does not require payment of any con-sideration by the beneficiary. Elbert v. Waples-Platter Co., Tex.Civ.App., 156 S.W.2d 146, 150, 151.
DONATOR. A donor; one who makes a gift, (donatio.)
DONATOR NUNQUAM DESINIT POSSIDERE, ANTEQUAM DONATORIUS INCIPIAT POSSI-DERE. The donor never ceases to possess, until the donee begins to possess. Bract. fol. 41b; Dyer 281.
DONATORIUS. A donee; a person to whom a gift is made; a purchaser. Bract. fol. 13, et seg.
DONATORY. The person on whom the king be-stows his right to any forfeiture that has fallen to the crown.
DONE. Distinguished from "made." "A ‘deed made’ may no doubt mean an ‘instrument made;’
but a `deed done’ is not an ‘instrument done,’—it is an ‘act done;’ and therefore these words, ‘made and done,’ apply to acts, as well as deeds." Lord Brougham, 4 Bell, App.Cas. 38.
DONEC. Lat. As, long as; while; until; within a certain time.
DONEC PROBETUR IN CONTRARIUM. [Giv-en] until proof to the contrary. 19 C.J. p. 445.
DONEE. One who is invested with a power of appointment; the party executing a power; oth-erwise called the "appointer." 4 Kent, Comm. 316. One to whom a gift is made or a bequest given. He to whom lands or tenements are given in tail. Litt. § 57. In old English law. He to whom lands were given; the party to whom a donatio was made.
DONIS, STATUTE DE. See De Donis, the Stat-ute.
DONNEUR D’AVAL. In French law. Guarantor of negotiable paper other than by indorsement.
DONOR. The party conferring a power. 4 Kent, Comm. 316. One who makes a gift. One who creates a trust. Ulmer v. Fulton, 129 Ohio St. 323, 195 N.E. 557, 97 A.L.R. 1170. He who gives lands or tenements to another in tail. Litt. § 57; Termes de la Ley. In old English law. He by whom lands were given to another; the party making a donatio.
DONUM. Lat. In the civil law. A gift; a free gift. Calvin.
The difference betwéen donum and munus is said to be that donum 1s more general, while munus is speciflc. Vi-cat, Voc.Jur, ; Calvin.
DOOM. In Scotch law. Judicial sentence, or judgment. The decision or sentence of a court orally pronounced by an officer called a "demp-ster" or "deemster." In modern usage, criminal sentences still end with the words "which is pro-nounced for doom."
DOOMSDAY-BOOK. See Domesday-Book.
DOOR. The place of usual entrance in a house, or into a room in the house. State v. McBeth, 49 Kan. 584, 31 P. 145.
DOPE. Any thick liquid or pasty preparation, as of opium for medicinal purposes, of grease for a lubricant, etc., and in popular meaning signifies opium derivative, ranging from harmless con-coction to most powerful narcotics containing opium as ingredient. Abbott v. Vinson, 230 Ky. 786, 20 S.W.2d 995, 996.
DORMANT. Literally, sleeping; hence inactive; in abeyance; unknown; concealed; silent.
DORMANT CLAIM. One which is in abeyance.
DORMANT EXECUTION. One which a creditor delivers to the sheriff with directions to levy only, and not to sell, until further orders, or until a

junior execution 1s received. See Storm v. Woods, 11 Johns. (N.Y.) 110; Kimball v. Munger, 2 Hill (N.Y.) 364.
DORMANT JUDGMENT. One which has not been satisfied, nor extinguished by lapse of time, but which has remained so long unexecuted that exe-cution cannot now be issued upon it without first reviving the judgment, or one which has lost its lien on land from the failure to issue execution on it or take other steps to enforce it within the time limited by statute. 1 Black, Judgm., 2d Ed., § 462; Draper v. Nixon, 93 Ala. 436, 8 So. 489; General Electric Co. v. Hurd, C.C., 171 F. 984; Burlington State Bank v. Marlin Nat. Bank, Tex.Civ.App., 207 S.W. 954, 956.
DORMANT PARTNER. See Partners.
DORMITORY. A sleeping room or building con-taining a series of sleeping rooms, a sleeping apartment capable of containing many beds, es-pecially one connected with a college or boarding school. Russell v. Trustees of Purdue University, 201 Ind. 367, 168 N.E. 529, 534, 65 A.L.R. 1384.
DORMIUNT ALIQUANDO LEGES, NUNQUAM MORIUNTUR. 2 Inst. 161. The laws sometimes sleep, never die.
DORSUM. Lat. The back. In dorso recordi, on the back of the record. 5 Coke, 44b.
DORTURE. (Contracted from dormiture.) A dormitory of a convent; a place to sleep in.
DOS. In Roman. law. Dowry; a wife’s marriage portion; all that property which on marriage is transferred by the wife herself or by another to the husband with a view of diminishing the burden which the marriage will entail upon him. It is of three kinds. Profectitia dos is that which is de-rived from the property of the wife’s father or paternal grandfather. That dos is termed adven-titia which is not profectitia in respect to its source, whether it is given by the wife from her own estate or by the wife’s mother or a third person. It is termed receptitia dos when accom-panied by a stipulation for its reclamation by the constitutor on the termination of the marriage. See Mackeld.Rom.Law, §§ 561, 563; Vicat; Cal-vinus, Lex.; Du Cange; 1 Washb.R.P. 147.
In old English law. The portion given to the wife by the husband at the church door, in con-sideration of the marriage; dower; the wife’s portion out of her deceased husband’s estate in case he had not endowed her. 1 Washb.R.P. 147; 1 Cruise, Dig. 152; Park, Dower.•
DOS DE DOTE PETI NON DEBET. Dower ought not to be demanded of dower. Co.Litt. 31; 4 Coke, 122b. A widow is not dowable of lands assigned to another• woman in dower. 1 Hill.Real Prop. 135; 4 Dane, Abr. 671; 1 Washb.R.P. 209; Brooks v. Everett, 13 Allen (Mass.) 459.
DOS RATIONABILIS. A reasonable marriage portion. A reasonable part of her husband’s es-tate, to which every widow is entitled, of lands of
Black’s Law Dictionary Revlsed 4th Ed.-37
which her husband may have endowed her on the day of marriage. Co.Litt. 336. Dower, at com-mon law. 2 Bl.Comm. 134.
DOS RATIONABILIS VEL LEGITIMA EST CU-JUSLIBET MULTERIS DE QUOCUNQUE TEN– EMENTO TERTIA PARS OMNIUM TERRARUM ET TENEMENTORUM, QUIE VIR SUUS TENUTI IN DOMINIO SUO UT DE FEODO, ETC. Co.Litt. 336. Reasonable or legitimate dower belongs to every woman of a third part of all the lands and tenements of which her husband was seised in his demesne, as of fee, etc.
DOSSIER. Fr. A brief; a bundle of papérs.
DOT. (A French word, adopted in Louisiana.) The fortune, portion, or dowry which a woman brings to her husband by the marriage. Buisson v. Thompson, 7 Mart.La., N.S., 460.
DOTAGE. That feebleness of the mental facul-ties which proceeds from old age. It is a diminu-tion or decay of that intellectual power which was once possessed. It is the slow approach of death; of that irrevocable cessation, without hurt or disease, of all the functions which once be-longed to the living animal. The external func-tions gradually cease; the senses waste away by degrees; and the mind is imperceptibly visited by decay. Owing’s Case, 1 Bland (Md.) 389, 17 Am. Dec. 311.
DOTAL. Relating to the dos or portion of a wo-man; constituting her portion; comprised in her portion.
DOTAL. PROPERTY. In the civil law, in Louisi-ana. Property which the wife brings to the hus-band to assist him in bearing the expenses of the marriage establishment. Extradotal property, otherwise called "paraphernal property," is that which forms no part of the dowry. Fleitas v. Richardson, 13 Sup.Ct. 495, 147 U.S. 550, 37 L.Ed. 276. See, also, Community.
DOTALITIUM. In canon and feudal law. Dower. Spelman, voc. "Doarium"; Calvin.; 2 Bl.Comm. 129. Used as early as A.D. 841.
DOTATION. The act of giving a dowry or por-tion; endowment in general, including the en-dowment of a hospital or other charitable institu-tion.
DOTE, n. In Spanish law. The marriage por-tion of a wife. White, New Recop. b. 1, tit. 6, c. 1. The property which the wife gives to the husband on account of marriage, or for the pur-pose of supporting the matrimonial expenses. Id. b. 1, tit. 7, c. 1, § 1; Schm.Civil Law, 75; Cutter v. Waddingham, 22 Mo. 254; Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 566; Las Partidas, 4. 11. 1; Escriche, Dic. Raz. Dote.
DOTE, v. To be besotted, delirious, silly, or in-sane. Gates v. Meredith, 7 Ind. 441.
DOTE ASSIGNANDA. A writ which lay for a widow, when it was judicially ascertained that a tenant to the king was seised of tenements in fee

or fee-tail at the day of his death, and that he held of the king in chief. In such case the widow might come into chancery, and then make oath that she would not marry without the king’s leave, and then she might have this writ. These widows were called the "king’s widows." Jacob; Holt-house.
DOTE LINDE NIHIL HABET. A writ which lies for a widow to whom no dower has been assigned. 3 Bl.Comm. 182. By 23 & 24 Vict. c. 126. an ordi-nary action commenced by writ of summons has taken its place; but it remains in force in the United States, and under the designation of "dow-er ande nihil habet" (see that title), I is the form in common use for the recovery of dower at law. 1 Washb.R.P. 290; 4 Kent 63.
DOTI LEX FAVET; PRiEMIUM PUDORIS EST; IDEO PARCATUR. Co.Litt. 31; Branch, Princ. The law favors dower; it is the reward of chas-tity; therefore let it be preserved.
DOTIS ADMINISTRATIO. Admeasurement of dower, where the widow holds more than her share, etc.
DOTISSA. A dowager.
DOUBLE. • Twofold; acting in two capacities or having two aspects; multiplied by two. This term has ordinarily the same meaning in law as in popular speech. The principal compound terms into which it enters are noted below.
DOUBLE ASSESSMENT. The imposition of same tax, by same taxing power, upon same subject matter. Aragon v. Empire Gold Mining & Milling Co., 47 N.M. 299, 142 P.2d 539, 541.
DOUBLE ADULTERY. Adultery committed by two persons each of whom is married to another as distinguished from "single" adultery, where one of the participants is unmarried. Hunter v. U. S., 1 Pin. (Wis.) 91, 39 Am.Dec. 277.
DOUBLE AVAIL OF MARRIAGE. In Scotch law. Double the ordinary or single value of a marriage. Bell. See Duplex Valor Maritagii.
DOUBLE BOND. In Scotch law. A bond with a penalty, as distinguished from a single bond. 2 Kames, Eq. 359.
DOUBLE COMPLAINT, DOUBLE QUARREL, or DUPLEX QUERELA. A grievance made known by a clerk or other person, to the archbishop of the province, against the ordinary, for delaying or refusing to do justice in some cause ecclesiastical, as to give sentence, institute a clerk, etc. It is termed a "double complaint," because it is most commonly made against both the judge and him at whose suit justice is denied or delayed; the effect whereof is that the archbishop, taking no-tice of the delay, directs his Letters, under his au-thentical seal, to all clerks of his province, com-manding them to admonish the ordinary, within a certain number of days, to do the justice re-quired, or otherwise to appear before him or his official, and there allege the cause of his delay;
and to signify to the ordinary that if he neither perform the thing enjoined, nor appear nor show cause against it, he himself, in his court of audience, will forthwith proceed to do the jus-tice that is due. Cowell.
DOUBLE COSTS. See Costs.
DOUBLE CREDITOR. One who has a lien on two funds. Newby v. Fox, 90 Kan. 317, 133 P. 890, 47 L.R.A.(N.S.) 302.
DOUBLE DAMAGES. See Damages.
DOUBLE EAGLE. A gold coin of the United States of the value of twenty dollars.
DOUBLE ENTRY. A system of mercantile book-keeping, in which the entries in the day-book, etc., are posted twice into the ledger. First, to a per-sonal account, that is, to the account of the per-son with whom the dealing to which any given entry refers has taken place; secondly, to an im-personal account, as "goods." Mozley & Whitley.
DOUBLE FINE. In old English law. A fine sur done grant et render was called a "double fine," because it comprehended the fine sur cognizance de droit come ceo, etc., and the fine sur concessit. 2 Bl.Comm. 353.
DOUBLE FLEMISH BOND. An arrangement whereby two stretchers are followed by a header throughout the entire course, while on the succeed-ing course the header is centered over the vertical joint between the two stretchers of the course be-low. Seglin Const. Co. v. State, Ct.C1., 22 N.Y.S. 2d 94, 96.
DOUBLE GLAZING. That by which two panes of glass are set in each section of the window sash instead of one. Johnson v. Olsen, 134 Minn. 53, 158 N.W. 805, 806.
DOUBLE HOUSE. A building having accommo-dations for two families, divided vertically instead of horizontally. Donnelly v. Spitza, 246 Mich. 284,
224 N.W. 396. Schwarzer v. Calcasieu Lumber Co., Tex.Civ.App., 176 S.W.2d 597, 599.
DOUBLE INSURANCE. Double insurance is where divers insurances are made upon the same interest in the same subject against the same risks in favor of the same assured, in proportions ex-ceeding the value. 1 Phill.Ins. §§ 359, 366. A double insurance exists where the same person is insured by several insurers separately in respect to the same subject and interest. Insurance Co. v. Gwathmey, 1 S.E. 209, 82 Va. 923; Lowell Mfg. Co. v. Safeguard F. Ins. Co., 88 N.Y. 597; Chere-waty v. Grangers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 181 Md. 149, 28 A.2d 824, 825; Broune v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co.,
225 Mo.App. 665, 37 S.W.2d 977, 981.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY. Common-law and consti-tutional prohibition against "double jeopardy" re-fers not to the same offense eo nomine but to the same crime, transaction or omission. Driggers v. State, 137 Fla. 182, 188 So. 118, 120. A second prosecution after a first trial for the same offense. People ex rel. Rozea v. Warden of Queens County Jail, 43 N.Y.S.2d 211, 213.
DOUBLE PATENTING. The test respecting "double patenting" is whether the claims of both patents, when properly construed in the light of the descriptions given, define essentially the same things. Waterbury Buckle Co. v. G. E. Prentice Mfg. Co., D.C.Conn., 294 F. 930, 937. Occurs only when claims of two patents issued to one applicant are the same. Scharf v. Weinfeld & Kahn, D.C. N.Y., 31 F.Supp. 689, 692.
The imposition of the same tax, by the same tax-ing power, upon the same subject matter. City of Philadelphia v. Heinel Motors, 16 A.2d 761, 764, 142 Pa.Super. 493. People ex rel. Toman v. Ad-vance Heating Co., 376 III. 158, 33 N.E.2d 206, 209, 210.
DOUBLE PLEA, DOUBLE PLEADING. See Du-plicity; Plea; Pleading.
DOUBLE POSSIBILITY. A possibility upon a possibility. 2 Bl.Comm. 170.
DOUBLE RECOVERY. Recovery which repre-sents more than the total maximum loss which all parties have sustained. Hindmarsh v. Sulpho Sa-line Bath Co., 108 Neb. 168, 187 N.W. 806, 808.
DOUBLE RENT. In English law. Rent payable by a tenant who continues in possession after the time for which he has given notice to quit, until the time of his quitting possession. St. 11 Geo. II. c. 19.
DOUBLE TAX RULE. Collections made in taxa-ble year on sales made in prior years, and which had already been taxed in prior years. Hoover-Bond Co. v. Denmah, C.C.A.Ohio, 59 F.2d 909, 910.
DOUBLE TAXATION. The taxing of the same itero or piece of property twice to the same per-son, or taxing it as the property of one person and again as the property of another; but this does not include the imposition of different taxes concurrently on the same property (e. g., a city tax and a school tax), nor the taxation of the same piece of property to different persons when they hold different interests in it or when it re-presents different values in their hands, as when both the mortgagor and mortgagee of property are taxed in respect to their interests in it, or when a tax is laid upon the capital or property of a corporation and also upon the value of its shares of stock in the hands of the separate stock-holders. Cook v. Burlington, 59 Iowa, 251, 13 N. W. 113, 44 Am.Rep. 679. "Double taxation" means taxing twice for the same purpose in the same year some of the property in the territory in which the tax is laid without taxing all of it. Die-fendorf v. Gallet, 51 Idaho 619, 10 P.2d 307, 315; Amarillo-Petos Valley Truck Unes v. Gallegos, 44 N.M. 120, 99 P.2d 447, 451.
DOUBLE USE. In patent law. An application of a principie or process, previously known and ap-plied, to some new use, but which does not lead to
a new result or the production of a new article. De Lamar v. De Lamar Min. Co., C.C.Idaho, 110 F. 542.
DOUBLE VALUE. In English law. This is a penalty on a tenant holding over after his land-lord’s notice to quit. By 4 Geo. II. c. 28, § 1, it is enacted that if any tenant for Life or years hold over any lands, etc., after the determination of his estate, after demand made, and notice in writ-ing given, for delivering the possession thereof, by the landlord, or the person having the rever-sion or remainder therein, or his agent thereunto lawfully authorized, such tenant so holding over shall pay to the person so kept out of possession at the rate of double the yearly value of the lands, etc., so detained, for so long a time as the same are detained. See Woodf. Landl. & Ten. (12th Ed.) 717, et seg.
DOUBLE VOUCHER. This was when a common recovery was had, and an estate of freehold was first conveyed to any indifferent person against whom the prcecipe was brought, and then he vouched the tenant in tail, who vouched over the common vouchee. For, if a recovery were had immediately against a tenant in tail, it barred only the estate in the premises of which he was then actually seised, whereas, if the recovery were had against another person, and the tenant in tail were vouchee, it barred every latent right and interest which he might have in the lands recovered. 2 Bl.Comm. 359.
DOUBLE WASTE. When a tenant bound to re-pair suffers a house to be wasted, and then un-lawfully fells timber to repair it, he is said to commit double waste. Co. Litt. 53.
DOUBLE WILL. A will in which two persons join, each leaving his property and estate to the other, so that the survivor takes the whole. Evans v. Smith, 28 Ga. 98, 73 Am.Dec. 751.
DOUBLES. Letters-patent. Cowell.
DOUBT, v. To question or hold questionable. Claussen v. State, 21 Wyo. 505, 133 P. 1055, 1056.
DOUBT, n. Uncertainty of mind; the absence of a settled opinion or conviction; the attitude of mind towards the acceptance of or belief in a proposition, theory, or statement, in which the judgment is not at rest but inclines alternately to either side. Rowe v. Baber, 93 Ala. 422, 8 So. 865; Smith v. Railway Co., 143 Mo. 33, 44 S.W. 718; West Jersey Traction Co. v. Camden Horse R. Co., 52 N.J.Eq. 452, 29 A. 333. An equipoise of the mind arising from an equality of contrary reasons. Ayliffe, Pand. 121.

Reasonable Doubt

This is a term of ten used, probably pretty well understood, but not easily defined. It does not mean a mere possible doubt, because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, afterthe entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in that con-dition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge. If upon proof there is reasonable doubt remaining, the accused is entitled to the benefit of it by an acquittal; for it is not suffi-cient to establish a probability, though a strong one, arising from the doctrine of chances, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the contrary, but the evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral cer-tainty,—a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act con-scientiously upon it. This is proof beyond rea-sonable doubt; because if the law, which mostly depends upon considerations of a moral nature, should go further than this, and require absolute certainty, it would exclude circumstantial evi-dence altogether. Egan v. U. S., 52 App.D.C. 384, 287 F. 958.
Proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" is not be-yond all possible or imaginary doubt, but such proof as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it tends to support. It is proof "to a moral certainty,"—such proof as satisfies the judgment and consciences of the jury, as reasonable men, and applying their reason to the evidence before them, that the crime charged has been committed by the defendant, and so satisfies them as to leave no other reasonable conclusion possible. State v. Koski, 100 W.Va. 98, 130 S.E. 100, 101.
The difflculty of a satisfactory definition is discussed In 57 Am.L.Reg. 419, where C. J. Shaw’s definition is criti-cized and that in Com. v. Costley, 118 Mass. 1, supra, is suggested as better. And in Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 7 S.Ct. 614, 30 L.Ed. 708, it was approved as contrasted with C. J. Shaw’s definition.
A "reasonable doubt" is such a doubt as would cause a reasonable and prudent man in the grav-er and more important affairs of lif e to pause and hesitate to act upon the truth of the matter charg-ed. But a reasonable doubt is not a mere possi-bility of innocence, nor a caprice, shadow, or speculation as to innocence not arising out of the evidence or the want of it. State v. Perkins, 21 N.M. 135, 153 P. 258, 259.
A "reasonable doubt" is such a doubt as an uprlght man might entertain in an honest investigation after truth. Peterson v. State, 47 Ga. 524(5); Lochamy v. State, 152 Ga. 235, 109 S.E. 497.
A "reasonable doubt" is one for which a reason can be given. State v. Jefferson, 4.3 La.Ann. 995, 10 So. 199. Contra: Abbott v. Territory, 20 Okl. 119, 94 P. 179, 16 L. R.A.,N.S., 260, 129 Am.St.Rep. 818.
The term needs no definition. People v. Rogers, 324 III. 224, 154 N.E. 909, 913.
DOUBTFUL PAPER. "Slow" paper and "doubt-ful paper" are not synonymous. American Nat. Bank of Portsmouth v. Ames, 169 Va. 711, 194 S.E. 784, 793.
DO’UBTFUL TITLE. One as to the validity of which there exists some doubt, either as te mat-ter of fact or of law; one which invites or ex-poses the party holding it to litigation. Barrett
v. McMannis, 153 Kan. 420, 110 P.2d 774, 778; Black v. American International Corporation, 264 Pa. 260, 107 A. 737, 739. Distinguished from a "marketable" title, which is of such a character that the courts will compel its acceptance by a purchaser who has agreed to huy the property or has bid it in at public sale. Herman v. Somers, (158 Pa. 424, 27 A. 1050, 38 Am.St.Rep. 851.
DOUN. L. Fr. A gift. Otherwise written "don" and "done." The thirty-fourth chapter of Britton is entitled "De Douns."
DOVE. Doves are animals ferce naturce, and not the subject of larceny unless they are in the own-er’s custody. Com. v. Chace, 9 Pick., Mass. 15, 19 Am.Dec. 348; Ruckman v. Outwater, 28 N.J.Law 581.
DOVETAIL. A structure in the form of a tenon having oppositely-flared edges similar in shape to the tail of a bird. Cheney Co. v. Cunningham, D.C.Pa., 37 F.Supp. 224, 226.
DOWABLE. Subject to be charged with dower; as dowable lands.
Entitled or entitling to dower. Thus, a dowable interest in lands is such as entitles the owner to have such lands charged with dower.
DOWAGER. A widow who is endowed, or who has a jointure in lieu of dower. In England, this is a title or addition given to the widows of princes, dukes, earls, and other noblemen, to dis-tinguish them from the wives of the heirs, who have right to bear the title. 1 B1.Comm. 224.
DOWAGER–QUEEN. The widow of the king. As such she enjoys most of the privileges belong-ing to her as queen consort. It is not treason to conspire her death or violate her chastity, be-cause the succession to the crown is not thereby endangered. No man, however, can marry her without a special license from the sovereign, on pain of forfeiting his lands or goods. 1 B1.Comm. 233.
DOWER. The provision which the law makes for a widow out of the lands or tenements of her husband, for her support and the nurture of her children. Co. Litt. 30a; 2 B1.Comm. 130; In re Miller’s Estate, 44 N.M. 214, 100 P.2d 908, 911. A species of life-estate which a woman is, by law, entitled to claim on the death of her husband, in the lands and tenements of which he was seised in fee during the marriage, and which her issue, if any, might by possibility have inherited. 1 Steph.Comm. 249; 2 B1.Comm. 129; Cruise, Dig. tit. 6; 2 Crabb, Real Prop. p. 124, § 1117; 4 Kent, Comm. 35. See Inchoate Dower.
"Dower" Is the lite estate to which every married woman is entitled on death of her husband, intestate, or, in case she dissents from his will, one-third in value of all lands of which husband was beneficially seized in law or in fact. at any time during coverture. McGehee v. MeGehee, 189 N. C. 558, 127 S.E. 684, 687. McLawhorn v. Smith, 211 N.C. 513, 191 S.E. 35, 38, 110 A.L.R. 980.
The term, both technically and in popular ac-ceptation, has reference to real estate exclusive-ly. Shackelford v. Shackelford, 181 Va. 869, 27 S.E.2d 354, 359.
"Dower,"An modem use, is distinguished from "dowry." The former is a provision for a widow on her husband’s death; the latter is a bride’s portion on her marriage. Wendler v. Lambeth, 163 Mo. 428, 63 S.W. 684,
DOWER AD OSTIUM ECCLESLE. Dower at the church door or porch. An ancient kind of dower in England, where a man, (being tenant in fee-simple, of full age,) openly at the church door, where all marriages were formerly celebrated, alter affiance made and troth plighted between them, endowed his wife with the whole of his lands, or such quantity as he pleased, at the same time specifying and ascertaining the same. Litt. § 39; 2 Bl.Comm. 133.
DOWER BY COMMON LAW. The ordinary kind of dower in English and American law, consisting of a life interest in one-third of the lands of which the husband was seised in fee at any time during the coverture. Litt. § 36; 2 BI.Comm. 132; 2 Steph.Comm. 302; 4 Kent, Comm. 35.
DOWER BY CUSTOM. A kind of dower in Eng-land, regulated by custom, where the quantity allowed the wife differed from the proportion of the common law; as that the wife should have half the husband’s lands; or, in some places, the whole; and, in some, only a quarter. 2 Bl,Comm. 132; Litt. § 37.
DOWER DE LA PLUS BELLE (DE LA PLUIS BEALE). L. Fr. Dower of the fairest [part.] A species of ancient English dower, incident to the old tenures, where there was a guardian in chivalry, and the wife occupied lands of the heir as guardian in socage. If the wife brought a writ of dower against such guardian in chivalry, he might show this matter, and pray that the wife might be endowed de la plus belle of the tenement in socage. Litt. § 48. This kind of dower was abolished with the military tenures. 2 Bl.Comm. 132.
DOWER EX ASSENSU PATRIS. Dower by the father’s assent. A species of dower ad ostium ecclesice, made when the husband’s father was alive, and the son, by his consent expressly giv-en, endowed his wife with parcel of his father’s lands. Litt. § 40; 2 BI.Comm. 133; Grogan v. Garrison, 27 Ohio St. 61.
DOWER UNDE NIHIL HABET. A writ of right which lay for a widow to whom no dower had been assigned.
DOWLE STONES. Stones dividing lands, etc. Cowell.
DOWMENT. In old English law. Endowment; dower. Grogan v. Garrison, 27 Ohio St. 61.
DOWNWARD COURSE. Term "dip" is miners’ word synonymous with expression "downward course" in mining act, and means direction of ore vein or lode in its descent into earth at right angles to its strike or course. 30 U.S.C.A. § 26. Brugger v. Lee Yim, 12 Ca1.App.2d 38, 55 P.2d 564, 570.
DOWRESS. A woman entitled to dower; a ten-ant in dower. 2 P.Wms. 707.
DOVVRY. The property which a woman brings to her husband in marriage; now more common-ly called a "portion."
This word expresses the proper meaning of the "dos" of the Roman, the "dot" of the French, and the "dote" of the Spanish, law, but is a very different thing from "dower," with which it has sometimes been confounded. See Co.Litt. 31; Dig. 23, 3, 76; Code 5, 12, 20; Buard v. De Russy, 6 Rob., La., 111; Gates v. Legendre, 10 Rob., La., 74; Cut-ter v. Waddingham, 22 Mo. 254.
By dowry, in the Louisiana Civil Code (see ar-ticle 2337), is meant the effects which the wife brings to the husband to support the expenses of marriage. It is given to the husband, to be enjoyed by him so long as the marriage shall last, and the income of it belongs to him. He alone has the administration of it during mar-riage, and his wife cannot deprive him of it. The real estate settled as dowry is inalienable during marriage, unless the marriage contract contains a stipulation to the contrary. De Young v. De Young, 6 La.Ann. 786.
DOYLE RULE. A formula for computing the board measure from the dimensions of a log. Peter v. Owl Bayou Cypress Co., 137 La. 1067, 69 So. 840, 841. The rule is to deduct four inches from the diameter of the log, as an allowance for slab, square one-quarter of the remainder, and multiply the result by the length of the log in feet. Morrison v. Pickrell Walnut Co., 199 III. App. 175, 176.
DOZE. To slumber or sleep lightly. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of St. Paul, Minn., v. Kendle, 163 Ky. 146, 173 S.W. 373, 374.
DOZEIN. L. Fr. Twelve; a person twelve years of age. St. 18 Edw. II.; Barring. Ob. St. 208.
DOTEN PEERS. Twelve peers assembled at the instance of the barons, in the reign of Henry III., to be privy counselors, or rather conservators of the kingdom.
DR. An abbreviation for "doctor;" also, in com-mercial usage, for "debtor," indicating the items or particulars in a Bill or in an account-book chargeable against the person to whom the bill is rendered or in whose name the account stands. as opposed to "Cr." ("Credit" or "creditor"), which indicates the items for which he is given credit. Jaqua v. Shewalter, 10 Ind.App. 234, 37 N.E. 1072.
DRACHMA. A term employed in old pleadings and records, to denote a groat. Townsh. P. 180,
An Athenian silver coin, of the value of about fifteen cents.
DRACO REGIS. The standard, ensign, or
mili-tary colors borne in war by the ancient kings of lingland, having the figure of a dragon painted thereon.DRACONIAN LAWS. A code of laws prepared by Draco, the celebrated lawgiver of Athens. These laws were exceedingly severe, and the term is now sometimes applied to any laws of unusual harshness.
DRAFF. \Vaste matter, sweepings, refuse, lees, or dregs. In weighing commodities the term sig-nifies dust and dirt, and not What is generally meant by "draught" or "draft" (q. v.). 28 C.J.S. p. 227.
DRAFT. The common term for a bill of ex-change; as being drawn by one person on an-other. Hinnemann v. Rosenback, 39 N.Y. 100; Ennis v. Coshocton Nat. Bank, 27 Ga.App. 479, 108 S.E. 811.
An order for the payment of money drawn by one person on another. It is said to be a no-men generalissimum, and to include all such or-ders. Wilson v. Buchenau, D.C.Cal., 43 F.Supp. 272, 275.
The term includes a cashier’s check, People v. Miller, 278 III. 490, 116 N.E. 131, 138 L.R.A.1917E, 797; Advance-Rum-ely Thresher Co. v. Hess, 85 Mont. 293, 279 P. 236, 237; but a draft is distinguishable from a cashier’s check in that a draft is a bill of exchange payable on demand pur-porting to be drawn on deposit while a cashier’s check ís a primary obligation of a bank which íssues It and con-stitutes íts written promise to pay it on demand. In re Bank of U. S., 277 N.Y.S. 96, 243 App.Div. 287. It is dis-tinguished from "check" by the fact that in a draft the drawer is a bank, while in the ordinary check the drawer is an individual. Leach v. Mechanics’ Sav. Bank, 202 Iowa, 899, 211 N.W. 506, 508, 50 A.L.R. 388.
A tentative, provisional, or preparatory writ-ing out of any document (as a will, contract, lease, etc.) for purposes of discussion and correc-tion, which is afterwards to be copied out in its final shape.
Also, a small arbitrary deduction or allowance made to a merchant or importer, in the case of goods sold by weight or taxable by weight, to cover possible loss of weight in handling or from differences in scales. Marriott v. Brune, 9 How. 633, 13 L.Ed. 282; Seeberger v. Mfg. Co., 15 S. Ct. 583, 157 U.S. 183, 39 L.Ed. 665; Napier v. Barney, 17 Fed.Cas. 1149.
A draft in stockyard parlance is all those ani-mals in one consignment weighed as a single sales or purchase classification. Acker v. U. S., D. Cali., 12 F.Supp. 776, 780.
DRAFTSMAN. Any, one who draws or frames a legal document, e. g., a will, conveyance, plead-ing, etc.
In the marine engineering profession, any of various men who design the several parts of ves-sels and other machinery in the different depart-ments. Ex parte Aird, D.C.Pa., 276 F. 954, 956.
DRAG. In a technical sense, the lower part of the mold for casting iron pipe. Casey-Hedges Co. v. Gates, 139 Tenn. 282, 201 S.W. 760, 761.
DRAGO DOCTRINE. The principie asserted by Luis Drago, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic, in a letter to the Argentine Minister at Washington, December 29, 1902, that
the forcible intervention of states to secure the
payment of debts due to their citizens from foreign states is unjustifiable and danirrous to the security and peace of the nations of South America. The subject was brought before the Conference by the United States and a Conven• tion was adopted in which the contracting pow-ers agreed, with some restrictive conditions, not to have recourse to armed force for the recov-ery of contract debts claimed by their nationals against a foreign state. Higgins, 184-197. See Calvo Doctrine.
DRAGOMAN. An interpreter employed in the east, and particularly at the Turkish court.
DRAIN, v. To conduct water from one place to another, for the purpose of drying the former. To make dry; to draw off water; to rid land of its superfluous moisture by adapting or improv-ing natural water courses and supplementing them, when necessary, by artificial ditches. Peo-ple v. Parks, 58 Cal. 639.
To "drain," in its larger sense, includes not only the supplying of outlets and channels to relieve the land from water, but also the provision of ditches, drains, and embankments to prevent water from accumulating. Holt v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 176 S.W. 743, 746; In re Mississippl and. Fox River Drainage Dist., 270 Mo. 157, 192 S.W. 727, 731; Pioneer Real Estate Co. v. City of Portland, 119 Or. 1, 247 P. 319, 323.
DRAIN, n. A trench or ditch to convey water from wet land; a channel through which water may flow off.
The word has no technical legal mea/ling. Any hollow space In the ground, natural or artificial, where water la collected and passes off, ís a ditch or drain. Sherrod v. Battle, 154 N.C. 345, 70 S.E. 834, 836.
The term may be synonymous with "water course." Green v. County Com’rs of Harbine, 74 Ohio St. 318, 78 N.E. 521, 522.
"Sewers" díffer from "drains" only in that the former are In cities, and generally covered over, while the latter are in rural communities, and open. Barton v. Drainage Dist. No. 30, 174 Ark. 173, 294 S.W. 418, 419. But "drains" may sometimes include sewers. City of Charlestown, 170 III. 336, 48 N.E. 985, 986. See, generally, Mound City Land & Stock Co. v. Miller, 170 Mo. 240, 70 S.W. 721, 724, 6 L.R.A. 190, 94 Am.St.Rep. 727.
Also, sometimes, the easement or servitude (ac-quired by grant or prescription) which consists in the right to drain water through another’s land. See 3 Kent, Comm. 436; 7 M. & G. 354.
DRAINAGE DISTRICT. A political subdivision of the state, created for the purpose of draining and reclaiming wet and overtlowed land, as well as to preserve the public health and convenience. Commander v. Board of Com’rs of Buras Levee Dist., 202 La. 325, 11 So.2d 605, 607.
DRAM. In common parlance, a drink of some substance containing alcohol; something which can produce intoxication. Lacy v. State, 32 Tex. 228. See Wright v. People, 101 III. 134.
DRAM—SHOP. A drinking saloon, where liquors are sold to be drunk on the premises. Com. v. Marzynski, 21 N.E. 228, 149 Mass. 68. A place where spirituous liquors are sold by the dram or the drink; a barroom. McCormick v. Brennan, 224 Ill.App. 251, 254.
DRAM SHOP ACT. A civil damage statute di-rected at the operators of dram shops and at own-ers of buildings and premises wherein the opera-tors are tenants. It permits an action to be brought by a person injured by an intoxicated per-son against one who contributed to the intoxica-tion. See 1958 Univ. of Ill.Law Forum, No. 2 "Ac-tions under the Illinois Dram Shop Act," and John A. Appleman, "Civil liability under the Il-linois Dram Shop Act," 34 Ill.L.Rev. 30 (1939), Wanna v. Miller (N.Dak.) 136 N.W.2d 563 (1965).
DRAMA. A term descriptive of any represen-tation in which a story is told, a moral conveyed, or the passions portrayed, whether by words and actions combined, or by mere actions alone. Asa G. Candler, Inc., v. Georgia Theater Co., 148 Ga. 188, 96 S.E. 226, 227, L.R.A.1918F, 389. A story put in action. Zucarro v. State, 82 Tex.Cr.R. 1, 197 S.W. 982, 985, L.R.A.1918B, 354.
DRAMATIC COMPOSITION. In copyright law. A literary work setting forth a story, incident, or scene from life, in which, however, the nar-rative is not related, but is represented by a dia-logue and action; may include a descriptive poem set to music, or a pantomime, but not a composi-tion for musical instruments alone, nor a mere spectacular exhibition or stage dance. Martinetti v. McGuire, 16 Fed.Cas. 920; Fuller v. Bemis, C. C.N.Y., 50 Fed. 926.
DRAMATIC WORK. Photoplay is "dramatic work" within Copyright Law. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distributing Corporation v. Bijou Theatre of Holyoke, D.C.Mass., 3 F.Supp. 66, 73; contra. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distributing Corporation v. Bijou Theatre, D.C.Mass., 50 F.2d 908, 909.
DRAUGHT. Act of drawing, or the thing drawn; act of moving loads by drawing as by beasts of burden, and the like; and the term may be used in the sense of pull. Jackson Floor Covering v. Maryland Casualty Co. of Baltimore, 117 N.J.L. 401, 189 A. 84, 85.
DRAW, n. A movable section of a bridge, which may be raised up or turned to one side, so as to admit the passage of vessels. Gildersleeve v. Railroad Co., D.C.N.Y., 82 Fed. 766; A depression in the surface of the earth, in the nature of a shallow ravine or gulch, sometimes many miles in length, forming a channel for the escape of rain and melting snow draininl into it from ei-ther side. Railroad Co. v. Sutherland, 44 Neb. 526. 62 N.W. 859.
DRAW, v. To draw a firearm or deadly weapon is to point it intentionally. State v. Boyles, 24 N. M. 464, 174 P. 423. To draw a bead on; to bring into line with the bead or fore sight of a rifle and the hind sight; to aim at. Hatfield v. Common-wealth, 200 Ky. 243, 254 S.W. 748, 749.
To prepare a draft; to compose and write out in due form, as, a deed, complaint, petition, me-morial, etc. Winnebago County State Bank v. Hustel, 119 Iowa 115, 93 N.W. 70.
To draw a jury is to select the persons who are to compase it, either by taking their names successively, but at hazard, from the jury box, or by summoning them individually to attend the court. Smith v. State, 34 So. 168, 136 Ala. 1.
In old criminal practice. To drag (on a hurdle) to the place of execution. Anciently no hurdle was allowed, but the criminal was actually dragged along the road to the place of execution. A part of the ancient punishment of traitors was to be thus drawn. 4 Bl.Comm. 92, 377.
In mercantile law. To draw a bill of exchange is to write (or cause it to be written) and sign it; to make, as a note. Knox v. Rivers Bros., 17 Ala.App. 630, 88 So. 33, 34.
In fiscal law and administration. To take out money from a bank, treasury, or other deposi-tory in the exercise of a lawful right and in a lawful manner. But to "draw a warrant" is not to draw the money; it is to make or execute the instrument which authorizes the drawing of the money. Brown v. Fleischner, 4 Or. 149.
DRAWBACK. In the customs laws, an allow-ance made by the government upon the duties due on imported merchandise when the importer, in-stead of selling it here, re-exports it; or the re-funding of such duties if already paid. This al-lowance amounts, in some cases, to the whole of the original .duties; in others, to a part only. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1313.
DRAVVEE. A person to whom a bill of exchange is addressed, and who is requested to pay the amount of money therein mentioned.
DRAWER. The person drawing a bill of ex-change and addressing it to the drawee. Boaten-reiter v. Williams, 58 Ga.App. 635, 199 S.E. 558, 559.
DRAWING. In patent law. A representation of the appearance of material objects by means of Unes and marks upon paper, cardboard, or other substance. Ampt v. Cincinnati, 8 Ohio Dec. 628; 35 U.S.C.A. § 34.
DRAWLATCHES. Thieves; robbers. Cowell.
DRAYAGE. A charge for the transportation of property in wheeled vehicles, such as drays, wa-gons, and carts. Soule v. San Francisco Gas-light Co., 54 Cal. 242.
DREDGE. Formerly applied to a net or drag for taking oysters; now a machine for cleansing canals and rivers. To "dredge" is to gather or take with a dredge, to remove sand, mud, and filth from the beds of rivers, harbors, and canals, with a dredging machine. 15 Can.L.T. 268.
DREIT-DREIT. Droit-droit. (Also written with-out the hyphen.) Double right. A union of the right of possession and the right of property. 2 Bl.Comm. 199.
DRENCHES, or DRENGES. In Saxon law. Ten-ants in capite. They are said to be such as, at the coming of William the Conqueror, being put out of their estates, were afterwards restored to them, on their making it appear that they were the true owners thereof, and neither in auxilio or consilio against him. Spelman.
DRENGAGE. The tenure by which the drenches, or drenges, held their lands. A variety of feudal tenure by serjeanty (q. v.), often occurring in the northern counties of England, involving a kind of general service. Vinogradoff, Engl.Soc. in Eleventh Cent. 62. Little is known of it; 3 Holdsw.Hist.E.L. 132.
DRESSING. In the meat packing industry. The freeing of the carcass of hair, scurf, toenails, evisceration of the carcass, the cleaning and separation of the warm fancy meats, and the placing of these in the coolers. Likewise, all the operations performed upon the carcasses after slaughtering and until they go to the coolers, are included. The cleaning of casings is considered as "dressing", as is the grading of casings, if the grading takes place prior to salting. The removal of hides, pelts, bones, fats, blood and other ma-terials from the dressing fioor is also considered as "dressing" in the meat packing industry. Flem-ing v. Swift & Co., D.C.I11., 41 F.Supp. 825, 828. Freeing of body from feathers and matters not suitable for consumption. Shain v. Armour & Co., D.C.Ky., 50 F.Supp. 907, 911.
DRIER. In the paper-making trade, a hot drum. Tompkins-Hawley-Fuller Co. v. Holden, C.C.A.N.Y., 273 F. 424, 430.
DRIFT, v. To float or be driven along by or as a current of water or air; to accumulate in heaps by the force of the wind; to be driven into heaps, as snow or sand drifts. State ex rel. Perkins v. Hardwick, 144 Kan. 3, 57 P.2d 1231, 1234.
DRIFT, n. In mining law. An underground passage driven horizontally along the course of a mineralized vein or approximately so. Distin-guished from "shaft," which is an opening made at the surf ace and extending downward into the earth vertically, or nearly so, upon the vein or intended to reach it; and from "tunnel," which is a lateral or horizontal passage underground in-tended to reach the vein or mineral deposit, where drifting may begin. Jurgenson v. Diller, 114 Cal. 491, 46 P. 610, 55 Am.St.Rep. 83; Empire Star Mines Co. v. Butler, 62 Cal.App.2d 49, 145 P.2d 49, 63.
In old English law. A driving, especially of cattle.
DRIFT NET. A net with both ends free to drift with the current;—distinguished from a "set net," which is one fastened at one or both ends, so the whole net cannot drift with the current. State v. Blanchard, 96 Or. 79, 189 P. 421, 427.
DRIFT–STUFF. This term signifies, not goods which are the subject of salvage, but matters fioat-ing at random, without any known or discoverable ownership, which, if cast ashore, will probably
never be reclaimed, but will, as a matter of course, accrue to the riparian proprietor. Watson v. Knowles, 13 R.I. 641.
DRIFTS OF THE FOREST. A view or examina-tion of what cattle are in a forest, chase, etc., that it may be known whether it be surcharged or not; and whose the beasts are, and whether they are commonable. These drifts are made at certain times in the year by the officers of the forest, when all cattle are driven into some pound or place inclosed, for the before-mentioned purposes, and also to discover whether any cattle of stran-gers be there, which ought not to common. Man-wood, p. 2, c. 15.
DRIFTING. The natural tendency of wells drilled in search of oil or gas to deflect from vertical. Gliptis v. Fifteen Oil Co., 204 La. 896, 16 So.2d 471, 476.
DRIFTLAND, DROFLAND, or DRYFLAND. A Saxon word, signifying a tribute or yearly pay-ment made by some tenants to the king, or their landlords, for driving their cattle through a manor to fairs or markets. Cowell.
DRIFTVVAY. A road or way over which cattle are driven. Selw.N.P. 1037; Woolr.Ways 1; 2 Hilliard, Abr.Prop. 33; Smith v. Ladd, 41 Me. 314; Swen-sen v. Marino, 306 Mass. 582, 29 N.E.2d 15, 18, 130 A.L.R. 763.
DRILL AND COMPLETE A WELL. Term "drfll and complete a well" to known oil sand for pur-pose of testing and operating for oil production meats cleaning out of well, so that sand reached may give flow of production. Arnold y. Adams, 147 Okl. 57, 294 P. 142, 147.
DRILLED. Completed;raid of oil wells and the like. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. y. Harris, Tex. Civ.App., 230 S.W, 237, 238. The term implies progress in the work, and not mere use of the drill. Texas Const. Co. v. Dearing, Tex.Civ.App., 296 S.W. 1112, 1115,
DRILLING IN. Drilling, as an oil well, after the casing has been set. Smith & Hayslip v. Wilcox Oil Co., Tex.Civ.App., 253 S.W. 641, 642.
DRINCLEAN. Sax. A contribution of tenants, in the time of the Saxons, towards a potation, or ale, provided to entertain the lord, or his steward. Cowell. See Cervisarli.
DRINK. To use liquid as a beverage to slake thirst. State v. Woodward, 41 Idaho 353, 238 P. 525, 527. See, also, Merle v. Beifeld, 194 I1l.App. 364, 385. Specifically, to use intoxicating liquors.
DRINKABLE. Capable of being drunk; fit to drink. McChristy v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 26, 133 S.W.2d 976, 977.
DRINKING MAN. One who takes a drink of liquor when he chooses, even though it may be so infrequent as to produce no harmful effect on his health. Tuepker v. Sovereign Camp, W. O. W., Mo.App., 226 S.W. 1002, 1003.DRINKING–SHOP. A place where intoxicating liquors are sold, bartered, or delivered to be drunk on the premises. Portland v. Schmidt, 13 Or. 17, 6 Pac. 221.
DRIP. A species of easement or servitude obli-gating one man to permit the water falling from another man’s house to fall upon his own land. 3 Kent, Comm. 436; 1 Rolle, Abr. 107. A mecha-nism which hastens the condensation of moisture and collects the liquid in a reservoir from which it is drained into a storage tank. Slater v. United Fuel Gas Co., 126 W.Va. 127, 27 S.E.2d 436, 437.
DRIVE, n. An underground process. Diller v. St. Louis, S. & P. R. R., 304 III. 373, 136 N.E. 703, 704.
DRIVE, v. To impel motion and quicken. Bosse v. Marye, 80 Cal.App. 109, 250 P. 693, 696. To com-pel, urge, or move in some manner or direction. Howell v. J. Mandelbaum & Sons, 160 Iowa 119, 140 N.W. 397, 398, Ann.Cas.1915D, 349. To con-trol the motive power, as of a motor vehicle. Grant v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 78 Mont. 97, 252 P. 382, 385. To go by, or pass in, a carriage whose course is wholly or partly under one’s di-rection. Federal Life Ins. Co. v. McAleer, 161 Okl. 251, 17 P.2d 681, 683.
DRIVE–IT–YOU’RSELF CARS. A term used to describe automobiles which their owners, as a regular business, rent out for hire without fur-nishing drivers. City of Rockford v. Nolan, 316 III. 60, 146 N.E. 564. See, also, Welch v. Hartnett, 127 Misc. 221, 215 N.Y.S. 540; White v. Holmes, 89 Fla. 251, 103 So. 623; Blashfield’s Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, p. 2802.
DRIVER. One employed in conducting or operat-ing a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle, with horses, mules, or other animals, or a bicycle, tricycle, or motor car, though not a street railroad car. A person actually doing driving, whether em-ployed by owner to drive or driving his own ve-vehicle. Wallace v. Woods, 340 Mo. 452, 102 S.W.2d 91, 97.
DRIVING. To urge forward under guidance, com-pel to go in a particular direction, urge onward, and direct the course of. Mould v. Travelers’ Mut. Casualty Co., 219 Iowa 16, 257 N.W. 349.
DROFDEN, or DROFDENNE. A grove or woody place where cattle are kept. Jacob.
DROFLAND. Sax. A quit rent, or yearly pay-ment, formerly made by some tenants to the king, or their landlords, for driving their cattle through a manor to fairs or markets. Cowell; Blount.
DROIT. In French law. Right, justice, equity, law, the whole body of law; also a right. Toullier, n. 96; Pothier, Droit.
This term exhibits the same ambigulty which 1s discov-erable in the German equivalent, "recht" and the English word "right." On the one hand, these terms answer to the Roman "jus," and thus indicate law in the abstract, con-sldered as the foundation of all rights, or the complex of underlying moral principies which impart the character of justice to all positive law, or give it an ethical content. Taken in thls abstract sense, the tercos may be adjectives,
in which case they are equivalent to "just," or nouns, In which case they may be paraphrased by the expressions "justice," "morality," or "equity." On the other hand, they serve to polnt out a right; that is, a power, privilege, faculty, or demand, lnherent in one person, and incident upon another. In the latter signification, droit (or recht or right) is the correlative of "duty" or "obligation." In the former sense, It may be considered as opposed to wrong, injustice, or the absence of law. Droit has the further ambiguity that it is sometimes used to denote the existing body of law considered as one whole, or the sum total of a number of Individual laws taken together. See Jus; Recht; Right.
In old English law. Law; right; a writ of right. Co.Litt. 158b.
A person was said to have droit droit, plurimum and plurinium possessionis, when he had the freehold, the fee, and the property in him. Crabb, Hlst.E.L. 406.
—Autre droit. The right of another.
DROITS C1VIIS. This phrase in French law de-notes private rights, the exercise of which is in-dependent of the status (gualité) of citizen. For-eigners enjoy them; and the extent of that en-joyment is determined by the principie of red-procity. Conversely, foreigners may be sued on contracts made by them in France. Brown.
DROIT–CLOSE. An ancient writ, directed to the lord of ancient demesne on behalf of those of his tenants who held their lands and tenements by charter in fee-simple, in fee-tail, for lile, or in dower. Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 23.
DROIT COMMON. The common law. Litt. 4 213; Co.Litt. 142a.
DROIT COUTUMER. Common law.
DROIT D’ACCESSION. That property which is acquired by making a new species out of the ma-terial of another. It is equivalent to the Roman "specificatio." This subject is treated of in the Code Civil de Napoléon, arts. 565, 577; Merlin, Répert. Accession; Malleville’s Discussion, art. 565.
DROIT D’ACCROISSEMENT. The right which an heir or legatee has of combining with his own interest in a succession the interest of a coheir or colegatee who either refuses to or cannot accept his interest. Houghton v. Brantingham, 86 Conn. 630, 86 A. 664, 667.
DROIT D’AUBAINE. A rule by which all the property of a deceased foreigner, whether movable or immovable, was confiscated to the use of the state, to the exclusion of his heirs, whether claim-ing ab intestato or under a will of the deceased. Finally abolished in 1819. Opel v. Shoup, 100 Iowa 407, 69 N.W. 560, 37 L.R.A. 583.
DROIT D’EXÉCUTION. The right of a stockbro-ker to sell the securities bought by him for ac-count of a client, if the latter does not accept de-livery thereof. The same expression is also ap-plied to the sale by a stockbroker of securities de-posited with him by his client, in order to guaranty the payment of operations for which the latter has given instructions. Arg.Fr.Merc.Law, 557.DROIT DE BRIS. A right formerly claimed by the lords of the roasts of certain parts of France, to shipwrecks, by which not only the property, but the persons of those who were cast away, were confiscated for the prince who was lord of the coast. Otherwise called "droit de bris sur le nau-frage." This right prevailed chiefly in Bretagne, and was solemnly abrogated by Henry III. as duke of Normandy, Aquitaine, and Guienne, in a charter granted A. D. 1226, preserved among the rolls at Bordeaux.
DROIT DE DÉTRACTION. A tax upon the re-moval from one state or country to another of property acquired by succession or testamentary disposition; it does not cover a tax upon the suc-cession to or transfer of property. Moody v. Ha-gen, 162 N.W. 704, 708, 36 N.D. 471, L.R.A.1918F, 947, Ann.Cas.1918A, 933. Cf. Duties of Detraction.
DROIT DE GARDE. In French feudal law. Right of ward. The guardianship of the estate and per-son of a noble vassal, to which the king, during his minority, was entitled. Steph.Lect. 250.
DROIT DE GITE. In French feudal law. The duty incumbent on a roturier, holding lands within the royal domain, of supplying board and lodging to the king and to his suite while on a royal prog-ress. Steph.Lect. 351.
DROIT DE GREFFE. In old French law. The right of selling various offices connected with the custody of judicial records or notarial acts. Steph. Lect. 354. A privilege of the French kings.
DROIT DE MAÍTRISE. In old French law. A charge payable to the crown by any one who, after having served his apprenticeship in any commer-cial guild or brotherhood, sought to become a master workman in it on his own account. Steph. Lect. 354.
DROIT DE NAUFRAGE. The right of a seig-neur, who owns the seashore, or the king, when a vessel is wrecked, to take possession of the wreck-age and to kill the crew or sell them as slaves. 14 Yale L.Jour. 129.
DROIT DE FRISE. In French feudal law. The duty (incumbent on a roturier) of supplying to the king on credit, during a certain period, such articles of domestic consumption as might be re-quired for the royal household. Steph.Lect. 351.
DROIT DE QUINT. In French feudal law. A relief payable by a noble vassal to the king as his seigneur, on every change in the ownership of his fief. Steph.Lect. 350.
DROIT DE SUITE. The right of a creditor to pursue the debtor’s property into the hands of third persons for the enforcement of his claim.
DROIT-DROIT. A double right; that is, the right of possession and the right of property. These two rights were, by the theory of our ancient law, distinct; and the aboye phrase was used to indicate the concurrente of both in one person, which con-
currence was necessary to constitute a complete title to land. Mozley & Whitley.
DROIT ÉCRIT. In French law. (The written law.) The Roman civil law, or Corpus Juris Ci-vilis. Steph.Lect. 130.
DROIT INTERNATIONAL. International law. DROIT MARITIME. Maritime law.
DROIT NAT1UREL. Fr. The law of nature.
DROIT NE POET PAS MORIER. Right cannot die. Jenk.Cent. 100, case 95.
DROIT NE DONE PLIAS QUE SOIT DE-MAUNDE. The law gives not more than is de-manded. 2 Inst. 286.
DROITS OF ADMIRALTY. Rights or perquisites of the admiralty. A term applied to goods found derelict at sea. Applied also to property captured in time of war by non-commissioned vessels of a belligerent nation. 1 Kent, Comm. 96; 2 Sel.Es-says in Anglo-Amer.Leg.Hist. 318; 15 L.Q.R. 359; Marsden, Admiralty, Droits and Salvage; 1 W. Rob. 423. In England, it has been usual in mari-time wars for the government to seize and con-demn, as droits of admiralty, the property of an enemy found in her parts at the breaking out of hostilities. 1 C.Rob. 196; 13 Ves. 71; 1 Edw. 60; 3 Bos. & P. 191. The power to exercise such a right has not been delegated to, nor has it ever been claimed by, the United States government. Benedict, Adm. § 33; Brown v. U. S., 8 Cranch, 110, 3 L.Ed. 504.
DROITURAL. What belongs of right; relating to right; as real actions are either droitural or pos-sessory,—droitural when the plaintiff seeks to re-cover the property. Finch, Law, 257.
DROMONES, DROMOS, DROMUNDA. These were at first high ships of great burden, but after-wards those which we now call "men-of-war." Jacob.
DROP. In English practice. When the members of a court are equally divided on the argument showing cause against a rule nisi, no order is made, i. e., the rule is neither discharged nor made absolute, and the rule is said to drop. In practice, there being a right to appeal, it has been usual to make an order in one way, the junior judge withdrawing his judgment. Wharton.
DROP-LETTER. A letter addressed for delivery in the same city or district in which it is posted.
DROP SHIPMENT DELIVERY. In mercantile usage, this phrase refers to ordinary freight un-loaded from railroad cars;—distinguished from carload shipments, known as "track delivery shipments." Boshell v. Receivers of St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 200 Ala. 366, 76 So. 282, 284.
DROPPING GROUND. In the logging industry, a place on the bank of a stream to store sawlogs, railroad ties, staves, and the products of the for-est, while waiting for a rise of the stream that will enable the owner to float his timbered products down the river to a market. Lexington & E. Ry. Co. v. Grigsby, 176 Ky. 727, 197 S.W. 408.
DROVE. A number of animals collected and driv-en together in a body; a fiock or herd of cattle in process of being driven; indefinite as to number, but including at least several. McConvill v. Jer-sey City, 39 N.J.Law, 43.
DROVE—ROAD. In Scotch law. A road for driv-ing cattle. 7 Bell, App.Cas. 43, 53, 57. A drift-road. Lord Brougham, Id.
DROVE—STANCE. In Scotch law. A place adjoin-ing a drove-road, for resting and refreshing sheep and cattle on their journey. 7 Bell, App.Cas. 53, 57.
DROVER’S PASS. A free pass given by a rail-road company, accepting a drove of cattle for transportation, to the drover who accompanies and cares for the cattle on the train. Railway Co. v. Ivy, 71 Tex. 409, 9 S.W. 346, 1 L.R.A. 500, 10 Am.St.Rep. 758.
DROWN. To merge or sink. "In some cases a right of freehold shall drown in a chattel." Co. Litt. 266a, 321a.
DRU. A thicket of wood in a valley. Domesday.
DRUG. The general name of substances used in medicine; any substance, vegetable, animal, or mineral, used in the composition or preparation of medicines; any substance used as a medicine. Carroll Perfumers v. State, Ind., 7 N.E.2d 970, 972; Hammond v. State, 173 Ark. 674, 293 S.W. 714, 717. The term is also applied to materials used in dye-ing and in chemistry. See, generally, Collins v. Banking Co., 79 N.C. 281, 28 Am.Rep. 322; In-surance Co. v. Flemming, 65 Ark. 54, 44 S.W. 464, 39 L.R.A. 789, 67 Am.St.Rep. 900.
DRUG STORE. A place where drugs are sold. Department of State v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., Ind.App., 40 N.E.2d 375, 378; Carroll Per-fumers v. State, 212 Ind. 455, 7 N.E.2d 970, 972.
DRUGGIST. A dealer in drugs; one whose busi-ness is to sell drugs and medicines. In strict us-age, this term is to be distinguished from "apothe-cary." A druggist deals in the uncompounded medicinal substances; the business of an apothe-cary is to mix and compound them. But in Ameri-ca the two words are used interchangeably, as the same persons usually discharge both functions. State v. Donaldson, 41 Minn. 74, 42 N.W. 781.
DRUGLESS PRACTITIONER. Any person who practises or holds himself out in any way as prac-tising the treatment of any ailment, disease, de-fect, or aisability of the human body by manipu-lation, adjustment, manual or electrotherapy, or by any similar method. State v. Houck, Wash., 203 P.2d 693, 699.
DRUIVIMER. A term applied to commercial agents who travel for wholesale merchants and supply the retan trade with goods or take orders for
goods to be shipped to the retail dealer. nomas v. Hot Springs, 34 Ark. 557, 36 Am.Rep. 24.
DRUNGARIUS. In old European law. The .cont-mander of a drungus, or band of soldiers. Appliéd also to a naval commander. Spelman.
DRUNGUS. In old European law. A ,band of soldiers, (globus militum.) Spelman.
DRUNK. A person is "drunk" when he As so dar under the influence of liquor that his passions are visibly excited or his judgment impaired, or when his brain is so far affected by potations of liquor that his intelligence, sense-perceptions, judgment, continuity of thought or of ideas, speech, and co-ordination of volition with muscular action (or some of these faculties or processes) are impaired
or not under normal control. Wilson Inter- Ocean Casualty Co., 210 N.C. 585, 188 S.E. 102, 106. It is a synonym of intoxicated. Gault v. State, 42 Okl.Cr. 89, 274 P. 687, 688.
DRUNKARD. He is a drunkard whose habit it Qs to get drunk; whose ebriety has become habitual. The terms "drunkard" and "habitual drunkard" mean the same thing. Gourlay v. Gourlay, 16 R,I. 705, 19 A. 142. Pollon v. State, 218 Wis. 466, 261 N.W. 224, 225.
A "common" drunkard ls deflned by statute in some states as a person who has been convicted of drunkennéss (or proved to have been drunk) a certain number of tiznes within a limited period. State v. Flynn, 16 R.I. 10, 11 A. 170. Elsewhere the word "common" in this connection 1s understood as being equivalent to "habitual," Com. v. McNamee, 112 Mass. 286; or perhaps as synonymous with "public," Com. v. Whitney, 5 Gray, Mass., 86.
DRUNKENNESS. In medical jurisprudence. The condition of a man whose mind is affected by the immediate use of intoxicating drinks; the state of one who is "drunk." Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 64 Okl. 222, 166 P. 1074, 1076. The ef-fect produced upon the mind or body by drinking intoxicating liquors to such an extent that the normal condition of the subject is changed and his capacity for rational action and conduct is sub-stantially lessened. Lecates v. Lecates, Del.Super., 190 A. 294, 296. See Drunk.
DRY, adj. In the vernacular, this term meahs desiccated or free from moisture; but, In legal use, it signifies formal or nominal, without impqs-ing any duty or responsibility, or unfruitful, with-out bringing any profit or advantage.
DRY, n. Term used to designate a person who is opposed to allowing the sale of intoxicating liq-uors; a prohibitionist; in contradistinction .to a "wet," or antiprohibitionist. State v. Shumaker, 200 Ind. 623, 157 N.E. 769, 778, 58 A.L.R. 954.
DRY CHECK. Synonymous vvitn "cold check", and "hot check". Elder v. Evatt, Tex.Civ.App.; 154 S.W.2d 684. 685.
DRY—CWEFT. Witchcraft; inagic. Eng.
DRY DOCK. Watertight oasin, which alloWs examination and work on bottom of vessel áfter pumping out. Maryland Casualty Co. v. LaWson, C.C.A.Fla., 101 F.2d 732, 733. Whatever may have been the definition of a "dry dock" in the past, the definition must be enlarged to include modern facilities for repairing boats out of the water, as the meaning of the term, used in its common, ordinary sense, is a dry place to work in. Con-tinental Casualty Co. v. Lawson, D.C.Fla., 2 F. Supp. 459, 460.
DRY EXCHANGE. In English law. A term for-merly in use, said to have been invented for the purpose of disguising and covering usury; some-thing being pretended to pass on both sides, whereas, in truth, nothing passed but on one side, in which respect it was called "dry." Cowell; Blount.
DRY ICE. Solid carbon dioxide. Carbo-Frost v. Pure Carbonic, C.C.A.Mo., 103 F.2d 210, 213; New York Eskimo Pie Corporation v. Rataj, C.C.A.Pa., 73 F.2d 184, 186.
DRY MORTGAGE. One which creates a lien on land for the payment of money, but does not im-pose any personal liability upon the mortgagor, collateral to or over and aboye the value of the premises. Frowenfeld v. Hastings, 134 Cal. 128, 66 P. 178.
DRY—MULTURES. In Scotch law. Corn paid to the owner of a mili, whether the payers grind or not.
DRY NATURAL GAS. Natural gas that does not contain an appreciable amount of readily con-densible gasoline. When natural gas contains readily condensible gasoline it is called "wet na-tural gas." Mussellem v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 107 Okl. 183, 231 P. 526, 530.
DRY OIL. A petroleum liquid carrying in cohe-sion with it less than 3 per tent. by volume of wa-ter and sediment. Alamitos Land Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 3 CaI.2d 396, 44 P.2d 573, 575.
DRY RECEIVERSELIP. Receivership wherein there is no equity to be administered for general creditors, even if action is in statutory form. Maxwell Lumber Co. v. Connelly, 34 N.M. 562, 287 P. 64, 67.
DRY RENT. Rent seck; a rent reserved without a clause of distress.
DRY TRUST. A passive trust; one which re-quires no action on the part of the trustee beyond turning over money or property to the cestui que trust. Trautz v. Lemp, 329 Mo. 580, 46 S.W.2d 135, 142.
DRY WEIGRT. In tariff laws, this term does not mean the weight of an article after desiccation in a kiln, but its air-dry weight as understood in com-merce. U. S. v. Perkins, 66 F. 50, 13 C.C.A. 324.
DUAL BUSINESS. Must show units of substan-tial separateness and completeness, such as might be maintained as an independent business and capable of producing profit in and of themselves. Maxwell v. Kent-Coffey Mfg. Co., 204 N.C. 365, 168 S.E. 397, 399, 90 A.L.R. 476.
DUAL NATIONALITY. Fact that two states make equal claim to the allegiance of an individ-ual at the same time. Perkins v. Elg, App.D.C., 59 S.Ct. 884, 894, 307 U.S. 325, 83 L.Ed. 1320.
DUARCIIY. A form of government where two reign jointly.
DUAS UXORES EODEM TEMPORE HABERE NON LICET. It is not lawful to have two wives at the same time. Inst. 1, 10, 6; 1 Bl.Comm. 436.
DUBITANS. Doubting. Dobbin, J., dubitans. 1 Show. 364.
DUBITANTE. Doubting. Is affixed to the name of a judge, in the reports, to signify that he doubt-ed the decision rendered.
DUBITATUR. It is doubted. A word frequently used in the reports to indicate that a po’int is con-sidered doubtful.
DUBITAVIT. Doubted. Vaughan, C. J., dubitav-it. Freem. 150.
DUCAT. A foreign coin, varying in value in dif-ferent countries, but usually worth about $2.26 of our money.
DUCATUS. In feudal and old English law. A duchy, the dignity or territory of a duke.
DUCES TECUM. (Lat. Bring with you.) The name of certain species of,writs, of which the subpcena duces tecum is the most usual, requiring a party who is summoned to appear in court to bring with him some document, piece of evidente, or other thing to be used or inspected by the court.
DUCES TECUM LICET LANGUIDUS. (Bring with you, although sick.) In practice. An ancient writ, now obsolete, directed to the sheriff, upon a return that he could not bring his prisoner with-out danger of death, he being adeo languidus, (so sick;) whereupon the court granted a habeas cor-pus in the nature of a duces tecum licet languidus. Cowell; Blount.
DUCHY OF LANCASTER. Those lands which formerly belonged to the dukes of Lancaster, and now belong to the crown in right of the duchy. The duchy is distinct from the county palatine of Lancaster, and includes not only the county, but also much territory at a distance from it, especi-ally the Savoy in London and some land near Westminster. 3 BI.Comm. 78.
DUCHY COURT OF LANCASTER. A tribunal of special jurisdiction, held bef ore the chancellor of the duchy, or his deputy, concerning all matters of equity relating to lands holden of the crown in right of the duchy of Lancaster; which is a thing very distinct from the county palatine, (which has also its separate chancery, for sealing of writs, and the like,) and comprises much territory which lies at a vast distance from it; as particularly a very large district surrounded by the city of West-minster. The proceedings in this court are the same as were those on the equity side of the court of chancery, so that it seems not to be a court of record; and, indeed, it has been holden that the court of chancery has a concurrent jurisdic-tion with the duchy court, and may take cogniz-anee of the same causes. Jud.Act 1873, § 18; 3 Bl.Comm. 78.
DUCKING—STOOL. See Castigatory.
DUCROIRE. In French law. Guaranty; equiv-alent to del credere, (which see.)
DUE. Just; proper; regular; lawful; suffi-cient; remaining unpaid; reasonable; as in the phrases "due care," "due process of law," "due notice."
Owing; payable; justly owed. That which one contracts to pay or perform to another; that which law or justice requires to be paid or done.
Owed, or owing, as distinguished from payable. A debt is often said to be due from a person where he is the party owing it, or primarily bound to pay, whether the time for payment has or has not ar-rived. The same thing is true of the phrase "due and owing."
Payable. A bill or note is commonly said to be due when the time for payment of it has arrived.
Final is not synonymous with due. Twine v. Locke, D.C.N.Y., 3 F.Supp. 1012, 1013.
The word "due" always imports a fixed and settled obligation or liability, but with reference to the time for its payment there is considerable amblguity in the use of the term, as will appear from the foregoíng deflnitions, the precise signification being determined in each case from the context. It may mean that the debt or claim in question is now (presently or immedíately) matured and enforce-able, or that it matured at some time in the past and yet remain unsatisfled, or that it ís fixed and certain but the day appointed for its payment has not yet arrived. But commonly, and in the absence of any qualifying expres-sions, the word "due" is restricted to the first of these meanings, the second being expressed by the term "over-due," and the thírd by the word "payable." See Feeser v. Feeser, 93 Md. 716, 50 A. 406.
DIJE AND PROPER CARE. That degree of care which is required of one for prevention of the ac-cident. Odgers v. Clark, Del.Super., 19 A.2d 724, 726, 2 Terry 232.
DIJE AND REASONABLE CARE. Care which reasonably prudent man would exercise under cir-cumstances. Southern Ry. Co. v. Whetzel, 159 Va. 796, 167 S.E. 427, 431.
DIJE CABE. Just, proper, and sufficient care, so far as the circumstances demand it; the absence
of negligente. That care which an ordinarily prudent person would have exercised under the circumstances. "Due care" is care proportioned to any given situation, its surroundings, peculiar-ities, and hazards. It may and often does require extraordinary care. Tower v. Camp, 103 Conn. 41, 130 A. 86, 89. "Due care," "reasonable care," and "ordinary care" are convertible terms. Corthell v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 291 Mass. 242, 196 N.E. 850, 851; Sweeney v. Blue Anchor Bev-erage Co., 325 Pa. 216, 189 A. 231, 234.
This term, as usually understood in cases where the gist of the action is the defendant’s negli-gence, implies not only that a party has not been negligent or careless, but that he has been guilty of no violation of law in relation to the subject-matter or transaction which constitutes the cause of action.
DUE CONSIDERATION. To give such weight or significante to a particular factor as under the
circumstances it seems to merit, and this involves discretion. United States ex rel. Maine Potato Growers & Shippers Ass’n v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 88 F.2d 780, 783, 66 App.D.C. 398.
DIJE COMPENSATION. For condemned land is the value of land taken and the damages, if any, which result to him as a consequence of the tak-ing without considering either general benefits or injuries. Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Hillman, 189 Misc. 850, 198 So. 565, 569.
DIJE COURSE HOLDER. See "Holder in Due Course."
DIJE COURSE OF LAW. This phrase is synony-mous with "due process of law," or "the law of the land," and the general definition thereof is "law in its regular course of administration through courts of justice;" and, while not always necessarily confined to judicial proceedings, yet these words have such a signification, when used to designate the kind of an eviction, or ouster, from real estate by which a party is dispossessed, as to preclude thereunder proof of a constructive eviction resulting from the purchase of a para-mount title when hostilely asserted by the party holding it. Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. City of Dayton, 138 Ohio St. 540, 38 N.E.2d 70, 72, 137 A.L.R. 1058.
DIJE DATE. Time appointed or requifed for fil-ing a tax return and, in the event of an extension of time to file return, is the date to which period for filing is extended. Langer v. Gray, N.D., 15 N.W.2d 732, 735. Under federal Revenue Act, "due date," is the date fixed for payment of tax, or sev-eral installments thereof. American Exchange Irving Trust Co. v. U. S., Ct.C1., 52 F.2d 1027, 1028.
Within Texas inheritance tax law due date is not date of assessment, but last day on which taxes Gould be paíd with-out incurring penalty. Halff v. U. S., Ct.C1., 5 F.Supp. 132, 135.
DUE DILIGENCE. See Diligente.
DIJE INFLUENCE. Influence obtained by Per-suasion and argument or by appeals to the af-fections. In re Chamberlain’s Estate, Cal.App., 109 P.2d 449, 452.
DIJE NOTICE. No fixed rule can be established as to what shall constitute "due notice." "Due" is a relative term, and must be applied to each case in the exercise of the discretion of the court in view of the particular circumstances. Slattery v. Doyle, 61 N.E. 264, 180 Mass. 27; Shellenberg-er v. Warburton, 124 A. 189, 190, 279 Pa. 577; Car-son v. Kalisch, 99 A: 199, 202, 89 N.J.Law, 458; Franklin Brass Foundry Co. v. Shapiro & Aron-son, C.C.A.Pa., 278 F. 435, 436; City of Sebree v. Powell, 298 S.W. 1103, 1104, 221 Ky. 478.

DIJE POSTING. Includes stamping and placing letter in United States mail. Tharp v. Loeb Hardware Co., 135 So. 412, 413, 24 Ala.App. 344.
DIJE PROCESS OF LAW. Law in its regular course of administration through courts of jus-tice. 3 Story, Const. 264, 661. "Due process of law in each particular case means such an exer-cise of the powers of the government as the set-tled maxims of law permit and sanction, and un-der such safeguards for the protection of indivi-dual rights as those maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which the one in question be-longs." Cooley, Const. Lim. 441. Whatever dif-ficulty may be experienced in giving to those terms a definition which will embrace every per-missible exertion of power affecting private rights, and exclude such as is forbidden, there can be no doubt of their meaning when applied to judicial proceedings. They then mean a course of legal proceedings according to those rules and princi-pies which have been established in our systems of jurisprudence for the enforcement and protec-tion of private rights. To give such proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its constitution—that is, by the law of its crea-tion—to pass upon the subject-matter of the suit; and, if that involves merely a determination of the personal liability of the defendant, he must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of proc-ess within the state, or his voluntary appearance. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 733, 24 L.Ed. 565. Due process of law implies the right of the person af-fected thereby to be present before the tribunal which pronounces judgment upon the question of life, liberty, or property, in its most comprehen-sive sense; to be heard, by testimony or other-wise, and to have the right of controverting, by proof, every material fact which bears on the question of right in the matter involved. If any question of fact or liability be conclusively pre-sumed against hire, this is not due process of law. Zeigler v. Railroad Co., 58 Ala. 599. These phras-es in the constitution do not mean the general body of the law, common and statute, as it was at the time the constitution took effect; for that would seem to deny the right of the legislature to amend or repeal the law. They refer to certain fundamental rights, which that system of juris-prudence, of which ours is a derivative, has al-ways recognized. Brown v. Levee Com’rs, 50 Miss. 468. "Due process of law," as used in the constitution, cannot mean less than a prosecution or suit instituted and conducted according to the prescribed forms and solemnities for ascertaining guilt, or determining the title to property. Em-bury v. Conner, 3 N.Y. 511, 517, 53 Am.Dec. 325. And see, generally, Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 104, 24 L.Ed. 616.
"Law of the land," "due course of law," and "due proc-ess of law" are synonymous. People v. Skinner, Cal., 110 P.2d 41, 45; State v. Rossi, 71 R.I. 284, 43 A.2d 323, 326; Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. City of Dayton, 138 Ohio St. 540, 38 N.E.2d 70, 72, 137 A.L.R. 1058; Stoner v. Higginson, 316 Pa. 481, 175 A. 527, 531. But "judicial process" and "judicial proceedings" are not necessarily synonymous with "due process." Pennsylvania Publications v. Penn-sylvania Public Utility Commission, 152 Pa.Super. 279, 32 A.2d 40, 49; Barry v. Hall, 98 F.2d 222, 68 App.D.C. 350.
The essential elements of "due process of law" are notice
and opportunity to be heard and to defend in orderly pro-
ceeding adapted to nature of case, and the guarantee ot due process requires that every man have protection of day in court and benefit of general law. Dimke v. Finke, 209 Minn. 29, 295 N.W. 75, 79; Di Maio v. Reid, 13 N.J.L. 17, 37 A.2d 829, 830. Daniel Webster defined this phrase to mean a law which hears before it candemns, which pro-ceeds on inquiry and renders judgment only after
Wichita Council No. 120 of Security Ben. Ass’n v. Security
hen. Assn., 138 Kan. 841, 2S P.2d 976, 980, 94 A.L.R. 629;
J. B. Barnes Drilling Co. v. Phillips, 166 Okla. 154, 26 P.2d 766. This constitutional guaranty demands only that law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that means selected shall have real and substantial rela-tion to object. Nebbia v. People of State of New York, N.Y., 54 S.Ct. 505, 291 U.S. 502, 78 L.Ed. 940, 89 A.L.R. 1469; North American Co. v. Securities and Exchange Com-mission, C.C.A., 133 F.2d 148, 154.
DUE PROOF. Within policies requirements mean such a statement of facts, reasonably veri-fied, as, if established in court, would prima facie require payment of the claim, and does not mean some particular form of proof which the insurer arbitrarily demands. Misskelley v. Home Life Ins. Co., 205 N.C. 496, 171 S.E. 862, 868; National Life Ins. Co. v. White, D.C.Mun.App., 38 A.2d 663, 666. Sufficient evidence to support or produce a conclusion; adequate evidence. Lando v. Equita-ble Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., D.C.Cal., 11 F.Supp. 729, 732.
DUE REGARD. Consideration in a degree appro-priate to demands of the particular case. Willis v. Jonson, 279 Ky. 416, 130 S.W.2d 828, 832.
DIJE TO. Expressions "sustained by," "due to," "resulting from," "sustained by means of," "sus-tained in consequence of," and "sustained through" have been held to be synonymous. Federal Life Ins. Co. v. White, Tex., 23 S.W.2d 832, 834. Also, synonymous with "caused by." American Stores Co. v. Herman, 166 Md. 312, 171 A. 54, 58.
DUE-BILL. A brief written acknowledgment of a debt. It is not made payable to order, like a promissory note. See Feeser v. Feeser, 93 Md. 716, 50 Atl. 406; Lee v. Balcom, 9 Colo. 216, 11 Pac. 74. See I. 0. U.
DUEL. A duel is any combat with deadly weap-ons, fought between two or more persons, by previous agreement or upon a previous quarrel. Baker v. Supreme Lodge K. P., 103 Miss. 374, 60 So. 333, Ann.Cas.1915B, 547.
DUELLING. The fighting of two persons, one against the other, at an appointed time and place, upon a precedent quarrel. It differs from an af-fray in this, that the latter occurs on a sudden quarrel, while the former is always the result of design.
DUELLUM. The trial by battel or judicial com-bat. See Battel.
DIJES. Certain payments; rates or taxes. See Ward v. Joslin, 105 Fed. 227, 44 C.C.A. 456; Whit-man v. National Bank, 176 U.S. 559, 20 Sup.Ct. 477, 44 L.Ed. 587. As applied to club and other membership corporations, word refers to sums paid toward support of society and to retain mem-bership therein. Jefferson County Farm Bureau v. Sherman, 208 Iowa 614, 226 N.W. 182, 185. And covers only fixed and definite charges appli-cable to all club members. Hardt v. McLaughlin, D.C.Pa., 25 F.Supp. 684, 685.
DUKE, in English law, is a title of nobility, rank-ing immediately next to the Prince of Wales. It is only a title of dignity. Conferring it does not give any domain, territory, or jurisdiction over the place whence the title is taken. Duchess, the con-sort of a duke. Wharton.
DUKE OF EXETER’S DAUGHTER. The name of a rack in the Tower, so called after a minister of Henry VI, who sought to introduce it into Eng-land.
DUKE OF•YORK’S LAWS. A body of laws com-piled in 1665 for the government of the colony of New York.
DULOCRACY. A government where servants and slaves have so much license and privilege that they domineer. Wharton.
DULY. In due or proper form or manner; ac-cording to legal requirements.
Regularly; properly; suitable; upon a proper foundation, as distinguished from mere form; ac-cording to law in both form and substance. Wel-born v. Whitney, 190 Okl. 630, 126 P.2d 263, 266; Cromwell v. Slaney, C.C.A.Mass., 65 F.2d 940, 941; Zechiel v. Firemen’s Fund Ins. Co., C.C.A.Ind., 61 F.2d 27, 28.
DULY ORDAINED MINISTER OF RELIGION. Person who has been ordained in accordance with the ceremonial, ritual, or discipline of a recognized church, religious sect, or religious organization, to teach and preach its doctrines and to adminis-ter its !líes and ceremonies and public worship, and who customarily performs those duties. In re Rogers, D.C.Tex., 47 F.Supp. 265, 266.
DULY QUALIFIED. Being "duly qualified" to fill an office, in the constitutional sense and in the ordinary acceptation of the words, means that the officer shall possess every qualification; that he shall in all respects comply with every requi-site before entering on duties of the office; that, in addition to being elected by the qualified elec-tors, he shall be commissioned by the governor, give bond as required by law; and that he shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution of the commonwealth, and to per-form the duties of the office with fidelity. Com-monwealth v. Lomas, 302 Pa. 97, 153 A. 124, 126, 74 A.L.R. 481; State ex rel. Landis v. Bird, 120 Fla. 780, 163 So. 248.
DUM. Lat. While; as long as; until; upon con-dition that; provided that.
DUM BENE SE GESSERIT. While he shall con-duct himself well; during good behavior. Ex-pressive of a tenure of office not dependent upon the pleasure of the appointing power, nor for a limited period, but terminable only upon the death or misconduct of the incumbent.
DUM FERVET OPUS. While the work glows; in the heat of action. 1 Kent, Comm. 120.
DUM FUIT IN PRISONA. In English law. A writ which lay for a man who had aliened lands under duress by imprisonment, to restore to him his proper estates. 2 Inst. 482. Abolished by St. 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 27.
DUM FUIT INFRA IETATEM. (While he was within age.) In old English practice. A writ of entry which formerly lay for an infant after he had attained his full age, to recover lands which he had aliened in fee, in tail, or for lile, during his infancy; and, after his death, his heir had the same remedy. Reg.Orig. 228b; Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 192, G; Litt. 1 406; Co.Litt. 247b.
DUM NON FUIT COMPOS MENTIS. The name of a writ which the heirs of a person who was non compos mentis, and who aliened his lands, might have sued out to restore him to his rights. Abolished by 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 27.
DUM RECENS FUIT MALEFICIUM. While the offense was fresh. A term employed in the old law of appeal of rape. Bract. fol. 147.
DUM SOLA. While sole, or single. Dum sola fuerit, while she shall remain sole. Dum sola et casta vixerit, while she lives single and chaste. Words of limitation in old conveyances. Co.Litt. 235a. Also applied generally to an unmarried woman in connection with something that was or might be done during that condition.
DUMB. One who cannot speak; a person who is mute.
DUMB-BIDDING. In sales at auction, when the minimum amount which the owner will take for the article is written on a piece of paper, and placed by the owner under a candlestick, or other thing, and it is agreed that no bidding shall avail unless equal to that, this is called "dumb-bidding." Bab. Auct. 44.
DUMMODO. Provided; provided that. A word of limitation in the Latin forms of conveyances, of frequent use in introducing a reservation; as in reserving a rent.
DUMMY, n. One who holds legal title for an-other; a straw man. Hegstad v. Wysiecki, 178 App.Div. 733, 165 N.Y.S. 898, 900. Space 614 feet in width between street railroad tracks. Schroed-"er v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 311 Pa. 398, 165 A. 733.
DUMMY, adj. Sham; make-believe; pretended; imitation. U. S. v. Warn, D.C.Idaho, 295 F. 328, 330. As respects basis for predicating liability on parent corporation for acts of subsidiary, "agency," "adjunct," "branch," "instrumentality," "dummy," "buffer," and "tool" all mean very much the same thing. Lowendahl v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 287 N.Y.S. 62, 74, 247 App.Div. 144.
DUMMY DIRECTOR. One to whom (usually) a single share of stock in a corporation is transferred for the purpose of quallfying him as a director of the corporation, in which he has no real or ac-tive interest. Ashby v. Peters, 128 Neb. 338, 258 N.W. 639, 99 A.L.R. 843. One who is a mere figure-head and in effect discharges no duties. Golden Rod Mining Co. v. Bukvi 108 Mont. 569, 92 P. 2d 316, 319.
DUMP. To put er throw down with more or less of violence; to unload. Baney v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 116 Neb. 615, 218 N.W. 424, 428. To drop down; to deposit something in a heap or unshap-ed mass. Lambert v. City of Port Arthur, Tex., 22 S.W.2d 320, 321.
DUMP CARS. A cart or car having a body that can be tilted or a bottom opening downwards for emptying. Baney v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 116 Neb. 615, 218 N.W. 424, 428.
DUMPING. In commercial usage, the act of sell-ing in quantity at a very low price or practically regardless of the price; also, selling (surplus goods) abroad at less than the market price at home. Webster, Dict. The act of forcing a pro-duct such as cotton on the market during the short gathering season. Arkansas Cotton Grow-ers’ Co-op. Ass’n y: Brown, 270 S.W. 946, 953, 168 Ark. 504.
DUMPING BOARD. An elevated structure of timber, which. in part overhangs the water, to en-able a scow to go under it for the purpose of taking mei a load. Healey v. Moran Towing & Transportation Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 253 F. 334, 337.
DUN. One who duns or urges for payment; a troublesome creditor. A demand for payment whether oral or written. Stand. Dict.
A mountain or high open place. The names of places ending in dun or don were either built on hills or near them in open places.
DUNA. In old records. A bank of earth cast up; the side of a ditch. Cowell.
DUNGEON. Such an underground prison or cell as was formerly placed in the strongest part of a fortress; a dark or subterraneous prison.
DUNIO. A double; a kind of base coin less than a farthing.
DUNNAGE. Pieces of wood placed against the sides and bottom of the hold of a vessel, to pre-serve the cargo from the effect of leakage, accord-ing to its nature and quality. Abb.Shipp. 227.
There is considerable resemblance between dun-nage and ballast. The latter is used for trimming the ship, and bringing it down to a draft of water proper and sale for sailing. Dunnage is placed under the cargo to keep it from being wetted by water getting into the hold, or between the differ-ent parcels to keep them from bruising and injur-ing each other. Great Western Ins. Co. v. Thwing, 13 Wall. 674, 20 L.Ed. 607; Richards v. Hansen, C.C.Mass., 1 F. 56.
"Dunnage" belongs to the category of crating and boxing employed to protect more valuable ar-
ticles in shipment, the weight of which, unless some provision to the contrary appears in a tariff classification, naturally takes the rate applicable to the contents. "Dunnage" used in blocking and securing automobiles was held subject to the auto-mobile rate and not to the lumber rate, under tariff classification providing charges shall be computed on gross weights. Butler Motor Co. y, Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., C.C.A.Mo., 272 F. 683, 684.
DUNSETS. People that dwell on hilly places or mountains. Jacob.
DUO NON POSSUNT IN SOLIDO UNAM REM POSSIDERE. Two cannot possess one thing in entirety. Co.Litt. 368.
DUO SUNT INSTRUMENTA AD OMNES RES AUT CONFIRMANDAS AUT IMPUGNANDAS, RATIO ET AUTIIORITAS. There are two instru-ments for confirming or impugning all things,— reason and authority. 8 Coke, 16.
DUODECEMVIRALE JUDICIUM. The trial by twelve men, or by jury. Applied to juries de medietate ltinguce. Mol. de Jure Mar. 448.
DUODECIMA MANUS. Twelve hands. The oaths of twelve men, including himself, by whom the defendant was allowed to make his law. 3 Comm. 343.
DUODENA. In old records. A jury of twelve men. Cowell.
DUODENA MANU. A dozen hands, 1. e., twelve witnesses to purge a criminal of an offense.
DUODENUM. The intestine that joins onto the lower portion of the stomach and that goes out of the stomach. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Crowder, 71 Ga.App. 612, 31 S.E.2d 618, 620.
DUORUM IN SOLIDUM DOMINIUM VEL POS-SESSIO ESSE NON POTEST. Ownership or pos-session in entirety cannot be in two persons of the same thing. Dig. 13, 6, 5, 15; Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 245. Bract. fol. 28b.
DUPLA. In the civil law. Double the price of a thing. Dig. 21, 2, 2.
DUPLEX HOUSE. A house which has accommo-dations for two families on two or more floors, without regard to whether such accommodations are identical or not. Donnelly v. Spitza, 246 Mich. 284, 224 N.W. 396, 397.
DUPLEX QUERELA. A double complaint. An ecciesiastical proceeding, which is in the nature of an appeal. Phillim.Ecc.Law, 440. See Double Complaint.
DULPEX VALOR MARITAGIL In old English law. Double the value of the marriage. While an infant was in ward, the guardian had the Pow-er of tendering him or her a suitable match, with-out disparagement, which if the infants refused, they forfeited the value of the marriage to their guardian, that is, so much as a jury would assess or any one would give to the guardian for such an alliance; and, if the infants married themselves without the guardian’s consent, they forfeited dou-ble the value of the marriage. 2 Bl.Comm. 70;
Litt. § 110; Co.Litt. 82b.
DUPLICATE, v. To double, repeat, make, or add a thing exactly like a preceding one; reproduce exactly. State v. Ogden, 20 N.M. 636, 151 P. 758, 760.
DUPLICATE, n. When two written documents are substantially alike, so that each might be a copy or transcript from the other, while both stand on the same footing as original instruments, they are called "duplicates." Agreements, deeds, and other documents are frequently executed in duplicate, in order that each party may have an original in his possession. Lorch v. Page, 97 Conn. 66, 115 A. 681, 682, 24 A.L.R. 1204.
A duplicate is sometimes defined to be the "copy" of a thing; but, though generally a copy, a duplicate differs from a mere copy, in having all the valldity of an original. Nor, it seems need it be an exact copy. Defined also to be the "counterpart" of an instrument; but in indentures there is a distinction between counterparts executed by the several parties respectively, each party afflxing his or her seal to only one counterpart, and duplicate originals, each executed by all the parties. Maston v. Glen Lumber Co., 65 Okl. 80, 163 P. 128, 129. The old indentures, charters, or chirographs seem to have had the character oí duplicates. Burrill.
That which exactly resembles or corresponds to some-thing else; another, correspondent to the first; hence, a copy: transcript; counterpart; an original instrument repeated; a document the same as another in essential particulars; differing from a copy as being valid as an original. Baker v. Sovereign Camp, W. O. W., Mo.App., 116 S.W.2d 513, 517.
The term is also frequently used to signify a new original, made to take the place of an instru-ment that has been lost or destroyed, and to have the same force and effect. Benton v. Martin, 40 N.Y. 347.
In English law. The certificate of discharge given to an insolvent debtor who takes the bene-fit of the act for the relief of insolvent debtors.
The ticket given by a pawnbroker to the pawn-er of a chattel.
DUPLICATE TAXATION. The same as "double taxation." See that title.
DUPLICATE WILL. A term used in England, where a testator executes two copies of his will, one to keep himself, and the other to be deposited with another person. Upon application for pro-bate of a duplicate will, both copies must be de-posited in the registry of the court of probate.
DUPLICATIO. In the civil law. The defendant’s answer to the plaintiff’s replication; correspond-ing to the rejoinder of the common law.
DUPLICATIONEM POSSIBILITATIS LEX NON PATITUR. The law does not allow the doubling of a possibility. 1 Rolle, 321.
DUPLICATUM JUS. Double right. Bract. fol. 283b. See Droit-Droit.
Black’s Law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed.-38
DUPLICITOUS. A pleading which joins in one and the same count different grounds of action of different nature, or of the same nature, to en-force a single right to recovery, or which is based on different theories of the defendant’s lia-bility. Peck v. Woomack, Nev., 192 P.2d 874, 884. In an information the joinder of separate and dis-tinct offenses in one and the same count. State v. Seward, 163 Kan. 136, 181 P.2d 478, 480.
DUPLICITOUS APPEAL. Appeal from two sep-arate judgments or from judgment and order or from two independent orders, both of which are appealable. City of Duncan v. Abrams, 171 Okl. 619, 43 P.2d 720, 723.
DUPLICITY. The technical fault, in pleading, of uniting two or more causes of action in one count in a writ, or two or more grounds of defense in one plea, or two or more breaches in a replica-tion, or two or more offenses in the same count of an indictment, or two or more incongruous sub-jects in one legislative act, or two or more contro-verted ultimate issues submitted in a single spe-cial issue. Empire Oil & Gas Corporation v. U. S., C.C.A.Cal., 136 F.2d 868, 872; People v. Link, 365 Ill. 266, 6 N.E.2d 201, 207; Clay Drilling Co. v. Furman, Tex.Civ.App., 150 S.W.2d 869, 871; Hart-ley v. Hartley, 198 Ga. 294, 31 S.E.2d 655.
DUPLY, n. (From Lat duplicatio, q. v.) In Scotch pleading. The defendant’s answer to the plaintiff’s replication.
DUPLY, v. In Scotch pleading. To rejoin. "It is duplyed by the panel." 3 State Trials, 471.
DUPUYTREN’S CONTRACTION. A pathologi-cal condition involving the palmar fascia of the hands. American Maize Products Co. v. Nichi-porchik, 108 Ind.App. 502, 29 N.E.2d 801, 802.
DURABLE LEASES. Leases reserving a rent pay-able annually, with right of re-entry for nonpay-ment of the same, and for the term "as long as grass grows or water runs," or equivalent terms. University of Vermont and State Agr. College v. Ward, Vt., 158 A. 773, 778.
DURALUMIN. A light weight aluminum alloy. Reed Propeller Co. v. United States, Ct.C1., 42 F. Supp. 545, 567.
DURANTE. Lat. During. A word of limitation in old conveyances. Co.Litt. 234b.
DURANTE ABSENTIA. During absence. In some jurisdictions, administration of a decedent’s estate is said to be granted durante absentia in cases where the absence of the proper propon-ents of the will, or of an executor, delays or im-perils the settlement of the estate.
DURANTE BENE PLACITO. During good pleas-ure. The ancient tenure of English judges was durante bene platito. 1 Bl.Comm. 267, 342.
DURANTE MINORE 1ETATE. During minority. 2 Bl.Comm. 503; 5 Coke, 29, 30. Words taken from the old form of letters of administration. 5 Coke, ubi supra,.DURANTE VIDUITATE. During widowhood. 2 B1.Comm. 124. Durante casta viduitate, during chaste widowhood. 10 East, 520.
DURANTE VIRGINITATE. During virginity, (so long as she remairs unmarried.)
DURANTE VITA. During Life.
DURATION. Extent, limit or time. People v. Hill, 7 Cal. 102. The portion of time during which anything exists. Morrison v. Farmers’ & Trad. ers’ State Bank, 70 Mont. 146, 225 P. 123, 125.
DURBAR. In India. A court, audience, or levee. Mozley & Whitley.
DURESS, v. To subject to duress. A word used by. Lord Bacon. "If the party duressed do make any motion," etc. Bac. Max. 89, reg. 22.
DURESS, n. Unlawful constraint exercised upon a man whereby he is forced to do some act that he otherwise would not have done. It may be eith-er "duress of imprisonment," where the person is deprived of his liberty in order to force him to compliance, or by violente, beating, or other ac-tual injury, or duress per minas, consisting in threats of imprisonment or great physical injury or death. Duress may also include the same in-juries, threats, or restraint exercised upon the man’s wif e, child, or parent. Coughlin v. City of Milwaukee, 227 Wis. 357, 279 N.W. 62, 67, 119 A. L.R. 990; Radich v. Hutchins, 95 U.S. 213, 24 L. Ed. 409.
Duress consists in any illegal imprisonment, or legal imprisonment used for an illegal purpose, or threats of bodily or other harm, or other means amounting to or tending to coerce the will of an-other, and actually inducing him to do an act con-trary to his free will. Heider v. Unicume, 142 Or. 410, 20 P.2d 384, 385; Shlensky v. Shlensky, 369 III. 179, 15 N.E.2d 694, 698. And it is never "dur-ess" to threaten to do that which a party has a legal right to do. Doernbecher v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 16 Wash.2d 64, 132 P.2d 751, 755, 756; Miller v. Walden, 53 Ca1.App.2d 353, 127 P.2d 952, 956, 957. Such as, instituting or threat-ening to institute civil actions. Standard Radio Corporation v. Triangle Radio Tubes, 125 N.J.L. 131, 14 A.2d 763, 765; Shipman v. Moseley, 319 Ill.App. 443, 49 N.E.2d 662, 666.
BURESS OF GOODS. Where the act consists of a tortious seizure or detention of property from the person entitled to it, and requires some act as a condition for its surrender, the act is "duress of goods". Sistrom v. Anderson, 51 Cal.App.2d 213, 124 P.2d 372, 376.
DURESS OF IMPRISONMENT. The wrongful imprisonment of a person, or the illegal restraint of his liberty, in order to compel him to do some act. 1 Bl.Comm. 130, 131, 136, 137; 1 Steph.Comm. 137; 2 Kent, Comm. 453.

DURESS PER MINAS. Duress by threats. The use of threats and menaces to compel a person, by the fear of death, or grievous bodily harm, as mayhem or loss of limb, to do some lawful act, or to commit a misdemeanor. 1 Bl.Comm. 130; 4 Bl.Comrn. 30; 4 Steph.Comm. 83; In re Nightin-gale’s Estate, 182 S.C. 527, 189 S.E. 890, 898. See Metus.
DURESSOR. One who subjects another to duress; one who compels another to do a thing, as by men-ace. Bac.Max. 90, reg. 22.
DURHAM. A county palatine in England, the jurisdiction of which was vested in the Bishop of Durham until the statute 6 & 7 Wm. IV. c. 19, vested it as a separate franchise and royalty in the crown. The jurisdiction of the Durham court of pleas was transferred to the supreme court of judicature by the judicature act of 1873.
DURHAM RULE. The irresistible impulse test of criminal responsibility. The rule states that when there is some evidence that the accused suffered from a diseased or defective mental condition at the time the unlawful act was committed the ac-cused is not criminally responsible if it is found beyond a reasonable doubt that the act was the product of such mental abnormality. Durham v. United States, C.A.D.C., 214 F.2d 862, 875.
DURING. Throughout the course of; throughout the continuance of; in the time of; after the com-mencement and bef ore the expiration of. Conti-nental Bank & Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 51 N.Y.S.2d 903, 909;
DURLNG GOOD BEHAVIOR. While defendant whose sentence had been suspended, was obedient to the state law. State v. Hardin, 183 N.C. 815, 112 S.E. 593, 595.
DURING THE HOURS OF SERVICE. Working-hours plus reasonable periods for ingress and egress. Lienau v. Northwestern Telephone Exch. Co., 151 Minn. 258, 186 N.W. 945, 946.
DURING THE TRIAL. Period beginning with swearing of jury and ending with rendition of verdict. Kokas v. Commonwealth, 237 S.W. 1090, 1091, 194 Ky. 44. Period commencing with pre-sentation of indictment by grand jury to court and terminating with final judgment. State v. Hud-son, 55 R.I. 141, 179 A. 130, 133, 100 A.L.R. 313.
DURSLEY. In old English law. Blows without wounding or bloodshed; dry blows. Blount.
DUST EXPLOSION. Almost instantaneous com-bustion of myriads of small particles of solid mat-ter held in suspension by air. Cornee v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., C.C.A.Md., 48 F.2d 497, 500.
DUSTUCK. A term used in Hindostan for a pass-port, permit, or order from the English East In-dian Company. It generally meant a permit under their seal exempting goods from the payment of duties. Enc.Lond.
DUTCH AUCTION. See Auction.

DUTCH LOTTERY. Also known as the "class lottery." As distinguished from the "Genoese lottery" (q. v.), it is a scheme in which the num-ber and value of the prizes are regularly esti-mated, ah the ticket holders are interested at once in the play, and chance determines whether a prize or a blank falls to a given number. Flem-ing v. Bills, 3 Or. 286.
DUTCH NET. A kind of fishing net commonly known as a "pound net" (q. v.).
DUTIES. In its most usual signification this word is the synonym of imposts or customs; but it is sometimes used in a broader sense, as including all manner of taxes, charges, or governmental impositions. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, 13 L.Ed. 996.
DUTIES OF DETRACTION. Taxes levied upon the removal from one state to another of prop-erty acquired by succession or testamentary dis-position. Frederickson v. Louisiana, 23 How. 445, 16 L.Ed. 577; In re Strobel’s Estate, 5 App.Div. 621, 39 N.Y.S. 169. Cf. Draft de détraction.
DUTIES ON IMPORTS. This term signifies not merely a duty on the act of importation, but a duty on the thing imported. It is not confined to a duty levied while the article is entering the country, but extends to a duty levied after it has entered the country. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 437, 6 L.Ed. 678.
DUTY. A human action which is exactly conform-able to the laws which require us to obey them. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Filson, 35 Okl. 89, 91, 128 P. 298.
The words, ”it shall be the duty," In ordinary legisla-tion, imply the assertion of the power to command and to coerce obedience. Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 107, 16 L.Ed. 717.
In its use in jurisprudence, this word is the cor-relative of right. Thus, wherever there exists a right in any person, there also rests a corre-sponding duty upon some other person or upon all persons generally. But it is also used, in a widér sense, to designate that class of moral ob-ligations which he outside the jural sphere; such, namely, as rest upon an imperative ethical basis, but have not been recognized by the law as within its proper province for purposes of enforcement or redress. Thus, gratitude towards a benefactor is a duty, but its refusal will not ground an action. In this meaning "duty" is the equivalent of "moral obligation," as distinguished from a "legal obli-gation." Harrison v. Bush, 5 El. & Bl. 349.
Duty ls considered by some modern ethicists to be the fundamental conception of ethics and to be subject to intuitive knowledge; by others it is conceived as that which is ethically valid because sanctioned by law, soclety, or religion. Webster, Dict.
As a technical term of the law, "duty" signifies a thing due; that which is due from a person; that which a person owes to another. An obligation to do a thing. A word of more extensive significa-tion than "debt," although both are expressed by the same Latin word "debitum." Bankers’ Deposit Guaranty & Surety Co. v. Barnes, 81 Kan. 422, 105
P. 697, 698. Sometimes, however, the term is used synonymously with debt. Fox v. Hills, 1 Conn. 295, 303.
But in practice it is commonly reserved as the designation of those obligations of performance, care, or observante which rest upon a person in an official or fiduciary capacity; as the duty of an executor, trustee, manager, etc. Goodwine v. Vermilion County, 271 III. 126, 110 N.E. 890, 892.
It also denotes a tax or impost due to the gov-ernment upon the importation or exportation of goods.
Judicial Duty. See Judicial. Legal Duty. See Legal Duty.
DUTY OF TONNAGE. A charge upon a vessel as an instrument of commerce for entering, lying in or leaving a port, and includes all taxes and du-ties, regardless of name or form. In re Los An-geles Lumber Products Co., D.C.Cal., 45 F.Supp. 77, 81; Marine Lighterage Corporation v. Lucken-bach S. S. Co., 139 Misc. 612, 248 N.Y.S. 71, 72.
DUTY OF WATER. Such a quantity of water necessary when economically conducted and ap-plied to land without unnecessary loss as will result in the successful growing of crops. Enter-prise Irr. Dist. v. Willis, 135 Neb. 827, 284 N.W. 326, 329.
DUUMVTRI. (From duo, two, and viri, men.) A general appellation among the ancient Romans, given to any magistrates elected in pairs to fill any office, or perform any function. Brande.
Duumviri municipales were two annual magis-trates in the towns and colonies, having judicial powers. Calvin.
Duumviri navales were officers appointed to man, equip, and refit the navy. Calvin.
DUX. A military governor of a province. See Cod. 1, 27, 2. A military officer having charge of the borders or frontiers of the empire, called "dux limitis." Cod. 1, 49, 1, pr. At this period, the word began to be used as a title of honor or dig-nity.
In Roman law. A leader or military comman-der. The commander of an army. Dig. 3, 2, 2, pr.
In feudal and old European law. Duke; a title of honor, or order of nobility. 1 Bl.Comm. 397; Crabb, Eng.Law, 236.
DWELL. To have an abode; to inhabit; to live in a place. Gardener v. Wagner, 9 Fed.Cas. 1,154; Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 502; Eatontown v. Shrewsbury, 49 N.J.Law, 188, 6 A. 319. More than mere physical presence is sometimes required. It must be in conformity with law. Kaplan v. Tod, 45 S.Ct. 257, 267 U.S. 228, 69 L.Ed. 585; U. S. v. Tod, D.C., 292 F. 243, 245.
To delay, to pause or linger, to abide as a per-manent residence or for a time; to live in a place, to have one’s residence or domicile, to reside. It is synonymous, with inhabit, live, sojourn, stay, rest. MacLeod v. Stelle, 43 Idaho, 64, 249 P. 254, 256.
DWELLING HOUSE. The holise in which a man lives with his family; a residence; abode; habita-tion; the apartment or building, or group of buildings, occupied by a family as a place of resi-dence.
"Dwelling house" is a very flexible term. Its meaning depends not only on context, but on the determination of the courts not to permlt public policy or justice to be defeated by a word. "Dwelling house" often means any building within the curtilage. Daniels v. Commonwealth, 172 Va. 583, 1 S.E.2d 333, 335. It may mean a single house used by one family exclusively as a home. It may include an apartment building, or any structure used by human beings, partly for business and partly for residential pur-poses, or a building regardless of habitation. Gerstell v. Knight, 345 Pa. 83, 26 A.2d 329, 330.
In conveyancing. Includes all buildings at-tached to or connected with the house. 2 Hil.Real Prop. 338, and note. In the law of burglary. A house in which the occupier and his family usually reside, or, in other words, dwell and lie in. Whart. Crim.Law, 357. Temporary absence will not de-stroy character as "dwelling house." Haynes v. State, 180 Miss. 291, 177 So. 360; State v. Bair, 112 W.Va. 655, 166 S.E. 369, 370, 85 A.L.R. 424.

Private Dwelling

Within a restrictive covenant, a place or house in which a person or family lives in an individual or private state, the covenant being violated by the conversion of a house theretofore used as a resi-dence for a single family into a residence for two families, even though the outward appearance of the house was not materially affected. Paine v. Bergrose Development Corp., 198 N.Y.S. 311, 312, 119 Misc. 796. The distinction between a boarding house and a "private dwelling house" is whether the house is occupied as a home for the occupant and his wife and child, or whether he occupied it as a place for carrying on the business of keeping boarders, although while prosecuting the business and as a means of prosecuting it, he and his wife and children live in the house also. Trainor v. Le Beck, 101 N.J.Eq. 823, 139 A. 16, 17.
DWELLING—PLACE, or home, is some permanent abode or residence, in which one has the intention of remaining; it is not synonymous with "domi-cile," as used in international law, but has a more limited and restricted meaning. Nor is it synony-mous with a "place of pauper settlement." Lisbon v. Lyman, 49 N.H. 553.
DYED HANGING PAPER. See Hanging Paper. DYING DECLARATION. See Declaration.
DYING WITHOUT ISSUE. At common law this phrase imports an indefinite failure of issue, and
not a dying without issue surviving at the time of the death of the first taker. But this rule has been changed in some of the states, by statute or decisions, and in England by St. 7 Wm. IV, and 1 Vict. c. 26, 9 29.
The words "die without issue," and "die without leaving issue," in a devise of real estate, import an indefinite fail-ure of issue, and not the fallure of issue at the death of the first taker. And no distinction is to be made between the words "without issue" and "without leaving issue." Har-well v. Harwell, 151 Tenn. 587, 271 S.W. 353, 355.
In Connecticut and other states it has been repeatedly held that the expression "dying without issue," and like expressions, have reference to the time of the death of the party, and not to an indefinite failure of issue. Phelps v. Phelps, 55 Conn. 359, 11 A. 596; Briggs v. HopkIns, 103 Ohlo St. 321, 132 N.E. 843.
Dying without children importa not a failure of issue at any indeflnite future perlod, but a leaving no children at the death of the legatee. Condict v. King, 13 N.J.Eq. 375. The law favors vesting of estates, and limitation such as "dying without issue," refers to a definite perlod, fIxed in will, rather than to an Indefinite failure of issue. Howard v. Howard’s Trustee, 212 Ky. 847, 280 S.W. 156, 157. Where context is such as to show clearly that testator intended the phrase "die without issue" to mean that, if first taker die without issue during life of testator, the second taker shall stand in his place and prevent a lapse, the words "die without issue" are taken to mean death during life of testator. Martín v. Raft, 114 Ind.App. 507, 52 N.E.2d 839, 845.
DYKE—REED, or DYKE—REEVE. An officer who has the tare and oversight of the dykes and drains in fenny counties.
DYNASTY. A succession of kings in the same line or family.
DYSNOMY. Bad legislation; the ena.ctment of bad laves.
DYSPAREUNIA. In medical jurisprudence. In-capacity of a woman to sustain the act of sexual intercourse except with great difficulty and pain; anaphrodisia (which see).
DYSPEPSIA. A state of the stomach in which its functions are disturbed, without the presence of other diseases, or when, if other diseases are pres-ent, they are of minor importante. Dungl.Med. Dict.
DYVOUR. In Scotch law. A bankrupt.
DYVOUR’S HABIT. In Scotch law. A habit which debtors who are set free on a cessio bono-rum are obliged to wear, unless in the summons and process of cessio it be libeled, sustained, and proved that the bankruptcy proceeds from mis-f ortune. And bankrupts are condemned to sub-mit to the habit, even where no suspicion of fraud lies against them, if they have been dealers in an illicit trade. Ersk.Prin. 4, 3, 13.

BLACK ‘S LAW DICTIONARY – Section E

E. As an abbreviation, this letter may stand for "Exchequer," "English," "Edward," "Equity," "East," "Eastern," "Easter," or "Ecclesiastical." A Latin preposition, meaning from, out of, after, or according. It occurs in many Latin phrases; but (in this form) only before a consonant.
E. E. O. C. Equal Employment Opportunity Com-mission.
E. G. An abbreviation of exempli gratia. For the sake of an example.
E. O. E. Errors and omissions excepted. Vernon Metal & Produce Co. v. Joseph Joseph & Bros. Co., 212 App.Div. 358, 209 N.Y.S. 6, 11.
E CONTRA. From the opposite; on the con-trary.
E CONVERSO. Conversely. On the other hand; on the contrary. Equivalent to e contra.
E MERA GRATIA. Out of mere grace or favor. E PILI ANA. Hawaiian. Adjoining.
E PLURIBUS UNUM. One out of many. The motto of the United States of America.
EA. Sax. The water or river; also the mouth of a river on the shore between high and low wa-ter-mark.
EA EST ACCIPIENDA INTERPRETATIO, QUE VITIO CARET. That interpretation is to be re-ceived [or adoptedl which is free from fault [or wrong.1 The law will not intend a wrong. Bac. Max. 17, (in reg. 3.)
EA INTENTIONE. With that intent. Held not to make a condition, but a confidente and trust. Dyer, 138b.
EA QUE, COMMENDANDI CAUSA, IN VENDI-TIONIBUS DICUNTUR, SI PALAM APPARE-ANT, VENDITOREM NON OBLIGANT. Those things which are said on sales, in the way of com-mendation, if [the qualities of the thing soldl ap-pear openly, do not bind the seller. Dig. 18, 1, 43, pr.
EA QUE DARI IMPOSSIBILIA SUNT, VEL QUE IN ,RERUM NATURA NON SUNT, PRO NON ADJECTIS HABENTUR. Those things which aré impossible to be given, or which are not in the nature of things, are regarded as not added, [as no part of an agreement.1 Dig. 50, 17, 135.
EA QUE IN CURIA NOSTRA RITE ACTA SUNT DERIVE EXECUTIONI DEMANDARI DEBENT. Co.Litt. 289. Those things which are properly transacted in our court ought to be com-mitted to a due execution.
EA QUE RARO ACCIDUNT NON TEMERE IN AGENDIS NEGOTIIS COMPUTANTUR. Those things which rarely happen are not to be taken into account in the transaction of business without sufficient reason. Dig. 50, 17, 64. •

EACII. A distributive adjective pronoun, which denotes or refers to every one of the persons or things mentioned; every one of two or more per-sons or things, composing the whole, separately considered. The effect of this word, used in the covenants of a bond, is to create a several obliga-tion. Seller v. State, 160 Ind. 605, 67 N.E. 448; Knickerbocker v. People, 102 Ill. 233; Costigan v. Lunt, 104 Mass. 219; State v. Monfred, 183 Md. 303, 37 A.2d 912, 914. The word "any" is equiva-
lent to "each." Conerty v. Richtsteig, 308 Ill.App. 321, 31 N.E.2d 351.
EADEM CAUSA DIVERSIS RATIONIBUS COR-AM JUDICIBUS ECCLESIASTICIS ET SECU-LARIBlUS VENTILATUR. 2 Inst. 622. The same cause is argued upon different principies before ecclesiastical and secular judges.
EADEM EST RATIO, EADEM EST LEX. The same reason, the same law. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 493.
EADEM DIENS PRPESUMITUR REGIS QU’E EST JURIS ET QU’E ESSE DEBET, PRIESERTIM IN DUBUS. Hob. 154. The mind of the sovereign is presumed to be coincident with that of the law, and with that which it ought to be, especially in ambiguous matters.
EAGLE. A gold coin of the United States of the value of ten dollars.
EALDER, or EALDING. In old Saxon law. An elder or chief.
EALDERMAN, or EALDORMAN. The name of a Saxon magistrate; alderman; analogous to earl among the Danes, and senator among the Ro-mans. See Alderman.
The name of Ealdorman, Is one of a large class; among a primitive people age implies command and command implies age; hence, In a somewhat later stage of language, the elders are simply the rulers. 1 Freeman, Norman Con-quest, 51, quoted in Cent.Dict.
EALDOR—BISCOP. An archbishop.
EALDORBURG. Sax. The metropolis; the chief city. Obsolete.
EALEHUS. (Fr. eale, Sax., ale, and hus, house.) An ale-house.
EALHORDA. Sax. The privilege of assising and selling beer. Obsolete.
EAR GRASS. In English law. Such grass which is upon the land after the mowing, until the least of the Annunciation after. 3 Leon. 213.
EAR—MARK. A mark put upon a thing to dis-tinguish it from another. Originally and literally, a mark upon the ear; a mode of marking sheep and other animals.

Property is said to be ear-marked when it can be identified or distinguished from other property of the same nature.
Money hás no ear-mark, but it is an ordinary term for a privy mark made by any one on a coin.
EAR—MARK RULE. Rule that through the proc-ess of commingling money or deposit with the funds of a bank it loses its identity, with the re-sultant effect of defeating the right of preferente over general creditors. Hitt Fireworks Co. v. Scandinavian American Bank of Tacoma, 121 Wash. 261, 209 P. 680, 682.
EAR—WITNESS. In the law of evidence. One who attests or can attest anything as heard by himself.
EARL. A title of nobility, formerly the highest in England, now the third, ranking between a marquis and a viscount, and corresponding with the French "comte" and the German "graf." The title originated with the Saxons, and is the most ancient of the English peerage. William the Con-queror first made this title hereditary, giving it in fee to his nobles; and allotting them for the support of their state the third penny out of the sheriff’s court, issuing out of all pleas of the shire, whence they had their ancient title "shiremen." At present the title is accompanied by no territory, private or judicial rights, but merely confers no-bility and an hereditary seat in the house of lords. Whárton.
EARL MARSHAL OF ENGLAND. A great offi-cer of state who had anciently several courts un-der his jurisdiction, as the court of chivalry and the court of honor. Under him is the herald’s of-fice, or college of arms. He was also a judge of the Marshalsea court, now abolished. This office is of great antiquity, and has been for several ages hereditary in the family of the Howards. 3 Bl.Comm. 68, 103; 3 Steph.Comm. 335, note.
EARLDOM. The dignity or jurisdiction of an earl. The dignity only remains now, as the jurisdiction has been given over to the sheriff. 1 Bl.Comm. 339.
EARLES—PENNY, or EARL’S PENNY. Money given in part payment. See Earnest; Arles.
EARLIER MATURITY RULE. The rule under which bonds first maturing are entitled to priority when sale of security is not sufficient to satisfy all obligations. Scherk v. Newton, C.C.A.Colo., 152 F.2d 747, 749.
EARN. To acquire by labor, service or perform-ance. Hartford Electric Light Co. v. McLaughlin, 37 A.2d 361, 363, 131 Conn. 1.
EARNED INCOME. Implies some labor, man-agement or supervision in production thereof, not income derived merely from ownership of prop-erty. Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances on Lives & Granting Annuities v. City of Philadelphia, 346 Pa. 406, 31 A.2d 137, 141.
EARNER. One whose personal efforts produces income, or who owns property which produces it, or combination of both. Van Meter v. Commis-sioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A., 61 F.2d 817, 818; Wells v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A., 63 F.2d 425, 430.
EARNEST. The payment of a part of the price of goods sold, or the delivery of part of such goods, for the purpose of binding the contract. Weidner v. Hyland, 216 Wis. 12, 255 N.W. 134.
A token or pledge passing between the parties, by way of evidence, or ratification of the sale. 2 Kent, Comm. 495, note.
EARNING CAPACITY. "Earning capacity" does not necessarily mean the actual earnings that one who suffers an injury was making at the time the injuries were sustained, but refers to that which, by virtue of the training, the experience, and the business acumen possessed, an individual is cap-able of earning. Texas Electric Ry. v. Worthy, Tex.Civ.App., 250 S.W. 710, 711. Not saving abil-ity, but capacity to acquire money, less the neces-sary expense of his own living. Pitman v. Merri-man, 80 N.H. 295, 117 A. 18, 19, 26 A.L.R. 589. Fitness, readiness and willingness to work, con-sidered in connection with opportunity to work. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Hoage, 85 F.2d 411, 416, 66 App.D.C. 154.
EARNING POWER. Power of an individual to create property. Reward for labor performed. Ransom v. Matson Nav. Co., D.C.Wash., 1 F.Supp. 244, 246. Not synonymous with wages. Micek v. Omaha Steel Works, 136 Neb. 843, 287 N.W. 645, 648.
EARNINGS. That which is earned; money earn-ed; the price of services performed; reward; the reward of labor or the price of personal service performed, the reward for personal services, whether in money or chattels, the fruit or reward of labor; the fruits of the proper skill, experience, and industry; the gains of a person derived from his services or labor without the aid of capital; money or property gained or merited by labor, service, or the performance of something; that which is gained or merited by labor, services, or performances. Saltzman v. City of Council Bluffs, 214 Iowa 1033, 243 N.W. 161, 162. "Income" is synonymous with "earnings." State ex rel.. Froedtert Grain and Malting Co. v. Tax Commis-sion of Wisconsin, 221 Wis. 225, 265 N.W. 672, 673, 104 A.L.R. 1478.
This term is used to denote a larger class of credits than would be included in the term "wag-es." Somers v. Keliher, 115 Mass. 165; Jenks v. Dyer, 102 Mass. 235.
The gains of the person derived from his serv-ices or labor without the aid of capital. Brown v. Hebard, 20 Wis. 330, 91 Am.Dec. 408; United Benefit Life Ins. Co. of Omaha v. Zwan, Tex.Civ. App., 143 S.W.2d 977, 980. Either gross or net earnings. Springfield Coal Mining Co. v. Indus-trial Commission, 291 Ill. 408, 126 N.E. 133, 22 A_ L.R. 859

The gross earnings of a business or company are the total receipts before deducting expendi-tures. Net earnings are the excess of the gross earnings over the expenditures defrayed in pro-ducing them, and aside from and exclusive of capital laid out in constructing and equipping the works or plant. State v. Railroad Co., 30 Minn. 311, 15 N.W. 307. "Gross earnings" means all re-ceipts from the employment of capital, without deduction for expenses incurred. People ex rel. Genesee Light & Power Co. v. Saxe, 165 N.Y.S. 938, 939, 179 App.Div. 486.

Net Earnings Rule

The net earnings rule for assessing a special franchise for taxation starts with the gross earn-ings for the year ending with the commencement of the year for which the valuation is made from which is deducted operating expenses and a fair and reasonable return on that portion of the cor-poration’s capital invested in tangible property, the balance being deemed to give the net earn-ings attributable to the special franchise, the value of which is then found by capitalizing such bal-ance at a rate 1 per tent. higher than that found as a matter of fact to be a fair and reasonable return on the tangible property. People ex rel. Third Ave. R. Co. v. State Board of Tax Com’rs, 142 N.Y.S. 986, 997, 157 App.Div. 731.

Surplus Earnings

Amount owned by company over and aboye its capital and actual liabilities. People v. Com’rs of Taxes, 76 N.Y. 74.
EARNINGS OF PROSTITUTE. Income derived from practice of prostitution. State v. Crane, 88 Wash. 210, 152 P. 989.
EARTH. Soil of all kinds, including gravel, clay, loam, and the like, in distinction from the firm rock. Dickinson v. Poughkeepsie, 75 N.Y. 76; Davis v. Commissioners of Sewerage of City of Louisville, D.C.Ky., 13 F.Supp. 672, 680.
EASE. Comfort, consolation, contentment, en-joyment, happiness, pleasure, satisfaction. Na-tional Suréty Co. v. Jarrett, 95 W.Va. 420, 121 S.E. 291, 295.
EASEMENT. A right in the owner of one par-cel of land, by reason of such ownership, to use the land of another for a special purpose not in-consistent with a general property in the owner. Hollomon v. Board of Education of Stewart Coun-ty, 168 Ga. 359, 147 S.E. 882, 884; Frye v. Seb-bitt, 145 Neb. 600, 17 N.W.2d 617, 621.
A privilege which the owner of one adjacent tenement hath of another, existing in respect of their several tenements, by which that owner against whose tenement the privilege exists is ob-liged to suffer or not to do something on or in re-gard to his own land for the advantage of him in whose land the privilege exists. Termes de la Ley, Easements.

A privilege, service, or conveniente which one neighbor has of another, by prescription, grant, or necessary implication,’ and without profit; as a way over his land, a gate•way, water-course, and the like. Kitch. 105; 3 Cruise, Dig. 484. And see Harrison v. Boring, 44 Tex. 267.
A liberty, privilege, or advantage without proflt, which the owner of one parcel of land may have in the lands of another. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Caswell, Tex., 1 S.W.2d 597, 600; Hasselbring v. Koepke, 263 Mich. 466, 248 N.W. 869, 873, 93 A. L.R. 1170.
The land against which the easement or privilege exists is called the "servient" tenement, and the estate to which it is annexed the "dominant" tenement; and their owners are called respectively the "servient" and "dominant" owner. These tercos are taken from the civil law. Sara-toga State Waters Corporation v. Pratt, 227 N.Y. 429, 125 N.E. 834, 838; Joachim v. Belfus, 108 N.J.Eq. 622, 156 A. 121, 122; Brasengton v. Williams, 143 S.C. 223, 141 S.E. 375, 382.
Distinguished from "servitude", Stephenson v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas, Tex.Civ.App., 181 S.W. 568, 572; "profit a prendre", Richfield Oil Co. of California v. Hercules Gasoline Co., 112 Cal.App. 437, 297 P. 73, 75; "covenant", Lingle Water Users’ Ass’n v. Occidental Build-ing & Loan Ass’n, 43 Wyo. 41, 297 P. 385, 387; "fran-chise", City of Fort Worth v. Southwestern Bell Tele-phone Co., C.C.A.Tex., 80 F.2d 972, 974; "restriction", Kutschinski v. Thompson, 101 N.J.Eq. 649, 138 A. 569,-573; Stanolind Pipe Line Co. v. Ellis, 142 Kan. 102, 45 P.2d 846, 848; Morrison v. Fellman, 271 N.Y.S. 436, 150 Misc. 772; "prescription", Black v. Whitacre, 206 Iowa 1084, 221 N.W. 825.

Affirmative Easement

One where the servient estate must permit something to be done thereon, as to pass over it, or to discharge water on it. Miller v. Babb, Tex. Com.App., 263 S.W. 253, 254

Apparent Easement

One the existence of which appears from the construction or condition of one of the tenements, so as to be capable of being seen or known on in-spection. Miller v. Skaggs, 79 W.Va. 645, 91 S.E. 536, 537, Ann.Cas.1918D, 929.

Appurtenant Easement

An "incorporeal right" which is attached to and belongs with some greater and superior right or something annexed to another thing more worthy and which passes as incident to it and is incap-able of existence separate and apart from the par-ticular land to which it is annexed. Union Falls Power Co. v. Marinette County, 238 Wis. 134, 298 N.W. 598, 600, 601, 134 A.L.R. 958. One which is attached to and passes with the dominant tene-ment as an appurtenance thereof. Cadwalader v. Bailey, 17 R.I. 495, 23 A. 20, 14 L.R.A. 300; Wal-ler v. Hildebrecht, 295 Ill. 116, 128 N.E. 807, 809. Safety Building & Loan v. Lyles, 131 S.C. 540, 128 S.E. 724, 725.

Continuing Easement

One that is self-perpetuating, independent of human intervention, as, the flow of a stream, or one which may be enjoyed without any act on the part of the person entitled thereto, such as a spout which discharges the water whenever it rains, adrain by which surface water is carried off, win-dows which admit light and air, and the like. Starrett v. Baudler, 181 Iowa, 965, 165 N.W. 216, 219, L.R.A.1918B, 528. Also, it is sometimes termed an "apparent" easement, and defined as one depending on some artificial structure upon, or natural conformation of, the servient tene-ment, obvious and permanent, which constitutes the easement or is the means of enjoying it. Fet-ters v. Humphreys, 18 N.J.Eq. 260; Larsen v. Pet-erson, 53 N.J.Eq. 88, 30 A. 1094. See, also, Appar-ent Easement.

Disconfibming Easement

Discontinuous, non-continuous, or non-apparent easements are those the enjoyment of which can be had only by the interference of man, as, a right of way or a right to draw water. Outerbridge v. Phelps, 45 N.Y.Super.Ct. 570.

Easement by Prescription

A mode of acquiring title to property by im-memorial or long-continued enjoyment, and re-fers to personal usage restricted to claimant and his ancestors or grantors. J. C. Vereen & Sons, Inc. v. Houser, 123 Fla. 641, 167 So. 45.

Easement in Gross

Easement in gross is not appurtenant to any estate in land (or not belonging to any person by virtue of his ownership of an estate in land) but a mere personal interest in, or right to use, the land of another. Weigold v. Bates, 258 N.Y.S. 695, 144 Misc. 395; Joachim v. Belfus, 108 N.J.Eq. 622, 156 A. 121, 122.

Easement of Access

Rig–,t of ingress and egress to and from the premises of a lot owner to a street appurtenant to the land of the lot owner. Lang v. Smith, 113 Pa. Super. 559, 173 A. 682, 683.

Easement of Convenience

One in which the easement is indispensable to the enjoyment of the dominant estate. Richards v. Trezvant, 185 S.C. 489, 194 S.E. 326, 329

Equitable Easements

The special easements created by derivation of ownership of adjacent proprietors from a com-mon source, with specific intentions as to build-ings for certain purposes, or with implied privi-leges in regard to certain uses, are sometimes so called. A narre frequently applied to building re-strictions in a deed. Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 183 P. 945, 947.

Implied Easement

An easement resting upon the principie that, where the owner of two or more adjacent lots selis
a part thereof, he grants by implication to the grantee all those apparent and visible easements which are necessary for the reasonable use of the property granted, which at the time of the grant are used by the owner of the entirety for the bene-fit of the part granted. Farley v. Howard, 68 N. Y.S. 159, 33 Misc. 57.

Intermittent Easement

One which is usable or used only at times, and not continuously. Eaton v. Railroad Co., 51 N.H. 504, 12 Am.Rep. 147.

Negative Easement

Those where the owner of the servient estate is prohibited from doing something otherwise law-ful upon his estate, because it will affect the dom-inant estate, (as interrupting the light and air from the latter by building on the former.) South Buffalo Stores v. W. T. Grant Co., 274 N.Y.S. 549, 153 Misc. 76; Pierce v. Keator, 70 N.Y. 447, 26 Am. Rep. 612; Miller v. Babb, Tex.Com.App., 263 S.W. 253, 254. As to "reciprocal negative easement," see that title, infra

Private or Public Easements

A private easement is one in which the enjoy-ment is restricted to one or a few individuals, while a public easement is one the right to the enjoyment of which is vested in the public gen-erally or in an entire community; such as an ease-ment of passage on the public streets and high-ways or of navigation on a stream. Kennelly v. Jersey City, 57 N.J.Law, 293, 30 A. 531, 26 L.R.A. 281.

Quasi Easement

An "easement," in the proper sense of the word, can only exist in respect of two adjoining pieces of land occupied by different persons, and can only impose a negative duty on the owner of the servient tenement. Hence an obligation on the owner of land to repair the fence between his and his neighbor’s land is not a true easement, but is sometimes called a "quasi easement." Gale, Easem. 516; Sweet.

Reciprocal Negative Easement

If the owner of two or more lots, so situated as to bear the relation, sells one with restrictions of benefit to the land retained, the servitude be-comes mutual, and, during the period of restraint, the owner of the lot or lots retained can do noth-ing forbidden to the owner of the lot sold; this being known as the doctrine of "reciprocal nega-tive easement." Sanborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496, 497.

Secondary Easement

One which is appurtenant to the primary or ac-tual easement; every easement includes such "sec-ondary easements," that is, the right to do such things as are necessary for the full enjoyment of the easement itself. Toothe v. Bryce, 50 N.J.Eq. 589, 25 A. 182.

EAST. In the absence of other words qualifying its meaning, the word "east" describing boundaries means due east. Anaheim Sugar Co. v. Orange County, 181 Cal. 212, 183 P. 809, 813; Livingston Oil & Gas Co. v. Shasta Oil Co., Tex.Civ.App., 114 S.W.2d 378, 381. See, also, Easterly.
In the customs laws of the United States, the words "countries east of the Cape of Good Hope" mean countries with which, formerly, the Unit-ed States ordinarily carried on commercial inter-course by passing around that cape. Powers v. Conley, 101 U.S. 790, 25 L.Ed. 805.
EAST GREENWICH. The name of a royal man-or in the county of Kent, England; mentioned in royal grants or patents, as descriptive of the ten-ure of free socage.
EAST INDIA COMPANY. Originally established for prosecuting the trade between England and India, which they acquired a right to carry on ex-clusively. Since the middle of the last century, however, the company’s political affairs had be-corne of more importante than their commerce. In 1858, by 21 & 22 Vict. c. 106, the government of the territories of the company was transferred to the crown. Wharton.
EASTER. A feast of the Christian church held in memory of the Saviour’s resurrection. The Greeks and Latins call it "pascha," (passover,) to which Jewish feast our Easter answers. This feast has been annually celebrated since the time of the apostles, and is one of the most important festivals in the Christian calendar, being that which regulates and determines the times of all the other movable feasts. Enc. Lond.
EASTER-OFFERINGS, or EASTER-DUES. In English law. Small sums of money paid to the parochial clergy by the parishioners at Ezster as a compensation for personal tithes, or the tithe for personal labor; recoverable under 7 & 8 Wm. III. c. 6, before justices of the peace.
EASTER TERM. In English law. Formerly cine of the four movable terms of the courts, but aft-erwards a fixed term, beginning on the 15th of April and ending on the 8th of May in every year, though sometimes prolonged so late as the 13th of May, under St. 11 Geo. IV. and 1 Wm. IV. c. 70. From November 2, 1875, the division of the legal year into terms is abolished so far as concerns the administration of justice. 3 Steph.Comm. 482-486; Mozley & Whiteley.
EASTERLING. A coin struck by Richard II. which is supposed by some to have given rise to the name of "sterling," as applied to English mon-ey.
EASTERLY. This word, when used alone, will be construed to mean "due east." But that is a rule of necessity growing out of the indefinite-ness of the term, and has no application where other words are used for the purpose of qualify-ing its meaning. Where such is the case, it means precisely what the qualifying word makes it
mean. Walker v. City of Los Angeles, 23 Cal.App. 634, 139 P. 89, 90. See East.
EASTINUS. An easterly coast or country.
EASTMAN FORMULA. In determining fixed charges under railroad reorganization plan, the "Eastman Formula" is that such charges should not exceed 80 per tent. of the net available for interest in the three worst years of the last ten. In re Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., D.C.Colo., 38 F. Supp. 106, 110.
EAT INDE SINE DIE. In criminal practice. Words used on the acquittal of a defendant, or when a prisoner is to be discharged, that he may go thence without a day, i. e., be dismissed with-out any further continuance or adjournment. Dane, Abr. Index.
EATING-HOUSE. Any place where food or
re-
freshments of any kind, not including spirits, wines, ale, beer, or other malt liquors, are pro-vided for casual visitors, and sold for consump-tion therein. Act Cong. July 13, 1866, § 9 (14 St. at Large, 118). And see Carpenter v. Taylor, 1 Hilt. (N.Y.) 195; State v. Hall, 73 N.C. 253. A place where the public may go and be served with meals. Babb v. Elsinger, Sup., 147 N.Y.S. 98, 99.
EAVES. The edge of a roof, built so as to pro-ject over the walls of a house, in order that the rain may drop therefrom to the ground instead of running down the wall. Center St. Church v. Machias Hotel Co., 51 Me. 413.
EAVES-DRIP. The drip or dropping of water from the eaves of a house on the land of an ad-jacent owner; the easement of having the water so drip, or the servitude of submitting to such drip; the same as the stillicidium of the Roman law. See Stillicidium.
EAVESDROPPING. In English criminal law. The offense of listening under walls or windows, or the eaves of a house, to hearken af ter dis-course, and thereupon to frame slanderous and mischievous tales. 4 Bl.Comm. 168. It is a mis-demeanor at common law, indictable at sessions, and punishable by fine and finding sureties for good behavior. Id.; Steph.Crim.Law, 109. Sel-den v. State, 74 Wis. 271, 42 N.W. 218, 17 Am.St. Rep. 144.
EBB AND FLOW. An expression used formerly in this country to denote the limits of admiralty jurisdiction. See United States v. Aborn, 3 Ma-son, 127, Fed.Cas.No.14,418.
EBBA. In old English law. Ebb. Ebba et ftuc-tus; ebb and flow of tide; ebb and flood. Bract. fols. 255, 338. The time occupied by one ebb and flood was anciently granted to persons essoined as being beyond sea, in addition to the period of forty days. See Fleta, lib. 6, c. 8, § 2.
EBDOMADARIUS. In ecclesiastical law. An of-ficer in cathedral churches who supervised the

regular performance of divine service, and pre-scribed the particular duties of each person in the choir.
EBEREMORTH, EBEREMORS, EBEREMUR-DER. See Aberernurder.
EBRIETY. In criminal law and medical juris-prudence. Drunkenness; alcoholic intoxication. Com. v. Whitney, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 479.
ECCE MODO MIRUM, QUOD FCEMINA FERT BREVE REGIS, NON NOMINANDO VIRUM, CONJUNCTUM ROBORE LEGIS. Co.Litt. 132b. Behold, indeed, a wonderl that a woman has the king’s writ without naming her husband, who by law is united to her.
ECCENTRICITY. In criminal law and medical jurisprudence. Personal or individual perculiar-ities of mind and disposition which markedly dis-tinguish the subject from the ordinary, normal, or average types of men, but do not amount to men-tal unsoundness or insanity. Ekin v. McCrack-en, 11 Phila. (Pa.) 535.
ECCHYMOSIS. In medical jurisprudence. Lo-calized discoloration in and under the skin; a livid or black and blue spot; blackness. An ex-travasation of blood by rupture of capillary ves-sels, and hence it follows contusion; but it may exist, as in cases of scurvy, asphyxiation, and oth-er morbid conditions, without the latter. Ryan Med.Jur. 172. Ecchymoses produced by blows up-on a body but a few hours dead cannot be distin-guished from those produced during life. 1 Witth. & Beck.Med.Jur. 485; 2 Beck, Med.Jur. 22. It is generally attended by swelling. People v. Mummert, 50 N.Y.S.2d 699, 703, 183 Misc. 243.
ECCLESIA. Lat. An assembly. A Christian as-sembly; a church. A place of religious worship. In the law, generally, the word is used to denote a place of religious worship, and sometimes a par-sonage. Spelman.
ECCLESIA ECCLESLIE DECIMAS SOLVERE NON DEBET. Cro.Eliz. 479. A church ought not to pay tithes to a church.
ECCLESIA EST DOMUS MANSIONALIS OMNI-POTENTIS DEI. 2 Inst. 164. The church is the mansionhouse of the Omnipotent God.
ECCLESIA EST INFRA 2ETATEM ET IN CUS-TODIA DOMINI REGIS, QUI TENETUR JURA ET IliEREDITATES EJUSDEM MANU TENERE ET DEFENDERE. 11 Coke, 49. The church is under age, and in the custody of the king, who is bound to uphold and defend its rights and inher-itances.
ECCLESIA FUNGITUR VICE MINORIS; MELI-OREM CONDITIONEM SUAM FACERE PO-TEST, DETERIOREM NEQUAQUAM. Co.Litt. 341. The church enjoys the privilege of a minor; it can make its own condition better, but not worse.
ECCLESIA NON MORITUR. 2 Inst. 3. The church does not die.
ECCLESIJE MAGIS FAVENDU1VI EST QUAM PERSONE. Godol. Ecc. Law, 172. The church is to be more favored than the parson (or an in-dividual).
ECCLESLE SCULPTURA. The image or sculp-ture of a church in ancient times was often cut out or cast in plate or other metal, and preserv-ed as a religious treasure or relic, and to perpetu-ate the memory of some famous churches. Ja-cob.
ECCLESIARCH. The ruler of a church.
ECCLESIASTIC. A clergyman; a priest; a man consecrated to the service of the church; as, a bishop, a priest, a deacon.
ECCLESIASTICAL. Pertaining to anything be-longing to or set apart for the church, as distin-guished from "civil" or "secular," with regard to the world. Wharton.
ECCLESIASTICAL AUTHORITIES. In England, the clergy, under the sovereign, as temporal head of the church, set apart from the rest of the peo-pie or laity, in order to superintend the public worship of God and the other ceremonies of re-ligion, and to administer spiritual counsel and in-struction. The several orders of the clergy are: (1) Archbishops and bishops; (2) deans and chapters; (3) archdeacons; (4) rural deans; (5) parsons (under whom are included appropriators) and vicars; (6) curates. Church-wardens or sidesmen, and parish clerks and sextons, inas-much as their duties are connected with the church, may be considered to be a species of ec-clesiastical authorities. Wharton.
ECCLESIASTICAL COMMISSIONERS. In Eng-lish law. A body corporate, erected by St. 6 & 7 Wm. IV, c. 77, empowered to suggest measures conducive to the efficiency of the established church, to be ratified by orders in council. Whar-ton. See 3 Steph.Comm. 156, 157.
ECCLESIASTICAL CORPORATION. See Corpo-ration.
ECCLESIASTICAL COUNCIL. In New England. A church court or tribunal, having functions partly judicial and partly advisory, appointed to determine questions relating to church discipline, orthodoxy, standing of ministers, controversies between ministers and their churches, differences and divisions in churches, and the like. Stearns v. First Parish, 21 Pick., Mass., 124; Sheldon v. Congregational Parish, 24 Pick., Mass., 281.
ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS (called, also, "Courts Christian"). A generic name for certain courts having cognizance mainly of spiritual matters. D. v. D., Del.Super., 20 A.2d 139, 140. A system of courts in England, held by authority of the sov-ereign, and having jurisdiction over matters per-taining to the religion and ritual of the established church, and the rights, duties, and discipline of ecclesiastical persons as such. They are as fol-lows: The archdeacon’s court, arches court, con-sistory court, court of archdeacon, court of peculiars, prerogative court, court of delegates, court of convocation, court of audience, and court of faculties. 3 Bl.Comm. 64-68. Equitable Life As-sur. Soc. v. Paterson, 41 Ga. 364, 5 Am.Rep. 535.
ECCLESIASTICAL DIVISION OF ENGLAND. This is a division into provinces, dioceses, arch-deaconries, rural deaneries, and parishes.
ECCLESIASTICAL JURISDICTION. Jurisdiction over ecclesiastical cases and controversies; such as appertains to the ecclesiastical courts. Short v. Stotts, 58 Ind. 35.
ECCLESIASTICAL LAW. The body of jurispru-dence administered by the ecclesiastical courts of England; derived, in large measure, from the can-on and civil law. As now restricted, it applies mainly to the affairs, and the doctrine, discipline, and worship, of the established church. De Witt v. De Witt, 67 Ohio St. 340, 66 N.E. 136.
ECCLESIASTICAL MATTER. One that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such associations those deemed un-worthy of membership. Olear v. Haniak, 235 Mo. App. 249, 131 S.W.2d 375, 380.
ECCLESIASTICAL THINGS. This term, as used in the canon law, includes church buildings, church property, cemeteries, and property given to the church for the support of the poor or for any other pious use. Smith v. Bonhoof, 2 Mich. 115.
ECDICUS. The attorney, proctor, or advocate of a corporation. 1 Reeve, Eng.Law, 65.
ECHANTILLON. In French law. One of the two parts or pieces of a wooden tally. That in posses-sion of the debtor is properly called the "tally," the other "échantillon." Poth.Obl. pt. 4, c. 1, art. 2, § 8.
ECHEVIN. In French law. A municipal officer corresponding with alderman or burgess, and hav-ing in some instances a civil jurisdiction in cer-tain causes of trifling importance.
ECHOLALIA. In medical jurisprudence. The constant and senseless repetition of particular words or phrases, recognized as a sign or symptom of insanity or of aphasia.
ECHOUEMENT. In French marine law. Strand-ing. Emerig.Tr. des Ass. c. 12, s. 13, no. 1.
ECLAMPSIA PARTURIENTIUM. In medical ju-risprudence. Puerperal convulsions; a convulsive seizure which sometimes suddenly attacks a wo-man in labor or directly atter, generaily attended by unconsciousness and occasionally by mental aberration, which may be permanent. The attack dosely resembles the convulsions of epilepsy, and is often fatal.
ECLECTIC PRACTICE. In medicine. That sys-tem followed by physicians who select their modes of practice and medicines from various schools. Webster.
"Without professing to understand much of medical phraseology, we suppose that the terms ‘allopathic prac-tice’ and ‘legitimate business’ memn the ordinary method commonly adopted by the great body of learned and emi-nent physicians, which is taught in their institutions, estab-lished by their highest authorities, and accepted by the larger and more respectable portion of the communtty. By ‘eclectic practice,’ without imputing to it, as the counsel for the plaintiff seem inclined to, an odor of illegality, we presume is intended another and different system, unusual and eccentric, not countenanced by the classes before referred to, but characterized by them as spurious and denounced as dangerous. It is sufficient to say that the two modes of treating human maladies are essentially dis-tinct, and based upan different views of the nature and causes of diseases, their appropriate remedies, and the modes of applying them." Bradbury v. Bardin, 34 Conn. 453.
ECONOMIZER. As applied to boiler construc-tion, a contrivance or device in which water is heated preliminary to entering the boiler proper. Ithaca Traction Corporation v. Travelers’ Indemni-ty Co., Sup., 177 N.Y.S. 753, 754.
ECONOMY. Frugality; prudent economy. Not synonymous with "parsimony." Includes that which pertains to the satisfaction of man’s needs. D’Arcy v. Snell, 162 Or. 351, 91 P.2d 537, 540, 122 A.L.R. 928.
ÉCRIVAIN. In French marine law. The clerk of a ship. Emerig.Tr. des Ass. c. 11, s. 3, no. 2.
ECUMENICAL. General; universal; as an ecu-menical council. Groesbeeck v. Dunscomb, 41 How.Prac. (N.Y.) 344.
EDDERBRECHE. In Saxon law. The offense of hedge-breaking. Obsolete.
EDESTIA. In old records. Buildings.
EDGE. A line where two surf aces meet. I. T. S. Rubber Co. v. Essex Rubber Co., D.C., 270 F. 593, 605.
EDGE LEASE. One located on the edge of an oil bearing structure. Carter Oil Co. v. Mitchell, C. C.A.Okl., 100 F.2d 945, 947.
EDICT. A positive law promulgated by the sov-ereign of a country, and having reference either to the whole land or some of its divisions, but usually relating to affairs of state. It differs from a "public proclamation," in that it enacts a new statute, and carries with it the authority of law, whereas the latter is, at most, a declaration of a law before enacted. In Roman law. Some-times, a citation to appear before a judge. A "special edict" was a judgment in a case; a "gen-eral edict" was in effect a statute. See Edictum.
EDICTAL CITATION. In Scotch law. A citation published at the market-cross of Edinburgh, and pier and shore of Leith. Used against foreign-ers not within the kingdom, but having a landed estate there, and against natives out of the king-dom. Bell.EDICTS OF JUSTINIAN. Thirteen constitutions or laws of this prince, found in most editions of the Corpus Juris Civilis, after the Novels. Being confined to matters of police in the provinces of the empire, they are of little use.
EDICTUM. In the Roman law. An edict; a man-date, or ordinance. An ordinance, or law, enacted by the emperor without the senate; belonging to the class of constitutiones principis. Inst. 1, 2, 6. An edict was a mere voluntary constitution of the emperor; differing from a rescript, in not being returned in the way of answer; and from a de-cree, in not being given in judgment; and from both, in not being founded upon solicitation. Tayl. Civil Law, 233.
A general order published by the preetor, on en-tering upon his office, containing the system of rules by which he would administer justice during the year of his office. Dig. 1, 2, 2, 10; Mackeld. Rom.Law, § 35; Tayl.Civil Law, 214. See Calvin.
EDICTUM ANNUlUM. The annual edict or system of rules promulgated by a Roman prmtor immedi-ately upon assuming his office, setting forth the principies by which he would be guided in deter-mining causes during his term of office. Mackeld. Rom.Law, § 36.
EDICTUM PERPETUUM. The perpetual edict. A compilation or system of law in fifty books, di-gested by Julian, from the preetor’s edicts and oth-er parts of the Jus Honorarium. All the remains of it which have come down to us are the extracts of it in the Digests. Butl.Hor.Jur. 52.
EDICTUM PROVINCIALE. An edict or system of rules for the administration of justice, similar to the edict of the prwtor, put forth by the procon-suls and proprwtors in the provinces of the Roman Empíre. Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 36.
EDICTUM THEODORICI. This is the first col-lection of law that was made after the downfall of the Roman power in Italy. It was promulgated by Theodoric, king of the Ostrogoths, at Rome in A.D. 500. It consists of 154 chapters, in which we recognize parts taken from the Code and Novella: of Theodosius, from the Codices Gregorianus and Hermogenianus, and the Sententiw of Paulus. The edict was doubtless drawn up by Roman writers, but the original sources are more disfigured and altered than in any other compilation. This col-lection of law was intended to apply both to the Goths and the Romans, so far as its provisions went; but, when it made no alteration in the Goth-ic law, that law was still to be in force. Savigny, Geschichte des R. R.
EDICTUM TRALATITIUM. Where a Roman pr-tor, upon assuming office, did not publish a wholly new edict, but retained the whole or a principal part of the edict of his predecessor (as was usually the case) only adding to it such rules as appeared to be necessary to adapt it to changing social conditions or juristic ideas, it was called "edictum tralatitium." Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 36.
EDITION. Any quantity of books put forth to the bookselling trade at one time by the publisher. 4 K. & J. 656. A new edition is publíshed whenever, having in his warehouse a certain number of copies, the publisher issues a fresh batch of them to the public.
EDITOR. One who directs or supervises the poli-cies and contributions of a newspaper, magazine, work of reference, or the like. Brokaw v. Cottrell, 211 N.W. 184, 187, 114 Neb. 858. The term is held to include not only the person who writés or se-lects the articles for publication, but he who pub-lishes a paper and puts it in circulation. Pennoy-er v. Neff, 95 U.S. 721, 24 L.Ed. 565.
EDITUS. In old English law. Put forth or prom-ulgated, when speaking of the passage of a stat-ute; and brought forth, or born, when speaking of the birth of a child.
EDMUNDS ACT. An act of congress of March 22, 1882, punishing polygamy. See 22 Stat. 31.
EDUCATE. To give proper moral, as well as in-tellectual and physical, instruction. See Williams v. MacDougall, 39 Cal. 80; Peck v. Claflin, 105 Mass. 420. To prepare and fit oneself for any calling or business, or for activity and usefulness in life. In re Wolfe’s Estate, 299 N.Y.S. 99, 102, 164 Misc. 504.
EDUCATION. Comprehends not merely the in-struction received at school or college, but the whole course of training, moral, intellectual, and physical. Education may be particularly directed to either the mental, moral, or physical powers and faculties, but in its broadest and best sense it re-lates to them all. Barbers’ Commission of Mobile County v. Hardeman, 21 So.2d 118, 120, 31 Ala.App. 626. Acquisition of all knowledge tending to train and develop the individual. Mifchell v. Reeves, 123 Conn. 549, 196 A. 785, 788, 15 A.L.R. 1114.
"Education" is not conflned to the improvement and cultivation of the mind, but may consist of the cultivation of one’s religious or moral sentiments, and likewise may consist in the development of one’s physical faculties. Commissioners of District of Columbia v. Shannon & Luchs Const. Co., 57 App.D.C. 67, 17 F.2d 219, 220; Jones v. Better Business Bureau of Oklahoma City, C.C.A.Okla., 123 F.2d 767, 769.
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION. A school, semi-nary, college, or educational establishment, not necessarily a chartered institution. Ward Semi-nary for Young Ladies v. City of Nashville, 129 Tenn. 412, 167 S.W. 113. As used in a zoning ordi-nance, the term may include not only buildings, but also all grounds necessary for the accomplish-ment of the full scope of educational instruction, including those things essential to mental, moral, and physical development. Commissioners of Dis-trict of Columbia v. Shannon & Luchs Const. Co., 57 App.D.C. 67, 17 F.2d 219, 220.
EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES. Synonymous with an educational undertaking, and whatever educates is within the meaning of an "educational under-taking." Ancient and Accepted Scottish Rite of Freemasonry v. Board of County Com’rs, 122 Neb. 586, 241 N.W. 93, 95.EDUCATIONAL TRAINING. Acquisition of in-formation or inspirational suggestions which cause the individual to think and act along proper lines. Dones v. Better Business Bureau of Oklahoma City, C.C.A.Okl., 123 F.2d 767, 769.
EFFECT, v. To do; to produce; to make; to bring to pass; to execute; enforce; accomplish. Vailsburg Motor Corporation v. Fidelity & Casual-ty Co., 110 N.J.L. 209, 164 A. 408, 409. A be-lief that a mortgage would "effect" a preference under the bankruptcy act is equivalent to a belief that it would "operate as" a preference. Ogden v. Reddish, D.C.Ky., 200 F. 977, 979.
EFFECT, n. Result. Western Indemnity Co. v. MacKechnie, Tex.Civ.App., 214 S.W. 456, 460; Beel-er v. People, 58 Colo. 451, 146 P. 762, 764. The re-sult which an instrument between parties will produce in their relative rights, or which a stat-ute will produce upon the existing law, as dis-covered from the language used, the forms em-ployed, or other materials for construing it. The operation of a law, of an agreement, or an act. Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342.
The phrases "take effect," "be in force," "go into opera-tion," etc., are used interchangeably. Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342.

With Effect

With success; as, to prosecute an action with effect. Schutze v. Dabney, Tex.Civ.App., 204 S.W. 342, 347.
EFFECTING LOAN. Renewal of original note without lending of new money held not "effecting of loan," within statute prohibiting officers or employees of banking department from effecting loans from state bank. To effect a loan within such statute means to bring about a loan, to ac-complish, fulfill, or produce or make a loan. It means the result or consequence, the bringing into operation of a loan; while "renewal" is not a loan, but an extension of the time of payment. State v. Love, 150 So. 196, 199, 170 Miss. 666, 90 A.L.R. 506.
EFFECTIVE PROCURING CAUSE. The "effec-tive procuring cause," of sale of realty is ordi-narily the broker who first secures the serious at-tention of the customer and is instrumental in bringing the parties together. In re Cowan’s Es-tate, 13 N.Y.S.2d 374, 377.
EFFECTS. Personal estate or property. See Johnson v. Olson, 92 Kan. 819, 142 P. 256, 258, L.R. A.1915E, 327. Movable or chattel property of any kind. Ettlinger v. Importers’ & Exporters’ Ins. Co. of New York, 247 N.Y.S. 260, 262, 138 Misc. 743.
In this sense, the term is more comprehensive than the word "goods," as including fixtures and choses in action, which ”goods" will not include. Bank v. Byram, 131 III. 92, 22 N. E. 842.
Also, every kind of property, real and personal. Child v. Orton, 119 N.J.Eq. 438, 183 A. 709, 710; Adams v. Akerlund, 48 N.E. 454, 168 Ill. 632; Cas-tle v. Castle, C.C.A.Hawaii, 267 F. 521, 523; Erick-son v. Carlson, 145 N.W. 352, 95 Neb. 182; Peter-son’s Estate, 151 N.W. 66, 68, 168 Iowa 511, L.R.A. 1916A, 469.

Personal property; goods; worldly substance. If the term is used simpliciter, as in a gift of "all my effects," it will carry the whole personal es-tate, unless an intention appears to the contrary. Schouler, Wills, § 509. In re Mitchell’s Will, 38 N.Y.S.2d 673, 674, 675. The meaning of the term is .determined by the context and surrounding cir-cumstances ; Coffman’s Adm’r v. Coffman, 131 Va. 456, 109 S.E. 454, 459; and is broad enough to in-dude property of any kind. In re Lafferty’s Es-tate, 311 Pa. 469, 167 A. 49, 50.
The words "real and personal effects" will em-brace the whole estate. Hogan v. Jackson, Cowp. 304; The Alpena, D.C., 7 F. 361; 15 M. & W. 450; Foxall v. McKenney, 3 Cranch C.C. 206, Fed.Cas. No.5,016.
EFFECTUS SEQUITUR CAUSAM. Wing. 226. The effect follows the cause.
EFFENDI. Turkish. Master; a title of respect.
EFFET. In France an "effet" is a bill of ex-change; "effets" means goods, movables, chattels. In re Steimes’ Estate, 270 N.Y.S. 339, 150 Misc. 279.
EFFETS MOBILIERS. Funds or stocks. In re Steimes’ Estate, 270 N.Y.S. 339, 150 Misc. 279.
EFFICIENT. Causing an effect;—particularly the result or results contemplated. Tate-Jones & Co. v. Union Electric Steel Co., 281 Pa. 448, 126 A. 813, 816. The term is not an antonym of "defective." Adequate in performance or producing properly a desired effect. Spotts v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., C.C.A.Ind., 102 F.2d 160, 162.
EFFICIENT CAUSE. The working cause; that cause which produces effects or results; an inter-vening cause, which produces results which would not have come to pass except for its interposition, and for which, therefore, the person who set in motion the original chain of causes is not respon-sible. Southland-Greyhound Lines v. Cotten, Tex. Civ.App., 55 S.W.2d 1066, 1069; The cause which originates and sets in motion the dominating agency that necessarily proceeds through other causes as mere instruments or vehicles in a na-tural line of causation to the result. That cause of an injury to which legal liability attaches. Bole v. Pittsburgh Athletic Club, C.C.A., 205 F. 468, 471, 46 L.R.A.,N.S., 602. The "proximate cause." Munger v. Hancock, Tex.Civ.App., 271 S.W. 228, 231. Hilles v. Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, 348 Mo. 601, 154 S.W.2d 761, 764. The phrase is practically synonymous with "procuring cause." Buhrmester v. Independent Plumbing & Heating Supply Co., Mo.App., 151 S.W.2d 509, 513.
EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE. One not produced by a wrongful act or omission but inde-pendent of it, and adequate to bring the injurious results. State v. Des Champs, 126 S.C. 416, 120 S. E. 491, 493. A new and independent force which breaks casual connection between original wrong

and injury. Anderson v. Byrd, 133 Neb. 483, 215 N.W. 825, 826; Bennett v. Robertson, 107 Vt. 202, 177 A. 625, 628, 98 A.L.R. 152.
EFFIGY. The figure or corporeal representation of a person.
EFFLUX. The running, as of a prescribed period of time to its end; expiration by lapse of time. Particularly applied to the termination of a lease by the expiration of the term for which it was made.
EFFLUXION OF TIME. When this phrase is used in leases, conveyances, and other like deeds, or in agreements expressed in simple writing, it in-dicates the conclusion or expiration of an agreed term of years specified in the deed or writing, such conclusion or expiration arising in the natural course of events, in contradistinction to the de-termination of the term by the acts of the parties or by some unexpected or unusual incident or other sudden event. Brown.
EFFORCIALITER. Forcibly; applied to military force.
EFFORT. An attempt; an endeavor; a struggle directed to the accomplishment of an object. Du-laney v. Burns, 218 Ala. 493, 11^ So. 21, 24.
EFFRACTION. A breach made by the use of force.
EFFRACTOR. One who breaks through; one who commits a burglary.
EFFUSIO SANGUINIS. In old English law. The shedding of blood; the mulct, fine, wite, or penal-ty imposed for the shedding of blood, which the king granted to many lords of manors. Cowell; ‘Tomlins. See Bloodwit.
EFTERS. In Saxon law. Ways, walks, or hedges. Blount.
EGALITY. Owelty, (q. v.) Co. Litt. 169a.
EGG ALBUMEN. The white of egg. For com-mercial purposes, dried, uncoagulated egg. In-ternational Cork Co. v. New Process Cork Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 6 F.2d 420, 421.
EGLISE. A church.
EGO. I; myself. This term is used in forming genealogical tables, to represent the person who is the object of inquiry.
EGO, TAUS. I, such a one. Words used in de-scribing the forms of old deeds. Fleta, lib. 3, c. 14, § 5.
EGREDIENS ET EXEUNS. In old pleading. Go-ing forth and issuing out of (land.) Townsh. Pl. 17.
EGRESS. Often used interchangeably with the word "access." C. Hacker Co. v. City of Joliet, 196 Ill.App. 415, 423.
EGYPT/ANS, commonly called "Gypsies" (in old English statutes,) are counterfeit rogues, Welsh or English, that disguise themselves in speech and apparel, and wander up and down the coun-try, pretending to have skill in telling fortunes, and to deceive the common people, but live chief-ly by filching or stealing, and, therefore, the stat-utes of 1 & 2 Mar. c. 4, and 5 Eliz. c. 20, were made to punish such as felons if they departed not the realm or continued to a month. Termes de la Ley.
El INCUMBIT PROBATIO, QUI DICIT, NON QUI NEGAT; CUM PER RERUM NATURAM FAC-TUM NEGANTIS PROBATIO NULLA SIT. The proof lies upon him who affirms, not upon him who denies; since, by the nature of things, he who denies a fact cannot produce any proof. Dig. 22, 3, 2; 1 Phill. Ev. 194; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 74; Dran-guet v. Prudhomme, 3 La. 83; 2 Dan.Ch.Pr. 408.
El NIHIL TURPE, CUI NIHIL SATIS. To him to whom nothing is enough, nothing is base. 4 Inst. 53.
EIA, or EY. An island. Cowell.
EIGNE. L. Fr. Eldest; eldest-born. The term is of common occurrence in the old books. Thus, bastard eigne means an illegitimate son whose parents afterwards marry and have a second son for lawful issue, the latter being called mulier puisne, (after-born.) Eigne is probably a corrupt form of the French "atiné." 2 Bl.Comm. 248; Litt. § 399.
EIGNESSE. See Esnecy.
EIK. In Scotch law. An addition; as, eik to a reversion, eik to a confirmation. Bell.
EINECIA. Eldership. See Esnecy.
EINETIUS. In English law. The oldest; the first-born. Spelman.
EIRE, or EYRE. In old English law. A journey, route, or circuit. Justices in eire were judges who were sent by commission, every seven years, into various counties to hold the assizes and hear pleas of the crown. 3 B1.Comm. 58.
EIRENARCHA. A name formerly given to a jus-tice of the peace. In the Digests, the word is written "irenarcha."
EISDEM MODIS DISSOLVITUR OBLIGATIO QUI NASCITUR EX CONTRACTU, VEL QUA-SI, QUIBUS CONTRAHITUR. An obligation which arises from contract, or quasi contract, is dissolved in the same ways in which it is con-tracted, Fleta, lib. 2, c. 60, § 19.
EISNE. The senior; the oldest son. Spelled, also, "eigne," "einsne," "aisne," "eign." Termes de la Ley; Kelham.
EISNETIA, EINETIA. The share of the oldest son. The portion acquired by primogeniture. Termes de la Ley; Co.Litt. 166b; Cowell.

EITHER. Each of two; the one and the other; one or the other of two alternatives; one of two. Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Allen, Tex., 43 S.W. 2d 165, 170; Alswager v. Dwelle, 70 N.D. 118, 292 N.W. 223, 224, 128 A.L.R. 1150. Often used, how-ever, with reference to more than two, in which case it may mean "each" or "any." In re Broun’s Estate, 343 Pa. 19, 21 A.2d 898, 901. Carr-Lowry Lumber Co. v. Martin, 144 Miss. 106, 109 So. 849, 850; Southern Ry. Co. v. Gaston County, 200 N. C. 780, 158 S.E. 481, 483. Watson v. Watson, 223 Mass. 425, 111 N.E. 904, 906.
EJECT. To cast, or throw out; to oust, or dis-possess; to put or turn out of possession. 3 Bl. Comm. 198, 199, 200. See Bohannon v. Southern Ry. Co., 112 Ky. 106, 65 S.W. 169. To expel or thrust forcibly, as passengers from a train. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Ogles, 142 Ga. 720, 83 S.E. 681, 683.
EJECTA. In old English law. A woman ravish-ed or deflowered, or cast forth from the virtuous. Blount.
EJECTION. A turning out of possession. 3 Bl. Comm. 199.
EJECTIONE CUSTODUE. In old English law. Ejectment of ward. This phrase, which is the Latin equivalent for the French "ejectment de garde," was the title of a writ which lay for a guardian when turned out of any land of his ward during the minority of the latter. Brown. It lay to recover the land or person of his ward, or both. Fitzh. N.B. 139, L.; Co.Litt. 199.
EJECTIONE FIRMA. Ejection, or ejectment of farm. The name of a writ or action of trespass, which lay at common law where lands or tene-ments were let for a term of years, and after-wards the lessor, reversioner, remainder-man, or any stranger ejected or ousted the lessee of his term, Terme, or farm, (ipsum a firma ejecit.) In this case the latter might have his writ of ejec-tion, by which he recovered at first damages for the trespass only, but it was afterwards made a remedy to recover back the term itself, or the re-mainder of it, with damages. Reg.Orig. 227b; Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 220, F, G; 3 Bl.Comm. 199; Litt. § 322; Crabb, Eng.Law, 290, 448. It is the foun-dation of the modern action of ejectment.
EJECTMÉNT. At common law, this was the name of a mixed action (springing from the earlier personal action of ejectione firmce) which lay for the recovery of the possession of land, and for damages for the unlawful detention of its pos-session. The action was highly fictitious, being in theory only for the recovery of a term for years, and brought by a purely fictitious person, as lessee in a supposed lease from the real party in interest. The latter’s title, however, must be established in order to warrant a recovery, and the establishment of such title, though nominally a mere incident, is in reality the object of the ac-tion. Hence this convenient form of suit carne to be adopted as the usual method of trying titlesto land. See 3 Bl.Comm. 199. French v. Robb, 67 N.J.Law, 260, 51 A. 509, 57 L.R.A. 956, 91 Am.St. Rep. 433. In England, since the Judicature Act, ejectment has given place to a new action for the recovery of land. Ejectment has been mate-rially modified in many of the states, though stili retaining the name. For the history of ejectment,. see 3 Sel.Essays in Anglo-Amer. L. Hist. 611.
It was the only mixed action at common law, the whole method of proceeding in which was anomalous, and
depended on fictions invented and upheld by the court for
the convenience of justice, In order to escape from the• inconveniences which were found to attend the anclent forms of real and mixed actions.
It is also a form of action by which possessory titles to corporeal hereditaments may be tried and possession obtained

Ejectment Bill

A bill in equity brought merely for the recovery of real property, together with an account of the• rents and profits, without setting out any distinct ground of equity jurisdiction; hence demurrable. Crane v. Conklin, 1 N.J.Eq. 353, 22 Am.Dec. 519.

Equitable Ejectment

A proceeding in use in Pennsylvania, brought to enforce specific performance of a contract for the sale of land, and for some other purposes, which is in form an action of ejectment, but is in reality a substitute for a bill in equity. Riel v. Gannon, 161 Pa. 289, 29 A. 55

Justice Ejectment

A statutory proceeding in Vermont, for the evic-tion of a tenant holding over after termination of the lease or breach of its conditions. Foss v. Stanton, 76 Vt. 365, 57 A. 942.
EJECTOR. One who ejects, puts out, or dispos-sesses another.

Casual Ejector

The nominal defendant in an action of eject-ment; so called because, by a fiction of law pecu-liar to that action, he is supposed to come casual-ly or by accident upon the premises and to eject the lawful possessor. 3 Bl.Comm. 203.
EJECTUM. That which is thrown up by the sea.. Also jetsam, wreck, etc. Warder v. La Belle Cre-ole, 1 Pet.Adm.Dec. 43, Fed.Cas.No.17,165.
EJECTUS. In old English law. A whore-mong-er. Blount.
EJERCITORIA. In Spanish law. The name of an action lying against a ship’s owner, upon the contracts or obligations made by the master for-repairs or supplies. It corresponds to the actio exercitoria of the Roman law. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 512.
EJIDOS. In Spanish law. Commons; lands us-ed in common by the inhabitants of a city, pueblo, or town, for pasture, wood, threshing-ground, etc. Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 554.

EJURATION. Renouncing or resigning one’s place.
EJUS EST INTERPRETAR’ CUJUS EST CON-DERE. It is his to interpret whose it is to enact. Tayl. Civil Law, 96.
EJUS EST NOLLE, QUI POTEST VELLE. He who can will, [exercise volition,1 has a right to refuse to will, [to withhold consent.1 Dig. 50, 7, 3. This maxim is sometimes written, E jus est non nolle qui potest velle, and is translated, "He may consent tacitly who may consent expressly."
EJUS EST PERICULUM CUJUS EST DOMIN-IUM AUT COMMODUM. He who has the do-minion or advantage has the risk. Bart.Max. 33.
EJUS NULLA CULPA EST, CUI PARERE NEC-ESSE SIT. No guilt attaches to him who is com-pelled to obey. Dig. 50, 17, 169, pr. Obediente to existing laws is a sufficient extenuation of guilt before a civil tribunal. Broom, Max. 12, note.
EJUSDEM GENERIS. Of the same kind, class, or nature.
In the construction of laws, wills, and other lnstruments, the "ejusdem generls rule" 1s, that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned. Bleck, Interp. of Laws, 141; Goldsmith v. U. S., C.C.A.N.Y., 42 F.2d 133, 137; Aleksich v. Industrial Accldent Fund, 116 Mont. 69, 151 P.2d 1016, 1021. The rule, however, does not neces-sarily require that the general provision be limited in its scope to the Identical things specifically named. Nor does It apply when the context manifests a contrary intention.
The maxim "ejusdem generis," is only an illustration of the broader maxim, "noscitur a sociis." State v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 196 Ala. 570, 72 So. 99, 100.
ELABORARE. In old European law. To gain, acquire, or purchase, as’ by labor and industry.
ELABORATUS. Property which is the acquisi-tion of labor. Spelman.
ELASTIC. Pertaining to a substance having the property of returning or springing back to its original form alter being disarranged by pressure or applied force;—to be distinguished from "plas-tic," which applies to a substance capable of being molded and pressed into form. Diamond Patent Co. v. Webster Bros., C.C.A.Cal., 249 F. 155, 157; Kitson Co. v. Lattimer-Stevens Co., C.C.A.Pa., 37 F.2d 562, 563.
ELDER BRETHREN. A distinguished body of men, elected as masters of Trinity House, an insti-tution incorporated in the reign of Henry VIII., charged with numerous important duties relating to the marine, such as the superintendente of lighhhouses. Mozley & Whitley; 2 Steph.CoMm. 502. The full title of the corporation is Elder Brethren of the Holy and Undivided Trinity.
ELDER TITLE. A title of earlier date, but com-ing simultaneously into operation with a title of younger origin, is called the "elder title," and pre-vails.
ELDEST. He or she who has the greatest age. The eldest son is the first-born, the primo-genitus; L.R. 2 App.Cas. 698; L.R. 12 Ch.Div. 171; Ander-son v. Anderson, C.C.A.S.C., 221 F. 871, 874. If there is only one son, he may still be described as the "eldest." L.R. 7 H.L. 644.
ELECTA UNA VIA, NON DATUR RECURSUS AD ALTERAM. He who has chosen one way can-not have recourse to another. 10 Toull. no. 170.
ELECTED. The word "elected," In its ordinary signification, carries with it the idea of a vote, generally popular, sometimes more restricted, and cannot be held the synonym of any other mode of filling a position. Kimberlin v. State, 130 Ind. 120, 29 N.E. 773, 14 L.R.A. 858, 30 Am.St.Rep. 208.
ELECTIO EST INTERNA LIBERA ET SPON-TANEA SEPARATIO UNIUS REI AB ALIA, SINE COMPULSIONE, CONSISTENS IN ANIMO ET VOLUNTATE. Dyer, 281. Election is an in-ternal, free, and spontaneous separation of one thing from another, without compulsion, consist-ing in intention and will.
ELECTIO SEMEL FACTA, ET PLACITUM TES-TATUM NON PATITUR REGRESSUM. Co.Litt. 146. Election once made, and plea witnessed (or intent shown), suffers not a recall.
ELECTION. The act of choosing or selecting one or more from a greater number of persons, things, courses, or rights. The choice of an al-ternative. State v. Tucker, 54 Ala. 210.
The internal, free, and spontaneous separation of one thing from another, without compulsion, consisting in intention and will. Dyer, 281.
The selection of one person from a specified class to discharge certain duties in a state, cor-poration, or society. Smith v. McQueen, 232 Ala. 90, 166 So. 788, 791.
With respect to the choice of persons to 1111 publlc (Alce or the decision of a particular public question or public policy the term means in ordinary usege the expression by vote of the will of the people or of a somewhat numerous body of electors. State v. State Board of Canvassers, 78 S.C. 461, 59 S.E. 145. But this is not necessarily so, for the term may apply to the selection by a city council of one of their number as mayor.
"Election" ordinarlly has reference to a choice or selec-tion by electors, while "appointrnent" refers to a choice or selection by an individual, as the Governor, or an oficia] body. Board of Education of Boyle County v. McChesney, 235 Ky. 692, 32 S.W.2d 26, 27. But the terms are some-times used interchangeably. Van Cleve v. Wallace, 216 Minn. 500, 13 N.W.2d 467, 469.
A primary election is an "election" within the constitu-tlonal provision. United States v. Classic, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 1039, 313 U.S. 299, 85 L.Ed. 1368; Ex parte Hawthorne, 116 Fla. 608, 156 So. 619, 622, 96 A.L.R. 572. But the contrary view has been expressed, Mathes v. State, 173 Tenn. 511, 121 S.W.2d 548, 549; People ex rel. Llndstrand v. Emmer-son, 333 III. 606, 165 N.E. 217, 223, 62 A.L.R. 912. Refer-endum elections are "elections". Masters v. Duval County, 114 Fla. 205, 154 So. 172, 176. To the contrary, Vulcan Last Co. v. State, 194 Wis. 636, 217 N.W. 412, 414.
The choice which is open to a debtor who is bound in an alternative obligation to select either one of the alternatives.

Equitable Election

See Equitable Election.

One at which the officers to be elected are such as belong to the general government,—that is, the general and central political organization of the whole state; as distinguished from an elec-tion of officers for a particular locality only. Al-so, one held for the selection of an officer atter the expiration of the full term of the former of-ficer; thus distinguished from a special election, which is one held to supply a vacancy in office occurring before the expiration of the full term for which the incumbent was elected. Downs v. State, 78 Md. 128, 26 A. 1005. One that regularly recurs in each election precinct of the state on a day designated by law for the selection of of-ficers, or is held in such entire territory pursuant to an enactment specifying a single day for the ratification or rejection of one or more measures submitted to the people by the Legislative As-sembly, and not for the election of any officer. Bethune v. Funk, 166 P. 931, 932, 85 Or. 246. One that is held throughout the entire state or terri-tory. Territory v. Ricordati, 18 N.M. 10, 132 P. 1139, 1140. An election for the choice of a na-tional, state, judicial, district, municipal, county, or township official, required by law to be held regularly at a designated time, to fill a new of-fice or a vacancy in an office at the expiration of the full term thereof. Eakle v. Board of Edu-cation of Independent School Dist. of Henry, 97 W.Va. 434, 125 S.E. 165, 168. In statutes, the term may include a primary election. Kelso v. Cook, 184 Ind. 173, 110 N.E. 987, 993, Ann.Cas.1918E, 68. Contra, under a municipal charter, City Council of San Jose v. Goodwin, 196 Cal. 274, 237 P. 548, 549. In Vermont, the term is used throughout the Public Statutes to designate what before had com-monly been known as "freeman’s meeting." Martin v. Fullam, 97 A. 442, 445, 90 Vt. 163.

In Criminal Law

The choice, by the prosecution, upon which of several counts in an indictment (charging distinct offenses of the same degree, but not parts of a continuous series of acts) it will proceed. Jack-son v. State, 95 Ala. 17, 10 So. 657

In Practice

The liberty of choosing (or the act of choosing) one out of several means afforded by law for the redress of an injury, or one out of several avail-able forms of action.
An "election of remedies" arises when one having two coexistent but Inconsistent remedies chooses to exercise one, in which event he loses the right to thereafter exer-cise the other. Mosher Mfg. Co. v. Eastland W. F. & G. R. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 259 S.W. 253, 255.
An "election of remedies" is choosing between two or more different and coexisting modes of procedure and relief allowed by law on the same state of facts. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of California v. Rhame, D.C.S.C., 32 F’.Supp. 59, 63; Doggett Lumber Co. v. Perry, 212 N.C. 713, 194 S.E, 475, 478.
"Election of remedies" is a specles of estoppel in pais. Mansfield v. Plckwick Stages, Northern Division, 191 Cal.
129, 215 P. 389, 390.

In the Law of Wills

A widow’s election is her choice whether she will take under the will or under the statute; that is, whether she will accept the provision made for her in the will, and acquiesce in her husband’s disposition of his property, or disre-gard it and claim what the law allows her. Logan v. Logan, Tex.Civ.App., 112 S.W.2d 515, 518; Schlimme v. Schlimme, 364 III. 303, 4 N.E.2d 369, 370.
An "election under the will" means that a lega-tee or devisee under a will is put to the choice of accepting the beneficial interest offered by the donor in lieu of some estate which he is entitled to, but which is taken from him by the terms of the will. McDermid v. Bourhill, 101 Or. 305, 199 P. 610, 612, 22 A.L.R. 428.

Primary Election

An election by the voters of a ward, precinct, or other small district, belonging to a particular party, of representatives or delegates to a con-vention which is to meet and nominate the candi-dates of their party to stand at an approaching municipal or general election. State v. Woodruff, 68 N.J.Law, 89, 52 A. 294. Also, an• election to select candidates for office by a political organiza-tion, the voters being restricted to the members or supporters of such organization. Kelso v. Cook, 184 Ind. 173, 110 N.E. 987, Ann.Cas.1918E, 68. They are not in reality elections but are merely nominating devices. Van Dyke v. Thomp-son, 136 Tenn. 136, 189 S.W. 62, 66.

Regular Election

One recurring at stated times fixed by law. State v. Andresen, 110 Or. 1, 222 P. 585, 587. A gen-eral, usual, or stated election. When applied to elections, the terms "regular" and "general" are used iiiterchangeably and synonymously. The word "regular" is used in reference to a general election occurring throughout the state. State v. Conrades, 45 Mo. 47; Ward v. Clark, 35 Kan. 315, 10 P. 827.

Result of Election

Usually, the expression of the will of the voters as determined by a count of the ballots. Cipow-ski v. Calumet City, 322 Ill. 575, 153 N.E. 613, 614.

Special Election

An election for a particular emergency; out of the regular course; as one held to fill a vacancy arising by death of the incumbent of the office. State v. Andresen, 110 Or. 1, 222 P. 585, 587. In a statute, any election at which officers are not chosen. Hutchins v. City of Des Moines, 176 Iowa 189, 157 N.W. 881, 883. In determining whether an election is special or general, regard must be had to the subject-matter as well as date of the election, and, if an election occurs throughout state uniformly by direct operation of law, it is a "general election," but, if it depends on employ-ment of special preliminary proceeding peculiar to process which may or may not occur, and the election is applicable only to a restricted area less than whole state, it is a "special election." Hill v. Hartzell, 121 Or. 4, 252 P. 552, 555.
ELECTION AUDITORS. In English law. Offi-cers annually appointed, to whom was committed the duty of taking and publishing the account of all expenses incurred at parliamentary elections. See 17 & 18 Vict. c. 102, §§ 18, 26-28. But these sections have been repealed by 26 Vict. c. 29, which throws the duty of preparing the accounts on the declared agent of the candidate, and the duty of publishing an abstract of it on the return-ing oí:neer. Wharton.
ELECTION CONTEST. A contest in behalf of one who has failed of success in election against right of one who has been declared or determined by proper authority to have been successful. State ex rel. Ingles v. Circuit Court of Spink County, 63 S.D. 313, 258 N.W. 278.
ELECTION DISTRICT. A subdivision of terri-tory, whether of state, county, or city, the bound-aries of which are fixed by law, for convenience in local or general elections. Lane v. Otis, 68 N.J. Law, 656, 54 A. 442.
The term has been held not to refer to senator-ial district. Appeal of Phillips, 262 Pa. 396, 105 A. 547, 548.
ELECTION DOWER. A name sometimes given to the provision which a law or statute makes for a widow in case she "elects" to reject the provi-sion made for her in the will and take what the statute accords. Stanton v. Leonard, 344 Mo. 998, 130 S.W.2d 487, 489.
ELECTION, ESTOPPEL BY. An estoppel which arises by a choice between inconsistent remedies. Aladdin Temple Ben. Ass’n, D. O. K. K. v. Ameri-can Standard Life Ins. Co., 235 Ala. 431, 179 So. 243, 245.
An estoppel predicated on a voluntary and intelligent action or choice of one of several things which is incon-sistent with another, the effect of the estoppel being to prevent the party so choosing from afterwards reversing his election or disputing the state of affairs or rights of others resulting from his original choice. Yates v. Hurd, 8 Colo. 343, 8 Pac. 575.
The doctrine of "estoppel by election" against benefici-ary who has elected to take favorable provisions of will from objecting to other provisions of will applies only where will undertakes to bestow a gift and also deprive donee of a prior existing right, thus confronting devisee with alternative of accepting devise and renouncing prior right or of retaining latter and renouncing devise. Mason & Mason v. Brown, Tex.Civ.App., 182 S.W.2d 729, 733.
ELECTION JUDGES. In English law. Judges of the high court selected in pursuance of 31 & 32 Vict. c. 125, § 11, and Jud. Act 1873, § 38, for the trial of election petitions.
ELECTION PETITIONS. Petitions for inquiry into the validity of elections of members of par-liament when it is alleged that the return of a member is invalid for bribery or any other rea-son.
ELECTION RETURNS. The report made to the board of canvassers of the number of votes cast for each candidate, or proposition voted upon by those charged by law with the duty of counting or tallying the votes for or against the respective candidates or propositions. Spear v. Marshall, 95 Utah 62, 79 P.2d 15, 16.
ELECTIONES FIANT RITE ET LIBERE SINE INTERRUPTIONE ALIQUA. Elections should be made in due form, and freely, without any interruption. 2 Inst. 169.
ELECTIVE. Dependent upon choice; bestowed or passing by election. Also pertaining or relat-ing to elections; conferring the right or power to vote at elections.
ELECTIVE FRANCHISE. The right of voting at public elections; the privilege of qualified voters to cast their ballots for the candidates they favor at elections authorized by law. People v. Barber, 48 Hun, N.Y. 198; State v. Staten, 6 Cold. Tenn. 255; Xippas v. Comrnonwealth, 141 Va. 497, 126 S.E. 207, 209.
ELECTIVE OFFICE. One which is to be filled by popular election. One filled by the direct exer-cise of the voters’ franchise. In re Opinion of the Justices, 83 N.H. 589, 139 A. 180, 183.
ELECTOR. A duly qualified voter; one who has a vote in the choice of any officer; a constituent. DeBauche v. City of Green Bay, 227 Wis. 148, 277 N.W. 147, 148. One who elects or has the right of choice, or who has the right to vote for any functionary, or for the adoption of any measure. Aczel v. United States, C.C.A.Ind., 232 F. 652, 657. In a narrower sense, one who has the general right to vote, and the right to vote for public of-ficers. One authorized to exercise the elective franchise. McEvoy v. Christensen, 178 Iowa, 1180, 159 N.W. 179, 181. But a woman citizen, though having such general right and authority to vote, may nevertheless not be an "elector" entitled to have her name put on a jury list, in view of a state constitution and statute. People v. Barnett, 319 Ill. 403, 150 N.E. 290, 291.
WhIle the terms ”electors" and "voters" are sometimes used interchangeably, their meaning is not precisely the same, "electors" being properly applied to all those enti-tled to vote. whereas "voters" appropriately designates only those actually voting. State ex rel. Chaney v. Grin-stead, 314 Mo. 55, 282 S.W. 715, 719. A fortiori, "electors" is a broader term than "registered voters." City of Day-ton, Ohio, v. City Ry. Co., C.C.A.Ohio, 16 F.2d 401, 405.
One of the persons chosen to comprise the "elec-toral college" (q. v.).
Also, the title of certain German princes who had a voice in the election of the Holy Roman Emperors. The office of elector in some instances became hereditary and was connected with terri-torial possessions.
Sometimes, one who exercises the right of elec-tion in equity. Brett, L. Cas. Mod. Eq. 257.

Registered Qualified Elector

ELECTORAL. Pertaining to electors or elec-tions; composed or consisting of electors.
ELECTORAL COLLEGE. A name sometimes given, in the United States, to the college or body of electors of a state chosen to elect the president and vice-president; also, the whole body of such electors, composed of the electoral colleges of the several sta tes. Webster; Cent. Dict.; 2 Sto. Const. § 1463; 1 Hare, Am.Const.L. 219; Stevens, Sources of the Constitution of the U. S. 153, note; Black, Const.L. 86; 1 Calhoun’s Works, 175.
ELECTORAL COMMISSION. A commission cre-ated by an act of congress of January 29, 1877, to decide certain questions arising out of the presidential election of November, 1876, in which Hayes and Wheeler had been candidatas of the Republican party and Tilden and Hendricks of the Democratic party.
ELECTRIC CONDENSER. A device by which excesses of current are stored and released, act-ing as a sort of elastic cushion for its variations. It is made up of two electrodes, anode and cath-ode, separated by a nonconductor, the dielectric. The capacity of the condenser depends upon the dielectric, and varíes inversely with its thickness. Aerovox Corporation v. Concourse Electric Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 65 F.2d 386, 387. A reservoir of elec-trical energy. Aurynger v. R C A Mfg. Co., D.C. Md., 35 F.Supp. 69.
ELECTRICITY. A highly subtle imponderable Huid, whose presence or influence is only known by its effect. Myers v. Portland Ry., Light & Power Co., 68 Or. 599, 138 P. 213. An imponder-able and invisible agent producing light, heat, chemical decomposition, and other physical phen-omena. United States v. City and County of San Francisco, D.C.Cal., 23 F.Supp. 40, 52.
ELECTROCARDIOGRAPHY. The recording in the form of a graph of certain minute electric currents produced by the human heart in the course of its action. Nichols v. Sanborn Co., D.C. Masa., 35 F.Supp. 707, 708.
ELECTROCUTE. To put (a criminal) to death by passing through the body a current of electri-city of high power; also, by extension, to kill by an electric current. Ferguson v. State, 90 Fla. 105, 105 So. 840.
The word is a hybrid, and has met with the disapproval of some for that reason. "This barbarism jars the unhappy latinist’s nerves much more cruelly than the operation denoted jars those of its victim." Fowler, Dict. of Mod. English ,Usage (1926), p. 130. "To one having even an ele-mentary knowledge of Latin grammar this word is no less than disgusting, and the thing meant by it is felt to be altogether too good for the word’s inventor." alerce, Write it Right (1909), p. 24. It is not Included in the New English Dict. (Oxford, 1897), but is listed without comment in the New Cent. Dict. (1927) and also in Funk & Wag-nalls’ New Standard Dict. (1925), which spells it "electri-cute." "It is considered by many to be inelegant, but is widely used and has no accepted equivalent." Webster, New Internatl. Dict. (1927). The word is "now in estab-lished use, though formerly much criticized from the learned point of view because of the manner of its forma-tion." Krapp, Comprehensive Guide to Good English (1927), p. 218.

ELECTROCUTION. A method of punishment of death inflicted by causing to pass through the body of the convicted person a current of elec-tricity. See 1 Witth. & Beck. Med. Jur. 663; Peo-ple v. Durston, 119 N.Y. 569. See Electrocute.
ELECTROLYSIS. The decomposition of a metal solution in water, liquid ammonia, etc., accom-panied by decomposition of the water into oxy-gen and hydrogen or of a mass of molten metal by having an electric current passed through it, Peoria Waterworks Co. v. Peoria Ry. Co., C.C.I11., 181 F. 990.
As applied to water pipes electrolysis is the stripping off of small particles of the iron when a suitable electroIytic solution is present leaving the carbon of which the pipe is partly composed intact. Peoría Waterworks Co. v. Peoria R. Co., C.C.I11., 181 F. 990.
The term covers a wide varlety of acts, ranging from the removal of superfluous heir by electricitY to the electrocu-tion of a human being. People v. Lehrman, 296 N.Y.S. 580, 581, 251 App.D1v. 451.
ELECTROLYTE. A substance which when dis-solved in liquid is capable of conducting an elec-tric current. Lee v. Congress Beauty Equipment Co., D.C.Mass., 48 F.Supp. 827, 829; Ruben v. Ariston Laboratories, D.C.Ill., 40 F.Supp. 551, 563.
ELEEMOSYNA REGIS, and ELEEMOSYNA AR-ATRI, or CARUCARUM. A penny which King Ethelred ordered to be paid for every plow in England towards the support of the poor. Leg. Ethel. c. 1.
ELEEMOS’YN1E. Possessions belonging to the church. Blount.
ELEEMOSYNARIA. The place in a religious house where the common alms were deposited, and thence by the almoner distributed to the poor. In old English law, the aumerie, aumbry, or am-bry; words still used in common speech in the north of England, to denote a pantry or cup-board. Cowell. The office of almoner. Cowell.
ELEEMOSYNARIUS. In old English law. An almoner, or chief officer, who received the elee-mosynary rents and gifts, and in due method dis-tributed them to pious and charitable uses. Co-well; Wharton.
The name of an officer (lord almoner) of the English kings, in former times, who distributed the royal alms or bounty. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 23.
ELEEMOSYNARY. Relating to the distribution of alms, bounty, or charity; charitable. In re Bailey’s Estate, 19 Cal.App.2d 135, 65 P.2d 102, 103.
ELEEMOSYNARY CORPORATION. A private corporation created for charitable and benevolent purposes. Society for Propagation of Gospel v. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464, 5 L.Ed. 662; 1 Bl. Comm. 471. See Corporation.
ELEGANTER. In the civil law. .Accurately; with discrimination. Veazie v. Williams, 3 Story, 611, 636, Fed.Cas.No.16,907.
ELEGIT. (Lat. He has chosen.) This is the name, in English practice, of a writ of execution

first given by the statute of Westm. 2 (13 Edw. I. e. 18) either upon a judgment for a debt or dam-ages or upon the forfeiture of a recognizance caken in the king’s court. It is so called because it is in the choice or election of the plaintiff whether he will sue out this writ or a fi. fa. By it the de-fendant’s goods and chattels are appraised and all of them (except oxen and beasts of the plow) are delivered to the plaintiff, at such reasonable appraisement and price, in part satisfaction of his debt. If the goods are not sufflcient, then the moiety of his freehold lands, which he had at the time of the judgment given, are also to be deliv-ered to the plaintiff, to hoid till out of the rents and profits thereof the debt be levied, or till the defendant’s interest be expired. During this per-iod the plaintiff is called "tenant by elegit," and his estate, an "estate by elegit." This writ, or its analogue, is in use in some of the United States, as Virginia and Kentucky. See 3 Bl. Comm. 418; North American F. Ins. Co. v. Gra-ham, 5 Sandf. (N.Y.) 197.
ELEMENT. Material; substance. Hoskins Mf g. Co. v. General Electric Co., D.C.I11., 212 F. 422, 427.
Also, one of the simple substances or principies of which, according to early natural philoso-phers, the physical universe is composed, the four elements pointed out by Empedocles being air, water, earth, and fire. Webster. See Elements.
ELEMENTS. The forces of nature. The ulti-mate undecomposable parts which unite to form anything. Leahy v. Wenonah Theater Co., 251 Mich. 594, 232 N.W. 184, 185. Popularly, fire, air, earth, and water, anciently supposed to be the four simple bodies of which the world was com-posed. Encyc. Dict. Often applied in a particu-lar sense to wind and water, as "the fury of the elements." Cent. Dict. Fire is one of the ele-ments included in the expression "damages by the elements" as used in a lease of a building. O’Neal v. Bainbridge, 94 Kan. 518, 146 P. 1165, 1167, Ann. Cas.1917B, 293. The same is true of water. Milis v. United States, 52 Ct.Cl. 452, 458. It has also been said that "damages by the elements" means the same thing as "damages by the act of God." Van Wormer v. Crane, 51 Mich. 363, 16 N.W. 686, 47 Am.Rep. 582.
ELEVATOR. A building containing one or more mechanical elevators, especially a warehouse for the storage of grain; a hoisting apparatus; a lift; A car or cage for lifting and lowering passengers or freight in a hoistway. Cent. Dict.

In Insurance Law

The term has been held not to be limited to the car, or platform, but to include the elevator shaft. London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Ladd, C.C.A.Mich., 299 F. 562, 565; Boles v. Royal Union Life Ins. Co., 219 Iowa 178, 257 N.W. 386, 96 A.L. R. 1400. It has also been held to include the ma-chinery to which the car is attached, and by which it is operated; and the fixed equipment necessary to operate the elevator. The term has been inter-preted as meaning only a passenger elevator. Jahns & Knuth Co. v. American Indemnity Co., 182 Wis. 556, 196 N.W. 569, 571.

Passenger Elevator

Any elevator ordinarily or customarily used for conveying passengers, though also used for conveying freight, and though not of any parti-cular form laid in any particular way or with any particular kind of gates or safety contriv,ances. Wilmarth v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Cali-fornia, 168 Cal. 536, 143 P. 780, 782, Ann.Cas.1915B, 1120.
ELIGIBILITY. Proper to be chosen; qualified to be elected; legally qualified. Rainey v. Taylor, 166 Ga. 476, 143 S.E. 383; State ex rel. Evans v. Wheatley, 197 Ark. 997, 125 S.W.2d 101, 103. A word which, when used in connectlon with an of-fice, where there are no explanatory words indi-cating that it is used with reference to the time of election, may be deemed to refer to the qualifica-tion to hold the office rather than to be elected. Bradfield v. Avery, 16 Idaho, 769, 102 P. 687, 23 L. R.A.,N.S., 1298. See Eligible.
ELIGIBLE. Fit to be chosen. State ex rel. Sund-for v. Thorson, 72 N.D. 246, 6 N.W.2d 89, 92, 143 A.L.R. 599. Capable of serving, legally qualified to serve. State v. Johnson, 123 S.C. 50, 115 S.E. 748, 749. Capable of being chosen, as a candidate for office. Board of Com’rs of Guadalupe County v. District Court of Fourth Judicial Dist., 29 N. M. 244, 223 P. 516, 522. Also, capable of holding office. State v. Wait, 95 Neb. 806, 146 N.W. 1048, 1049.
ELIMINATION. In old English law. The act of banishing or turning out of doors; rejection.
ELINGUATION. The punishment of cutting out the tongue.
ELISORS. In practice. Electors or choosers. Persons appointed by the court to execute writs of venire, in cases where both the sheriff and coroner are disqualified from acting, and whose duty is to choose—that is, name and return—the jury. 3 B1.Comm. 355; Doherty v. Kalmbach, 87 F.2d 539, 541, 66 App.D.C. 322.
Persons appointed to execute any writ, in de-fault of the sheriff and coroner, are also called "elisors." See Bruner v. Superior Court, 92 Cal. 239, 28 Pac. 341. An elisor may be appointed to take charge of a jury retiring to deliberate upon a verdict, when both sheriff and coroner are dis-qualified or unable to act. People v. Fellows, 122 Cal. 233, 54 Pac. 830.
ELL. A measure of length, answering to the modern yard. 1 Bl.Comm. 275.
ELLENBOROUGH’S ACT. An English statute (43 Geo. III. c. 58) punishing offenses against the person.

ELLIPSIS. Omission of words or clauses neces-sary to complete the construction, but not neces-sary to convey the meaning. State v. Staub, 182 La. 1040, 162 So. 766.
ELOGIUM. In the civil law. A will or testament.
ELOIGNE. (Fr. éloigner, to remove to a distance; to remove alar off.) In practice. A return to a writ of replevin, when the chattels have been removed out of the way of the sheriff.
ELOIGNMENT. The getting a thing or person out of the way; or removing it to a distance, so as to be out of reach. Garneau v. Mill Co., 8 Wash. 467, 36 P. 463.
ELONGATA. In practice. Eloigned; carried away to a distance. The old form of the return made by a sheriff to a writ of replevin, stating that the goods or beasts had been eloigned; that is, carried to a distance, to places to him unknown. 3 BI.Comm. 148; 3 Steph.Comm. 522; Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 73, 74; Archb. N. Pract. 552. The word eloigne is sometimes used as synonymous with elongata.
ELONGATUS. Eloigned. A return made by a sheriff to a writ de homine replegiando, stating that the party to be replevied has been eloigned, or conveyed out of his jurisdiction. 3 Bl.Comm. 129.
ELONGAVIT. In England, where in a proceeding by foreign attachment the plaintiff has obtained judgment of appraisement, but by reason of some act of the garnishee the goods cannot be ap-praised, (as where he has removed them from the city, or has sold them, etc.,) the serjeant-at-mace returns that the garnishee has eloigned them, i. e., removed them out of the jurisdiction, and on this return (called an "elongavit") judg-ment is given for the plaintiff that an inquiry be made of the goods eloigned. This inquiry is set down for trial, and the assessment is made by a jury after the manner of ordinary issues. Sweet.
ELOPEMENT. The act of a wife who voluntarily deserts her husband to go away with and cohabit with another man. 2 Bl.Comm. 130; State v. O’Higgins, 178 N.C. 708, 100 S.E. 438. The depar-ture of a married woman from her husband and dwelling with an adulterer. Cowell; Tomlin. Al-so, the act of a man in going away with a woman who has voluntarily left her husband, to indulge in sexual intercourse with her. State v. Hopp, 186 N.C. 405, 119 S.E. 769, 773.
To constitute an elopement, the wife must not only leave the husband, but go beyond his actual control; for if she abandons the husband, and goes and lives in adultery in a house belonging to him, lt is said not to be an elopement. Cogswell v. Tibbetts, 3 N.H. 42.
In a popular sense, also, the act of an unmar-ried woman in secretly leaving her home with a man, especially with a view to marriage without her parents’ consent.
ELSEWIIERE. In another place; in any other place. See 1 Vern. 4, and note; 3 P.Wms. 56; Azbill v. State, 19 Ariz. 499, 172 P. 658, 659; Su-
preme Ruling of Fraternal Mystic Circle v. Hos-kins, Tex.Civ.App., 171 S.W. 812, 815. The term does not always mean literally any other place whatever, but may be more or less limited by the context. See Commonwealth v. Bowser, 61 Pa. Super.Ct. 107, 108, 114, 214; State v. Sanders, 136 La. 1059, 68 So. 125, Ann.Cas.1916E, 105.
In shipping articles, this term, following the designation of the port of destination, must be construed either as void for uncertainty or as subordinate to the principal voyage stated in the preceding words. Brown v. Jones, 2 Gall. 477, Fed. Cas, No. 2,017.
ELUVIONES. In old pleading. Spring tides. Townsh. Pl. 197.
EMANCIPATION. The act by which one who was unfree, or under the power and control of another, is rendered free, or set at liberty and made his own master. Town of Plainville v. Town of Mil-ford, 119 Conn. 380, 177 A. 138, 140.
The term is principally used with reference to the emancipation of a minor child by its parents, which involves an entire surrender of the right to the care, custody, and earnings of such child as well as a renunciation of parental duties. Dela-ware L. & W. R. Co. v. Petrowsky, C.C.A., 250 F. 554, 559; Public Service Co. of Indiana v. Tackett, 113 Ind.App. 307, 47 N.E.2d 851, 853. The emanci-pation may be express, as by voluntary agree-ment of parent and child, or implied from such acts and conduct as import consent, and it may be conditional or absolute, complete or partial. Wallace v. Cox, 136 Tenn. 69, 188 S.W. 611, 612, L.R.A.1917B, 690.
Complete emancipation is entire surrender of care, cus-tody, and earnings of child, as well as renunciation of parental duties. Beebe v. Kansas City, 223 Mo.App. 642, 17 S.W.2d 608, 612. And a "partial emancipation" frees a child for only a part of the period of minority, or from only a part of the parent’s rlghts, or for some purposes, and not for others. Memphis Steel Const. Co. v. Lister, 138 Tenn. 307, 197 S.W. 902, 903, L.R.A.1918B, 406.

Express Emancipation

That which results when parent and child vol-untarily agree that the child, able to take care of himself, may go out from his home and make his ownliving, receive his own wages, and spend them as he pleases. Nichols v. Harvey & Hancock, 206 Ky. 112, 266 S.W. 870, 871.

In England

The term "emancipation" has been borrowed from the Roman law, and is constantly used in the law of parochial settlements. 7 Adol. & E., N.S., 574, note.

In Roman Law

The enfranchisement of a son by his father, which was anciently done by the formality of an imaginary sale. This was abolished by Justinian, who substituted the simpler proceeding of a manu-mission before a magistrate. Inst. 1, 12, 6.
EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION. An execu-tive proclamation, issued January 1, 1863, by Abra-ham Lincoln, declaring that all persons held in slavery in certain designated states and districts were and should remain free.
EMBARGO. A proclamation or order of state, usually issued in time of war or threatened hos-tilities, prohibiting the departure of ships or goods from some or all the ports of such state until further order. The William King, 2 Wheat. 148, 4 L.Ed. 206. For the use of the term as applied In a loose sense to the government’s control of coal exports during a strike, see Ernesto Foglino & .Co. v. Webster, 216 N.Y.S. 225, 237, 217 App.Div. 282.
Embargo Is the hindering or detention by any govern-ment of ships of commerce in its ports. If the embargo is laid upon ships belonging to citizens of the state imposing it, it is called a "civil embargo;" if, as more commonly happens, it is laid upon ships belonging to the enemy, it is called a "hostile embargo." The effect of this latter embargo is that the vessels detained are restored to the rightful owners if no war follows, but are forfeited to the embargoing government if war does follow, the declara-tion of war being held to relate back to the original seizure and detention. Brown.
The temporary or permanent sequestration of the property of individuals for the purposes of a government, e. g., to obtain vessels for the trans-port of troops, the owners being reimbursed for this forced service. Man. Int. Law, 143.
EMBASSADOR. See Ambassador.
EMBASSAGE, or EMBASSY. The message or commission given by a sovereign or state to a minister, called an "ambassador," empowered to treat or communicate with another sovereign or state; also the establishment of an ambassador.
EMBER DAYS. In ecclesiastical law. Those days which the ancient fathers called "quatuor tempora jejunii" are of great antiquity in the church. They are observed on Wednesday, Friday, and Satur-day next after Quadragesima Sunday, or the first Sunday in Lent, after Whitsuntide, Holyrood Day, in September, and St. Lucy’s Day, about the mid-dle of Decembe,. Brit. c. 53. Our almanacs call the weeks in which they fall the "Ember Weeks," and they are nów chiefiy noticed on account of the ordination of priests and deacons; because the canon appoints the Sundays next after the Ember weeks for the solemn times of ordination, thotlgh the bishops, if they please, may ordain on any Sunday or holiday. Enc. Lond.
EMBEZZLEMENT. The fraudulent appropriation to his own use or benefit of property or money intrusted to him by another, by a clerk, agent, trustee, public officer, or other person acting in a fiduciary character. See 4 Bl.Comm. 230, 231.
The fraudulent appropriation of property by a person to whom it has been intrusted, or to whose hands it has lawfully come. American Life Ins. Co. v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 261 Mich. 221, 246 N.W. 71.
Embezziement is not an offense at common law, but was created by statute. "Embezzle" includes in lis meaning
appropriation to one’s own use, and therefore the use of the single word "embezzle," in the indictment or informa-tion, contains within itself the charge that the defendant appropriated the money or property to his own use. State
v. Wolff, 34 La.Ann. 1153; State v. Hudson, 93 W.Va. 435, 117 S.E. 122, 125.
Embezzlement is common-law larceny extended by stat-ute to cover cases where the stolen property comes orig-inally luto the possession of the defendant without a tres-pass. Moody v. People, 65 Colo. 339, 176 P. 476.
Embezzlement is a specles of larceny, and the term Is applicable to cases of furtive and fraudulent appropriation by clerks, servants, or carriers of property coming hito their possession by virtue of their employment. It is dis-tinguished from "larceny," properly so called, as being committed in respect of property which la not at the time in the actual or legal possession of the owner. That is to say, that in embezzlement the original taking of the prop-erty was lawful or with the consent of the owner, while in larceny the felonious intent must have existed at the time of the taking. Tredwell v. U. S., C.C.A.Va., 266 F. 350, 352. Both words, however, rnay be used, as in a bond, as generlc terms to indícate the dishonest and fraudulent breach of any duty or obligation upon the part of an employee to pay over to his employer, or account to him for any money, securities, or other personal property, title to which is in the employer, but which may come finto the possession of the employee. National Surety Co. v. Wil-liams, 74 Fla. 446, 77 So. 212, 222. Under statute declaring guilty of a felony an officer or clerk of a state bank who "embezzles, abstracts, or willfully misapplies" its funds, "embezzié" refers to acts done for the benefit of the actor as against the bank, "misapply" covers acts having no relation to pecuniary profit or advantage to the doer, while "abstract" means only to take and withdraw from the pos-session and control of the bank; and while "embezzle-ment" may include the offenses of abstraction and willful misapplicatIon, either of those offenses may be committed without embezzlement. Ferguson v. State, 80 Tex.Cr.R. 383, 189 S.W. 271, 273. See, however, Winkelmann v. State, 114 Neb. 1, 205 N.W. 565, 566.
EMBLEMATA TRIBONIANI. In the Roman law. Alterations, modifications, and additions to the writings of the older jurists, selected to make up the body of the Pandects, introduced by Tribon-jan and his associates who constituted the com-mission appointed for that purpose, with a view to harmonize contradictions, exscind obsolete mat-ter, and make the whole conf orrn to the law as understood in Justinian’s time, were called by this name. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 71.
EMBLEMENTS. The vegetable chattels called "emblements" are the corn and other growth of the earth which are produced annually, not spon-taneously, but by labor and industry, and thence are called "fructus industriales." Reiff v. Reiff, 64 Pa. 137. See Crop.
The growing crops of those vegetable productions of the soil which are annually produced by the labor of the culti-vator. They are deemed personal property, and pass as such to the executor or administrator of the occupier, whether he were the owner in fee, or for Life, or for years, If he die before he has actually cut, reaped, or gathered the same; and Uds, although, being affixed to the soil, they might for some purposes be considered, while grow-Mg, as part of the realty. Wharton.
The term also denotes the right of a tenant to take and carry away, after his tenancy has ended, such annual products of the land as have resulted from his own care and labor.
Emblements are the away-going crop; In other words, the crop which is upon the ground and unreaped when the tenant goes away, bis lease having determined: and the right to emblements is the right in the tenant to take away the away-going crop, and for that purpose to come upon the land, and do all other necessary things thereon. Miller v. taray, Tex.Civ.App., 108 S.W.2d 265, 267, 268.
Where a life tenant, having leased the premises, died, and the remainderman did not recognize the lease, the lessee of the life tenant was entitled to the emblements,which are the crops of grain growing yearly, but requiring an outlay of labor or industry, without payment of any compensation for use of the land in harvesting the emble-Ments. Turner v. Turner, 132 Tenn. 592, 179 S.W. 132, 133.
EMBLERS DE GENTZ. L. Fr. A stealing from the people. The phrase occurs in the old rolls of parliament: "Whereas divers murders, emblers de gentz, and robberies are committed," etc.
EMBOLISM. In medical jurisprudence. The me-chanical obstruction of an artery or capillary by some body traveling in the blood current, as, a blood-clot (embolus), a globule of fat or an air-bubble.
Embolism is to be distinguished from "thrombosis," a thrombus being a clot of blood formed In the heart or a blood vessel In consequence of some impediment of the circulation from pathological causes, as distinguished from mechanical causes, for example, an alteration of the blood or walls of the blood vessels. When embolism occurs In the brain (called "cerebral embolism") there is more or less coagulation of the blood in the surrounding parts, and there may be apoplectic shock or paralysis of the brain, and its functional activity may be so far disturbed as to cause entire or partial insanity. See Cundall v. Haswell, 23 R.I. 508, 51 A. 426.
EMBOLUS. In case of wounds is a product of coagulation of the blood or blood clot. Berryhill v. Nichols, 171 Miss. 769, 158 So. 470. A plug which floats along until it becomes lodged so as to obstruct the passage of the blood. It consists usually of a clot or fibrin, a shred from a morbid growth, a globule of fat, air bubbles, or a micro-organism. An embolus or floating particle by attaching itself or becoming wedged may forro a thrombosis or occlusion. Norris v. Industrial Commission, 90 Utah 256, 61 P.2d 413, 414.
EMBRACEOR. A person guilty of the offense of embracery (q. v.). See Co. Litt. 369.
EMBRACERY. In criminal law. This offense consists in the attempt to influence a jury corrupt-ly to one side or the other, by promises, persua-sions, entreaties, entertainments, douceurs, and the like. The person guilty of it is called an "em-braceor." Moss v. Arnold, 63 Okla.Cr. 343, 75 P.2d 491, 503; Commonwealth v. Fahey, 113 Pa.Super. 598, 173 A. 854, 856.
Embracery being but an attempt corruptly to influence juror, there is no such crime as attempt to commit embracery. Wiseman v. Commonwealth, 143 Va. 631, 130 S.E. 249, 251.
EMENDA. Amends; something given in repara-tion for a trespass; or, in old Saxon times, in compensation for an injury or crime. Spelman.
EMENDALS. An old word still made use of in the accounts of the society of the Inner Temple, where so much in emendals at the foot of an ac-count on the balance thereof signifies so much money in the bank or stock of the houses, for reparation of losses, or other emergent occasions. Spelman.
EMENDARE. In Saxon law. To make amends or satisfaction for any crime or trespass commit-ted; to pay a fine; to be fined. Spelman. Emen-dare se, to redeem, or ransom one’s life, by pay-ment of a weregild.
EMENDATIO. In old English law. Amendment, or correction. The power of amending and cor-recting abuses, according to certain rules and measures. Cowell.
In Saxon law. A pecuniary satisfaction for an injury; the same as emenda (q. v.). Spelman.
EMENDATIO PANIS ET CEREVISLE. In old English law. The power of supervising and cor-recting the weights and measures of bread and .ale, (assising bread and beer.) Cowell.
EMERGE. To arise; to come to light. "Unless a matter happen to emerge after issue joined." Hale, Anal. § 1.
EMERGENCY. A sudden unexpected happening; an unforeseen occurrence or condition; specifical-ly, perplexing contingency or complication of cir-cumstances; a sudden or unexpected occasion for action; exigency; pressing necessity.
A relatively permanent condition of insuificien-cy of service or of facilities resulting in social dis-turbance or distress. Kardasinksi v. Koford, 88 N.H. 444, 190 A. 702, 703, 111 A.L.R. 1017; Con-tract Cartage Co. v. Morris, D.C.I11., 59 F.2d 437, 446; Los Angeles Dredging Co. v. City of Long Beach, 210 Cal. 348, 291 P. 839, 843, 71 A.L.R. 161.
"Emergency" in sense of constitutional provision respect-ing referendum does not mean expedlency, conveniente, or best Interest. State v. Hinkle, 161 Wash. 652, 297 P. 1071, 1072.
EMERGENCY EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE. A regularly employed servant possesses implied aU-thority to engage an assistant to aid in perform-ing a task, within scope of servant’s duties in case of emergency rendering it absolutely necessary to obtain such assistance, and without which emer-gency conditions could not be overcome by serv-ant or any of his coemployees in regular service of their common master. Hall v. O. C. Whitaker Co., 143 Tex. 397, 185 S.W.2d 720, 722, 723.
EMERGENCY LANDING AREA. Any area that a plane could possibly be landed into with or with-out motor. It should be from five hundred to a thousand feet in length, depending on obstructions around it, and width is not so important, although it should be at least two or three times that of plane. Shaw v. Carson, 218 Iowa 1251, 257 N.W. 194.
EMERGENT YEAR. The epoch or date whence any people begin to compute their time.
EMIGRANT. One who quits his country for any lawful reason, with a design to settle elsewhere, and takes his family and property, if he has any, with him. Vattel, b. 1, c. 19, § 224. Benson v. State, 36 Ga.App. 87, 135 S.E. 514.
EMIGRANT AGENT. One engaged in the busi-ness of hiring laborers for work outside the state. Gleaton v. State, 55 Ga.App. 875, 191 S.E. 926.
EMIGRATION. The act of removing from one country or state to another.
It is to be distinguished from "expatriation." The latter means the abandonment of one’s country and renunciation of one’s citizenship in it, while emigration denotes merely the removal of person and property to another country. The former is usually the consequence of the latter. Emigration is also used of the removal from one section to another of the same country.
EMINENCE. An honorary title given to car-dinals. They were called "illustrissimi" and "re-verendissimi" until the pontificate of Urban VIII.
EMINENT DOMAIN. The power to take private property for public use. MacVeagh v. Multon-omah County, 126 Or. 417, 270 P. 502, 507.
The right of eminent domain is the right of the state, through its regular organization, to reas-sert, either temporarily or permanently, its do-minion over any portion of the soil of the state on account of public exigency and for the public good. Thus, in time of war or insurrection, the proper authorities may possess and hold any part of the territory of the state for the common safe-ty; and in time of peace the legislature may au-thorize the appropriation of the same to public purposes, such as the opening of roads, construc-tion of defenses, or providing channels for trade or travel.
The right of society, or of the sovereign, to dispose, in case of necesslty, and for the public safety, of all the wealth contained in the state, is called "eminent domain." Jones v. Walker, 2 Paine, 688, Fed.Cas.No.7,507.
Eminent domain is the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government, or in the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity. It gives a right to resume the possession of the property In the man-ner directed by the constitution and the laws of the state, whenever the public interest requires it. Beekman v. Sara-toga & S. 11. Co., 3 Palge, N.Y., 45, 73, 22 Am.Dec. 679.
"The exaction of money from lndividuals under the right of taxation, and the appropriation of private property for public use by virtue of the power of eminent domain, must not be confused. In paying taxes the citizen contributes his just and ascertained share to the expenses of the gov-ernment under which he lives. But when his property is taken under the power of eminent domain, he is compelled to surrender to the public something aboye and beyond his due proportion for the public benefit. The matter is spe-cial. It is in the nature of a compulsory sale to the state." Black, Tax-Titles, § 3; Beeland Wholesale Co. v. Kaufman, 234 Ala. 249, 174 So. 516, 520.
The term "eminent domain" is sometimes (but inac-curately) applied to the land, buildings, etc., owned directly by the government, and which have not yet passed int° any prívate ownershíp. This species of property is much better designated as the "public domain," or "national domain."
EMISSARY. A person sent upon a mission as the agent of another; also a secret agent sent to as-certain the sentiments and designs of others, and to propagate opinions favorable to his employer.
EMISSION. In medical jurisprudence. The ejec-tion or throwing out of any secretion or other matter from the body; the expulsion of urine, semen, etc.
EMIT. To put forth or send out; to issue. "No state shall emit bilis of credit." Const. U. S. art. 1, § 10.
To issue; to give forth with authority; to put finto_ circulation. See Bill of Credit.
The word "emit" is never employed In describing those contracts by which a state binds itself to pay money at a future day for services actually received, or for money borrowed for present use. Nor are instruments executed for such purposes, In common language, denominated "bilis of credit." "To emit bilis of credit" conveys to the mind the idea of Issuing paper intended to ctrculate through the community, for its ordinary purposes, as money, which paper is redeemable at a future day. Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 316, 9 L.Ed. 709.
To throw off; give out; discharge. Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Stewart, 15 Ala.App. 466, 73 So. 827, 828.
In Scotch practice. To speak out; to state in words. A prisoner is said to emit a declaration. 2 Alis.Crim.Pr. 560.
EMMENAGOGUES. In medical jurisprudence. The name of a class of medicines supposed to have the property of promoting the menstrual discharge, and sometimes used for the purpose of procuring abortion.
EMOLUMENT. The profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as a compen-sation for services, or which is annexed to the possession of office as salary, lees, and perqui-sites; advantage; gain, public or private. Web-ster. Any perquisite, advantage, profit, or gain arising from the possession of an office. Apple v. Crawford County, 105 Pa. 303, 51 Am.Rep. 205; United States v. MacMillan, D.C.I11., 209 F. 266, 272; McLean v. United States, 33 S.Ct. 122, 124, 226 U.S. 374, 57 L.Ed. 260; State ex rel. Todd v. Reeves, 196 Wash. 145, 82 P.2d 173, 175, 118 A.L.R. 177.
EMOTIONAL INSANITY. The species of mental aberration produced by a violent excitement of the emotions or passions, though the reasoning faculties may remain unimpaired. A passion, ef-fecting for a space of time complete derange-ment of accused’s intellect, or an impulse, which his mind is not able to resist, to do the act. Fan-non v. Commonwealth, 295 Ky. 817, 175 S.W.2d 531, 533. See Insanity.
EMPALEMENT. In ancient law. A mode of in-flicting punishment, by thrusting a sharp pole up the fundament. Enc. Lond.
EMPANNEL. See Impanel. EMPARLANCE. See Imparlance.
EMPARNOURS. L. Fr. Undertakers of sults. Kelham.
EMPEROR. The title of the sovereign ruler of an empire. This designation was adopted by the rulers of the Roman world af ter the decay of the republic, and was assumed by those who claimed to be their successors in the "Holy Roman Em-pire," as also by Napoleon. "The sovereigns of Japan and Morocco are often, though with little propriety, called emperors." 10 Encyc. Amer. (1929), p. 300. In western speech the former sover-eigns of Turkey and China were called emperors. Cent. Dict.
The title "emperor" seems to denote a power and dignity superior to that of a "king." It appears to be the appropriate style of the executive head of a federal government, con structed on the monarchial principie, and comprising in its organi-zation several distinct kingdoms or other quasi sovereign states; as was the case with the Ger-man empire from 1871 to 1918. "The proper mean-ing of emperor is the chief of a confederation of states of which kings are members." Cent. Dict., quoting Encyc. Brit. "In general, an emperor is the holder of a sovereignty extending over con-quered or confederated peoples, a king is ruler of a single people. Thus * * * the ‘King of Eng-land’ is ‘Emperor of India.’ " Webster’s New Int. Dict. Before the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian empire in November, 1918, its monarch was known as the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary.
EMPHASIZING FACTS. An instruction is said to emphasis facts which may contain sufficient facts to authorize a verdict, but nevertheless some fact or facts are selected from the evidence and mentioned in such a way as to indicate to the jury that they have especial potency when that is not justified. Robinson v. Ross, Mo., 47 S.W.2d 122, 125.
EMPHYTEUSIS. In the Roman and civil law. A contract by which a landed estate was leased to a tenant, either in perpetuity or for a long term of years, upon the reservation of an annual rent or canon, and upon the condition that the lessee should improve the property, by building, cultivating, or otherwise, and with a right in the lessee to alien the estate at pleasure or pass it to his heirs by descent, and free from any revoca-tion, re-entry, or claim of forfeiture on the part of the grantor, except for non-payment of the rent. Inst. 3, 25, 3; 3 Bl.Comm. 232; Maine, Anc. Law, 289.
The right granted by such a contract, (jus em-phyteuticum, or emphyteuticarium.) The real right by which a person is entitled to enjoy an-other’s estate as if it were his own, and to dis-pose of its substance, as far as can be done with-out deteriorating it. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 326.
EMPHYTEUTA. In the civil law. The person to whom an emphyteusis is granted; the lessee or tenant under a contract of emphyteusis.
EMPHYTEUTICUS. In the civil law. Founded on, growing out of, or having the character of, an emphyteusis; held under an emphyteusis. 3 Bl. Comm. 232.
EMPIRE. The dominion or jurisdiction of an em-peror; the region over which the dominion of an emperor extends; imperial power; supreme do-minion; sovereign command.
EMPIRIC. A practitioner in medicine or surgery, who proceeds on experience only, without science or legal qualification; a quack. Parks v. State, 159 Ind. 211, 64 N.E. 862, 59 L.R.A. 190.
EMPLAZAMIENTO. In Spanish law. A sum-mons or citation, issued by authority of a judge,
requiring the person to whom it is addressed to appear before the tribunal at a designated day and hour.
EMPLEAD. To indict; to prefer a charge against; to accuse.
EMPLOI. In French law.. Equitable conversion. When property covered by the régime dota is sold, the proceeds of the sale must be reinvested for the benefit of the wife. It is the duty of the purchaser to see that the price is so reinvested. Arg. Fr. Merc. Law, 557.
EMPLOY. To engage in one’s service; to use as an agent or substitute in transacting business; to commission and intrust with the management of one’s affairs; and, when used in respect to a servant or hired laborer, the term is equivalent to hiring, which implies a request and a contract for a compensation, and has but this one meaning when used in the ordinary affairs and business of life. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, Ala., 64 S.Ct. 698, 703, 705, 321 U.S. 590, 88 L.Ed. 949; Slocum Straw Works v. Indus-trial Commission, 232 Wis. 71, 286 N.W. 593, 598; It is a synonym of "appoint". Morris v. Parks, 145 Or. 481, 28 P.2d 215, 216; Board of Com’rs of Colfax County v. Department of Public Health, 44 N.M. 189, 100 P.2d 222, 223, It is also synony-mous with "hire." Nat. Wooden Box Ass’n v. U. S., Ct.C1., 103 Ct.Cl. 595, 59 F.Supp. 118, 119.
EMPLOYED. This signifies both the act of doing a thing and the being under contract or orders to do it. To give employment to; to have employ-ment. State v. Birmingham Beauty Shop, Ala., 198 So. 435, 436.
EMPLOYEE. This word "is from the French, but has become somewhat naturalized in our language. Strictly and etymologically, it means ‘a person employed,’ but, in practice in the French language, it ordinarily is used to signify a person in some official employment, and as generally used with us, though perhaps not confined to any oficial employment, it is understood to mean some permanent employment or position." The word may be more extensive than "clerk" or "officer," and may signify any one in place, or having charge or using a function, as well as one in of-fice. Hopkins v. Cromwell, 89 App.Div. 481, 85 N.Y.S. 839.
One who works for an employer; a person working for salary or wages; applied to anyone so working, but usually only to clerks, workmen, laborers, etc., and but rarely to the higher officers of a corporation or government or to domestic servants. Keefe v. City of Monroe, 120 So. 106, 9 La.App. 545; State ex rel. Gorczyca v. City of Minneapolis, 174 Minn. 594, 219 N.W. 924.
Generally, when person for whom services are performed has right to control and direct indi-vidual who performs services not only as to re-sult to be accomplished by work but also as to details and means by which result is accomplished, individual subject to direction is an "em-ployee". Young v. Demos, 70 Ga.App. 577, 28 S.E. 2d 891, 893.
"Servant" is synonymous with "employee". Gooden v. Mitchell, Del.Super., 21 A.2d 197, 200, 201, 203, 2 Terry 301; Gibson v. Gillette Motor Transport, Tex.Civ.App., 138 S.W.2d 293, 294. Ten-nessee Valley Appliances v. Rowden, 24 Tenn. App. 487 146 S.W.2d 845, 848.
"Employee" must be distinguished from "Independent contractor," ”officer," "vice-principal," "agent," etc. The term is often specially defined by statutes; and whether one is an employee or not within a particular statute Will depend upon facts and circumstances. For examples; Fair Labor Standards Act, Fleming v. Demeritt Co., D.C.Vt., 56 F.Supp. 376, 378, 390; Schroepfer v. A. S. Abell Co., D.C.Md., 48 F.Supp. 88, 94, 95, 98. Motor Carriers’ Act, United States v. American Trucking Ass’n, App.D.C., 60 S.Ct. 1059, 1065, 310 U.S. 534, 84 L.Ed. 1345; West v. Smoky Mountain States, D.C.Ga., 40 F.Supp. 296, 298, 299. National Labor Relations Act. Standard Lime & Stone Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, C.C.A.4, 97 F.2d 531, 534, 535, 537; Eagle-Picher Mining Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, C.C.A.8, 119 F.2d 903, 911. Social Security Act, Kentucky Cottage Industries v. Glenn, D.C.Ky., 39 F.Supp. 642, 644, 645; Yearwood v. United States, D.C.La., 55 F.Supp. 295, 299, 300. State Labor Relations Law, In re New York State Labor Relations Board, 37 N.Y.S.2d 304, 308, 309; New York State Labor Relations Board v. Union Club of City of N. Y., 52 N.Y.S.2d 74, 83, 268 App.Div. 516. Unemployment Compensation Act. In re General Electric Co., 66 Idaho 91, 156 P.2d 190, 191. In re Keith, 30 N.Y.S.2d 206, 262 App.Div. 984. Workmen’s Compensation Act, Stiles v. Des Moines Councll of Boy Scouts of America, 209 Iowa 1235, 229 N.W. 841, 844; Essex County Country Club v. Chapman, 113 N.J.L. 182, 173 A. 591, 592.
For "Executive Employee", see that title.
EMPLOYER. One who employs the services of others; one for whom employees work and who pays their wages or salaries. The correlative of
employee." Angell v. White Eagle Oil & Refin-ing Co., 169 Minn. 183, 210 N.W. 1004, 1005. "Mas-ter" is a synonymous term. Tennessee Valley Appliances v. Rowden, 24 Tenn.App. 487, 146 S.W. 2d 845, 846; Gooden v. Mitchell, 2 Terry 301, 21 A. 2d 197, 200.
The fo]Iowing are examples of persons who have been or have not been classified as "employers" within varlous statutes. Carriers’ Taxing Act. Interstate Transit Unes v. U. S., D.C.Neb., 56 F.Supp. 332; Walling v. Baltimore Steam Packet Co., C.C.A.Md., 144 F.2d 130, 132. Fair Labor Standards Act. Bowe v. Judson C. Burns, Inc., D.C.Pa., 46 F.Supp. 745, 748; Barrow v. Adams & Co. Real Estate, 46 N.Y.S.2d 357, 359, 182 Misc. 641. National Labor Relations Act. National Labor Relations Board v. Con-denser Corporation of America, C.C.A.3, 128 F.2d 67, 71; N. L. R. B. v. Hofmann, C.C.A.3, 147 F.2d 679, 681, 157 A.L.R. 1149. Social Security Act. Matcovich v. Anglem, C.C.A.Cal., 134 F.2d 834, 837; Florida Industrial Commis-sion v. Peninsular Life Ins. Co., 152 Fla. 55, 10 So.2d 793, 794. Unemployment Compensation Act, Smith v. Brooklyn Bar Ass’n, 44 N.Y.S.2d 620, 621, 266 App.Div. 1038; State ex rel. Merion v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 142 Ohio St. 628, 53 N.E.2d 818, 820.
EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY ACTS. Statutes de-fining or limiting the occasions and the extent to which employers shall be hable in damages for injuries to their employees occurring in the course of the employment, and particularly (in recent times) abolishing the common-law rule that the employer is not Hable if the injury is caused by the fault or negligence of a fellow servant.
EMPLOYMENT. The act of hiring (People v. Hyde, 89 N.Y. 11, 16), implying a request and a
contract for compensation. State v. Deck, 108 Mo. App. 292, 83 S.W. 314, 315, (quoting and adopting definition in State v. Foster, 37 Iowa, 404; Mc-Cluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N.Y. 593).
It does not necessarily import an engagement or rendering services for another. A person may as well be "employed" about his riwn business as in the transaction of the same for a principal. State v. Canton, 43 Mo. 51.
Act of employing or state of being employed; that which engages or occupies; that which con-sumes time or attention; also an occupation, pro-fession, trade, post or business. Hinton v. Colum-bia River Packers’ Ass’n, C.C.A.Or., 117 F.2d 310; Davis v. Lincoln County, 117 Neb. 148, 219 N.W. 899, 900.
Includes the doing of the work and a reason-able margin of time and space required in pass-ing to and from the place where the work is to be done. California Casualty Indemnity Ex-change v. Industrial Accident Commission, 21 Cal. 2d 751, 135 P.2d 158, 161; Park Utah Consol. Mines Co. v. Industrial Commission, 103 Utah 64, 133 P.2d 314, 317.
The term "office" implies a delegation of a portion of the sovereign power to, and the possession of it by, the person filling the office, while an "employment" does not compre-hend a delegation of any part of the sovereign authority. Dade County v. State, 95 Fla. 465, 116 So. 72, 76.
EMPLOYMENT AGENCY. Business operated by a person, firm or corporation engaged in procur-ing, for a fee, employment for others and em-ployees for employers. McMillan v. City of Knox-ville, 139 Tenn. 319, 202 S.W. 65, 66.
EMPORIUM. A place for wholesale trade in commodities carried by sea. The name is some-times applied to a seaport town, but it properly signifies only a particular place in such a town. Smith, Dict. Antiq.
EMPOWER. A grant of authority rather than a command of its exercise. In re Whiteman’s Will, 52 N.Y.S.2d 723, 725, 268 App.Div. 591.
EMPRESARIOS. In Mexican law. Undertakers or promoters of extensive enterprises, aided by concessions or monopolistic grants from govern-ment; particularly, persons receiving extensive land grants in consideration of their bringing emigrants into the country and settling them on the lands, with a view of increasing the population and developing the resources of the country. U. S. v. Maxwell Land-Grant Co., 7 S.Ct. 1015, 121 U.S. 325, 30 L.Ed. 949.
EMPRESTIDO. In Spanish law. A loan. Some-thing lent to the borrower at his request. Las Partidas, pt. 3, tit. 18, 1. 70.
EMPTIO. In the Roman and civil law. The act of buying; a purchase.
EMPTIO BONORUM. A species of forced assign-ment for the benefit of creditors; being a public sale of an insolvent debtor’s estate whereby the purchaser succeeded to all his property, rights, and claims, and became responsible for his debts and liabilities to the extent of a quota fixed be-fore the transfer. See Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 521.
EMPTIO ET VENDITIO. Purchase and sale; sometimes translated "emption and vendition." The name of the contract of sale in the Roman law. Inst. 3, 23; Bract. fol. 61b. Sometimes made a compound word, emptio-venditio.
EMPTIO REI SPERATZE. A purchase in the hope of an uncertain future profit; the purchase of a thing not yet in existence or not yet in the possession of the seller, as, the cast of a net or a crop to be grown, and the price of which is to depend on the actual gain. On the other hand, if the price is fixed and not subject to fluctuation, but is to be paid whether the gain be greater or less, it is called emptio spei. Mackeld. Rom. Law, g 400.
EMPTOR. Lat. A buyer or purchaser. Used in the maxim "caveat emptor," let the buyer be-ware; i. e., the buyer of an article must be on his guard and take the risks of his purchase.
EMPTOR EMIT QUAM MINIMO POTEST, VEN-DITOR VENDIT QUAM MAXIMO POTEST. The buyer purchases for the lowest price he can; the seller sells for the highest price he can. 2 Kent, Comm. 486.
EMTIO. In the civil law. Purchase. This form of the word is used in the Digests and Code. Dig. 18, 1; Cod. 4, 49. See Emptio.
EMTOR. In the civil law. A buyer or purchaser; the buyer. Dig. 18, 1; Cod. 4, 49.
EMTRIX. In the civil law. A female purchaser; the purchaser. Cod. 4, 54, 1.
EN ARERE. L. Fr. In time past. 2 Inst. 506.
EN AUTRE DROIT. In the right of another. See Autre Droit.
EN BANC. L. Fr. In the bench. 1 Anders. 51.
EN BREVET. In French law. An acte is said to be en brevet when a copy of it has not been recorded by the notary who drew it.
EN DÉCLARATION DE SIMULATION. A form of action used in Louisiana. Its object is to have a contract declared judicially a simulation and a nullity, to remove a cloud from the title, and to bring back, for any legal purpose, the thing sold to the estate of the true owner. Edwards v. Bal-lard, 20 La.Ann. 169.
EN DEMEURE. In default. Used in Louisiana of a debtor who fails to pay on demand accord-ing to the terms of his obligation. See Bryan v. Cox, 3 Mart. (La. N. S.) 574.
EN ESCHANGE IL COVIENT QUE LES ES-TATES SOIENT EGALES. Co. Litt. 50. In an exchange it is desirable that the estates be equal.
EN FAIT. Fr. In fact; in deed; actually.EN GROS. Fr. In gross. Total; by wholesale.
EN JUICIO. Span. Judicially; in a court of law; in a suit at law. White, New Recop. b. 2, tit. 8, c. I.
EN MASSE. Fr. In a mass; in a lump; at wholesale.
EN MORT MAYNE. L. Fr. In a dead hand; in mortmain. Britt. c. 43.
EN OWEL MAIN. L. Fr. In equal hand. The word "owei" occurs also in the phrase "owelty of partition."
EN RECOUVREMENT. Fr. In French law. An expression employed to denote that an indorse-ment made in favor of a person does not transfer to him the property in the bill of exchange, but merely constitutes an authority to such person to recover the amount of the bill. Arg. Fr. Merc. Law, 558.
EN ROUTE. Fr. On the way; in the course of a voyage or journey; in course of transportation. McLean v. U. S., 17 Ct.C1. 90.
EN VENTRE SA MERE. L. Fr. In its mother’s womb. A term descriptive of an unbarn child. For some purposes the law regards an infant en ventre as in being. It may take a legacy; have a guardian; an estate may be limited to its use, etc. 1 Bl. Comm. 130.
EN VIE. L. Fr. In life; alive. Britt. c. 50.
ENABLE. To give power to do something. In the case of a person under disability as to deal-ing with another, "enable" has the primary mean-ing of removing that disability; not of conferring a compulsory power as against that other; 66 L. J. Ch. 208; [1897] A. C. 647. To make able. Summers v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 335 III. 564, 167 N.E. 777, 779.
ENABLING POWER. When the donor of a pow-er, who is the owner of the estate, confers upon persons not seised of the fee the right of creat-ing interests to take effect out of it, which could not be done by the donee of the power unless by such authority, this is called an "enabling power." 2 Bouv. Inst. no. 1928.
ENABLING STATUTE. The act of 32 Henry VIII. c. 28, by which tenants in tail, husbands seised in right of their wives, and others were empowered to make leases for their lives or for twenty-one years, which they eould not do be-fore. 2 Bl. Comm. 319; Co. Litt. 44a. The phrase is also applied to any statute enabling persons or corporations to do what before they could not. It is applied to statutes which confer new powers.
ENACH. In Saxon law. The satisfaction for a crime; the recompense for a fault. Skene.
ENACT. To establish by law; to perform or effect; to decree. The usual introductory formu-la in making laws is, "Be it enacted." In re Sen-ate File, 25 Neb. 864, 41 N.W. 981.ENACTING CLAUSE. That part of a statute which declares its enactment and serves to iden-tify it as an act of legislation proceeding from the proper legislative authority. Various formulas are used for this clause, such as "Be it enacted by the people of the state of Illinois represented in general assembly," "Be it enacted by the senate and house of representatives of the United States of America in congress assembled," "The general assembly do enact," etc. A section of a statute denouncing an offense is sometimes spoken of as the "enacting clause." City of Astoria v. Malone, 169 P. 749, 750, 87 Or. 88. See United States v. Mendelsohn, D.C.N.J., 32 F.Supp. 622, 623, ques-tioning this definition.
ENAJENACION. In Spanish and Mexican law. Alienation; transfer of property. The act by which the property in a thing, by lucrative title, is transferred, as a donation; or by onerous title, as by sale or barter. In a more extended sense, the term comprises also the contracts of emphy-teusis, pledge, and mortgage, and even the crea-tion of a servitude upon an estate. Escriche; Mulford v. Le Fraile, 26 Cal. 88.
ENBREVER. L. Fr. To write down in short; to abbreviate, or, in old language, imbreviate; to put into a schedule. Britt. c. 1.
ENCAUSTUM. In the civil law. A kind of ink or writing Huid appropriate to the use of the em-peror. Cod. 1, 23, 6.
ENCEINTE. Pregnant. See Pregnancy.
ENCHESON. The occasion, cause, or reason for which anything is done. Termes de la Ley.
ENCLOSE. See Inclose.
ENCLOSURE. See Inclosure.
ENCOMIENDA. In Spanish law. A grant from the crown to a private person of a certain portion of t’erritory in the Spanish colonies, together with the concession of a certain number of the native ,inhabitants, on the feudal principie of commenda-tion. 2 Wools. Pol. Science, 161, 162. Also a royal grant of privileges to the military orders of Spain.
ENCOURAGE. In criminal law. To instigate; to incite to action; to give courage to; to in-spirit; to embolden; to raise confidence; to make confident; to help; to forward; to advise. Com-itez v. Parkerson, C.C.La., 50 F. 170.

ENCROACH. To enter by gradual steps or stealth into the possessions or rights of another; to trespass; intrude. Miami Corporation v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315, 318. To gain unlawfully upon the lands, property, or authority of another; as if one man presses upon the grounds of another too far, or if a tenant owe two shillings rent-serv-ice, and the lord exact three. So, too, the Spenc-ers were said to encroach the king’s authority. Blount; Plowd. 94a.

ENCROACHMENT. An encroachment upon a street or highway is a fixture, such as a wallor fence, which illegally intrudes into or invades the highway or incloses a portion of it, diminish-ing its width or area, but without closing it to public travel. State v. Scott, 82 N.H. 278, 132 A. 685, 686.
In the law of easements. Where the owner of an easement alters the dominant tenement, so as to impose an additional restriction or burden on the servient tenement, he is said to commit an en-croachment. Sweet.
ENCUMBER. See Incumben ENCUMBRANCE. See Incumbrance.
END. Object; intent. Things are construed ac-cording to the end. Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 3, no. 10.
END ZINES. In mining law, the end unes of a claim, as platted or laid down on the ground, are those which mark its boundaries on the shorter dimension, where it crosses the vein, while the "side Unes" are those which mark its longer dimension, where it follows the course of the vein. But with reference to extra-lateral rights, if the claim as a whole crosses the vein, instead of f ol-lowing its course, the end Unes will become side Unes and vice versa. Consolidated Wyoming Gold Min. Co. v. Champion Min. Co., C.C.Cal., 63 F. 549.
END OF WILL. Point in will at which desposi-tive provisions terminate. In re Levanti’s Will, 252 N.Y.S. 497, 498, 141 Misc. 248. In re Coyne’s Estate, 349 Pa. 331, 37 A.2d 509, 510.
END ON OR NEARLY SO. Approaching vessels whose courses diverge not more than one or two points are meeting "end on or nearly so," within article 18 of the Inland Rulos (33 USCA § 203), and are required to pass port to port. The Amol-co, C.C.A.Mass., 283 F. 890, 893.
END SILLS. The sill of a car is one of the main longitudinal timbers which are connected trans-versely by the end sills, bolsters, and cross-ties. Sills are divided into side sills, intermediate sills, and center sills. The end sill is the transverse member of the under frame of a car framed across the ends of all the longitudinal sills. In passenger cars the end sill comes directly under the end door; the platform with its various parts usually being a separate construction. The plat-form end sill is the transverse end piece of the platform frame, and is also called the "end tim-ber" and buffer beam on passenger equipment cars. Hill v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 160 Minn. 484, 200 N.W. 485, 486.
END TO END. The expression "end to end," used in a patent claim in describing the relative position of rollers, does not necessarily require that there shall be no longitudinal space between the ends of the rollers, nor impose a limitation which will enable another to avoid infringement by leaving a space between them, where it does not change their function or mode of operation. Stebler v. Riverside Heights Orange Growers’ Ass’n, C.C.A.Cal., 205 F. 735, 740.ENDEAVOR. To exert physical and intellectual strength toward the attainment of an object; a systematic or continuous effort. Thompson v. Corbin, Tex.Civ.App., 137 S.W.2d 157, 159.
ENDENZIE, or ENDENIZEN. To make free; to enfranchise.
ENDOCARDITIS. In medical jurisprudence. An inflammation of the living membrane of the heart.
ENDORSE. See Indorse.
ENDOW. To give a dower; to bestow upon; to make pecuniary provision for. Fish v. Fish, 184 Ky. 700, 212 S.W. 586, 587.
ENDOWED SCHOOLS. In England, certain schools having endowments are distinctively known as "endowed schools;" and a series of acts of parliament regulating them are known as the "endowed schools acts." Mozley & Whitley.
ENDOWMENT. The assignment of dower; the setting off a woman’s dower. 2 Bl. Comm. 135.
In appropriations of churches, (in English law,) the setting off a sufficient maintenance for the vicar in perpetuity. 1 Bl. Comm. 387.
The act of settling a fund, or permanent pecun-iary provision, for the maintenance of a public institution, charity, college, etc.
A fund settled upon a public institution, etc., for its maintenance or use.
The words "endowment" and "fund," in a statute exempting from taxation the real estate, the furniture and personal property, and the "endowment or fund" of rell-glous and educational corporations, are ejusdem generis, and intended to comprehend a class of property different from the other two, not real estate or chattels. The dif-ference between the words is that "fund" 1s a general term, including the endowment, whlle "endowment" means that particular fund, or part of the fund, of the institution, bestowed for its more permanent uses, and usually kept sacred for the purposes intended. The word "endowment" does not, in such an enactment, include real estate. See First Reformed Dutch Church v. Lyon, 32 N.J.Law, 360; Appeal of Wagner Institute, 116 Pa. 555, 11 A. 402,
ENDOWMENT POLICY. In life insurance. A policy which is payable when the insured reaches a given age, or upon his decease, if that occurs earlier. Central States Life Ins. Co. v. Morris, 202 Ark. 969, 155 S.W.2d 333, 336, 202 Ark. 969.
ENDURANCE. State or capability of lasting; continuance; or act or instante of bearing or suffering; a continuing or the power of continu-ing under pain, hardship, or distress without being overcome; sufferance; as beyond endurance. State ex rel. Adams v. Crowder, 46 N.M. 20, 120 P.2d 428, 431.
ENEMY, in public law, signifies either the state which is at war with another, or a citizen or sub-ject of such state, or a person, partnership, or corporation doing business within the territory of an enemy state or an ally thereof. United States v. Fricke, D.C.N.Y., 259 F. 673, 675; Rossie v. Garvan, D.C.Conn., 274 F. 447, 453.

Alien Enemy

An alien, that is, a citizen or subject of a for-eign state or power, residing within a given coun-try, is called an "alien ami" if the country where he lives is at peace with the country of which he is a citizen or subject; but if a state of war exists between the two countries, he is called an "alien enemy," and in that character is denied access to the courts or aid from any of the departments of government.

Enemy Belligerent

Citizens who associate themselves with the mili-tary arm of an enemy government and enter the United States bent on hostile acts. Ex parte Quir-in, App.D.C., 63 S.Ct. 2, 15, 317 U.S. 1, 87 L.Ed. 3.

Enemy’s Property

In international law, and particularly in the usage of prize courts, this term designates any property which is engaged or used in illegal in-tercourse with the public enemy, whether belong-ing to an ally or a citizen, as the illegal traffic stamps it with the hostile character and attaches to it all the penal consequences. Prize Cases, 2 Black, 674, 17 L.Ed. 459.

Public Enemy

A nation at war with the United States; also every citizen or subject of such nation. Not in-cluding robbers, thieves, private depredators, or riotous mobs. State v. Moore, 74 Mo. 417, 41 Am. Rep. 322.
The term has latterly acquired, in the vocab ulary of journalism and civic indignation, a more extended meaning, denoting a particularly notor-ious offender against the criminal laws, especially one who seems more or less immune from suc-cessful prosecution.
ENFEOFF. To invest with an estate by feoff-ment. To make a gift of any corporeal heredita-ments to another. See Feoffment.
ENFEOFFMENT. The act of investing with any dignity or possession; also the instrument or deed by which a person is invested with possessions.
ENFITEUSIS. In Spanish law. Emphyteusis, (q. v.). See Mulford v. Le Franc, 26 Cal. 103.
ENFORCE. To put into execution; to cause to take effect; to make effective; as, to enf orce a writ, a judgment, or the collection of a debt or fine; to compel obediente to. Dozier v. City of Gatesville, Tex.Civ.App., 51 S.W.2d 1091.
ENFORCEABLE. Word "enforceable," standing alone, does not mean "perform" or "performable," but, when employed in contract for performance of obligation relating to venue, it is synonymous with word "execute," and must be given meaning of "perform," "performable," and "to perform." It does not necessarily imply actual force or co-ercion, but may mean to be executed; to put into execution; to cause to take effect. Glover v. American Mortgage Corporation, Tex.Civ.App., 94 S.W.2d 1235, 1236.
ENFRANCHISE. To make free; to incorporate a man in a society or body politic.
ENFRANCHISEMENT. The act of making free; giving a franchise or freedom to; investiture with privileges or capacities of freedom, or municipal or political liberty. Admission to the freedom of a city; admission to political rights, and particu-larly the right of suffrage. Anciently, the acquisi-tion of freedom by a villein from his lord.
The word is now used principally either of the manumission of slaves, (q. v.,) of giving to a borough or other constituency a right to return a member or members to parliament, or of the conversion of copyhold into freehold. Mozley & Whiteley.
ENFRANCHISEMENT OF COPYHOLDS. In English law. The conversion of copyhold into freehold tenure, by a conveyance of the fee-simple of the property from the lord of the manor to the copyholder, or by a release from the lord of all seigniorial rights, etc., which destroys the custom-ary descent, and also all rights and privileges an-nexed to the copyholder’s estate. 1 Watk. Copyh. 362; 2 Steph. Comm. 51.
ENGAGE. To employ or involve one’s self ; to take part in; to embark on. State ex rel. Kusie v. Weber, 72 N.D. 705, 10 N.W.2d 741, 745. It im-ports more than a single act or transaction or an occasional participation. Head v. New York Life Ins. Co., C.C.A.Okl., 43 F.2d 517, 519; Lee v. Guardian Life Ins. of America, 46 N.Y.S.2d 241, 246, 187 Misc. 221.
"Engage- means to take part In or be employed in and denotes more than a single act or single transaction while "particípate" means simply to take or have a part or share in, and may apply equaliy to a single act or many acts. Lawyers Lloyds of Texas v. Webb, Tex.Civ.App., 150 S.W.2d 181, 184.
ENGAGED IN AVIATION. See Aviation.
ENGAGED IN COMMERCE. To be "engaged in commerce" an employee must be actually engaged in the movement of commerce or the services he performs must be so closely related thereto as to be for all practical purposes an essential part thereof; McLeod v. Threlkeld, Tex., 63 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 1252, 319 U.S. 491, 87 L.Ed. 1538; Boutell v. Walling, C.C.A.Mich., 148 F.2d 329, 331.
ENGAGED IN EMPLOYMENT. To be rendering service for employer under terms of employment, and is more than being merely hired to commence work. Walling v. Consumers Co., C.C.A.I11., 149 F.2d 626, 629.
ENGA GEMENT. In French law. A contract. The obligation arising from a quasi contract. The terms "obligation" and "engagement" are said to be synonymous, (17 Toullier, no. 1;) but the Code seems specially to apply the term "en-ga gement" to those obligations which the law im-poses on a man without the intervention of anycontract, either on the part of the obligor or the obligee, (article 1370.) An engagement to do or omit to do something amounts to a promise. Rue v. Rue, 21 N.J.Law, 369.
In English practice. The term has been appro-priated to denote a contract entered into by a married woman with the intention of binding or charging her separate estate, or, with stricter ac-curacy, a promise which in the case of a person sui juris would be a contract, but in the case of a married woman is not a contract, because she cannot bind herself personally, even in equity. Her engagements, therefor, merely operate as dispositions or appointments pro tanto of her separate estate. Sweet.
Under statute rendering national bank stock-holders hable to assessment in order to discharge an "engagement" of the bank, the quoted word includes all pecuniary liabilities and obligations of the bank. Oppenheimer v. Harriman Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of City of New York, N.Y., 57 S.Ct. 719, 723, 301 U.S. 206, 81 L.Ed. 1042.
ENGENDER. To cause, to bring about, to excite, to occasion, to call forth. Lacy v. State, 30 Okl. Cr. 273, 236 P. 53, 54.
ENGINE. This is said to be a word of very gen-eral signification; and, when used in an act, its meaning must be sought out from the act itself, and the language which surrounds it, and also from other acts in parí materia, in which it oc-curs. Abbott, J., 6 Maule & S. 192. In a large sense, it applies to all utensils and tools which afford the means of carrying on a trade. But in a more limited sense it means a thing of consider-able dimensions, of a fixed or permanent nature, analogous to an erection or building. Id. 182. And see Lefler v. Forsberg, 1 App.D.C. 41; Brown v. Benson, 101 Ga. 753, 29 S.E. 215.
Within Employers’ Liability Law, § 1, par. 2, subd. (a), an "engine" is an ingenious or skillful contrivance used to effect a purpose, and is often synonymous with the word "machine"; machine-ry being any combination of mechanical means designed to work together so as to effect a given end. Haddad v. Commercial Motor Truck Co., 146 La. 897, 84 So. 197, 198, 9 A.L.R. 1380.
Machine by which power is applied to the doing of work, particularly one that converts some mo-tive energy, especially heat, into mechanical power. Chrysler Corporation v. ‘Trott, Cust. & Pat.App., 83 F.2d 302, 310.

Compound Compressed Air Engine

An engine in which the compressed air is first used in a high pressure cylinder, that is, in a cylinder of relatively small diameter, and after driving the piston connected therewith, instead of being permitted to escape, is conveyed to a low pressure cylinder, that is, to a cylinder of larger diameter, where it still has sufflcient expansive force to drive another piston. This operation may again be repeated in a third cylinder or the air be permitted to escape to the atmosphere. H. K. Porter Co. v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, D.C.Pa., 219 F. 226, 229.
ENGINEER. One who is versed in or follows as a calling or profession any branch of engineering. Employers’ Liability Assur. Corporation v. Acci-dent & Casualty Ins. Co. of Winterthur, Switzer-land, C.C.A.Ohio, 134 F.2d 566, 569. One who man-ages or runs any stationary or locomotive engine; an engine driver. Baggaley v. Aetna Ins. Co., C. C.A.I11., 111 F.2d 134, 135.
ENGINEERING. The art and science by which mechanical properties of matter are made useful to man in structures and machines. Employers’ Liability Assur. Corporation v. Accident & Cas-ualty Ins. Co. of Winterthur, Switzerland, C.C.A. Ohio, 134 F.2d 566, 569, 146 A.L.R. 1186.
ENGLESHIRE. A law was made by Canute, for the preservation of his Danes, that, when a man was killed, the hundred or town should be Hable to be amerced, unless it could be proved that the person killed was an Englishman. This proof was called "Engleshire." 1 Hale, P. C. 447; 4 El. Comm. 195; Spelman.
ENGLETERRE. L. Fr. England.
ENGLISH INFORMATION. In English law. A proceeding in the court of exchequer in matters of revenue.
ENGLISH MARRIAGE. This phrase may refer to the place where the marriage is solemnized, or it may refer to the nationality and domicile of the partes between whom it is solemnized, the place where the union so created is to be enjoyed. 6 Prob. Div. 51.
ENGRAVING. The art of producing on hard material incised or raised patterns, unes, and the like, from which an impression or print is taken. The term may apply to a text or script, but is generally restricted to pictorial illustrations or works connected with the fine arts, not including the reproduction of pictures by means of pho-tography. American Historical Co. v. Clark, 316 Ill.App. 309, 44 Ñ.E.2d 761.
ENGROSS. To copy the rude draft of an instru-ment in a fair, large hand. To write out, in a large, fair hand, on parchment.
In old criminal law. To buy up so much of a commodity on the market as to obtain a monopoly and sell again at a forced price.
ENGROSSER. One who engrosses or writes on parchment in a large, fair hand.
One who purchases large quantities of any com-modity in order to acquire a monopoly, and to sell them again at high prices.
ENGROSSING. In English law. The getting in-to one’s possession, or buying up, large quantities of corn, or other dead victuals, with intent to sell them again. The total engrossing of any other commodity, with intent to sell it at an unreason able price. 4 B1.Comm. 158, 159. This was a mis-demeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment. Steph.Crim.Law, 95. Now repealed by 7 & 8 Vict. c. 24. 4 Steph.Comm. 291, note.
ENHANCED. This word, taken in an unqualified sense, is synonymous with "increased," and com-prehends any increase of value, however caused or arising. Thornburn v. Doscher, C.C.Or., 32 Fed. 812.
ENHERITANCE. L. Fr. Inheritance.
ENITIA PARS. The share of the eldest. A term of the English law descriptiva of the lot or share chosen by the eldest of coparceners when they make a voluntary partition. The first choice (primer election) belongs to the eldest. Co.Litt. 166.
ENITIA PARS SEMPER PRiEFERENDA EST PROPTER PRIVILEGIUM irETATIS. Co.Litt. 166. The part of the elder sister is always to be preferred on account of the privilege of age.
ENJOIN. To require; command; positively di-rect. To require a person, by writ of injunction from a court of equity, to perform, or to abstain or desist from, some act. Clifford v. Stewart, 95 Me. 38, 49 A. 52; Lawrence v. Cooke, 32 Hun, 126; Brimberg v. Hartenfeld Bag Co., 89 N.J.Eq. 425, 105 A. 68, 69.
ENJOY. To have, possess, and use with satisfac-tion; to occupy or have benefit of. Salway v. Multnomah Lumber & Box Co., 134 Or. 428, 293 P. 420, 422.
ENJOYMENT. The exercise of a right; the pos-session and fruition of a right, privilege or incor-poreal hereditament.
Comfort, consolation, contentment, ease, happi-ness, pleasure and satisfaction. National Surety Co. v. Jarrett, 95 W.Va. 420, 121 S.E. 291, 295.

Adverse Enjoyment

The possession or exercise of an easement, un-der a claim of right against the owner of the land out of which such easement is derived. 2 Washb. Real Prop. 42; Cox v. Forrest, 60 Md. 79.

Quiet Enjoyment

Covenant for. See Covenant.
ENLARGE. To make larger; to increase; to ex-tend a time limit; to grant further time. Also to set at liberty one who has been imprisoned or in custody.

ENLARGER L’ESTATE. A species of release which inures by way of enlarging an estate, and consists of a conveyance of the ulterior interest to the particular tenant; as if there he tenant for life or years, remainder to another in fee, and he in remainder releases all his right to the particu-lar tenant and his heirs, this gives him the estate in fee. 1 Steph.Comm. 518.

ENLARGING. Extending, or making more com-prehensive; as an enlarging statute, which is a remedial statute enlarging or extending the com-mon law. 1 Bl.Comm. 86, 87.
ENLISTIVIENT. The act of one who voluntarily enters the military or naval service of the govern-ment, contracting to serve in a subordinate ca-pacity. Morrissey v. Perry, 137 U.S. 157, 11 Sup. Ct. 57, 34 L.Ed. 644; Babbitt v. U. S., 16 Ct.Cl. 213.
The words "enlist" and "enlistment," in law, as in com-mon usase, may signify either the complete fact of enter-ing into the military service, or the first step taken by the recruit towards that end. When used in the former sense, as in statutes conrerring a right to compel the military service of enlisted men, the enlistment is not deemed com-pleted until the man has been mustered into the service. Tyler v. Pomeroy, 8 Allen, Mass., 480.
Enlistment does not include the entry of a person into
the military service under a commIssion as an officer. Hil-llard v. Stewartstown, 48 N. H. 280.
Enlisted applies to a drafted man as well as a volunteer, whose name is duly entered on the military rolls. Sheffield v. Otis, 107 Mass. 282.
ENORMIA. In old practice and pleading. Un-lawful or vvrongful acts; wrongs. Et alia enor-mia, and other wrongs. This phrase constantly occurs in the old writs and declarations of tres-pass.
ENORMOUS. Aggravated. "So enormous a trespass." Vaughan, 115. Written "enormious," in some of the old Books. Enormious is where a thing is made without a rule or against law. Brownl. pt. 2, p. 19.
ENPLEET. Anciently used for implead. Cowell.
ENQUÉTE, or ENQUEST. In canon law. An examination of witnesses, taken down in writing, by or before an authorized judge, for the purpose of gathering testimony to be used on a trial.
ENRÉGISTREMENT. In French law. Registra-tion. A formality which consists in inscribing on a register, specially kept for the purpose by the government, a summary analysis of certain deeds and documents. At the same time that such analysis is inscribed upon the register, the clerk places upon the deed a memorandum indicating the date upon which it was registered, and at the side of such memorandum an impression is made with a stamp. Arg.Fr.Merc.Law, 558.
ENROLL. To register; to make a record; to en-ter on the rolls of a court; to transcribe. Ream v. Com., 3 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 209; Anderson v. Com-monwealth, 275 Ky. 232, 121 S.W.2d 46, 47.
ENROLLED BILL. In legislative practice, a bfil which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the governor (or president) and filed by the secretary of state. Sedgwick County Com’rs v. Bailey, 13 Kan. 608.
ENROLLMENT. The act of putting upon a roll. A record made. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 275 Ky. 232, 121 S.W.2d 46, 47.

In English law. The registering or entering on the rolls of chancery, king’s bench, common pleas, or exchequer, or by the clerk of the peace in the records of the quarter sessions, of any law-ful act; as a recognizance, a deed of bargain and sale, and the like. Jacob.
ENROLLMENT OF VESSELS. In the laws of the United States on the subject of merchant shipping, the recording and certification of ves-sels employed in coastwise or inland navigation; as distinguished from the "registration" of ves-sels employed in foreign commerce. U. S. v. Leet-zel, 3 Wall. 566, 18 L.Ed. 67.
ENROLLMENT RECORDS. AH the testimony and exhibits tending to establish age that were in evidence before the Commission to the Five Civil-ized Tribes and the conclusions of the Commis-sien based thereon from the date of the applica-tion for enrollment of any particular individual up to the date of the ascertainment by the Corn-mission as to whether the name of such person was intended to be included upon the final roil of the nation in which he claimed citizenship. Dun-can v. Byars, 44 Okl. 538, 144 P. 1053, 1054.
ENS LEGIS. L. Lat. A creature of the law; an artificial being, as contrasted with a natural per-son. Applied to corporations, considered as de-riving their existente entirely from the law.
ENSCHEDULE. To insert in a list, account, or writing.
ENSEAL. To seal. Ensealing is still used as a formal word in conveyancing.
ENSERVER. L. Fr. To make subject to a serv-ice or servitude. Britt. c. 54.
ENSUE. To follow after; to follow in order or train of events. Agricultural Publishers’ Ass’n v. Homestead Co., 197 Iowa, 380, 197 N.W. 314.
ENTAIL, To settle or limit the succession to
real property; to create an estate tail.
ENTAIL, n. A fee abridged or limited to the is-sue, or certain classes of issue, instead of descend-ing to all the heirs. 1 Washb. Real Prop. 66; Cowell; 2 B1.Comm. 112, note.
Entail, In legal treatises, is used to signify an estate tail, especially with reference to the restraint which such an estate imposes upon its owner, or, in other words, the points wherein such an estate differs from an estate in fee-simple. And this is often its popular sense; but some-times it is, in popular language, used differently, so as to signify a succession of life-estates, as when it is said that "an entail ends with A.," meaning that A. is the first per-son who is entitled to bar or cut off the entail, being in law the first tenant in tail. Mozley & Whiteley.

Quasi Entail

An estate pur nutre vie may be granted, not only to a man and his heirs, but to a man and the heirs of his body, which is termed a "quasi entail;" the interest so granted not being proper-ly an estate-tail, (for the statute De Donis applies only where the subject of the entail is an estate of inheritance,) but yet so far in the nature of an estate-tail that it will go to the heir of the body as special occupant during the life of the cestui que vie, in the same manner as an estate of in-heritance would descend, if limited to the grantee and the heirs of his body. Wharton.
ENTAILED. Settled or limited to specified heirs, or in tail.
ENTAILED MONEY. Money directed to be in-vested in realty to be entailed. 3 & 4 Wm. IV, c. 74, §1 70, 71, 72.
ENTAILMENT. An interferente with and cur-tailment of the ordinary rules pertaining to dev-olution by inheritance; a limitation and direc-tion by which property is to descend different from the course which it would take if the creator of the entailment, grantor or testator, had been content that the estáte should devolve in regular and general succession to heirs at law in the statu-tory order of precedente and sequence. Gardner v. Anderson, 114 Kan. 778, 227 P. 743, 748.
ENTENCION. In old English law. The plaintiff’s count or declaration.
ENTENDMENT. The old form of intendment (q. v.) derived directly from the French, and used to denote the true meaning or signification of a word or sentence; that is, the understanding or con-struction of law. Cowell.
ENTER. To form a constituent part, to become a part or partaker; to impenetrate; share; with into; as, tin enters into the composition of pew-ter. Bedford v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corpora-tion, 102 Colo. 538, 81 P.2d 752, 755.
In the law of real property. To go upon land for the purpose of taking possession of it. In strict usage, the entering is preliminary to the taking possession but in common parlance the en-try is now merged in the taking possession. See Entry.
In practice. To place anything before a court, or upon or among the records, in a formal and regular manner, and usually in writing; as to "en-ter an appearance," to "enter a judgment." In this sense the word is nearly equivalent to setting down formally in writing, in either a 1 ull or abridged form.
ENTERCEUR. L. Fr. A party challenging (claiming) goods; he who has placed them in the hands of a third person. Kelham.
ENTERING. Generally synonymous with "re-cording". In re Labb, D.C.N.Y., 42 F.Supp. 542, 544.

ENTERING JUDGMENTS. The formal entry of the judgment on the rolls of the court, which is necessary before bringing an appeal or an action on the judgment. Blatchford v. Newberry, 100 III. 491. The entering of judgment is a ministerial act performed by the clerk of court by means of which permanent evidence of judicial act in ren-dering judgment is made a record of the court. Jones v. Sun Oil Co., Tex.Civ.App.., 145 S.W.2d 615, 619. Under some statutes, the entering con-sists merely in the filing of a judgment with the clerk; Mathison v. Anderson, 107 Wash. 617, 182 P. 622. But under other acts, the entry of a judg-ment consists in the recording of it in the judg-ment book. Wilson v. Durkee, 20 Cal.App. 492, 129 P. 617, 618.
Entry of judgment differs from rendition of judgment. "Rendition" of a judgment is the ju-dicial act of the court in pronouncing the sentence of the laW upon the facts in controversy. The "entry" is a ministerial act, which consists in spreading upon the record a statement of the final conclusion reached by the court in the matter, thus furnishing external and incontestable evidence of the sentence given, and designed to stand as a perpetual memorial of its action. Jaqua v. Har-kens, 40 Ind.App. 639, 82 N.E. 920, 922; Beet-chenow v. Bartholet, 162 Wash. 119, 298 P. 335, 336.
ENTERING SHORT. When bilis not due are paid into a bank by a customer, it is the custom of some bankers not to carry the amount of the bilis directly to his credit, but to "enter them short," as it is called, i. e., to note down the receipt of the bilis, their amounts, and the times when they be-come due in a previous column of the page, and the amounts when received are carried forward into the usual cash column. Sometimes, instead of entering such bilis short, bankers credit the customer directly with the amount of the bilis as cash, charging interest on any advances they may make on their account, and allow him at once to draw upon them to that amount. If the banker becomes bankrupt, the property in bilis entered short does not pass to his assignees, but the cus-tomer is entitled to them if they remain in his hands, or to their proceeds, if received, subject to any lien the banker may have upon them. Wharton.
ENTERPRISE. A project or undertaking. Size-more v. Hall, 148 Kan. 233, 80 P.2d 1092, 1095. In Workmen’s Compensation Law. A hazardous un-dertaking or project. Hahnemann Hospital v. In-dustrial Board of Illinois, 282 Ill. 316, 118 N.E. 767, 770.
ENTERTAINMENT. This word is synonymous with "board," and includes the ordinary neces-sanies’ of life. See Lasar v. Johnson, 125 Cal. 549, 58 P. 161. Hospitable provision for the wants of a guest, especially a provision for the table. That which serves as amusement. Young v. Board of Trustees of Broadwater County High School, 90 Mont. 576, 4 P.2d 725, 726.

ENTIIUSIASTS. Those who believe far more than they can prove and can prove far more than any one else can believe. Peskind v. State, 115 Ohio St. 279, 152 N.E. 670.
ENTICE. To wrongfully solicit, persuade, pro-cure, allure, attract, draw by blandishment, coax or seduce. Nash v. Douglass, 12 Abb.Prac.N.S., N.Y., 190. To lure, induce, tempt, incite, or per-suade a person to do a thing. Berger v. Levy, 5 Cal.App.2d 544, 43 P.2d 610, 611.
ENTIBE. Whole; without division, separation, or diminution; unmingled; complete in all its parts; not participated in by others. 15 Cyc. 1054; 11 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 48; People v. Tahaures Purchase, 26 N.Y.S.2d 795, 813.
ENTIBE ACT. The words "entire Act" as used in the rule of statutory construction that it is the duty of the court to examine the entire act means the caption, the body of the act, and the emergen-cy clause. Anderson v. Penix, 138 Tex. 596, 161 S.W.2d 455, 459.
ENTIBE BALANCE OF MY ESTATE. The res-idue. In re Taylor’s Estate, 86 A. 708, 711, 239 Pa. 153; In re Brothers’ Estate, 156 Pa.Super. 292, 40 A.2d 156, 157.
ENTIBE BLOOD. Relations of the "entire blood" are those derived not only from the same ances-tor, but from the same couple of ancestors. In re Skidmore’s Estate, 266 N.Y.S. 312, 148 Misc. 569.
ENTIBE CONTRACT. See Contract.
ENTIBE DAY. This phrase signifies an undivid-ed day, not parts of two days. An entire day must have a legal, fixed, precise time to begin, and a fixed, precise time to end. A day, in contempla-tion of law, comprises all the twenty-four hours, beginning and ending at twelve o’clock at night. Robertson v. State, 43 Ala. 325. In a statute re-quiring the closing of all liquor saloons during "the entire day of any election," etc., this phrase means the natural day of twenty-four hours, com-mencing and terminating at midnight. Haines v. State, 7 Tex.App. 30.
ENTIBE INTEREST. The whole interest or right, without diminution. Where a person in selling his tract of land sells also his entire interest in all improvements upon public land adjacent thereto, this vests in the purchaser only a quitclaim of his interest in the improvements. McLeroy v. Duck-worth, 13 La.Ann. 410.
ENTIBE LOSS OF SIGHT. In respect of one eye, or both. Substantial blindness, not necessarily absolute. International Travelers’ Ass’n v. Rog-ers, Tex.Civ.App., 163 S.W. 421, 422. There was "entire loss of sight" of eye within accident policy, where insured could not distinguish one object from another in the strongest light, though he could distinguish between light and darkness. Tracey v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 119 Me. 131, 109 A. 490, 494, 9 A.L.R. 521. Locomotive Engineers’ Mut. Life Accident Ins. Co. v. Meeks, 157 Miss. 57,

127 So. 699, 702. See Blind; Complete and Per-manent Loss of Sight of Both Eyes.
ENTIBE STRUCTURE. Under lien statute. Not a completed, as distinguished from an uncomplet-ed, building, but a new structure, not before exist-ing, as distinguished from betterments and repairs on previously constructed improvements. Atkin-son v. Colorado Title & Trust Co., 59 Colo. 528, 151 P. 457, 461.
ENTIBE TENANCY. A sole possession by one person, called "severalty," which is contrary to several tenancy, where a joint or common posses-sion is in one or more.
ENTIBE USE, BENEFIT, etc. These words in the habendum of a trust-deed for the benefit of a married woman are equivalent to the words "sole use," or "sole and separate use," and consequent-ly her husband takes nothing under such deed. Heathman v. Hall, 38 N.C. 414.
ENTIRELY WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING. Ina-bility to comprehend nature and effect of transac-tion involved, not necessarily absolute imbecility, idiocy or mental incapacity. Barlow v. Strange, 120 Ga. 1015, 1018, 48 S.E. 344.
ENTIRETY. The whole, in contradistinction to a moiety or part only. When land is convgyed to husband and wif e, they do not take by moie-ties, but both are seised of the entirety. 2 Kent, Comm. 132; 4 Kent, Comm. 362. Parceners, on the other hand, have not an entirety of interest, but each is properly entitled to the whole of a dis-tinct moiety. 2 Bl.Comm. 188. See Estate by the Entirety.
The word is also used to designate that which the law considers as one whole, and not capable of being divided into parts. Thus, a judgment, it is held, is an entirety, and, if void as to one of the two defendants, cannot be valid as to the oth-er. So, if a contract is an entirety, no part of the consideration is due until the whole has been per-f ormed.
ENTITLE. In its usual sense, to entitle is to give a right or title. Felter v. McClure, 135 Wash. 410, 237 P. 1010, 1011. To qualify for; to furnish with proper grounds for seeking or clarining. Fitts v. Terminal Warehousing Corporation, 170 Tenn. 198, 93 S.W.2d 1265, 1267. In re Graves, 325 Mo. 888, 30 S.W.2d 149, 151. In ecclesiastical law. To en-title is to give a title or ordination as a minister.
ENTITY. A real being; existente. Department of Banking v. Hedges, 136 Neb. 382, 286 N.W. 277, 281.
ENTRAILS. Intestines. "Entrails" of a calf do not include pluck and sweetbread. Common-wealth v. Cohen, 250 Mass. 570, 146 N.E 228, 230.
ENTRANCE. A door or gate for entering; a gate; an opening, and perhaps a passage. Wea-therby v. Travelers Indemnity Co., Tex.Civ.App., 171 S.W.2d 540, 541.ENTRAP. To catch, to entrap, to ensnare; hence, to catch by artifice; to involve in difficulties or distresses; to catch or involve in contradictions. Roane v. State, 55 Okl.Cr. 332, 29 P.2d 990, 992.
ENTRAPMENT. The act of officers or agents of the government in inducing a person to commit a crime not contemplated by him, for the purpose of instituting a criminal prosecution against him. Falden v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 549, 189 S.E. 329, 332. Lee v. State, 66 Okl.Cr. 399, 92 P.2d 621, 623. But the mere act of an ofilcer in furnishing the accused an opportunity to commit the crime, where the criminal intent was already present in the accused’s mind, is not ordinarily entrapment. State v. Cowling, 161 Wash. 519, 297 P. 172, 174.
ENTREATY. Beseeching, or suppliant, or prayer-ful in nature. In re Sloan’s Estate, 7 Cal.App.2d 319, 46 P.2d 1007, 1018.
ENTREBAT. L. Fr. An intruder or interloper. Britt. c. 114.
ENTREGA. Span. Delivery. Las Partidas, pt. 6, tit. 14, 1. 1.
ENTREPÓT. A warehouse or magazine for the deposit of goods. In France, a building or place where goods from abroad may be deposited, and from whence they may be withdrawn for expor-tation to another country, without paying a duty. Brande; Webster.
ENTRY. The act of making or entering a record; a setting down in writing of particulars; or that which is entered; an item. United States v. Dar-by, D.C.Md., 2 F.Supp. 378, 379. Generally synony-mous with "recording." In re Labb, D.C.N.Y., 42 F.Supp. 542, 544.
Passage leading into a house or other building or to a room; a vestibule. Weatherby v. Trav-elers Indemnity Co., Tex.Civ.App., 171 S.W.2d 540, 541.
In commercial law. Entry denotes the act of a. merchant, trader, or other business man in re-cording ir. his account-books the facts and circum-stances of a sale, loan, or other transaction. Also the note or record so made. Bissell v. Beckwith, 32 Conn. 517; U. S. v. Crecelius, D.C.Mo., 34 F. 30. The books in which such memoranda are first (or originally) inscribed are called "books of original entry," and are prima facie evidence for certain purposes.
In copyright law. Depositing with the register of copyrights the printed title of a hook, pamphlet, etc., for the purpose of securing copyright on the same. The old formula for giving notice of copy-right was, "Entered according to act of congress," etc.
In criminal law. Entry is the unlawful making one’s way into a dwelling or other house, for the purpose of committing a crime therein.
In cases of burglary, the least entry with the whole or any part of the body, hand, or foot, or with any instru-ment or weapon, introduced for the purpose of committing a felony, is sufflcient to complete the offense. 3 Inst. 64. And see Walker v. State, 63 Ala. 49, 35 Am.Rep. 1. State v. Chappell, 185 S.C. 111, 193 S.E. 924, 925.

In customs law. The entry of imported goods at the custom house consists in submitting them to the inspection of the revenue officers, together with a statement or description of s’ich goods, and the original invoices of the same, for the purpose of estimating the duties to be paid thereon. U. S. v. Legg, 105 F. 930, 45 C.C.A. 134.
In mining law. A place in coal mines used by the miners and other workmen generally in going to and from their work, through which coal is hauled from the necks of the rooms to the foot of the shaft; a "room" being the place in which a miner works and from which he mines coal. Ri-cardo v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 100 Kan. 95, 163 P. 641, 643.
In parliamentary law. The "entry" of a pro-posed constitutional amendment or of any other document or transaction in the journal of a house of the legislature consists in recording it in writ-ing in such journal, and (according to most of the authorities) at length. See Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa, 543, 15 N.W. 609.
In practice. Entry denotes the formal inscrip-tion upon the rolls or records of a court of a note or minute of any of the proceedings in an action; and it is frequently applied to the filing of a pro-ceeding in writing, such as a notice of appearance by a defendant, and, very generally, to the filing of the judgment roll as a record in the Office of the court. Thomason v. Ruggles, 69 Cal. 465, 11 P. 20.
In public land laws. Under the provisions of the land laws of the United States, the term "en-try" denotes the filing at the land-office, or in-seription upon its records, of the documents re-quired to found a claim for a homestead or pre-emption right, and as preliminary to the issuing of a patent for the land. Chotard v. Pope, 12 Wheat. 588, 6 L.Ed. 737; Stephens v. Terry, 178 Ky. 129, 198 S.W. 768, 771.
The word "entry," as used in the public land laws, covers all methods by which a right to ac-quire title to public lands may be initiated. Unit-ed States v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., C.C.Mont., 204 F. 485, 487.

Homestead Entry

An entry under the United States land laws for the purpose of acquiring title to a portion of the public domain under the homestead laws, consist-ing of an affidavit of the claimant’s right to enter, a formal application for the land, and payment of the money required. Whitmire v. Spears, 212 Ala. 583, 103 So. 668, 669.

Mineral Land Entry

Filing a claim to hold or purchase lands be-longing to the public domain and valuable for the minerals they contain, implying a prior discovery of ore and the opening of a mine. U. S. v. Four Bottles Sour Mash Whisky, D.C.Wash., 90 F. 720.ferred right to acquire the land by virtue of his occupation and improvement of it. Hartman v. Warren, 76 F. 161, 22 C.C.A. 30.

Timber Culture Entry

An entry of public lands under the various acts of congress opening portions of the public do-main to settlement and to the acquisition of title by the settlers on condition of the planting and cultivation of timber trees. Hartman v. Warren, 76 F. 160, 22 C.C.A. 30.
In real property law. Entry is the act of going peaceably upon a piece of land which is claimed as one’s own, but is held by another person, with the intention and for the purpose of taking posses-sion of it.
Entry 1s a remedy which the law affords to an injured party ousted of his lands by another person who has taken possession thereof without right. This remedy (which must in all cases be pursued peaceably) takes place in three only out of the five species of ouster, viz., abatement, intrusion, and disseisin; for, as in these three cases the original entry of the wrong-doer is unlawful, so the wrong may be remedied by the mere entry of the former posses-sor. But it 1s otherwise upon a discontinuance or deforce-ment, for in these latter two cases the former possessor cannot remedy the wrong by entry, but must do so by action, lnasmuch as the original entry being in these cases lawful, and therefore conferring an apparent right of pos-session, the law will not suffer such apparent right to be overthrown by the mere act or entry of the cla1mant. Brown. Johnson v. Cobb, 29 S.C. 372, 7 S.E. 601.

Open Entry

An entry upon real estate, for the purpose of taking possession, which is not clandestine nor effected by secret artifice or stratagem, and (in some states by statute) one which is accomplished in the presence of two witnesses. Thompson v. Kenyon, 100 Mass. 108.

Re-Entry

The resumption of the possession of leased premises by the landlord on the tenant’s failure to pay the stipulated rent or otherwise to keep the conditions of the lease.
In Scotch law. The term refers to the acknowl-edgment of the title of the heir, etc., to be admit-ted by the superior.

ENTRY AD COMMUNEM LEGEM. Entry at common law. The name of a writ of entry which lay for a reversiones after the alienation and death of the particular tenant for life, against him who was in possession of the land. Brown.
ENTRY AD TERMIN1UM QUI PRIETERIIT. The writ of entry ad terminum qui prceteriit lies where a man leases land to another for a term of years, and the tenant holds over his term. And if lands be leased to a man for the term of another’s lile, and he for whose life the lands are leased dies, and the lessee holds over, then the lessor shall have this writ. Termes de la Ley.ENTRY BY COURT. Acts 1923, c. 6, amending Acts 1921, c. 112, § 138, provides that county court may enter upon lands and build roads and within 60 days after such entry shall petition for assess-ment of compensation. An "entry" within stat-ute means the establishing of the road on, and ap-propriation of, the land, by a proper order of the county court. To effect an entry under the statute it is not necessary that the county court go upon the lands and begin the work of construction. Mc-Gibson v. Roane County Court, 95 W.Va. 338, 121 S.E. 99, 104.
ENTRY FOR MARRIAGE IN SPEECII. A writ of entry causa matrimonii proe/oquuti lies where lands or tenements are given to a man upon con-dition that he shall take the donor to be his wife within a certain time, and he does not espouse her within the said term, or espouses another woman, or makes himself priest. Termes de la Ley.
ENTRY IN CASU CONSIMILI. A writ of entry in casu consimili lies where a tenant for lile or by the curtesy aliens in fee. Termes de la Ley.
ENTRY IN REGULAR COURSE OF BUSINESS. A record setting forth a fact or transaction made by one in the ordinary and usual course of one’s business, employment, office or profession, which it was the duty of the enterer in such manner to make, or which was commonly and regularly made, or which it was convenient to make, in the conduct of the business to which such entry per-tains. Leonard v. State, 100 Ohio St. 456, 127 N.E. 464, 468.
ENTRY IN THE CASE PROVIDED. A writ of entry in casu proviso lies if a tenant in dower alien in fee, or for life, or for another’s lite, liv-ing the tenant in dower. Termes de la Ley.
ENTRY OF CAUSE FOR TRIAL. In English practice. The proceeding by a plaintiff in an ac-tion who had given notice of trial, depositing with the proper officer of the court the nisi prius record, with the panel of jurors annexed, and thus bringing the issue before the court for trial.
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT. See Entering Judg-ment.
ENTRY ON THE ROLL. In former times, the parties to an action, personally or by their coun-sel, used to appear in open court and make their mutual statements viva voce, instead of as at the present day delivering their mutual pleadings, un-tul they arrived at the issue or precise point in dispute between them. During the progress of this oral statement, a minute of the various pro- ceedings was made on parchment by an officer of the court appointed for that purpose. The parch-ment then became the record; in other words, the official history of the suit. Long after the prac-tice of oral pleading had fallen into disuse, it con-tinued necessary to enter the proceedings in like manner upon the parchment roll, and this was called "entry on the roll," or making up the "issue roll." But by a rule of H. T. 4 Wm. IV. the prac-tice of making up the issue roll was abolished; and it was only necessary to make up the issue in the form prescribed for the purpose by a rule of H. T. 1853, and to deliver the same to the court and to the opposite party. The issue which was delivered to the court was called the "nisi prius record;" and that was regarded as the official history of the suit, in like manner as the issue roll formerly was. Under the present practice, the issue roll or nisi prius record consists of the pa-pers delivered to the court, to facilitate the trial of the action, these papers consisting of the pleadings simply, with the notice of trial. Brown.
ENTRY VVITHOUT ASSENT OF THE CHAPTER. A writ of entry sine assensu capituli lies where an abbot, prior, or such as hath covent or common seal, aliens lands or tenements of the right of his church, without the assent of the covent or chap-ter, and dies. Termes de la Ley.
ENTRY, WRIT OF. In old English practice. This was a writ made use of in a form of real action brought to recover the possession of lands from one who wrongfully withheld the same from the demandant.
Its object was to regain the possession of lands of which the demandant, or his ancestors, had been unjustly deprived by the tenant of the freehold, or those under whom he claimed, and hence it belonged to the possessory division of real actlons. It decided nothing with respect to the right of property, but only restored the demandant to that situation in which he was (or by law ought to have been) before the dispossession committed. 3 BIComm. 180.
It was usual to specify in such writs the degree or degrees within which the writ was brought, and it was said to be "In the per" or "in the per and cui," according as there had been one or two descents or alienations from the original wrongdoer. If more than two such transfers had intervened, the writ was said to be "in the post." See 3 Bl.Comm. 181. See, further, Writ of Entry.
ENTRYMAN. One who makes an entry of land under the public land laws of the United States. Indian Cove Irr. Dist. v. Prideaux, 25 Idaho 112, 136 P. 618, 620, Ann.Cas.1916A, 1218.
ENUMERATED. This term is often used in law as equivalent to "mentioned specifically," "desig-nated," or "expressly named or granted"; as in speaking of "enumerated" governmental powers, items of property, or articles in a tariff schedule. See Bloomer v. Todd, 3 Wash.T. 599, 19 P. 135, 1 L.R.A. 111.
ENUMERATIO INFIRMAT REGULAM IN CASI-BUS NON ENUMERATIS. Enumeration disaf-firms the rule in cases not enumerated. Bac.Aph. 17.
ENUMERATIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO AL-TERIUS. The specification of one thing is the ex-clusion of a different thing. A maxim more gen-erally expressed in the form "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," (q. v.).
ENUMERATORS. Persons appointed to collect census papers or schedules. 33 & 34 Vict. c. 108, § 4.
ENURE. To operate or take effect. To serve to the use, benefit, or advantage of a person. A re-lease to the tenant for life enures to him in re-version; that is, it has the same effect for him as for the tenant for Life. Often written "inure."
ENVELOPE. That which envelops; a wrapper; an inclosing cover; especially, the cover or wrap-per of a document, as of a letter. In re Eastman Kodak Co., Cust. & Pat.App., 80 F.2d 270, 271, 272.
ENVOY. In international law. A public minister of the second class, ranking next after an ambassa-dor.
Envoys are either ordinary or extraordinary; by custom the latter is held in greater consideration.
ENZYME. Any one of a series of catalytic agents, animal or vegetable, produced by living cells, ef-fecting chemical change in absorbed or surround-ing substances so as to render them fit for the requirements of the cells. In re Reese, Cust. & Pat.App., 143 F.2d 1021.
EO DIE. Lat. On that day; on the same day.
EO INSTANTI. Lat. At that instant; at the very or same insta nt; immediately. 1 Bl.Comm. 196, 249; 2 BI.Comm. 168; Co.Litt. 298a; 1 Coke 138. Also written eo instante.
EO INTUITU. Lat. With or in that view; with that intent or object. Hale, Anal. § 2.
EO LOCI. Lat. In the civil law. In that state or condition; in that place, (eo loco.) Calvin.
EO NOMINE. Lat. Under that name; by that appellation. Perinde ac si eo nomine tibi tradita fuisset, just as if it had been delivered to you by that name. Inst. 2, 1, 43. A common phrase in the books.
EODEM LIGAMINE QUO LIGATUM EST DIS-SOLVITUR. A bond is released by the same for-malities with which it is contracted. Co.Litt. 212b; Broom, Max. 891.
EODEM MODO QUO QUID CONSTITUITUR, DIS-SOLVITUR. In the manner in which [by the same means by whichl a thing is constituted, is. it dissolved. 6 Coke, 53b.
EORLE. In Saxon law. An earl. EOTH. In Saxon law. An oath.
EPICYCLOIDAL CURVE. A curve generated by the motion of a point on the circumference of a circle which rolls upon the convex side of a fixed circle. Hill v. Hill, Cust. & Pat.App., 54 F.2d 950, 952.
EPIDEMIC. This term, in its ordinary and popu-lar meaning, applies to any disease which is wide-ly spread or generally prevailing at a given place and time. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Industrial Acci-dent Commission, 21 Ca1.2d 742, 135 P.2d 153, 157; Martin v. Springfield City Water Co., Mo.App., 128 S.W.2d 674, 679.
EPILEPSY. In medical jurisprudence. A disease of the brain, which occurs in paroxysms with un-certain intervals between them. Vulgarly called "fits." Westphall v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 27 Cal.App. 734, 151 P. 159, 162; Morse v. Caldwell, 55 Ga.App. 804, 191 S.E. 479, 485.
The disease is generally organlc, though it may be func-tional and symptomatic of irritation in other parts of the body. The attack is characterized by loss of consclousness, sudden falling down, distortion of the eyes and face, grind-ing or gnashing of the teeth, stertorous respiration, and more or less severe muscular spasms or convulsions, Epi-lepsy, though a disease of the brain, is not to be regarded as a form of insanity, in the sense that a person thus afflicted can be said to be permanently insane, for there may be little or no mental aberration in the intervals between the attacks. But the paroxysm is frequently fol-lowed by a temporary insanity, varying in particular instances from slight alienation to the most violent mafia. In the latter form the affection is known as "epileptic fury." But this generally passes off within a few days. But the course of the principal disease is generally one of deterioration, the brain being gradually more and more deranged in its functions in the intervals of attack, and the memory and intellectual powers in general becoming enfeebled, leading to a greatly impaired state of mental efficiency, or to dementia, or a condition bordering on imbecility. See Aurentz v. Anderson, 3 Pittsb.R., Pa., 310; Lawton v. Sun Mutual Ins. Co., 2 Cush., Mass., 517.
Hystero-epilepsy. A condition initiated by an ap-parently mild attack of convulsive hysteria, fol-lowed by an epileptiform convulsion, and suc-ceeded by a period of "clownism" (Osler) in which the patient assumes a remarkable series of droll contortions or cataleptic poses, sometimes simulat-ing attitudes expressive of various passions, as, fear, joy, erotism, etc. The final stage is one of delirium with unusual hallucinations. The attack differs from true epilepsy in that the convulsions may continue without serious result for several successive days, while true epilepsy, if persistent, is always serious, associated with fever, and fre-quently fatal.
EPIMENIA. Expenses or gifts. Blount.
EPIPHANY. A Christian festival, otherwise called the "Manifestation of Christ to the Gen-tiles," observed on the 6th of January, in honor of the appearance of the star to the three magi, or wise men, who carne to adore the Messiah, and bring him presents. It is commonly called "I’welfth Day." Enc.Lond.
EPIPHYSEITIS. Inflammation of an epiphysis-a process of bone attached for a time to another bone by cartilage. Eckenroad v. Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co., 149 Pa.Super. 257, 27 A.2d 759, 761.
EPIPHYSEAL SEPARATION. Not a bone frac-ture in true sense, but a separation of the fibers and cartilaginous tissues which attach the epiphy-sis to the femur. Elsen v. State Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 219 Minn. 315, 17 N.W.2d 652, 655.
EPIPIIYSIS. Part or process of a bone which os-sifies separately and subsequently becomes anky-losed (to grow together into one) into the main part of the bone. Elsen v. State Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 219 Minn. 315, 17 N.W.2d 652, 655.
EPIQUEYA. In Spanish law. A term synony-mous with "equity" in one of its senses, and de-fined as "the benignant and prudent interpretation

of the law according to the circumstances of the time, place, and person."
EPISCOPACY. The office of overlooking or over-seeing; the office of a bishop, who is to overlook and oversee the concerns of the church. A form of church government by diocesan bishops. Trus-tees of Diocese of Central New York v. Colgrove, 4 Hun (N.Y.) 366.
EPISCOPALIA. In ecclesiastical law. Synodals, pentecostals, and other customary payments from the clergy to their diocesan bishop, formerly col-lected by the rural deans. Cowell.
EPISCOPALIAN. Of or pertaining to episcopacy, or to the Episcopal Church.
EPISCOPATE. A bishopric. The dignity or office of a bishop.
EPISCOPORUM ECDICUS. Bishop’s proctors; church lawyers. 1 Reeve, Eng.Law, 65.
EPISCOPUS. In the civil law. An overseer; an inspector. A municipal oflicer who had the charge and oversight of the bread and other provisions which served the citizens for their daily food. Vicat. In medieval history. A bishop; a bishop of the Christian church.
EPISCOPUS ALTERIUS MANDATO QUAM RE-GIS NON TENETUR OBTEMPERARE. Co.Litt. 134. A bishop needs not obey any mandate save the king’s.
EPISCOPUS PUERORUM. It was an old custom that upon certain feasts some lay person should plait his hair, and put on the garments of a bishop, and in them pretend to exercise episcopal jurisdic-tion, and do several ludicrous actions, for which reason he was called "bishop of the boys;" and this custom obtained in England long after several constitutions were made to abolish it. Blount.
EPISCOPUS TENEAT PLACITUM, IN CURIA CHRISTIANITATIS, DE IIS QUJE MERE SUNT SPIRITUALIA. 12 Coke, 44. A bishop may hold plea in a Court Christian of things merely spir-itual.
EPISTOLA. A letter; a charter; an instrument in writing for conveyance of lands or assurance of contracts. Calvin.; Spelman.
EPISTOL7E. In the civil law. Rescripts; opin-ions given by the emperors in cases submitted to them for decision.
Answers of the emperors to petitions.
The añswers of counsellors, (juris-consulti,) as Ulpian and others, to questions of law proposed to them, were also called "epistolce."
Opinions written out. The term originally signi-fied the same as literce. Vicat.
EPOCH. The time at which a new computation is begun; the time whence dates are numbered. Enc. Lond.EQUAL. Alike; uniform; on the same plane or level with respect to efficiency, worth, value, amount, or rights. People v. Hoffman, 116 III. 587, 5 N.E. 600, 56 Am.Rep. 793.
EQUAL AND UNIFORM TAXATION. Taxes are said to be "equal and uniform" when no person or class of persons in the taxing district, whether it be a state, county, or city, is taxed at a different rate than are other persons in the same district upon the same value or the same thing, and where the objects of taxation are the same, by whomso-ever owned or whatsoever they may be. Weather-ly Independent School Dist. v. Hughes, Tex.Civ. App., 41 S.W.2d 445, 447.
EQUAL DEGREE. Persons are said to be related to a decedent "in equal degree" when they are all removed by an equal number of steps or degrees. from the common ancestor. Fidler v. Higgins, 21 N.J.Eq. 162; Helmes v. Elliott, 14 S.W. 930, 89 Tenn. 446, 10 L.R.A. 535.
EQUAL ELECTION. Elections are "equar," when vote of each voter is equal in its infiuence upon result to vote of every other elector. Blue v. State ex rel. Brown, 206 Ind. 98, 188 N.E. 583, 589, 91 A.L.R. 334.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS. The ?qua’ protection of the laws of a state is extended to persons within its jurisdiction, within the mean-ing of the constitutional requirement, when its courts are open to them on the same conditions as to others, with like rules of evidence and modes of procedure, for the security of their persons and property, the prevention and redress of wrongs, and the enforcement of contracts; when they are subjected to no restrictions in the acquisition of property, the -enjoyment of personal liberty, and the pursuit ‘oí happiness, which do not generally affect others; when they are hable to no other or greater burdens and charges than such as are laid upon others; and when no different or greater punishment is enforced against them for a viola-ton of the laws. State v. Montgomery, 94 Me. 192, 47 A. 165.
"Equal protection of the law" means that equal protec-tion and security shall be given to all under like circum-stances in his Life, his liberty, and his property, and in the pursuit of happiness, and in the exemption from any greater burdens and charges than are equally imposed upon all others under like circumstances. Sovereign Camp, W. O. W., v. Casodos, D.C.N.M., 21 F.Supp. 989, 994.
EQUAL WATCHES. Under statute requiring di-vision of sailors at sea into equal watches, "equal watches" means successive and continuous watch-es to be constituted in numbers as nearly equal as the sum of the whole number will permit. New York & Cuba Mail S. S. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co. of City of New York, C.C.A.N.Y., 117 F.2d 404, 409.
EQUALITY. The condition of possessing sub-stantially the same rights, privileges, and immuni-ties, and being hable to substantially the same du-ties. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 160 Ky. 769, 170 S.W. 162, Ann.Cas.1916A, 405.
EQUALIZATION. The act or process of making equal or bringing about conformity to a commonStandard. The process of equalizing assessments or taxes, as performed by "boards of erualization" in various states, consists in comparing the assess-ments made by the local officers of the various counties or other taxing districts within the ju-risdiction of the boárd and reducing them to a common and uniform basis, increasing or diminish-ing by such percentage as may be necessary, so as to bring about, within the entire territory affected, a uniform and equal ratio between the assessed value and the actual cash value of property. The term is also applied to a similar process of leveling or adjusting the assessments of individual taxpay-ers, so that the property of one shall not be as-sessed at a higher (or lower) percentage of its market value than the property of another. See Harney v. Mitchell County, 44 Iowa 203.
EQUALIZE. To make equal, to cause to cor-respond, or be like in amount or degree, as com-pared with something. Los Angeles County v. Ransohoff, 24 Cal.App.2d 238, 74 P.2d 828, 830; De Mille v. Los Angeles County, Cal.App., 77 P.2d 905, 906.
EQUALLY DIVIDED. Provision in will that prop-erty shall be "equally divided," or divided "share and share alike" means that the property shall be divided per capita and not per stirpes. However, these phrases may be so modified by other parts of the will as to require distribution per stirpes. In re Mays’ Estate, 197 Mo.App. 555, 196 S.W. 1039, 1040.
EQUERRY. Án officer of state under the master of the horse.
EQUES. Lat. In Roman and old English law. A knight.
EQUILIBRIUM. As applied in chemistry, the bal-anced state reached when the action apparently stops in a chemical reaction, that is, the concen-tration between reaction products and the original reacting substances has become such that decom-position and recombination proceeds with equal speed. In re Sussman, 141 F.2d 267, 271, 31 C.C. P.A. (Patents) 921.
EQUILOCUS. An equal. It is mentioned in Sim-eon Dunelm, A.D. 882. Jacob.
E’QUINOXES. The two periods of the year (ver-nal equinox about March 21st, and autumnal equi-nox about September 22d) when the time from the rising of the sun to its setting is equal to the time from its setting to its rising. See Dig. 43, 13, 1, 8.
EQUIP. To furnish for service or against a need or exigency; to fit out; to supply with whatever is necessary to efficient action in any way. Synon-ymous with furnish. State ex rel. Davis v. Bar-ber, 139 Fla. 706, 190 So. 809.
EQUIPMENT. Furnishings, or outfit for the re-quired purposes. An exceedingly elastic term, the meaning of which depends on context. Elliott v. Payne, 293 Mo. 581, 239 S.W. 851, 852, 23 A.L.R. 706; Midland Special School Dist. of SebastianCounty, Ark., v. Central Trust Co. of Illinois, C.C. A.Ark., 1 F.2d 124, 126.
Whatever is needed in equipping; the articles comprised in an outfit; equippage. Department of Treasury, Gross Income Tax Division, v. Ran-ger-Cook, Inc., Ind.App., 49 N.E.2d 548, 550. Farm & Home Saving & Loan Ass’n of Missouri v. Em-pire Furniture Co., Tex.Civ.App., 87 S.W.2d 1111, 1112. Nearly synonymous with "instrumentality." Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co. v. Minneapolis St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 217 Wis. 426, 259 N.W. 618, but not synonymous with "maintenance". Neal v. City of Morrilton, 192 Ark. 450, 92 S.W.2d 208, 209.
EQUITABLE. Just; conformable to the principies of justice and right.
Just, fair, and right, in consideration of the facts and circumstances of the individual case.
Existing in equity; available or sustainable only in equity, or only upon the rules and principies of equity.
As to "Fair and Equitable Value," see that title. As to equitable "Assets," "Construction," "Conver-sion," "Easement," "Ejectment," "Estate," "Gar-nishment," "Levy," "Mortgage," "Title," and "Waste." see those tities.
EQUITABLE ACTION. One founded on an equity or cognizable in a court of equity; or, more spe-cifically, an action arising, not immediately from the contract in suit, but from an equity in favor of a third person, not a party to it, but for whose benefit certain stipulations or promises were made. Wenzel & Henoch Const. Co. v. Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California, D.C.Cal., 18 F.Supp. 616, 620.
EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENT. An assignment which, though invalid at law, will be recognized and enforced in equity; e. g., an assignment of a chose in action, or of future acquisitions of the as-signor. Lewis v. Braun, 356 III. 467, 191 N.E. 56, 60; Stewart v. Kane, Mo.App., 111 S.W.2d 971, 974.
In order to work an "equitable assignment", there must be an absolute appropriation by the assignor of the debt or fund sought to be assigned. Blount v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 192 Ga. 325, 15 S.E.2d 413, 415; Sneesby v. Livington, 182 Wash. 229, 46 P.2d 733, 735.
EQUITABLE CONVERSION. A fiction which re-sults in treating land as personalty and personalty as land under certain circumstances. It takes place when a contract for sale of realty becomes binding on parties. Shay v. Penrose, 185 N.E.2d 218, 219, 25 Ill.2d 447; Panushka v. Panushka, 349 P.2d 450, 452, 221 Or. 145; Parr-Richmond Indus. Corp. v. Boyd, 272 P.2d 16, 22, 43 C.2d 157.
EQUITABLE DEFENSE. A defense to an action on grounds which, prior to the passing of the Com-mon Law Procedure Act (17 and 18 Vict. c. 125), would have been cognizable only in a court of equity. Moz. & W. In American practice, a de-fense which is cognizable in a court of equity, but which is available there only, and not in an action at law, except under the reformed codes of prac-tice. Kelly v. Hurt, 74 Mo. 561-570; City of New York v. Holzderber, 90 N.Y.S. 63, 44 Misc. 509. The codes of procedure and the practice in some of the states likewise permit both a legal and eq-uitable defense to the same action. Susquehanna S. S. Co. v. A. O. Andersen & Co., 239 N.Y. 285, 146 N.E. 381, 383. It has also been construed to mean a defense which a court of equity would recognize, or one founded on some distinct ground of eq-uitable jurisdiction. City of New York v. Holzder-ber, 44 Misc. 509, 90 N.Y.S. 63, 64.
EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF APPROXIMATION. This doctrine differs from "Cy pres doctrine" in purpose and application. The last mentioned doc-trine applies where an apparent charitable inten-tion has failed, whether by an incomplete disposi-tion at the outset or by subsequent inadequacy of the original object, and its purpose is to give a cy pres or proximate application to testator’s inten-tion, whereas the "equitable doctrine of approxi-mation" merely authorizes a court of chancery to vary the details of administration, in order to pre-serve the trust, and carry out the general purpose of the donor. National Bank of Greece v. Savari-ka, 167 Miss. 571, 148 So. 649, 654.
EQUITABLE ELECTION. The choice to be made by a person who may, under a will or other instru-ment, have either one of two alternative rights or benefits, but not both. Peters v. Bain, 133 U.S. 670, 10 S.Ct. 354, 33 L.Ed. 696.
The obligation imposed upon a party to choose between two inconsistent or alternative rights or claims, in cases where there is clear intention of the person from whom he derives one that he should not enjoy both. 2 Story, Eq.Jur. § 1075; Dakan v. Dakan, 83 S.W.2d 620, 624, 125 Tex. 305.
A choice shown by an overt act between two inconsistent rights, either of which may be as-serted at the will of the chooser alone. Bierce v. Hutchins, 205 U.S. 346, 27 S.Ct. 524, 51 L.Ed. 828; Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. General Electric Co., C.C.A.Ohio, 246 F. 695, 701; Jenkins v. U. S., D.C. R.I., 22 F.2d 568, 571.
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL is that condition in which justice forbids one to gainsay his own acts or assertions. Goodwin Tile & Brick Co. v. De-Vries, Iowa, 13 N.W.2d 310, 312, 155 A.L.R. 346. The preclusion of person by his act or conduct or silente from asserting rights which might oth-erwise have existed. Marshall v. Wilson, Or., 154 P.2d 547, 551. The species of estoppel which equity puts upon a person who has made a false repre-sentation or a concealment of material facts, with knowledge of the facts, to a party ignorant of the truth of the matter, with the intention that the other party should act upon it, and with the result that such party is actually induced to act upon it, to his damage. Bigelow, Estop. 484.
See, also, In Pais, Estoppel In.

Elements or essentials of such estoppel include change of position for the worse by party asserting estoppel, Ma-lone v. Republic Net. Bank & Trust Co., Tex.Civ.App., 70 S.W.2d 809, 812; Llover v. Peterson, 203 Minn. 337, 281 N. W, 275, 278; conduct by party estopped such that it would be contrary to equity and good conscience for him to al-lege and prove the truth, Rody v. Doyle, 181 Md. 195, 29 A.2d 290, 293; false representation or concealment of facts, Clerk v. National Aíd Life Ass’n, 177 Okl. 137, 57 P.2d 832, 833; Antrim Lumber Co. v. Wagner, 175 Okl. 564, 54 P.2d 173, 176; ignorante of party asserting estoppel of facts and absence of opportunity to ascertaín them, Trenton Bankíng Co. v. Howard, N.J.Ch., 187 A. 569, 574; Fipps v. Stidham, 174 Okl. 473, 50 P.2d 680, 684; ínjury from declarations, acts, or omissions of party were he permitted to gainsay their truth, Fleishbein v. Western Auto Supply Agency, 19 Cal.App.2d 424, 65 P.2d 928; Rob-erts v. Friedell, 218 Minn. 88, 15 N.W.2d 496, 500; inten-tion that representation should be acted on, Stookesberry v. Burgher, 220 Iowa 916, 262 N.W. 820; Consolidated Cut Stone Co. v. Seídenbach, 181 Okl. 578, 75 P.2d 442, 452; knowledge, actual or constructive, of facts by party estop-ped, Antrim Lumber Co. v. Wagner, 175 Okl. 564, 54 P.2d 173, 176; Lillywhite v. Coleman, 46 Ariz. 523, 52 P.2d 1157, 1160; misleading person to his prejudice, United States, for Use and Benefit of Noland Co., v. Wood, C.C.A.Va., 99 F.2d 80, 82; omission, misconduct or misrepresentation misleading another, Security Savings & Trust Co. v. Port-land Flour Milis Co., 124 Or. 276, 261 P. 432, 437; reliance upon representation or conduct of person sought to be es-topped, Wilkinson v. Lieberman, 327 Mo. 420, 37 S.W.2d 533, 536, George W. Armbruster, Jr., Inc., v. City of Wild-wood, D.C.N.J., 41 F.2d 823, 829.
Estoppel in pais and equitable estoppel are convertible terms, Brown v. Corn Exchafige Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 42 A.2d 474, 480, 136 N.J.Eq. 430; State ex rel. Squíre v. Murfey, Blossom & Co., 131 Ohio St. 289, 2 N.E.2d 866, 870.
"Legal estoppel" excludes evidente of the truth and the equity of the particular case to support a stríct rule of law on grounds of public policy whereas "equitable estoppel" is admitted on exactly the opposite ground of promoting the equity and justice of the individual case by preventing a party from asserting his rights under a general technical rule of law, when he has so conducted himself that it would be contrary to equity and good conscience forlim to allege and prove the truth. First Nat. Bank v. Boles, 231 Ala. 473, 165 So. 586, 592.
Such estoppel may be based on acts, omission to act, rep• resentations, admissions, concealment or silente, Carter v. Curlew Creamery Co., 16 Wash.2d 476, 134 P.2d 66; West v. Cleveland Ry. Co., Ohio App., 58 N.E.2d 799. 801; Ma-honey v. Mahoney, Tex.Civ.App., 103 S.W.2d 459, 462.
EQUITABLE EXECUTION. This term is some-times applied to the appointment of a receiver with power of sale. Hatch v. Van Dervoort, 54 N.J. Eq. 511, 34 A. 938.
Though a garnishment is not an "execution," garnish-ment after execution ís practically an equitable "execu-tion" brought for purpose of reaching nonleviable assets, issuing on judgment in somewhat same manner as an "execution" and in immediate aid or in lieu thereof. First Nat. Bank v. City Guaranty Bank of Hobart, 174 Okl. 545, 51 P.2d 573, 576.
EQUITABLE LIENS are such as exist in equity.
An equitable lien arises either from a written contract which shows an intention to charge some particular prop-erty with a debt or obligation or is implied and declared by a court of equity out of general considerations of right and justice as applied to relations of the parties and cir-cumstances of their dealings, Owensboro Banking Co. v. Lewis, 269 Ky. 277, 106 S.W.2d 1000, 1004; Clark v. Arm-strong & Murphy, 180 Okl. 514, 72 P.2d 362, 365, 366; It is a mere floating and ineffective equity until such time as judgment or decree is rendered actually subjecting prop-erty to the payment of the debt or claim, Langford v. Fanning, Mo., 7 S.W.2d 726, 728; Nelson v. Nelson Neal Lumber Co., 171 Wash. 55, 17 P.2d 626, 628, 92 A.L.R. 554. It is founded upon an agreement indicating intention that some specific property is tú be held, given. or transferred as security, In re Friedlander’s Estate, 32 N.Y.S.2d 991, 994, 995, 178 Misc. 65. It is neither a jiu* in re nor jus adrem, Folsom v. Farmers’ Bank of Vero Beach, 136 So. 524, 527, 102 Fla. 899: Clemente v. Holmes, 22 Tenn.App. 230, 120 S.W.2d 988, 993; It is not an estate or property in the thing itself or a right to recover the same. Foster v. Thornton, 179 So. 882, 892; Jan-ileon Coal & Coke Co. v. Goltra, C.C.A.Mo., 143 F.2d 889, 893, 154 A.L.R. 1191; it more properly constítutes a charge upon the thing, Eq-uitable liens most commonly grow out of constructive trusts. Story, Eq.Jur. § 1215; Jones v. Carpenter, 90 Fla. 407, 106 So. 127. 129, 43 A.L.R. 1409; Aldrlch v. R. J. Ederer Co., 302 Ill. 391, 134 N.E.•726, 728.
It is right by which a credltor is entitled to obtain sat-isfactlon of his debt by resort to specifled property belong-ing to debtor, Plncus v. Collins, 198 Miss. 283, 22 So.2d 361, 362; right of a special nature over property constitut-ing a charge or incumbrance thereon. Miller v. Heisler, Mo.App., 187 S.W.2d 485, 491; Gables Racing Assoc. v. Persky, 148 Fla. 627, 6 So.2d 257, 262, 263; right, not rec-ognized at law, to have a fund or specific property, or the proceeds, applied in whole or in part to payment of a particular debt or class of debts or obligation, Bank of Aurora v. Aurora Co-Op. Fruit Growing & Marketing Ass’n, Mo.App., 91 S.W.2d 177; Jarnison Coal & Coke Co. v. Goltra, C.C.A.Mo., 143 F.2d 889, 893, 154 A.L.R. 1191; Ship-ley v. Metropolítan Life Ins. Co., 25 Tenn.App. 452, 158 S. W.2d 739, 741; right over subject-matter of contract, where-by obligee ís enabled to follow ldentical thing to whích lien attaches and enforce obligation by remedy operating di-rectly thereon, Bassett v. City Bank & Trust Co., 116 Conn. 617, 165 A. 557; right to have property subjected in court of equity to payment of a clairn, Theatre Realty Co. v. Aronberg-Fried Co., C.C.A.Mo., 85 F.2d 383, 388; right to proceed in an equitable action against the subject-matter of the líen and have it sold or sequestered and its proceeds or rents and profits applied to the demand of the owner of the lien, Oppenheimer v. Szulerecki, 297111. 81, 130 N.B. 325, 328, 28 A.L.R. 1439.
The equitable lien differs essentially from a cornmon-law lien, in that In the equitable lien, possession remains with the debtor or person who holds the proprietary interest. Jones v. Carpenter, 90 Fla. 407, 106 So. 127, 129, 43 A.L.R. 1409.
Every express executory agreement 1.n writing, whereby the contracting party sufficiently indicates an intention to make some particular property, real or personal, or fund therein identified. a security for a debt or other obligation, or whereby the party promises to convey, assign, or transfer the property as security, creates an equitable lien upon the property so indicated, which is enforceable against the property. Knott v. Mfg. Co., 30 W.Va. 790, 5 S.E. 266; Geddes v. Reeves Coal & Dock Co., C.C.A.Minn., 20 F.2d 48, 50, 54 A.L.R. 282; Root Mfg. Co. v. Johnson, C.C.A.Ind., 219 F. 397, 406.
EQUITABLE RATE OF INTEREST. In Englancl, the interest, generally at a lower rate than legal, charged against a trustee or executor improperly or unnecessarily keeping balances or portion of trust moneys in his handl. In re Ricker’s Estate, 14 Mont. 153, 35 P. 960, 968, 29 L.R.A. 622.
EQUITABLE RECOUPMENT. Rule of the law which diminishes the right of a party invoking legal process to recover a debt, to the extent that he holds money or property of his debtor, to which he has no moral right, and it is ordinarily a de-fensive remedy going only to mitigation of dam-ages. Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Rothensies, D.C.Pa., 57 F.Supp. 731, 735.
EQUITABLE RESCISSION. Rescission decreed by court of equity, as distinguished from "legal rescission" which is effected by restoration or offer to restore. Mueller v. Michels, 184 Wis. 324, 199 N.W. 380, 382.
EQUITABLE RULE. In broad sense in which term is sórnetimes used, signifies natural jus-tice. In re New Jersey State Bar A :1’12, 111 N.J. Eq. 234, 162 A. 99, 101.EQUITAS SEQUITUR LEGEM. Equity follows the law. Tallman v. Varick, 5 Barb. (N.Y.) 277, 282. Cas teme. Talb. 52; 1 Sto.Eq.Jur. § 64.
In respect of this maxim it has been said: "Op-erative only within a very narrow rango." 1 Pom.Eq.Jur. § 427. The reverse is quite as sound a maxim; 9 Harv.L.Rev. 18. "The main business of equity is avowedly to correct and supplement the law." Phelps, Jurid.Eq. § 237. The English Judicature Act, 1873. provides that when law and equity conflict equity shall prevail. See Equity Follows the Law.
EQUITATURA. In old English law. Traveling furniture, or riding equipments, including horses, horse harness, etc. Reg.Orig. 100b; St.Westm. 2, c. 39.
EQUITY. In its broadest and most general sig-nification, this term denotes the spirit and the hab-it of fairness, justness, and right dealing which would regulate the intercourse of men with men, —the rule of doing to all others as we desire them to do to us; or, as it is expressed by Justinian, "to live honestly, to harm nobody, to render to every man his due." Inst. 1, 1, 3. It is therefore the synonym of natural right or justice. But in this sense its obligation is ethical rather than jur-al, and its discussion belongs to the sphere of mor-als. It is grounded in the precepts of the con-science, not in any sanction of positive law.
In a restricted sense, the word denotes equal and impartial justice as between two persons whose rights or clairns are ‘in conflict; justice, that is, as ascertained by natural reason or ethic-al insight, but independent of the formulated body of law. This is not a technical meaning of the term, except in so far as courts which administer equity seek to discover it by the agencies aboye mentioned, or appiy it beyond the strict Unes of positive law. See Miller v. Kenniston, 86 Me. 550, 30 A. 114.
In a still more restricted sense, it is a system of jurisprudence, or branch of remedial justice, administered by certain tribunals, distinct from the common-law courts and empowered to decree "equity" in the sense last aboye given. Here it becomes a complex of well-settled and well-under-stood rules, principies, and precedents. Isabelle Properties v. Edelman, 297 N.Y.S. 572, 574, 164 Misc. 192.
"The meaning of the word ‘equity,’ as used in its techni-cal sense in English jurisprudence, comes back to this: that it is simply a term descriptive of a certain field of jurisdiction exercised, la the English system, by certain courts, and of which the extent and boundarics are not marked by unes founded opon principie so much as by the features of the original constitution of the English scherne of remedial law, and the accidents of its development." Bisp.Eq. § 11.
A system of jurisprudence collateral to. ami in some re-spects independent of, "law," properly so called; the Ob-ject of which is to render the adrninistration of justice more complete, by affording relief where the courts of law are incompetent to glve it, or to give it with effect, or by exercising certain branches of jurisdiction independently of them. This is equity in its proper modem acose; an elab-orate system of rules and process, administered in many cases by distinct tribunals, (termed "courts of chancery,") and with exclusive jurisdiction over certain subjects. It
is "still distinguished by its original and animating prin-cipie that no right shouid be without an adequate remedy," and its doctrines are founded upon the same basis of nat-ural justice; but its action has become systematized, de-prived of any loose and arbitrary character which might once have belonged to it, and as carefully regulated by fixed rules and precedents as the law itself. Burrill.
Equity, in Its technical and scientific legal use, means neither natural justice nor even all that portion of natural justice which is susceptible of being judicially enforced. It has a precise, limited, and definite signification, and is used to denote a system of justice which was administered in a particular court,—the English high court of chancery,— which system can only be understood and explained by studying the history of that court, and how it carne to ex-ercise what is known as its extraordinary jurisdiction. Bisp.Eq. § 1.
That part of the law which, having power to enforce dis-covery, (1) administers trusts, mortgages, and other ficiu-ciary obligations; (2) administers and adjusts common-law rights where the courts of common law have no machinery; (3) supplies a speciflc and preventive remedy for common-law wrongs where courts of common law only give subse-quent damages. Chute, Eq. 4.
Equity is a body of jurisprudence, or field of jurisdiction, differing in its origin, theory, and methods from the common law. Laird v. Union Traction Co., 208 Pa. 574, 57 A. 987.
It is a body of rules existing by the side of the original civil law, founded on distinct principies, and claiming in-cidentally to supersede the civil law in virtue of a superior sanctity inherent in those principies. Maine, Anc. Law, 27.
"As old rules become too narrow, or are felt to be out of harmony with advancing civilization, a machinery is need-ed for their gradual enlargement and adaption to new views of society. One mode of accomplishing this object on a large scale, without appearing to disregard existing law, is the introduction, by the prerogative of some high functionary, of a more perfect body of rules, discoverabie in his judicial consciente, which is to stand side by side with the law of the land, overriding it in case of conflict, as on some title of inherent superiority, but not ~port.- ing to repeal it. Such a body of rules has been called ‘Equity.’ " Holl.Jur. 59.
-Equity," in its technical sense, contradistinguished from natural and universal equity or justice, may well be described as a "portion of justice" or natural equity, not ernbodied in legislative enactments, or in the rules of com-mon law, yet modified by a due regard thereto and to the complex relations and convenientes of an artificial state of society, and administered in regard to cases where the particular rights, in respect of which relief is sought come within some general class of rights enforced at law, or may be enforced without detriment or inconveniente to the com-munity: but where, as to such particular rights, the or-dinary courts of law cannot, or originally did not, clearly aíford relief. Rob.Eq.
The remaining interest belonging to one who has pledged or mortgaged his property, or the sur-plus of value which may remain after the prop-erty has been disposed of for the satisfaction of liens. The amount or value of a property aboye the total liens or charges. Des Moines Joint Stock Land Bank of Des Moines v. Allen, 220 Iowa 448, 261 N.W. 912.
"Chancery" is synonymous and interchange-able with "equity." Const. art. 4, § 6. Ireland v. Cheney, 129 Ohio St. 527, 196 N.E. 267, 270.

Equitable Right

Equity also signifies an equitable right, i. e., a right enforceable in a court of equity; hence, a bfil of complaint which did not show that the plaintiff had a right entitling him to relief was said to be demurrable for want of equity; and certain rights now recognized in all the courts are still known as "equities," from having been originally recognized only in the court of chan-cery. Sweet

Better Equity

The right which, in a court of equity, a second incumbrancer has who has taken securities against subsequent dealings to his prejudice, which a prior incumbrancer neglected to take al-though he had an opportunity. 1 Ch.Prec. 470, note. See 3 Bouv.Inst. note 2462.

Countervailing Equity

A contrary and balancing equity; an equity or right opposed to that which is sought to be en-forced or recognizéd, and which ought not to be sacrificed or subordinated to the latter, because it is of equal strength and justice, and equally de-serving of consideration.

Existing EquityB

See Existing Equity

Latent or Secret Equity

An equitable claim or right, the knowledge of which has been confined to the parties for and against whom it exists, or which has been con-cealéd from one or several persons interested in the subject-matter.

Natural Equity

A term sometimes employed in works on juris-prudence, possessing no very precise meaning, but used as equivalent to justice, honesty, or mor-ality in business relations, or man’s innate sense of right dealing and fair play. Inasmuch as equi-ty, as now administered, is a complex system of rules, doctrines, and precedents, and possesses, within the range of its own fixed principies, but little more elasticity than the law, the term "na-tural equity" may be understood to denote, in a general way, that which strikes the ordinary con-sciente and sense of justice as being fair, right, and equitable, in advance of the question whether the technical jurisprudence of the cha,ncery courts would so regard it.

Perfect Equity

An equitable title or right which lacks nothing to its completeness as a legal title or right except the formal conveyance or other investiture which would make it cognizable at law; particularly, the equity or interest of a purchaser of real estate who has paid the purchase 1S rice in full and fui-filled all conditions resting ot him, but has not yet received a deed or patent. See Shaw v. Lindsey, 60 Ala. 344; Smith v. Cockrell, 66 Ala. 75.
EQUITY, COURTS OF. Courts which administer justice according to the system of equity, and ac-cording to a peculiar course of procedure or prac-tice. Frequently termed "courts of chancery."
See 1 Bl.Comm. 92; Dowell v. Goodwin, 22 R.I. 287, 27 A. 693, 695, 51 L.R.A. 873, 84 Am.St.Rep. 842.
EQUITY DELIGHTS TO DO JUSTICE, AND THAT NOT BY HALVES. Tallman v. Varick, 5 Barh. (N.Y.) 277, 290; Story, Eq.P1. § 72.
EQUITY FOLLOWS THE LAW. Talb. 52. Equity adopts and follows: the rules of law in all cases to which those rel¿S may, in tercos, be applicable. Equity, in dealing with cases of an equitable na-ture. adopts and follovvs the analogies furnished by the rules of law. A lending maxim of equity jurisprudence, which, however, is not of universal application, but hable to many exceptions. Frink v. Commercial Bank of Emmettsburg, 195 Iowa, 1011, 191 N.W. 513.
EQUITY JURISDICTION. In a general sense, the jurisdiction belonging to a court of equity, but more particularly the aggregate of those cas-es, controversies, and occasions which form prop-er subjects for the exercise of the powers of a chancery court. See Wadham Oil Co. v. Tracy, 141 Wis. 150, 123 N.W. 785, 787, 18 Ann.Cas. 779; Venner v. Great Northern R. Co., C.C.N.Y., 153 F. 408, 413, 414.
"Equity jurisdiction," In its ordinary acceptation, as dis-tinguished on the one side from the general power to de-cide matters at all, and on the other from the jurisdiction "at law" or "common-law jurisdiction," Is the power to hear certain kinds and classes of civil causes according to the principies of the method and procedure adopted by the court of chancery, and to decide them In accordance with the doctrines and rules of equity jurisprudence, which deelsion may involve either the determination of the equitable rights, estates, and interests of the parties to sucli causes. or the granting of equitable remedies. In order that a cause may come within the scope of the equi-ty jurisdiction, one of two alternatives is essential ; either
the primary estala, or interest to be maintained, or the violation of which furnishes the cause of action, must he equitable rather than legal; or the remedy granted must he in its natura purely equitable, or if it be a rem-edy which may also be given by a court of law, it must be one which, under the facts and circumstances of the case, can only be nade complete and adequate through the equitable modes of procedure. Norback v, Board of Di-rectors of Church Extension Soc., 84 Utah 506, 37 P.2d 339.
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE. That portion of remedial justice which is exclusively administer-ed by courts of equity as distinguished from courts of common law. Jackson v. Nimmo, 3 Lea (Tenn.) 609. More generally speaking, the science which treats of the rules, principies, and maxims which govern the decisions of a court of equity, the cases and controversies which are con-sidered proper subjects for its cognizance, and the nature and form of the remedies which it grants.
EQUITY LOOKS UPON THAT AS DONE WHICH OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN DONE. 1 Story, Eq.Jur. § 64g. Equity will treat the sub-ject-matter, as to collateral consequences and in-cidents, in the same manner as if the final acts contemplated by the parties had been executed exactly as they ought to have been; not as the parties might have executed them. Rankin v. Rankin, 36 Ill. 293, 87 Am.Dec. 205.
EQUITY OF A STATUTE. By this phrase is in-tended the rule of statutory construction which

admits within the operation of a statute a class of cases which are neither expressly named nor excluded, but which, from their analogy to the cas-es that are named, are clearly and justly within the spirit and general meaning of the law; such cases are said to be "within the equity of the statute."
EQUITY OF PARTNERS. A term used to desig-nate the right of each of them to have the firm’s property applied to the payment of the firm’s debts. Colwell v. Bank, 16 R.I. 288, 17 A. 913.
EQUITY OF REDEMPTION. The right of the mortgagor of an estate to redeem the same after it has been forfeited, at law, by a breach of the condition of the mortgage, upon paying the amount of debt, interest and costs. Riddick v. Davis, 220 N.C. 120, 16 S.E.2d 662, 666; Broun v. United States, C.C.A.Pa., 95 F.2d 487, 489.
The right of redemption after sale is distlnct from the equity of redemption after breach of condition and before the sale. The former commences only when the latter ends. One rests on the principies of equity, the other on the terms of the statute. Hummel v. Citizen’ Building & Loan Ass’n, Ariz., 296 P. 1014, 1015.
EQUITY SUFFERS NOT A RIGHT WITHOUT A REMEDY. 4 Bouv.Inst. No. 3726. Graselli Chemi-cal Company v. ZEtna Explosives Co., 252 F. 456, 164 C.C.A. 380.
EQUITY TERM. An equity term of court is one devoted exclusively to equity business, that is, in which no criminal cases are tried nor any cases requiring the impaneling of a jury. Hesselgrave v. State, 63 Neb. 807, 89 N.W. 295.
EQUITY TO A SETTLEMENT. The equitable right of a wife, when her husband sues in equity for the reduction of her equitable estate to his own possession, to have the whole or a portion of such estate settled upon herself and her children. Also a similar right now recognized by the equity courts as directly to be asserted against the hus-band. Also called the "wife’s equity." Poindex-ter v. Jeffries, Clarke v. McCleary, 12 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 354.
EQUIVALENT, adj. Equal in value, force, measure, volume, power, and effect or having equal or corresponding import, meaning or signi-ficance; alike, identical. Salt Lake County v. Utah Copper Co., C.C.A.Utah, 93 F.2d 127, 132; Nahas y. Nahas; 59 Nev. 220, 90 P.2d 223, 224; Kelley v. Clark, 23 Idaho, 1, 129 P. 921, 925, Ann.Cas.1914C, 665.
EQUIVALENT, n. In patent law. Any act or substance which is known in the arts as a proper substitute for some other act or substance em-ployed as an element in the invention, whose sub-stitution for that other act or substance does not in any manner vary the idea of means. It pos-sesses three characteristics: It must be capable of performing the same office in the invention as the act or substance whose place it supplies; it must relate to the form or embodiment alone and not affect in any degree the idea of means; and it must have been known to the arts at the dateof the patent as endowed with this capability. Duff Mfg. Co. v. Forgie, 59 F. 772, 8 C.C.A. 261; For "Fair Equivalent," see that title.
For one device to be the equivalent of another, it must perform the same function In substantially the same way. Chicago Forging & Mfg, Co. v. Bade-Cummins Mfg. Co., C.C.A.Ky., 63 F.2d 928, 931; Donner v. Sheer Pharmacal Corporation, C.C.A.Mo., 64 F.2d 217, 223; Corcoran v. Riness, D.C.Cal., 19 F.Supp. 344, 347.
“Equivalent;" in an art or process are such acts as, In accordanco with preceding rules, are interchangeable with t4ose which the inventor has himself employed. Superior Skylight Co. v. August Kuhnla, D.C.N.Y., 265 F. 282, 284.
An "equivalent," in patent law, is not the same as a "substitute." McCaskey Register Co. v. Mantz, D.C.N.Y., 217 F. 415, 419.
EQUIVOCAL. Having a double or several mean-ings or senses. Synonymous with "ambiguous". Fleck v. Baldwin, 141 Tex. 340, 172 S.W.2d 975, 979. See Ambiguity.
EQUULEUS. A kind of rack for extorting con-fessions.
EQUUS COOPERTUS. A horse equipped with saddle and furniture.
ERABILIS. A maple tree. Not to be confounded with arabilis, (arable land.)
ERASTIANS. The followers of Erastus. The• sect obtained much influence in England, partic-ularly among common lawyers in the time of Sel-den. They held that offenses against religion and morality should be punished by the civil pow-er, and not by the censures of the church or by excommunication. Wharton.
ERASURE. The obliteration of words or marks from a written instrument by rubbing, scraping, or scratching them out. Also the place in a docu-ment where a word or words have been so remov-ed. The term is sometimes used for the removal of parts of a writing by any means whatever, as by cancellation; but this is not an accurate use. Cloud v. Hewitt, 5 Fed.Cas. 1,085; In re Fergeson, 126 Misc. 286, 213 N.Y.S. 656, 658; Murray v. Floyd, 216 Minn. 69, 11 N.W.2d 780, 783.
ERCISCUNDUS. In the civil law. To be divid-ed. Judicium familice erciscundce, a suit for the partition of an inheritance. Inst. 4, 17, 4. An ancient phrase derived from the Twelve Tables. Calvin.
ERECT. One of the formal words of incorpora-tion in royal charters. "We do, incorporate, erect, ordain, name, constitute, and establish." "Con-struct" is synonymous with "erect". State ex rel. Davis v. Barber, 139 Fla. 706, 190 So. 809.
ERECTION. Raising up; building; a complet-ed building; to build; construct; set up. In a statute on the "erection" of wooden buildings, this term does not include repairing, alteration, en-larging, or removal. See Shaw v. Hitchcock, 119 Mass. 256; Escambia County v. Blount Const. Co., 66 Fla. 129, 62 So. 650, 651; Flynn v. New York, W. & B. Ry. Co., 218 N.Y. 140, 112 N.E. 913, 914, Ann. Cas.1918B, 588; Watson v. Greely, 69 Cal.App.

643, 232 P. 475, 479. There is a distinction between "erection" and maintenance. Turturro v. Calder, 307 Mass. 159, 29 N.E.2d 744, 746.
ERECTOR SPINZE MUSCLES. A group of mus-cles on each side of the spine running all the way up from the sacrum to the skull. Biener v. St. Louis Public Service Co., Mo.App., 160 S.W.2d 780, 788.
ERGO. Lat. Therefore; hence; because.
ERGOLABI. In the civil law. Undertakers of work; contractors. Cod. 4, 59.
ERGOT. A medicinal used as a uterine contrae-tor to contract the muscles so as to expel certain material from the uterus. People v. Chester, 179 Misc. 864, 42 N.Y.S.2d 293, 295.
ERIACIL A term of the Irish Brehon law, de-noting a pecuniary mulct or recompense which a murderer was judicially condemned to pay to the family or relatives of his victim. It correspond-ed to the Saxon "weregild." See 4 Bl.Comm. 313.
ERIGIMUS. We erect. One of the words by which a corporation may be created in England by the king’s charter. 1 Bl.Comm. 473.
ERMINE. By metonymy, this term is used to describe the office or functions of a judge, whose state robe, lined with ermine, is emblematical of purity and honor without stain. Webster.
ERNES. In old English law. The loose scatter-ed ears of corn that are left on the ground after the binding.
EROSION. The gradual eating away of the soil by the operation of currents or tides. Distinguish-ed from submergence, which is the disappearance of the soil under the water and the formation of a navigable body over it. Mulry v. Norton, 100 N.Y. 433, 3 N.E. 584, 53 Am.Rep. 206; State of Arkansas v. State of Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158, 38 S. Ct. 301, 304, 62 L.Ed. 638, L.R.A.1918D, 258.
EROTOMANIA. See Insanity.
ERRANT. Wandering; itinerant; applied to jus-tices on circuit, and bailiffs at large, etc.
ERRANT WATER. Stream water, which does not have channel of navigable river or which re-turns to stream after overflowing its banks, is not "errant water" in which riparian owner can acquire no vested rights. Tallassee Power Co. v. Clark, C.C.A.Tenn., 77 F.2d 601, 603.
ERRATICUM. In old law. A waif or stray; a wandering beast. Cowell.
ERRATUM. Lat. Error. Used in the Latin for-mula for assigning errors, and in the reply there-to, "in nullo est erratum," i. e., there was no er-ror, no error was committed.
ERRONEOUS. Involving error; deviating from the law. This term is never used by courts or law-writers as designating a corrupt or evil act.

Thompson v. Doty, 72 Ind. 338; U. S. v. Sakharam Ganesh Pandit, C.C.A.Cal., 15 F.2d 285, 286. "False" as a constituent of a fraud action may at times be said to be synonymous with "erroneous." Abel v. Paterno, 153 Misc. 248, 274 N.Y.S. 749.
ERRONEOUS ASSESSMENT. Refers to an as-sessment that deviates from the law and is there-fore invalid, and is a defect that is jurisdictional in its nature, and does not refer to the judgment of the assessing officer in fixing the amount of val-uation of the property. In re Blatt, 41 N.M. 269, 67 P.2d 293, 301, 110 A.L.R. 656; Ritchie Grocer Co. v. City of Texarkana. 182 Ark. 137, 30 S.W. 2d 213, 214; Flourney v. First Nat. Bank of Shreveport, 197 La. 1067, 3 So.2d 244, 252.
ERRONEOUS JUDGMENT. One rendered ac-cording to course and practice of court, but con-trary to law, upon mistaken view of law, or upon erroneous application of legal principies. Her-bert B. Newton & Co. v. Wilson Furniture Mfg. Co., 206 N.C. 533, 174 S.E. 449, 450.
ERRONEOUS OR ILLEGAL TAX. One levied without statutory authority, or upon property not subject to taxation, or by some officer having no authority to levy the tax, or one which in some other similar respect is illegal. Jewett Realty Co. v. Board of Sup’rs of Polk County, 239 Iowa 988, 33 N.W.2d 377.
ERRONICE. Lat. Erroneously; through error or mistake.
ERROR. A mistaken judgment or incorrect be-lief as to the existente or effect of matters of fact, or a false or mistaken conception or application of the law.
Such a mistaken or false conception or applica-tion of the law to the facts of a cause as will fur-nish ground for a review of the proceedings upon a writ of error; a mistake of law, or false or ir-regular application of it, such as vitiates the pro-ceedings and warrants the reversal of the judg-ment.
Error is also used as an elliptical expression for "writ of error;" as in saying that error lies; that a judgment may be reversed on error.
An act involving a departure from truth or ac-curacy. Gronseth v. Mohn, 57 S.D. 604, 234 N.W. 603, 604.

Assignment of Errors

In practice. The statement of the plaintiff’s case on a writ of error, setting forth the errors complained of; corresponding with the declara-tion in an ordinary action. 2 Tidd, Pr. 1168; 3 Steph.Comm. 644. Armour v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 353 III. 575, 187 N.E. 532, 534; Fahrenbrink v. Moore, 51 Ariz. 176, 75 P.2d 360, 361. A specifica-tion of the errors upon which the appellant will rely, with such fullness as to give aid to the court in the examination of the transcript. Squires v. Foorman, 10 Cal. 298; Streeter v. State, 89 Fla. 400, 104 So. 858, 859; Largent v. Etheridge, Tex. Civ.App., 13 S.W.2d 9-Z4, 976; Helms v. Cook, 62 Ind.App. 629, 111 N.E. 632, 633„ Why, JonL:„ 183 Iowa, 1166, 168 N.W. 318, 320.
The office’ of an assignmcnt erre:, is in thr. na-
ture of a pleading by the pl„.inlia aprcilant, Ts not only to inform the appelluic coutt uf the c:.acl. cara-plaint against rulings, whcrcby, if the cOMplaint be sus-tained, a judgment or decree may ba changed or revcrsed, but is to inform the defendant in error or appellee of the precise errors relied upan, in order that such de-fendant in error or appellee may take proper steps, or give proper directions In his own behalf, for makíng up a sufficient transcript of the record to exhibit to the court what might otherwise be insufficiently shown. Davidson v. Bezant, 101 Fla. 1296, 132 So. 488, 489.
"Assignment of error" is formal complaint of some ac-tion of trial court, as distinguished from "proposition," which merely sets forth reasons why such action is errone-ous. Standard v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co., Tex.Civ. App., 47 S.W.2d 443, 449.

Clerical Error

See Clerical.
Common Error
(Lat. communis error, q. v.) An error for which there are many precedents. "Common er-ror goeth for a law." Enich Law. b. 1. c. .3 no.
54. "Common errors" e that ta-: &,::11craticr, 315
insufficient in law to n;lai-5.1.arn that
judgment was aii;
fendant, or vice vetza- -21r:E. Y, Gridt.c.rg. 101 N.J.L. 75, 127 A. 271, 242

Croas-Errors

Errors assigned by the respondent in a writ of error, or appellee.
Error Apparent of Record
Plain, fundamental error that goes to the foun-dation of the action irrespective of the evidence; an obvious misapprehension of the applicable law. Kenedy Mercantile Co. v. Ainsworth, Tex.Civ..App., 281 S.W. 637; Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Johnson, Tex.Civ.App., 235 S.W. 650, 652; Parks v. Parks, 68 App.D.C. 363, 98 F.2d 235, 236.

Fundamental E’rtor

In appellate practice. Error which goes to the merits of the plaintiff’s cause of action, and which
will be considered on whethei assi;ned as
error or not, where the justicc oí arcra:- to
require it. Hollywood v. Vv’ellilause-n, 23 re:: Ce; App. 541, 68 S.W. 329; , Goodhtle y. Fulicr,
App., 193 S.W. 170, 172. Ei-,,or la law apparent on the face of the record. St. L.. tus SralliWr..stern Ry. Co. of Texas v. AndCrá.tn, l’ex.Civ.App- 206 S.W. 696, 698.
É1′.«
Error which ’41
fected the verdria the party complairaa;!.
Power Co., 138 Va. 313, 1.22 S.E. 104, 113.
lfarmless Error
In appellate practice. An error committed in the progress of the trial below, but which was not prejudicial to the rights of the party assigning it, and for which, therefore, the court will not revers

the judgment, as, where the error was neutralized or conceted by subsequent proceedings in the case, or where, notwithstanding the error, the par-ticular issue was found in that party’s favor, or where, even if the error had not been committed, he could not have been legally entitled to prevail.

Invited Error

In appellate practice. The principie of "invit-ed error" is that if, during the progress of a cause, a party requests or moves the court to make a rul-ing which is actually erroneous, and the court does so, that party cannot take advantage of the error on appeal or review. Gresham v. Harcourt, 93 Tex. 149, 53 S.W. 1019.

Judicial Errors

Errors into which the court itself falls. State v. District Court of Second Judicial District in and for Silver Bow County, 55 Mont. 324, 176 P. 608, 609.

Reversible Error

In appellate practice. Such an error as war-rants the appellate court in reversing the judg-mula betore it; substantial error, that which rea-soiatbly niight have prejudiced the party com-plaining. Shinn v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 248 irlo. 173, 154 S.W. 103, 105; New MeXican R. Co. v. Hendricks, 6 N.M. 611, 30 Pac. 901.

Technical Error

In appellate practice. A merely abstract or the-oretical error, which is practically not injurious to the party assigning it. Epps v. State, 102 Ind. 539, 1 N.E. 491.
ERROR CASE. An appeal on questions of law. In re Green’s Estate, Ohio App., 41 N.E.2d 586.
ERROR CORAM NOBIS. Error committed in the proceedings "before us;" i. e., error assigned as a ground for reviewing, modifying, or vacating a judgment in the same court in which it was ren-dered. A writ to bring before the court that pro-nounced judgment errors in matters of fact which had not been put in issue or passed on and were material to validity and regularity of legal pro.
(..cecling Illawassee Lumber Co. v. United tzi tcs, C.C.A.N.C., 64 F.2d 417, 418.
ERROR CORAM VOBIS. Error in the proceed-ings "before you;" words used in a writ of error clin,cled by a court of review to the court which 1.-ri.zd the cause.
IF,I1/11.01,1 FUCATUS NUDA VERITATE IN MUL-VIS . EST PROBABILIOR; ET SPEPENUIVIERO RATIONIBUS VINCIT VERITATEM ERROR. Error artfully disguised. [or coloreen is, in many instantes, more probable than naked truth; and frequently error overwhelms truth by [its show of] reasons. 2 Coke, 73.
ERROR IN EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION. Er-ror in determination of questions of law or facton which the court’s jurisdiction in particular case depends. Burgess v. Nail, C.C.A.Okl., 103 F.2d 37, 43.
ERROR IN FACT. In judicial proceedings, error in fact occurs when, by reason of some fact which is unknown to the court and not apparent on the record (e. g., the coverture, infancy, or death of one of the parties), it renders a judgment which is void or voidable. Cruger v. McCracken, 87 Tex. 584, 30 S.W. 537; Kihlholz v. Wolff, 8 Ill. App. 371.
ERROR IN LAW. An error of the court in ap. plying the law to the case on trial, e. g., in ruling on the admission of evidence, or in charging the jury. McKenzie v. Bismarck Water Co., 6 N.D. 361, 71 N.W. 608; Scherrer v. Hale, 9 Mont. 63, 22 Pac. 151.
ERROR IN VACUO. Error in adverse ruling without adverse effect is "error in vacuo" which may subject the erring judge to criticism but not the case to re-trial. United States v. A Certain Tract or Parcel of Land in Chatham County, Ga., D.C.Ga., 47 F.Supp. 30, 36.
ERROR JURIS NOCET. Error of law injures. A mistake of the law has an injurious effect; that is, the party committing it must suffer the con-sequences. Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 178; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 139, note.
ERROR NOMINIS. Error of name. A mistake of detail in the name of a person; used in contra-distinction to error de persona, a mistake as to identity.
ERROR NOMINIS NUNQUAM NOCET, SI DE IDENTITATE REI CONSTAT. A mistake in the name of a thing is never prejudicial, if it be clear as to the identity of the thing itself, [where the thing intended is certainly known.l 1 Duer, Ins. 171. This maxim is applicable only where the means of correcting thn mistake are apparent on the face of the instrument to be construed. Id.
ERROR OF FACT. That is called "error of fact" which proceeds either from ignorance of that which really exists or from a mistaken belief in the existence of that which has none. See Norton v. Marden, 15 Me. 45, 32 Am.Dec. 132. Finding of fact contrary to the weight of the evidence is an error of fact. Wear v. Imperial Window Glass Co., C.C.A.Mo., 224 F. 60, 62. Cf. Error in Fact, supra.
ERROR OF LAW. He is under an error of law who is truly informed of the existence of facts, but who draws from them erroneous conclusions of law. Civ.Code La. art. 1822. Mowatt v. Wright, 1 Wend., N.Y., 360, 19 Am.Dec. 508.
ERROR QUI NON RESISTITUR APPROBATUR. An error which is not resisted or opposed is ap-proved. Doct. & Stud. c. 40.
ERROR, WRIT OF. See Writ of Error.
ERRORES AD SUA PRINCIPIA REFERRE, EST REFELLERE. To refer errors to their sources is to refute them. 3 Inst. 15. To bring errors to their beginning is to see their last.
ERRORES SCRIBENTIS NOCERE NON DEB-ENT. The mistakes of the writer ought not to harm. Jenk.Cent. 324.
ERRORS EXCEPTED. A phrase appended to an account stated, in order to excuse slight mistakes or oversights.
ERTIIMIOTUM. In old English law. A meeting of the neighborhood to compromise differences among themselves; a court held on the boundary of two lands.
ERUBESCIT LEX FILIOS CASTIGARE PAR-ENTES. 8 Coke, 116. The law blushes when children correct their parents.
ESBRANCAT1URA. In old law. A cutting off the branches or boughs of trees. Cowell; Spelman.
ESCALATOR CLAUSE. A clause usually found in leases or contracts executed subject to price control regulations. Under this clause, in the case of a lease, the landlord is authorized to collect the maximum rent permissible under rent regulations in force at time of execution of the lease. The es-calator part of the clause of the lease consists in the provision that in the event that the rent regu-lations are modified during the term of the lease, the tenant will pay the increased rental following the allowance thereof. Wasservogel v. Meyero-witz, 191 ‘Alise. 594, 79 N.Y.S.2d 256; and 89 N.Y.S. 2d 290, 275 App.Div. 387. In the case of a sales contract, the escalator clause usually provides in effect that should the maximum prices promul-gated be increased or decreased during the life of the contract, payment will be made by the pur-chaser at a rate of increase or decrease not to ex-ceed the same ratio that the prices quoted bear to the maximum prices authorized. Simpson Bios. v. District of Columbia, D.C.D.C., 73 F.Supp. 858, and 179 F.2d 430. Pfotzer et al. v. United States, 176 F.2d 675; Record & Tribune Co. v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., Iowa, 39 N.W.2d 288. Escalator clauses authorizing the contractor to increase the contract price should the p-rices of labor or material advance also appear in other contractA, such as a contract to furnish steam. Lincoln Rug Co. v. East Newark Realty Corp., 142 N.J.Eq. 743, 61 A.2d 448.
ESCALDARE. To scald. It is said that to scald hogs was one of the ancient tenures in serjeanty. Wharton.
ESCAMBIO. In old English law. A wrít of ex-change. A license in the shape of a writ, former-ly granted to an English merchant to draw a bill of exchange on another in foreign parts. Reg. Orig. 194.
ESCAMBIUM. An old English law term, signify-ing exchange.
ESCAPE. The departure or deliverance out of custody of a person who was lawfully imprison-ed, before he is entitled to his liberty by the proc-ess of law.
The voluntarily or negligently allowing any per-son lawfully in confinement to leave the place. 2 Bish.Crim.Law, § 917.
Escapes are either voluntary or negligent. The • former is the case when the keeper voluntarily concedes to the orisoner any liberty not author-ized by law. The latter is the case when the pris-oner contrives to leave his prison by forcing his way out, or any other means, without the knowl-edge or against the will of the keeper, but through the latter’s carelessness or the insecurity of the building. Cortis v. Dailey, 21 App.Div. 1, 47 N.Y. S. 454; U. S. v. Hoffman, D.C.I11., 13 F.2d 269, 270; Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 188 Ky. 95, 221 S.W. 215, 216, 10 A.L.R. 145; State v. Pace, 192 N.C. 780, 136 S.E. 11, 12.
To flee from; to a void; to get out of the way, as to flee to avoid arrest. Life & Casualty Ins.
Co. Hargraves, 169 Tenn. 388, 88 S.W.2d 451, 452; State v. Dreiling, 136 Kan. 78, 12 P.2d 735, 736.
—Constructive escape. This takes place when a prisoner obtains more liberty than the law allows, although he still remains in custody. 21 C.J. p. 827. An example is the unauthorized production of a prisoner in court by his custodian. In re Rigg, 123 A. 243, 95 N.J.Eq. 341.
ESCAPE FROM PRISON. A prisoner serving a sentence of imprisonment in a state prison is, in contemplation of law, a prisoner therein, as well when at work outside under the surveillance of prison guards as when confined within its walls, so that if he escapes when outside he escapes from a prison within Pen.Code, §§ 106, 787. People v. Vanderburg, 67 Cal.App. 217, 227 P. 621.
ESCAPE WARRANT. In English practice. This was a warrant granted to retake a prisoner com-mitted to the custody of the king’s prison who had escaped therefrom. It was obtained on affi-davit from the judge of the court in which the action had been brought, and was directed to all the sheriffs throughout England, commanding them to retake the prisoner and commit him to gaol when and where taken, there to remain until the debt was satisfied. Jacob; Brown.
ESCAPE WAY. Passageway leading from the In-side to the outside of the mine. Roberts v. Ten-nessee Coal, Iron & R. Co., C.C.A.Ala., 255 F. 469, 471; Robinson v. Maryland Coal & Coke Co., 196 Ala. 604, 72 So. 161, 162.
ESCAPIO QUIETUS. In old English law. Deliv-ered from that punishment which by the laws of the forest lay upon those whose beasts were found upon forbidden land. Jacob.
ESCAPIUM. That which comes by chance or ac-cident. Cowell.
ESCEPPA. A measure of corn. Cowell.
ESCH12ETA DERIVATUR A VERBO GALLICO ESCHOIR, QUOD EST ACCIDERE, QUIA AC-CIDIT DOMINO EX EVENTU ET EX INSPERA-TO. Co.Litt. 93. Escheat is derived from the French word "eschoir," which signifies to happen, because it falls to the lord from an event and from an unforeseen circumstance.
ESCILETIE VULGO DICUNTUR QUizE DECID-ENTIBUS IIS QUZE DE REGE TENENT, CUM NON EXISTIT RATIONE SANGUINIS MERES, AD FISCUM RELABUNTUR. Those things are commonly called "escheats" which revert to the exchequer from a failure of issue in those who hold of the king, when there does not exist any heir by consanguinity.
ESCHEAT. In feudal law. Escheat is an ob-struction of the course of descent, and consequent determination of the tenure, by some unforeseen contingericy, in which case the land naturally re-sults back, by a kind of reversion, to the original grantor, or lord of the fee. 2 B1.Comm. 15; Wal-lace v. Harmstad, 44 Pa. 501; Marshall v. Love-lass, 1 N.C. 445; Kavanaugh v. Cohoes Power & Light Corporation, 114 Misc. 590, 187 N.Y.S. 216, 231; State v. Phoenix Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 60 Ariz. 138, 132 P.2d 637, 638.
It is the casual descent, in the nature of forfei-ture, of lands and tenements within his manor, to a lord, either on failure of issue of the tenant dy-ing seised or on account of the felony of such ten-ant. Jacob.
Also the land or fee itself, which thus fell back to the lord. Such lands were called "excadentice," or "terne excadentiales." Fleta, lib. 6, c. 1; Co. Litt. 13a.
In American law. Escheat signifies a reversion of property to the state in consequence of a want of any individual competent to inherit. The state is deemed to occupy the place and hold the rights of the feudal lord. See 4 Kent, Comm. 423, 424. Center v. Kramer, 112 Ohio St. 269, 147 N.E. 602, 604; In re O’Connor’s Estate, 126 Neb. 182, 252 N.W. 826; Braun v. McPherson, 277 Mich. 396, 269 N.W. 211, 212.
"Escheat at feudal law was the right of the lord of a fee to re-enter upon the same when it became vacant by the extinction of the blood of the tenant. This extinction might either be per defectum sanguinis or else per delictum tenentis, where the course of descent was broken by the corruption of the blood of the tenant. As a fee might be holden either of the crown or from some inferior lord, the escheat was not always to the crown. The word ‘escheat,’ in this country, at the present time, merely indicates the preferable right of the state to an estate left vacant, and without there being any one in existente able to make claim thereto." 29 Am.Dec. 232, note.
Single Escheat
When all a person’s movables fall to the crown, as a casualty, because of his being declared rebel. Wharton.
ESCHEAT, WRIT OF. A writ which anciently lay for a lord, to recover possession of lands that had escheated to him. Reg.Orig. 164b; Fitzh. Nat.Brev. 143.ESCHEATOR. In English law. The name of an officer who was appointed in every county to look after the escheats which fell due to the king in that particular county, and to certify the same into the exchequer. An escheator could continue in office for one year only, and was not re-eligible until three years. There does not appear to exist any such officer at the present day. Brown. See 10 Vin.Abr. 158; Co.Litt. 13b.
ESCHECCUM. In old English law. A jury or inquisition.
ESCHIPARE. To build or equip. Du Cange.
ESCOBEDO RULE. Where police investigation begins to focus on a particular suspect, the sus-pect is in custody, the suspect requests and is de-nied counsel, and the police have not warned him of his right to remain silent, the accused has been denied assistance of counsel and no statement elicited during such interrogation may be used in a criminal trial. Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490, 491, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977.
ESCOT. A tax formerly paid in boroughs and corporations towards the support of the commu-nity, which is called "scot and lot."
ESCRIBANO. In Spanish law. An ofilcer, re-sembling a notary in French law, who has author-ity to set down in writing, and verify by his at testation, transactions and contracts between pri-vate persons, and also judicial acts and proceed-ings.
ESCRITURA. In Spanish law. A written instru-ment. Every deed that is made by the hand of a public escribano, or notary of a corporation or council (concejo,) or sealed with the seal of the king or other authorized persons. White, New Recop. b. 3, tit. 7, c. 5.
ESCROQUERIE. Fr. Fraud, swindling, cheat-ing.
ESCROW. A scroll, writing, or deed, delivered by the grantor, promisor or obligor into the hands of a third person, to be held by the latter until the happening of a contingency or performance of a condition, and then by him delivered to the gran-tee, promisee or obligee. Minnesota & Oregon Land & Timber Co. v. Hewitt Inv. Co., D.C.Or., 201 F. 752, 759.
The state or condition of a deed which is condi-tionally held by a third person, or the possession and retention of a deed by a third person pending a condition; as when an instrument is said to be delivered "in escrow." This use of the term, how-ever, is a perversion of its meaning.
ESCROWL. In old English law. An escrow; a scroll. "And deliver the deed to a stranger, as an escrowl." Perk. c. 1, § 9; Id. c. 2, §§ 137, 138.
ESCUAGE. Service of the shield. One of the varieties of tenure .in knight’s service, the duty imposed being that of accompanying the king to the wars for forty days, at the tenant’s own
charge, or sending a substitute. In later times, this service was commuted for a certain payment in money, which was then called "escuage cer-tain." See 2 Bl.Comm. 74, 75.
ESCURARE. To scour or cleanse. Cowell. ESGLISE, or EGLISE. A church. Jacob.
ESKETORES. Robbers, or destroyers of other men’s lands and fortunes. Cowell.
ESKIPPAMENTUM. Tackle or furniture; outfit. Certain towns in England were bound to furnish certain ships at their own expense and with double skippage or tackle. Cowell.
ESKIPPER, ESKIPPARE. To ship.
ESKIPPESON. Shippage, or passage by sea. Spelled, also, "skippeson." Cowell.
ESLISORS. See Elisors.
ESNE. In old law. A hireling of service condi-tion.
ESNECY. Seniority; the condition or right of the eldest; the privilege of the eldest-born. Particu-larly used of the privilege of the eldest among coparceners to make a first choice of purparts upon a voluntary partition.
ESPEDIENT. In Spanish law. A junction of all the separate papers made in the course of any one proceeding and which remains in the office at the close of it. Castillero v. U. S., 2 Black 109, 17 L. Ed. 360.
ESPERA. A period of time fixed by law or by a court within which certain acts are to be per-formed, e. g., the production of papers, payment of debts, etc.
ESPERONS. L. Fr. Spurs.
ESPLEES. An old term for the products which the ground or land yields; as the hay of the mead-ows, the herbage of the pasture, corn of arable fields, rent and services, etc. The word has been anciently applied to the land itself. Jacob; Fos-gate v. Hydraulic Co., 9 Barb., N.Y., 293.
ESPOUSALS. A mutual promise between a man and a woman to marry each other at some other time. It differs from a marriage, because then the contract is completed. Wood, Inst. 57.
ESPURIO. Span. In Spanish law. A spurious child; one begotten on a woman who has promis-cuous intercourse with many men. White, New Recop. b. 1, tit. 5, c. 2, § 1.
ESQUIRE. In English law. A title of dignity next aboye gentleman, and below knight. Also a title of office given to sheriffs, serjeants, and bar-risters at law, justices of the peace, and others. 1 Bl.Comm. 406; 3 Steph.Comm. 15, note; Tomlins. On the use of this term in American law, particu-larly as applied to justices of the peace and other inferior judicial officers, see Christian v. Ashley County, 24 Ark. 151; Com. v. Vance, 15 Serg. & R., Pa., 37.

ESSARTER. L. Fr. To cut down woods; to clear land of trees and underwood; properly to thin woods, by cutting trees, etc., at intervals. Spel-man. See Assart.
ESSARTUM. Woodlawls turned into tillage by uprooting the trees and removing the underwood.
ESSENCE. That which is indispensable. Pitts-burgh IroTI & Steel Foundries Co. v. Seaman-Sleeth Co., D.C.Pa., 236 F. 756, 757. The gist or substance of any act; the vital constituent of a thing; that without which a thing cannot be it-self. Norman v. Department of Labor and Indus-tries, 10 Wash.2d 180, 116 P.2d 360, 362.
ESSENCE OF THE CONTRACT. Any condition or stipulation in a contract which is mutually un-derstood and agreed by the parties to be of such vital importante that a sufficient performance of the contract cannot be had without exact coro-pliance with it is said to be "of the essence of the contract " Flatow, Riley & Co. v. Roy Camp-bell Co., Tex.Com.App., 280 S.W. 517, 520; Day-vault & Newsome v. Townsend, Tex.Civ.App., 244 S.W. 1108, 1110.
ESSENDI QUIETUM DE TOLONIO. A writ to be quit of toll; it lies for citizens and burgesses of any City or town who, by charter or prescription, ought to be exempted from toll, where the same is exacted of them. Reg.Orig. 258.
ESSENTIAL. Indispensably necessary; impor-tant in the highest degree; requisite. Solter v. Macmillan, 147 Md. 580, 128 A. 356, 358; City of Kalamazoo v. Balkema, 252 Mich. 308, 233 N.W. 325, 326.
ESSENTIAL GOVERNMENTAL DUTIES. Those duties which framers of Constitution intended each member of union would assume in functioning under form of government guaranteed by Consti-tution. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Stil-well, C.C.A.7, 101 F.2d 588, 591.
ESSENTIAL OIL. A group of volatile oi]s having marked characteristic odors, occurring in fruits, fiowers, leaves, stems, etc. In re Johnston, Cust. & Pat.App., 132 F.2d 136, 139.
ESSENTIALLY. "Substantially" is not necessari-ly synonymous. Robins v. Wettlaufer, Cust. & Pat.App., 81 F.2d 882, 893.
ESSOIN, v. In old English practice. To present or offer an excuse for not appearing in court on an appointed day in obediente to a summons; to cast an essoin. Spelman. This was anciently done by a person whom the party sent for that purpose, called an "essoiner."
ESSOIN, n. In old English law. An excuse for not appearing in court at the return of the proc-ess. Presentation of such excuse. Spelman; 1 Sel.Pr. 4; Com.Dig. "Exoine," B 1. Essoin is not now allowed at all in personal actions. 2 Term, 16; 16 East, 7a; 3 B1.Comm. 278, note.
ESSOIN DAY. Formerly the first general return-day of t1ae term, on which the courts sat to receive
essoins, i. e., excuses for parties who did not ap-pear in court, according to the summons of writs. 3 B1.Comm. 278; Boote, Suit at Law, 130; Gilb. Com.Pl. 13; 1 Tidd, Pr. 107. But, by St. 11 Geo. IV. and 1 Wm. IV. c. 70, § 6, these clays were done away with, as a part of the term.
ESSOIN DE MALO VILLFE. When the defendant is in court the first day; but Bone without plead-ing, and being afterwards surprised by sickness, etc., cannot attend, but sends two essoiners, who openly protest in court that he is detained by sickness in such a village, that he cannot come pro lucrari and pro perdere; and this will be admit-ted, for it lieth on the plaintiff to prove whether the essoin is true or not. Jacob.
ESSOIN ROLE. A roll upon which essoins were formerly entered, together with the day to which they were adjourned. Boote, Suit at Law, 130; Rosc.Real Act. 162, 163; Gilb.Com.P1. 13.
ESSOINIATOR. A person who made an essoin.
EST ALIQUID QUOD NON OPORTET ETIAM SI LICET; QUICQUID VERO NON LICET CERTE NON OPORTET. Hob. 159. There is that which is not proper, even though permitted; but what-ever is not permitted is certainly not proper.
EST ASCAVOIR. It is to be understood or known; "it is to-wit." Litt. §§ 9, 45, 46, 57, 59. A very common expression in Littleton, especially at the commencement of a section; and, according to Lord Coke, "it ever teacheth us some rule of law, or general or sure leading point." Co.Litt. 16.
EST AUTEM JUS PUBLICUM ET PRIVATUM, QUOD EX NATURALIBUS PRIECEPTIS AUT GENTIUM, AUT CIVILIBUS EST COLLECTUM; ET QUOD IN JURE SCRIPTO JUS APPELLA-TUR, ID IN LEGE ANGLLE RECTUM ESSE DICITUR. Public and private law is that which is collected from natural precepts, on the one hand of nations, on the other of citizens; and that which in the civil law is called "jus," that, in the law of England, is said to be right. Co.Litt. 558.
EST AUTEM VIS LEGEM SDIULANS. Violence may also put on the mask of law.
EST IPSORUM LEGISLATORUM TANQUAM VIVA VOX. The voice of the legislators them-selves is like the living voice; that is, the language of a statute is to be understood and interpreted like ordinary spoken language. 10 Coke, 101b.
EST QUIDDAM PERFECTIUS IN REBUS LICI-TIS. There is something more perfect in things allowed.
ESTABLISH. This word occurs frequently in the constitution of the United States, and it is there used in different meanings: (1) To settle firmly, to fix unalterably; as to establish justice, which is the avowed object of the eonstitution. (2) To make or form; as to establish a uniform rulp of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies, which evidently does not mean that these laws shall be unalterably established as justice. (3) To found, to create, to regulate; as: "Congress shall have power to establish post-roads and post-offices." (4) To found, recognize, con-firm, or admit; as: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." (5) To create, to ratify, or confirm; as: "We, the peo-ple," etc., "do ordain and establish this constitu-tion." 1 Story, Const. § 454. And see Ware v. U. S., 4 Wall. 632, 18 L.Ed. 389; U. S. v. Smith, 4 N.J. L. 33.
To settle or fix firmly; place on a permanent footing; found; create; put beyond doubt or dis-pute; prove; convince. Smith v. Forrest, 49 N.H. 230; Rowley v. Braly, Tex.Civ.App., 286 S.W. 241, 245; Village of Villa Park v. Wanderer’s Rest Cemetery Co., 316 III. 226, 147 N.E. 104, 106; Thompson v. U. S., C.C.A.N.J, 283 F. 895, 899; Wells Lamont Corp. v. Bowles, Emp.App, 149 F.2d 364, 366.
To bring into being; to build; to constitute; to create; to erect; to form, to found; to found and regulate, to institute, to locate; to make; to model; to organize; to originate; to prepare; to set up. Georgia Public Service Commission v. Georgia Power Co., 182 Ga. 706, 186 S.E. 839, 844; Muscatine Lighting Co. v. City of Muscatine, 205 Iowa 82, 217 N.W. 468, 470; Ronnow v. City of Las Vegas, 57 Nev. 332, 65 P.2d 133, 140.
ESTABLISHMENT, ETABLISSEMENT. An ordi-nance or statute. Especially used of those ordi-nances or statutes passed in the reign of Edw. I. 2 Inst. 156; Britt. c. 21.
Etablissement is also used to denote the settlement of dower by the husband ilpon his wife. Britt. c. 102.
Institution, place where conducted and equip-ment; industrial plant and appurtenances; place of business and fixtures; residente with grounds, furniture, equipage, etc. State v. Scullin-Gallagher Iron & Steel Co., 268 Mo. 178, 186 S.W. 1007, 1008, Ann.Cas.1918E, 620; Benjamin Rose Institute v. Myers, 92 Ohio St. 252, 110 N.E. 924, 927, L.R.A. 1916D, 1170; Walling v. American Stores Co., C.C.A.Pa., 133 F.2d 840, 844; Continental Baking Co. v. Campbell, 176 Okl. 218, 55 P.2d 114, 116. In a narrow sense, "to bring into being, create, build, set up, etc." Gunnar v. Town of Montezuma, 229 Iowa 734, 294 N.W. 895, 897.
ESTABLISHMENT OF DOWER. The assurance of dower made by the husband, or his friends, be. fore or at the time of the marriage. Britt. cc. 102, 103.
ESTACHE. A bridge or stank of stone or timber. Cowell.
ESTADAL. In Spanish law. In Spanish America, a measure of land of sixteen squaye varas, or yards. 2 White, Recop. 139.
ESTADIA (or Sobrestadia). In Spanish law. De-lay in a voyage, or in the delivery of cargo, caused by the charterer or consigne, for which demur-rage is payable. The time for which the party who has chartered a vessel, or is bound to receive the cargo, has to pay demurrage on account of his de-lay in the execution of the contract.
ESTANDARD. L. Fr. A standard (of weights and measures.) So called because it stands con-stant and immovable, and hath all other measures coming towards it for their conformity. Termes de la Ley.
ESTANQUES. Wears (weirs) or kiddles in rivers.
ESTATE. The interest which any one has in lands, or in any other subject of property. 1 Prest.Est. 20. And see Mulford v. Le Franc, 26 Cal. 103; Robertson v. VanCleave, 129 Ind. 217, 29 N.E. 781, 15 L.R.A. 68; Ball v. Chadwick, 46 III. 31. An estate in lands, tenements, and heredita-ments signifies such interest as the tenant has therein. 2 Bl.Comm. 103. The condition or cir-cumstance in which the owner stands with regard to his property. 2 Crabb, Real Prop. p. 2, § 942; Boyd v. Siboid, 7 Wash.2d 279, 109 P.2d 535, 539. In this sense, "estate" is constantly used in conveyances in connection with the words "right," "title," and "interest," and is, in a great degree, synonymous with all of them. See Co.Litt. 345.
The degree, quantity, nature, and extent of interest which a person has in real property is usually referred to as an estate, and it varíes from absolute ownership down to naked possession. Nicholson Corporation v. Ferguson, 114 Okl. 10, 243 P. 195, 200; Washington Ins. Co. v. Pass, for Use of Nalley, 64 Ga.App. 221, 12 S.E.2d 460, 461; Gibbs v. Lester, Tex.Com.App., 41 S.W.2d 28, 29, 80 A.L.R. 431.
In another sense, "estate" designates the prop-erty (real or personal) in which one has a right or interest; the subject-matter of ownership; the corpus of property. Thus, we speak of a "valu-able estate," "all my estate," "separate estate," "trust estate," etc. This, also, is its meaning in the classification of property into "real estate" and "personal estate." Conriertin v. Concannon, 122 Or. 387, 259 P. 290, 292; Bates v. Sparrell, 10 Mass. 323; Archer v. Deneale, 1 Pet. 585, 7 L.Ed. 272; Den v. Snitcher, 14 N.J.L. 53.
There Is no such legal entity as an "estate." Hansen v. Stanton, 177 Wash. 257, 31 P.2d 903, 904, 92 A.L.R. 1037. It is a convenlent phrase, to Identity the subject of litiga-tion In the orphans’ court, and in proceedings in rem it may be treated as harmless superffulty, but as a designa-tion of a party to be served with a writ it is unknown to the law. It cannot be made the plalntlff In an action, as it is not a person and cannot sue or be sued. In re Harris-burg Trust Co., 80 Pa.Super.Ct. 585.
The word "estate" Is a word of the greatest extension, and comprehenda every species of property, real and per-sonal. It describes both the corpus and the extent of in-terest. Deering v. Tucker, :55 Me. 284; Frazer v. First Nat. Bank of Mobile, 235 Ala. 252, 178 So. 441, 444. When used in some connections, it signifies everything of which riches or fortune may consist. Williams v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 155 S.W. 64, 66, 169 Mo. App. 468.
"Estate" comprehends everything a man owns, real and personal, and ought not to be limited in its construction, unless connected with some other word which must neces-sarily have that effect. Weber v. Bardon, 92 N.J.Eq. 190, 111 A. 649, 650; Block v. Sylvania Producing Co., 105 Ohio St. 346, 137 N.E. 904, 905.
It mean, ordinarily, the whole of the property owned by anyone, the realty as well as the personalty. Hunter v. Husted, 45 N.C. 141; Wingard v. Harrison, 337 III. 387, 169
N.E.
232,
233; Miller v. Miller, 200 Iowa, 1070, 205 N.W.
870,
874,
43 A.L.R. 567;
In re Quackenbush’s Will, 127
Misc.
731,
217 N.Y.S. 493,
496; Jennings v. Jennings, 299
Ky. 779, 187 S.W.2d 459, 463.

A man’s "estate" is that which he can sell or dispose of at his pleasure or what he can pass on to another. Howard v. Mitchell, 268 Ky. 429, 105 S.W.2d 128, 133.
Estates may be either absolute or conditional. An absolute estate is a full and complete estate, Cooper v. Cooper, 56 N.J.Eq. 48, 38 A. 198, or an es-tate in lands not subject to be defeated upon any condition. In this phrase the word "absolute" is not used legally to distinguish a fee from a life-estate, but a qualified or conditional fee from a fee simple. Greenawalt v. Greenawalt, 71 Pa. 483. A conditional estate is one, the existence of which depends upon the happening or not happening of some uncertain event, whereby the estate may be either originally created, or enlarged, or finally defeated. 2 Bl.Comm. 151. Estates are also classed as executed or executory. The former is an estate whereby a present interest passes to and resides in the tenant, not dependent upon any subsequent circumstance or contingency. They are more commonly called "estates in possession." 2 Bl.Comm. 162. An estate where there is vested in the grantee a present and immediate right of present or future enjoyment. An executory estate is an estate or interest in lantls, the vestíng or en-joyment of which depends upon some future con-tingency. Such estate may be an executory de-vise, or an executory remainder, which is the same as a contingent remainder, because no present in-terest passes. Further, estates may be legal or equitable. The former is that kind of estate which is properly cognizable in the courts of common law, though noticed, also, in the courts of equity. 1 Steph.Comm. 217. And see Sayre v. Mohney, 30 Or. 238, 47 P. 197; In re Qualifications of Electors, 19 R.I. 387, 35 A. 213. An equitable estate is an estate an interest in which can only be enforced in a court of chancery. Avery v. Dufrees, 9 Ohio 145. That is properly an equitable estate or in-terest for which a court of equity affords the only remedy; and of this nature, especially, is the benefit of every trust, express or implied, which is not converted into a legal estate by the statute of uses. The rest are equities of redemption, con-structive trusts, and all equitable charges. Burt. Comp. c. 8. Brown v. Freed, 43 Ind. 253; In re Qualifications of Electors, 19 R.I. 387, 35 A. 213. "Equitable estates" are in equity what legal es-tates are in law; the ownership of the equitable estate is regarded by equity as the real ownership, and the legal estate is, as has been said, no more than the shadow always following the "equitable estate," which is the substance. Town of Cascade v. Cascade County, 75 Mont. 304, 243 P. 806, 808.
A contingent estate is one which depends for its effect upon an event which may or may not happen, as, where an estate is limited to a person not yet born. Conventional estates are those free-holds not of inheritance or estates for life, which are created by the express acts of the parties, in contradistinction to those which are legal and arise from the operation of law. A dominant es-tate, in the law of easements, is the estate for the benefit of which the easement exists, or the tenement whose owner, as such, enjoys an ease-ment over an adjoining estate. An expectant es-tate is one which is not yet in possession, but the
enjoyment of which is to begin at a future time; a present or vested contingent right of future en-joyment. Examples are remainders and rever-sions. A future estate is an estate which is not now vested in the grantee, but is to commence in possession at some future time. It includes re-mainders, reversions, and estates limited to com-menee in futuro without a particular estate to sup-port them, which last are not good at common law, except in the case of chattel interests. See 2 Bl. Comm. 165. An estate limited to commence in pos-session at a future day, either without the inter-vention of a precedent estate, or on the determina-tion by lapse of time, or otherwise, of a precedent estate created at the same time. Griffin v. Shep-ard, 124 N.Y. 70, 26 N.E. 339; Sabledowsky v. Ar-buckle, 50 Minn. 475, 52 N.W. 920; A particular estate is a limited estate which is taken out of the fee, and which precedes a remainder; as an es-tate for years to A., remainder to B. for life; or an estate for life to A., remainder to B. in tail. This precedent estate is called the "particular es-tate," and the tenant of such estate is called the "particular tenant." 2 Bl.Comm. 165; Bunting v. Speek, 41 Kan. 424, 21 P. 288, 3 L.R.A. 690. A servient estate, in the law of easements, is the estate upon which the easement is imposed or against which it is enjoyed; an estate subjected to a burden or servitude for the benefit of another estate. Walker v. Clifford, 128 Ala. 67, 29 So. 588, 86 Am.St.Rep. 74; Dillman v. Hoffman, 38 Wis. 572. A settled estate, in English law, is one created or limited under a settlement; that is, one in which the powers of alienation, devising, and transmission according to the ordinary rules of descent are restrained by the limitations of the settlement. Micklethwait v. Micklethwait, 4 C.B., N.S., 858. A vested estate is one in which there is an immediate right of present enjoyment or a present fixed right of future enjoyment; an es-tate as to which there is a person in being who would have an immediate right to the possession upon the ceasing of some inteimediate or prece-dent estate. Flanner v. Fellows, 206 Ill. 136, 68 N.E. 1057.
Original and derivative estates. An original is the first of several estates, bearing to each other the relation of a particular estate and a reversion. An original estate is contrasted with a derivative estate; and a derivative estate is a particular in-terest carved out of another estate of larger ex-tent. Prest.Est. 125.
For the names and definitions of the various kinds of estates in land, see the different titles below.
"Estate" and "heirs" are not equivalent terms, Martin v. Hale, 167 Tenn. 438, 71 S.W.2d 211, 214; Abraham v. Abraham, 245 App.Div. 302, 280 N.Y.S. 825.
"Estate" and "property" may be used synony-mously, McVicar v. McVicar, 128 Kan. 394, 278 P. 36, 38; Ponsonby v. Sacramento Suburban Fruit Lands Co., 210 Cal. 229, 291 P. 167, 168.

Fa,st Estate

Real property. A term sometimes used in wills. Lewis v. Smith, 9 N.Y. 502, 61 Am.Dec. 706.

Landed Estate or Property See Landed Estate or Property.

Qualified Estate

Interests in real property which are not absolute and unconditional including fee tail, estates on condition, estates on limitation, and estates on con-ditional limitation. Carpender v. City o

Real Estate

Landed property, including all estates and inter-ests in lands which are held for Life or for some greater estate, and whether such lands be of free-hold or copyhold tenure. Wharton.
As to "Homestead," "Movable," "Residuary," "Separate," and "Trust" estate, see those titles

Financial or Personal Status

In a wider sense, a man’s whole financial status or condition,—the aggregate of his interests and concerns, so far as regards his situation with ref-erence to wealth or its objects, including debts and obligations, as well as possessions and rights. Thus, we speak of "debts due the estate," or say that "A.’s estate is a stockholder in the bank." In this sense it is a fictitious or juridical person, the idea being that a man’s business status con-tinues his existente, for its special purposes, un-til its final settlement and dissolution. See Mor-gannelli’s Estate v. City of Derby, 105 Conn. 545, 135 A. 911; In re Watson, 86 Misc. 588, 148 N.Y.S. 902, 908.
In its broadest sense, the social, civic, or po-litical condition or standing of a person; or a class of persons considered as grouped for social, civic, or political purposes; as in the phrases, "the third estate," "the estates of the realm." See 1 Bl.Comm. 153.
"Estate" and "degree," when used in the sense of an individual’s personal status, are synonymous, and indicate the individual’s rank in life. State v. Bishop, 15 Me. 122.
ESTATE AD REMANENTIAM. An estate in fee-simple. Glan. 1. 7, c. 1.
ESTATE AT SUFFERANCE. The interest of a tenant who has coma rightfully into possession of lands by permission of the owner, and continues to occupy the same after the period for which he is entitled to hold by such permission. 1 Washb. Real Prop. 392; 2 Bl.Comm. 150; Co.Litt. 57b. The estate arises where one comes into possession of land by lawful title, but keeps it afterwards without any title at all, and the original entry need not have been under lease or as a tenant of the dispossessing landlord. Malone v. Floyd, 50 Ga.App. 701, 179 S.E. 176.ESTATE AT WILL. A species of estate less than freehold, where lands and tenements are let by one man to another, to have and to hold at the will of the lessor; and the tenant by force of this lease obtains possession. 2 Bl.Comm. 145; 4 Kent, Comm. 110; Litt. § 68; Co.Litt. 55a; Tud.L.Cas.R. P. 10, 14. Or it is where lands are let without lim-iting any certain and determinate estate. 2 Crabb, Real Prop. p. 403, § 1543.
The estate arises where lands or tenements are express-ly demised by one person to another to be held during the joint wills of both parties, or it may arise by implication of law wherever one person is put in possession of another’s land with the owner’s consent, but under an agreement which does not suffIce to create in the tenant an estate of freehold or for years. Eason v. Rose, 183 Va. 359, 32 S. E.2d 66, 68.
ESTATE BY ELEGIT. See Elegit.
ESTATE BY ENTIRETY. A form of co-ownership of realty or personalty held by husband and wife in which there is unity of estate, unity of posses-sion and unity of control of entire property, and on death of one, survivor takes estate under orig-inal conveyance. In re Cochran’s Real Estate, Sel. Orph., 66 A.2d 497, 499; In re Gallagher’s Estate, 352 Pa. 476, 43 A.2d 132, 133.
ESTATE BY PURCHASE. One acquired in any other method than descent. In re Field, 182 App. Div. 226, 169 N.Y.S. 677, 679. See, also, Purchase.
ESTATE BY STATUTE MERCHANT. An estate whereby the creditor, under the custom of London, retained the possession of all his debtor’s lands until his debts were paid. 1 Greenl. Cruise, Dig. 515. See Statute Merchant.
ESTATE BY STATUTE STAPLE. See Staple. ESTATE BY THE CURTESY. See Curtesy.
ESTATE BY THE ENTIRETY. Called also estate in entirety, or estate by the entireties. An estate in joint tenancy, plus the unity of the marital re-lation. Hoyt v. Winstanley, 221 Mich. 515, 191 N.W. 213, 214. A common-law estate, based on the doctrine that husband and wife are one, and that a conveyance of real property to husband and wife creates but one estate. Klorfine v. Cole, 121 Or. 76, 252 P. 708, 709. An estate held by husband and wife together so long as both live, and, after the death of eifher, by the survivor. It is an es-tate held by husband and wife by virtue of a title acquired by them jointly after marriage. Bailey v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 103 So. 833, 834. A creature of the common law created by legal fiction based wholly on the common-law doctrine that husband and wife are one, and hence a conveyance to hus-band and wife created only one estate, and each was owner of the whole estate, and neither could dispose of it without the consent of the other, and on thQ death of one survivor was the owner in fee simple. Wimbush v. Danford, 292 Mo. 588, 238 S.W. 460, 466; In re Flynn, D.C.Pa., 1 F.2d 566, 567; Alexander v. Alexander, 154 Or. 317, 58 P.2d 1265, 1270, 1271.
An "estate by entireties" resembles a "joint tenancy" In that there is a right of survivorship in both, but such an estate is distinguishable from a joint tenancy in that the latter may be invested in any number of natural persons each of whom is seized of an undivided moiety of the whole, whereas a "tenancy by entirety" is vested in two persons only, who in law are regarded as only one, and each of whom becomes seized of the estate as a whole. Heffner v. White, 113 Ind.App. 296, 45 N.E.2d 342, 346; Carlisle v. Parker, 8 W.W.Harr. 83;’188 A. 67.
ESTATE DUTY. A duty imposed in Ehgland (act of 1894) superseding probate duty, taxing not the interest to which some person succeeds on a death, but the interest which ceased by reason of the death. Hansen, Death Duties 63. It is leviable on property which was left untouched by probate du-ty, such as real estate, yet it is in substance of the same nature as the old probate duty.
ESTATE FOR LIFE. See Life Estate.
ESTATE FOR YEARS. A species of estate less than freehold, where a man has an interest in lands and tenements, and a possession thereof, by virtue of such interest, for some fixed and deter-mínate period of time; as in the case where lands are let for the term of a certain number of years, agreed upon between the lessor and the lessee, and the lessee enters thereon. 1 Steph.Comm. 263, 264. Blackstone calls this estate a "contract" for the possession of lands or tenements for some deter-minate period. 2 Bl.Comm. 140. See Hutcheson
v. Hodnett, 115 Ga. 990, 42 S.E. 422; Harbottle v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 134 Ark. 254, 203 S.W. 1044, 1046; 2 Crabb, R.P. § 1267; Bac.Abr. Leases; Wms.R.P. 195. Such estates are frequently called terms.
”Estates for years" embrace all terms limited to endure for a definite and ascertained period, however short or long the period may be; they embrace terms for a fixed number of weeks or months or for a single year, as well as for any definite number of years, however great. Guy v. Brennan, 60 Cal.App. 452, 213 P. 265, 267. Compare Met-calf Apto Co, v. Norton, 119 Me. 103, 109 A. 384.
ESTATE FROM PERIOD TO PERIOD. An es-tate continuing for successive periods of a year, or successive periods of a fraction of a year, un-less it is terminated. Pitney-Bowes Postage Meter Co. v. United States, D.C.Conn., 57 F.Supp. 365, 366.
ESTATE FROM YEAR TO YEAR. An example of an estate for years. It is of later origin and is not found in Littleton (see § 381). It exists in cases where the parties stipulate for it, and also where the parties by their conduct have placed them-selves in the relation of landlord and tenant with-out adopting any other term. If a tenant has been allowed to hold over after the expiratibn of his term in such a way as to preclude the possibil-íty of his becoming a tenant on sufferance, it is a tenancy from year to year. Jenks, Mod.Land Law 88. See, also, Odger, C.L. 869; 7 Q.B. 958. It was originally a development of a tenancy at will, by which the tenancy was terminable only at the time of the year at which it began, and on notice.
ESTATE IN COMMON. An estate in lands held by two or more persons, with interests accruing under different titles; or accruing under the same title, but at different periods; or conferred by words of limitation importing that the grantees are to take in distinct shares. 1 Steph.Comm. 323.See Tenancy in common. An estate held in joint possession by two or more persons at the same time by several and distinct titles. 1 Washb.R.P. 415; 2 Bla.Comm. 191; 1 Pres.Est. 139.
ESTATE IN COPARCENARY. See Coparcenary. ESTATE IN DOWER. See Dower.
ESTATE IN EXPECTANCY. One which is not yet in possession, but the enjoyment of which is to begin at a future time; an estate giving a pres-ent or vested contingent right of future enjoy-ment. One in which the right to pernancy of the profits is postponed to some future period. Such are estates in remainder and reversion. Underhill v. R. Co., 20 Barb. 455; Fenton v. Miller, 108 Mich. 246, 65 N.W. 966; Ayers v. Trust Co., 187 III. 42, 58 N.E. 318.
ESTATE IN FEE SIMPLE. See Fee Simple. ESTATE IN FEE—TAIL. See Tail, Estate in. ESTATE IN JO1NT TENANCY. See Tenancy.
ESTATE IN LANDS. Property one has in lands, tenements or hereditaments, or conditions or. cir-cumstances in which tenant stands as to his prop-erty. Tallman v. Eastern Illinois & Peoría R. Co., 379 III. 441, 41 N.E.2d 537, 540.
ESTATE IN REMAINDER. See Remainder. ESTATE IN REVERSION. See Reversion.
ESTATE IN SEVERALTY. An estate held by a person in his own right only, without any other person being•joined or connected with him in point of interest, during his estate. This is the most common and usual way of holding an estate. 2 BL Comm. 179; Cruise, Dig. tit. 18, c. 1, § 1.
ESTATE IN VADIO. An estate in gage or pledge. 2 Bl.Comm. 157; 1 Steph.Comm. 282. See Mort-gage.
ESTATE LESS THAN FREEHOLD. An estate for years, estate at will, or estate at sufferance. Fowler v. Marion & Pittsburg Coal Co., 315 Ill. 312, 146 N.E. 318, 319. See Estate of Freehold.
ESTATE OF FREEHOLD. See Freehold.
ESTATE OF INHERITANCE. An estate which may descend to heirs. 1 Washb.R.P. 51; Adminis-tration & Trust Co. v. Catron, 171 Tenn. 268, 102 S.W.2d 59, 60. A species of freehold estate in lands, otherwise called a "fee," where the tenant is not only entitled to enjoy the land for his own life, but where, after his death, it is cast by the law upon the persons who successively represent him in perpetuum, in right of blood, according to a certain established order of descent. 1 Steph. Comin. 218; Litt. § 1; Nellis v. Munson, 108 N.Y. 453, 15 N.E. 739; Roulston v. Hall, 66 Ark. 305,
50 S.W. 690, 74 Am.St.Rep. 97; George v. George,
51 Ohio App. 169, 200 N.E. 142, 143.
Estates of freehold are divided into those of inheritance and those not of inheritance. All estates of inheritance in tenements are freehold; but, since freeholds embrace es-tates for lite and those of indefinile duration which mayendure for life, all freeholds are not "estates of inherit-ance." Beirl v. Columbia County, 73 Or. 107, 144 P. 457, 460; Crabb, R.P. § 945.
ESTATE ON CONDITIONAL LIMITATION. An estate conveyed to one person so that, upon oc-currence or failure of occurrence of some contin-gent event, whether conditional or limitative, the estate shall depart from original grantee and pass to another. Carpender v. City of New Brunswick, 135 N.J.Eq. 397, 39 A.2d 40, 43.
ESTATE ON LIMITATION. An estate originated by the use of words denoting duration of time, such as while, during, so long as, and the like and when designated limitative event happens, such estate ends naturaily without any re-entry and property reverts to grantor. Carpender v. City of New Brunswick, 135 N.J.Eq. 397, 39 A.2d 40, 43. Sometimes referred to as "base fee", "quali-fied fee", "determinable fee", or "fee simple de-feasible". Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Chapman, 171 A.2d 653, 657, 35 N.J. 177.
ESTATE PUR AUTRE VIE. See Pur Autre Vie.
ESTATE SUBJECT TO A CONDITIONAL LIMI-TATION. The distinction between an estate upon condition subsequent and an "estate subject to a conditional limitation" is that in former words creating condition do not originally limit term, but merely permit its termination upon happening of contingency, while in latter words creating it limit continuation of estate to time preceding happening of contingency. Johnson v. Lane, 199 Ark. 740, 135 S.W.2d 853, 866.
ESTATE TAIL. See Tan, Estate in.
ESTATE TAIL, QUASI. When a tenant for life grants his estate to a man and his heirs, as these words, though apt and proper to create an estate tail, cannot do so, because the grantor, being only tenant for life, cannot grant in perpetuum, there-fore they are said to create an estate tan quasi, or improper. Brown.
ESTAFE TAX. An excise tax upon privilege of transferring or transmitting property by reason of death and is not tax on property itse]f. Friend v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.7, 119 F.2d 959, 960; In re Vanderbilt’s Estate, 281 N.Y. 297, 22 N.E.2d 379, 390. An "estate tax" taxes, not the interest to which some person succeeds on a death, but the interest which ceases by reason of the death; while the "inheritance tax" is based on the interest to which the living person succeeds. In re Ogden’s Estate, 209 Wis. 162, 244 N.W. 571, 573.
It is an "estate tax" when the lux la required to be paid on the entire net estate helare it is divided finto its several
parts to be distributed. State Tax Commission v. Back-man, 88 Utah 424, 55 P.2d 171, 174.
ESTATE UPON CONDITION. An estate in Lands, the existence of which depends upon the happen-ing or not happening of some uncertain event, whereby the estate may be either originally creat-ed, or enlarged, or finally defeated. 2 BI.Comm. 151; 1 Steph.Comm. 276; Co. Litt. 201a. An es-
tate having a qualification annexed to it, by which it may, upon the happening of a particular event, be created, or enlarged, or destroyed. 4, Kent, Comm. 121. Un’ ed States v. 1,010.8 Acres, More or Less, Situate in Sussex County, Del., D.C.Del., 56 F.Supp. 120, 127.
ESTATE UPON CONDITION EXPRESSED. An estate granted, either in fee-simple or otherwise, with an express qualification annexed, whereby the estate granted shall either commence, be en-larged, or be defeated upon performance or breach of such qualification or condition. 2 Bl.Comm. 154. An estate which is so expressly defined and limited by the words of its creation that it cannot endure for any longer time than till the contin-gency happens upon which the estate is to fail. 1 Steph.Comm. 278.
ESTATE UPON CONDITION IMPLIED. An es-tate having a condition annexed to it inseparably from its essence and constitution, although no condition be expressed in words. 2 Bl.Comm. 152; 4 Kent, Comm. 121.
ESTATES OF THE REALM. The lords spiritual, the lords temporal, and the commons of Great Britain. 1 Bl.Comm. 153. Sometimes called the "three estates." Inasmuch as the lords spiritual have no separate assembly or negativo in their political capacity, some authorities reduce the es-tates in Great Britain to two, the lords and com-mons. Webster, Dict.
Generally in feudal Europe there were three estates, the clergy, nobles, and commons. In England (until about the 14th century) the three estates of the realm were the cler-gy, barons, and knights. In legal practice the lords spirit-ual and lords temporal are usually collectively designated under the one name lords. Webster, Dict.
ESTENDARD, ESTENDART, or STANDARD. An ensign for horsemen in war.
ESTER. A compound ether derived from oxy-genated acid. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. y. Byrnes, D.C.N.Y., 1 F.R.D. 34, 36.
ESTER IN JUDGMENT. L. Fr. To appear be-fore a tribunal either as plaintiff or defendant. Kelham.
ESTIMATE. A valuing or rating by the mind, without actually measuring, weighing, or the like. City of Tulsa v. Weston, 102 Okl. 222, 229 P. 108, 122. A rough or approximate calculation only. Bair v. Montrose, 58 Utah 398, 199 P. 667, 669; United States v. Foster, C.C.A.Iowa, 131 F.2d 3, 7; P. M. Hennessy Const. Co. v. Hart, 141 Minn. 449, 170 N.W. 579, 598. Thus, a census is a finding of the population, not an "estimate." State ex rel. Reynolds v. Jost, 265 Mo. 51, 175 S.W. 591, 597, Ann.Cas.1917D, 1102.
This word is used to express the mind or judgment of the speaker or writer on the particular subject under con-sideration. It implies a calculation or computation, as to estimate the gain or loss of an enterprise. People v. Clark, 37 Hun, N.Y., 203; New Orleans Terminal Co. v. Dixie Rendering, La.App., 179 So. 98, 100.
As used in a contract for the sale of an estimated quanti-ty of goods, ‘estimated" may mean practically the same as "more or Less." Robbins v. Hill, Tex.Civ.App., 259 S.W.1112, 1115. Generaliy, the word "estimated" indicates that a statement of quantity is a matter of description, and not of the essence of the contract. Biglione v. Bronge, 192 Cal. 167, 219 P. 69, 70.
ESTIMATED COST. The "estimated cost" of a building means the reasonable cost of a building erected in accordance with the plans and specifica-tions referred to, and not necessarily the amotInt of some actual estimate made by a buildér, nor an estimate agreed upon by the parties, nor yet an estimate or bid accepted by the defendant. New Orleans Terminal Co. v. Dixie Rendering, La. App., 179 So. 98, 100.
ESTOP. To stop, bar, or impede; to prevent; to preclude. Co.Litt 352a; Olsgard v. Lemke, 32 N. D. 551, 156 N.W. 102, 103. See Estoppel.
ESTOPPEL. A man’s own act or acceptance stops or closes his mouth to allege or plead the truth. Caulfield v. Noonan, 229 Iowa 955, 295 N. W. 466, 471; Williams v. Edwards, 163 Okl. 246, 22 P.2d 1026.
An estoppel arises when one is concluded and forbidden by law to speak agalnst bis own act or deed. Gural v. Engle, 128 N.J.L. 252, 25 A.2d 257, 261; an inconsistent position, attitude or course of conduct may not be adopted to loes or injury of another. Brand v. Farmers Mut. Pro-tective Ass’n of Texas, Tex.Civ.App., 95 S.W.2d 994, 997.
Estoppel is a bar or imped1ment which precludes allega-tion or denial of a certain fact or state of facts, in con-sequence of previous allegation or denial or conduct or ad-mission, or in consequence of a final adjudication of the matter in a court of law, Lewis v. King, 157 La. 718, 103 So. 19, 22; Agoodash Achim oí Ithaca v. Temple Beth->I, 147 Misc. 405, 263 N.Y.S. 81; Chernick v. National Surety Co.,’ 50 R.I. 419, 148 A. 418, 419; an equltable doc-trine to accomplish justice, Sisson v. Swift, 243 Ala. 289, 9 So.2d 891, 903; Elowe v. Superior Fire Ins. Co., 307 Ill. App. 569, 30 N.E.2d 953, 958; preclusion by act or conduct from asserting right which might otherwise have existed. Reynolds v. Travelers’ Ins. Co.’ 176 Wash. 36, 28 P.2d 310, 314; Tucker v. Brown, 20 Wash.2d ‘740, 150 P.2d 604, 652; Preclusion from alieging or denying fact because of pre-vious action, inaction, allegation, or denial. Steph.P1. 239; Spear v. Farwell, 5 Cal.App.2d 111, 42 P.2d 391, 392; Scholl v. Scholl, 123 Ohio St. 1, 173 N.E. 305, 306; preclu-sion from denying truth of fact which has in contempla-tion of law become settled by acts and proceedings of ju-dicial or legislative officers, or by act of party himself, either by conventional writing or by representations, ex-prese or implied in pais, May v. City of Kearney, 145 Neb. 475, 17 N.W.2d 448, 458; shield for defense but not a weapon of attack, United States, to Use oí Noland Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., D.C.Md., 38 F.Supp. 479, 484. It is available only for protection, and cannot be used as a weapon of assault. Stant° v. Berner Lohne Co., 127 Conn. 431, 17 A.2d 502, 504; It operates to put party entitled to Its beneftts in same position as 1f thing represented were true. May v. City of Kearney, 145 Neb. 475, 17 N.W.2d 448, 458.
Under law of "estoppel" where one of two innocent per-sone must suffer, he whose act occasioned loss must bear it. Buxbaum v. Assicurazioni General’, 175 Misc. 785, 25 N.Y.S.2d 357, 360; Sackenreuther v. Winston, Tex.Civ. App., 137 S.W.2d 93, 96.
Elements or essentials of estoppel include change of posi-tion of parties so that party against whom estoppel is in-
voked has recelved a proflt or benellt or party invoking
estoppel has changed his position to bis detriment, Wertz v. Shane, 216 Iowa 768, 249 N.W. 661; Lebold v. Inland
Steel Co., C.C.A.I11., 125 F.2d 369, 375; Garmon v. Fitz-gerald, 168 Miss. 532, 151 So. 726, 728; circumstances such that a knowledge of truth is necessarily Imputad to party estopped, Froslee v. Sonju, 209 Minn. 522, 297 N.W. 1, 3, 4; conduct intended to deceive or of such nature that reason-ably prudent person would have been decelved, Cellized Floors v. Glena Falle Indemnity Co. of New York, 9 N.J. Mime. 1111, 156 A. 845, 846; Agnew v. Mullenix, La,App.,11 So.2d 106, 107; direct or immediate influence on party claiming beneflt of estoppel, Stanolind 011 & Gas Co. v. Midas Oil Co., Tex.Civ.App., 173 S.W.2d 342, 345; false representation or wrongful silence or concealment, Noxon v. Cockburn, Tex.Civ.App., 147 S.W.2d 872, 875; Weber v. Fohl, 111 Ind.App. 388, 41. N.E.2d 648, 650, 651; Van An-twerp v. United States, C.C.A.Cal., 92 F.2d 871, 875; in-ducing another to alter his position or to do that which he would not otherwise have done, Babcock v. McKee, S.D., 18 N.W.2d 750, 754; Wellsville East Field Irr. Co. v. Lindsay Land & Livestock Co., 104 Utah 448, 137 P.2d 634, 647; Albermarle County v. Massey, 183 Va. 310, 32 S.E.2d 228, 230; intent or reasonable expectation of party estop-ped that other would act, Bank of Sutton v. Skidmore, 113 ‘W.Va. 25, 167 S.E. 144, 146; Mercer Casualty Co. v. Lewis, 41 Cal.App.2d 918, 108 P.2d 65, 67; knowledge oí facts by party to be estopped, Caveney v. Caveney, 234 Wis. 637, 291 N.W. 818, 824; In re Dimon’s Estate, Sur., 32 N.Y.S.2d 239, 243; lack of knowledge and means of knowledge by party claiming estoppel, Ainscow v. Alexander, Del.Super., 39 A.2d 54, 60; Froslee v. Sonju, 209 Minn. 522, 297 N.W. 1, 3, 4; misleading of one party by another party, Williams v. Middle-West Roads Co., 295 Ky. 648, 175 S.W.2d 136, 138; United States, to Use of Noland Co. v. Marfand Casualty Co., D.C.Md., 38 F.Supp. 479, 484; prejudice or loes or in-jury to party invoking estoppel, Vinton v. Atlas Assur. Co., 107 Vt. 272, 178 A. 909, 912; Commission v. Shell Oil Co., Tex.Civ.App., 170 S.W.2d 568, 570; Hooper v. Ball, 133 Me. 412, 179 A. 404, 406; reliance by one party on act, word or conduct of other party, Gosney v. Metropolitan Life Ins. CO., C.C,A.Mo., 114 F.2d 649, 652; In re Sarvey’s Estate, 206 Iowa 527, 219 N.W. 318, 321; right of party asserting estoppel to believe party estopped intended that his con-duct should be acted upon, Lusitanlan-American Develop-ment Co. v. Seaboard Dairy Credit Corporation, 1 Ca1.2d 121, 34 P.2d 139, 142; wrongdoing on part of person sought to be estopped, Sovereign Camp, W. O. W., v. Johnson, Tex.Civ.App., 64 S.W.2d 1084, 1087. Nor on mere delay in asserting a claim, Peyrelitte v. Union Homestead Ass’n, La. App., 185 So. 693, 695.
Nor on errors of judgment, Northwestern Nat. Bank v. Commonwealth, 345 Pa. 192, 27 A.2d 20, 23; nor on error of law, United States v. Du Pont, D.C.Del., 47 F.Supp. 894. 897.
Estoppel is or may be based on acceptance of beneflts, Rhodus v. Geatley, 341 Mo. 397, 147 S.W.2d 631, 637, 638, 639; Hado v. Johnston, 187 Okl. 561, 104 P.2d 985, 992, 998; acknowledgments of matters of fact but not acknowledg-ments or statements of propositions oí law, McDonald v. Richard, 203 La. 155, 13 So.2d 712, 718; acquiescence, In re Kennedy’s Estate, 321 Pa. 225, 183 A. 798, 801; acts done under or in performance of contract, Jackson v. United Gas Public Service Co., 196 La. 1, 198 So. 633, 640; Finch v. Smith, 177 Okl. 307, 58 P.2d 850, 851; actual or construc-tive fraudulent conduct, Peterson v. Hudson Ins. Co., 41 Ariz, 31, 15 P.2d 249, 252; adjudication, Kunkel v. Eastern Iowa Light & Power Co-op., 232 Iowa 649, 5 N.W.2d 899, 903; Citizens’ Loan & Trust Co. of Washington, Ind. v. 3anders, 99 Ind.App. 77, 187 N.E. 396, 398; admissions or denials by which another is induced to act to his injury, New York Life Ins. Co. v. Oates, 122 Fla. 540, 166 So. 269, 276; Wabash Drilling Co. v. Ellis, 230 Ky. 769, 20 S.W.2d 1002, 1004; agreement on and settlement of facts by force of entering loto contract, Masterson v. Bouldin, Tex.Civ. App., 151 S.W.2d 301, 307; In re Schofleld’s Estate, 101 Colo. 443, 73 P.2d 1381; assertion of facts on which an-other relies, Fedas v. Insurance Co. of State of Pennsyl-vania, 300 Pa. 555, 151 A. 285, 287; assumption of position which, if not maintained, would result in injustice to an-other, Harvey v. J. P. Morgan & Co., 166 Misc. 455, 2 N.Y. 5.2d 520; concealment of facts, Greer v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 109 S.W.2d 305, 315; RoSser v. Texas Co., 173 Okl. 309, 48 P.2d 327, 330; conduct or acts amount-ing to a representation or a concealment, Spradling v. Spradling, 118 W.Va. 308, 190 S.E. 537, 540; consent to copyright infringement, whether express or implied from long acquiescence with knowledge of the infringement, Edwin L. Wiegand Co. v. Harold E. Trent Co., C.C.A.Pa., 122 F.2d 920, 925; election between rights or remedies, Hartley v. Hartley, 173 Ga. 710, 161 S.E. 358, 360; Mason & Mason v. Brown, Tex.Civ.App., 182 S.W.2d 729, 733; fault of party estopped, Conner v. Caldwell, 208 Minn. 502, 294 N.W. 650, 653: Maction, Utah State Building Commis-sion, for Use and Benefit of Mountaln States Supply Co., v. Great American Indernnity Co., 105 Utah 11, 140 P.2d 763,771, 772; Hankins v. Waddell, 26 Tenn.App. 71, 167 S.W. 2d 694, 696; injury resulting from porfíes’ conduct, In re Bastanchury Corporation, C.C.A.Cal., 66 F.2d 653, 657; In-nocent misrepresentation, Countway v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.1, 127 F.2d 69, 76; leches, Oak Lawn Cemetery of Baltimore County v. Baltimore County Com’rs, 174 Md. 356, 198 A. 600, 605, 115 A.L.R. 1478; language or conduct which has induced another to act, French Market Ice Mfg. Co. of New Orleans v. Dalton, 15 La.App. 115, 130 So. 122, 123; Brown v. Federal Land Bank of Houston, Tex.Civ.App., 180 S.W.2d 647, 652; matter of record, Coral Realty Co. v. Peacock Holding Co., 103 Fla. 916, 138 So. 622, 624; misrepresentation, Cushing y. United States, D.C.Mass., 18 F.Supp. 83, 85; Rhoads v. Rhoads, 342 Mo. 934, 119 S.W.2d 247, 252; negligente,
Postal v. Home State Bank for SavIngs, 284 Mich. 220,
279
N.W.
488,
491; Fisher v. Beckwith, 30 W1s. 55, 11
Am.
Rep.
546;
omission to act, West v. Cleveland Ry.
Co.,
Ohio
App.,
58 N.E.2d 799, 801; prejudice, Alderman v.
Town of West Haven, 124 Conn. 391, 200 A. 330, 333; prior judgment, Morreli v. Towle, 141. Neb. 370, 3 N.W.2d 655, 664; Kelliher v. Stone & Webster, C.C.A.Fla., 75 F.2d 331, 332; PromIse of future performance, Albachten v. Brod-ley, 212 Minn. 359, 3 N.W.2d 783, 785; provlsIons of a deed, Carson v. Cochran, 52 Minn. 67, 53 N.W. 1130; Robert v. O’Connell, 269 Mass. 532, 169 N.E. 487, 488; public policy, Ervin v. City of Pittsburgh, 339 Pa. 241, 14 A.2d 297, 300; Bloomfleld Village Drain Dist. v. Keefe, C.C.A.Mich., 119 F.2d 157, 163, 165; representation or concealment of facts, Kerestury v. Elkhart Packing Co., 108 Ind.App. 148, 27 N. E.2d 383, 385; Albermarle County v. Massey, 183 Va. 310, 32 S.E.2d 228, 230; silente, Rone v. Sawney, 197 Ark. 472, 123 S.W.2d 524, 526, 527; Brown v. Brown, 347 Mo. 45, 146 S.W.2d 553, 555.
Estoppels are sometimes sald to be of there kinds: (1) by deed; (2) by matter of record; (3) by matter in pais. The first two are also called legal estoppels, as distin-guished from the last kind, known as equitable estoppels.

Acta and Declarations

An "estoppel by acts and declarations" is such as arises from the acts and declarations of a per-son by which he designedly induces another to al-ter his position injuriously to himself. Brauch v. Freking, 219 Iowa 556, 258 N.W. 892.

Ad judication Distinguished

"Adjudication" and an "estoppel" from relitigating things are different in that there 1s an adjudication when a sult 1s repeated, but that there may be an estoppel be-cause some fact which is controlling in both actions was litigated and set at rest in first action. Kunkel v. Eastern Iowa Light & Power Co-Op., 232 Iowa 649, 5 N.W.2d 899, 903.

Common Lato

"Estoppel at common law" includes estoppel by record, estoppel by deed, and certain cases of estoppel In pais which are recognized in courts of law. Thomas v. Conyers, 198 N.C. 229, 151 S.E. 270, 273

Election Distinguished

"Election" differs from an "estoppel in pais" in that in order to be effective it need not be acted upon by the other party by way of a detrimental change of his position, provided the election is a decisíve one. Philllps v. Rooker, 134 Tenn. 457, 184 S.W. 12, 14.

Estoppel Against Estoppel

Doctrine that two estoppels may destroy each other, or that one estoppel may set another at large. Shean v. United States Fidelity & Guaran-ty Co., 263 Mich. 535, 248 N.W. 892, 893.
In wIfe’s divorce sun, evidence showed that wife in procuring void Nevada divorce decree was under husband’s duress, domination, and compuislon, and hence there arose an "estoppel against estoppel" destroying each other, and wife was not barred from settine up invalidity of Nevadadecree. Llpp1ncott v. Lippincott, 141. Neb. 186, 3 N.W.2d 207, 215, 140 A.L.R. 901.

Fraud

Estoppel is a penalty paid by perpetrator of wrong by affirmative act which, though without fraudulent intent, may result in legal fraud on another. Harris v. Prince, Tex.Civ.App., 98 S.W.• 2d 1022, 1026.
A judgment procured by fraud may not be used as the basls of an "estoppel". Seubert v. Seubert, 68 S.D. 195, 299 N.W. 873, 875; Actual or intended fraud is not an es-sential element of estoppel, but estoppel arises when omission to speak 1s an actual or constructive fraud. Kel-ley-Springfield Tire Co. v. Steln, 163 Misc. 393, 297 N.Y.S. 22, 26. An act done which cannot be contravened without fraud may be basis of estoppel, Tradesmens Nat. Bank of New Haven v. Minor, 122 Conn. 419, 190 A. 270, 272, An es-sential element of "equitable estoppel" is fraudulent In-tent. Fleishbein v. Western Auto Supply Agency, 19 Cal. App.2d 424, 65 P.2d 928; An estoppel does not require a showing of fraudulent intent. New Jersey Suburban Water Co. v. Town of Harrison, 122 N.J.L. 189, 3 A.2d 623, 625, 626, 627; An estoppel may arase although there Is no de-signed fraud. Laraway v. First Nat. Bank of La Verne, 39 Cal.App.2d 718, 104 P.2d 95, 101; Estoppel Is an equitable principie dependent on fraud. Volk v. City of New York, 259 App.Div. 247, 19 N.Y.S.2d 53, 60.

Intent

"Estoppel" in its broadest sense is penalty paid by one perpetrating wrong by known fraud or by affirmative act which, though without fraudulent intent, may result in legal fraud on another. Har-ris v. Prince, Tex.Civ.App., 98 S.W.2d 1022, 1026.
Actual or intended fraud is not an essential element of estoppel but estoppel arises when omission to speak ls an actual or constructive fraud. Kelley-Springlield Tire Co. v. Stein, 163 Misc. 393, 297 N.Y.S. 22, 26. Elements of equitable estoppel are representations intentionally made under such circumstances as show that party making them intended, or might reasonably have anticipated, that par-ty to whom they are made, or to whom they are communi-cated, will rely and act on them as true, Crane Co. of Minnesota v. Advance Plumbing & Heating Co., 177 Minn. 132, 224 N.W. 847, 848. An essential element of equitable estoppel is fraudulent intent but careless and culpable conduct is equivalent to 1ntent to deceive. Fleishbein v. Western Auto Supply Agency, 19 Cal.App.221. 424, 65 P.2d 928. An estoppel arises when one by acts, representations, admisstons or silente intentionally Induces another to change his position for the worse. Smith v. Vara, 136 Misc. 500, 241 N.Y.S. 202, 209; American Exchange Nat. Bank v. Winder, 198 N.C. 18, 150 S.E. 489, 491. An estoppel does not require a showing of fraudulent intent. New Jersey Suburban Water Co. v. Town of Harrison, 122 N.J. L. 189, 3 A.2d 623, 625, 626, 627. An estoppel may arase where there Is no intent to mislead. Mandril v. Thomas, 113 Vt. 322, 34 A.2d 105, 109.

Legal Titie to Land

Estoppel affecting legal title to land requires conduct amounting to knowing representation or concealment relied on by other party changing his position for the worse. Crane v. Esmond, 214 Wis. 571, 253 N.W. 780.
It requires conduct amounting to representation or con-cealment of material facts known to party estopped at time of conduct, or at least under circumstances necessarlly im-puting knowledge thereof, and truth concerning such facts must be unknown to other party claiming beneflt of es-toppel, with further requirement that conduct was done with intention or expectation that it would be acted on, and other party led to act thereon in rellance on conduct so as to change his position for the worse. Jacksonville Public Service Corporation v. Calhoun Water Co., 219 Ala. 616, 123 So. 79, 81, 64 A.L.R. 1550.

Misrepresentation See Representation, Estoppel By.
Pleading-
Pleader must allege and prove not only that person sought to be estopped made misieading statements and representations but that pleader actually believed and relied on them and was mis-led to his injury thereby. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Midas Oil Co., Tex.Civ.App., 173 S.W.2d 342, 345.
A plea, replication, or other pieading, which, without confessing or denying the matter of fact adversely alleged, relies merely on some matter of estoppei as a ground for excluding the opposite party from the allegation of the fact. Steph.P1. 219; 3 Bl.Comm. 308.
A plea which neither admits nor denles the facts alleged by the plaintiff, but denies his right to allege them. Gould, Pl. c. 2, § 39.
A special plea in bar. which happens where a man has done some act or executed some deed which precludes him from averring anything to the contrary. 3 Bl.Comm. 308.
A pleader is not "estopped" by judicial allegations which have neither deceived nor damaged anyone. Thomas v. Leonard Truck Lines, La.App., 7 So.2d 753, 756; Hearon v. Davis, La.App., 8 So.2d 787, 791.
Person pleading estoppel must have been misled to his injury by acts of omission or commission of him who is sought to be estopped. Selber Bros. v. Newstadt’s Shoe Stores, 203 La. 316, 14 So.2d 10; 13.
Plea of estoppel lacks merit unless it appears that op-posing litigant has been misled, deceived or has suffered damage from the allegations of pleader. Mounger v. Fer-rell, La.App., 11 So.2d 56, 60.
Plea of ”estoppel" was fatally defective where there was no statement that defendant relled on course alleged to have been taken by plaintiff. Sertic v. Roberts, 171 Or. 121, 136 P.2d 248, 251.
Statements in pleading in former action which are mere-ly assertlons of conclusion of law do not constitute "es-toppel by pleading." Smith v. Saulsberry, 157 Wash. 270, 288 P. 927, 930

Ratification Distinguished

The substance of "estoppel" is the inducement of another to act to his prejudice. The substance of "ratification" is confirmation after conduct. Citizens State Bank of Thedford v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. of Baltimore, Md., 130 Neb. 603, 266 N.W. 81, 84, 103 A.L.R. 1401; Cudahy Bros. Co. v. West Michigan Dock & Market Corpo-ration, 285 Mich. 18, 280 N.W. 93, 95; Gillihan v. Morguelan, 299 Ky. 671, 186 S.W.2d 807, 809.
By ratification party Is bound because he intended to be, while under "estoppel" he is bound because other party will be prejudiced unless the law treats him as legally bound. Carlile v. Harris, Tex.Civ.App., 38 S.W.2d 622, 624; doctrine of ratification is based on fact of intention to carry out terms of certain agreement, while doctrine of estoppel 1s based on right of party to deny existente of agreement by reason of misleading acts. B. F. C. Morris Co. v. Mason, 171 Okl. 589, 39 P.2d 1, 3; Ratification re-quires no change of position or prejudice. Texas & Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Kirtley, Tex.Civ.App., 288 S.W. 619, 622. Ratification is retroactive and validates all of the act in-volved, while estoppel extends only to so much of the act as is affected by the conduct working the estoppel. Wood-worth v. School Dist. No. 2, Stevens County, 92 Wash. 456, 159 P. 757, 760. Generally speaking, "ratification" applies to a formal declaration of the approval of another’s act, whereas "estoppei" is where the party is bound by his own act, but the legal effect is the same. Zenos v. Britten-Cook Land & Live Stock Co., 75 Cal App. 299, 242 P. 914, 917; Marion Sav. Bank v. Leahy, 200 Iowa 220, 204 N.W. 456, 458.

Recital

The theory of "estoppel by recital" is that holder of instrument is entitled to rely upon facts recit-ed therein. Bloomfield Village Drain Dist. v. Keele, C.C.A.Mich., 119 F.2d 157, 163, 165.

Res Judicata Distinguished

A prior judgment between same parties, which is not strictly res judicata because based upon dif-ferent cause of action, operates as an "estoppel" only as to matters actually in issue or points con-troverted. JEtna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., v. Martin, C.C.A.Ark., 108 F.2d 824, 827; Cunning-ham v. Oklahoma City, 188 Okl. 466, 110 P.2d 1102, 1104.
Doctrine that lssues decided may not be drawn In ques-tion in any future action between same parties or their privies, whether cause of action in the two actions be identical or different, Is based on "estoppel" rather than upon "res judicata". Norwood v. McDonald, 142 Ohio St. 299, 52 N.E.2d 67, 71, 74; In a later action upon a different cause of action a judgment operates as an "estoppel" only as to such issues in second action as were actually de-terminad in the first action. Lorber v. Vista Irr. Dist., C. C.A.Cal., 127 F.2d 628, 634. The doctrine of "res judicata" is a branch of law of "estoppel". Krisher v. McAllister, 71 Ohio App. 58, 47 N.E.2d 817, 819; The plea of "res judicata" is in its nature an "estoppel" against the losing party from again litigating matters involved in previous action, but the plea does not have that effect as to matters trans-piring subsequently. Fort Worth Stockyards Co. v. Brown, Tex.Civ.App., 161 S.W.2d 549, 555. Where a second action between same parties involves different cause of action, under doctrine of "res judicata", judgment in first action operates as an "estoppel" only as to those matters which were in issue and actually litigated. International Broth-erhood of Electrical Workers v. BridgAman, 179 Va. 533, 19 S.E.2d 667, 67

Stare Decisis

The doctrine of "stare decisis" is but an appli-cation of the doctrine of "estoppel." Brown v. Rosenbaum, 175 Misc. 295, 23 N.Y.S.2d 161, 171; The doctrine of "stare decisis" involves no element of "estoppel". Joslin v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 146 S.W.2d 208, 212.

Suppression

The doctrine of "estoppel by concealment and suppression" applies only where there has been reduction to practice of invention. Bogoslowsky v. Huse, 142 F.2d 75, 76, 31 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1034

Waiver Distinguished

Waiver is intentional relinquishment of a known right. Globe Indemnity Co. v. Cohen, C.C.A.Pa., 106 F.2d 687, 691; Beatty v. Employers’ Liability Assur. Corporation, 106 Vt. 25, 168 A. 919, 922; but may be more narrowly and accurately defined as intended giving up of known privilege or Pow-er. John Alt Furniture Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., C.C.A.Mo., 88 F.2d 36, 41. Waiver is volun-tary and intentional. Insurance Co. of North America v. Williams, 42 Ariz. 331, 26 P.2d 117, 119; Sentinel Fire Ins. Co. v. McRoberts, 50 Ga.App. 732, 179 S.E. 256. Waiver is voluntary surrender or relinquishment of some known right, benefit or advantage; estoppel is the inhibition to assert it. Benson v. Borden, 174 Md. 202, 198 A. 419, 427, 428; Johnston v. Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co., 130 Me. 143, 154 A. 79, 80.Acts, conduct or declarations insufficient to create a technlcal estoppel may create a waiver. Benson v. Borden, 174 Md. 202, 198 A. 419, 427, 428. Acts or conduct of only one of the parties is involved In waiver while an estoppel may arise where there Is no intent to mislead. Beatty v. Employers’ Liability Assur. Corporation, 106 Vt. 25, 168 A. 919, 922; Benson v. Borden, 174 Md. 202, 198 A. 419, 427, 428. Actual intent to abandon or surrender right is es-sential in waiver and immaterial in estoppel. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. Pettid, 40 Ariz. 239, 11 P.2d 833, 838; Boyce v. Toke Point Oyster Co., Consol., 145 Or. 114, 25 P.2d 930; Actual or construetive fraudulent conduct is essential to estoppel but not to waiver. Insurance Co. of North America v. Williams, 42 Ariz. 331, 26 P.2d 117, 119; An act which operates to injury of other party is essential to estoppel whereas there may be a waiver, al-though the opposite party is beneficially affected. Sentinel Fire Ins. Co. v. McRoberts, 50 Ga.App. 732, 179 S.E. 256; Conduct or dealings with another by which other is induced to act or to forbear to act is basis of estoppel whereas waiver Is intentional relinquishment of a known right. De Pasquale v. Union Indemnity Co., 50 R.I. 509, 149 A. 795; Reynolds v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., 176 Wash. 36, 28 P.2d 310, 314. Estoppel results from an act which operates to the injury of the other party, while waiver may even affect him beneficially. City of Glendale v. Coquat, 46 Ariz. 478, 52 P.2d 1178, 1180, 102 A.L.R. 837. Fraud may be implied in estoppel but never in waiver. City of Glendale v. Co-quat, 46 Ariz. 478, 52 P.2d 1178, 1180, 102 A.L.R. 837; Benson v. Borden, 174 Md. 202, 198 A. 419, 427, 428. Ignor-anee of party who invokes estoppel, representations or con-duct of party estopped which misled, and an innocent and deleterious change of position in reltance upon such repre-sentations or conduct are essential to estoppel whereas waiver is an intentional relinquishment. Ellis v. Metro-politan Casualty Ins. Co. of New York, 187 S.C. 162, 197 S. E. 510; Knowledge and Intention are both involved in waiver while an estoppel may arise where there is no in-tent to mislead. Benson v. Borden, 174 Md. 202, 198 A. 419, 427, 428; Beatty v. Employers’ Liability Assur. Corpo-ration, 106 Vt. 25, 168 A. 919, 922. Misleading of party to his injury or prejudice or into altered position Is essential to estoppel but not to walver. A-1 Cleaners & Dyers v. Amer-ican Mut. Liability Ins. Co. of Boston, 307 111.App. 64, 30 N. E.2d 87, 88; Beatty v. Employers’ Liability Assur. Corpo-ration, 106 Vt. 25, 168 A. 919, 922. Waiver consists merely in renouncing some right or in ratifying what one might repudiate. Williams v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 96 Mont. 204, 29 P.2d 649, 651. Waiver depends on what one party intends to do, rather than upon what he induces his adversary to do, as in "estoppel". Nathan Miller, Inc.’ v. Northern Ins. Co. of New York, 3 Terry 523, 39 A.2d 23, 25; Wisdom v. Board of Sup’rs of Polk County, 236 Iowa 669, 19 N.W.2d 602, 610.
Implied waiver is kin to estoppel and rests on course of conduct evidencing intention not to insist on some perform-ance due. Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, C.C.A.Cal., 95 F.2d 952, 957. It does not necessarily include all ele-ments of estoppel. Smith v. Coutant, 232 Iowa 887, 6 N.W. 2d 421, 425.
Legal effect of waiver and estoppel ís the same. Wood-men of the World Life Ins. Soc. v. Greathouse, 242 Ala. 532, 7 So.2d 89, 91.
Téchnically, a distinction exista between "waiver" and "estoppel" but under ínsurance law, terms are used inter-changeably. Boyle Road & Bridge Co. v. American Em-ployers’ Ins. Co. of Boston, Mass., 195 S.C. 397, 11 S.E.2d 438, 440, 441; The doctrine of waiver, as asserted against Insurance companles to avoid the strict enforcement of con-ditions contained In their policies, is only another name for the doctrine of estoppel. Rushville Nat. Bank of Rush-ville v. State Life Ins. Co., 210 Ind. 492, 1 N.E.2d 445, 448. While there are distinguishing features between "walver" and "estoppel," waiver belongs to family of estoppel and the terms are frequently used as meaning the same thing in law of Insurance contracts. Ellis v. Metropolitan Cas-ualty Ins. Co. of New York, 187 S.C. 162, 197 S.E. 510, 512.

Warranty

An estoppel based on principie of giving effect to manifest intent of grantor and of preventIng grantor from derogating or destroying his own gra.nt by subsequent act. Lewis v. King, 157 La.
718, 103 So. 19, 22; Jordan v. Marks, D.C.La., 55 F.Supp. 204, 209. See, also, Deed, Estoppel By.
For "Acquiescence, Estoppel By", "Admissions, Estoppel By", "Collateral Attack", "Concealment, Estoppel By," "Conduct, Estoppel By", "Contract, Estoppel By", "Deed, Estoppel By", "Election, Es-toppel By", "Equitable Estoppel", "In Pais, Estop-pel In", "Judgment, Estoppel By", "Judicial Es-toppel," "Laches, Estoppel By," "Legal Estoppel," "Negligente, Estoppel By," "Promissory Estop-pel," "Quasi Estoppel," "Record, Estoppel By," "Representation, Estoppel By," "Silente, Estoppel By" and "Verdict, Estoppel By," see those titles.
ESTOVERIA SUNT ARDENDI, ARANDI, CON-STRUENDI ET CLAUDENDI. 13 Coke, 68. Es-tovers are of fire-bote, plow-bote, house-bote, and hedge-bote.
ESTOVERLIS RABENDIS. A writ for a wife judicially separated to recover her alimony or es-tovers. Obsolete.
ESTOVERS. The right to use; during lease, what-ever timber there may be on leased premises nec-essary to promote good husbandry. Hood v. Fos-ter, 194 Miss. 812, 13 So.2d 652, 653.
An allowance made to a person out of an estate or other thing for his or her support, as for food and raiment.
An allowance (more commonly called "ali-mony") granted to a woman divorced a mensa et thoro, for her support out of her husband’s estate. 1 Bl.Comm. 441.
The right or prívilege which a tenant has to furnish himself with so much wood from the dernised premises as may be sufficient or necessary for his fuel, fences, and oth-er agricultural operations. 2 BI.Comm. 35; Woodf.Landl. & Ten. 232; Zimmerman v. Shreeve, 59 Md. 363; Van Rensselaer v. Radcliff, 10 Wend. (N.Y.) 639, 25 Am.Dec. 582.
There is much learning in the old Books relative to the creation, apportionment, suspension, and extinguishment of these rights, very little of which, however, is applicable to the condition of things in this country, except perhaps in New York, where the grants of the manor-lands have led to some litigation on the subject. Tayl.Landl. & T. § 220. See 4 Wash.R.P. 99; 7 Bing. 640; Richardson v. York, 14 Me. 221; Dalton v. Dalton, 42 N.C. 197; Loomis v. Wilbur, 5 Mas. 13, Fed.Cas.No.8,498.
Common of estovers, see Common.
ESTRAY. Cattle whose owner is unknown. 2 Kent, Comm. 359; Spelman. Any beast, not wild, found within any lordship, and not owned by any man. Cowell; 1 BI.Comm. 297. These belonged to the lord of the soil. Britt. c. 17. An animal that has strayed away and lost itself; a wander-ing beast which no one seeks, f ollows, or clairms. Campbell v. Hamilton, 42 N.D. 216, 172 N.W. 810.
Estray must be understood as denoting a wandering beast whose owner is unknown to the person who takes it up. An estray is an animal that has escaped froin its owner, and wanders or strays about; usually defined, at common law, as a wandering animal whose owner is unknown. An animal cannot be an estray when on the range where it was raised, and permitted by its owner to run, and especially when the owner is known to the party who takes it up. The fact of its being breachy or vicious does not make It an estray. Kinney v. Roe, 70 Iowa, 509, 30 N.W. 776; Shepherd v. Hawley, 4 Or.’ 208; Lyman v.

Glpson, 18 Pick., Mass., 426; but see Worthington v. Brent, 69 Mo. 205; State v. Apel, 14 Tex. 431.
Helfers trespassing unattended upon adjoinIng ranch when taken up held "estrays" within Estray Act even if helfers’ owners were known, since act covers animals belonging to known as well as to unknown owners. Soares v. Ghisletta, 1 Ca1.App.2d 402, 36 P.2d 668, 669.
The term is used of flotsam at sea. 15 L.Q.R. 357.
ESTREAT, v. To take out a forfeited recogniz-ance from the records of a court, and return it to the court of exchequer, to be prosecuted. See Estreat, n.
A forfeited recognizance taken out from among the other records for the purpose of being sent up to the exchequer, that the parties might be sued thereon, was said to be estreated. 4 Bl.Comm. 253. And see Louisiana Society v. Cage, 45 La.Ann. 1394, 14 So. 422.
There is no "estreat" or taking a judgment of forfeiture of a ball recognizance from the records and sending it up to the exchequer for suit thereon in Louisiana, since the same court which renders a judgment executes it, and the same officers who are charged with procuring It to be ren-dered are also charged with procuring it to be executed. State v. Johnson, 132 La. 11, 60 So. 702, 703.
ESTREAT, n. (From Lat. extractum.) In Eng-lish law. A copy or extract from the book of es-treats, that is, the rolls of any court, in which the amercements or fines, recognizances, etc., imposed or taken by that court upon or from the accused, are set down, and which are to be levied by the bailiff or other officer of the court. Cowell; Brown. A true copy or note of some original writ-ing or record, and especially of fines and amerce-ments imposed by a court, extracted from the rec-ord, and certified to a proper officer or officers authorized and required to collect them. Fitzh. N.B. 57, 76.
ESTRECIATUS. Straightened, as applied to roads. Cowell.
ESTREPE. To strip; to despoil; to lay waste; to comit waste upon an estate, as by cutting down trees, removing buildings, etc. To injure the value of a reversionary interest by stripping or spoiling the estate.
ESTREPEMENT. A species of aggravated waste, by stripping or devastating the land, to the injury of the reversioner, and especially pending a suit for possession.
ESTREPEMENT, WRIT OF. This was a com-mon-law writ of waste, which lay in particular for the reversioner against the tenant for life, in respect of damage or injury to the land commit-ted by the latter.
As It was only auxillary to a real action for recovery of the land, and as equity afforded the same relief by lnjunc-tion, the writ fell finto disuse in England, and was abol-ished by 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27. In Pennsylvania, by statute, the remedy by estrepement is extended for the beneflt of specified persons. See 10 Viner, Abr. 497; Woodf.Landl. & T. 447; Arch.C1v.P1. 17; 7 Com.Dig. 659; Byrne v. Boyle, 37 Pa. 260.
ESTUARY, is that part of the mouth or lower course of a river fiowing hito the sea which is subject to tide; especially, an enlargement of a river channel toward its mouth in which the move-
ment of the tide is very prominent. Alameda County v. Garrison, 108 Cal.App. 122, 291 P. 464, 466.
ET. And. The introductory word of several Lat-in and law French phrases formerly in common use.
ET ADJOURNATUR. And it is adjourned.
A phrase used In the old reports, where the argumentiof a cause was adjourned to another day, or where a second argument was had. 1 Keb. 692, 754, 773.
ET AL. An abbreviation for et alii, "and others." Mitchell v. Mason, 90 Fla. 192, 105 So. 404, 405. The singular is "et alius" (q. v.). It may also mean "and another" in the singular. Bahb v. Dowdy, 229 Ky. 767, 17 S.W.2d 1014, 1016; Glen Falls Indemnity Co. v. Manning, La.App., 168 So. 787, 788. ,
• Where the words "et al." are used In a judgment against defendants, the quoted words include all defendants. Wil-liams v. Williams, 25 Tenn.App. 290, 156 S.W.2d 363, 369.
ET ALII É CONTRA. And others on the other side.
A phrase constantly used in the Year Books, In descrlb-ing a joinder in issue. P. 1 Edw. II. Prist; et álii d con-tra, et sic ad patriairc: ready; and others, 8 contra, and so to the country. T. 3 Edw. III. 4.
ET ALIUS. And another.
The abbreviation et al. (sometimes In the plural written et ala.) is often affixed to the name of the person first men-tioned, where there are several plaintiffs, grantors, persons addressed, etc. See In re McGovern’s Estate, 77 Mont. 182, 250 P. 812, 815; Anderson v. Haas, 160 Ga. 420, 128 S.E. 178, 179; Conery v. Webb, 12 La.Ann. 282; Lyman v. Mil-ton, 44 Cal. 630.
ET ALLOCATUR. And it is allowed.
ET CETERA (or ET CiETERA). And others; and other things; and others of like character; and others of the like kind; and the rest; and so on; and so forth. Muir v. Kay, 66 Utah, 550, 244 P. 901, 904; Osterberg v. Section 30 Development Co., 160 Minn. 497, 200 N.W. 738, 739; State on Inf. Haw v. Three States Lumber Co., 274 Mo. 361, 202 S.W. 1083, 1084; Wagner v. Brady, 130 Tenn. 554, 171 S.W. 1179; Fleck v. Harmstad, 304 Pa. 302, 155 A. 875, 877, 77 A.L.R. 874. In its abbreviated form (etc.) this phrase is frequently affixed to one of a series of articles or names to show that others are intended to follow or understood to be included. So, alter reciting the initiatory words of a set formula, or a clause already given in full, etc. is added, as an abbreviation, for the sake of convenience. And other things of like kind or purpose as compared with those immediately theretofore mentioned. Hisaw v. Ellison Ridge Consolidated School Dist., 189 Miss. 664, 198 So. 557, 558.
In its abbreviated form (etc.) this phrase means and other like purposes. Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhime er, Tex.Civ.App., 115 S.W.2d 1212, 1214; other things of like character. Lewis v. Ladner, 177 Miss. 473, 168 So. 281, 282; other things or the rest; and so forth; used to indicate others of a kind specified, Potter v. Bor-ough of Metuchen, 108 N.J.L. 447, 155 A. 369, 370; others of the like kind; and the rest; and so on; and so forth, Forman v. Columbia Theater Co., 20 Wash.2d 685, 148 P.2d 951, 953. In such form it is frequently affixed to one of a series of articles or names to show that others are in-tended to follow or understood to be included so, after re-citing the initiatory words of a set formula, or a clause already given in full, etc. is added, as an abbreviation, for the sake of convenience. See Lathers v. Keogh, 39 Hun, N.Y., 579; Morton v. Young, 173 Ky. 301, 190 S.W. 1090; Becker v. Hopper, 22 Wyo. 237, 138 P. 179, 180, Ann.Cas. 1916D, 1041.
ET DE CEO SE METTENT EN LE PAYS. L. Fr. And of this they put themselves upon the country.
ET DE HOC PONIT SE SUPER PATRIAM. And of this he puts himself upon the country. The formal conclusion of a common-law plea in bar by way of traverse. See 3 Bl.Comm. 313. The liter-al translation is retained in the modern form.
ET El LEGITUR IN MEC VERBA. L. Lat, And it is read to him in these words. Words formerly used in entering the prayer of oyer on record.
ET HABEAS IBI TUNC HOC BREVE. And have you then there this writ. The formal words di-recting the return of a writ. The literal transla-tion is retained in the modern form of a consider-able number of writs.
ET HABUIT. And he had it.
A common phrase ín the Year Books, expressive of the allowance of an application or demand by a party. Parn. demanda /a view. Et habuit, etc. M. 6 Edw. III. 49.
ET HOC PARATUS EST VERIFICARE. And this he is prepared to verify.
The Latin form of concluding a plea in confesslon and avoídance; that is, where the defendant has confessed all that the plaintiff has set forth, and has pleaded new matter In avoídance. 1 Salk, 2.
These words were used, when the pleadings were in Latín, at the concluslon of any pleading which contained new afflrmative matter. They expressed the willingness or readiness of the party so pleading to establish by proof the matter alleged in his pleading. A pleading which con-cluded in that manner was technically said to ”conclude with a veriflcation," In contradistinction to a pleading which simply denied matter alleged by the opposite party, and which for that reason was said to "conclude to the country," because the party merely put hímself upon the country, or left the matter to the jury. Brown.
ET HOC PETIT QUOD INQUIRATUR PER PA-TRIAM. And this he prays may be inquired of by the country. The conclusion of a plaintiff’s pleading, tendering an issue to the country. 1 Salk. 6. Literally translated in the modern forms.
ET INDE PETIT JUDICIUM. And thereupon [or thereof] he prays judgment. A clause at the end of pleadings, praying the judgment of the court in favor of the party pleading. It occurs as early as the time of Bracton, and is literally translated in the modern forms. Bract. fol. 57b; Crabb, Eng. Law, 217.
ET INDE PRODUCIT SECTAM. And thereupon he brings suit. The Latin conclusion of a dec-laration, except against attorneys and other of-flcers of the court. 3 Bl.Comm. 295.
ET MODO AD HUNC DIEM. Lat. And now at this day. This phrase was the formal beginning of an entry of appearance or of a continuance. The equivalent English words are still used in this connection.ET NON. Lat. And not. A technical phrase in pleading, which introduces the negative averments of a special traverse. It has the same force and effect as the words absque hoc, "without this," and is occasionally used instead of the latter.
ET SEQ. An abbreviation for et sequentes (mas-culine and feminine plural) or et sequentia (neu-ter), "and the following." Thus a reference to "p. 1, et seq." means "page first and the follow-ing Pages." Also abbreviated "et sqq.," which is preferred by some authorities for a reference to more than one following page.
ET SIC. And so. In the Latin forms of plead-ing these were the introductory words of a spe-cial conclusion to a plea in bar, the object being to render it positive and not argumentative; as et sic ni/ debet.
ET SIC AD JUDICIUM. And so to judgment. Yearb. T. 1 Edw. II. 10.
ET SIC AD PATRIAM. And so to the country. A phrase used in the Year Books, to record an is-sue to the country.
ET SIC FECIT. Arid he did so. Yearb. P. 9 Hen. VI. 17.
ET SIC PENDET. And so it hangs. A term us-ed in the old reports to signify that a point was left undetermined. T. Raym. 168.
ET SIC ULTERIUS. And so on; and so further; and so forth. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 50, § 27.
ET UX. An abbreviation for et uxor,—"and wife." Where a grantor’s wife joins him in the conveyance, it is sometimes expressed (in ab-stracts, etc.) to be by "A. B. et ux."
ETCHING. Strictly, the art of using acid to bite a design on metal; in a broader sense, the word includes the sand-blast process, which uses no acid, but relies on abrasion by sand, emery, or a like substance. Graphic Arts Co. v. Photo-Chrom-otype Engraving Co., C.C.A.Pa., 231 F. 146, 148.
ETERNAL SECURITY. The doctrine of "etern-al security" means that once one becomes a Chris-tian or has been "regenerated" his future conduct, no matter what it may be, will not jeopardize his salvation. Ashman v. Studebaker, 115 Ind.App. 73, 56 N.E.2d 674, 678.
ETHICAL. "Of or relating to moral action, mo-tive or character; as, ethical emotion; also, treat-ing ,of moral feelings, duties or conduct; con-taining precepts of morality; moral"; and sec-ondarily as "professionally right or befitting; con-forming to professional standards of conduct." Kraushaar v. La Vin, 181 Misc. 508, 42 N.Y.S.2d 857, 859.
ETHICS. What is generally called the "ethics" of the profession is but consensus of expert opin-ion as to necessity of professional standards. Cherry v. Board of Regents of University of State of New York, 289 N.Y. 148, 44 N.E.2d 405, 412.

ETHICS, LEGAL. See Legal Ethics.
ETIQUETTE OF THE PROFESSION. The code of honor agreed on by mutual understanding and tacitly accepted by members of the legal profes-sion, especially by the bar. Wharton.
EUM QUI NOCENTEM INFAMAT, NON EST IEQUUM ET BONUM OB EAM REM CONDEM-NARI; DELICTA ENIM NOCENTIUM NOTA ESSE OPORTET ET EXPEDIT. It is not just and proper that he who speaks ill of a bad man should be condemned on that account; for it is fitting and expedient that the crimes of bad men should be known. Dig. 47, 10, 17; 1 Bl.Comm. 125.
EUNDO, MORANDO, ET REDEUNDO. Lat. Going, remaining, and returning.
A person who is privileged from arrest (as a witness, legislator, etc.) is generally so privileged cundo, morando, st redeundo; that is, on his way to the place where his futies are to be performed, whlie he rematas there, and on his return journey.
EUNDO ET REDEUNDO. Lat. In going and re-turning. Applied to vessels. 3 C.Rob.Adm. 141.
EUNOMY. Equal laws and a well-adjusted con-stitution of government.
EUNUCH. A male of the human species who has been castrated. See Domat. liv. prél. tit. 2, § 1, n. 10. Eckert v. Van Pelt, 69 Kan. 357, 76 P. 909, 66 L.R.A. 266.
EUTHANASIA. The act or practice of painlessly putting to death persons suffering from incurable and distressing disease. An easy or agreeable death.
EVASIO. Lat. In old practice. An escape from prison or custody. Reg. Orig. 312.
EVASION. An act of eluding or avoiding, or avoidance by artifice. City of Wink v. Griffith Amusement Co., 129 Tex. 40, 100 S.W.2d 695, 701.
A subtle endeavoring to set aside truth or to es-cape the punishment of the law.
Thus, If one person says to another that he will not strike him, but will give him a pot of ale to strike first, and, accordingly, the latter strikes, the returning the blow is punishable; and, Ir the person first striking is killed, it it is murder, for no man shall evade the justice of the law by such a pretense. 1 Hawk.P.C. 81; Bac.Abr. Fraud, A. So no one may plead ignorante of the law to evade it. Jacob.
Artlflce or cunning is implicit in the term as applied to contest between citizen and government over taxation. Clapp v. Heiner, C.C.A.Pa., 51 F.2d 224, 225.
In a general way the words "suppression," "evasion," and "concealment" mean to avoid by some device or strat-egy or the concealment or intentlonal withholding some fact which ought in good faith to be communicated. Mur-ray v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen, 180 Iowa, 626, 163 N.W. 421, 428.
When an act is condemned as an "evasion," what is meant ls that it is on the wrong side of the line indicated by the policy if not by the mere letter of the law. Wynd-moor Building & Loan Ass’n v. Power Building & Loan Ass’n, Pa.Super., 121 Pa.Super. 236, 183 A. 367, 369; Bul-len v. State of Wisconsin, Wis., 240 U.S. 625, 36 S.Ct. 473, 474, 60 L.Ed. 830.EVASIVE. Tending or seeking to evade; elu-sive; shifting; as an evasive argument or plea.
Deprivation of lessee of free enjoyment of premises, and, if it does so, deprivation need not be permanent. Title & Trust Co. v. Durkheimer Inv. Co., 155 Or. 427, 63 P.2d 909.
EVASIVE ANSWER. One which consists in re-fusing either to admit or to deny a matter as to which the defendant is necessarily presumed to have knowledge.
Hence, where a defendant 15 alleged to be a corporation, an answer declining, for want of sufficient information, either to admit or to deny such an averment would be evasive. Raleigh & Gaston Ry. Co. v. Pullman Co., 122 Ga. 700, 50 S.E. 1008. But an answer distinctly denying an allegation that the defendant is a corporation, although it may be false, is not evasive. Gaynor v. Travelers’ las. Co., 12 Ga.App. 601, 77 S.E. 1072, 1073.
EVE. The period immediately preceding an im-portant event. Jarvis v. Jarvis, 286 Ill. 478, 122 N.E. 121, 123.
EVEN. Although; if. May v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 143 Ark. 75, 219 S.W. 756, 757.
EVENING. The closing part of the day and be-ginning of the night; in a strict sense, from sun-set till dark; in common speech, the latter part of the day and the earlier part of the night, until bedtime. Golay v. Stoddard, 60 Idaho 168, 89 P. 2d 1002, 1005. The period between sunset or the evening meal and ordinary bedtime. City of Al-bany v. Black, 216 Ala. 4, 112 So. 433; State v. Foley, 89 Vt. 193, 94 A. 841, 842.
EVENINGS. In old English law. The delivery at even or night of a certain portion of grass, or corn, etc., to a customary tenant, who performs the service of cutting, mowing, or reaping for his lord, given him as a gratuity or encowagement. Ken-nett, Gloss.
EVENT. The consequence of anything, the issue, conclusion, end; that in which an action, opera-tion, or series of operations, terminates. Geis v. Geis, 125 Neb. 394, 250 N.W. 252; Brewer v. Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co., 223 Mo.App. 983, 25 S.W.2d 1086, 1088.
Anything that -happens or comes to pass as distinguished from a thing that exists, Quinn v. Streeter, Sup., 175 Misc. 932, 24 N.Y.S.2d 916, 920. That which comes, arrives, or happens, especially an incident which is important or remarkable, Schulz v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 331 Mo. 616, 56 S.W.2d 126; the consequence, outcome, sequel, or end effected by prior operation of medium or contribut-Ing force or agency referred to as the "means" or "cause", Toups v. Pean Mut. Life Ins. Co., D.C.La., 49 F.Supp. 348, 349; the culmination or end that means may have pro-duced or brought about. Whatcott v. Continental Casualty Co., 85 Utah 406, 39 P.2d 733, 736; Sentinel Life Ins. Co. v. Blackmer, C.C.A.Colo., 77 F.2d 347, 350.
An event may be lnjury itself rather than means pro-ducing it. Juhl v. Hussman-Ligonier Co., Mo.App., 146 S.W.2d 106, 108. An event need not necessarily be a cause, but may be and generally ls a result. Guillod v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 224 Mo.App. 382, 18 S.W.2d 97, 100.
The word includes all of steps or connected incidents from first cause to final result, and may include both cause and effect. Rinehart v. F. M. Stamper Co., 227 Mo.App. 653, 55 S.W.2d 729. The word is broad enough to include an omission. Texas Cities Gas Co. v. Dickens, Tex.Civ. App., 156 S.W.2d 1010, 1016.The "making of a contract" Is an "event". Brown v. Oneida Knitting Mills, 226 Wis. 662, 277 N.W. 653, 655.
In reference to judicial and quasi judicial Pro-ceedings, "event" means the conclusion, end, or fin-al outcome or result of a litigation; as, in the phrase "abide the event," speaking of costs or of an agreement that one suit shall be governed by the determination in another. Reeves v. McGreg-or, 9 Adol. & El. 576; Benjamin v. Ver Nooy, 168 N.Y. 578, 61 N.E. 971; Gordon v. Krellman, 217 App.Div. 477, 216 N.Y.S. 778, 779.
Where costs are awarded to an appellant to abide the event, the "event" which determines whether the appel-lant is entítled to an award of costs of appeal Is hls suc-cess In obtalning a judgment on the meríts on the retrial. Commercial Sealeaf Co. v. Purepac Corporation, 169 Misc. 133, 7 N.Y.S.2d 146, 148.
EVENT OF ANY SUIT. Means legal event of any suit. Drainage Dist. No. 1 of Lincoln County v. Kirkpatrick-Pettis Co., 140 Neb. 530, 300 N.W. 582, 587; Geis v. Geis, 125 Neb. 394, 250 N.W. 252.
EVENTUS EST QUI EX CAUSÁ. SEQUITUR; ET DICITUR EVENTUS QUIA EX CAUSIS EVENIT. 9 Coke, 81. An event is that which foliows from the cause, and is called an "event" because it even-tuates from causes.
EVENTUS VARIOS RES NOVA SEMPER HAB-ET. Co. Litt. 379. A new matter always pro-duces various events.
EVERY. Each one of all; all the separate indi-viduals who constitute the whole, regarded one by one. Smith v. Hall, 217 Ky. 615, 290 S.W. 480, 482; Salo v. Pacific Coast Casualty Co., 95 Wash. 109, 163 P. 384, 385, L.R.A.1917D, 613. The term is sometimes equivalent to "all" ; Erskine v. Pyle, 51 S.D. 262, 213 N.W. 500, 502; and sometimes to "each"; Miller v. Rodd, 285 Pa. 16, 131 A. 482, 483.
EVERY CONTRACT OF HIRING, VERBAL, WRITTEN OR IMPLIED. Means wherever and by whomsoever made. De Gray v. Miller Bros. Const. Co., 106 Vt. 259, 173 A. 556, 562.
EVERY CORPORATION. Statute providing that books of "every corporation" shall be open to in-spection of shareholders, held applicable to foreign corporation doing business within state. Get-ridge v. State Capital Co., 129 Cal.App. 86, 18 P. 2d 375, 376.
EVERY MAN MUST BE TAKEN TO CONTEM• PLATE THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACT HE DOES. Lord Ellenborough, 9 East, 277. A fundamental maxim in the law of evi-dence. Best, Pres. § 16; 1 Phil.Ev. 444. (Every man is presumed to intend the natural and prob-able consequences of his own voluntary acts. 1 Greenl.Evid. § 18; 9 B. & C. 643; 3 Maule & S. 11; Webb, Poll.Torts 35.)
EVERY OTHER THING. This phrase, as used in requiring employer to furnish safe place of em-ployment and to do "every other thing" reason-ably necessary to protect employees, relates to things of same kind that employer must neces-sarily do in making place sale. NorthwesternCasualty & Surety Co. v. Industrial Commission, 194 Wis. 337, 216 N.W. 485, 486.
EVERY OWNER. As used in law making "every owner" of a motor vehicle hable for personal in-juries in certain circumstances include a munici-pality. Kelly v. City of Niagara Falls, 131 Misc. 934, 229 N.Y.S. 328, 331.
EVERY PART. As used in charge on caveat to probate of will, the signature is included in "every part" of will. Dulin v. Dulin, 197 N.C. 215, 148 S.E. 175, 178.
EVERY PERSON. Statute making it misdemean-or for "every person" to sell appointments to pub-lic office applies to all per.sons whether public of-ficials or not. Smalley v. State, 75 Okl.Cr. 10, 127 P.2d 869, 870.
Statute making ít duty of "every person" to pay taxes without demand includes recelvers. Hood v. Bond, 42 N.M. 295, 77 P.2d 180, 188.
Statute providing for arrest of every person in city engaged in violating law or ordinance includes female offenders. City of Janesville v. Tweedell, 217 Wis. 395, 258 N.W. 437.
Where a law speclflcally excludes any person engaged In certain transportation from definitlon of "contract hauler" and defines "for hire carrier" to include "every person," except "certifled operator" and "contract hauler," "every person" includes those engaged In such transportation, State ex rel. Scott v. Superior Court for Thurston County, 173 Wash. 547, 24 P.2d 87.
EVERY PERSON, FIRM OR CORPORATION. City ordinance providing "every person, firm or corporation" should pay gasoline tax held to in-elude receivers. Kansas City, Mo. v. Johnson, C. C.A.Mo., 70 F.2d 360, 361.
EVERY RESIDENT OF THIS STATE. As used in constitutional provision partially exempting from taxation those honorably discharged from military service applies to every person who ful-fills requirements of provision regardless of sex. Lockhart v. Wolden, 17 Ca1.2d 628, 111 P.2d 319, 320.
EVERY RIGHT, TITLE, INTEREST OR
Tender of "every right, title, interest or thing" received is tender of everything received in action to rescind land contract. Mathews v. Tannen-baum, 139 Cal.App. 500, 34 P.2d 233, 235.
EVERY STOCK CORPORATION. Statute mak-ing stockholders of "every stock corporation" li-able for employees’ services refers to domestic stock corporations only. Bogardus v. Fitzpatrick, 139 Misc. 533, 247 N.Y.S. 692, 693.
EVERY SUCH PROVISION. In statute provid-ing that devise for jointure of wife shall bar her dower and that every such provision by will shall be taken as intended in lieu of dower, "every such provision" means devise for jointure of wife. Shackelford v. Shackelford, 181 Va. 869, 27 S.E.2d 354, 359.
EVES—DROPPERS. See Eaves-Droppers.
EVICT. Civil law. To recover anything from a person by virtue of the judgment of a court or judicial sentence.Common law. To dispossess, or turn out of the possession of lands by process of law. Also to recover land by judgment at law. "If the land is evicted, no rent shall be paid." 10 Coke, 128a.
The term "evicted," mean deprivation by one of office, or of salary attached thereto, to which another is, or may be, entitled. The term "evicted" properly applies only to realty and has been used to describe inability to get prom-ised possession, ami also, as deprivation of the possession of lands and tenements. Hawkins v. Voishie, 292 Mich. 357, 290 N.W. 827, 828.
To "evIct" a tenant 15 to deprive him of possession of the leased premises or disturb Mm in their beneficial enjoyment so as to cause tenant to abandon the premises. Estes v. Gatliff, 291 Ky. 93, 163 S.W.2d 273, 276.
EVICTION. Dispossession by process of law; the act of depriving a person of the possession of lands which he has held, in pursuance of the judg-ment of a court. Reasoner v. Edmundson, 5 Ind. 395; Cowdrey v. Coit, 44 N.Y. 392, 4 Am.Rep. 690; Home Life Ins. Co. v. Sherman, 46 N.Y. 372.
Originally and technically, the dispossession must be by judgment of law; if otherwise, it was an ouster; Webb v. Alexander, 7 Wend.N.Y. 285; but the necessity of legal process was long ago abandoned in England; 4 Term 617; and in this country also it is settled that there need not be legal process; Green v. Irving, 54 Miss. 450, 28 Am.Rep. 360; Thomas v. Becker, 190 Iowa 237, 180 N.W. 285, 286. Any actual entry and dispos-session, adversely and lawfully made under para-mount title, will be an eviction. Rawle, Coy. § 133; Gallison v. Downing, 244 Mass. 33, 138 N.E. 315, 318.
In a more popular sense, the term denotes turn-ing a tenant of land out of possession, either by re-entry or by legal proceedings, such as an ac-tion of ejectment. Sweet.
By a loose extension, the term is sometimes ap-plied to the ousting of a person from the posses-sion of chattels; but, properly, it applies only to realty.
A wrongful act opon the part of the landlord is involved in eviction. Cerruti v. Burdick, 130 Conn. 284, 33 A.2d 333, 335.
An entry under paramount title, so as to interfere with the rights of the grantee, is implied in eviction. The object of the party making the entry is immaterial, whether it be to take all or a part of the land itself or merely an incorporeal right. Phrases equivalent in mean-ing are "ouster by paramount title," "entry and dlsturb-ance," "possession under an elder title," and the like. Mitchell v. Warner, 5 Conn. 497.
An "eviction by title paramount" arises when a third person establIshes title to demised premises superior to that of landlord, and by virtue of that title gains posses-sion. John R. Thompson Co. v. Northwestern Mut. Life los. Co., D.C.Ohlo, 31 F.Supp. 399, 400.
Any act of landlord which deprives tenant of beneficial enjoyment of premises. Adler v. Sklaroff, 154 Pa. Super. 444, 36 A.2d 231, 233.
Any wrong of lessor which results in substantial inter-ference with lessee’s rights. Harríson v. Fregger, 88 Mont. 448, 294 P. 372, 373.
Deprivation of lessee of possession of premises or dis-turbance of lessee in beneficial enjoyment so as to cause tenant to abandon the premises. Estes v. Gatliff, 291 Ky. 93, 163 S.W.2d 273, 276.
Dispossession of tenant by landlord. Lesher v. Louis-ville Gas & Electric Co., D.C.Ky., 49 F.Supp. 88, 89, 90.Dispossession under judgment, though it need not be by force of process under judgment. Edgemont Coal Co. v. Asher, D.C.Ky., 298 F. 1000; Walker v. Robinson, 163 Ky. 618, 174 S.W. 503, 505.
Entry on and taking possession of any part of demised premises by landlord during continuance of Tease and exclusion of tenant. Landon v. Hill, 136 Cal.App. 560, 29 P.2d 281, 282.
Formerly the word was used to denote an expulslon by the assertion of a paramount title or by process of law. Port Utilities Commission of Charleston v. Marine Oil Co., 173 S.C. 345, 175 S.E. 818.
Intentional exclusion of lessee from some part of leased premises. Gorfinkle v. Abrams, 263 Mass. 569, 161 N.E. 795.
Interferente with tenant’s beneficial enjoyment of prem-ises. Peale v. Tvete, 172 Wash. 296, 20 P.2d 12, 13; Kahn v. Bancamerica-Blair Corporation, 327 Pa. 209, 193 A. 905, 906.
Manual or physical explusion or exclusion from demised premises, or any part thereof is unnecessary to constitute eviction. Kennerly v. B. F. Avery & Sons Plow Co., Tex. Civ.App., 300 S.W. 159, 161.
Oríginally an eviction was understood to be a disposses-sion of the tenant by some act of his landlord or the fan-ure of bis title. Of later years it has come to include any wrongful act of the landlord which may result In an inter-ference with the tenant’s possession in whole or in port. The act may be one of omlssion as well as one of commis-sion. Holden v. Tidwell, 37 Okl. 553, 133 P. 54, 56, 49 L.R.A.,N.S., 369.
Something of a grave and permanent character by land-lord or those acting under his authority with intent and effect to deprive tenant of use, occupation, and enjoyment of premises or part thereof, or the establishment or asser-tion agalnst tenant of a title paramount to the landlord. Blomberg v. Evans, 194 N.C. 113, 138 S.E. 593, 594, 53 A.L.R. 686; Aguglia v. Cavicchia, 229 Mass. 263, 118 N.E. 283, 284, L.R.A.1918C, 59; Waldorf System v. Dawson, 49 R.I. 57, 139 A. 789, 790; Automobile Supply Co. v. Scene-in-Action Corporation, 340 M. 196, 172 N.E. 35, 37, 69 A.L.R. 1085.
When It would be useless for covenantee to attempt to malátain his title, as where holder of superior title has taken actual possession or threatens suit, an eviction occurs in legal contemplation. Love v. Minerva Petroleum Corpo-ration, Tex.Civ.App., 105 S.W.2d 892, 894.
When tenant’s possesslon or enjoyment oí premises le interfered with by a third person not acting by landlord’s authority, or consent, there is no "eviction". Smith v. Nortz Lumber Co., N.D., 72 N.D. 353, 7 N.W.2d 435, 437; Prospect Point Land Improvement Co. v. Jackson, 109 N.J.L. 385, 162 A. 576, 577.
Civil Lato
The abandonment which one is obligad to make of a thing, in pursuance of a sentence by Which he is con-demned to do so. Poth.Contr.Sale, pt. 2, c. 1, § 2, art. 1, no. 83. The abandonment which a buyer is compelled to make of a thing purchased, in pursuance of a judicial sen-tence.
Eviction is the loss suffered by the buyer of the totality of the thing sold, or of a part thereof, occasioned by the right or claims of a third person. Civil Code La. art. 2500.
For "Actual Eviction," "Constructive Eviction," "Partial Eviction," and "Total Eviction," see those titles.
EVIDENCE. Any species of proof, or probative matter, legally presented at the trial of an issue, by the act of the parties and through the meditan of witnesses, records, documents, concrete ob-jects, etc., for the purpose of inducing belief in the minds of the court or jury as to their conten-tion. Hotchkiss v. Newton, 10 Ga. 567; O’Brien v. State, 69 Neb. 691, 96 N.W. 650; Hubbell v. U. S., 15 Ct.Cl. 606; McWilliams v. Rodgers, 56 Ala. 93AII clrcumstances in case, including opportunity of wit-nesseli for observation, lnterest in case, demeanor on stand, and other eircumstances. Auschwitz v. Wabash Ry. Co., 346 III. 190, 178 N.E. 403, 410; all kinds of proof, Kneezle Y. Scott County Milling Co., Mo.App., 113 S.W.2d 817, 822.
All the means by which any alleged matter of fact, the truth of which is submitted to investigation, is established or dísproved. 1 Greenl.Ev. c. 1, § 1; Bednarik v. Bed-narik, 18 N.J.Misc. 633, 16 A.2d 80, 89; Latikos v. State, 17 Ala.App. 592, 88 So. 45, 47.
Any matter of fact, the effect, tendency, or design of which is to produce in the mirad a persuasion of the exist-ente or nonexistence of some matter of fact. State v. Heavener, 146 S.C. 138, 143 S.E. 674, 676.
Anything perceptible to the five senses constítuting "evi-dence," when submitted to court or jury, If competent. In re FIsher’s Estate, 47 Idaho 668, 279 P. 291, 293.
As a part of procedure "evidence" signifles those rules of law whereby It is determined what testimony should be admitted and what should be rejected In each case, and what is the weight to be gíven to the testimony admitted. Kellman v. Stoltz, D.C.Iowa, 1 F.R.D. 726, 728.
Competent evidence is meant by statute requiring trial court to hear evidence on controverted application for change of venue. State ex rel. Kansas City Public Service Co. v. Waltner, 350 Mo. 1021, 169 S.W.2d 697, 703.
Documents and other exhibits which may properly be submitted to jury are evidence. Madison v. State, 138 Fle. 467, 189 So. 832, 835.
Evidence legally and properly introduced is meant by "evidence". Young v. Industrial Accident CommIssion, 38 Cal.App.2d 250, 100 P.2d 1062, 1066.
Exhibits are evidence, Wórland v. McGill, 26 OhIo App. 442, 160 N.E. 478, 480.
Facts admitted upon trial of cause become "evidence". American Extension School of Law v. Ragland, 232 Mo.App. 763, 112 S.W.2d 110, 113.
Facts judicially noticed are equlvalent to "evidence". Zlckefoose v. Thompson, 347 Mo. 579, 148 S.W.2d 784, 792.
Inference arising under doctrine of "res ipsa loquítur" la "evidence". Druzanich v. Crlley, 19 Ca1.2d 439, 122 P.2d 53, 56.
Medical testimony la "evidence". Farmer Motor Co. v. Smith, 253 Ky. 151, 69 S.W.2d 1.
Opinion of expert is evidence whIch is to be weighed and considered Ince any other evidence. Southern California Edison Co. v. Gemmill, 30 Cal.App.2d 23, 85 P.2d 500, 502.
Reasonable inferences drawn from affirmatíve facts proven are "evidence". Hepp v. Quickel Auto & Supply Co., 37 N.M. 525, 25 P.2d 197.
Something of substance and relevant consequenee. Broad-way & Fourth Ave. Realty Co. v. Metcalfe, 230 Ky. 800, 20 S.W.2d 988, 990.
Substantial evidence Is meant by word "evidence", Indi-anapolis Power & Light Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, C.C.A.7, 122 F.2d 757, 761; Gelb v. Federal Trade Commission, C.C.A.2, 144 F.2d 580, 582.
Such kinds of proof as may be legally presented at a trial, by the act of the parties, and through the aid of such concrete facts as wItnesses, records or other documents.
That which demonstrates, makes clear, or ascertains the truth of the very fact or point in Issue, either on the cine side or on the other. Leonard v. State, 100 ()hl() St. 456, 127 N.E. 464, 466; Lynch v. Rosenberger, 121 Kan. 601, 249 P. 682, 683, 60 A.L.R. 376.
That which furnIshes or tends to furnish proof. It is that whIch bríngs to the mirad a just conviction of the truth or falsehood of any substantive proposition which is asserted or denied. Wong Yee Toon v. Stump, C.C.A.Md., 233 F. 194, 198; Ex parte Lam Pul, D.C.N.C., 217 F. 456, 467.
That which is legally submitted to a jury, to enable them to decide upon the questions in dispute or Issue, as pointed out by the pleadings, and distinguished from all comment and argument. 1 Starkie, Ev. pt. 1, § 3.
That whIch tends to produce conviction in the mínd as to existente of a fact. Magazine v. Shull, 116 Ind.App. 79, 60 N.E.2d 611, 613.That vvlifeh ténds to prove or disprove any matter In question, or.tu influence the beilel respecting it. Belief Is produced by the conáideration of something presented to the mirad. The matter thus presented, in whatever shape it may come, and through whatéver material organ It is derived, is evidente. Parker, Lectures on Medical Juris-prtidence, in Dartmouth College.
The means sanctloned by law of ascertaining In a judi-cial proceeding the truth respecting a question of fact. Cal.Code Civ.Proc. § 1823.
The word signifles, in its original sense, the state of being evident, i. e., plain, apparent or notorious. But by an almost peculiar inflection of our language, lt Is applled to that which tends to render evident or to generate proof. Best, Ev. §§ 10, 11; Dupont v. Pelletier, 120 Me. 114, 113 A. 11, 12.
What transpires in jury’s presence and what is neces-sarily obvious to them is "evidence" if relevant and un-prejudicial. Williamson v. Derry Electric Co., 89 N.H. 216, 196 A. 265 266.
Whatever ís received to establish or disprove an alleged fact. In re Selgle’s Estate, 26 N.Y.S.2d 410, 413, 176 Misc. 15.
Whatever may be gíven to the jury as tending to prove a case; includes testimony of witnesses, documents, adrnís-sions of partles, etc. Harris v. Tomlinson, 130 Ind. 426, 30 N.E. 214; Carroll v. Baneker, 43 La.Ann. 1078, 10 So. 192.
Whatever may properly be submítted to a court or jury to elucídate an issue or prove a case. Superior Meat Prod-ucts v. Holloway, 113 Ind.App. 320, 48 N.E.2d 83, 86.
Within prohibition againat requIring an accused to glve evidence against hírnself, "evidc;ce" means evidence by accused out of court as well as In court. State v. Bates, 187 Miss. 172, 192 So. 832, 835.
Evidence may be false and of no probative value and so it differs from proof. State v. Howard, 162 La. 719, 111 So. 72, 75.
To "evidence" means to attest, prove, show clearly, make piale. Indiana Harbor Belt R. Co. v. Jacob Stern & Sons, D.C.I11., 37 F.Supp. 690, 691.
For Presumption as evidence, see Presumption; Proof and evidence distinguished, see Proof; Tes-timony as synonymous or distinguishable, see Testimony; View as evidence, see View.
For "Adminicular Evidence", "Aliunde", "Best Evidence", "Beyond Reasonable Doubt", "Circum-stantial Evidence", "Competent Evidence", "Cor-roborating Evidence", "Cumulative Evidence", "Demonstrative Evidence", "Direct Evidence", "Documentary Evidence," "Expert Evidence", "Ex-trajudicial Evidence", "Extraneous Evidence," "Extrinsic EVidence", "Fact", "Fair Preponder-ante", "Hearsay", "Incompetent Evidence", "In-culpatory", "Indirect Evidence", "Indispensable Evidence", "Inference", "Intrinsic Evidence", "Legal Evidence", "Material Evidence", "Mathe-matical Evidence", "Moral Evidence," "Newly-Dis-covered Evidence", "Opinion Evidence", "Oral Evi-dence", "Original Evidence", "Parol Evidence", "Partial Evidence," "Prepond’erance," "Presump-tive Evidence," "Prima Facie Evidence," "Prirnary Evidence," "Probable Evidence," "Probative," "Probative Facts," "Proof," ”Proper Evidence," "Real Evidence," "Rebutting Evidence," "Relevan-cy," "Satisfactory Evidence," "Scintilla of Evi-dence," "Second-Hand Evidence," "Secondary Evi-dence," "State’s Evidence," "Substantive Evi-dence," "Substitutionary Evidence," "Traditionary Evidence," and "Weight qf Evidence," see those titles.EVIDENCE BY INSPECTION is such evidence as is addressed directly to the senses without in-tervention of testimony. Kabase v…State, 31 Ala. App. 77, 12 So.2d 758, 764.
EVIDENCE COMPLETED. Means that both sides have offered testimony and rested, or that plaintiff has rested and defendant has made mo-tion for finding on plaintiff’s case .and stands on motion and declines to offer evidence. Merriam v. Sugrue, D.C.Mun.App., 41 A.2d 166, 167.
EVIDENCE; LAW OF. The aggregate of rules and principies regulating the admissibility, rele-vancy, and weight and sufficiency of evidence in legal proceedings. See Ballinger’s Ann.Codes & St.Or.1901, § 678, Code 1930, § •9-102.
EVIDENCE OF DEBT. A term applied to writ-ten instruments or securities for the payment of money, importing on their face the existence of a debt. 1 Rev.St.N.Y. p. 599, § 55.
EVIDENCE OF INSURABILITY SATISFAC-TORY TO COMPANY. Means evidence which would satisfy a yeasonable person experienced in the life insurance business that insured was in an insurable condition. Bowie v. Bankers Life Co., C.C.A.Colo., 105 F.2d 806, 808.
EVIDENCE OF TITLE. A deed or other docu-ment establishing the title to property, especial-ly real estate.
EVIDENCE PROPER is something capable of being weighed in scales of reason and compared and estimated with other matter of the probative sort. Neely v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. of Chattanooga, Tenn., 322 Pa. 417, 185 A. 784, 788.
EVIDENCE REASONABLY TENDING TO SUP-PORT VERDICT. Means evidence that is com-petent, relevant, and material, and which to ra-tional and impartial rnind naturally leads, or involuntarily tends to lead, to conclusion for which there is valid, just, and substantial reason. Kelly v. Oliver Farm Equipment Sales Co., 169 Okl. 269, 36 P.2d 888, 891.
EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT IN LAW. Substantial evidence. Almon v. Morgan County, 245 Ala. 241, 16 So.2d 511, 516.
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT FINDINGS. In action to review an order of the Unemployment Com-pensation Commission "evidence" to support find-ings meant substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to di-rect a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for jury. Jordan v. Craighead, 114 Mont. 337, 136 P.2d 526, 528.
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT. Means some legal evidence tending to prove every material fact in issue as to which the party in whose favor the verdict was rendered had the burden of proof. Nicolai-Neppach Co. v. Smith, 154 Or. 450, 58 P.2d 1016, 1024, 107 A.L.R. 1124.EVEDENT. Clear to the understanding and sat-isfactory to the judgment; rnanifest; plain; ob-vious; conclusive. Russell v. State, 71 Fla. 236, 71 So. 27, 28. Noticeable; apparent to observa-ton. Hamill v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 165 Iowa 266, 143 N.W. 99, 107. That is "evident" that suggests more than a mental process, but no difficulty in seeing that the thing is true. Brem-ner v. Marc Eidlitz & Son, 118 Conn. 666, 174 A. 172, 174.
A constitutional provision forbidding ball in capital cases when the proof is "evident," means that, if the evidence is such as to lead a dispassionate mind to the conclusion that the accused is guilty, and that if the law is properly adrnin-istered a conviction would be had of a capital offense, ball should be denied. Ex parte Vermillion, 102 Tex.Cr.R. 590, 280 S.W. 771; Ex parte Bates, 90 Tex.Cr.R. 406, 235 S.W. 879, 880; Ex parte Dumas, 110 Tex.Cr.R. 1, 7 S.W.2d 90, 91.
Under constitutional provision that all prisoners shall be bailable unless for capital offenses when the proof is evi-dent, the word "evident" means that the accused, with a cool and deliberate mind and formed design, did mali-ciously kill another, and that a dispassionate jury would not only convict him, but would also assess the death pen-alty. Ex parte Redding, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 434, 180 S.W.2d 951, 952; Ex parte Shults, 127 Tex.Cr.R. 484, 77 S.W.2d 877.
—Proof Evident. See Proof.
EVIDENTIA. L. Evidence. See Preuve.
EVIDENTIARY. Having the quality of evidence; constituting evidence; evidencing. A term intro-duced by Bentham, and, from its conveniente, adopted by other writers.
EVIDENTIARY FACTS. Facts necessary to prove the essential or ultimate fact. People ex rel. Hudson & M. R. Co. v. Sexton, Sup., 44 N.Y. S.2d 884, 885. Facts which furnish evidence of existence of some other fact. General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cooper, 176 Miss. 491, 165 So. 420, 421; proofs and testimony. In re Britton’s Will, 167 Misc. 747, 4 N.Y.S.2d 715, 719; such facts must be found from testimony and other evidence. Texas Employers Ins. Ass’n v. Reed, Tex.Civ.App., 150 S.W.2d 858, 862.
Those which have a legitimate bearing on the matter or question in lssue and which are directly (not lnferentially) established by the evidence In the case. Woodfill v. Pat-ton, 76 Ind. 579, 40 Am.Rep. 269. Facts which can be directly established by testimony or evidence;—distin-guished from -ultimate facts." Real Estate Titie, Ins. & Trust Co. v. Lederer, D.C.Pa., 229 F. 799, 804.
EVIDENTLY. Means in an evident manner, per-ceptibly, clearly, obviously, plainly. It is employ-ed to express the idea of fuli-proof conviction. Tennes v. Tennes, 320 Iil.App. 19, 50 N.E.2d 132, 139.
EVIL. It is an "evil" within rule that either means or end of conspiracy must be evil, to frus-trate or impede a government function, whether that function is performed under a constitutional or an unconstitutional law. U. S. v. Rhoads, D.C. D.C., 48 F.Supp. 175, 176.
EVIL REPUTATION. Character imputed to per-son in community is generally bad. Peopie v. Pieri, 269 N.Y. 315, 199 N.E. 495, 497.
EVOCATION. In French law. The withdrawal of a cause from the cognizance of an inferiorcourt, and bringing it before another court or judge. In some respects this process resembles the proceedings upon certiorari.
EVOLUTION. Every useful art has its technique which is practiced by those who are skilled in it, and which is broadened in its usefulness thereto from precedent to precedent. This is the process of "evolution"–a phenomenon in which the ex-pectable follows the expectable. Less Car Load Lots Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., D.C.N.Y., 10 F. Supp. 642, 648.
EVOLVED. Means "developed" and may apply to any person attaining highly developed mental training and experience in arts and sciences and profession of teaching, medicine, or law. In re Carpenter’s Estate, 163 Misc. 474, 297 N.Y.S. 649, 654.
EWAGE. (L. Fr. Ewe, water.) In old English law. Toll paid for water passage. Cowell. The same as aquage or aquagium. Tomlins.
EWBRICE. Adultery; spouse-breach; marriage-breach. Cowell; Tomlins.
EWRY. An office in the royal household where the table unen, etc., is taken tare of. Wharton.
EX. A latin preposition meaning from, out of, by, on, on account of, or according to.
A prefix, denoting removal, cessation or former. Prefixed to the name of an office, relation, status, etc., it denotes that the person spoken of once occupied that office or relation, but does so no longer, or that he is now out ot it. Thus, ex-mayor, ex-partner, ex-judge.
A prefix which is equivalent to "without," "re-serving," or "excepting." In this use, probably an abbreviation of "except." Thus, ex-interest, ex-coupons.
"A sale of bonds ‘ex. Italy coupons’ means a sale reserv-Ing the coupons; that la, a sale in which the seller recelves, In addltion to the purchase price, the beneflt of the coupons, whIch benefit he may realize elther by detach-ing them or receiving from the buyer an equivalent con-sideration." Porter v. Wormser, 94 N.Y. 445.
Also used as an abbreviation for "exhibit." See Dugan v. Trisler, 69 Ind.. 555.
EX ABUNDANTL Out of abundante; abundant-ly; superfiuously; more than sufficient. Calvin.
EX ABUNDANTI CAUTELA. Lat. Out of abun-dant caution. "The practice has arisen abundanti cautela." 8 East, 326; Lord Ellenborough, 4 Maule & S. 544.
EX ADVERSO. On the other side. 2 Show. 461. Applied to counsel.
EX ZEQUITATE. According to equity; in equity. Fleta, lib. 3, c. 10, § 3.
EX AEQUO ET BONO. A phrase derived from the civil law, meaning, in justice and fairness; according to what is just and good; according to equity and conscience. 3 Bl. Comm. 163.
EX ALTERA PARTE. Of the other part.EX ANTECEDENTIBUS ET CONSEQUENTIBUS FIT OPTIMA DITERPRETATIO. A passage in a statute is best interpreted by reference to what precedes and what follows it. Behrens v. State, 140 Neb. 671, 1 N.W.2d 289, 292; The best interpre-tation [of a part of an instrument] is made from the antecedents and the consequents, rfrom the preceding and following parts.] 2 Inst. 317.
The law will judge of a deed or other instrument, con-sisting of divers parts or clauses, by looking at the whole; and will give to each part its proper office, so as to ascer-tain and carry out the intention of the parties. Broom, Max. •577. The whole instrument Is to be viewed and comparad in all íts parts, so that every part of ít may be made consistent and effectual. 2 Kent, Comm. 555.
EX ARBITRIO JUDICIS. At, in, or upon the dis-cretion of the judge. 4 BI. Comm. 394. A term of the civil law. Inst. 4, 6, 31.
EX ASSENSU CURIAE. By or with the conserit of the court.
EX ASSENSU PATRIS. By or with the conrent of the father.
A species of dower ad ostium ecclesice, duríng the life of the father of the husband; the son, by the. father’s cop-sent expressly given, endowing his wlfe with parcel of his father’s landa. Abolished by 3 & 4 Wm. IV, c. 105, g 13.
EX ASSENSU SUO. With his assent. Formal words in judgments for damages by default. Comb. 220.
EX BONIS. Of the goods or property. A term of the civil law; distinguishe-i from in bonis, as being descriptive of or applicable to property not in actual possession. Calvin.
EX CATKEDRA. From the chair. Originally applied to the decisions of the popes from their cathedra, or chair. Hence, authoritative; having the weight of authority.
EX CAUSA. L. Lat. By title.
EX CERTA SCIENTIA. Of certain or sure knowledge. These words were anciently used in patents, and imported full knowledge of the sub-ject-matter on the part of the king. See 1 Coke, 40b.
EX COLORE. By color; under color of; under pretense, show, or protection of. Thus, ex colore under color of office.
EX COMITATE. Out of comity or courtesy.
EX COMMODATO. From or out of loan. A term applied in the old law of England to a right of action arising out of a loan, (commodatum.) Glanv. lib. 10, c. 13; 1 Reeve, Eng. Law, 166.
EX COMPARATIONE SCRIPTORUM. By a com-parison of writings or handwritings. A term in the law of evidence. Best, Pres. 218.
EX CONCESSIS. From the premises granted. According to what has been already allowed.
EX CONSULTO. With consultation or delibera-tion.EX CONTINENTL Immediately; without any in. terval or delay; incontinently. A term of the civil law. Calvin.
EX CONTRACTO. From or out of a contract.
In both the civil and the common rights and causes
of action are divided hito two classes,—those arising ex contractu, (from a contract,) and those arising ex delicto, (from a delict or tort.) See 3 Bl.Comm. 117; Mackeld. Rom.Law, § 384. See Scharf v. People, 134 III. 240, 24 N.E. 761; Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Maxam, 70 Ind.App. 266, 117 N.E. 801, 807.
It cause of action declared In pleading arises Prora breach of promise, the action Is "ex contractu". Chambers v. Birmingham Trust & Savíngs Co., 232 Ala. 609, 168 So. 893.
EX CURIA. Out of court; away from the court.
EX DEBITO JUSTITLzE. From or as a debt of justice; in accordance with the requirement of justice; of right; as a matter of right. The op-posite of ex gratia, (q. vi. 3 Bl. Comm. 48, 67.
EX DEFECTU SANGUINIS. From failure of blood; for want of issue.
EX DELICTO. From a delict, tort, fault, crime, or malfeasance.
In both the civil and the common law, obligations and causes of action are divided Int° two great classes,—those arísíng ex contractu, (out of a contract,) and those ex delicto. The latter are such as grow out of or are founded upon a wrong or tort, e. g., trespass, trover, replevin. These ternas were known in English law at a very early period. See Inst. 4, 1, pr.; Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 384; 3 Bl.Comm. 117; Bract. fol. 101b; King v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 140 La. 843, 74 So. 168, 169; , Lamb v. McHan, 17 Ga.App. 5, 86 S.E. 252, 253; Seney v. Knight, 292 ni. 206, 126 N.E. 761, 763.
An action "ex delicto" is an action of tort; an action arising out of fault, mIsconduct, or malfeasance. Sayers & Muir Service Station v. Indian Refining Co., 266 Ky. 779; 100 S.W.2d 687, 689. If cause of action declared in plead-ing arises from breach of duty growing out of contract, it is In form "ex delicto" and case. Chambers v. Birming-ham Trust & Savings Co., 232 Ala. 609, 168 So. 893.
EX DELICTO NON EX SUPPLICIO EMERGIT INFAMIA. Infamy arises from the crime, not from the punishment.
EX DEMISSIONE (commonly abbreviated ex dem.) Upon the demise. A phrase forming part of the title of the old action of ejectment.
EX DIRECTO. Directly; immediately. Story, Bills, § 199.
EX DIUTURNITATE TEMPORIS, OMNIA PRZE-SUMUNTUR SOLEMNITER ESSE ACTA. From length of time [after lapse of time] all things are presumed to have been done in due form. Co. Litt. 6b; Best, Ev. Introd. § 43; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 20.
EX DOLO MALO. Out of fraud; out of deceitful or tortious conduct. A phrase applied to obliga-tions and causes of action vitiated by fraud or deceit.
EX DOLO MALO NON ORITUR ACTIO. Out of fraud no action arises; fraud never gives a right of action. No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act. Cowp. 343; Broom, Max. 729.EX DONATIONIBUS AUTEM FEODA MILITAR-IA VEL MAGNUM SERJEANTIUM NON CON-TINENTIBUS ORITUR NOBIS QUODDAM NOMEN GENERALE, QUOD EST SOCAGIUM. Co. Litt. 86. From grants not containing military fees or grand serjeanty, a kind of general name is used by us, which is "socage."
EX EMPTO. Out of purchase; founded on pur-chase. A term of the civil law, adopted by Brac-ton. Inst. 4, 6, 28; Bract. fol. 102. See Actio ex Empto.
EX FACIE. From the face; apparently; evi-dently. A term applied to what appears on the face of a writing.
EX FACTO. From’ or in consequence of a fact or action; actually. Usually applied to an unlaw-ful or tortious act as the foundation of a title, etc. Sometimes used as equivalent to "de lacto." Bract. fol. 172.
EX FACTO JUS ORITUR. The law arises out of the fact. Broom, Max. 102. A rule of law con-tinues in abstraction and theory, until an act is done on which it can attach and assume as it were a body and shape. Best, Ev. Introd. § 1.
EX FICTIONE JURIS. By a fiction of law.
EX FREQUENTI DELICTO AUGETUR P(A. 2 Inst. 479. Punishment increases with increasing crime.
EX GRATIA. Out of grace; as a matter of grace, favor, or indulgence; gratuitous. A term applied to anything accorded as a favor; as distinguished from that which may be demanded ex debito, as a matter of right.
EX GRAVI QUERELA. (From or on the grievous complaint.) In old English practice. The name of a writ (so called from its initial words) which lay for a person to whom any lands or tenements in fee were devised by will, (within any city, town, or borough wherein lands were devisable by custom,) and the heir of the devisor entered and detained them from hico. Fitzh. Nat. Breva 198, L, et seq.; 3 Reeve, Eng. Law, 49. Abolished by St. 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 27, § 36.
EX HYPOTHESI. By the hypothesis; upon the supposition; upon the theory or facts assumed.
EX INDUSTRIA. With contrivance or delibera-ton; designedly; on purpose. See 1 Kent, Comm. 318; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 334, 4 L.Ed. 97.
EX INTEGRO. Anew; afresh.
EX JUSTA CAUSA. From a just or lawful cause; by a just or legal title.
EX LEGE. By time law; by force of law; as a matter of law.
EX LEGIBUS. According to the laws. A phrase of the civil law, which mean according to time in-tent or spirit of the law, as well as according to the words or letter. Dig. 50, 16, 6. See Calvin.EX LICENTIA REGIS. By the king’s license. 1 Bl. Comm. 168, note.
EX LOBATO. From or out of lease or letting. A term of the civil law, applied to actions or rights of action arising out of the contract of locatum, (q. v.) Inst. 4, 6, 28. Adopted at an early period in the law of England. Bract. fol. 102; 1 Reeve, Eng. Law, 168.
EX MALEFICIO. Has been defined variously as from or growing out of wrongdoing; tortious; tortiously; growing out of, or founded on, mis-doing or tort; on account of misconduct; by virtue of or out of an illegal act. "Ex maleficio" is probably synonymous with "malfeasance". Lucas v. Central Missouri Trust Co., 350 Mo. 593, 166 S.W.2d 1053, 1056.
This term is frequently used in the civil law as the syn-onym of "ex delicto," (q. v.,) and Is thus contrasted with "ex contractu," In this sense it is of more rare occurrence in the common law, though found In Bracton (fols. 99, 101, 102.)
EX MALEFICIO NON ORITUR CONTRACTUS. A contract cannot arise out of an act radically vicious and illegal. 1 Term, 734; 3 Term, 422; Broom, Max. 734.
EX MALIS MORIBUS BONIE LEGES NATE SUNT. 2 Inst. 161. Good laws arise from evil morals, i. e., are necessitated by the evil behavior of men.
EX MALITIA. From malice; maliciously. In the law of libel and slander, this term imports a publication that is false and without legal ex-cuse. Dixon v. Allen, 69 Cal. 527, 11 P. 179.
EX MERO MOTU. Of his own mere motion; of his own accord; voluntarily and without prompt-ing or request.
Royal letters patent which are granted at the crown’s own instance, and without request made, are said to be granted ex mero motu. When a court interferes, of its own motion, to object to an irregularity, or to do something which the parties are not strictly entitled to, but which will prevent injustice, it is said to act ex mero motu, or ex proprio motu, or sua sponte, all these terms being here equivalent.
EX MORA. From or in consequence of delay. Interest is allowed ex mora; that is, where there has been delay in returning a sum borrowed. A term of the civil law. Story, Bailm. § 84.
EX MORE. According to custom. Calvin.
EX MULTITUDINE SIGNORUM, COLLIGITUR IDENTITAS VERA. From a great number of signs or marks, true Identity is gathered or made up. Bac. Max. 103, in regula 25. A thing de-scribed by a great number of marks is easily identified, though, as to some, the description may not be strictly correct. Id.
EX MUTUO. From or out of loan. In the old law of England, a debt was said to arise ex mutuo when one Tent another anything which consisted in number, weight, or measure. 1 Reeve, Eng. Law, 159; Bract. fol. 99.EX NECESSITATE. Of necessity. 3 Rep. Ch. 123.
EX NECESSITATE LEGIS. From or by neces-sity of law. 4 Bl. Comm. 394.
EX NECESSITATE REI. From the necessity or urgency of the thing or case. 2 Pow. Dev. (by Jarman,) 308.
EX NIIIILO NIHIL FIT. From nothing nothing comes. Jackson v. Waldron, 13 Wend. N.Y. 178, 221; Root v. Stuyvesant, 18 Wend. N.Y. 257, 301.
EX NUDO PACTO NON ORITUR [NASCITUR] ACTIO. Out of a nude or naked pact [that is, a bare parol agreement without consideration] no action arises. Bract. fol. 99; Fleta, lib. 2, c. 56, § 3; Plowd. 305. Out of a promise neither attend-ed with particular solemnity (such as belongs to a specialty) nor with any consideration no legal liability can arise. 2 Steph. Comm. 113. A parol agreement, without a valid consideration, cannot be made the foundation of an action. A leading maxim both of the civil and common law. Cod. 2, 3, 10; Id. 5, 14, 1; 2 Bl. Comm. 445; Smith, Cont. 85, 86.
EX OFFICIO. From office; by virtue of the of-fice; without any other warrant or appointment than that resulting from the holding of a particu-lar office.
Powers may be exercised by an officer which are not speciflcally conferred uopn him, but are necessarily Implied in his office; these are ex officio. Thus, a judge has ex officio the powers of a conservator of the peace. Courts are bound to notice public statutes judiclally and ex officio. King v. Physicians’ Casualty Ass’n of America, 97 Neb. 637, 150 N.W. 1010, 1011; Lobrano v. Pollee Jury of Parish of Plaquemines, 150 La. 14, 90 So. 423, 424; Allin v. Mercer County, 174 Ky. 566, 192 S.W. 638, 640.
EX OFFICIO INFORMATION. In English law. A criminal information filed by the attorney gen-eral ex officio on behalf of the crown, in the court of king’s bench, for offenses more immediately af-fecting the government, and to be distinguished from informations in which the crown is the nominal prosecutor. Mozley & Whitley; 4 Steph. Comm. 372-378.
EX OFFICIO OATH. An oath taken by offending priests; abolished by 13 Car. II. St. 1, c. 12.
EX OFFICIO SERVICES. Services which the law annexes to a particular office and requires the incumbent to perform. City of Birmingham v. Hawkins, 208 Ala. 79, 94 So. 62, 64; Nichols v. Galveston County, 111 Tex. 50, 228 S.W. 547, 548.
"Ex officio services," which deputy attorney general may perform in place of Attorney General, are services Imposed by law on public officer by virtue of his office and relating to public interests or business of county or state. Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Oakland County, 264 Mich. 673, 251 N.W. 395.
EX PACTO ILLICITO NON ORITUR ACTIO. From an illegal contract an action does not arise. Broom, Max. 742. See 7 Clark & F. 729.
EX PARTE. On one side only; by or for one party; done for, in behalf of, or on the applica-tion of, one party only.A judicial proceeding, order, injunction, etc., is said to be ex parte when it is taken or granted at the instante and for the beneflt of one party only, and without notice to, or contestation by, any person adversely interested. Janin v. Logan, 209 Ky. 811, 273 S.W. 531, 532; Van Alen v. Supe-rior Court in and for Los Angeles County, 37 Cal.App. 696, 174 P. 672; Stella v. Mosele, 299 Ill.App. 53, 19 N.E.2d 433, 435.
In its primary sense, ex parte, as applied to an applica-tion in a judicial proceeding, means that it is made by a person who is not a party to the proceeding, but who has an interest in the matter which entitles him to make the application. Thus, in a bankruptcy proceeding or an administration action, an application by A. B., a creditor, or the like, would be described as made "ex parte A. B.,"
e.., on the part of A. B.
In its more usual sense, ex parte means that an applica-tion is made by one party to a proceeding in the absence of the other. Thus, an ex parte injunction is one granted without the opposite party having had notice of the appli-cation. It would not be called "ex parte" if he had proper notice of it, and chose not to appear to oppose it. Sweet.
"Ex parte," in the heading of a reported case, signifies that the narre following is that of the party upon whose application the case is heard.
EX PARTE MATERNA. On the mother’s side; of the maternal line.
EX PARTE PATERNA. On the father’s side; of the paternal line.
The phrases "ex parte materna" and "ex parte paterna" denote the line or blood of the mother or father, and have no, such restricted or limited sense as from the mother or father exclusively. Ganta v. Demarest, 24 N.J.L. 431.
EX PARTE TALIS. A writ that lay for a bailiff or receiver, who, having auditors appointed to take his accounts, cannot obtain of them reason-able allowance, but is cast into prison. Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 129.
EX PAUCIS DICTIS INTENDERE PLURIMA POSSIS. Litt. § 384. You can imply many things from few expressions.
EX • PAUCIS PLURIMA CONCIPIT INGENIUM. Litt. § 550. From a few words or hints the under-standing conceives many things.
EX POST FACTO. Alter the fact; by an act or fact occurring after some previous act or fact, and relating thereto; by subsequent matter; the opposite of ab initio. Thus, a deed may be good ab initio, or, if invalid at its inception, may be confirmed by matter ex post facto.
EX POST FACTO LAW. A law passed after the occurrence of a fact or commission of an act, which retrospectively changes the legal conse-quences or relations of such fact or deed. By Const. U. S. art. 1, § 10, the states are forbidden to pass "any ex post lacto law." In this connec-tion the phrase has a much narrower meaning than its literal translation would justify, as will appear from the extracts given below.
A statute which changes punishment which may be imposed for a crime theretofore committed is "ex post facto" only it it prescribes or permite imposition of a greater sentence. People ex rel. Pincus v. Adams, 274 N.Y. 447, 9 N.E.2d 46, 110 A.L.R. 1303.
An "ex post facto law" has been deflned as (1) Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action. (2) Every law that aggravates a crime, or
makes it greater than it was when committed. (3) Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when com-mitted. (4) Every law that alters the legal rules of evi-dence, and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender. All these, and similar laws, are prohibited by the constitution. But a law may be ex post facto, and still not amenable to this constitutional inhibition; that 1s, provided it molllfles, instead of aggra-vating, the rigor of the criminal law. Cummings v. Mis-sourl, 4 Wall. 277, 18 L.Ed. 356; 3 Story, Const. 212; State v. Malloy, 95 S.C. 441, 78 S.E. 995, 997, Ann.Cas.1915C, 1053; In re Jamestown Caucus Law, 43 R.I. 421, 112 A. 900, 902; State v. Teasley, 194 Ala. 574, 69 So. 723, 725, Ann.Cas. 1918E, 347; Beazell v. State of Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216; Hernandez v. State, 43 Ariz. 424, 32 P. 2d 18, 24.
An "ex post facto law" includes every law that creates and punishes a criminal offense which, when done before the passing of the law, was innocent, and every law that aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed, and every law that inflicts a greater punish-ment than was attached to the crime when committed. State v. Pleason, 56 N.D. 499, 218 N.W. 154, 155.
An "ex post facto law" is deflned as a law which provides for the infliction of punishment upon a person for an act done which, when it was committed, was innocent; a law which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; a law that changes the punishment or inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; a law that changes the rules of evidente and receives less or different testimony than was required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the offender; a law which, assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or the deprivation of a right which, when done, was lawful; a law which deprives persons accused of crime of some lawful protection to which they have become enti-tled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or of the proclamation of amnesty; every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage. State v. Rowe, 116 N.J.L. 48, 181 A. 706.
An "ex post facto law" is one which makes an act pun-ishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when it was committed. Statler v. U. S. Savings & Trust Co., 122 Pa.Super. 189, 186 A. 290, 292; Southern Kraft Corpo-ration v. Hardin, 205 Ark. 512, 169 S.W.2d 637, 643.
An "ex post facto law" is one which makes a crime of an act which when committed was not a crime or a law which increases the punishment for an act already com-mitted. Commonwealth ex rel." Wall v. Smith, 345 Pa. 512, 29 A.2d 912, 913.
An "ex post facto law" is one which renders an act punishable in manner in which it was not punishable when it was committed, or which deprives accused of any sub-stantial right or immunity possessed by him before its passage as to prior offenses. People of U. S. ex rel. Umbenhowar v. McDonnell, D.C.Ili., 11 F.Supp. 1014, 1015.
An ex post facto law is one which renders an act pun-ishable in manner in which it was not punishable when committed. Such a law may inflict penalties on the person, or pecuniary penalties which swell the public treasury. The legislature is therefore prohibited from passing a law by which a man’s estate, or any part of it, shall be seized for a críale, which was not declared, by some previous law, to render him fiable to such punishment. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 138, 3 L.Ed. 162.
An increase in possible penalty is "ex post facto" regard-less of length of sentence actually imposed. Ex parte Flora, Ohio App., 31 N.E.2d 482, 485.
The plain and obvious meaning of prohibition is that the legislature shall not pass any law, after a fact done by any citizen, which shall have relation tp that fact, so as to punish that which was innocent when done; or to add to the punishment of that which was criminal; or to increase the malignity of a crime; or to retrench the rules of evi-dence, so as to make conviction more easy. This deflnition of an ex post facto law is sanctioned by long usage. Strong v. State, 1 Bleck., Ind., 196.The term "ex post tacto law," in the United States con-stitution, cannot be construed to include and to prohibit the enacting any law after a fact, nor even to prohibit the deprlving a citizen of a vested right to property. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L.Ed. 648.
Any law passed after commission of offense for which the defendant is tried which infiicts greater punishment or which alters situation of accused is ”ex post facto". United States v. Platt, D.C.Tex., 31 F.Supp. 788, 793.
Statute which punishes as a crime an act previously com-Mitted, which was innocent when done, which makes more burdensome punishment for a crime after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense avallable according to law at time act was committed, is "ex post facto". People ex rel. Luciano v. Murphy, 290 N.Y.S. 1011, 1014, 160 Misc. 573.
The operation of a statute to repeal, extend the period of, or provide for the tolling of a statute of limitations under which a complete defense has already accrued, would be "ex post facto". Hill v. State, 146 Tex.Cr.R. 333, 171 S.W.2d 880, 882, 883, 884.
The prohibition of "ex post facto" laws applies only to criminal or penal matters. Bannister v. Bannister, 181 Md. 177, 29 A.2d 287, 289; Garrett Freight Lines v. State Tax Commission, 103 Utah 390, 135 P.2d 523, 527, 146 A.L.R. 1003; Southern Kraft Corporation v. Hardin, 205 Ark. 512, 169 S.W.2d 637, 643.
To render a statute "ex post facto," it must be one which Imposes punishment for an act which was not punishable when it was committed, or imposes additional punishment or alters the situation of the accused to his disadvantage. Andras v. McCauley, D.C.Wash., 21 F.Supp. 70.
Trial procedure may be changed by Legislature, and new procedure may be made applicable to offenses previously committed, without violation of constitutional provision. People ex rel. Pincus v. Adams, 274 N.Y. 447, 9 N.E.2d 46, 49, 50, 110 A.L.R. 1303.
"Ex post facto" and "retrospective" are not convertible terms. The latter is a term of wider signiflcation than the former and includes it. AH ex post facto laws are neces-sarily retrospective, but not e converso. A curative or con-fIrmatory statute is retrospective, but not ex post facto. Constitutions of nearly all the states contaln prohibitions against ex post facto laws, but only a few forbid retrospec-tive legislation in specific terms. Bleck, Const.Prohib. §1 170, 172, 222.
Retrospective laws divesting vested rights are impolitic and unjust; but they are not "ex post facto laws," within the meaning of the constitution of the United States, nor repugnant to any other of its provislons and, It not repugnant to the state constitution, a court cannot pro-nounce them to be void, merely because in their judgment they are contrary to the principies of natural justice. Albee v. May, 2 Paine, 74 Fed.Cas.No.134.
Every retrospective act is not necessarily an ex post facto law. That phrase embraces only such laws as impone or affect penalties or forfeitures. Locke v. New Orleans, 4 Wall. 172, 18 L.Ed. 334.
Retrospective laws which do not Impair the obligation of ontracts, or affect vested rights, or partake of the cher-acter of ex post facto laws, are not prohibited by the con-stitution. Bay v. Gage, 36 Barb., N.Y., 447.
The act providing that every sentence of death imposed Shall be by electrocution is not an "ex post facto law" because of its retrospective effect. State ex rel. Pierre v. Jones, 200 La. 808, 9 So.2d 42, 45, 47.
EX PRZECEDENTIBUS ET CONSEQUENTIBUS OPTIMA FIT INTERPRETATIO. 1 Roll. 374. The best interpretation is made from the context.
EX PROPRIO MOTU. Of his own accord. See Ex Mero Motu.
EX PROPRIO VIGORE. By their or its own force. 2 Kent, Comm. 457.EX PROVISIONE HOMINIS. By the provision of man. By the limitation of the party, as distin-guished from the disposition of the law. 11 Coke, 80b.
EX PROVISIONE MARITI. From the provision of the husband.
EX QUASI CONTRACTU. From quasi contract. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 60.
EX RELATIONE. Upon relation or information.
Legal proceedings which are instituted by the attorney general (or other proper person) in the name and behalf of the state, but on the information and at the instigation of an individual who has a private interest in the matter, are said to be taken ”on the relation" (ex relatIone) of such person, who is called the "relator." Such a cause is usually entitled thus: "State ex rel. Doe v. Roe."
In the books of reports, when a case is said to be reported ex relatione, it is meant that the reporter derives his account of it, not from personal knowledge, but from the relation or narrative of some person who was present at the argument.
EX RIGORE JURIS. According to the rigor or strictness of law; in strictness of law. Fleta, lib. 3, c. 10, § 3.
EX SCRIPTIS OLIM VISIS. From writings for- merly seen.
A term used as descriptive of that kind of proof of hand-writing where the knowledge has been acquired by the wit-ness having seen letters or other documents professing fo be the handwriting of the party, and having afterwards communicated personally with the party upon the contents of those letters or documents, or having otherwise acted upon them by written answers, producing further corre-spondence or acquiescence by the party in some matter to which they relate, or by the witness transacting with the party some business to which they relate, or by any other mode of communication between the party and the witness which, in the ordinary course of the transactions of life, induces a reasonable presumption that the letters or docu-ments were the handwrjting of the party. 5 Adol. & E. 730.
EX SHIP. See Ship.
EX STATUTO. According to the statute. Fleta. lib. 5, c. 11, § 1.
EX STIPULATU ACTIO. In the civil law. An action of stipulation. An action given to recover marriage portions. Inst. 4, 6, 29.
EX TEMPORE. From or in consequence of time; by lapse of time. Bract. fols. 51, 52. Ex diuturno tempore, from length of time. Id. fol. 51b.
Without preparation or premeditation.
EX TESTAMENTO. From, by, or under a will. The opposite of ab intestato (q. v.).
EX TOTA MATERIA EMERGAT RESOLUTIO. The explanation should arise out of the whole sub-ject-matter; the exposition of a statute should be made from all its parts together. Wing. Max. 238.
EX TURPI CAUSA NON ORITUR ACTIO. Out of a base [illegal, or immoral] consideration, an action does [can] not arise. 1 Selw. N. P. 63; Broom, Max. 730, 732; Story, Ag. § 195.
No disgraceful matter can ground an action. Eidson v. Maddox, 195 Ga. 641, 24 S.E.2d 895, 897.EX TURPI CONTRACTU ACTIO NON ORITUR. From an immoral or iniquitous contract an action does not arise. A contract founded upon an
il-
legal or immoral consideration cannot be en-forced by action. 2 Kent, Comm. 466; Dig. 2, 14, 27, 4.
EX UNA PARTE. Of one part or side; on one side.
EX UNO DISCES OMNES. From one thing you can discern all.
EX UTRAQUE PARTE. On both sides. Dyer, 126b.
EX UTRISQUE PARENTIBUS CONJUNCTI. Re-lated on the side of both parents; of the whole blood. Hale, Com. Law, c. 11.
EX VI TERMINI. From or by the force of the term. From the very meaning of the expression used. 2 Bl. Comm. 109, 115.
EX VISCERIBUS. From the bowels. From the vital part, the very essence of the thing. 10 Coke, 24b; Homer v. Shelton, 2 Mete. Mass. 213. Ex visceribus verborum, from the mere words and nothing else. 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 980; Fisher v. Fields, 10 Johns. N.Y. 495.
EX VISITATIONE DEL By the dispensation of God; by reason of physical incapacity. Anciently, when a prisoner, being arraigned, stood silent in-stead of pleading, a jury was impaneled to in-quire whether he obstinately stood mute or was dumb ex visitatione Dei. 4 Steph. Comm. 394.
Also by natural, as distinguished from violent, causes. When a coroner’s inquest finds that the death was due to disease or other natural cause, it is frequently phrased "ex visitatione Dei."
EX VISU SCRIPTIONIS. From sight of the writing; from having seen a person write. A term employed to describe one of the modes of proof of handwriting. Best, Pres. 218.
EX VOLUNTATE. Voluntarily; from freewill or choice.
EXACTION. The wrongful act of an officer or other person in compelling payment of a fee or reward for his services, under color of his official authority; where no payment is due.
Between "extortion" and "exaction" there is thls dif-ference: that In the forrner case the officer extorts more than his due, when something is due to him; In the latter, he exacts what is not his due, when there is nothing due to him. Co.Litt. 368.
EXACTLY ALIKE. Representation that the liv-ing apartment on the first floor was exactly like the living apartment on the second floor is speci-fic and definite; exactly alike meaning not abso-lutely identical, but substantially so in size, de-sign, finish, and fixtures. Lipsher v. Resnikoff, 99 Conn. 13, 120 A. 859.
EXACTOR.
Civil law. A gatherer or receiver of money; a collector of taxes. Cod. 10, 19.Old English law. A collector of the public mon-eys; a tax gatherer. Thus, exactor regis was the name of the king’s tax collector, who took up the taxes and other debts due the treasury.
EXALTARE. In oid English law. To raise; to elevate. Frequently spoken of water, i. e., to raise the surface of a pond or pool.
EXAMEN. L. Lat. A trial. Examen computi, the balance of an account. Townsh. Pl.. 223.
EXAMINATION. An investigation; search; in-terrogating.
Criminal Practice
An investigation by a magistrate of a person who has been charged with crime and arrested, or of the facts and circumstances which are alleged to have attended the crime and to fasten suspicion upon the party so charged, in order to ascertain whether there is sufficlent ground to hold him to ball for his trial by the proper court. U. S. V. Stanton, C.C.A.Conn., 17 C.C.A. 475, 70 F. 890; State v. Conrad, 95 N.C. 669. The prelimlnary hearing to determine whether person charged with having committed a crime should be held for trial. Commonwealth v. Cohen, 102 PaSuper. 397, 157 A. 32, 33.
Trial Practice
The examination of a witness consists of the series of questions put to him by a party to the action, or his coun-sel, for the purpose of bringing before the court and jury In legal form the knowledge which the witness has of the facts and matters in dispute, or of probing and sifting bis evidence prevlously given.
Of a long account. This phrase does not mean examination of the account to ascertain the result or effect of it, but proof by testimony of correct-ness of items composing it. Magown v. Sinclair, 5 Daly N.Y. 63; State ex rel. Hustisford Light, Power & Mfg. Co. v. Grimm, 208 Wis. 366, 243 N.W. 763.
Of bankrupt. This is the interrogation of a bank-rupt, in the course of proceedings in bankruptcy, or prior to the adjudication (Cameron v. United States, 231 U.S. 710, 34 S.Ct. 244, 58 L.Ed. 448; In re Fleischer, D.C.N.Y., 151 F. 81), concerning the conduct of his business, the cause of his bank-ruptcy, his dealings with his creditors and other persons, the amount, kind, and whereabouts of his property, and all matters which may affect the administration and settlement of his estate. This is authorized by Bankruptcy Act, § 7, 30 Stat. 548, 11 U.S.C.A. § 25. The bankrupt’s wife or any other person may also be examined concerning the bankrupt’s acts, conduct, or property. Bank-ruptcy Act, § 21, 30 Stat. 551, as amended by Act Feb. 5, 1903, c. 487, § 7, 32 Stat. 798, 11 U.S.C.A. § 44. In re Horgan, C.C.A.N.Y., 39 C.C.A. 118, 98 F. 414.
Of invention. An inquiry made at the patent-office, upon application for a patent, into the nov-elty and utility of the alleged invention, and as to íts interfering with any other patented inven-tion. Rev.St. U. S. § 4893, 35 U.S.C.A. § 36.
Of title. An investigation made by or for a per-son who intends to purchase real estate, in the offices where the public records are kept, to ascer-tain the history and present condition of the title to such land, and íts status with reference to liens, incumbrances, clouds, etc.Of wife. See Private Examination.
On his own behalf. For executor or devisee to be "examined on his own behalf", such executor or devisee müst be a party to the action. In re Custer’s Estate, 229 Iowa 1061, 295 N.W. 848, 852.
For "Cross-Examination," "De Bene Esse", "Di-rect Examination," "Preliminary Examination," "Pro Interesse Suo," "Reexamination," and "Sep-arate Examination," see those titles.
EXAMINED COPY. A copy of a record, public book, or register, and which has been compared with the original. 1 Campb. 469.
EXAMINER. English law. A person appointed by a court to take the examination of witnesses in an action, i. e., to take down the result of their interrogation by the parties or their counsel, ei-ther by written interrogatories or vivd voce. An examiner is generally appointed where a witness is in a foreign country, or is too ill or infirm to attend before the court, and is either an officer of the court, or a person specially appointed for the purpose. Sweet.
New Jersey. An examiner is an officer appoint-ed by the court of chancery to take testimony in causes depending in that court. His powers are similar to those of the English examiner in chan-cery.
Patent Office. An officer in the patent-ofilce charged with the duty of examining the patent-ability of inventions for which patents are asked.
For "Special Examiner," see that title.
EXAMINER IN CHANCERY. An officer of the court of chancery, before whom witnesses are examined, and their testimony reduced to writing, for the purpose of being read on the hearing of the cause. Cowell.
EXAMINERS. Persons appointed to question students of law in order to ascertain their qualifi-cations before they are admitted to practice.
EXANNUAL ROLL. In old English practice. A roll into whích (in the old way of exhibiting sher-iffs’ accounts)• the illeviable fines and desperate debts were transcribed, and which was annually read to the sheriff upon his accounting, to see what might be gotten. Cowell.
EXCAMB. In Scotch law. To exchange. 6 Bell, App. Ces. 19, 22.
EXCAMBIATOR. An exchanger of lands; a broker. Obsolete.
EXCAMBION. In Scotch law. Exchange. 1 Forb. Inst. pt. 2, p. 173.
EXCAMBIUM. An exchange; a place where merchants meet to transact their business; also an equivalent in recompense; a recompense in lieu of dower ad ostium ecclesice.
EXCELLENCY.
America. The title is sometimes given to the chief executive of a state or of the nation.
English law. The title of a viceroy, governor general, ambassador, or commander in chief.
EXCEPT. But. In re Naftzger’s Estate, 24 Cal. 2d 595, 150 P.2d 873, 875; Not including. In re Kelly’s Estate, 153 Misc. 445, 274 N.Y.S. 488. Oth-er than, In re Nelson’s Estate, 152 Misc. 245, 273 N.Y.S. 268; Ingram v. State, 241 Ala. 166, 3 So.2d 431, 432; Otherwise than, State v. White, 195 La. 1028, 197 So. 745, 747; Reserve. Adams v. Osage Tribe of Indians, C.C.A.Okl., 59 F.2d 653, 655; Brown v. Weare, 348 Mo. 135, 152 S.W.2d 649, 656, 136 A.L.R. 286. To exclude from an enumeration, the scope of statement or enactment, a privilege, etc.; to leave out of account or consideration. In re Garvin’s Estate, 335 Pa. 542, 6 A.2d 796, 800; Rickman v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 715, 243 S.W. 929.
The expression "except for" is synonymous in many cases with "but for" and "only for." Rick-man v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 715, 243 S.W. 929.
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY LAW. As used in statute held to refer to statutory and not general law of state, Pace v. Pace Bros. Co., 91 Utah 132, 59 P.2d 1, 8.
EXCEPT FOR THE INTESTATE SHARE OF THE SURVIVING SPOUSE, IF ANY, OF SUCH RELICT. Phrase as used in statute relating to disposition of property coming from a deceased spouse to relict dying intestate and without issue, refers to share a surviving spouse would take un-der section covering generally distribution of an intestate’s property. Russell v. Roberts, 54 Ohio App. 441, 7 N.E.2d 811, 813.
EXCEPT IN TIME OF WAR. In statute provid-ing for delivery to civil authorities of persons accused of crime but subject to military law, "ex-cept in time of war", quoted words merely relieve military authorities in time of war of duty to de-liver accused persons to civil authorities. Articles of War, art. 74, 10 U.S.C.A. § 1546. People v. Wil-liams, 184 Misc. 510, 55 N.Y.S.2d 181, 182.
EXCEPT RIGHT OF WAY. Recitals "less the right of way" and "except right of way" in grant-ing clause of deed have well-defined accepted cer-tain and unambiguous meaning by which grantor conveys entire interest in servient estate and at same time expressly recognizes and acknowledges dominant estate. Jennings v. Amerada Petroleum Corporation, 179 Okl. 561, 66 P.2d 1069, 1071.
EXCEPTING. As used in a deed, the terms "re-serving" and "excepting" are used interchange-ably, and their technical meaning will give way to the manifest intent. Porter v. Warner-Cald-well Oil Co., 183 Okl. 1, 80 P.2d 252, 253.
The words "reserving" and "excepting," although strictly distinguishable, may be used Interchangeably or indlscriminately. Stephan v. Kentucky Valley Distilling Co., 275 Ky. 705, 122 S.W.2d 493, 496.
EXCEPTIO.
Modern civil law. A plea by which the defend-ant admits the cause of action, but alleges new facts which, provided they be true, totally orpartially answer the allegations put forward on the other side; thus distinguished from a mere traverse of the plaintiff’s averments. Tomkins & J. Mod. Rom. Law, 90. In this use, the term corresponds to the common-law plea in confession and avoidance.
Roman law. An exception. In a general sense, a judicial allegation opposed by a defendant to the plaintiff’s action. Calvin. A stop or stay to an action opposed by the defendant. Cowell.
Answering to the "defense" or ”plea" of the common law. An allegation and defense of a defendant by which the plaintiff’s claim or complaint is defeated, either accord-ing to strict law or upon grounds of equity.
In a stricter sense, the exclusion of an action that lay In strict law, on grounds of equity, (a~tionis Jure stricto com-petentis ob cequitatem exclusio.) Heinecc. A kind of limi-tation of an action, by which it was shown that the action, though otherwise just, did not lie in the particular case. Calvin. A species of defense allowed in cases where. though the action as brought by the plaintiff was in itself just, yet it was unjust as against the particular party sued. Inst. 4, 13, pr,
EXCEPTIO DILATORIA. A dilatory exception; called also "temporalis," (temporary;) one which defeated the action for a time, (quce ad tem pus nocet,) and created delay, (et temporis dilationem tribuit;) such as an agreement not to sue within a certain time, as five years. Inst. 4, 13, 10. See Dig. 44, 1, 3.
EXCEPTIO DOLI MALI. An exception or plea of fraud. Inst. 4, 13, 1, 9; Bract. fol. 100b.
EXCEPTIO DOMMINII. A claim of ownership set up in an action for the recovery of property not in the possession of the plaintiff. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 299.
EXCEPTIO DOTIS CAUTVE NON NUMERATIE. A defense to an action for the restitution of a dowry that it was never paid, though promised, available upon the dissolution of the marriage within a limited time. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 458.
EXCEPTIO EJUS REI CUJUS PETITUR DISSO-LUTIO NULLA EST. A plea of that matter the dissolution of which is sought [by the action] is null, [or of no effect.] Jenk. Cent. 37, case 71.
EXCEPTIO FALSI OMNIUM ULTIMA. A plea denying a fact is the last of all.
EXCEPTIO FIRMAT REGULAM IN CASIBUS NON EXCEPTIS. An exception affirms the rule in cases not excepted. Bacon, Aph. 17.
EXCEPTIO FIRMAT REGULAM IN CONTRAR-IUM. An exception proves an opposite rule. See exceptio probat regulam. Bacon, Aph. 17.
EXCEPTIO IN FACTUM. An exception on the fact. An exception or plea founded on the pe-culiar circumstances of the case. Inst. 4, 13, 1.
EXCEPTIO IN PERSONAM. A plea or defense of a personal nature, which may he alleged only by the person himself to whom it is granted by the law. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 217.
EXCEPTIO IN REM. A plea or defense not of a personal nature, but connected with the legalcircumstances on which the suit is founded, and
which may therefore be alleged any party in interest, including the heirs and sureties of the proper or original debtor. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 217.
EXCEPTIO JURISJURANDI. An exception of oath; an exception or plea that the martes.’ had been sworn to. Inst. 4, 13, 4. This kind of excep-tion was allowed where a debtor, at the instance of his creditor, (creditore deferente,) had sworn that nothing was due the latter, and had notwith-standing been sued by him.
EXCEPTIO METUS. An exception or plea of fear or compulsion. Inst. 4, 13, 1, 9; Bract. fol. 100b. Answering to the modern plea of duress.
EXCEPTIO NON ADDIPLETI CONTRACTOS. An exception in an action founded on a contract involving mutual duties or obligations, to the effect that the plaintiff is not entitled to sue be-cause he has not performed his own part of the agreement. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 394.
EXCEPTIO NON SOLUTIE PECUNIM. A plea that the debt in suit was not discharged by pay-ment (as alleged by the adverse party) notwith-standing an acquittance or receipt given by the person to whom the payment is stated to have been made. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 534.
EXCEPTIO NULLA EST VERSUS ACTIONEM QUM, EXCEPTIONEM PERIMIT. There is [can be] no plea against an action which destroys [the matter of] the plea. Jenk. Cent. 106, case 2.
EXCEPTIO PACTI CONVENTI. An exception of compact; an exception or plea that the plaintiff had agreed not to sue. Inst. 4, 13, 3.
EXCEPTIO PECUNIM NON NUMERATIE. An exception or plea of money not paid; a defense which might be set up by a party who was sued on a promise to repay money which he had never received. Inst. 4, 13, 2.
EXCEPTIO PEREMPTORIA. A peremptory ex-ception; called also "perpetua," (perpetual; ) one which forever destroyed the subject-matter or ground of the action, ((luce semper resn de qua agitur perimit;) such as the exceptio doli mali, the exceptio metus, etc. Inst. 4, 13, 9. See Dig. 44, 1, 3.
EXCEPTIO PROBAT REGULAM. The exception proves the rule. 11 Coke, 41; 3 Term, 722. Some-times quoted with the addition "de rebus non ex-ceptis," ("so far as concerns the matters not ex-cepted.")
EXCEPTIO QUIE FIRMAT LEGEM, EXPONIT LEGEM. An exception which confirms the law explains the law. 2 Bulst. 189.
EXCEPTIO QUOQUE REGULAM DECLARAT. The exception also declares the rule. Bacon, Aph.EXCEPTIO BEI JUDICATZE. An exception or plea of matter adjudged; a plea that the subject-matter of the action had been determined in a previous action. Inst. 4, 13, 5.
This term is adopted by Bracton, and is constantly used in modern law to denote a defense founded upon a previous adjudication of the same matter. Bract. fols. 100b, 177; 2 Kent, Comm. 120. A plea of a former recovery or judg-ment.
EXCEPTIO BEI VENDIT1E ET TRADITZE. An exception or plea of the sale and delivery of the thing.
This exception presumes that there was a valid sale and a proper tradition; but though, in consequence of the rule that no one can transfer to another a greater right than he himself has, no property was transferred, yet because of some particular circumstance the real owner is estopped from contesting it. Mackeld. Rom.Law, 299.
EXCEPTIO SEMPER ULTIMO PONENDA EST. An exception should always be put Last. 9 Coke, 53.
EXCEPTIO SENATUSCONSULTI MACEDON. ‘ANL A defense to an action for the recovery of money loaned, on the ground that the loan was made to a minor or person under the paternal power of another; so named from the decree of the senate which forbade the recovery of such loans. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 432.
EXCEPTIO SENATUSCONSULTI VELLEIANI. A defense to an action on a contract of surety-ship, on the ground that the surety was a woman and therefore incapable of becoming bound for another; so named from the decree of the senate forbidding it. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 455.
EXCEPTIO TEMPORIS. An exception or plea analogous to that of the statute of limitations in our law; viz., that the time prescribed by law for bringing such actions has expired. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 213.
EXCEPTION. Act of excepting or excluding from a number designated or from a description; that which is excepted or separated from others in a general rule or description; a person, thing, or case specified as distinct or not included; an act of excepting, omitting from mention or leaving out of consideration; and "except" means not in-cluding. In re Kelly’s Estate, 153 Misc. 445, 274 N.Y.S. 488.
For "General Exception" and "Special Excep-tion," see those titles.

Admiralty and Equity Practice

An exception is a formal allegation tendered by a party that some previous pleading or pro-ceeding taken by the adverse party is insufficient. Peck v. Osteen, 37 Fla. 427, 20 So. 549; Arnold v. Slaughter, 36 W.Va. 589, 15 S.E. 250.
In admiralty, an "exception" serves the function of a demurrer in common law or equity pleading. The Nea Hellis, C.C.A.N.Y., 116 F.2d 803, 805.

Bail

An exception to bail is an objection to the spe-cial bail put in by the defendant to an actor at
law made by the plaintiff on grounds of the in-sufficiency of the ball. 1 Tidd, Pr. 255.

Bequests

Bequests of sums made to same persons by different paragraphs in same codicil held accumu-lative, where second paragraph stated that be-quest was "exception" to other bequests made; term as used meaning in addition to person’s be-quests. In re Kelly’s Estate, 153 Misc. 445, 274 N. Y.S. 488

Civil Law

An exceptio or plea. Used in this sense in Louis-lana. For "Declarátory Exceptions," "Dilatory Exceptions" and "Peremptory Exceptions," see those titles.

Constitution

Provision granting Legislature discretionary power to tax merchants, peddlers, and privileges is "exception" to constitutional requirement of equality. A "proviso" and an "exception" are sub-stantially the same thing. Evans v. McCabe, 164 Tenn. 672, 52 S.W.2d 159, 160.

Contracta

An exception is something taken out of instru-ment and of kind dealt with in contract. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Naman, 118 Tex. 21, 6 S.W.2d 743, 745.

Deeds or Conveyances

A clause by which grantor excepts something out of that which he granted before by the deed. Winston v. Johnson, 42 Minn. 398, 45 N.W. 958; Cox v. Colossal Cavern Co., 210 Ky. 612, 276 S.W. 540, 542; Worcester v. Smith, 117 Me. 168, 103 A. 65; De Moss v. Sample, 143 La. 243, 78 So. 482, 485; Beardslee v. New Berlín Light & Power Co., 207 N.Y. 34, 100 N.E. 434, 437, Ann.Cas.1914B, 1287.
An exception withdraws from operation of deed part of thing granted which would otherwise pass to grantee. Powell v. Big Horn Low Line Ditch Co., 81 Mont. 430, 263 P. 692, 693; Johnson v. Peck, 90 Utah, 544, 63 P.2d 251, 254; Slone v. Ken-tucky West Virginia Gas Co., 289 Ky. 623, 159 S. W.2d 993, 994, 995.

Insurance Contract or Policy

An exclusion of one or more risks. Kirkby v. Federal Life Ins. Co., C.C.A.Mich., 35 F.2d 126, 128; Mancini v. Thomas, 113 Vt. 322, 34 A.2d 105, 109. Provision of life and accident policy specifying that indemnity should be paid only when death occurred within thirty days af ter accident. Mow-ery v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 289 III.App. 443, 7 N.E.2d 334, 336. Things taken out. Raymond v. Great American Indemnity Co., 86 N.H. 93, 163 A. 713, 716.
The object of an exception is to exclude that which other-wise would be included, Estabrook v. Eastern Commerdal Travelers Accident Ass’n, 308 Mass. 439, 32 N.E.2d 250, 252; to take special cases out of a general Class or to guard against misinterpretation. Landau v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, 1 N.Y.S.2d 891, 895, 166 Misc. 42.
Under liability policy, excluded uses of automobile held not "exceptions" since they were not in first instance included within any statement of in.surance. Raymond v. Great American Indemnity Co., 86 N.H. 93, 163 A. 713, 716.

Practice

A formal objection to the action of the court, during the trial of a cause, in refusing a request or overruling an objection; implying that the par-ty excepting does not acquiesce in the decision of the court, but will seek to procure its reversal, and that he means to save the benefit of his re-quest or objection in some future proceeding. United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaran-ty Co., 236 U.S. 512, 35 S.Ct. 298, 303, 59 L.Ed. 696; Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Rodman, 52 Okl. 211, 152 P. 439; State v. Laundy, 103 Or. 443, 206 P. 290. It is also somewhat used to signify other objections in the course of a suit; for example, exception to bail is a formal objection that special bail offered by defendant is insufficient. 1 Tidd, Pr. 255.
An exception is, an objection formally taken to a deci-sion of the court on a matter of law. State v. Wolzenski, 340 Mo. 1181, 105 S.W.2d 905, 907; an objection on a mat-ter of law to a decision made, either before or after judg-ment, by a court, tribunal, judge, or other judicial officer in an action or proceeding. Hearn v. Gunther, 57 Cal. App.2d 82, 13,4 P.2d 3, 5; an objection, oral or written, taken, in course of an action or proceeding, as to bail, to the decision or a ruling of a judge, or to something ín his charge to a jury. In re Pardue’s Estate, 57 Cal.App.2d 918, 135 P.2d 394, 395.
.An objection to a pleading or any part thereof for want of substance is a general exception; an objection to the forra in which a cause of action is stated is a special excep-tion. Cochran v. People’s Nat. Bank, Tex.Civ.App., 271 S.W. 433, 434.
Objections to report of master on bill for injunction held "exceptions". Respro, Inc., v. Worcester Backing Co., 291 Mass. 467, 197 N.E. 198, 200.
To authorize review of alleged error In admitting evi-dence in compensation case, there must be an "exception", that known to equity practice, and defined as act of appeal-Ing from rulings appearing of record, and nothing more. Indrisano’s Case, 307 Mass. 520, 30 N.E.2d 538, 539.

Proviso and Exception Distinguished

A "proviso" and an "exception" are substantial-ly the same thing. Evans v. McCabe, 164 Tenn. 672, 52 S.W.2d 159, 160.
A proviso differs from an exception. 1 Barri. & Ald. 99. An exception exempts, absolutely, from the operation of an engagement or an enactment; a proviso, properly speaking, defeats their opera-tion, conditionally. An exception takes out of an engagement or enactment something which would otherwise be part of the subject-matter of it; a proviso avoids them by way of defeasance or ex-cuse. 8 Am.Jur. 242; Board of Com’rs of Noble County v. Whitney, 73 Okl. 160, 175 P. 112, 113; Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. v. Farnsley’s Adm’r, 162 Ky. 27, 171 S.W. 1004, 1005; New Jersey State Board of Optometrists v. S. S. Kresge Co., Sup., 113 N.J.L. 287, 174 A. 353, 357; Sowers Plan Crop Ins. Mut. Co. v. Hobbs, 146 Kan. 166, 68 P.2d 1110, 1111.
The ordinary office of an "exception" or "proviso" In a policy Is to take special cases out of a general class or to guard against misinterpretation. Landau v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, 1 N.Y.S.2d 891, 895, 166 Misc. 42.

Reservation and Exception as Synonymous or Distinguishable
A reservation Is always of a thing not in esse, but newly created or reserved out of the land or tenement demised;
an exception Is always of a part of the thing granted, and of a thing in esse. Co.Litt. 47a; 4 Kent, Comm. 468.
A "reservado/1" creates some new right in grantor while an "exception" withholds from grant title to some part of property which would otherwise pass. Clark v. Pauley, 291 Ky. 637, 165 S.W.2d 161, 162; Federal Land Bank of New Orleans v. Cooper, 190 Miss. 490, 200 So. 729, 730, 731; Goss v. Congdon, 114 Vt. 155, 40 A.2d 429, 430.
A reservation does not affect the description of the prop-erty conveyed, but retains to the grantor some right upon the property, as an easement, whereas an exception oper-ates upon the description and withdraws from the descrip-tion the excepted property. Moore v. Davis, 273 Ky. 838, 117 S.W.2d 1033, 1035.
A "reservation" is always of something taken back out of that which is clearly granted, while an "exception" is of some part of the estate not granted at all. Houghtaling v. Stoothoff, 170 Misc. 773, 12 N.Y.S.2d 207, 210; Lewis v. Standard Oil Co. of California, C.C.A.Cal., 88 F.2d 512, 514.
A reservation provides for return of rent or service, re-garded as issuing out of land granted. An exception with-holds particular portion of land granted. Cook v. Farley, 195 Miss. 638, 15 So.2d 352, 355; Mallas River Syndicate v. Big West Oil Co., 98 Mont. 254, 38 P.2d 599, 601.
Reservation means something issuing or arising out of thing granted while an exception means some part of the estate not granted, or withdrawn from the effect of the grant, although the terms are often used indiscriminately and given effect according to the obvious intent of the parties. Vance v. Pritchard, 213 N.C. 552, 197 S.E. 182, 185.
Reservation must always be in favor of and for benefit of grantor, whereas exception is mere exclusion from grant, of some interest which may be vested in grantor or out-standing in another; reservation reserves to grantor some new thing, either issuing out of or incident to thing grant-ed, while exception in deed is clause exempting from oper-ation thereof and retaining In grantor title to some part of the thing granted or excepting some part of thing granted, title to which is at the time in another. Klein v. Humble Oil & Reflning Co., Tex.Civ.App., 67 S.W.2d 911, 915.
Reservation reserves to grantor some new interest out of thing granted, while exception excludes from operation of grant some existing part of estate. Petty v. Griffith, Mo., 165 S.W.2d 412, 414; U. S. v. 1,010.8 Acres, More or Less, Situate in Sussex County, Del., D.C.Del., 56 F.Supp. 120, 128.
The terms "reservation" and "exception" are frequently used as interchangeable for synonymous terms. Nelson v. Bacon, 113 Vt. 161, 32 A.2d 140, 145; Murphy v. Sunset Hills Ass’n, 243 Wis. 139, 9 N.W.2d 613, 615; Meaning in-tended must be determined by reference to subject matter and surrounding circumstances. Federal Land Bank of New Orleans v. Cooper, 190 Miss. 490, 200 So. 729, 730, 731; Duus v. Town of Ephrata, 14 Wash.2d 426, 128 P.2d 510, 511; Parties’ intention, not language used, is dominating factor in determining whether provision is reservation or exception. Goss v. Congdon, 114 Vt. 155, 40 A.2d 429, 430; Technical meaning will yield to the manifest intent. ten-sen v. Sheker, 231 Iowa 240, 1 N.W.2d 262, 267; Technical misnomer does not operate to defeat attempted reserva-tion or exception. Clark v. Pauley, 291 Ky. 637, 165 S.W. 2d 161, 162; It has been also said that there is a diversity between an exception and a saving, for an exception ex-empts clearly, but a saving goes to the matters touched, and does not exempt. Plowd. 361. Ogden v. Straus Bldg. Corporation, 187 Wis. 232, 202 N.W. 34, 44; Haymaker v. Windsor Reservoir & Canal Co., 81 Colo. 168, 254 P. 768, 770; Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Wyatt, 189 N.C. 107, 126 S.E. 93, 94; Greenspan v. Yaple, 194 N.Y.S. 658, 659, 201 App. Div. 575.

Statutory Lava

An exception in a statute is a clause designed to reserve or exempt some individuals from the general class of persons or things to which the language of the act in general attaches. People v. Bailey, 103 Misc. 366, 171 N.Y.S. 394, 397.
An exception differs from an explanation, which, by the use of a videiicet, proviso, etc., is allowed only to explaln doubtful clauses precedent, or to separate and distrIbute generala hito particulars. Cutler v. Tufts, 3 Pick., Mass., 272.
An "exception" exempts absolutely from the operation of the statute, while a "proviso" generally defeats operation of statute conditionally. Oregon Liquor Control Com-mission v. Coe, 163 Or. 646, 99 P.2d 29, 31; People v. Thursam, City Ct., 23 N.Y.S.2d 706, 710, 713.
The office of an "exception" in a statute is to except something from the operative effect of a statute or to qualify or restrain the generality ot the substantive en-actment to which it is attached, and it is not necessarlly limited to the section of the statute immediately following or preceding. Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, C.C.A.Ky., 142 F.2d 876, 882.
Two statutes relating to same subject must be read to-gether, and provisions of one having special application to particular subject will be deemed an "exception" to other statute general in its terms. Eagleton v. Murphy, 348 Mo. 949, 156 S.W.2d 683, 685, 138 A.L.R. 749.

Zoning

An "exception" in zoning ordinance is one al-lowable where conditions detailed therein as those on which exception may be permitted exist. Ap-plication of Devereux Foundation, 351 Pa. 478, 41 A.2d 744, 746.
Exceptions may be treated as a legislative process, con-ditions for which must be found In the zoning ordinance and may not be varied, and variances may be treated as judicial functlon through appeals from administrative or-ders, whereby literal enforcement of ordinance may be diaregarded. Stone NT. Cray, 89 N.H. 483, 200 A. 517, 521.
EXCEPTION EN MASSE. An assignment in de-fendant’s amended motion for new trial that "court erred in giving Instructions Nos. 1 to 10, inclusive", is "exception en masse". Tugg v. State, 206 Ark. 161, 174 S.W.2d 374, 376

EXCEPTION OF LACK OF CAPACITY TO STAND IN JUDGMENT. Challenges authority of plaintiff to institute and prosecute suit regardless of whether plaintiff owns or has an interest in the claim. It is usually resorted to where plain-tiff is alleged to be under some disability or where he sues through a representative who, it is alleged, has no authority. Riche v. Ascension Parish School Board, La.App., 200 So. 681, 685.
EXCEPTION OF MISJOINDER seeks to restrain plaintiff’s pursuit of the cause when there is pres-ent another party whose liabilities or rights are not connected with the exceptor. Henrichs v. New Orleans Public Service, La.App., 179 So. 610.
EXCEPTION OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION ad-dresses itself to sufficiency in law of the petition and exhibits attached. Bartholomew v. Impastato, La.App., 12 So.2d 700, 702.
EXCEPTION OF NO RIGHT OF ACTION chal-lenges plaintiff’s interest or right to assert cause of action. McCain v. Le Blanc Bros., La.App., 10 So.2d 116, 118.
EXCEPTION OF WANT OF INTEREST or of "no right of action" is afforded as means of challeng-ing preliminarily either interest or right of plain-tiff to assert cause of action and is not limited to want of capacity in plaintiff as such to bring suit. McCain v. Le Blanc Bros., La.App., 10 So.2d 116,EXCEPTIONAL GTELCUMSTANCES. -Peculiar ur• gency, existed where death sentence was imposed, or defendant had not been given a reasonable op-portunity to prepare for trial, or the common-wealth conceded belatedly, though not too late, that its material etridence is perjured. Sharpe v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, C.C.A.Ky., 135 F.2d , 974, 977.
EXCEPTIS EXCIP1ENDIS. Lat. With all neces-sary exceptions.
EXCEPTOR. In old English law. A party who entered an exception or plea.
EXCERPTA, or EXCERPTS. Extracts.
EXCESS. When a defendant pleaded to an action of assault that the plaintiff trespassed on his land, and he would not depart when ordered, whereupon he, molliter manus imposuit, gently laid hands on him, the replication of excess was to the effect that the defendant used more force than neces-sary. Wharton.
Degree or amount by which one thing or number ex-ceeds another, and the remainder or the difference between two numbers is the excess of one over the other. In re Bunce’s Estate, 100 Misc. 385, 165 N.Y.S. 426.
Statute providing that, if capital used or invested In business of corporations includes borrowed capital in "ex-cess" of capital stock, surplus and undivided profits, such excess of borrowed capital shall be added to capital stock, surplus and undivided proflts as basis for computing fran-chise tax, means that, if corporation uses any borrowed ex’ additional capital, such borrowed or additional capital must be added to the other capitn1 in order to form basis for computing the tax. State v. Union Bldg. Corporation, 185 La. 598, 170 So. 7, 12.
EXCESS FEES of tax collector consist of sum re-maining in collector’s hands alter deducting from total of all lawf ul fees collected, his maximum annual lees, his deputy hire, his official expenses and one-fourth of remainder until such one-fourth amounts to specified sum. American Indemnity Co. v. Red River Nat. Bank in Clarksville, Tex. Civ.App., 132 S.W.2d 473, 480.
EXCESS INSURANCE. No recovery for loss of cotton which was insured under another policy could be had except that recoverable as "excess insurance," although the other policy also provid-ed for its avoidance by other ¡nsurance, for, as to such other policy, the litigated policy was not "other" but merely "excess insurance." St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Garza County Ware-house & Marketing Ass’n, C.C.A.Tex., 93 F.2d 590, 592; Travelers Indemnity Co. v. State Automobile Ins. Co., 67 Ohio App. 457, 37 N.E.2d 198, 200.
Where fire and theft poltcy Issued to conditional seller of truck contained indorsement against accidental cdllision occurring after insured had repossessed truck, and policy provided that such insurance was excess insurance where any speclfic insurance existed for benefit of insured, when seller later repossessed truck, insurance taken by seller became "excess insurance." Fageol Truck & Coach Co. v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 18 Cal.2d 731, 117 P.2d 661, 669.
Where materials which belonged to owners who carrIed Eire insurance covering merchandise while In possesslon of contractors, were sent to contractors to be made luto fin-Ished garments, fire policies of contractors covering mer-chandise held in trust but excluding property otherwise specifically insured, provided only "excess insurance" ín accordance with terms thereof, as to goods in possesslonof contractors who had insured themselves as ballees. Gor-don v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia, 262 App.Div. 328, 28 N.Y.S.2d 480, 482.
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION. A case in which court has initially proceeded properly within its jurisdiction but steps out of jurisdiction in mak-ing of some order or in the doing of some judi-cial act. Olson v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 93 Utak, 145, 71 P.2d 529, 534, 112 A.L.R. 438. Act within judge’s general power is unau-thorized in particular case. Beckwith v. McAlis-ter, 165 S.C. 1, 162 S.E. 623, 628; Carter v. Mit-chell, 225 Ala. 287, 142 So. 514, 517; In re Knox’ Estate, 52 Cal.App.2d 338, 126 P.2d 108, 112. Acts which exceed defined power of court in any in-stance. Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, Third Dist., 17 Ca1.2d 280, 109 P.2d 942, 948, 132 A.L.R. 715.
A departure by a court from those reeognized and es-tablished requirements of law, hówever close apparent ad-herence to mere form in method of procedure, which has the effect of depriving one of a constitutional right, is an "excess of jurisdiction." Wuest v. Wuest, 53 Cal.App.2d 339, 127 1:›2d 934, 937.
EXCESS OR SURPLUS WATER. Mean simply water which is fiowing in stream in addition to what may be termed adjudicated waters. Quigley v. McIntosh, 88 Mont. 103, 290 P. 266, 268; Any water not needed for reasonable beneficial uses of those having prior rights is "excess or surplus water". City df Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, Cal., 207 P.2d 17, 28.
EXCESSES. Spouse’s gambling habits or extrav-agances when carried, to excess, constitute "ex-cesses" authorizing separation from bed and board. Moore v. Moore, 192 La. 289, 187 So. 670, £72.
EXCESSIVE. Greater than what is usual or prop-er; overmuch; a general term for what goes be-yond just measure or amount. Austin St. Ry. Co. v. Oldham, Tex.Civ.App., 109 S.W.2d 235, 237. Tending to or marked by excess, which is the quality or state of exceeding the proper or rea-sonable limit or measure. Railway Co. v. John-ston, 106 Ga. 130, 32 S.E. 78; Morrow v. Missouri Gas & Electric Service Co., 315 Mo. 367, 286 S.W. 106, 111.
EXCESSIVE ASSESSMENT. A tax assessment grossly disproportionate as compared with other assessments. Southern California Telephone Co. v. Los Angeles County, 45 Ca1.App.2d 111, 113 P. 2d 773, 776.
EXCESSIVE BAIL. Ball in a sum more than will be reasonably sufficient to prevent evasion of the law by flight or concealment; bail which is per se unreasonably great and clearly disproportionate to the offense involved, or shown to be so by the special circumstances of the particular case. In re Losasso, 15 Colo. 163, 24 P. 1080, 10 L.R.A. 847; Ex parte Ryan, 44 Cal. 558.
The dental of ball is not necessarily "excesslve ball", although such dental may be in a particular case the equiv-alent of excessive ball. People ex rel. Shapiro v. Keeper of City Prison, Tombs, New York County, 265 App.Div. 474, 39 N Y.S.2d 526, 531.EXCESSIVE DAMAGES. See Damages.
EXCESSIVE DRUNKENNESS. Drunkenness IS excessive where a party is so far deprived of his reason and understanding as to.render him incap-able of understanding character and consequenc-es of his act. Taylor v. Koenigstein, 128 Neb. 809, 260 N.W. 544.
EXCESSIVE FINE OR PENALTY. Any fine or penalty which seriously impairs the capacity of gaining a business livelihood. C. F. Smith Co. v. Fitzgerald, 270 Mich. 659, 259 N.W. 352.
EXCESSIVE OR INTEMPERATE USE OF IN-TOXICANTS. In benefit certificate. Habitual in-dulgence in intoxicating liquors to such extent as to impair health or otherwise render insurance risk more hazardous. Wising v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen, 132 Minn. 303, 156 N.W. 247, 248, Ann.Cas.1918A, 621.
EXCESSIVE OXIDATION. As used in product patent for improvement in bleached and dyed furs and the like, relate to what would occur if it was attempted to effect oxidation, bleaching of a dark skin with an ordinary bleach, such as strong hy-drogen peroxide, without a protecting agent Steinfur Patents Corporation v. J. Meyerson, Inc., D.C.N.Y., 56 F.2d 372, 382.
EXCESSIVE SENTENCE. No sentence is exces-sive which is within limits fixed by law. Bryant v. State, 39 Ga.App. 26, 145 S.E. 911; State v. Brackett, 218 N.C. 369, 11 S.E.2d 146, 149.
EXCESSIVE SPEED. Automobile’s speed is "ex-cessive" whenever it places car beyond driver’s control. Esponette v. Wiseman, 130 Me. 297, 155 A. 650, 653.
EXCESSIVE TAX. One that exceeds what the tax would be if correctly calculated at the legal rate on the valuation as finally fixed by the coun-ty authorities. Pocomoke Guano Co. v. City of New Bern, 172 N.C. 258, 90 S.E. 202, 203.
EXCESSIVE VERDICT. A verdict which is re-sult of passion or prejudice. Babb v. Murray, 26 Cal.App.2d 153, 79 P.2d 159, 160.
The test of whether a verdict is ‘:excesslve" 1s whether the amount thereof is such as to shock the conscience of the court. Scheldegger v. Thompson, Mo.App., 174 S.W.2d 216, 222.
EXCESSIVELY. To excess. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Nunnery, 176 Miss. 197, 167 So. 416, 419.
EXCESSIVELY INTOXICATED. Where one is so intoxicated as to be so far deprived of his reason and understanding as to render him incapable of knowing the character and consequences of his act. Keedick v. Brogan, 116 Neb. 339, 217 N.W. 583, 585.
EXCESSIVUM IN JURE REPROBATUR. EX-CESSUS IN RE QUALIBET JURE REPROBATUR COMMUNI. Co. Litt. 44. Excess in law is repre-hended. Excess in anything is reprehended at common law.EXCIIANGE. To barter; to swap. Dairymen’s Leágue Co-op. Ass’n v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. of New York, Sup., 8 N.Y.S.2d 403, 412. To part with, give or transfer for an equivalent. Kessler v. United States, C.C.A.Pa., 124 F.2d 152, 154; Dairymen’s League Co-op. Ass’n v. Metropoli-tan Casualty Ins. Co. of New York, Sup., 8 N.Y.S. 2d 403, 412.
Act of giving or taking one thing for another. United States v. Paine, D.C.Mass., 31 F.Supp. 898, 900; Kessler v. United States, C.C.A.Pa., 124 F.2d 152, 154; contract by terms of which specific property is given in consideration of the receipt of property other than money. Capps v. Mines Service, 175 Or. 248, 152 P.2d 414, 416; Mutual grant of equal interests, the one in consideration of the other, Hale v. Helvering, 66 App.D.C. 242, 85 F.2d 819, 821, 822; mutual transfer of property other than for money although one of parties may pay a sum of money in addition to property, Law v. McLaughlin, D.C.Cal., 2 F.Supp. 601, 603; transaction in which one piece of property, usually some-thing other than money or its equivalent, is given in re-turn for another piece of property, Hadley Falls Trust Co. v. United States, C.C.A.Mass., 110 F.2d 887, 891: transfer of property for other property, Helvering v. Nebraska Bridge Supply & Lumber Co., C.C.A.8, 115 F.2d 288, 290; transfer of property for property or some value other than money, Burger-Phillips Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.Ala., 126 F.2d 934, 936; transfers of en-during interests and not such- as must immediately be re-conveyed in fulfillment of preconceived plan, Morgan v. Helvering, C.C.A.2, 117 F.2d 334, 336.
An exchange 1s two sales. Robbins v. Pacific Eastern Corporation, 8 Ca1.2d 241, 65 P.2d 42, 56.
The criterion in deterrnining whether a transaction is a sale or an exchange is whether there is a determination of value of things exchanged, and if no price is set for either property It is an "exchange". Gruyer v. Commis-sioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.4, 142 F.2d 363, 366.
The mutual transfers must be in kind, and any transac-tion into which money ‘enters, either as the consideration or as a basis of measure is excluded. Hoovel v. State, 125 Tex.Cr.R. 545, 69 S.W.2d 104, 108; Trenton Cotton Oil Co. v. C. I. R., C.C.A.6, 147 F.2d 33, 36.

Capital Assets

Reciprocal transfers. Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247, 61 S.Ct. 878, 880, 85 L.Ed. 1310; Harwick v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.8, 133 F.2d 732, 737.
Conveyance of mortgaged realty by mortgagor in con-sideration of payment of past-due taxes thereon, Philips v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.3, 112 F.2d 721, 722.
Mortgagor’s transfers of equity of redemption In prop-erty which constituted a capital asset of mortgagor to mortgagee in return for release of liability on accompany-ing bond given to evidente or further secure the mortgage debt. Stamler v. C. I. R., C.C.A.3, 145 F.2d 37, 39.

Commercial Law

A negotiation by which one person transfers to another funds which he has in a certain place, either at a price agreed upon or which is fixed by commercial usage. Nicely v. Bank, 15 Ind.App. 563, 44 N.E. 572, 57 Am.St.Rep. 245; Iowa. State Sav. Bank of Fairfleld v. City Nat. Bank, 183 Iowa, 1347, 168 N.W. 148, 149, L.R.A.1918F, 169.
The process of settling accounts or debts betwegn parties residing at a distance from each other, without the inter-vention of money, by exchanging orders or drafts, called bilis of exchange; the payment of debts in different places by an exchange or transfer of credits. Webster, Dict.
The profit which alises from a maritime loan, when such profit is a percentage on the money lent, considering it in the light of money lent in one place to be returned in another. with a difference in amount in the sum borrowed and that paid. arising from . the difference of time and place. The term is commonly used in this sense by French writers. Hall, Emerig, Mar.Loans, 56n.
A public place where merchants, brokers, factors, etc., meet to transact their business.

Conveyancing

A mutual grant of equal interests, (in lands or tenements,) the one in consideration of the other. 2 B1.Comm. 323; Windsor v. Collinson, 32 Or. 297, 52 P. 26; Herring Motor Co. v. IEtna Trust & Sav-ings Co., 87 Ind.App. 83, 154 N.E. 29, 31; Balti-more & O. R. Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., D.C.N.Y., 241 F. 162, 169; Finke v. Boyer, 331 Mo. 1242, 56 S.W.2d 372.

Nontaxable Exchange

Elements are that property be transferred to a corporation solely in exchange for stock or securi-ties in corporation and that transferors imme-diately after exchange be in control of corpora-tion, through ownership of 80 per cent. of all vot-ing stock and at least 80 per cent. of all other classes of stock of corporation. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Cement Investors, C.C.A.10, 122 F.2d 380, 383.

Personal Property Law

Exchange of goods is a commutation, transmu-tation, or transfer of goods for other goods, as distinguished from sale, which is a transfer of goods for money. 2 BI.Comm. 446; 2 Steph. Comm. 120; Elwell v. Chamberlin, 31 N.Y. 624; Cooper v. State, 37 Ark. 418; Preston v. Keene, 14 Pet. 137, 10 L.Ed. 387.
Exchange is a contract by which the parties mutually give, or agree to give, one thing for an-other, neither thing, or both things, being money only.
The distinction between a sale and exchange of property is rather one of shadow than of substance. In both cases the title to property is absolutely transferred ; and the same rules of law are applicable to the transaction, wheth-er the consideration of the contract 1s money or by way of barter. It can make no essential difference in the rights and obligations of parties that goods and merchanillse are transferred and paid for by other goods and merchandise instead of by money, which is but the representative of value or property. Com. v. Clark, 14 Gray, Mass., 36

Stock and Securities

To exchange one security for a different securi-ty of some kind or for other property or rights. Mertz v. H. D. Hudson Mfg, Co., 194 Minn. 636, 261 N.W. 472.
Plan whereby preferred stock was lssued In exchange for half of common stock held by voting trustees and oth-er half was split up on basis of two for one constituted a genuine "exchange" of common stock for preferred stock in pursuance of a plan of "recapltalization". Bass v. Com-missioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.1, 129 F.2d 300, 307.
Where holder of nearly all of a corporation’s stock de-livered securities to corporatiOn, gave corporation his check in payment of preferred stock, and received from corporation its check in payment of his securities, and checks, which were simultaneously deposited, cancelled each other almost entirely, transaction was exchange. Louis W. Gunby, Inc., v. Helvering, 74 App.D.C. 185, 122 F.2d 203, 206.

For "Arbitration of Exchange," "Bill of Ex-change," "Dry Exchange," "First of Exchange," and "Owelty of Exchange," see those titles.
EXCHANGE BROKER. One who negotiates bilis of exchange drawn on foreign countries or on other places in the same country; one who makes and concludes bargains for others in matters of money or merchandise. Little Rock v. Barton, 33 Ark. 444; Portland v. O’Neill, 1 Or. 219.
EXCHANGE OF LIVINGS. In ecclesiastical law. This is effected by resigning them into the bishop’s hands, and each party being inducted into the other’s benefice. If either die before both are in-ducted, the exchange is void.
EXCHANGED means a complete divestment of property. Lord v. Smith, 293 Mass. 555, 200 N.E. 547, 550.
EXCHEQUER. That department of the English government which has charge of the collection of the national revenue; the treasury department.
It is said to have been so named from the chequered cloth, resembling a chess-board, which anciently covered the table there, and on which, when certain ot the king’s accounts were made up, the sums were marked and scored with counters. 3 Bl.Comm. 44.
For "Court of Exchequer" and "Court of Ex-chequer Chamber," see those titles.
EXCHEQUER BILLS. Bills of credit issued in England by authority of parliament. Brande.
Instruments issued at the exchequer, under the authority, for the most part, of acts of parliament passed for the purpose, and containing an engagement on the part of the government for repayment of the principal suma advanced with interest. 2 Steph.Comm. 586. See Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 328, 9 L.Ed. 709.
EXCHEQUER DIVISION. A division of the Eng-lish high court of justice, to which the special business of the court of exchequer was specially assigned by section 34 of the judicature act of 1873. Merged in the queen’s bench division from and alter 1881, by order in council under section 31 of that act. Wharton.
EXCISE. An inland imposition, paid sometimes upon the consumption of the commodity, and f re-quently upon the retail sale. 1 Bl.Comm. 318; Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608, 22 S.Ct. 493, 46 L. Ed. 713; Portland Bank v. Apthorp, 12 Mass. 256.
An excise has been defined as meaning tribute, custom, tax, tollage, or assessment, a fixed absolute and direct charge laid on merchandise, products, or commodities without any regard to amount of property belonging to those on whom it may fall, or to any supposed relation Be-tween money expended for a public object and a special beneflt occasioned to those by whom the charge is to be paid. In re Opinion of the Justices, 282 Mass. 619, 186 N. E. 490, 491.
An excise is an lmpost for a license to pursue certain callings or to deal in special commodities or to exercise particular franchises. East Ohlo Gas Co. v. Tax Com-mission of Ohio, D.C.Ohio, 43 F.2d 170, 172; any tax not falling within classification of poll or property tax, Die-fendorf v. Gallet, 51 Idaho 619, 10 P.2d 307, 312; any tax which Is not directly on property or the rents or incomes from real estate, Anne Arundel County Com’rs v. English, 182 Md. 514, 35 A.2d 135, 141; duties laid on manufacture, sale, or consumption of commodities, or upon certain call-Ings or occupations, In re City of Enid, 195 Okl. 365, 158 P.2d 348, 350, 159 A.L.R. 358; every form of charge im-
posed by public authority on performance of act, enjoy-ment of privilege, or engagement in occupation, Idaho Gold Dredging Co. v. Balderston, 258 Idaho 692, 78 P.2d 105, 112; every form of taxation which is not laid directly on persona or property. Gula Meat Co. v. State, 35 Ariz. 194, 276 P. 1, 2; Lutz v. Arnold, 208 Ind. 480, 193 N.E. 840; public charges on subjects other than manufacture and sale of commodities, such as licenses to pursue particular call-ings, franchises of corporations and particularly the fran-chise of corporate existence, and inheritance or succession of estates. Pollock v. Farmers’ L. & T. Co., 158 U.S. 601, 15 S.Ct. 912, 39 L.Ed. 1108; Albert Pick & Co. v. Jordan, 169 Cal. 1, 145 P. 506, 513, Ann.Cas.1916C, 1237; Des Moines Union Ry. Co. v. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co., 188 Iowa, 1019, 177 N.W. 90, 9 A.L.R. 1557; Northern Cent. Ry. Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 152 Md. 94, 136 A. 66, 68, 60 A.L.R. 558; Hattiesburg Grocery Co. v. Robertson, 126 Miss. 34, 88 So. 4, 5, 25 A.L.R. 748; something cut off from price paid on sale of goods as contribution to government, City of Louisville v. Churchill Downs, 267 Ky. 339, 102 S. W.2d 10, 13; tax imposed on performance of act, engage-ment in occupation, or enjoyment of privilege, State v. Fields, Ohio App., 35 N.E.2d 744, 747; tax laid on manu-facture, sale, or consumption of commodities or upon
li-
censes to pursue certain occupations or upon corporate privileges. Alexander Theatre Ticket Office v. U. S., C.C.A. N.Y., 23 F.2d 44, 46; City of De Land v. Florida Public Service Co., 119 Fla. 804, 161 So. 735, 738.
An "excise tax" is often used as synonymous with "privilege" or "license tax". Shannon v. Streckfus Steani-ers, 279 Ky. 649, 131 S.W.2d 833, 838.
The terma excise tax and privilege tax are synonymous. American Airways v. Wallace, D.C.Tenn., 57 F.2d 877, 880.

English Law

The name given to the duties or taxes laid on certain articles produced and consumed at home, among which spirits have always been the most important; but, exclusive of these, the duties on the licenses of auctioneers, brewers, etc., and on the licenses to keep dogs, kill game, etc., are in-cluded in the excise duties. Wharton.

Tax and Excise Distinguished

A tax imposed directly by Legislature without assessment and measured by amount of business done, income previously received, or by extent to which privilege may have been enjoyed or exer-cised by the taxpayer, irrespective of nature or value of his assets or his investments in business, is excise tax while assessed tax on valuation of property is property tax. City of De Land v. Flori-da Public Service Co., 119 Fla. 804, 161 So. 735, 738.
A "property tax" is a visitational tax and Is the taking of part of taxpayer’s wealth, represented by property he owns for needs of government, and is not an "excise tax" for privilege of owning property for period of fiscal year. Bemis Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Graham County, N. C., 214 N.C. 167, 198 S.E. 843, 845.
A tax directly on property is a property tax; but a tax is an excise tax where it is not a tax on property as such, but on certain kinds of property, having reference to their origin and their intended use. State ex rel. Porterie v. H. L. Hunt, Inc., 182 La. 1073, 162 So. 777, 103 A.L.R. 9.
An excise tax is an inland Impost on articles of manu-facture or sale, and also upon licenses to pursue certain trades, or to deal in certain commodities, and property tax is a tax which is not a capitation tax or a direct tax on land or personalty. Flynn, Welch & Yates v. State Tax Commission, 38 N.M. 131, 28 P.2d 889, 891.
As usually used, "franchise tax" is tax on intangible values inhering to business and added value given to tangible property, being "ad valorem" as distinguished from "excise" or "privilege" tax. State Tax Commission v. Petroleum Exploration, 253 Ky. 119, 68 S.W.2d 777.ir a morigage registration tax is in effeci upon the in-strunient itself, the tax is a "property tax", but if the tax is imposed solely upon the privilege of registration, and validity or use of the instrument is not affected by failure to pay the tax, the tax is an "excise tax". Community Public Service Co. v. James, Tex.Civ.App., 167 S.W.2d 588, 595.
Income tax !s a "property tax" and not an "excise tax." tensen v. Henneford, 185 Wash. 209, 53 P.2d 607, 610.
The words "tax" and "excise," although of ten used as synonymous, are to be considered as having entirely
tinct and separate signlflcations, under Const.Mass. c. 1, § 1, art. 4. The former is a charge apportioned either among the whole people of the state or those residing within cer-tain distrlcts, municipalities, or sectlons. It is required to be imposed, so that, if levied for the public charges of government, it shall be shared according to the estate, real and personal, which each person may possess: or, if raised to defray the cost of some local improvement of a public nature, it shall be borne by those who will receive some special and peculiar benefit or advantage which an ex-penditure of money for a public object may cause to those on whom the tax is assessed. An excise, on the other hand, is of a different character. It is based on no rule of al-portionment or equality whatever. It is a fixed, absolute, and direct charge laid on merchandise, products, or com-modities, without any regard to the amount of property belonging to those on whom It may fall, or to any sup-Po,’ecl relation betvecn money expended for a public object and a special benefit occasioned to those by whom the charge is to be paid. Oliver v. Washington Milis, 11 Allen, Mass., 268.
EXCISE LAW. A law imposing excise duties on specified commodities, and providing for the col-lection of revenue therefrom. In a more restrict-ed and more popular sense, a law regulating; restricting, or taxing the manufacture or sale of lntoxicating liquors.
A statute requiring payment of license Pee for operating motor vehicle on state hlghway for hire Is an "excise tax measure" rather than a "pollee measure." Comp.Laws Nev. § 4437. Ziemer v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., D.C.Nev., 22 F.Supp. 384, 385.
EXCISE LIEU PROPERTY TAX. Táx on gross premiums received and collected by designated classes of insurance companies held "excise lieu property tax." United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Bakes, 57 Idaho 537, 67 P.2d 1024, 1029.
EXCLUSA. In old English law. A sluice to carry off water; the payment to the lord for the benefit of such a sluice. Cowell.
EXCLUSION. Denial of entry. Ex parte Do-mingo Corypus, D.C.Wash., 6 F.2d 336.
"Exclusions" are things barred and not adinitted. Ray-mond v. Great American Incleinnity Co., 86 N.H. 93, 163 A. 713, 716.
EXCLUSION, RULE OF. A witness, whether a party to the cause or not, may not testify as to his uncommunicated intent, purpose or motive. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. Nichols, 97 So.2d 879, 885, 266 Ala. 521. This rule applies even though witness’ intent or state of mind is ma-terial to the issue. McCain v. City of Montgomery, 92 So.2d 678, 681, 38 Ala.App. 568.
EXCLUSIVE. Appertaining to the subject alone, not including, admitting, or pertaining to any others. Fellows v. Seymour, 171 Misc. 833, 13 N.Y. S.2d 803, 805. Sole. State v. Bridges, 246 Ala. 486, 21 So.2d 316, 319. Shutting out; debarring from interference or participation; vested in one person alone.The term "exclusive" as used to define quantity of con-trol of offending agency for res ipsa loquitur to apply means that control must be exclusive as against all who do not have a concurrent joint control. Frenkil v. John-son National Retailers Mut. Ins. Co., 175 Md. 592, 3 A.2d 479, 485.
EXCLUSIVE AGENCY. A contract to give an "exclusive agency" to deal with property is or-dinarily interpreted as not precluding competition by the principal generally, but only as precluding him from appointing another agent to accomplish the result. Navy Gas & Supply Co. v. Schoech, 105 Colo. 374, 98 P.2d 860, 861, 863, 126 A.L.R. 1225.
The grant of an "exclusive agency to sell," that is. the exclusive right to sell the products of a wholesaler in a specified terrltory, ordinarily is interpreted as precluding competition in any forro within designated area. Navy Gas & Supply Co. v. Schoech, 105 Colo. 374, 98 P.2d 860, 861, 126 A.L.R. 1225.
Relationship such as that created by contract between manufacturer and sole distributors within specified terri-tory for outright sales to distributors who established re-tan prices. Stratton & Terstegge Co. v. Stiglitz Furnace Co., 258 Ky. 678, 81 S.W.2d 1, 3.
EXCLUSIVE AGENCY CONTRACT means that owner will not sell property through any other agency. Torrey & Dean v. Coyle, 138 Or. 509, 7 P.2d 561, 562.
EXCLUSIVE CONTROL. The "exclusive control" of thing causing accident, applies to right of con-trol of instrumentality causing injury. Gerhart v. Southern California Gas Co., 56 Cal.App.2d 425, 132 P.2d 874, 877.
As used in statute giving city exclusive control of school system, means control to exclusion of control exercised by county or state over other types of Independent school dis-tricts authorized by school laws. Temple Independent School Dist. v. Proctor, Tex.Civ.App., 97 S.W.2d 1047, 1054.
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION. These words pre-elude idea of co-existente, and mean possessed to exclusion of others. Dunn Const. Co. v. Craig, 191 Miss. 682, 2 So.2d 166, 171.
The words "exclusive jurisdiction" when used in statutes with respect to inferior criminal courts were only intended to define jurisdiction of inferior criminal courts established thereby as between themselves. People ex rel. Kawiecki v. Carhart, 170 Misc. 894, 13 N.Y.S.2d 293, 294.
Under statute giving United States District Courts "ex-clusive jurisdiction" of violations of Securities Exchange Act, Mi criminal or civil proceedings for violations of the act must be brought in such courts. ,Wright v. Securities and Exchange Commission, C.C.A.2, 112 F.2d 89, 95.
EXCLUSIVE LICENSE is permission to do thing and contract not to give leave to any one else to do same thing. Overman Cushion Tire Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 59 F.2d 998, 999.
A license which binds licensor not to enlarge thereafter the scope of other licenses already granted, or increase the number of licenses, Is an "exclusive license", Mechanical Ice Tray Corporation v. General Motors Corporation, C.C. A.N.Y., 144 F.2d 720, 725.
EXCLUSIVE LICENSEE. One granted exclusive , right and license to use, manufacture, and sell patented article. Deitel v. Chisholm, C.C.A.N.Y., 42 F.2d 172, 173. One having exclusive right to use patented method and apparatus in designated territory. Paul E. Hawkinson Co. v. Carne% C. C.A!Pa., 112 F.2d 396, 398.
EXCLUSIVE MOVING PICTURE RIGHTS. Grant-ed by author in book held to include technical im-provements in motion pictures developed during license. L. C. Page & Co. v. Fox Film Corpora-tion, C.C.A.N.Y., 83 F.2d 196, 199.
EXCLUSIVE OF ANY OUT BUILDINGS as used in covenant that within restricted area, no resi-dence should be erected, "actual bona fide cost" of which "exclusive of any outbuildings" should be less than $10,000, meant that no buildings other than the residente could or should be considered. Dillingham v. Kahn, 188 Ark. 759, 67 S.W.2d 735.
EXCLUSIVE OF INTEREST AND COSTS as used in statute defining court’s pecuniary jurisdiction, refers to interest accrued before filing of com-plaint, not that accruing after suit was brought. Athan v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 73 F. 2d 66, 67.
EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IN ALL CASES. Constitutional provision, giving circuit court "exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases in equity", established in circuit court exclusive jurisdiction in all cases in equity involving matters which were of exclusive equity jurisdiction under the common law. In re Niernsee’s Estate, 147 Fla. 388, 2 So.2d 737, 739.
EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP. Ownership free from any kind of .legal or equitable interest in any one else. U. S. Casualty Co. v. Timmerman, 118 N.J. Eq. 563, 180 A. 629.
EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION. Possession may be "exclusive" so as to entitle possessor to title by ad-verse possession, notwithstanding that the land is subject to exercise of easement by private par-ty. Young v. City of Lubbock, Tex.Civ.App., 130 S.W.2d 418, 420.
Defendant, if in actual adverse open and notorious pos-session of land, had exclusive possession, visible to another accepting mortgage on premises sought to be foreclosed. Whittaker v. Farmers’ Nat. Bank of Somerset, 237 Ky. 596, 36 S.M.Ud 18, 19.
Exclusive possession by adverse possessor means that ad-verse possessor must show an exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit. Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. art. 5510. W. T. Carter & Bro. v. Holmes, 131 Tex. 365, 113 S.W.2d 1225, 1226.
Under lease providing that lessor should give exclusive possession which was defined to include consent agreements signed by lienholder satisfactory to lessee, lessor whose mortgage was in default did not comply with lease require-ment by tendering a consent agreement from a company which agreed to refinance the mortgage. Fox Realty Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., C.C.A.Ind., 124 F.2d 710, 712, 713.
EXCLUSIVE POWER. If special power permits donee to bar one or more members of class from receiving portion of property it is "exclusive". Moore v. Emery, 137 Me. 259, 18 A.2d 781, 788, 792.
Power upon specified condition to appoint by will such full-blood relations of donor to take estate as donee mightdesignate held exclusive power. In re Skldmore’s Estate, 148 Misc. 569, 266 N.Y.S. 312.
Under will giving testator’s daughters power to dlspose of principal of trusts created in their favor, provided it be bequeathed to testator’s descendants, where testator’s gen-eral intent was that property should be kept in the family, but that his children should share equally, power of ap-pointment was exclusive. Moore v. Emery, 137 Me. 259, 18 A.2d 781, 788, 792.
EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGE or FRANCHISE. A statute does not grant an "exclusive" privilege or franchise, unless it shuts out or excludes others from enjoying a similar privilege or franchise. Sunnyside Land & Investment Co. v. Bernier, 119 Wash. 386, 205 P. 1041, 1042, 20 A.L.R. 1261; Toten v. Stuart, 143 Va. 201, 129 S.E. 217, 218.
EXCLUSIVE REMEDY. Where a statute creates a new right or imposes a new duty or liability, unknown to the common law, and gives a remedy for its enforcement, the remedy prescribed is "ex-clusive". Kosicki v. S. A. Healy Co., 312 Ill.App. 307, 38 N.E.2d 525, 528; Kosicki v. S. A. Healy Co., 380 lil. 298, 44 N.E.2d 27, 29.
Statute declaring right to compensation under Compensa-tion Law exclusive remedy of employee injured by fellow employee means that injured employee suing fellow em-ployee without having elected to take compensation under such law loses remedy against employer. Hall v. Hill, 158 Misc. 341, 285 N.Y.S. 815.
Statute providing method of recovery does not furnish exclusive remedy unless its terms indicate an intent to make statutory remedy exclusive. Kosicki v. S. A. Healy Co., 312 Ill.App. 307, 38 N.E.2d 525, 528.
EXCLUSIVE RIGHT. An exclusive right is one which only the grantee thereof can exercise, and from which all others are prohibited or shut out.
By "exclusive right" essential to a right of way by pre-scription, the law means that the right should not depend for its enjoyment upon a similar right in others; it must be exclusive as against the right of the community at large. Downie v. City of Renten, 162 Wash. 181, 298 P. 454, 457.
The word "exclusive," as used in deed granting exclusive right to erect and maintain poles with wires meant that the right was exclusive of grantor, not exclusive in grantee, American Telephone & Telegraph Co. of Massachusetts v. McDonald, 273 Mass. 324, 173 N.E. 502, 503.
EXCLUSIVE USE. As used in law authorizing registration of trade-marks, means exclusive use not only of specific mark but also any other con-fusingly similar mark or term. McKesson & Rob-bins v. Charles H. Phillips Chemical Co., C.C.A. Conn., 53 F.2d 1011.
Exclusive use does not mean that no one may or does not use way except claimant of easement, but means Only that claimant’s right to do so does not depend on like right in others, Rush v. Collins, 366 III. 307, 8 N.E.2d 659, 662.
Seminary property is fairly to be regarded as in "ex-clusive use" for educational purposes. Trustees of Phillips Exeter Academy v. Exeter, 90 N.H. 472, 27 A.2d 569, 591.
EXCLUSIVELY. Apart from all others. Lee v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 148 Fla. 612, 4 So.2d 868, 870, 871; People ex rel. Divico v. Adams, 264 App.Div. 315, 35 N.Y.S.2d 453, 455; Only, Lee v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 148 Fla. 612, 4 So.2d 868, 870, 871; Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 142 S.W.2d 519, 521, 522, 523. Purely. Baptist Memorial Hospital v. Couillens, 176 Tenn. 300, 140 S.W.2d 1088, 1092. Solely. Provident Life & Acci-dent Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 18 Tenn.App. 452, 79 S. W.2d 292, 296; Stuart v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 156 Or. 522, 68 P.2d 1037, 1044. Substantially all or for the greater part. Anoka County v. City of St. Paul, 194 Minn. 554, 261 N.W. 588, 99 A.L.R. 1137. To the exclusion of all others; without ad-mission of others to participation; in a inanner to exelude. Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. State, Tex. Civ.App., 142 S.W.2d 519, 521, 522, 523. Wholly. People ex rel. Divico v. Adams, 264 App.Div. 315, 35 N.Y.S.2d 453, 455; Baptist Memorial Hospital v. Couillens, 176 Tenn. 300, 140 S.W.2d 1088, 1092.
EXCLUSIVELY FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES. It is not essential to exemption from taxation under provisions exempting from taxation public prop-erty used "exclusively for any public purpose" that all the property that is part of the utility unit be used for public purposes. City of Toledo v. Jenkins, 143 Ohio St. 141, 54 N.E.2d 656, 664, 665.
EXCLUSIVELY INTERSTATE. Transportation of passengers by motor vehicles between points within state over route lying partly outside state held exclusively interstate. Conlin Bus Lines v. Old Colony Coach Lines, 282 Mass. 498, 185 N.E. 350, 352.
EXCLUSIVELY OF ALL OTHER CAUSES. Mean that, if accident is shown to be cause of injury for which action is brought, insured can recover. Williams v. General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corporation, Limited, of Perth, Scotland, 144 Kan. 755, 62 P.2d 856, 857.
EXCLUSIVELY USED. The phrase in provision exempting from taxation properties exclusively used for religious worship, for schools or for pur-poses purely charitable, has reference to primary and inherent as over against a mere secondary and incidental use. Salvation Army v. Hoehn, Mo., 354 Mo. 107, 188 S.W.2d 826, 830.
EXCOMMENGEMENT. Excommunication (q. v.). Co. Litt. 134a.
EXCOMMUNICATION. A sentence of censure pronounced by one of the spiritual courts for of-fenses falling under ecclesiastical cognizance.
It is described In the books as two-fold: (1) The lesser excommunication, which is an ecclesiastical censure, ex-cluding the party from the sacramenta; (2) the greater, which excludes him from the company of all Christians. Formerly, too, an excommunicated man was under various
civil disabilities. He could not serve upon juries, or be a witness in any court; neither could he bring an action to
recover landa or money due to him. These penalties are abolished by St. 53 Geo. III. c. 127. 3 Steph.Comm. 721.
EXCOMMUNICATO CAPIENDO. In ecclesiasti-cal law. A writ issuing out of chancery, founded on a bishop’s certificate that the defendant had been excommunicated, and requiring the sheriff to arrest and imprison him, returnable to the king’s bench. 4 Bl.Comm. 415; Bac. Abr. "Ex-communication," E.
EXCOMMUNICATO DELIBERANDO. A writ to the sheriff for delivery of an excommunicated person out of prison, upon certificate from the ordinary of his conformity to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 63.
EXCOMMUNICATO INTERDICITUR OMNIS AC-TUS LEGITIMUS, ITA QUOD AGERE NON PO-TEST, NEC ALIQUEM CONVENERE, LICET IPSE AB ALIIS POSSIT CONVENIRI. Co. Litt. 133. Every legal act is forbidden an excommuni-cated person, so that he cannot act, nor sue any person, but he may be sued by others.
EXCOMMUNICATO RECAPIENDO. A writ com-manding that persons excommunicated, who for their obstinacy had been committed to prison, but were unlawfully set free before they had given caution to obey the authority of the church, should be sought af ter, retaken, and imprisoned again. Reg. Orig. 67.
EXCULPATE is employed in sense of excuse of justification. State v. Langdon, 46 N.M. 277, 127 P.2d 875, 876.
EXCULPATION. In Scotland the law allows of an "exculpation", by which the prisoner is suffered before his trial to prove the thing to be impos-sible. State v. Langdon, 46 N.M. 277, 127 P.2d 875, 876.
EXCULPATION, LETTERS OF. In Scotch law. A warrant granted at the suit of a prisoner for citing witnesses in his own defense.
EXCULPATORY. Clearing or tending to clear from alleged fault or guilt; excusing. Moore v. State, 124 Tex.Cr.R. 97, 60 S.W.2d 453.
EXCULPATORY CLAUSE. Such clause in favor of a trustee in will implies that trustee has pow-er which he purports to execute, and it exculpates him where this power is exercised in good faith. In re Wacht’s Estate, Sur., 32 N.Y.S.2d 871, 897.
EXCUSABLE. Admitting of excuse or palliation.
As used In the law, this word implies that the act or omission spoken of Is on its face unlawful, wrong, or Hable to entail loas or disadvantage on the person chargeable, but that the circumstances attending it were such as to con-stitute a legal "excuse" for it, that la, a legal .reason for withholding or foregoing the punishment, liabIlity, or disadvantage which otherwlse would follow.
EXCUSABLE ASSAULT. One committed by ac-cident or misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means, with ordinary caution and without any unlawful intent. People v. O’Connor, 82 App. Div. 55, 81 N.Y.S. 555.
EXCUSABLE HOMICIDE. See Homicide.
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT. In practice, and parti-cularly with reference to the setting aside of a judgment taken against a party through his "ex-cusable neglect," this means a failure to take the proper steps at the proper time, not in conse-quence of the party’s own carelessness, inatten-tion, or willful disregard of the process of the court, but in consequence of some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident, or reliance on the care and vigilance of his counsel or on promis-es made by the adverse party. See 1 Bl. Judgm. § 340; Brothers v. Brothers, 71 Mont. 378, 230 P. 60, 61; Westbrook v. Rice, 28 N.D. 324, 148 N.W.827, 828; Boise Valley Traction Co. v. Boise City, 37 Idaho, 20, 214 P. 1037, 1038; Haas v. Scott, 115 Or. 580, 239 P. 202, 204.
EXCUSAT AUT EXTENUAT DELICTUM IN CAPITALIBUS QUOD NON OPERATUR IDEM IN CIVILIBUS. Bac. Max: r. 15. That may ex-cuse or palliate a wrongful act in capital cases which would not have the same effect in civil injuries. See Eroom, Max. 324.
EXCUSATIO. In the civil law. An excuse or rea-son which exempts from some duty or obligation.
EXCUSATOR.
English law. An excuser.
Old German law. A defendant; he who utterly denies the plaintiff’s claim. Du Cange.
EXCUSATOR QUIS QUOD CLAMEUM NON OP-POSUERIT, UT SI TOTO TEMPORE LITIGII FUIT ULTRA MARE QUACUNQUE OCCASIONE. Co. Litt. 260. He is excused who does not bring his claim, if, during the whole period in which it ought to have been brought, he has been beyond sea for any reason.
EXCUSE. A reason alleged for doing or not doing a thing. Worcester; State v. Weagley, 286 Mo. 677, 228 S.W. 817, 820; State v. Saffron, 143 Wash. 34, 254 P. 463. A matter alleged as a rea-son for relief or exemption from some duty or obligation.
That which is offered as a reason for being ex-cused, or a plea offered in extenuation of a fault or irregular deportment; it is that plea or state-ment made by the accused which arises out of the state of facts constituting and relied on as the cause. State v. Craig, 161 S.C. 232, 159 S.E. 559, 560.
EXCUSS. To seize and detain by law.
EXCUSSIO.
Civil law. A diligent prosecution of a remedy against a debtor; the exhausting of a remedy against a principal debtor, before resorting to his sureties. Translated "discussion" (q. v.).
Old English law. Rescue or rescous. Spelman.
EXEAT. A permission which a bishop Brants to a priest to go out of his diocese; also leave to go out generally. For "Ne Exeat", see that title.
EXECUTE. To complete; to make; to perform; to do; to follow out. Glover v. American Mort-gage Corporation, Tex.Civ.App., 94 S.W.2d 1235, 1236.
To flnish, accomplish, make complete, fulfill. To per-form; obey the injunctions of.
To make; as to execute a deed, which includes signing, sealing, and delivery; performance of all necessary for-malities. Heinbach v. Heinbach, 274 Mo. 301, 202 S.W. 1123, 1130; White v. Hendley, 35 Cal.App. 267, 169 P. 710, 713; Hathaway v. Cook, 258 III. 92, 101 N.E. 227, 228; Williams v. Kldd, 170 Cal. 631, 151 P. 1, 8, Ann.Cas.1916E, 703. The "execution" of a note involves not only the signing but the delivery of the note. Kennedy & Parson Co. v. Lander Dairy & Produce Co., 36 Wyo. 58, 252 P. 1036, 1038, 51 A.
L.R. 315; Lynch v. Figge, 192 N.Y.S. 873, 876, 200 App. Dly. 92; Perko v. Rock Springs Commercial Co., 37 Wyo. 98, 259 P. 520, 522; The execution of a contract includes performance of all acts necessary to render It complete as an instrument. Hofgesang v. Silver, 223 Ky. 101, 3 S.W.2d 185, 186; To make and sign contract, Glick v. Daniel, 184 Ark. 576, 42 S.W.2d 1007, 1008.
To perform; carry out according to Its terms; as to execute a contract, or a writ. State v. Miller, 104 W.Va. 226, 139 S.E. 711, 712; Harrity v. Steers, 185 N.Y.S. 704, 195 App.Div. 11.
To fulfill the purpose of; to obey; to perform the com-mands of ; as to execute a writ.
A statute is said to execute a use where it transmutes the equitable interest of the cestui que use into a legal es-tate of the same nature, and makes him tenant of the land accordingly, in lieu of the feoffee to uses or trugtee, whose estate, on the other hand, is at the same moment an-nihilated. 1 Steph.Comm. 339.
Word "sign" as used in trial court’s general oral charge and in special written charge given at request of defendant was synonymous with word "execute". Kinney v. Glenn, 29 Ala.App. 478, 198 So. 250, 253.
EXECUTED. Completed; carried into full ef-fect; already done or performed; taking effect immediately; now in existence or in possession; conveying an immediate right or possession. The opposite of executory.
A contract Is "executed" by being signed. Mastin Realty & Mining Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A. 8, 130 F.2d 1003, 1005. A trust does not become fully "ex-ecuted" until subject matter of It has been properly paid over to beneficiaries. Harlan v. Gleason, 180 Md. 24, 22 A. 2d 579, 581. Act or course of conduct carried to completion. Northwest Steel Rolling Milis v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.9, 110 F.2d 286, 290. Term imports idea that nothing remains to be done. Pacific Finance Corpora-tion v. Hendley, 119 Cal.App. 697, 7 P.2d 391, 393. Term when applied to contract includes delivery and Implies com-plete contract. Smith v. School Dist. No. 1, Marshall County, 187 Okl. 184, 102 P.2d 131, 134, 135. Term when applied to deed includes the signing thereof. National Fire Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 170 Okl. 593, 41 P.2d 645, 647.
Generally a jail sentence is "executed" only when the cowict has actually suffered the imprisonment. State ex rel. Libtz v. Coleman, 149 Fla. 28, 5 So.2d 60, 61.
EXECUTED CONSIDERATION. A considera-tion which is wholly past. 1 Pars. Cont. 391. An act done or value given before the making of the agreement.
EXECUTED CONTRACT. See Contract. EXECUTED ESTATE. See Estate.
EXECUTED FINE. The fine sur cognizance de droit, come ceo que il ad de son done; or a fine upon acknowledgment of the right of the cog-nizee, as that which he has of the gift of the cognizor. Abolished by 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 74.
EXECUTED NOTE. Under Small Loan Act note was not "executed" until it was both signed and delivered. Trustees System Co. of Newark v. Stoll, 13 N.J.Misc. 490, 179 A. 372, 373.
EXECUTED ORAL AGREEMENT. An oral agreement is not "executed" unless it has been fully performed by both parties. Walther v. Oc-cidental Life Ins. Co., 40 Cal.App.2d 160, 104 P.2d 551, 554.
EXECUTED REMAINDER. See Remainder. EXECUTED SALE. See SaleEXECUTED TRUST. See Trust. EXECUTED USE. See Use.
EXECUTED WRIT. In practice. A writ carried into effect by the officer to whom it is directed The term "executed," applied to a writ, has been held to mean "used." Amb. 61.
EXECUTIO. Lat. The doing or following up of a thing; the doing a thing completely or thor-oughly; management or administration.
In old practice. Execution; the final process in an action.
EXECUTIO BONORUM. In old English law. Management or administration of goods. Ad ec-clesiam et ad amitos pertinebit executio bonor-um, the execution of the goods shall belong to the church and to the friends of the deceased. Br’act. fol. 60b.
EXECUTIO EST EXECUTIO JURIS SECUNDUM JUDICIUM. 3 Inst. 212. Execution is the execu-tion of the law according to the judgment.
EXECUTIO EST FINIS ET FRUCTUS LEGIS. Co. Litt. 289. Execution is the end and fruit of the law.
EXECUTIO JURIS NON BASET INJURIAM. 2 Roll. 301. The execution of law does no injury.
EXECUTION. Carrying out some act or course of conduct to its completion. Northwest Steel Rolling Milis v. Commissioner of Interna’ Rev-enue, C.C.A.9, 110 F.2d 286, 290. Completion of an act. Domestic Finance Corporation v. Williams, 174 Misc. 227, 20 N.Y.S.2d 467, 469. Putting into force, Greene v. Wheeler, C.C.A.Wis., 29 F.2d 468, 469. The completion, fulfillment, or perfect-ing of anything, or carrying it into operation and effect.
At common law, executions are said to be elther final or quousque; the former, where complete satisfaction of the debt Is Intended to be procured by this process; the latter, where the execution is only a means to an end, as where the defendant Is arrested on ca. sa.
The word cannot be stretched to include prescription; the natural meaning of "execution" is "performance," in-cluding excuses for performance. Wood & Selick v. Com-pagnie Generale Transatlantique, C.C.A.N.Y., 43 F.2d 941, 942.
Where testatrlx left residue of her estate to be divided equally among named individuals, but provided that, if any of those beneficiarles should be deceased at time of "ex-ecution" of the will, their share "is" to revert to testatrix’ estate, the word "execution" had reference to time when will should take effect and not to time when will was signed. Central Nat. Bank v. Stevenson, 25 Del.Ch. 215, 16 A.2d 114, 115.
Writ of asslstance is in the nature of an "execution." Davis v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia, 217 N.C. 145, 7 S.E.2d 373, 376.

Attachment distinguished

Term "executions" as used In Code section dealing with commIssions which sheriff may charge in cases where sheriff has collected a judgment on execution without mak-ing a sale of the judgment debtor’s property is sufficiently broad to include attachment, Jones-Noland DrIlling Co. v. Bixby, 34 N.M. 413, 282 P. 382. 384.
Under an attachment, property of defendant Is placed in custody of law to await final determination of suit. and the attachment is really a prellminary execution depend-ent for its ultimate efficacy upon the rendering of a judg-ment in plaintiff’s favor; on the other hand, an "execu-tion" Is a remedy afforded by 19.w for the enforcement of a judgment of the court. J. M. Radford Grocery Co. v. Owenby, Tex.Civ.App., 34 S.W.2d 385, 387.

Criminal Law

The carrying into effect of the sentence of the law by the infliction of capital punishment. 4 Bl.Comm. 403; 4 Steph. Comm. 470

Prench Law

A method of obtalning satisfaction of a debt or claim by sale of the debtor’s property privately, i. e., without judi-cial process, authorized by the deed or agrecment of the parties or by custom; as, in the case of a stockbroker, who may sell securities of his customer, bought under his in-structions or deposited by him, to indemnify himself or make good a debt. Arg.Fr.Merc.Law, 557.

Garnishment

Execution Includes writ of garnishment. Buckley v. F. L. Riley Mercantile Co., 155 Miss. 150, 124 So. 267.
Garnishee execution is an execution against property. In re Howard Hotel Corporation, 150 Misc. 782, 270 N.Y.S. 259.
Garnishment after judgment "is execution" within stat-ute providing that execution shall only be issued from court in which judgment is rendered. Though a garnish-ment is not an execution, garnishment after execution Is practically an equitable execution. First Nat. Bank oí Cordell v. City Guaranty Bank of Hobart, 174 Okl. 545, 51 P.2d 573, 576.

Order of Sale

"Execution" in statute includes an order of sale. Bart-lett Mortg. Co. v. Morrison, 183 Okl. 214, 81 P.2d 318, 322; Blanscet v. Palo Duro Furniture Co., Tex.Civ.App., 68 S. W.2d 527, 528.

Practice
The name of a writ issued to a sheriff, constable, or marshal, authorizing and requiring him to execute the judgment of the court. Raulerson v. Peeples, 81 Fla. 206, 87 So. 629, 630.
For "Attachment execution," see Attachment.
For "Body Execution," "Dormant Execution," "Equitable Execution," "General Execution," "Junior Execution" and "Special Execution," see those titles.
For "Execution of Judgment or Decree," see that title.
For "Testatum execution," see Testatum. EXECUTION CREDITOR. See Creditor.
EXECUTION LIEN. An "execution lien" may be created by service of execution, levy upon real estate, and filing of a certificate of levy in the proper office of county in which real estate is located. Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. Maley, C.C.A.Ill., 125 F.2d 131, 135.
EXECUTION OF INSTRUMENT. Execution in-eludes signing, sealing, and delivering. Erie R. Co. v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co., 111 N.J.L. 100, 166 A. 205, 207. Completion of instrument. Domestic Finance Corporation v. Williams, 174 Misc. 227, 20 N.Y.S.2d 467, 469. Subscribing and delivery of instrument. Miller v. Jansen, Cal. App., 128 P.2d 97, 98.
Delivery is essential to complete execution of deed. Barnes v. Aycock, 219 N.C. 360, 13 S.E.2d 611, 612.
Execution imports, includes or involves delivery. Miller v. Jansen, 21 Ca1.2d 473, 132 P.2d 801, 802; McCarthy Co.v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.9, 80 F.2d 618, 620; Stocks v. Inzer, 232 Ala. 482, 168 So. 877, 878.
Execution includes performance of all acts necessary to render instrument complete and of every act required to give instrument validity or to carry it finto effect. North-west Steel Rolling Milis v. Commissioner of Internal Rev-enue, C.C.A.9, 110 F.2d 286, 290.
Execution of deed means making thereof, Turlington v. Neighbors, 222 N.C. 694, 24 S.E.2d 648, 650.
Execution of instruments means making thereof, and when spoken of deeds, it includes all acts such as signing, sealing, and delivering, which are necessary to give effect thereto. United States v. Peppa, D.C.Cal., 13 F.Supp. 669, 670.
Execution of prescription means preparation and delivery by authorized person. U. S. v. Peppa, D.C.Cal., 13 F.Supp. 669.
"Execution" of wrítten contract includes signing, un-conditional delivery by promisor, and acceptance by prom-isee. Coen v. American Surety Co. of New York, C.C.A. Mo., 120 F.2d 393, 397.
Performance and completion of all of those formal acts essential for mortgage’s effectíveness. Southern Enter-prises v. Foster, La.App., 12 So.2d 842, 844.
Signing, acknowledging, delivering and acceptance of mortgage are essential to "execution" of mortgage, Illi-nois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Holmes, 311 Ill.App. 286, 35 N.E.2d 823, 825.
Term "execution" as employed in respect to promissory note means both signing and delivery of bill or note, and mere signing is insufficient. In re Tynan’s Estate, 142 Neb. 671, 7 N.W.2d 628, 630.
The signing and publicatlon of a will.
The signing, sealing, and cielivery of deeds. Turlington v. Neighbors, 222 N.C. 694, 24 S.E.2d 648, 650.
Words "Issuing" and ”execution," used in statutes in re-lation to passing of title by tax deed, are interchangeable terma. Lance v. Smith, 123 Fla. 461, 167 So. 366, 369.
EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT OR DECREE. "Execution" is putting into effect of final judg-ment of court. Tice v. Tice, 208 Iowa 145, 224 N. W. 571, 572.
As used in Code provision regarding right to demand that nullity of judgment be declared unless defendant suf-fered judgment to be executed, means the seizure of prop-erty. Frank v. Currie, La.App., 172 So. 843, 848.
Execution embraces all appropriate means to execution of judgment, Buckley v. F. L. Riley Mercantile Co., 155 Miss. 150, 124 So. 267.
Process to carry into effect decree or judgment is execu-tion. Painter v. Berglund, 31 Cal.App.2d 63, 87 P.2d 360, 363; Miller v. London, 294 Mass. 300, 1 N.E.2d 198, 200.
Sometimes from the neglect of parties, or some other cause, it became impossible to carry a decree into execu-tion without the further decree of the court upon a bill filed for that purpose. This happened generally in cases where, parties having neglected to proceed upon the decree, their rights under it became so embarrassed by a variety of subsequent events that it was necessary to have the de-cree of the court to settle and ascertain them. Such a bill might also be brought to carry into execution the judg-ment of an inferior court of equity, if the jurisdiction of that court was not equal to the purpose; as in the case of a decree in Wales, which the defendant avoided by flee-ing into England. This species of bill was generally part-ly an original bill, and partly a bill in the nature of an original bill, though not strlctly original. Story, Eq,P1 342; Daniell, Ch.Pr. 1429.
Statutory means provided for enforcement of judgment requíring the payment of money is execution. Lupton v. Edmundson, 220 N.C. 188, 16 S.E.2d 840, 841.
The last stage of a suit, whereby possession is obtained of anythíng recovered. It is styled "final process," and consists in putting the sentence of the law in force. 3 Bi.
Comm. 412. The carrying finto effect of the sentence or judgment of a court. U. S. v. Nourse, 9 Pet. 28, 9 L.Ed. 31; Griffith v. Fowler, 18 Vt. 394; Hurlbutt v. Currier, 68 N.B. 94, 38 A. 502.
Within statute providing for execution of judgment after nye years from its entry, "execution" is used in broad sense of execution or carrying into effect by such means as are provided by law for enforcement of various classes of judgments. Bank of America N. T. & S. A. v. Katz, 45 Cal.App.2d 138, 113 P.2d 759, 760.
Writ of execution is a civil proceeding for enforcement of a judgment against property. Lash v, Mann, 141 Ohio St. 577, 49 N.E.2d 689, 691.
EXÉCUTION PAREE. In French law. A right founded on an act passed before a notary, by which the creditor may immediately, without cita-tion or summons, seize and cause to be sold the property of his debtor, out of the proceeds of which to receive his payment. It imports a con-fession of judgment, and is not unlike a warrant of attorney. Code Proc. La. art. 732; 6 Toullier, no. 208; 7 Toullier, no. 99.
EXECUTION SALE. A sale by a sheriff or other ministerial officer under the authority of a writ of execution which he has levied on property of the debtor. Noland v. Barrett, 122 Mo. 181, 26 S.W. 692, 43 Am.St.Rep. 572; Norton v. Reardon, 67 Kan. 302, 72 P. 861, 100 Am.St.Rep. 459.
Sale under order in mortgage foreclosure proceeding is sale on execution. Goslen v. Waddell Inv. Co., 145 Okl. 269, 292 P. 362, 364.
Execution sales relate to sales under a writ of execution. Peebler v. Olds, 56 Cal.App.2d 13, 132 P.2d 236, 237.
EXECUTION THEREOF. In ordinance provid-ing that contractor should not have claim under city contract unless controller certified that at date of "execution thereof" sufficient amount stood to credit of appropriation for contract, words "execution thereof" mean date of certifica-tion. Edwin E. Hallenbeck, Inc., v. Hadley, 312 Pa. 176, 167 A. 574, 575.
EXECUTIONE FACIENDA. A writ commanding execution of a judgment. Obsolete. Cowell.
EXECUTIONE FACIENDÁ IN WITHERNAM-IUM. A writ that lay for taking cattle of one who has conveyed the cattle of another out of the county, so that the sheriff cannot replevy them. Reg. Orig. 82.
EXECUTIONE JUDICII. A writ directed to the judge of an inferior court to do execution upon a judgment therein, or to return some reasonable cause wherefore he delays the execution. Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 20.
EXECUTIONER. The name given to him who puts criminals to death, according -to their sen-tence; a hangman.
EXECUTIVE. As distinguished from the legis-lative and judicial departments of government, the executive department is that which is charged with the detail of carrying the laws into effect and securing their due observance. The word "executive" is also used as an impersonal desig-nation of the chief executive officer of a state or nation. In re Railroad Com’rs, 15 Neb. 679, 50N.W. 276; In re Davies, 168 N.Y. 89, 61 N.E. 118,
56 L.R.A. 855; State v. Denny, 118 Ind. 382, 21 N.E. 252, 4 L.R.A. 79.
Under constitutional provision dividing powers of gov-ernment into the legislative, the executive, including the administrative, and the judicial departments, the word "ad-ministrative" is not used as synonymous with "executive". Tucker v. State, 218 Ind. 614, 35 N.E.2d 270, 290.
Words "executive" and "administrative" may be used as synonymous or interchangeable terms. Saint v. Allen, 169 La. 1046, 126 So. 548, 555.
EXECUTIVE ACT. "Executive" and "adminis-trative" duties are such as concern the execution of existing laws. People ex rel. Holvey v. Kapp, 355 III. 596, 189 N.E. 920, 923.
EXECUTIVE ADMINISTRATION, or MINIS. TRY. A political term in England, applicable to the higher and responsible class of public officials by whom the chief departments of the govern-ment of the kingdom are administered.
The number of these amounts to flfty or sixty persons. Their tenure of office depends on the confidence of a ma-jority of the house of comrnons, and they are supposed to be agreed on all matters of general policy except such as are specifically lett open questions. Cab.Lawy.
EXECUTIVE AGENCY. These words include col-lector and Secretary of Treasury. U. S. v. Para-mount Publix Corporation, Cust. & Pat. App., 73 F.2d 103, 105; Selective Training and Service Act boards. United States ex rel. Beers v. Selective Training and Service Local Board No. 1, Rock County, Wis., D.C.Wis., 50 F.Supp. 39, 40. Works Projects Administration. Thomason v. Works Projects Administration, C.C.A.Idaho, 138 F.2d 342, 343.
EXECUTIVE AGENT. President of a bank is but the "executive agent" of board of directors. Ex parte Lamberth, 242 Ala. 165, 5 So.2d 622, 623.
EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY. Petition for referen-dum filed with clerk is filed with executive author-ity of municipality. State ex rel. Tietje v. Collett, 138 Ohio St. 425, 35 N.E.2d 568, 570. State ex rel. City of Middletown v. City Commission of City of Middletown, 140 Ohio St. 368, 44 N.E.2d 459, 463.
EXECUTIVE CAPACITY. Duties in such capacity relate to active participation in control, supervi-sion, and management of business. Arkansas Amusement Corporation v. Kempner, C.C.A.Ark.,
57 F.2d 466, 473; Wilkinson v. Noland Co., D.C. Va., 40 F.Supp. 1009, 1012.
EXECUTIVE EMPLOYEES. Persons whose du-ties include some form of managerial authority, actually directing the work of other persons. Stanger v. Glenn L. Martin Co., D.C.Md., 56 F. Supp. 163, 166; persons whose duties relate to ac-tive participation in control, supervision and man-agement of business, or who administer affairs, or who direct, mana ge, execute or dispense. Stein-er v. Pleasantville Constructors, 181 Misc. 798, 46 N.Y.S.2d 120, 123.
The term executive employee carries the idea of super-vision of or control over ordinary employees. Ralph Knight, Inc., y. Mantel, C.C.A.Mo., 135 F.2d 514, 517EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS have relation to man-agement of all or some part of a business and im-ply activity. Arkansas Amusement Corporation v. Kempner, 182 Ark. 897, 33 S.W.2d 42, 43.
General charge, control, and conduct of taxation is "ex-ecutive function. " In re Opinion of the Justices, 87 N.H, 492, 179 A. 357, 110 A.L.R. 819.
EXECUTIVE OFFICER. An officer of the execu-tive department of government; one in whom re-sides the power to execute the laws; one whose duties are to cause the laws to be executed and obeyed. People v. Salsbury, 134 Mich. 537, 96 N. W. 939; Petterson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 58 S.W. 100; Mekota v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment, Neb., 19 N.W.2d 633, 640. An adminis-trative officer. Sheely v. People, 54 Colo. 136, 129 P. 201, 203.
Officers who are neither judicial nor legislative are ex-ecutive officers. Spivey v. State, 69 Okl.Cr. 337, 104 P.2d 263, 277; State v. Emory, 55 Idaho 649, 46 P.2d 67, 68.
One vested with power to carry out obligations intrusted to him and charged with administrative duties relative to executing, performing, and carrying into effect purposes of his employment. State Automobile Mutual Ins. Ass’n of Columbus v. Friedman, 122 Ohio St. 334, 171 N.E. 591, 592.
One who assumes command or control and directs course of business, or some part thereof, and who outlines duties and directs work of subordínate employees. Arkansas Amusement Corporation v. Kempner, 182 Ark. 897, 33 S.W. 2d 42, 43.
Cashier of bank Is executive officer. Mays v. Board of Com’rs of Creek County, 164 Okl. 231, 23 P.2d 664.
President and vice president of corporation are executive officers. Emmerglick v. Philip Wolf, Inc., C.C.A.N.Y., 138 F.2d 661, 662.
EXECUTIVE ORDER INDIAN RESERVATION is reservation created by order of Chief Executive withdjawing land within its boundaries from set-tlement or making other disposition of it under public land laws of United States. Santa Rita Oil & Gas Co. v. Board of Equalization, 101 Mont. 268, 54 P.2d 117, 122.
EXECUTIVE PARDON is an executive act of grace exempting an individual from punishment for a crime he has committed. People ex rel. Prisament v. Brophy, 287 N.Y. 132, 38 N.E.2d 468, 470, 139 A.L.R. 667. See Pardon.
EXECUTIVE POWERS AND DIJTIES on which Supreme Court may advise Governor, means a du-ty appertaining to the execution of the laws as they exist. In re Advisory Opinion to Governor, 154 Fla. 866, 19 So.2d 370, 371.
The "executive power" vested in the Governor by the Constitution is the power to "execute" the laws, that is, to carry them into effect, as distinguished from the power to make the laws and the power to judge them. Tucker v. State, 218 Ind. 614, 35 N.E.2d 270, 291.
EXECUTIVE SALARIES. Means salaries of of-ficers only. Leonard v. S. G. Frantz Co., 268 App. Div. 144, 49 N.Y.S.2d 329, 332.
EXECUTIVE WARRANT of Governor of asylum State is but license or privilege to move within state, and may be revoked before border is crossed. Downey v. Schmidt, D.C.Tex., 4 F.Supp. 1, 3.
EXECUTOR. A person appointed by a testator to carry out the directions and requests in his will, and to dispose of the property according to his testamentary provisions after his decease. In re Lamb’s Estate, 122 Mich. 239, 80 N.W. 1081; In re Sipchen’s Estate, 180 Wis. 504, 193 N.W. 385, 387; Ricks v. Johnson, 134 Miss. 676, 99 So. 142, 146.
A person to whom a testator by his will commits the exe-cution, or putting In force, of that instrument and its cod-icils. Fonbl. 307.
Appointment as executor of person on whom will casts affirmative duty to collect debts, adjust claims and make distribution of assets, is validated. In re Hazen’s Estate, 175 Misc. 851, 25 N.Y.S.2d 293, 295, 296.
One named In will as executor is an "executor" even be-fore probate of will. McKibban v. Scott, 131 Tex. 182, 114 S.W.2d 213, 215, 115 A.L.R. 1421.
One to whom another man commits by his Last will the execution of that will and testament. 2 BI.Comm. 503.
Person appointed under will appointing person as "ad-ministrator of my estate after my death," held testamen-tary "executor". Succession of Rassat, La.App., 157 So. 412, 414.
Person nominated as executor becomes "executor" only when will is admitted to probate and when he takes oath. Robertson v. National Spirltualists’ Ass’n, Tex., 25 S.W.2d 889, 894.
Person or corporation empowered to discharge duties of a aduclary, appointed as such by testator in his will. In re Watklns’ Estate, 113 Vt. 126, 30 A.2d 305, 310.
Term "executor" as employed in statute providing that county judge shall receive commission on actual cash re-ceipts of each executor, refers to executor administering estate of testator under control of probate court. Willis v. Harvey, Tex., 26 S.W.2d 288, 289.
Words "custodian and administrator" in will directing cnpointment of named person mean "executor." Frazier v. Frazier, 83 Colo. 188, 263 P. 413, 414.

Civil Law

A ministerial offIcer who executed or carried into effect the judgment or sentence in a cause.

Ecclesiastical Law

Executor d lege constitutus, an executor appointed by law; the ordinary of the diocese.
Executor ab episcopo constitutua, or executor dativus, an executor appointed by the bishop; an administrator to an intestate.
Executor 4 testatore constitutus, an executor appoInted by a testator. Otherwlse termed "executor testamentar-lacs;" a testamentary executor.
An executor to the tenor is one who, though not directly constituted executor by the will, is therein charged with duties in relation to the estate which can only be performed by the executor.
For "Coexecutor," "General Executor," "Institut-ed Executor," "Joint Executors," "Limited Execu-tor," "Special Executor" and "Substituted Execu-tor," see those titles.
EXECUTOR 1W SUBSTITUTION. A successor executor appointed by testator entitled to succeed to administration of estate following resignation of first executor who had partially administered upon such estate. In re Stahl’s Estate, 113 Ind. App. 29, 44 N.E.2d 529, 532.
EXECUTOR CREDITOR. See Creditor. EXECUTOR DATIVE. See Dative. EXECUTOR DE SON TORT. See De Son Tort

EXECUTOR LUCRATUS. An executor who has assets of his testator who in his Life-time made himself Hable by a wrongful interferente with the property of another. 6 Jur., N.S., 543.
EXECUTOR NAMED IN WILL. Where will re-quested that executor named designate some per-son to act as executor in case of his own disability and requested that a bank be named as executor in event of failure of executor named to designate another to act in his place, and executor named executed formal instrument requesting that the bank be appointed in his stead, such bank was "executor named in the will." In re Crosby’s Es-tate, 218 Minn. 149, 15 N.W.2d 501, 505.
EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR OF A DE-CEASED EXECUTOR. Under statute relating to right to require an accounting from "executor or administrator, of a deceased executor," represen-tative of deceased representative of deceased re-presentative of an estate cannot be compelled to file an account. In re Griffin’s Estate, 170 Misc. 496, 1066, 10 N.Y.S.2d 161.
EXECUTOR—TRUSTEE. An executor whose du-ties of holding and managing assets were extend-ed by the will beyond the period usually permis-sible for their administration. In re Putnam’s Will, 173 Misc. 151, 17 N.Y.S.2d 238, 239.
EXECUTORIAL DUTIES are what any layman could perform or was capable of performing. In re Owen’s Estate, 144 Misc. 688, 259 N.Y.S. 892.
For the most part, "executorial duties" consist in as-certalning proper net amount of various parta of testator’s property after payment of debts and expenses, and distrib-uting them among persons entítied. Keel v. First Nat. Bank of Pikeville, 271 Ky. 745, 113 S.W.2d 33, 36, 116 A.L. R. 151.
Generally, a power of sale given an executor which is of an imperative nature, and the exercíse of which is not left to executor’s discretion, creates an "executorial duty" ra-ther than a "trust". Esser v. Chimel, Del.Ch., 30 A.2d 685, 687.
EXECUTORY. That which is yet to be executed or performed; that which remains to be carried into operation or effect; incomplete; depending upon a future performance or event. The op-posite of executed.
Right which is not vested but líes in action and which requires resort to court of equity to invest plaintiff with right claimed is "executory." Parks v. Classen Co., 156 Okl. 43, 9 P.2d 432, 435.
As to executory "Bequests," "Contracts," "De-vises," "Estates," "Remainders," "Trusts," and "Uses," see those titles.
EXECUTORY CONSIDERATION. A considera-tion which is to be performed after the contract for which it is a consideration is made.
EXECUTORY CONTRACT TO SELL. Under which something remains to be done by either party before delivery and passing of title. Martin v. John Clay & Co., Mo.App., 167 S.W.2d 407, 411.
EXECUTORY FINES. These are the fines sur cognizance de droit tantum; sur concessit; and sur done, grant et render. Abolished by 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 74.EXECUTORY INTERESTS. A general term, com-prising all future estates and interests in land or personalty, other than reversions and remainders.
A right which is not vested in possession but lies in ac-tion, and which it is necessary to obtain the peculiar relief afforded by courts of equity in order to Invest plaintiff with the right claimed, is an "executory interest". Lang v. Shell Petroleum Corporation, Tex.C1v.App., 141 S.W.2d 667, 671.
EXECUTORY LIMITATION. A limitation of a future interest by deed or will; if by will, it is al-so called an "executory devise."
EXECUTORY PROCESS. A process which can be resorted to in the following cases, namely: (1) When the right of the creditor arises from an act importing confession of judgment, and which contains a privilege or mortgage in his favor; (2) when the creditor demands the execution of a judgment which has been rendered by a tribunal different from that within whose jurisdiction the execution is sought. Code Prac. La. art. 732; Marin v. Lalley, 17 Wall. 14, 21 L.Ed. 596.
EXECUTORY SALE. See Sale.
EXECUTORY UNILATERAL ACCORD. Nothing more than an offer to enter a contract. Boyd v. Christiansen, 229 Iowa 1, 293 N.W. 826, 828.
EXECUTORY WARRANTIES. Arise where in-sured undertakes to perform some executory stipu-lation, as that certain acts will be done, or that certain facts will continue to exist. Procacci v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.J.L. 423, 193 A. 180, 182.
EXECUTRESS. A female executor. Hardr. 165, 473.
EXECUTRIX. A woman who has been appointed by will to execute such will or testament.
EXECUTRY. In Scotch law. The movable es-tate of a person dying, which goes to his nearest of kin. So called as falling under the distribution of an executor. Bell.
EXEDOS. See Ejidos. EXIDOS. See Ejidos.
EXEMPLA ILLUSTRANT NON RESTRINGUNT LEGEM. Co. Litt. 240. Examples illustrate, but do not restrain, the law.
EXEMPLAR. A specimen which is capable of sup-porting both deduction and inference. In re Fish-er’s Estate, 47 Idaho 668, 279 P. 291, 293.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. See Damages.
EXEMPLI GRATIA. For the purpose of example, or for instance. Of ten abbreviated "ex. gr." or
EXEMPLIFICATION. An offlcial transcript of a document from public records, made in form to be used as evidence, and authentícated as a true copy.EXEMPLIFICATIONE. A writ granted for the exemplification or transcript of an original record. Reg. Orig. 290.
EXEMPLUM. In the civil law. Copy; a written authorized copy. This word is also used in the modern cense of "example,"—ad exemplum con-stituti singulares non trahi, exceptional things must not be taken for examples. Calvin.
EXEMPT, v. To release, discharge, waive, relieve from liability. Davidow v. Jenks, Sup., 48 N.Y.S. 2d 586, 588.
To relieve, excuse, or set free from a duty or service imposed upon the general class to which the individual exempted belongs; as to exempt from militia service. Jones v. Wells Fargo Co. Express, 83 Misc. 508, 145 N.Y.S. 601, 602. See 1 St. at Large, 272.
To relieve certain classes of property from lis-bility to sale on execution.
EXEMPT, n. One who is free from liability to military service; as distinguished from a detall, who is one belonging to the army, but detached or set apart for the time to some particular duty or service, and fiable, at any time, to be recalled to his place in the ranks. In re Strawbridge, 39 Ala. 379. Relieved. In re Miller’s Estate, 330 Pa. 477, 199 A. 148, 149. See Exempts.
EXEMPT FROM ALL TAXATION. In proposed constitutional amendment, exempting specified homesteads from taxation, mean exempt when not restrained by Federal Constitution. Gray v. Winthrop, 115 Fla. 721, 156 So. 270, 94 A.L.R. 804.
EXEMPTION. Freedom from a general duty or service; immunity from a general burden, tax, or charge. Green v. State, 59 Md. 128, 43 Am.Rep. 542; Koenig v. Railroad Co., 3 Neb. 380; Long v. Converse, 91 U.S. 113, 23 L.Ed. 233; Poore v. Bow-lin, 150 Tenn. 412, 265 S.W. 671.
A privilege allowed by law to a judgment debtor, by which he may hold property to a certain amount, or cer-tain classes of property, free from all liability to levy and sale on execution or attachment. Turrill y, McCarthy, 114 Iowa, 681, 87 N.W. 667; Williams v. Smith, 117 Wis. 142, 93 N.W. 464; In re Trammell, D.C.Ga.; 5 F.2d 326, 327.
A right given by law to a debtor to retain portion of his property free from claims of creditors. Pickens v. Pickens, 125 Tex. 410, 83 S.W.2d 951, 954.
An "exemption" contemplated by constitutional provi-sion forbidding exemption of property from taxation is an exemption from all taxation in any form. Turco Paint & Varnish Co. v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 421, 184 A. 37, 43.
An "exemption" from inheritance tax is a deduction. In re Maxson’s Estate, 30 Cal.App.2d 566, 86 P.2d 922, 924.
As applied to taxation "exemption" is freedom from burden of enforced contributions to expenses and mainte-nance of government. Washington Chocolate Co. v. King County, 21 Wash.2d 630, 152 P.2d 981, 984.
Credit against income tax for income tax paid to other state or country is an "exemption". Miller v. McColgan, 17 Ca1.2d 432, 110 P.2d 419, 424, 134 A.L.R. 1424; Keasbey & Mattison Co. v. Rothensies, C.C.A.3, 133 F.2d 894, 898.
Deduction made in determining taxable income is an "exemption," Tupelo Garment Co. of Tupelo, Miss. v. State Tax Commission, 178 Miss. 730, 173 So. 656, 660.

The words "exemption from seizure" in statute providing that a pension or other reward granted by the United States for military service is exempt from seizure in legal proceeding meant ”not subject to debts." In re McCor-mick’s Estate, 169 Misc. 672, 8 N.Y.S.2d 179, 188.
EXEMPTION LAWS. Laws which provide that a certain amount or proportion of a debtor’s property shall be exempt from execution.
EXEMPTION, WORDS OF. It is a maxim of law that words of exemption are not to be construed to import any liability; the maxim expressio un-ius exclusio alterius, or its converse, exciusio unius inclusio alterius, not applying to such a case. For example, an exemption of the crown from the bankruptcy act 1869, in one specified particular, would not inferentially subject the crown to that act in any other particular. Brown.
EXEMPTS. Persons who are not bound by law, but excused from the performance of duties im-posed upon others.
EXENNIUM. In old English law. A gift; a new year’s gift. Cowell.
EXEQUATUR. Lat. Let it be executed.
In French practice, this term is subscribed by judicial authority upon a transcript of a judgment from a foreign country, or from another part of France, and authorizes the execution of the judgment within the jurisdiction where it is so indorsed

International Law

A certificate issued by the foreign department of a state to a consul or commercial agent of an-other state, recognizing his official character, and authorizing him to fulfill his duties.
EXERCISE. To make use of. Thus, to exercise a right or power is to do something which it en-ables the holder to do. U. S. v. Souders, 27 Fed. Cas. 1267; Cleaver y, Comm., 34 Pa. 284; Snead v. Wood, 24 Ga.App. 210, 100 S.E. 714, 715.
To put in action or practice, to carry on some-thing, to transact. Salway v. Multnomah Lumber & Box Co., 134 Or. 428, 293 P. 420, 421.
The "exercise" of an option to purchase is merely the election of optionee to purchase. Floyd v. Morgan, 60 Ga, App. 496, 4 S.E.2d 91, 97.
EXERCISE OF JUDGMENT. Exercise of sound discretion, that is, discretion exercised, not arbi-trarily or willfully, but with regard to what is right and equitable. United States v. Beckman, C.C.A.Pa., 104 F.2d 260, 262.
EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION. In practical effect, "exercise of judicial discretion" by trial judge means doing as he pleases, unguid-ed by law. Borger v. Mineral Wells Clay Prod-ucts Co., Tex.Civ.App., 80 S.W.2d 333, 334.
EXERCISED DOMINION. Open acts and con-duct relative to land as evidence claim of the right of absolute possession, use, and ownership. Whelan v. Henderson, Tex.Civ.App., 137 S.W.2d 150, 153.
EXERCISING AN OPTION. Elements are deci-sion of optionee to purchase property under termsof option and communication of decision to op-tionor within life of option. Floyd v. Morgan, 60 Ga.App. 496, 4 S.E.2d 91, 95.
EXERCITALIS. A soldier; a vassal. Spelman.
EXERCITOR NAVIS. Lat. The temporary own-er or charterer of a. ship. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 512; The Phebe, 19 Fed.Cas. 418.
EXERCITORIA ACTIO. In the civil law. An action which lay against the employer of a vessel (exercitor navis) for the contracts made by the master. Inst. 4, 7, 2; 3 Kent, Comm. 161; Mack-eld. Rom. Law, § 512.
EXERCITORIAL POWER. The trust given to a ship-master.
EXERCITUAL. In old English law. A heriot paid only in arms, borses, or military accouter-ments.
EXERCITUS. In old European law. An army; an armed force. The term was absolutely indefi-nite as to number. It was applied, on various oc-casions, to a gathering of forty-two armed men, of thirty-five, or even of four. Spelman.
EXETER DOMESDAY. The name given to a record preserved among the muniments and charters belonging to the dean and chapter of Exeter Cathedral, which contains a description of the western parts of the kingdom, comprising the counties of Wilts, Dorset, Somerset, Devon, and Cornwall. The Exeter Domesday was published with several other surveys nearly contemporary, by order of the commissioners of the public rec-ords, under the direction of Sir Henry Ellis, in a volume supplementary to the Great Domesday, folio, London, 1816. Wharton.
EXFESTUCARE. To abdicate or resign; to re-sign or surrender an estate, office, or dignity, by the symbolical delivery of a staff or rod to the alienee.
EXFREDIARE. To break the peace; to commit open violence. Jacob.
EXIL/EREDATIO. In the civil law. Disinherit-ing; disherison. The formal method of excluding an indefeasible (or forced) heir from the entire inheritance, by the testator’s express declaration in the will that such person shall be exhcrres. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 711.
EXHAERES. In the civil law. One dilinherited. Vicat; Du Cange.
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REME-DIES. The doctrine is that, where an administra-Vive remedy is provided by statute, relief must be sought from administrative body and such rem-edy exhausted before courts will act. Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, Third Dist., 17 Ca1.2d 280, 109 P.2d 942, 949, 132 A.L.R. 715; Hill v. Bris-bane, 66 Cal.App.2d 15, 151 P.2d 578, 582.
EXHEREDATE. In Scotch law. To disinherit; to exclude from an inheritance.EXHIBERE. To present a thing corporeally, so that it may be handled. Vicat. To appear per-sonally to conduct the defense of an action at law.
EXHIBIT, v. To show or display; to offer or present for inspection. To produce anything in public, so that it may be taken into possession. Dig. 10, 4, 2.
To present; to offer publicly or officially; to file of record. Thus we speak of exhibiting a charge of treason, exhibiting a bill against an officer of the king’s bench by way of proceeding against him in that court. In re Wiltse, 5 Misc. 105, 25 N.Y.Supp. 737; Newell v. State, 2 Conn. 40.
To administer; to cause to be taken; as medi-cines.
To submit to a court or officer in course of pro-ceedings. In re Edwards’ Estate, 138 Neb. 671, 294 N.W. 422, 425.
The word implies some aflIrmadve act or at least some conduct on part of person charged with duty of exhibiting a thing or who exhibas it. Pecht v. Colby Management Corporation, 131 Cal.App. 2, 20 P.2d 768, 769.
EXHIBIT, n. A paper or document produced and exhibited to a court during a trial or hearing, or to a commissioner taking depositions, or to au-ditors, arbitrators, etc., as a voucher, or in proof of facts, or as otherwise connected with the sub-ject-matter, and which, on being accepted, is marked for identification and annexed to the depo-sition, report, or other principal document, or filed of record, or otherwise made a part of the case.
A paper referred to in and filed with the bill, answer, or petition in a suit in equity, or with a deposition. Brown v. Redwyne, 16 Ga. 68.
EXHIBITANT. A complainant in articles of the peace. 12 Adol. & E. 599.
EXHIBITED. Displayed. Callison v. State, Tex. Civ.App., 146 S.W.2d 468, 469.
EXHIBITIO BILLZE. Lat. Exhibition of a bill. In old English practice, actions were instituted by presenting or exhibiting a bill to the court, in cases where the proceedings were by bill; hence this phrase is equivalent to "commencement of the suit."
EXHIBITION. Something that one views, or at which one looks, and at the same time hears. Longwell v. Kansas City, 199 Mo.App. 480, 203 S.W. 657, 659.
As used In consignment of art objects, indicates a special showing, Lion v. LIllenfeld, Sup., 30 N.Y.S.2d 866, 869.
Motlon pictures are "exhibitions" subject to regulation. Thayer Amusement Corporation v. Moulton, 63 R.I. 182, 7 A.2d 682, 686, 124 A.L.R. 236.
Ecclesiastical law. An allowance for meat and drink, usually made by religious appropriators of churches to the vicar. Also the benefaction set-tled for the maintaining of scholars in the uni-versities, not depending on the foundation. Par-och. Antiq. 304.Scotch law. An action for compelling the pro-duction of writings.
EXHIBITION VALUE. "Minimum sale" or "ex-hibition value" is interchangeably used with term "price expectancy" in moving picture industry, de-noting minimum receipts which distributors ex-pect to realize from exhibition of pictures. Ex-port & Import Film Co. v. B. P. Schulberg Produc-tions, 125 Misc. 756, 211 N.Y.S. 838, 839.
EXHUMATION. Disinterment; the removal from the earth of anything previously buried therein, particularly a human corpse.
EXIGENCE, or EXIGENCY. Demand, want, need, imperativeness; emergency, something aris-ing suddenly out of the current of events; any event or occasional combination of circumstances, calling for immediate action or remedy; a press-ing necessity; a sudden and unexpected happen-ing or an unforeseen occurrence or condition. United States v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., D.C.N.C., 224 F. 160, 162; Los Angeles County v. Payne, 8 Ca1.2d 563, 66 P.2d 658, 663. Something arising suddenly out of circumstances calling for imme-diate action or remedy, or where something help-ful needs to be done at once, yet not so pressing as an emergency. State ex rel. Odenwald v. Dis-trict Court of Tenth Judicial Dist. in and for Fergus County, 98 Mont. 1, 38 P.2d 269, 271.
EXIGENCY OF A BOND. That which the bond demands or exacts, i. e., the act, performance, or event upon which it is conditioned.
EXIGENCY OF A WRIT. The command or im-perativeness of a writ; the directing part of a writ; the act or performance which it commands.
EXIGENDARY. In English law. An officer who makes out exigents. See Exigenter.
EXIGENT, or EXIGE FACIAS. L. Lat. In Eng-lish practice. A judicial writ made use of in the process of outlawry, commanding the sheriff to demand the defendant, (or cause him to be de-manded, exigi, faciat,) from county court co coun-ty court, until he be outlawed; or, if he appear, then to take and have him before the court on a day certain in term, to answer to the plaintiff’s action. 1 Tidd Pr. 132; 3 Bl. Comm. 283, 284; Archb. N. Pr. 485. Outlawry has long been ob-solete. See Allocato Comitatu; Allocatur Exigent.
EXIGENT LIST. A phrase used to indicate a list of cases set down for hearing upon various inci-dental and ancillary motions and rules.
EXIGENTER. An officer of the English court of common pleas, whose duty it was to make out the exigents and proclamations in the process of outlawry. Cowell. Abolished by St. 7 Wm. W. and 1 Vict. c. 30. Holthouse.
EXIGI FACIAS. That you cause to be demanded. The emphatic words of the Latin form of the writ of exigent. They are sometimes used as the name of that writ.EXIGIBLE. Demandable; requirable.
EXIGIBLE DEBT. A liquidated and demandable or matured claim. Gulf Refining Co. of Louisiana v. Glassell, 186 La. 190, 171 So. 846, 853.
EXILE. Banishment; the person banished.
EXILIUM. Lat. In old English law. (1) Exile; banishment from one’s country. (2) Driving away; despoiling. The name of a species of waste, which consisted in driving away tenants or vassals from the estate; as by demolishing build-ings, and so compelling the tenants to leave, or by enfranchising the bond-servants, and unlaw-fully turning them out of their tenements. Fleta, 1. 1, c. 9.
EXILIUM EST PATRIZE PRIVATIO, NATALIS SOLI MUTATIO, LEGUM NATIVARUM AMIS-SIO. 7 Coke, 20. Exile is a privation of country, a change of natal soil, a loss of native laws.
EXIST. To live; to have life or anin;iation; to be in present force, activity, or effect at a given time; as in speaking of "existing" contracts, creditors, debts, laws, rights, or liens. Wing v. Slater, 19 R.I. 597, 35 Atl. 302, 33 L.R.A. 566; Poe v. Poe, 125 Ark. 391, 188 S.W. 1190; In re Havel’s Estate, 156 Minn. 253, 194 N.W. 633, 34 A.L.R. 1300. To be or continue to be. State v. Saw-tooth Men’s Club, 59 Idaho 616, 85 P.2d 695, 698.
See, also, Existing.
EXISTENCE. As applied to will means physical existente. In re Kerckhof’s Estate, 13 Wash.2d 469, 125 P.2d 284, 287, 290; unrevoked. In re Flood’s Estate, 47 Cal.App.2d 809, 119 P.2d 168, 169.
EXISTIMATIO. In the civil law. The civil repu-tation which belonged to the Roman citizen, as such. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 135. Called a state or condition of unimpeached dignity or character, (dignitatis inlcesce status;) the highest standing of a Roman citizen. Dig. 50, 13, 5, 1.
Also the decision or award of an arbiter.
EXISTING. The force of this word is not neces-sarily confined to the present.
EXISTING CLAIM. Claim which has arisen. Great Western Oil Co. v. Bailey, 35 N.M. 277, 295 P. 298, 299.
EXISTING CREDITORS. As used in statute re-garding validity of chattel mortgage against ex-isting creditors, means general creditors who have acquired a lien thereon. In re Lewis’ Estate, 230 Iowa 694, 298 N.W. 842.
Persons having subsisting obligations against debtor at time fraudulent alienation was made or secret trust created, although claims may not have matured or been reduced to judgment until after such conveyance. First Nat. Bank v. Mer-rick, 103 N.J.Eq. 63, 142 A. 243; First State Bank of Mobeetie v. Goodner, Tex.Civ.App., 168 S.W. 2d 941, 944.To determine whether person is such an "ex-isting creditor" as can invoke protection of stat-ute of Elizabeth, inception of debt is time which controls. Matthews v. Montgomery, 193 S.C. 118, 7 S.E.2d 841, 848.
EXISTING DEBT. To have an "existing debt" it is sufficient if there is an absolute debt owing though the period for its payment may not yet have arrived. Helms v. State, 137 Old. 55, 280 P. 416, 417.
A tax may be a "debt" within meaning of agreement to assume "existing debts". Shepard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.7, 101 F.2d 595, 598.
EXISTING DISEASE. A chronic or definite af-fliction such as would be embraced in the common understanding and meaning of the term "diseased" or "sick." Browning v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, 94 Utah 532, 72 P.2d 1060, 1074.
EXISTING EQUITY implies an existing right to future payment, and including a contingent lia-bility, as distinguished from an "existing debt," implying a present, enforceable liability. Bark-ley v. Kerfoot, 77 Wash. 556, 137 P. 1046, 1047; State v. Smith, 107 Ohio St. 1, 140 N.E. 737, 738.
EXISTING INDEBTEDNESS ON THE POLICY. Reference in statute to any "existing indebtedness on the policy," to be deducted from reserve value in computing extended term insurance, means in-debtedness created by "proper assignment of poli-cy". Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Jamora, Tex.Civ. App., 44 S.W.2d 808, 812.
EXISTING LAW. As used in appropriation act for street improvements requiring refund from street railways under "existing law" refer to statute law. District of Columbia v. Georzetown & T. Ry. Co., 59 App.D.C. 335, 41 F.2d 424, 425.
As used in federal statute rendering initial carrier Hable for negligence of connecting carrier and providing that nothing in statute should deprive holder of bill of lading oí any remedy or right of action which he has under existing law mean existing federal law and not state law. Fort Worth & Denver City Ry. Co. v. Motley, Tex.Civ.App., 87 S.W.2d 551, 554.
EXISTING LIABILITIES embrace conditional or contingent obligations, which may or may not in the future result in indebtedness. Daniels v. Goff, 192 Ky. 15, 232 S.W. 66, 67.
A tax may be a "liability" within meaning of agreement to assume "existing liabilities." Shep-ard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A. 7, 101 F.2d 595, 598.
EXISTING PERSON. A child conceived, but not born, is to be deemed an "existing person" so far as may be necessary for its interests in the event of its subsequent birth. Comp.Laws N.D.1913, § 4337; 1 Bl.Comm. 130.
EXISTING PUBLIC SCHOOL. Mean not only the building, but the school grounds. State ex rel. Fronton Exhibition Co. v. Stein, 144 Fla. 387, 198 So. 82, 87.
EXISTING RAILROAD CORPORATIONS. Ex-tends to such as are incorporated alter as well asbefore its passage, unless exception is provided in their charters. Indianapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Blackman, 63 III. 117; Lawrie v. State, 5 Ind. 525; Fox v. Edwards, 38 Iowa, 215.
EXIST1N4 RIGHT. Rights as exist under gen-eral laws. Funk v. Inland Power & Light Co., 164 Wash. 110, 1 P.2d 872, 874.
EXISTING USE. Construction °É adaptability of a building or room for purpose, and employment of building or room or land within the purpose. Appeal of Yocom, 142 Pa.Super. 165, 15 A.2d 687, 690.
Utilization of premises so that they may be known in neighborhood as being employed for giv-en purpose. De Felice v. Zoning Board of Ap-peals of Town of East Haven, 130 Conn. 156, 32 A. 2d 635, 637, 638; Landay v. MacWilliams, 173 Md. 460, 196 A. 293, 297, 114 A.L.R. 984.
EXISTS OR IS KEPT OR MAINTAINED. An actual being; something in fact in existente; something continuing and not failing. McCarron v. Commonwealth, 169 Va. 387, 193 S.E. 509, 512.
EXIT. Lat. It goes forth. This word is used in docket entries as a brief mention of the issue of process. Thus, "exit fi. fa." denotes that a writ of fieri lacias has been issued in the particular case. The "exit of a writ" is the fact of its issu-ance.
EXIT WOUND. A term used in medical juris-prudence to denote the wound made by a weapon on the side where it emerges, after it has passed completely through the body, or through any part of it.
EXITUS. Children; offspring. The rents, issues, and profits of lands and tenements. An export duty. The conclusion of the pleadings.
EXLEGALITAS. In old English law. Outlawry. Spelman.
EXLEGALITUS. He who is prosecuted as an out-law. Jacob.
EXLEGARE. In old English law. To outlaw; to deprive one of the benefit and protection of the law, (exuere aliquem beneficio legis.) Spelman.
EXLEX. In old English law. An outlaw; qui est extra legem, one who is out of the law’s pro-tection. Bract. fol. 125. Qui beneficio legis pri-vatur. Spelman.
EXOINE. In French law. An act or instrument in writing which contains the reasons why a par-ty in a civil suit, or a person accused, who has been summoned, agreeably to the requisitions of a decree, does not appear. Poth. Proc. Crim. § 3, art. 3. The same as "Essoin" (q. v.).
EXONERATE. To relieve, to exculpate. Stan-dard Oil Co. of New York v. Stevens, 103 Vt. 1, 151 A. 507, 508.
EXONERATION. The removal of a burden, charge, or duty. Particularly, the act of relievinga person or estate from a charge or Bability by casting the same upon another person or estate. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Comm., 114 Ky. 787, 71 S.W. 916; Bannon v. Burnes, C.C.Mo., 39 Fed. 898.
A right or equity which exists between those who are successively hable for the same debt. "A surety who dis-charges an obligation is entitled to look to the principal for reimbursement, and to invoke the aid of a court of equity for this purpose, and a subsequent surety who, by the terms of the contract, is responsible only in case of the de-fault of the principal and a prior surety, may claim exoner-ation at the hands of either." Bisp.Eq. § 331.
A right to have a fund applied to payment of guaranteed claims. Stulz-Sickles Co. v. Fredburn Const. Corporation, 114 N.J.Eq. 475, 169 A. 27, 28.
The right which a person has who has been compelled to pay what another should be forced to pay in fuli. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co. of New York v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 124 Conn. 227, 199 A. 93, 94.

Scotch Law

A discharge; or the act of being legally dis-burdened of, or liberated from, the performance of a duty or obligation. Bell.
EXONERATIONE SECTIE. A writ that lay for the crown’s ward, to be free from all suit to the county court, hundred court, leet, etc., during wardship. Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 158.
EXONERATIONE SECT1E AD CURIAM BARON. A writ of the same nature as that last aboye de-scribed, issued by the guardian of the crown’s ward, and addressed to the sheriffs or stewards of the court, forbidding them to distrain him, etc., for not doing suit of court, etc. New Nat. Brev. 352.
EXONERETUR. Lat. Let him be relieved or discharged. An entry made on a bailpiece, where-by the surety is relieved or discharged from fur-ther obligation, when the condition is fulfilled by the surrender of the principal or otherwise.
EXORBITANT. Deviating from the normal or customary course, or going beyond the rule of es-tablished limits of right or propriety. U. S. v. Oglesby Grocery Co., D.C.Ga., 264 F. 691, 695.
EXORDIUM. The beginning or introductory part of a speech.
EXPATRIATION. The voluntary act of abandon-ing one’s country, and becoming the citizen or sub-ject of another. Ludlam v. Ludlam, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 489. See Emigration; Reynolds v. Haskins, C.C.A.Kan., 8 F.2d 473, 475, 45 A.L.R. 759; United States ex rel. Wrona v. Karnuth, D.C.N.Y., 14 F. Supp. 770, 771; 1 Barton, Conv. 31, note; Vaugh. 227, 281; 7 Co. 16; Dy. 2, 224, 298b, 300b; 2 P. Wms. 124; 1 Hale, Pl.Cr. 68; 1 Wood, Conv. 382; Westl.Priv.Int.Law; Story, Confi. Laws; Cock-burn, Nationality. The voluntary renunciation or abandonment of nationality and allegiance. Schaufus v. Attorney General of United States, D.C.Md., 45 F.Supp. 61, 66; Perkins v. Elg, D.C., 307 U.S. 325, 39 S.Ct. 884, 889, 83 L.Ed. 1320.
EXPECT. To await; to look forward to some-thing intended, promised, or likely to happen. At-chison, etc., R. Co. v. Hamlin, 67 Kan. 476, 73 P. 58; Kronenberg v. Whale, 21 Ohio App. 322, 153N.E. 302, 308; to look for mentally, to look for-ward to, as to something about to happen or come, to have a previous apprehension of whether good or evil, to look for with some confidente, and once meant to demand, to require. Holcomb v. Holcomb, 173 Miss. 192, 159 So. 564, 566.
The word has also a secondary meaning, in which it implies a demand rather than anticipation, as where a person, in negotiating a contract, says he will "expect" to write hall the flre insurance. Sillman v. Spokane Savings & Loan Soc., 103 Wash. 619, 175 P. 296, 297.
Where testator gave Life estate provided that after Life tenant’s death he "expected" his realty to be sold the word "expect" was almost equivalent of word "direct". Wattjes v. Faeth, 379 III. 290, 40 N.E.2d 521, 524.
EXPECTABLE RISK. Risk which is indefinite and uncertain. Martin v. Hodson, 93 N.H. 66, 35 A.2d 402, 404.
EXPECTANCY. That which is expected or hoped for. The condition of being deferred to a future time, or of dependence upon an expected event; contingency as to possession or enjoyment. With respect to the time of their enjoyment, estates may either be in possession or in expectancy; and of expectancies there are two sorts,—one created by the act of fhe parties, called a "remainder;" the other by act of law, called a "reversion." 2 B1.Comm. 163.
" ‘Expectancy’ as applied to property, is contingency as to possession, that which is expected or hoped for. At most it is a mere hope or expectation, contingent upon the will and Pleasure of the landowner, and hardly reaches the height of a property right, much less a vested right, be-cause where there is no obligation, there is no right. It is a possibility for which a party may under certain cir-cumstances properly hope." Robinson v. Eagle-Picher Lead Co., 132 Kan. 860, 297 P. 697, 698, 75 A.L.R. 840.
EXPECTANCY OF LIFE. In the doctrine of life annuities, the share or number of years of life which a person of a given age may, upon an equal-ity of chance, expect to enjoy. Wharton.
EXPECTANT. Contingent as to enjoyment. Hay-ing relation to, or dependent upon, a contingency.
EXPECTANT ESTATES. See Estate in Expect-ancy.
EXPECTANT REIR. A person who has the ex-pectation of inheriting property or an estate, but small present means.
The term is chiefiy used in equity, where relief is afford-ed to such persons against the enforcement of "catching bargains," (q. v.) Jeffers v. Lampson, 10 Ohio St. 106; In re Robbins’ Estate, 199 Pa. 500, 49 A. 233. "The phrase is used not in its literal meaning, but as including every one who has either a vested remainder, or a contingent remainder in a family property, including a remainder in a portion, as well as a remainder in an estate, and every one who has the hope of succession to the property of an ancestor, either by reason of his being the heir-apparent or presumptive, or by reason, merely, of the expectation of a devise or bequest on account of the supposed or presumed affection of his ancestor or relation. More than this, the doctrine as to expectant heirs has been extended to all reversioners and remaindermen. So that the doctrine not only included the class mentioned, who in some popular sense might be called ‘expectant heirs,’ but also all re-maindermen and reversioners." Jessel, M. R.
EXPECTANT RIGHT. A contingent right, not vested; one which depends on the continued exis-tence of the present condition of things until the happening of some future event. Pearsall v. Great Northern R. Co., 161 U.S. 646, 16 S.Ct. 705, 40 L. Ed. 838; Pollack v. Meyer Bros. Drug Co., C.C.A. Mo., 233 F. 861, 868; Adams v. Ernst, 1 Wash.2d 254, 95 P.2d 799, 804. A right is contingent, not vested, when it comes into existente only on an event or condition which may not happen. Wirtz v. Nestos, 51 N.D. 603, 200 N.W. 524, 530.
EXPECTATION OF LIFE. See Expectancy of Life.
EXPECTED. A shipping agent’s letter that a ship was "expected" to be ready to be loaded at a port on a stated date constituted a representation of a belief or expectation. L. N. Jackson & Co. v. Seas Shipping Co., 185 Misc. 94, 56 N.Y.S.2d 501, 503.
EXPECTED SERVICE. Incidental to employment is that service which an employee has no absolute duty to perform but is of the type of duty which has the approval of the employer. Severson v. In-dustrial Commission, 221 Wis. 169, 266 N.W. 235, 236.
EXPEDIENCY. Involves utility. Woolf v. Fuller, 87 N.H. 64, 174 A. 193, 196, 94 A.L.R. 1067.
EXPEDIENT. Apt and suitable to end in view. Werner v. Biederman, 64 Ohio App. 423, 28 N.E.2d 957, 959. Whatever is suitable and appropriate in reason for the accomplishment of a specified object. Eustace v. Dickey, 240 Mass. 55, 132 N.E 852, 862.
EXPEDIENTE. An historical record of proceed-ings in connection with grant of land by the sover-eign. State v. Balli, Tex.Civ.App., 173 S.W.2d 522, 526. In Mexican law, a term including all the papers or documents constituting a grant or title to land from government. Vanderslice v. Hanks, 3 Cal. 27, 38.
EXPEDIMENT. The whole of a person’s goods and chattels, bag and baggage. Wharton.
EXPEDIT REIPUBLIC2rE NE SUA RE QUIS MALE UTATUR. It is for the interest of the state that a man should not enjoy his own property im-properly (to the injury of others). Inst. 1, 8, 2.
EXPEDIT REIPUBLICZE UT SIT FINIS LITIUM. It is for the advantage of the state that there be an end of sults; it is for the public good that ac-tions be brought to a close. Co.Litt. 303b; Broom, Max. 365-6; Belcher v. Farrar, 8 Allen, Mass. 329. This maxim belongs to the law of all countries: 1 Phill. Int. L. 553; French v. Shotwell, 5 Johns. Ch., N.Y., 555, 568.
EXPEDITAT1E ARBORES. Trees rooted up or cut down to the roots. Fleta, 1. 2, c. 41.
EXPEDITATION. In old forest law. A cutting off the claws or ball of the forefeet of mastiffs or other dogs, to prevent their running after deer;— a practice for the preservation of the royal for-ests. Cart. de For. c. 17; Spelman; Cowell.EXPEDITE. To hasten; to make haste; to speed. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ridley, 119 Okl. 138, 249 P. 289, 290.
EXPEDITER. An employee whose duty is to see that shortage in material at one point in a plant is remedied by delivery of the needed ma-terial from another part of the plant where it is stacked or stored. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 250 Ala. 354, 34 So. 2d 474, 476.
EXPEDITIO. An expedition; an irregular kind of army. Spelman.
EXPEDITIO BREVIS.. In old practice. The serv-ice of a writ. Townsh. Pl. 43.
EXPEDITION. A sending forth or setting forth for the execution of some object of consequence. Progress. An important journey or excursion for a specific purpose; as, a military or exploring ex-pedition; also, the body of persons making such an excursion. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of Unit-ed States v. Dyess, 194 Ark. 1023, 109 S.W.2d 1263, 1265.
An important journey or excursion for specific purpose; a journey, march, or voyage generally of several or many persons for definite purpose, such as a military or exploring expedition or a trading expedition to the African coast; the word carries an implication of a military exploit or of an exploration into remote regions or over new routes. Day v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., C.C.A.Colo., 83 F.2d 147, 149.
EXPEDITIOUS. Possessed of, or characterized by, expedition or efficiency and rapidity in action; performed with, or acting with, expedition; quick; speedy. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ridley, 119 Okl. 138, 249 P. 289, 290.
EXPEL. In regard to trespass and other torts, this terco means to eject, to put out, to drive out, and generally with an implication of the use of force. Perry v. Fitzhowe, 8 Q.B. 779; Smith v. Leo, 92 Hun, 242, 36 N.Y.S. 949.
EXPEND. To pay out, use up, consume. Adams v. Prather, 176 Cal. 33, 167 P. 534, 538, 3 A.L.R. 928; School Dist. No. 24 of Marion County v. Smith, 82 Or. 443, 161 P. 706, 708. To pay out, lay out, use up, and implies receiving sornething in re-turn. In re Holmes’ Estate, 233 Wis. 274, 289 N.W. 638, 641.
EXPENDERE. The word "expense" had its ori-gin in the Latin word "expendere"; "ex" meaning "out," and "pendere" meaning "to weigh." State v. DeWitt C. Jones Co., 108 Fla. 613, 147 So. 230, 233.
EXPENDITORS. Paymasters. Those who expend or disburse certain taxes. Especially the sworn offiaer who supervised the repairs of the banks of the canals in Romney Marsh. Cowell.
EXPENDITURE. An expending, a laying out of money; disbursement;—it is not the same as an "appropriation," the setting apart or assignmentto a particular person or use, in exclusion of all others. Grout v. Gates, 97 Vt. 434, 124 A. 76, 80.
As used in constitutional provision relating to allowable increase over preceding fiscal year. includes all expendi-tures legally made by county rather than expenditures in enforcement of law only. Crow v. Board of Sup’rs of Stanislaus County, 135 Cal.App. 451, 27 P.2d 655.
The word "expenditure" has been defined as the spend-ing of money; the act of expending; disbursement ex-pense; money expended; a laying out of money; pay-ment ; expenditure. Crow v. Board of Sup’rs of Stanislaus County, 135 Cal.App. 451, 27 P.2d 655.
EXPENSE LITIS. Costs or expenses of the suit, which are generally allowed to the successful party.
EXPENSE. That which is expended, laid out or consumed; an outlay; charge; cost; price. Row-ley v. Clarke, 162 Iowa 732, 144 N.W. 908, 911.
Actual outlay or actual obligation to make outlay, U. S. v. Block & Kohner Mercantile Co., D.C.Mo., 33 F.2d 196, 197; an actual and honest disbursement, H. B. Humphrey Co. v. Pollack Roller Runner Sled Co., 278 Mass. 350, 180 N. E. 164, 166; an outlay of money; the expenditure of time, labor, and thought; the employment and consumption of time and labor ; act of expending, disbursement, expendi-ture, etc., State v. De Witt C. Iones Co., 108 Fla. 613, 147 So. 230, 233; expenditures, outlays, or disbursements of money, In re McMurray, 131 Misc. 182, 227 N.Y.S. 115, 117; laying out or expending of money or other resources, as time or strength; expenditure; hence drain on resources; detriment; Loss; as, at the expense of health; the habit of expending; money expended; outlay; charge; as, ex-penses for the journey, In re Bates’ Will, 152 Misc. 627, 274 N.Y.S. 93; laying out or spending of money or other resources, In re Bond & Mortgage Guarantee Co., Sup:, 39 N.Y.S.2d 760, 767.
For "Current Expenses," see that title.
EXPENSE IN CARRYING ON BUSINESS. Usual or customary expenditure in course of business during the year. Whitney v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.3, 73 F.2d 589, 591.
EXPENSES OF ADMINISTRATION. As used in Revenue Act means obligations incurred after decedent’s death by his representatives in adminis-tering his estate. Mayer v. Reinecke, D.C.I11., 28 F.Supp. 334, 339.
EXPENSES OF FAMILY. Medical and funeral ex-penses are "expenses of the family" within mean-ing of statute making expenses of family charge-able upon property of both husband and wife. Hansen v. Hayes, 175 Or. 358, 154 P.2d 202, 205.
Under such a statute the terco includes not only roer-chandise used by family as a whole, but also expenses, such as medica! aid, hospital services and burla’ attend-ance, incurred or supplied for one of the spouses. In re De Nisson’s Guardianship, 197 Wash. 265, 84 P.2d 1024, 1026.
EXPENSES OF RECEIVERSHIP. Comprehend allowances to receivers’ counsel, master’s fees, ap-praisers’ fees, auditors’ fees, and rent and expenses incurred by receivers in conducting business. Phil-adelphia Dairy Products Co. v. Summit Sweets Shoppe, Ch., 113 N.J.Eq. 458, 167 A. 667.
EXPENSES OF THE STATE. Within constitu-tional provision for raising revenue has reference to general operating expenses of state government for fiscal year. State ex rel. Conrad v. Langer, 68 N.D. 167, 277 N.W. 504, 509.EXPENSIS
EXPENSIS MILITUM NON LEVANDIS. An an-cient writ to prohibit the sheriff from levying any allowance for knights of the shire upon those who held lands in ancient demesne. Reg.Orig. 261.
EXPERIENCE. A state, extent, or duration of being engaged in a particular study or work; the real life as contrasted with the ideal or imaginary. Arthur v. City oi Pittsburgh, 330 Pa. 202, 198 A. 637, 638. A word implying skill, facility, or prac-tical wisdom gained by personal knowledge, feel-ing, and action, and also the course or process by which one attains knowledge or wisdom. Chicago,
I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Gorman, 58 Ind.App. 381, 106 N.E. 897, 898.
EXPERIENCE RATE. Under compensation policy "experience rate," which is payable or applicable rate, is made up by taking the basic rate and considering the business conducted by the insured. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. of New York v. Rochester Fruit & Vegetable Co., 232 App.Div. 321, 249 N.Y.S. 572, 575.
EXPERIENTIA PER VARIOS ACTUS LEGEM FACIT. MAGISTRA RERUM EXPERIENTIA. Co.Litt. 60; Branch, Princ. Experience by various acts makes law. Experience is the mistress of things.
EXPERIMENT. A trial or special test or observa-tion made to confirm or disprove something doubt-ful. Stone v. City of Florence, 203 S.C. 527, 28 S.E.2d 409, 410, 150 A.L.R. 953; Bragg v. Ohio Chemical & Manufacturing Co., 349 Mo. 577, 162 S.W.2d 832, 837.
In patent law, elther a trial of an uncompleted mechani-cal structure to ascertain what changes or additions may be necessary to make it accomplish the design of the pro-jector, or a trial of a completed machine to test or
il-
lustrate its practical effIciency. In the farmer case, the inventor’s efforts, being Incomplete, 11 they are then abandoned, will have no effect upon the right of a subse-quent Inventor; but if the experiment proves the capaclty of the machine to effect what its inventor proposed, the law assigns to him the merit of having produced a complete invention. Northwestern Fire Extinguisher Co. v. Phlla-delphia Fire Extinguisher Co., 10 Phila. 227, 18 Fed.Cas. 394.
EXPERIMENTAL TESTIMONY. That of some witness who, after the commission of the crime, makes experiments for the purpose of ascertain-ing the effect of a certain act under certain con-ditions, and swears to such experiments. State v. Harlan, Mo.Sup., 240 S.W. 197, 201.
EXPERT EVIDENCE. Testimony given in rela-tion to some scientific, technical, or professional matter by experts, i. e., persons qualified to speak authoritatively by reason of their special training, skill, or familiarity with the subject.
Evidence of persons who are skilled in some art, science, profession, or business, which skill or knowledge is not common to their fellow men, and which has come to such experts by reason of special study and experience in such art, science, profession, or business. Culver v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 6 W.W.Harr. 582, 179 A. 400.
Opinion by qualifled person on facts already proved in-volving scientific or technical knowledge, and not evidence of thing done or measurement taken which any one is competent to prove. Crichton v. Krouse, La.App., 150 So443, 445; Allen v. Tex. & N. O. R. Go., Tex.Civ.App., 70 S.W.2d 758, 763.
Opinion of witness possessing peculiar knowledge, wis-dom, skill or information regarding subject matter under consideration, acquired by study, investigation, observa-tion, practice or experience and not likely to be possessed by ordinary layman or inexperienced person. Baker v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 353 Mo. 625, 183 S.W.2d 873, 875; Ambruster v. Levitt Realty & Investment Co., 341 Mo. 364, 107 S.W.2d 74, 79.
Such as is given on questions of science, skill, or trade by persons learned or experienced therein. Langford v. State, 124 Tex.Cr.R. 473, 63 S.W.2d 1027.
EXPERT WITNESSES may be men of science ed-ucated in the art, or persons possessing special or peculiar knowledge acquired from practical ex-perience. Empire Oil & Réfining Co. v. Hoyt, C. C.A.Mich., 112 F.2d 356, 360.
One who gives result of process of reasoning which can be mastered only by special scientists. Phillips v. Tidwell, 26 Tenn.App. 543, 174 S.W.2d 472, 477; one who has skilled experience or ex-tensive knowledge in his calling, or in any branch of learning, King v. State, 109 Tex.Cr.R. 173, 3 S. W.2d 802, 804, 57 A.L.R. 407; one who has special knowledge of subject, Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers’ Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Messenger, 181 Md. 295, 29 A.2d 653, 655; Hutchens v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., Tex.Civ.App., 161 S.W.2d 571, 573; Greenstreet v. Greenstreet, 65 Idaho 36, 139 P.2d 239, 242; one who is skilled in some art, science, trade, profession, or other human activity, and possesses peculiar knowledge concerning it, Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communica-tions Commission, 68 App.D.C. 292, 96 F.2d 564, 568; person competent to give expert testimony, Ambruster v. Levitt Realty & Investment Co., 341 Mo. 364, 107 S.W.2d 74, 79.
Witnesses who have acquired ability to deduce correct inferences from hypothetically stated facts, or from facts lnvolving scientific or technical knowledge. Clty of Chicago v. Lehmann, 262 III. 468, 104 N.E. 829, 830.
Witnesses who have had special opportunity for observa-tion, or special training or special skill in obtaining the facts in a case. Milis v. Richardson, 126 Me. 244, 137 A. 689, 690.
Experts. An expert is a sklllful or experienced person; a person having skill or experience, or peculiar knowledge on certain subjects, or in certain professions; a scientiflc witness. See Congress & E. Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 657, 25 L.Ed. 487; Koccis v. State, 56 N.J.Law, 44, 27 A. 800; Ellingwood v. Bragg, 52 N.H. 489; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Rochester, Tex.Civ.App., 281 S.W. 306, 311.
One possessing, with reference to particular sub-ject, knowledge not acquired by ordinary persons, Oklahoma Natural Gas Corporation v. Schwartz, 146 Okl. 250, 293 P. 1087, 1090; one skilled in any particular art, trade, or profession, being possessed of peculiar knowledge concerning the same, and one who has given subject in question particular study, practice, or observation. Hardy v. Dahl, 210 N.C. 530, 187 S.E. 788, 790; one who by habits of life and business has peculiar skill in forming opinion on subject in dispute, Robertson v. lEtna Life Ins. Co., 37 Ga.App. 703, 141 S.E. 504, 505; Sims v. State, 40 Ga.App. 10, 148 S.E. 769, 771; one who can see all sides of a subject, Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co. v. Howes, 246 Ky. 843, 56 S.W.2d 539.Persons professionally acquainted with the science or practice in question. Strickl.Ev. 408. Persons conversant with the subject-matter on questions of science, skill, trade, and others of like kind. Best, Ev. § 346; Crosby v. City of East Orange, 84 N.J.Law, 708, 87 A. 341, 342; Pridgen v. Gíbson, 194 N.C. 289, 139 S.E. 443, 445, 54 A.L.R. 885.
Persons selected by the court or parties in a cause, on account of their knowledge or skill, to examine, estimate, and ascertain things and make a report of their opinions. Merlin, Répert.
Persons who are professionally acquainted with some science or are skilled in some art or trade, or who have experience or knowledge in relation to matters which are not generally known to the people. Miller v. State, 9 Oki.Cr. 255, 131 P. 717, 718, L.R.A.1915A, 1088.
EXPILARE. In the civil law. To spoil; to rob or plunder. Applied to inheritances. Dig. 47, 19; Cod. 9, 32.
EXPILATIO. In the civil law. The offense of unlawfully appropriating goods belonging to a succession. It is not technically theft (furtion) because such property no longer belongs to the decedent, nor to the heir, since the latter has not yet taken possession.
In the common law, the grant of letters testamentary, or letters of administration, relates back to the time of the death of the testator or intestate; so that the property of the estate is vested in the executor or administrator from that períod.
EXPILATOR. In the civil law. A robber; a spoiler or plunderer. Expilatores sunt atrociores tures. Dig. 47, 18, 1, L
EXPIRATION. Cessation; termination from mere lapse of time; as the expiration of a lease, statute, and the like. Marshall v. Rugg, 6 Wyo. 270, 45 Pac. 486, 33 L.R.A. 679; Harris v. Gold-berg, 111 Misc.Rep. 600, 182 N.Y.S. 262, 263. Com-ing to a close. Clevenger v. Kern, 100 Ind.App. 581, 197 N.E. 731, 737. Termination or end. Pe-tition of Prime, 335 Pa. 218, 6 A.2d 530, 532.
The record known in insurance circies as "expirations" is in effect a copy of policy íssued to Insured which con-tains the date of issuance, name of ínsured, expiration, amount, premiums, property covered and terms of ínsur-anee. Woodruff v. Auto Owners Ins. Co, 300 Mich. 54, 1 N.W.2d 450, 453; Kerr & Elliott v. Green Mountaln Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 111 Vt.. 502, 18 A.2d 164, 168.
The term "expiration," as in an insurance policy, refers to termination of the policy by lapse of time covering the policy períod, whlle "cancellation" refers to termination of the policy by act of either or both parties prior to ending of the policy period. Beha v. Breger, 223 N.Y.S. 726, 731, 130 Misc.Rep. 235; Hanson v. Royal Ins. Co., C.C.A.Tenn., 257 F. 715, 716.
EXPIRATION OF CREDIT. As used in statute, refers to expiration of additional period of grace or credit extension accorded the debtor. Flesh-man v. Whiteside, 148 Or. 73, 34 P.2d 648, 650, 93 A.L.R. 1456.
EXPIRATION OF PERIOD FOR REDEMPTION. As used in statute concerning conveyance of title by tax deed, it means time of application for tax deed. Hartman v. Mimmack, 116 Mont. 392, 154 P.2d 279, 281.
EXPIRE. Where term of lease has ended, either by lapse of time or by limitation, it has expired. Burnee Corporation v. Uneeda Pure Orange Drink Co., 132 Misc. 435, 230 N.Y.S. 239, 246.EXPIRY OF THE LEGAL. In Scotch law and practice. Expiration of the period within which an adjudication may be redeemed, by paying the debt in the decree of adjudication. Bell; 3 Jurid. Styles, 3d ed. 1107.
EXPLEES. See Esplees.
EXPLETA, EXPLETIA, or EXPLECIA. In old records. The rents and profits of an estate.
EXPLICATIO. In the civil law. The fourth pleading; equivalent to the surrejoinder of the common law. Calvin.
EXPLICIT. Not obscure or ambiguous, having no disguised meaning or reservation. Eclipse Lumber Co. v. Bitler, 213 Iowa 1313, 241 N.W. 696, 698.
EXPLOITATION. Act or process of exploiting, making use of, or working up; utilization by ap-plication of industry, argument, or other means of turning to account, as the exploitation of a mine or a forest. State Finance Co. v. Hamacher, 171 Wash. 15, 17 P.2d 610, 613.
EXPLORATION. In mining law. The examina-tion and investigation of land supposed to contain valuable minerals, by drilling, boring, sinking shafts, driving tunnels, and other means, for the purpose of discovering the presence of ore and its extent. Colvin v. Weimer, 64 Minn. 37, 65 N.W. 1079.
EXPLORATOR. A scout, huntsman, or chaser.
EXPLOSION. A sudden expansion of a liquid substance with result that gas generated by the expansion escapes with violence, usually causing a loud noise. Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Har-rison-Wright Co., 207 N.C. 661, 178 S.E. 235.
A sudden and rapid combustion, causing violent expan-sion of the air, and accompanied by a report. United Life, Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Foote, 22 Ohio St. 348, 10 Am. Rep. 735; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Empire Coal Mining Co., C.C.A.Colo., 30 F.2d 794, 798. In the common accept-ance of the term, it includes the sudden bursting or break-ing up from an interna’ or other force, and is not límíted to cases caused by combustion or flre. American Paper Prod-ucts Co. v. Continental Ins. Co. 208 Mo.App. 87, 225 S.W. 1029, 1030. The ordinary idea is that the exploslon is the cause, whlle the rupture 15 the effect. Mitchell v. Ins. Co., 183 U.S. 42, 22 S.Ct. 22, 46 L.Ed. 74.
A violent bursting or expansion with noise following the sudden production of great pressure or a sudden release of pressure. Lever Bros. Co. v. Atlas Assur. Co.,
131 F.2d 770; 775, 776.
A violent expansion of some force, accompanied by noise. Sweeney v. Blue Anchor Beverage Co., 325 Pa. 216, 189 A. 331, 335.
Burstíng of something with great noise and violence. Lever Bros. Co. v. Atlas Assur. Co., C.C.A.Ind., 131 F.2d 770, 775, 776.
Bursting with a loud noise or detonation. Bower v. Aetna Ins. Co., D.C.Tex., 54 F.Supp. 897, 898.
Sudden release of pressure such as disruption of steam boiler, Travellers’ Indemnity Co. v. B. & B. Ice & Coal Co., 248 Ky. 443, 58 S.W.2d 640.
The word "explosion" is variously used in ordinary speech, and is not one that admits of exact definition. Every combustion of an exploslve substance, whereby other property is ignited and consumed, would not be an "explo-sion," within the ordinary meaning of the term. It is notused as a synonym of "combustion." An explosion may be descríbela generally as a sudden and rapid combus-tion, causing violent expansion of the air, and accompanied by a report. Out the rapidity of the combustion, the vio-lence of the expansion, and the vehemence of the report vary in intensity as often as the occurrences multiply. Hence an explosion is an if,ca of degrees; and the trua meaning of the word, in each particular case, must be set-tled, not by any flxed standard or accurate measurement, but by the common experience and notions of men in mat-ters of that sort. Insurance Co. v. Foote, 22 Ohio St. 348, 10 Am.Rep. 735. And see Insurance Co. v. Dorsey, 56 Md. 81, 40 Am.Rep. 403; Louisville Underwriters v. Durland, 123 Ind. 544, 24 N.E. 221, 7 L.R.A. 399.
The word "explosion," when used in a Eire policy, is that which ordinary men, not scientists, understand an explo-sion to be. Roma Wine Co. v. Hardware Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Minnesota, 31 Cal.App.2d 455, 88 P.2d 260, 262.
EXPLOSION OF ANY KIND. Under fire policy exempting insurer from liability, phrase refers not to agency producing explosion, but to kinds of material which explode. McDonald v. Royal Ins. Co., 98 Mont. 572, 40 P.2d 1005, 1006.
EXPLOSIVE. Any substance by whose decom-position or combustion gas is generated with such rapidity that it can be used for blasting or in fire-arms. Schwartz v. Northern Life Ins. Co., C.C. A.Cal., 25 F.2d 555, 559.
"Explosive" is compound or mixture susceptible of explo-siva chemical reaction, as gunpowder or nitroglycerine, and has been construed not to cover speciflc things which do explode or contain explosive material. Henderson v. Mas-sachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 337 Mo. 1, 84 S.W.2d 922,
925•
EXPORT, v. To carry or to send abroad. Tennes-see Oil Co. v. McCanless, 178 Tenn: 683, 157 S.W. 2d 267, 271, 272. To send, take, or carry an ar-ticle of trade or commerce out of the country. To transport merchandise from one country to an-other in the course of trade. To carry out or con-vey goods by sea. State v. Turner, 5 Har., Del., 501.
Transportation of goods from United States to foreign country. West India Oil Co. v. Sancho, C.C.A.Puerto Rico, 108 F.2d 144, 147.
"Export," in its primary sense, means to carry or send out of a place, and in secondary sense means to carry from one state or country. McKesson & Robblns v. Collins, 18 Cal.App.2d 648, 64 P.2d 469, 470.
While the word export technically includes the landing In as well as the ghipment to a foreign country, it is often used as meaning enly the shipment from this country. S. v. Chavez, 228 V.S. 525, 33 S.Ct. 595, 57 L.Ed. 950.
EXPORT, n. A thing or commodity exported. More commonly used in the plural.
In American law, this term is only used oí goods carried to foreign countries, not of goods transported from one state ’01 another. Swan v. U. S., 190 U.S. 143, 23 S.Ct. 702, 47 L.Ed. 984; hothermel v. Meyerle, 136 Pa. 250, 20 A. 583, 9 L.R.A. 366.
EXPORT TAX. A tax on goods going out and which actually leave the country. Krauter v. Menchacatorre, 202 App.Div. 200, 195 N.Y.S. 361, 363.
EXPORTATION. A severance of goods from mass of things belonging to United States with intention of uniting them to mass of things be-longing to some foreign country. U. S. v. Hill,C.C.A.N.Y., 34 F.2d 133, 135. The act of sending or carrying goods and merchandise from one country to another.
EXPOSE, v. To show publicly; to display; to offer to the public view; as, to "expose" goods to sale, to "expose" a tariff or schedule of rates, to "expose" the person. Comm. v. Byrnes, 158 Mass. 172, 33 N.E. 343; Adams Exp. Co. v. Schlessinger, 75 Pa. 246. To "expose for sale" means to keep and show for the purpose of selling. State v. Hogan, 212 Mo.App. 473, 252 S.W. 90; to have in stock. People ex rel. Goldstein v. Glass, 154 Misc. 569, 278 N.Y.S. 764.
To place ln a position where the object spoken of is open to danger, on where it is near or accessible to anything which may affect it detrlmentally; as, to "expose" a child, or to expose oneself or another to a contagious disease or to danger or hazard of any kind. In re Smith, 146 N.Y. 68, 40 N.E. 497, 28 L.R.A. 820; Davis v. Insurance Co., 81 Iowa, 496, 46 N.W. 1073, 10 L.R.A. 359; Eau Claire Sand & Gravel Co. v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 173 Wis. 561, 181 N.W. 718. To cast out to chance, to place abroad, or in a situation unprotected. Shannon v. People, 5 Mich. 90.
Word "exposed" as used in pedestriaa’s complaint against city meant that city negligently permitted hole to remain in street open and unguarded. City of Birmingham v. Chambless, 222 Ala. 249, 132 So. 313.
EXPOSÉ. Fr. A statement; account; recital; explanation. The term is used in diplomatic lan-guage as descriptive of a written explanation of the reasons for a certain act or course of conduct.
EXPOSITIO. Lat. Explanation; exposition; in-terpretation.
EXPOSITIO QUirE EX VISCERIBUS CAUSE NASCITUR, EST APTISSIMA ET FORTISSIMA IN LEGE. That kind of interpretation which is born [or drawn] from the bowels [or vitals] of a cause is the aptest and most forcible in the law. 10 Coke, 24b.
EXPOSITION. Explanation; interpretation.
EXPOSITION DE PART. In French law. The abandonment of a child, unable to take tare of itself, either in a public or private place.
EXPOSITORY STATUTE. One the office of which is to declare what shall be taken to be the true meaning and intent of a statute previously enacted. Black, Const.Law (3d ed.) 89. And see Lindsay v. United States Sav. & Loan Co., 120 Ala. 156, 24 So. 171, 42 L.R.A. 783; People v. Board of Sup’rs, 16 N.Y. 424.
They are often expressed thus: "The true intent and meaning of an act passed • • • be and is hereby declared to be;" "the provisions of the act shall not here-after extend"; or "are hereby declared and enacted not to apply," and the like. This is a common mode of legisla-tlon.
EXPOSURE. The act or state of exposing or be-ing exposed. See Expose.
Words "exposure to unnecessary danger" and the words "unnecessary exposure to danger", include all cases of exposure to unnecessary danger attributable to insured’s negligente. Oakley v. National Casualty Co., 217 N.C. 150, 7 S.E.2d 495, 496; Micca v. Wisconsin Nat. Life Ins. Co., C.C.A.I11., 75 F.2d 710, 712.
For "Indecent exposure", see IndecentEXPOSURE OF CHILD. Placing it (with the in-tention of wholly abandoning it) in such a place or position as to leave it unprotected against dan-ger and jeopard its health or lif e or subject it to the peril of severe suffering or serious bodily harm. Shannon v. People, 5 Mich. 90.
EXPOSURE OF PERSON. In criminal law. Such an intentional exposure, in a public place, of the naked body or the private parts as is cal-culated to shock the feelings of chastity or to cor-rupt the morals of the community. Gilmore v. State, 118 Ga. 299, 45 S.E. 226.
EXPRESS. Clear; definite; explicit; unmistak-able; not dubious or ambiguous. In re Moon’s Will, 107 Vt. 92, 176 A. 410, 412. Clear, definite, plain, direct. State ex rel. Andrews v. Zangerle, 101 Ohio St. 235, 128 N.E. 165, 167. Declared in terms; set forth in words. Directly and distinct-ly stated. State ex rel. Ashauer v. Hostetter, 344 Mo. 665, 127 S.W.2d 697, 699. Explicit. Elliott v. Hudson, 117 W.Va. 345, 185 S.E. 465, 467; made known distinctly and explicitly, and not left to inference. Minneapolis Steel & Machinery Co. v. Federal Surety Co., C.C.A.Minn., 34 F.2d 270, 274. Manifested by direct and appropriate language, as distinguished from that which is inferred from conduct. The word is usually contrasted with "implied." State v. Denny, 118 Ind. 449, 21 N.E. 274, 4 L.R.A. 65.
"Express" necéssarily implies previous knowl-edge of intended personal use. Burford v. Hues-by, 35 Cal.App.2d 643, 96 P.2d 380, 381.
To force out by pressure; to press or squeeze out, as the juice of a fruit; to empty by pressure or squeezing. Strommen v. Prudential Ins. Co., 187 Minn. 381, 245 N.W. 632, 634.
As to express "Conditions," "Consent," "Consid-eration," "Contracts," "Covenants," "Dedication," "Emancipation," "Invitation," "Malice," "Notice," "Obligation," "Trust," "Waiver," and "Warranty," see those titles.
EXPRESS ABROGATION. Abrogation by ex-press provision or enactment; the repeal of a law or provision by a subsequent one, referring direct-ly to it.
Express abrogation 1s that literally pronounced by the new law either in general terms, as when a final clause abrogates or repeals all laws contrary to the provisions of the new one, or in particular terms, as when it abrogates certain preceding laws which are named.
EXPRESS ACTIVE TRUST. See Trust.
EXPRESS ASSUMPSIT. An undertaking to do some act, or to pay a sum of money to another; manifested by express terms.
An assumpsit ls "expresa" if promisor puta his engage-ment in distinct and definite language. Dukes v. Rogers, 67 Ga.App. 661, 21 S.E.2d 295, 297.
An undertaking made orally, by writing not un-der seal, or by matter of record, to perform act or to pay sum of money to another. Holcomb v. Kentucky Union Co., 262 Ky. 192, 90 S.W.2d 25, 27; Anderson v. Biesman & Carrick Co., 287 III. App. 507, 4 N.E.2d 639, 640, 641.
EXPRESS AUTHORITY. Authority delegated to agent by words which expressly authorize him to do a delegable act. Greep v. Bruns, 160 Kan. 48, 159 P.2d 803, 808. Authority distinctly, plainly ex-pressed, orally or in writing. Ulen v. Knecttle, 50 Wyo. 94, 58 P.2d 446, 449, 111 A.L.R. 565. Author-ity which is directly granted to or conferred upon agent in express terms. Stevens v. Frost, 140 Me. 1, 32 A.2d 164, 168; Riefsnyder v. Dougherty, 301 Pa. 328, 152 A. 98, 100.
That which confers power to do a particular identical thing set forth and deciared exactly, plainly, and directly with well-defined limits; an authoríty given In direct terms, deflnitely and explicitly, and not left to inference or implication, as distinguished from authority which is gen-eral, implied, or not directly stated or given. Fergus v. Brady, 277 Di. 272, 115 N.E. 393, 396, Ann.Cas.1918B, 220.
EXPRESS COLOR. An evasive form of special pleading in a case where the defendant ought to plead the general issue. Abolished by the com-mon-law procedure act, 1852, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, § 64.
EXPRESS COMMON—LAW DEDICATION. See Dedication.
EXPRESS COMPANY. A firm or corporation en-gaged in the business of transporting parcels or other movable property, in the capacity of com-mon carriers, and especially undertaking the safe carriage and speedy delivery of small but valu-able packages of goods and money. Alsop v. Southern Exp. Co., 104 N.C. 278, 10 S.E. 297, 6 L.R.A. 271; Pfister v. Central Pac. Ry. Co., 70 Cal. 169, 11 P. 686, 59 Am.Rep. 404.
A common carrier that carries at regular and stated times, over fixed and regular routes, money and other val-uable packages, which cannot be conveniently or safely carried as common freight; and also other articles and packages of any description which the shipper desires or the nature of the article requires should have safe and rapid transit and quick delivery, transporting the same in the immediate charge of its own messenger on passenger steamers and express and passenger railway trains, which it does not own or operate, but with the owners of which it contracts for the carriage of lts messengers and freights. Pacific Exp. Co. v. Seibert, C.C.Mo., 44 F. 310.
EXPRESS DISSATISFACTION. Where will de-clares that any one expressing dissatisfaction with its provisions should forfeit his interest, "dissat-isfaction" is legally "expressed" when beneficiary contests or objects in legal proceeding to enforce-ment of any provision of will. In re Hickman’s Estate, 308 Pa. 230, 162 A. 168, 169.
EXPRESS PERMISSION within statute respect-ing automobile owner’s liability includes prior knowledge of intended use and affirmative and ac-tive consent thereto. Bradford v. Sargent, 136 Cal.App. 324, 27 P.2d 93.
EXPRESS PRIVATE TRUST. See Trust.
EXPRESS REPEAL. Abrogation or annulment of previously existing law by enactment of subse-quent statute declaring that former law shall be revoked or abrogated. Brockman v. Board of Di-rectors of Jefferson County Bridge Dist., 188 Ark. 396, 66 S.W.2d 619. A repeal of statute is "ex-press" when it is literally declared by a subse-quent statute. Stoker v. Police Jury of Sabine Parish, La.App., 190 So. 192, 194.
EXPRESS REPUBLICATION of will occurs where testator repeats ceremonies essential to valid execution, with avowed intention of repub-lishing will. In re Simeone’s Estate, 141 Misc. 737, 253 N.Y.S. 683, 689.
EXPRESS REQUEST. That which occurs when one person commands or asks another to do or give something, or answers affirmatively when asked whether another shall do a certain thing. Zeidler.v. Goelzer, 191 Wis. 378, 211 N.W. 140, 144.
EXPRESS TERMS. Within provision that quali-fied acceptance, in "express terms," varíes effect of draft, "express terms" means clear, unambigu-ous, definite, certain, and unequivocal terms. In-ternational Finance Corp. v. Philadelphia Whole. sale Drug Co., 312 Pa. 280, 167 A. 790, 792.
EXPRESSA NOCENT, NON EXPRESSA NON NOCENT. Things expressed are [may be] preju-dicial; things not expressed are not. Express words are sometimes prejudicial, which, if omit-ted, had done no harm. Dig. 35, 1, 52; Id. 50, 17, 195. See Calvin.
EXPRESSA NON PROSUNT QU’E NON EX-PRESSA PRODERUNT. 4 Coke, 73. The expres-sion of things of which, f unexpressed, one would have the benefit, is useless. Thing expressed may be prejudicial which when not expressed will profit.
EXPRESSED. Means stated or declared in di-rect terms, set forth in words; not left to infer-ence or implication. Anderson v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. No. 91, 390 Ill. 412, 61 N.E.2d 562, 567.
EXPRESSIO EORUM QUE TACITE INSUNT NI-HIL OPERATUR. The expression or express mention of those things which are tacitly implied avails nothing. 2 Inst. 365.
A man’s own words are void, when the law speaketh as much. Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 3, no. 26. Words used to express what the law will imply without them are mere words of abundante. 5 Coke, 11; Broom, Max. 669, 753;
2 Pars.Contr. 28; 4 Co. 73; Andr.Steph.Pl. 366; Hob. 170;
3 Atk. 138; 11 M. & W. 569; 7 Exch. 28.
EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTER-IUS. Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. Co.Litt. 210a; Burgin v. Forbes, 293 Ky. 456, 169 S.W.2d 321, 325; Newblock v. Bowles, 170 Okl. 487, 40 P.2d 1097, 1100. Mention of one thing implies exclusion of another. Fazio v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 321 Pa. 7, 182 A. 696, 698; Saslaw v. Weiss, 133 Ohio St. 496, 14 N.E.2d 930, 932. When certain persons or things are specified in a law, contract, or will, an intention to ex-elude all others from its operation may be in-ferred. Little v. Town of Conway, 171 S.C. 27, 170 S.E. 447, 448.
Under this maxim, if statute specifles one exception to a general rule or assumes to specify the effects of a certain provision, other exceptions or effects are exciuded, People v. One 1941 Ford 8 Stake Truck, Engine No. 99T370053, License No. P.8410, Cal., 159 P.2d 641, 642.
EXPRESSIO UNIUS PERSONZE EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS. Co.Litt. 210. The mention of one person is the exclusion of another. See Broom, Max. 651.
EXPRESSLY. In an express manner; in direct or unmistakable terms; explicitly; definitely; di-rectly. Le Ballister v. Redwood Theatres, 1 Cal. App.2d 447, 36 P.2d 827; St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Hill, 336 Mo. 17, 76 S.W.2d 685, 689. In an express manner; in direct terms; with distinct purpose; particularly. Hawkins v. Mattes, 171 Okl. 186, 41 P.2d 880, 891; the opposite of implied-ly. Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381, 396.
EXPRESSUM FACIT CESSARE TACITUM. That which is expressed makes that which is im-plied to tease, [that is, supersedes it, or controls its effect.] Thus, an implied covenant in a deed is in all cases controlled by an express covenant. 4 Coke, 80; Broom, Max. 651; 5 Bingh.N.C. 185; 6 B. & C. 609; 2 C. & M. 459; 2 E. & B. 856; And-over & Medford Turnpike Corp. v. Hay, 7 Mass. 106; Galloway v. Holmes, 1 Doug., Mich., 330.
Where a law sets down plalnly its whole meaning the court 15 prevented from making it mean what the court pleases. Munro v. City of Albuquerque, 48 N.M. 306, 150 P.2d 733, 743.
EXPRESSUM SERVITIUM REGAT VEL DE-CLARET TACITUM. Let service expressed rule or declare what is silent.
EXPROMISSIO. In the, civil law. The species of novation by which a creditor accepts a new debtor, who becomes bound instead of the old, the latter being released. 1 Bouv.Inst. no. 802.
EXPROMISSOR. In the civil law. A person who assumes the debt of another, and becomes solely hable for it, by a stipulation with the creditor. He differs from a surety, inasmuch as this con-tract is one of novation, while a surety is jointly Hable with his principal. Mackeld.Rom.Law, 538; Dig. 12, 4, 4; 16, 1, 13; 24, 3, 64, 4; 38, 1, 37, 8.
EXPEOMITTERE. In the civil law. To under-take for another with the view of becoming Hable in his place. Calvin.
EXPROPRIATION. This word primarily denotes a voluntary surrender of rights or claims; the act of divesting oneself of that which was previously claimed as one’s own, or renouncing it. In this sense it is the opposite of "appropriation."
A meaning has been attached to the term, imported from its use in foreign jurisprudence, which makes it synony-mous with the exercise of the power of eminent domain, i. e., the compulsory taking from a person, on compensa-tion made, of his private property for the use of a railroad, canal, or other public work. Brownsville v. Pavazos, 2 Woods 293, Fed.Cas.No.2,043. In Louisiana expropriation is used as is taking under eminent domain in most of the other states. In England "compulsory purchase" la used; Halsbury, Laws of England.

Freneh Law

Expropriation is the compulsory realization of a debt by the creditor out of the lands of his debtor,

or the usufruct thereof. When the debtor is coten-ant with others, it is necessary that a partition should first be made. It is confined, in the first place, to the lands (if any) that are in hypothéque, but afterwards extends to the lands not in hypo- . théque. Moreover, the debt must be of a liqui-dated amount. Brown.
EXPULSION. A putting or driving out. Eject-ment; banishment; a cutting off from the privi-leges of an institution or society permanently. John B. Stetson University v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637, 639. The act of depriving a member of a corporation, legislative body, assembly, so-ciety, commercial organization, etc., of his mem-bership in the same, by a legal vote of the body itself, for breach of duty, improper conduct, or other sufficient cause. New York Protective Ass’n v. McGrath, Super.Ct., 5 N.Y.S. 10; Palmet-to Lodge v. Hubbell, 2 Strob., S.C., 462, 49 Am. Dec. 604. Also, in the law of torts and of land-lord and tenant, an eviction or forcible putting out. See Expel.
"Separation" from a church by reason of a schism is not like "expulsión" or "excommunication," which terms necessarily involve involuntary and compulsory separation of members. Lindstrom v. Tell, 131 Minn. 203, 154 N.W. 969, 971.
EXPUNGE. Means to destroy or obliterate; it implies not a legal act, but a physical annihilation. Andrews v. Police Court of City of Stockton, Cal. App., 123 P.2d 128, 129. To blot out; to efface de-signedly; to obliterate; to strike out wholly. Webster. See Cancel.
EXPlURGATION. The act of purging or cleans-ing, as where a book is published without its ob-scene passages.
EXPURGATOR. ene who corrects by expurging.
EXQU1ESTOR. In Roman law. One who had filled the office of qucestor. A title given to Tri-bonian. Inst. prcem. § 3. Used only in the abla-tive case, (exqucestore.)
EXROGARE. (From ex, from, and rogare, to pass a law.) In Roman law. To take something from an old law by a new law. Tayl. Civil Law, 155.
EXTEND. Lends itself to .great variety of mean-ings, which must in each case be gathered from context. Blouch v. Stevens, 106 N.J.L. 488, 150 A. 581, 583.
It may mean to broaden the application or action oí, Meyering v. MIller, 30 Mo. 885, 51 S.W.2d 65, 66; to carry forward, Loeffier v. Federal Supply Co., 187 Okl. 373, 102 P.2d 862, 864; to cause to reach or continue as from polnt to point, Henderson Development Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 121 W.Va. 284, 3 S.E.2d 217, 219; to expand, enlarge, prolong, lengthen, wlden, carry out, further than the orig-inal limit; as, to extend the time for flling an answer, to extend a lease, term oí °ince, charter, railroad track, etc., State v. Armstrong, 31 N.M. 220, 243 P. 333, 345; Lesser-Goldman Cotton Co. v. Cache River Drainage Dist., 174 Ark. 160, 294 S.W. 711, 713; State v. Scott, 113 Mo. 559, 20 S.W. 1076; Moers v. Reading, 21 Pa. 201; Keetch v. Cord-ner, 90 Utah 423, 62 P.2d 273, 277, 108 A.L.R. 52; to give as a privilege, Tantum v. Keller, 95 N.J.Eq. 466, 123 A. 299, 300, 301, 302; to give wider range, State ex rel. Berthot v. Gallatin County High School Dist., 102 Mont. 356, 58 P.2d264, 266; to make more comprehensive or caprIcious, Mey-erIng v. Miller, 33 Mo. 885, 51 S.W.2d 65, 66; Keetch v. Cordner, 90 Utah 423, 62 P.2d 273, 277, 108 A.L.R. 52; to stretch out or to draw out; Crane Enamelware Co. v. Smith, 168 Tenn. 203, 76 S.W.2d 644; Loeffier v. Federal Supply Co., 187 Okl. 373, 102 P.2d 862, 864.
Statute authorizing Interstate Commerce Commission to require carriers to "extend" linea Is conflned to extensions within undertakIng of carriers to serve, and does not embrace new unes reaching new territory. Interstate Com-merce Commission v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nav. Co., Or., 288 U.S. 14, 53 S.Ct. 266, 77 L.Ed. 588.
To extend a charter is to give one which now exists greater or longer time to operate in than that to which it was originally limited. Fldellty & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville Ry. Co., 258 Ky. 817, 81 S.W.2d 896, 900.
To "extend" a lease or contract is not necessarily the same as "renew," for a stípulation to renew requires the making of a new lease, while one to extend does not. Sanders v. Wender, 205 Ky. 422, 265 S.W. 939, 941. See, also, Nenzel v. Rochester SIlver Corporation, 48 Nev. 41, 226 P. 1102, 1105; Livingston Waterworks v. City of Liv-ingston, 53 Mont. 1, 162 P. 381, 383, L.R.A.1917D, 1074; Buckland v. Tarble, 95 Vt. 87, 112 A. 217, 218. But whether a clause in a lease is a covenant of renewal or an agree-ment for an extension depends on the parties’ intention and the use of the word "renewal" ; Freiheit v. Broch, 98 Conn. 166, 118 A. 828, 829; and the two terms may be used practically synonymously; American Press v. City of St. Louis, 314 Mo. 288, 284 S.W. 482, 486: Orr v. Doubleday, Page & Co., 157 N.Y.S. 1009, 1012, 172 App.Div. 96. The word "extend" as used in a lease does not necessarily mean the same, as ”renew," but context may show lntent that the words be given a similar meaning. Candler v. Smyth, 168 Ga. 276, 147 S.E. 552, 554.
To extend a street means to prolong and continue it In the direction in which it already points, but does not include deflecting it from the course of the existing por-tion. In re Charlotte St., 23 Pa. 288; Seattle & M. Ry. Co. v. State, 7 Wash. 150, 34 P. 551, 22 L.R.A. 217

English Practice

To value the lands or tenements of a person bound by a statute or recognizance which has be-come forfeited, to their full extended value. 3 B1.Comm. 420; Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 131. To execute the writ of extent or extendi lacias (q. v.). 2 Tidd, Pr. 1043, 1044.

Taxation

Extending a tax consists in adding to the as-sessment roll the precise amount due from each person whose name appears thereon. "The sub-jects for taxation having been properly usted, and a basis for apportionment established, noth-ing will remain to fix a definite liability but to extend upon the list or roll the several propon tionate amounts, as a charge against the several taxables." Cooley, Tax’n, 2d Ed., 423.
EXTENDED. A lengthening out of time previ-ously fixed and not the arbitrary setting of a new date. In re Parent, D.C.N.H., 30 F.Supp. 943, 945, Stretched, spread, or drawn out. Rathbone v. State Board of Land Com’rs of Montana, 100 Mont. 109, 47 P.2d 47, 49.
As used in constitutional inhibltion against extendIng provísions of statute by reference to its Ude only, has ref-erence to an attempt to add something to text of pre-exist-Ing law. Hollis & Co. v. McCarroll, 200 Ark. 523, 140 S.W.2d 420, 422.
EXTENDED INSURANCE. An option to use dividend to procure extended insurance is one to procure extension of term of insurance from date to which premiums have been paid, without fur-ther payment. Williams v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., Tex., 291 U.S. 170, 54 S.Ct. 348, 78 L.Ed. 711, 92 A.L.R. 693.
EXTENDED LEASE. An "extended lease" is merely enlarged upon all the terms and condi-tions of the instrument, while a "renewed lease" is a new lease. Rathbone v. State Board of Land Com’rs of Montana, 100 Mont. 109, 47 P.2d 47, 49.
EXTENDI FACIAS. Lat. You cause to be extend-ed. In English practice. The name of a writ of execution, (derived from its two emphatic words 😉 more commonly called an "extent." 2 Tidd, Pr. 1043; 4 Steph.Comm. 43.
EXTENDING as used in agreement to extend railroad siding at point of termination signified making connection with. Blouch v. Stevens, 106 N.J.L. 488, 150 A. 581, 582.
EXTENSION. A part constituting an addition or enlargement, as an annex, as to build on an ex-tension to a house. Northwestern Light & Power Co. v. Town of Grundy Center, 220 Iowa 108, 261 N.W. 604. Addition of existing facilities. People ex rel. Anderson v. Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co., 359 III. 301, 194 N.E. 568, 569. Enlargement of main body; addition of something smaller than that to which it is attached; to cause to reach or continue as from point to point; to lengthen or prolong. City of Lancaster v. Public Service Com-mission, 120 Pa.Super. 597, 182 A. 781, 783. That property of a body by which it occupies a portion of space. Newark Stove Co. v. Gray & Dudley Co., D.C.Tenn., 39 F.Supp. 992, 993.
Renewal of paper is not a loan but an extension of time for payment. McRoberts v. Spaulding, D.C.Iowa, 32 F.2d 315, 318.
The word "extension" ordinarily implies the existente of something to be extended. State v. Graves, 352 Mo. 1102, 182 S.W.2d 46, 51.
Bankruptcy
An extension proposal is an agreement on part of credi-tors that they will extend time within which their claims are probably to be paid, i.n full as to secured creditors, on terms proposed by debtor and approved by court. Held-stab v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, C.C.A. Kan., 91 F.2d 655, 658.
"Extension" under Bankruptcy Act is proceeding wherein debtor merely obtains extension of time within which to pay in full. In re Thompson, D.C.Va., 51 F.Supp. 12, 14.
Proposal under which debts which were not settled in full but were merely extended in time for ultimate pay-ment in full was an ”extension proposal". Mullican v. Texas Land & Mortgage Co., C.C.A.Tex., 117 F.2d 576, 578.
Carrier’s Lines
Tracks over which there are to be train movements in the sense that such movements are a part of the actual transportation haul from shipper to the aonsignee. Mis-souri Pac. R. Co. v. Chicago Great Western H. Co., 137 Kan. 217, 19 P.2d 484, 489.
Lease
An option for renewal implies giving of new lease on same terms as old lease, while an option for extension con-templates a continuance of old lease for a further period. Mutual Paper Co. v. Hoague-Sprague Corporation, 297 Mass. 294, 8 N.E.2d 802, 806"Renewal" and "extension," as used In leases with ref-erence to options for renewal or for extension, are synony-mous. Economy Stores v. Moran, 178 Miss. 62, 172 So. 865, 867.
The dlstinction between "extension" and "renewal" of lease is chiefly that, in the case of renewal, a new lease is requlsite, while, in the case of extension, the same lease continues in force during additional period upon perform-ance of stipulated act. Carrano v. Shoor, 118 Conn. 86, 171 A. 17, 20.
The word "extension," when used In its proper and usual sense in connection with a lease, means a prolongation t51 the previous leasehold estate. Talbot v. Rednalloh Co., 283 Mass. 225, 186 N. E. 273, 275.
Mercantile Law
An allowance of additional time for the payment of debts. An agreement between a debtor and his creditors, by which they allow him further time for the payment of his liabilities. A creditor’s indulgence by giving a debtor further time to pay an existing debt. State v. Mestayer, 144 La. 601, 80 So. 891, 892. Among the French, a similar agreement is known by the name of attermoiement. Mer-lin, Répert. mot Attermoiement.
Patent Law
An extension of the life of a patent for an additional period of seven years, formerly allowed by law in the United States, upon proof being made that the inventor had not succeeded in obtaining a reasonable remuneration from his patent-right. This is no longer allowed, except as to designs. See Rev.St.U.S. § 4924.
EXTENSION OF PAYMENT. To constitute "ex-tension of payment" of obligation which would re-lease sureties, there must be agreement between obligor and obligee supported by consideration by which obligee has precluded himself from taking action against obligor during period of extension. O’Banion v. Willis, 14 La.App. 638, 129 So. 440, 441.
EXTENSION OR ÉENEWAL OF NOTE. Takes place when parties agree upon valuable considera-tion for maturity of debt on day subsequent to that provided in original contract. Elk Horn Bank & Trust Co. v. Spraggins, 182 Ark. 27, 30 S.W.2d 858, 859.
EXTENSIVE. Widely extended in space, time, or scope; great or wide or capable of being extended. American Cannel Coal Co. v. Indiana Cotton Milis, 78 Ind.App. 115, 134 N.E. 891, 893.
EXTENSIVE RAINFALL is not same as "extra-ordinary rainfall," for which damages could not be recovered; word "extensive" being applicable to area embraced in circumference of particular rainfall, but not implying necessarily rainfall out of ordinary. Johnson v. Ratliff, 233 Ky. 187, 25 S.W.2d 355, 356. See Extraordinary Rainfall.
EXTENSORES. In old English law. Extenders or appraisers.
The name of certain officers appointed to appralse and divide or apportion lands. It was their duty to make a survey, schedule, or Inventory of the lands, to lay them out under certain heads, and then to ascertain the value of each, as preparatory to the division or partition. Bract. fols. 72b, 75; Britt. c. 71.
EXTENT. Amount. Cox v. State Industrial Acci-dent Commission, 121 P.2d 919, 921, 168 Or. 508, 23 P.2d 800, 159 A.L.R. 899. A writ of execution issuing from the exchequer upon a debt due the crown, or upon a debt due a private person, lf upon recognizance or statute merchant or staple, by which the sheriff is directed to appraise the debtor’s lands, and, instead of selling them, to set them off to the creditor for a term during which the rental will satisfy the judg-ment. Hackett v. Amsden, 56 Vt. 201; Nason v. Fowler, 70 N.H. 291, 47 A. 263. It Is so called because the sheriff is to cause the lands to be appraised at their full extended value before he delivers them to the plaintiff. Fitzh.N.B. 131. The term ís sometimes used in the various states of the United States to denote writs which give the creditor possession of the debtor’s lands for a limited time till the debt be paid. Roberts v. Whiting, 16 Mass. 186.Scotch Practico
The value or valuation of lands. Bell.
The rents, proflts, and íssues of lands. Skene.
For "Manorial Extent," see that title.
EXTENT IN AID. That kind of extent which is-sues at the instance and for the benefit of a debtor to the crown, for the recovery of a debt due to him-self. 2 Tidd, Pr. 1045; 4 Steph.Comm. 47. This writ was much abused, owing to some peculiar privileges possessed by crown-debtors, and its use was regulated by Stat. 57 Geo. III. c. 117. See 3 Bla.Comm. 419. The writ used by a debtor of the king against his debtor to enf orce the right of preferente given to him because of his indebted-ness to the king. United States Fidelity & Guar-anty Co. v. Carter, 161 Va. 381, 170 S.E. 764, 768, 90 A.L.R. 191.
EXTENT IN CHIEF. A summary process by which the king’s action was commenced against his debtor and his body, personal property (tangible and intangible), and lands at once seized for the satisfaction of the king’s debt. United States Fi-delity & Guaranty Co. v. Carter, 161 Va. 381, 170 S.E. 764, 768, 90 A.L.R. 191. The principal kind of extent, issuing at the suit of the crown, for the re-covery of the crown’s debt. 4 Steph.Comm. 47. An adverse proceeding by the king, for the recov-ery of his own debt. 2 Tidd, Pr. 1045.
EXTENT OF SUCH PAYMENT. Under statute ‘extending right of subrogation to Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, phrase "to the extent of such payment" is equivalent to term "pro tanto" or words "as to the portion of the deposit paid". Federal Deposit Ins. Corporation v. Citizens State Bank of Niangua, C.C.A.Mo., 130 F.2d 102, 103.
EXTENTA MANERII. (The extent or survey of a manor.) The title of a statute passed 4 Edw. I. St. 1; being a sort of direction for making a sur-vey or terrier of a manor, and all its appendages. 2 Reeve, Eng.Law, 140.
EXTENUATE. To lessen; to palliate; to mití-gate. Connell v. State, 46 Tex.Cr.R. 259, 81 S.W. "748.
EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES. Such as render a delict or crime less aggravated, heinous, or reprehensible than it would otherwise be, or tend to palliate or lessen its guilt. Such circum-stances may ordinarily be shown in order to re-duce the punishment or damages.EXTENUATION. That which renders a crime or tort less heinous than would be without it. It is opposed to aggravation.
EXTERIOR. As used in policy means on the out-side, external, pertaining to the outside part, Northwestern Casualty & Surety Co. v. Barzune, Tex.Civ.App., 42 S.W.2d 100, 103; the surface out-side, Jackson Steam Laundry v. lEtna Casualty & Surety Co., 156 Miss. 649, 126 So. 478, 480.
The phrase "exterior of the building" as used in a lease of a building adjacent to another build-ing, each having its own wall, the two against each other forming a solid double wall, means co-extensive with its external parts and including the four walls. B. Siegel Co. v. Codd, 183 Mich. 145, 149 N.W. 1015, 1017.
EXTERNAL. Apparent, outward, visible from the outside, capable of being perceived. Toliver v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co., Mo. App., 47 S.W.2d 140, 141. Outward; exterior; re-lating to the outside, as of the body; really being without; acting from without, as the external surface of a body; and outwardly; perceptible, visible; physical or corporeal; as distinguished from mental or moral. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 18 Tenn.App. 452, 79 S.W.2d 292, 296.
In d’ouble indemnity clause of life policy, the term "external" applies to the force or means and not to the injury. Hanna v. Rio Grande Nat. Life Ins. Co., Tex.Civ. App., 181 S.W.2d 908, 911.
EXTERNAL, VIOLENT AND ACCIDENTAL MEANS. Death through "external, violent and ac-cidental means" necessarily implies that death did not result indirectly from disease or bodily infirmi-ty. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Hassing, C.C.A.10, 134 F.2d 714, 716.
EXTERRITORIALITY. The privilege of those persons (such as foreign ministers) who, though temporarily resident within a state, are not sub-ject to the operation of its laws. The exemption from the operation of the ordinary laws of the state accorded to foreign monarchs temporarily within the state and their retinue, to diplomatic agents and the members of their household, to consuls in non-Christian states, and to foreign men of war in port. 1 Opp. 460-469. See Capitu-lation; Extraterritoriality.
EXTERUS. Lat. A foreigner or alíen; one born abroad. The opposite of civis.
EXTERUS NON .HABET TERRAS. An alien holds no lands. Tray.Lat.Max. 203.
EXTINCT. Extinguished. A rent is said to be extinguished when it is destroyed and put out. Co.Litt. 147b. See Extinguishment.
EXTINCTO SUBJECTO, TOLLIT1UR ADJUNC-TUM. When the subject [or substance] is ex-tinguished, the incident [or adjunct] ceases. Thus, when the business for which a partnership has been formed is completed, or brought to an end the partnership itsell ceases. Inst. 3, 26, 6; 3 Kent, Comm. 52, note; Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns., N.Y., 438, 492.
EXTINGUISH. To put an end to. Onondaga Wa-ter Service Corporation v. Crown Mills, Inc., 132 Misc. 848, 230 N.Y.S. 691, 698. To put out, quench, stifle, as to extinguish a fire or flame. Gally v. Wynne, 96 Cal.App. 145, 273 P. 825, 826.
EXTINGUISHMENT. The destruction or cancel-lation of a right, power, contract, or estate. The annihilation of a collateral thing or subject in the subject itself out of which it is derived. Prest. Merg. 9. For the distinction between an extin-guishment and passing a right, see 2 Shars.Bl. Comm. 325, note.
"Extinguishment" Is sometimes confounded with "merg-er," though there Is a clear distinction between them. "Merger" is only a mode of extinguishment, and applies to estates only under particular circumstances; but "extin-guishment"’ is a terco of general application to rights, as well as estates. 2 Crabb, Real Prop. p. 367, § 1487. "Extin-guishment" connotes the end of a thing, precluding the existence of future life therein; in "mergers" there is a carrying on of the substance of the thing, except that it is inerged into and becomes a part of a separate thing with a new Identity. McRoberts v. McRoberts, 177 Okl. 156, 57 P.2d 1175, 1177.
EXTINGUISHMENT OF COMMON. Loss of the right to have common. This may happen from various causes. 2 Steph.Com. 41; Co.Litt. 280; 1 Bacon, Abr. 628; Cro.Eliz. 594.
EXTINGUISHMENT OF COPYHOLD. In English law. A copyhold is said to be extinguished when the freehold and copyhold interests unite in the same person and in the same right, which may be either by the copyhold interest coming to the free-hold or by the freehold interest coming to the copyhold. 1 Crabb, Real Prop. p. 670, § 864; Hutt. 81; Cro.Eliz. 21; Wms.R.P. 287.
EXTINGUISHMENT OF DEBTS. This takes place by payment; by accord and satisfaction; by novation, or the substitution of a new debtor; by merger, when the creditor recovers a judg-ment or accepts a security of a higher nature than the original obligation; by a release; by the mar-riage of a Teme sole creditor with the debtor, or of an obligee with one of two joint obligors; and where one of the párties, debtor or creditor, makes the other his executor.
EXTINGUISHMENT OF LEGACY. This occurs in case the identical thing bequeathed is not in existence, or has been disposed of so that it does not form part of the testator’s estate, at the time of his death. Welch v. Welch, 147 Miss. 728, 113 So. 197, 198. See Ademption.
EXTINGUISHMENT OF LIEN. Discharge by operation of law. Schreiber v. Cook County, 388 Ill. 297, 58 N.E.2d 40, 44, 155 A.L.R. 1162.
EXTINGUISHMENT OF RENT. If a person have a yearly rent of lands, and afterwards purchase those lands, so that he has as good an estate in the land as in the rent, the rent is extinguished. Termes de la Ley; Cowell; Co.Litt. 147. Rent may also be extinguished by conjunction of es tates, by confirmation, by grant, by release, and by surrender. 1 Crabb, Real Prop. pp. 210-213, § 209.
EXTINGUISHMENT OF WAYS. This is usually effected by unity of possession. As if a man have a way over the Mose of another, and he purchase that close, the way is extinguished. 1 Crabb, Real Prop. p. 341,. § 384; 2 Washb.Real Prop.
EXTIRPATION. In English law. A species of de-struction or waste, analogous to estrepement. See Estrepement.
EXTIRPATIONE. A judicial writ, either before or after judgment, that lay against a person who, when a verdict was found against him for land, etc., maliciously overthrew any house or extirpat-ed any trees upon it. Reg.Jud. 13, 56.
EXTOCARE. In old records. To grub woodland, and reduce it to arable or meadow; "to stock up." Cowell.
EXTORSIVELY. A technical word used in in-dictments for extortion.
It is a sufficient averment of a corrupt lntent, In an
indictment for extortion, to allege that the defendant "extorsively" took the unlawful fee. Leeman v. State, 35 Ark. 438, 37 Am.Rep. 44. When a person is charged with extorsively taking, the very import of the word shows that he is not acquiring possession of his own, 4 Cox, Cr.Cas. 387. In North Carolina the crime may be charged without using this word, State v. Dickens, 2 N.C. 406.
EXTORT. To compel or coerce, as a confession or information by any means serving to overcome one’s power of resistance, or making the confes-sion or admission involuntary. Sutton v. Com-monwealth, 207 Ky. 597, 269 S.W. 754, 757.
To gain by wrongful methods, to obtain In an unlawful manner, to compel payments by means of threats of injury to person, property, or reputa-tion. McKenzie v. State, 113 Neb. 576, 204 N.W. 60, 61; State v. Richards, 97 Wash. 587, 167 P. 47, 48. To take from unlawfully; to exact some-thing wrongfully by threats or putting in fear. State v. Adams, Del., 106 A. 287, 288, 7 Boyce, 335. See Extortion.
To wrest from, to exact, to take under a claim of protection. Commonwealth v. Neubauer, 142 Pa.Super. 528, 16 A.2d 450, 452.
The natural meaning of the word "extort" is to obtain money or other valuable thing either by compulsion, by actual force, or by the force of motives applied to the will, and often more overpowering and irresistible than physical force. Com. v. O’Brien, 12 Cush., Mass., 90.
EXTORTIO EST CRIMEN QUANDO QUIS COL-ORE OFFICH EXTORQUET QUOD NON ÉST DEBITUM, VEL SUPRA DEBITUM, VEL ANTE TEMPUS QUOD EST DEBITUM. 10 Coke, 102. Extortion is a crime when, by color of office, any person extorts that which is not due, or more than is due, or before the time when it is due.
EXTORTION. Unlawful obtaining of money from another. People v. Parkinson, 181 Misc. 603, 41 N.Y.S.2d 331, 334.
It has also been defined as corrupt demanding or recelv-nig by a person in office of a fee for services which should be performed gratuitously; or, where compensation Is per-missible, of a larger fee than the law justifies, or a fee not due, 2 BIsh.Crlm.Law, § 390; exaction of .money by reason 191 oppressive conditions or circumstances, People v. Wel-ter, 237 N.Y. 316, 143 N.E. 205, 208, 38 A.L.R. 613; obtain-Ing of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right. .And see State v. Logan, 104 La. 760, 29 So. 336; In re Rempfer, 51 S.D. 393, 216 N.W. 355, 359, 55 A.L.R. 1346; Lee v. State, 16 Aríz. 291, 145 P. 244, 246, Ann.Cas.1917B, 131. Obtaining of property of another by threats to injure him and to destroy his property, State v. Phillips, 62 Idaho 656, 115 P.2d 418, 420. Taking or obtaining of anything from another by means of illegal compulsion or oppressive exaction, Daniels v. U. S., C.C.A.Cal., 17 F.2d 339, 342; whether by an officer or otherwise, United States v. Dunk-ley, D.C.Cal., 235 F. 1000, 1001. Unlawful taking by any officer, by color of his Office, of any money or thing of value that ís not due to him, or more than ls due, or before it is due, 4 Bla.Comm. 141: Com. v. Saulsbury, 152 Pa. 554, 25 A. 610; 1 Russ.Cr.• 144; 2 Bish.Cr.L. 390; U. S. v. Dea-ver, D.C.N.C., 14 F. 595; Bush v. State, 19 Ariz. 195, 168 P. 508, 509. Wrongful exaction of money or other valuable thing, either by compulsion, actual force, or by force of motives applied at will, Commonwealth v. Donoghue, 250 Ky. 343, 63 S.W.2d 3, 89 A.L.R. 819.
A taking under color of office is of essence of offense. La Tour v. Stone, 139 Fla, 681, 190 So. 704, 709, 710.
At common law, any oppression by color or pretense of right, and particularly and technically the exaction or unlawful taking by an officer of money or thing of value, by color of his office, elther when none at all is due, or not so much is due, or when ít is not yet due. Preston v. Bacon, 4 Conn. 480. See People v. Barondess, 16 N.Y.S. 436, 61 Hun, 571; Murray v. State, 125 Tex.Cr.R. 252, 67 S.W.2d 274, 275; State v. Anderson, 66 N.D. 522, 267 N.W. 121, 123; Whart.Cr.L. 833.
Term applies to persons who exact money elther for the performance of a duty, the prevention of injury, or the exercise of influence, and covers the obtaining of money or other property by operating on fear or credulity, or by promise to conceal the crimes of others. Commonwealth v. Mann, 111 Pa.Super. 371, 170 A. 381, 382.
Term In comprehensive or general sense signifies any oppressíon under color of right, and in strict or technical sense signifies unlawful taking by any officer, under color of office, of any money or thing of value not due him, more than is due, or before it is due. State v. Barts, 132 N.J.L. 74, 38 A.2d 838, 843, 844, 848; State v. Vallee, 136 Me. 432, 12 A.2d 421.
To constitute "extortion," money or other thing of value must have been wilfully and corruptly received. La Tour v. Stone, 139 Fla. 681, 190 So. 709, 710.
To constitute "extortion," the wrongful use of fear must be the operating cause producing consent. People v. Biggs, 178 Cal. 79, 172 P. 152, 153.
The distinction between "bribery" and "extortion" seems to be this: the former offense consists in the offering a present, or receiving one, If offered; the latter, in demand-ing a fee or present, by color of office. Jacob.
For the distinction between "extortion" and "exaction," see Exaction.
EXTRA. A Latin preposition, occurring in many legal phrases, and meaning beyond, except, with-out, out of, outside.
Work outside contract, performed by subcontractor was properly claimed as an "extra." United States ex rel. Park L. Davis Co. v. Matthew Cummings Co., D.C.Mass., 27 F.Supp. 405, 407, 408.
EXTRA ALLOWANCE. In New York practice. A sum in addition to costs, which may, in the dis-cretion of the court, be allowed to the successful party in cases of unusual difficulty. See Hascall v. King, 54 App.Div. 441, 66 N.Y.S. 1112.
EXTRA COMMERCIA. Property once dedicated to public use is "extra commercia". J. B. McCrary Co. v. Town of Winnfield, D.C.La., 40 F.Supp. 427, 435 EXTRA COMPENSATION. Within constitution-al provision prohibiting Legislature from granting extra compensation to contractor, is compensa-tion over and aboye that fixed by contract for agreed work, and is in nature of gratuity. Wes-ton v. State, 262 N.Y. 46, 1861 .E. 197, 200, 88 A.L. R. 1219.
Under statutes providing for extra compensation to cus-toms ínspectors payment made by licensees to Collector at rates fixed by Secretary of the Treasury constitute "extra compensation" over and aboye the animal salary, and not a payment from licensees. United States v. Myers, Ct.Cl., 320 U.S. 561, 64 S.Ct. 337, 341, 88 L.Ed. 312.
EXTRA COSTS. In English practice. Those charges which do not appear upon the face of the proceedings, such as witnesses’ expenses, fees to counsel, attendances, court fees, etc., an affida-vit of which must be made, to warrant the master in allowing them upon taxation of costs. Whar-ton.
EXTRA—DOTAL PROPERTY. In Louisiana this term is used to designate that property which forms no part of the dowry of a woman, and which is also called "paraphernal property." Civ. Code La. art. 2335. Fleitas v. Richardson, 147 U.S. 550, 13 S.Ct. 495, 37 L.Ed. 276.
EXTRA FEODUM. Out of his fee; out of the seigniory, or not holden of him that claims it. Co.Litt. lb; Reg.Orig. 97b.
EXTRA JUDICIUM. Extrajudicial; out of the proper cause; out of court; beyond the jurisdic-tion. See Extrajudicial.
EXTRA JUS. Beyond the law; more than the law requires. In jure, vel extra jus. Bract. fol. 169b.
EXTRA LEGEM. Out of the law; out of the pro-tection of the law.
EXTRA LEGEM POSITUS EST CIVILITER MOR,TUUS. Co. Litt. 130. He who is placed out of the law is civilly dead. A bankrupt is, as it were, civilly dead. International Bank v. Sher-man, 101 U.S. 406, 25 L.Ed. 866.
EXTRA PRPESENTIAM MARITI. Out of her husband’s presence.
EXTRA QUATUOR MARIA. Beyond the four seas; out of the kingdom of England. 1 Bl. Comm. 457.
EXTRA REGNUM. Out of the realm. 7 Coke, 16a; 2 Kent, Comm. 42, note.
EXTRA SERVICES, when used with reference to officers, means services incident to the office in question, but for which compensation has not been provided by law. Miami County v. Blake, 21 Ind. 32.
EXTRA TERRITORIUM. Beyond or without the territory. 6 Bin. 353; 2 Kent, Comm. 407. Out-side the territorial limits of a state. Milne v. Moreton, 6 Binn., Pa., 353, 6 Am.Dec. 466.EXTRA TERRITORIUM JUS DICENTI IMPUNE NON PARETUR. One who exercises jurisdiction out of his territory is not obeyed with impunity. Dig. 2, 1, 20; Branch, Princ.; 10 Coke, 77; Story, Confl.Laws, 539. He who exercises judicial au-thority beyond his proper limits cannot be obeyed with safety.
EXTRA VIAM. Outside the way. Where the de-fendant in trespass pleaded a right of way in jus-tification, and the replication alleged that the tres-pass was committed outside the limits of the way claimed, these were the technical words to be us-ed. 16 East, 343, 349.
EXTRA VIRES. Beyond powers. See Ultra Vires.
EXTRA WORK. As used in connection with con-struction contract, means work done not required in performance of the contract, something done or furnished in addition to or in excess of the re-quirement of the contract. Kansas City Bridge Co. v. State, 61 S.D. 580, 250 N.W. 343; work en-tirely outside and independent of contract—some-thing not required or contemplated in its perform-ance. Bradshaw v. Wolfe City, Tex.Civ.App., 3 S.W.2d 527, 530; while additional work on the other hand, is usually work which results from a change or alteration in plans concerning work which has to be done under a contract. De Mar-tini v. Elade Realty Corp., Co.Ct., 52 N.Y.S.2d 487, 489; or such work as may fairly be presumed to arise in the construction, and is within the con-tract, although not included in the plans and spe-cifications. Wilson v. Salt Lake City, 52 Utah, 506, 174 P. 847, 850.
But in a sewer construction contract providing that the city engineer might make such changes in the fines, grades, and dimensions which do not entail any extra expense to the contractor, the word "extra- was deemed equivalent to additional work which was required in the performance of the contract, and not necessary to such performance in the sense that the contract could not have been carried out without it, but necessary in the sense that by means of it the contract could be more conveniently and beneficially performed in the interest of both parties thereto, and did not include work arising out of and entirely independent of the contract, something not required in its performance.
City of Richrriond v. Burton, 115 Va.
206,
78 S.E. 560,
563.
See, also, Fetterolf v. S. & L. Const.
Co.,
161. N.Y.S.
549,
550, 175 App.Div. 177; /v1cHugh v.
City
of Tacoma,
76
Wash. 127, 135 P. 1011, 1015.
Materials and labor not contemplated by the contract, but which are required by changes in the plans and speci-fications made after the contract had been entered into, are "extra work". Collins v. Hall, Tex.Civ.App., 161 S.W.2d 311, 314.
EXTRACT, y. To draw out or forth; to pull out from a fixed position. Webster,
To "extract" ore within the meaning of a royalty provi-sion in a mining tease contemplates not only the removal of the ore from the mine and throwing it on a dump, but also the separation of the ore from the dirt and refuse in which it was found on the dump. Giersa v. Creech, Mo.App., 181 S.W. 588, 589.
EXTRACT, n. A portion or fragment of a writ-ing. In Scotch law, the certified copy, by a clerk of a court, of the proceedings in an action carried on before the court, and of the judgment pró-nounced; containing also an order for execution or proceedings thereupon. Jacob; Whishaw.EXTRACTA CURIAE. In old English law. The issues or profits of holding a court, arising from the customary lees, etc.
EXTRADITION. The surrender by one state to another of an individual accused or convicted of an offense outside its own territory and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, be-ing competent to try and punish him, demands the surrender. Waller v. Jordan, 58 Ariz. 169, 118 P. 2d 450, 451.
The surrender of a criminal by a foreign state to which he has fled for refuge from prosecution to the state within whose jurisdiction the crime was committed, upon the demand of the latter state, in order that he may be dealt with accordíng to its laws. Extradition may be accorded as a mere matter of comity, or may take place under treaty stipulations between the two nations. It also obtains as between the different states of the American Union. Ter-linden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 22 S.Ct. 484, 46 L.Ed. 534; Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., 149 U.S. 698, 13 S.Ct. 1016, 37 L.Ed. 905.
Extradition between the states must be consldered and defined to be a political duty of imperfect obligation, founded upon compact, and requiring each state to sur-render one who, having violated the criminal laws of another state, has fled from its justice, and is found in the state from which he is demanded, on demand of the execu-tive authority of the state from which he fled. Abbott.
—Extradition warrant. See Executive Warrant.
EXTRAHAZARDOUS. In the law of insurance. Characterized or attended by circumstances or conditions of special and unusual danger. Rey-nolds v. Insurance Co., 47 N.Y. 597; Russell v. Insurance Co., 71 Iowa 69, 32 N.W. 95.
EXTRAHURA. In old English law. An animal vvandering or straying about, without an owner; an estray. Spelman.
EXTRAJUDICIAL. That which is done, given, or effected outside the course of regular judicial proceedings; not founded upon, or unconnected with, the action of a court of law; as extrajudicial evidence, an extrajudicial oath.
That which, though done in the course of regu-lar judicial proceedings, is unnecessary to such proceedings, or interpolated, or beyond their scope; as an extrajudicial opinion, (dictum.)
That which does not belong to the judge or his jurisdiction, notwithstanding which he takes cognizance of it.
EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION. See Confes-sion.
EXTRAJUDICIAL EVIDENCE is that which is used to satisfy private persons as to facts requir-ing proof.
EXTRAJUDICIAL OATH. One taken not in the course of judicial proceedings, or taken without any authority of law, though taken formally be-fore a proper person. State v. Scatena, 84 Minn. 281, 87 N.W. 764.
EXTRAJUDICIALLY. The testimony of an ex-pert witness based upon information obtained "ex-trajudicially", which means in any other manner than from evidence given in court, is objection-able. State v. David, 222 N.C. 242, 22 S.E.2d 633, 640.
EXTRALATERAL RIGHT. In mining law. The right of the owner of a mining claim duly located on the public domain to follow, and mine, any vein or lode the apex of which lies within the boun-daries of his location on the surface, notwithstand-ing the course- of the vein on its dip or downward direction may so far depart from the perpendicu-lar as lo extend beyond the planes which would be formed by the vertical extension downwards of the side unes of his location. See Rev.Stat. U.S. § 2322, 30 U.S.C.A. § 26.
EXTRAMURAL. As applied to the powers of a municipal corporation, its "extramural" powers are those exercised outside the corporate limits, as distinguished from "intramural" powers. State v. Port of Astoria, 79 Or. 1, 154 P. 399, 404.
EXTRANEOUS EVIDENCE. With reference to a contract, deed, will, or any writing, extraneous evidence is such as is not furnished by the docu-ment itself, but is derived from outside sources; the same as evidence aliunde. See, also, Aflunde.
EXTRANEOUS OFFENSE. Is one that is ex-tra, beyond, or foreign to the offense for which the party is on trial. Ridinger v. State, 146 Tex. Cr.R. 286, 174 S.W.2d 319, 320.
EXTRANEUS.
Old English law. One foreign born; a foreign-er. 7 Coke, 16.
Roman law. An heir not born in the family of the testator. Those of a foreign state. The same as alienus. Vicat; Du Cange.
EXTRANEUS EST SUBDITUS QUI EXTRA TER-RAM, i. e., POTESTATEM REGIS NATUS EST. 7 Coke, 16. A foreigner is a subject who is born out of the territory, i. e., government of the king.
EXTRAORDINARY. Out of the ordinary; ex-ceeding the usual, average, or normal measure or degree; beyond or out of the common order or rule; not usual, regular, or of a customary kind; remarkable; uncommon; rare. Puget Sound Traction, Light & .Power Co. v. Reynolds, D.C. Wash., 223 F. 371, 378; Courtney v. Ocean Acci-dent & Guaranty Corporation, 346 Mo. 703, 142 S. W.2d 858, 861, 130 A.L.R. 234. The word is both comprehensive and flexible in meaning. Zollman v. Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co., 121 N.E. 135, 140, 70 Ind.App. 395.
Beyond or out of the common order or method; exceed-ing the ordinary degree; not ordinary: unusual; em-ployed for an exceptional purpose or on a special occasion; as a noun it is dellned as, something extraordinary; espe-cially, an extraordinary expense or allowance; specItIcally (Eng.) any allowance made to troops beyond the customary gross paid. State v. Rogers, 142 Kan. 841, 52 P.2d 1185, 1195.
EXTRAORDINARY AVERAGE. A contribution by all the parties concerned in a mercantile voy-age, either as to the vessel or cargo, toward a loss sustained by some of the parties in interest for the benefit of all. Wilson v. Cross, 33 Cal. 69. EXTRAORDINARY CABE. Synonyrnous with greatest care, utmost care, highest degree of care. Railroad Co. v. Baddeley, 54 111. 24, 5 Am.Rep. 71; Railway Co. v. Causler, 97 Ala. 235, 12 So. 439; Sorey v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 17 La.App. 538, 136 So. 155, 158. See Care; Diligence; Negligente.
EXTRAORDINARY CASE. "The extraordinary mations or cases contemplated by the statute are such as do not ordinarily occur in the transaction of human affairs; as, when a man has been con-victed of murder, and it afterwards appears that the supposed deceased is still alive, or where one is convicted on the testimony of a witness who is subsequently found guilty of perjury in giving that testimony, or where there has been some providential cause, and cases of like character." Herrington v. State, 32 Ga.App. 83, 123 S.E. 147, 148; Farmers’ Union Warehouse of Metter v. Boyd, 31 Ga.App. 104, 119 S.E. 542.
The presence of an unexplored point of law de-‘ terminative of litigation makes litigation an "ex-traordinary case" within statute authorizing addi-tional allowance. National Bank of Far Rocka-way v. City of New York, Sup., 46 N.Y.S.2d 153, 154.
EXTRAORDINARY DANGER. In the law of master and servant, one not ordinarily incident to the service. Piorkowski v. A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co., 190 Mo.App. 597, 176 S.W. 258, 260.
EXTRAORDINARY DIVIDENDS. Cash dis-bursements by "wasting asset" companies are apportioned as "extraordinary dividends" where they represent, in part at least, distribution of proceeds of capital assets. In re Nirdlinger’s Es-tate, 327 Pa. 160, 193 A. 33.
"Extraordinary dividends" may assume unusual form and amount, paid at irregular intervals from accumulated surplus or earnings. In re Nirdling-er’s Estate, 327 Pa. 160, 193 A. 33.
EXTRAORDINARY EXPENSES. This term in a constitutional provision that the state may incur indebtedness for extraordinary expenses, means other than ordinary expenses and such as are in-curred by the state for the promotion of the gen-eral welfare, compelled by some unforeseen con-dition which is not regularly provided for by law, such as flood, famine, fire, earthquake, pestilence, war, or any other condition that will compel the state to put forward its highest endeavors to pro-tect the people, their property, liberty, or lives. State v. Davis, 113 Kan. 4, 213 P. 171, 172.
EXTRAORDINARY FLOOD. One of those unex-plained visitations whose comings are not fore-shadowed by the usual course of nature, Jensen v. Buffalo Drainage Dist. of Cloud County, 148 Kan. 712, 84 P.2d 961, 965; and whose magnitude and destructiveness could not have been anticipated or provided against by the exercise of ordinary foresight. Eikland v. Casey, C.C.A.Alaska, 266 F. 821, 823, 12 A.L.R. 179; Clements v. Phoenix Utility Co., 119 Kan. 190, 237 P. 1062, 1065.
One of such unusual occurrence that it could not have been foreseen by men of ordinary experience and prudence Soules v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 34 N.D. 7, 157 N.W. 823, 830, L.R.A.1917A, 501. A flood is not extraordinary which Is such as residents of the neighborhood might expect from their observation. City of Richmond v. Cheatwood, 130 Va. 76, 107 S.E. 830, 833.
EXTRAORDINARY GRAND JURY is limited in scope of its investigation which may not go be-yond terms of executive proclamation, and exam-ination of witness must be confined within those terms, and must not be used as means of disclos-ing or intermeddling with extraneous matters. People v. Doe, 247 App.Div. 324, 286 N.Y.S. 343.
EXTRAORDINARY HAZARD. If hazards are in-creased by what other servants do, and injured servant has no part in increasing them, they are "extraordinary". Stotie v. Howe, 92 N.H. 425, 32 A.2d 484, 487.
EXTRAORDINARY MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL are such as do not ordinarily occur. King v. State, 174 Ga. 432, 163 S.E. 168, 171.
EXTRAORDINARY OBSOLESCENCE. An ex-tensive supersession of property used for trans-mission or generation of power or instrumentali-ties used for the transportation of passengers. State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Public Service Commission, 341 Mo. 920, 110 S.W.2d 749, 775.
EXTRAORDINARY RAINFALL. Not such a dovvnpour of rain as may not have been known to occur, but only such rainfall that is so unusual and extraordinary that men of ordinary prudente -vould not have anticipated and provided for. City of Portsmouth v. Weiss, 145 Va. 94, 133 S.E. 781, 787. Cf. Extensive Rainfall.
EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES. The writs of mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and some others are sornetimes called "extraordinary remedies," in contradiátinction to the ordinary remedy by action. Receivership is also said to be an "extraordinary remedy." Prudential Securi-des Co. v. Three Forks, H. & M. V. R. Co., 49 Mont. 567, 144 P. 158, 159.
EXTRAORDINARY REPAIRS. Within the meaning of a lease, such aseare made necessary by some unusual or unforeseen occurrence which does not destroy the building but merely renders it less suited to the use for which it was intended. Nixon v. Gammon, 191 Ky. 175, 229 S.W. 75, 77; Courtney v. Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corpora-tion, 346 Mo. 703, 142 S.W.2d 858, 861, 130 A.L.R. 234.
EXTRAORDINARY RISK. The expression is generally used to describe risks arising from the negligence of the master. Tenney v. Baird Ma-chine Co., 87 Conn. 119, 87 A. 352, 354; Royal Col-lieries Co. v. Wells, 210 Ky. 600, 276 S.W. 515, 518. An "extraordinary risk" is one lying outside of the sphere of the normal, arising out of condi-tions not usual in the master’s business. Brazeale v. Piedmont Mfg. Co., 184 S.C. 471, 193 S.E. 39, 43. It is one which is not normally and neces-sarily incident to the employment. Pollard v. Weeks, 60 Ga.App. 664, 4 S.E.2d 722, 727. It is one which is not naturally incident to occupation and grows out of future of employer to furnish safe place to work and proper and safe appliances and tools for work. Snow v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., La.App., 166 So. 200, 203. It is one which may be obviated by the exercise of reasonable care by the employer. Wheeler v. Chicago & W. I. R. Co., 267 III. 306, 108 N.E. 330, 336; Louisiana Ry. & Nav. Co. of Texas v. Disheroon, Tex.Civ.App., 295 S.W. 250, 252. It is a risk which is only indirectly connected with the employment. Emerick v. Sla-vonian Roman Greek Catholic Union, 93 N.J.L. 282, 108 A. 223.
As respects assumptlon of risks, an "extraordinary risk" is not one which is uncommon or unusual in the sense that it Is rare, but is one which arises out of unusual condltlons not resulting in the ordinary course of business, as by rea-son of the master’s negligence, Leyba v. Albuquerque & Cerrillos Coal Co., 22 N.M. 455, 164 P. 823, 825; Houston Lighting & Power Co., 1905 v. Conley, Tex.Civ.App., 171 S.W. 561, 563; It Is a risk arising from the master’s negli-gence, Simowitz v. Reglster, 60 Ga.App. 180, 3 S.E.2d 231, 233; it is a risk which may be obviated by exercise of rea-sonable care on master’s part. Tyner v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 149 S.C. 89, 146 S.E. 663, 670. A servant does. not assume "extraordinary risks" unless they are known to and appreciated by him, or are so obvious that ordi-narily prudent person under circumstances would have observed and appreciated them, Brazeale v. Pledmont Mfg. Co., 184 S.C. 471, 193 S.E. 39, 43; unless they are known or obvious. Pollard v. Weeks, 60 Ga.App. 664, 4 S.E.2d 722, 727. If injury results from master’s breach of duty of due care the risk Is "extraordinary" and is assumed only if servant knew or ought to have known of dangerous condi-don and comprehended It or must be taken to have known of and comprehended It. Stone v. Howe, 92 N.H. 425, 32 A.2d 484, 486.
Under Federal Employers’ Liability Act, "extraordinary risks" are risks not normally and necessarily incident to employment, Southern Ry. Co. v. Blanton, 63 Ga.App. 93, 10 S.E.2d 430, 434; an employee is not treated as assuming extraordinary risks arising from defects due to negligente of employer unless he has knowledge of them or danger is so obvious that it would be apprecíated by ordinarily pru-dent person, Snow v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., La.App., 166 So. 200, 203.
EXTRAORDINARY SERVICES. As applied to thé care and attention of an old and infirm person, such services as are unusual, extra, or aboye those generally required or to be anticipated in usual course of things, not such services as are rendered to an old and feeble person, even though sick, which are not different from those usually requir-ed by such persons in similar circumstances. Al-len v. Smith, 208 Ky. 207, 270 S.W. 782, 783.
As used in statute authorizing allowance of additional compensation to guardian, means services in addition to guardian’s usual or regular services. In re Gislason’s Estate, 73 N.D. 731, 19 N.W.2d 447, 451, 452.
EXTRAORDINARY STORM is not necessarily an unprecedented one, but one that happens so rarely that it is unusual and not ordinarily to be expected. Spitzer v. City of Waterbury, 113 Conn. 84, 154 A. 157, 160; Oklahoma City v. Evans, 173 Okl. 586, 50 P.2d 234, 238.
EXTRAPAROCHIAL. Out of a parish; not within the bounds or limits of any parish. 1 Bl. Comm. 113, 284.
EXTRATERRITORIALITY. The extraterritorial operation of laws; that is, their operation upon persons, rights, or jural relations, existing be-yond the limits of the enacting state, but still amendable to its laws. A term used, especially formerly, to express, in lieu of the word exterri-toriality (q. v.), the exemption from the obliga-tion of the laws of a state granted to foreign dip-lomatic agents, warships, etc. Wheaton, § 224. The term is used to indicate jurisdiction exercised by a nation in other countries, by treaty, as, by the United States in China or Egypt; or by its own ministers or consuls in foreign lands. Crime is said to be extraterritorial when committed in a country other than that of the forum in which the party is tried. See 2 Moore, Int.L.Dig.; U. S. v. Lucas, D.C.Wash., 6 F.2d 327, 328.
EXTRAVAGANTES. In canon law. Those de-cretal epistles which were published after the Clementines.
They were so called because at first they were not digested or arranged with the other papal constitutions, but seemed to be, as it were, detached from the canon law. They continued to be called by the same name when they were afterwards inserted in the body of the canon law. The first extravagantes are those of Pope John XXII., suc-cessor of Clement V. The last collection was brought down to the year 1483, and was called the "Common Extrava-gantes," notwithstanding that they were likewise incor-porated with the rest of the canon law. Enc.Lond.
EXTREME. At the utmost point, edge, or bor-der; most remote. Last; conclusive. Greatest, highest, strongest, or the like. Immoderate; vio-lent. Webster.
EXTREME AND REPEATED CRUELTY. Acts of physical violence producing bodily harm. Holmstedt v. Holmstedt, 383 III. 290, 49 N.E.2d 25, 29; physical acts of violence, bodily harm or suf-fering, or such acts as endanger life or limb, or raise a reasonable apprehension of great bodily harm, but does not include bad temper, petulance, rude language, want of civil attentions, or angry and abusive words. Moore v. Moore, 362 III. 177, 199 N.E. 98, 99.
EXTREME CABE. Such tare as prudent man would exercise in place of danger. Schlossstein v. Bernstein, 293 Pa. 245, 142 A. 324, 327.
EXTREME CASE. An extreme case, in which an injunction granted inadvertently or improvi-dently may be dissolved ex parte, means one in which the injunction was manifestly granted im-properly, and its continuation until hearing in due course might cause great injury. Teacle v. Hughes, 146 La. 195, 83 So. 457, 458.
EXTREME CRUELTY is condition of extreme discomfort and wretchedness incapacitating spouse to discharge duties or seriously endanger-ing health. McKee v. McKee, 107 N.J.Eq. 1, 151 A. 620, 622. It is grave and serious misconduct which defeats marriage relation. Kennedy v. Ken-nedy, 101 Fla. 239, 134 So. 201, 203.
Any habitual indulgente by one spouse, that causes men-tal torture, undermines the health, or tends to dethrone reason of other, is sufficient to constitute "extreme cruelty". Bergman v. Bergman, 145 Fla. 10, 199 So. 920, 922.
As respects constructive abandonment, "extreme cruelty" per se by husband ís conduct which law presumes to be malícious, intended to force separation, and dangerous to Life or health of wife, or ncapacitates her from performing her duties. Fallon v. Fallon, 111 N.J.Eq. 512, 162 A. 406, 409.
Extreme cruelty is conduct or treatment which: causes reasonable apprehension of bodily hurt, Chisholm v. Chis-holm, 98 Fla. 1196, 125 So. 694, 702; constitutes aggravated or inhuman ill treatment, having regard to the physical and temperamental constitution of the parties and alI the sur-rounding circumstances, Donald v. Donald, 21 Fla. 573; Blain v. Blain, 45 Vt. 544; Poor v. Poor, 8 N.H. 315, 29 Am.Dec. 664; damages health, Chisholm v. Chisholm, 98 Fla. 1196; 125 So. 694, 703; destroys concord, harmony, happiness, or affection, Hassell v. Hassell, 185 Okl. 154, 90 P.2d 885; destroys happiness and health and defeats the very purposes of matrimony, Hassell v. Hassell, 185 Okl. 154, 90 P.2d 885; destroys legitimate ends and objects of matrimony, Dier v. Dier, 141 Neb, 685, 4 N.W.2d 731, 734; McCarty v. McCarty, 193 Okl. 18, 141 P.2d 103, 104; destroys peace of mind, Dier v. Dier, 141 Neb. 685, 4 N.W.2d 731, 734; destroys peace of mind as to seriously impair health or endanger life, Smith v. Smith, 61 Ariz. 373, 149 P.2d 683, 684; McCarty v. McCarty, 193 Okl. 18, 141 P.2d 103, 104; Hornor v. Hornor, 151 Okl. 292, 3 P.2d 670, 671; endangers health and prevents proper discharge of matrimonial duties, Brinkerhoff v. Brinkerhoff, 106 N.J.Eq. 331, 150 A. 679, 680; endangers loalth or safety, Mac-Arthur v. MacArthur, 135 N.J.Eq. 215, 37 A.2d 76; whether actually ínflicted or reasonably apprehended, Rosengren v. Rosengren, 115 N.J.Eq. 283, 170 A. 660, 661; Bamberg v. Bamberg, 123 N.J.Eq. 570, 199 A. 54, 55; endangers life or health, Fallon v. Fallon, 111 N‘J.Eq. 512, 162 A. 406, 408; Chisholm v. Chisholm, 98 Fla. 1196, 125 So. 694, 702; impairs bodily health, Dier v. Dier, 141 Neb. 685, 4 N.W.2d 731, 734; incapacitates one from performing marital duties, Fallon v. Fallon. 111 N.J.Eq. 512, 162 A. 406, 408; inflicts grievous bodily injury or grievous mental suffering. Civ. Code Cal. § 94, McFall v. McFall, 58 Cal.App.2d 208, 136 P.2d 580, 583; produces bodily hurt to physical system or reasonable apprehension thereof, Morris v. Morris, 132 Okl. 291, 133 Okl. 176, 270 P. 833, 835; produces continuous, in-tense mental pain and suffering, danger to health, or a forced abnegation of the marital reiation, Currie v. Currie, 120 Fla. 28, 162 So. 152; wounds, feelings, Nelson v. Nel-son, 89 Okl. 318, 117 P.2d 110, 111; Smith v. Smith, 61 Ariz. 373, 149 P.2d 683, 684; renders cohabitation intolerable, Stocker v. Stocker, 173 Okl. 64, 47 P.2d 107, 108; renders cohabitation intolerable and unsafe, Chisholm v. Chis-holm, 98 Fla. 1196, 125 So. 694, 703.
Physical violence is extreme cruelty. Baker v. Baker, 94 Fla. 1001, 114 So. 661, 663. But "extreme cruelty" is not conflned to physical violence. Henderson v. Henderson, 137 Fla. 770, 189 So. 24, 25; Bastien v. Hastíen, 57 R.I. 176, 189 A. 37, 38.
To constitute "extreme cruelty" within divorce statute, the acts must be directed toward the other party and must be committed with a malevolent motive. Nason v. Nason, 48 Cal.App.2d 500, 120 P.26 37, 39, 40.
Voluntary or intentional extreme cruelty is the "extreme cruelty," which is ground for divorce, Heim v. Heim, 35 Ohlo App. 408, 172 N.E. 451.
EXTREME HAZARD. To constitute extreme hazard, the situation of a vessel must be such that there is imminent danger of her being lost, not-withstanding all the means that can be applied to get her off. King v. Hartford Ins. Co., 1 Conn. 421.
EXTREME LOW TIDE are tides which are lower than lower low. State v. Edwards, 188 Wash. 467, 62 P.2d 1094, 1095.
EXTREMIS. When a person is sick, beyond the hope of recovery, and near death, he is said to be in extremis.
EXTREMIS PROBATIS, PR1ESUMUNTUR MED-IA. Extremes being proved, intermediate things are presumed. Tray,’Lat. Max. 207.EXTREMITY. The furthest point. Roberts v. Hart, Tex.Civ.App., 165 S.W. 473, 476.
EXTRINSIC. Foreign; from outside sources; dehors. As to "Extrinsic Fraud", see "Fraud."
Grounds for quashing of indictment may be matters "intrinsic" to the pleading, as defects apparent upon its face, United States v. Frankfeld, D.C.D.C., 38 F.Supp. 1018, 1019.
EXTRINSIC AYISIGUITY. In a written contract is an uncertainty which does not arise by the terms of the instrument itself, but is created by some collateral matter not appearing in the in-strument. Pacific Indemnity Co. v. California Electric Works, 29 Cal.App.2d 260, 84 P.2d 313, 320.
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE is external evidence, or that which is not contained in the body of an agreement, contract, and the like. Extrinsic evi-dence is also said to be evidence not legitimate-ly before the tribunal in which the determina-tion is made. Baldwin v. City of Buffalo, 35 N.Y. 375, 382.
EXTUME. In old records. Relics. Cowell.
EXUERE PATRIAM. To throw off or renounce one’s country or native allegiance; to expatriate one’s self. Phillim. Dom. 18.
EXULARE. In old English law. To exile or ban-ish. Nullus liber homo, exuletur, nisi, etc., no freeman shall be exiled, unless, etc. Magna Char-ta, c. 29; 2 Inst. 47.
EXUPERARE. To overcome; to apprehend or take. Leg. Edm. c. 2.
EY. A watery place; water. Co.Litt. 6. EYDE. Aid; assistance; relief. A subsidy.EYEWITNESS. A person who could testify as to what he had seen. Wigginton v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, C.C.A.Ind., 126 F.2d 659, 662, 665, 666, 667. One who saw the act, fact, or transaction to which he testifies. Distin-guished from an ear-witness, (auritus.) Bankers’ Health & Accident Ass’n v. Wilkes, Tex.Civ.App., 209 S.W. 230, 233; Pannell v. Sovereign Camp, W. 0.W., 171 Tenn. 245, 102 S.W.2d 50, 52. Persons able to testify from their observation. Hayes v. Stunkard, 233 Iowa 582, 10 N.W.2d 19.
"Eye-witness" does not necessarily mean one who obtains knowledge of an act through the sense of sight alone, and may include one who is able to identify a person by his volee and who could not recognize the person on account of absence of sight. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 727, 166 S.W.2d 30, 36.
EYEWITNESS RULE is that, in absence of eye-witness, or of any obtainable direct evidence as to what deceased did or failed to do by way of pre-caution, at and immediately before injury, pre-sumption is that he, prompted by natural instinct, ovas in exercise of care for his own safety, obtains. Edwards v. Perley, 223 Iowa 1119, 274 N.W. 910, 915.
EYGNE. The same as "eigne" (q. v.).
EYOTT. A small island arising in a river. Fleta, 1. 3, c. 2, § b; Bract. 1. 2, c. 2.
EYRE. A journey; a court of itinerant justices.
Justices in eyre were judges commissioned In Anglo-Nor-man times in England to travel systematically through the kingdom, once in seven years, holding courts in specified places for, the trial of certain descriptions of causes.
EYRER. L. Fr. To travel or journey; to go about or itinerate. Britt. c. 2. See Eyre.
EZARDAR. In Hindu law. A farmer or renter of land in the districts of Hindoostan.

BLACK ‘S LAW DICTIONARY – Section F

F

F. The sixth letter of the alphabet.

Under the oid English criminal law, this letter was branded upon felons upon their being admitted to clergy; as also upon those cOnvicted of fights or frays, or falsity. Jacob; Cowell; 2 Reeve, Eng.Law, 392; 4 Reeve, Eng.Law, 485.
F. A. A. Federal Aviation Agency.
F. A. A. In marine insurance. "Free of all average," denoting that the insurance is against total Loss only. Wharton.
F. A. S. Free alongside ship. Larkin v. Geisen-heimer, 201 App.Div. 741, 195 N.Y.S. 577, 578; Iwaí & Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 162 Ga. 795, 134 S.E. 763. The term implies delivery at dock for ship named. Christenson v. Gorton-Pew Fish-eries Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 8 F.2d 689, 691.
A lumber contract providing that prices were f. o. b, f. a. s. is too indefinite for enforcement; the expression "f. o. b." designating that the seller should bear’ the expense of loading onto the vessel, while the expression "f. a. s." denotes that the lumber should merely be placed within reach of the vessel’s tackle. McGowin Lumber & Export Co. v. R. J. & 13. F. Lumber Co., 192 Ala. 35, 68 So. 263, 264.
The delivery of goods under contract "F. A. S." which means free acide ship, is complete and relieves consignor of liability after the goods have been delivered in good order to dock where ship is to sail. Tex-O-Kan Flour Mills Co. v. Nord, La.App., 18 So.2d 50, 54.
F. C. A. Farm Credit Administration.
F. C. C. Federal Communications Commission.
F. C. L. means Femme Couleur Libre. Sunseri v. Cassagne, 191 La. 209, 185 So. 1, 4.
F. D. A. Food and Drug Administration.
F. D. I. C. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
F. G. A. In marine insurance. "Free from gen-eral average"; also, sometimes, "foreign general average." The precise meaning of this abbrevia-tion must be gathered from the context. Wharton.
F. H. A. Federal Housing Administration; Farm-ers Home Administration.
F. H. L. B. B. Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
F. M. C. S. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.
F. N. M. A. Federal National Mortgage Associa-tion.
F. O. B. Term "f. o. b." is an abbreviation for "free on board," and means that seller or con-signor of goods will deliver them on car, vessel, or other conveyance by which they are to be trans-ported without expense to buyer or consignee. Hatcher v. Ferguson, 33 Idaho, 639, .198 P. 680, 681, 16 A.L.R. 590; Swerdfeger v. United Ac-ceptance Corporation, 9 Cal.App.2d 590, 50 P.2d 818, 820; Olsen v. McMaken & Pentzien, 139 Neb. 506, 297 N.W. 830, 832; Fernholtz Machinery Co. v. Wilson, 118 Cal.App. 573, 5 P.2d 679, 682.
Contract provislon for shipment of goods by seller "f. o. b." place of manufacture means that they are to be delivered to carrier by seller without expense to buyer.State ex rel. Day Pulvdizer Co. v. Fitts, 166 Tenn. 156, 60 S.W.2d 167; Humphries v. Frick Co., 56 Ga.App. 124, 192 S.E. 247, 248.
The farm "F. O. B." as used in contract for purchase of scrap iron from railroad for overseas shipment, mlght rea-sonably be construed as meaning merely that purchase price of scrap iron was flxed on basis that railroad
transport free of charge and not as indicating the poini of passage of title. Expression "F. O. B." signifies gen-erally an intention to pass title. Southern Pac. Co. v. Hyman-Michaels Co., 63 Cal.App.2d 757, 147 P.2d 692, 696.
"F. o. b. factory" means "f. o. b. railroad cars at f ac-tory," obligating seller to deliver to carrier without cost to buyer, who takes risk thereafter. Richter v. Zoccoli,
N.J.Misc. 289, 150 A. 1, 2.
Generally, place "f. o. b.- where goods are sold Is regarded as place of delivery, but effect of term "t. o. b." depends on connection in which used. Craig Brokerage Co. v. Joseph A. Goddard Co., 92 Ind.App. 234, 175 N.E. 19, 22.
The initials "f. o. b." are generaily construed as an intention that the price Is to be paid when the property is delivered to carrier. Rudy,Patrick Seed Co. v. Roseman, 247 Iowa 597, 13 N.W.2d 347, 349, 350.
Under contract to sell sage leaves providing for shipment "f. o. b." Greek port, buyer and not seller had the duty of supplying ship at Greek port. Carvel v. John Kellys (Lon-don), Limited, Sup., 53 N.Y.S.2d 640, 641.
When used in connection with the price of goods, the term is commonly construed as fixing only the price, and not as relating to the time, place, or mode of delivery. Lee v. Northway Motor Sales Co., R.I., 121 A. 425; Pond Creek Mill & Elevator Co. v. Clark, C.C.A.I11., 270 F. 482, 486; Bott v. N. Snellenburg & Co., 177 Va. 331, 14 S.E.2d 372, 374.
F. P. A. In marine insurance. "Free from par-ticular average." Wharton. See Average.
F. R. S. Federal Reserve System.
F. T. C. Federal Trade Commission.
FABRIC. With reference to the reinforcement of concrete, a union of drawn wires made up in rows. Soule v. Northern Construction Co., 33 Cal.App. 300, 165 P. 21, 22,
A woven, felted, or krfitted material for wear or orna-ment, as cloth, felt, hosiery, or lace; also the material used In its rnaking; something that has been tabricated, constructed. or put together; any complex construction; a system built up of correlated parts; structure or ediflce. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Johns-Manville Corpo-ration, D.C.N.Y., 14 F.Supp. 792, 797.
Something that has heen fabricated, constructed, or put together; the structure of anything or anything manufac-tured, and in a broad sense includes a flexible sheet metal. Johns-Manville Corporation v. National Tank Seal Co., C.C.A.Okl., 49 F.2d 142, 145.
FABRIC LANDS. In English law. Lands given towards the maintenance, rebuilding, or repairing of cathedral and other churches. Cowell; Blount. Called by the Saxons timber-lands. Spelman.
It was the custom, says Cowell, for almost every one to give by will more or less to the fabric of the cathedral or parlsh church where he lived. These lands so given were called fabric lands, because given ad fabricara ecclesia3 reparandam (for repairing the fabric of the church).
FABRICA. In old English law. The making or coining of money.FABRICARE. Lat. To make. Used in old Eng« lish law of a lawful coining, and also of an un-lawf ul making or counterfeiting of coin. Used in an indictment for forging a bill of lading; 1 Salk. 341.
FABRICATE. To invent; to devise falsely. In-vent is sometimes used in a bad sense, but fabri-cate never in any other.
To fabricate a story implies that It is so contrary to probability as to require the skill of a workman to induce belief in it. Crabbe, Syn. The word implies fraud or false-hood; a false or fraudulent concoction, knowing It to be wrong. L.R. 10 Q.B. 162.
To fabricate evidence is to arrange or manufacture cir-cumstances or indicio, after the fact committed, with the purpose of using them as evidence, and of deceitfully mak-ing them appear as if accidental or undesigned; to devise falsely or contrive by artifice with the intention to deceive. Such evidence may be wholly forged and artificial, or it may consist in so warping and distorting real facts as to create an erroneous impression in the minds of those who observe them and then presenting such impression as true and genuine.
FABRICATED EVIDENCE. Evidente manufac-tured or arranged after the fact, and either whol-ly false or else warped and discolored by artifice and contrivance with a deceitful intent. See su-pra.
FABRICATED FACT. In the law of evidence. A fact existing only in statement, without any foundation in truth. An actual or genuine fact to which a false appearance has been designedly given; a physical object placed in a false connec-tion with another, or with a person on whom it is designed to cast suspicion.
FABRICATING. .The word "fabricating," in its context, does not mean "manufacturing," but means cutting, carving, dressing, shaping and working over stone. Commonwealth v. Paul W. Bounds Co., 316 Pa. 29, 173 A. 633.
FABRICATION. "Manufacture" and "fabrica-tion," are often, in broadest sense, interchange-able in meaning; definition in particular instance depending on environment of particular use of either. Union Wire Rope Corporation v. .Atchi-son, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., C.C.A.Mo., 66 F.2d 965, 970.
The word "fabrication," meaning "making," although not generally synonyrnous with "reworking," meaning a working over, was expressly so used in railroad tariff in question, as distinguished from "manufacture." Atchison, I. & S. F. R. Co. v. Union Wire Rope Corporation, D.C.Mo., 1 F.Supp. 399.
FABULA. In old European law. A contract or formal agreement; particularly used in the Lom-bardic and Visigothic laws to denote a marriage contract or a will. Burrill.
FACE. That which is shown by the mere lan-guage employed without any explanation, modi-fication, or addition from extrinsic facts or evi-dence, the principal sum which it expresses to be due or payable, without any additions in the way of interest and costs. Cunningham v. Great Southern Life Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 66 S.W.2d 765, 773. The outward appearance or aspect of a thing.
For "Regular on its face," see that title. The surface of anything; especially the front, upper, or outer part or surface; that which particularly offers itself to the view of a spectator. The words of a written paper In their apparent or obvious meaning, as, the face of a note, bill, bond, check, draft, judgment record, or contract; the face of a judgment for which it was rendered exclusive of interest. Cunningham v. Great Southern Life Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 66 S.W.2d 765, 773.
FACE AMOUNT. The "face amount" of an in-strument is that shown by the mere language em-ployed, and excludes any accrued interest. Burns v. Corn Exch. Nat. Bank of Omaha, Neb., 33 Wyo. 474, 240 P. 683, 687. See Face of instrument.
The face amount of a policy means the amount which is, in all events, payable under the policy as straight life insurance without regard to any additional features, such as accident or disability insurance, Smith v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, 232 Mo.App. 935, 107 S.W.2d 191, 195; face values specified in policies plus dividend additions postdating lapse, and exclusive of accidental death benefits, Valenti v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, C.C.A.Mo., 71 F.2d 229, 233.
FACE AMOUNT INSURED BY THE POLICY. Within statute relating to extended life insurance, means the amount which is, in all events, payable under the policy as straight life insurance without regard to additional features such as accident or disability insurance. Wilkins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 350 Mo. 185, 165 S.W.2d 858, 861, 862; Wilkins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 236 Mo.App. 586, 159 S.W.2d 354, 356.
FACE OF BOOK. Under an act providing that a public or private statute or the proceedings of any legislative body purporting on the lace of the book to be printed by authority of the government of the state are evidence without further proof, the "face of the book" and the "title page" need not coincide, as "face" is used in contradistinction to "cover." Pensacola, St. A. & G. S. S. Co. v. Brooks, 14 Ala.App. 364, 70 So. 968, 970.
FACE OF INSTRUMENT. That which is shown by the language employed, without any explana-tion, modification, or addition from extrinsic facts or evidence. Adopted in Re Stoneman, Sur., 146 N.Y.S. 172, 175; Investors’ Syndicate v. Willcuts, D.C.Minn., 45 F.2d 900, 902. Thus, if the express terms of the paper disclose a fatal legal defect, it is said to be "void on its face." Regarded as an evidence of debt, the face of an instrument is the principal sum which it expresses to be due or pay-able, without any additions in the way of interest or costs. Osgood v. Bringolf, 32 Iowa, 265. See, also, State v. Newby, 169 Wis. 208, 171 N.W. 953, 954.
FACE OF JUDGMENT. The sum for which it was rendered, exclusive of interest. Osgood v. Bringolf, 32 Iowa, 265. See, also, Face of instru-ment.
FACE OF POLICY. A phrase which, as used in a statute forbidding life insurance policies to con-tain provision for any mode of settlement at ma-turity of less value than the amount insured on the "face of the policy," does not mean merely the first page, but denotes the entire insurance con-tract contained in the policy, including a rider at-tached and referred to on the first page. Julius v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 299 III. 343, 132 N.E.
435, 437, 17 A.L.R. 956.
FACE OF RECORD. The entire record In a case, not merely what the judgment recites. Carson v. Taylor, Tex.Civ.App., 261 S.W. 824; San Ber-nardo Townsite Co. v. Hocker, Tex.Civ.App., 176
S.W. 644, 646.
The "face of the record" means, in a criminal case, the indictment and the verdict. Sones v. State, 58 Ga.App. 374, 198 S.E. 566.
The phrases "judgment roll," "judgment record," and "face of the record" are synonymous. Every part of trial proceedings reserved in courts of record under direction of court for purpose oí its records constitutes the "judgment roll." Permian Oil Co. v. Smith, 129 Tex. es, 107 S.W.2d 564, 566, ni A.L.R. 1152.
FACE VALUE. This terco, in a statute taxing
transfers of corporate . stock, means par value. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. U. S., 273 U.S. 100, 47 S.Ct. 263, 71 L.Ed. 558. See, also In re Stone-man, Sur., 146 N.Y.S. 172, 174.
As used in statute concerning acceptance of bonds as ball means that value, written or printed on face of instrument and the unmatured coupons attached thereto, without refer-ence to the actual or market value of bonds. Wilson v. Jus-tice’s’ Court of Township of San Diego, 22 Ca1.App.2d 278, 70 P.2d 695, 696.
The ‘lace value" of an interest bearing note, is the prin-cipal plus accrued interest. American Nat. Bank of Ports-mouth v. Ames, 169 Va. 711, 194 S.E. 784, 798.
The value which can be ascertained from the language of the instrument without aid from extrinsic facts or evi-dence. Investors’ Syndicate v. Willcuts, D.C.Minn., 45 F.2d 900, 902.
FACERE. Lat. To do; to make. Thus, lacere defaltam, to make default; lacere duellum, to make the duel, or make or do battle; facere finem, to make or pay a fine; facere legem, to make
one’s law; lacere sacramentum, to make oath.
FACIAL DISFIGUREMENT. That which im-pairs or injures the beauty, symmetry, or appear-ance of a person, that which renders unsightly, misshapen or imperfect or deforms in some man-ner. Ferguson v. State Highway Department, 197 S.C. 520, 15 S.E.2d 775, 778; Poole v. Saxon Mills, 192 S.C. 339, 6 S.E.2d 761, 764.
,FACIAS. That you cause.
Oceurring in the phrases "sctire facies," (that you cause to know,) "fieri facies," (that you cause to be made,) etc. Used also in the phrases Do ut lacias (I give that you may do), Fado ut lacias (I do that you may do), two of the four divisions of consideratIons made by Biackstone, 2 Comm. 444. See Fado ut des; Fado ut facias.
FACIENDO. In doing or paying; in some activi-ty.
FACIES. Lat. The face or countenance; the ex-terior appearance or view; hence, contemplation or study of a thing on its externa’ or apparent
side.
Thus, prima facie means at the first inspection, on a pre-liminary or exterior scrutiny. When we speak of a "prima facie case," we mean one which, on its own showing, on a first examination, or without investigating any alleged defenses, is apparently good and maintainable.
FACILE. In Scotch law. Easily persuaded; imposed upon. Bell.FACILITATE. To make easy or less difficult, or to free from difficulty or impediment. Pon Wing Quong v. United States, C.C.A.Cal., 111 F.2d 751, 756. To make more easy or less difficult; free more or less completely from obstruction or hin-drance; lessen the labor of: United States v. One Dodge Coupe, Motor No. D14-105424, Serial No. 30284066, D.C.N.Y., 43 F.Supp. 60, 61.
"FACILITIES. That which promotes the ease of any action, operation, transaction, or course of
conduct. Webster. The terco denotes inanimate means rather than human agencies. Sloss-Shef-field Steel & Iron Co. v. Smith, 185 Ala. 607, 64 So. 337, 338.
Also, a name formerly given to certain notes of some of the banks in the state of Connecticut, which were made payable in two years after the close of the war of 1812. Springfield Bank v. Mer-
rick, 14 Mass. 322.
As applied to carriers, means everything necessary for the conveniente of passengers and the safety and prompt transportation of freight; everything incident to the gen-eral, prompt, safe, and impartial performance of the duties to the public at large imposed by the state, in the proper exercise of its pollee power, upon transportation or trans-mission companies. As applied to a ferry franchise, every-thing incident to the general, prompt, and sale carriage of passengers, boats in good repair, appliances answering the purpose, and readiness and willingness to perform the services incident to the grant. Fraters v. Keeling, 20 Cal. App.2d 490. 67 P.2d 118, 119.
As used in phrase "special facilities within the place of amusement," in statute creating amusement tax, referred to personal accommodations furnished for comfort of patron to enable him to obtain a better view of what he paid for when he entered the ground or to more conven-iently do so. Martín v. F. H. Bee Shows, 271 Ky. 822, 113 S.W.2d 448, 452,
As used in statute giving Public Service Commission con-trol over service and facilities of public service companies, means something owned by or under the control of a pub-lic utility. Borough of Swarthmore v. Public Service Com-mission, 277 Pa. 472, 121 A. 488, 489.
Electric company which transmitted electricity from gen-erating plant through a line to another company which transmitted such electricity in interstate commerce, oper-ated "facilities" subject to jurisdiction of Federal Power Commission. Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Federal Power Commission, C.C.A.3, 129 F.2d 183, 195.
Electric company’s corporate organization, contracto, accounts, memorandum, papers, and other records consti-tuted "facilities" within Federal Power Act. The word "facilities" embraces anything which alds or makes easter the performance of the activities involved in the business of a person or corporation. Hartford Electric Light Co. v. Federal Power Commission, C.C.A.2, 131 F.2d 953, 960. 961, 962.
Freight cars are "facilities" of transportation as defined by Interstate Commerce Act. General American Tank Car Corporation v. El Dorado Terminal Co., Cal., 308 U.S. 422, 60 S.Ct. 325, 329, 84 L.Ed. 361.
Sidetracks constituting part of a transportation system are "facilities" of the rallroad, even though privately owned. Lehigh Nav. Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Util-ity Commission, 133 Pa.Super. 67, 1 A.2d 540, 544.
Street railroad’s "facilities" include tracks and land rea-sonably necessary for operation of railroad and accom-modation of patrons. Munoz v. Porto Rico Ry., Light & Power Co., C.C.A.Puerto Rico, 74 F.2d 816, 821.
FACILITY. In Scotch law. Pliancy of disposi-tion. Bell.
A switch engine and crew is a "facility" within statute authorizing rental thereof by railroad. Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co. v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 217 WIs. 426, 259 N.W. 618.As ordínarily used, is not as narrow a term as "instru-mentality." Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co. v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 217 Wis. 426, 259 N.W. 618.
Convenlent means. BrIggs Mfg. Co. v. U. S., D.C.Conn., 30 F.2d 962, 964.
Where electric company transmitted electricíty to another company which transmitted it 1n interstate com-merce, the former company’s line was a "facílity" subject to jurisdiction of Federal Power Commission. Jersey Cen-tral Power & Light Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 319 U.S. 61, 63 S.Ct. 953, 959, 87 L.Ed. 1258.
FACILITY OF PAYMENT CLAUSE, is appoint-ment by assured and beneficiary of persons au-thorized to receive payment. French v. Lanham, App.D.C., 57 F.2d 422; Fulcher v. Parker, 169 Va. 479, 194 S.E. 714, 716. It confers on insurer an option as to whom it will make nayment, Metro-politan Life Ins. Co. v. Brown for Use and Benefit of Fleming, 25 Tenn.App. 514, 160 S.W.2d 434, 438; Rohde v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 233 Mo.App. 865, 111 S.W.2d 1006.
Such clause In group policy glvíng employer under cer-tain contingencies power to designate beneficiary controls only where no other beneficiary is named. Potter v. Young, 193 Ark, 957, 104 S.W.2d 802, 804.
FACING. In deed containing building restric-tions applicable to lots "facing" and "having a frontage" on named street, quoted words as ap-plied to oblong lots referred to the street which buildings to be erected on the lots were intended to face. Aller v. Berkeley Hall School Founda-tion, 40 Cal.App.2d 31, 103 P.2d 1052, 1054.
FACINUS QUOS INQUINAT .JEQUAT. Guilt makes equal those whom it stains.
FACIO UT DES. (Lat. I do that you may give.)
A species of contract in the civil law (being one of the innominate contracts) which occurs when a man agrees to perform anything for a price either specifically mentioned or left to the determination of the law to set a value on it; as when a servant hires hlmself to his master for certain wages or an agreed sum of money. 2 BI.Comm. 445. Also, the consideration of that species of contract.
FACIO UT FACIAS. (Lat. I do that you may do.)
The consideration of that specles of contract In the civil law, or the contract itself (being one of the innominate contracts), which occurs when I agree with a man to do his work for him if he will do mine for me; or if two persons agree to marry together, or to do any other posi-tíve aets on both sídes; or it may be to forbear on one side in consideration of something done on the other. 2 Bl.Comm. 444.
FACSIMILE. An exact copy, preserving all the marks of the original.
FACSIMILE PROBATE. In England, where the construction of a will may be affected by the ap-pearance of the original paper, the court will order the probate to pass in facsimile, as it may possibly help to show the meaning of the testator. 1 Wil-liams, Ex’rs, 7th Ed., 331, 386, 566.
FACT. A thing done; an action performed or an incident transpiring; an event or circumstance; an actual occurrence. An actual happening in time or space or an event mental or physical. Fowler-Curtis Co. v. Dean, 203 App.Div. 317, 196 N.Y.S. 750, 754; German-American Ins. Co. v. Huntley, 62 Okl. 39, 161 P. 815, 817; Rost v. Kes-sler, 267 App.Div. 686, 49 N.Y.S.2d 97, 99. That which has taken place, not what might or might.not have taken place. Churchill v. Meade, 92 Or. 626, 182 P. 368, 371.
A fact Is either a state of things, that is, an existence, or a motion, that is, an event. 1 Benth.Jud.Ev. 48.
Fact (factum, fait) stands in lawbooks for : 1. An act; 2. For a completed and operative transaction brought about by sealing and executing a certain sort of writing, and so for the instrument itself, a deed (factura); 3. As designating what exista, in contradistinction to what should exist (de jacto as contrasted with de jure); 4. As indicat-Ing things, events, actions, conditions, as happening, exist-Ing, ready taking place. Thayer, Evid. 190.
"Fact" was formerly used almost excluslvely In the sense of "action" or "deed." This usage survives In phrases such as "accessory before the fact."
As used In statute providing that malice shall be pre-sumed from publication of matter not privileged, unless the "fact" and the testimony rebut such presumption, means the act, the thing done, the circumstance, the pub-lication itself. Reininger v. Prickett, 192 Okl. 486, 137 P.2d 595, 597.
As used in statute requiring statement of facts constitut-ing cause of action, "facts" mean narrative of events, acta, and things done which show legal liability of defendant to plaintiff. Rhoads v. Columbia Fire Underwriters’ Agency, 128 Neb. 710, 260 N.W. 174.
"Facts" to which Supreme Court is limited on certiorari to quash Court of Appeals’ decision for conflict comprise record before Court of Appeals, evidente, documentary and oral, and instructions and pleadings. State ex rel. Hors-pool v. Haid, 328 Mo. 327, 40 S.W.2d 611, 613.
Good reputatIon of an accused when proved Is a "fact". State v.. Fenimore, 3 Terry 183, 29 A.2d 170, 171. Intent Ss a "fact". Majestic Securities Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.8, 120 F.2d 12, 14. "Knowl-edge" is a "fact", and an "assertion of knowledge", when knowledge does not exist, is an assertion not in accordance with the facts. Eastern States Petroleum Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 24 Del.Ch. 11, 3 A.2d 768, 775. Represen-tations as to boundaries of land are representatlons of "fact". Algee v. Hlllman Inv. Co., 12 Wash.2d 672, 123 P.2d 332, 334. Where knowledge is possible, one who repre-sents a mere bellef as knowledge m1srepresents a "fact". Sovereign Pocohontas Co. v. Bond, 74 App.D.C. 175, 120 F.26 39, 40.

Law and Fact as Distinguishable

"Fact" is very frequently used in opposition or contrast to "law."
Thus, questions of fact are for the jury; questions of Zaw for the court. So an attorney at law is an officer of the courts of justice; an attorney in fact ís appointed by the written authorlzation of a principal to manage business affairs usually not professional. Fraud in fact consists in an actual intention to defraud, carried into effect; while fraud imputed by law arises from the man’s conduct in its necessary relations and consequences.
A "fact", as distinguished from the "law", may be taken as that out of which the point of law arises, that which is asserted to be or not to be, and is to be presumed or proved to be or not to be for the purpose of applying or refusing to apply a rule of law. Hinckley v. Town 01 Barnstable, 311 Mass. 600, 42 N.E.2d 581, 584.
Law is a principie; fact is en event. Law 1s conceived; fact is actual. Law is a rule of duty; fact is that which has been according to or ín contravention of the rule. The distinction ís well illustrated In the rule that the existence of foreign laws ís matter of fact. Within the territory of its jurisdiction, law operates as an obligatory rule which judges must recognize and enforce; but, in a tribunal out-side that jurisdiction, it loses its obligatory force and íts clairn to judicial notice. The fact that it exists. if impor-tant to the rights of parties, must be alleged and proved the same as the actual existence of any other institution. Abbott.

Law of Evidence

A circumstance, event or occurrence as it actual-ly takes or took place; a physical object or ap-pearance, as it actually exists or existed. An ac-tual and absolute reality, as distinguished frommere supposition or opinion; a truth, as distin-guished from fiction or error. Burrill, Circ.Ev. 218.
-circumstances" are but minor facts, Scott v. State, 57 Ga.App. 489, 195 S.E. 923, 924. Facts admitted upon trial of cause become "evidence". American Extension School of Law v. Ragland, 232 Mo.App. 763, 112 S.W.2d 110, 113. Facts judicially noticed are equivalent to evidence. Zieke-foose v. Thompson, 347 Mo. 579, 148 S.W.2d 784, 792.
"Facts" and "evidence" are sometimes used interchange-ably. Mackey v. First Nat. Bank, Mo.App., 293 S.W. 66, 71. But the terms are not really synonymous; evidence, broadly defined, being means from which an inference may logically be drawn as to existente of a fact. Tjernstrom v. Ford Motor Co., 285 Mich. 450, 280 N.W. 823, 825. Yet, although "facts" and the "evidence" are quite different, it sometimes may happen that they constitute one and the same thing. Gates v. Haw, 150 Ind. 370, 50 N.E. 299.
Hypothetical question propounded to plaintiff’s witness in which an assumed fact was that a test made by another expert had a specified result referred to a "fact" and not an "opinion" of the expert. Cody v. Toller Drug Co., 232 Iowa 475, 5 N.W.2d 824, 828.
In rule 41(b), providing for motion for dismissal at Glose of plaintiff’s evidence in nonjury case on ground that upon the facts and the law plaintiff has shown no right to relief, the "facts" referred to are the prima facie facts shown by plaintiff’s evidence viewed In light most favorable to him. Schad v. Twentieth Cehtury-Fox Film Corporation, C.C.A. Pa., 136 F.2d 991, 993.
Ownership of property is, generally, a "fact" to which a witness may testify. Diamond v. Grath, 46 Cal.App.2d 443, 116 P.2d 114, 116.
Statement that cause of death was a gunshot wound was a statement of "fact" but further statements .that such wound was self-inflicted and that death was suicide were mere expressions of "opinion". Kentucky Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Watts, 298 Ky. 471, 183 S.W.2d 499, 502.
Where person states matter which might otherwise be only an "opinion" as an existing fact material to the transaction, the statement clearly becomes a statement of "fact". Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. J. D. Pitt-man Tractor Co., 244 Ala. 354, 13 So.2d 669, 672.
Words "facts" and "circumstances" are used inter-changeably in the phrase circumstantlal evidence. PuIllam v. State, 196 Ga. 782, 28 S.E.2d 139, 147.
Workmen’s compensation claimant’s testimony that he was well related to a "fact" and not to an "opinion". Texas Employers Ins. Ass’n v. Grifils, Tex.Civ.App., 141 S.W.2d 687, 690.

Truth and Fact Distinguished

The terms "fact" and "truth" are often used in common parlante as synonymous, but, as em-ployed in reference to pleading, they are widely different. A fact in pleading is a circumstance, act, event, or incident; a truth is the legal princi-pie which declares or governs the facts and their operative effect. Admitting the facts stated in a complaint, the truth may be that the plaintiff is not entitled, upon the face of his complaint, to what he claims. The mode in which a defendant sets up that truth for his protection is a demurrer. Drake v. Cockroft, 4 E. D. Smith, N.Y., 37.
For "Collateral Facts," "Dispositive Facts," "Evi-dentiary Facts," "Finding of Fact," "Inmaterial Facts," "Jurisdictional Facts," "Material Fact," "Principal Fact," and "Ultimate Facts," see those heads.
FACT MATERIAL TO RISK. See Material Fact.
FACTA. In old English law. Deeds. Facta ar-morum, deeds or feats of arms; that is, jousts or tournaments. Cowell.Facts. Facta et casus, facts and cases. Bract. fol. lb.
FACTA SUNT POTENTIORA VERBIS. Deeds for facts] are more powerful than words.
FACTA TENENT MULTA QUE FIERI PRO-HIBENTUR. 12 Coke, 124. Deeds contain many things which are prohibited to be done.
FACTIO TESTAMENTI. In the civil law. The right, power, or capacity of making a will; called "factio activa." Inst. 2, 10, 6.
The right or capacity of taking by will; called "factio passiva." Inst. 2, 10, 6; Vicat, Voc.Jur.
FACTO. In fact; by an act; by the act or fact. Ipso facto, by the act itself ; by the mere effect of a fact, without anything superadded, or any pro-ceeding upon it to give it effect. 3 Kent, Comm. 55, 58.
FACTO ET ANIMO. In fact and intent. North-western Mortgage & Security Co. v. Noel Const. Co., 71 N.D. 256, 300 N.W. 28, 31.
FACTOR. A commercial agent, employed by a principal to sell merchandise consigned to him for that purpose, for and in behalf of the principal, but usually in his own name, being intrusted with the possession and control of the goods, and being remunerated by a commission, commonly called "factorage." Howland v. Woodruff, 60 N.Y. 80; In re Rabenau, D.C.Mo., 118 F. 474; Graham v. Duck-wall, 8 Bush, Ky., 17; Pal.P_g. 13; Sto.Ag. § 33; Com.Dig. Merchant, B; Malynes, Lex Merc. 81; Beawes, Lex Merc. 44; 3 Chit.Com.L. 193; 2 Kent 622; 1 Bell, Comm. 385, § 408; 2 B. & Ald. 143.
In Scotch law, a person appointed to transact business or manage affairs for another, but more particularly an estate-agent or one intrusted with the management of a landed estate, who finds tenants, makes leases, collects the rents, etc.
In some of the states, the person who is else-where called "garnishee" or "trustee." See Fac-torizing Process.
commercial agent to whom the possession of personalty is entrusted by or for the owner, to be soid, for a com-pensation, in pursuance of the agent’s usual trade or busi-ness, with title to goods remaining in principal and the "factor" being merely a ballee for the purposes of the agency. Neild v. District of Columbia, 71 App.D.C. 306, 110 F.2d 246, 259.
Although a "factor" is in the last analysls an agent, the agency is a limited one. Falls Rubber Co. v. La Fon, Tex. Clv.App., 256 S.W. 577, 579.
An agent employed to sell goods for principal, The Robín Gray, D.C.N.Y., 53 F.2d 1037, 1041. An agent employed to sell goods for his principal which are in bis possession for a commission and ordinary consignment contract create relation of factor and principal. Robertson v. State, 207 Ind. 374, 192 N.E. 887, 888.
An agent employed to sell goods or merchandise con-signed or delivered to him, by or for his principal, for a compensation, commonly called factorage or commission, and an agent for the sale of goods in his possession or con-signed to him. Hughes v. Young, 17 Tenn.App. 24, 65 S.W.2d 858.
An agent, who, in pursuance of his usual trade or busi-ness, and for compensation, sells goods or merchandise con-signed or intrusted to his possession for that purpose by orfor the owner. Sams v. Arthur, 135 S.C. 123, 133 S.E. 205, 207; M. H. Thomas & Co. v. Hawthorne, Tex.Civ.App., 245 S.W. 966, 971; Lemnos Broad Silk Works v. Spiegelberg, 127 Misc.Rep. 855, 217 N.Y.S. 595, 597.
An agent who, in the pursuit of an independent calling, is employed by another to sell property for him, and is vested by the latter with the possession or control of the property, or authorized to receive payment therefor from the purchaser. Civ.Code Cal. § 2026; Comp.Laws N.D.1913, § 6145; Comp.Laws S.D.1929, § 1288; Leland v. Oliver, 82 Cal.App. 474, 255 P. 775, 777.
One who, in pursuance of business, receives goods from principal and sells them for compensation called factorage or commission. Holleman v. Taylor, 200 N.C. 618, 158 S.E. 88, 89.
One whose business ls to receive and sell goods for a com-mission, being intrusted with the possession of the goods to be sold, and usually selling in his own name. City of Atlanta v. York Mfg. Co., 155 Ga. 33, 116 S.E. 195, 199; Tyson v. Jennings Produce Co., 16 Ala.App. 374, 77 So. 986, 987; G. H. Hammond Co. v. Joseph Mercantile Co., 144 Ark. 108, 222 S.W. 27, 28.
In the oid law, one to whom goods are consigned to sell by a merchant at a distante from the place of sale. Eames v. H. B. Claflin Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 239 F. 631, 635.

Broker and Factor Distinguished

A factor differs from a "broker" in that he is in-trusted with the possession, management, and con-trol of the goods, (which gives him a special prop-erty in them,); while a broker acts as a mere in-termediary without control or possession of the property. A factor may buy and sell in his own name, as well as in that of the principal, while a broker, as such, cannot ordinarily buy or sell in his own name. Cornmercial Inv. Trust v. Stewart, 235 Mich. 502, 209 N.W. 660, 661; Sutton & Cummins v. Kiel Cheese & Butter Co., 155 Ky. 465, 159 S.W. 950, 951; Hughes v. Young, 17 Tenn.App. 24, 65 S.W.2d 858; Gadsden County Tobacco Co. v. Corry, 103 Fla. 217, 137 So. 255, 257. A factor or commission merchant has a lien upon the goods for his charges, advances, and commissions, while the broker has no control of the property and is responsible only for bad faith. McCornick & Co., Bankers v. Tolmie Bros., 42 Idaho 1, 243 P. 355, 358.
A. factor or commission merchant 15 one who has the actual or technlcal possession of goods or wares of another for sale. A ”merchandise broker" is one who negotiates the sale of merchandise without having it in his possession or control. He is simply an agent with very limited pow-ers, J. M. Robinson, Norton & Co. v. Cotton Factory, 124 Ky. 435, 99 S.W. 305, 102 S.W. 869, 8 L.R.A.,N.S., 474.

Commission Merchants and Factors as Synonymous

Factors are also frequently called "commission merchants;" and it is said that there is no dif-ference in the meaning of these terms, the latter being perhaps more commonly used in America. Thompson v. Woodruff, 7 Cold. 410; Duguid v. Edwards, 50 Barb., N.Y., 288; Lyon v. Alvord, 18 Conn. 80. See, also, Commission Merchant.

Domestic and Foreign Factors

Factors are called "domestic" or "foreign" ac-cording as they reside and do business in the same state or country with the principal or in a different state or country.
A domestic factor is sometimes called a "home" factor. Ruffner v. Hewitt, 7 W.Va. 585; 1 Term 112; 4 Maule & S. 576.

A "foreign factor," as understood in marine matters, was a person who had charge of the cargo to handle it, dispose of it, convert it into money, or exchange it for other prop-erty, but who had nothing to do with the management of the boat when he sailed thereon, at which time he was called a "supercargo." Gllchrist Transp. Co. v. Worthing-ton & Sill, 193 App.Div. 250, 184 N.Y.S. 81, 83; Beawes, Lex Merc. 44; Liverm.Ag. 69; 1 Domat, b. 1, t. 16, § 3, art. 2.

Judicial Factor

In Scotch law. A factor appointed by the courts in certain cases where it becomes necessary to in-trust the management of property to another than the owner, as, where the latter is insane or imbecile or the infant heir of a decedent.

Supercargo as a Factor

Where an owner of goods to be shipped by sea consigns them to the tare of an agent, who sails on the same vessel, has charge of the cargo on board, sells it abroad, and buys a return cargo out of the proceeds, such agent is strictly and properly a "factor," though in maritime law and usage he is commonly called a "supercargo." Beawes, Lex Merc. 44, 47; Liverm.Ag. 69, 70.

FACTORAGE. The wages, allowance, or commis-sion paid to a factor for his services. Winne v. Hammond, 37 III. 103; State v. Thompson, 25 S.W. 346, 120 Mo. 12.
‘ FACTORING is a system involving notice to the trade debtors, and is confined principally to the textile industry. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank & Trust Co., Philadelphia, v. Klauder, Pa., 318 U.S. 434, 63 S.Ct. 679, 682, 87 L.Ed. 884, 144 A.L.R. 1189.
FACTORIZING PROCESS. In American law. A process by which the effects of a debtor are at-tached in the hands of a third person. A term peculiar to the practice in Vermont and Connecti-cut. Otherwise termed "trustee process," "gar-nishment," and process by "foreign attachment." Cross v. Brown, 19 R.I. 220, 33 A. 147; Drake, At-tack. § 451.
FACTORS’ ACTS. The name given to several English statutes (6 Geo. IV. c. 94; 5 & 6 Vict. c. 39; 40 & 41 Vict. c. 39) by which a factor is enabled to make a valid pledge of the goods, or of any part thereof, to one who believes him to be the bona fide owner of the goods. Similar legislation is not uncommon in the United States.
FACTORY.

American Law

A building or group of buildings approprlated to the manufacture of goods, including the ma-chinery necessary to produce the goods, and the engine or other power by which the machinery is propelled; the place where workers are employed in fabricating goods, wares, or utensils. Cent. Dict.; Mayhew v. Hardesty, 8 Md. 479. A struc-ture where something is made or manufactured. People v. R. F. Stevens Co., 178 App.Div. 306, 165 N.Y.S. 39.
An undertaking In which the business of working at commodities is carried on with power-driven machinery. Gowey v. Seattle Lighting Co., 108 Wash. 479, 184 P. 339.

Any mili, workshvp, or any manufacturing or business establishment, and all buildings, sheds, structures, or other places used for or in connection therewith where one or more persons are employed al- labor. Under such statute, the term includes a machine shop, People v. Transit Development Co., 165 N.Y.S. 114, 115, 178 App.Div. 288; and a theatrical company; Ursprung v. Winter Garden Co., 169 N.Y.S. 738, 745, 183 App.Div. 718; but not a butche: shop; O’Connor v. Webber, 219 N.Y.. 439, 114 N.E. 799.
Any premises where steam, water, or other mechanical power Is used in the aid of any manufacturing process without reference to whether it Is inclosed in a building. Casey v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., C.C.A.Wash., 202 F. 1, 5.
Any premises wherein power is used in manufacturing, makhag, altering, adapting, ornamenting, finishing, repair-ing, or renovating articles for purpose of trade or gain, or of business carried on therein. Bradley v. Blakley, La.App., 147 So. 709, 710; Menke v. Hauber, 99 Kan. 171, 160 P. 1017, 1018.
The word does not necessarily mean a single building or edifice, but may apply to several, where they are used in connection with each other, for a common purpose, and stand together in the same inclosure. Liebenstein v. Insur-ance Co., 45 III. 303. And see Hernischel v. Texas Drug Co., 26 Tex.CIv.App. 1, 61 S.W. 419; Schott v. Harvey, 105 Pa. 227, 51 Am.Rep. 201; Amberg v. Kinley, 214 N.Y. 531, 108 N.E. 830, 833, L.R.A.1915E, 519.
To bring acts within statutory definition of "fac-tory" as used in statute relating to employees’ rest each week, the acts must be manufacturing ones. People v. Middletown & U. R. Co., 169 Misc. 773, 8 N.Y.S.2d 193, 195, 196.

English Law and Statutes

The term includes all buildings and premises wherein, or within the close or curtilage of which, steam, water, or any mechanical power is used to move or work any machinery employed in prepar-ing, manufacturing, or finishing cotton, wool, hair, silk, flax, hemp, jute, or tow. So defined by the statute 7 Vict. c. 15, § 73.
By later acts this definition has been extended to various other manufacturing places. Mozley & Whitley.
.Also a place where a considerable number of factors reside, in order to negotiate for their masters or employers. Enc.Brit.

Scotch Law

A species of contract or employment which falls under the general designation of "agency," but which partakes both of the nature of a mandate and of a bailment of the kind called "locatio ad operandum." 1 Bell, Comm. 259.
FACTORY ACTS. Laws enacted for the purpose of regulating the hours of work, and the sanitary condition, and preserving the health and morals, of the employés, and promoting the education of young persons employed at such labor.
FACTORY PRICES. The prices at which goods may be bought at the factories, as distinguished from the prices of goods bought in the market after they have passed into the hands of third persons or shop-keepers. Whipple v. Levett, 2 Mason, 90, Fed.Cas.No.17,518.
FACTORY RATING. Of carrying capacity of motortrucks as used in statute imposing license fee means customary public announcement of manufacturer in placing motortrucks on market. Memphis Steam Laundry Co. v. Crenshaw, 166 Tenn. 168, 61 S.W.2d 669.
FACTS. See Fact.

FACTS CANNOT LIE. 18 How.State Tr. 1187; 17 How.State Tr. 1430; but see Best, Ev. 587.
FACTS IN ISSUE. Those matters of fact on which the plaintiff proceeás by his action, and which the defendant controverts in his pleadings. Maeder Steel Products Co. v. Zanello, 109 Or. 562, 220 P. 155, 158; King v. Chase, 15 N.H. 9, 41 Am. Dec. 675; Caperton v. Schmidt, 26 Cal. 494, 85 Am.Dec. 187.
FACTS INCOMPLETE. A certificate of trial judge to bill of exceptions not certifying to correct-ness of any recital therein and only certifying that the bill "is facts incomplete", that is, not finished, not perfect. defective, verifies nothing and brings nothing before the Court of Appeals for review. Loving v. Kamm, 34 N.E.2d 591.
FACTS OF THE CASE. With which Supreme Court will deal in case brought from Court of Appeal by writ of review, are facts that were proved or admitted, not deductions or conclusions as to duty of parties or negligence. Llorens v. McCann, 187 La. 642, 175 So. 442, 444.
FACTS WELL PLEADED are those of a substan-tive nature necessary to the framing of the issue submitted. Bushman v. Barlow, 321 Mo. 1052, 15 S.W.2d 329, 331.
FACTUM. Lat. With respect to change of domi-cile, "factum" is person’s physical presence in new domicile. Guilfoil v. Hayes, 169 Va. 548, 194 S.E. 804, 807.
Civil Law. Fact; a fact; a matter of fact, as dis-tinguished from a matter of law. Dig. 41, 2, 1, 3. French Law. A memoir which contains concisely set down the fact on which a contest has hap-pened, the means on which a party founds his pretensions, with the refutation of the means of the adverse party. Vicat.
Old English Law. A deed; a person’s act and deed. A culpable or criminal act; an act not founded in law. Anything stated or made cer-tain ; a deed of conveyance; a written instrument under seal: called, also, charta. Spelman; 2 Bla. Comm. 295. A fact; a circumstance; particular-ly a fact in evidence. Bract. fol. lb. Factum pro-bandum (the fact to be proved). 1 Greenl. Ev. I 13.
OId European Law. A portion or allotment of land; otherwise called a hide, bovata, etc. Spel-man.
Testamentary Law. The execution or due execu-tion of a will. The factum of an instrument means not barely the signing of it, and the formal pub-lication or delivery, but proof that the party well knew and understood the contents thereof, and did give, will, dispose, and do, in all things, as in the said will is contained. Weatherhead v. Bas-kerville, 11 How. 354, 13 L.Ed. 717.
FACTUM A JUDICE QUOD AD EJUS OFFICIUM NON SPECTAT NON RATUM EST. An action of a judge which relates not to his office is of no force. Dig. 50, 17, 170; 10 Coke, 76; Broom, Max. 93, n.FACTUM CUIQUE SUUM NON ADVERSARIO, NOCERE DEBET. Dig. 50, 17, 155. A party’s own act should prejudice himself, not his adver-sary.
FACTUM INFECTIZI FIERI NEQUIT. A thing done cannot be undone. 1 Karnes, Eq. 96, 259.
FACTUM JURIDICUM. A juridical fact. Denotes one of the factors or elements consututing an obligation.
FACTUM NEGANTIS NULLA PROBATIO SIT.
Cod. 4, 19, 23. There is no proof incumbent upon him who denies a fact.
"FACTUM" NON DICITUR QUOD NON PERSE-VERAT. That is not called a "deed" which does not continue operative. That is not said to be done which does not last. 5 Coke, 96; Shep. Touch., Preston ed. 391.
FACTUM PROBANDUM. Lat. In the law of evidence. The fact to be proved; a fact which is in issue, and to which evidence is to be directed. 1 Green!. Ev. § 13.
FACTUM PROBANS. A probative or evidentiary fact; a subsidiary or connected fact tending to prove the principal fact in issue; a piece of dr-cumstantial evidence.
FACTUM UNIUS ALTERI NOCERI NON DEBET. Co. Litt. 152. The deed of one should not hurt an-other.
FACULTAS PROBATIONUM NON EST ANGUS-TANDA. The power of proofs [right of offering
or giving testimony] is not to be narrowed. 4 Inst. 279.
FACULTATIVE COMPENSATION is that which operates by the will of the parties, when one of them removes an obstacle preventing compensa-tion, resulting from the dispositions of the law. In re Interstate Trust & Banking Co., La.App., 194 So. 35, 40, 42.
FACULTATIVE REINSURANCE. Under type designated "facultative", the reinsurer has the op-tion of accepting the tendered part of the original insurer’s risk. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. State Tax Commission, 196 Miss. 82, 16 So.2d 369.
FACULTIES. In the law of divorce. The capa-bility of the husband to render a support to the wife in the form of alimony, whether temporary or permanent, including not only his tangible property, but also his income and his ability to earn money. 2 Bish. Mar. & Div. § 446; Lovett v. Lovett, 11 Ala. 763; Wright v. Wright, 3 Tex. 168; Fowler v. Fowler, 61 Okl. 280, 161 P. 227, 230, L. R.A.1917C, 89. See Allegation of Faculties.
FACULTIES, COURT OF. In English ecclesias-tical law. A jurisdiction or tribunal belonging to the archbishop.
It does not hoid pleas In any sults, but creates rlghts to pews, monuments, and particular places, and modes of burlal. It has also various powers under 25 Hen. VIII. c. 21, in granting licenses of different descrlptions, as a !!cense to marry, a faculty to erect an organ In a parish church, to level a church-yard, to remove bodies previously burled. 4 Inst. 337.
FACULTIES, MASTER OF TIIE. An officio’ in the archdiocese of Canterbury who granted dis• pensations. 4 Inst. 337. See Arches Court.

FACULTY.
Ecclesiastical Law. A license or authority; a privilege granted by the ordinary to a man by favor and indulgence to do that which by law he may not do; e. g., to marry without banns, to erect a monument in a church, etc. Termes de la Ley.
Faculties are of two kinds: first, when the grant Is to a man and his heirs In gross; second, when it is to a person and his heirs as appurtenant to a house which he holds In the parish; 1 Term 429, 432; 12 Co. 106.
Scotch Law. A power founded on consent, as dis-tinguished from a power founded on property. 2 Kames, Eq. 265.
FACULTY OF A COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY. The corps of professors, instructors, tutors, and lecturers. To be distinguished from the board of trustees, who constitute the corporation.
The teaching body. West v. Board of Trustees of Miami University and Miami Normal School, 41 Ohio App. 367, 181 N.E. 144, 150.
FACULTY OF ADVOCATES. The college or so-ciety of advocates in Scotland.
FADE THE GAME. Means that spectators of a game of "craps" bet on the success of actual par-ticipants. Sullivan v. State, 146 Tex.Cr.R. 79, 171. S.W.2d 353.
FADERFIUM. In oid English law. A marriage gift coming from the father or brother of the bride. Spelman.
FZEDER—FEDI. In old English law. The por-tion brought by a wife to her husband, and which reverted to a widow, in case the heir of her de-ceased husband refused his consent to her second marriage; i. e., it reverted to her family in case she returned to them. Wharton.
FiESTING—MEN. Approved men who were strong-armed; habentes homines or rich men, men of substance; pledges or bondsmen, who, by Sax-on custom, were bound to answer for each other’s good behavior. Cowell; Du Cange.
FAGGOT. A badge worn in popish times by per-sons who had recanted and abjured what was then adjudged to be heresy, as an emblem of what they had merited. Cowell.
FAGGOT VOTE. A terco applied to votes manu-factured by nominally transferring land to per-sons otherwise disqualified from voting for mem-bers of parliament.
A faggot vote occurs where a man is formally possessed of a right to vote for members of parliament, without pos-sessIng the substance which the vote should represent; as if he is enabled to buy a property, and at the same moment mortgage it to its full value, for the mere sake of the vote. See 7 & 8 Wm. III. c. 25, § 7. Wharton.
FALDA. In Saxon law. Malice; open and dead-ly hostility; deadly feud.
The word designated the enmlty between the family of a murdered man and that of his murderer, which was recog-nized, among the Teutonic peoples, as justification for vengear.ce taken by any one of the former upon any one of the latter. Du Cange; Spelman.

FAIL. Fault, negligence, or refusal. Walker v. Sheffield Steel Corporation, 224 Mo.App. 849, 27 S.W.2d 44, 48; Anderson v. Commercial Credit Co., 110 Mont. 333, 101 P.2d 367, 369.
Yt also means:
Involuntarily to fall short of success or the attalnment of one’s purpose. See Cobb v. Morrison, 197 Ala. 550, 73 So. 42; Pennsylvania Co. v. Good, 56 Ind.App. 562, 103 N.E. 672, 673; lapse, Gredig v. Sterling, C.C.A.Tex., 47 F.2d 832, 834; Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 25 Del.Ch. 204, 15 A.2d 830, 834; to become insolvent and unable to meet one’s obligations as they mature. Davis v. Campbell, 3 Stew., Ala., 321; Mayer v. Hermann, 16 Fed. Cas. 1,242; to come short of ; lack; to prove ineffective or inoperative; to become or be found deficient or wanting, In re Merritt’s Will, 14 N.Y.S.2d 103, 107, 171 Misc. 812; to decline. Buffalo County v. Phelps County, 129 Neb. 268, 261 N.W. 360; to keep or cease from an appointed, proper, expected, or required action. Romero v. Department of Public Works, 17 Ca1.2d 189, 109 P.2d 662, 665; to lapse, as a legacy which has never vested or taken effect, Sherman v. Richmond Hose Co., No. 2, 230 N.Y. 462, 130 N.E. 613; to leave unperformed; to omita to neglect; to be wanting in action, Buffalo County v. Phelps County, 129 Neb. 268, 261 N.W. 360; A. Widemann Co. v. Digges, 21 Cal.App. 342, 131 P. 882, 883; Ginnochlo v. Hydraulic Press Brick Co., D.C.Ohln, 266 F. 564, 569.
The difference between "fail" and "refuse" is that the latter involves an act of the will, while the former may be an act of inevitable necessity. Taylor v. Mason, 9 Wheat. 344, 6 L.Ed. 101. See Stallings v. Thomas, 55 Ark. 326, 18 S.W. 184; Persons v. Hight, 4 Ga. 497; Maestas v. Ameri-can Metal Co. of New Mexlco, 37 N.M. 203, 20 P.2d 924, 928.
The words "fail to comply," however, have in general the same operation in law as the words "refuse to com-ply," Ginnochio v. Hydraulic Press Brick Co., D.C.Ohio, 266 F. 564, 569. And an allegation in an lndictment that defendant ”failed and refused" to comply with a statute should not be expanded to carry the implication that there was a deliberate, intentional, and inexcusable refusal, es-pecially where the indictment is not good without such ex-pansion. Mackey v. U. S., C.C.A.Tenn., 290 F. 18, 21.
The term may imply an inopportunity to act. Worthing-ton Pump & Machinery Corporation v. City of Cudahy, 182 Wis. 8, 195 N.W. 717.
FAILING CIRCUMSTANCES. Insolvency, that is, the lack of sufficient assets to pay one’s debts. Brown v. State, 71 Tex.Cr.R. 353, 162 S.W. 339, 346. A person (or a corporation or institution) is said to be in failing circumstances when he is about to fail, that is, when he is actually insolvent and is acting in contemplation of giving up his busi-ness because he is unable to carry it on. Appeal of Millard, 62 Conn. 184, 25 A. 658; Utley v. Smith, 24 Conn. 310, 63 Am.Dec. 163.
A bank is in "failing circumstances" when, from any cause, it is unable to pay its debts in the ordinary or usual course qf business, Sanders v. Owens, Mo.App., 47 S.W.2d 132, 134; when in state of uncertainty as to whether it will he able to sustain itself, depending on favorable or unfavorable contingencies, over which its officers have no control. Graf v. Afilen, 230 Mo.App. 721, 74 S.W.2d 61, 66.
FAILING OF RECORD. When an action is brought against a person who alleges in his plea matter of record in bar of the action, and avers to prove it by the record, but the plaintiff saith nul tiel record, viz., denies there is any such record, upon which the defendant has a day given him by the court to bring it in, if he fail to do it, then he is said to fail of his record, and the plain-tiff is entitled to sign judgment. Termes de la Ley.FAILLITE. In French law. Bankruptcy; fail-ure; the situation of a debtor who finds himself unable to fulfill his engagements. Code de Com. arts. 442, 580; Civil Code La. art. 3556, No. 11; 3 Massé, Droit Comm. 171; Guyot, Répert.
FAILS TO ATTEND AT THE TRIAL. Must be such a prolonged absence and failure to attend as to hinder and delay the orderly business of the court. Smith v. State, 42 Okl.Cr. 308, 275 P. 1071, 1072.
FAILURE. Abandonment or defeat, State v. Summers, 320 Mo. 189, 6 S.W.2d 883, 885. De-ficiency, want, or lack; ineffectualness; ineffici-ency as measured by some legal standard; an un-successful attempt. State v. Butler, 81 Minn. 103, 83 N.W. 483; In re Moore, 79 Ind.App. 470, 138 N.E. 783. Lapse. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wil-mington Trust Co., 25 Del.Ch. 204, 15 A.2d 830, 834. See, also, Fail.
As used in municipal charter concerning ”failure" to fill certain office by certain methods, the term presupposes efforts that had proved fruitless, and demands a bona fide and seasonable attempt to select by such methods. Scott v. Suitor, 103 Vt. 175, 152 A. 801, 802.
Discontinuance of business from insolvency, bankruptcy, or the like. State v. Thompson, 333 Mo. 1069, 64 S.W.2d 277.
"Failure" of appeal tax court to reduce assessment giv-ing right of appeal means failure to reduce alter applica-tion by owner asking that assessment be reduced. Aejis Co. v. Ray, 156 Md. 590, 144 A. 842, 844.
Insolvency. Goess v. A. D. H. Holding Corporation, C.C. A.N.Y., 85 F.2d 72, 74.
"Failure" is not always synonymous with "Insolvency." State v. Tunnicliffe, 98 Fla. 731, 124 So. 279, 281.
Suspension or abandonment of business by a merchant, manufacturer, bank, etc., in consequence of insolvency, American Credit Indemnity Co. v. Carrolton Furniture Mfg. Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 95 F. 115, 36 C.C.A. 671; Terry v. Calman, 13 S.C. 220; State v. Lewis, 42 La.Ann. 847, 8 So. 602.
The failure to note action for trial is a "neglect" or "fail-ure" within practice rule relating to dismissal of action without prejudice for want of prosecution. State ex rel. Woodworth & Cornell v. Superior Court for King County, 9 Wash.2d 37, 113 P.2d 527, 530.
The neglect of any duty may be a "failure." See Christ-hilf v. City of Baltimore, 152 Md. 204, 136 A. 527, 528; Washington v. State, 22 Okl.Cr. 69, 209 P. 967, 968. Com-pare, however, In re Green, 192 Cal. 714, 221 P. 903, 905. But to constitute a statutory offense, such as the failure to work on public roads, the term may imply willfulness and the absence of sufficient excuse. Jones v. State, 7 Ala. App. 180, 62 So. 306, 307.
FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION. As applied to notes, contracts, conveyances, etc., this term does not mean a want of consideration, but implies that a consideration, originally existing and good, has since become worthless or has ceased to exist or been extinguished, partially or entirely. Shirk v. Neible, 156 Ind. 66, 59 N.E. 281, 83 Am.St.Rep.
150; Williamson v. Cline, 40 W.Va. 194, 20 S.E. 920.
It means that sufficient consideration was contemplated by the parties at time contract was entered into, but either on account of some innate defect in the thing to be given or nonperformance in whole or in part of that which the promisee agreed to do or forbear nothing of value can be or is received by the promisee. Holcomb v. Long Beach Inv. Co., 129 Cal.App. 285, 19 P.2d 31, 36.
It occurs where the thing expected to be received by .one party and given by the other party cannot be or has notbeen given without fault of the party contractIng to give it. Edmund D. Cook, Inc. v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 15 N.J.Misc. 256, 190 A. 99, 101.
"Fraud" cannot be pleaded as defense to note on ground that it amounts to "failure of consideration." Fraud is in its essence a tort, while "failure of consideration" ordi-narily involves no actionable wrong, but occurs by reason of accident or mistake. Kothmann v. Southwest Co., Tex. Civ.App., 92 S.W.2d 272, 276.
Want of consideration as aynonymous or diatinguishable
"Failure of consIderatIon" is in fact slmply a want of consIderation. Farreli v. Third Nat. Bank, 20 Tenn.App. 540, 101 S.W.2d 158, 163.
"Want of conslderation" embraces transactiona or instantes where no consideration was intended to pasa while "failure of consideration" implles that a valuable consideration moving from obligee to obligor was con-templated. In re Conrad’s Estate, 333 Pa. 561, 3 A.2d 697, 699; Rauschenbach v. McDaniel’s Estate, 122 W.Va. 632, 11 S.E.2d 852, 854.
There la "want of consIderatIon" when nothing of value has ever been received. and "failure of consideration" where something of value was originally received which has since lost its value. Columbia Restaurant v. Sadnovick, La.App., 157 So. 280, 282.
FAILURE OF EVIDENCE. Judicially speaking, a total "failure of evidence" means not only the utter absence of all evidence, but it also means a failure to offer proof, either positive or inferen-tial, to establish one or more of the many facts, the establishment of all of which is indispensable to the finding of the issue for the plaintiff. Cole v. Hebb, 7 Gill & J., Md., 28.
FAILURE OF GOOD BEHAVIOR. Enumerated in statute as ground for removal of a civil service employee means behavior contrary to recognized standards of propriety and morality, misconduct or wrong conduct. State ex rel. Ashbaugh v. Bahr, 68 Ohio App. 308, 40 N.E.2d 677, 680, 682.
FAILURE OF ISSUE. The failure at a fixed time, or the total extinction, of issue to take an estate limited over by an executory devise. A definite failure of issue is when a precise time is fixed by the will for the failure of issue, as in the case where there is a devise to one, but if he dies with-out issue or lawful issue living at the time of his death, etc. An indefinite failure of issue is the period when the issue or descendants of the first taker shall become extinct, and when there is no longer any issue of the issue of the grantee, with-out reference to any particular time or any par-ticular event. 4 Kent, Comm. 275; Huxford v. Milligan, 50 Ind. 546; Parkhurst v. Harrower, 142 Pa. 432, 21 A. 826, 24 Am.St.Rep. 507; Woodlief v. Duckwall, 19 Ohio Cir.Ct.R. 564.
FAILURE OF JUSTICE. The defeat of a partic-ular right, or the failure of reparation for a par-ticular wrong, from the lack or inadequacy of a legal remedy for the enforcement of the one or the redress of the other. The term is also collo-quially applied to the miscarriage of justice which occurs when the result of a trial is so palpably wrong as to shock the moral sense.
FAILURE OF PROOF. In this phrase, the word "failure" is of broader significante than either "want" or "lack." State v. Davis, 154 La. 295, 97 So. 449, 456.A "failure of proof"’ consists in failure to prove the cause of action or defense in its entire scope and mean-ing. Breslin-Griffitt Carpet Co. v. Asadorian, Mo.App., 145 S.W.2d 494, 496.
An omission of a material fact from special finding is deemed a "failure of proof". Kelley, Glover & Vale v. Heitman, 220 Ind. 625, 44 N.E.2d 981, 984.
As used in a statute authorizing dismissal of sun with-out prejudice on account of failure of proof, the term does not mean failure to convince the court by preponderante of evidence, but failure to make prima facie case. Crim v. Thompson, 112 Or. 399, 229 P. 916, 920; Wolke v. Schmidt, 112 Or. 99, 228 P. 921, 923.
Under a statute pertaining to variante, a ‘failure of proof’ results when the evidence offered so far departs from the cause of action pleaded that it may be said falrly that the allegations oí the pleading in their general scope and meaning are unproved. Chealey v. Purdy, 54 Mont. 489, 171 P. 926, 927; Nelson v. Dowgiallo, 73 Or. 342, 143 P. 924, 925.
Where evidence is such as would support either oí two contradictory inferences, or presumptions, respecting the uní/nate facts, there is a "failure of proof". Muesenfechter v. St. Louis Car Co., Mo.App., 139 S.W.2d 1102, 1106.
Where time la not of essence of offense, showing that crime, which information alleged was committed "on or about" certain day, was committed on next day, was not a failure of proof, even had words "on or about" been omit-ted. State v. Woodall, Mo., 300 S.W. 712, 713.
FAILURE OF RECORD. Failure of the defend-ant to produce a record which he has alleged and relied on in his plea.
See Failing of Record.
FAILURE OF TITLE. The inability or failure of a vendor to make good title to the whole or a part of the property which he has contracted to sell. See Alger-Sullivan Lumber Co. v. Union Trust Co., 207 Ala. 138, 92 So. 254, 257.
FAILURE OF TRUST. The lapsing or noneffici-ency of a proposed trust, by reason of the defect or insufficiency of the deed or instrument creat-ing it, or on account of illegality, indefiniteness, or other legal impediment.
FAILURE OTHERWISE THAN UPON MERITS. Imports some action by court by which plaintiff is defeated without a trial upon the merits. Kim-berlin v. Stoley, 49 Ohio App. 1, 194 N.E. 885.
FAILURE TO ACT. Under statute setting up system of classification of offices and giving in-cumbent right to an administrative appeal in case of any failure to act by officers in charge of the classification plan, the words "failure to act" re-ferred to duties in connection with classification of offices. Dolan v. Suffolk County, 310 Mass. 318, 37 N.E.2d 998, 1000.
FAILURE TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY. An employer’s refusal to discuss with union, as em-ployees’ bargaining agency, questions involving conditions of employment and interpretation of contract constituted a "failure to bargain collec-tively" with union. Rapid Roller Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, C.C.A.7, 126 F.2d 452, 459.
FAILURE TO COOPERATE. Material or inten-tional, or fraudulent variations of statements, of assured’s driver as given at trial and bef ore trial would constitute failure to co-operate with auto-mobile insurance company. Brooks Transp. Co. v. Merchants’ Mut. Casualty Co., 6 W.W.Harr. 40, 171 A. 207.
FAILURE TO LOOK. A failure to see an object within range of vision is equivalent. Brooks v. City of Ste. Genevieve, Mo.App., 164 S.W.2d 164, 168.
FAILURE TO MAKE DELIVERY. Misdelivery is "failure to make delivery". Coos Bay Amuse-ment Co. v. American Ry. Express Co., 129 Or. 216, 277 P. 107, 109. Nondelivery is "failure to make delivery". Mt. Arbor Nurseries v. American Ry. Express Co., 221 Mo.App. 241, 300 S.W. 1051, 1053. This phrase is fully adequate to cover all cases where delivery has not been made as re-quired. Kahn v. American Railway Express Co., 88 W.Va. 17, 106 S.E. 126, 128; Watts v. Southern Ry. Co., 139 S.C. 516, 138 S.E. 290, 293; Georgia, F. & A. Ry. Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U.S. 190, 36 S.Ct. 541, 543, 60 L.Ed. 948.
FAILURE TO MET OBLIGATIONS. Bank’s failure to pay depositors on demand constitutes "failure to meet obligations" in most cases. State of Ohio ex rel. Squire v. Union Trust Co. of Pitts-burgh, 137 Pa.Super. 75, 8 A.2d 476, 480.
Where bank closed its doors and ceased to transact busi-ness or make transfers of capital stock, and thereafter ordinary deposits could not be drawn out and checks in process of collection were dishonored, returned unpaid, was "failure to meet obligations". State of Ohio ex rel. Squire v. Union Trust Co. of Pittsburgh, 137 Pa.Super. 75, 8 A.2d 476, 480.
FAILURE TO PERFORM. As regards recipro-cal promises, allegation of defendant’s "failure to perform" when demanded is equivalent to allega-tion of "refusal to perform," unless performance by plaintiff is condition precedent to cause of ac-tion. Brooks v. Scoville, 81 Utah 163, 17 P.2d 218, 220.
FAILURES IN REVENDE. Terms "casual de-ficits" and "failures in revenue," within provision authorizing Legislature to contract debt to meet such deflcits, are synonymous. State Budget Commission v. Lebus, 244 Ky. 700, 51 S.W.2d 965.
FAINT (or FEIGNED) ACTION. In old English practice. An action was so called where the par-ty bringing it had no title to recover, although the words of the writ were true; a false action was properly where the words of the writ were false. Litt. § 689; Co. Litt. 361.
FAINT PLEADER. A fraudulent, false, or col-lusive manner of pleading to the deception of a third person.
FAIR, n. In English law. A greater species of market; a privileged market. Cowell; Cunning-ham, Law Dict. It is an incorporeal hereditament, granted by royal patent, or established by pre-scription presupposing a grant from the crown. A public mart or place of buying or selling. 1 Bla.Comm. 274.
Though etymologically signifying a market for buying and selling exhibited articles, it includes a place for the exhibition of agricultural and mechanical products. State v. Long, 48 Ohio St. 509, 28 N.E. 1038.
A fair is usually attended by a greater concourse of peo-ple than a market, for the amusement of whom various exhibitions are gotten up. McCulloch, Comm.Dict.; Whar-ton, Dict.
A fair is a franchise which is obtained by a grant from the crown. 2d Inst. 220; 3 Mod. 123; 1 Ld.Raym. 341; 2 Saund. 172; 1 Rolle, Abr. 106; Tomlin; Cunningham, Law Dict.
In the earller English law, the franchise to hold a fair conferred certain important privileges; and fairs, as legally recognized Institutions, possessed dlstlnctive legal characteristics. Most of these privileges and character-istics, however, are now obsolete. In America, fairs, in the ancient technical sense, are unknown, and, in the modern and popular sense, they are entirely voluntary and non-legal, and transactions arising in or in connection with them are subject to the ordlnary rules governing sales, etc.
FAIR, adj. Equitable as a basis for exchange; reasonable; a fair value. Utah Assets Corpora-tion v. Dooley Bros. Ass’n, 92 Utah 577, 70 P.2d 738, 741. Honest. East Bay Municipal Utility Dist. v. Kieffer, 99 Cal.App. 240, 278 P. 476, 482. Impartial, free from suspicion, bias, etc. Looney v. Elliott, Tex.Civ.App., 52 S.W.2d 949, 952. Just; equitable; even-handed; equal, as between con- flicting interests.
FAIR ABRIDGMENT. In copyright law. An abridgment consisting not merely in the arrange-ment of excerpts, but one involving real and sub-stantial condensation of the materials by the exer-cise of intellectual labor and judgment. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed.Cas. 345.
FAIR AND EQUITABLE. A proposed plan to dissolve parent public utility holding company and to reclassify its preferred and voting common stock is "fair and equitable", if preferred stock-holders’ rights are transmuted into their equita-ble equivalents. In re Securities and Exchange Commission, C.C.A.Del., 142 F.2d 411, 419.
As condition of conflrmation under provisions of Bank-ruptcy Act relating to corporate reorganization, signify that the final arrangement must conform to principie that unsecured creditors are entitled to priority over stockhold-ers to full extent of their debts and that any scaling down of claims of creditors without fair compensating advantage to them which is prior to rights of stockholders is inadmis-sible. Securities and Exchange Commission v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 60 S.Ct. 1044, 1051, 84 L.Ed. 1293; In re Janson Steel & ‘ron Co., D.C.Pa., 47 F.Supp. 652, 655, 656.
Statutory requirements of "fair and equitable" rallroad reorganization are satisfled so long as creditors receive full compensatory treatment and each group shares in securities of the whole enterprise on an equitable basis. Ecker v. Western Pac. R. R. Corporation, 318 U.S. 448, 63 S.Ct. 692, 713, 87 L. Ed. 892.
FAIR AND EQUITABLE VALUE. In a contract to purchase a waterworks plant at fair and equita-ble value, the amount is to be determined not by capitalization of the earnings nor limited to the cost of reproducing the plant, but allowance should be made for the additional value created by connection with and supply of buildings, al-though the company did not own the connections. National Waterworks Co. v. Kansas City, Mo., 62 F. 863.
FAIR AND FEASIBLE. As test in determining whether corporate reorganization plan should be approved means economically expedient, without discrimination or destruction of vested rights. In re Stanley Drug Co., D.C.Pa., 22 F.Supp. 664, 665.
FAIR AND FULL EQUIVALENT FOR LOSS. The same as a full and perfect equivalent. Fon-ticello Mineral Springs Co. v. City of Richmond, 147 Va. 355, 137 S.E. 458, 460.
FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JURY means that every member of the jury must be a fair and impartial juror. City of San Antonio v. McKenzie Const. Co., 136 Tex. 315, 150 S.W.2d 989, 993.
FAIR AND IMPARTIAL SYSTEM OF SEPARA-TION FROM SERVICE. Of employees of depart-ment of state involves specific reasons for removal and reasonable hearing before some designated and proper authority. Welch v. State Board of Social Security and Welfare, 53 Ariz. 167, 87 P.2d 109, 112.
FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL. One where ac-cused’s legal rights are safeguarded and respected. Floyd v. State, 166 Miss. 15, 148 So. 226, 232; Raney v. Commonwealth, 287 Ky. 492, 153 S.W. 2d 935, 937, 938.
A fair and impartial trial by a jury of one’s peers con-templates counsel to look after one’s defense, compulsory attendance of witnesses, if need be, and a reasonable time in the light of all prevailing circumstances to investigate, properly prepare, and present the defense. Christie v. State, 94 Fla. 469, 114 So. 450, 451.
One wherein defendant is permitted to be represented by counsel and neither witnesses nor counsel are intimidated. George v. Kanape, 284 Ill.App. 648, 3 N.E.2d 149. One wherein no undue advantage is taken by the district attor-ney or any one else. People v. Nationwide News Service, 16 N.Y.S.2d 277, 279, 172 Misc. 752. One wherein witnesses of litigants are permitted to testify under rules of court within proper bounds of judicial discretion, and under law governing testimony of witnesses with right in parties to testify, if qualifled, and of counsel to be heard. Fessenden v. Fessenden, 32 Ohio App. 16, 165 N.E. 746, 748.
Defendant has a "fair and impartial trial" when oppor-tunity is given him to object and except to what is done to his prejudice upon the trial. State v. Burns, 181 Iowa 1098, 165 N.W. 346, 347.
Such a trial contemplates a trial before a jury of 12 impartial and unbiased men, neither more nor lens, in the presence and under the superintendence of a judge having the power to lnstruct them as to the law and advise them in respect to the facts, and the establishment of guilt by a unanimous verdict of such jury. Baker v. Hudspeth, C.C.A. Kan., 129 F.2d 779, 782, 783. It contemplates counsel, compulsory attendance of witnesses, and time in which to prepare for trial. Wood v. State, 155 Fla. 256, 19 So.2d 872, 875. It excludes jurors who have an opinion on the merits of the case, based on such testimony as may reasonably be expected to be presented on the trial, or an opinion founded on personal ill will towards the accused. Murphy v. State, 72 Okl.Cr. 1, 112 P.2d 438, 453, 454. It includes a reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial. Cruthirds v. State, 190 Miss. 892, 2 So.2d 145, 146.
It requires that the jury of 12 men chosen to sit in judg-ment shall have no fixed opinion concerning the guilt or Innocence of one on trial. Baker v. Hudspeth, C.C.A.Kan., 129 F.2d 779, 782, 783. There must not only be fair and Impartial jury, and learned and upright judge, but there should be atmosphere of calm in which witnesses can deliver their testimony without fear and intimidation, in which attorneys can assert accused’s rights freely and fully, and in which the truth may be received and given credence without fear of violente. Raney v. Common-wealth, 287 Ky. 492, 153 S.W.2d 935, 937, 938.
FAIR AND PROPER LEGAL ASSESSMENT. Such as places the value of property on a fair,equal, and uniform basis with other property of like character and value throughout the county and state. Edward Hines Yel]ow Píne Trustees v. Knox, 144 Miss. 560, 108 So. 907, 911.
FAIR AND REASONABLE COMPENSATION. Full compensation. Pfeiffer v. Schee, Mo.App., 107 S.W.2d 170, 175.
FAIR AND REASONABLE CONTRACT. One which, when made with an infant, must not be one wasting the infant’s estate, but must be a provident one, advantageous to the minor. Berg-lund v. American Multigraph Sales Co., 135 Minn. 67, 160 N.W. 191, 193.
FAIR AND REASONABLE MARKET VALUE. Under statute requiring determination of fair and reasonable market value of mortgaged prem-ises in connection with deficiency judgment, means market value and should be determined by those market conditions prevailing where willing buyers meet willing sellers and deal on that basis. Berkshire Life Ins. Co. of Pittsfield, Mass. v. Van Voorhis, 245 App.Div. 592, 283 N,Y.S. 95, 97, 98.
FAIR AND REASONABLE TOLLS. The term is broad enough to include such fair and reasonable charges as may be deemed "fair and reasonable" for value of privilege the toll payer obtains for his money in use of bridge. In re Tolls on St. Johns River Bridge, 108 Fla. 172, 146 So. 99, 100.
FAIR AND REASONABLE VALUE. This phrase in a statute imposing a tax on property means the best price obtainable at a voluntary sale, to be paid at once in money, and excluding any additional amount that might be had were credit or terms allowed. State v. Woodward, 208 Ala. 31, 93 So. 826.
Provision of statute for appralsal of farm debtor’s prop-erty at "fair and reasonable value, not necessarily market value," for purpose of discharging debtor from his obliga-tlons, means that market value is minimum value to be found, beyond which other circumstances may be con-sidered to arrive at "fair and reasonable value". Louis-ville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, C.C.A.Ky., 74 F.2d 576, 582.
FAIR AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION. One which is a substantial compensation for the property conveyed, or which is reasonable, in view of the surrounding circumstances and condi-tions, in contradistinction to an adequate consid-eration. Jones v. Wey, 124 Okl. 1, 253 P. 291, 292; Lucas v. Coker, 189 Okl. 95, 113 P.2d 589, 590.
FAIR CASH MARKET VALUE. Terms "cash market value", "fair market value", "reasonable market value" or "fair cash market value" are substantially synonymous. Housing Authority of girmingham Dist. v. Title Guarantee Loan & Trust Co., 243 Ala. 157, 8 So.2d 835, 837. Terms "market value," "fair market value," "cash mark-et value," and "fair cash market value" are syn-onymous. Fort Worth & D. N. Ry. Co. v. Sugg, Tex.Civ.App., 68 S.W.2d 570, 572.
FAIR CASH VALUE. The phrase is practically synonymous with "reasonable value," and "ac-tual cash value," meaning the fair or reasonable cash price for which the property can be sold on the market. Montesano Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Portland Iron Works, 94 Or. 677, 186 P. 428, 432; State v. Woodward, 208 Ala. 31, 93 So. 826, 827.
The words "fair cash value" and the words "fair market value" are frequently treated as synonymous. Commis-sioner of Corporation and Taxátion v. Boston Edison Co., 310 Mass. 674, 39 N.E.2d 584, 593.
"Fair cash value" of dissenting stockholder’s stock is the intrinsic worth of the stock and not necessarlly its market price. Miller v. Canton Motor Coach, 58 Ohio App. 94, 16 N.E.2d 486, 488; Adams v. U. S. Distributing Corp., 184 Va. 134, 34 S.E.2d 244, 250, 162 A.L.R. 1227.
For tax purposes "fair cash value", means the highest price the property would bring free of incumbrances, at a fair and voluntary private sale for cash. Commonwealth v. Sutcliffe, 287 Ky. 809, 155 S.W.2d 243, 245. The price that an owner willing but not compelled to sell ought to receive from one willing but not compelled to buy. Assessors of Quincy v. Boston Consolidated Gas Co., 309 Mass. 60, ’34 N.E.2d 623, 626. The price that the property would bring at a voluntary sale where the owner is ready, willing and able to sell but not compelled to do so. In re 168 Adams Bldg. Corporation, C.C.A.I11., 105 F.2d 704, 708; People ex rel. McGaughey v. Wilson, 367 Ill. 494, 12 N.E.2d 5, 6; the price which some one will pay for it in open market. Donovan v. City of Haverhill, 141 N.E. 564, 565, 247 Mass. 69, 30 A.L.R. 358.
It is ascertained by a consideration of all elements mak-ing it attractive for valuable use to one under no compul-sion to purchase, but yet willing to buy for a fair price, attributing to each element of value the amount it adds to the price likely to be offered by such a buyer. Massachu-setts General Hospital v. Inhabitants of Belmont, 233 Mass. 190, 124 N.E. 21, 26.
Taxable "foir cash value", of annuity contract was to be determined according to mortality tables, Evans v. Boyle County Board of Sup’rs, 296 Ky. 353, 1’77 S.W.2d 137, 139.
Under corporate franchise tax statute, the term "fair cash value" meant exchange value, Commissioner of Corpo-rations and Taxation v. Boston Edison Co., 310 Mass. 674, 39 N.E.2d 584, 592, 593.
FAIR COMMENT. A term used in the law of libel, applying to statements made by a writer in an honest belief of their truth, relating to of-icial acts, even though the statements are not true in fact. People v. Hebbard, 96 Misc. 617, 162 N.Y.S. 80, 92. In a privileged communication the words used, if defamatory and libelous, are ex-cused, while in "fair comment" the words are not a defamation and not libelous. Van Lonkhuyzen v. Daily News Co., 203 Mich. 570, 170 N.W. 93, 99.
Defense of "fair comment" is not destroyed by circum-stance that jury may believe that the comment is logically unsound, but it suffices that a reasonable man may hon-estly entertain such opinion, on facts found. Cohalan v. New York Tribune, 172 Misc. 20, 15 N.Y.S.2d 58, 60, 61.
"Fair comment" must be based on facts truly stated, must not contain Imputations of corrupt or dishonorable motives except as warranted by the facts, and must be honest expression of writer’s real opinion. Cohalan v. New York World-Telegram Corporation, 16 N.Y.S.2d 706, 712, 172 Misc. 1061; Hall v. Binghamton Press Co., 33 N.Y.S.2d 840, 848, 263 App.Div. 403.
Imputation to official of corrupt or dishonorable motives is justified as "fair comment" if It is inference which fair-minded man might reasonably draw from facts. Tanzer v. Crowley Pub. Corporation, 240 App.Div. 203, 268 N.Y.S. 620.Mere exaggeration, sllght irony, or wit, or all those delightful touches of style going to make article readable, do not push beyond limitations of fair comment. Briarcliff Lodge Hotel v. Westchester Newspapers, 260 N.Y. 106, 183 N.E. 193, 197.
FAIR COMPETITION. Open, equitable, just competition, which is fair as between competitors and as between any of them and his customers. U. S. v. Sutherland, D.C.Mo., 9 F.Supp. 204, 205; U. S. v. National Garment Co., D.C.Mo., 10 F. Supp. 104, 107. Opposite of "unfair competition." Wilentz v. Crown Laundry Service, 116 N.J.Eq. 40, 172 A. 331, 333; State on Complaint of Lief v. Packard-Bamberger & Co., 123 N.J.L. 180, 8 A.2d 291, 293.
The words "fair competition" In National Industrial Recovery Act do not include price fixing, since price regu-lation is the antithesis of competition, fair or otherwise. Mississippi Valley Hardwood Co. v. McClanahan, D.C. Tenn., 8 F.Supp. 388.
FAIR CONSIDERATION. A fair equivalent. Farmers’ Exchange Bank v. Oneida Motor Truck Co., 202 Wis. 266, 232 N.W. 536, 538; Drury v. State Capitol Bank of Eastern Shore Trust Co., 163 Md. 84, 161 A. 176, 179. One which, under all the circumstances, is honest, reasonable, and free from suspicion, whether or not strictly "adequate" or "full." Ferguson v. Dickson, C.C.A.N.J., 300 F. 961, 963. Payment of an antecedent debt. Mc-Dougal v. Central Union Conference Ass’n of Seventh Day Adventists, C.C.A.Colo., 110 F.2d 939, 942. Pre-existing debt. In re Seim Const. Co., D.C.Md., 37 F.Supp. 855, 858. Reasonable in contractual sense, and free from suspicion of in-tent to evade inheritance tax, though not fraud-ulent. Philips v. Gnichtel, C.C.A.N.J., 27 F.2d 662, 665.
In bankruptcy law, one which is honest or free from suspicion, or one actually valuable, but not necessarily adequate or a full equivalent. Myers v. Fultz, 124 Iowa, 437, 100 N.W. 351.
Under Fraudulent Conveyance Law. An antecedent debt, Klaseus v. Meester, 173 Minn. 468, 217 N.W. 593, 594; Bar-ishefsky v. Cohen, 299 Mass. 360, 12 N.E.2d 832, 833; Hol-lander v. Gautier, 114 N.J.Eq. 485, 168 A. 860, 862; an enforceable promise by grantee at time of transfer, Hol-lander v. Gautier, 114 N.J.Eq. 485, 168 A. 860, 861; full and adequate consideration, Klaseus v. Meester, 173 Minn. 468, 217 N.W. 593, 594; good-faith satisfaction of an antecedent debt, Bennett v. Rodman & English,’ D.C.N.Y., 2 F.Supp. 355, 358; one which fairly representa the value of the prop-erty transferred, Bianco v. Lay, 313 Mass. 444, 48 N.E.2d 36. 40; one which is not disproportionate to the value of the property conveyed. Buhl v. McDowell, 51 S.D. 603, 216 N.W. 346, 347; Klaseus v. Meester, 173 Minn. 468, 217 N.W. 593, 594; the test of "fair consideration", is whether con-veyance, by debtor, which includes every payment of money, renders the debtor execution proof. McCaslin v. Schouten, 294 Mich. 180, 292 N.W. 696, 699.
FAIR DAMAGES are something more than nom-inal damages; and are even more than such dam-ages as would compensate for injury suffered. Gurfein v. Howell, 142 Va. 197, 128 S.E. 644, 646.
FAIR EQUIVALENT. As used in statute provid-ing that fair consideration is given for property exchanged at fair equivalent rneans value at time of conveyance; "equivalent" means equal in worth or value; "fair" means equitable as a basis for exchange; reasonable; a fair value. Utah Assets Corporation v. Dooley Bros. Ass’n, 92 Utah 577, 70 P.2d 738, 741.
As used In Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Law does not mean that adequacy of consideration is to be determined by welghing value of goods sold and price received in very precise scales. Blanco v. Lay, 313 Mass. 444, 48 N.E.2d 36, 40.
The test to be used in determining what constitutes a "fair equivalent" under Fraudulent Conveyance Act, for conveyance by debtor, is whether the conveyance, which includes every payment of money, renders the debtor execu-tion proof. McCaslin v. Schouten, 294 Mich. 180, 292 N.W. 696, 699.
FAIR HEARING. One in which authority is fair-ly exercised; that is, consistently with the funda-mental principies of justice embraced within the conception of due process of law. U. S. ex rel. Dean, for and on behalf of Mahfood, v. Reynolds, D.C.Ind., 2 F.Supp. 290, 291.
A hearing before the immigration authorities 1s "fair" if conducted with due regard to those rights of the alien that are embraced in the phrase "due process of law". United States ex rel. Eng Fon Sing v. Reimer, D.C.N.Y., 30 F.Supp. 602, 604.
Although rules of evidence and of procedure have not been strictly followed a hearing may be "fair." Ex parte Bridges, D.C.Cal., 49 F.Supp. 292, 306; U. S. ex rel. Shaw V. Van De Mark, D.C.N.Y., 3 F.Supp. 101, 102.
Fair hearing of an alien’s right to enter the United States means a hearing before the immigration officers in accordance with the fundamental principies that inhere in due process of law, and implies that alien shall not only have a fair opportunity to present evidence in hís favor, but shall be apprised of the evidence against him, so that at the conclusion of the hearing he may be in a position to know all of the evidence on which the matter is to be de-cided; it being not enough that the immigration off:leíais meant to be fair. Ex parte Petkos, D.C.Mass., 212 F. 275, 277. See, also, Ex parte Keisuki. Sata, D.C.Cal., 215 F. 173, 176.
The obligation of a local draft board to grant a registrant a "fair hearing" on matter of classification does not mean a trial by court or a trial in strict or formal sense. Rase v. United States, C.C.A.Mich., 129 F.2d 204, 210; Seele v. U. S., C.C.A.Mo., 133 F.2d 1015, 1022.
The test of a "fair hearing" before the National Labor Relations Board is whether the íssues were clearly defined, so that the employer could address itself to the charges made against it. National Labor Relations Board v. Air Associates, C.C.A.2, 121 F.2d 586, 591.
Where students were charged with sale of examination papers and expelled, a "fair hearing" did not contemplate a trial as in a chancery court or court of law. State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822, 826.
FAIR KNOWLEDGE OR SKILL. A reasonable degree of knowledge or measure of skill. Jones v. Angell, 95 Ind. 382.
FAIR MARKET PRICE means not only that the price be ascertained by sales, but that the sales so made and the subject-matter of the sales are to be considered. In re Spitly’s Estate, 124 Cal. App. 642, 13 P.2d 385, 386.
For inheritance tax purposes, "clear market price" ls synonymous with "fair market price." In re Spitly’s Es-tate, 124 Cal.App. 642, 13 P.2d 385, 386.
For tax purposes, means price fixed by manufacturer for sale of its products where there is no market price oth-er than price so fixed. Bourjois, Inc., v. McGowan, D.C.N. Y., 12 F.Supp• 787, 792.
Within statute governing valuation of property for as-sessment of income tax, resultant of tuvo opposing views of willing seller and willing buyer where seller is not com-pelled to sell and buyer is not required to buy. Vale v.du Pont, Del., 7 W.W.Harr. 254, 182 A. 668, 673, 674, 103 A. L.R. 946.
Ordinarily, "actual cash value," "fair market price," and "market value" are synonymous terms. Butler v. JEtna Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 64 N.D. 764, 256 N.W. 214.
FAIR MARKET VALUE. Price at which a will-ing seller and a willing buyer will trade. Mont-rose Cemetery Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.7, 105 F.2d 238, 242; Utah Assets Corporation v. Dooley Bros. Ass’n, 92 Utah 577, 70 P.2d 738, 741.
It has also been defined to mean: Amount that would in all probability have been arrived at between owner willIng to sell and purchaser desiring to buy, Karlson v. U. S., C.C.A.Minn., 82 F.2d 330, 337; Whitlow v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.8, 82 F.2d 569, 572; exchange-able value, Walls v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C. C.A.Wyo., 60 F.2d 347, 350; price at which a willing seller under no compulsion and a willing buyer under no compul-sion will trade, Rheinstrom v. Willcuts, D.C.Minn., 26 F. Supp. 306, 310; State ex rel. Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. Schanke, 247 Wis. 182, 19 N.W.2d 264, 267; Talbot v. City of Norfolk, 158 Va. 387, 163 S.E. 100, 101; price at which specified quantity of a given economic good is ac-tually sold, or general or future power In exchange, Jenkins v. Smith, D.C.Conn., 21 F.Supp. 251, 253; price such as a capable and diligent business man could present-ly obtain from the property after conferring with those ac-customed to buy such property, Appeal of Hickey, 124 Pa. Super. 213, 188 A. 95, 96; price which a willing purchaser would pay a willing seller, Ozette Ry. Co. v. Grays Harbor County, 16 Wash.2d 459, 133 P.2d 983, 988; Baetjer v. Unit-ed States, C.C.A.Puerto Rico, 143 F.2d 391, 396; price which property would bring at a fair sale between parties dealing on equal terms, Union Nat. Bank of Pittsburgh v. Crump, 349 Pa. 339, 37 A.2d 733, 735; sum a purchaser willing but not obliged to buy would pay an owner willing but not obliged to sell, Appeal of Hickey, 124 Pa.Super. 213, 188 A. 95, 96; City of Tampa v. Colgan, 121 Fla. 218, 163 So. 577, 582; City of Tulsa v. Creekmore, 167 Okl. 298, 29 P.2d 101, 103; value in money as between one who wlshes to purchase and one who wishes to sell, Wood v. United States, Ct.Cl., 29 F.Supp. 853, 859, 860; Stiles v. Commis-sioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.Fla., 69 F.2d 951, 952.
"Fair market value" assumes agreement be-tween owner willing but not obliged to sell for cash and buyer desirous but not compelled to purchase. Lewis v. Beall, 162 Md. 18, 158 A. 354, 356. It implies not only a willing buyer, but a willing seller. Syracuse Engineering Co. v.
Haight, C.C.A.N.Y., 110 F.2d 468, 471. It means neither panic value, auction value, speculative value, nor a value fixed by depressed or inflated prices. In re Board of Water Supply of City of New York, 277 N.Y. 452, 14 N.E.2d 789, 792. It resides in estimate and determination of what is fair, economic, just and equitable value under normal conditions. State ex rel. Buck v. Rapp, Sup., 36 N.Y.S.2d 790, 794.
As of a certain date. Fair market value of a given dale means amount stock is fairly worth as marketable security or equity to be bought and sold in course of business, Robertson v. Routzahn, D.C.Ohlo, 1 F.Supp. 355, 356; price that could actually have been realized on that date, Jenkins v. Smith, D.C.Conn., 21 F.Supp. 251; price that probably would have resulted had goods been exchanged between willing, Informed, and normal buyer and similar seller, Jenkins v. Smith, D.C.Conn., 21 F.Supp. 251; price that property would bring at voluntary sale to willing buyer; both seller and buyer having adequate knowledge of ma-terial facts affecting value, Robertson v. Routzahn, C.C.A. Ohlo, 75 F.2d 537, 539; price which intelllgent and reason-abie buyers and sellers, having due regard for their mer-cenary interests, would have most likely agreed upon. Vale v. State School Tax Department, 6 W.W.Harr. 252, 173 A. 795.It resides in an estimate and a determination of what is the fair, economic, just, and equitable value under nor-mal conditions. In re Board of Water Supply of City of New York, 277 N.Y. 452, 14 N.E.2d 789, 792.
"Fair market value" of stock received by taxpayer in payment of bonuses was value of stock received in extin-guishment of bonus claims and not amount credited for bonuses. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Vandeveer, C.C.A.6, 114 F.2d 719, 722.
Primary evidence of "fair market value" of stock is what willing purchasers pay to willing sellers on open market. Hazeltine Corporation v. Commissioner of Inter-nal Revenue, C.C.A.3, 89 F.2d 513, 518.
Synonymous or identical terms are:
Actual cash value. Stiles v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.Fla,’ 69 F.2d 951, 952; actual value, Ap-peals of Matson, 152 Pa.Super. 424, 33 A.2d 464, 465; cash market value, West Texas Hotel Co. v. City of El Paso, Tex.Civ.App., 83 S.W.2d 772, 775; Housing Authority of Birmingham Dist. v. Title Guarantee Loan & Trust Co., 243 Ala. 157, 8 So.2d 835, 837; cash value, Thomison v. Hillcrest Athletic Ass’n, 9 W.W.Harr. 590, 5 A.2d 236, 238; In re Ryerson’s Estate, 239 Wis. 120, 300 N.W. 782, 784, 785; clear market value, In re Ryerson’s Estate, 239 Wis. 120, 300 N.W. 782, 784, 785; fair cash market value, Housing Authority of Birmingham Dist. v. Title Guarantee Loan & Trust Co., 243 Ala. 157, 8 So.2d 835, 837; fair cash value, Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation v. Boston Edi-son Co., 310 Mass. 674, 39 N.E.2d 584, 593; market value, Fort Worth & D. N. Ry. Co. v. Sugg, Tex.Civ.App., 68 S. W.2d 570, 572; United States v. 3969.59 Acres of Land, D. C.Idaho, 56 F.Supp. 831, 837; reasonable market value, Housing Authority of Birmingham Dist. v. Title Guarantee Loan & Trust Co., 243 Ala. 157, 8 So.2d 835, 837; true cash value, Appeals of Matson, 152 Pa.Super. 424, 33 A.2d 464, 465; value, United States v. 3969.59 Acres of Land, D.C. Idaho, 56 F.Supp. 831, 837.
Value of leal property for railroad purposes approxi-meted by capitalizing net íncome consídered with other factors, may be accepted as Indicative of "fair market val-ue". Appeal of Pitney, 20 N.T.Misc. 448, 28 A.2d 660, 664.
FAIR ON ITS FACE. A tax deed "fair on its face," is one which cannot be shown to be illegal without extraneous evidence. Denny v. Stevens, 52 Wyo. 253, 73 P.2d 308, 310, 113 A.L.R. 1337.
A process fair on its face does not mean that it must appear to be perfectly regular or in all respects in accord with proper practice and after the most approved form, but that ít shall apparently be process lawfully íssued and such as the officer may lawfully serve, and a process Is fair on its Pace which proceeds from a court, magistrate, or body having authority of law to issue process of that nature and which is legal in form and on its face contalns nothing to notify or fairly apprise the officer that it Is issued without authority. Brown v. Hadwin, 182 Mich. 491, 148 N.W. 693, L.R.A.1915B, 505.
FAIR PERSUASION means argument, exhorta-tion, or entreaty addressed to a person without threat of physical harm or economic loss, or per-sistent molestation or harassment or material and fraudulent misrepresentations. City of Reno v. Second Judicial District Court in and for Wa-shoe County, 59 Nev. 416, 95 P.2d 994, 998, 125 A.L.R. 948.
FAIR—PLAY MEN. A local irregular tribunal which existed in Pennsylvania about the year 1769, as to which see Serg. Land Laws Pa. 77; 2 Smith, Laws Pa. 195.
FAJE PLEADER. See Beau-pleader.
FAIR PREPONDERANCE. In the law of evi-dence. A "clear" preponderance. M. E. Smith & Co. v. Kimble, 38 S.D. 511, 162 N.W. 162, 163. Evidente sufficient to create in the minds of the
triers of fact the conviction that the party upon whom is the burden has established its case. Jackson Furniture Co. v. Lieberman, 65 R.] 224, 14 A.2d 27, 32. The greater and weightier evi-dence, the more convincing evidence. Barbero v. Pellegrino, 108 N.J.L. 156, 156 A. 765. The greater weight of the evidence. Belmont Hotel v. New Jersey Title Guaranty & Trust Co., 22 N.J. Misc. 261, 37 A.2d 681, 682. Weight, credit, and value. Chenery v. Russell, 132 Me. 130, 167 A. 857, 858.
If evidence on any material allegation Is equally bal-anced, verdict should be for defendant. Funk v. Bonham, 204 Ind. 170, 183 N.E. 312, 317.
Such a superiority of evidence on one sido that the fact of its outweighing the evidence on the other side can be percetved if the whole evidence Is fairly considered. Bryan v. Railroad Co., 63 Iowa, 464, 19 N.W. 295; City Bank’S Appeal, 54 Conn. 274, 7 A. 548. Such evidence as when weighed with that which is offered to oppose it, has more convincing power in the minds of the jury. Neely 1.1. De-troit Sugar Co., 138 Mich. 469, 101 N.W. 665, 666.
The probability of truth; In re Oliver’s Will, 126 Misc. 511, 214 N.Y.S. 154, 166; not necessarily the largest num-ber of witnesses; Verdi v. Donahue, 91 Conn. 448, 99 A. 1041, 1043; Chenery v. Russell, 132 Me. 130, 167 A. 857, 858.
The term conveys the idea of something more than a pre-ponderance. Bryan v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 63 Iowa, 464, 19 N.W. 295, 296; De St. Aubin v. Marshall Field & Co., 27 Colo. 414, 62 P. 199, 201; The term is not a technical term, but simply means that evidence which out-weighs that which is offered to oppose It, and does not necessarily mean the greater number of witnesses. De-vencenzi v. Cassinelli, 28 Nev. 222, 81 P. 41, 42 (quoting and adopting definition in Strand v. Chicago & N. M. Ry. Co., 67 Mich. 380, 34 N.W. 712); Hynes v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 31 Misc. 825, 64 N.Y.S. 382, 383.
FAIR PRICE. The words "fair price" have been held to be of an ascertainable valuation. Mc-Cormick v. Tissier, 222 Ala. 422, 133 So. 22, 24. For "Fair Market Price," see that title.
FAIR RENT. A reasonable rent. Shapiro v. Goldstein, 113 Misc. 258, 185 N.Y.S. 234,
FAIR RETURN. A net return upon fair value of property. State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Public Service Commission, 341 Mo. 920, 110 S.W. 2d 749, 778.
A "fair return" is to be largely measured by usual re-turns in like investments in the same vicinity over the same period of time. Natural Gas Pipellne Co. of America v. Federal Power Commisslon, C.C.A.7, 120 F.2d 625, 633, 634.
FAIR RETURN ON INVESTMENT. A fair re-turn on value of property used and useful in car-rying on the enterprise, performing the service or supplying the thing for which the rates are paid. i.ubin v. Finkelstein, 82 N.Y.S.2d 329, 335.
FAIR SALE. In foreclosure and other judicial proceedings, this means a , sale conducted with fairness and impartiality as respects the rights and interests of the parties affected. Lalor v. McCarthy, 24 Minn. 419. A sale at a price sutil-cient to warrant confirmation o: approval when it is required.
FAIR TRIAL. A hearing by an impartial and disinterested tribunal; a proceeding which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry,and renders judgment only alter trial. Johnson v. City of Wildwood, 116 N.J.L. 462, 184 A. 616, 617.
A legal trial or one conducted In all material things in substantial conformity to law. Stacey v. State, 79 Okl.Cr. 417, 155 P.2d 736, 739; A trial which insures substantial justice, Capone v. Union County Park Commission, 9 N.J. Misc.R. 1105, 156 A. 782, 783; A trial without prejudice to the accused, State v. Smith, 119 W.Va. 347, 193 S.E. 573, 574; an orderly trial before an impartial jury, and judge whose neutrality is indifferent to every factor in trial but that of administering justice. State ex rel. Brown v. De-well, 131 Fla. 566, 179 So. 695, 698, 115 A.L.R. 857. One con-ducted according to due course of law; a trial before a competent and impartial jury. Railroad Co. v. Cook, 37 Neb. 435, 55 N.W. 943; Railroad Co. v. Gardner, 19 Minn. 136, Gil. 99, 18 Am.Rep. 334. One conducted according to rules of common law except in so far as it has been changed by statute. Di Malo v. Reid, 132 N.J.L. 17, 37 A.2d 829, 830. One conducted in substantial conformity to law. Sunder-land v. U. S. C.C.A.Neb., 19 F.2d 202, 216; People v. Ephraim, 77 Cal.App. 29, 245 P. 769, 774. One where
ac-cused’s legal rights are safeguarded and respected. Levin-son v. Mooney, 128 N.J.L. 569, 27 A.2d 9, 10; Garrett v. State, 187 Miss. 441, 193 So. 452, 458; Johnson v. City of Wildwood, 116 N.J.L. 462, 184 A. 616.
A fuli and fair trial, required In order that a foreign judgment against a cltizen be accorded credit in the courts of the United States, means not a summary proceeding, though sanctioned by the law of the Forum, but an op-portunIty to be heard on the proof, where it is apparent that the cause involves questions of fact, and to have it consldered by an unprejudiced court. Banco Minero v. Ross, 106 Tex. 522, 172 S.W. 711, 714.
Essential factors are a fair and impartial jury and a learned and upright judge to Instruct jury and pass upon legal questions, and an atmosphere of calm in which wit-nesses can deliver their testimony without fear and intimi-dation, in which attorneys can assert defendant’s rights freely and fully, and in which truth may be received and given credence without fear of violence, Floyd v. State, 166 Miss. 15, 148 So, 226, 232. A trial before an impartial judge, an impartial jury, and in an atmosphere of judicial calm; that, while the judge may and should direct and control the proceedings, and may exercise his right to com-ment on the evidence, yet he may not extend his activities so far as to become In effect either an assisting prpsecutor or a thlrteenth juror, Goldstein v. U. S., C.C.A.Mo., 63 F.2d 609, 613; an adequate hearing and an impartial tribunal, free from any interest, bias, or prejudice. The Reno, C.C. A.N.Y., 61 F.2d 966, 968.
FAIR USAGE. The doctrine of "fair usage" means that the matter which was under copyright was neither copied nor adopted, but that the un-copyrightable underlying idea was used, since a theme or idea is not copyrightable. Towle v. Ross, D.C.Or., 32 F.Supp. 125, 127.
FAIR VALUATION. Present market value; such sum as the property will sell for to a purchaser desiring to buy, the owner wishing to sell; such a price as a capable and diligent business man could presently obtain from the property af ter conferring with those accustomed to buy such property; the amount the property would bring at a sale on execution shown to have been in all respects fair and reasonable; the fair market value of the property as between one who wants to purchase and one who wants to sell the prop-erty. Market St. Nat. Bank v. Huff, 319 Pa. 286, 179 A. 582, 583.
As used in Bankruptcy Act the term means fair cash value or fair market value of property as between one who wants to purchase and one who wants to seli, Barman v. Defatta, 182 La. 463, 162 So. 44; Trenton Trust Co. v. Carlisle Tire Corporation, 110 Conn. 125, 147 A. 366, 367; fair market value, or value that can be made promptly ef-fective by owner of property for payment of debts, Nicolal-Neppach Co. v. Smith, 154 Or. 450, 58 P.2d 1016, 1019, 107 A.L.R. 1124; In re Sedalia Farmers’ Coop. Packing & Produce Co., D.C.Mo., 268 F. 898, 900; present market val-ue of property and the value that the debtor might realíze thereon If permitted to continue in business, Arnold v. Knapp, 75 W.Va. 804, 84 S.E. 895, 899; value of property taken in relation to business of debtor as a goIng concern, In re Gibson Hotels, D.C.W.Va., 24 F.Supp. 859, 863. It is not the value that would or did prevail at sacrifled or forced sale. Bank of Forest v. Capital Nat. Bank, 176 Miss. 163, 169 So. 193, 198. Where no definite market value can be established and expert testimony must be relled on, fair valuation is the amount which the property ought to give to a going concern as a fair return, If sold to some one who is willing to purchase under ordinary selling con-ditions. In re Kobre, D.C.N.Y., 224 F. 106, 117. The term is not synonymous with "salable value." In re Crystal Ice & Fuel Co., D.C.Mont., 283 F. 1007, 1009.
In determlning "fair valuation" of property, court should consider all elements enteríng ínto the intrinsic value, as well as the selling value, and also the earning power of the property. In re Gibson Hotels, D.C.W.Va., 24 F.Supp. 859, 863; the "fair valuation" of accounts is what with rea-sonable diligence can be realízed from their collectlon within a reasonable time, Matthews v. Concrete Ergineer-ing Co., 228 Iowa 493, 292 N.W. 64, 65, 133 A.L.R. 1270.
FAIR VALUE. Present market value; such sum as the property will sell for to a purchaser desir-ing to buy, the owner wishing to sell; such a price as a capable and diligent business man could pre-sently obtain from the property atter conferring with those accustomed to buy such property; the amount the property would bring at a sale on execution shown to have been in all respects fair and reasonable; fair market value of the prop-erty as between one who wants to purchase and one who wants to sell the property. Market St, Nat. Bank v. Huff, 319 Pa. 286, 179 A. 582, 583.
"Actual value," "market value," "fair value," and the like, may be used as convertible terms. Kerr v. Clinch-fleld Coal Corporation, 169 Va. 149, 192 S.E. 741, 744.
In determining depreclation, "fair value" Implies consid-eration of all factors material in negotiating sale and pur-chase of property, such as wear, decay, deterloration, ob-solescence, inadequacy, and redundancy. Idaho Power Co. v. Thompson, D.C.Idaho, 19 F.2d 547, 566.
Price which a seller, willing but not compelled to seli, would take, and a purchaser, willing but not compelled to buy, would pay, Masonite Corporation v. Robinson-Slagle Lumber Co., D.C.La., 3 F.Supp. 754, 755; U. S. v. Crary, D.C.Va., 2 F.Supp. 870, 879. Price whlch buyers of the class which would be interested in buying property would be justifled in paying for !t. In re Crane’s Estate, 344 Pa, 141, 23 A.2d 851, 855. Value which willing purchaser and seller would likely agree on. In re Aranoff & Son, D.C.Ga., 1 F.Supp. 708, 710.
As affectíng stockholder’s right to particlpate In re-organization plan, "fair value" of corporate debtor’s prop-erty, connotes fair market value In dealing with certain kinds of property, and in certain cases stock exchange quotations are the best índex of value, but bonds of Re-public of Cuba, secured by apparently adequate pledges of revenues, should be valued at par rather than market price in absence of specific showing that Cuba might de-fault. In re Warren Bros. Co., D.C.Mass., 39 F.Supp. 381, 384, 385.
Dissenting stockholder is entitled on combination or merger of corporations to "fair value" of stock determined by an ascertainment of all assets and liabilities of corpora-tion, intrinsic value of stock, and not merely its market value, when traded in by the public. American General Corporation v. Camp, 171 Md. 629, 190 A. 225, 228.
For purpose of credit upon a deficiency claim arising out of a mortgage foreclosure proceeding, that sum which the mortgagee purchaser ought, under all circumstances, reasonably expect to realize from the acquired premises either by way of sale in the future or upon the basis of a permanent investment. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Ritz Holding Co., 126 N.J.Eq. 148, 8 A.2d 235, 245.
Reproduction cost of a public utílity’s property is an es-sential element in ascertainment of its "fair value". Peo-pies Natural Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Com-mission, 153 Pa.Super, 475, 34 A.2d 375, 380.
Under Deficiency Judgment Act, fair market value at time of execution sale as based on testimony of qualified witnesses. Market St. Nat. Bank v. Huff, 319 Pa. 286, 179 A. 582, 583.
Within a Revenue Act levying an excise tax on corpora-tIons measured by the fair value of their capital stock, "fair value" is the exact equivalent of "actual value." Central Union Trust Co. of New York v. Edwards, C.C.A. N.Y., 287 F. 324, 327.
Within statute requiring fair value of mortgaged prem-ises to be credlted on mortgage debt, interest, and coste before confírmation of foreclosure sale or rendition of de-ficiency judgment, that amount which under all clrcum-stances of case will not shock consciente of court. North-western Loan & Trust Co. v. Bidinger, 226 Wis. 239, 276 N.W. 645, 648.
Rete Purposes
"Fair value" rule requires that consideration be given to original cost of construction, amount expended in per-manent improvements, amount and market value of bonds and stock, present cost of construction, probable earníng capacity under rates prescribed, operating expenses, ac-crued depreciation, market value of land, working capital, going concern value, and future coste of construction. State ex rel. and to Use of City of St. Louis v. Public Service Commission, 326 Mo. 751, 34 S.W.2d 507, 510.
A "fair value" for rate making ís not the value for ex-change, but such a value found after consideríng all rele-vent facts as will give the public utility a reasonable re-turn and the public a reasonable rate. It is one which will enable the public utility to realize the expense of operating and keeping up its road and meeting its financial obliga-tions for investments with a reasonable excess for dividends and ordinary contíngencies. City of Rochester v. New York State Rys., 127 Misc. 766, 217 N.Y.S. 452, 458.
"Fair value" must ínclude increase in value over original cost. Northern States Pówer Co. v. Public Service Com-mission, 73 N.D. 211, 13 N.W.2d 779, 786, 787.
"Fair value of the property" ís not necessarily synony-mous with "reconstruction cost depreclated." State ex rel. Oregon-Washington Water Service Co. v. Department of Public Works of Washington, 184 Wash. 45, 51 P.2d 610, 612.
Historical cost, provided consideration is given to changes in price level, reproduction cost at time of inquiry, less accrued depreciation, provided reproduction cost of com-ponente can be found with reasonable certainty, financial history of utility, and other relevant facts, may be con-sldered in determining "fair value" of a utility’s property. State v. Trl-State Telephone & Telegraph Co., 204 Minn. 516, 284 N.W. 294, 306.
Reproduction cost of a utility Is an element in ascertain-ment of "fair value". Solar Electric Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 137 Pa.Super. 325, 9 A.2d 447, 456, 460, 463, 464, 466.
Reproduction cost of telephone company’s property, less actual depreciation, ls not the legal equivalent of "fair value" but 1s mereiy evidente of value. New York Tele-phone Co. v. Prendergast, D.C.N.Y., 36 F.2d 54, 59.
The book cost of a telephone company’s exchange plant and the "reproduction cost new" basis are recognized methods of ascertainíng "fair value" of the company’s property. Application of Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 69 S.D. 36, 6 N.W.2d 165, 169.
The "fair value" as a rate base and the "value" in money for purposes of taxation of a public utility are not necessarily the same. State ex rel. Public Service Com-mission v. Southern Pac. Co., 95 Utah 84, 79 P.2d 25, 34.
The "fair value" of a utility’s property is the cost of reproduction, less depreciation at time in questian, whether more or less than original cost. Citizens’ Gas Co. of Han-nibal v. Public Service Commission of Missouri, D.C.Mo., 8 F.2d 632, 633. It is the reasonable value of property, used and useful, for the service of the public at the time the property is being so used. Northern States Power Co. v. Board of Railroad Com’rs, 71 N.D. 1, 298 N.W. 423, 431.
Value of additions completed and in use by a utility should be allowed in rete case in determining "fair value". Northern States Power Co. v. Board of Railroad Com’rs, 71 N.D. 1, 298 N.W. 423, 43L
FAIRLY. Equitably, honestly, impartially. Loon-ey v. Elliott, Tex.Civ.App., 52 S.W.2d 949, 952. In good faith, People v. Mancuso, 255 N.Y. 463, 175 N.E. 177, 179. Justly; rightly. With substantial correctness. Reasonably. Conway v. Robinson, 216 Ala. 495, 113 So. 531, 533. Equitably. Satcher v. Satcher’s Adm’r, 41 Ala. 40, 91 Am.Dec. 498. "Fairly merchantable" conveys the idea of medi-ocrity in quality, or something just aboye it. Warner v. Ice Co., 74 Me. 479.
"Fairly" 1s not synonymous with "truly," and "truly" should not be substituted for it in a commissioner’s oath to take testimony fairly. Language may be truly, yet un-fairly, reported; that is, an answer may be truly written down, yet in a manner conveying a different meaning from that intended and conveyed. And language may be fairly reported, yet not in accordance with strict truth. Law-rence v. Finch, 17 N.J.Eq. 234.
FAIRWAY. A strip of land, where the grass is kept mowed, and at the opposite ends of which are a green and a tee. Page v. Unterreiner, Mo. App., 106 S.W.2d 528, 532.
The middle and deepest or most navigable channel. Water on which vessels of commerce habitually move; Horst v. Columbia Contract Co., 89 Or. 344, 174 P. 161, 163.
The word "thalweg" (q.v.), from which it is apparent-ly derived, has reference more particularly to navigable channels as boundaries. Johnnsson v. American Tugboat Co., 147 P. 1147, 85 Wash. 212.
FAIT. L. Fr. Anythipg done. A deed; act; fact.
A deed lawfully executed. Com. Dig.
Feme (or Femme)’ de fait. A wife de facto.
FAIT ENROLLE. A deed enrolled, as a bargain and sale of freeholds. 1 Keb. 568.
FAIT JURIDIQUE. In French law. A juridical fact. One of the f actors or elements constitutive of an obligation.
FAITH. Confidence; credit; reliance. Thus, an act may be said to be done "on the faith" of cer-tain representations.
Belief ; credence; trust. Thus, the constítution provides that "full faith and credit" shall be given to the judg-ments of each state in the courts of the others.
Purpose; intent; sincerity; state of knowledge or de-sign. This is the meaning of the word In the phrases "good faith" and "bad faith."
Scotch Law. A solemn pledge; an oath. "To make faith" is to swear, with the right hand up-lifted, that one will declare the truth. 1 Forb. Inst. pt. 4, p. 235.
FAITHFUL. Trusty, honest, trustworthy. Wright v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 176 Okl. 274, 54 P.2d 1084, 1087.
As used in the rule that executors must be "faithful," means that they must act In good faith. In re McCaffertY’S Will, 147 Misc. 179, 264 N.Y.S. 38.
The guaranty required by statute and bond of "faithful" discharge of school district treasurer’s duties is a guaranty not only of treasurer’s personal honesty but also of his competency, skill and diligence in discharge of his duties. Thurston County, to Use of Vesely, v. Chmelka, 138 Neb. 696, 294 N.W. 857, 863, 132 A.L.R. 1077.
Where a public officer gives a bond for the "falthful" discharge of his duties, "faithful" Implies that he has as-sumed that measure of responsibility laid on him by law had no bond been given. Thurston County, to Use of Vese-ly, v. Chmelka, 138 Neb. 696, 294 N.W. 857, 863, 132 A.L.R. 1077; London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. of America v. Community Savings & Loan Ass’n, 102 Ind.App. 665, 4 N.E. 2d 688, 693.
FAITHFULLY. Conscientious diligence or faith-fulness, adequate to due execution of object of’ bailment, or just regard of adherente to duty, or due observante of undertaking of contract. Com-monwealth v. Polk, 256 Ky. 100, 75 S.W.2d 761, 765. Diligently, and without unnecessary delay;—not synonymous with "fairly" ‘or "impartially." Den v. Thompson, 16 N.J.L. 72, 73. Truthfully, sin-cerely, accurately. Kansas City, M. & O. R. Co., of Texas v. Whittington & Sweeney, Tex.Civ.App.,
153 S.W. 689, 690.
As used In bonds of public and private officers, this term lmports not only honesty, but also a punctllious discharge of all the duties of the office, requiring competence, dili-gence, and attention, without any malfeasance or non-teasance, aside from mere mistakes. State v. ChadwIck, 10 Or. 468; Hoboken v. Evans, 31 N.J.L. 343; Harris v. Hanson, 11 Me. 245.
FAITOURS. Idle persons; idle livers; vaga-bonds. Termes de la Ley; Cowell; Blount; ningham, Law Dict.
FAKE. To make or construct. A "faked alibi" is a made, manufactured, or false alibi. U. S. v. Heitler, D.C.Il1., 274 F. 401, 409.
FAKER. A petty swindler. National Automo-bile Ass’n v. Strunk, 122 Neb. 890, 240 N.W. 294.
FAKIR. A term applied among the Mohamme-dans to a kind of religious ascetic or beggar, whose claim is that he "is in need of merey, and poor in the sight of God, rather than in need of worldly assistance." Hughes, Dict. of Islam.
Sometimes spelled Faqueer or Fakeer. It is commonly used In English to designate a person engaged in some use-less or dishonest business. Fake is also so used and also to designate the quality of such business.
A street peddler who disposes of worthless wares, or of any goods aboye their value, by means of any false repre-sentation, track, device, lottery, or game of chance. Milis’ Ann.St.Colo. § 1400, ’35 C.S.A. c. 48, § 227.
FALANG. In old English law. A jacket or Glose coat. Blount.
FALCARE. In old English law. To mow. For "Jus Folcandi", see that title.
Faltare prata, to mow or cut grass in meadows laid in for hay. A customary service to the lord by his inferior tenants. Kennett, Gloss.
Falcata, grass fresh mown, and laid in swaths. That which was mowed. Kennett, Gloss.; Cowell; Jacobs.
Falcatio, a mowing. Bract. fols. 35b, 230.
Faicator, a mower; a service tenant who performed the labor of mowing.
Falcatura, a day’s mowing. Falcatura una. Once mow-ing the grass. FALCIDIA. In Spanish law. The Falcidian por-tion; the portion of an inheritance which could not be legally bequeathed away from the heir, viz., one-fourth.
FALCIDIAN LAW. In Roman law. A law on the subject of testamentary disposition.
It was enacted by the people during the reign of Augus-tus, in the year of Rome 714, on the proposition of the tribune Falcidius. By this law, the testator’s right to bur-den his estate with legacies was subjected to an important restriction. It prescribed that no one could bequeath more than three-fourths of his property in legacies, and that the heir should have at least one-fourth of the estate, and that, should the testator violate this prescript, the heir may have the right to make a proportional deduction from each legatee, so far as necessary. Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 771; Inst. 2, 22; Heinecc.Elem. lib. 2, tit. 22.
A similar principie exists in Louisiana. See Legitime.
In some of the states the statutes authorizing bequests and devises to charitable corporations limit the amount which a testator may give, to a certain fraction of his estate.
FALCIDIAN PORTION. That portion of a tes-tator’s estate which, by the Falcidian law, was required to be left to the heir, amounting to at least one-fourth.
FALD, or FALDA. A sheep-fold. Cowell.
FALDA. Span. In Spanish law. The slope or skirt of a hill. Fossat v. United States, 2 Wall. 673,17 L.Ed. 739.
FALDIE CURSUS. In old English law. A fold-course; the course (going or taking about) of a fold. Spelman. A sheep walk, or leed Por sheep. 2 Vent. 139.
FALDAGE. The privilege which anciently sev-eral lords reserved to themselves of setting up folds for sheep in any fields within their manors, the better to manure them, and this not only with their own but their tenants’ sheep. Called, var-i ously, "secta faldare," "fold-course," "free-hold," "faldagii." Cowell; Spelman; Cunningham, Law Dict.
FALDATA. In old English law. A fiock or fold of sheep. Cowell.
FALDFEY. Sax. A fee or rent paid by a tenant to his lord for leave to fold his sheep on his own ground. Blount; Cunningham, Law Dict.
FALDISDORY. In ecclesiastical law. The bish-op’s seat or throne within the chancel.
FALDSOCA. Sax. The liberty or privilege of foldage.
FALDSTOOL. A place at the south side of the altar at which the sovereign kneels at his coron-ation. Wharton.
A folding seat similar to a camp stool, made either of wood or metal, sometimes covered with silk or other ma-terial. It was used by a bishop when officiating in other than his own cathedral church. Encyc.Dic.
FALDWORTH. In Saxon law. A person reck-oned old enough to become a member of the de-cennary, and so subject to the law of frank-pledge. Spelman; Du Fresne. FALERJE. In old English law. The tackle and furniture of a cart or wain. Blount.
FALESIA. In old English law. A hill or down by the sea-side. Co. Litt. 5b; Domesday.
FALK—LAND. See Folc-Land.
FALL, n. One of the four seasons of the year, embracing the three months commencing with the lst of September and terminating with the Last day of November. Rosenau v. Lansing, 113 Or. 638, 232 P. 648; Horn v. State, 19 Ala.App. 572, 99 So. 58. But a finding that certain persons oc-cupied a house until the fall of each year has been held ambiguous, since "fall" covers a period of time of upward of three months. Clegg v. Bishop, 105 Conn. 564, 136 A. 102, 104.
FALL, v. In Scotch law. To lose or loose. To fall from a right is to lose or forfeit it. 1 Kam-es, Eq. 228.
As used in flre policy provision that if building or any part thereof "fall," except as result of fire, all insurance on contents of building should immediately tease, includes any situation where building once erect líes prostrate. Nalley v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 56 Ga.App. 555, 193 S.E. 619, 622.
The statute provision concerning holding of courts which fall between January and June, both inclusive, íncludes any term which begins in June, the word "fall" meaning to come, become, occur, or arise. West v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 214 N.C. 214, 198 S.E. 659, 660.
FALL OF LAND. In English law. A quantity of land six ells square superficial measure.
FALLING. When the one object descends upon the other, we do not speak of it as colliding with the second, but as "falling" upon it. Atlas Assur. Co. v. Lies, 70 Ga.App. 162, 27 S.E.2d 791, 794.
FALLO. In Spanish law. The final decree or judgment given in a controversy at law.
FALLOPIAN TUSE. An essential part of the fernale reproductive system, consisting of a nar-row condult, some four inches in length, that extends on each side of a woman’s body from the base of the womb to the ovary upon that side. Smith v. Board of Examiners of Feeble-Minded, 85 N.J.L. 46, 88 A. 936, 965.
FALLOW. Barren or unproductive. May v. American Trust Co., 153 Cal.App. 385, 27 P.2d 101.
FALLOW—LAND. Land plowed, but not sown, and lett uncultivated for a time after successive crops; land lef t untilled for a year or more.
FALLUM. In old English law. An unexplained term for some particular kind of land. Cowell; Jacob, L. Dic.
FALSA DEMONSTRATIO. In the civil law. False designation; erroneous description of a per-son or thing in a written instrument. Inst. 2, 20, 30.
FALSA DEMONSTRATIO NON NOCET, CUM DE CORPORE (PERSONA) CONSTAT. False description does not injure or vitiate, provided the thing or person intended has once been sufficiently
Black’s Law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed.-46described. Mere false description does not make an instrument inoperative. Broom, Max. 629; 6 Term, 676; 11 Mees. & W. 189; Cleaveland v. Smith, 2 Story, 291, Fed.Cas.No.2,874. See 1 Greenieaf, Evidence, § 301; 2 Pars. Contr. 62, n.; 4 C. B. 328; 14 C. B. 122; Sargent v. Adams, 3 Gray (Mass.) 78, 63 Am.Dec. 718.
FALSA DEMONSTRATIONE LEGATUM NON PERIMI. A bequest is not rendered void by an erroneous description. Inst. 2, 20, 30; Broom, Max. 645; Roman Catholic Orphan Asylum v. Emmons, 3 Bradf. Sur., N.Y., 144, 149.
FALSA GRAMMATICA NON VITIAT CONCES-SIONEM. False or bad grammar does not vitiate a grant. Shep. Touch. 55; 9 Coke, 48a. Neither false Latin nor false English will make a deed void when the intent of the parties doth plainly appear. Shep. Touch. 87.
FALSA MONETA. In the civil law. False or counterfeit money. Cod. 9, 24.
FALSA ORTHOGRAPHIA NON VITIAT CHARTAM, CONCESSIONEM. False spelling does not vitiate a deed. Shep. Touch. 55, 87; 9 Coke, 48a; Wing. Max. 19; Bart. Max. 164.
FALSARE. In old English law. To counterfeit. Quia falsavit sigillum, because he counterfeited the seal. Bract. fol. 276b.
FALSARIUS (or FALCARIOUS). A counterfeit-er. Townsh. Pl. 260.
FALSE. Not true. State v. Arnett, 338 Mo. 907, 92 S.W.2d 897, 900; Sentinel Life Ins. Co. v. Black-mer, C.C.A.Colo., 77 F.2d 347, 352.
It also mean;
Artificial. U. S. v. Darby, D.C.Md., 2 F.Supp. 378, 379; Sentinel Life Ins. Co. v. Blackmer, C.C.A.Colo., 77 F.2d 347, 352; assumed or designed to deceive. Sentinel Life Ins. Co. v. Blackmer, C.C.A.Colo., 77 F.2d 347, 352; North American Accident Ins. Co. v. Tebbs, C.C.A.Utah, 107 F.2d 853, 855; contrary to fact. In re Davis, 349 Pa. 651, 37 A. 2d 498, 499; counterfeit, Sentinel Life Ins. Co. v. Blackmer, C.C.A.Colo., 77 F.2d 347, 352; North American Accident Ins. Co. v. Tebbs, C.C.A.Utah, 107 F.2d 853, 855; deceitful; deliberately and knowingly false, People v. Mangan, 140 Misc. 783, 252 N.Y.S. 44, 52; designedly untrue, W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Brantley, 97 Miss. 244, 19 So.2d 808, 811, 157 A.L.R. 188; erroneous, Abel v. Paterno, 153 Misc. 248, 274 N.Y.S. 749; Gilbert v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co. of Cincinnati, Ohio, 41 N.M. 463, 71 P.2d 56, 59; hypocritical; sham; feigned, Sentinel Life Ins. Co. v. Blackrrier, C.C.A. Colo., 77 F.2d 347, 352; North American Accident Ins. Co. v. Tebbs, C.C.A.Utah, 107 F.2d 853, 855; lncorrect, State v. Arnett, 338 Mo. 907, 92 S.W.2d 897, 900; intentionally untrue. In re Venturella, D.C.Conn., 25 F.Supp. 332, 333; In re Cleveland, D.C.Mich., 40 F.Supp. 343; not according to truth or reallty. State v. Arnett, 338 Mo. 907, 92 S.W. 2d 897. 900; North American Accident Ins. Co. v. Tebbs, C.C.A.Utah, 107 F.2d 853, 855; not genuine or real; U. S. v. Darby, D.C.Md., 2 F.Supp. 378, 379; North American Accident Ins. Co. v. Tebbs, C.C.A.Utah, 107 F.24 853, 855; uttering falsehood; unveracious; given to decelt;
honest, Wilensky v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., C.C.A. Mass., 67 F.2d 389, 390; wilfully and intentionally untrue. In re Brown, D.C.N.Y., 37 F.Supp. 526, 527; North Amer-ican Accident Ins. Co. v. Tebbs, C.C.A.Utah, 107 F.2d 853, 855.
Court’s substitution in charge of term "fraudulent" in place of term "false" held not misleading. Wood v. Wil-liams, Tex.Civ.App., 46 S.W.2d 332, 334.In law, thls word usually means something more than untrue; it means something designedly untrue and deceit-ful, and implies an intention to perpetrate some treachery or fraud. Hatcher v. Dunn, 102 Iowa, 411, 71 N.W. 343, 36 L.R.A. 689; Masaft v. Association, 18 U.C.C.P. 19; State v. Leonard, 73 Or. 451, 144 P. 113, 118; State v. Smith, 63 Vt. 201, 22 A. 604. It implies either conscious wrong or culpable negligente, and signifies knowingly or negligently untrue. United States v. Ninety-Nine Diamonds, C.C.A. Minn., 139 F. 961, 72 C.C.A. 9, 2 L.R.A.,N.S., 185.
The word "false" has two distinct and well-recognized meanings: (1) intentionally or knowingly or negligently untrue; (2) untrué by mistake or accident, or honestly aft-er the exercise of reasonable care. Metropolitan Life Iris. Co. v. Adams, D.C.Mun.App., 37 A.2d 345, 350. In jurispru-dence, "false" and "falsely" are oftenest used to character-ize a wrongful or criminal act, such as involves an error or untruth, intentionally or knowingly put forward. A thing is called "false" when it is done, or made, with knowledge, actual or constructive, that it is untrue or 11-legal, or is said to be done falsely when the meaning is that the party is in fault for its error. Fouts v. State, 113 Ohio St. 450, 149 N.E. 551, 554; Monahan v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 192 Wis. 102, 212 N.W. 269, 271.
The word "false" in its juristic use implies something more than a mere untruth, Dombroski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 126 N.J.L. 545, 19 A.2d 678, 680.
The word "false" sometimes connotes an intent to de-ceive, People v. Wahl, 39 Cal.App.2d Supp. 771, 100 P.2d 550, 551; Salt’s Textile Mfg. Co. v. Ghent, 107 Conn. 211, 139 A. 694, 695.
FALSE ACTION. See Feigned Action.
FALSE AND FRAUDULENT. The phrase "false and fraudulent" in Food and Drugs Act of 1906 means that the statement must have been made with actual intent to deceive. United States v. Dr. David Roberts Veterinary Co., C.C.A.Wis., 104 F.2d 785, 788.
To amount to actionable "false and fraudulent repre-sentations", they must have been as to existing fact or known by one making them, from his superior knowledge, to have been untrue when made. Burlison v. Wels, Mo. App., 152 S.W.2d 201, 203.
FALSE AND MISLEADING STATEMENT: Fail-ure to state material fact made letter a "false • and misleading statement" within rule of Secur-ities and Exchange Commission. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Okin, C.C.A.N.Y., 132 F.2d 784, 787.
FALSE ANSWER. In pleading. A sham answer; one which is false in the sense of being a mere pretense set up in bad faith and without color of fact. Howe v. Elwell, 57 App.Div. 357, 67 N.Y. Supp. 1108; Farnsworth v. Halstead, Sup., 10 N.Y. S. 763.
FALSE ARREST. Any unlawful physical re-straint by one of another’s liberty, whether in prison or elsewhere. Gariety v. Fleming, 121 Kan. 42, 245 P. 1054, 1055; Russell v. Levinsohn, 5 N.J. Misc. 765, 138 A. 205; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Phillips, 253 Ky. 126, 69 S.W.2d 5.
FALSE CHARACTER. Personating the master or mistress of a servant, or any representative of such master or mistress, and giving a false char-acter to the servant is an offense punishable in England with a fine of £20. St. 32 Geo. III. c. 56.
FALSE CHECKS. Obtaining money by means and use of a check upon a bank, in which the drawer at the time had no funds or credit withwhich to meet the same, and which he had no reason to believe would honor such check upon presentation at said bank for payment, is obtain-ing money by use of a false check. Gunther v. State, 42 Okl.Cr. 129, 276 P. 237, 238.
FALSE CLAIM, in the forest law, was where a man claimed more than his due, and was amerced and punished for the same. Manw. c. 25; Tom-lins.
As used in a statute making it a felony to present to any state, county, or city board or officer a false or fraudu-lent claim, a "false claim" is something more than a mere-ly excessive claim. Burke v. Knox, 59 Utah, 596, 206 P. 711, 714. The act of knowingly making untruthful statements of material facts in "reasons for refund" of excise taxes. supported by fictitious copies of letters and cards attached thereto, constitutes "false claim" against government, within Criminal Code, § 35 (18 USCA §§ 80, 82-86). Evans v. U. S., C.C.A.S.C., 11 F.2d 37, 39.
FALSE DECRETALS. A collection of canon law, dated about the middle of the 9th century, prob-ably by a Frankish ecclesiastic who called himself Isadon. It continued to be the chief repertory of the canon law till the 15th century when its un-trustworthy nature was demonstrated.
FALSE DEMONSTRATION. Where description of person or thing in will is partly true and partly false, if part which is true describes subject or object of gift with sufficient certainty, untrue part may be rejected and gift sustained, under doctrine of "false demonstration." In re Heins’ Estate, 132 Cal.App. 131, 22 P.2d 549.
FALSE ENTRY. An entry in books of a bank or trust company which is intentionally made to rep-resent what is not true or does not exist, with intent either to deceive its officers or a bank ex-aminer or to defraud the bank or trust company. Agnew v. U. S., 165 U.S. 36, 17 S.Ct. 235, 41 L.Ed. 624; Fricke v. State, 112 Neb. 767, 201 N.W. 667, 670; Commonwealth v. Bardolph, 111 Pa.Super. 85, 169 A. 574, 575; U. S. v. Mulloney, D.C.Mass., 5 F.Supp. 77, 79.
An untrue statement of ítems of account by written words, figures, or marks. United States v. Herrig, D.C. Mont., 204 F. 124, 125. One making an original false entry makes a false entry in every book which is made up in regular course from the entry or entries from the original book of entry. State v. Davidson, 46 N.D. 564, 180 N.W. 31, 32.
Where entry upon books of bank of matter contalned in deposlt slip is not true it is a "false entry," Adams v. State, 179 Ark. 1047, 20 S.W.2d 130, 133.
Entries made by cashier of balance in insurance com-pany’s account after deducting unauthorized wlthdrawals made by cashier as agent of insurance company held "false entries" within statute. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1005. Laws v. U. S., C.C.A.Okl., 66 F.2d 870, 873.
FALSE FACT. In the law of evidente. A feigned, simulated, or fabricated fact; .a fact not founded In truth, but existing only in assertion; the deceitful semblance of a fact.
FALSE INITERSONATION. To impersonate an-other falsely, and in such assumed character to do any act whereby any benefit might accrue to the offender or to another person. People v. Horkans, 109 Colo. 177, 123 P.2d 824.FALSE IMPRISONMENT. See Imprisonment.
FALSE INSTRUMENT. A counterfeit; one made in the similitude of a genuine instrument and purporting on its face to be such. U. S. v. Howell, 11 Wall. 435, 20 L.Ed. 195; U. S. v. Owens, C.C.Tenn., 37 Fed. 115; State v. Willson, 28 Minn. 52, 9 N.W. 28.
FALSE JUDGMENT. In old English law. A writ which lay when a false judgment had been pronounced in a court not of record, as a county court, court baron, etc. Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 17, 18. In old French law. The defeated party in a suit had the privilege of accusing the judges of pronouncing a false or corrupt judgment, where-upon the issue was determined by his challenging them to the combat or duellum. This was called the "appeal of false judgment." Montesq. Esprit des Lois, liv. 28, c. 27.
FALSE LATIN. When law proceedings were written in Latin, if a word were significant though not good Latin, yet an indictment, declaration, or fine should not be made void by it; but if the word were not Latin, nor allowed by the law, and it were in a material point, it made the whole vicious. (5 Coke, 121; 2 Nels. 830.) Wharton.
FALSE LIGHTS AND SIGNALS. Lights and sig-nals falsely and maliciously displayed for the purpose of bringing a vessel into danger. See stat. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, § 47; 18 U.S.C.A. § 488.
FALSE MAKING. An essential element of forg-ery, where material alteration is not involved. Term has reference to manner in which writing is made or executed rather than to its substance or effect. A falsely made instrument is one that is fictitious, not genuine, or in some material par-ticular something other than it purports to be and without regard to truth or falsity of facts stated therein. Wright v. U. S., C.A.Ariz., 172 F.2d 310, 311.
FALSE NEWS. Spreading false news, whereby discord may grow between the queen of Eng-land and her people, or the great men of the realm, or which may produce other mischiefs, still seems to be a misdemeanor, under St. 3 Edw. I. c. 34. Steph. Cr. Dig. § 95.
FALSE DATIL To defeat discharge in bank-ruptcy "false oath" must contain all the elements involved in "perjury" at common law, namely, an intentional untruth in matter material to a ma-terial issue, In re Bergman, D.C.N.Y., 6 F.Supp. 898, 901, it must have been knowingly and fraud-ulently made. In re Stone, D.C.N.H., 52 F.2d 639, 641. See, also, Perjury.
FALSE OR FRAUDULENT CLAIM. A "false or fraudulent claim" within meaning of statute pro-viding for punishment of any one receiving pro-ceeds of fraudulent audit or payment, since to be "false or fraudulent," must be a claim for serv-ices or materials not actually rendered or fur-nished. People v. Daily, 175 Misc. 680, 24 N.Y.S.2d 692, 695.FALSE PAPER. In a statute defining an offense of willfully and knowingly subscribing to "false papers" to deceive bank examiners, the term re-fers not to one which is forged or spurious, but to a paper duly subscribed by the person purport-ing to sign it, and containing an untrue statement in the body of the instrument. State v. Pierson, 101 Wash. 318, 172 P. 236, 238.
FALSE PERSONATION. The criminal offense of falsely representing some other person and acting in the character thus unlawfully assumed, in order to deceive others, and thereby gain some profit or advantage, or enjoy some right or priv-ilege belonging to the one so personated, or sub-ject him to some expense, charge, or liability. See 4 Steph. Comm. 181, 290.
FALSE PLEA. See Sham Plea.
FALSE PRETENSES. Designed misrepresenta-tion of existing fact or condition whereby person obtains another’s money or goods. People v. Gould, 363 Ill. 348, 2 N.E.2d 324.
Elements of offense include actual fraud, State v. Nuser, 199 Minn. 315, 271 N.W. 811, 812; State v. Mayer, 196 N.C. 454, 146 S.E. 64, 65; assertion of a present or past fact, Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 222 Ky. 225, 300 S.W. 619, 621, 56 A.L.R. 1209; State v. Nuser, 199 Minn. 315, 271 N.W. 811, 812, falsity of representation, State v. Mayer, 196 N.C. 454, 146 S.E. 64, 65; People v. Leaverton, 107 Cal. App. 51, 289 P. 890, 892; intent to cheat and de-fraud. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 116 Pa.Su-per. 180, 176 A. 246, 250; State v. Johnson, 195 N.C. 506, 142 S.E. 775, 776; knowledge of the falsity, fraud. Couch v. State, 31 Ala.App. 586, 20 So.2d 57, 58; Dennis v. Thomson, 240 Ky. 727, 43 S.W.2d 18, 25; obtaining of property or something of value. State v. Johnson, 195 N.C. 506, 142 S.E. 775, 776; Couch v. State, 31 Ala.App. 586, 20 So.2d 57, 58; perpetration of fraud by means of such false pretenses, State v. Hintz, 200 Wis. 636, 229 N.W. 54, 55; reliance on representa-tion, State v. Howley, 220 N.C. 113, 16 S.E.2d 705, 708, 709; use of pretenses or false representa-tions, Dennis v. Thomson, 240 Ky. 727, 43 S.W.2d 18, 25; State v. Mayer, 196 N.C. 454, 146 S.E. 64, 65.
Other deflnitions of "false pretenses" Include:
False representation of existing fact or condition by which a party obtains property of another, People ex rel. Courtney v. Sullivan, 363 III. 34, 1 N.E.2d 206, 208; false representation of existing fact, whether by oral or wrltten words or conduct, calculated to deceive, Intended to de-ceive, and does in fact deceive, whereby one person ob-tains value from another without compensation, Common-wealth v. Johnson, 312 Pa. 140, 167 A. 344, 345, 89 A.L.R. 333; State v. Alick, 62 S.D. 220, 252 N.W. 644; false rep-resentation of existing or past fact calculated to induce confldence on part of one to whom representation is made, and accompanied by or blended with a promise to do some-thing in future, State v. Parkinson, 181 Wash. 69, 41 P.2d 1095, 1097; false representation of existing fact, made with knowledge of falsity, with intent that party to whom it is made should act upon lt, and acted upon by such party to his detriment. GrifIlth v. State, 93 Ohio St. 294, 112 N.E. 1017, 1018; State v. Hathaway, 168 Wis. 518, 170 N.W. 654, 656; State v. Whitney, 43 Idaho, 745, 254 P. 525, 526; Smith v. State, 74 Fia. 594, 77 So. 274, 276; false rep-resentation of past or existing fact, made with knowledge of falsity, with intent to deceive and defraud, and which is adapted to deceive person to whom made, State v. Alick, 62 S.D. 220, 252 N.W. 644; false representations and state-ments, made with a fraudulent design to obtain money, goods, wares, or merchandise, with intent to cheat, 2 Bouv. Inst. no. 2308; false statement made with knowledge of its falsity, which is intended to deceive, and which in fact does deceive, and injury results, Morris Plan Bank of Richmond v. Henderson, D.C.N.C., 57 F.2d 326, 327; fraud-ulent representation of fact by one who knows it not to be true as is adapted to induce person to whom made to part with something of value, Fisher v. State, 161 Ark. 586, 256 S.W. 858, 860; State v. Tanner, 22 N.M. 493, 164 P. 821, 822, L.R.A.1917E, 849; State v. Luff, 1 Boyce (Del.) 152, 74 A. 1079, 1080; State v. Barr, 63 Idaho 59, 117 P.2d 282, 286; misrepresentation of past fact, knowingly made to Induce another to part with his property, People v. Martín, 372 III. 484, 24 N.E.2d 380, 381, 382; misstatement of fact, Carr v. State, 60 Ga.App. 590, 4 S.E.2d 500, 501; represen-tation of some fact or circumstance, calculated to mislead or deceive, which is not true, State v. Grant, 86 Iowa 216, 53 N.W. 120; Commonwealth v. McKnight, 289 Mass. 530, 195 N.E. 499, 506.
A "false pretense" must be as to an existí/1g or past fact. State v. Neal, 350 Mo. 1002, 169 S.W.2d 686, 689; Common-wealth v. Becker, 151 Pa.Super. 169, 30 A.2d 195, 197.
A pretense is the holding out or offering to others some-thing false and feigned. This may be done either by words or actions, which amount to false representations. In fact, false representations are Inseparable from the idea of a pretense. Without a representation which is false there can be no pretense. State v. Joaquín, 43 Iowa, 132.
Gist of offense of "obtalnIng money by false pretenses" is the fraud and deception by the perpetrator, his motive, and the result-the fact that a person was deceived and defrauded. Frazier v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 467, 165 S.W.2d 33, 34.
Giving of worthless check is, in itself, "false pretense". State v. Augustine, 114 W.Va. 143, 171 S.E. 111, 113; Laird v. Employers Liability Assur. Corporation, Limited, of London, England, 2 Terry 216, 18 A.2d 861, 862.
In "false pretenses" owner intends to part with his prop-erty In money or chattel but it is obtained from him by fraud. People v. Santora, 51 Cal.App.2d 707, 125 P.2d 606, 608.
One distinctIon between "embezzlement" and "false pre-tenses" Is that In the former case the defendant does not have Ude to the property, while in the latter, he has. State v. Serkau, 128 Conn. 153, 20 A.2d 725, 727.

Confidente game distinguished

A "confidence game" is any swindling opera-tion in which advantage is taken of the confi-dence reposed by the victim in the swindler. It consists of gaining the possession of money or property by means of some trick, device, or swin-dling operation in which advantage is taken of the confidence of the victim reposed in the swindler. In obtaining money by "false pretenses," the false pretenses used must have been believed and relied on by the defrauded party and been the means of inducing the victim to part with his property. People v. Blume, 345 Ill, 524, 178 N.E. 48, 52.
"Confidente game" is not established by mere proof that property has been obtained by false pretense. Clerk v. State, 53 Ariz. 416, 89 P.2d 1077, 1080.

Larceny and false pretenses distinguished

In larceny owner has no intention to part with his prop-erty, although he may intend to part with possession, while in false pretenses the owner does intend to part with the property but it is obtained from him by fraud. People v. Shwartz, 43 Cal.App. 696, 185 P. 686, 687. Roberts v. State, 181 Ind. 520, 104 N.E. 970, 971.
In larceny owner has no intention to part with title to and possession of property taken, while in false pretenses he does so intend, but it is obtained from him by fraud. Simmons v. State, 165 Md. 155, 167 A. 60, 64.Only a very narrow distinction exists between "Iarceny" and "false pretense"; the character of the crime depend-ing on the intention of the parties. Riley v. State, 64 Okl. Cr. 183, 78 P.2d 712, 716.
The intention of owner of property not to part with ti-tle when relinquishing possession of property is vital point to be determined in distinguishing between "larceny by fraud" and obtaining property by "false pretenses". Dob-son v. State, 74 Okl.Cr. 341, 126 P.2d 95, 101.

Obtaining money or property by false pretenses

Elements are intent to defraud, actual fraud, false pre-tense, and fraud resulting therefrom, Simmons v. State, 165 Md. 155, 167 A. 60, 64; false pretenses, that property was obtained thereby, that false pretenses were made with intent to cheat and defraud, and that money was paid in reliance upon and under inducement of false pretenses, People v. Sloane, 165 Misc. 444, 300 N.Y.S. 1032, 1035.
It is suflicient if false pretenses are a part of the mov-ing cause, and, without them, the defrauded party would not have parted with the property. State v. Faulkner, 139 Kan. 665, 33 P.2d 175, 177.
The distinction between "obtaining money by false pre-tenses" and forgery is that In the former, the acquisítion of the money is the principal thing, while in forgery the making, altering, uttering, or publishing of the written instrument la the principal part, and money need not nec-essarily be obtained. State v. Hobl, 108 Kan. 261, 194 P. 921, 924.
The false representations may be made by ímplication. Johnson v. People, 110 Colo. 283, 133 P.2d 789, 792.
The "false pretense" may be the fallure to speak when it was necessary to do so. People v. Etzler, 292 Mich. 489, 290 N.W. 879, 880.
The ."false pretense" must relate to existing fact, or to fact which has theretofore occurred. Jones V. State, 236 Ala. 30, 182 So. 404, 405.
FALSE RECORD. The Fair Labor Standards Act prohibiting the making of "false records" refers to falsification of payroll records customarily made available to a wage and hour inspector. United States v. Selman-Reinstein, Inc., D.C. Minn., 52 F.Supp. 208, 209, 210.
FALSE REPRESENTATION. A representation which is untrue, willfully made to deceive an-other to his injury. See, also, Deceit and Fraud.
A deceitful representation, or one contrary to the fact, made knowingly and with the design and effect of inducing the other party to enter into the contract to which it re-lates; a declaration of present intention, false when made, to perform act in futura, Pease & Elliman v. Wegeman, 223 App.DIv. 682, 229 N.Y.S. 398, 400; a representation known to be false by person making it, or made without knowledge as a positiva statement of known fact upon which another relied and acted, Platte Valley Bank v. Lemke, 141 Neb. 218, 3 N.W.2d 396, 399; a representation of what is true, which nevertheless creates an impression which is false. Newark Trust Co. v. Lackawanna Inv. Co., 88 N.J.Eq. 541, 103 A. 168, 169; McClellan v. Tobin, Ind., 219 Ind, 563, 39 N.E.2d 772, 774; an assertion of knowledge which in fact one does not have, Tone v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., 286 Ill.App. 169, 3 N.E.2d 142, 147; an assertion of something as true which one does not know to be true, Hargrove v. Henderson, 108 Cal.App. 667, 292 P. 148; such representations as will deceive persons of ordinary pru-dence. Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Kerron, 128 Or. 70, 264 P. 453, 455; Holmberg v. Prudential Savings & Loan Ass’n, 130 Or. 1, 278 P. 943, 945.
A "false representation" may arase from any conduct capable of being turnad into a statement of fact. Bundesen v. Lewis, 291 Ill.App. 83, 9 N.E.2d 327, 334.
A "false representation" may be made scienter, so as to afford a right of action in damages, in any of the following ways: (1) With actual knowledge of its falsíty; (2) with-out knowledge either of its truth or falsity; or (3) under circumstances In which the person making it ought to have known if he did not know of its falsity. Horton v. Tyree,

104 W.Va. 238, 139 S.E. 737, 738; Sebastian County Bank v. Geam, 121 Ark. 145, 180 S.W. 754, 755.
A false representation, within Bankruptcy Act not af-fected by discharge, must Involve moral turpitude or inten-tional wrong. Hisey v. Lewls-Gale Hospital, D.C.Va., 27 F.Supp. 20, 23.
False statements although future In form may be "false representations" of existing facts and conditlons. Nation-al Theatre Supply Co. v. Rigney, Mo.App., 130 S.W.2d 258, 263.
To maintain an action for damages for "false representa-tion," the plaintiff, in substance, must allege and must prove by a preponderante of the evidente the following ele-ments: (1) What representation was made; (2) that it was false; (3) that the defendant knew it was false, or else made it without knowledge as a positive statement of known fact; (4) that the plaintiff believed the represen-tation to be true: (5) that the plaintiff relied on and acted upon the representation; (6) that the plaintiff was thereby injured; and (7) the amount of the damages. Peterson v. Schaberg, 116 Neb. 346, 217 N.W. 586, 587.
FALSE RETURN. See Return.
FALSE STATEMENT. Under statutory provi-sion, making it unlawful for officer or director of corporation to make any false statement in re-gard to corporation’s financial condition, the phrase means something more than merely un-true or erroneous, but implies that statement is designedly untrue and deceitful, and made with intention to deceive person to whom false- state-ment is made or exhibited. State v. Johnston, 149 S.C. 138, 146 S.E. 657, 660.
As used in bankruptcy statute provislon concerning dIscharge, these words denote or connote guilty scienter on part of bankrupt, In re Krulewitch, D.C.N.J., 60 F.2d 1039, 1041; Wilensky v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., C.C.A. Mass., 67 F.2d 389, 390. They mean an incorrect statement made or acquiesced In with knowledge of incorrectness or with reckless indifference to actual facts and with no reasonable ground to believe it correct. International Shoe Co. v. Lewine, C.C.A.Miss., 68 F.2d 517, 518; statement false to bankrupt’s knowledge and made with fraudulent intent, In re Johnson, D.C.Conn., 1 F.Supp. 649, 651; state-ment knowingly false, or made recklessly without honest belief in its truth, and with purpose to mislead or deceive, Third Nat. Bank v. Schatten, C.C.A.Tenn., 81 F.2d 538, 540; In re Venturella, D.C.Conn., 25 F.Supp. 332. They mean more than erroneous or untrue and import inten-tion to deceive, Schapiro v. Tweede Footwear Corporation, C.C.A.Pa., 131 F.2d 876, 878.
Bank’s statement which gives result showing bank sub-stantially stronger than it is in fact, constantes "false statement" within statute deflning offense of making or publishing false statement. Rosenberg v. State, 212 Wls. 434, 249 N.W. 541.
FALSE SWEARING. The essential elements of "false swearing" consist in willfully, knowingly, absolutely and falsely swearing under oath or af-firmation on a matter concerning which a party could legally be sworn and on oath administered by one legally authorized to administer it. Smith v. State, 66 Ga.App. 669, 19 S.E.2d 168, 169.
To constitute "false swearing", it must appear that matter sworn to was judicially pending or was being investigated by grand jury, or was a subject on which accused could legally have been sworn, or on which he was required to be sworn. Capps v. Commonwealth, 294 Ky. 743, 172 S.W.2d 610, 611. The oath need not be taken in a matter judicially pending or any matter ma-terial to any point in question. Capps v. Com-monwealth, 294 Ky. 743, 172 S.W.2d 610, 611. See, also, Perjury.As used in provision concerning dental of liability under policy, means false statement willfully made with respect to a material matter with intention of thereby deceiving insurer, Sands v. Bankers’ Fire Ins. Co., 168 Va. 645, 192 S.E. 617; false statements made knowingly and willfully, with intent to deceive insurer concerning matter material to insurance, Buccola v. National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 18 La.App. 353, 137 So. 346, 350; knowingly and in-tentionally stating upon oath what is not true, or state-ment of a fact as true, which the party does not know to be true, Harwood v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 136 Me. 223, 7 A.2d 899, 902; knowingly and willfully false swear-ing to deceive or mislead insurers, Young v. California Ins. Co., 55 Idaho 682, 46 P.2d 718, 722; misstatement in proofs of loss willfully made, Palace Cafe v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., C.C.A.Ind., 97 F.2d 766, 769; statements which are not only untrue but knowingly and Intentionally made with knowledge of their untruthfulness or those statements which are made as the truth when party did not know them to be true and had no reasonable grounds for believing them to be true, and statements must be made for purpose of defrauding insurer, United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Mer-rick, 171 Md. 476, 190 A. 335, 342; swearing knowingly and intentionally false and not through mere mistake. Knight v. Boston Ins. Co., 113 N.J.L. 132, 172 A. 594, 595.
"Perjury" and "false swearing" may be interchangeable. Ray v. Times Pub. Co., Tex.Com.App., 12 S.W.2d 165, 166.
The misdemeanor committed in English law by a person who swears falsely before any person authorized to ad-minister an oath upon a matter of public concern, under such clrcumstances that the false swearing would have amounted to perjury if committed in a judicial proceeding; as where a person makes a false affidavit under the bilis of sale acts. Steph.Cr.Dig. p. 84. And see O’Bryan v. State, 27 Tex.App. 339, 11 S.W. 443. In Texas, it is not necessary, to complete the offense, that the affidavit be used for the purpose for which it was intended. Welch v. State, 71 Tex. Cr.R. 17, 157 S.W. 946. Under the Texas and Kentucky statutes, however, "false swearing" is distinct from the common-law crime of perjury; Commonwealth v. Hinkle, 177 Ky. 22, 197 S.W. 455, 456; Shipp v. State, 81 Tex.Cr.R. 328, 196 S.W. 840, 842; inasmuch as "false swearing" con-slsts in making a false oath on a subject about which the party could legally be sworn, and before a person legally authorized to administer the oath; Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 210 Ky. 405, 276 S.W. 124, 125; it not being necessary, as in perjury, that the testimony be material; Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 158 Ky. 536, 165 S.W. 696, 697.
FALSE TOKEN. In criminal law. A false docu-ment or sign of the existente of a fact,—in gen-eral used for the purpose of fraud. See 3 Term, 98; 2 Starkie, Ev. 563; 1 Bish. Cr. L. 585; People v. Haynes, 14 Wend., N.Y., 570, 28 Am.Dec. 530; Smith v. State, 74 Fla. 594, 77 So. 274, 276; State v. Renick, 33 Or. 584, 56 P. 275, 44 L.R.A. 266.
A written release of lictitious claim was a "false token" People v. Beilfuss, 59 Cal.App.2d 83, 138 P.2d 332, 339.
FALSE VERDICT. See Verdict.
FALSE WEIGHTS. False weights and measures are such as do not comply with the standard pre-scribed by the state or government, or with the custom prevailing in the place and business in which they are used.
FALSE WITNESS. One who is intentionally rather than merely mistakenly false. State v. Weston, 109 Or. 19, 219 P. 180, 189.
FALSE WORDS, which may be eliminated from descriptions in wills, deeds, etc., are misdescrip-tions of property that are not applicable to any property owned or intended to be devised or con-veyed. Brown v. Ray, 314 III. 570, 145 N.E. 676, 679; Armstrong v. Armstrong, 327 Ill. 85, 158 N.E. 356, 358.FALSEDAD. In Spanish law. Falsity; an al-teration of the truth. Las Partidas, pt. 3, tit. 26, 1. 1.
Deception; fraud. Id. pt. 3, tit. 32, 1. 21.
FALSEROOD. A statement or assertion known to be untrue, and intended to deceive. A willful act or declaration contrary to the truth. Put-nam v. Osgood, 51 N.H. 207.
The term is perhaps generally used in the second sense here given. It 1s committed either by the wilful act of the party, or by dissimulation, or by words.
Crabbe thus distingulshes between falsehood and un-truth ”The latter is an untrue saying, and may be unln-tentional, in which case it reflects no disgrace on the agent. A falsehood and a 11e are intentional false sayings, differ-Ing only in degree of the guilt of the offender; falsehood being not always for the expresa purpose of deceiving, but a lie always for the worst of purposes." See Rosc.Cr.Ev. 362; Deceit; Fraud; Misrepresentation.
A fabrication. Werner v. Southern Cal. Asso-ciated Newspapers, Cal.App., 206 P.2d 952, 961.

Scotch Late

A fraudulent imitation or suppression of truth, to the prejudice of another. Bell. "Something used and pub-lished falsely." An old Scottish nomen juris. "Falsehood is undoubtedly a nomínate crime, so much so that Sir George Mackenzie and our older lawyers used no other term for the falsification of writs, and the name ‘forgery’ has been of modern introduction." "If there 15 any dis-tinction to be made between ‘forgery’ and ‘falsehood,’ I would consider the latter to be more comprehensive than the former." 2 Broun, 77, 78.
FALSELY. In a false manner, erroneously, not truly, perfidiously or treacherously. Dombroski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 126 N.J.L. 545, 19 A. 2d 678, 680. Knowingly affirming without prob-able cause. Hicks v. State, 67 Ga.App. 475, 21 S.E. 2d 113, 118. See, also, False.
As applied to making or altering a wrItting in order to make It forgery, implies that the paper or writing is not genuine; that in itself It is false or counterfeit. People v. Kramer, 352 111. 304, 185 N.E. 590, 591.
The use of the word falsely In a statute (against counter-feiting) implies that there must be a fraudulent or crim-inal intent in the act; U. S. v. Ring, 5 McLean 208, Fed. Cas.No.15,535. See, also, 4 B. & C. 329; 6 Com.Dig. 58; Stark, Cr.P1. 86.
The word "falsely", particularly In a criminal statute, suggests something more than a mere untruth and in-eludes perfidiously or treacherously or with intent to de-fraud. United States v. Achtner, C.C.A.N.Y., 144 F.2d 49, 52.
Usually used in the sense of designedly untrue and de-ceitful, and as implying an intention to perpetrate some treachery or fraud. Fouts v. State, 113 Ohio St. 450, 149 N.E. 551, 554; State v. Merlo, 92 Or. 678, 173 P. 317, 319; McDonald v. McNeil, 92 Vt. 356, 104 A. 337, 339; Cro.Ellz. 201; 7 D. & R. 665. But see 1 Den.C.C. 157.
FALSELY IMPERSONATE. To "falsely imper-sonate" may mean to pretend to be a particular person without lawful authority. People v. Hor-kans, 109 Colo. 177, 123 P.2d 824, 826.
FALSELY MAKE, means to make an instrument which has no original as such and no genuine maker whose work is copied, although in form it may resemble a type of recognized security. Pines v. United States, C.C.A.Iowa, 123 F.2d 825, 828.FALSI CRIMEN. Fraudulent subornation or con-cealment, with design to darken or hide the truth, and make things appear otherwise than they are. It is committed (1) by words, as when a witness swears falsely; (2) by writing, as when a person antedates a contract; (3) by deed, as selling by false weights and mea sures. Wharton. See Crim-en Falsi.
FALSIFICATION. In equity practice. The show-ing an item in the debit of an account to be either wholly false or in some part erroneous. 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 525. And see Phillips v. Belden, 2 Edw. Ch. 23; Pit v. Cholmondeley, 2 Ves. Sr. 565; Tate v. Gairdner, 119 Ga. 133, 46 S.E. 73; Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat., U.S., 237, 6 L.Ed. 468.
FALSIFY. To disprove; to prove to be false or erroneous; to avoid or defeat; spoken of verdicts, appeals, etc. Co. Litt. 104b.
To counterfelt or forge; to make something false; to give a false appearance to anything. To make false by mutilation or addition; to tamper with; as, to falslfy a record or document. Pou v. Ellis, 66 Fla. 358, 63 So. 721, 722.
To show, as In an accounting before a master in chan-cery, that a charge has been inserted which le wrong; that 1s, either wholly false or in some part erroneous. Pull.
Accts. 162; 1 Story, Eq.Jur. 1 525. See Shores-Mueller Co. v. Bell, 21 Ga.App. 194, 94 S.E. 83, 84; Falsification.
The word ”falsify" may be used to convey two dIstinct meanings—either that of being lntentlonally or knowingly untrue, made with intent to defraud, or mistakenly and ac-cldentally untrue. Washer v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass’n, 21 Ca1.2d 822, 136 P.2d 297, 301.
FALSIFYING A JUDGMENT. A term some-times used for reversing a judgment. See 4 Steph. Com. 553.
FALSIFYING A RECORD. A high offense against public justice, punishable in England by 24 & 25 Vict. c. 98, §§ 27, 28, and in the United States, generally, by statute. See U. S. Rev.Stat. § 5394, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1506.
FALSING. In Scotch law. False making; forg-ery. "Falsing of evidentis." 1 Pite. Crim. Tr. pt. 1, p. 85.
Making or proving false.
FALSING OF DOOMS. In Scotch law. The proving the injustice, falsity, or error of the doom or sentence of a court. Tomlins; Jacob. The reversal of a sentenee_or judgment; an action to set aside a decree. Skene. Protesting against a sentence and taking an appeal to a higher tri-bunal. Bell, Dict.
FALSITY implies more than erroneous or untrue; it indicates knowledge of untruth. Abercrombie v. Hair, 185 Ga. 728, 196 S.E. 447, 451.
FALSO RETORNO BREVIUM. In old English law. A writ which formerly lay against the sher-iff who had execution of process for false return-ing of writs. Reg. Jud. 43b; Cunningham, Law Dict.
FALSONARIUS. A forger; a counterfeiter. Hov. 424.FALSUM. Lat. In the civil law. A false or forged thing; a fraudulent simulation; a fraud-ulent counterfeit or imitation, such as a forged signature or instrument. Also falsification, which may be either by falsehood, concealment of the truth, or fraudulent alteration, as by cutting out or erasing part of a writing.
FALSUS. Lat. False; fraudulent; erroneous. Deceitful; mistaken.
In the sense of "deceiving" or "fraudulent," it Is applied to persons in respect to their acts and conduct, as well as to things, and in the sense of "erroneous," lt is applied to persons on the question of personal identitY.
FALSUS IN UNO, FALSUS IN OMNIBUS. False in one thing, false in everything. Commonwealth v. Billings, 97 Mass. 406; Mercer v. Wright, 3 Wis. 645; State v. Williams, 47 N.C. 257; Dawson v. Bertolini, 70 R.I. 325, 38 A.2d 765, 768.
The doctrine means that, if testimony of a witness on a material issue is willfully false and given with an inten-tion to deceive, jury may disregard all the witness’ testi-mony. Hargrave v. Stockloss, 127 N.J.L. 262, 21 A.2d 820, 823.
The maxim deals only with weight of evidence, Metro-politan Life Ins. Co. v. Wright, 190 Miss. 53, 199 So. 289, 290. It does not relieve jury from passing on credibility of the whole testimony of a false sweariiig witness or excuse jury from weighing the whole testimony. State v. Willard, 346 Mo. 773, 142 S.W.2d 1046, 1052. It is a mere rule of evidence affirming a rebuttable presumption of fact, under which the jury must consider all the evidence of the wit-ness, other than that which is found to be false, and it is their duty to give effect to so much of it, if any, as is relieved from the presumption against it and found to be true. Levine Bros. v. Mantel!, 90 W.Va. 166, 111 S.E. 501, 504; Sheet’ v. United States, C.C.A.Wis., 226 F. 184, 187. It is not a rule of law and false statement, State v. Stur-chio, 127 N.S.L. 366, 22 A.2d 235, 237. It is not a rule of the law of evidence, but is merely an aid in weighing and sir ting of evidence. Dawson v. Bertolini, 70 R.I. 325, 38 A.2d 765, 768. It is particularly applied to the testimony of a witness who, if he is shown to have sworn falsely in ene detall, may be considered unworthy of belief as to all the rest of his evidence. Grimes v. State, 63 Ala. 168; Wil-son v. Coulter, 51 N.Y.S. 804, 29 App.Div. 85; Whlte v. Dlsher, 67 Cal. 402, 7 P. 826.
The rule is merely permissive and not mandatory. Bank-ers’ Health & Life Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 44 Ga.App. 536, 162 S.E. 161.
Where a party Is clearly shown to have embezzled one article of property, it is a ground of presumption that he may have embezzled others also. The Boston, 1 Sumn. 328, 356, Fed.Cas.No.1,673; The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 339, 5 L.Ed. 454.
FAMA. Lat. Fame; character, reputation; re-port of common opinion.
FAMA, FIDES ET OCULUS NON PATIUNTUR LUDUM. 3 Bulst. 226. Fame, faith, and eyesight do not suffer a cheat.
FAMA QUE SUSPICIONEM INDUCIT, ORIRI DEBET APUD BONOS ET GRAVES, NON QUID-EM MALEVOLOS ET MALEDICOS, SED PRO-VIDAS ET FIDE DIGNAS PERSONAS, NON SEMEL SED SIEPIUS, QUIA CLAMOR MINUIT ET DEFAMATIO MANIFESTAT. 2 Inst. 52. Re-port, which induces suspicion, ought to arise from good and grave men; not, indeed, from malevo-lent and malicious men, but from cautious and credible persons; not only once, but frequently; for clamor diminishes, and defamation manifests.FAMACIDE. A killer of reputation; a slanderer. FAMILIA.
Old English Law. A household; the body of household servants; a quantity of land, otherwise called "mansa," sufficient to maintain one family. Du Cange; Cowell; Cunningham, Law Dict.; Creasy, Church Hist.
Roman Law. A household; a family. On the composition of the Roman family, see Agnati; Cognati; and see Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 144.
Family right; the right or status of being the head of a family, or of exercising the patria potestas over others. This could belong only to a Roman citizen who was a "man in his own right," (horno sui juris.) Mackeld.Rom.Law, §§ 133, 144.
Spanish Law. A family, which might consist of domestics or servants. It seems that a single per-son owning negroes was the "head of a family," within the meaning of the colonization laws of Coahuila and Texas. State v. Sullivan, 9 Tex. 156.
FAMILLE EMPTOR. In Roman law. An inter-mediate person who purchased the aggregate in-heritance when sold per ces et libram, in the pro-cess of making a will under the Twelve Tables. This purchaser was merely a man of straw, trans-mitting the inheritance to the hceres proper. Brown.
FAMILLE ERCISCUNDIE. In Roman law. An action for the partition of the aggregate succes-sion of a familia, where that devolved upon ce-hceredes. rt was also applicable to enf orce a con-tribution towards the necessary expenses incurred on the familia. See Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 499; Stair, Inst. I. 1, tit. 7, § 15.
FAMILIAR. The word is equivalent to the word "know." Smiley v. Lenane, 363 III. 66, 1 N.E.2d 213, 216.
FAMILIARES REGIS. Persons of the king’s household. The ancient title of the "six clerks" of chancery in England. Crabb, Com. Law, 184; 2 Reeve, Eng. Law, 249, 251.
FAMILIARITY. Acquaintance expresses less than "familiarity"; familiarity less than intimacy. Ac-quaintance springs from occasional intercourse, familiarity from daily intercourse, intimacy from unreserved intercourse; acquaintance, having some knowledge, familiarity, from long habit, in-timacy, by close connection. Atkins Corporation v. Tourny, 6 Ca1.2d 206, 57 P.2d 480, 483.
FAMILY. The word is used to designate many relationships. Collins v. Northwest Casualty Co., 180 Wash. 347, 39 P.2d 986, 989, 97 A.L.R. 1235; State ex rel. Kemp v. Arnold, 234 Mo. 154, 113 S. W.2d 143, 146.
In broad or primary sense "family" means: a collective body of any two persons living to-gether in one house as their common home for the time; In re Barnes’ Estate, 149 Misc. 149, 267 N.Y.S. 634; a collective body of persons, living together in one home, in a permanent and domes-tic character, under one head or management,State ex rel. Kemp v. Arnold, 234 Mo. 154, 113 S. W.2d 143, 146; a collective body of persons who live in one house and under one head or manage-ment, Fratellanza Italiana v. Nugnes, 114 N.J.Eq. 185, 168 A. 589, 590; a group of blood-relatives; all the relations who descend from a common an-cestor, or who spring from a common root, Civil Code La. art. 3556, no. 12; 9 Ves. 323; a group of kindred persons, Hartley v. Bohrer, 52 Idaho 72, 11 P.2d 616, 618; husband and wife and their children. Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Shadid, Tex. Com.App., 68 S.W.2d 1030, 1032.
In most common use, the word implies father, mother and children, immediate blood relatives. Collins v. Northwest Casualty Co., 180 Wash. 347, 39 P.2d 986, 989, 97 A.L.R. 1235.
In narrow or restricted sense "family" means: a father, mother, and children, whether living together or not, Higgins v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 127 Md. 171, 96 A. 322, 323; group of parents and children founded on prin-cipie of monogamy, In re Schmidt’s Estate, 159 Misc. 373, 289 N.Y.S. 247, 250; husband and wife and their children, State ex rel. Kemp v. Arnold, 234 Mo.App. 154, 113 S.W.2d 143, 146.
In ordinary conversation, the word is descrip-tive of a person’s wife and children. Adams v. Cande F. Wright Hospital, 82 N.H. 260, 132 A. 525, 526.
In restricted sense, the word "family" may be used interchangeably with household. Collins v. Northwest Casualty Co., 180 Wash. 347, 39 P.2d 986, 989, 97 A.L.R. 1235.
In secondary meaning, "family" means those who are of the same lineage, or descend from one common progenitor. Fratellanza Italiana v. Nug-nes, 114 N.J.Eq. 185, 168 A. 589, 590.
The word conveys the notion of some relationship, blood or otherwise. Collins v. Northwest Casualty Co., 180 Wash. 347, 39 P.2d 986, 989, 97 A.L.R. 1235.
The word may mean: a body of persons who live in one house and under one head or manager, Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Pulsifer, D.C.Me., 41 F.Supp. 249, 252; Collins v. Northwest Casualty Co. 180 Wash. 347, 39 P.2d 986, 989, 97 A.L.R. 1235. A collection of persons living under a common roof, or constituting a domestic circle, In re Keegan’s Estate, Sur., 37 N.Y.S.2d 368, 370, 371. A col-lective body of any two persons living together in one house as their common home for the time, In re Barnes’ Estate, 267 N.Y.S. 634, 149 Misc. 149; a collective body of persons, consisting of parents or children, or other rela-tives, domestics, or servants, residing together in one house or on the same premises, Sullivan v. Walburn, 9 N.J.Misc. 280, 154 A. 617, 619. A collective body of persons living together in one house or within the curtiiage. Sullivan v. Walburn, 9 N.J.Misc. 280, 154 A. 617, 619. A collective body of persons who form one household under one head and one domestic government. Sullivan v. Walburn, 9 N.J.Misc. 280, 154 A. 617, 619. A collective body of persons who form one household under one head and one domestic govern-ment and who have reciprocal natural and moral duties to support and care for one another, Krug v. Milis, 159 Md. 670, 152 A. 493, 495; Hartley v. Bohrer, 52 Idaho 72, 11 P.2d 616, 618. A collective body of persons who live in one home under one head or management. Dalton v. Poinsett, Mo.App., 164 S.W.2d 124, 128; Vaughn v. American Aliiance
Co. of New York, 138 Kan. 731, 27 P.2d 212; a collec-tive body of persons who live in one house or within the same curtilage and under one head or management (thereby including domestic servants, lodgers, boarders, guests, etc.). Jarboe v. Jarboe, 106 Mo.App. 459, 79 S.W. 1162; Wllson v. Else, 204 Iowa 857, 216 N.W. 33, 37; Cityof Mextco v. Gray, 203 Mo.App. 547, 219 S.W. 707, 709; Wil-son v. Cochran, 31 Tex. 680, 98 Am.Dec. 553; a group, com-prising immediate kindred, consisting of the parents and their children, whether actually living together or not, Uden v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 58 Ohio App. 151, 16 N.E.2d 277, 279; a group of blood relatives; a group of kindred persons, Hartley v. Bohrer, 52 Idaho 72, 11 P.2d 616, 618; a household. Sullivan v. Walburn, 9 N.J.Misc. 280, 154 A. 617, 619; a household composed of parents or children, or other relatives or domestics and servants, Sullivan v. Wal-burn, 9 N.J.Misc. 280, 154 A. 617, 619; a small select corps attached to an army chief, Boston-Edison Protective Ass’n v. Paulist Fathers, 306 Mich. 253, 10 N.W.2d 847, 849, 148 A.L.R. 364; a whole sect, such as Shakers, Boston-Edison Protective Ass’n v. Paulist Fathers, 306 Mich. 253, 10 N.W.2d 847, 849, 148 A.L.R. 364; all members of the house-hold living under the authority of the head thereof, Sulli-van v. Walburn, 9 N.J.Misc. 280, 154 A. 617, 619; all per-sons of the biood of a common ancestor, Collins v. North-west Casualty Co., 180 Wash. 347, 39 P.2d 986, 989, 97 A.L.R. 1235; all the relations who descend from a common ancestor or who spring from a common root; all who are descended from a not too distant common progenitor, In re Lund’s Estate, 26 Ca1.2d 472, 159 P.2d 643, 655; an entire household. Sullivan v. Walburn, 9 N.J.Misc. 280, 154 A. 617, 619; any group of persons ciosely related by biood, In re Schmidt’s Estate, 289 N.Y.S. 247, 250, 159 Misc. 373; any group of persons constituting a distinct domestic body, Sullivan v. Walburn, 9 N.J.Misc. 280, 154 A. 617, 619; or
body, Boston-Edison Protective Ass’n v. Paulist Fathers, 306 Mich. 253, 10 N.W.2d 847, 849, 148 A.L.R. 364; group of parents and children founded on principies of mo-nogamy, In re Schmidt’s Estate, 289 N.Y.S. 247, 250, 159 Misc. 373; immediate domestic circle of a particular per-son, Collins v. Northwest Casualty Co., 180 Wash. 347, 39 P. 2d 986, 989, 97 A.L.R. 1235; immediate members of one’s household, Niemes v. Niemes, 97 Ohio St. 145, 119 N.E. 503, 506; members of the domestic circle, Sullivan v. Walburn, 9 N.J.Misc. 280, 154 A. 617, 619; one or more persons living together in same house who are supported by one in whole or in part and are dependent on him therefore, where he is under natural or moral obligation to render such support, Umbarger v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 218 Iowa 203, 254 N.W. 87; the genealogical stock from which a man and those related to him by biood have sprung, Albright v. Albright, 116 Ohio St. 668, 157 N.E. 760, 764; the personnel of the home. Sullivan v. Walburn, 9 N.J.Misc. 280, 154 A. 617, 619; those members of the house-hold who are dependent on the householder to whom he owes some duty, Cheshire v. Burlington, 31 Conn. 326; those who are of the same lineage, or descend from one common progenitor, Fratellanza Italiana v. Nugnes, 114 N.J.Eq. 185, 168 A. 589, 590; those who live in one house, In re Lund’s Estate, 26 Ca1.2d 472, 159 P.2d 643, 655; those who live in same household subject to general management and control of the head thereof, McGee v. Crawford, 205 N.C. 318, 171 S.E. 326, 327; those who live with the pater familias, Vaughn v. American Alliance Ins. Co. of New York, 138 Kan. 731, 27 P.2d 212; Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America v. Sanders, 169 Okl. 378, 36 P.2d 271, 273; those whom it ls the natural or moral duty of one to sup-port, or who are dependent on him for support, Finn v. Eminent Household of Columbia Woodmen, 163 Ky. 187, 173 S.W. 349, 350.
The word may mean, include or embrace an adult child, Watson v. Burley, 105 W.Va. 416, 143 S.E. 95, 96, 64 A.L.R. 839; Yadon v. Yadon, 202 Ark. 634, 151 S.W.2d 969, 970; aunts, In re Schmidt’s Estate, 289 N.Y.S. 247, 250, 159 Misc. 373; blood relatives, Boston-Edison Protective Ass’n v. Paulist Fathers, 306 Mich. 253, 10 N.W.2d 847, 849; In re Keegan’s Estate, Sur., 37 N.Y.S.2d 368, 370, 371; children, In re Dooling’s Will, 285 N.Y.S. 603, 609, 158 Misc. 333; In re Schmidt’s Estate, 289 N.Y.S. 247, 250, 159 Misc. 373; cousins, In re Schmidt’s Estate, 289 N.Y.S. 247, 250, 159 Misc. 373; father and chlld, Hinds v. Buck, 177 Tenn. 444, 150 S.W.2d 1071, 1072; father, mother, and all children, wherever they may reside, Barrett v. Commerctal Standard Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 145 S.W.2d 315, 318; group of par-ents and children founded on principie of monogamy, In re Schmidt’s Estate, 289 N.Y.S. 247, 250, 159 Misc. 373;. hus-band and wife, In re De Nisson’s Guardianship, 197 Wash. 265, 84 P.2d 1024, 1027, 1028; Boston-Edison Protective Ass’n v. Paulist Fathers, 306 Mich. 253, 10 N.W.2d 847, 849; Hinds v. Buck, 177 Tenn. 444, 150 S.W.2d 1071, 1072; hus-band and wife and their children, Franklin Fire los. Co.v. Shadid, Tex.Com.App., 68 S.W.2d 1030, 1032; State ex rel. Kemp v. Arnold, 234 Mo.App. 154, 113 S.W.2d 143, 146; husband or wife and children. In re Keegan’s Estate, Sur., 37 N.Y.S.2d 368, 370, 371; parents, In re Schmidt’s Estate, 289 N.Y.S. 247, 250, 159 Misc. 373; parents and children, In re Schmidt’s Estate, 289 N.Y.S. 247, 250, 159 Misc. 373; Uden v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 58 Ohio App. 151, 16 N.E.2d 277, 279; parents, children, and servants, and, as the case may be, lodgers or boarders, Cleaves v. Funk, D.C.Okl., 3 F.Supp. 804, 805; In re Schmidt’s Estate, 289 N.Y.S. 247, 250, 159 Misc. 373; parents or children, or other relatives, or domestics and servants, Sullivan v. Walburn, 9 N.J.Misc 280, 154 A. 617, 619; parents with their children whether they dwell together or not, In re Schmidt’s Estate, 289 N.Y.S. 247, 250, 159 Misc. 373; Higglns v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 127 Md. 171, 96 A. 322, 323; spouse and the issue of designated person, and no other persons, Restatement, Property, § 293; uncles, In re Schmidt’s Estate, 289 N.Y.S. 247, 250, 159 Misc. 373.
Sisters of a religious order who were employed in hos-pital and lived together in a community as members of a "family". Goss v. Klipfel, 112 Colo. 87, 146 P.2d 217, 218.
Son-in-law is not a member of father-in-law’s family, nor is his daughter, after she becomes son-in-law’s wife. Bry-ant v. Keen, 43 Ga.App. 251, 158 S.E. 445, 446.
Widow who lived with her children in her father-In-law’s house and recelved board for herself and children for keep-ing house was member of father-ln-law’s "family". Holli-baugh v. School Dist. No. 89, 131 Neb. 727, 269 N.W. 819, 820.

Allowances

Where marriage between decedent and his widow occurred years before decedent’s death, partles lived together for about three weeks and never resumed their relationship as husband and wife, widow was not entitled to statutory allowance for the beneflt of decedent’s family. In re Feciuch’s Estate, Sur., 26 N.Y.S.2d 390, 391.
Widow constitutes within statute providing for
allowance for maintenance from husband’s estate. In re Hilleware’s Estate, 159 Wash. 580, 294 P. 230, 231.
Word "family" in code provislon authorizing family allowance where property set apart is insufficient for sup-port of widow and children, does not include husband, Hills v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County, 207 Cal. 666, 279 P. 805, 806, 65 A.L.R. 266.

Beneficial and fraternal associations

As used in beneficial association’s by-law proviffing that death benefit should be payable to member’s family, the word means next of kin, including widow. Fratellanza Italiana v. Nugnes, 114 N.J.Eq. 185, 168 A. 589, 590.
As used in statutes or charters relating to who may become beneficiaries in fraternal associations, the word is not to receive a restrictive construction, and it may include stepchildren. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. Bogan, D.C.Minn., 5 F.Supp. 598, 603.
When used in constitution of beneflt society, declaring its purpose among others as that ot aiding the families of members, the word means such persons as habitually reside under one roof and form one domestle circle, or such per-sons as are dependent on each other for support or among whom there is legal or equitable obligation to furnish sup-port and in its widest scope it would include all descendants of a common progenitor, Logan v. St. Louis Police Relief Ass’n, Mo.App., 133 S.W.2d 1048, 1049, 1050.’

Compwation Law

A collective body of persons who live In one house and under one head or management is the significance ordi-narily attributed to the word "family". Roney’s Case, 316 Mass. 732, 56 N.E.2d 859, 864, 866.
Deceased adult son was a member of his parents’ "fam-ily" though at time of his death he lived apart from his parents but contributed to support of parents. Baker v. Western Power & Light Co., 147 Kan. 571, 78 P.2d 36, 40.
Persons related by kinshlp or marriage, though not living In same household, may be members of "family". Moore’s Case, 294 Mass. 557, 3 N.E.2d 5.

As used In act changing descent as between relativas of hall blood, "family" comprehends only the descendants of ancestor, those who have his blood running in their veins; in that sense Is nearly if not quite of same import as the word "issue." Ryder v. Myers, 113 N.J.Eq. 360, 167 A. 22, 24.
The word "family" may mean: all descendants of a common progenitor, Logan v. St. Louis Police Relief Ass’n, Mo.App., 133 S.W.2d 1048, 1049, 1050; In re Lundis Estate, 26 Ca1.2d 472, 159 P.2d 643, 645; those who are of the same lineage, or descend from one common progenitor. Fratel-lanza Italiana v. Nugnes, 114 N.J.Eq. 185, 168 A. 589, 590

Homestead and exemption laws

A "family" 1s a collection of persons living together under one head, Holsomback v. Slaughter, 177 Miss. 553, 171 So. 542. 543; a collection of persons living together, where there is an obligation, legal or moral, on head of the house to support the others or some of them, Logue v. Von Almen, 379 III. 208, 40 N.E.2d 73, 80, 140 A.L.R. 251; a col-lective body of persons, consisting of parents or children, or other relatives, domestics, or servants, residing together In one house or upon the same prernises, and person to be member of family must be member In good faith, Lobban v. Vander Vries Realty & Mortgage Co., 48 Ariz. 180, 60 P.2d 933, 935; a collective body of persons who live in one house and under one head or manager, Hurt v. Perryman, 173 Tenn. 646, 122 S.W.2d 426, 427; a group of two or more persons dwelling together under one ‘leed, and which can-not consist of but one person, Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah, 198, 48 P.2d 513, 524, 101 A.L.R. 532.
A husband dying leaving a wife from whom he was not judicially separated left a "family". In re Zalewski’s Estate, 30 N.Y.S.2d 658, 664, 177 Misc. 384.
An unmarried adult daughter who remains contlnuously with the "family" is member. Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. Burgess, Tex.Civ.App., 155 S.W.2d 977, 980.
Constitution and statute exempting homestead in each "head of a family" include not only a father, or husband, in his lifetime, but a widow, and after death of both, any minor children. Whitfield v. People’s Union Bank & Trust Co., 168 Tenn. 24, 73 S.W.2d 690, 691.
"Family", continues to exist so long as widow lives and remains widow. Miers v. Mien, 160 Miss. 746, 133 So. 133, 134.
Husband who, after wife had abandoned him and remar-ried without obtaining divorce, purchased release of wife’s right in his estate and abandoned her held not entitled to exemptlon provided on death of person leaving family. In re Schmidt’s Estate, 287 N.Y.S. 44, 47, 247 App.D1v. 505.
Husband, who had lived apart from wife prior to her death and had not contributed to her support held entitled to exemptlon provided on death of person having family. In re Gluer’s Will, 278 N.Y.S. 994, 155 Misc. 41.
Persons who may constitute a family include: husband and wife. Bigelow v. Dunphe, 144 Fla. 330, 198 So. 13; husband and wife living together, Miller v. Finegan, 26 Fla. 29, 7 So. 140, 6 L.R.A. 813; Oppenheim v. Myers, 99 Va. 582, 39 S.E. 218; Dye v. Cooke, 88 Tenn. 275, 12 S.W. 631, 17 Am.St.Rep. 882; husband and wife so long as marriage continues in existence, In re Brown’s Will, 274 N.Y.S. 924, 153 Misc. 282; mother and children living under father’s authority, Washington Bank & Trust Co. v. Carrier, 178 La. 902, 152 So. 560, 561; school teacher on whom moral obliga-tion rested to support and care for her sister, Standard Paving Co. v. Tolson, Tex.Civ.App., 86 S.W.2d 789, 791. Sister, owning property, and semi-invalid brother, who was cared for and supported by sister, and younger sister, who contributed to household expenses. Real Estate Land Title & Trust Co. v. Street, Tex.Civ.App., 85 S.W.2d 341, 342; stepchildren and stepfather living together after step-father’s divorce from children’s mother, Smith Bros. v. Lucas, Tex.Com.App., 26 S.W.2d 1055, 1056. With particu-lar reference to homestead laws, one parent and his or her children; Carie v. Bamberger, 53 Okl. 777, 158 P. 599, 600; Solnar v. Solnar, 205 Iowa, 701, 216 N.W. 288, 290; and even a widow or widower, though without children; Cole-man v. Bosworth, 180 Iow15., 975, 164 N.W. 238, 240; may constitute a "family." See, also, In re Hooper’s Estate, 117 Wash. 463, 201 P. 740, 742.

Test of whether husband has a ‘"famtly" within statute providing for exemptions to widow If husband dies having a family cannot be measured by number of years husband and wife lived apart nor by distante of miles separating them. In re Brown’s Will, 274 N.Y.S. 924, 153 Misc. 282.
To constitute family, status must be social and head of family must be legally or moraily obligated to support other members, who must be dependent on such support. United Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. Plainview Building & Loan Ass’n, Tex.Civ.App., 81 S.W.2d 1092, 1093; Lobban v. Van-der Vries Realty & Mortgage Co., 48 Ariz. 180, 60 P.2d 933, 935.
To constitute family there must be one whom law deslg-nates or reeognizes as head of family who by natural ties or by legal or moral obligation is under duty to support others of the household. Owens v. Altsheller & Co., 263 Ky. 727, 93 S.W.2d 844, 846.
To constitute persons living with another in same house a "family", it must appear that they are being supported by that other in whole or in part, and are dependent on him therefor, and that he is under a natural or moral obligation to render such support. Poffinbarger v. Adminis-trator of Poffinbarger’s Estate, 206 Iowa 961, 221 N.W. 550.
Where relatives live together because such arrangement is more convenient or economical, or for reasons of friend-ship or affection, such relation does not constitute them "family". Rock Island Bank & Trust Co. v. Lamont, 361 III. 432, 198 N. E. 430.

Household

A "family" is a collective body of persons who form one household under one head and one domestic govern-ment, Sullivan v. Walburn, 9 N.J.Misc. 280, 154 A. 617, 619; a collective body of persons forming one household under one head and domestic government, having reciprocal, natural and moral duties to tare for one another. Hartley v. Bohrer, 52 Idaho 72, 11 P.2d 616, 618; Krug v. Milis, 159 Md. 670, 152 A. 493, 495; a household, Sullivan v. Wal-burn, 9 N.J.Misc. 280, 154 A. 617, 619; a household corn-posed of parents or children or other relatives, or domestics ama servants, Sullivan v. Walburn, 9 N.J.Misc. 280, 154 A. 617, 619; all members of the household living together under the authority of the head thereof, Sullivan v. Wal-burn, 9 N.J.Misc. 280, 154 A. 617, 619; all persons who dwell together under a common head as a household, Hoff v. Hoff, 132 Pa.Super. 431, 1 A.2d 506, 508; an entire house-hold, Sullivan v. Walburn, 9 N.J.Misc. 280, 154 A. 617, 619; the lmmediate members of one’s household, as wife, chil-dren, brothers, and sisters or father and mother. Niemes V. Niemes, 97 Ohio St. 145, 119 N.E. 503, 506; those who live in same household subject to general management and control of the head thereof, McGee v. Crawford, 205 N.C. 318, 171 S.E. 326, 327.
Family and household are substantially synonymous, Umbarger v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 218 Iowa 203, 254 N.W. 87; the words are often used inter-changeably, Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America v. Sanders, 169 Okl. 378, 36 P.2d 271, 273; Brovdy v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 145 Pa.Super. 602, 21 A.2d 437, 438; while in a restricted sense the word ”family" may be used ínterchangeably with "household," there is a difference in the ideas suggested by the two words, Collins v. Northwest Casualty Co., 180 Wash. 347, 39 P.2d 986, 989, 97 A.L.R. 1235.

insane Persona

Under statute providing for support of family of insane person out of his estate, "family" includes those whom in-sane person under normal circumstances would be under legal duty to support, such as wife and children, and under some circumstances may include others. Woman who had become insane person’s stepmother when he was infant and had cared for him during his infancy and to whose support he had contributed during his minority and until he joined Army held member of his "family" so as to be entitled to support. In re Freeman’s Estate, 171 Miss. 147, 157 So. 253.

Insurance

Accident policy condition that insurer should have op-portunity to be present at autopsy performed with con-sent of insured’s "family" held to apply to person who, as surviving wife or husband, or next of kin, had right of possession of body. If insured left no wife, and sister.was nearest kin, sister held "family" within such condi-tion. Sheehan v. Commercial Travelers’ Mut. Acc. Ass’n, 283 Mass. 543, 186 N.E. 627, 631, 88 A.L.R. 975.

Pauper

Duty of town to support "family" oí pauper includes only those persons whom head of family is bound by law to support. Town of St. Johnsbury v. Town of Sutton, 102 Vt. 451, 150 A. 133, 135.
Reservation lands
Words "family" and "heirs," within statute providing for holding of reservation lands by Seneca Indians, mean family and heirs which Indians themselves recognize. Woodin v. Seeley, 141 Misc. 207, 252 N.Y.S. 818, 826.

Servants

A family is a body of persons who live in one household under one head or management; a hdusehold including parents, children and servants, and, as the case may be, lodgers or boarders. Cleaves v. Funk, D.C.Okl., 3 F.Supp. 804, 805.
Domestic servants, when living in establishment, are in-elude(‘ in term ”family" for purposes of serving summons. Sullivan v. Walburn, 9 N.J.Misc. 280, 154 A. 617, 619.

Service of Procesa

A domestic servant may be Included in term "family." Sullivan v. Walburn, 9 N.J.Misc. 280, 154 A. 617, 619.
Defendant’s mother, who maintained permanent home, but who usually visited in defendant’s home during winter months, held not a member of defendant’s "family." Cleaves v. Funk, C.C.A.Okl., 76 F.2d 828, 829.
The word "family", as used in acts regulating service of process, is ghen its restricted meaning and held to include only a father, a mother, and their children, but the rela-tionship between the person receiving a copy of the sum-mons and the person on whom service is attempted must be more confldential and intimate than in most employer and employee or master and servant relationships in order that the receipt by the former may be deemed valid serv-ice on the latter. Moore v. Kasishke, 189 Okl. 336, 117 P.2d 113, 115, 136 A.L.R. 1502

Support of persona

A "family" is a collection of persons living together un-der one head, under such circumstances or conditions that the head is under a legal or moral obligation to support the other members, and the other members are dependent upon him for support, Hurt v. Perryman, 173 Tenn. 646, 122 S.W.2d 426, 427; those entitled by law to look to person for support and protection, In re Fulton’s Estate, 15 Cal. App.2d 202, 59 P.2d 508, 510; those members of the house-hold who are dependent on the householder to whom he owes some duty, Brokaw v. Ogle, 170 Ill. 115, 48 N.E. 394; those whom It is the natural or moral duty of one to sup-port, or who are dependent on him for support, Finn v. Eminent Household of Columbia Woodmen, 163 Ky. 187, 173 S.W. 349, 350.
Bankrupt whose minor children were living separately from him in custody of his divorced wife held person hav-ing "family dependent on him for support". In re Mc-Farland, D.C.Wash., 49 F.2d 342, 343.
"Family," within statute imposing liability for articles going to support of "family," held to include wife as well as children. Baledes v. Greenbaum, 112 Conn. 64, 151 A. 333, 334.
He upon whom law imposes duty to support growing out of status and not out of contract, and persons to whom he owes this duty If. dwelling together in a domestic establish-ment constitute a "family" of which he is the head. Owens v. Altsheller & Co., 263 Ky. 727, 93 S.W.2d 844, 846.
Householder’s sister and her husband living with house-holder and dependent upon him may constitute "family". Rock Island Bank & Trust Co. v. Lamont, 361 III. 432, 198 N.E. 430.
Moral duty to support arising from ties of blood or pos-sibly other similar relations will be sufficient to support claim that one ís head of a family. Owens v. Altsheller & Co., 263 Ky. 727, 93 S.W.2d 844, 846.

Síster on whom moral obligation rested to support her sister and such sister constituted "family." Standard Pav-ing Co. v. Tolson, Tex.Civ.App., 86 S.W.2d 789, 791.
To constitute "family" within homestead or exemption provision there must be legal or moral or natural obliga-tion of one to support other members and corresponding de-pendence of others. L. E. Whitham & Co. v. Briggs’ Es-tate, Tex.Com.App., 58 S.W.2d 49; Lobban v. Vander Vries Realty & Mortgage Co., 48 Ariz. 180, 60 P.2d 933, 935; Wineblood v. Payne, 129 Okl. 103, 263 P. 669, 671.
Town of residente of head of "family" held not Hable to reimburse another town for support furnished step-children. Town of St. Johnsbury v. Town of Sutton, 102 Vt. 451, 150 A. 133, 135.

WiIZs

As respects construction of will, the word "family" de-notes a group of persons related to each other by marriage or blood living together under a single roof and compris-ing a household whose head is usually the father or hus-band, but the word ís not one of inflexible meaning and its significante to a large extent depends upon the context and the purpose for which it is employed. The word "fam-ily" includes those who have left father’s home and have married and established their own homes when context and purpose indícate such significante should be attributed to the word. Magill v. Magill, 317 Mass. 89, 56 N.E.2d 892, 894, 896, 154 Á.L.R. 1406.
Testamentary precatory trust created in favor of any of testatrix’ "family" held to comprehend those who would take under statute of distribution. nyder v. Myers, 113 N. J.Eq. 360, 167 A. 22, 24.
Testatrix in creating trust for beneflt of granddaughter during her life and providing that upon granddaughter’s death without issue principal should go to then living members of granddaughter’s father’s "family" did not use word family to designate those who comprised her son’s household, where testatrix knew when she executed will that son was dead and that his widow and daughter made their homes with testatrix and his other children lived separate from each other. Magill v. Magill, 317 Mass. 89, 56 N.E.2d 892, 894, 896, 154 A.L.R. 1406.
The use of the word "family" disclosed a testamentary intent to make a gift to a class including those who would have been distributees of the deceased brothers of testatrix had such brothers died as of the date of death of testatrix and Included therein the widows of such brothers. In re Keegan’s Estate, Sur., 37 N.Y.S.2d 368, 370, 371.
Under will of widow, providing that "I wish my hus-band’s family to share and share alike the remainder of my property," the word "family" ís equivalent to "heirs," In re McCrum’s Estate, 97 Cal.App. 576, 275 P. 971, 972.
When the word "family" is used to designate those en-titled to receive a legacy, the intended meaning of the word depends upon the context of the will and upon a showing as to whom were the objects of the testator’s bounty by reason of kinship or friendship. Where a legacy was to a class, consisting of family of testatrix’ deceased brother who was survived by widow and three children, each of which children maintained separate households, "family" included widow and three children. In re Kee-gan’s Estate, Sur., 37 N.Y.S.2d 368, 370, 371.
Where testatrix created trust for beneflt of granddaugh-ter during her life and, knowing that one of granddaugh-ter’s brothers was already dead, provided that any issue granddaughter might leave should share equally with then living members of granddaughter’s father’s "family" in division of principal of trust and thereafter upon death of another grandson leaving a widow and two infant children executed a codicil giving grandson’s legacy under another provision of will to his widow, word "family" was used to designate lineal descendants of granddaughter’s father where such construction was consistent with provisions of the will and carried out intention of testatrix. Magill v. Magill, 317 Mass. 89, 56 N.E.2d 892, 894, 896, 154 A.L.R. 1406.
FAMILY ARRANGEMENT. A term denoting an• agreement between a father and his children, or between the heirs of a deceased father, to dispose of property, or to partition it in a different man-ner than that which would result if the law alone

directed it, or to divide up property without ad-ministration. In these cases, frequently, the mere relation of the parties will give effect to bargains otherwise without adequate consideration. 1 Chit. Pr. 67; 1 Turn. & R. 13; Boyd v. Robinson, 93 Tenn. 1, 23 S.W. 72; De Hatre v. De Hatre, 50 Mo. App. 1.
FAMILY AUTOMOBILE DOCTRINE. The doc-trine is that one who owns and maintains an au-tomobile for the general use of his household makes use of automobile for such purposes a part of his business so that any member using automo-bile for those purposes under general authority to do so becomes his representative, for whose negli-gence he is responsible. Durso v. A. D. Cozzolino, Inc., 128 Conn. 24, 20 A.2d 392, 394.
It is an extension of the principie of respon-deat superior to the relation created by operation of family use automobile. Buss v. Wachsmith, 190 Wash. 673, 70 P.2d 417, 421. See, also, Family Car Doctrine and Family Purpose Doctrine.
It le based on theory that members of family were en-gaged in a joint enterprlse or that child was agent of par-ents. Paulson v. McMillan, 8 Wash.2d 295, 111 P.2d 983, 989.
II an automobile le owned and maintained by a family corporation for general use of a family, such as that of corporation’s manager and one of its principal stockholders, corporation may be held Hable under the "family automo-hile doctrine" to third parties. Durso v. A. D. Cozzolino, Inc., 128 Conn. 24, 20 A.2d 392, 394.
FAMILY BIBLE. A Bible containing a record of the births, marriages, and deaths of the members of a family. As to its admissibility in evidente, see Whart. Ev. § 219; Tayl. Ev. 572; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 104; L. R. 1 Ex. 255; Greenleaf v. R. Co., 30 Iowa, 301; Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 53 Ga. 535; Weaver v. Leiman, 52 Md. 709.
FAMILY CAR. Automobile used to send owner’s children to school was "family car." Coleman y. Rollo, Tex.Civ.App., 50 S.W.2d 391, 392.
FAMILY CAR DOCTRINE. The doctrine rests upon the basis that the automobile is furnished by the husband in his individual capacity and as common-law head of the family for the use of the family, and not as the agent of the community. Donn v. Kunz, 52 Ariz. 219, 79 P.2d 965. It rests on theory that operator is husband’s agent and runs automobile in husband’s "business," Hart v. Hogan, 173 Wash. 598, 24 P.2d 99; that wife is husband’s agent in carrying out one of the pur-poses for which the automobile is purchased and owned, Moffitt v. Krueger, 11 Wash.2d 658, 120 P. 2d 512, 513.
Under the doctrine, a father furnishing automo-bile for pleasure and convenience of family makes the use of automobile by family his business and any member of family driving automobile with father’s express or implied consent is the father’s agent and the father is hable for the member’s negligence. Donn v. Kunz, 52 Ariz. 219, 79 P.2d 965, 966, 967.
See, also, Family Automobile Doctrine and Fam-ily PurpoSe Doctrine.The person upon whom It Is sought to fasten liability under the doctrine must own, provide, or maintain an au-tomobile for the general use, pleasure, and convenience of the family. Liability under the doctrine is not confined to owner or driver. It depends upon control and use. A widow, wife, or mother may be Hable as well as á husband or father. Hart v. Hogan, 173 Wash. 598, 24 P.2d 99. To bring a case within doctrine, it must be shown that auto-mobile was in fact a family pleasure automobile, but auto-mobile purchased and used for business purposes may come within the doctrine, where It Is also used for family pleas-ure.: Dillon v. Burnett, 197 Wash. 371, 85 P.2d 656, 658.
FAMILY COUNCIL. See Family Arrangement; Family Meeting; Conseil de Famille.
FAMILY DEPENDENT UPON HIM FOR SUP-PORT. Bankrupt whose minor children were liv-ing separately from him in custody of his divorced wife held to have "family dependent on him for support." In re McFarland, D.C.Wash., 49 F.2d 342, 343.
FAMILY EXPENSES. Obligations incurred for something intended for the use or comfort of the collection spoken of as the family, as distinguished from individual or personal expenses. Vose v. Myott, 141 Iowa, 506, 120 N.W. 58, 21 L.R.A.,N.S., 277.
Purchase price of team of horses used on farm was a "family expense". Wall v. Crawford, 103 Colo. 66, 82 P.2d 749, 750.
Tuttion for education of children of taxpayer held "fami-ly expense". Channing v. U. 5., D.C.Mass., 4 F.Supp. 33, 34.
FAMILY GROUP, within purview of the family car doctrine, is not confined to persons related to the owner, but includes members of the collective body of persons living in his household for whose convenience the car is maintained and who have authority to use it. Smart v. Bissonette, 106 Conn. 447, 138 A. 365, 366; Hart v. Hogan, 173 Wash. 598, 24 P.2d 99. See Family Purpose Doctrine, infra.
The children of trust settior including an adult son are members of the settlor’s "family group" for Income tax purposes. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Wilson, C. C.A.?, 125 F.2d 307, 310.
FAMILY HOTEL. A "family hotel", as distin-guished from an ordinary "public hotel", in con-struction of covenant, is designed primarily for the accommodation of permanent guests. Kew Gardens Corporation v. Ciro’s Plaza, 175 Misc. 475, 23 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959.
FAMILY LIBRARY. Which one spouse cannot mortgage without consent of other may be com-posed of such books as family or head of family chooses to select. Lupton v. Merchants’ Nat. Bank of Topeka, 140 Kan. 615, 38 P.2d 125, 127.
FAMILY MEETING. An institution of the laws of Louisiana, being a council of the relatives (or, if there are no relatives, of the friends) of a minor, for the purpose of advísing as to his affairs and the administration of his property.
The family meeting is called by order of a judge, and presided over by a justice or notary, and must consist of at least five persons, who are put under oath. In re Bot-hlck, 44 La.Ann. 1037, 11 So. 712; Civ. Code La. art. 305. It corresponds to the "conseil de famille" of French law, q. v. See Lemoine v. Ducote, 45 La.Ann. 857, 12 So. 939; Commaux v. Barbin, 6 Mart.La. N.S. 455.
FAMILY PHYSICIAN. A physician who regular-ly attends and is consulted by the members of the family as their medical adviser; but he need not attend in all cases or be consulted by all the members of the family. Price v. Ins. Co., 17 Minn. 519, Gil. 473, 10 Am.Rep. 166; Reid v. Ins. Co., 58 Mo. 424; Cromeens v. Sovereign Camp, W. O. W., Mo.App., 247 S.W. 1033, 1034.
FAMILY POOL. A species of contract that must llave something to stand on besides wishful think-ing, and the parties to it must be conscious that they are in it and contributing to it to be bound by it. Sherman v. Florida Tar & Creosote Corp., 160 Fla. 696, 36 So.2d 267, 269.
FAMILY PURPOSE DOCTRINE. A doctrine that the owner of a car, who gives it over to the use of his family and permits it to be operated by the members thereof, is hable for the injuries inflicted while being operated by a member of the family. Turoff v. Burch, 60 App.D.C. 221, 50 F.2d 986, 987; McNamara v. Prother, 277 Ky. 754, 127 S.W.2d
160, 161; Schwartz v. Johnson, 152 Tenn. 586, 280′ S.W. 32, 33, 47 A.L.R. 323. The doctrine, that the owner of an automobile purchased or maintained for the pleasure of his family is Hable for in-juries inflicted by the machine while being used by the members of the family for their own pleas-ure. Doss v. Monticello Electric Light & Power Co., 193 Ky. 499, 236 S.W. 1046, 1047; Thompson v. Kansas City Rys. Co., 113 Kan. 74, 213 P. 633.
See, also, Family Automobile Doctrine; Family Car Doctrine; Family Group.
The doctrine imputes relationshlp of principal and agent where one maintains an automobile for pleasure or other use of member of his family. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Brann, 297 Ky. 381, 180 S.W.2d 102, 104; it is based on theory that each family member in using such car for own pleasure is carrying out the purpose for which it is furnished, and is the owner’s agent or servant, Behse-leck v. Andrus, 60 S.D. 204, 244 N.W. 268, 269, 88 A.L.R. 596; Hackley v. Robey, 170 Va. 55, 195 S.E. 689, 692; Ener v. Gandy, Tex.Civ,App,, 141 S.W.2d 772, 775. It Is founded upon principies of agency or of master and servant. Kali’ v. Spivey, 70 Ga.App. 84, 27 S.E.2d 475, 479; Baptist v. Slate, 162 Va. 1, 173 S.E. 512, 515; It is restricted to au-tomoblles maintained by owner for comfort, pleasure, and convenience of members of his family. Mitchell v. Mullen, 45 Ga.App. 285, 164 S.E. 278, 280; Commonwealth of Ken-tucky, for Use and Benefit of Kern, v. Maryland Casualty Co. of Baltimore, Md., C.C.A.Ky., 112 F.2d 352, 356.
A father Is not Hable merely because he Is head of fam-ily, but the one who owns or provides the automobile is ]fiable. McNamara v. Prather, 277 Ky. 754, 127 S.W.2d 160,
161, 162. A wife may be held Hable for the torts of her husband under the doctrine. Goldstein v. Johnson, 64 Ga. App. 31, 12 S.E.2d 92, 94. Agency is the very genesis of the doctrine, Vaughn v. Booker, 217 N.C. 479, 8 S.E.2d 603, 604, 605; Grandmother standing in loco parentis to grandson was Hable under the doctrine for grandson’s negligent op-eration of her automobile. Rutherford v. Smith, 284 Ky. 592, 145 S.W.2d 533, 536; Where wife owned automobile, husband was not Hable under "family purpose doctrine," for minor son’s negligent operation of the automobile, not-withstanding husband paid part of gasoline and garage bilis. McNamara v. Prather, 277 Ky. 754, 127 S.W.2d 160, 161, 162.
It has been said that the family purpose doctrine has been accepted by the courts of about half of the states. Jacobsen v. Dalley, 36 N.W.2d 711, 228 Minn. 201. Among those states are Georgia, Nebraska, North Caro-lina, and Oregon.
On the other hand, the doctrine has been speciflcal-ly rejected, or not adopted, by fully one-haif of the states, including California, Illinois, Mississippi, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin. In Min-nesota it has been held that the doctrine has been su-
perseded by a financial responsibility statute § 170.54). Ellingboe v. Guerin, 36 N.W.2d 598, 228 Minn. 211. For a full discussion of the subject, see Blashtleld, Cyc. of Automobile Law and Prac., Perm.Ed., § 3111 et seq.
FAMILY RELATION. A relationship which may exist between one taken into the family by the head of the family, notwithstanding the absence of blood relationship or of legal adoption. Nelson v. Poorman’s Estate, Mo.App., 215 S.W. 753, 754.
Such relation exlsts: between two sisters when there is moral obligation on part of one to support and care for the other and when necessity for such care and support exlsts, Standard Paving Co. v. Tolson, Tex.Civ.App., 86 S. W.2d 789, 791; when child receives from parent services, maintenance, or gifts reasonably frequent to lead to ex-pectation of future enjoyment thereof. Gaydos v. Dom-abyl, 301 Pa. 523, 152 A. 549, 551; Where brother owes moral obligation to support sister and necessity for such support exists, Central Life Assur. Soc. (Mutual) v. Gray, Tex.Civ.App., 32 S.W.2d 259, 260. Where father. lives on homestead after mother’s death with two adult sons, his only heírs, one of whom marries and remains on with fath-er until father’s death, Cumberland & Liberty Milis v. Keggin, 139 Fla. 133, 190 So. 492, 493. Where there ís legal or moral obligation on head of family to support the other members, and there is dependence upon such members for support, Standard Paving Co. v. Tolson, Tex.Civ.App., 86 S.W.2d 789, 791.
FAMILY SERVICE RULE. Under "family-pur-pose doctrine" or "family-service rule" or "family-automobile doctrine" or "family-car rule", family head maintaining automobile for use of family is liable for injury resulting from negligence of minor son who is member of family while operat-ing automobile with knowledge and consent of family head for comfort or pleasure of family. Cohen v. Whiteman, 75 Ga.App. 286, 43 S.E.2d 184, 186.
FAMILY SETTLEMENT. An agreement between members of a family settling the distribution of family property among them. Fitagerald v. Nel-son, 159 Or. 264, 79 P.2d 254, 255.
An arrangement or an agreement, between heírs of a deceased person, by which they agree on distribution or management of estate without administration by court havíng jurisdiction of such administration proceedings. Wright v. Saltmarsh, 174 Okl. 226, 50 P.2d 694, 703.
An agreement made between a father and bis son or children or between brothers to dispose of property in a different manner from that which would otherwise take place. Peterson v. Hegna, 158 Minn. 289, 197 N.W. 484, 487. A term of practically the same signification as "family ar-rangement," q. v. supra. See Willey v. Hodge, 104 Wis. 81, 80 N.W. 75, 76 Am.St.Rep. 852.
Where decedent’s widow and son were only parties con-cerned in distribution of decedent’s estate, an agreement between the widow and son for division of the estate was a "family settlement". Stark v. Stark, 201 Ark. 133, 143 S.W.2d 875, 878.
FAMILY USE. That use ordinarily made by and suitable for the members of a household whether as individuals or collectively. Spring Valley Wa-ter Works v. San Francisco, 52 Cal. 120. The sup-ply of water in a municipal corporation for family use includes the supply of jails, hospitals, alm-houses, schools, and other municipal institutions; id.FAMOSUS. In the civil and old English law. Re-lating to or affecting injuriously the character or reputation; defamatory; slanderous; scandalous.
FAMOSUS LIBELLUS. A libelous writing. A term of the civil law denoting that species of in-juria which corresponds nearly to libel or slander.
FANAL. Fr. In French marine law. A large lantern, fixed upon the highest part of a vessel’s stern.
FANATIC. A religious enthusiast; a bigot; a person entertaining wild and extravagant notions, or affected by zeal or enthusiasm, especially upon religious subjects.
Also, a person pretending to be lnspired;—formerly ap-plied to Quakers, Anabaptists, and all other sectaries, ami factious dissenters from the Church of England. St. 13 Car. II. c. 6. Jacob.
FANCIFUL TRADE—NAME. Trade-names are "fanciful" when they do not, by their usual and ordinary meaning, denote or describe products to which they are applied, but indicate their purpose by application and association. Skinner Mfg. Co. v. General Foods Sales Co., D.C.Neb., 52 F.Supp. 432, 445.
FANEGA. In Spanish law. A measure of land varying in different provinces, but in the Spanish settlements in America consisting of 6,400 square varas or yards. Diccionario de la Acad.; 2 White Recop. 49; 138.
FAQUEER. See Fakir.
FARANDMAN. In Scotch law. A traveler or merchant stranger. Skene.
FARDEL OF LAND. In old English law. The fourth part of a yard-land. Spelman. Noy says an eighth only, because, according to him, two fardels make a nook, and four nooks a yard-land. Wharton. See Noy, Complete Lawyer 57; Cowell; Cunningham, Law Dict.
FARDELLA. In old English law. A bundle or pack; a fardel. Fleta, lib. 1, c. 22, § 10.
FARDING—DEAL. The fourth part of an acre of land. Spelman.
FARE. A voyage or passage by water; also the money paid for a passage either by land or by wa-ter. Cowell.
The sum paid or to be paid for carrying a pas-senger. Chase v. New York Cent. R. Co., 26 N.Y. 526; Clark v. Southern Ry. Co., 69 Ind.App. 697, 119 N.E. 539, 543.
As used In connection with interstate transportation, means a rate of charge for the carriage of passengers, as approved by the proper governmental agency. Krause v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of California, 141 Neb. 844, 5 N. W.2d 229, 232.
In case of a water company it means the tax or compen-sation which the company may charge for furnishing a supply of water. McNeal Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Howland, 111 N.C. 615, 16 S.E. 857, 20 L.R.A. 743.FARE !AYING PASSENGER is a passenger who pays the legal fare. Krause v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of California, 141 Neb. 844, 5 N.W. 2d 229, 232.
FARINAGIUM. A mili; a toll of meal or flour. Jacob; Spelman.
FARLEU (or FARLEY). Money paid by tenants in lieu of a heriot. It was of ten applied to the best chattel, as distinguished from heriot, the best beast, Cowell.
FARLINGARII. Whoremongers; adulterers.
FARM, n. A body of land under one ownership, devoted to agriculture, either to raising crops, or pasture, or both. Dorsett v. Watkins, 59 Okl. 198, 158 P. 608, 9 A.L.R. 278. With the development particularly of the western states, a large part of whose wealth consists of cattle, the word "farm" has acquired a somewhat broader meaning, and in its generic sense is as applicable tc, a stock farm as to one where grain is raised. Po’rter v. Yakima County, 77 Wash. 299, 137 P. 466, 467. A certain amount of provision reserved as the rent of a messuage. Spelman. A considerable tract of land .cultivated or used in some one of the usually recognized ways of farming. Mattison v. Dunlap, 191 Okl. 168, 127 P.2d 140, 141. A term, a lease of lands; a leasehold interest. 2 Bl.Comm. 17; 1 Reeve, Eng. Law, 301, note. The land itself, let to farm or rent. 2 Bl.Comm. 368. Rent generally which is reserved on a lease; when it was to be paid in money, it was called "blanehe firme." Spelman; 2 Bl.Comm. 42.
Old English Law. A lease of other things than land, as of imposts. There were several of these, such as "the sugar farm," "the silk farm," and farms of wines and currants, called "petty farms." See 2 How. State Tr. 1197-1206.
The word has been defined to mean: a considerable tract
•ot land, or a number of small tracts, devoted wholly or partially to agricultural purposes or pasturage of cattle but may also include woodland, Jones v. Holloway, 183 Md. 40, 36 A.2d 551, 554, 152 A.L.R. 933; A large tract or portion of land taken by a lease under a yearly rent pay-able by the tenant, Tomlin, Law Dict. ; a parcel or group of parcels of land cultivated as a unit, Supervisors of Man-heim Tp., Lancaster County, v. Workman, 154 Pa.Super. 146, 35 A.2d 747, 749; a piece of land held under lease for cultivation; Supervisors of Manheim Tp., Lancaster Coun-ty, v. Workman, 154 Pa.Super. 146, 35 A.2d 747, 749; a piece of land used whoily or principally for agricultural purposes. State Industrial Accident Commission v. Eggi-man, 172 Or. 19, 139 P.2d 565, 567; a plot or tract of land devoted to the raising of domestic or other animals; as a chlcken farm; a fox farm; Hagenburger v. City of Los Angeles, 51 Cal.App.2d 161, 124 P.2d 345, 347; a portion of land used for agricultural purposes, either wholly or in part; a tract of land devoted in part, at least, to cultiva-tion, for agricultural purposes, without reference to its ex-tent, or to the tenure by which it is held. People ex rel. Rogers v. Caldw8ll, 142 III. 434, 32 N.E. 691; Fleckles v. Hille, 83 Ind.App. 715, 149 N.E. 915.
A tract of land devoted to agricultural purposes. Hagan-burger v. City of Los Angeles, 51 Cal.App.2d 161, 124 P.2d 345, 347; a tract of land devoted to agriculture, stock rais-ing, or some allied industry, Winship v. Inspector of Build-ings of Town of Wakefield, 274 Mass. 380, 174 N.E. 476, 477; a tract of land devoted to general or special cultivation under single control. Supervisors of Manheim Tp., Lan-caster County, v. Workman, 154 Pa.Super. 146, 35 A.2d 747, 749; a tract of land used for raisirg crops or rearing animals. Gordon v. Buster, 113 Tex. 382, 257 S.W. 220; a wheat, fruit, dairy or market farm, Township of Marple v. Lynam, 151 Pa.Super. 288, 30 A.2d 208, 210.
Both grazing and cultivated lands, sold on mortgage foreclosure, constituted "farm," State ex rel. Wahluke Inv. Co. v. Superior Court for Walla Walla County, 168 Wash. 142, 10 P.2d 986, 987.
The original meaning of the word was "rent," and by a natural transition it carne to mean the land Out of which the rent issued.
The term does not necessarily include only the land un-der cultivation and within a fence. It may include all the land which forms part of the tract, and may also in-elude several connected parcels under one control. Succes-sion of Williams, 132 La. 865, 61 So. 852, 853.
The word ”farm" within town zoning by-law, mean land used for production of crops, livestock grazing, raising of hay for cows to produce milk and other dairy products, raising of poultry and sale of chickens and eggs, or grow-ing of fruit. Town of Lincoln v. Murphy, 314 Mass. 16, 49 N.E.2d 453, 455, 146 A.L.R. 1196.
Usually the chief messuage in a village or town whereto belongs a great demesne of all sorts. Cowell; Cunning-ham, Law Dict.; Termes de la Ley.
FARM, v. To lease or let; to demise or grant for a limited term and at a stated rental.
FARM GROSSING. A roadway over a railroad track at grade for the purpose of reaching tillage land cut off by the track. True v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 113 Me. 375, 94 A. 183, 184. See, a lso, In re Colvin Street in City of Buffalo, 155 App.Div. 808, 140 N.Y.S. 882, 883.
A conveyance of strip of land across farm to rallroad as right of way, which reserved to grantor right to maintain two "farm crossings" over right of way, is broad enough to permit installation of an underground conduit for pur-pose of supplying electricity to farm of grantor for domes-tic and farm purposes. New York Cent. R. Co. v. Yarlan, 71.9 Ind. 477, 39 N.E.2d 604, 607, 139 A.L.R. 455.
A farm crossing is a crossing used in connection with a farm and not property within city limits. Chicago. M., St. P. & P. R. Co. v. Cross, .212 Iowa 218, 234 N.W. 569, 572.
FARM LABOR. Agricultural employment and farm labor are used as practically synonymous and include all farm work and work incidental thereto. Smythe v. Phoenix, 63 Idaho 585, 123 P. 2d 1010, 1012.
Ordinarily, the term "farm labor" connotes the tilling of the soil, its products and the raising and caring for such domestic animals as are usually found in those sur-roundings. Tucker v. Newman, 217 Minn. 473, 14 N.W.2d 767, 771, 772.
Under Unemployment Insurance Law an employee em-ployed on a farm devoted to the raising of fur-bearing animals was engaged in "farm labor". In re Bridges, 262 App.Div. 19, 28 N.Y.S.2d 312, 314.
FARM LABOREE. Generally, a man hired to go on a farm. Klein v. McCleary, 154 Minn. 498, 192 N.W. 106, 107. The term "farm laborer" is or-dinarily synonymous with the term "hired man." Lowe v. North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Bureau, 66 N.D. 246, 264 N.W. 837, 107 A.L.R. 973.
One employed as a laborer on a farm, especially one who does all kinds of farm work, In re Keaney, 217 Mass. 5, 104 N.E. 438; one employed in or about business of farming. Pridgen v. Murphy, 44 Ga.App. 147, 160 S.E. 701, 702; one employed on a farm in customary types of farm work or employed and paid directly by a farmer in trans-porting his raw produce. Cedarburg Fox Farros v. In-dustrial Commission, 241 Wis. 604, 6 N.W.2d 687, 689, 690; one who devotes his time to ordinary farm labor as gain-ful occupation with some reasonable degree of regularity and continuity, Adams v. Ross, 230 App.Div, 216, 243 N.Y.S.464, 466; Makeever v. Marlin, 92 Ind.App. 158, 174 N.E. 517, 518; one who labors on a farm in raising crops, or in doing general farm work. H. Duys & Co. v. Tone, 125 Conn. 300, 5 A.2d 23, 28; Wayland v. Kleck, 57 Ariz. 135, 112 P.2d 207, 208..
On question whether the terne as used in Workmen’s Compensation Acts includes an employee on a corn husking or a grain threshing outflt, or theo like, which goes from one farm to another for compensation, the decisions are conflicting. See Slyeord v. Horn, 179 Iowa, 936, 162 N.W. 249, 252, 7 A.L.R. 1285. For cases contra, holding that such an employee is not a farm laborer, see In re Boyer, 65 Ind. App. 408, 117 N.E. 507, 508; Industrial Commission of State of Colorado v. Shadowen, 68 Colo. 69, 187 P. 926, 927, 13 A.L.R. 952.
The term includes a compensation claimant hired to feed and water poultry and clean poultty bins and houses and collect eggs, Bennett v. Stoneleigh Farms, 254 App.Div. 790, 4 N.Y.S.2d 255, 256; a ranch laborer, Gordon v. Bus-ter, 113 Tex. 382, 257 S.W. 220; a sheep herder, Davis v. Industrial Commission, 59 Utah, 607, 206 P. 267, 268; Finger v. Northwest Properties, 63 S.D. 176, 257 N.W. 121; employee injured while carting flrewood for domestic use from a farm that employer was operating on shares, But-terfield v. Brown, 261 App.Div. 1022, 25 N.Y.S.2d 803, 804: employee of independent contractor engaged in business of spraying trees for owners of citrus orchárds, Maryland Casualty Co. v. Dobbs. 128 Tex. 547, 100 S.W.2d 349, 350. Employee of owner of farm land employed solely to dig ditch, Culpepper v. White, 52 Ga.App. 740, 184 S.E. 349; farm hand injured while cranking tractor furnishing power for buzz saw used to saw wood of employer’s neighbor, McAllister v. Cobb, 237 App.Div. 674, 263 N.Y.S. 349; nurséryman’s helper or employee, held "farm laborer", Georgia Casualty Co. v. Hill, Tex.Civ.App., 30 S.W.2d 1055, 1057; In re Bronxville Nurseries, 258 App,Div. 1019, 17 N.Y.S.2d 95.
FARM LAND. A term applicable to all the land contained in a farm, and not necessarily merely to land which has been plowed. De Woffe v. Kup-ers, 106 Or. 176, 211 P. 927, 930.
FARM LEASE. A contract upon a printed lease form, containing all provisions of standard Ne-braska farm leases, was a "farm lease," notwith-standing inserted provision that first party em-ployed second party to farm the premises and would pay second party half the corn and hay. In re Mulligan, D.C.Neb., 45 F.Supp. 763, 766.
FARM LET. Technical words in a lease creating a term for years. Co. Litt. 45 b; 1 Washb. R. Pr. Index, Lease. Operative words in a lease, which strictly mean to let upon payment of a certain rent in farm; i. e., in agricultural produce.
FARM OUT. To let for a term at a stated rental.
Among the Romans the collection of revenue was farmed out, and the same system existed in France before the rev-olution of 1789; in England the excise taxes were farmed out, and thereby their evils were greaily aggravated. The farming of the excise was abolished in Scotland by the un-ion, having been before that time abandoned in England. In all these cases the custom gave rise to great abuse and oppression of the people, and in France most of the farm-ers-general, as they were called, perished on the scaffold.
FARM PRODUCTS. Include swine, horses, meat cattle, sheep, manure, cordwood, hay, as well as vegetables, fruit, eggs, milk, butter, lard, and other provisions for the mouth. Keeney v. Beas-man, 169 Md. 582, 182 A. 566, 569, 103 A.L.R. 1515.
FARM-TO-MARKET ROADS. Within act desig-nating purposes for which road funds were allot-ted to counties, held to mean county public high-ways leading directly to, or intersecting, statehighways leading to markets. Hastings v. Pfeif-fer, 184 Ark. 952, 43 S.W.2d 1073, 1074.
FARM UTENSILS. A term which, in an insur-ance policy, is broader than the term garden tools, and includes any instrumentalities within the meaning of the word utensils made use of on a farm, including a stock scale or a new windmill not erected. Murphy v. Continental Ins. Co., 17& Iowa 375, 157 N.W. 855, L.R.A.1917B, 934.
FARM WAGON. This term in an exemption stat-ute includes a farm wagon moved by mechanical as well as by animal power. People v. Corder, 82 Colo. 318, 259 P. 613.
FARMER. A cultivator; a husbandman; an agri-culturist. Kaslovitz v. Reid, C.C.A.Utah, 128 F.2d 1017, 1018. One who assumes the collection of the public revenues, taxes, excise, etc., for a certain commission or percentage; as a farmer of the. revenues. The lessee of a farm. It is said that every lessee for lile or years, although it be but of a small house and land, is called "farmer.". This word implies no mystery, except it be that of husbandman. Cunningham; Cowell; 3 Sharsw. Bla.Comm. 318. There may also be a farmer of other personal property as well as of revenue and. of lands. Plowd. 195; Cunn. Law Dict.
The word "farmer" also includes: an Individual pri marily, bona fide, personally engaged in producing prod-ucts of the soil, In dairy farming, the production of poultry or live stock, the production of poultry or live stock prod-ucts, or the principal part of whose income is derived from any one or more of the foregoing operations, In re Davis, D.C.Iowa, 22 F.Supp. 12, 13; employer cutting valuable timber off land incidental to his occupation of agriculture, Robinson v. Stockley, 166 Tenn. 380, 61 S.W.2d 677. Oñe continuously and profltably engaged in farmlng, though much of his efforts were devoted to unprofltable seed busi-ness, Stoller v. Cleveland Trust Co., C.C.A.Ohlo, 133′ F.2d’ 180, 181; one engaged exclusively in raising tomato plants to sell to others who .actually grow the tomatoes for mar-ket, In re Horner, C.C.A.Ill., 104 F.2d 600, 602; one en-gaged in agricultural pursuits as a livelihood or business, Skinner v. Dingwell, C.C.A.Iowa, 134 F.2d 391, 393; one’ engaged in dairy farming and in production of poultry or livestock, Leonard v. Bennett, C.C.A.Or., 116 F.2d 128, 131, 132, 134; one engaged in the business of cultivating land’ or employing it for the purpose of husbandry, Kaslovitz v. Reid, C.C.A.Utah, 128 F.2d 1017, 1018; one living on his farm from revenue thereof and personally operating It on large scale as his primary activity, In re Lindsay, D.C. Tex., 41 F.Supp. 948, 950, 951; one personally engaged in farrning. Shyvers v. Security-First Nat. Bank of Los An-geles, C.C.A.Cal., 108 F.2d 611, 612, 613, 126 A.L.R. 674;. In re Davis, D.C.Iowa, 22 F.Supp. 12, 13; one prlmarily en-gaged in agricultural pursuits. Leonard v. Bennett, C.C.A. Or., 116 F.2d 128, 131, 132, 134; one who cultivates a con-siderable tract of land in some one of the usual recognized ways of farming, Kaslovitz v. Reid, C.C.A.Utah, 128 F.2d 1017, 1018; Matteson v. Dunlap, 191 Okl. 168, 127 P.2d 140, 141; one who cultivates a farm either as owner or lessee. Kaslovitz v. Reid, C.C.A.Utah, 128 F.2d 1017, 1018; one who cultivates a farm, whether the land be his own or an-other’s; one who directs the business of a farm and works at farm labor. Kaslovitz v. Reid, C.C.A.Utah, 128 F.2d 1017, 1018; Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., Mo.App., 90 S.W.2d 784, 795; one who expends his energies and produc-tion efforts in tilling the soil, raising crops and marketing them, thereby promoting his financial interest and advance-ment, Kaslovitz v. Reid, C.C.A.Utah, 128 F.2d 1017, 1018; one who is devoted to the tillage of the soil, Kasiovitz v. Reid, C.C.A.Utah, 128 F.2d 1017, 1018; one who is primarily, personally, and bona fide engaged in farming although he does not spend all of his time therein, work farm without assistance, or refrain from engaging in secondary activities, In re Lindsay, D.C.Tex., 41 F.Supp. 948, 950, 951; one who,owns and resides on a farm, Kaslovitz v. Reid, C.C.A.Utah, 128 F.2d 1017, 1018; one who resides on a farm with his family, cultivating such farm, and mainly deriving his support from it, Kaslovitz v. Reid, C.C.A.Utah, 128 F.2d 1017, 1018; one who resides on and cultivates a farm, main-ly deriving his support therefrom, State v. Hines, 94 Or. 607, 186 P. 420, 422.
The term "farmer" In Bankruptcy Act includes an ad-ministrator, Harris v. Zion Sav. Bank & TTust Co., 317 U. S. 447, 63 S.Ct. 354, 357, 87 L.Ed. 390; personal representa-tive of a deceased farmer. In re Stoner,. C.C.A.Pa., 133 F. 2d 696, 697.
FARMER GENERAL. See Farm Out.
FARMING. Tillage of the soil. In re Brown, D,C.Mo., 284 F. 899, 900; Hart-Parr Co. v. Barkley, C.C.A.Okl., 231 F. 913, 914.
Other definitions include:
Act or business of cultivating the land, Hagenburger v. City of Los Angeles, 51 Ca1.App.2d 161, 124 P.2d 345, 347; business of cultivating land or employing it for the pur-poses of husbandry, Kaslovitz v. Reid, C.C.A.Utah, 128 F. 2d 1017, 1018; business of tilling the soil, Hagenburger v. City of Los Angeles, 51 Cal.App.2d 161, 124 P.2d 345, 347; commercial production of any plant, even horticultur-al or annual which has economic value, Township of Marple v. Lynam, 151 Pa.Super. 288, 30 A.2d 208, 210; conduct of a farm, State Industrial Accident Commission v. Eggiman, 172 Or. 19, 139 P.2d 565, 567, 569; cultivation and fertiliza-tion of the soll as well as caring for and harvesting the crops, Kaslovitz v. Reid, C.C.A.Utah, 128 F.2d 1017, 1018; cultivation of land for production of agricultural crops with incidental enterprises, Collins v. Milis, 198 Ga. 18, 30 S.E. 2d 866, 870; cultivation of the soil for the production of crops, Chudnov v. Board of Appeals of Town of Bloomfleld, 113 Conn. 49, 154 A. 161, 162; operation of a farm, In re McMurray, D.C.Iowa, 8 F.Supp. 449, 454; operation of a nursery from which no sales were made on lots within zoning distrIct, Hagenburger v. City of Los Angeles, 51 Cal.App.2d 161, 124 P.2d 345, 347, 348; stock raising and dairying if in connection with and incidental to tillage of the soil, In re Brown, D.C.Wash., 251 F. 365, 370; to pro-duce crops or animals on a farm. Hagenburger v. City of Los Angeles, 51 Cal.App.2d 161, 124 P.2d 345, 347.
Cultivation of an indeflnite quantity of land, and includ-ing gardening or horticulture, fruit growing, raising of vegetables, trees, shrubs, plants and similar products is farming within zoning ordinance. Hagenburger v. City of Los Angeles, 51 Cal.App.2d 161, 124 P.2d 345, 347, 348. Pasturing sheep is "farming or agriculture". Weddle v. Parrish, 135 Or. 345, 295 P. 454, 455.
"Farming" Implies that the operator ls dealing with the natural products of the soil In a natural manner, Dye v. McIntyre Floral Co., 176 Tenn. 527, 144 S.W.2d 752, 753.
To be engaged in "farming" within Bankruptcy Act, debtor need not be actually engaged in manual farm work, but may operate farm himself, or may operate many farros through overseers and wage hands. Florida Nat. Bank v. Evans, D.C.Ga., 28 F.2d 67, 68.
FARMING BUSINESS. A farmer’s employee en-gaged in delivering a farm product to market or to buyer is employed in the "farming business". Hayes v. Barras, La.App., 6 So.2d 66, 68; Robi-chaux v. Realty Operators, 195 La. 70, 196 So. 23, 26.
FARMING OPERATIONS within statute provid-ing for relief to farm debtors, means production of raw food or other material by natural pro-cesses of growth, and includes production of poul-try and eggs. In re Knight, D.C.Conn., 9 F.Supp. 502.
Clearing wood land, if a mere incident to farming opera-tions, is itself a "farming operation," Stahl v. Patrick, 206 Minn. 413, 288 N.W. 854, 855.
Persons employed to pack tobacco in warehouses by cor-poration which grew its own tobacco were engaged in
"farming operations" where there was no market for tobacco at time it was brought to warehouses. American Sumatra Tobacco Corporation v. Tone, 127 Conn. 132, 15 A.2d 80, 82.
FARMING PRODUCTS. All things are considered as "farming products" or "agricultural products" which have a situs of their production upon the farm and which are brought into condition for uses of society by labor of those engaged in agri-cultural pursuits as contradistinguished from manufacturing or other industrial pursuits. In re Rodgers, 134 Neb. 832, 279 N.W. 800, 803.
FARMING PURPOSES. These words are not limited in meaning to mere cultivation of soil and maintenance of improvements thereon for such purposes, but include raising of live stock, as well as production of farm crops directly from soil. State v. Superior Court for Walla Walla County, 168 Wash. 142, 10 P.2d 986, 987.
FARO. An unlawful game of cards, In which all the other players play against the banker or dealer, staking their money upon the order in which the cards will lie and be dealt from the pack. Webster; Ward v. State, 22 Ala. 19; U. S. v. Smith, 27 Fed.Cas. 1149; Patterson v. State, 12 Tex.App. 224.
FARO LAY—OUT. A board commonly covered with green cloth to which the entire spade suit is affixed in a certain order. State v. Williams, 157 P. 957, 52 Mont. 369.
FARRAGO LIBELLI. Lat. An ill-composed book containing a collection of miscellaneous subjects not properly associated nor scientifically arranged. Wharton.
FARRIER. One who takes upon himself the Pub-lic employment of shoeing horses. See 1 Bl.Comm. 431; 2 Salk. 440; Hanover, Horses 215.
FARTHING. The fourth part of an English penny.
FARTHING OF GOLD. An ancient English coin, containing in value .the fourth part of a noble. 9 Hen. V. c. 7.
FARTHING OF LAND. A great quantity of land, differing much from farding-deal, q. v.
FARVAND. Standing by itself, this word signifies "passage by sea or water." In charter-parties, it means voyage or passage by water. 18 C.B. 880.
FARYNDON INN. The ancient designation of Serjeants’ Inn, Chancery Lane, London.
FAS. Lat. Right; justice; the divine law. 3 Bl. Comm. 2; Calvin.
In primitive times it was the will of the gods, embodied in rules regulating not only ceremonials but the conduct of all men. Taylor, Science of Turispr. 65.
FASCISM. Is defined as the principies and or-ganization of the patriotic and anti-communist movement in Italy started during the great war, culminating in the virtual dictatorship of SignorMussolini and imitated -by fascist or blackshirt organizations in other countries. Luotto v. Field, Sup., 49 N.Y.S.2d 785, 788.
FASCIST. A member of the Fascisti, pertaining to, sponsored by or embodying the principies of the Fascisti, which principies are described as na-tionalist and conservative and embodying prin-cipies of syndicalism, whether applied to an Ital-ian party or to a similar party in other countries. Luotto v. Field, Sup., 49 N.Y.S.2d 785, 788.
A totalitarian; a believer in the corporate state; one opposed to the exercise of democratic meth-ods or of civil liberties; high handed. A name of opprobium sometimes given to those who op-pose proposed reforms or who are conservative in their political views.
FASIUS. In old English law. A faggot of wood.
FAST BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. One which may be taken in Georgia in injunction suits and similar cases, at such time and in such manner as to bring the case up for review with great expedition. It must be certifled within twenty days from the rendering of the decision. Sewell v. Edmonston, 66 Ga. 353.
FAST-DAY. A day of fasting and penitence, or of mortification by religious abstinence. As to counting it in legal procéedings, see 1 Chit. Archb. Pr., 12th Ed., 160, et seq.
FAST ESTATE. See Estate.
FASTERMANS, FASTERMANNES, or FASTING-MEN. Men in repute and substance; pledges, sureties, or bondsmen, who, according to the Sax-on polity, were fast bound to answer for each other’s peaceable behavior. Spelman; Enc. Lond.
FASTI. In Roman law. Lawful. Dies fasti, law-ful days; days on which justice could lawfully be administered by the pretor. See Dies Fasti.
FAT SPOT. A "fat spot" is a spot where there is an excessive amount of bituminous material on the surface of the pavement. Karl v. State, 279 N.Y. 555, 18 N.E.2d 852, 853.
FATAL ERRORS. Are such only as may reason-ably be held to have worked injury to complain-ing party. Willard v. Stauffer, 91 Ind.App. 119, 170 N.E. 332, 334.
FATAL INJURY. A term embracing injuries re-sulting in death, which, as used in accident and disability insurance policies is distinguished from "disability," which embraces injuries preventing the insured from performing the work in which he is usually employed, but not resulting in death. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Johnson, Tex.Civ.App., 235 S.W. 650, 652.
FATAL VARIANCE. A variance tending to mis-lead defendant in making defense or one prevent-ing plea of former jeopardy. Burke v. U. S., C.C. A.Cal., 58 F.2d 739, 741.
A variance in order to be "fatal" must be mater-ial. Whittier v. Leifert, 72 N.D. 528, 9 N.W.2d
Black’s Law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed 47
402, 405; People v. Mizer, 37 Cal.App.2d 148, 99 P.2d 333, 335, 336; it must be rnisleading or serve to mislead the adverse party, Lorenz v. Santa Monica City High School Dist., 51 Cal.App.2d 393, 124 P.2d 846, 851; it must be substantial and ma-terial, Miller v. Arliskas, 324 Ill.App. 588, 58 N.E. 2d 743.
Attempt to introduce evidente of special damages from breach of tort or breach of contract, under general aver-ment of damage is a "fatal variance" W. C. Hardesty Co. v. Schaefer, Mo.App., 139 S.W.2d 1031, 1035.
The general rule with respect to proof of time when an offense is committed is that there is no "fatal variance" from the allegation that it was committed on a particular date, to show that it was actually committed on or about or near that date unless the variance results in misleading defendant so as to prevent him from making his defense to the charge or to deprive him of the beneflt of a plea of
former jeopardy in event of another trial for Use same of-fense. People v. Tracy, 50 Ca1.App.2d 460, 123 P.2d 138, 140, 141.
FATETUR FACINUS QUI JUDICIUM FUGIT. He who flees judgment confesses his guilt 3 Inst 14; 5 Co. 109b. But see Best, Pres. 248.
FATHER. A male parent. In re Clark’s Estate, 228 Iowa 75, 290 N.W. 13, 32. He by whom a child is begotten. Natural father; procreator of a child. In re Dexheimer’s Estate, 197 Wis. 145, 221 N.W. 737. For "Putative Father," see that title.
As used in law, this term may (according to the context and the nature of the instrument) include a putative as well as a legal father, also a stepfather, an adoptive father, or a grandfather, but is not as wide as the word "parent," and cannot be so construed as to include a female. Thorn-burg v. American Strawboard Co., 141 Ind. 443, 40 N.E. 1062, 50 Am.St.Rep. 334; McGaughey v. Grand Lodge, A. O. U. W. of State of Minnesota, 148 Minn. 136, 180 N.W. 1001; Fienup v. Stamer, Mo.App., 28 S.W.2d 437, 439. The term may, however, be so limited as to mean only the fa-ther of a legitímate child. People v. Wolf, 216 App.Div. 771, 215 N.Y.S. 95, 96; Howard v. U. S., D.C.Ky., 2 F.2d 170, 173.
As used in law, this term may mean natural father and not adoptive parent. McKinney v. Minkler, Tex.Civ.App., 102 S.W.2d 273, 279; Jackson’s Adm’x v. Alexlou, 223 Ky. 95, 3 S.W.2d 177, 178, 56 A.L.R. 1345.
As used In statute providing that father may lnherit from his illegitimate children, includes heirs of the father. State v. Chavez, 42 N.M. 569, 82 P.2d 900, 906.
As used In statutes relating to duty of a father and other relatives to support adult children likely to become public charges, refers to foster father atter adoption, Betz v. Horr, 276 N.Y. 83, 11 N.E.2d 548, 550, 114 A.L.R. 491.
The appellation "Father" indicates that the one to whom it is applied is a priest of the Catholic Church, Sweeney v. Newspaper Printing Corporation, 177 Tenn. 196, 147 S.W.2d 406, 407.
The word may be used in will as equivalent of "parent," which is defined as meaning father and mother. In re Frlst’s Estate, 18 Del.Ch. 409, 161 A. 918.
FATHER-IN-LAW. The father of one’s wife or husband.
FATHOM. A nautical measure of six feet In length. Occasionally used as a superficial measure of land and in mining, and in that case it mean a square fathom or thirty-six square feet. Na-haolelua v. Kaaahu, 9 Hawaii, 601.
FATUA MULIER. A whore. Du Fresne.FATUITAS. In old English law. Fatuity; idiocy. Reg. Orig. 266.
FATUM. Lat. Fate; a superhuman power; an event or cause of loss, beyond human foresight or means of prevention.
FATUOUS PERSON. In Scotch law. One entire-ly destitute of reason; is qui omnino desipit. Ersk. Inst. 1, 7, 48. An idiot. Jacob. One who is incapable of managing his affairs, by reason of a total defect of reason. He is described as having uniform stupidity and inattention of manner and childishness of speech. Bell’s Law Dict.
FATUUM JUDICIUM. A foolish judgment or verdict. As applied to the latter it is one rather false by reason of folly than criminally so, or as amounting to perjury. Bract. fol. 289.
FATUUS. An idiot or fool. Bract. fol. 420b. Foolish; silly; absurd; indiscreet; or ill consid-ered. See Fatuum judicium.
FATUUS, APUD JURISCONSULTOS NOSTROS, ACCLPITUR PRO NON COMPOS MENTIS; ET FATUUS DICITUR, QUI OMNINO DESIPIT. 4 Coke, 128. Fatuous, among our jurisconsults, is understood for a man not of right mind; and he is called "fatuus" who is altogether foolish.
FATUUS PRMSUMITUR QUI IN PROPRIO NOMINE ERRAT. A man is presumed to be simple who makes a mistake in his own name. Code, 6, 24, 14; Van Alst v. Hunter, 5 Johns. Ch., N.Y. 148, 161.
FAUBOURG. In French law, and in Louisiana. A district or part of a town adjoining the prin-cipal city; a suburb. See City Council of Lafay-ette v. Holland, 18 La. 286.
FAUCES TERRM. (Jaws of the land.) Narrow headlands and promontories, inclosing a portion or arm of the sea within them. 1 Kent, Comm. 367, and note; Hale, De Jure Mar. 10; The Har-riet, 1 Story, 251, 259, Fed. Cas. No. 6,099; 16 Yale L.J. 471.
FAULT.
American Law. Negligence; an error or defect of judgment or of conduct; any deviation from prudence, duty, or rectitude; any shortcoming, or neglect of care or performance resulting from inattention, incapacity, or perversity; a wrong tendency, course, or act; bad faith or mismanage-ment; neglect of duty. School Dist. v. Boston, H. & E. R. Co., 102 Mass. 553, 3 Am.Rep. 502; Dorr v. Harkness, 49 N.J.Law, 571, 10 A. 400, 60 Am. Rep. 656; Cochrane v. Forbes, 257 Mass. 135, 153 N.E. 566, 570; Continental Oil Co. v. Horsey, 175 Md. 609, 3 A.2d 476, 478; Continental Ins. Co. v. Sabine Towing Co., C.C.A.Tex., 117 F.2d 694, 697.
As respects wife’s fault as ground for divorce, it means more than a deviation from the rules of propriety and also means a blemish or impairment of excellence. Barnett v. Barnett, 292 Ky. 672, 167 S.W.2d 845, 847.
As used in statute respecting suite for separate main-tenance, means voluntary separation, or failure of duty or misconduct materially contributing to disruption of maritalrelation. Amberson v. Amberson, 349 III. 214, 181 N.E 825, 826.
As used in Unen. ployment Compensation Act protecting persons unemployed through no fault of their own, means failure or volition, White v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security DIvislon, 114 Ind.App. 383, 52 N.E.2d 500, 502.
The word "fault," the primary lexical meaning of which is defect or failing, in the language of the law and in the interpretation of statutes signifies a failure of duty, and is the equivalent of negligence. Milliken v. Fenderson, 110 Me. 306, 86 A. 174, 175; Marston v. Pickwick Stages, 78 Cal.App. 526, 248 P. 930, 933. But see Liberty Highway Co. v. Callahan, 24 Ohio App. 374, 157 N.E. 708, 714.
Civil Law. Negligence; want of care. An im-proper act or omission, injurious to another, and transpiring through negligence, rashness, or ignor-ante.
There are in law three degrees of faults,—the gross, the slight, and the very slight fault. The gross fault is that which proceeds from inexcusable negligence or ignorante; it 1s considered as nearly equal to fraud. The slight fault is that want of care which a prudent man usually takes of his business. The very slight fault is that which is excus-able, and for which no responsibility Is incurred. Civil Code La. art. 3556, par. 13.
Commercial Law. Defect; imperfection; blemish. See With All Faults.
Mining Law. A dislocation of strata; particular-ly, a severance of the continuity of a vein or lode by.the dislocation of a portion of it.
FAUTOR. Old English law. A favorer or sup-porter of others; an abettor. Cowell; Jacob. A partisan. One who encouraged resistance to the execution of process.
Spanish Law. Accomplice; the person who aids or assists another in the commission of a crime.
FAUX.
Civil Law. The fraudulent alteration of the truth. The same with the Latin falsum or crimen falsi.
French Law. A falsification or fraudulent altera-tion or suppression of a thing by words, by writ-ings, or by acts without either. Biret.
"Faux may be understood in three ways. In lts most extended sense it is the alteration of truth, with or without intention; it is nearly synonymous with ‘Iying.’ In a less extended sense, it is the alteration of truth, accompanied with fraud, mutatio veritatis curn dolo Jacta. And lastly, in a narrow, or rather the legal, sense of the word, when it is a question to know If the Faux be a crime, it is the fraudulent alteration of the truth in those cases ascer-tained and punished by the law." Touillier, t. 9, n. 188.
Old English Law. False; counterfeit. Faux ac-tion, a false action. Litt. § 688. Faux money, counterfeit money. St. Westm. 1, c. 15. Faux peys, false weights. Britt. c. 20. Faux serement, a false oath. St. Westm. 1, c. 38.
FAVOR, n. An act of kindness or generosity, as distinguished from one that is inspired by regard for justice, duty, or right. Ross v. Davis, 138 Misc. 863, 248 N.Y.S. 441, 443. Bias; partiality; lenity; prejudice. See Challenge.
FAVOR, v. To regard with favor; to aid or to have the disposition to aid; to show partiality or unfair bias towards;—practically synonymous with "support." United States v. Schulze, D.C.Cal., 253 F. 377, 379. The word implies a mental attitude or intent. Séhulze v. United States, C.C.A.Cal., 259 F. 189, 190.
FAVORABILIA IN LEGE SUNT FISCUS, DOS, VITA, LIBERTAS. Jenk. Cent. 94. Things favor-ably considered in law are the treasury, dower, Life, liberty.
FAVORABILIORES REI, POTIUS QUAM AC-TORES, HABENTUR. The condition of the de-fendant must be favored, rather than that of the plaintiff. In other words, melior est condigo de-fendentis. Dig. 50, 17, 125; Broom, Max. 715. See Hunt v. Rousmanier’s Adm’r, 8 Wheat. U.S. 195, 196, 5 L.Ed. 589.
FAVORABILIORES SUNT EXECUTIONES ALIIS PROCESSIBUS QUIBUSCUNQUE. Co. Litt. 289. Executions are preferred to all other processes whatever.
FAVORED BENEFICIARY. Within rule that con-fidential relations and activity by favored bene-ficiary in the execution of the will raises a prima facie presumption of undue influence, is one who in the circumstances has been favored over others having equal claims to testator’s bounty. Mind-ler v. Crocker, 245 Ala. 578, 18 So.2d 278, 281.
FAVORES AMPLIANDI SINT; ODIA RESTRIN-GENDA. Jenk. Cent. 186. Favors are to be en-larged; things hateful restrained.
FEAL. Faithful; truthful; true. Tenants by knight service swore to their lords to be feal and leal; i. e., faithful and loyal. Feal homager, faithful subject.
FEAL AND DIVOT. A right in Scotland, similar to the right of turbary in England, for fuel, etc. Wharton; Ersk. ii. tit. ix. s. 17.
FEALTY. In feudal law. Fidelity; allegiance to the feudal lord of the manor; the feudal ob-ligation resting upon the tenant or vassal by which he was bound to be faithful and true to his lord, and render him obediente and service. See De Peyster v. Michael, 6 N.Y. 497, 57 Am.Dec. 470; Littleton §§ 117, 131; Wright, Ten. 35; Termes de la Ley; 1 Washb. R. P. 19; 1 Poll. & Maitl. 277-287; Stubbs, Const. Hist. § 462 n; Co. Lit. 67b; 3 Kent 510.
This fealty was of two sorts: that which is general, and is due from every subject to his prince; the other special, and required of such only as in respect of their fee are tied by this oath to their landlords; 1 Bla.Comm. 367; Cowell.
Fealty signifles fidelity, the phrase "feal and leal" mean-ing simply "faithful and loyal." Tenants by knights’ service and also tenants in socage were required to take an oath of fealty to the king or others, their immediate lords; and fealty was one of the conditions of their tenure, the breach of which operated a forfeiture of their estates. Brown.
Although foreign jurlsts considered fealty and homage as convertible terms, because in some continental countries they are blended so as to form one engagement, yet they are not to be confounded In our country, for they do not imply the same thing, homage being the acknowledgment of tenure, and fealty, the vassal oath of fidelity, being the essential feudal bond, and the animating principie of a feud, without which it could not subsist. Wharton.FEAR. Apprehension of harm; dread; conscious-ness of approaching danger.
Apprehension of harm or punishment, as ex-hibited by outward and visible marks of emotion. An evidence of guilt in certain cases. See Burrili, Circ. Ev. 476.
The "fear" which renders evidence of female’s utmost resistance unnecessary to support conviction of "rape’ is a fear of death or great bodily harm, or a fear that so over-powers female that she dares not resist, or a fear and ter-ror so extreme as to preclude resistance, or a fear which renders female’s mind well nigh incapable of contlnuing her resistance. State v. Hoffman, 228 Wis. 235, 280 N.W. 357, 359, 361.
Statutes defining crime of extortion and provlding pun-ishment therefor must be read together, and "fear," within statute defining term as obtaining of property from another with his consent induced by "fear," must be induced by threats, and hence threat is necessary ingredient of crime. State v. Anderson, 66 N.D. 522, 267 N.W. 121, 124.
FEASANCE. A doing; the doing of an act; a performing or performance. See Malfeasance; Misfeasance; Nonfeasance.
A making; the making of an indenture, release, or obligation. Litt. § 371; Dyer, (Fr. Ed.) 56b. The making of a statute. Keilw. lb.
FEASANT. Doing, or making, as, in the term "damage feasant," (doing damage or injury,) spoken of cattle straying upon another’s land.
FEASIBLE. Capable of being done, executed, or affected. Lowe v. Chicago Lumber Co. of Omaha, 135 Neb. 735, 283 N.W. 841, 844.
It also means: capable of being successfully done or ao-complished. Gilmartin v. D. & N. Transp. Co., 123 Conn. 127, 193 A. 726, 729, 113 A.L.R. 1322; fit to be dealt with successfully, Hinchman v. City Water Co., 179 Tenn. 545, 167 S.W.2d 986, 990; practically possible or capable of be-ing managed, utilized, or dealt with successfully, In re Washakie Needles Irr. Dist., 52 Wyo. 518, 76 P.2d 617, 621.
A "feasible method of liquldation", as used in section o! Bankruptcy Act selting out conditions precedent to con-firmation of agricultural extension proposal, means that court must be convinced before confirming proposal that proposal to creditors is one that probably can be carried out by debtor and result In liquidation to secured creditors and rehabilitation for farmer, and that It le to best inter-ests of all creditors. Heldstab v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, C.C.A.Kan., 91 F.2d 655, 659.
The word "feasible", within meaning of rule that a plan of corporate reorganization must be feasible, does not con-note absolute Insurance of success but only reasonable as-surance of success. In re Waern Bldg. Corporation, C.C.A. III., 145 F.2d 584, 588.
FEASOR. Doer; maker. Feasors del estatute, makers of the statute. ,Dyer, 3b. Also used in the compóund term, "tort-feasor," one who commits or is guilty of a tort.
FEASTS. Certain established festivals or holi-days in the ecclesiastical calendar. These days were anciently used as the dates of legal instru-menta, and in England the quarter-days, for pay-ing rent, are four feast-days. The terms of the courts, in England, before 1875, were fixed to be-gin on certain days determined with reference to the occurrence of four of the chief feasts.
FECIAL LAW. The nearest approach to a system of international law known to the ancient world. It was a branch of Roman jurisprudence, concerned with embassies, declarations of war, and treaties of peace. It received this name from the feciales, (q. v.,) who were charged with its admin-istration.
FECIALES. Among the ancient Romans, that order of priests who discharged the duties of am-bassadors. Subsequently their duties appear to have related more particularly to the declaring war and peace. Calvin.; 1 Kent, Comm. 6.
FEDERAL.
American Law. Belonging to the general govern-ment or union of the states. Founded on or or-ganized under the constitution or laws of the Unit-ed States.
The United States has been generally styled, in American political and judicial writings, a "federal government." The term has not been imposed by any specific constitu-tional authority, but only expresses the general sense and opinion upon the nature of the form of government. in
recent years, there observable a disposition to employ the term "national" in speaking of the government of the Union. Neither word settles anything as to the nature or powers of the government. "Federal" is somewhat more appropriate if the government is considered a union of the states; "national" is preferable if the view is adopted that the state governments and the Union are two distinct systems, each established by the people directly, one for local and the other for national purposes. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 23 L.Ed. 588; Abbott; Milis, Representative Government 301; Freeman, Fed. Gov’ t.
Constitutional Law. A term commonly used to express a league or compact between two or more states, to become united under one central govern-ment. Montana Auto Finance Corporation v. Brit-ish &. Federal Underwriters of Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc., 72 Mont. 69, 232 P. 198, 199, 36 A.L. R. 1495.
FEDERAL CENSUS. A census of each state or territory or of a certain state or of any subdivi-sion or portion of any state, provided it is taken by and under the direction and supervision of the Census Bureau of the United States, and approved and certified by it as the census of that state or subdivision. In re Cleveland’s Claim, 72 Okl. 279, 180 P. 852, 885.
FEDERAL COMMON LAW is a body of decisión-al law developed by the federal courts untram-meled by state court decisions. O’Brien v. Wes-tern Union Telegraph Co., C.C.A.Mass., 113 F.2d 539, 541.
FEDERAL COURTS. The courts of the United States. See Courts of the United States.
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. The system of gov-ernment administered in a state formed by the union or confederation of several independent or quasi independent states; also the composite state so formed.
In strict Image, there ls a distinctIon between a confeder-ation and a federal government. The former term denotes a league or permanent, alliance between several states, each of whIch ls fully sovereign and independent, and each of which retalns lts full dignity, organization, and sovereign-ty, though yielding to the central authority a controlling power for a few limited purposes, such as external and dlplomatic relations. In this case, the component states are the units, with respect to the confederation, and the central government acts upon them, not upon the Individual citizens. In a federal government, on thé other hand, the allied states form a union,—not, indeed, to such an extent as to destroy their separate organization or deprive them of quasi sovereignty with respect to the administration of thelr purely local concerns, but so that the central power is erected finto a true state or nation, possessing sovereignty both external and lnternal,—while the administration of na-tional affairs is directed, and its effects felt, not by the sep-arate states deliberating as units, but by the people of all. in their collective capacity, as citizens of the nation. The distinction is expressed, by the German writers, by the use of the two words "Staatenbund" and "Bundesstaat;" the former denoting a league or confederation of states, and the latter a federal government, or state formed by means of a league or confederation.
FEDERAL INSTRUMENTALITY. A means or agency used by the federal government. Capitol Building & Loan Ass’n v. Kansas Commission of Labor and Industry, 148 Kan. 446, 83 P.2d 106, 107, 118 A.L.R. 1212. A government agency immune from state control. Waterbury Sav. Bank v. Dan-aher, 128 Conn. 78, 20 A.2d 455, 458.
FEDERAL PROHIBITION OFFICER. An officer of the federal government charged with the en-forcement of the national prohibition statute. De Marco v. U. S., C.C.A.Va., 296 F. 667, 668.
FEDERAL QUESTION. Cases arising under Constitution of United States, Acts of Congress, or treaties, and involving their interpretation and application, and of whtch jurisdiction is given to federal courts, are commonly described as in-volving a "federal question." McAllister v. St. Louis Merchants’ Bridge Terminal Ry. Co., 324 Mo. 1005, 25 S.W.2d 791, 792.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION. An admin-istrativa body created by statute, with only the duties and powers granted expressly or by fair implication. Chamber of Commerce of Minne-apolis v. Federal Trade Commission, C.C.A.8, 13 F.2d 673, 683. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 41-51.
FEDERALIST, THE. A series of 85 essays by Alexander Hamilton, James Ma dist :, and John Jay, expounding and advocating the adoption of the Constitution of the United States. All but six of the essays were first published in the "Inde-pendent Journal" of New York City from October, 1787, to April, 1788. Webster, New Int. Dict. "The opinion of the Federalist has always [been] considered as of great authority." Cohens v. Vir-ginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 418, 5 L.Ed. 257.
FEDERATED STATE. An independent central organism, having its own machinery absorbing, in view of international law, all the individual states associated together. Molina v. Comision Reguladora Del Mercado De Henequen, 91 N.J.L. 382, 103 A. 397, 400.
FEDERATION. Ordinarily, an unincorporated association of persons for a common purpose. Hughes v. State, 109 Ark. 403, 160 S.W. 209.
FEE. A charge fixed by law for services of Pub-lic officers or for use of a privilege under control of government. Fort Smith Gas Co. v. Wiseman, 189 Ark. 675, 74 S.W.2d 789, 790. A recompense for an official or professional service or a charge or emolument or compensation for a.‘ particular act or service. Craig v. Shelton, 201 Ky. 790, 258 S.W. 694. A fixed charge or perquisite charged as recompense for labor and trouble, a reward, compensation, or wage given to a person for per-formance of professional services or something done or to be done. People v. Goulding, 275 Mich. 353, 266 N.W. 378, 379.
A contingent fee Is a fee stipulated to be paid’to an at-torney for his services in conducting a sun or other foren-sic proceeding only in case he wins It; it may be a per-centage of the amount recovered. Adopted in Gray v. Stern, 85 Wash. 645, 149 P. 26, 28.
For docket fee, see Docket

Estates

Ordinarily, word "fee" or "fee simple" is ap-plied to an estate in land, but term is applicable to any kind of hereditament, corporeal or incor-poreal, and is all the property in thing referred to or largest estate therein which person may have. In re Forsstrom, 44 Ariz. 472, 38 P.2d 878, 888.
A freehold estate in lands, heid of a superior lord, as a reward for services, and on condition of rendering some service in return for it. The true meaning of the word "fee" Is the same as that of "feud" or "fief," and In its original sense it is taken in contradistinction to "allodi-tan," which latter is defined as a man’s own land, which he possesses merely in bis own right, without owing any rent or service to any superior. 2 Bl.Comm. 105. See Wen-dell v. Crandall, 1 N.Y. 491.
In modern English tenures, "fee" signifies an estate of in-heritance, being the highest and most extensive interest which a man can have in a feud; and when the term is used simply, without any adjunct, or in the form "fee-simple," it imports an absolute inherltance olear of any condition, limitation, or restriction to particular heirs, but descendible to the heirs general, male or female, lineal or collateral. 2 BI.Comm. 106; Cowell; Termes de la Ley;
1 Washb.R.P. 51; Co.Litt. 1 b; 1 Prest.Est. 420; 3 Kent 514.
Base fee. A determinable or qualified fee; en estate hay-ing the nature of a fee, but not a fee simple absolute. In re Douglass’ Estate, 94 Neb. 280, ,143 N.W. 299, 302.
Conditional fee. An estate restrained to some particular heirs, exclusive of others, Blume v. Pearcy, 204 S.C. 409, 29 S.E.2d 673, 674, as to the heirs of a man’s body, by which only his lineal descendants were admitted, in exclusion of collateral; or to the heirs male of bis body, in exclusion of heirs female, whether lineal or collateral. It was called a "conditional fee," by reason of the condition expressed or implied in the donation of It that, If the donee died without such particular heirs, the land should revert to the donor.
2 BI.Comm. 110. The term includes a fee that is either to connnence or determine un some condition, 10 Co, 95b; Prest.Est. 476; Fearne, Cont.Rein. 9; and is sometimos used interchangeably with "base fee," that is, one to de-termine or be defeated on the happening of some con-tingent event or act. Citizens’ Electric Co. v. Susque-harma. Boom Co., 270 Pa. 517, 113 A. 559, 561; Glass v. Johnson, 2971]1. 149, 130 N.E. 473, 474.
Determinable fee. Also called a "base" or "qualified" fee. Stubbs v. Abel, 114 Or. 610, 233 P. 852, 859. One which has a qualification subjoined to it, and which must be determined whenever the qualification annexed to it is at an end. Littleton § 254; Co.Litt. 27a, 220; 1 Prest.Est. 449; 2 Bla.Comm. 109; Cruise, Dig. tit. 1, § 82. An estate in fee which is Hable to be determined by some act or event expressed on its limitation to circumscribe its con-tInuarIce, or inferred by law as bounding its extent. 1 Washb. Real Prop. 62; McLane v. Bovee, 35 Wis. 36. An estate which may last forever is a "fee," but If it may end on the happening of a merely possible event, it is a "determinable," or "qualified fee." Reichard v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 231 Iowa 563, 1 N.W.2d 721, 727.
Determinable lee or lee simple. Estate created with spe-cial limitation which delimits duration of estate in ¡and.P C K Properties, Inc., v. City of Cuyahoga Falle, 176 N.E.2d 441, 444, 112 Ohio App• 492.
Fee darnages. See Damages.
Fee expectant. A name sometimos applied to an estate created where lands are given to a man and his wife and the heirs of their bodies. See also Frank-Marriage.
Fee simple defeasible. Title created in trustees where le-gal title in fee simple to active trust estate is by will placed in trustees who are required to distribute property in fee simple upen happening of event. Also called a "determinable fee", "base fee", or "qualified fee". Kana-wha Val. Bank v. Hornbeck, W.Va., 151 S.E.2d 694, 700.
Great lee. In feudal law, the designation of a fee held dlrectly from the crown.
Knight’s fee. See Knight’s Fee.
Limited fea. An estate of inheritance in lands, which is clogged or confined with some sort of condition or qualifi-cation. Such estates are base or qualified lees, conditlonal Pees, and fees-tail. The term is opposed to "fee-simple." 2 Bl.Comm. 109; Lott v. Wyckoff, 1 Barb., N.Y., 575; Pat-erson v. Ellls, 11 Wend., N.Y., 259.
Plowman’s fee. In old English law, was a species of ten-ure peculiar to peasants or small farmers, somewhat like gavelkind, by which the lands descended in equal shares to all the sons of the tenant.
Quali.fied fee. In English law. A lee having a qualifica-tion subjoined thereto, and which must be determined whenever the qualification annexed to it is at an end; oth-erwise termed a "base fee." 2 Bl.Comm. 109; 1 Steph. Comm. 225. An interest which may continue forever, but is Hable to be determined, without the aid of a conveyance, by some act or event, circumscribing its continuance or extent. 4 Kent, Comm. 9; Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 190; U. S. v. Reese, 27 Fed.Cas. 744. An interest given to a man and certain of his heirs at the time of its limitation. •See Kelso v. Stigar, 75 Md. 397, 24 A. 18.
Quasi fee. An estate gained by wrong. Wharton. Also, the land which is heid in fee.

American Law

An estate of inheritance without condition, be-longing to the owner, and alienable by him or transmissible to his heirs absolutely and simply, and is an absolute estate in perpetuity and the largest possible estate a man can have, being, in fact, allodial in its nature. Stanton v. Sullivan, 63 R.I. 216, 7 A.2d 696, 698, 699.
Every estate which is not for lite, for years or at will. Chance v. Weston, 96 Or. 390, 190 P. 155, 157.
Terms "fee," "fee simple," and "fee simple absolute," are equivalent. Boon v. Boon, 348 III. 120, 180 N.E. 792, 794.FEE AND LIFE-RENT. In Scotch law, two es-tates in land—the first of which is the full right of proprietorship, the second the limited right of usufruct during life—may be heid together, or may co-exist in different persons at the same time. See Bell, Prin. § 1712; Ersk. Prin. 420; Fiar.
FEE-FARM. A species of tenure, where land is held of another in perpetuity at a yearly rent, without fealty, homage, or other services than such as are specially comprised in the feoffment. It corresponds very nearly to the "emphyteusis" of the Roman law. Cowell. Fealty, however, was incident to a holding in fee-farm, according to some authors. Spelman; Termes de la Ley.
Fee-farm le where en estate in fee is granted subject to a rent in fee of at least one-fourth of the value of the huida at the time of its reservation. Such rent appears to be called "fee-farm" becaume a grant of lands reserving so considerable a rent is indeed only letting lands to farm in fee-simple, instead of the usual method of life or years. 2 Bl. Comm. 43; 1 Steph.Comm. 676.
Fee-farms are lands held in fee to render for them an-nually the true value, or more or less; so called because a farm rent is reserved upon a grant in fee. Such estates are estates of inheritance. They are classed among estates in fee-simple. No reversionary interest remains in the lessor, and they are therefore subject to the operation of the legal principies which forbid restraints upon alienation in all cases where no feudal relation exists between grantor and grantee. De Peyster v. Michael, 6 N.Y. 497, 57 Am.Dec. 470.
FEE—FARM RENT. The rent reserved on grant-Mg a fee-farm. It might be one-fourth the value of the land, according to Cowell; one-third, ac-cording to other authors. Spelman; Termes de la Ley; 2 Bl. Comm. 43. Fee-farm rent is a rent-charge issuing out of an estate in fee; a perpetual rent reserved on a conveyance in fee-simple. De Peyster v. Michael, 6 N.Y. 467, 495, 57 Am.Dec. 470.
FEE SIMPLE

Absolute
A fee simple absolute is an estate limited ab-solutely to a man and his heirs and assigns for-ever without limitation or condition. Rathbun v. State, 284 Mich. 521, 280 N.W. 35, 40.
Conditional
At the common law, an estate in fee simple con-ditional was a fee limited or restrained to some particular heirs, exclusive of others. But the stat-ute "De Donis" converted all such estates into estates tail. 2 Bl. Comm. 110.
American Law
An absolute or fee-simple estate is one in which the owner is entitled to the entire property, with unconditional power of disposition during his life, and descending to his heirs and legal representa-tives upon his death intestate. Code Ga. 1882, § 2246 (Civ.Code 1910, § 3657). Friedman v. Steiner, 107 III. 131; Woodberry v. Matherson, 19 Fla. 785; Lyle v. Richards, 9 Serg. & R., Pa. 374. Un-limited as to duration, disposition, and descend-ibility. Slayden v. Hardin, 257 Ky. 685, 79 S.W. 2d 11, 12.
The estate which a man has where lands are given to him and to his heirs absolutely without any end or limit put to his estate. 2 Bl. Comm. 106; Plowd. 557; 1 Prest. Est. 425; Litt. § 1. The word "fee," used alone, is a sufficient designation of this species of estate, and hence "simple" is not a necessary part of the title, but it is added as a means of clearly distinguishing this estate from a fee-tail or from any variety of conditional estates.
Fee-simple signifles a pure fee; an absolute estate of inheritance clear of any condition or restriction to particu-lar heirs, being descendible to the heirs general, whether male or female, lineal or collateral. It is the largest estate and most extensive interest that can be enjoyed in land. Haynes v. Bourn, 42 Vt. 686; Powers v. Trustees of Cale-donia County Grammar School, 93 Vt. 220, 106 A. 836, 841; Smith v. Smith’s Ex’r, 122 Va. 341, 94 S.E. 777, 779. When a person owns In common with another, he does not own the entire fee,—a fee-simple; ft is a fee divided or shared with another. Brackett v. Ridlon, 54 Me. 426.
Terms "fee," "fee simple," and "fee simple absolute," are equivalent. Boon v. Boon, 348 III. 120, 180 N.E. 792, 794.
English Law
A freehold estate of inheritance, absolute and unqualified. It stands at the head of estates as the highest in dignity and the most ample in ex-tent; since every other kind of estate is derivable thereout, and mergeable therein. It may be en-joyed not only in land, but also in advowsons, commons, estovers, and other hereditaments, as well as in personalty, as an annuity or dignity, and also in an upper chamber, though the lower buildings and soil belong to another. Wharton; Co.Litt. 1 b; 2 Bla. Comm. 106.
FEE TAIL. A freehold estate in which there is a fixed line of inheritable succession limited to the issue of the body of the grantee or devisee, and in which the regular and general succession of heirs at law is cut off. Coleman v. Shoemaker, 147 Kan. 689, 78 P.2d 905, 907.
An estate tan; an estate of inheritance given to a man and the heirs of his body, or limited to certain classes of particular heirs. It corresponds to the feudum taniatum of the feudal law, and the idea Is believed to have been borrowed from the Roman law, where, by way of fidei commissa, lands might be entailed upon children and freed-men and their descendants, with restrIctions as to aliena-tion. 1 Washb.Real Prop. •66. For the varieties apd special characteristics of thls kind of estate, see Tall, Estate in.
FEED. To lend additional support; to strengthen ex post facto. "The interest when it accrues feeds the estoppel." Christmas v. Oliver, 5 Mood. & R. 202. Similarly, a subsequent title acquired by the mortgagor is said "to feed the mortgage."
The word is used in lis ordlnary sense with reference to cattle and hogs which are said to be made marketable by feeding. Brockway v. Rowley, 66 III. 102.
It is also used in the phrase feeding of a cow by and on the land to signif y from the land while there Is food on it, and with hay by the owner of the land at other times; 2 Q. B. Div. 49.
FEGANGI. In old English law, a thief caught while escaping with the stolen goods in his pos-session. Spelman.
FEHMGERICHTE. The name given to certain secret tribunals which flourished in Germany from the end of the twelfth century to the middle of the sixteenth, usurping many of the functions of the governments which were too weak to main-tain law and order, and inspiring dread in all who carne within their jurisdiction. Ene. Brit. Such a court existed in Westphalia (though with greatly diminished powers) until finally sup-pressed by Jerome Bonaparte in 1811. See Bork, Geschichte der Westphaelischen Vehmgerichte; Paul Wigand, Das Fehmgericht Westphaleus.
FEIGNED. Fictitious; pretended; suppositi-tious; simulated.
FEIGNED ACCOMPLICE. One who pretends to consult and act with others in the planning or commission of a crime, but only for the ~pose of diicovering their plans and confederates and securing evidence against them. State v. Ver-ganadis, 50 Nev. 1, 248 P. 900, 903; People v. Bol-anger, 71 Cal. 17, 11 P. 800.
FEIGNED ACTION. In. practice, an action brought on a pretended right, when the plaintiff has no true cause of action, for some illegal pur-pose. In a feigned action the words of the writ are true. It differs from false action, in which case the words of the writ are false. Co. Litt. 361.
FEIGNED DISEASES. Simulated maladies. Dis eases are generally feigned from one of three causes,—fear, shame, or the hope of gain.
FEIGNED ISSUE. An issue framed to try ques-tions of fact. Miles v. Layton, 8 W.W.Harr. 411, 193 A. 567, 574, 112 A.L.R. 786.
An issue made up by the direction of a court of equity, (or by consent of parties,) and sent to a common-law court, for the purpose of obtainIng the verdict of a jury on some disputed matter of fact which the court has not jurisdic-tion, or is unwilling, to decide. It rests upon a suppositi-tious wager between the partles. See 3 BI.Comm. 452. Under the reformed codes of some states issues may be framed In certain exceptional cases. In England, the prac-tice has been disused since the passing of the stat. 8 and 9 Viet. c. 109, s. 19, permitting any court to refer any ques-tlon of fact to a jury in a direct farm. The act 21 and 22 Vitt. c. 27, provided for trial by jury in the court of chan-cery.
FELAGUS. In Saxon law, one bound for an-other by oath; a sworn brother. A friend bound in the decennary for the good behavior of an-other. One who took the place of the deceased. Thus, if a person was murdered, the recompense due from the murderer went to the felagus of the slain, in default of parents or lord. Cun-ningham; Cowell; Du Cange.
FEM. A field; in composition, wild. Blount. FELE, FEAL. L. Fr. Faithful. See Feal.
FELLATIO, or FELLATION. The offense com-mitted with the male sexual organ and the mouth. State v. Murry, 136 La. 253, 66 So. 963. See Sado-my.
FELLOW. A co-worker; a partaker or sharer of; a companion; one with whom we consort; one joined with another in some legal status or relation; a member of a college or corporate body.
FELLOW-HEIR. A co-heir; partner of the same inheritance.
FELLOW SERVANT. One who serves and is controlled by the same master. Walsh v. Eu-banks, 183 Ark. 34, 34 S.W.2d 762, 764.
Those engaged in the same common pursuit, under the same general control. Cooley, Torts 541. Those who derive authority and compensation from the same common source, and are engaged in the same general business, though it may be In different grades or departments of it. 2 Thomp. Neg. p. 1026, § 31; Southern Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 57 App.D.C. 21, 16 F.2d 517, 519; Brush Electric Light Co. v. Wells, 110 Ga. 192, 35 S.E. 365. When servants are employed and paid by the same master, and their duties are such as to bring them finto such relation that negligence of one in doing his work may injure other in performance of his, then they are engaged in the same common business, and are "fellow servants." Hercules Powder Co. v. Hammack, 145 Miss. 304, 110 So. 676, 677. But it has been held that an inferior employee is not a "fellow servant" of a superior ernployee. McDonald v. Louisville & N. R. CO., 232 Ky. 734, 24 S.W.2d 585, 587.
Convicts in involuntary servitude, having no power to refuse to enter upon the service to which they have been hired out by the state, or to quit it, are not "fellow serv-ants." Sloss-Sheffleld Steel & Iron Co. v. Weir, 179 Ala. 227, 60 So. 851, 853.
FELLOW-SERVANT HULE. The rule that the master is not Hable for injuries to a servant, caused by the negligence of a fellow servant en-gaged in the same general business, where the master has exercised due tare in selection of serv-ants. Setzkorn v. City of Buffalo, 219 App.Div. 416, 219 N.Y.S. 351, 352.
FELO DE SE. A felon of himself; a suicide or murderer of himself.
Where a man of the age of discretion (14 years at com-mon law) and compos mentís voluntarily kills himself. Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Wynn, 29 Ala.App. 207, 194 So. 421, 422. One who commits some unlawful or mali-clous act which results in his own death. Hale, P.C. 411; 4 BI.Comm. 189; Life Ass’n v. Waller, 57 Ga. 536.
FELON. A person who commits a felony. In re La Grange, 153 Mise. 236, 274 N.Y.S. 702. One convicted of felony.
But a person who has committed a felony, been con-victed, served his sentence, and been discharged, may be deemed, at least for some purposes, to be no longer a felon; 3 Exch.Div. 352.
FELONIA. Felony. The act or offense by which a vassal forfeited his fee. Spelman; Calvin. Per feloniam, with a criminal intention. Co. Litt. 391.
FELONIA, EX VI TERMDZI SIGNIFICAT QUODLIBET CAPITALE CRIMEN FELLEO AN-IMO PERPETRATUM. Co. Litt. 391. Felony, by force of the term, signifies any capital crime per-petrated with a malignant mind.
FELONIA IMPLICATUR IN QUALIBET PROD-ITIONE. 3 Inst. 15. Felony is implied in every treason.
FELONICE. Feloniously. Cunningham, Law Dict.
Anciently an indispensable word in indictments for fel-ony, and classed by Lord Coke among those voces artis (words of art) which cannot be expressed by any periphra-sis or circumlocution. 4 Coke, 39; Co.Litt. 391a; 4 BI.Comm. 307.
FELONIOUS. A technical word of law which means done with intent to commit crime; of the grade or quality of a felony; such an assault on the person as, if consummated, would subject party making it, on conviction, to punishment of a felony. Martin v. State, 163 Miss. 454, 142 So. 15, 16. Malicious; villainous; traitorous. People v. Knapp, 152 Misc. 368, 274 N.Y.S. 85. Malig-nant. People v. Moore, 37 Hun, N.Y., 93. Wrong-ful. State v. Uhler, 32 N.D. 483, 156 N.W. 220, 226. Proceeding from an evil heart or purpose. Gatewood v. Commonwealth, 215 Ky. 360, 285 S.W. 193, 194. Wickedly and against the admonition of the law; unlawfully. State v. Allister, 317 Mo. 348, 295 S.W. 754, 757. In the law of larceny, "felonious" is synonymous with fraudulent; State v. Albert, 117 Or. 179, 242 P. 1116, 1117; and means done "animo furandi," that is, with intent to steal. Fountain v. State, 92 Fla. 262, 109 So. 463, 464.
FELONIOUS ASSAULT. Such an assault upon the person as, if consummated, would subject the party making it, upon conviction, to the punish-ment of a felony, that is, to imprisonment in the penitentiary. Hinkle v. State, 94 Ga. 595, 21 S.E. 595.
FELONIOUS HOMICIDE. Killing of human be-ing without justification or excuse. State v. Plum-lee, 177 La. 687, 149 So. 425, 431. There are two degrees: manslaughter and murder. It may in-elude killing oneself. 4 Bl. Comm. 188, 190; 4 Steph. Comm. 108, 111; State v. Symmes, 40 S.C. 383,19 S.E. 16.
FELONIOUSLY. Of, pertaining to, or having, the quality of felony. People v. Thomas, 58 Cal. App. 308, 208 P. 343, 344.
Means proceeding from an evil heart or purpose done with a deliberate intention of committing a crime. Golden v. Commonwealth, 245 Ky. 19, 53 S.W.2d 185, 186. Without color of right or excuse. State v. Enanno, 96 Conn. 420, 114 A. 386, 387. Malignantly; maliciously. State v. Horne, 62 Utah, 376, 220 P. 378, 381. Wickedly and against the admonition of the law. State v. Young, 314 Mo. 612, 286 S.W. 29, 34. With a felonious intent.
An indispensable word at common law in índictments for felony, as feloniee was In the Latin forms. 4 BI.Comm. 307; State v. Jesse, 19 N.C. 300; Com.Dig. Indictment (G 6); Bac.Abr. Indictment (G 1); 2 Hale, PI.Cr. 172, 184: 1 Ben. & H. Lead. Cr.Cas. 154. It is still necessary in descrIbIng a common-law felony, or where lts use 1s pre-scribed by statute; Whart.Cr.P1. § 260; Bowler v. State, 41 Miss. 570; Cain v. State, 18 Tex. 387.
FELONY. A crime of a graver or more atro-cious nature than those designated as misdemean-ors. Ex parte Ramirez, 49 Cal.App.2d 709, 122 P. 2d 361, 362. Generally an offense punishable by death or imprisonment in penitentiary. People v. Pointer, 348 III. 277, 180 N.E. 796, 797, or state prison. State v. Harwood, 206 N.C. 87, 173 S.E. 24, 25. And at common law, an offense occasion-ing total forfeiture of either land or goods to which capital or other punishment might be su-peradded according to degree of guilt. Bell v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 526, 189 S.E. 441, 443.
Felony, compounding of. See Compounding Felony.
Misprision of felony. See Misprision.
Reducible felony. A felony upon conviction of which the offender may be punished as for a misdemeanor, upon recommendation of the jury. Atkins v. State, 154 Ga. 540, 114 S.E. 878.

American Law

The term has no very. deftníte or precise meaníng, except in some cases where it is deflned by statute. In general, what ís felony under the English common law is such under ours, 1 Bish.Cr.L. § 617; Clark, Cr.L. 33. A crime is not a felony unless so declared by statute, or it was such at thecommon law; State v. Murphy, 17 R.I. 698, 24 A.. 473, 16 L.R.A. 550.
Whether an offense is a "felony" depends on whether the uffense may be punished by confinement in the penitentiary and not on whether such punishment of necessity follows conviction of that offense. Lashley v. State, 236 Ala, 1. 180 So. 717, 718. 719. Sentence actually given determines nature of offense. People v. Brown, 52 Cal.App.2d 428, 126 P.2d 406, 408.
Under U. S. Cr. Code, § 335, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1, offenses punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year are felonies. Joplin Mercantile Co. v. United States, C.C.A.Mo., 213 F. 926, 935, Ann.Cas.1916C, 470.

English Lato

This term meant originally the state of having forfeited lands and goods to the crown upon conviction for certain offenses, and then, by transition, any offense upon convic-tion for which such forfeiture followed, in addition to capital or any other punishment prescribed by law; as distinguished from a "misdemeanor," upon conviction for which no forfeiture followed. All indictable offenses are either felonies or misdemeanors, but a material part of the distinction Is taken away by St. 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23, which abolishes forfeiture for felony. Wharton; 4 Bla.Comm. 94; 1 Russ.Cr. 78; Co.Litt. 391; 1 Hawk Pl.Cr. c. 37; U. S. v. Smith, 5 Wheat., U. S., 153, 5 L.Ed. 57; 1 Bish. New Cr.L. § 616.
At early common law the term was applied to describe the more serlous offenses cognizable In the royal courts, conviction for which entailed forfeiture of life, limb and chattels and escheat of lands to the felon’s lord atter a year and a day in the king’s hands. Subsequently, however, the classiflcation was so greatly enlarged that many offenses not involving moral turpitude were included thereln. In re Donegan, 282 N.T. 285, 26 N.E.2d 260, 261.

Feudal Lato

An act or offense on the part of the vassal, which cost him his fee, or in consequence of which his fee fell into the hands of his lord; that is, became forfeited.’ (See Felo-nía.) Perfkly, ingratitude, or disloyalty to a lord.
FELONY ACT. The statute 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23, abolishing forfeitures for felony, and sanctioning the appointment of interim curators and admin-istrators of the property of felons. Mozley & Whiteley; 4 Steph. Comm. 10, 459.
FELONY-MURDER RULE. Any homicide com-mitted while perpetrating or attempting felony is first-degree murder. Payne v. State, 406 P.2d 922, 924, 81 Nev. 503; Element of legal malice is sup-plied from the commission of the felony. Com. v. Cater, 152 A.2d 259, 261, 396 Pa. 172.
FELTING. In the process of "felting," as ap-plied to the manufacture of fur felt hats, the fur fibers become interlocked with the wool fibers, or with other fibers of fur, for their whole length. Matteawan Mfg. Co. v. Emmons Bros. Co., C.C.A. Mass., 253 F. 372, 375. See, also, Werk v. Parker, C.C.A.Pa., 231 F. 121, 123.
FEMALE. The sex which conceives and glves birth to young. Also a member of such sex. The term is generic, but may have the specific mean-ing of "woman," if so indicated by the context. State v. Hemm, 82 Iowa, 609, 48 N.W. 971; State v. Phillips, 26 N.D. 206, 144 N.W. 94, 95, 49 L.R.A., N.S., 470, Ann.Cas.1916A, 320.
Unmarried female, is a term descriptive not only of those who have never married, but also of widows and divorced women. People v. Weinstock, 27 N.Y.Cr.R. 53, 140 N.Y.S. 453, 458.FEME, FEMME. L. Fr. A woman. Ducre v. Milner, La.App., 146 So. 734, 736. Also, a wife, as in the phrase "baron et feme" (q. V.).
FEME COVERT. A married woman. Generally used in reference to the legal disabilities of a mar-ried woman, as compared with the condition of a feme sole. Hoker v. Boggs, 63 111. 161.
FEME SOLE. A single woman, including those who have been married, but whose marriage has been dissolved by death or divorce, and, for most purposes, those women who are judicially sepa-rated from their husbands. Mozley & Whiteley; 2 Steph. Comm. 250. Kirkley v. Lacey, 7 Houst. Del. 213, 30 A. 994.
FEME SOLE TRADER. In English law, a mar-ried woman, who, by the custom of London, trades on her own account, independently of her hus-band; so called because, with respect to her trading, she is the same as a feme sole. Jacob; Cro. Car. 68. The term is applied also to women deserted by their husbands, who do business as temes sole. Rhea v. Rhenner, 1 Pet. 105, 7 L.Ed. 72.
The custom was recognized as common law In South Carolina, but did not extend beyond trading in merchan-dise; McDaniel v. Cornwell, 1 Hill, S.C., 429; Newbiggin v. Pillan, 2 Bay, S.C., 164. By statute in several states a similar custom is recognized, as in Pennsylvania, by act of Feb. 22, 1718, 48 P.S. ¢ 41. Black v. Tricker, 59 Pa. 13; People’s Sav. Bank v. Denig, 131 Pa. 241, 18 A. 1083.
FEMICIDE. The killing of a woman. Wharton. One who idlls a woman.
FEMININE. Of or belonging to females.
FEMME COULEUR LIBRE. Up to the time of Civil War, term applied to all persons not of the white race, including Indians. Sunseri v. Cas-sagne, 191 La. 209, 185 So. 1, 4.
FENATIO (or FEONATIC). In forest law, the fawning of deer; the fawning season. Spelman.
FENCE, v. In old Scotch law, to defend or pro-tect by formalities.
To "fence a court°’ was to open it In due form, and inter-dict sil manner of persons from disturbing their proceed-ings. This was called "fencing," q. d., defending or pro-tecting the court. Pitcairn, Cr.Law, pt. 1, p. 75.
FENCE, n. A hedge, structure, or partition, erect-ed for the purpose of inclosing a piece of land, or to divide a piece of land into distinct portions, or to separate two contiguous estates. Kimball v. Carter, 95 Va. 77, 27 S.E. 823, 38 L.R.A. 570; Estes v. Railroad Co., 63 Me. 309.
An enclosure about a field or other space, or about any object; especially an enclosing structure of wood, iron or other materials, intended to prevent intrusion from with-out or straying from within. Mutual Lumber Co. v. Shep-pard, Tex.Civ.App., 173 S.W.2d 494, 499.
A colloqiiial characterization of a receiver of stolen property. People v. Fishel, 270 Mich. 82, 258 N.W. 217.
FENCE COUNTY. A county where the stock law has not been adopted. McKenzie v. Powell, 68 Ga.App. 285, 22 S:E.2d 735, 736.FENCE-MONTH, or DEFENSE-MONTIL In old English law, a period of time, occurring in the middle of summer, during which it was unlawful to hunt deer in the forest, that being their fawn-ing season. Probably so called because the deer were then defended from pursuit or hunting. Manwood; Cowell; Spelman.
FENCING PATENTS. Patents procured in an effort to broaden the scope of the invention be-yond the article or process which is actually in-tended to be manufactured or licensed. Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 133, 144 F. 2d 497, 499.
FENDER. A guard or protection against danger. Cape May, D. B. & S. P. R. Co. v. Cape May, 59 N.J.L. 396, 36 A. 696, 36 L.R.A. 653. A safety de-vice sometimes called life guard, on street cars. Tampa Electric Co. v. Bazemore, 85 Fla. 164, 96 So. 297, 298; Galveston Electric Co. v. Swank, Tex.Civ.App., 188 S.W. 704, 706.
FENERATION. Usury; the gain of interest; the practice of increasing money by lending. Sometimes applied to interest on money lent. See Colebrook, Dig. Hindu Law, L 7.
FENGELD. In Saxon law, a tax or imposition, exacted for the repelling of enemies. Spelman.
FENIAN. A champion, hero, giant. This word, in the plural, is generally used to signif y invaders or foreign spoilers. The modern meaning of "Fenian" is a member of an organization of per-sons of Irish birth, resident in the United States, Canada, and elsewhere, having for its aim the overthrow of English rule in Ireland. Webster.
FEOD. The same as feud or fi,ef. 2 Bla. Comm. 45; Spelman.
FEODAL. Belonging to a fee or feud; feudal. More commonly used by the old writers than feudal.
FEODAL ACTIONS. Real actions. 3 Bla. Comm. 117.
FEODAL SYSTEM. See. Feudal System.
FEODALITY. Fidelity or fealty. Cowell. See Fealty.
FEODARUM (or FEUDARAM) CONSUETU-DINES. The customs of feuds. The name of a compilation of feudal laws and customs made at Milan in the twelfth century. It is the most an-cient work on the subject, and was always regard-ed, on the continent of Europe, as possessing the highest authority.
FEODARY. ,An of lcer of the court of wards, appointed by the master of that court, under 32 Hen. VIII. c. 26, whose business it was to be pres-ent with the escheator in every county at the find-ing of offices of Lands, and to give evidence for the king, as well concerning the value as the ten-ure; and his office was also to survey the land of the ward, after the office found, and to rate it He also assigned the king’s widows their dower; and received all the rents, etc. Abolished by 12 Car. II. c. 24. Wharton; Kennett, Gloss.; Cowell.
FEODATORY, or FEUDATORY. In feudal law, the grantee of a feod, feud, or fee; the vassal or tenant who held his estate by feudal service. Termes de la Ley. Blackstone uses "f eudatory." 2 Bl. Comm. 46.
FEODI FIRMA. In old English law, fee-farm (q. y.).
FEODI FIRMARIUS. The lessee of a fee-farm.
FEODUM. This word (meaning a feud or fee) is the one most commonly used by the older Eng-lish law-writers, though its equivalent, "feudum" (q. v.), is used generally by the more modern writers and by the feudal law-writers. Litt. § 1; Spelman.
There were various classes of feoda, among which may be enumerated the following: Feodum kvicum, a lay fee. Feodum militare, a knight’s fee., Feodum improprium, an improper or derivative fee. Feodum proprium, a proper and original fee, regulated by the strict rules of feudal suc-cession and tenure. Feodum simplex, a simple or pure fee; fee-simple. Feodum talliatum, a fee-tall. See 2 131.Comili. 58, 62; Litt. II 1, 13; Bract. fol. 175; Glan. 13, 23.
In old English law, a seigniory or jurisdiction. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 63, § 4. A fee, a perquisite or com-pensation for a service. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 7.
FEODUM ANTIQUUM. A feud which devolved upon a vassal from his intestate ancestor.
FEODUM EST QUOD QUIS TENET EX QUA-CUNQUE CAUSA SIVE SIT TENEMENTUM SIVE REDDITUS. Co. Litt. 1. A fee is that which any one holds from whatever cause, wheth-er tenement or rent.
FEODUM NORME. A fief for which the tenant did guard and owed homage. Spelman.
FEODUM NOVUM. A feud acquired by a vassal himseif.
FEODUM SIMPLEX QUIA FEODUM IDEM EST QUOD HAEREDITAS, ET SIMPLEX IDEM EST QUOD LEGITIMUM VEL PURUM; ET SIC FEO-DUM SIMPLEX IDEM EST QUOD HZEREDITAS LEGITIMA VEL IIIEREDITAS PURA. Litt. § 1. A fee-simple, so called because fee is the same as inheritance, and simple is the same as lawful or pure; and thus fee-simple is the same as a law-ful inheritance, or pure inheritance.
FEODUM TALLIATUM, 1. e., LIZEREDITAS IN QUANDAM CERTITUDINEM LIMITATA. Litt. § 13. Fee-tail, i. e., an inheritance limited in a definite descent.
FEOFFAMENTUM. A feoffment. 2 Bl. Comm. 310.
FEOFFARE. To enfeoff; to bestow a fee. The bestower was called "feoffator," and the grantee or feoffee, "feoffatus." 1 Reeve, Hist. Eng. Law,FEOFFATOR. In old English law, a feoffer or feoffor; one who gives or bestows a fee; one who makes a feoffment. Bract. fols. 12b, 81.
FEOFFATUS. In old English law, a feoffee; one to whom a fee is given, or a feoffment made. Bract. lois. 17b, 44b.
FEOFFEE. He to whom a fee is conveyed. Litt. § 1; 2 Bl. Comm. 20.
FEOFFEE TO USES. A person to whom land was conveyed for the use of a third party. (The latter was called "cestui que use.") One holding the same position with reference to a use that a trustee does to a trust. 1 Greenl. Cruise, Dig. 333. He answers to the hceres fiduciarius of the Roman law.
FEOFFMENT. The gift of any corporeal here-ditament to another (2 Bl. Comm. 310), operat-ing by transmutation of possession, and requiring, as essential to its completion, that the seisin be passed (Watk. Conv. 183), which might be ac-complished either by investiture or by livery of seisin. 1 Wáshb. Real Prop. 33. Thatcher v. Omans, 3 Pick., Mass., 532; French v. French, 3 N.H. 260. A gift of a freehold interest in land accompanied by livery of seisin. The essential part is the livery of seisin. 3 Holdsw. Hist. E. L. 187.
Also the deed or conveyance by which such cor-poreal hereditament is passed.
A feoffment originally meant the grant of a feud or fee; that is, a barony or knight’s fee, for which certain services were due from the feoffee to the feoffor. By custom it carne afterwards to signify also a grant (with livery of seisin) of a free inheritance to a man and his heirs, refer-ring rather to the perpetuity of the estate than to the feudal tenure. 1 Reeve, Eng.Law, 90, 91. It was for ages the only method (in ordinary use) for conveying the free-hold of land in possession, but has now fallen In great measure finto disuse, even in England, having been almost entirely supplanted by some of that class of conveyances founded on the statute law of the realm. 1 Steph.Comm. 467, 468; Dane, Abr. c. 104; Stearn, Real Act. 2; Green v. Liter, 8 Cranch, U.S., 229, 3 L.Ed. 545.
FEOFFMENT TO USES. A feoffment of lands to one person to the use of another.
In such case the feoffee was bound in conscience to hold the lands according to the use, and could himself derive no benefit. Sometimes such feoffments were made to the use of the feoffer. The effect of such conveyance was entirely changed by the statute of uses. See Wms.R.P., 6th Ed., 155; 2 Sand.Us. 13; Watk.Conv. 288.
FEOFFOR. The person making a feoffment, or enfeoffing another in fee. 2 Bl. Comm. 310; Litt. §§ 1, 57.
FEOH. This Saxon word meant originally cattle, and thence property or money, and, by a second transition, wages, reward, or fee. It was probab-ly the original form from which the words "feod," "feudum," "fief," "feu," and "fee" (all meaning a feudal grant of land) have been derived. SPel-man, Feuds.
FEONATIO. In forest law, the fawning season of deer.FEORME. A certain portion of the produce of the land due by the grantee to the lord according to the terms of the charter. Spel. Feuds, c. 7.
FEILE BESTIA& Wild beasts.
FERIE NATURZE. Lat. Of a wild nature or disposition.
AnImals which are by nature wild are so designated, by way of distinction from such as are naturally tatue, the lat-ter being called "domitce natuxce." Fleet v. Hegeman, 14 Wend., N.Y., 43; State v. Taylor, 27 N.J.L. 119, 72 Am. Dec. 347; Gillet v. Mason, 7 Johns., N.Y., 17.
FERCOSTA. Ital. A kind of small vessel or boat. Mentioned in old Scotch law, and called "fercost." Skene.
FERDELLA TERR2E. A fardel-land; ten acres; or perhaps a yard-land. Cowell.
FERDFARE. Sax. A summons to serve in the army. An acquittance from going into the army. Fleta, lib. 1, c. 47, § 23.
FERDINGUS. A term denoting, apparently, a freeman of the lowest class, being named after the cotseti. Anc. Inst. Eng.
FERDWITE. In Saxon law, an acquittance of manslaughter committed in the army; also a fine imposed on persons for not going forth on a military expedition. Cowell.
FERIA. In old English law, a weekday; a holi-day; a day on which process could not be served;. a fair; a ferry. Cowell; Du Cange; Spelman; 4 Reeve, Hist. Eng. Law 17.
FERIE. In Roman law, holidays; generally speaking, days or seasons during which free-born Romans suspended their political transactions and their lawsuits, and during which slaves enjoyed a cessation from labor.
All ferias were thus dies nefasti. All feHas were ,divided into two classes,—"ferice publicas" and "ferice privatce." The latter were only observed by single families or individ-uals, in commemoration of some particular event which had been of importance to them or their ancestors. Smith, Dict. Anti e.
Numerous festivals were called by thls narre in the early Roman empine. In the laten Roman empire the single days occurring at intervals of a week apart, commencing with the seventh day of the ecclesiastical year, were so called. Du Cange.
FERIAL DAYS. Originally and properly, days free from labor and pleading; holidays. In stat-ute 27 Hen. VI. c. 5, working-days; weekdays, as distinguished from Sunday. Cowell.
FERITA. In old European law, a wound; a stroke. Spelman.
FERLING. In old records, the fourth part of a penny; also the quarter of a ward in a borough.
FERLINGATA. A fourth part of a yard-land.
FERLINGUS, or FERLINGUM. A furlong. Co. Litt. 5 b.
FERM, or FEARM. A house or land, or both, let by lease. Cowell.FERME. A farm; a rent; a lease; a house or land, or both, taken by indenture or lease. Plowd. 195; Vieat; Cowell. See Farm.
FERMENTATION. A decomposition produced in an organic substance by the physiological action of a living organisin, or by certain unorganized agents. U. S. v. Dodson, D.C.Cal., 268 F. 397, 403.
FERMENTED LIQUORS. Beverages produced by, or which have undergone, a process of aleo-holle fermentation, to which they owe their intoxi-cating properties, including beer, wine, hard cider, and the like, but not spirituous or distilled liquors. State v. Lemp, 16 Mo. 391; State v. Biddle, 54 N. H. 383; People v. Foster, 64 Mich. 715, 31 N.W. 596; Hill v. State, 174 Md. 137, 197 A. 795, 799.
FERMER, FERMOR. A lessee; a farmer. One who holds a term, whether of lands or an incor-poreal right, such as customs or revenue.
FERMIER. In French law, one who farms any public revenue.
FERMISONA. In old English law, the winter season for killing deer.
FERMORY. In old records, a place in monas-teries, where they received the poor, (hospicio ex-cipiebant,) and gave them provisions (ferm, fir-ma.) Spelman. Hence the modern infirmary, used in the sense of a hospital.
FERNIGO. In old English law, a waste ground, or place where fern grows. Cowell.
FERRATOR. A farrier (q. v.).
FERRI. In the civil law, to be borne; that is on or about the person. This was distinguished from portari, (to be carried,) which signified to be car-ried on an animal. Dig. 50, 16, 235.
FERRIAGE. The toll or fare paid for the trans-portation of persons and property across a ferry.
Llterally speaking, it is the price or fare fiked by law for the transportation of the traveling public, with such goods and chattels as they may have with them, across a river, bay, or lake. People v. San Francisco & A. R. Co., 35 Cal. 606.
FERRIFODINA. In old pleading, an iron mine. Townsh.P1. 273.
FERRUERE, or FERRURA. The shoeing of horses. Kelham. See Ferrum.
FERRUM. Iron. In old English law, a horse-shoe. Ferrura, shoeing of horses.
FERRY. A place of transit across a river or arm of the sea. Woolr.Ways 217. In law it is treated as a franchise, and defined as the exclusive right to carry passengers across a river, or arm of the sea, from one vill to another, or to connect a con-tinuous line of road leading from township or vill to another. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co. v. U. -S., C.C.A. Wash., 73 F.2d 831, 832.
A continuation of the highway from one side of the water over which it passes to the other, for transportation of passengers or of travelers with their teams and vehicles and such other property as they may carry or have with them. U. S. v. Puget Sound Nav. Co., D.C.Wash., 24 F.Supp. 431,
432.
A liberty to have a boat on a stream, river, arm of the sea, lake, or other body of water for the transportation ot men, horses, and vehicles with their contents, for a reasonable toll. Sometimes limited to the landing place. State Highway Com-mission v. Smith, 250 Ky. 269, 62 S.W.2d 1044.
It may be said to be necessary service by specially con-structed boat to carry passengers and property across rivera or bodies of water from place on one shore to point con-veniently opposite on other shore and continuation of high-way making connection with thoroughfare at each termi-nus. U. S. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., D.C.Wash., 4 F.Supp.
851, 853. It comprises not merely the exclusive privilege of transportation, but also the use for that purpose of the respective landings, with the outlets therefrom. Hale v. Record, 74 Okl. 77, 176 P. 756, 757.
A public ferry la one to which all the public have the right to resort, for which a regular fere is established, and the ferryman is a common carrier, bound to take over all who apply, and bound to keep his ferry in operation and good repair. Hudspeth v. Hall, 111 Ga. 510, 36 S.E. 770; Broadnax v. Baker, 94 N.C. 681, 55 Am.Rep. 633.
A private ferry is one mainly for the use of the owner, and though he may take pay for ferriage, he does not fol-low it as a business. His ferry is not open to the public at its demand, and he may or may not keep it in operation. Hudspeth v. Hall, supra; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 140 Ark. 158, 215 S.W. 698.
FERRY FRANCAISE. The public grant of a right to maintain a ferry at a particular place; a right conferred to land at a particular point and secure toll for the transportation of persons and property from that point across the stream. Milis v. St. Clair County, 7 Ill. 208. A grant to a named person empowering him to continue an interrupt-ed land highway over the interrupting waters. U. S. v. Puget Sound Nav. Co., D.C.Wash., 24 F. Supp. 431, 432.
FERRYBOAT. A vessel traversing any of the waters of the state between two constant points regularly employed for the transfer of passengers and freight, authorized by law so to do, and also any boat employed as a part of the system of a railroad for the transfer of passengers and freight plying at regular and stated periods between two points. Pol.Code Cal. § 3643; Lake Tahoe Ry. & Transp. Co. v. Roberts, 168 Cal. 551, 143 P. 786, 789, Ann.Cas.1916E, 1196.
FERRYMAN. One employed in taking persons across a river or other stream, in boats or other contrivances, at a ferry. Covington Ferry Co. v. Moore, 8 Dana, Ky., 158; State v. Clarke, 2 Mc-Cord, S.C., 48, 13 Am.Dec. 701.
FESTA IN CAPPIS. In old English law, grand holidays, on which choirs wore caps. Jacob.
FESTINATIO JUSTITLIE EST NOVERCA IN-FORTUNH. Hob. 97. Hasty justice is the step-mother of misfortune.
FESTING—MAN. In old English law, a bonds-man; a surety; a frank-pledge, or one who was surety for the good behavior of another. Monas-teries enjoyed the privilege of being "free from festing-men," which means that they were "not bound for any man’s forthcoming who should transgress the law." Cowell. See Frank-Pledge.
FESTING—PENNY. Earnest given to servants when hired or retained. The same as arles-penny. Cowell.
FESTINUM REMEDIUM. Lat. A speedy rem-edy.
A term applied to those cases where the remedy for the redress of an injury is given without any unnecessary delay. Bacon, Abr. Assise, A. The action of dower is /estiman remedium. The writ of assise was also thus char-acterized (in comparison with the less expeditious remedies previously available) by the statute of Wéstminster 2 (13 Edw. I. c. 24.)
FESTUCA. In Frankish law, a rod or staff or (as described by other writers) a stick, on which im-precatory runs were cut, which was used as a gage or pledge of good faith by a party to a contract, or for symbolic delivery in the conveyance or quit-claim of land, before a court of law, anterior to the introduction of written documents by the Romans. 2 Poll. & Maitl. 86, 184, 190; Maitl. Domesday Book and Beyond 323.
FESTUM. A feast, holiday, or festival. Festutn stultorum, the feast of fools.
FETICIDE. In medical jurisprudence, destruc-tion of the fetus; the act by which criminal abor-tion is produced. 1 Beck, Med.Jur. 288; Guy, Med. Jur. 133. See, also, Prolicide.
FETTERS. Chains or shackles for the feet; irons used to secure the legs of convicts, unruly pris-oners, etc. Similar chains securing the wrists are called "handcuffs."
FEU. In Scotch law, a holding or tenure where the vassal, in place of military service, makes his return in grain or money. Distinguished from "wardholding," which is the military tenure of the country. Bell; Erskine, Inst. lib. ii. tit. 3, 7.
FEU ANNUALS. In Scotch law, the reddendo, or annual return from the vassal to a superior in a feu holding. Wharton, Dict., 2d Lond.Ed.
FEU ET LIEU. Fr. In old French and Canadian law, hearth and home. A term importing actual settlement upon land by a tenant.
FEU HOLDING. A holding by tenure of render-ing grain or money in place of military service. Bell.
FEUAR. In Scotch law, the tenant or vassal of a feu; a feu-vassal. Bell.
FEUD. Feudal law. An estate in land held of a superior on condition of rendering him services. 2 Bl.Comm. 105. An inheritable right to the use and occupation of lands, held on condition of ren-dering services to the lord or proprietor, who him-self retains the property in the lands. See Spel. Feuds, c. 1.
In this sense the word is the same as "feod," "feodum," "feudum," "fief," or "fee." 1 SullivanLect. 128; 1 Spence, Eq.Jur. 34; Dalrymple, Feud. Pr. 99; 1 Washb.R.P. 18; Mitch.R.P. 80.

Saxon and Old German Law

An enmity, or species of private war, existing between the family of a murdered man and the family of his slayer. In Scotland and the north of England, a combination of all the kin to re-venge the death of any of the blood upon the slayer and all his race. Termes de la Ley; Whi-shaw. See Deadly Feud; Faida.

Military Feuds

The genuine or original feuds which were in the hands of military men, who performed military duty for their tenures.
FEUDA. Feuds or fees.
FEUDAL. Pertaining to feuds or fees; relat-ing to or growing out of the feudal system or feudal law; having the quality of a feud, as dis-tinguished from "allodial."
FEUDAL ACTIONS. An ancient name for real actions, or such as concern real property only. 3 Bl.Comm. 117.
FEUDAL COURTS. In the 12th century a lord qua lord had the right to hold a court for his tenants.
In the 13th century, they became of less ímportance and for three reasons: The feudal principie would have led to a series of courts one aboye the other, and the dominions of the large landowners were usually scattered, so that great feudal courts became impossible. The growth of the jurisdiction of the king’s court removed the necessíty for feudal courts. All the incidents of the feudal system came to be regarded in a commercial spirit—as property. Its jurisdiction became merely appendant to landowning. 1 Holdsw.HIst.E.L. 64.
FEUDAL LAW. The body of jurisprudence re-lating to feuds; the real-property law of the feud-al system; the law anciently regulating the prop-erty relations of lord and vassal, and the creation, incidents, and transmission of feudal estates.
The body of laws and usages constituting the "feudal law" was originally customary and unwritten, but a com-pilation was made in the twelfth century, called "Feodarum Consuetudines," which has formed the basis of later dígests. The feudal law prevailed over Europe from the twelfth to the fourteenth century, and was introduced finto England at the Norman Conquest, where it formed the entire basis of the law of real property until comparatively modern times. Survívals of the feudal law, to the present day, so affect and color that branch of jurisprudence as to require a certain knowledge of the feudal law in order to the perfect comprehension of modern tenures and rules of real-property law.
FEUDAL POSSESSION. The equivalent of "sel-sin" under the feudal system.
FEUDAL SYSTEM. The system of feuds. A po-litical and social system which prevailed through-out Europe during the eleventh, twelfth, and thir-teenth centuries, and is supposed to have grown out of the peculiar usages and policy of the Teu-tonic nations who overran the continent alter the fall of the Western Roman Empire, as developed by the exigencies of their military domination,and possibly furthered by notions taken from the Roman jurisprudence.
It was introduced into England, in tts completeness, by William I., A. D. 1085, though it may have exlsted in a rudimentary form among the Saxons before the Conquest. It formed the entire basis of the real-property law of Eng-land in medieval times; and survivals of the system,- in modern days, so modif y and color that branch of jurispru-dence, both in England and America, that many of its principies require for their complete understanding a knowledge of the feudal system. The feudal system orig-inated in the relations of a mílitary chteftain and his fol-lowers, or king and nobles, or lord and vassals, and espe-cially their relations as determined by the bond established by a grant of land from the former to the latter. From this it grew lato a complete and intricate complex of rules for the tenure and transmission of real estate, and of cor-related dutíes and services; while, by tying men to the land and to those holding aboye and below them, it created a close-knit hierarchy of persons, and developed an aggre-gate of social and political institutIons. For an account of the feudal system in its juristic relations, see 2 Bl.Comm. 44; 1 Steph.Comm. 160; 3 Kent, Comm. 487; Spel.Feuds; Litt.Ten.; Sull.Lect.; Spence, Eq.Jur.; 1 Washb.Real Prop. 15; Dair.Feu.Prop. For its political and social rela-tions, see Hall, Middle Ages; Maine, Anc.Law; Rob. Car. V.; Montesq. Esprit des Lois, bk. 30; Guizot, Hist.Civili-zation.
FEUDAL TENURES. The tenures of real estate under the feudal system, such as knight-service, socage, villenage, etc.
FEUDALISM. The feudal system; the aggregate of feudal principies and usages.
It la a vague term to describe a congeries of customs and legal relations by no means uniform throughout Europe and never static. But feudalism had one basic character-istic traceable through all its variations: It rested on relations to land, the primary factor in a relatively primi-tive agrarian cívilization. United States v. Forness, C.C.A. N.Y., 125 F.2d 928, 933.
FEUDALIZE. To reduce to a feudal tenure; to conform to feudalism. Webster.
FEUDARY. A tenant who holds by feudal ten-ure, (also spelled "feodatory" and "feudatory.") Held by feudal service. Relating to feuds or feu-dal tenures.
FEUDBOTE. A recompense for engaging in a feud, and the damages consequent, it having been the custom in ancient times for all ale kindred to engage in their kinsman’s quarrel. Jacob.
FEUDE. An occasional early form of "feud" in the sense of private war or vengeance. Termes de la Ley. See Feud.
FEUD1ST. A writer on feuds, as Cujacius, Spel-man, etc.
FEUDO. In Spanish law, feud or fee. White, New Recop. b. 2, tit. 2, c. 2.
FEUDORUM LIBER. The book of feuds.
This was a compilation of feudal law, prepared by order of the emperor Frederick I., and published at Milan in 1170. It comprised flve books, of which only the first two are now extant with fragmentary portions of the others, printed at the end of modern editions of the Corpus Juris Cívilis. Giannone, b. 13, c. 3; Cruise, Mg. prel. días. c. 1, § 31.
FEUDORUM L1BRI. The Books of Feuds pub-lished during the reign of Henry III., about the year 1152.The particular customs of Lombardy as to feuds began about the year 1152, to be the standard of authority to other nations, by reason of the greater reflnement with which that branch of learning had been there cultivated. This compllation was probably known in England, but does not appear to have had any °t’uer effect than to Influence English lawyers to the more critica/ study of their own tenures, and to induce them to extend the learning of real property so as to embrace more curious matter of similar klnd. 2 Reeves, Hist.Eng.Law, 55.
FEUDUM. L. Lat. A feud, fief, or fee. A right of using and enjoying forever the lands of an-other, which the lord grants on condition that the tenant shall render fealty, military duty, and other services. Spelman. It is not properly the land, but a right in the land.
This form of the word is used by the feudal writers. The earlier English writers generally prefer the form feodum. There was an older word jeum.
lis use by the Normans is exceedingly obscure. "Feudal" was not In their vocabulary. Usually It denoted a stretch of land, rarely a tenure or mass of rights. It carne to be applied to every person who had heritable rights in land. Maitl.Domesday Book and Beyond 152.
FEUDUM ANTIQUUM. An ancient feud or fief; a fief descended to the vassal from his ancestors. 2 Bl.Comm. 212, 221. A fief which ancestors had possessed for more than four generations. Spel-man; Priest v. Cummings, 20 Wend. N.Y. 349.
FEUDUM APERTUM. An open feud or fief ; a fief resulting back to the lord, where the blood of the person last seised was utterly extinct and Bone or where the tenant committed a crime, or gave other legal cause. Spelman; 2 Bl.Comm. 245.
FEUDUM FRANCUM. A free feud. One which was noble and free from talliage and other sub-sidies to which the plebeia feuda (vulgar feuds) were subject. Spelman.
FEUDUM HAUBERTIClUM. A fee held on the military service of appearing fully armed at the ban and arriere ban. Spelman.
FEUDUM LMPROPRIUM. An improper or deriva-tive feud or fief. 2 Bl.Comm. 58.
FEUDUM INDIVIDUUM. An indivisible or im-partible feud or fief; descendible to the eldest son alone. 2 Bl.Comm. 215.
FEUDUM LAICUM. A lay fee.
FEUDUM LIGIUM. A liege feud or fief; a fief held immediately of the sovereign; one for which the vassal owed fealty to his lord against &I per-sons. 1 Bl.Comm. 367; Spelman.
FEUDUM MATERNUM. A maternal fief; a fief descended to the feudatory from his mother. 2 Bl.Comm. 212.
FEUDUM MILITARE. A knight’s fee, held by knight service and esteemed the most honorable species of tenure. 2 Bla.Comm. 62.
FEUDUM NORME. A fee for which the tenant did guard and owed fealty and homage. Spel-man.FEUDUM NOVUM. A new feud or fief; a fiel which began in the person of the feudatory, and did not come to him by succession. Spelman; 2 Bl.Comm. 212; Priest v. Cummings, 20 Wend. N.Y. 349.
FEUDUM NOVUM UT ANTIQUUM. A new fee held with the qualities and incidents of an ancient one. 2 Bl.Comm. 212.
FEUDUM PATERNUM. A fee which the paternal ancestors had held for four generations. Calvin.; Spelman. One descendible to heirs on the pater-nal side only. 2 Bl.Comm. 223. One which might be held by males only. Du Cange.
FEUDUM PROPRIUM. A proper, genuine, and original feud or fief; being of a purely military character, and held by military service. 2 Bl. Comm. 57, 58.
FEUDUM TALLIATUM. A restricted fee. One limited to descend to certain classes of heirs. 2 Bl.Comm. 112, note; 1 Washb. Real Prop. 66; Spelman.
FEUM. An older form of feudum. Maitl. Domes-day Book and Beyond 152.
FEW. Not many; of small number. U. S. v. Margolis, C.C.A.N.J., 138 F.2d 1002, 1003. An in-definite expression for a small or limited num-ber. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Brod-erick, 56 Ind.App. 58, 102 N.E. 887, 893. Indicating a small number of units or individuals which constitute a whole. Provident Loan Bank v. Par-ham, 137 Tenn. 483, 194 S.W. 570. A relative term of great elasticity of meaning. Klann v. Minn, 161 Wis. 517, 154 N.W. 996.
FF. A Latin abbreviation for "Fragmenta," des-ignating the Digest or Pandects in the Corpus Juris Civilis of Justinian; so called because that work is made up of fragments or extracts from the writings of numerous jurists. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 74.
FI. FA. An abbreviation for fieri facias, (which see.)
FIANCER. L. Fr. To pledge one’s faith. Kel-ham.
FIANZA. Sp. In Spanish law, trust, confidence, and correlatively a legal duty or obligation aris-ing therefrom.
The term is sufliclently broad In meaning to include both a general obligation and a restricted liability under a single instrument. Martinez v. Runkle, 57 N.J.L. 111, 30 A. 593. But In a special sense, lt designates a surety or guarantor, or the contract or engagement of suretyship; the contract by which one person engages to pay the debt or fulfll the obligation of another If the latter should fail to do so.
FIAR. In Scotch law, he that has the fee or feu. The proprietor is termed "fiar," in contradistinc-tion to the life renter. 1 Kames, Eq. Pref. One whose property is charged with a life-rent. Where a right is taken to a husband and wife in conjunct fee and life-rent, the husband, as the persona dignior, is the only fiar. Ersk. Prin. 421.FIARS PRICES. The value of grain in the dif-ferent counties of Scotland, fixed yearly by the respective sheriffs, in the month of February, with the assistance of juries. These regulate the pile-es of grain stipulated to be sold at the fiar prices, or when no price has been stipulated. Ersk. 1, 4, 6.
FIAT. (Lat. "Let it be done.") In English prac-tice, a short order or warrant of a judge or magis-trate directing some act to be done; an authority issuing from some competent source for the doing of some legal act. See 1 Tidd Pr. 100.
One of the proceedings in the English bankrupt practice, being a power, signed by the lord chan-cellor, addressed to the court of bankruptcy, au-thorizing the petitioning creditor to prosecute his complaint before it. 2 Steph.Comm. 199. By the statute 12 & 13 Vict. c. 116, fiats were abolished.
Joint fiat. In English law, a fiat in bankruptcy, issued against two or more trading partners.
FIAT JUSTITIA. Let justice be done. On a pe-tition to the king for his warrant to being a writ of error in parliament, he writes on the top of the petition, "Fiat justitia," and then the writ of error is made out, etc. Jacob.
FIAT JUSTITIA, RUAT C(ELUM. Let right be done, though the heavens should fall. Branch, Princ. 161.
FIAT PROUT FIERI CONSUEVIT, (NIL TEMERE NOVANDUM.) Let it be done as it hath used to be done, (nothing must be rashly innovated.) Jenk. Cent. 116, case 39; Branch, Princ.
FIAT UT PETITUR. Let it be done as it is asked. A forro of granting a petition.
FIAUNT. An order; command. See Fíat.
FICTIO. In Roman law, a fiction; an assumption or supposition of the law.
"Ficho" in the old Roman law was properly a term of pleading, and signifled a false averment on the part of the plaintiff which the defendant was not allowed to traverse; as that the plaintiff was a Roman citizen, when in truth he was a foreigner. The object of the fiction was to gíve the court jurisdiction. Maine, Anc.Law, 25.
FICTIO CEDIT VERITATI. FICTIO JURIS NON EST UBI VERITAS. Fiction yields to truth. Where there is truth, fiction of law exists not. 11 Co. 51.
FICTIO EST CONTRA VERITATEM, SED PRO VERITATE HABETUR. Fiction is against the truth, but it is to be esteemed truth.
FICTIO JURIS NON EST UBI VERITAS. Where truth is, fiction of law does not exist.
FICTIO LEGIS INIQUE OPERATUR ALICUI DAMNUM VEL INJURIAM. A legal fiction does not properly work loss or injury. 2 Coke, 35; 3 Coke, 36; Broom, Max. 129; Gilb. 223. Fiction of law is wrongful if it works loss or injury to any-one.FICTIO LEGIS NEMINEM LiEDIT. A fiction of law injures no one. 2 Rolle, 502: 3 Bl.Comm. 43; Low v. Little, 17 Johns. N.Y. 348.
FICTION. An assumption or supposition of law that something which is or may be false is true, or that a state of facts exists which has never really taken place. New Hampshire Strafford , Bank v. Cornell, 2 N.H. 324; Hibberd v. Smith, 67 Cal. 547, 4 P. 473, 56 Am.Rep. 726; Murphy v. Murphy, 190 Iowa 874, 179 N.W. 530, 533. An sumption, for purposes of justice, of a fact that does not or may not exist. Dodo v. Stocker, 74 Colo. 95, 219 P. 222, 223.
A rule of law which assumes as true, and will not allow to be disproved, something which is false, but not impossible. Best, Ev. 419.
These assumptions are of an innocent or even beneficial character, and are made for the advancement of the ends of justice. They secure this end chiefly by the extension of procedure from cases to which it Is applIcable to other cases to which it is not strictly applicable, the ground of inap-p]icability being some difference of an immaterial char-acter. Brown.
FIctions are to be dIstInguIshed from presumptions of law. By the former, something known to be false or unreal Is assumed as true; by the latter, an Inference Is set up, which may be and probably Is true, but which, at any rate, the law will not permit to be controverted. It may also be said that a presumption is a rule of law prescribed for the purpose of getting at a certain concluslon, though arbltrary, where the subject is Intrinsically hable to doubt from the remoteness, discrepancy, or actual defect of proofs.
Fictions are also to be distinguished from estoppels; an estoppel being the rule by which a person is precluded from asserting a fact by prevlous conduct inconsistent therewith on his own part or the part of those under whom he clalms, or by an adjudication upon his rights which he cannot be allowed to question.
Best distinguishes legal flctions from presumptions juris et de jures and divides them finto three kinds,—afiírmative or positive flctions, negative flctions, and flctions by rela-tion. Best, Pres. p. 27, 4 24.
FICTION OF LAW. Something known to be false is assumed to be true. Ryan v. Motor Credit Co., 130 N.J.Eq. 531, 23 A.2d 607, 621.
FICTITIOUS. Founded on a fiction; having the character of a fiction; pretended; counterfeit. People v. Carmona, 79 Cal.App. 159, 251 P. 315, 317; State v.’ Tinnin, 64 Utah 587, 232 P. 543, 545, 43 A.L.R. 46. Feigned, imaginary, not real, false, not genuine, nonexistent. Bill alleging that amount of mortgage sought to be canceled was "fictitious" held to allege that mortgage was with-out consideration. Kinney v. Kinney, 230 Ala. 558, 161 So. 798, 800. Arbitrarily invented and set up, to accomplish an ulterior object. West Virginia Mortgage & Discount Corporation v. Newcomer, 101 W.Va. 292, 132 S.E. 748, 749.
FICTITIOUS ACTION. An action brought for the sole purpose of obtaining the opinion of the court on a point of law, not for the settlement of any actual controversy between the parties. Smith v. Junction Ry. Co., 29 Ind. 551.
FICTITIOUS NAME. A counterfeit, feigned, or pretended name taken by a person, differing in some essential particular from his true name, (consisting of Christian name and patronymic,)with the implication that it is meant to deceive or mislead. Pollard v. Fidelity F. Ins. Co., 1 S’.D. 570, 47 N.W. 1060; Carlock v. Cagnacci, 88 Cal. 600, 26 P. 597; Mangan v. Schuylkill County, 273 Pa. 310, ll6 A. 920, 921.
FICTITIOUS PAVEE. Negotiable instrument is drawn to fictitious payee whenever payee named in it has no right to it, and its maker does not in-tend that such payee shall take anything by it; whether name of payee used by maker is that of person living or dead or one who never existed is immaterial. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. of Cali-fornia v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 1 Cal.App.2d 694, 37 P.2d 483.
"Fictitiousness" depends on the intention to pay, rather than on the payee’s existence. Norton v. City Bank & Trust Co., C.C.A.Va., 294 F. 839, 844; Mueller & Martin v. Liberty Ins. Bank, 187 Ky. 44, 218 S.W. 465, 466.
FICTITIOUS PERSON. A person, who, though named as payee in a check has no right to it or its proceeds because the drawer of it so intended. Johnston v. Exchange Nat. Bank of Tampa, 152 Fla. 228, 9 So.2d 810, 811, 812.
FICTITIOUS PLAINTIFF. A person appearing in the writ or record as the plaintiff in a suít, but who in reality does not exist, or who is ignorant of the suit and of the use of his name in it. It is a contempt of court to sue in the name of a ficti-tious party. See 4 BI.Comm. 134.
FICTITIOUS PROMISE. See Promise.
FIDE-COMMISSARY. A term derived from the Latin "fidei-commissarius," and occasionally used by writers on equity jurisprudence as a substitute for the law French term "cestui que trust," as being more elegant and euphonious. See Brown v. Brown, 83 Hun, 160, 31 N.Y.S. 650.
FIDEI-COMMISSARIUS. In the civil law, this term corresponds nearly to our "cestui que trust." It designates a person who has the real or bene-ficia) interest in an estate or fund, the title or administration of whieh is temporarily confided to another. See Story, Eq.Jur. § 966; 1 Greenl.Cruise, Diga 295.
According to Du Cange, the term was some-times used to denote the executor of a Will.
FIDEI-COMMISSUM. In the civil law, a species of trust; being a gift of property (usually by will) to a person, accompanied by a request or direction of the donor that the recipient will transfer the property to another, the latter being a person not capable of taking directly under the will or gift. In re Courtin, 144 La. 971, 81 So. 457, 459; Suc-cession of Reilly, 136 La. 347, 67 So. 27, 33; Gor-tario v. Cantu, 7 Tex. 44.
FIDE-JUBERE. In the civil law, to order a thing upon one’s faith; to pledge one’s self; to become surety for another. Fide-jubes? Fide-jubeo: Do you pledge yourself? I do pledge myself. Inst. 3, 16, 1. One of the forms of stipulation.FIDE-JUSSIO. An act by which any one binds himself as an additional security for another. This giving security does not destroy the liability of the principal, but adds to the security of the surety. Vicat, Voc.Jur.; Hallifax, Annals, b. 2, c. 16, n. 10.
FIDE-JUSSOR. In Roman law, a guarantor; one who becomes responsible for the payment of an-other’s debt, by a stipulation which binds him to discharge it if the principal debtor fails to do so. Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 452; 3 BI.Comm. 108. He dif-fers from a co-obligor in this, that the latter is equally bound to a debtor, with his principal, while the former is not hable till the principal has failed to fulfil his engagement; Dig. 12, 4, 4; 16, 1, 13; 24, 3, 64; 38, 1, 37; 50, 17, 110; 6, 14, 20; Hall, Pr. 33; Dunl.Adm.Pr. 300; Clerke, Prax. tit. 63.
The obligation of the fide-jussor was an accessory con-
tract; for, if the principal obligation was not previously contracted, bis engagement then took the name of man-date. Lec. Elém. § 872; Code Nap. 2012.
The sureties taken on the arrest of a defendant, in the court of admiralty, were formerly denominated "fide jata-sore." 3 Bl.Comm. 108.
FIDE-PROMISSOR. See Fide-Jussor. FIDELITAS. Fealty; fidelity. See Fealty.
FIDELITAS. DE NULLO TENEMENTO, QUOD TENET1UR AD TERMINUM, FIT HOMAGII; FIT TAMEN INDE FIDELITATIS SACRAMENTUM. Co.Litt. 676. Fealty. For no tenement which 1s held for a term is there the oath of homage, but there is the oath of fealty.
FIDELITY BOND. Contract of fidelity insurance. Runcie v. Corn Exchange Bank Trust Co., Sup., 6 N.Y.S.2d 616, 620. A guaranty of personal honesty of officer furnishing indemnity against his defalca-tion or negligence. Phillips v. Board of Education of Pineville, 283 Ky. 173, 140 S.W.2d 819, 822.
FIDELITY INSURANCE. See Insurance.
FIDEM MENTIBL Lat. To betray faith or feal-ty. A ten used in feudal and old English law of a feudatory or feudal tenant who does not keep that fealty which he has sworn to the lord. Leg. Hen. I. c. 53.
FIDES. Lat. Faith; honesty; confidence; trust; veracity; honor. Occurring in the phrases "bona fides" (good faith), "mala fides" (bad faith), and "uberrima fides," (the utmost or most abundant good faith.)
FIDES EST OBLIGATIO CONSCIENTVE ALICU-JUS AD INTENTIONEM ALTERIUS. Bacon. A trust is an obligation of conscience of one to the will of another.
FIDES FACTA. Among the Franks and Lom-bards undertakings were guaranteed by "making one’s faith"—fides /acta. This was symbolized by such formal acts as the giving of a rod; in sure-tyship giving the "festuca" or "vadium." 2 Holdsw.Hist.E.L. 73.FIDES SERVANDA EST. Faith must be ob-served. An agent must not violate the confidence reposed in him. Story, Ag. § 192; Coolidge v. Brigham, 1 Mete., Mass., 551.
FIDES SERVANDA EST; SIMPLICITAS JURIS GENTIUM PRJEVALEAT. Faith must be kept; the simplicity of the law of nations must prevail. A rule applied to bilis of exchange as a sort of sacred instruments. 3 Burrows, 1672; Story, Bills, § 15.
FIDUCIA. In Roman law, an early form of mort• gage or pledge, in which both the title and posses-sion of the property were passed to the creditor by a formal act of sale, (properly with the solemni-ties of the transaction known as mancipatio,) there being at the same time an express or implied agreement on the part of the creditor to reconvey the property by a similar act of sale provided the debt was ,duly paid; but en default of payment, the property became absolutely vested in the cred-itor without foreclosure and without any right of redemption.
In course of time, this form of security gave place to that known as hypotheca, while the contemporary contract of pignus or pawn underwent a corresponding development. See Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 334; Tomk. & J. Mod.Rom.Law, 182; Hadley, Rom.Law, 201-203; Pothier, Pand. tit. "Fiducia."
FIDUCIAL. An adjective having the same mean-ing as "fiduciary;" as, in the phrase "public or fiducial office." Ky.St. § 3752; Moss v. Rowlett, 112 Ky. 121, 65 S.W. 153.
FIDUCIARIUS MERES. See Fiduciary Heir.
FIDUCIARIUS TUTOR. In Roman law, the eld-er brother of an emancipated pupillus, whose fa-ther had died leaving him still under fourteen years of age.
FIDUCIARY. The term is derived from the Ro-man law, and means (as a noun) a person holding the character of a trustee, or a character analo-gous to that of a trustee, in respect to the trust and confidence involved in it and the scrupulous good faith and candor which it requires. Svanoe v. Jurgens, 144 Ill. 507, 33 N.E. 955; Stoll v. King, 8 How.Prac.,N.Y., 299. A person having duty, cre-ated by his undertaking, to act primarily for an-other’s beneflt in matters connected with such un-dertaking. Haluka v. Baker, 66 Ohio App. 308, 34 N.E.2d 68, 70. As an adjective it means of the nature of a trust; having the characteristics of a trust; analogous to a trust; relating to or founded upon a trust or confidence.
FIDUCIARY CAPACITY. One is said to act in a "fiduciary capacity" or to receive money or con-tract a debt in a "fiduciary capacity," when the business which he transacts, or the money or property which he handles, is not his own or for his own benefit, but for the benefit of another per-son, as to whom he stands in a relation implying and necessitating great confidence and trust on the one part and a high degree of good faith on the other part. The term is not restricted to tech-nical or express trusts, but includes also such oí-fices or relations as those of an attorney at law, a guardian, executor, or broker, a director of a corporation, and a public officer. Templeton v. Bockler, 73 Or. 494, 144 P. 405, 409; Madison
v. Dunkle, 114 Ind. 262, 16 N.E. 593. As used in the Bankruptcy Act, § 17, subd. 4, 11 U.S.C.A. 35, however, the term imports a technical trust, actually and expressly constituted, and not such merely as the law implies, and has no application to debts or obligations merely because they were created under circumstances in which trust or confidence in the popular sense of those terms was reposed in debtor. Culp v. Robey, Tex.Civ.App., 294 S.W. 647, 651; American Agricultural Chem-ical Co. v. Berry, 110 Me. 528, 87 A. 218, 45 L.R.A., N.S., 1106, Ann.Cas.1915A, 1293.
FIDUCIARY CONTRACT. An agreement by which a person delivers a thing to another on the condition that he will restore it to him. Cicero, de Offic, lib. 3, cap. 17; Lec. du Dr.Civ.Rom. § 237. See Chapman v. Forsyth, 2 How., U.S., 202, 11 L. Ed. 236; Fisk v. Sarber, 6 W. & S., Pa., 18; Mc-Ginn v. Shaeffer, 7 Watts, Pa., 415.
FIDUCIARY DEBT. A debt founded on or aria-ing from some confidence or trust as distinguished from a "debt" founded simply on contract. Mont-gomery v. Phillips Petroleum Co., Tex.Civ.App., 49 S.W.2d 967, 973.
FIDUCIARY DEBTORS. Only public officers and trustees, not agents, factors, commission men, and the like, within the meaning of Bankruptcy Act,
14, subd. 4, 11 U.S.C.A. § 32. Keefauver v. Hev-enor, 163 App.Div. 531, 148 N.Y.S. 434, 435.
FIDUCIARY HEIR. The Roman laws called a fiduciary heir the person who was instituted heir, and who was charged to deliver the succession to a person designated by the testament. Merlin, Répert. But Pothier, Pand. vol. 22, says that fidu-ciarius hceres properly signifies the person to whom a testator has sold his inheritance under the condition that he should seli it to another.
FIDUCIARY OR CONFIDENTIAL RELATION. A very broad term embracing both technical
fidu-ciary relations and those informal relations which exist wherever one man trusts in or relies upon another. State v. Gautier, 108 Fla. 390, 147 So. 240, 242. One founded on trust or confidence re-posed by one person in the integrity and fidelity ot another. Kerrlgan v. O’Meara, 71 Mont. 1, 227 P. 819, 821.
The origin of the confidence and the source of the influence are immaterial. Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419, 420, 54 A.L.R. 1173. The relations and duties involved need not be legal but may be moral, social, domes-tic, or merely personal. Trustees of Jesse Parker Williams Hospital v. Nisbet, 191 Ga. 821, 14 S.E.2d 64, 76. See aleo, Fiduciary Relation.
FIDUCIARY RELATION. An expression includ-ing both technical fiduciary relations and those informal relations which exist whenever one man trusts and relies upon another. Peckham v. John-son, Tex.Civ.App., 98 S.W.2d 408, 416. It exists where there is special confidence reposed in one-who in equity and good consciente is bound to-act in good faith and with due regard to interests of one reposing the confidence. Neagle v. Mc-Mullen, 334 Ill. 168, 165 N.E. 605, 608. A relation subsisting between two persons in regard to a business, contract, or piece of property, or in re-gard to the general business or estate of one of them, of such a character that each must repose trust and confidence in the other and must exer-cise a corresponding degree of fairness and good faith.
Out of such a relation, the law ralses the rule that nel-ther party may exert influence or pressure upon the other, take selfish advantage of his trust, or deal with the subject-matter of the trust in such a way as to beneflt himself or prejudice the other except in the exercise of the utmost good falth and with the full knowledge and consent of that other, business shrewdness, hard bargaining, and astute-ness to take advantage of the forgetfulness or negligente of another being totally prohtbited as between persons standing in such a relation to each other. Examples of ftduclary relations are those existing between attorney and client, guardian and ward, principal and agent, executor and heir, trustee and cestui que trust, landlord and tenant, etc. Robins v. Hope, 57 Cal. 497; Thomas v. Whitney, 186 III. 225, 57 N.E. 808; Central Nat. Bank v. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co., 104 U.S. 68, 26 L.Ed. 693. The relation need not be legal, but may be moral, social, domestic, or merely personal. Miranovitz v. Gee, 163 Wis. 246, 157 N.W. 790, 792; Higgins v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 312 III. 11, 143 N.E. 482, 484. It lo one in which, if a wrong arise, the same remedy exists against the wrongdoer on behalf of the principal as would exlst against a trustee on behalf of a cestui que trust. Smith v. Smith, 222 Mass. 102, 109 N.E. 830, 832. Sometimes confldential and flduciary relations are regarded as synonymous; In re Cover’s Estate, 188 Cal. 133, 204 P. 583, 588; but on the other hand, a technical dlstinction may be taken between a "flducial relation" which is more correctly applicable to legal relationships between parties, such as guardian and ward, administra-tor and heirs, and other similar relationships, and a "con-fidential relation" which includes the legal relationships, and aleo every other relationshlp wherein confidence le rightfully reposed and is exercised. Roberts v. Parson, 195 Ky. 274, 242 S.W. 594, 596.
FIEF. A lee, teod, or feud.
FIEF D’IIAUBERT (or D’HAUBERK). Fr. In Norman feudal law, a fiel or fee held by the ten-ure of knight-service; a knight’s fee. 2 BI.Comm. 62. A fee held on the military tenure of appear-ing fully armed on the ban and arriére-ban. Feu-dum hauberticum. Spelman; Calvinus, Lex.; Du Cange.
FIEF-TENANT. In old English law, the holder of a fiel or lee; a feeholder or freeholder.
FIEL. In Spanish law, a sequestrator; a person in whose hands a thing in dispute is judicially de-posited; a receiver. Las Partidas, pt. 3, tit. 9, 1.1.
FIELD. A cultivated tract of land; State v. Mack, 92 Vt. 103, 102 A. 58, 59; but not a one-acre lot used for cultivating vegetables; Simons v. Lovell, 7 Heisk., Tenn., 510. This term might well be considered as definite and certain a de-scription as "close," and might be used in law; but it is not a usual description in legal proceed-ings. 1 Chit.Gen.Pr. 160.
Armies away from the home base on an opera-tional, hostile mission are in the "field". In re Di Bartolo, D.C.N.Y., 50 F.Supp. 929, 933.FIELD-ALE, or FILKDALE. An ancient custom in England, by which officers of the forest and bailiffs of hundreds had the right to compel the hundred to furnish them with ale. Tomlins.
FIELD BOOK. A description of the courses and distances of the unes, and of the corners of the lots of the town as they were surveyed, and as they appear by number and division on the town plan. Neill v. Ward, 103 Vt. 117, 153 A. 219, 225.
FIELD HOSPITAL. See Hospital.
FIELD NOTES. A description of a survey. Out-law v. Gulf Oil Corporation, Tex.Civ.A. pp., 137 S. W.2d 787, 794.
FIELD REEVE. An officer elected, in England, by the owners of a regulated pasture to keep in order the fences, ditches, etc., on the land, to regu-late the times during which animals are to be ad-mitted to the pasture, and generally to maintain and manage the pasture subject to the instructions of the owners. (General Inclosure Act, 1845, § 118.) Sweet.
FIELD VISION. The general vision used in catching in sight, following and locating objects; —distinguished from "binocular vision" (q. v.). Turpin v. St. Regis Paper Co., 199 App.Div. 64, 192 N.Y.S. 85, 87.
FIELD WORK. Work in the field, specifically the task of gathering scientific data from the field. Includes the sphere of practical operation, as of an organization or enterprise; also, the place or ter-ritory where direct contácts, as with a clientele may be made or first-hand knowledge may be gain-ed; sphere of action or place of contest, either literally or figuratively; hence, any scene of oper-ations or opportunity for activity. State ex rel. McPherson v. Snell, 168 Or. 153, 121 P.2d 930, 937.
FIELDAD. In Spanish law, sequestration. This is allowed in six cases by the Spanish law where the title to property is in dispute. Las Partidas, pt. 3, tit. 3, 1. 1.
FIERDING COURTS. Ancient Gothic courts of an inferior jurisdiction, so called because four were instituted within every inferior district or hundred. 3 Bl.Comm. 34; 3 Steph.Com. 393; Stiernhook, De Jure Goth. i. 1, c. 2.
FIERI. Lat. To be made; to be done. See In Fieri.
FIERI FACIAS. Means that you cause to be made. In practice, a writ of execution command-ing the sheriff to levy and make the amount of a judgment from the goods and chattels of the judg-ment debtor.
FIERI FACIAS DE BONIS ECCLESIASTICIS. When a sheriff to a common fi. fa. returns nulla bona, and that the defendant is a beneficed clerk, not having any lay fee, a plaintiff may issue a fi. fa. de bonis ecclesiasticis, addressed to the bishop of the diocese or to the archbishop, (during the vacancy of the bishop’s see,) commanding him tomake of the ecclesiastical goods and chattels be-longing to the defendant within his diocese the sum therein mentioned. 2 Chit.Archb.Pr. (12th Ed.) 1062.
FIERI FACIAS DE BONIS TESTATORIS. The writ issued on an ordinary judgment against an executor when sued for a debt due by his testator. If the sheriff returns to this writ nulla bona, and a devastavit, (q. v.,) the plaintiff may sue out a fieri facias de bonis propriis, under which the goods of the executor himself are seized. Sweet.
FIERI FECI. Means I have caused to be made. In practice, the return made by a sheriff or other Officer to a writ of fteri facias, where he has col-lected the whole, or a part, of the sum directed to be levied. 2 Tidd, Pr. 1018. The return, as ac-tually made, is expressed by the word "Satisfied" indorsed on the writ.
FIERI NON DEBET, (DEBUIT,) SED FACTUM VALET. It ought not to be done, but Uf] done, it is valid. Shep. Touch. 6; 5 Coke, 39; T.Raym. 58; 1 Strange, 526. A maxim frequently applied in practice. Nichols v. Ketcham, 19 Johns., N.Y., 84, 92.
FIFTEENTRS. In English law, this was origin-ally a tax or tribute, levied at intervals by act of parliament, consisting of one-fifteenth of all the movable property of the subject or personalty in every city, township, and borough.
Under Edward III., the taxable property was assessed, and the value of its fifteenth part (then about £29,000) was recorded in the exchequer, whence the tax, levied on that valuation, continued to be called a "flfteentb," although as the wealth of the kingdom increased, the name ceased to be an accurate designation of the proportion of the tax to the value taxed. See 1 BI.Comm. 309; Co. 2d Inst. 77; 1 Poll. & Maitl. 604; Cowell.
FIFTH DEGREE OF KINSHIP. The degree of kinship between a deceased intestate and the chil-dren of decedent’s first cousin, sometimes desig-nated as "first cousins once removed", was in the "fifth degree". Simonton v. Edmunds, 202 S.C. 397, 25 S.E.2d 284, 285.
FIFTY DECISIONS. Ordinances of Justinian (529-532) upon the authority of which all moot points were settled in the preparation of the sec-ond edition of the Code. Taylor, Science of Ju-rispr. 144.
FIGHT. "Fight" means combat or battle, as hos-tile encounter or engagement between opposing forces, suggesting primarily the notion of a brawl or unpremeditated encounter, or that of a pugil-istic combat. Gitlow v. Kiely, D.C.N.Y., 44 F.2d 227, 232.
An encounter, with blows or other personal violente, between two persons. Carpenter v. People, 31 Colo. 284, 72 P. 1072; Coles v. New York Casualty Co., 87 App.Div. 41, 83 N.Y.S. 1063. The term does not necessarlly Imply that both partles should give and take blows. It is sufficient that they,voluntarily put their bodies in position with that intent; State v. Gladden, 73 N.C. 155; Tate v. State, 46 Ga. 148.
FIGIITVVITE. Sax. A mulct or fine for making a quarrel to the disturbance of the peace. Called also by Cowell "forisfactura pugnce." The amount was one hundred and twenty shillings. Cowell.
A payment to a lord possessing soc over a place where a wrong was done. 2 Holdsw. Hist.E.L. 35.
FIGURES. Artificial representations of a form, as in sculpture, drawing, or painting, especially the human body represented by art of any kind. People v. Eastman, 89 Misc. 596, 152 N.Y.S. 314, 317.
Numerais. They are either Roman, made with letters of the alphabet: for example, MDCCLXXVI; or they are Arabic, as follows: 1776.
FILACER. An officer of the superior courts at Westminster, whose duty it was to file the writs on which he made process. There were fourteen filacers, and it was their duty to make out all original process. Cowell; Blount; Jacob L.Dict. It is used in 8 Mod. 284. The office was abolished in 1837.
FILARE. In old English practice, to file. Townsh.P1. 67.
FILCHING. "Filching" means to steal money, commonly of little value, secretly or underhand-edly. Peck v. Bez, W.Va., 40 S.E.2d 1, 10.
FILE, n. A record of the court. Milton v. Unit-ed States, C.C.A.La., 105 F.2d 253, 255. A thread, string, or wire upon which writs and other ex-hibits in courts and offices are fastened or filed for the more safe-keeping and ready turning to the same. Spelman; Cowell; Tomlins. Papers put together and tied in bundles. A paper is said also to be filed when it is delivered to the proper officer, and by him received to be kept on file. 13 Vin.Abr. 211; 1 Litt. 113; 1 Hawk.P.C. 7, 207; Beebe v. Morrell, 76 Mich. 114, 42 N.W. 1119, 15 Am.St.Rep. 288. But, in general, "file," or "the files," is used loosely to denote the official custody o! the court or the place in the &Idees of a court where the records and papers are kept. The "file" in a cause includes original subpcenas and all pa-pers belonging thereto. Jackson v. Mobley, 157 Ala. 408, 47 So. 590.
FILE, v. To lay away papers for presentation and reference. Murphy v. Burlington Overall Co., 225 Mo.App. 866, 34 S.W.2d 1035, 1037. In prac-tice, to put upon the files, or deposit in the cus-tody or among the records of a court. To deliver an instrument or other paper to the proper of-ficer for the purpose of being kept on file by him in the proper place. Gallagher v. Linwood, 30 N.M. 211, 231 P. 627, 629, 37 A.L.R. 664; Dillon v. Superior Court of Nevada County, 24 Cal.App. 760, 142 P. 503, 505; Pendrey v. Brennan, 31 Idaho, 54, 169 P. 174, 175. It carries the idea of permanent preservation as a public record. In re Gubelman, C.C.A., 10 F.2d 926, 929.
The term "oled" is used to denote the paper placed with the clerk, and assigned by law to his official keeping. Ex parte Leifeste, 127 Tex.Cr.R. 445, 77 S.W.2d 675, 676.
"To flle" a paper, on the part of a party, is to place it In the °facial custody of the clerk. "To file," on the part of the clerk, is to indorse upon the paper the date of its reception, and retaln it in his oftIce, subject to inspection by whomsoever ít may concern. Holman v. Chevaillier,.14 Tex. 339.
"Filing a bill" in equity is an equivalent expres-sion to "commencing a suit."
FILE VVRAPPER ESTOPPEL. The doctrine de-pends upon the fact that, when an applicant has accepted the rejection of a broad claim he may not Tater assert that another claim, deliberately restricted to secure its allowance, is its equiva-lent. Tampax, Inc. v. Personal Products Corpora-tion, C.C.A.N.Y., 123 F.2d 722, 723.
FILED FOR RECORD. Left with recorder or registrar for recording. In re Grodzins, D.C.Cal., 27 F.Supp. 521, 523, 524.
FILE1NJAID. Brit. A name given to villeins in the laws of Hoel Dda. Barring. Obs.St. 302.
FILIATE. To fix a bastard child on some one, as its father. To declare whose child it is. 2 W.B1. 1017.
FILIATIO NON POTEST PROBAR!. Co.Litt. 126r Filiation cannot be proved; that is, the hus-band is presumed to be the father of a child born during coverture. But see 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101.
FILIATION. The relation of parent and child, but does not import legitimacy, although often a step to that end. Rodrigues v. Rodrigues, 286 Mass. 77, 190 N.E. 20, 22. Correlative to "patern-ity."
The judicial assignment of an illegitimate child to a designated man as its father.
In the civil law, the descent of son or daughter, with regard to his or her father, mother, and their ancestors.
FILIATION PROCEED1NG. A special statutory proceeding, criminal in form, but in the nature of a civil action to enforce a civil obligation or duty specifically for the purpose of establishing par-entage and the putative father’s duty to support his illegitimate child. State v. Morrow, 158 Or. 412, 75 P.2d 737, 738, 739, 744.
FILICETUM. In old English law, a ferny or bracky ground; a place where fern grows. Co. Lit. 4b; Shep.Touch. 95.
FILIOLUS (or FILIOUS). In old records, a god-son. Spelman.
FILIUS. Lat. A son; a child.
As distinguished from heir filias is a term of nature, lucres a term of law. 1 Powell, Dev. 311. In the civil law the term was used to denote a child generally. Calvinus, Lex.; Vicat, Voc.Jur.
A distinction was sometimes made, in the civil law,
between and "liberi;" the latter word including grandchildren, (nepotes,) the formen not. Inst. 1, 14, 5. But, according to Paulus and Julianus, they were of equally extensive import. Dig. 50, 16, 84; Id. 50, 16, 201.
FILIUS EST NOMEN NATURZE, SED ILERES NOMEN JURIS. 1 Sid. 193. 1 Pow.Dev. 311. Son is a name of nature, but heir is a name of law.FILIUS FAMILIAS. In the civil law, the son of a family; an unemancipated son. Inst. 2, 12, pr.; Id. 4, 5, 2; Story, Confl.Laws, § 61.
FILIUS IN ÚTERO MATRIS EST PARS VIS-CERUM MATRIS. 7 Coke, 8. A son in the moth-er’s womb is part of the mother’s vitals.
FILIUS MULIERATUS. In old English law, the eldest legitimate son of a woman, vvho previously had an illegitimate son by his father. Glanv. lib.
7, c. 1. Otherwise called "mulier." 2 Bl.Comm. 248.
FILIUS NULLIUS. An illegitimate child; son of nobody. In re Ellis’ Estate, 225 Iowa 1279, 282 N.W. 758, 762, 120 A.L.R. 975.
FILIUS POPULI, A son of the people. In re
Clark’s Estate, 228 Iowa 75, 290 N.W. 13, 29. Na-tural child.
FILL. To make full; to complete; to satisfy or fulfill; to possess and perforen the duties of; to occupy the whole capacity or extent of, so as to leave no space vacant.
Word "1111" in agreement to "take and luz- a certain number of shares, amounts to a promise to pay assess-ments. Bangor Bridge Co. v. McMahon, 10 Me. 478.
To fi/1 a prescription is to furnlsh, prepare, and combine the requlsite meteríais in due proportion as prescribed. Ray v. Burbank, 61 Ga. 505, 34 Am.Rep. 103.
To "Mi" embroidery is to stuff out the figure, which is the ornamentation, by covering the stuffing with the silk, cotton, or other threads used by the embroiderer. G. Reis & Bro. v. Reform Initial Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 266 F. 219.
The term "fill," used in relation to shipments of live stock, means feeding and watering stock just prior to sale so as to increase their weight and thus enhance their value. Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. West Broa., Tex.Com.App., 207 S.W. 918, 922.
FILLED MILK. Milk to which has been added fat or oil other than milk fat so that the resulting product is in imitation or semblante of milk, cream, or skim milk. State v. Hershman, 346 Mo. 892, 143 S.W.2d 1025, 1026.
FILLING CHAMBER. A place in which a bottle mouth is held so as to cut off communication with open air while the bottle is being filled with gase-ous liquids to be sealed in it under pressure. Crown Cork & Seal Co. of Baltimore City v. Car-per Automatic Bottling Mach. Co. of Baltimore City, D.C.Md., 229 F. 748, 750.
FILLING STATION. A building or structure where motor vehicle fuel is stored for sale to the public. Hanes v. Carolina Cadillac Co., 176 N.C. 350, 97 S.E. 162.
FILLY. A young mare; a female colt. An in-dictment charging the theft of a "filly" is not sustained by proof of the larceny of a "mare." Lunsford v. State, 1 Tex.App. 448, 28 Am.Rep. 414.
FILTHY. Under Cr.Code, § 211, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1461, an unmailable filthy letter is morally foul, polluted, nasty. United States v. Davidson, D.C. N.Y., 244 F. 523, 526. Dirty, vulgar, indecent, of-fensive to the moral sense, morally depraving, debasing. Tyomies Pub. Co. v. United States, C.C.A. Mich., 211 F. 385, 390.
In Fec!eral Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, § 402(a) (3), 21 U.S.C.A. § 342(a) (3), word "filthy" is used in its usual and ordinary ineaning, and is not to be confined to any scientific or medical definition. U. S. v. Lazere, D.C.Iowa, 56 F.Supp. 730, 732.
FILUM. Lat. In old practice, a file, i. e., a thread or wire on which papers were strung, that being the ancient method of filing.
An imaginary thread or Une passing through the middle of a stream or road, as in the titles following.
FILUM AQUitE. A thread of water; a line of water; the middle line of a stream of water, sup-posed to divide it into two equal parts, and con-stituting in many cases the boundary between the riparian proprietors on each side. Ingraham v. Wilkinson, 4 Pick., Mass., 273, 16 Am.Dec. 342. Medium filum is sometimes used with no addi-tional meaning. Cf. Thalweg.
FILUM FORESTIE. The border of the forest. 2 Bla.Comm. 419; 4 Inst. 303; Manw. Purlieu.
FILUM VLZE. The thread or middle line of a road. The boundary between the owners of the land on each side of a road. 2 Smith, Lead.Cas. Am.Ed., 98, note. City of Chicago v. Rumsey, 87 Ill. 348; Cox v. Freedley, 33 Pa. 124, 75 Am.Dec. 584.
FIN. Fr. An end, or limit; a limitation, or pe-riod of limitation.
FIN DE NON RECEVOIR. In French law, an ex-ception or plea founded on law, which, without entering into the merits of the action, shows that the plaintiff has no right to bring it, either because the time during which it ought to have been brought has elapsed, which is called "prescrip-tion," or that there has been a compromise, accord and satisfaction, or any other cause which has de-stroyed the right of action which once subsisted. Poth.Proc. Civile, pt. 1, c. 2, § 2, art. 2; Story, Confi.Laws, § 580.
FINAL. Last; conclusive. Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey) v. U. S., Ct.Cl., 10 F.Supp. 550, 560. Deci-sive; definitive. State ex rel. Grodin v. Barns, 119 Fla. 405, 161 So. 568, 574. Terminating; com-pleted. In its use in j urisprudence, this word is generally contrasted with "interlocutory." John-son v. New York, 48 Hun, 620, 1 N.Y.S. 254; Gar-rison v. Dougherty, 18 S.C. 488; U. S. v. Broude, D.C.Minn., 299 F. 332, 333.
As to final "Costs," "Decree," "Judgment," "In-tunction," "Order." "Process," "Recovery," "Sen-tence," and "Settlement," see those titles.
FINAL ARCIIITECT’S CERTIFICATE. One which is issued after a Job is done and which fin-ally determines the rights of the parties as to money and disputes. Johnson v. Hogg, 202 El. App. 253, 255; Hunt v. Owen Bldg. & Inv. Co., Mo.App., 219 S.W. 138, 140. FINAL DECISION. One which leaves nothing open to further dispute and which sets at rest cause of action between parties. Hammond v. Boston Terminal Co., 295 Mass. 566, 4 N.E.2d 328. One which settles rights of parties respecting the subject-matter of the suit and which concludes them until it is reversed or set aside. Orwig v. Conley, 322 Ill. 291, 153 N.E. 371, 372; Pawtucket Cabinet & Builders’ Finish Co. v. People’s Excur-sion Line, 45 R.I. 426, 123 A. 354. See, however, Wyman v. Hageman, 318 III. 64, 148 N.E. 852, 855. The filing of signed findings and conclusions and order for judgment. Crane v. First Nat. Bank, 26 N.D. 268, 144 N.W. 96, 97. Synonymous with final judgment or decree. In re Tiffany, 252 U.S. 32, 40 S.Ct. 239, 240, 64 L.Ed. 443. Also, a deci-sion from .which no appeal or writ of error can be taken. Moore v. Mayfield, 47 Ill. 167; 6 El. & Bl. 408; U. S. v. Tod, C.C.A.N.Y., 1 F.2d 246, 251; Blanding v. Sayles, 23 R.I. 226, 49 A. 992.
FINAL DETERMINATION. Final judgment is synonymous. The final settling of the rights of the parties to the action beyond all appeal. Quar-ture .v. Allegheny County, 141 Pa.Super. 356, 14 A.2d 575, 578. See Judgment.
FINAL DISPOSITION. Such a conclusive deter-mination of the subject-matter embraced in a submission to arbitrators, that after the award is made nothing further remains to fix the rights and obligations of the parties, and no further con-troversy or litigation can arise thereon. Quarture v. Allegheny County, 141 Pa.Super. 356, 14 A.2d 575, 578. It is such an award that the party against whom it is made can perform or pay it without any further ascertainment of rights or duties. Colcord v. Fletcher, 50 Me. 401.
FINAL HEARING. Describes that stage of Pro-ceedings relating to the determination of a suit upon its merits as distinguished from those of preliminary questions. Menard v. Bowman Dairy Co., 296 Il1.App. 323, 15 N.E.2d 1014, 1015. It may also be used with reference to a dismissal on the motion of plaintiff. Christensen v. General Elec-tric Co., D.C.N.Y., 248 F. 284, 286.
FINAL PASSAGE. The vote on a passage of a bill or resolution in either house of the legislature after it has received the prescribed number of readings and has been subjected to such action as is required by the fundamental law governing the body or its own rule. State v. Buckley, 54 Ala. 613. The actual final vote necessary to a bill be-coming a law, regardless of parliamentary fictions. Roane Iron Co. v. Francis, 130 Tenn. 694, 172 S. W. 816.
FINAL RECEIVER’S RECEIPT. An acknowl-edgment by the government that it has received full payment for public land, that it holds the le-gal title in trust for the entryman, and will in due course issue to him a patent. Bovey-Shute Lum-ber Co. v. Erickson, 41 N.D. 365, 170 N.W. 628, 630.
FINAL SETTLEMENT. In probate proceeding, a direct adjudication that the estate is fully admin-istered; that the administrator has completely.executed his trust and has accounted for all mon-eys received as the law requires. In re Braun’s Estate, 140 Kan. 188, 34 P.2d 94, 95.
The final determination of amount due contrac-tor by proper governmental authority. Consoli-dated Indemnity & Insurance Co. v. W. A. Smoot & Co., C.C.A.Va., 57 F.2d 995, 996.
A formal determination by commissioners’ court, in cases involving contract with county, of amount finally due under contract. Austin Bros. Bridge Co. v. Love, Tex.Com.App., 34 S.W.2d 574, 577.
FINAL S’Ul3MISSION. Exists when nothing re-mains to be done to render submission complete. Thompson v. Schalk, 228 Iowa 705, 292 N.W. 851, 852.
Where the whole case, both requested instructions and evidence, is submítted to the court for its ruling and the court takes the case under advisement, there is a "final submission" of the entire case. Piatt v. Heim & Overly Realty Co., 342 Mo. 772, 117 S.W.2d 327, 329.
FINAL TRIAL. Under a statute such trial in the court having original trial jurisdiction as is the basis of entry of judgment finally disposing of ac-tion in that court; the term does not apply to Pro-ceedings in the appellate court. Wynne v. Smith, 23 Ga.App. 330, 98 S.E. 271, 272.
FINALIS CONCORDIA. A final or conclusive agreement.
In the process of "levying a fine," this was a final agree-ment entered by the litigating parties upon the record, by permission of court, settling the title to the land, and which was binding upon them like any judgment of the court. 1 Washb.Real Prop. •70.
FINANCE CILARGE. The consideration for privi-lege of deferring payment of purchase price. Cow-art v. Lang, 252 App.Div. 720, 298 N.Y.S. 875.
FINANCES. Money resources generally. The state of the finances of an individual or corpora-tion, being his condition in a monetary point of view. The cash he has on hand, and that which he expects to receive, as compared with the en-gagements he has made to pay.
The public wealth of a state or government, considered elther statically (as the property or money which a state now owns) or dynamically, (as its income, revenue, or Public resources.) Monetary affairs, funds in a treasury or accruing to it, etc. City of Newburgh v. Dickey, 150 N.Y.S. 175, 177, 164 App.Div. 791.
FINANCIAL. Fiscal. Armstrong v. State Bank of Mayville, 177 App.Div. 265, 165 N.Y.S. 5, 8. Dealing in money. Crown Finance Corporation v. McColgan, 23 Ca1.2d 280, 144 P.2d 331, 333.
FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY. Obligation to pay to a third party. Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co., 215 Minn. 394, 10 N.W.2d 406, 415, 147 A.L.R. 945.
FINANCIAL WORTII. The value of one’s prop-erty less what he owes, or the value of his re-sources less his liabilities. Boney v. Central Mut. Ins. Co. of Chicago, 213 N.C. 470, 196 S.E. 837, 841.
FINANCIALLY ABLE. Means purchaser must be able to command the necessary funds to close the deal within the required time. Hersh v. Garau, 218 Cal. 460, 23 P.2d 1022.
FINANCIER. A person employed in the economi-cal management and application of public money; one skilled in matters appertaining to the judi-cious management of money affairs.
FIND. To come upon by seeking or by effort. Shields v. Shields, 115 Mont. 146, 139 P.2d 528, 530. To discover; to determine; to ascertain and de-clare.
To announce a conclusion, as the result of judicial inves-tigation, upon a disputed fact or state of facts; as a jury are said to. "find a will." To determine a controversy in favor of one of the parties; as a jury "find for the plain-tiff." State v. Bulkeley, 61 Conn. 287, 23 A. 186, 14 L.R.A. 657. The term usually means to ascertain by judicial inquIry, State ex inf. of Barker v. Crandall, 269 Mo. 44, 190 S.W. 889, 893; in contradlstinction to ‘nets by a clerk of court, State v. Halaby, 148 La. 1, 86 So. 561, 563; or by administrative boards, Union Pac. R. Co. v. Board of Com’rs of Weld County, Colo., C.C.A.Colo., 217 F. 540, 541. But the term does not always require a judicial or official finding. City of Chicago v. Atwood, 269 III. 624, 110 N.E. 127, 128.
FINDER. One who discovers and takes posses-sion of another’s personal property, which was thén lost. Kincaid v. Eaton, 98 Mass. 139, 93 Am. Dec. 142.
A searcher employed to discover goods imported or exported without paying custom. Jacob.
FINDER’S FEE. A sum of money paid by a banker to one who brings to him a deal out of which he makes money. Cray, McFawn & Co. v. Hegarty, Conroy & Co., D.C.N.Y., 27 F.Supp. 93, 97, 98, 100, 101.
FINDING. The result of the deliberations of a jury or a court. Denslow v. Moore, 2 Day (Conn.) 12; U. S. v. Moller, 16 Blatchf. 65, Fed.Cas.No. 15,794. A decision upon a question of fact reached as the result of a judicial examination or investi-gation by a court, jury, referee, coroner, etc. Ben-ton v. Roberts, 53 Ga.App. 121, 185 S.E. 292, 294. A recital of the facts as found. Crighton v. Jacobs, 100 Conn. 281, 123 A. 437, 438. The word common-ly applies to the result reached by a judge, Maeder Steel Products Co. v. Zanello, 109 Or. 562, 220 P. 155, 158; it being sometimes, however, as a matter of interpretation, treated as a ruling of law, Gar-den Cemetery Corporation v. Baker, 218 Mass. 339, 105 N.E. 1070, 1072, Ann.Cas.1916B, 75.
FINDING OF FACT. A determination of a fact by the court, averred by one party and denied by the other, and founded on evidence in case. C.I.T. Corp. v. Elliott, 66 Idaho 384, 159 P.2d 891, 897. A conclusion by way of reasonable inference from the evidence. Barker v. Narragansett Racing Ass’n, 65 R.I. 489, 16 A.2d 495, 497. Also the an-swer of the jury to a specific interrogatory pro-pounded to them as to the existente or non-exist-ence of a fact in issue. Miles v. McCallan, 1 Ariz. 491, 3 P. 610; Murphy v. Bennett, 68 Cal. 528, 9 P. 738.
The term is not applicable, with special reference to review on appeal, to a mere conclusion that the evidence is insufficient to authorize relief, Monetalre MinIng Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consol. Mines Co., 53 Utah, 413, 174 P.172, 174: nor to the opinion of the trial court, delivered in announcing judgment, Rogers v. Harris, 76 Okl. 215, 184 P. 459, 462; nor to a memorandum of the decision of the trtal judge, Preston v. Preston, 102 Conn. 96, 128 A. 292, 296; nor to a transcript of the evidence, State v. Chin Lung, 106 Conn. 701, 139 A. 91, 97.
A general finding by a court is a general statement that the facts are in favor of a party or entitle him to judg-ment. It le a complete determination of all matters, and is a finding of every special thing necessary to be found to sustain the general finding. Miller v. Thompson, 80 OkI. 70, 194 P. 103, 105.
A special finding is a specific setting forth of the ultímate facts established by the evidence and which are determina-live of the judgrnent which must be given. Rhodes v. United States Nat. Bank, Ill., 66 F. 514, 13 C.C.A. 612, 34 L.R.A. 742; Humphreys v. Third Nat. Bank, Ohio, 75 F. 856, 21 C.C.A. 538. It Is only a determination of the ulti-mate facts on which the law must be determined, Societe Nouvelle d’Armement v. Barnaby, C.C.A.Wash., 246 F. 68, 70. A special finding may also be said to be one limited to the fact lssue submitted. Ex parte Woodward Iron Co., 212 Ala. 220, 102 So. 103, 106.
The term "fact" in the phrase "finding of fact" denotes the inferences drawn by the triar from ascertained facts. Porter v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 173 Wis. 267, 131 N.W. 317, 318.
FINE, y. To impose a pecuniary punishment or mulct.
To sentence a per-son convicted of an offense to pay a penalty in money. Goodman v. Durant B. & L. Ass’n, 71 Miss. 310, 14 So. 146; State v. Belle, 92 Iowa 258, 60 N.W. 525.
FINE, n. A sum of money paid at the end, to make an end of a transaction, suit, or prosecution; mulct; penalty. Railroad Co. v. State, 22 Kan. 15; Sunderland Bros. Co. v. Chicago, B. & I. R. Co., 104 Neb. 319, 177 N.W. 156, 157. A forfeit or for-feiture. Keinath, Schuster & Hudson v. Reed, 18 N.M. 358, 137 P. 841, 844; Bryant v. Rich’s Grill, 216 Mass. 344, 103 N.E. 925, 927, Ann.Cas.1915B, 869.
Conveyancing
An amicable composition or agreement of a suit, either actual or fictitious, by leave of the court, by which the lands in question become, or are ac-knowledged to be, the right of one of the parties. 2 Bl.Comm. 349; Christy v. Burch, 25 Fla. 942, 2 So. 258; Hitz v. Jenks, 123 U.S. 297, 8 S.Ct. 143, 31 L.Ed. 156. Fines were abolished in England by St. 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 74, substituting a disentailing (leed. (q. v.).
A fine is so called because it puts an end not only to the suit thus commenced, but also to all other sults and con-troversies concerning the same matter. The party who parted with the latid, by acknowledging the right of the other, was said to ievy the fine, and was called the "cog-nizor" or "conusor," while the party who recovered or received the estate was termed the "cognizee" or "con-usee," and the fine was said to be levied to him.

Criminal Law

A pecuniary punishment imposed by lawful tri-bunal upon person convicted of crime or misde-meanor. In re Chester School District’s Audit, 301 Pa. 203, 151 A. 801, 808. A pecuniary penalty. Hanks v. Shreveport Yellow Cabs, La.App., 187 So. 817, 819. It may include a forfeiture or penalty recoverable in a civil action. Vitelli v. Mayor and

Council of Wilmington, 9 W.W.Harr. 336, 199 A. 283, 287.
The word "penalty" is broader than word which
is always a penalty; whereas, a penalty may be a fine or it may designate some other form of punishment. McHugh v. Plantel Oil Co., 206 La. 511, 19 So.2d 221.

Executed Fine

See Executed

Joint Fine

In old English law. "If a whole vill is to be fined, a joint fine may be laid, and it will be good for the necessity of it; but, in other cases, fines for offenses are to be severally imposed on each particular offender, and not jointly upon all of them." Jacob.

Law of Tenure

A money payment made by a feudal tenant to his lord.
The most usual fine is that payable on the admittance of a new tenant, but there are also due in some manors fines upon alienation, on a license to demise the lands, or on the death of the lord, or other events. Elton, Copyh. 159; De Peyster v. Michael, 6 N.Y. 495, 57 Am.Dec. 470.
FINE AND RECOVERY ACT. The English stat-utes 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 74, for abolishing fines and recoveries. 1 Steph.Comm. 514, et seq.
FINE ANULLANDO LEVATO DE TENEMENTO QUOD FUIT DE ANTIQUO DOMINICO. An abolished writ for disannulling a fine levied of lands in ancient demesne to the prejudice of the lord. Reg.Orig. 15.
FINE CAPIENDO PRO TERRIS. An obsolete writ which lay for a person who, upon conviction by jury, had his lands and goods taken, and his body imprisoned, to be remitted his imprisonment, and have his lands and goods redelivered to him, on obtaining favor of a sum of money, etc. Reg. Orig. 142.
FINE FOR ALIENATION. A fine anciently pay-able upon the alienation of a feudal estate and substitution of a new tenant. It was payable to the lord by all tenants holding by knight’s service or tenants in capite by socage tenure. Abolished by 12 Car. II. c. 24. See 2 BI.Comm. 71, 89; De Peyster v. Michael, 6 N.Y. 467, 495, 57 Am.Dec. 470.
FINE FOR ENDOWMENT. A fine anciently pay-able to the lord by the widow of a tenant, without which she could not be endowed of her husband’s Lands. Abolished under Henry I., and by Magna Charta. 2 Bl.Comm. 135; Mozley & Whitley.
FINE NON CAPIENDO PRO PULCHRE PLACI-TANDO. An obsolete writ to inhibit officers of courts to take fines for fair pleading.
FINE PRO REDISSEISINA CAPIENDO. An old writ that lay for the release of one imprisoned for a redisseisin, on payment of a reasonable fine. Reg.Orig. 222.
FINE ROLLS. See Oblate Rolla.FINE SUR COGNIZANCE DE DROIT, CUM CEO QUE IL AD DE SON DONE. A fine upon acknowledgment of the right of the cognizee as that which he hath of the gift of the cognizor. By this the deforciant acknowledged in court a former feoffment or gift in possession to have been made by him to the plaintiff. 2 Bl.Comm. 352.
FINE SUR COGNIZANCE DE DROIT TANTUM. A fine upon acknowledgment of the right merely, and not with the circumstance of a preceding gift from the cognizor.
This was commonly used to pass a reversionary interest which was in the cognizor, of which there could be no feoff-ment supposed. 2 Bl.Comm. 353; 1 Steph.Comm. 519; Jacob, Law Dict ; Com., Dig.
FINE SUR CONCESSIT. A fine upon concessit (he hath granted). A species of fine, where the cognizor, in order to make an end of disputes, though he acknowledged no precedent right, yet granted to the cognizee an estate de novo, usually for lif e or years, by way of supposed composition. 2 Bl.Comm. 353; 1 Steph.Comm. 519.
FINE SUR DONE GRANT ET RENDER. A dou-ble fine, comprehending the fine sur cognizance de droit come ceo and the fine sur concessit.
It might be used to convey particular llmitations of estates, whereas the fine sur cognizance de droll come ceo, etc., conveyed nothing but an absolute estate, either of inheritanee, or at least freehold. In this last species of fines, the cognizee, after the right was acknowledged to be in him, granted back again or rendered to the cognizor, or perhaps to a stranger, some other estate in the premises. 2 BI.Comm. 353; Viner, Abr. Fine; Comyns, Dig. Fine.
FINE—FORCE. An absolute necessity or inevi-table constraint. Plowd. 94; 6 Coke, 11; Cowell; Old N.B. 78.
FINEM FACERE. To make or pay a fine. Bract. 106; Skene.
FINES LE RQY. In old English law, the king’s fines. Fines formerly payable to the king for any contempt or offense, as where one committed any trespass, or falsely denied his own deed, or did anything in contempt of law. Termes de la Ley.
FINGER. The loss of the use of a thumb cannot be considered the loss of a finger within Work-men’s Compensation Law. Doris v. James Butler, Inc., 199 App.Div. 116, 192 N.Y.S. 515.
FINGER PRINTS. See Anthropometry.
FINIRE. In old English law, to fine, or pay a fine. Cowell. To end or finish a matter.
FINIS. Lat. An end; a fine; a boundary or treminus; a limit. Also in L. Lat., a fine (q. y.).
FINIS EST AMICABILIS CÓMPOSITIO ET FI-NALIS CONCORDIA EX CONCENSU ET CON-CORDIA DOMINI REGIS VEL JUSTICIARUM. Glan. lib. 8, c. 1. A fine is an amicable settlement and decisive agreement by consent and agreement of our lord, the king, or his justíces.
FINIS FINEM LITIBUS DIPONIT. A fine puts an end to litigation. 3 Inst. 78.FDTIS REI ATTENDENDUS EST. 3 Inst. 51. The end of a thing is to be attended to.
FINIS UNIUS DIEI EST PRINCIPIUM ALTERI-US. 2 Bulst. 305. The end of one day is the be-ginning of another.
FINITIO. An ending; death, as the end of lite. Blount; Cowell.
FINIUM REGUNDORUM ACTIO. In the civil Law, action for regulating boundaries. The narre, of an action which lay between those who had lands bordering on each other, to settle disputed boundaries: Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 499.
FINORS. Those that purify gold and silver, and part theml by fire and water from coarser metals; and therefore, in the statute of 4 Hen. VII. c. 2, they are also called "parters." Termes de la Ley.
FIRDFARE. Sax. In old English law, a sum-moning forth to a military expedition, (indictio ad profectionem militarem.) Spelman.
FIRDIRINGA. Sax. A preparation to go into the army. Leg. Hen. I.
FIRDSOCNE. Sax. In old English law, exemp-tion from military service. Spelman.
FIRDWITE. In bId English law, a fine for refus-ing military service (mulcta detrectantis mili-tiam.) Spelman. A mulct or penalty imposed on military tenants for their default in not appearing in arms or coming to an expedition. Cowell.
A fine imposed for murder committed in the army; an acquittance of such fine. Fleta, lib. 1, c 47.
FIRE. The effect of combustion. The juridical meaning of the word does not differ from the vernacular. 1 Pars.Mar.Law, 231, et seq.
The word "fire," as used In Insurance policies, does not have the technical meaning developed from analysis of its nature, but more nearly the popular meaning, being an effect rather than an elementary principie, and is the effect of combustion, being equivalent to Ignition or burning, but heat is not flre, though flre may proximately cause loss from heat. Lavitt v. Hartford County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 105 Conn. 729, 136 A. 572.
The ordlnary meaning of the word as used In an insur-ance policy Includes the idea of visible heat or llght. Secu-rity Ins. Co. of New Haven, Conn., v. Choctaw Cotton Oil Co., 149 Okl. 140, 299 P. 882, 884. Damage to wool by spontaneous combustion with smoke and great heat, but withont any visible llame or glow, is heid not to be fire. The "tire is always caused by combustion, but combustion does not always cause flre." Western Woolen Mill Co. v. Assurance Co., Kan., 139 F. 637, 72 C.C.A. 1.
Under a are policy it must be a "hostile fire," that is one which becomes uncontrollable or breaks out from where It was intended to be and becomes a hostile element. Mode, Limited, v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 62 Idaho 270, 110 P.2d 840, 842, 133 A.L.R. 791.
FIRE AND SWORD, LETTERS OF. In old Scotch Law, Letters issued from the privy council in Scot-land, addressed to the sheriff of the county, au-thorizing him to call for the assistance of the coun-ty to dispossess a tenant retaining possession, contrary to the order of a judge or the sentence oí. a court. Wharton; Bell, Dict.FIREARM. An instrument used In the propul-sion of shot, shell, or bullets by the action, of gunpowder exploded within it. A weapon which acts by force of gunpowder. People v. Simons, 124 Misc. 28, 207 N.Y.S. 56, 57. This word com-prises all sorts of guns, fowling-pieces, blunder-busses, pistols, etc.; Harris v. Cameron, 81 Wis. 239, 51 N.W. 437, 29 Am.St.Rep. 891; Atwood v. State, 53 Ala. 509; Whitney Arms Co. v. Barlow, 38 N.Y.Super.Ct. 563; fountain pen primarily intend-ed for discharge of tear gas, People v. Anderson, 236 App.Div. 586, 260 N.Y.S. 329; but not an air pistol. People v. Schmidt, 221 App.Div. 77, 222 N.Y.S. 647, 650.
FIREBARE. A beacon or high tower by the sea-side, wherein are continual lights, either to direct sailors in the night, or to give warning of the ap-proach of an enemy. Cowell.
FIREBOTE. Allowance of wood or estovers to maintain competent firing for the tenant. A suf-ficient allowance of wood to burn in a house. 1 Washb.Real Prop. 99.
FIREBUG. A popular phrase referring to persons guilty of the crime of arson; commonly under-stood to mean an incendiary or pyromaniac. Blechner v. Kraser, Co.Ct., 157 N.Y.S. 256.
FIRE DAME’. "Fire damp" consists of light car-burated hydrogen, and is so called from its ten-dency to explode when mixed with atrsiospheric air and brought into contact with flame. Wells’ Adm’r v. Sutherland Coal & Coke Co., 116 Va. 1003, 83 S.E. 384, 385.
FIRE DISTRICT. One of the districts into which a city may be (and commonly is) divided for the purpose of more efficient service by the flre de-partment in the extinction of fires. Des Moines v. Gilchrist, 67 Iowa 210, 25 N.W. 136. Under a stat-ute, a territorial subdivision of the state, estab-lished to provide protection against fire within its limits, maintain street lights, etc., and, although composed of one or more towns, it is in substance a quasi municipal corporation of definitely re-stricted powers, and as such it may raise money by taxation for its legitimate uses. President, etc., of Williams College v. Inhabitants of Town of Williamstown, 219 Mass. 46, 106 N.E. 687, 688.
FIRE DOOR. A fireproof barrier for closing open-ings to prevent the spread of fire. People v. One Hundred and Thirty-One Boerum St. Co., 233 N.Y. 268, 135 N.E. 327, 328.
FIRE ESCAPE. An apparatus constructed to af-ford a safe and convenient method of escape from a burning building. The term includes fire lad-ders of such sort and location as to permit safe descent of persons caught in a building on fire, but not a balcony or an interior staircase in a hotel. West v. Spratling, 204 Ala. 478, 86 So. 32, 36.
FIRE EXIT. A reasonable, practicable, safe exit. Keefe v. Annpaul Realty Co., 215 App.Div. 301, 213 N.Y.S. 637, 642.FIRE FIGHTING MACHINE. An instrument of public utility designed and used exclusively for putting out fires; the average or normal fire-flghting machine is in all its parts essentially designed for that purpose. American-La France Fire Engine Co. v. Riordan, C.C.A.N.Y., 6 F.2d 964, 966.
FIRE INSURANCE. See Insurance.
FIREMAN. A person engaged in the fighting and extinguishment of fires. City of Galveston v. Fred-rickson, Tex.Civ.App., 174 S.W.2d 994, 995.
FIRE ORDEAL. See Ordeal.
FIRE POLICY. A contract for payment of indem-nity to insured in case of loss. Converse v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 315 Mass. 544, 53 N.E.2d 841, 843. See Insurance.
FIRE—PROOF. Incombustible; not in danger from the action of fire.
To say of a building that it is fire-proof excludes the idea that it is of wood, and necessarily implies that ft is of some substance fltted for the erectlon of flre-proof build-ings. To say of a certain portion of a building that it is dre-proof warrants conclusion that lt is of a different material. Hickey v. Morrell, 102 N.Y. 459, 7 N.E. 321, 55 A.m.Rep. 824. A "flre-proof safe" within an Insurance policy is one which, In the judgment of prudent men In locallty of property insured, is suffIcient, National Llberty Ins. Co. of America v. Spharler, 172 Ark. 715, 290 S.W. 594, 596; or one which is of the klnd commonly regarded as fire-proof; Knoxville Fire Ins. Co. v. Hird, 4 Tex.Civ.App. 82, 23 S.W. 393.
FIRE RAISING. In Scotch law, the wilfully set-ting on Eire buildings, growing or stored cereals, growing wood, or coalheughs. Ersk.Pr. 577. See Arson.
FIRE WALL. This term, as used in a municipal building code, has been held to refer to a wall that is noncombustible, and to require that such qtiality adhere to the openings in the wall as well as the solid wall itself. Robenson v. Turner, 199 Ky. 642, 251 S.W. 857, 860.
FIRE—WOOD. Wood suitable for fuel, not includ-ing standing or felled timber which is suitable and valuable for other purposes. Hogan v. Hogan, 102 Mich. 641, 61 N.W. 73.
FIREWORKS. Contrivances of infiammable and explosive materials combined of various propor-tions for purpose of producing in combustion beautiful or amusing scenic effects, or to be used as night signal, on land or sea or for *various pur-poses in war. Henderson v. Massachusetts Bond-ing & Ins. Co., 337 Mo. 1, 84 S.W.2d 922, 925.
FIRKIN. A measure of capacity, equal to nine gallons. The word is also used to designate a weight, used for butter and cheese, of fifty-six pounds avoirdupois.
FIRLOT. A Scotch measure of capacity, contain-ing two gallons and a pint. Spelman.
FIRM. The word applicable only to firm on particular
"firm" is conventional term, persons who are members of occasion when name is used,and means name, title, or style under which a company transacts business, a partnership of two or more persons, or a commercial house, and is synonymous with "company", "house", "partner-ship", and "concern". Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Webb, 207 Ark. 820, 182 S.W.2d 941, 943; 1 Chitty, Bailm. 49.
FIRM NAME. The name or title of a firm in bus-iness.
FIRMA. In old English law, the contract of lease or letting; also the rent (or farm) reserved upon a lease of lands, which was frequently paya ble in provisions, but sometimes in money, in which lat-ter case it was called "alba firma," white rent. Spelman, Gloss.; Cunningham, Law Dict.
A messuage with the house, Barden, or lands, etc., connected therewith. Co.Litt. 5 a; Shepp. Touchst. 93.
A banquet; supper; provisions for the table. Du Cange.
A tribute or custom paid towards entertaining the king for one night. Domesday; Cowell.
FIRMA BURGI. The right, in medieval days, to take the profits of a borough, paying for them a fixed sum to the crown or other lord of the bor-ough. 2 Holdsw.Hist.E.L. 276.
FIRMA FEODI. In old English law, a farm or lease of a fee; a fee-farm.
FIRMAN. A Turkish word denoting a decree or grant of privileges, or passport to a traveler. A passport granted by the Great Mogul to cap-tains of foreign vessels to trade within the terri-tories over which he has jurisdiction; a permit.
FIRMARATIO. The right of a tenant to his lands and tenements. Cowell.
FIRMARIUM. In old records, a place in monas-teries, and elsewhere, where the poor were receiv-ed and supplied with food. Spelman. Hence the word "infirmary."
FIRMARIUS. L. Lat. A fermor. A lessee of a term. Firmarii comprehend all such as hold by lease for life or lives or for year, by deed or with-out deed. 2 Inst. 144, 145; 1 Washb.Real Prop. 107; Sackett v. Sackett, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 312; 7 Ad. & E. 637.
FIRMATIO. The doe season. Also a supplying with food. Cowell.
FIRME. In old records, a farm.
FIRMIOR ET POTENTIOR EST OPERATIO LEGIS QUAM DISPOSITIO HOMINIS. The op-eration of the law is firmer and more powerful [or efficacious] than the disposition [or will] of man. Co.Litt. 102a.
FIRMITAS. In old English law, an assurance of some privilege, by deed or charter.
FIRMLY. A statement that an affiant "firmly believes" the contents of the affidavit irnports a strong or high degree of belief, and is equivalent to saying that he "verily" belleves it. Bradley v. Eccles, 1 Browne, Pa., 258; Thompson v. White, 4 Serg. & R., Pa., 137. The operative words in a bond or recognizance, that the obligor is held and "firmly bound," are equivalent to an acknowledg-ment of indebtedness and promise to pay. Shat-tuck v. People, 5 Bl. 477.
FIRMURA. In old English law, liberty to scour and repair a mili-dam, and carry away the soil, etc. Blount.
FIRST. Preceding all others; foremost; used as an ordinal of one, as earliest in time or succes-sien or foremost in position; in front of or in advance of all others. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. U. S., C.C.A.Del., 130 F.2d 913, 915. Initial; leading; chief; entitled to priority or preference aboye others. Redman v. Railroad Co., 33 N.J.Eq. 165; Thompson v. Grand Gulf R. & B. Co., 3 How. Miss. 247, 34 Am.Dec. 81; Hapgood v. Brown, 102 Mass. 452.
The word commonly, but not necessarlly, connotes pre-cedente. Hill v. Prior, 79 N.H. 188, 106 A. 641; Beckley v. Alling, 91 Conn. 362, 99 A. 1034, 1035. Thus, under a con-tract that, if the purchaser should "first" make payment, the vendor would convey, payment was to precede the exe-cution of the conveyance. Walker v. Hewitt, 109 Or. 366, 220 P. 147, 151, 35 A.L.R. 100. But in a wiil the word "first" may not import precedente of one bequest over another. Everett v. Carr, 59 Me. 330; Swasey v. American Bible Society, 57 Me. 523.
As to first "Cousin," "Distress," and "Mort-gage," see those titles.
FIRST BLUSA. By the phrase "first blush," with-in the rule that damages, to justify reversal, must be so great as to strike the mind at first blush as having been superinduced by passion or preju-dice on the part of the jury, is meant that imme-diately the judicial mind is shocked and surpris-ed at the great disproportion of the size of the verdict to what the facts of the case would author-ize. Cole & Crane v. May, 185 Ky. 135, 214 S.W. 885, 887.
FIRST-CLASS. Of the most superior or excel-lent grade or kind; belonging to the head or chief or numerically precedent of several classes into which the general subject is divided. See Pacific Feed Co. v. Kennel, 63 Cal.App. 108, 218 P. 274, 275.
FIRST-CLASS MAIL-MATTEC. In the postal laws, all mailable matter containing writing and all else that is sealed against inspection.
FIRST-CLASS MISDEMEANANT. In English law. Under the prisons act (28 & 29 Vict. c. 126, § 67) prisoners in the county, city, and borough prisons convicted of misdemeanor, and not sen-tenced to hard labor, are divided into two classes, one of which is called the "first division;" and it is in the discretion of the court to order that such a prisoner be treated as a misdemeanant of the first division, usually called "first-class misde-meanant," and as such not to be deemed a crim-inal prisoner, i. e., a prisoner convicted of a crime.
FIRST-CLASS TITLE. A marketable title, shown by a elean record, or at least not depending on presumptions that must be overcome or facts that are uncertain. Vought v. Williams, 120 N.Y. 253, 24 N.E. 195, 8 L.R.A. 591, 17 Am.St.Rep. 634.
FIRST DEGREE BURN. One which produces an inflammation of the outer layer of the skin, like a sunburn. Smith v. Beard, 56 Wyo. 375, 110 P. 2d 260, 261, 262.
FIRST DEVISEE. The person to whom the es-tate is first given by the will, term "next dev-isee" referring to the person to whom the re-mainder is given. Young v. Robinson, 5 N.J.L. 689; Wilcox v. Heywood, 12 R.I. 198.
FIRST DOMESTIC PROCESSING. Refining or saponification of coconut oil is a "processing" or use thereof, and if the refining or saponification is the first processing or use of the oil in the United States, and occurs in the course of the manufac-ture or production of any article intended for sale, it is the "first domestic processing" within the statute taxing the first domestic processing. Reve-nue Act of 1934, § 6021/2 (a), 26 U.S.C.A. § 2470(a). Cincinnati Soap Co. v. U. S., D.C.Ohio, 22 F.Supp. 141.
FIRST FRUITS. In English ecclesiastical law, the first year’s whole proflts of every benefice or spiritual living, anciently paid by the incumbent to the pope, but afterwards transferred to the fund called "Queen Anne’s Bounty," for increasing the revenue from poor livings.
In feudal law, one year’s proflts of land which belonged to the king on the death of a tenant in ca pite; otherwise called "primer seisin." One of the incidents to the old feudal tenures. 2 Bi. Comm. 66, 67.
FIRST HEIR. The person who will be first en-titled to succeed to the title to an estate after the termination of a life estate or estate for years. Winter v. Perratt, 5 Barn. & C. 48.
FIRST IMPRESSION. First examination. First presentation to a court for examination or deci-sion. A case is said to be "of the first impression" when it presents an entirely novel question of law for the decision of the court, and cannot be gov-erned by any existing precedent.
FIRST IN, FIRST OUT RULE. It is not a rule of law nor of logic, but a rule of thumb. It is a presumption of fact and really a regulation of the burden of proof. What is first sold is presumed to be what was first bought. Ninth Bank & Trust Co. v. U. S., D.C.Pa., 15 F.Supp. 951, 952.
FIRST INVENTOR. Within the meaning of that phrase as used in the fourth paragraph of Rev.St. § 4920 (35 U.S.C.A. § 69), providing that it shall be a defense to a suit for infringement that the patentee was not the original or first inventor, a person who perfects his invention, the only evi-dence of such perfected invention ordinarily de-rivable from any patent being a union of disclo-sure and claim. Davis-Bournonville Co. v. Alex-ander Milburn Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 1 F.2d 227, 232.
FIRST LIEN. One which takes priority or prece-dence over all other charges or incumbrances up-on the same piece of property, and which must be satisfied before such other charges are entitled to participate in the proceeds of its sale.
FIRST MEETING. As used in a statute provid-ing that, for insulting words or conduct to reduce homicide to manslaughter, killing must occur im-mediately or at "first meeting" after slayer is informed thereof, quoted words mean first time parties are in proximity under such circumstances as would enable slayer to act in the premises. Smith v. State, 288 S.W. 458, 462, 105 Tex.Cr.R. 327.
FIRST OF EXCIIANGE. Where a set of bilis of exchange is drawn in duplicate or triplicate, for greater safety in their transmission, all being of the same tenor, and the intention being that the exceptance and payment of any one of them (the first to arrive safely) shall cancel the others of the set, they are called individually the "first of exchange," "second of exchange," etc. See Bank of Pittsburgh v. Neal, 22 How. 96, 110, 16 L.Ed. 323.
FIRST POLICY YEAR. This phrase in a statute eliminating suicide of insured after such year as defense, means year for which policy, annually re-newed, was first issued. Carter v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 65 Utah, 465, 238 P. 259, 267, 41 A.L.R. 1495. The year beginning with the issuance of the policy. American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Thompson, Tex.Civ.App., 186 S.W. 254, 255.
FIRST PROCESSING. The processing that first results in a marketable product. Hendricks v. Di Giorgio Fruit Corporation, D.C.Cal., 49 F.Supp. 573, 575, 576.
FIRST PURCHASER. In the law of descent, this term signifies the ancestor who first acquired (in any other manner than by inheritance) the estate which still remains in his family or descendants. Blair v. Adams, C.C.Tex., 59 F. 247.
FIRST RETURN. The "first return", within stat-ute as to depletion deduction is a first return List-ing items of gross income and deductions arising out of the property. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Alta Mines, C.C.A.10, 139 F.2d 580, 582.
FIRST TRIAL. Under a statute providing when a case at law is tried by a jury, and the success-ful party excepts to the granting of a new trial for insufficiency of the evidence, and the evidence is certified, the appellate court, if there have been two trials below, shall first look to the evidence and proceedings on the first trial, and, if the set-ting aside of the first verdict was error, all pro-ceedings subsequent thereto shall be annulled, and judgment rendered thereon, the "first trial" means the first at-which exceptions to the grant-ing of a new trial were taken. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Parker’s Adm’r, 116 Va. 368, 82 S.E. 183, 187.FISC. A treasury of a kingdom or state; a mon-ey chest. Daly v. Beery, 45 N.D. 287, 178 N.W. 104, 109. An Anglicized form of the Latiii "fis-cus," (which see.)
FISCAL. Of or pertaining to the public treas-ury or revenue, of or pertaining to financial mat-ters generally. Wall v. Close, 203 La. 345, 14 So. 2d 19, 26. Belonging to the fisc, or public treas-ury. Relating to accounts or the management of revenue. Of or pertaining to the public finances of a government. Daly v. Beery, 45 N.D. 287, 178 N.W. 104, 109. Financial. Armstrong v. State Bank of Mayville, 177 App.Div. 265, 165 N.Y.S. 5,
FISCAL AGENT. This term does not necessarily imply a depositary of the public funds, so as, by the simple use of it in a statute, without any di-rections in this respect, to make it the duty of the state treasurer to deposit with him any moneys in the treasury. State v. Dubuclet, 27 La.Ann. 29.
FISCAL COURT. A ministerial and executive body in some states. Stone v. Winn, 165 Ky. 9, 176 S.W. 933, 941.
FISCAL JUDGE. A public Officer named in the laws of the Ripuarians and some other Germanic peoples, apparently the same as the "Graf ," "reeve," "comes," or "count," and so called be-cause charged with the collection of public reve-nues, either directly or by the imposition of fines. See Spelman, voc. "Grafio."
FISCAL OFFICÉRS. Those charged with the collection and distribution of public money, as, the money of a state, county, or municipal corpora-tion.
FISCAL YEAR. The year by or for which ac-counts are reckoned, or the year between one an-nual time Of settlement or balancing of accounts and another. People ex rel. Pollastrini v. Wheal-an, 353 El. 500, 187 N.E. 491, 494. An accounting period of 12 months. U. S. v. Mabel Elevator Co. D.C.Minn., 17 F.2d 109, 110; U. S. v. Carroll Chain Co., D.C.Ohio, 8 F.2d 529, 530. A period of twelve months (not necessarily concurrent with the cal-endar year) with reference to which appropria-tions are made and expenditures authorized, and at the end of which accounts are made up and the books balanced. Shaffner v. Lipinsky, 194 N.C. 1, 138 S.E. 418, 419.
FISCUS. Roman law. The treasury of the prince or emperor, as distinguished from "cerarium," which was the treasury of the state. Spelman; Paillet, Droit Public, 21, n. This distinction was not observed in France. In course of tima the fiscus absorbed the cerarium and became the treas-ury of the state. Gray, Nature and Sources of Law 58. See Law 10, ff. De jure Fisci.
The treasury (o’ property of the state, as distin-guished from the private property of the sover-eign.
English law. The king’s treasury, as the re-pository of forfeited property.The treasury of a noble, or of any prívate per-son. Spelman.
FISH. An animal which inhabits the water. breathes by means of gills, swims by the aid of fins, and is oViparous. The term includes crabs, State v. Savage, 96 Or. 53, 184 P. 567, 570; escal-lops, State v. Dudley, 182 N.C. 822, 109 S.E. 63, 65; and mussels and other shellfish, Gratz v. McKee, C.C.A.Mo., 258 F. 335, 336.
The object to be removed from oil well is known as a "fish." Raymond v. Wickersham, Cust. & Pat.App., 110 F.2d 863, 864.
FISH COMMISSIONER. A public officer of the United States, created by act of congress of Feb-ruary 9, 1871, R.S. § 4395, whose duties principal-ly concerned the preservation and increase throughout the country of fish suitable for food. Office of Commissioner of Fisheries was abolished and functions were transferred to the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 16 U.S.C.A. § 241 notes.
FISH POTS. Contrivances in the nature of screens and traps, placed at the junction of low dams or walls extending out from each shore and somewhat down stream, in such a way as to col-lect the water and send it through the pot, so that fish may be screened out there. Middlekauff v. Le Compte, 149 Md. 621, 132 A. 48.
Cf. Pound Net.
FISH ROYAL. These were the whale and the sturgeon, which, when thrown ashore or caught near the coast of England, became the property of the king by virtue of his prerogative and in recompense for his protecting /he shore from pir-ates and robbers. Brown; 1 B1.Comm. 290. Ar-nold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 86, 10 Am.Dec. 356. Some authorities include the porpoise. Hale, De Jure Mar. pt. 1, c. 7; Plowd. 305; Bracton, 1. 3, c. 3.
FISHERY. A place prepared for catching fish with nets or hooks. This is commonly applied to the place of drawing a seine or net. Hart v. Hill, 1 Whart., Pa., 131, 132.
A right or liberty of taking fish; a species of incorporeal hereditament, anciently termed "pis-cary," of which there are several kinds. 2 Bl. Comm. 34, 39; 3 Kent, Comm. 409-418; Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 22, 10 Am.Dec. 356; Gould v. James, 6 Cow., N.Y., 376; Hart v. Hill, 1 Whart., Pa., 124.
Common fishery. A fishing ground when all persons have a right to take fish. Bennett v. Costar, 8 Taunt. 183; Albright v. Park Com’n, 68 N.J.L. 523, 53 A. 612. Not to be confounded with "common of fishery," as to which see Common, n.
Free fishery. A franchise in the hands of a subject, existing by grant or prescription, distinct from an owner-ship in the sol!. It is an exclusive right, and applies to a public navigable river, without any right In the soil. 3 Kent, Comm. 410. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 87, 10 Am. Dec. 356.
Right of fishery. The general and common right of the citizens to take fish from public waters, such as the sea, great lakes, etc. Shlvely v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14 S.Ct. 548, 38 L.Ed. 331.
Severa! fishery. A fishery of which the owner is also the owner of the soil, or derives his right from the owner of the soil. 2 B1.Com. 39, 40; 1 Steph.Comm. 671, note. One by which the party claiming it has the right of fish-ing, independently of all other, so that no person can have a coextensive right with him in the object claimed; but a partial and independent right in another, or a limited liberty, does not derogate from the right of the owner. 5 Burr. 2814.
FISHERY LAWS. A series of statutes passed in England for the regulation of fishing, especially to prevent the destruction of fish during the breed-ing season, and of small fish, spawn, etc., and the employment of improper modes of taking fish. 3 Steph.Comm. 165.
FISHGARTH. A dam or weir in a river for tak-ing fish. Cowell.
FISHING BANKS. A fishing ground of compar-ative shoal water in the sea. Parker v. Thomson, 21 Or. 523, 28 P. 502.
FISHING BILL. A bill showing no cause of ac-tion and endeavoring to compel defendants to disclose one in plaintiff’s favor. White v. Na-tonal Paving Co., Tex.Civ.App., 101 S.W.2d 588, 590. Or seeking disclosure by adversary of facts supporting suit. Puget Sound Nav. Co. v. Asso-ciated Oil Co., D.C.Wash., 56 F.2d 605, 606. A dis-covery sought on general, loose, and vague alleg-ations. Story, Eq.Pl. § 325; In re Pacific Ry. Com’n, C.C.Cal., 32 F. 263; or on suspicion, sur-mise, or vague guesses. Marietta Mfg. Co. v. Hedges-Walsh-Weidner Co., 9 W.W.Harr. 511, 2 A.2d 922, 926.
Where purpose of proposed examination of wltness was to examine books and records to determine status of an account on which petitioner expected to sue, the proceed-ing was a "fishing expedition". State ex rel. Pitcher v. District Court of Fifth Judicial Dist. in and for Madison County, 114 Mont. 128, 133 P.2d 350, 353.
FISK. In Scotch law, the fiscus or fisc. The rev-enue of the crown. Generally used of the personal estate of a rebel which has been forfeited to the crown. Bell.
FISSURE VEIN. In mining law, a vein or lode of mineralized matter filling a pre-existing flssüre or crack in the earth’s trust extending across the strata and generally extending indefinitely down-ward. See Crocker v. Manley, 164 III. 282, 45 N.E. 577, 56 Am.St.Rep. 196.
FISTUCA, or FESTUCA. In old English law, the rod or wand, by the delivery of which the property in land was formerly transferred in making a fe-offment. Called, also, "baculum," "virga," and "f ustis." Spelman. See Festuca.
FISTULA. In the civil law, a pipe for conveying water. Dig. 8, 2, 18.
FIT. Suitable or appropriate; Whisnant v. State, 39 Okl.Cr. 214, 264 P. 837, 839. Conformable to a duty. Adapted to, designed, prepared. Thomas v. State, 34 Okl.Cr. 49, 244 P. 816. Proper. Hanes v. Southern Public Utilities Co., 191 N.C. 13, 131 S.E. 402, 406.
FIT, n. In medical jurisprudence, an attack or spasm of muscular convulsions, generally attend-ed with loss of self-control and of consciousness;particularly, such attacks occuning In epilepsy. In a more general sense, the period of an acute attack of any disease, physical or mental, as, a fit of insanity. See Gunter v. State, 83 Ala. 96, 3 So. 600. Also used in the plural, in which sense it is a layman’s term for epilepsy. Westphall v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 27 Cal.App. 734, 151 P. 159, 162.
FITZ. A Norman word, meaning "son." It is used in law and genealogy; as Fitzherbert, the son of Herbert; Fitzjames, the son of James; Fitzroy, the son of the king. It was originally applied to illegitimate children.
FIVE-MILE ACT. An act of parliament, passed in 1665, against non-conformists, whereby minis-ters of that body who refused to take the oath of non-resistance were prohibited from coming with-in five miles of any corporate town, or place where they had preached or lectured since the passing of the act of oblivion in 1660, nullifled by act of 1689. Brown.
FIX. Adjust or regulate. McKann v. Town of Irvington, 133 N.J.L. 63, 42 A.2d 391, 393. Deter-mine; settle. Bunn v. Kingsbury County, 3 S.D. 87, 52 N.W. 673; In re McLure’s Estate, 68 Mont. 556, 220 P. 527, 530. Make permanent. Kendall v. Stafford, 178 N.C. 461, 101 S.E. 15, 17. It im-ports finality and stability. MacNeill v. Baze-more, 194 Ga. 406, 21 S.E.2d 414, 416. Certainty and definiteness. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. State Board of Tax Appeals, 119 N.J.L. 94, 194 A. 390, 391.
To liquídate or render certain. To fasten a liability upon one. To transform a possible or contingent liability finto a present and definite liability. Zimmerman v. Can-fleld, 42 Ohio St. 468; Polk v. Minnehaha County, 5 Dak. 129, 37 N.W. 93; Logansport & W. V. Gas Co. v. Peru, C.C.Ind., 89 F. 187.
FIX UP. A promise by a debtor to visit his cred-itor and "fix it up" with him was not a sufficient promise to pay to toll the statute of limitations, as the expression "fix it" would ordinarily be un-derstood as meaning "make some kind of agree-ment or adjustment that may dispose of it." Shaw v. Bubier, 119 Me. 83, 109 A. 373, 374.
FIXED. In a charter entered finto by the captain of a ship, containing the condition, "Provided ship not fixed previously," "fixed" was equivalent to "tied up," "closed," "not free." Richichi v. James B. Drake & Sons, D.C.Me., 280 F. 421, 424.
Prices are "fixed" when they are agreed upon. United States v. Masonite Corporation, N.Y., 316 U.S. 265, 62 S.Ct. 1070, 1076, 86 L.Ed. 1461.
FIXED ASSET. An asset essential to continu-ance of undertaking and proper operation of busi-ness. Ruden v. City of Platte, 62 S.D. 175, 252 N.W. 32.
FIXED CAPITAL. Cost of total plant and gener-al equipment. Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tele-phone Co., Ill., 292 U.S. 151, 54 S.Ct. 658, 71 L.Ed. 1182.FIXED INDEBTEDNESS. An established or set-tled indebtedness; not contingent. State ex rel. Hawkins v. State Board of Examiners, 97 Mont. 441, 35 P.2d 116, 120.
FIXED LIABILITIES. Those certain and defin-ite as to both obligation and amount. National Commercial Titie & Mortgage Guaranty Co. v. City of Newark, 18 N.J.Misc. 186, 11 A.2d 759, 763.
FIXED OPINION. A conviction, prejudgment, disqualifying juror to impartially consider whole evidente and apply free from bias law as given in charge by court. Peterson v. State, 227 Ala. 361, 150 So. 156, 159.
FIXED PRICES. Agreed prices. United States v. Food and Grocery Bureau of Southern Califor-nia, D.C.Cal., 43 F.Supp. 966, 972.
FIXED SALARY. One which is definitely ascer-tained and prescribed as to amount and time of payment, and does not depend upon the receipt of fees or other contingent emoluments; not nec-essarily a salary which cannot be changed by com-petent authority. Sharpe v. Robertson, 5 Grat., Va., 518; Hedrick v. U. S., 16 Ct.C1. 101. Estab-lished or settled, to remain for a time. Board of Sup’rs of Yavapai County v. Stephens, 177 P. 261, 262, 20 Ariz. 115.
FIXING BAIL. In practice, rendering absolute the liability of special bail.
MIXTURE. A chattel attached to realty, In re Triborough Bridge Approach, City of New York, 159 Misc. 617, 288 N.Y.S. 697, 707. Becoming ac-cessory to it and part and parcel of it. Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Sawyer, 26 Ala.App. 520, 163 So. 657. And ordinarily the property of the owner of the land. Hill.; Atlantic Refining Co. v. Feinberg, 1 W.W.Harr., Del., 183, 112 A. 685, 687; Red Diamond Clothing Co. v. Steidemann, 169 Mo. App. 306, 152 S.W. 609, 617.
A thing is deemed to be affixed to land when it is at-tached to it by roots, imbedded in it, permanently resting upon it, or permanently attached to what is thus perma-nent, as by means of cement, plaster, nails, bolts, or screws. Civ.Code Cal. § 660; Blg Sespe 011 Co. v. Cochran, C.C.A.Cal., 276 F. 216, 225.
Ordinarily, requisites are actual annexation to realty, or something appurtenant thereto, appropriation to use or purpose of realty, and intention to make artlele permanent accession to freehold as gathered from nature of articles affixed, relation and situation of person making annexa-tion, structure and mode of annexation, and purpose or use for which it has been made. Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Ohrt, 131 Neb. 858, 270 N.W. 497, 502.
It has been said, however, that a ‘‘fixture" formerly meant any chattel which on becoming affixed to the soil became a part of the realty; but it now means those things which formed an exception to that rule and can be re-moved by the person who affixed them to the soil, L.R. 4 Ex. 328; if they can be taken away without material in-jury to the realty. Boise Ass’n of Credit Men v. Ellis, 26 Idaho, 438, 144 P. 6, 9, L.R.A.1915E, 917.
It has also been said that it is generally understood to comprehend any article which a tenant has the power to remove. Sheen v. Bielde, 5 Mees. & W. 174; Rogers v. Gil-Inger, 30 Pa. 185, 189, 72 Am.Dec. 694.
The general result seems to be `.hat three views have been taken. One is that "fixture" means something which has been al fixed to the realty, so as to become a part of it;it is fixed, irremovable. An opposite view is that "fixture" means something which appears to be a part of the realty, but is not fully so; it is only a chattel fixed to it, but re-movable. An intermediate view is that "fixture" means a chattel annexed, affixed, to the realty, but imports noth-ing as to whether it is removable; that is to be de-termined by considering its circumstances and the relation of the parties. Abbott; New Castle Theater Co. v. Ward, 57 Ind.App, 473, 104 N.E. 526, 527; Review Printing Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 133 Minn. 213, 158 N.W. 39, 40.
Things fixed or affixed to other things. The rule of law regarding them 1s that which is expressed in the maxim. "accessio cedit principali," "the accessory goes with, and as part of, the principal subject-matter." Brown.
That which is fixed or attached to something permanently as an appendage, and not removable. Webster. Something fixed or immovable. Wor-cester.
A plece of metal having the same function as a jig, ex-cept that the operation upon the casting, which It is de-signed to facilitate, is an operation of grooving and plan-ing, Matead of drilling holes. Commonwealth Trust Co. of Pittsburgh v. Harkins, 312 Pa. 402, 167 A. 278, 280.
Agricultura’ fixtures. Those annexed for the purpose of farming. In re Shelar, D.C.Pa., 21 F.2d 136, 138.
Domestic fixtures. AU such articles as a tenant attaches to a dwelling house in order to render his occupation more comfortable or convenient, and which may be separated from it without doing substantial injury, such as furnaces, stoves, cupboards, shelves, bells, gas fixtures, or things merely ornamental, as painted wainscots, pier and chimney glasses, although attached to the walls with screws, mat’ble chlmney pieces, grates, beds nailed to the walls, wlndow bllnds and curtains. Wright v. Du Bignon, 40 S.E. 747, 114 Ga. 765, 57 L.R.A. 669.
Trade fixtures. Artides placed in or attached to rented buildings by the tenant, to prosecute the trade or business for which he occupies the premises, or to be used in con-nection with such business, or promote convenience and efficiency in conducting It. Herkimer County L. & P. Co. v. Johnson, 37 App.Div. 257, 55 N.Y.Supp, 924; Brown v. Reno Electric L. & P. Co., C.C.Nev., 55 F. 231; North-western Lumber & Wrecking Co. v. Parker, 125 Minn. 107, 145 N.W. 964, 965. Such chattels as merchants usually pos-sess and annex to the premises occupied by them to en-able them to store, handle, and display their goods, which are generally removable without material injury to the premises. Lovett v. Bermingham-Seaman-Patrick Co., 192 Mich. 372, 158 N.W. 881, 883.
FLACO. A place covered with standing water.
FLAG. A national standard on which are certain emblems; an, ensign; a banner.
It is carried by soldiers, ships, etc., and commonly dis-played at forts and many other suitable places.
In common parlante, the word "flag," when used as de-noting a signal, does net necessarily mean the actual use of a flag, but by figure of speech the word is used in the secondary sense and slgnifies a signal Oven as with a flag, that is to say, as by a waiving of the hand for the purpose of communicating information. Bergfeld v. Kansas City Rys. Co., 285 Mo. 654, 227 S.W. 106, 110.
FLAG, DUTY OF THE. This was an ancient cer-emony in acknowledgment of British sovereignty over the British seas, by which a foreign vessel struck her flag and .lowered her top-sail on meet-ing the British flag.
FLAG, LAW OF. In maritime law. The law of that nation or country whose flag is flown by a particular vessel.
A shipowner who sends bis vessel into a foreign port gives notice by his flag to all who enter into contracts with the master that he intends the law of that flag to regulate such contracta, and that they must elther submit .to its operation or not contract with him. Ruhstrat v. People, 185 III. 133, 57 N.E. 41, 49 L.R.A. 181, 76 Am.St.Rep. 30.
FLAG OF THE UNITED STATES. By the act en-titled "An act to establish the flag of the United States," (Rev.St. H 1791, 1792), it was provided "that, from and after the fourth day of July next, the flag of the United States be thirteen horizon-tal stripes, alternate red and white; that the un-ion be twenty stars, white in a blue field; that, on the admission of every new state into the Union, one star be added te the union of the flag; and that such addition shall take effect on the fourth day of July then next succeeding such admis-sion." See Act July 30, 1947, c. 389, §§ 1, 2, 61 Stat. 641; 4 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 2.
FLAG OF TRUCE. A white flag displayed by one of two belligerent parties to notify the other party that communication and a cessation of hostilities are desired.
FLAGELLAT. Whipped; scourged. An entry on old Scotch records. 1 Pitc.Crim.Tr. pt. 1, p. 7.
FLAGRANS. Lat. Burning; raging; in actual perpetration.
FLAGRANS BELLUM. A war actually going on.
FLAGRANS CRIMEN. In Roman law, a fresh or recent crime. This term designated a crime in the very act of its commission, or white it was of recent occurrence.
FLAGRANT DELIT. In French law, a crime which is in actual process of perpetration or which has just been committed. Code d’Instr. Crim. art. 41.
FLAGRANT NECESSITY. A case of urgency ren-dering lawful an otherwise illegal act, as an as-sault to remove a man from impending danger.
FLAGRANTE BELLO. During an actual state of war.
FLAGRANTE DELICTO. In the very act of com-mitting the crime. 4 B1.Comm. 307.
FLAGRANTLY AGAINST EVIDENCE. Without any substantial support in evidence. Williams v. Commonwealth, 276 Ky. 754, 125 S.W.2d 221, 223. So much against weight of evidence as to shock conscience and clearly indicate passion and prej u-dice of jury. Smith v. Cornmonwealth, 216 Ky. 813, 288 S.W. 752, 754.
FLASH CHECK. A check drawn upon a banker by a person who has no funds at the banker’s and knows that such is the case.
FLAT. A place covered with water too shallow for navigation with vessels ordinarily used for commercial purposes. The space between
and low water mark along the edge of an arm of the sea, bay, tidal river, etc. Thomas v. Hatch, 23 F.Cas. 946; Church v. Meeker, 34 Conn. 424; Jones v. Janney, 8 Watts & S., Pa., 443, 42 Am.Dec. 309.
A fioor or separate division of a fioor, fitted for housekeeping and designed to be occupied by a single family. Cent.Dict. A building, the various floors of which are fitted up as fiats, either residen-tial or business.
A contrivance upon which lumber is piled and is not movable by wheels affixed thereto but must be moved by the use of jacks. Mengel Co. v. Park-er, 192 Miss. 634, 7 So.2d 521, 522.
FLATTERY. False or excessive praise, insincere complimentary language or conduct. Smith v. State, 13 Ala.App. 399, 69 So. 402, 404.
FLAVIANUM JUS. In Roman law, the title of a book containing the forms of actions, published by Cneius Flavius, A. U. C. 449. Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 39. Calvin.
FLECTA. A feathered or fleet arrow. Cowell.
FLEDWITE. A discharge or freedom from amercements where one, having been an outlawed fugitive, cometh to the place of our lord of his own accord. Termes de la Ley.
The liberty to hold court and take up the amerce-ments for beating and striking. Cowell.
The fine set on a fugitive as the price of obtain-ing the king’s freedom. Spelman.
FLEE FROM JUSTICE. Removing one’s self from or secreting one’s self within jurisdiction wherein offense was committed, Renner v. Renner, 13 N.J.Misc. 749, 181 A. 191, or leaving one’s home, residence, or known place of abode, or concealing one’s self therein, with intent, in either case, to avoid detection or punishment for some public offense. Streep v. U. S., 160 U.S. 128, 16 S.Ct. 244, 40 L.Ed. 365; Lay v. State, 42 Ark. 110; U. S. v. O’Brian, 3 Diil. 381, F.Cas.No.15,908.
FLEE TO THE WALL. A metaphorical expres-sion, used in connection with homicide done in self-defense, signifying the exhaustion of every pos-sible means of escape, or of averting the assault, before killing the assailant.
FLEET. A place where the tide fiows; a creek, or inlet of water; a company of ships or navy; a prison in London (so called from a river or ditch formerly in its vicinity,) now abolished by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 22. See Fleta.
FLEM. In Saxon and old English law, a fugitive bondman or villein. Spelman.
The privilege of having the goods and fines of fugitives.
FLEMENE FRIT, FLEMENES FRINTHE, OR FLYMENA FRYNTHE. (A corrupt pseudo-ar-chaic form is ftemens-firth, representing the old law Latin form, flemenaferth, of the Anglo-Saxon fiyman fyrmth or fiymena fyrmth. Cent. Dict.) The reception or relief of a fugitive or outlaw. Jacob.
FLEMESWITE. The possession of the goods of fugitives. Fleta, lib. 1, c. 147.
FLET. In Saxon law, land; a house; home.
FLETA. The name given to an ancient treatise on the laws of England, founded mainly upon the writings of Bracton and Glanville, and supposed to have been written in the time of Edw. I. The author is unknown, but it is surmised that he was a j udge or learned lawyer who was at that time confined in the Fleet prison, whence the name of the book.
FLEXIBLE PARTICIPATION BANK NIGHT. A scheme whereby some method is employed by means of which some persons obtain chances to win without purchasing theater tickets. Common-wealth v. Lund, 142 Pa.Super. 208, 15 A.2d 839, 842.
FLEXIBLE PARTICIPATION SCIIEME. A scheme whereby sum of money is given to member of audience holding registered number drawn from a hopper at theater. The scheme is one form of a lottery. Commonwealth v. Lund, 142 Pa.Super. 208, 15 A.2d 839, 846.
FLICHWITE. In Saxon law, a fine on account of brawls and quarrels. Spelman.
FLIGHT. The evading of the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing one’s self in order to avoid arrest or detention, or the institution or con-tinuance of criminal proceedings, regardless of whether one leaves jurisdiction. Commonwealth v. Myers, 131 Pa.Super. 258, 200 A. 143, 146. Also comprehends continued concealment. Common-wealth v. Fusci, 153 Pa.Super. 617, 35 A.2d 93, 95.
FLIM-FLAM. "Flim-flam" is a form of bunco or confidente game. Commonwealth v. Townsend, 149 Pa.Super. 337, 27 A.2d 462, 463.
FLOAT. Checks in process of collection. Lewis v. West Side Trust & Savings Bank, 376 IlL 23, 32 N.E.2d 907, 914; Hillmer v. Chicago Bank of Com-merce, 375 Ill. 266, 31 N.E.2d 309, 316.
In American land law, especially in the western states, a certificate authorizing the entry, by the holder, of a certain quantity of land not yet specifi-cally selected or located. U. S. v. Central Pac. R. Co., C.C.Cal., 26 F. 480; Hays v. Steiger, 76 Cal. 555, 18 P. 670; Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. v. Price County, 133 U.S. 496, 10 S.Ct. 341, 33 L.Ed. 687.
FLOATABLE. Used for fioating. A floatable stream is a stream used for fioating logs, rafts, etc. Gerrish v. Brown, 51 Me. 260, 81 Am.Dec. 569; Gaston v. Mace, 33 W.Va. 14, 10 S.E. 60, 5 L.R.A. 392, 25 Am.St.Rep. 848; Fortson Shingle Co. v. Skagland, 77 Wash, 8, 137 P. 304, 305.
FLOATING BOG. A mass of grass reeds or oth-er acquatic vegetation growing and floating on the water. Attorney General v. Bay Boom Wild Rice & Fur Farm, 172 Wis. 363, 178 N.W. 569, 572.
FLOATING CAPITAL (or circulating capital). Capital retained for the purpose of meeting cur• rent expenditure.
The capital which is consumed at each operation of production and reappears transformed into new products.
At each sale of those products the capital is represented In cash, and it ts from its transformations that profit le de-rived. Floating capital includes raw material& destined for fabrtcatlon, such as wool and flax, products in the ware-houses of manufacturera or merchants, such as cloth and linen, and money for wages, and stores. De Laveleye,
FLOATING CILARGE. A continuing charge on the assets of the company creating it, but permit-ting the company to deal freely with the property in the usual course of business until the security holder shall intervene to enforce his claim. Penn-sylvania Co. for Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities v. United Railways of Havana & Regla Warehouses, D.C.Me., 26 F.Supp. 379, 387, 388.
FLOATING DEBT. Loans for which no perma-nent provision was required to be made, which have been obtained for temporary purposes, with intention of paying them off within a brief period. State Budget Commission v. Lebus, 244 Ky. 700, 51 S.W.2d 965.
Lawful and valid claims against the corporation for the payment of which there is no money in the corporate treasury specifically designed, nor any taxation nor other means of providing money to pay particularly provided. People v. Wood, 71 N. Y. 374; City of Huron v. Second Ward Sav. Bank, S.D., 30 C.C.A. 38, 86 F. 276, 49 L.R.A. 534.
Debt not in the form of bonds or stocks bearing regular interest. Pub.St.Mass.1882, p. 1290. State v. Faran, 24 Ohio St. 541; People v. Carpenter, 31 App.Div. 603, 52 N.Y.S. 781.
FLOATING POLICY. A policy intended to supple-ment specific insurance on property and attaches only when the latter ceases to cover the risk, and the purpose of such policy is to provide indemnity for property which cannot, because of its frequent change in location and quantity, be covered by spe-cific insurance. Davis Yarn Co. v. Brooklyn Yarn Dye Co., 293 N.Y. 236, 56 N.E.2d 564, 570.
FLOATING SECURITY. An equitable charge on the assets for the time being of a going concern. Lord Macnaghten in Government Stock Inv. Co. v. Manila Ry. Co., [1897] A.C. 81. Pennsylvania Co. for Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities v. United Railways of Havana & Regla Ware-houses, D.C.Me., 26 F.Supp. 379, 387.
FLODE-MARK. Flood-mark, high-water mark. The mark which the sea, at flowing water and highest tide, makes on the shore. Blount.
FLOGGING. Thrashing or beating with a whip or lash.
FLOOD. An inundation of water over land not usually covered by it. Such an accident is an Act of God. McHenry v. R. Co., 4 Harr. (Del.) 449. See Act, of God. Of variable meaning. City of Tulsa v. Grier, 114 Okl. 93, 243 P. 753, 757.
Ordinary and extraordinary fioode. Extraordinary or unprecedented floods are fioods which are of such unusual occurrence that they could not have been foreseen by men of ordinary experience and prudence. Ordinary floods are those, the occurrence of which may be reasonably andel-pated from the general experience of men residing In the reglon where such floods happen. Soules v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 34 N.D. 7, 157 N.W. 823, 830, L.R.A.1917A, 501; Eildand v. Casey, C.C.A.Alaska, 12 A.L.R. 179, 266 F. 821, 823; Clemente v. Phcenix Utility Co., 119 Kan. 190, 237 P. 1062, 1065.FLOOD WATERS. Waters which escape from stream or other body of water and overflow adja-cent territory, Poole v. Sun Underwriters Ins. Co. of New York, 65 S.D. 422, 274 N.W. 658, 660; under conditions which do not usually occur. Thomson v. Public Service Commission, 241 Wis. 243, 5 N.W.2d 769, 771; Everett v. Davis, 18 Cal. 2d 389, 115 P.2d 821, 823, 824.
Where a stream coming out of the mouth of a canyon has lett a cone (Di detritus and flows down one side thereof, but in a time of high water it breaks out of its channel to flow down the other slope of the cone, such waters are "flood waters", it being immaterial that the escaping waters have made for themselves a channel or follow some natural channel, gulley, or depresslon. Horton v. Good-enough, 184 Cal. 451, 194 P. 34, 35; Motl v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82, 286 S.W. 458, 468; Herminghaus v. Southern Cali-fornia Edison Co., 200 Cal. 81, 252 P. 607, 610.
FLOOR. A section of a building between hori-zontal planes. Lowell v. Strahan, 145 Mass. 1, 12 N.E. 401, 1 Am.St.Rep. 422. A story, including outer walls. Leominster Fuel Co. v. Scanlon, 243 Mass. 126, 137 N.E. 271, 24 A.L.R. 1459.
The word "floor" may mean the mere bottom plane of an inclosure or artificial structure, the surface on which we walk, ride, or travel, or It may mean such surface or plane, together with the tlmbers, framework, and materials which enter into and form part of its construction. So of the word -flooring." If used without reference to a structure in its completed form, It would ordinarily convey the Idea of materials suitable for use in constructing a floor, or in a narrower sense the boards or planks for covering the framework of a floor. When used with reference to a completed structure, it may mean either the materials of which the floor is composed, or the completed floor struc-ture. When not attempting to speak with technical exact-ness, the words "floor" and "flooring" may be, and often are, used as synonymous or interchangeable terms. Cedar Rapids & M. C. R. Co. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 173 Iowa 386, 155 N.W. 842; Missourl Pac. R. Co. v. Holt, C.C.A. Ark. 293 F. 155, 157.
A term used metaphorically, in parliamentary practice, to denote the exclusive right to address the body in session.
A member who has been recognized by the chairman, and who is in order, is said to "have the floor," until his remarks are concluded. Similarly, the "floor of the house" means the main part of the hall where the members sit, as distinguished from the galleries, or from the corridors or lobbies.
In England, the floor of a court is that part between the judge’s bench and the front row of counsel. Litigants ap-pearing in person, in the high court or court of appeal, are supposed to address the court from the floor.FLOOR BROKER. Broker’s sub-agent. Helfhat v. Whitehouse, 258 N.Y. 274, 179 N.E. 493, 496.
FLOOR PLAN. A horizontal section drawing showing the thickness of walls and partitions, ar-rangement of passages, apartments, and openings at any floor of a building. Webster.
FLOOR PLAN RULE. Rule by which an owner who has placed an automobile on the floor of a retail dealer’s showroom for sale is estopped to deny the title of an innocent purchaser from such dealer in the ordinary retail dealing, without knowledge of any conflicting claim. National Guarantee & Finance Co. v. Russell, Ohio App., 36 N.E.2d 1015, 1018.FLOOR PLANNING. Financing automobiles for dealers. Associates Discount Corporation v. Haynes Garage, 304 Mass. 526, 24 N.E.2d 685, 687.
FLOORED. In automobile law. An automobile is floored when it is flnanced under a trust receipt or similar title retention document, whereby re-tail dealer obtains possession of automobile from distributor for exhibition and sale through pay-ment to distributor by finance company. Com-mercial Credit Co. v. Barney Motor Co., 10 Ca1.2d 718, 76 P.2d 1181, 1183; Blashfield, Cyc. of Auto-mobile Law and Prac., Perm. Ed., § 4755.
FLORENTINE PANDECTS. A copy of the Pan-dects discovered accidentally about the year 1137, at Amalphi, a town in Italy, near Salerno.
FLORIN. A coin originally made at Florence, now of the value of about two English shillings.
FLOTAGES. Such things as by accident float on the top of great rivers or the sea. Blount.
A commission paid to water bailiffs. Cun.Dict.
FLOTERIAL DISTRICT. A legislative district which includes within its boundaries several sep-arate districts or political subdivisions which in-dependently would not be entitled to additional representation but whose conglomerate population entitles the entire area to another seat in the par-ticular legislative body being apportioned. Kil-garlin v. Martin, D.C.Tex., 252 F.Supp. 404, 419; Davis v. Mann, Va., 84 S.Ct. 1441, 1446, 377 U.S. 678, 12 L.Ed.2d 609.
FLOTSAM, FLOTSAN. A name for the goods which float upon the sea when cast overboard for the safety of the ship, or when a ship is sunk. Dis-tinguished from "jetsam" and "ligan." Bract. lib. 2, c. 5; 5 Coke, 106; 1 Bl.Comm. 292.
FLOUD-MARKE. In old English law, high-water mark ; flood-mark. 1 And. 88, 89.
FLOURISIL The act of brandishing or waving; a swinging or whirling movement as flourish of a whip or sword; to fling or whirl about while holding in the hand, brandish, flaunt, as, he- flour-ished his whip. State v. Boyles, 24 N.M. 464, 174 P. 423.
FLOWAGE. The natural flow or movement of wa-ter from an upper estate to a lower one is a servi-tude which the owner of the latter must bear, though the flowage be not in a natural water course with well defined banks. Leidlein v. Meyer, 95 Mich. 586, 55 N.W. 367; Ogburn v. Connor, 46 Cal. 346, 13 Am.Rep. 213; Gray v. McWilliams, 98 Cal. 157, 32 P. 976, 21 L.R.A. 593, 35 Am.St.Rep. 163.
FLOWING. Movement, as if in a current or stream. }tomer Brooke Glass Co. v. Hartford-Fairmont Co., C.C.A.Conn., 262 F. 427, 431.FLOVVING LANDS. Imports raising and setting back water on another’s land, by a dam placed across a stream or water course which is the nat. ural drain and outlet for surplus water on such land. Cali v. Middlesex County Com’rs, 2 Gray, Mass., 235.
FLUCTUS. Flood; flood-tide. Bract. fol. 255.
FLEME. Primarily, a stream or river, but usually used to designate an artificial channel applied to some definite use, and may mean either an open or a covered aqueduct. Talbot v. Joseph, 79 Or. 308, 155 P. 184, 186.
FLUMEN.
In Roman law, a servitude which consists in the right to conduct the rain-water, collected from the roof and carried off by the gutters, onto the house or ground of one’s neighbor. Mackeld.Rom. Law, § 317; Ersk.Inst. 2, 9, 9. Also a river or stream.
In old English law, flood; flood-tide.
FLUMINA ET PORTUS PUBLICA SUNT, IDEO-QUE JUS PISCANDI OMNIBUS COMMUNE EST. Rivers and ports are public. Therefore the right of fishing there is common to all. Day. Ir. K. B. 55; Branch, Princ.
FLUMINIE VOLUCRES. Wild fowl; waterfowl. 11 East, 571, note.
FLUVIUS. Lat. A river; a public river; flood; flood-tide.
FLUXUS. In old English law, flow. Per fluxum et refluxum maris, by the flow and reflow of the sea. Dal. pl. 10.
FLY FOR IT. Anciently, it was the custom in a criminal trial to inquire after a verdict, "Did he fiy for it?" After the verdict, even if not guilty, forfeiture of goods followed conviction upon such inquiry. Abolished by 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 28. Whar-ton.
FLYING MACHINE. A heavier-than-air machine capable of soaring in the air and susceptible to being guided by a pilot into different altitudes when aloft. Myers v. United States, Ct.Cl., 25 F. Supp. 500, 501.
FLYING SWITCH. In railroading, a flying switch is made by uncoupling the cars from the engine while in motion, and throwing the cars onto the side track, by turning the switch, alter the engine has passed it upon the main track. Greenleaf v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 29 Iowa 39, 4 Am.Rep. 181; Hanson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 157 Wis. 455, 146 N.W. 524, 525.
FLYMA. In old English law, a runaway; fugitive; one escapes from justice, or who has no "hlaford."
FLYMAN—FRYMTH. See Flemene Frit.
FLY—POWER. A written assignment in blank, whereby, on being attached to a stock certificate, the stock may be transferred. Carlisle v. Norris,215 N.Y. 400, 109 N.E. 564, 565, Ann.Cas.1917A, 429; Carlisle v. Norris, 157 App.Div. 313, 142 N. Y.S. 393, 396.
FOAL, v. To being forth young; said of animals of the horse family. O’Rear v. Richardson, 17 Ala.App. 87, 81 So. 865, 866.
FOCAGE. House-bote; fire-bote. Cowell.
FOCALE. In old English law, firewood. The right of taking wood for the fire. Fire-bote. Cun-ningham.
FODDER. Food for horses or cattle. In feudal law, the term also denoted a prerogative of the prince to be provided with corn, etc., for his horses by his subjects in his wars.
FODERTORIUM. Provisions to be paid by custom to the royal purveyors. Cowell.
FODERUM. See Fodder.
FODINA. A mine. Co.Litt. 6a.
FcEDUS. In international law, a treaty; a league; a compact.
FCEMINA VIRO CO—OPERTA. A married wo-man; a feme covert.
FCEMINJE AB OMNIBUS OFFICHS CIVILIBUS VEL PUBLICIS REMOIVE SUNT. Women are excluded from all civil and public charges or of-fices. Dig. 50, 17, 2; 1 Exch. 645; 6 Mees. & W. 216.
FCEIVIINZE NON SUNT CAPACES DE PUBLICIS OFFICHS. Jenk.Cent. 237. Women are not ad-missible to public offices.
FcENERATION. Lending money at interest; the act of putting out money to usury.
FcENUS. Lat. In the civil law, interest on mon-ey; the lending of money on interest.
FCENUS NAUTICUM. Nautical or maritime in-terest.
FcENUS UNCIARIUM. Interest of one-twelfth, that is, interest amounting annually to one-twelfth of the principal, hence at the rate of eight and one-third per cent. per annum. This was the high-est legal rate of interest in the early times of the Roman republic. See Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 382.
An extraordinary rate of interest agreed to be paid for the loan of money on the hazard of a voyage; sometimes called "usura raaritima." Dig. 22, 2; Code, 4, 33; 2 Bl. Comm. 458. The extraordinary rate of interest, propor-tioned to the risk, demanded by a person, lending money on a ship, or on "bottomry," as it is termed. The agree-ment for such a rate of interest is also called "fcenus nau-ticum." (2 Bl.Comm. 458; 2 Steph.Comm. 93.) Mozley & Whitley.
FCESA. In old records, grass; herbage. 2 Mon. Angl. 906b; Cowell.
FCETICIDE. See Feticide.
FCETURA. In the civil law, the produce of ani-mals, and the fruit of other property, which areacquired to the owner of such animals and prop-erty by virtue of his right. Bowyer, Mod.Civil Law, c. 14, p. 81
FETUS. In medical jurisprudence, an unborn child. An infant in ventre sa mere.
FOG. In maritime law, any atmospheric condi-tion (including not only fog properly so called, but also mist or falling snow) which thickens the air, obstructs the view, and so increases the perils of navigation. Flint & P. M. R. Co. v. Marine Ins. Co., C.C.Mich., 71 F. 210; Dolner v. The Monticello, 7 F.Cas. 859.
FOGAGIUM. In old English law, foggage or fog; a kind of rank grass of late growth, and not eaten in summer. Spelman; Cowell.
FOL In French feudal law, faith; fealty. Guyot, Inst.Feod. c. 2.
FOINESUN. In old English law, the ¡awning of deer. Spelman.
FOIRFAULT. In old Scotch law, to forfeit. 1 How.State Tr. 927.
FOIRTHOCHT. In old Scotch law, forethought; premeditated. 1 Pitc.Crim.Tr. pt. 1, p. 90.
FOITERERS. Vagabonds. Blount.
FOLC—GEMOTE (spelled, also, folkmote, folcmote, folkgemote; from folc, people, and gemote, an as-sembly). In Saxon law, a general assembly of the people in a town or shire.
It appears to have had judicial functions of a limited nature, and also to have discharged political offices, such as deliberating upon the affairs of the commonwealth or complaining of misgovernment, and probably possessed considerable powers of local self-government. The name was also given to any sort of a popular assembly. See Spelman; Manwood; Cunningham.
FOLC—LAND. In Saxon law, land of the folk or people. Land belonging to the people or the Pub-lic.
Folc-land was the property of the community. It rnight be occupied in common, or possessed in severalty; and, in the latter case, it was probably parceled out to individuals in the folc-gemote or court of the district, and the grant sanctioned by the freemen who were there present. But, while it continued to be folc-land, it could not be alienated in perpetuity; and therefore, on the expiration of the term for which it had been granted, it reverted to the communi-ty, and was again distributed by the same authority. It was subject to many burdens and exactions from which boc-land was exempt. Wharton.
FOLC—MOTE. A general assembly of the people, under the Saxons. See Folc-Gemote.
FOLC—RIGHT. The common right of all the peo. ple. 1 Bl.Comm. 65, 67.
The jus commune, or common law, mentioned in the laws of King Edward the Elder, declaring the same equal right, law, or justice to be due to persons of all de-grees. Wharton.
FOLD—COURSE. In English law, land to which the sole right of folding the cattle of others is appurtenant. Sometimes it means merely such.right of folding. The right of folding on another’s land, which is called "common foldage." Co.Litt. 6a, note 1.
FOLD—SOKE. A feudal service which consisted in the obligation of the tenant not to have a fold of his own but to have his sheep lie in the lord’s fold.
He was said to be consuetus ad foldam, tried to his lord’s fold. The basis of his service is thus expressed by a re-cent wrlter: "It is manure that the lord wants; the de-mand for manure has played a large part in the history ot the human race." Maitland, Domesday Book 76. In East Anglia the peasants had sheep enough to make this an im-portant social institution; id. 442.
FOLDAGE. A privilege possessed in some places by the lord of a manor, which consists in the right of having his tenant’s sheep to leed on his fields, so as to manure the land. The name of foldage is also given in parts of Norfolk to the customary lee paid to the lord for exemption at certain times from this duty. Elton, Com. 45, 46.
FOLGARII. Menial servants; followers. Bract.
FOLGERE. In old English law, a freeman, who has no house or dwelling of his own, but is the follower or retainer of another, (heorthfcest,) for whom he performs certain predial services.
FOLGERS. Menial servants or followers. Cow-ell.
FOLGOTH. Official dignity.
FOLIE BRIGHTIQUE. See Insanity, FOLIE CIRCULAIRE. See Insanity,
FOLIO. A leaf. In the ancient lawbooks it was the custom to number the leaves, instead of the pages; hence a folio would include both sides of the leaf, or two pages. The references to these books are made by the number of the folio, the Letters "a" and "b" being added to show which of the two pages is intended; thus "Bracton, fol. 100a."
A large size of book, the page being obtained by folding the sheet of paper once only in the Bind-ing. Many of the ancient lawbooks are folios.
When used in connection with legal documents, it means a certain number of words varying from 72 to 100, but generally in the United States con-sisting of 100. Reed v. Sackett, 135 Okl. 69, 273 P. 1002, 1004.
In pleading denying allegations of a specified folio, it refers to a division in a document for pur-pose of measurement or reference. Mahin v. Ma-hin, 131 Fla. 546, 179 So. 651.
FOLK—LAND; FOLK—MOTE. See Folc-Land; Folc-Gemote.
FOLLOW. To conform to, comply with, or be fixed or determined by; as in the expressions "costs follow the event of the suit," "the situs of personal property follows that of the owner," "the offspring follows the mother," (partos sequitur ventrera).To waik in, to attend upon closely, as a profes-sion or calling. Spears v. Ford, 247 S.W. 713, 197 Ky. 575.
FOLLOWS THE PROPERTY. Synonymous with "adheres to the property." Tonopah Mining Co. of Nevada v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.3, 127 F.2d 239, 244.
FONDS ET BIENS. Fr. In French law, goods and effects. Adams v. Akerlund, 168 III. 632, 48 N.E. 454.
Including realty. Erickson v. Carlson, 95 Neb. 182, 145 N.W. 352, approved and followed. Engen v. Union State Bank of Harvard, 118 Neb. 105, 223 N.W. 664, 666.
FONDS PERDUS. In French law, a capital is said to be invested d fonds perdus when it is stip-ulated that in consideration of the payment of an amount as interest, higher than the normal rate, the lender shall be repaid his capital in this manner. The borrower, af ter paying the in-terest during the period determined, is free as re-gards the capital itself. Arg.Fr.Merc.Law, 560.
FONSADERA. In Spanish law, any tribute or loan granted to the king for the purpose of enabl-ing him to defray the expenses of a war.
FONTANA. A fountain or spring. Bract. fol. 233.
FOOT. A measure of length containing twelve inches or one-third of a yard. Spicer v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 171 Va. 428, 199 S.E. 499, 501.
The base, bottom, or foundation of anything; and, by metonomy, the end or termination; as the foot of a fine.
The terminal part of the leg. Reno v. Holmes, 238 Mich. 572, 214 N.W. 174, 175. That part of leg at or below ankle joint. Milis v. Milis & Con-nelly, 214 Ky. 675, 283 S.W. 1010, 1011. Embraces the arch. Trustees for Arch Preserver Shoe Pat-enta v. James McCreery & Co., Cust. & Pat.App., 49 F.2d 1068, 1071.
FOOT ACRE. One acre of coal one foot thick. In re Hudson Coal Co., 327 Pa. 247, 193 A. 8, 10.
FOOT DROP. A loss of ability to turn the foot inward, a loss of ability to extend the toes and to raise them, and a loss of sensation in the low-er frontal portions of the leg below the knee, and the greater portion of the top of the foot. Engel-king v. Carlson, Cal.App., 80 P.2d 96, 97.
FOOT—FRONTAGE RULE. Under rule, assess-ment is confined to actual frontage on line of im-provement, and depth of lot, number or character of improvements, or value thereof, is immaterial. Borough of Berwick v. Smethers, 105 Pa.Super. 40, 160 A. 148.
FOOTGELD. In the forest law, an amercement for not cutting out the ball or cutting off the claws of a dog’s feet, (expeditating, him.) To be quit of footgeld is to have the privilege of keeping dogs in the forest unlawed without punishment or control. Manwood.
FOOT OF THE FINE. The fifth part of the con-clusion of a fine. It includes the whole matter, reciting the names of the parties, day, year, and place, and bef ore whom it was acknowledged or levied. 2 Bl.Comm. 351.
FOOT POUND. A unit of energy, or work, equal to work done in raising one pound avoirdupois against the force of gravity to the height of one foot. Webster, Dict. Healey v. Moran Towing & Transportation Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 253 F. 334, 337.
FOOTPRINTS. In the law of evidence, impres-sions made upan earth, snow, or other surface by the feet of persons, or by the shoes, boots, or other covering of the feet. Burrill, Circ.Ev. 264.
FOR. Fr. In French law, a tribunal. Le for in-terieur, the interior forum; the tribunal of con-science. Poth.Obl. pt. 1, c. 1, § 1, art. 3, § 4.
FOR. In behalf of, in place of, in lieu of, instead of, representing, as being which, or equivalent to which, and sometimes imports agency. Medler v. Henry, 44 N.M. 63, 97 P.2d 661, 662.
During; throughout; for the period of; as, where a notice is required to be published "for" a certain number of weeks or months. Wilson v. Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co., C.C.A.Kan., 65 F. 39, 12 C.C.A. 505; Northrop v. Cooper, 23 Kan. 432; Burdine v. Sewell, 92 Fla. 375, 109 So. 648, 653. Duration, when put in connection with time. Progressive Building & Loan Ass’n v. McIntyre, 169 Tenn. 491, 89 S.W.2d 336, 337.
In consideration for; as an equivalent for; in exchange for; in place of; as where property is agreed to be given "for" other property or "for" services. Norton v. Woodruff, 2 N.Y. 153; Dun-can v. Franklin Tp., 10 A. 546, 43 N.J.Eq. 143; Mudge v. Black, Sheridan & Wilson, C.C.A.Mo., 224 F. 919, 921.
Belonging to, exercising authority or functions within; as, where one describes himself as "a notary public in and for the said county."
By reason of; with respect to; for benefit of; for use of; in consideration of. Basler v. Sacra-mento Electric, Gas & Ry. Co., 166 Cal. 33, 134 P. 993, 994; Elmore-Schultz Grain Co. v. Stonebrak-er, 202 Mo.App. 81, 214 S.W. 216, 221; Work v. 1J. S., ex rel. Rives, 54 App.D.C. 84, 295 F. 225, 226. The cause, motive or occasion of an act, state or condition. American Ins. Co. v. Naylor, 103 Colo. 461, 87 P.2d 260, 265. Used in sense of "because of," "on account of," or "in consequence of." Kelly v. State Personnel Board of Califor-nia, 31 Cal.App.2d 443, 88 P.2d 264, 266. By means of, or growing out of. Cormier v. Hudson, 284 Mass. 231, 187 N.E. 625, 626.
It connotes the end with reference to which anything is, acts, serves, or is done. Bates v. Schillinger, 128 Me. 14, 145 A. 395, 399. In consid-eration of which, in view of which, or with refer-ence to which, anything is done or takes place. Fleming v. Atlantic Co., D.C.Ga., 40 F.Supp. 654, 660. In direction of; with view of reaching; with reference to needs, purposes or uses of; appropri-ate or adapted to; suitable to purpose, require-ment, character or state of. Robert v. Clapp Co. v. Fox, 124 Ohio St. 331, 178 N.E. 586, 588.
FOR ACCOUNT OF. Introduces name of person entitled to receive proceeds of indorsed note or draft. Freiberg v. Stoddard, 161 Pa. 259, 28 A. 1111; White v. Miners’ Nat. Bank, 102 U.S. 658, 26 L.Ed. 250; Equitable Trust Co. of New York v. Rochling, 275 U.S. 248, 48 S.Ct. 58, 59, 72 L.Ed. 264.
FOR AND DURING SUCH TIME, FOR SO LONG AS. Temporarily. Burdine v. Sewell, 92 Fla. 375, 109 So. 648, 653.
FOR AT LEAST. As applied to a number of days required for notice this phrase includes either the first or last day, but not both. Stroud v. Water Co., 56 N.J.L. 422, 28 A. 578.
FOR CAUSE. Means for reasons which law and public policy recognize as sufficient warrant for removal and such cause is "legal cause" and not merely a cause which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient. State ex rel. Nagle v. Sullivan, 98 Mont. 425, 40 P.2d 995, 998, 99 A.L.R. 321.
FOR COLLECTION. A form of indorsement on a note or check where it is not intended to trans-fer title to it or to give it credit or currency, but merely to authorize the transferee to collect the amount of it. Central R. Co. v. Bank, 73 Ga. 383; Sweeny v. Easter, 1 Wall. 166, 17 L.Ed. 681. But see In re Ziegenhein, Mo.App., 187 S.W. 893, 895.
FOR HIRE OR REWARD. To transport passen-gers or property of other persons than owner or operator of the vehicle for a reward or stipend, to be paid by such passengers, or persons for whom such property is transported, to owner or operator. Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. Sohio Pe-troleum Co., 32 N.W.2d 353, 356, 321 Mich. 102.
FOR PURPOSE OF. With the intention of. State v. Derrickson, 1 W.W.Harr., Del., 342, 114 A. 286, 288.
FOR THAT. In pleading, words used to intro-duce the allegations of a declaration. "For that" is a positive allegation; "For that whereas" is a recital. Ham. N.P. 9.
FOR THAT WHEREAS. In pleading, formal words introducing the statement of the plaintiff’s case, by way of recital, in his declaration, in all actions except trespass. 1 Instr.Cler. 170; 1 Bur-rill, Pr. 127. In trespass, where there was no recital, the expression used was, "For that." Id.; 1 Inst.Cler. 202.
FOR USE. (1) For the benefit or advantage of another. Thus, where an assignee is obliged to sue in the name of his assignor, the suit is enti-tled "A. for use of B. v. C." (2) For enjoyment or employment without destruction.A Jipan "for use" is one in which the bailee has the right to use and enjoy the article, but without consuming or destroying it, in which respect it differs from a loan "for consumption." In re Houk’s Estate, 186 Cal. 643, 200 P. 417, 418.
FOR VALUE. See Holder.
FOR VALUE RECEIVED. See Value Received.
FOR WHOM IT MAY CONCERN. Phrase cre-ates presumption of intention on part of named insured to cover any persons who may have an insurable interest in the property. Allemannia Fire Ins. Co. v. Winding Gulf Collieries, D.C.W. Va., 60 F.Supp. 65, 68.
FORAGE. Hay and straw for horses, particularly in the army. Jacob.
FORAGIUM. Straw when the corn is threshed out. Cowell.
FORAKER ACT. A name usually given to the act of congress of April 12, 1900, 31 Stat.L. 77, c. 191 (48 U.S.C.A. § 731 et seq.), which provided civil government for Porto Rico. See a synopsis of it by Harlan, J., in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 390, 21 S.Ct. 770, 45 L.Ed. 1088.
FORANEUS. One from without; a foreigner; a stranger. Calvin.
FORATHE. In forest law, one who could make oath, i. e., bear witness for another. Cowell; Spelman.
FORBALCA. In old records, a forebalk; a balk (that is, an unplowed piece of land) lying forward or next the highway. Cowell.
FORBANNITUS. A pirate; an outlaw; one ban-ished.
FORBARRER. L.Fr. To bar out; to preclude; hence, to estop.
FORBATUDUS. In old English law, the aggres-sor slain in combat. Jacob.
FORBEARANCE. Act by which creditor waits for payment of debt due him by debtor alter it becomes due. Upton v. Gould, 64 Cal.App.2d 814, 149 P.2d 731, 733. A delay in enforcing rights. Shaw v. Philbrick, 129 Me. 259, 151 A. 423, 74 A. L.R. 290. Indulgence granted to a debtor. Dry Dock Bank v. American Life Ins., etc., Co., 3 N. Y. 354.
Refraining from action. The term is used in this sense in general jurisprudence, in contradis-tinction to "act."
Within usury law, term signifies contractual obligation of lender or creditor to refrain, during given period of time, from requiring borrower or debtor to repay loan or debt then due and payable. Hafer v. Spaeth, 22 Wash.2d 378, 156 P.2d 408, 411.
FORCE. Power dynamically considered, that is, in motion or in action; constraining power, com-pulsion; strength directed to an end. Usually the word occurs in such connections as to show that unlawful or wrongful action is meant. Watson v. Railway Co., 7 Misc.Rep. 562, 28 N.Y.S. 84; Plank,Road Co. v. Robbins, 22 Barb., N.Y., 667; Temple Lumber Co. v. Living, Tex.Civ.App., 289 S.W. 746, 749; Hafner Mfg. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 262 Mo. 621, 172 S.W. 28, 34.
Unlawful violence. It is either simple, as enter-ing upon another’s possession, without doing any other unlawful act; compound, when some other
violence is committed, which of itself alone is criminal; or implied, as in every trespass, rescous, or disseisin. Lambert v. Helena Adjustment Co., 69 Mont. 510, 222 P. 1057, 1058.
It may mean either exact pressure times exact area to which the pressure Is applied, or it may mean simply an operative physical power without taking account of the exact quantity applied. Hydraulic Press Corporation v. Coe, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 251, 134 F.2d 49, 56.
Such display of physical power as is reasonably calcu-lated to inspire fear of physical harm to those opposing possession of premises by trespasser. Smith y. Sinclair Refining Co., Tex.Civ.App., 77 S.W.2d 894, 895.
Terms "violence" and ”force" are synonymous when used In relation to assault. People v. James, 9 Cal.App.2d 162, 48 P.2d 1011, 1012.
Power statically considered; that is at rest, or latent, but capable of being called into activity upon occasion for its exercise. Efficacy; legal va-lidity. This is the meaning when we say that a statute or a contract is "in force."
As used in divorce statute, "force" or "coercion" are synonymous. Santer v. Santer, 115 Pa.Super. 1, 174 A. 651, 652.
In old English law, a technical term applied to a species of accessary before the fact.
In Scotch law, coercion; duress. Bell. —Of force. See that title.
FORCE AND ARMS. A phrase used in declara-tions of trespass and in indictments, but now un-necessary in declarations, to denote that the act complained of was done with violence. 2 Chit.Pl. 846, 850.
FORCE AND FEAR, called also "vi metuque," means that any contract or act extorted under the pressure of force (vis) or under the influence of fear (metas) is voidable on that ground, pro-vided, of course, that the force or the fear was such as influenced the party. Brown.
FORCE MAJESTURE. Includes lightnings, earth-quakes, storms, flood, sunstrokes, freezing, etc., wherein latter two can be considered hazards in contemplation of employer within Compensa-tion Act. Fogg v. Van Saun Coal Co., N.J.Dept. Labor, 12 N.J.Misc. 680, 174 A. 419, 420.
FORCE MAJEURE. Fr. In the law of insur-ance, superior or irresistible force. Emerig. Tr. des Ass. c. 19
FORCED HEIRS. Those persons whom the tes-tator or donor cannot deprive of the portion of his estate reserved for them by law, except in cases where he has a just cause to disinherit them. Civil Code La. art. 1495. And see Crain v. Crain, 17 Tex. 90; Hagerty v. Hagerty, 12 Tex. 456; Mil-ler v. Miller, 105 La. 257, 29 So. 802.FORCED SALE. In practice, a sale made at the time and in the manner prescribed by law, in virtue of execution issued on a judgment already rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; a sale made under the process of the court, and in the mode prescribed by law. Sampson v. Wil-liamson, 6 Tex. 110, 55 Am.Dec. 762.
A sale against the consent of the owner. The term should not be deemed to embrace a sale under a power in a mortgage. Patterson v. Taylor, 15 Fla. 336.
FORCES. The military and naval power of the country.
FORCHEAPUM. Pre-emption; forestalling the market. Jacob.
FORCIBLE DETAINER. Exists where one or-iginally in rightful possession of realty refuses to surrender it at termination of his possessory right. Sayers & Muir Service Station v. Indian Refining Co., 266 Ky. 779, 100 S.W.2d 687, 689.
The offense of vIolently keeping possession of lands and tenements, with menaces, force, and arms, and without the authority of law. 4 Bl.Comm. 148; 4 Steph.Comm. 280.
Forcible detainer may ensue upon a peaceable entry, as well as upon a forcible entry ; but it is most commonly spoken of in the phrase "forcible entry and detainer."
FORCIBLE ENTRY. Violently taking possession of lands and tenements with menaces, force, and arms, against the will o! those entitled to the possession, and without the authority of law. 4 Bl. Comm. 148; 4 Steph. Comm. 280; Code Ga. 1882, § 4524 (Pen. Code, 1910, § 344). Accompan-ied with circumstances tending to excite terror in the occupant, and to prevent him from maintain-ing his rights. Barbee v. Winnsboro Granite Cor-poration, 190 S.C. 245, 2 S.E.2d 737, 739. Angry words and threats of force may be sufficient. Cal-idino Hotel Co. of San Bernardino v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass’n, 31 Cal.App. 2d 295, 87 P.2d 923, 931.
Every person is guilty of forcible entry who either (1) by breaking open doors, windows, or other parts of a house, or by any kind of violence or circumstance of ter-ror, enters upon or into any real property ; or (2) who, after entering peaceably upan real property, turns out by force, threats, or menacing conduct the party in posses-sion. Code Civil Proc.Cal. § 1159.
In many states, an entry effected without consent of rightful owner, or against his remonstrance, or under cir-cumstances which amount to no more than a mere tres-pass, is now technically considered "forcible," while a detainer of the property consisting merely in the refusal to surrender possession after a lawful demand, is treated as a "forcible" detainer, the "force" required at common law being now supplied by a mere fiction. See Vernon’s Tex. Ann.Civ.St. art. 3975; Goldsberry v. Bishop, 2 Duv., Ky., 144; Wells v. Darby, 13 Mont. 504, 34 P. 1092; Willard v. Warren, 17 Wend., N.Y. 261; California Products v. Mitchell, 52 Cal.App. 312, 198 P. 646.
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER. A sum-mary proceeding for restoring to possession of land one who is wrongfully kept out or has been wrongfully deprived of the possession. Wein v. Albany Park Motor Sales Co., 312 Ill.App. 357, 38 N.E.2d 556, 559.
The title cannot be inquired into for any purpose. Davis V. Robinson, 374 III. 553, 30 N.E.2d 52, 54. The inquiry is confined to the actual and peaceable possession of the plaintiff and the unlawful or forcible ouster or detentionby defendant; the object of the law being to prevent the disturbance of the public peace by the forcible assertion of a private right. Gore v. Altice, 33 Wash. 335, 74 P. 556; Eveleth v. Gill, 97 Me. 315, 54 A. 757; Harris v. Harris, 190 Ala. 619, 67 So. 465, 466; Long v. Bagwell, 38 Okl. 312, 133 P. 50, 51.
FORCIBLE TRESPASS. In North Carolina, this is an invasion of the rights of another with re-spect to his personal property, of the same char-acter, or under the same circumstances, which would constitute a "forcible entry and detainer" of real property at common law. It consists in taking or seizing the personal property of an-other by force, violence, or intimidation or in forcibly injuring it. State v. Lawson, 123 N.C. 740, 31 S.E. 667, 68 Am.St.Rep. 844; State v. Hold-er, 188 N.C. 561, 125 S.E. 113, 114.
There must be actual violence used, or such demonstra-don of force as is calculated to intimidate or tend to a breach of the peace. It is not necessary that the person be actually put in fear. State v. Stínnett, 167 S.E. 63, 64, 203 N.C. 829.
FORDA. In old records, a ford or shallow, made by damming or penning up the water. Cowell.
FORDAL. A butt or headland, jutting out upon other land. Cowell.
FORDANNO. In old European law, he who first assaulted another. Spelman.
FORDIKA. In old records, grass or herbage growing on the edge or bank of dykes or ditches. Cowell.
FORE. Sax. Before. Fr. Out. Kelham.
FORE—MATRON. In a jury of women this word corresponds to the foreman of a jury. She was sworn in separately; 8 Carr. & P. 264.
FORE—OATH. Before the Norman Conquest, an oath required of the complainant in the first in-stante (in the absence of manifest facts) as a security against frivolous suits. Pollock, 1 Sel. Essays Anglo-Amer. Leg. Hist. 93.
FOREBALK. See Headland.
FORECLOSE. To shut out; to bar; to termí-nate. State v. Darling, 39 S.D. 558, 165 N.W. 536, 537.
Method of terminating mortgagor’s right of redemption. Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Lauffer, 41 Cal.App.2d 725, 107 P.2d 494, 497.
FORECLOSURE. To shut out, to bar, to destroy an equity of redemption. Anderson v. Barr, 178 Okl. 508, 62 P.2d 1242, 1246. A termination of all rights of the mortgagor or his grantee in the property covered by the mortgage. Levin v. Cen-tury Indemnity Co., 279 Mass. 256, 181 N.E. 223, 225.
A process in chancery by which all further right existing in a mortgagor to redeem the estate is defeated and lost to him, and the estate becomes the absolute property of the mortgagee ; being applicable when the mortgagor has forfeited his estate by non-payment of the money due un the mortgage at the time appointed, but still retains the equity of redemption. 2 Washb. Real Prop. 237. Goodman v. White, 26 Cono. 322; Trustees of Schools v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 296 III. 99, 129 N.E. 567, 568.The term is also loosely applied to any of the various methods, statutory or otherwise, known in different juris-dictions, of enforcing payment of the debt secured by a mortgage, by taking and selling the mortgaged estate. Dikeman v. Jewel Gold Mining Co., C.C.A.Alaska, 13 F.2d 118; Realty Mortgage Co. v. Moore, 80 Fla. 2, 85 So. 155, 156.
Foreclosure is also applied to proceedings founded upon some other liens; thus there are proceedings to foreclose a mechanic’s lien. Insurance Co. of North America v. Cheat-hem, 221 Ky. 668, 299 S.W. 545, 547. It is a proceeding in court or out of court, when provided for by a valid con-tract, to subject property or part thereof covered by a líen to payment of debt secured by the lien, and it has effect of extinguishing all right, title, or interest, if any, of de-fendants in the property. Southwestern Peanut Growers Ass’n v. Womack, Tex.Civ.App., 179 S.W.2d 371, 373.
Statutory foreclosure. The term is sometimes applied to foreclosure by execution of a power of sale contained in the mortgage, without recourse to the courts, as it must conform to the provisions of the statute regulating such sales. See Mowry v. Sanborn, 11 Hun, N.Y., 548.
Strict foreclosure. A decree of strict foreclosure of a mortgage finds the amount due under the mortgage, orders its payment within a certain limited time, and provides that, in default of such payment, the debtor’s right and equity of redemption shall be forever barred and fore-closed ; lts effect ís to vest the title of the property ab-solutely in the mortgagee, on default in payment, without any sale of the property. Champion v. Hínkle, 45 N.J.Eq. 162, 16 A. 701; Lightcap v. Bradley, 186 III. 510, 58 N.E. 221; Warner Bros. Co. v. Freud, 138 Cal. 651, 72 P. 345.
FORECLOSURE DECREE. Properly speaking, a decree ordering the strict foreclosure of a mort-gage; but the term is also loosely and conven-tionally applied to a decree ordering the sale of the mortgaged premises and the satisfaction of the mortgage out of the proceeds. Hanover F. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 77 Md. 64, 25 A. 989, 39 Am.St. Rep. 386.
FORECLOSURE SALE. A sale of mortgaged property to obtain satisfaction of the mortgage out of the proceeds, whether authorized by a de-cree of the court or by a power of sale contained in the mortgage. a Johnson v. Cook, 96 Mo.App. 442, 70 S.W. 526.
FORECLOSURE SUIT. A proceeding for legal determination of existente of lien, ascertainment of its extent, and subjection to sale of estate pledged for its satisfaction, and to settle conflict-ing claims by selling equity of redemption. Reich-ert v. McCool, 92 Ind.App. 406, 169 N.E. 86, 88.
FOREFAULT. In Scotch law, to forfeit; to lose. FOREGIFT. A premium for a lease.
FOREGOERS. Royal purveyors. 26 Edw. III. c. 5.
FOREHAND RENT. In English law, rent pay-able in advance; or, more properly, a species of premium or bonus paid by the tenant on the mak-ing of the lease, and particularly on the renewal of leases by ecclesiastical corporations.
FOREIGN. Belonging to another nation or coun7 try; belonging or attached to another jurisdic-tion; made, done, or rendered in another state or jurisdiction; subject to another jurisdiction; operating or solvable in another territory; ex-trinsic; outside; extraordinary. Nonresident.Blanchette v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., 90 N.H. 207, 6 A.2d 161, 162.
As to foreign "Administrator," "Assignment," "Attachment," "Bill of Exchange," "Charity," "Commerce," "Corporation," "County," "Credi-tor," "Divorce," "Document," "Domicile," "Fac-tor," "Judgment," "Jury," "Minister," "Plea," "Port," "State," "Vessel," and "Voyage," see those titles.
FOREIGN ANSWER. In old English practice, an answer which was not triable in the county where it was made. (St. 15 Hen. VI. c. 5.) Blount.
FOREIGN APPOSER. An ofilcer in the excheq-uer who examines the sheriff’s estreats, compar-ing them with the records, and apposeth (inter-rogates) the sheriff what he says to each particu-lar sum therein. 4 Inst. 107; Blount; Cowell.
FOREIGN BOUGHT AND SOLD. A custom in London which, being found prejudicial to sellers of cattle in Smithfield, was abolished. Wharton.
FOREIGN COINS. Coins issued as money under the authority of a foreign government. As to their valuation in the United States, see 46 Stat. 739, 31 U.S.C.A. § 372.
FOREIGN COURTS. The courts of a foreign state or nation. In the United States, this term is frequently applied to the courts of one of the states when their judgments or records are intro-duced in the courts of another.
FOREIGN DOMINION. In English law this means a country which at one time formed part of the dominions of a foreign state or potentate, but which by conquest or cession has become a part of the dominions of the British crown. 5 Best & S. 290.
FOREIGN ENLISTMENT ACT. The statute 59 Geo. III. c. 69, prohibiting the enlistment, as a soldier or sailor, in any foreign service. 4 Steph. Comm. 226. A later and more stringent act is that of 33 & 34 Vict. c. 90.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE. Drafts drawn on a for-eign state or country.
FOREIGN—GOING SHIP. By the English mer-chant shipping act, 1854, (17 & 18 Vict. c. 104,) § 2, any ship employed in trading, going between some place or places in the United Kingdom and some place or places situate beyond the following lim-its, that is to say: The coasts of the United King-dom, the islands of Guernsey, Jersey, Sark, Alder-ney, and Man, and the continent of Europe, be-tween the river Elbe and Brest, inclusive. Home-trade ship includes every ship employed in trading and going between places within the last-men-tioned limits.
FOREIGN JUDGMENT. See Judgment.
FOREIGN JURISDICTION. Any jurisdiction for-eign to that of the forum. Also the exercise bya state or nation of jurisdiction beyond its own territory, the right being acquired by treaty or otherwise.
FOREIGN LAWS. The laws of a foreign country, or of a sister state. People v. Martin, 38 Misc. Rep. 67, 76 N.Y.S. 953; Bank of Chillicothe v. Dodge, 8 Barb., N.Y., 233. Foreign laws are of ten the suggesting occasions of changes in, or additions to, our own laws, and in that respect are called "jus receptum." Brown.
FOREIGN MATTER. In old practice, matter triable or done in another county. Cowell.
FOREIGN OFFICE. The department of state through which the English sovereign communi-cates with foreign powers. A secretary of state is at its head. Till the middle of the last century, the functions of a secretary of state as to foreign and home questions were not disunited.
FOREIGN SERVICE, in feudal law, was that whereby a mesne lord held of another, without the compass of his own fee, or that which the tenant performed either to his own lord or to the lord paramount out of the fee. (Kitch. 299.) Foreign service seems also to be used for knight’s service, or escuage uncertain. (Perk. 650.) Ja-cob.
FOREIGN TRADE. Commercial interchange of commodities from different countries; export and import trade. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 29 Cust. & Pat.App. 82, 120 F.2d 340, 342.
FOREIGN WILL. Will of person not domiciled within state at time of death. De Tray v. Hard-grove, Tex.Com.App., 52 S.W.2d 239, 240.
FOREIGNER. In old English law, this term, when used with reference to a particular city, designated any person who was not an inhabitant of that city. According to later usage, it denotes a person who is not a citizen or subject of the state or country of which mention is made, or any one owing allegience to a foreign state or sovereign.
For the distinctions, in Spanish law, between "domiciliated" and "transient" foreigners, see Yates v. Iams, 10 Tex. 168.
FOREIN. An old form of foreign (q. v.). Blount.
FOREJUDGE. In old English law and practice, to expel from court for some offense or miscon-duct. When an officer or attorney of a court was expelled for any offense, or for not appear-ing to an action by bill filed against him, he was said to be forejudged the court. Cowell.
To deprive or put out of a thing by the judg-ment of a court. To condemn to lose a thing.
To expel or banish.
FOREJUDGER. In English practice, a judgment by which a man is deprived or put out of a thing; a judgment of expulsion or banishment.FOREMAN. The presiding member of a grand or petit jury, who speaks or answers for the jury.
Person designated by master to direct work of employees; superintendent, overseer. White v. Kansas City Stockyards Co., 104 Kan. 90, 177 P. 522; Browning v. Smiley-Lampert Lumber Co., 68 Or. 502, 137 P. 777, 780; Brokaw v. Cottrell, 114 Neb. 858, 211 N.W. 184, 187.
FORENSIC. Belonging to courts of justice.
FORENSIC MEDICINE, or medical jurispru-dence, as it is also called, is "that science which teaches the application of every branch of medi-cal knowledge to the purposes of the law; hence its limits are, on the one hand, the requirements of the law, and, on the other, the whole range of medicine. Anatomy, physiology, medicine, sur-gery, chemistry, physics, and botany lend their aid as necessity arises; and in some cases all these branches of science are required to enable a court of law to arrive at a proper conclusion on a contested question affecting life or property." Tayl. Med. Jur. 1.
FORENSIS.
In Civil law, belonging to or connected with a court; forensic. Forensis horno, an advocate; a pleader of causes; one who practices in court. Calvin.
In old Scotch law, a strange man or stranger; an out-dwelling man; an "unfreeman," who dwells not within burgh.
FORESAID. Used in Scotch law as aforesaid is in English, and sometimes, in a plural form, foresaids. 2 How. State Tr. 715. Forsaidis oc-curs in old Scotch records. "The Loirdis asses-ouris forsaidis." 1 Pite. Crim, Tr. pt. 1, p. 107.
FORESCHOKE. Foresaken; disavowed. 10 Edw. II. c. 1.
FORESEEABILITY. The ability to see or know in advance, hence, the reasonable anticipation that harm or injury is a likely result of acts or omissions. Emery v. Thompson, 347 Mo. 494, 148 S.W.2d 479, 480.
FORESHORE. The strip of land that lies be-tween the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. Tenenbaum v. Sea Gate Ass’n, 253 App. Div. 166, 1 N.Y.S.2d 224, 227. According to the mediurn line between the greatest and least range of tide (spring tides and neap tides). Sweet. See, also, Shore.
FORESIGHT. Heedful thought for the future; reasonable anticipation of result of certain acts or omissions. Emery v. Thompson, 347 Mo. 494, 148 S.W.2d 479.
FOREST. A tract of land covered with trees and one usually of considerable extent. Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook County v. Jirsa, 336 III. 624, 168 N.E. 690, 691.
In old English law, a certain territory of wooded ground and fruitful pastures, prIvileged for wild beasts and fowls
of forest, chase, and warren, to rest and abide in the safe protection of the prince for his princely delight and pleas-ure, having a peculiar court and officers. Manw. For. Laws, e. 1, no. 1; Termes de la Ley; 1 Bl.Comm. 289.
A royal hunting-ground which lost Its peculiar Character with the extinction of lts courts, or when the franchise passed into the hands of a subject. Spelman; Coweil.
The word is also used to signify a franchise or right, being the right of keeping, for the purpose of hunting, the wild beasts and fowls of forest, chase, park, and warren, in a territory or precinct of woody ground or pasture set apart for the purpose. 1 Steph.Comm. 665.
FOREST COURTS. In English law. Courts in-stituted for the government of the king’s forest in different parts of the kingdom,, and for the punishment of all injuries done to the king’s deer or venison, to the vert or greensward, and to the covert in which such deer were lodged. They consisted of the courts of attachments, of regard, of sweinmote, and of justice-seat; but in later times these courts are no longer held. 3 Bl. Comm. 71.
FOREST LAW. The system or body of old law relating to the royal forests.
FORESTAGE. A duty or tribute payable to the king’s foresters. Cowell.
FORESTAGIUM. A duty or tribute payableo to the king’s foresters. Cowell.
FORESTALL. To intercept or obstruct a passen-ger on the king’s highway. Coweil. To beset the way of a tenant so as to prevent his coming on the premises. 3 Bl. Comm. 170. To intercept a deer on his way to the forest before he can regain it. Cowell.
FORESTALLER. In old English law, obstruc-tion; hindrance; the offense of stopping the highway; the hindering a tenant from coming to his land; intercepting a deer before it can regain the forest. Also one who forestalls; one who commits the offense of forestalling. 3 Bl. Comm. 170; Cowell.
FORESTALLING. Obstructing the highway. In-tercepting a person on the highway.
FORESTALLING THE MARKET. Securing con-trol of commodities on way to market. Raney v. Montgomery County Com’rs, 170 Md. 183, 183 A. 548, 551.
The act of the buying or contracting for any merchandise or provision on its way to the market, with the intentioti of selling it again at a higher price; or the dissuading persons from bringing their goods or provisions there; or persuading them to enhance the price when there. 4 Bl. Comm. 158. Barton v. Morris, 10 Phila., Pa., 361. This was formerly an indictable offense in England, but is now abolished by St. 7 & 8 vitt. c. 24. 4 Steph.Comm. 291, note.
FORESTARIUS.
In English law, a forester. An officer who takes tare of the woods and forests. De forestario ap-ponendo, a writ which lay to appoint a forester to prevent further commission of waste when a tenant in dower had committed waste. Bract. 316; Du Cange.
In Scotch law, a forester or keeper of woods, to whom, by reason of his office, pertains the barkand the hewn branches. And, when he rides through the forest, he may take a tree as high as his own head. Skene de Verb. Sign.
FORESTER. A sworn officer of the forest, ap-pointed by the king’s letters patent to walk the forest, watching both the vert and the venison, attaching and presenting all trespassers against them within their own bailiwick or walk. These letters patent were generally granted during good behavior; but sometimes they held the office in fee. Blount.
FORETHOUGHT FELONY. In Scotch law, mur-der committed in consequence of a previous de-sign. Ersk. Inst. 4, 4, 50; Bell.
FORFANG. In old English law, the taking of provisions from any person in fairs or markets before the royal purveyors were served with nec-essaries for the sovereign. Cowell. Also the seizing and rescuing of stolen or strayed cattle from the hands of a thief, or of those having 11-legal possession of them; also the reward fixed for such rescue.
FORFEIT. To lose, or lose the right to, by some error, fault, offense, or crime, or to subject, as property, to forfeiture or confiscation. State v. Cowen, 231 Iowa 1117, 3 N.W.2d 176, 180. To lose, in consequence of breach of contract, neglect of duty, or offense, some right, privilege, or property to another or to the State. United States v. Chav-ez, C.C.A.N.M., 87 F.2d 16, 19.
To incur a penalty; to become liable to the payment of a sum of money, as the consequence of a certain act. Sands v. Holbert, 93 W.Va. 574, 117 S.E. 896, 899; Ford v. Ellison, 287 Mo. 683, 230 S.W. 637, 640.
To lose an estate, a franchise, or other property belong-Ing to one, by the act of the law, and as a consequence of some misfeasance, negligence, or omission. Cassell v. Crothers, 193 Pa. 359, 44 A. 446; State v. De Gress, 72 Tex. 242, 11 S.W. 1029; State v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 12 Gill & J., Md., 432, 38 Am. Dec. 319. The further ideas connoted by this term are that it is a deprivation, (that is, against the will of the losíng party,) and that the property is eith-er transferred to another or resumed by the original gran-tor.
FORFEITABLE. Liable to be forfeited; subject to forfeiture for non-user, neglect, crime, etc.
FORFEITURE. Something to which the right is lost by the commission of a crime or fault or the losing of something by way of penalty. Ridge-way v. City of Akron, Ohio App., 42 N.E.2d 724, 726. A deprivation or destruction of a right in consequence of the nonperformance of some obli-gation or condition. Connellan v. Federal Life & Casualty Co., 134 Me. 104, 182 A. 13, 14.
1. A punishment annexed by law to some illegal act or negligence in the owner of land, tenements, or heredita-ments whereby he loses all interest therein. Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66 P.2d 894, 900. And which go to the party injured as a recompense for the wrong which he alone, or the public together with himself, hath sustained. 2 BI.Comm. 267. Wiseman v. McNulty, 25 Cal. 237; Steph-enson v. Calliham, Tex.Civ.App., 289 S.W. 158, 159; Fratt
v. Daniels-Jones Co., 47 Mont. 487, 133 P. 700, 701.
2. The loss of land by a tenant to his lord, as the con-sequence of some breach of fidelity. 1 Steph.Comm. 166.
3. The loss of lands and goods to the state, as the con-sequence of crime. 4 BI.Comm. 381, 387; 4 Steph.Comm. 447, 452; 2 Kent, Comm. 385; 4 Kent, Comm. 426; Avery v. Everett, 110 N.Y. 317, 18 N.E. 148, 1 L.R.A. 264, 6 Am. St.Rep. 368.
4. The loss of goods or chattels, as a punishment for some crime or misdemeanor in the party forfelting, and as a compensation for the offense and injury committed against him to whom they are forfeited. 2 BI.Comm. 420.
5. The loss of office by abuser, non-user, or refusal to exercise it. City of Williamsburg v. Weesner, 164 Ky. 769, 176 S.W. 224, 225.
6. The loss of a corporate franchise or charter In con-sequence of some illegal act, or of malfeasance or non-feasance. Murphy v. Missouri & Kansas Land & Loan Co., 28 N.D. 519, 149 N.W. 957, 959; Village of Fredonia v. Fredonia Natural Gas Light Co., 87 Misc. 592, 149 N.Y.S. 964, 965.
7. The loss of the right to life, as the consequence of the commission of some crime to which the law has affixed a capital penalty. In re New Jersey Court of Pardon, 97 N.J.Eq. 555, 129 A. 624, 630.
8. The incurring a Iiability to pay a deflnite sum of money as the consequence of violating the provisions of some statute, or refusal to comply with some requirement of law. State v. Marion County Com’rs, 85 Ind. 493.
9. A thing or sum of money forfeited. Sornething im-posed as a punishment for an offense or delinquency. The word in this sense is frequently associated with the word "penalty." Van Buren v. Digges, 11 How. 477, 13 L.Ed. 771; Bryant v. Rich’s Grill, 216 Mass. 344, 103 N.E. 925, 927, Ann.Cas.1915B, 869; Miller v. Bopp, 136 La. 788, 67 So. 831; Missouri, K & T. Ry. Co. v. Dewey Portland Gement Co., 113 Okl. 142, 242 P. 257, 259.
10. In mining law, the loss of a mining claim held by location on the public domain (unpatented) in consequence of the failure of the holder to make the requíred annual expenditure upon ít within the time allowed. McKay v. McDougall, 25 Mont. 258, 64 P. 669, 87 Am.St.Rep. 395; St. John v. Kidd, 26 Cal. 271.
FORFEITURE OF BOND. A failure to perform the condition upon which obligor was to be ex-cused from the penalty in the bond. Hall v. Browning, 71 Ga.App. 835, 32 S.E.2d 424, 427.
FORFEITURE OF MARRIAGE. A penalty in-curred by a ward in chivalry who married with-out the consent or against the will of the guard-ian. See Duplex Valor Maritagii.
FORFEITURE OF SILK, supposed to lie in the docks, used, in times when its importation was prohibited, to be proclaimed each term in the ex-chequer.
FORFEITURES ABOLITION ACT. Another name for the felony act of 1870, abolishing for-feitures for felony in England.
FORGABULUM, or FORGAVEL. A quit-rent; a small reserved rent in money. Jacob.
FORGE. To fabricate by false imitation. Carter v. State, 135 Tex.Cr.R. 457, 116 S.W.2d 371, 377. To fabricate, construct, or prepare one thing in imitation of another thing, with the intention of substituting the false for the genuine, or other-wise deceiving and defrauding by the use of the spurious article. To counterfeit or make falsely. Especially, to make a spurious written instru-ment with the intention of fraudulently substitut-ing it for another, or of passing it off as genuine; or to fraudulently alter a genuine instrument to another’s prejudice; or to sign another person’sname to a docurnent, with a deceitful and fraud-ulent intent. In re Cross, D.C.N.C., 43 F. 520; U. S. v. Watkins, 28 Fed.Cas. 445; Johnson v. State, 9 Tex.App. 251; Longwell v. Day, 1 Mich. N.P. 290.
To forge (a metaphorlcal expression, borrowed from the occupation of the smith) means, properly speaking, no more than to make or form, but in our law it is always taken in an evil sense. 2 East, P. C. p. 852, c. 19, § 1.
To forge is to make in the likeness of something else; to counterfeit is to make in imitation of something else, with a view to defraud by passing the false copy for gen-uine or original. Both words, "forged" and "counterfeit-ed," convey the idea of similitude. State v. McKenzie, 42 Me. 392.
In common usage, however, forgery is almost always predicated of some private instrument or writing, as a deed, note, will, or a signature; and counterfeiting denotes the fraudulent imitation of comed or paper money or some substitute therefor.
FORGERY.

Criminal Law]

The false making or material altering, with intent to defraud, of any writing which, if gen-uine, might apparently be of legal efficacy or the foundation of a legal liability. People v. Routson, 354 Ill. 573, 188 N.E. 883, 885; 2 Bish. Crim. Law, § 523; McCornack v. Central State Bank, 203 Iowa 833, 211 N.W. 542, 545, 52 A.L.R. 1297. A fraudulent making and alteration of writing to prejudice of another man’s right, or a false making, a making malo animo of any in-strument, for the purpose of fraud or deceit. Iber-ville Trust & Saving Bank v. City Café, La.App., 143 So. 73. See Forge.
The thing itself, so falsely made, imitated or forged; especially a forged writing. A forged signature is frequently said to be "a forgery."

Evidence

The fabrication or counterfeiting of evidence. The artful and fraudulent manipulation of physi-cal objects, or the deceitful arrangement of genuine facts or things, in such a manner as to create an erroneous impression or a false infer-ence in the minds of those who may observe them. See Burrill, Circ. Ev. 131, 420.
FORGERY ACT, 1870. The statute 33 & 34 Vict. c. 58, was passed for the punishment of forgers of stock certificates, and for extending to Scot-land certain provisions of the forgery act of 1861. Mozley & Whitley.
FORHERDA. In old records, a herdland, head-land, or foreland. Cowell.
FORI DISPUTATIONES. In the civil law, dis-cussions or arguments before a court. 1 Kent, Comm. 530.
FORINSECUS. Lat. Foreign; exterior; out-side; extraordinary.
Seruitium forinsecum, the payment of aid, scutage, and other extraordinary military services. Forinsecum maner-ium, the manor, or that part of it which lies outside the bars or town, and is not included within the liberties of it. Cowell; Blqunt; Jacob; 1 Reeve, Eng.Law, 273.FORINSIC. In old English law, exterior; for-eign; extraordinary.
In feudal law, the term "forinslc services" comprehended the payment of extraordinary aids or the rendition of extraordinary military services, and in this sense was op-posed to "Intrinsic services." 1 Reeve, Eng. Law, 273.
FORIS. Lat. Abroad; out of doors; on the out-side of a place; without; extrinsic.
FORISBANITUS. In old English law, banished.
FORISFACERE. Lat. To forfeit; to lose an es-tate or other property on account of some crim-inal or illegal act. To confiscate.
To act beyond the law, %. e., to transgress or in-fringe the law; to commit an offense or wrong; to do any act against or beyond the law. See Co. Litt. 59a; Du Cange; Spelman.
FORISFACERE, i. e., EXTRA LEGEM SEU CON-SUETUDINEM FACERE. Co. Litt. 59. Foris-facere, i. e., to do something beyond law or cus-tom.
FORISFACTUM. Forfeited. Bona forisfacta, forfeited goods. 1 BI. Comm. 299. A crime. Du Cange; Spelman.
FORISFACTURA. A crime or offense through which property is forfeited.
A fine or punishment in money.
Forfeiture. The loss of property or life in consequence of crime.
FORISFACTURA PLENA. A forfeiture of all a man’s property. Things which were forfeited. Du Cange. Spelman.
FORISFACTUS. A criminal. One who has for• feited his life by commission of a capital offense. Spelman.
FORISFACTUS SERVUS. A slave who has been a free man, but has forfeited his freedom by crime. Du Cange.
FORISFAMILIARE. In old English and Scotch law, literally, to put out of a family (foris fanal-
ponere). To portion off a son, so that he could have no further claim upon his father. Glanv. lib. 7, c. 3.
To emancipate, or free from paternal authority.
FORISFAMILIATED. In old English law, por-tioned off.
A son was said to be forisfamiliated (forisfamiliari) if his father assigned him part of his land, and gave him seisin thereof, and did this at the request or with the free con-sent of the son himself, who expressed himself satislied with such portion. 1 Reeve, Eng. Law, 42, 110.
FORISFAMILIATUS. In old English law, put out of a family; portioned off; emancipated; forisfamiliated. Bract. fol. 64.
FORISJUDICATIO. In old English law, fore-judger. A forejudgment. A judgment of court whereby a man is put out of possession of a thing. Co. Litt. 100b.FORLSJUDICATUS. Forejudged; sent from court; banished. Deprived of a thing by judg-ment of court. Bract. fol. 250b; Co. Litt. 100b; Du Cange.
FORISJURARE. To forswear; to abjure; to abandon.
Provinciam forisjurare. To forswear the country. Spelman.
FORISJURARE PARENTILAM. To remove one-self from parental authority. The person who did this lost his rights as heir. Du Cange.
FORJUDGE. See Forejudge.
FORJURER. L. Fr. In old English law, to for-swear; to abjure.
FORJURER ROYALME. To abjure the realm. Britt. cc. 1, 16.
FORLER-LAND. Land in the diocese of Here-ford, which had a peculiar custom attached to it, but which has been long since disused, although the name is retained. But. Surv. 56.
FORM. A model or skeleton of an instrument to be used in a judicial proceeding, containing the principal necessary matters, the proper technical terms or phrases, and whatever else is necessary to make it formally correct, arranged in proper and methodical order, and capable of being adapt-ed to the circumstances of the specific case.
In contradistinction to "substance," "form" means the legal or technical manner or order to be observed in legal instruments or juridical pro-ceedings, or in the construction of legal docu-ments or processes.
Antithesis of "substance." Phcenix Building & Homestead Ass’n v. Meraux, 189 La. 819, 180 So. 648, 649.
Common Form, Solenut Form. See Probate.
Forms of Action. This term is the general des-ignation of the various species or kinds of per-sonal actions known to the common law, such as trover, trespass, debt, assumpsit, etc. These dif-fer in their pleadings and evidente, as well as in the circumstances to which they are respectively applicable. Truax v. Parvis, 7 Houst. (Del.) 330, 32 A. 227.
Matter of Form. In pleadings, in indictments, in affidavits, conveyances, etc., matter of form (as .distinguished from matter of substance) is all that relates to the mode, form, or style of expressing the facts involved, the choice or ar-rangement of words, and other such particulars, without affecting the substantial validity or suf-ficiency of the instrument, or without going to the merits. Railway Co. v. Kurtz, 10 Ind.App. 60, 37 N.E. 303; Meath v. Mississippi Levee Com’rs, 109 U.S. 268, 3 S.Ct. 284, 27 L.Ed. 930; State v. Amidon, 58 Vt. 524, 2 A. 154.
Form of the Statute. This expression means the words, language, or frame of a statute, and
hence the inhibition or command which it may contain; used in the phrase (in criminal plead-ing) "against the form of the statute in that case made and provided."
FORMA. Lat. Form; the prescribed form of judicial proceedings.
FORMA DAT ESSE. Form gives being. Called "the old physical maxim." Lord Henley, Ch., 2 Eden, 99.
FORMA ET FIGURA JUDICII. The form and shape of judgment or judicial action. 3 Bl. Comm. 271.
FORMA LEGALIS FORMA ESSENTIALIS. Le-gal form is essential form. 10 Coke, 100.
FORMA NON OBSERVATA, INFERTUR AD-NULLATIO ACTUS. Where form is not ob-served, a nullity of the act is inferred. 12 Coke, 7. Where the law prescribes a form, the non-observance of it is fatal to the proceeding, and the whole becomes a nullity. Best, Ev. Introd. § 59.
FORMA PAUPERIS. See In Forma Pauperis.
FORMAL. Relating to matters of form; as, "formal defects"; inserted, added, or joined pro forma. See Parties.
FORMALITIES. In England, robes worn by the magistrates of a city or corporation, etc., on sol-emn occasions. Enc. Lond.
FORMALITY. The conditions, in regard to meth-od, order, arrangement, use of technical expres-sions, performance of specific acts, etc., which are required by the law in the making of con-tracts or conveyances, or in the taking of legal proceedings, to insure their validity and regular-ity. Succession of Seymour, 48 La.Ann. 993, 20 So. 217.
FORMATA. In canon law, canonical letters. Spelman.
FORMATA BREVIA. Formed writs; writs of form. See Brevia Formata.
FORMED ACTION. An action for which a set form of words is prescribed, which must be strict-ly adhered to. 10 Mod. 140, 141.
FORMED DESIGN. In criminal law, and par-ticularly with reference to homicide, this term means a deliberate and fixed intention to kill, whether directed against a particular person or not. Mitchell v. State, 60 Ala. 33; Wilson v. State, 128 Ala. 17, 29 So. 569; Ake v. State, 30 Tex. 473.
FORMEDON. An ancient writ in English law which was available for one who had a right to lands or tenements by virtue of a gift in tail.
It was in the nature of a writ of right, and was the highest action that a tenant in tail could have; for he
could tnosuch h ase an ámb ser i tne fweer-simple, mo fp l right, tfhoart that inrge a sc oonn-
this writ formedon was granted te, him by the statutede donis, (Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I. c. 1,) and was emphatical-ly called -his" writ of right. The writ was distinguished into three species, viz. : Formedon in the descender, in the remainder, and in the reverter. It was abolished in Eng-land by St. 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 27. See 3 BI.Comm. 191; Co. Litt. 316; Fitzh.Nat.Brev. 255.
FORMEDON IN THE DESCENDER. A writ of formedon which lay where a gift was made in tail, and the tenant in tail aliened the lands or was disseised of them and died, for the heir in tail to recover them, against the actual tenant of the freehold. 3 Bl. Comm. 192.
FORMEDON IN THE REMAINDER. A writ of formedon which lay where a man gave lands to another for life or in tail, with remainder to a third person in tail or in fee, and he who had the particular estate died without issue inheritable, and a stranger intruded upon him in remainder, and kept him out of possession. In this case he in remainder, or his heir, was entitled to this writ. 3 Bl. Comm. 192.
FORMEDON IN THE REVERTER. A writ of formedon which lay where there was a gift in tail, and afterwards, by the death of the donee or his heirs without issue of his body, the re-version fell in upon the donor, his heirs or as-signs. In such case, the reversioner had this writ to recover the lands. 3 Bl. Comm. 192.
FORMELLA. A certain weight of aboye 70 lbs., mentioned in 51 Hen. III. Cowell.
FORMER ACQUITTAL. See Autrefois.
FORMER ADJUDICATION. An adjudication in a former action. See Res Judicata.
Either a final determination of the rights of the parties or an adjudication of certain ques-tions of fact. Johnson v. Fontana County Fire Protection Dist., 101 P.2d 1092, 1097, 15 Ca1.2d 380; Johnson v. Fontana County Fire Protection Dist., Cal,App., 87 P.2d 426, 430.
FORMER JEOPARDY. Plea of "former jeop-ardy," that a man cannot be brought into danger of his life or limb for the same offense more than once, is fundamental common law and constitu-tional right of defendant, affording protection against his being again tried for the same of-fense, and not against the peril of second punish-ment. State v. Fredlund, 200 Minn. 44, 273 N.W. 353, 355, 113 A.L.R. 215.
FORMER RECOVERY. Recovery in a former action. See Res Judicata.
FORMIDO PERICULI. Lat. Fear of danger. 1 Kent, Comm. 23.
FORMS OF ACTION. This term comprehends the various classes of personal action at common law, viz.: trespass, case, trover, detinue, replevin, covenant, debt, assumpsit, scire lacias, and re-vivor, as well as the nearly obsolete actions of account and annuity, and the modem adtion of mandamus.
They are now abolished in England by the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875, and In many of the states of theUnited States, where a uniform course of proceeding under codes of procedure has taken their place. But the prin-cipies regulating the distinctions Between the common-law actions are still found applicable even where the technical forms are abolisheji.
FORMULA. In common-law practice, a set form of words used in judicial proceedings.
In the civil law, an action. Calvin.
FORMULA DEAL. An agreement between mo-tion picture distributors and independent or iated circuits to exhibit a feature in all theatres at specified percentage of national gross receipts realized from such feature by all theatres in the United States. U. S. v. Paramount Pictures, D.C. N.Y., 66 F.Supp. 323, 333, 347.
FORMULA INSTRUCTION. An instruction in-tended to be complete statement of law upon which jury may base verdict. Harvey v. Aceves, 115 Cal.App. 333, 1 P.2d 1043, 1045.
FORMULÍE. In Roman law, when the legis ac-tiones were proved to be inconvenient, a mode of
procedure called "per formulas," e., by means of formulce,) was gradually introduced, and even-tually the legis actiones were abolished by the Lex .,2E’butia, B. C. 164, excepting in a very few exceptional matters.
The formuke were four in number, namely: (1) The Demonstratio, wherein the plaintiff stated, i. e., showed, the facts out of which his claim arase; (2) the Intentio, where he made his claim against the defendant; (3) the Adjudicatio, wherein the judex was directed to assign or adjudicate the property or any portion or portions thereof according to the rights of the parties; and (4) the Condem-natio, in which the judex was authorized and directed to condemn or to acqult according as the facts were or were not proved. These formuke were obtalned from the magistrate, (in jure,) and were thereafter proceeded with before the judex, (in judicio). Brown. See Mackeld.Rom. Law, § 204.
FORMULARLES. Collections of formulce, 1,1r forms of forensic proceedings and instruments used among the Franks, and other early contin-ental nations of Europe. Among these the formu-lary of Marculphus may be mentioned as of con-siderable interest. Butl. Co. Litt. note 77, lib. 3.
FORNAGIUM. The fee taken by a lord of his tenant, who was bound to bake in the lord’s com-mon oven (in furno domini), or for a commission to use his own.
FORNICATION. Unlawful sexual lntercourse be• tween two unmarried persons. Further, if one of the persons be married and the other not, it is fornication on the part of the latter, though adult-ery for the former. In some jurisdictions, how-ever, by statute, it is adultery on the part of both persons if the woman is married, whether the man is married or not. Banks v. State, 96 Ala. 78, 11 So. 404; Hood v. State, 56 Ind. 263, 26 Am, Rep. 21; State v. Phillips, 26 N.D. 206, 144 N.W. 94, 95, 49 L.R.A.,N.S., 470, Ann.Cas.1916A, 320; State v. Ling, 91 Kan. 647, 138 P. 582, Ann.Cas. 1915D, 374.
FORNIX. Lat. A brothel; fornication.FORNO. In Spanish law, an oven. Las Partidas, pt. 3, tit. 32, 1. 18.
FORO. In Spanish law, the place yvhere tribunals hear and determine causes,—exercendarum litium locus.
FOROS. In Spanish law, emphyteutic rents. Schm. Civil Law, 309.
FORPRISE. An exception; reservation; except-ed; reserved. Anciently, a term of frequent use in leases and conveyances. Cowell; Blount.
In another sense, the word is taken for any exaction.
FORSCHEL. A strip of land lying next to the highway.
FORSES. Waterfalls. Camden, Brit.
FORSPEAKER. An attorney or advocate in a cause. Blount; Whishaw.
FORSPECA. In old English law, prolocutor; paranymphus.
FORSTAL. See Forestall.
FORSTELLARIUS EST PAUPERUM DEPRES-SOR ET TOTIUS COMMUNITATIS ET PATRLZE PUBLICUS INIMICUS. 3 Inst. 196. A forestaller is an oppressor of the poor, and a public enemy of the whole community and country.
FOR,SWEAR. In criminal law, to make oath to that which the deponent knows to be untrue.
This term is wider in its scope than "perjury," for the latter, as a technical term, includes the idea of the oath being taken before a competent court or officer, and relating to a material issue, which is not implied by the word "forswear." Fowle v. Robbins, 12 Mass. 501; Tomlinson v. Brittlebank, 4 Barn. & A. 632; Railway Co. v. McCurdy, 114 Pa. 554, 8 A. 230, 60 Am.Rep. 363.
FORT. This term means "something more than a mere military camp, post, or station. The term implies a fortification, or a place protected from attack by some such means as a moat, wall, or parapet." U. S. v. Tichenor, C.C.Or., 12 F. 424.
FORTALICE, or FORTELACE. A fortress or place of strength, which anciently did not pass without a special grant. 11 Hen. VII. c. 18.
FORTALITIUM. In old Scotch law, a fortalice; a castle. Properly a house or tower which has a battlement or a ditch or moat about it.
FORTAXED. Wrongly or extortionately taxed.
FORTHCOMING. In Scotch law, the action by which an arrestment (garnishment) is made ef-fectual. It is a decree or process by which the creditor is given the right to demand that the sum arrested be applied for payment of his claim. 2 Kames, Eq. 288, 289; Bell.
FORTHCOMING BOND. A bond conditioned on the forthcoming of property to answer such judg-ment as may be entered. If the property be forth-coming, no liability ensues. U. S. Fidelity & Guar-anty Co. v. Sabath, 286 Ill.App. 320, 3 N.E.2d 330, 335.
A bond given to a ssheriff who has levied on property, conditioned that the property shall be forthcoming, ti. e., produced, when required. On the giving of such bond, the goods are allowed to remain in the possession of the debtor. Hill v. Manser, 11 Grat., Va., 522; Nichols v. Chittenden, 14 Colo.App. 49, 59 P. 954; Burnham-Munger-Root Dry Goods Co. v. Strahl, 102 Neb. 142, 166 N.W. 266.
FORTHVVITH. Immediately; without delay, di-rectly, hence within a reasonable time under the circumstances of the case; promptly and with reasonable dispatch. State ex rel. Board of Edu-cation of City of Tulsa v. Morley, 168 Okl. 259, 34 P.2d 258, 261; 1 Chit. Archb. Pr. (12th Ed.) 164. Within such time as to permit that which is to be done, to be done lawfully and according to the practical and ordinary course of things to be performed or accomplished. Harris v. Stew-art, 187 Miss. 489, 193 So. 339, 342. The first op-portunity offered. Abbott v. State, 117 Neb. 350, 220 N.W. 578, 579.
FORTIA. Force. In old English law. Force used by an accessory, to enable the principal to commit a crime, as by binding or holding a per-son while another killed him, or by aiding or coun-seling in any way, or commanding the act to be done. Bract. fols. 138, 138b.
According to Lord Coke, fortia was a word of art, and properly signified the furnishing of a weapon of force to do the fact, and by force whereof the fact was committed, and he that furnisled it was not present when the fact was done. 2 Inst. 182.
FORTIA FRISCA. Fresh force (q. v.).
FORTILITY. In old English law, a fortified place; a castle; a bulwark. Cdwell; 11 Hen. VII. c. 18.
FORTIOR. Lat. Stronger. A term applied, in the law of evidence, to that species of presump-tion, arising from facts shown in evidence, which is strong enough to shift the burden of proof to the opposite party. Burrill, Circ.Ev. 64, 66.
FORTIOR EST CUSTODIA LEGIS QUAM HOMI• NIS. 2 Rolle, 325. The custody of the law is stronger than that of man.
FORTIOR ET POTENTIOR EST DISPOSITIO LEGIS QUAM HOMINIS. The disposition of the law is of greater force and effect than that of man. Co.Litt. 234a; Shep.Touch. 302; 15 East, 178. The law in some cases overrides the will of the individual, and renders ineffective or futile his expressed intention or contract. Broom, Max. 697.
FORTIORI. See A Fortiori.
FORTIS. Lat. Strong. Fortis et sana, strong and sound; staunch and strong; as a vessel. Townsh.P1. 227.
FORTLETT. A place or port of some strength; a little fort. Old Nat. Brev. 45.FORTUIT. In French law, accidental; fortuitous. Cas fortuit, a fortuitous event. Fortuitement, ac-cidentally; by chance; casually.
FORTUITOUS. Happening by chance or accident. Kermani v. Insurance Co. of North America, 142 Misc. 542, 255 N.Y.S. 687, 689. Occurring unex-pectedly, or without known cause. Stanton v. Min-neapolis St. Ry. Co., 195 Minn. 457, 263 N.W. 433, 434. Accidental; undesigned; adventitious. Re-sulting from unavoidable physical causes. Zap-pala v. Industrial Ins. Commission, 82 Wash. 314, 144 P. 54, L.R.A.1916A, 295.
FORTUITOUS COLLISION. In maritime law, the accidental running foul of vessels. Peters v. Warren Ins. Co., 14 Pet. 112, 10 L.Ed. 371.
FORTUITOUS EVENT. In the civil law, that which happens by a cause which cannot be re-sisted. An unforeseen occurrence, not caused by either of the parties, nor such as they could pre-vent.
In French it is called "cas fortuit." Civ. Code La. art. 3556, no. 15.
There is a difference between a fortuitous event, or in-evitable accident, and irresistible force. By the former, commonly called the "act of God," is meant any accident produced by physical causes which are irresistible; such as a loss by lightning or storms, by the perils of the seas, by inundations and earthquakes, or by sudden death or
ill-ness. By the latter is meant such an interposition of hu-man agency as is, from its nature and power, absolutely uncontrollable. Of this nature are losses occasioned by the inroads of a hostile army, or by public enemies. Story, Bailm. § 25. In Workmen’s Compensation Acts fortuitous event is accidental happening, or accident that takes place without design or expectation, or thing that happens from irresistible cause. The term is expressly defined in several acts. Stolp v. Department of Labor and Industries, 138 Wash. 685, 245 P. 20, 21; Stertz v. Industrial Insurance Commission of Washington, 91 Wash. 588, 158 P. 256, 259, Ann.Cas.1918B, 354: Zappala v. Industrial Ins. Commis-sion, 82 Wash. 314, 144 P. 54, L.R.A.1916A, 295.
FORTUNA. Lat. Fortune; also treasure-trove. Jacob.
FORTUNAM FACIUNT JUDICEM. They make fortune the judge. Co. Litt. 167, Spoken of the process of making partition among coparceners by drawing lots for the several purparts.
FORTUNE TELLER. One who professes to tell future events in the lite of another. People v. Plaskett, 171 Misc. 563, 13 N.Y.S.2d 682, 684.
In English law, persons pretending or profess-ing to tell fortunes, and punishable as rogues and vagabonds or disorderly persons. 4 Bl.Comm. 62.
FORTUNIUM. In old English law, a tournament or fighting with spears, and an appeal to fortune therein.
FORTY. In land laws and conveyancing, in those regions where grants, transfers, and deeds are made with reference to the subdiVisions of the government survey, this term means forty acres of land in the form of a square, being the tract obtained by quartering a section of land (640 acres) and again quartering one of the quarters. Lente v. Clarke, 22 Fla. 515, 1 So. 149.FORTY—DAYS COURT. In old English forest law, the court of attachment in forests, or wood-mote court.
FORUM. Lat. A court of justice, or judicial tri-bunal; a place of jurisdiction; a place of litiga-tion. 3 Story, 347. Place where remedy is pur-sued. Rubin v. Gallagher, 294 Mich. 124, 292 N.W. 584, 586.
In Roman law, the market place, or public paved court, in the city of Rome, where such pub-lic business was transacted as the assemblies of the people and the judicial trial of causes, and where also elections, markets, and the public ex-change were held.
FORUM ACTUS. The forum of the act. The forum of the place where the act was done which is now called in question.
FORUM BOVARIUM. See Bovarius.
FORUM CONSCIENTUE. The forum or tribunal of conscience.
FORUM CONTENTIOSUM. A contentious forum or court; a place of litigation; the ordinary court of justice, as distinguished from the tribunal of conscience. 3 Bl.Comm. 211.
FORUM CONTRACTUS. The forum of the con-tract; the court of the place where a contract is made; the place where a contract is made, con-sidered as a place of jurisdiction. 2 Kent, Comm. 463.
FORUM CONVENIENS. Place where testamen-tary trustee may be reached by process. In re Knox’ Estate, 52 Ca1.App.2d 338, 126 P.2d 108, 113.
FORUM DOMESTICUM. A domestic forum or tribunal. The visitatorial power is called a "forum domesticum," calculated to determine, sine stre-pitu, all disputes that arise within themselves. 1 W.B1. 82.
FORUM DOMICILII. The forum or court of the domicile; the domicile of a defendant, considered as a place of jurisdiction. 2 Kent, Comm. 463.
FORUM ECCLESIASTICUM. An ecclesiastical court. The spiritual jurisdiction, as distinguished from the secular.
FORUM LIGEANTLE REL The torum of de-fendant’s allegiance. The court or jurisdiction of the country to which he owes allegiance.
FORUM NON CONVENIENS. The doctrine is patterned upon the right of the court in the exer-cise of its equitable powers to refuse the imposi-tion upon its jurisdiction of the trial of cases even though the venue is properly laid if it appears that for the conveniente of litigants and witness-es and in the interest of justice the action should be instituted in another forum where the action might have been brought. Hayes v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., D.C.Minn., 79 F.Supp. 821, 824. The doctrine presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process and fur-nishes criteria for choice between such forums. Wilson v. Seas Shipping Co., D.C.Pa., 78 F.Supp. 464, 465; Neal v. Pennsylvania R. Co., D.C.N.Y., 77 F.Supp. 423, 424. The application of the doctrine rests in the sound discretion of the court and the factors to be considered in the doctrine are the private interests of the litigant and the interest of the public. Cullinan v. New York Cent. R. Co., D. C.N.Y., 83 F.Supp. 870, 871. And a court, either state or federal, will generally decline to interfere with or control by injunction or otherwise the management of internal affairs of a corporation organized under the laws of another state, leaving controversies as to such matters to courts of state of domicile. Garrett v. Phillips Petroleum Co., Tex.Civ.App., 218 S.W.2d 238, 240; Murray v. Un-ion Pac. R. Co., D.C.I11., 77 F.Supp. 219; Kelley v. American Sugar Refining Co., C.C.A.Mass., 139 F. 2d 76; Tiuoli Realty v. Interstate Circuit, C.C.A. Tex., 167 F.2d 155; Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123, 53 S.Ct. 295, 77 L.Ed. 652, 89 A.L.R. 720.
The rule is an equitable one embracing the discretionary power of a court to decline to exercise jurisdiction which it has over a transitory cause of action when it believes that the action may be more appropriately and justly tried elsewhere. Leet v. Union Pac. R. Co., 155 P.2d 42, 44, 25 Ca1.2d 605.
In determining whether doctrine should be applied, court should consider relative case of access to sources of proof, availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwill-ing wltnesses, cost of obtalning attendance of wllling wit-nesses, possibility of view of premises, and all other practi.- cal problems that make trial easy, expeditious and inex-pensive. DI Leila v. Lehlgh Val. R. Co., D.C.N.Y., 7 F.R. D. 192, 193.
FORUM ORIGINIS. The court of one’s nativity. The place of a person’s birth, considered as a place of jurisdiction.
FORUM REGIUM. The Idng’s court. St. Westm. 2,’ c. 43.
FORUM REI. This term may mean either (1) the forum of the defendant, that is, of his residence or domicile; or (2) the forum of the res or thing in controversy, that is, of the place where the property is situated. The ambiguity springs from the fact that rei may be the genitive of either reus or res.
FORUM REI GESTE. The forum or court of a res gesta (thing done;) the place where an act is done, considered ás a place of jurisdiction and remedy. 2 Kent, Comm. 463.
FORUM REI SITIE. The court where the thing in controversy is situated. The place where the subject•matter in controversy is situated, consid• ered as a place of jurisdiction. 2 Kent, Comm. 463.
FORUM SECULARE. A secular, as distinguished from an ecclesiastical or spiritual, court.
FORURTIL. In old records, a long slip of ground. Cowell.
FORWARD. To send forward; to send toward the place of destination; to transmit. Nicoletti v. Bank of Los Banos, 190 Cal. 637, 214 P. 51, 52,27 A.L.R. 1479; katcher v. American Express Co., 94 N.J.L. 165, 109 A. 741, 742.
FORWARDING MERCHANT, or FORWARDER. One who receives and forwards goods, taking up-on himself the expenses of transportation, for which he receives a• compensation from the own-ers, having no concern in the vessels or wagons by which they are transported, and no interest in the freight, and not being deemed a common car-rier, but a mere warehouseman and agent. Story, Bailm. §§ 502, 509. Schloss v. Wood, 11 Colo. 287, 17 P. 910; Bush v. Miller, 13 Barb. N.Y. 488.
FOSSA. In the Civil law, a ditch; a receptacle of water, made by hand. Dig. 43, 14, 1, 5.
In Old English law, a ditch. A pit full of water, in which women committing felony were drowned. A grave or sepulcher. Spelman.
FOSSAGIUM. In old English law, the duty levied on the inhabitants for repairing the moat or ditch round a fortified town.
FOSSATORUM OPERATIO. In old English law, fosse-work; or the service of laboring, done by in-habitants and adjoining tenants, for the repair and maintenance of the ditches round a city or town, for which some paid a contribution, called "fossagium." Cowell.
FOSSATUM. A dyke, ditch, or trench; a place inclosed by a ditch; a moat; a canal.
FOSSE-WAY, or FOSSE. One of the four ancient Roman ways through England. Spelman.
FOSSELLUM. A small ditch. Cowell.
FOSTER PARENT. One who has performed the duties of a parent to the child of another by rear-ing the child as his own child; "foster child." In re Norman’s Estate, 209 Minn. 19, 295 N.W. 63, 66.
FOSTERAGE. Care of a foster child, brother, sister, parent, etc.—one considered as holding the relationship indicated in consequence of nursing and rearing, though not related by blood. In re Norman’s Estate, 295 N.W. 63, 66, 209 Minn. 19.
FOSTERING. A ancient custom in Ireland, in which persons put away their children to fosterers. Fostering was field to be a stronger alliance than blood, and the foster children participated in the fortunes of their foster fathers. Mozley & Whit• ley.
FOSTERLAND. Land given, assigned, or allotted to the finding of food or victuals for any person or persons; as in monasteries for the monks, etc, Cowell; Blount.
FOSTERLEAN. The remuneration fixed for the rearing of a foster child; also the jointure of wife. Jacob.
FOUJDAR. In Hindu law, under the Mogul gov-ernment a magistrate of the police over a large district, who took cognizance of all criminal mat-ters within his jurisdiction, and sometimes was employed as receiver general of the revenues. Wharton.
FOUJDARRY COURT. In Hindu law, a tribunal for administering criminal law.
FOUND. A person is said to be found within a state when actually present therein. Patient re-moved to a sanitarium in county was "found" in county. In re Cash, 383 III. 409, 50 N.E.2d 487, 490. But only if a person is in a place voluntarily and not by reason of plaintiff’s fraud, artifice, or trick for purpose of obtaining service. Shields v. Shields, 115 Mont. 140, 139 P.2d 528, 530, 531. It does not necessarily mean physical presence: de-fendant who, after removal of action for breach of contract to federal court, entered general ap-pearance, defended on the merits, and filed coun-terclaim, was "found" in the district. Freeman v. Bee Mach. Co., Mass., 319 U.S. 448, 63 S.Ct. 1146, 1149, 87 L.Ed. 1509.
As applied to a corporation it is necessary that it be doing businesá in such state through an of-flcer or agent or by statutory authority in such manner as to render it hable then to suit and to constructive or substituted service of process. Ro-maine v. Ins. Co., C.C.Tenn., 55 F. 751; Venner v. Pennsylvania Steel Co. of New Jersey, D.C.N.J., 250 F. 292, 295; Haskell v. Aluminum Co. of Amer-ica, D.C.Mass., 14 F.2d 864, 867. And to such an extent that actual presence is established. Wes-tor Theatres v. Warner Bros. Pictures, D.C.N.J., 41 F.Supp. 757, 760.
FOUNDATION. The founding or building of a col-lege or hospital. The incorporation or endowment of a college or hospital is the foundation; and he who endows it with land or other property is the founder. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 667, 4 L.Ed. 629; Seagrave’s Appeal, 125 Pa. 362, 17 A. 412; Union Baptist Ass’n v. Hunn, 7 Tex.Civ.App. 249, 26 S.W. 755.
FOUNDED. Based upon; arising from, growing out of, or resting upon; as in the expressions "founded in fraud," "founded on a consideration," "founded on contract," and the like. In re Grant Shoe Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 130 F. 881, 66 C.C.A. 78; Palmer v. Preston, 45 Vt. 158, 12 Am.Rep. 191; Steele v. Hoe, 14 Adol. & El. 431; In re Morales, D.C.Fla., 105 F. 761.
FOUNDED ON. To serve as a base or basis for. Keen v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., D.C.Iowa, 58 F.Supp. 915, 922.
FOUNDER. The person who endows an eleemosy-nary corporation or institution, or supplies the funds for its establishment. See Foundation.
FOUNDERS’ SHARES. In English Company Law, shares issued to the founders of (or ven-dors to) a public company as a part of the con-sideration for the business, or concession, etc., taken over, and not forming a part of, the ordi-nary capital. As a rule, such shares only parti-cipate in profits after the payment of a fixed míni-mum dividend on paid-up capital. Encyc. Dict.FOUNDEROSA. Founderous; out of repair, as a road. Cro. Car. 366.
FOUNDLING. A deserted or exposed infant; a child found without a parent or guardian, its rel-atives being unknown. It has a settlement in the district where found. State ex rel. Wilson v. Pierre, 155 La. 510, 99 So. 421.
FOUNDLING HOSPITALS. Charitable institu-tions which exist in most countries for taking tare of infants forsaken by their parents, such being generally the offspring of illegal connections. The foundling hospital act in England is the 13 Geo. II. c. 29.
FOUR. Fr. In old French law, an oven or bake-house. Four banca, an oven, owned by the seignior of the estate, to which the tenants were obliged to bring their bread for baking. Also the proprie-tary right to maintain such an oven.
FOUR CORNERS. The face of a written instru-ment.
That which is contained on the face of a deed (without any aid from the knowledge of the circumstances under which it is made) is said to be within its four corners, be-cause every deed is still supposed to be written on one en-tire skin, and so to have but four corners.
To look at the four corners of an instrument is to ex-amine the whole of it, so as to construe it as a whole, without reference to any one part more than another. 2 Smith, Lead.Cas. 295.
FOUR SEAS. The seas surrounding England. These were divided into the Western, including the Scotch and Irish; the Northern, or North sea; the Eastern, being the German otean; the Southern, being the British channel.
FOURCHER. Fr. To fork. This was a method of delaying an action anciently resorted to by defendants when two of them were joined in the suit. Instead of appearing together, each would appear in turn and cast an essoin for the other, thus postponing the trial.
FOURIERISM. A form of soclalism. See 1 Mill, Pol. Ec. 260.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. The Fourteenth Amendment of the constitution of the United States.
It became a part of the organic law July 28, 1868, and its importante entitles it to special mention. It creates or at least recognizes for the first time a citizenship of the Unit-ed States, as distinct from that of the states; forbids the making or enforcement by any state of any law abridging the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; and secures all "persons" against any state action which is either deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or dental of the equal protee-tion of the laws.
FOWLS OF WARREN. Such towls as are pre-served under the game laws in warrens. Accord-ing to Manwood, these are partridges and pheas-ants. According to Coke, they are partridges, rails, quails, woodcocks, pheasants, mallards, and herons. Co. Litt. 233.
FOX’S LIBEL ACT. In English law, this was the statute 52 Geo. III. c. 60, which secured to juries,upon the trial of indictments for libel, the right of pronouncing a general verdict of guilty or not guilty upon the whole matter in issue, and no longer bound thefn to find a verdict of guilty on proof of the ptblication of the paper charged to be a libel, and of the wrise ascribed to it in the: indictment. Wharton.
FOY. L. Fr. Faith; allegiance; fidelity.
FR. A Latin abbreviation for "fragmentú m," a .f ragment, used in citations to the Digest or Pan-dects in the Corpus Juris Civilis of Justinian, the several extracts from juristic writings of which i.t is composed being so called.
FRACTIO. Lat. A breaking; division; fraction; .a portion of a thing less than the whole.
FRACTION. A breaking, or breaking up; a frag-ment or broken part; a portion of a thing, less than the whole. Jory v. Palace Dry Goods Co., 30 Or. 196, 46 P. 786.
FRACTION OF A DAY. A portion of a day. The dividing a day. Generally, the law does not allow the fraction of a day. 2 Bl.Comm. 141.
FRACTIONAL. As applied to tracts of land, par-ticularly townships, sections, quarter sections, and other divisions according to the government sur-vey, and also mining claims, this terco means that the exterior boundary lines are laid down to in-elude the whole of such a division or such a claim, but that the tract in question does not measure up to the full extent or include the whole acreage, because a portion of it is cut off by an overlapping survey, a river or lake, or some other external interference. Tolleston Club v. State, 38 N.E. 214, 141 Ind. 197; Parke v. Meyer, 28 Ark. 287; Golter-mann v. Schiermeyer, 111 Mo. 404, 19 S.W. 487. Any irregular division whether containing more or less than conventional amount of acreage. Gray-sonia-Nashville Lumber Co. v. Wright, 117 Ark. 151, 175 S.W. 405; South Florida Farros Co. v. Goodno, 84 Fla. 532, 94 So. 672, 675.
FRACTIONEM DIE’ NON RECIPIT LEX. Lofft, 572. The law does not take notice of a portion of a day.
FRACTITIUM. Arable land. Mon. Angl.
FRACTURA NAVIUM. Lat. The breaking or wreck of ships; the same as naufragium, (q. v.)
FRAGMENTA. Lat. Fragments. A name some-times applied (especially in citations) to the Di-gest or Pandects in the Corpus Juris Civilis of Jus-tinian, as being made up of numerous extracts or "fragments" from the writings of various jur-jsts. Mackeld. Rom. Law, 1 74.
ERAIS. Fr. Expense; charges; costs. Frais d’un proas, costs of a suit.
ERAIS DE JUSTICE. In French and Canadian law, costs incurred lncidentally to the action.
ERAIS JUSQU’A BORD. Fr. In French commer-cial law, expenses to the board; expenses incurredexcept such as were due to the sovereign.
FRANC TENANCIER. In French law, a free-holder.
FRANCHILANUS. A freeman. Chart. Hen. IV. A free tenant. Spelman.
FRANCHISE. A special privilege conferred by government on individual or corporation, and which does not belong to citizens of country gen-erally of common right. Elliott v. City of Eugene, 135 Or. 108, 294 P. 358, 360. In England it is de-fined to be a royal privilege in the hands of a subject.
A "franchise," as used by Blackstone in defining quo warranto, (3 Com. 262 [4th Am. Edi 322), had reference to a royal privilege or branch of the king’s prerogative subsisting in the hands of the subject, and must arise from the king’s grant, or be held by prescription, but today we understand a franchise to be some special privilege con-ferred by government on an individual, natural or artificial, which is not enjoyed by its citizens in general. State v. Fernandez, 106 Fla. 779, 143 So. 638, 639, 86 A.L.R. 240.
In this country a franchise is a privilege or Immunity of a public nature, which cannot be legally exercised with-out legislative grant. To be a corporation la a franchise. The various powers conferred on corporations are fran-chises. The execution of a policy of insurance by an ín-surance company, and the issuing a bank-nota by an in-corporated bank, are franchises. People v. Utica Ins, Co., 15 Johns., N.Y., 387, 8 Am.Dec. 243. But It does not em-brace the property acquired by the exercise of the fran-chise. Bridgeport v. New York & N. H. R. Co., 36 Conn. 255, 4 Am.Rep. 63. Nor involve ínterest in land acquíred by grantee. Whltbeck v. Funk, 140 Or. 70, 12 P.2d 1019, 1020. In a popular sense, the political rights of subjects and citizens are franchises, such as the right of suffrage, etc. Pierce v. Emery, 32 N.H. 484; State v. Black Dia-mond Co., 97 Ohio St. 24, 119 N.E. 195, 199, L.R.A.1918E, 352.
Electivo Franchise. The right of suifrage; the right or privilege of voting in publlc elections.
Exclusive Franchise. See Exclu,ive Privilege or Fran-chise.
General and Special. The charter of a corporation is íts "general" franchise, while a "special" franchise consista In any rights granted by the public to use property for a publlc use but with prívate profit. Lord v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 194 N.Y. 212, 87 N.E. 443, 22 L.R.A.,N.S., 420,
Personal Franchise. A franchise of corporate existence, or one which authorizea the formatIon and existence of a corporation, is sometimes called a "personal" franchise, as distingulshed from a "property" franchise, which au-thorizes a corporation so formed to apply its property to some particular enterprise or exercise some special privi-lege in lts eniployment, as, for example, to construct and operate a railroad. See Sandham v. Nye, 9 Misc.Rep. 541, 30 N.Y.S. 552.
Secondary Franchises. The franchise of corporate exist-ence being sometimes called the "primary" franchise of a corporation, its "secondary" franchises are the special and peculiar rights, privileges, or grants which it may re-ceive under lts charter or from a municipal corporatión, such as the right to use the publlc streets, exact tolls, collect fares, etc. State v. Topeka Water Co., 61 Kan. 547, 60 P. 337; Virginia Canon Toll Road Co. v. People, 22 Colo. 429, 45 P. 398, 37 L.R.A. 711. The franchises of a corporation are divisible finto (1) corporate or general franchises; and (2) "special or secondary franchises." The former is the franchise to exist as a corporation, while the latter are certain rights and privileges conferred upon existing corporations. Gulf Refining Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 166 Miss. 759, 108 So. 158, 160.
Special Franchises. See Secondary Franchises, supra.
FRANCHISE TAX. A tax on the franchise of a corporation, that is, on the right and privilege of carrying on business in the character of a cor-poration, for the purposes for which it was creat-ed, and in the conditions which surround it. In re Commercial Safe Deposit Co. of Buffalo, 148 Misc. 527, 266 N.Y.S. 626.
Though the value of the franchise, for purposes of taxa-tion, may be measured by the amount of business done, or the amount of earnings or dividends, or by the total value of the capital or stock of the corporation in excess of its tangible assets, a franchise tax is not a tax on either prop-erty, capital, stock, earnIngs, or dividends. Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U.S. 594, 10 S.Ct. 593, 33 L.Ed. 1025; Worth v. Petersburg R. Co., 89 N.C. 305; People v. Knight, 174 N.Y. 475, 67 N.E. 65, 63 L.R.A. 87; Greene v. Louls-ville & I. R. Co., 244 U.S. 499, 37 S.Ct. 673, 678, 61 L.Ed. 1280, Ann.Cas.1917E, 88; American Refining Co. v. Staples, Tex.Com.App., 269 S.W. 420, 421. Nor a tax on franchise In technical sense, but on all intangible property of such a corporation, not otherwise taxed, used in state as compo-nent part of corporation’s entire system. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Weaver, D.C.Neb., 5 F.Supp. 493, 497.
It is tax on intangible values inhering to business and added value given to tangible property, being "ad valorem" as distinguished from "excise" or "privilege" tax. State Tax Commission v. Petroleum Exploratlon, 253 Ky. 119, 68 S.W.2d 777.
FRANCIA. France. Bract. fol. 427b.
FRANCIGENA. A man born in France. A de-signation formerly given to aliens in England.
See Frenchman.
FRANCUS. L. Lat. Free; a freeman; a Frank. Spelman.
FRANCUS BANCUS. Free bench (q. v.).
FRANCUS HOMO. In old European law. A free man. Domesday.
FRANCUS PLEGIUS. In old English law, a frank pledge, or free pledge. See Frank-Pledge.
FRANCUS TENENS. A freeholder. See Frank-Tenement.
FRANK, v. To send matter through the public mails free of postage, by a personal or official privilege.FRANK, adj. In old English law, free. Occur-ring in several compounds.
FRANK-ALMOIGNE. In English law, free alms. A spiritual tenure whereby religious corporations, aggregate or sole, held lands of the donor to them and their successors forever.
They were discharged of all other except religious serv-ices, and the trinoda necessitas. It differs from tenure by divine service, in that the latter required the performance of certain divine services, whereas the former, as its name imports, is free. This tenure is expressly excepted in the 12 Car. II. c. 24, § 7, and therefore still subsists in some few instances. 2 Broom & H. Comm. 203.
FRANK BANK. In old English law, free bench. Litt. § 166; Co. Litt. 110b. See Free-Bench.
FRANK-CHASE. A liberty of free chase enjoyed by any one, whereby all other persons having ground within that compass are forbidden to cut down wood, etc., even in their own demesnes, to the prejudice of the owner of the liberty. Cowell. See Chase.
FRANK-FEE. Freehold lands exempted from all services, but not from homage; lands held other-wise than in ancient demesne. That which a man holds to himself and his heirs, and not by such service as is required in ancient demesne, accord-ing to the custom of the manor. Cowell.
FRANK FERM. In English law, a species of es• tate held in socage, said by Britton to be "lands and tenements whereof the nature of the fee is changed by feoffment out of chivalry for certain yearly services, and in respect whereof neither homage, ward, marriage, nor relief can be de-manded." Britt. c. 66; 2 Bl.Comm. 80.
FRANK-FOLD. In old English law, free-fold; a privilege for the lord to have all the sheep of his tenants and the inhabitants within his seigniory, in his fold, in his demesnes, to manure his land. Keilw. 198.
FRANK-LAW. An obsolete expression signifying the rights and privileges of a citizen, or the liber-ties and civic rights of a freeman.
FRANK-MARRIAGE. A species of entailed es. tates, in English law, now grown out of use, but still capable of subsisting.
When tenements are given by one to another, together with a wife, who is a daughter or cousin of the donar, to hold in frank-marriage, the donees shall have the tene-ments to them and the heirs of their two bodies begotten, á. e., In special tall. For the word "frank-marriage," ex vi iermini, both creates and limits an Inheritance, not only supplying words of descent, but also tercos of procre-ation. The donees are Hable to no service except fealty, and a reserved rent would be void, until the fourth de-gree of consanguinity be passed between the issues of the donor and donee, when they were capable by the law of the church of intermarrying. Litt. § 19; 2 B1.Comm. 115.
FRANK-PLEDGE. In old English law, a pledge or surety for freemen; that is, the pledge, or corporate responsibility, of all the inhabitants of a tithing for the general good behavior of each free-born citizen aboye the age of fourteen, and for his being forthcoming to answer any infrac-tion of the law. Termes de la Ley; Cowell.FRANK-TENANT. A freeholder. Litt. § 91.
FRANK-TENEMENT. In English law, a free tenement, freeholding, or freehold. 2 BI.Comm. 61, 62, 104; 1 Steph.Comm. 217; Bract. fol. 207. Used to denote both the tenure and the estate.
FRANK1NG PRIVILEGE. The privilege of send-ing certain matter through the public mails with-out payment of postage, in pursuance of a per-sonal or oficial privilege.
FRANKLEYN (spelled, also, "Francling" and "Franklin"). A freeman; a freeholder; a gentle-man. Blount; Cowell.
FRASSETUM. In old English law, a wood or wood-ground where ash•trees grow. Co. Litt. 4b.
FRATER. In the civil law, a brother. Frater consanguineus, a brother having the same father, but born of a different mother. Frater uterinos, a brother born of the same mother, but by a dif-ferent father. Frater nutricios, a bastard brother.
FRATER FRATRI UTERINO NON SUCCEDET IN HIEREDITATE PATERNA. A brother shall not succeed a uterine brother in the paternal in-heritance. 2 Bl.Comm. 223; Fortes. de Laud. c. 5. A maxim of the common law of England, now superseded by the statute 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 106, § 9. See Broom, Max. 530.
FRATERIA. In old records, a fraternity, brother-hood, or society of religious persons, who were mutually bound to pray for the good health and life, etc., of their living brethren, and the souls of those that were dead. Cowell.
FRATERNAL. Brotherly; relating or belonging to a fraternity or an association of persons formed for mutual aid and benefit, but not for profit. In re Mason Tire & Rubber Co., 56 App.D.C. 170, 11 F. 2d 556, 557.
FRATERNAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION. One whose members have adopted the same, or a very similar, calling, avocation, or profession, or who are working in unison to accomplish some worthy object, and who for that reason have banded themselves together as an association or society to aid and assist one another, and to promote the common cause. Alpha Rho Alumni Ass’n v. City of New Brunswick, 126 N.J.L. 233, 18 A.2d 68, 70. An association having a representative form of government and a lodge system with a ritualistic form of work for the meeting of its chapters, or other subordinate bodies. Fain v. Feldman, 191 Ga. 519, 13 S.E.2d 179, 181. A society or voluntary association organized and carried on for the mu-tual aid and benefit of its members, not for prof-it; which ordinarily has a lodge system, á ritual-istic form of work, and a representative govern-ment, makes provision for the payment of death benefits, and (sometimes) for benefits in case of accident, sickness, or old age, the funds therefor being derived from dues paid or assessments lev-ied on the members. National Union v. Marlow, Mo., 74 F. 778, 21 C.C.A. 89; Walker v. Giddings, 103 Mich. 344, 61 N.W. 512.FRATERNAL INSURANCE. The form of life (or accident) insurance furnished by a fraternal bene-ficial association, consisting in the payment to a member, or his heirs in case of death, of a stipu-lated sum of money, out of funds raised for that purpose by the payment of dues or assessments by all the members of the association.
FRATERNIA. A fraternity or brotherhood.
FRATERNITY. A body of men associated for their common interest, business or pleasure. Wom-an’s Club of Little Falls v. Township of Little Falls, 20 N.J.Misc. 278, 26 A.2d 739, 741; Alpha Rho Alumni Ass’n v. City of New Brunswick, 126 N.J.L. 233, 18 A.2d 68, 71. Organizations composed of either or both sexes. State v. Allen, 189 Ind. 369, 127 N.E. 145, 146. Brotherly regard and sym-pathy for others. Donnelly v. Sovereign Camp W. O. W., 111 Neb. 499, 197 N.W. 125, 127.
In American colleges, a student organization, either a nationally chartered soclety comprising many affiliated chapters or a single chapter in one institution formed chiefly to promote frlendship and welfare among the mem-bers, and usually having secret rites and a name consisting of Greek letters. Woman’s Club of Little Falls v. Town-ship of Little Falls, 20 N.J.Misc. 278, 26 A.2d 739, 741; Alpha Rho Alumni Ass’n v. City of New Brunswick, 126 N.J.L. 233, 18 A.2d 68, 71.
In old English law, "some people of a place united to-gether in respect to a mystery or business finto a company, and their laws and ordinances cannot bind strangers." Cuddon v. Eastwlck, 1 Salk. 192.
FRATRES CONJURATI. Sworn brothers or com-panions for the defense of their sovereign, or for other purposes. Hoved. 445.
FRATRES P’YES. In old English law, certain friars who wore white and black garments. Wal-singham, 124.
FRATRIAGE. A younger brother’s inheritance.
FRATRICIDE. One who has killed a brother or sister; also the killing of a brother or sister.
FRAUD. An intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing another in reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to him or to surrender a legal right; a false repre-sentation of a matter of fact, whether by words or by conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives and is intended to de-ceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury. Brainerd Dispatch Newspaper Co. v. Crow Wing County, 196 Minn. 194, 264 N.W. 779, 780. Any kind of artifice employed by one person to deceive another. Goldstein v..Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., 160 Misc. 364, 289 N.Y.S. 1064, 1067. A generic term, embracing all multi-farious means which human ingenuity can devise, and which are resorted to by one individual to get-advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth, and includes all sur-prise, trick, cunning, dissembling, and any unfair way by which another is cheated. Johnson v. Mc• Donald, 170 Okl. 117, 39 P.2d 150. "Bad faith" and "fraud" are synonymous, and also synonyms of dishonesty, infldelity, faithlessness, perfidy, unfair-ness, etc. Joiner v. Joiner, Tex.Civ.App., 87 S.W. 2d 903, 914, 915.
It consists of some deceitful practice or willful devine, resorted to with intent to deprive another of his right, or Id some manner to do him an injury. As distinguished from negligence, it is always positive, intentional. Maher v. Hibernia Iras. Co., 67 N.Y. 292; Alexander v. Church, 53 Conn. 561, 4 A. 103; Studer v. Bleistein, 115 N.Y. 316, 22 N.E. 243, 7 L.R.A. 702; McNair v. Southern States FI-nance Co., 191 N.C. 710, 133 S.E. 85, 88. It comprises all acta, omissions, and concealments involving a breach of a legal or equitable duty and resulting in damage to another. Coppo v. Coppo, 163 Misc. 249, 297 N.Y.S. 744, 750. And includes anything calculated to deceive, whether it be a single act or combination of circumstances, whether the suppression of truth or the suggestion of what is false, whether it be by direct falsehood or by innuendo, by speech or by silence, by word of mouth, or by look or gesture. People v. Gilmore, 345 Ill. 28, 177 N.E. 710, 717. Fraud, as applied to contracts, is the cause of an error bearing on a material part of the contract, created or continued by artifice, with design to obtain some unjust advantage to the one party, or to cause an inconveniente or loss to the other.. Civil Code La. art. 1847. Strauss v. Insurance Co. of North America, 157 La. 661, 102 So. 861, 865; Jesse French Plano & Organ Co. v. Gibbon, Tex.Civ.App., 180 S. W. 1185, 1187.
Fraud, in the sense of a court of equity, property in-eludes all abts, omissions, and concealments which in-volve a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confi-dence justly reposed, and are injurious to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. 1 Story, Eq.Jur. § 187; Howard v. West Jersey & S. S. R. Co., 102 N.J.Eq. 517, 141 A. 755, 757.
Fraud is either actual or constructive. Actual fraud consists in deceit, artifice, trick, design, some direct and active operation of the mirad; ít includes cases of the in-tentional and successful employment of any cunning, de-ception, or artifice used to circumvent or cheat another; it is something said, done, or omitted by a person with the design of perpetrating what he knows to be a cheat or deception. Constructive fraud consísts in any act of com-rnission or omisslon contrary to legal or equitable duty, trust, or confldence justly reposed, which is contrary to good conscience and operates to the injury of another. Or, as otherwise deflned, it ís an act, statement or omission which operates as a virtual fraud on an individual, or which, if generally permítted, would be prejudicial to the public welfare, and yet may have been unconnected with any selflsh or evil design. Or, according to Story, construc-tive frauds are such acts or contracts as, though not orígi-nating in any actual evil design or contrivance to perpe-trate a positive fraud or injury upon other persons, are yet, by their tendency to deceive or mislead other persons, or to violate prívate or public confidente, or to impair or injure the public interests, deemed equally reprehensible with actual fraud. 1 Story, Eq.Jur. § 258. Code Ga.1882, § 3173 (Cív.Code 1910, § 4622); People v. Kelly, 35 Barb., N.Y., 457; Jackson v. Jackson, 47 Ga. 99; Massachusetts Ben. L. Ass’n v. Robinson, 104 Ga. 256, 30 S.E. 918, 42 L.R. A. 261; Allen v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 269 III. 234, 109 N.E. 1035, 1038.
Fraud is ars() classifled as fraud in fact and fraud in law. The former is actual, positiva, intentional fraud. Fraud disclosed by matters of fact, as distinguished from con-structive fraud or fraud in law. McKibbin v. Martin, 64 Pa. 356, 3 Am.Rep. 588; Cook v. Burnham, 3 Kan.App. 27, 44 P. 447. Fraud in law is fraud in contemplation of law; fraud implied or inferred by law; fraud made out by con-struction of law, as distinguished from fraud found by a jury from matter of fact; constructive fraud (q. v.). See 2 Kent, Comm. 512-532; Delaney v. Valentine, 154 N.Y. 692, 49 N.E. 65; Lovato v. Catron, 20 N.M. 168. 148 P. 490, 492, L.R.A.1915E, 451; Furst & Thomas v. Merritt, 190 N.C. 397, 130 S.E. 40, 43.
Fraud is also said to be legal or positiva. The former is fraud made out by legal construction or inference, or the same thing as constructive fraud. Newell v. Wagness, 1 N. D. 62, 44 N.W. 1014. Positive fraud is the same thing as actual fraud. Douthitt v. Applegate, 33 Kan. 395, 6 P. 575, 52 Am.Rep. 533; Nocatee Fruit Co. v. Fosgate, C.C.A. Fla., 12 F.2d 250, 252.
Actionable fraud. See Actionable.Estrinsic or collateral fraud justifying equitable relief against a judgment or decreip means some intentional act or conduct by which the prevailing party has prevented the unsuccessful party from having a fati’ submission of the controversy. Farley v. Davis, 10 Wash.2d 62, 116 P.2d 263, 268.
Pious fraud is a subterfuge or evasion considered moral-ly justiflable on account of the ends sought to be promoted; particularly applied to an evasion or disregard of the laws in the interests of religion or religious institutions, such as circumventing the statutes of mortmain.
Statute of Frauds. This is the common designation of a very celebrated English statute, (29 Car. II. c. 3,) passed in 1677, and which has been adoptad, in a more or less modi-fied forro, in nearly all of the United States. Its chief characteristic is the provision that no suit or action shall be maintained on certain classes of contracts or engage-ments unless there shall be a note or memorandum thereof in writing signed by the party to be charged or by his authorized agent. Its Object was to close the door to the numerous frauds and perjuries. It is more fully named as the "statute of frauds and perjuries." Smith v. Morton, 70 Okl. 157, 173 P. 520, 521; Housley v. Strawn Merchan-dise Co., Tex.Com.App., 291 S.W. 864, 867; Norman v. Bul-lock County Bank, 187 Ala. 33, 65 So. 371, 372; Garber v. Goldstein, 92 Conn. 226, 102 A. 605, 606.
FRAUD IN TREATY. Arises where a person is induced by some fraudulent representation or pre-tense to execute the very instrument intended to be executed but under a misrepresentation as to the contents thereof. Meyers v. Murphy, 181 Md. 98, 28 A.2d 861, 862.
FRAUD ORDER. A narre given to orders issued by the postmaster general, under Rev.St. §§ 3929, 4041, 39 U.S.C.A. §§ 259, 732, for preventing the use of the mails as an agency for conducting schemes for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretences, etc.
They are not restricted to schemes which lack all the ele-ments ot legitímate business, but the statute applies "when a business, even if otherwise legítimate, is systematically and designedly conducted upon the plan of inducing its patrons by means of false representations to part with their money in the belief that they are purchasing something different from, superior to, and worth more than, what is actually sold;" Harris v. Rosenberger, Mo., 145 F. 449, 16 C.C.A. 225, 13 L.R.A.,N.S., 762.
The fraud order is íssued to the postmaster of the office through which the person affected by it receives his mail. It forbids the post-master to pay any postal money order to the specifled person, and instructs the postmaster to return all letters to the senders if practicable, or if not, to the dead letter oftice, stamped in either case with the word "fraudulent." The method of testing the validity of the fraud order is to apply to the federal court for an injunc-tion to restrain the postmaster from executing it. The de-cision of the postmaster-general is not the exercise of a judicial function; if he exceeds his jurisdiction, the party injured may have relief in equity; Degge v. Hitchcock, 229 U.S. 162, 33 S.Ct. 639, 57 L.Ed. 1135.
FRAUDARE. Lat. In the civil law, to deceive, cheat, or impose upon; to defraud.
FRAUDULENT. Based on fraud; proceeding from or characterized by fraud; tainted by fraud; done, made, or effected with a purpose or design to carry out a fraud. For "False and Fraudulent" and "False or Fraudulent Claim," see those titles.
FRAUDULENT ALIENATION. In a general sense, the transfer of property with an intent to defraud creditors, lienors, or others. In a particu-lar sense, the act of an administrator who wastesthe assets of the estate by giving them away or selling at a gross undervalue. Rhame v. Lewis, 13 Rich.Eq., S.C., 269.
FRAUDULENT ALIENEE. One who knowingly receives from an administrator assets of the es-tate under circumstances which make it a fraudu-lent alienation on the part of the administrator. Rhame v. Lewis, 13 Rich.Eq., S.C., 269.
FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT. The hiding or suppression of a material fact or circumstance which the party is legally or morally bound to disclose. Magee v. Insurance Co., 92 U.S. 93, 23 L.Ed. 699; Small v.’ Graves, 7 Barb., N.Y., 578.
The test of whether failure to disclose material facts constitutes fraud is the existence of a duty, legal or equitable, arising from the relation of the parties; failure to disclose a material fact with intent to mislead or de-fraud under such circumstances being equivalent to an actual ”fraudulent concealment." Newell Bros. v. Hanson, 97 Vt. 297, 123 A. 208, 210.
Fraudulent concealment justifying a rescission of a con-tract is the intentional concealment of some fact known to the party charged, which ís material for the party injured to know to prevent being defrauded; the concealment of a fact which one is bound to disclose being the equivalent of an indirect representation that such fact does not exist. Long v. Martín, Tex.Civ.App., 234 S.W. 91, 94.
To suspend running of limitations, it means employment of artifice, planned to prevent inquiry or escape investiga-tion and mislead or hínder acquirement of information dis-closing a right of action, and acts relled on must be of an affirmative character and fraudulent. McNaughton v. Rockford State Bank, 261 Mich. 265, 246 N.W. 84, 86.
FRAUDULENT CONVERSION. Receiving into possession money or property of another and fraudulently withholding, converting, or applying the same to or for one’s own use and benefit, or to use and benefit of any person other than the one to whom the money or property belongs. Com-monweal th v. Mitchneck, 130 Pa.Super. 433, 198 A. 463, 464.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE. A conveyance or transfer of property, the object of which is to de-fraud a creditor, or hinder or delay him, or to put such property beyond his reach. Seymour v. Wilson, 14 N.Y. 569; Lockyer v. De Hart, 6 N.J.L. 458; Surratt v. Eskridge, 131 Va. 325, 108 S.E. 677, 679; Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438, 37 S.Ct. 130, 61 L.Ed. 419. Conveyance made with intent to avoid some duty or debt due by or incumbent on person making transfer. Farmers Elevator Co. v. Peck, 134 Neb. 305, 278 N.W. 499, 501.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES, STATUTES OF, OR AGAINST. The name given to two celebrated English statutes,—the statute 13 Eliz. c. 5, made perpetual by 29 Eliz. c. 5; and the statute 27 Eliz. c. 4, made perpetual by 29 Eliz. c. 18.
FRAUDULENT OR DISHONEST ACT. One which involves bad faith, a breach of honesty, a want of integrity, or moral turpitude. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Singer, 185 Va. 620, 39 S.E. 2d 505, 507, 508.
FRAUDULENT PREFERENCES. In English law, every conveyance or transfer of property or charge thereon made, every judgment made, every.obligation incurred, and every judicial proceeding taken or suffered by any ,person unable to pay his debts as they become due from his own mon-eys, in favor of any creditor, with a view of giv-ing such creditor a preference over other credi-tors, shall be deemed fraudulent and void if the debtor become bankrupt within three months. 32 & 33 Vict. c. 71, § 92.
FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATION. A false statement as to material fact, made with intent that another rely thereon, which is believed by other party and on which he relies and by which he is induced to act and does act to his injury, and statement is fraudulent if speaker knows statement to be false or if it is made with utter disregard of its truth or falsity. Osborne v. Sim-mons, Mo.App., 23 S.W.2d 1102, 1104.
As basis for law action, establishment of rep-resentation, falsity, scienter, deception, and injury, is required. Gray v. Shell Petroleum Corporation, 212 Iowa, 825, 237 N.W. 460, 463.
But a promise made without intent, to perform constitutes "fraudulent representation," which generally affords ground for rescission. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 206 N.C. 546, 174 S.E. 447, 448.
FRAUNC, FRAUNCHE, FRAUNKE. See Frank. FRAUNCHISE. L. Fr. A franchise.
FRAUS. Lat. Fraud. More commonly called, in the civil law, "dolos," and "dolos malus" (q. y.). A distinction, however, was sometimes made Be-tween "fraus" and "dolos;" the former being held to be of the most extensive import. Calvin.
FRAUS DANS LOCUM CONTRACTUL A misre-presentation or concealment of some fact that is material to the contract, and had the truth re-garding which been known the contract would not have been made as made, is called a "fraud dans locum contractui;" i. e., a fraud occasioning the contract, or giving place or occasion for the con-tract.
FRAUS EST CELARE FRALTDEM. It is a fraud to conceal a fraud. 1 Vern. 240; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 389, 390.
FRAUS EST ODIOSA ET NON PRJESUMENDA. Fraud is odious, and not to be presumed. Cro. Car. 550.
FRAUS ET DOLUS NEMINI PATROCINAR! DEBENT. Fraud and deceit should defend or excuse no man. 3 Coke, 78; Fleta, lib. 1, c. 13, § 15; Id. lib. 6, c. 6, § 5.
FRAUS ET JUS NUNQUAM COHABITANT. Wing. 680. Fraud and justice never dwell to-gether.
FRAUS LATET IN GENERALIBUS. Fraud lies hid in general expressions.
FRAUS LEGIS. Lat. In the civil law, fraud of law; fraud upon law. See In Fraudem Legis.FRAUS MERETUR FRAUDEM. Plowd. 100. Fraud merits fraud.
FRAXINETUM. In old English law, a wood of ashes; a place where ashes grow. Co. Litt. 4b; Shep. Touch. 95.
FRAY. See Affray.
FRECTUM. In old English law, freight. Quoad frectum navium suarum, as to the freight of his vessels. Blount.
FREDNITE. In old English law, a liberty to hold courts and take up the fines for beating and wounding. To be free from fines. Cowell.
FREDSTOLE. Sanctuaries; seats of peace.
FREDUM. A fine paid for obtaining pardon when the peace had been broken. Spelman; Blount. A sum paid the magistrate for protection against the right of revenge.
FREDWIT, or FREDWITE. A liberty to hold courts and take up the fines for beating and wounding. Jacob, Law Dict.
FREE. Not subject to legal constraint of another.
Unconstrained; having power to follow the dic-tates of his own will. Not subject to the dominion of another. Not compelled to involuntary servi-tude. Used in this sense as opposed to "slave."
Not bound to service for a fixed term of years; in distinction to being bound as an apprentice.
Enjoying full civic rights.
Available to all citizens alike without charge; as a free school.
Available for public use without charge or toll; as a free bridge.
Not despotic; assuring liberty; defending in-dividual rights against encroachment by any per-son or class; instituted by a free people; said of governments, institutions, etc. Webster.
Certain, and also consistent with an honorable degree in Life; as free services, in the feudal law.
Confined to the person possessing, instead of being shared with others; as a free fishery.
Not engaged in a war as belligerent or ally; neutral; as in the maxim, "Free ships make free goods."
FREE ALMS. The name of a species of tenure. See Frank-almoigne.
FREE AND CLEAR (and like phrases). The title to property is said to be "free and clear" when it is not incumbered by any liens; but it is said that an agreement to convey land "free and clear" is satisfied by a conveyance passing a good• title. Meyer v. Madreperla, 68 N.J.L. 258, 53 A. 477, 96 Am.St.Rep. 536; Smith v. Toth, 61 Ind.App. 42, 111 N.E. 442, 444; Grisso v. Milsey, 104 Okl. 173, 230 P. 883, 889.
FREE AND EQUAL. As used in a constitutional provision that election shall be free and equal, theword "free" means that every one entitled to vote should have a reasonable opportunity to do so,. a reasonable manner of doing so, etc., and the word "equal" means that every vote cast should have its decisive effect in the selection or choice to be made at the election. McKinney v. Barker, 180 Ky. 526, 203 S.W. 303, 304, L.R.A.1918E, 581. The term means that the voter shall not be physi-cally restrained in the exercise of his right of fran-chise, by either civil or military authority, and that every voter shall have the same right as every other voter. Asher v. Arnett, 280 Ky. 347, 132 S.W.2d 772, 775.
A "free and equal" election is one at which every per-son entitled to vote may do so if he desires, although it can hardly be said that, if only a few are prevented from voting, the election is not free and equal In the constitu-tional sense. Wallbrecht v. Ingram, 164 Ky. 463, 175 S.W. 1022, 1026.
It is the essence of free elections that the right of suf-frage be untrammeled and unfettered, and that the ballot represent and express the electors’ own intelligent judg-ment and conscience, and there can be no "free election" unless there is freedom of opinion. An election to be free must be without coercion of any description or any de-terrent from the elector’s exercise of his free will by means of any intimidation or influence whatever, although there is no violence or physical coercion. Neelley v. Farr, 61 Colo. 485, 158 P. 458, 467, Ann.Cas.1918A, 23.
FREE-BENCH. A widow’s dower out of copy-holds to which she is entitled by the custom of some manors. It is regarded as an excrescence growing out of the husband’s interest, and is in. deed a continuance of his estate. Wharton.
FREE-BORD. In old records, an allowance of land over and aboye a certain limit or boundary, as so much beyond or without a fence. Cowell; Blount. The right of claiming that quantlty. Termes de la Ley.
FREE BOROUGH MEN. Such great men as did not engage, like the frank-pledge men, for their decennier. Jacob.
FREE CHAPEL. In English ecclesiastical law, a place of worship, so called because not Hable to the visitation of the ordir.ary. It is always of royal foundation, or founded at least by private persons to whom the crown has grafited the privi-lege. 1 Burn, Ecc. Law, 298.
FREE COURSE. In admiralty law, a vessel hav-ing the wind from a favorable quarter is said to sail on a "free course," or said to be "going free" when she has a fair (following) wind and her yards braced in. The Queen Elizabeth, D.C.N.Y., 100 F. 876.
FREE ELECTION. Where each voter is allowed to cast his ballot as his own conscience dictates. Moran v. Bowley, 347 III. 148, 179 N.E. 526, 531.
See Free and Equal, supra.
FREE ENTERPRISE. The right to conduct a legi-timate business for profit. Lafayette Dramatic Productions v. Ferentz, 305 Mich. 193, 9 N.W.2d 57, 62, 145 A.L.R. 1158.
FREE ENTRY, EGRESS, AND REGRESS. An expression used to denote that a person has theright to go on land again and again as of ten as may be reasonably necessary. Thus, in the case of a tenant entitled to emblements.
FREE FISHERY. See Fishery.
FREE ICE. All ice in navigable streams not in-cluded within that authorized to be appropriated is sometimes called "free" ice, and does not belong to the adjacent riparian owners, but to the per-son who first appropriates it. Hudson River Ice Co. v. Brady, 158 App.Div. 142, 142 N.Y.S. 819, 821.
FREE LAW. A term formerly used in England to designate the freedom of civil rights enjoyed by freemen. It was Fiable to forfeiture on con-viction of treason or an infamous crime. McCaf-ferty v. Guyer, 59 Pa. 116.
FREE LOVE. Consorting with opposite sex at pleasure without marriage. Robinson v. Casey, Tex.Civ.App., 272 S.W. 536, 538.
FREE MEN. Before the Norman Conquest, a free man might be a man of small estate depend-ent on a lord. Every man, not himself a lord, was bound to have a lord or be treated as unworthy of a free man’s right. Among free men there was a difference in their estimation for Wergild. See Liber Horno.
FREE ON BOARD. Means that the subject of sale is to be loaded for shipment without expense to the buyer. Olsen v. McMaken & Pentzien, 139 Neb. 506, 297 N.W. 830, 832.
FREE PASS. The power of riding over a rail-road without payment of the customary fare. Coco v. Oden, 143 La. 718, 79 So. 287, 288, 8 A.L.R. 679; Tripp v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., C.C.A.Mich., 238 F. 449, 458, L.R.A.1918A, 758.
FREE SCHOOL. Where no charge is made for tuition. Vincent v. County Board of Education of Talladega County, 222 Ala. 216, 131 So. 893, 894.
FREE SERVICES. In feudal and old English law, such feudal services as were not unbecoming the character of a soldier or a freeman to perform; as to serve under his lord in the wars, to pay a sum of money, and the like. 2 Bl.Comm. 60, 61.
FREE SHAREHOLDERS. The free shareholders of a building and loan association are subscrib-ers to its capital stock who are not borrowers from the association. Steinberger v. Independent B. & S. Ass’n, 84 Md. 625, 36 A. 439.
FREE SHIPS. In international law, ships of a neutral nation. The phrase "free ships shall make free goods" is often inserted in treaties, meaning that goods, even though belonging to an enemy, shall not be seized or confiscated, if found in neu-tral ships. Wheat. Int. Law, 507, et seg.
FREE SOCAGE. See Socage.
FREE TENURE. Tenure by free services; free-hold tenure.
FREE TIME. Period that railroad car may re-main unloaded before demurrage charges beginto accrue. Lehigh Valley Co. v. Maas & Wald-stein Co., 102 N.J.L. 332, 131 A. 884; Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Leverette, 34 Ga.App. 304, 129 S.E. 292, 293.
FREE WARREN. See Warren.
FREE WRITE PERSONS. "Free white persons" referred to in Naturalization Act, as amended by Act July 14, 1870, has meaning naturally given to it when first used in 1 Stat. 103, c. 3, meaning all persons belonging to the European races then commonly counted as white, and their descend-ants, including such descendants in other countries to which they have emigrated.
It includes all European Jews, more or less intermixed with peoples of Celtic, Scandinavian, Teutonic, Iberian, Latin, Greek, and Slavic descent. It includes Magyars, Lapps, and Finns, and the Basques and Albanians. It in-eludes the mixed Latin, Celtic-Iberian, and Moorish inhab-itants of Spain and Portugal, the mixed Greek, Latín, Phoenician, and North African inhabitants of Sicily, and the mixed Slav and Tarter inhabitants of South Russia. It does not mean Caucasian race, Aryan race, or Indo-European races, nor the mixed Indo-European, Dravídian, Semitic and Mongolian peoples who inhabit Persia. A. Syrían of Aslatic btrth and descent will not be entítied to become a naturalized citizen of the United States as beíng a free white person. Ex parte Shahid, D.C.S.C., 205 F. 812, 813; United States v. Cartozian, D.C.Or., 6 F.2d 919, 921; Ex parte Dow, D.C.S.C., 211 F. 486, 487; In re En Sk Song, D.C.Cal., 271 F. 23. Nor a native-born Filipino. U. S. v. Javier, 22 F.2d 879, 880, 57 App.D.C. 303. Nor a native o! India who belonged to Hindu race. Kharaltf Ram Samras v. United States, C.C.A.Cal., 125 F.2d 879, 881..
FREE WOMAN OF COLOR. Terra, up to the time of the Civil War, applied to all persons not of the white race, including Indlans. Sunseri v. Cassagne, 191 La. 209, 185 So. 1, 4.
FREEDMAN. In Roman law, one who was set free from a state of bondage; an emancipated slave. The word is used in the same sense in the United States, respecting negroes who were form-erly slaves. Fairfield v. Lawson, 50 Conn. 513, 47 Am.Rep. 669; Davenport v. Caldwell, 10 S.C. 333.
FREEDOM. The state of being free; liberty; self-determination; absence of restraint; the op, posite of slavery.
The power of acting, in the character of a moral personality, according to the dictates of the will, without other check, hindrance, or prohibition than such as may be imposed by just and neces-sary laws and the duties of social lite.
The prevalence, in the government and consti-tution of a country, of such a system of laws and institutions as secure civil liberty to the individual citizen.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION. Embraces the con-cept of freedom to believe and freedom to act, the first of which is absolute, but the second of which remains subject to regulation for protection of so-ciety. Oney v. Oklahoma City, C.C.A.Okl., 120 F. 2d 861, 865.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS. See Liberty.
FREEDOM OF THE CITY. In English law, this phrase signifies immunity from county juris-diction, and the privilege of corporate taxation and self-government held under a charter from the crown. This freedom is enjoyed of right, sub-ject to the provision of the charter, and is of ten conferred as an honor on princes and other dis-tinguished individuals. The freedom of a city carries the parliamentary franchise. Encyc. Dict. The rights and privileges possessed by the bur-gesses or freemen of a municipal corporation un-der the old English law; now of little importante, and conferred chiefly as a mark of honor. See 11 Chic. L. J. 357.
The phrase has no place in American law, and as fre-quently used in addresses of welcome made to organiza-tions visiting an American city, particulariy by mayors, has no meaning whatever except as an expression of good will.
The form of the grant made by the city of New York to Andrew Hamilton of Phlladelphla as quoted at large in 13 Law Notes 150.
FREEHOLD. An estate for life or in fee. Inter-mountain Realty Co. v. Allen, 60 Idaho 228, 90 P. 2d 704, 706, 122 A.L.R. 647.
A "freehold estate" is a right of title to land Cohn v. Litwin, 311 I11.App. 55, 35 N.E.2d 410, 413.
An estate in land or other real property, of un-certain duration; that is, either of inheritance or which may possibly last for the life of the tenant at the least, (as distinguished from a leasehold; ) and held by a free tenure, (as distinguished from copyhold or villeinage.) Nevitt v. Woodburn, 175 III. 376, 51 N.E. 593; Railroad Co. v. Hemphill, 35 Miss. 22; Ralston Steel Car Co. v. Ralston, 112 Ohio St. 306, 147 N.E. 513, 516, 39 A.L.R. 334; Lakeside Irr. Co. v. Markham Irr. Co., 116 Tex. 65, 285 S.W. 593, 596.
An oil and gas lease. Cravens v. Hubble, 375 III. 51, 30 N.E.2d 622, 623.
A 99-year lease renewable forever is a "freehold estate". Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Carman, 71 Ohio App. 508, 50 N.E.2d 358, 359.
Such an interest in lands of frank-tenement as may en-dure not only during the owner’s life, but which is cast after his death upon the persons who successively represent him, according to certain rules elsewhere explained. Such persons are called "heirs," and he whom they thus repre-sent, the "ancestor." When the interest extends beyond the ancestor’s life, it is called a "freehold of inheritance," and, when it only endures for the ancestor’s life, it is a freehold not of inheritance.
An estate to be a freehold must possess these two qual-ities : (1) Immobility, that is, the property must be either land or some interest issuing out of or annexed to land; and (2) indeterminate duration, for, if the utmost period of time to which an estate can endure be fixed and deter-mined, it cannot be a freehold. Wharton.
Freehold in deed is the real possession of land or tene-ments in fee, fee-tail, or for life. Freehold in law is the right to such tenements before entry. The term has also been applied to those offices which a man holds in fee or for life. Mozl. & W. Dict.; 1 Washb. R. P. 71, 637. See Gage v. Scales, 100 III. 221; State v. Ragland, 75 N.C. 12, L.R. 11 Eq. 454; Liberum Tenementum.
Determinable freeholds are estates for life, which may determine upon future contingencies before the life for which they are created expires, as if an estate be granted to a woman during her widowhood, or to a man until he be promoted to a benefice. In these and similar cases, when-ever the contingency happens,—when the widow marries, or when the grantee obtains the benefice,—the respective es-tates are absolutely determined and gone. Yet, while theysubsist, they are reckoned estates for life; because they may by possibility last for life, if the contingencies upon which they are to determine do not sooner happen. 2 Bl. Comm. 121.
Freehold in late la a freehold which has descended to a man, upon which he may enter at pleasure, but which he has not entered on. Termes de la Ley.
FREEHOLD LAND SOCIETIES. Societies in Eng-land designed for the purpose of enabling me-chanics, artisans, and other workingmen to pur-chase at the least possible price a piece of free-hold land of a sufflcient yearly value to entitle the owner to the elective franchise for the county in which the land is situated. Wharton.
FREEHOLDER. One having title to realty. State ex rel. Peterson v. City of Fraser, 191 Minn. 427, 254 N.W. 776. Either of inheritance or for life. Warren v. Chouteau County, 82 Mont. 115, 265 P. 676, 680. Either legal or equitable title. Daniels v. Fossas, 152 Wash. 516, 278 P. 412, 413.
A person who possesses a freehold estate. Shively v. Lankford, 174 Mo. 535, 74 S.W. 835. Statutory meaning not lnfrequently dlffers from common law meaning of the term. Payne v. Fiscal Court of Carlisle County, 200 Ky. 41, 252 S.W. 127, 129; In re Consofidation of School Dlsts. In Blue Earth County, 140 Minn. 475, 168 N.W. 552; Gor-don v. White, 33 S.D. 234, 145 N.W. 439.
FREEMAN. A person in the possession and en-joyment of all the civil and political rights ac-corded to the people under a free government.
In the Roman law, it denoted one who was either born free or emancipated, and was the opposite of "slave." In feudal law, it designated an allodial proprietor, as dis-tinguished from a vassal or feudal tenant. (And so In Pennsylvania colonial law. Fry’s Election Case, 71 Pa. 308, 10 Am.Rep. 698.) In old English law, the word described a freeholder or tenant by free services; one who was not a villein. In modero legal phrageology, it is the appella-tion of a member of a city or borough having the right of suffrage, or a member of any municipal corporation in-vested with full civic rights.
FREEMAN’S ROLL. A list of persons admitted as burgesses or freemen .for the purposes of the rights reserved by the municipal corporation act, (5 & 6 Wm. IV. c. 76.) Distinguished from the Burgess Roll. 3 Steph.Comm. 197. The term was used, in early colonial history, in some of the American colonies.
FREIGHT. Freight is property the price or com-pensation paid for the transportation of goods by a carrier, at sea, from port to port. The Bill, D. C.Md., 55 F.Supp. 780, 783. But the term is also used to denote the hire paid for the carriage of goods on land from place to place, (usually by a railroad company, not an express company,) or on inland streams or lakes. The name is also ap-plied to the goods or merchandise transported by any of the aboye means. Brittan v. Barnaby, 21 How. 533, 16 L.Ed. 177; Christie v. Davis Coal Co., D.C.N.Y., 95 F. 837, 838; Paradise v. Sun Mut. Ins. Co., 6 La.Ann. 596.
The sum agreed on for the hire of a ship, entirely or in part, for the carriage of goods from one port to another. 13 East, 300. AH rewards or compensation paid for the use of ships. Giles v. Cynthia, 1 Pet.Adm. 206, Fed.Cas.No. 5,424.
The reward, if any, to be paid for its carriage is called "freightage;" the person who delivers the freight to the carrier is called the "consignor;" and the person to whomIt is to be delivered Is called the "consignes." Civil Code Cal. § 2110; Comp.Laws N.D.1913, § 6197; Comp.Laws S.D. 1929, § 1119.
Property carried is called "freight." Lyman-Richey Sand & Gravel Co. v. State, 123 Neb. 674, 243 N.W. 891, 893, 83 A.L.R. 1301.
"Dead freight" is money payable by a person who has chartered a ship and only partly loaded her, in respect of the loss of freight caused to the ship-owner by the de-ficiency of cargo. L.R. 2 H.L. Se. 128; The Rosemary, C. C.A.Miss., 277 F. 674, 678.
FREIGHT BOOKING. ° The making of specific arrangements for the transportation of goods by particular vessel in advance of its sailing day. Iwai & Co., Limited, v. Hercules Powder Co., 162 Ga. 795, 134 S.E. 763, 765.
FREIGHT CAR. A railroad car adapted to the transportation from one Point to another of mov-able articles of every kind, character, and descrip-tion, and a box car while so used is at least tem-porarily a car carrying freight. State v. Jones, 84 W.Va. 85, 99 S.E. 271, 274.
FREIGHT IS THE MOTHER OF WAGES. 2 Show. 283; 3 Kent, Comm. 196. Where a voyage is broken up by vis major, and no freight earned, no wages, eo nomine, are due.
FREIGHT THEN PENDING. Earnings of the voyage. The C. F. Coughlin, D.C.N.Y., 25 F.Supp. 649, 650.
FREIGHT TRAIN. A train that carries freight alone, having a caboose attached for use of crew. Arizona Eastern R. Co. v. State, 29 Ariz. 446, 242 P. 870, 871; Mammoth Cave R. Co. v. Common-wealth, 176 Ky. 747, 197 S.W. 406, 407.
FREIGHTER. In maritime law, the party by whom a vessel is engaged or chartered; other-wise called the "charterer." 2 Steph. Comm. 148. In French law, the owner of a vessel is called the "freighter" (fréteur); the merchant who hires it is called the "affreighter" (affréteur). Emerig. Tr. des Ass. ch. 11, § 3.
FRENCH POOL. A system of gambling, espe-cially on horse races, now generally known as "parí mutuel" (q. v.).
FRENCHMAN. In early times, in English law, this term was applied to every stranger or "out-landish" man. Bract. lib. 3, tr. 2, c. 15.
FRENDLESMAN. Sax. An outlaw. So called because on his outlawry he was denied all help of friends after certain days. Cowell; Blount.
FRENDWITE. In old English law, a mulct or fine exacted from him who harbored an outlawed friend. Cowell; Tomlins.
FRENETICUS. In old English law, a madman, or person in a frenzy. Fleta, lib. 1, c. 36.
FREOBORGH. A free-surety, or free-pleoge. Spelman. See Frank-Pledge.FREOLING. (Sax. freoh, free, plus ling, pro-geny.) A freeman born. Wharton. See Frilingi.
FREQUENT, v. To visit often; to resort to often or habitually. Green v. State, 109 Ind. 175, 9 N.E. 781; Ex parte Werner, 46 R.I. 1, 124 A. 195, 196.
FREQUENTER. Any person not an employee who may go in or be in place of employment or public building under circumstances which render him other than trespasser. Tomlin v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry. Co., 220 Wis. 325, 265 N.W. 72.
FREQUENTIA ACTUS MULTUM OPERATUR. The frequency of an act effects much. 4 Coke, 78; Wing. Max. p. 719, max. 192. A continual usage is of great effect to establish a right.
FRÉRE. Fr. A brother. FrIre eyne, elder broth-er. Fr¿re puisne, younger brother. Britt. c. 75.
FRESCA. In old records, fresh water, or rain and land flood.
FRESIL Immediate; recent; following without any material interval.
FRESH DISSEISIN. By the ancient common law, where a man had been disseised, he was allowed to right himself by force, by ejecting the disseisor from the premises, without resort to law, provided this was done forthwith, while the dis-seisin was fresh, ( flagrante disseisina.) Bract. fol. 162b. No particular time was limited for doing this, but Bracton suggested it should be fifteen days. Id. fol. 163. See Britt. cc. 32, 43, 44, 65.
FRESH FINE. In old English law, a fine that had been levied within a year past. St. Westm. 2, c. 45; Cowell.
FRESH FORCE. Force done within forty days. Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 7; Old Nat. Brev. 4. The heir or reversioner in a case of disseisin by fresh force was allowed a remedy in chancery by bill before the mayor. Cowell.
FRESH PURSUIT. A pursuit instituted immedi-ately and with intent to reclaim or recapture, after an animal escaped, a thief fiying with stolen goods, etc. People v. Pool, 27 Cal. 578; White v. State, 70 Miss. 253, 11 So. 632.
FRESH SUIT. In old English law, immediate and unremitting pursuit of an escaping thief. "Such a present and earnest following of a rob-ber as never ceases from the time of the robbery until apprehension." Staundef, P. C. lib. 3, cc. 10, 12; 1 Bl. Comm. 297.
FRESHET. A flood, or overflowing of a river, by means of rains or melted snow; an inundation. Stover v. Insurance Co., 3 Phila., Pa., 42; Harris v. Social Mfg. Co., 9 R.I. 99, 11 Am.Rep. 224.FRET. Fr. In French marine law, freight. Ord. Mar. liv. 3, tit. 3.
FRÉTER. Fr. In French marine law, to freight a ship; to let it. Emerig. Tr. des Ass. c. 11, § 3.
FRÉTEUR. Fr. In French marine law, freighter. The owner of a ship, who Jets it to the merchant. Emerig. Tr. des Ass. c. 11, § 3.
FRETTUM, FRETTUM. In old English law, the freight of a ship; freight money. Cowell.
FRETUM. Lat. A strait.
FRETUM BRITANNICUM. The strait between Dover and Calais.
FRIARS. An order of religious persons, of whom there were four principal branches, viz.: (1) Minors, Grey Friars, or Franciscans; (2) August-Mes; (3) Dominicans, or Black Friars; (4) White Friars, or Carmelites, from whom the rest de-scend. Wharton.
FRIBURGH. (Also, Frithborg, Frithborgh, Fri-borg, Froborg, and Freoburgh.) (Sax.) A kind of frank-pledge whereby the principal men were bound for themselves and servants. Fleta, lib. 1, cap. 47. Cowell says it is the same as frank-pledge.
FRIBUSCULUM. In the civil law, a temporary separation between husband and wife, caused by a quarrel or estrangement, but not amounting to a divorce, because not accompanied with an in-tention to dissolve the marriage.
FRIDBORG, FRITHBORG. Frank-pledge. Cow-ell. Security for the peace. Spelman.
FRIDHBURGUS. In old English law, a kind of frank-pledge, by which the lords or principal men were made responsible for their dependents or servants. Bract. fol. 124b.
FRIEND. One favorably disposed. Ned v. Rob-inson, 181 Okl. 507, 74 P.2d 1156. Varying in de-gree from greatest intimacy to acquaintance more or less casual. United States Trust Co. of New-ark v. Montclair Trust Co., 133 N.J.Eq. 579, 33 A.2d 901, 903.
FRIEND OF THE COURT. See Amicus Curia.
FRIENDLESS MAN. In old English law, an out-law; so called because he was denied all help of friends. Bract. lib. 3, tr. 2, c. 12.
FRIENDLY FIRE. Fire burning in place where it was intended to burn, although damages may result. Progress Laundry & Cleaning Co. v. Re-ciprocal Exchange, Tex.Civ.App., 109 S.W.2d 226, 227.
FRIENDLY SOCIETIES. In English law, asso-ciations supported by subscription, for the relief and maintenance of the members, or their wives, children, relatives, and nominees, in sickness, in-fancy, advanced age, widowhood, etc. The stat-utes regulating these societies were consolidated and amended by St. 38 & 39 Vict. c. 60. Wharton.
FRIENDLY SUIT. A suit brought by a creditor in chancery against an executor or administrator, being really a suit by the executor or administra-tor, in the name of a creditor, against himself, in order to compel the creditors to take an equal distribution of the assets. 2 Williams, Ex’rs, 1915.
Also any suit instituted by agreement between the parties to obtain the opinion of the court upon some doubtful question in which they are in-terested.
FRIGIDITY. Impotence. Johnson. The term in this sense is obsolete. Webster’s New Int. Dict.
FRILINGI. Persons of free descent, or freemen born; the middle class of persons among the Saxons. Spelman. See Freoling.
FRISCUS. Fresh uncultivated ground. Mon. Angl. t. 2, p. 56. Fresh; not salt. Reg. Orig. 97. Recent or new. See Fresh, and subtitles there-under.
FRISK, v. The running of hands rapidly over another’s person, as distinguished from "search," which is to strip and examine contents more par-ticularly. Kalwin Business Men’s Ass’n v. Me-Laughlin, 126 Misc. 698, 214 N.Y.S. 99, 102.
FRITIL Sax. Peace, security, or protection. This word occurs in many compound terms used in Anglo-Saxon law.
FRITHBORG. Frank-pledge. Cowell.
FRITHBOTE. A satisfaction or fine, for a breach of the peace.
FRITHBREACH. The breaking of the peace.
FRITHGAR. The year of jubilee, or of meeting for peace and friendship.
FRITHGILDA. Guildhall; a company or fra-ternity for the maintenance of peace and security; also a fine for breach of the peace. Jacob.
FRITHMAN. A member of a company or fra-ternity.
FRITHSOCNE. Surety of defense. Jurisdiction of the peace. The franchise of preserving the peace. Also spelled "frithsoken."
FRITHSPLOT. A spot or plot of land, encircling some stone, tree, or well, considered sacred, and therefore affording sanctuary to criminals.
FRITHSTOOL. The stool of peace. A stool or chair placed in a church or cathedral, and which was the symbol and place of sanctuary to those who fied to it and reached it.
FRIVOLOUS. An answer is "frivolous" where it appears from bare inspection to be lacking in legal sufficiency, and, where in any view of the facts pleaded, it does not present a defense. Nee-fus v. Neefus, 209 Minn. 495, 296 N.W. 579, 581. Any pleading is called "frivolous" when it is clearly insufficient on its face, and does not contro-vert the material points of the opposite pleading, and is presumably interposed for mere purposes oY delay or to embarrass the opponent. Erwin v. Lowery, 64 N.C. 321; Strong v. Sproul, 53 N.Y. 499; Gray v. Gidiere, 4 Strob., S.C., 442; In re Beam, 93 N.J.Eq. 593, 117 A. 613, 614; Milberg v. Keuthe, 98 N.J.L. 779, 121 A. 713, 714.
"Frivolous pleas" are those which are so clear-ly and palpably bad as to require no argument to convince the court thereof, and which would be pronounced by the court indicative of bad faith in the pleader on a mere inspection. U. S. V. Delaney, D.C.N.J., 8 F.Supp. 224, 227.
A frivolous demurrer has been defined to be one which is so clearly untenable, or its insuffi-ciency so manifest upon a bare inspection of the pleadings, that its character may be determined without argument or research. Cottrill v. Cram-er, 40 Wis. 558.
A "frivolous appeal" is one presenting no justi-ciable question and so readily recognizable as de-void of merit on face of record that there is little prospect that it can ever succeed. Treat v. State ex rel. Mitton, 121 Fla. 509, 163 So. 883.
A sham plea is good on its face, but false in fact; it may, to all appearances, constitute a perfect defense, but is a pretense because false and because not pleaded In good faith. A frivolous plea may be perfeetly true in its allega-tions, but yet is Hable to be stricken out because totally Insufficient In substance. Andrea v. Bandler, Sup., 56 N.Y. S. 614; Brown v. Jenlson, 1 Code R.N.S., N.Y., 157; Sheets v. Ramer, 125 Minn. 98, 145 N.W. 787. See, further, Answer.
FRODMORTEL, or FREOMORTEL. An immun-ity for committing manslaughter. Mon. Angl. t. 1, p. 173.
FROM. Implies a starting point, whether it be of time, place, or condition; and meaning: Hay-ing a starting point of motion; noting the point of departure, origin, withdrawal, etc.; out of, starting at, as, he traveled "from" New York to Chicago. Silva v. MacAuley, 135 Cal.App. 249, 26 P.2d 887. Word "from" or "after" an event or day does not have an absolute and invariable mean-ing, but each should receive an inclusion or ex-clusion construction according to intention with which such word is used. Acme Life Ins. Co. v. White, Tex.Civ.App., 99 S.W.2d 1059, 1060. Words "from" and "to," used in contract, may be given meaning to which reason and sense entitles them, under circumstances of case. Woodruff v. Adams, 134 Cal.App. 490, 25 P.2d 529.
As to whether the word was to be treated as Inclusive or exclusive of a terminus a quo, whether of time or place, a critical writer formulated a rule that when referring to a certain point as a terminus a quo, though in vulgar accepta-tion It were capable of being taken indifferently, either inclusively or exclusively, yet in law it has obtained a cer-tain fixed import and is always taken as exclusive of the terminus a quo. Powell, Powers 449. It generally ex-eludes the day to which it relates, but the general rule will yield to the intent of parties; Kendall v. Kingsley, 120 Mass. 94. The views of Lord Mansfleld, in Cowp. 714 (overruling his own deeision of three years before, id. 189), was that it is either exclusive or inclusive according to context and subject-matter, and the court will construe it to effectuate the intent of partles and not to destroy it. Lowman V. Shotkoskl, 106 Neb. 540, 184 N.W. 107, 108;Allen v. Effler, 144 Tenn. 685, 235 S.W. 67, 68; Martín v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., 310 Mo. 411, 276 S.W. 380, 382, 41 A.L. R. 1372; Piatt v. Flaherty, 96 Kan. 42, 149 P. 734.
As to time, after an examination of authorities, Wash-ington, J., laid down what he considered the settled prin-cipies to be deduced from them: (1) When time Is com-puted from an act done, the day of its performance is in-cluded; (2) when the words are from the date, if a present interest is to commence, the day is included, if it is a terminus from which to impute time the day is excluded; Pearpoint v. Graham, 4 Wash.C.C. 240, Fed.Cas.No.10,877; where the latter principie was applied to a lease, as it was a,l,So in Lord Raym. 84; and to a bond; Lysle v. Williams, 15 S. & R., Pa., 135; and the first proposition has been laid down with reference to the words "from and after the passage of this act;" Arnold v. U. S., 9 Cra., U.S., 104, 3 L.Ed. 671; U. S. v. Williams, 1 Peine 261, Fed.Cas.No. 16,723; contra, Lorent v. Ins. Co., 1 Nott. & McC., S.C., 505. See U. S. v. Heth, 3 Cra., U.S., 399, 2 L.Ed. 479. From is generally held a word of exclusion; Wilcox v. Wood, 9 Wend., N.Y., 346; Ordway v. Remington, 12 R.I. 319, 34 Am.Rep. 646. But a promise made November lst, 1811, and sued November lst, 1817, was held barred by statute of limitation; Presbrey v. Williams, 15 Mass. 193. Where an act was to be done in a given number of days from the time of the contract, the day on which the con-tract was made was included; Brown v. Buzan, 24 Ind. 194; but if the contract merely says in so may days it means so many days from the day of date, and that is excluded; Blake v. Crowninshield, 9 N.H. 304. A fire policy from one given date to another includes the last day; whether the first is included was not decided; L.R. 5 Exch. 296. In most cases when something is required to be done in a given time from the day on which an event has happened, that day is excluded, as in case of proving claims against the estate of a decedent or insolvent; Weeks v. Hull, 19 Conn. 376, 50 Am.Dec. 249; enrolling deeds, alter execu-tion; Seaweil v. Williams, 5 Hayw., Tenn., 283; appeal from arbitrators, afterward; Browne v. Browne, 3 S. R., Pa., 496; issuing a scire lacias to revive a judgment, atter entry; Appeal of Green, 6 W. & S., Pa., 327; the time en execution runs, after its date; Homan v. Llswell, 6 Cow., N.Y., 659; redemption from execution sale; id. 518; allowing appeal from a justice; Ex parte Dean, 2 Cow., N.Y., 605, 14 Am.Dec. 521. The principie is thus well expressed. When time is to be competed from a particular day or a particular event, as when an act is to be performed within a specified period from or after a day named, that day is excluded and the last day included; Sheets v. Selden, 2 Wall., U.S., 177, 17 L.Ed. 822. But it was held that in considering the question of barring a writ of error, the day of the decree is included; Chiles v. Smith’s Heirs, 13 B.Monr., Ky., 460. Six months from testator’s death allowed a legatee to give security not to marry, are exclusive of that day; 15 Ves. 248.
Whenever they are used with respect to places it is said that "from," "to," and "at" are taken inclusively accord-ing to the subject-matter; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343, 23 L.Ed. 428 (fixing the termines of a railroad under an act of congress). From an object to an object in a deed excludes the termines referred te; Bonney v. Mor-rill, 52 Me. 252; State v. Bushey, 84 Me. 459, 24 A. 940. From place to place means from one place in a town to another in the same town; Com. v. Inhabitants of Cam-bridge, 7 Mass. 158; Com. v. Waters, 11 Gray, Mass., 81. From a street means from any part of it according to cir-cumstances; City of Pittsburg v. Ciuley, 74 Pa. 259. From a town is not always and indeed is seldom exclusive of the place named; it generally means from some indefinite place within the town; Chesapeake & 0. Canal Co. v. Key, 3 Cra.C.C. 599, 606, Fed.Cas.No.2,649. Authority in a railroad charter to construct a railroad from a city to another point gives power to construct the road from any point within the city; Hazlehurst v. Freeman, 52 Ga. 244; contra North-Eastern R. Co. v. Payne, 8 Rich.L., S.C., 177. Hut from a town to another in an indictment for transpor-tation of liquor does not charge it as done within the town; State v. Bushey, 84 Me. 459, 24 A. 940. To construe rea-sonably the expression a road from a village to a creek within the same village, in a statute, requires that it be taken inclusively; Smith v. Helmer, 7 Barb., N.Y., 416. Salling from a pert means out of it; U. S. v. La Coste, 2 Mass. 129, Fed.Cas.No.15,548.
Descent from a parent cannot be construed to mean through a parent, it must be immediate, from ethe persondesIgnated; Gardner v. Colllns, 2 Pet., U.S., 58, 86, 7 L.Ed.
347; but the words from the pont of the father include a aeseent, either immediately from the father or from any person in the line of the father; Shippen v. Izard, 1 S. & R., Pa., 222.
From the loading in a marine policy ordinarily means that the risk is covered after the goods are on board, but this meaning may be qualified by any words in the policy indicating a different intention, 16 East 240; L.R. 7 Q.B. 580, 702.
From day to day, in reference to adjournments, usually means to the next day but, under a statute authorizing the adjournment of a sale from day to day, a sale is good if made by adjournment to a day, certain, which did not immediately succeed the first, Burns v. Lyon, 4 Watts, Pa., 363. From henceforth in a lease means from the delivery; 5 Co. 1; so also does one from March 25th last past (the execution being March 25th); 4 B. & C. 272; or one from an impossible date (as February 30th), or no date, but if it has a sensible date, the word date in other parts of it means date, not delivery; 4 B. & C. 908.
FROM ONE PLACE TO ANOTHER. From prem-ises owned by one person to premises owned by another person in some legal subdivision or from one legal subdivision to another. Liquor Trans-portation Cases, 140 Tenn. 582, 205 S.W. 423, 426; Ready v. State, 155 Tenn. 15, 290 S.W. 28, 29; State v. White, 111 Kan. 196, 206 P. 903, 904.
FROM PERSON. Includes taking from presence of person assaulted as well as taking of property in actual contact with person of one robbed. Peo-ple v. Kubish, 357 Ill. 531, 192 N.E. 543, 545.
FROM, THROUGH, OR UNDER. The term re-fers to origin or devolution of property, and un-less some title to or interest therein has been derived by assignment or otherwise from party adverse to decedent’s estate, statute barring testi-mony is inapplicable. In re Iwers’ Estate, 225 Iowa 389, 280 N.W. 579, 582.
FROM TIME TO TIME. Occasionally, at inter-vals, now and then. Spade v. Hawkins, 60 Ind. App. 388, 110 N.E. 1010, 1012. See From.
FRONT. Forepart, as opposed to the back or rear. State v. Read, 162 Iowa, 572; 144 N.W. 310, 311; Howland v. Andrus, 81 N.J.Eq. 175, 86 A. 391, 393.
Any side or face of a building 1s a front, although the word is more commonly used to denote the entrance side. In re McInerney, 47 Wyo. 258, 34 P.2d 35, 43. As applied to a bare lot, it is that side of lot towards which, in ordi-nary circumstances, house, when built, will most likely face, and very general usage of building houses with their main entrance toward shorter street line results in common understanding that this is side intended when front of lot is referred to. Rhinehart v. Leitch, 107 Conn. 400, 140 A. 763.
FRONT FOOT. As respects assessment, synony-mous with "abutting foot." Moberly v. Hogan, 131 Mo. 19, 32 S.W. 1014.
The rata of assessment is obtained by having the total cost of the work divided by the total number of square feet of paving done under the contract; and the quotient multiplied by one-hall of the number of linear feet in the width of the pavement opposite the property Unes. City of Crowley v. Police Jury of Acadia Parish, 138 La. 488, 70 So. 487, 488.
FRONT—FOOT RULE. One by which cost of im-provement is to be apportioned among several properties in proportion to their frontage on im-provement and without regard to benefits con-ferred. Davy v. McNeill, 31 N.M. 7, 240 P. 482, 488.
FRONTAGE, FRONTAGER. Frontage denotes line of property on street. Smidt v. McKee, 262 N.Y. 373, 186 N.E. 869, 870. Extent of front along road or street. Tzeses v. Barbahenn, 125 N.J.L. 643, 17 A.2d 539, 540. Space available for erection of buildings, and does not include cross streets or space occupied by sidewalk or any ornamental spaces in plat between sidewalks and curb. Wal-lace v. Kramer, 296 Mich. 680, 296 N.W. 838, 842.
In English law a frontager is a person owning or occupy-ing land which abuts on a highway, river, seashore, or the like. The term is generally used with reference to the lia-bility of frontagers on, streets to contribute towards the expense of paving, draihing, or other works on the high-way carried out by a local authority, in proportion to the frontage of their respective tenements. Sweet.
The term is also in a similar sense in American law, the expense of local improvements made by municipal corpo-rations (such as paving. curbing, and sewering) being gen-erally assessed on abutting property owners in proportion to the "frontage" of their lots on the street or highway, and an assessment so levied being called a "frontage assess-ment." Neenan v. Smith, 50 Mo. 531; Lyon v. Tonawanda, C.C.N.Y., 98 F. 366; City of Youngstown v. Fishel, 89 Ohio St. 247, 104 N.E. 141, 143, 50 L.R.A.,N.S., 921, Ann.Cas. 1915D, 1073; Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. Kamradt, 319 III. 51, 149 N.E. 538, 539.
FRONTING AND ABUTTING. Very of ten, "fronting" signifies abutting, adjoining, or border-ing on, depending largely on the context. Rom-bauer v. Compton Heights Christian Church, 328 Mo. 1, 40 S.W.2d 545, 551. As used in statutes relating to assessment for improvements, prop-erty between which and the improvement there is no intervening land. Oklahoma Ry. Co. v. Severns Paving Co., 67 Okl. 206, 170 P. 216-218, 10 A.L.R. 157; Flynn v. Chiappari, 191 Cal. 139, 215 P. 682, 686.
FRONTIER. In international law, that portion of the territory of any country which lies close along the border line of another country, and so "fronts" or faces it. The term means something more than the boundary line itself, and includes a tract or strip of country, of indefinite extent, con-tiguous to the line. Stoughton v. Mott, 15 Vt. 169.
FROZEN SNAKE. A term used to impute ingrati-tude and held libelous, the court taking judicial notice of its meaning without an innuendo. 12 Ad. & El. 624.
FRUCTUARIUS. Lat. In the civil law, one who had the usufruct of a thing; i. e., the use of the fruits, profits, or increase, as of land or animals. Inst. 2, 1, 36, 38. Bracton applies it to a lessee, fermor, or farmer of land, or one who held lands ad firmam, for a farm or term. Bract. fol. 261.
FRUCTUS. Lat. In the civil law, fruit, fruits; produce; profit or increase; the organic produc-tions of a thing.
The right to the fruits of a thing belonging to another.
The compensation which a man receives from another for the use or enjoyment of a thing, such as interest or rent. See Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 167; Inst. 2, 1, 35, 37; Dig. 7, 1, 33; Id. 5, 3, 29; Id. 22, 1, 34.
FRUCTUS AUGENT WEREDITATEM. The yearly increase goes to enhance the inheritance. Dig. 5, 3, 20, 3.
FRUCTUS CIVILES. All revenues and recom-penses which, though not fruits, property speak-ing, are recognized as such by the law. The term includes such things as the rents and income of real property, interest on money loaned, and an-nuities. Civ.Code La. 1900, art. 545.
FRUCTUS FUNDL The fruits (produce or yield) of land.
FRUCTUS INDUSTRIALES. Industrial fruits, or fruits of industry. Those fruits of a thing, as of land, which are produced by the labor and industry of the occupant, as crops of grain; as distinguished from such as are produced solely by the powers of nature. Emblements are so called in the common law. 2 Steph. Comm. 258; 1 Chit. Gen. Pr. 92. Sparrow v. Pond, 49 Minn. 412, 52 N.W. 36, 16 L.R.A. 103, 32 Am.St.Rep. 571; Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co. v. Weinberg, 44 Idaho 332, 257 P. 31, 33, 54 A.L.R. 1527. Annual crops obtained by yearly labor and cultivation. Koerner v. Wilson, 85 Colo. 140, 274 P. 737, 738, 63 A.L.R. 227.
FRUCTUS LEGIS. The fruit of the law, i. e. execution.
FRUCTUS NATURALES. Those products which are produced by the powers of nature alone; as wool, metals, milk, the young of animals. Spar-row v. Pond, 49 Minn. 412, 52 N.W. 36, 16 L.R.A. 103, 32 Am.St.Rep. 571; Clark v. Strohbeen, 190 Iowa 989, 181 N.W. 430, 433, 13 A.L.R. 1419.
FRUCTUS PECUDUM. The produce or increase of flocks or herds.
FRUCTUS PENDENTES. Hanging fruits; those not severed. The fruits united with the thing which produces them. These form a part of the principal thing.
FRUCTUS PENDENTES PARS FUNDI VIDEN-TUR. Hanging fruits make part of the land. Dig. 6, 1, 44; 2 Bouv. Inst. no. 1578.
FRUCTUS PERCEPTOS VILLM NON ESSE CONSTAT. Gathered fruits do not make a part of the farm. Dig. 19, 1, 17, 1; 2 Bouv. Inst. no. 1578.
FRUCTUS REI ALIENE. The fruits of anoth-er’s property; fruits taken from another’s estate.
FRUCTUS SEPARATI. Separate fruits; the fruits of a thing when they are separated from it. Dig. 7, 4, 13.
FRUGES. In the civil law, anything produced from vines, underwood, chalk-pits, stone-quarries. Dig. 50, 16, 77.
Grains and leguminous vegetables. In a more restricted sense, any esculent growing in pods. Vicat, Voc. Jur.; Calvin.
FRUIT. The produce of a tree or plant which contains the seed or is used for food. Klas v. Kuehl, 159 Wis. 561, 150 N.W. 973, 975.
This term, in legal acceptation, is not confined to the produce of those trees which in popular language are called "fruit trees," but applies also to the produce of oak, elm, and walnut trees. Bullen v. Denning, 5 Barn. & C. 847.
Fruit fallen. The produce of any possession de-tached therefrom, and capable of being enjoyed by itself. Thus, a next presentation, when a va-caney has occurred, is a fruit fallen from the ad-vowson. Wharton.
FRUITS, FRUITS OF THE LAND. In replevy bond, "fruits" includes natural accession to live-stock. Southern Surety Co. v. Adams, Tex.Civ. App., 278 S.W. 943, 946. Includes the increase and the clip of replevied goats and sheep; "offspring" and "that which is produced." Southern Surety Co. v. Adams, 119 Tex. 489, 34 S.W.2d 789, 798. The right of a possessor to "fruits of the land" does not permit possessor to extract mineral oil and gas from land. Elder v. Ellerbe, 135 La. 990, 66 So. 337.
Civil fruits, in the civil law, (fructus civiles) are such things as the rents and income of real property, the interest on money loaned, and an-nuities. Civ.Code La. art. 545. Rents and reve-nues of an immovable. Posey v. Fargo. 187 La. 122, 174 So. 175, 179.
Natural fruits. The produce of the soil, or of fruit-trees, bushes, vines, etc., which are edible or otherwise useful or serve for the reproduction of their species. The term is used in contradistinc-tion to "artificial fruits," i. e., such as by metaphor or analogy are likened to the fruits of the earth. Of the latter, interest on money is an example. See Civ.Code La. art. 545.
FRUITS OF CRIME. In the law of evidence. material objects acquired by means and in con-sequence of the commission of crime, and some-times constituting the subject-matter of the crime. Burrill, Circ. Ev. 445; 3 Benth. Jud. Ev. 31.
FRUMENTA QU’E SATA SUNT SOLO CEDERE INTELLIGUNTUR. Grain which is sown is un-derstood to form a part of the soil. Inst. 2, 1, 32.
FRUMENTUM. In the civil law, grain. That which grows in an ear. Dig. 50, 16, 77.
FRUMGYLD. Sax. The first payment made to the kindred of a slain person in recompense for his murder. Blount.
FRUCTUS STANTES. Standing fruits; those not yet severed from the stalk or stem.
FRUMSTOLL. Sax. In Saxon law, a chief seat, or mansion house. Cowell.FRUSCA TERRA. In old records, uncultivated and desert ground. 2 Mon. Angl. 327; Cowell.
FRUSSURA. A breaking; plowing. Cowell.
FRUSTRA. Lat. Without effect, in vain, to no purpose, uselessly; without reason or cause, groundlessly; in error. Harpers’ Lat. Dict.
FRUSTRA AGIT QUI JUDICIUM PROSEQUI NEQUIT CUM EFFECTU. He sues to no pur-pose who cannot prosecute his judgment with ef-fect, [who cannot have the fruits of his judg-ment.] Fleta, lib. 6, c. 37, § 9.
FRUSTRA [VANA] EST POTENTIA QUZE NUN-QUAM VENIT IN ACTUM. That power is to no purpose which never comes into act, or which is never exercised. 2 Coke, 51.
FRUSTRA EXPECTATUR EVENTUS CUJUS EF-FECTUS NULLUS SEQUITUR. An event is vain-ly expected from which no effect follows.
FRUSTRA FERUNTUR LEGES NISI SUBDITIS ET OBEDIENTIBUS. Laws are made to no pur-pose, except for those that are subject and obedi-ent. Branch, Princ.
FRUSTRA FIT PER PLURA, QUOD FIERI PO-TEST PER PAUCIORA. That is done to no pur-pose by many things which can be done by fewer. Jenk.Cent. p. 68, case 28. The employment of more means or instruments for effecting a thing than are necessary is to no purpose.
FRUSTRA LEGIS AUXILIUM INVOCAT [QU1ERIT] QUI IN LEGEM COMMITTIT. He vainly invokes the aid of the law who trans-gresses the law. Fleta, lib. 4, c. 2, § 3; 2 Hale, P.C. 386; Broom, Max. 279, 297.
FRUSTRA PETIS QUOD MOX ES RESTITUR-US. In vain you ask that which you will have immediately to restore. 2 Kames, Eq. 104; 5 Man. & G. 757.
FRUSTRA PETIS QUOD STATIM ALTERI RED-DERE COGERIS. Jenk.Cent. 256. You ask in vain that which you might immediately be com-pelled to restore to another.
FRUSTRA PROBATUR QUOD PROBATUM NON RELEVAT. That is proved to no purpose which, when proved, does not help. Halk.Lat.Max. 50.
FRUSTRATION. Where, from nature of contract and surrounding circumstances, parties from be-ginning must have known it could not be fulfilled unless, when time thereof arrived, some particular condition continued to exist, under doctrine of "frustration", in absence of warranty that such condition of things shall exist, contract is to be construed as subject to implied condition that par-ties shall be excused in case, before breach, per-formance becomes impossible or purpose frus-trated from such condition ceasing to exist with-out default of either. Johnson v. Atkins, 53 Cal. App.2d 430, 127 P.2d 1027, 1028, 1029, 1030.
FRUSTRUM TERRJE. A piece or parcel of land lying by itself. Co.Litt. 5b.FRUTECTUM. In old records, a place overgrown with shrubs and bushes. Spelman; Blount.
FRUTOS. In Spanish law, fruits; products; pro-duce; grains; profits. White, New Recop. b. 1, tit. 7, c. 5, § 2.
FRYIVIITIL In old English law, the affording har-bor and entertainment to any one.
FRYTHE. Sax. In old English law, a plain be-tween woods. Co.Litt. 5b.
An arm of the sea, or a strait between two, lands. Cowell.
FUAGE, FOUAGE, or FEUAGE. Hearth money. A tax laid upon each fire-place or hearth. An im-position of a shilling for every hearth, levied by Edward III. in the dukedom of Aquitaine. Spel-man; 1 Bl.Comm. 324.
FUER. In old English law, fiight. It is of two kinds: (1) Fuer in fait, or in facto, where a per-son does apparently and corporally flee; (2) fuer in ley, or in lege, when, being called in the coanty court, he does not appear, which legal interpreta-tion makes flight. Wharton.
FUERO. In Spanish law, a law; a code.
A general usage or custom of a province, hav-ing the force of law. Strother v. Lucas, 12 Pet. 446, 9 L.Ed. 1137. Ir contra fuero, to violate a re-ceived custom.
A grant of privileges and immunities. Conceder fueros, to grant exemptions.
A charter granted to a city or town. Also desig-nated as "cartas pueblas."
An act of donation made to an individual, a church, or convent, on certain conditions.
A declaration of ‘a magistrate, in relation to tax-ation, fines, etc.
A charter granted by the sovereign, or those having authority from him, establishing the fran-chises of towns, cities, etc.
A place where justice is administered.
A peculiar Forum, before which a party is amen-able.
The jurisdiction of a tribunal, which is entitled to take cognizance of a cause; as fuero ecclesiasti-co, fuero militar. See Schm.Civil Law, Introd. 64.
FUERO DE CASTILLA. The body of laws and customs which formerly governed the Castilians.
FUERO DE CORREOS Y CAMINOS. A special tribunal taking cognizance of all matters relating to the post-office and roads.
FUERO DE GUERRA. A special tribunal taking cognizance of all matters in relation to persons serving in the army.
FUERO DE MARINA. A special tribunal taking cognizance of all matters relating to the navy and to the persons employed therein.FUERO JUZGO. The Forum Judicium; a code of laws established in the seventh century for the Visigothic kingdom in Spain. Some of its princi-pies and rules are found surviving in the modern jurisprudence of that country. Schm.Civil Law, Introd. 28.
FUERO MUNICIPAL. The body of laws granted to a city or town for its government and the ad-ministration of justice.
FUERO REAL. The title of a code of Spanish law promulgated by Alphonso the Learned, (el Sabio,) A.D. 1255. It was the precursor of the Partidas. Schm.Civil Law, Introd. 67.
FUERO VIEJO. The title of a compilation of Spanish law, published about A.D. 992. Schm. Civil Law, Introd. 65.
FUGA CATALLORUM. In old English law. A drove of cattle. Blount.
FUGACIA. A chase. Blount.
FUGAM FECIT. Lat. He has made flight; he fled. A clause inserted in an inquisition, in old English law, meaning that a person indicted for treason or felony had fled. The effect of this is to make the party forfeit his goods absolutely, and the profits of his Lands until he has been pardoned or acquitted.
FUGATOR. In old English law, a privilege to hunt. Blount.
A driver. Fugatores carrucarum, drivers of wagons. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 78.
FUGITATE. In Scotch practice, to outlaw by the sentence of a court; to outlaw for non-appear-anee in a criminal case. 2 Mis. Crim. Pr. 350.
FUGITATION. When a criminal does not obey the citation to answer, the court pronounces sen-tence of fugitation against him, which induces a forfeiture of goods and chattels to the crown.
FUGITIVE. One who flees; always used in law with the implication of a flight, evasion, or escape from some duty or pehálty or from the conse-quences of a misdeed.
FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE. A person who, hav-ing committed a crime, flees from jurisdiction of court where crime was committed or departs from his usual place of abode and conceals himself within the district. United States ex rel. Demarois v. Farrell, C.C.A.Minn., 87 F.2d 957, 960. State v. Clough, 71 N.H. 594, 53 A. 1086, 67 L.R.A. 946; People v. Hyatt, 172 N.Y. 176, 64 N.E. 825, 60 L.R. A. 774, 92 Am.St.Rep. 706.
To be regarded as a "fugitive from justice," it is not necessarY that one shall have left the state for the very purpose of avoiding prosecution; it being sufficient that, having committed there an act constituting a crime, he afterwards has departed from its jurisdiction, and when sought to be prosecuted is found in another state. Bogan v. O’Ne111, 255 U.S. 52, 41 S.Ct. 222, 65 L.Ed. 497; People ex rel. Gottschalk v. Brown, 237 N.Y. 483, 143 N.E. 653, 654, 32 A.L.R. 1164; State v. Hayes, 162 La. 917, 111 So. 327, 329 (one who did not See).No matter for what purpose or with what motive or under what belief he leaves state, and even though at time of leaving he had no belief he had violated criminal laws ami did not contemplate fieeing from justice to avoid prose-cution for crime with which he is charged. Ex parte Mor-ris, 131 Tex.Cr.R. 596, 101 S.W.2d 259.
FUGITIVE OFFENDERS. In English law, where a person accused of any offense punishable by im-prisonment, with hard labor for twelve months or more, has left that part of his majesty’s domin-ions where the offense is alleged to have been committed, he is fiable, if found in any other part of his majesty’s dominions, to be apprehended and returned in manner provided by the fugitive offenders’ act, 1881, to the part from which he is a fugitive. Wharton.
FUGITIVE OIL. Oil escaping from well which was out of control and fiowing down creek to point 10 or 12 miles below the well where it was picked up was "fugitive" or "waste oil" and be-longed to the first taker who might reduce it te his possession. Linkenhoger v. Brown, Tex.Civ. App., 128 S.W.2d 163, 164.
FUGITIVE SLAVE. One who, held in bondage, flees from his master’s power.
FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW. An act of congress passed in 1793 (and also one enacted in 1850) pro-viding for the surrender and deportation of slaves who escaped from their masters and fled into the territory of another state, generally a "free" state.
FUGITIVE’S GOODS. Under the old English Law, where a man fled for felony, and escaped, his own goods were not forfeited as bona fugitivorum until it was found by proceedings of record (e. g. bef ore the coroner in the case of death) that he fled for the felony. Foxley’s Case, 5 Co. 109 a.
FUGITIVUS. In the civil law, a fugitive; a runa-way slave. Dig. 11, 4; Cod. 6, 1. See the various definitíons of this word in Dig. 21, 1, 17.
FUGUES. Fr. In medical jurísprudence. Am-bulatory automatism. See Automatism.
FULL. Abundantly provided, sufficient in quanti-ty or degree, complete, entire, and detailed. City of Orlando v. Evans, 132 Fla. 609, 182 So. 264, 268. Having no open space. In re California Land Buyers Syndicate, D.C.Cal., 22 F.Supp. 183, 186. Ample; perfect; mature; not wanting in any es-sential quality. Mobile School Com’rs v. Putnam, 44 Ala. 537; McCrary v. McCrary, Tex.Civ.App., 230 S.W. 187, 207.
FULL AGE. The age of legal majority, twenty-one years at common law, twenty-five in the civil law. 1 Bl.Comm. 463; Inst. 1, 23, pr.
FULL ANSWER. In pleading, a complete and meritorious answer, not wanting in any essential requisite. Frizell v. Northern Trust Co. of Chi-cago, Ill., 144 Kan. 481, 61 P.2d 1344, 1345, 1346.
FULL BLOOD. Relations of the "full blood," "whole blood," or "entire blood" are those derived not only from the same ancestor, but from thesame couple of ancestors. In re Skidmore’s Es-tate, 148 Misc. 569, 266 N.Y.S. 312.
Brothers and sisters of full blood are those who are born of the same father and mother, or, as Justinian calls them, "ex utroque parente conjuncti." Nov. 118, cc. 2, 3; Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 145. The more usual term In modern law is "whole blood" (q. y.).
FULL COPY. In equity practice, a complete and unabbreviated transcript of a bill or other plead-ing, with all indorsements, and including a copy of all exhibits. Finley v. Hunter, 2 Strob. Eq., S. C., 210, note.
FULL COURT. In practice, a court in banc. A court duly organized with all the judges present.
Court containing permissible complement of judges, as distinguished from a quorum of two. Textile Mills Securities Corporation v. Commis-sioner of Internal Revenue, 314 U.S. 326, 62 S.Ct. 272, 277, 86 L.Ed. 249.
FULL COUSIN. Son or daughter of one’s uncle or aunt. Culver v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 120 Conn. 97, 179 A. 487, 489, 99 A.L.R. 663.
FULL COVENANTS. See Covenant.
FULL DEFENSE. In pleading, the formula of defense in a plea, stated at length and without abbreviation, thus: "And the said C. D., by E. F., his attorney, comes and defencis the force (or wrong) and injury when and where it shall be-hoove him, and the damages, and whatsoever else he ought to defend, and says," etc. Steph. Pl. p. 481.
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT. "Full faith and credit" clause of Const. U. S. art. 4, § 1, requires that foreign judgment be given such faith and credit as it had by law or usage of state of its origin. First Nat. Bank v. Terry, 103 Cal.App. 501, 285 P. 336, 337. That foreign statutes are to have force and effect to which they are entitled in home state. Flahive v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co., 131 Misc. 586, 227 N.Y.S. 587, 588. And that a judg-ment or record shall have the same faith, credit, conclusive effect, and obligatory force in other states as it has by law or usage in the state from whence taken. Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 302, 18 L.Ed. 475; McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 326, 10 L.Ed. 177; Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Phila-dephia v. Gold Issue Min. & Mill. Co., 243 U.S. 93, 37 S.Ct. 344, 61 L.Ed. 610.
FULL HEARING. Embraces not only the right to present evidence, but also a reasonable oppor-tunity to know the claims of the opposing party, and to meet them. Morgan v. U. S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct. 773, 776, 777, 82 L.Ed. 1129.
One in which ample opportunity is afforded to all parties to make, by evidence and argument, a showing fairly ade-guate to establish the propriety or impropriety from the standpoint of justice and law of the step asked ro be taken. Akron, C. & Y. Ry. Co. v. U. S., 261 U.S. 184, 43 S.Ct. 270, 67 L.Ed. 605; State v. Hunt, 137 Tenn. 243, 192 S.W. 931, 932.
FULL INDORSEMENT. See Indorsement.
FULL JURISDICTION. Complete jurisdiction over a given subject-matter or Class of actions (as,
Black’s Law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed.-51in equity) without any exceptions or reservations. Bank of Mississippi v. Duncan, 52 Miss. 740.
FULL LIFE. Life in fact and in law. See In Full Life.
FULL—PAID STOCK. Stock on which no further payments can be demanded by the issuing com-pany. Middleton y. Wooster, 184 App.Div. 165, 171 N.Y.S. 593, 595.
FULL PARTICULARS. Where contract of in-surance requires giving "full particulars" of an accident as a condition precedent to liability, un-necessary details are not required, but only such as enables insurer to determine, whether a claim was likely to be made, and the insured was not required to make an exhaustive investigation of all the attendant circumstances or decide what the facts were on conflicting evidence. Silberstein v. Vellerman, 241 Mass. 80, 134 N.E. 395, 397.
FULL POWERS. A document issued by the gov-ernment of a state empowering its diplomatic agent to conduct special business with a foreign government.
FULL PROOF. In the civil law, proof by two wit-nesses, or a public instrument. Hallifax, Civil Law, b. 3, c. 9, nn. 25, 30; 3 Bl.Comm. 370. Evi-dence which satisfies the minds of the jury of the truth of the fact in dispute, to the entire exclusion of every reasonable doubt. Kane v. Hibernia Mut. F. Ins. Co., 38 N.J.L. 450, 20 Am.Rep. 409.
FULL RIGHT. The union of a good title with ac-tual possession.
FULLSETTLEMENT. Implies an adjustment of all pending matters, the mutual release of all prior obligations existing between the parties. Hickox v. Hickox, Tex.Civ.App., 151 S.W.2d 913, 918.
FULL1UM AQWE. A fleam, or stream of water. Blount.
FULLY ADMINISTERED. The English equiva-lent of the Latin phrase "plene administravit;" being a plea by an executor or administrator that he has completely and legally disposed of all the assets of the estate, and has nothing left out of which a new claim could be satisfied. See Ryans v. Boogher, 169 Mo. 673, 69 S.W. 1048.
FUMAGE. In old English law, the same as fuage, or smoke farthings. 1 Bl.Comm. 324. See Fuage.
FUNCTION. Derived from Latin "functus," the past participle of the verb "fungor" which means to perform, execute, administer. McNamara v. Powell, Sup., 52 N.Y.S.2d 515, 551.
The nature and proper action of anything; ac-tivity appropriate to any business or profession. Rosenblum v. Anglim, D.C.CaI., 43 F.Supp. 889, 892.
Office; duty; fulfillment of a definite end or set of ends by the correct adjustment of means. The occupation of an office. By the performance of its duties, the officer is said to fill his function.Dig. 32, 65, 1. State y. Hyde, 121 Ind. 20, 22 N.E. 644. The proper activities or duties of munici-pality. Sean v. City of Knoxville, 180 Tenn. 448, 175 S.W.2d 954, 955.
FUNCTIONAL CLAIM. One which claims func-tion. In re Tucker, Cust. & Pat. App., 46 F.2d 214, 216. See Claim.
FUNCTIONAL DEPRECIATION. Results from necessary replacement of equipment before it is worn out, by reason of invention and improved appliances which render more efficient and satis-factory service. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Grand Rapids, G. H. & M. Ry. Co., D.C.Mich., 7 F.Supp. 511, 521.
FUNCTIONAL DISEASE. In medical jurispru-dence, one which prevents, obstructs, or interferes with the due performance of its special functions by any organ of the body, without anatomical de-fect or abnormality in the organ itself. See Hig-bee v. Guardian Mut. L. Ins. Co., 66 Barb., N.Y. 472. Distinguished from "organic" disease, which is due to some injury to, or lesion or malforma-tion in, the organ in question.
FUNCTIONARY. A public offlcer or employee. An officer of a private corporation is also some-times so called.
Functus officio. Lat. A task performed. Board of School Trustees of Washington City Adminis-trative Unit v. Benner, 222 N.C. 566, 24 S,E.2d 259, 263.
Having fulfilled the functlon, dIscharged the calce, or accomplished the purpose, and therefore of no further force or authorlty. Applled to an ofilcer whose term has expired, and who has consequently no further official authority; and also to an lnstrument, power, agency, etc., which has fulfilled the purpose of lts creation, and is therefore of no further virtue or effect. Blantón Banking Co. v. Taliaferro, Tex.Civ.App., 262 S.W. 196.
FUND, v. To capitalize with a view to the pro-duction of interest. Stephen v. Milnor, 24 N.J. Eq. 376. Also, to put into the form of bonds, stocks, or other securities, bearing regular in-terest, and to provide or appropriate a fund or permanent revenue for the payment thereof. Mer-rill v. Monticello, C.C.Ind., 22 F. 596. City of Long Beach v. Lisenby, 180 Cal. 52, 179 P. 198, 201.
To fund a debt is to pledge a specific fund to keep down the interest and reduce the principal.
Funded debt. As applied to states or municipal corno-rations, a funded debt is one for the payment of which (interest and principal) some fund is appropriated, either specifically, or by provision made for future taxation and the quasi pledging in advance of the public revenue. Ketchum v. Buffalo, 14 N.Y. 356; People v. Carpenter, 52 N.Y.S. 781, 31 App.Div. 603. As applied to the financial management of corporations (and sometimes of estates in course of administration or properties under receivership) funding means the borrowing of a sufficient sum of money to discharge a variety of floating or unsecured debts, or debts evidenced by notes or secured by bonds but maturing within a short time, and creating a new debt in lieu thereof, secured by a general mortgage, a series of bonds, or an issue of stock, generally maturing at a more remote period, and often at a lower rate of interest. The new debt thus substituted for the pre-existing debts is called the "funded debt." Ketchum v. Buffalo, 14 N.Y. 356; Lawrey v. Sterling, 41 Or. 518, 69 P. 460. This term is very seldom applied to the debts of a prívate Individual; but when soused it must be understood as referring to a debt embodied in securities of a permanent character and to the payment of which certain property has been applied or. pledged. Wells v. Wells, Super.N.Y., 24 N.Y.S. 874.
Funding system. The practice of borrowing money to defray the expenses of government, and creating a "sinking fund," designed to keep down interest, and to effect the gradual reduction of the principal debt. Merrill v. Monti-cello, C.C.Ind., 22 F. 596.
FUND, n. A generic term and all-embracing as compared with term "money," etc., which is spe-cific. Bivins V. State, 47 Ga.App. 391, 170 S.E. 513, 516.
A sum of money set apart for a specific pur-pose, or available for the payment of debts or claims. State v. Finney, 141 Kan. 12, 40 P.2d 411, 421.
In lts narrower and more usual sense, "fund" signifles "capital," as opposed to "lnterest" or "income;" as where we speak of a corporation funding the arrears of lnterest due on its bonds, or the llke, meantng that the lnterest is capitalized and made to bear interest in lts turn until it is repard. Sweet.
In the plural, this word has a variety of slight-ly different meanings, as follows:
Moneys and much more, such as notes, bilis, checks, drafts, stocks and bonds, and in broader meaning may include property of every kind. State v. Finney, 141 Kan. 12, 40 P.2d 411, 421.
Money in hand; assets; cash; money available for the payment of a debt, legacy, etc. Galena Ins. Co. v. Kupfer, 28 Ill. 335, 81 Am.Dec. 284; U. S. v. Jenks, D.C.Pa., 264 F. 697, 698; Johnson v. State, 37 Ga.App. 129, 139 S.E. 118, 119.
The proceeds of sales of real and personal es-tate, or the proceeds of any other assets convert-ed into money. Doane v. Insurance Co., 43 N.J. Eq. 533, 11 A. 739; Illinois Christian Missionary Soc. v. American Christian Missionary Soc., 277 Ill. 193, 115 N.E. 118, 120.
Corporate stocks or government securities; in this sense usually spoken of as the "funds."
Assets, securities, bonds, or revenue of a state or government appropriated for the discharge of its debts. State v. Hudson, 93 W.Va. 435, 117 S.E. 122, 126; Broadway Bank of St. Louis, Mo., v. McGee Creek Levee & Drainage Dist., 292 III. 560, 127 N.E. 165, 166; State v. Board of Education of Sharples Village School Dist, 114 Ohio St. 602, 151 N.E. 669, 670.
Current funda. Current money, whatever Is recelvable and current by law as money. Henderson v. Farmers’ Sav. Bank of Harper, 199 Iowa 496, 202 N.W. 259, 261; Feder v. Elliott, 198 Iowa 447, 199 N.W. 288, 289, 36 A.L.R. 1353.
General fund. This phrase, in New York, is a collective designation of all the assets of the state which furnish the means for the support of government and for defraying the discretionary appropriations of the legislature. People v. Orange County Sup’rs, 27 Barb., N.Y., 575, 588. It has also been used in Delaware in the messages of the governor and other state papers to distinguish such funds as are available in the hands of the state treasurer for general purposes from assets of a special character, such as the school fund.
General revenue fund. As used in connection with munfe-ipal finances, the usual, ordinary, running, and incidental expenses of a municipality. Atchison, T. & S. F. ny. Co. v. City of Topeka, 95 Kan. 747, 149 P. 697.
No funds. This term denotes a lack of assets or money for a specific use. It is the return made by a bank to a check drawn upon it by a person who has no deposit to his credit there; also by an executor, trustee, etc., who has no assets for the specific purpose.
Public funda. An untechnical name for (1) the revenue or money of a government, state, or municipal corporation; (2) the bonds, stocks, or other securities of a national or state government. Money, warrants, or bonds, or other paper having a money value, and belonging to the state, or to any county, city, incorporated town or school district. Crawford & Moses’ Dig. (Ark.) § 2835; Bank of Blythe-ville v. State, 148 Ark. 504, 230 S.W. 550, 553. The term applies to funds of every political subdivision of state wherein taxes are levied for public purposes. ./Etna Casu-alty & Surety Co. v. Bramwell, D.C.Or., 12 F.2d 307, 309.
Revolving fund. Usuaily, a renewable credit over a deflned period. In simple parlance it relates usually to a situation where a banker or merchant extends credit for a certain amount which can be paid off from time to time and then credit is again given not to exceed the same amount. It may also mean a fund, which, when reduced, is replen-ished by new funds from specified sources. U. S. v. Butter-worth-Judson Corporation, C.C.A.N.Y., 297 F. 971, 979.
Sinking fund. The aggregate of sums of money (as those arising from particular taxes or sources of revenue) set apart and invested, usually at fixed intervals, for the extin-guishment of the debt of A government or corporation, by the accumulation of interest, Elser v. Ft. Worth, Tex.Civ. App., 27 S.W. 740; Brooke v. Philadelphia, 162 Pa. 123, 29 A. 387, 24 L.R.A. 781. A fund arising from particular taxes, imposts, or duties, which is appropriated towards the payment of the interest due on a public loan and for the gradual payment of the principal. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Buffalo Co., 9 Neb. 453, 4 N.W. 53; Sidney Spitzer & Co. v. Commissioners of Franklin County, 188 N.C. 30, 123 S.E. 636, 639. A fund created for extinguishing or paying a funded debt. Ketchum v. Buffalo, 14 N.Y. 379, clted in Chicago & I. R. Co. v. Pyne, C.C.N.Y., 30 F. 89.
Sinking fund tax. A tax raised to be applied to the pay-ment of interest on, and principal of public loan. Sidney Spitzer & Co. v. Commissioners of Franklin County, 188 N.C. 30, 123 S.E. 636, 639; Union Pac. R. Co. v. York County, 10 Neb. 612, 7 N.W. 270.
FUNDAMENTAL ERROR. See Error.
FUNDAMENTAL LAW. The law which deter-mines the constitution of government in a state, and prescribes and regulates the manner of its exercise; the organic law of a state; the consti-tution.
FUNDAMUS. We found. One of the words by which a corporation may be created in England. 1 Bl.Comm. 473; 3 Steph.Comm. 173.
FUNDATIO. Lat. A founding or foundation. Particularly applied to the creation and endow-ment of corporations.
As applied to eleemosynary corporations such as colleges and hospitals, it is said that "fundatio incipiens" is the incorporation or grant of corporate powers, while "funda-tio perficiens" is the endowment or grant or gift of funds or revenues. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 667, 4 L.Ed. 629.
FUNDATOR. A founder (q. y.).
FUNDI PATRIMONIALES. Lands of inherit-ance.
FUNDI PUBLICI. Public lands. FUNDITORES. Pioneers. Jacob.
FUNDUS. In the civil and old English law, land; land or ground generally; land, without consid-ering its specific use; land, including buildings generally; a farm.FUNERAL EXPENSES. Money expended in pro-curing the interment, cremation, or other disposi-tion of a corpse, including suitable monument, per-petual tare of burial lot and entertainment of those participating in wake. Gooch v. Beasley, 137 Tenn. 407, 193 S.W. 132, 133; Nelson v. Schoon-over, 89 Kan. 388, 131 P. 147, 149; In re Bor-chardt’s Will, 184 Wis. 561, 200 N.W. 461, 464; Oster’s Ex’r v. Ohlman, 187 Ky. 341, 219 S.W. 187, 190; In re Gilehrist’s Estate, 110 N.J.Eq. 666, 128 A. 876.
FUNGIBLE THINGS. Movable goods which may be estimated and replaced according to weight, measure, and number. Things belonging to a class, which do not have to be dealt with in specie. Standard Bank of Canada v. Lowman, D.C.Wash., 1 F.2d 935, 940; Edwards v. Cleveland Mill & Pow-
er Co., 193 N.C. 780, 138 S.E. 131, 134, 53 A.L.R. 1404.
Those things one specimen of which is as good as another, as is the case with half-crowns, or pounds of rice of the same quality. Horses, slaves, and so forth, are non-fungible things, because they differ individually in value, and cannot be exchanged indifferently one for another. Holi.Jur. 88.
Where a thing which is the subject of an obligation (which one man is bound to deliver to another) must be delivered in specie, the thing is not fungible; that very individual thing, and not another thing of the same or another class, in lieu of it, must be delivered. Where the subject of the obligation is a thing of a given class, the thing is said to be fungible; i. e., the delivery of any object which answers to the generic description will satIsfy the terms of the obligation. Aust.Jur. 483, 484.
FUNGIBILES RES. Lat. In the civil law, fungi-ble things. See that title.
FUE. Lat. A thief. One who stole secretly or without force or weapons, as opposed to robber.
FUR MANIFESTUS. In the civil law, a manifest thief. A thief who is taken in the very act of stealing.
FURANDI ANIMUS. Lat. An intention of steal-ing.
FURCA. In old English law, a fork. A gallows or gibbet. Bract. fol. 56.
FURCA ET FLAGELLUM. Gallows and whip. Tenure ad furcam et flagellum, tenure by gallows and whip. The meanest of servile tenures, where the bondman was at the disposal of his lord for life and limb. Cowell.
FURCA ET FOSSA. Gallows and pit, or pit and gallows. A term used in ancient charters to sig-nify a jurisdiction of punishing thieves, viz., men by hanging, women by drowning. Spelman; Cowell.
FURIAN LAW. See Lex Furia Caninia. FURIGELDUM. A fine or mulct paid for theft.
FURIOSI NULLA VOLUNTAS EST. A madman has no will. Dig. 50, 17, 40; Broom, Max. 314.
FURIOSITY. In Scotch law, madness, as distin-guished from Iatuity or idiocy.FURIOSUS. Lat. An insane man; a madman; a lunatic.
FURIOSUS ABSENTIS LOCO EST. A madman is the same with an absent person, [that is, his presenze is of no effect.] Dig. 50, 17, 24, 1.
FURIOSUS NULLUM NEGOTIUM CONTRA-HERE POTEST. A madman can contract noth-ing, [can make no contract]. Dig. 50, 17, 5.
FURIOSUS SOLO FIJRORE PUNITUR. A mad-man is punished by his madness alone; that is, he is not answerable or punishable for his actions. Co.Litt. 247b; 4 Bl.Comm. 24, 396; Broom, Max. 15.
FURIOSUS STIPULARE NON POTEST NEC ALIQUID NEGOTIUM AGERE, QUI NON IN-TELLIGIT QUID AGIT. 4 Coke, 126. A madman who knows not what he does cannot make a bar-gain, nor transact any business.
FURLINGUS. A turlong, or a furrow one-eighth part of a mile long. Co.Litt. 5b.
FURLONG. A measure of length, being forty poles, or one-eighth of a mile.
FURLOUGH. A leave of absence. Smith v. Sov-ereign Camp, W. O. W., 204 S.C. 193, 28 S.E.2d 808, 811. A temporary leave of absence to one in the armed service of the country, or to a govern- ment official or an employee, indicating some vol-untary act on part of employee as contrasted with the phrase "lay-off" which contemplates action by employer. Jones v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 156 Pa.Super. 156, 39 A.2d 721, 725. Also the docu-ment granting leave of absence.
In United States army furloughs are given only to enlisted men, officers being given leaves of absence. In United States navy furlough is an extended leave of absence, or a suspension from duty by an executive order, on hall leave-of-absence pay, given only to an officer. A permit or passport. As a transitive verb, it means "to grant a furlough to; broadly, to allow leave of absence to." Ex parte Roach, D.C.Ala., 244 F. 625, 628.
FURNAGE. See Fornagium; Four.
FURNISH. To supply or provide. Talbott v. Caudill, 58 S.W.2d 385, 248 Ky. 146. For use in the accomplishment of a particular purpose. Wil-liam M. Graham Oil & Gas Co. v. Oil Well Supply Co., 128 Okl. 201, 264 P. 591, 599. Implying some degree of active effort to accomplish the designat-ed end. In re Opinion of the Justices, Mass., 304 Mass. 172, 14 N.E.2d 392, 393, 115 A.L.R. 1158. To provide for, to provide what is necessary for, to give, or afford. Juno v. Northland Elevator Co., 56 N.D. 223, 216 N.W. 562, 563. Equip synony-mous. State ex rel. Davis v. Barber, 139 Fla. 706, 190 So. 809. To deliver, whether gratuitously or otherwise. Delp v. Brewing Co., 123 Pa. 42, 15 A. 871; Wyatt v. Larimer & W. Irr. Co., 1 Colo. App. 480, 29 P. 906. As used in the liquor laws, "furnish" means to provide in any way, and in-eludes giving as well as selling. State v. Free-man, 27 Vt. 520; State v. Tague, 76 Vt. 118, 56 A. 535; Creel v. U. S., C.C.A.Okl., 21 F.2d 690; In re American Lime Co., D.C.Tenn., 201 F. 433, 434To supply or provide in any way other than by sale. State v. McDermott, 108 Vt. 58, 182 A. 191. 192.
FURNITURE. This term includes that which fur-nishes, or with which anything is furnished or supplied; whatever must be supplied to a house, a room, place of business, or public building or the like, to make it habitable, convenient, or agree-able ; goods, vessels, utensils, and other append-ages necessary or convenient for housekeeping; whatever is added to the interior of a house or apartment, for use or convenience. Bell v. Gold-ing, 27 Ind. 173; C. Ludwig Baumann & Co., Brooklyn, v. Manwit Corporation, 213 App.Div. 300, 207 N.Y.S. 437, 439; Fire Ass’n of Philadelphia v. Powell, Tex.Civ.App., 188 S.W. 47, 49; Smalley v. Dent County, Mo.Sup., 177 S.W. 620, 623.
The word comprehends only such furniture as is intended for use and ornament of apartments, but not libraries which happen to be there, nor plate. Civ.Code La. art. 477.
The term embraces everything about the house that has been usually enjoyed therewith, including plate, Unen, china, and pictures, rugs, draperies and furnishings. Endi-cott v. Endicott, 41 N.J.Eq. 96, 3 A. 157; In re Kathan’s Estate, 153 N.Y.S. 366, 368, 90 Misc.Rep. 540; Peckham v. Peckham, 97 N.J.Eq, 174, 127 A. 93. Readily movable ar-ticles which would be serviceable generally as household furniture. Farm & Home Savings & Loan Ass’n of Mis-souri v. Empire Furniture Co., Tex.Civ.App., 87 S.W.2d 1111, 1112.
Household furniture includes all personal chattels that may contribute to the use or convenience of the house-holder, or the ornament of the house; as plate, Unen, china, both useful and ornamental, and pictures. But goods in trade, books, and wines will not pass by a bequest of household furniture. 1 Rop. Leg. 203.
FURNITURE OF A SHIP. This term includes everything with which a ship requires to be fur-nished or equipped to make her seaworthy; it comprehends all articles furnished by ship chand-lers, which are almost innumerable. Weaver v. The S. G. Owens, 1 Wall.Jr. 369, Fed.Cas.No.17,310.
FURNIVAL’S INN. Formerly an hin of chan-cery. See Inns of Chancery.
FUROR BREVIS. A sudden transport of passion. Mosby v. Commonwealth, 168 Va. 688, 190 S.E. 152, 155.
FUROR CONTRAHI MATRIMONIUM NON SIN-IT, QUIA CONSENSU OPUS EST. Insanity pre-vents marriage from being contracted, because consent is needed. Dig. 23, 2, 16, 2; 1 Ves. & B. 140; 1 Bl.Comm. 439; Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns.Ch., N.Y., 343, 345.
FURST AND FONDUNG. In oíd English law, time to advise or take counsel. Jacob:
FURTA. A right derived from the king as su-preme lord of a state to try, condemn, and exe-cute thieves and felons within certain bounds or districts of an honour, manor, etc. Cowell seems to be doubtful whether this word should not read (urca, which means directly a gallows. Cowell; Holthouse, L.Dict.
FUR,THER. Not word of strict legal or technical import, and may be used to introduce negationor qualification of some precedent niatter, but generally when used as an adverb it is word of comparison, and means "additional," and is equiv-alent to "moreover, or furthermore, something be-yond what has been said or likewise, or also." Hollman v. Hollman, 88 Cal.App. 748, 264 P. 289, 290. Wider, or fuller, or something new. In re Andrus’ Will, 156 Misc. 268, 281 N.Y.S. 831. Occa-sionally it may mean any, future, or other. Lon-don & S. F. Bank v. Parrott, 125 Cal. 472, 58 P. 164, 73 Am.St.Rep. 64; Galpin v. City of Chicago, 269 III. 27, 109 N.E. 713, 717, L.R.A.1917B, 176; Smith v. Craig, 211 N.Y. 456, 105 N.E. 798, 800, Ann.Cas.1915B, 937.
FURTHER ADVANCE. A second or subsequent loan of money to a mortgagor by a mortgagee, either upon the same security as the original loan was advanced upon, or an additional security. Equity considers the arrears of interest on a mort-gage security converted into principal, by agree-ment between the parties, as a further advance. Wharton.
FURTILER ASSURANCE, COVENANT FOR. See Covenant.
FURTHER CONSIDERATION. In English prac-tice, upon a motion for judgment or application for a new trial, the court may, if it shall be of opinion that it has not sufficient materials before it to enable it to give judgment, direct the motion to stand over for further consideration, and di-rect such issues or questions to be tried or de-termined, and such accounts and inquiries to be taken and made, as it may think fit. Rules Sup. Ct. xl, 10.
FURTHER DIRECTIONS. Where a master made a separate report, or one not in pursuance of a decree or decretal order, a petition for consequen-tial directions had to be presented, since the cause could not be set down for further directions under such circumstances. See 2 Daniell, Ch.Pr. (5th Ed.) 1233, note.
FURTHER HEARING, or FURTHER PROCEED-INGS. In practice, hearing at another time; new trial; or other proceedings directed by appellate court. C. W. Hunt Co. v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 217 Mass. 319, 104 N.E. 728, 729; Morgan Es-gineering Co. v. Cache River Drainage Dist., 122 Ark. 491, 184 S.W. 57, 59. Not a new proceeding but rather a continuation of an existing proceed-ing. In re Mills’ Estate, 171 Misc. 42, 11 N.Y.S.2d 929, 932.
FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. Additional instruc-tions given to jury after they have once been in-structed and have retired. White v. Sharpe, 219 Mass. 393, 107 N.E. 56.
FURTHER MAINTENANCE OF ACTION, PLEA TO. A plea grounded upon some fact or facts which have arisen since the commencement of the suit, and which the defendant puts forward for the purpose of showing that the plaintiff should not further maintain his action. Brown.FURTHERANCE. Act of furthering, helping forward, promotion, advancement, or progress. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., 40 S.W.2d 913, 914.
FURTHERANCE OF BUSINESS OF EMEPLOY-ER. Discharge of duties of employment, as re-spects employer’s liability for employees’ torts. West v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 215 N.C. 211, 1 S.E. 2d 546, 548.
FURTIVE. In old English law, stealthily; by stealth. Fleta, lib. 1, c. 38, § 3.
FURTUM. Lat. Theft. The fraudulent appro-priation to one’s self of the property of another, with an intention to commit theft without the consent of the owner. Fleta, L 1, c. 36; Bract. fol. 150; 3 Inst. 107.
The thing which has been stolen. Bract. fol. 151.
FURTUM CONCEPTUM. In Roman law, the theft which was disclosed where, upon searching any one in the presence of witnesses in due form, the thing stolen was discovered in his possession.
FURTUM EST CONTRECTATIO REI ALIENZE FRAUDULENTA, CUM ANIMO FURANDI, IN-VITO ILLO DOMINO CUJUS RES ILLA FUER-AT. 3 Inst. 107. Theft is the fraudulent handling of another’s property, with an intention of steal-ing, against the will of the proprietor, whose prop-erty it was.
FURTUM GRAVE. In Scotch law, an aggravated degree of theft, anciently punished with death. It still remains an open point what amount of value raises the theft to this serious denomination. 1 Broun, 352, note. See 1 Swint. 467.
FURTUM MANIFESTUM. Open theft. Theft where a thief is caught with the property in his possession. Bract. fol. 150b.
FURTUM NON EST UBI INITIUM HABET DE-TENTIONIS PER DOMINIUM REL 3 Inst. 107. There is no theft where the foundation of the de-tention is based upon ownership of the thing.
FURTUM OBLATUM. In the civil law, offered theft. Oblatum furtum dicitur cum res furtiva ab aliquo tibi oblata sit, eaque apud te concepta sit. Theft is called "oblatum" when a thing stol-en is offered to you by any one, and found upon you. Inst. 4, 1, 4.
FUSE PLUG LEVEES. Under Mississippi Flood Control Act lower points for possible flood spill-ways were designated "fuse plug levees." U. S. v. Sponenbarger, Ark., 308 U.S. 256, 60 S.Ct. 225, 227, 84 L.Ed. 230.
FUSEL OIL. A volatile oily liquid obtained in the rectification of spirituous liquors made from the fermentation of grain, potatoes, the marc of grapes, and other material; its chief constituent being amyl alcohol, a direct nerve poison. Cal-kins v. National Travelers’ Ben. Ass’n of Des Moines, 200 Iowa 60, 204 N.W. 406, 407, 41 A.L.R. 363.
FUST. See Fuz.
FUSTIGATIO. In old English law, a beating with sticks or clubs; one of the ancient kinds of pun-ishment of malefactors. Bract. fol. 104b, lib. 3, tr. 1, c. 6.
FUSTIS. In old English law, a staff, used in mak-ing livery of seisin. Bract. fol. 40.
A baton, club, or cudgel.
FUTHVVITE, or FITHWITE. A fine for fighting or breaking the peace. Cowell; Cun.L.Dict.
FUTURE ACQUIRED PROPERTY. Mortgages, especially of railroad companies are frequently made in terms to cover after-acquired property; such as rolling stock, etc. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Woelpper, 64 Pa. 366, 3 Am.Rep. 596; Shaw v. Bill, 95 U.S. 10, 24 L.Ed. 333; L.R. 16 Eq. 383. This may include future net earnings; Dun-ham v. Isett, 15 Iowa 284; the proceeds to be re-ceived from the sale of surplus lands; L.R. 2 Ch. 201; a ditch or fiume in process of construction, which was held to cover all improvements and fixtures thereafter to be put on the line thereof; De Arguello v. Greer, 26 Cal. 620; rolling stock etc.; Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Woelpper, 64 Pa. 366, 3 Am.Rep. 596; Benjamin v. R. Co., 49 Barb., N.Y., 441. Future calls of assessments on stock cannot be mortgaged; L.R. 10 Eq. 681; but calla already made can be; id.
A will speaks as of the death of the testator and ordinarily passes property acquired atter its date.
FUTURE DEBT. In Scotch law, a debt which is created, but which will not become due till a fu-ture day. 1 Bell, Comm. 315.
FUTURE EARNINGS. A convenient way of des-ignating earnings which, if it had not been for in-jury, could have been made in future, but which were lost as result of injury. Nowlin v. Kansas City Public Service Co., Mo.App., 58 S.W.2d 324.
FUTURE ESTATE. See Estate.
FUTURE INTERESTS. Interests in land or oth-er things in which the privilege of possession or of enjoyment is future and not present. Commis-sioner of Internal Revenue v. Wells, C.C.A.6, 132 F.2£1 405, 407.
FUTURES. This term has grown out of those purely speculative transactions, in which there is a nominal contract of sale for future delivery, but where in fact none is ever intended or executed.The nominal seller does not have or expect to have the stock or merchandise he purports to sell, nor does the nominal buyer expect to receive it or to pay the price. Instead of that, a percentage or margin is paid, which is increased or diminished as the market rates go up or down, and accounted for to the buyer. Ring v. Quidnick Co., 14 R.I. 138; Lemonius v. Mayer, 71 Miss. 514, 14 So. 33; Plank v. Jackson, 128 Ind. 424, 26 N.E. 568; S. M. Weld & Co. y. Austin, 107 Miss. 279, 65 So. 247, 248.
FUTURL Lat. Those who are to be. Part of the commencement of old deeds. "Sciant prces-entes et futuri, quod ego talis, dedi et concessi," etc., (Let all men now living and to come know that I, A. B., have, etc.) Bract. fol. 34b.
FUZ, or FUST. A Celtic word, mearring a wood or forest.
F. W. C. Free Woman of Color, up to the time of Civil War, applied to all persons not of the white race, including Indians. Sunseri v. Cas-sagne, 191 La. 209, 185 So. 1, 4.
FYBTWITE. One of the fines incurred for homi-cide.
FYKE. A fish-trap consisting of several succes-sive conical nets with widestretched mouths. Mit« chell v. Curtis, 135 Or. 595, 296 P. 1078. A bow-net for catching fish. Pub.St.Mass.1882, p. 1291. Cf. Pound Net.
FYLE. In old Scotch law, to defile; to declare foul or defiled. Hence, to find a prisoner guilty.
FYLIT. In old Scotch practice, fyled; found gull-ty. See Fyle.
FYNDERINGA. (Sax.) An offense or trespass for which the fine or compensation was reserved to the king’s pleasure. Leges Hen. L c. 10. Its nature is not known. Spelman reads fynderinga, and interprets it treasure trove; but Cowell reads fyrderinga, and interprets it a joining of the king’s fird or host, a neglect to do which was pun-ished by a fine called firdwite. See Spelman, Gloss. Du Cange agrees with Cowell.
FYRD. Sax. In Anglo-Saxon law, the military array or land force of the whole country. Con-tribution to the fyrd was one of the imposts f orm-ing the trinoda necessitas. (Also spelled "ferd" and "fird.")
FYRDFARE. A summoning forth to join a mili-tary expedition; a summons to join the fyrd or army.
FYRDSOCNE, (or fyrdsoken.) Exemption from military duty; exemption from service in the fyrd.
FYRDWITE. A fine imposed for neglecting to join the fyrd when summoned. Also a fine
im-
posed for murder committed in the army; also an acquittance of such fine.

BLACK ‘S LAW DICTIONARY – Section G

G

G. In the Law French orthography, this setter is often substituted for the English W, particu-larly as an initial. Thus, "gage" for "wage," "garranty" for "warranty," "gast" for "waste." G. A. O. General Accounting Office.
G. S. A. General Services Administration.
GABEL. An excise; a tax on movables; a rent, custom, or service. Co.Litt. 142a, 213.
A tax, impost, or excise duty, especially in continental Europe; formerly, in France, specifically the tax on salt, but also applied to taxes on other industrial products. "The gabels of Naples are very high on oil, wine, tobacco * * a." Cent. Dict.
—Land Gabel. See Land Gabel.
GABELLA. The Law Latin form of "gabel," (q. v.).
Also, In Teutonic and early English history, the peasant-ry constitiiting a village or hamlet; the holdings of such a group oí freemen and serfs, or of either. The orig-inal significance of the word seems to be in its indica-tion of a small rent-paying community, the rents being rendered in kind or in labor. Cent. Dict. "So that Gabetia meant all the member of a family having an interest in a certain holding, and sometimes meant the holding itself." W. K. Sullivan.
GABLATORES. Persons who paid gabel, rent, or tribute. Domesday; Cowell.
GABLUM. A rent; a tax. Domesday; Du Cange. The gabie-end of a house. Cowell.
GABULUS DENARIORUM. Rent paid in money. Seld.Tit.Hon. 321.
GADSDEN PURCHASE. A term commonly ap-plied to the territory acquired by the United States from Mexico by treaty of December 30, 1853, known as the Gadsden Treaty.
GAFFOLDGILD. The payment of custom or trib-ute. Scott.
GAFFOEDLAND. Property subject to the gaffold-gild, or hable to be taxed. Scott.
GAFOL. The same word as "gabel" or "gavel." Rent; tax; interest of money.
GAGE, v. In old English law, to pawn or pledge; to give as security for a payment or performance; to wage or wager.
GAGE, n.
In old English law, a pawn or pledge; some-thing deposited as security for the performance of some act or the payment of money, and to be forfeited on failure or non-performance. Glanv. lib. 10, c. 6; Britt. c. 27.
A mortgage is a dead-gage or pledge; for, what-soever profit it yields, it redeems not itseif, unless the whole amount secured is paid at the appointed time. Cowell.
In French law, the contract of pledge or pawn; also the article pawned.

Gage, estates in. Those held in vadio, or pledge. They are of two kinds: (1) Vivum vadium, or liv-ing pledge, or vifgage; (2) mortuum vadium, or dead pledge, better known as "mortgage."
GAGER DE DELIVERANCE. In old English law, when he who has distrained, being sued, has not delivered the cattle distrained, then he shall not only avow the distress, but gager deliverance, i. e., put in surety or pledge that he will deliver them. Fitzh.Nat.Brev.
GAGER DEL LEY. Wager of law (q. v.).
GAIN. Profits; winnings; increment of value. Gray v. Darlington, 15 Wall. 65, 21 L.Ed. 45; Thorn v. De Breteuil, 86 App.Div. 405, 83 N.Y.S. 849. Difference between receipts and expenditures; pe-cuniary gain. Stanton v. Zercher, 101 Wash. 383, 172 P. 559, 562; Rooney v. City of Omaha, 105 Neb. 447, 181 N.W. 143, 145. Difference between cost and sale price. Weil v. State, 237 Ala. 293, 186 So. 467, 469.
"Gain derived from capital," Is a gain, profit, or some-thing of exchangeable value proceeding from the property, severed from the capital however invested, and received or drawn by claimant for his separate use, benefit, and dís-posal. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Simmons Gin Co., C.C.A.10, 43 F.2d 327, 328.
GAINAGE. The gain or profit of tilled or planted land, raised by cultivating it; and the draught, plow, and furniture for carrying on the work of tillage by the baser kind of sokemen or villeins. Bract. 1. i. c. 9.
GAINERY. Tillage, or the profit arising from it, or from the beasts employed therein.
GAINFUL. Profitable, advantageous, or lucrative. Smith v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, La. App., 165 So. 498, 500.
GAINFUL OCCUPATION. Within disability clause of policy, term means ordinary employment of particular insured, or such other employment, if any, as insured may fairly be expected to fol-low. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Barron, 198 Ga. 1, 30 S.E.2d 879, 882.
GAINOR. In old English law, a sokeman; one who occupied or cultivated arable land. Old Nat. Brev. fol. 12.
GAIUS, INSTITUTES OF. See Institutes. GAJUM. A thick wood. Spelman.
GALE. The payment of a rent, tax, duty, or an-nuity.
A gale is the right to open and work a mine within the Hundred of St. Briavel’s, or a stone quarry within the open lands of the Forest of Dean.
The right is a license or interest in the nature of real estate, conditional on the due payment of rent and observ-anee of the obligations imposed on the galee. It follows the ordinary tules as to the devolution and convey-anee of real estate. The galee pays the crown a rent known as a "galeage rent," "royalty," or some similar name, propor-tionate to the quantity of minerals got from the mine or quarry. Sweet.
GALEA. In old records, a piratical vessel; a gal-ley.
GALENES. In old Scotch law, amends or com-pensation for slaughter. Bell.
GALLI—HALFPENCE. A kind of coin which, with suskins and doitkins, was forbidden by St. 3 Hen. V. c. 1.
GALLIVOLATIUM. A cock-shoot, or cock-glade.
GALLON. A liquid measure containing 231 cubic inches, or four quarts; the standard gallon of the United States. State v. Standard Oil Co. of Louis-lana, 188 La. 978, 178 So. 601, 607. The imperial gallon contains about 277, and the ale gallon 282, cubic inches. Hollender v. Magone, C.C.N.Y., 38 F. 914; Nichols v. Beard, C.C.Mass., 15 F. 437.
GALLOWS. A scaffold; a beam laid over either one or two posts, from which malefactors are hanged.
GAMACTA. In old European law, a stroke or blow. Spelman.
GAMALIS. A child born in lawful wedlock; aiso one born to betrothed but unmarried parents. Spelman.
GAMBLE. To play, or game, for money or other stake; hence to stake money or other thing of value on an uncertain event. It involves, not only chance, but a hope of gaining something beyond the amount played. State v. Mint Vending Ma-chine No. 195084, 85 N.H. 22, 154 A. 224, 226.
The word "gamble" is perhaps the most apt and sub-stantial to convey the idea of unlawful play that our lan-guage affords. It is inclusive of hazarding and betting as well as playing. Bennett v. State, 2 Yerg., Tenn., 474. Alíen v. Commonwealth, 178 Ky. 250, 198 S.W. 896, 897.
It is not necessary that the player shall hazard what he plays, but it is equally "gambling" if he may win by chance more than the value expended by him. Nelson v. State, 37 Okl.Cr. 90, 256 P. 939, 940; City of Moberly v. Deskin, 169 Mo.App. 672, 155 S.W. 842, 843.
To constitute "gambling," winner must either pay con-sideration for his chance to win, or without paying any-thing in advance stand chance to lose or win. R. J. Wil-liams Furniture Co. v. McComb Chamber of Commerce, 147 Miss. 649, 112 So. 579, 580, 57 A.L.R. 421; Almy Mf g. Co. v. City of Chicago, 202 Ill.App. 240.
Commercialized gambling is such gambling as is a source of sure and steady profit. State v. Gardner, 151 La_ 874, 92 So. 368, 371.
A common gambler is one who furnishes facilities for gambling, or keeps or exhibits a gambling table, establish-ment, device, or apparatus. People v. Sponsler, 1 Dak. 291, 46 N.W. 459, citing cases.
GAMBLER. One who follows or practices games of chance or skill, with the expectation and pur-pose of thereby winning money or other property. Buckley v. O’Niel, 113 Mass. 193, 18 Am.Rep. 466; Brannon v. State, 16 Ala.App. 259, 76 So. 991, 993.

GAMBLING DEVICE. Such device, apparatus, and the like, as is used and employed for gambling, in the sense that in using it, money or the like is staked, wagered, won, or lost as a direct result of its employment or operation. Commonwealth v. Mihalow, 142 Pa.Super. 433, 16 A.2d 656, 659. A machine, implement, or contrivance ef any kind for the playing of an unlawful game of chance or hazard. In re Lee Tong, D.C.Or., 18 F. 257; State v. McTeer, 129 Tenn. 535, 167 S.W. 121, 122.
GAMBLING POLTCY. In life insurance, one is-sued to a person, as beneficiary, who has no pe-cuniary interest in the life insured. Otherwise called a "wager policy." Gambs v. Covenant Mut. L. Ins. Co., 50 Mo. 47.
GAME. Wild birds and beasts. The word in-dudes all game birds, game fowl, and game ani-mals. State ex rel. Sofeico v. Heffernan, 41 N.M. 219, 67 P.2d 240, 246.
Birds and beasts of a wild nature, obtained by fowling and hunting. Bacon, Abr. Coolidge v. Choate, 11 Metc., Mass., 79. The term is said to Include (in England) hares, pheasants, partrldges, grouse, heath, or moor game, black game, and bustards. Brown. 1 & 2 Wm. IV. c. 32. Graves v. Dunlap, 87 Wash. 648, 152 P. 532, 533, L.R.A.1916C, 338, Ann.Cas.1917B, 944.
A sport, pastime or contest. Lasseter v. O’Neill, 162 Ga. 826, 135 S.E. 78, 80, 49 A.L.R. 1076; Ever-hart v. People, 54 Colo. 272, 130 P. 1076, 1077. A contrivance which has for its Object to furnish sport, recreation, or amusement. Ex parte Wil-liams, 127 Cal.App. 424, 16 P.2d 172, 173. See Gam-ing.
GAME—KEEPER. One who has the care of keep-ing and preserving the game on an estate, being appointed thereto by a lord of a manor.
GAME LAWS. Laws passed for the preservation of game, usually forbidding the killing of specified game during certain seasons, Poulos v. State, 49 Ga.App. 20, 174 S.E. 253, or by certain described means. As to English game-laws, see 2 Steph. Comm. 82; 1 & 2 Wm. IV. c. 32.
GAME OF CHANCE. One in which result as to success or failure depends less on skill and experi-ence of player than on purely fortuitous or acci-dental circumstances incidental to game or manner of playing it or device or apparatus with which it is played, but not under control of player. People v. Cohen, 160 Misc. 10, 289 N.Y.S. 397, 400.
GAMING. An agreement between two or more persons to play together at a game of chance for a stake or wager which is to become the property of the winner, and to which all contribute. In re Stewart, D.C.N.J., 21 F. 398; People v. Todd, 51 Hun, 446, 4 N.Y.S. 25; Carpenter v. Beal-McDonnell & Co., D.C.Ark., 222 F. 453, 460.
"Gaming" and "gambling," in statutes, are similar in meaning, and either one comprehends the idea that, by a bet, by chance, by some exercise of skill, or by the tran-spiring of some event unknown until it occurs, something of value is, as the conclusion of premises agreed, to be transferred from a loser to a winner. Bish.St.Crimes, § 858. Town of Eros v. Powell, 137 La. 342, 68 So. 632, 634; Reinmiller v. State, 93 Fla. 462, 111 So. 633, 635.

"GamIng" is properly the act or engagement of the play-ers. If by-standers or other third persons put up a stake or wager among themselves, to go to one or the other according to the result of the game, this Is more correctly termed "betting."
GAMING CONTRACTS. See Wager.
GAMING HOUSE. A building, place, or room kept for use as a place to gamble, or to keep or exhibit for the purpose of gaming, any bank, table, alley, machine, wheel, or device, Davis v. State, Tex.Civ. App., 165 S.W.2d 757, 758; as the business of the occupants. 1 Russ.Crimes, 299; Rosc.Crim.Ev. 663; People v. Jackson, 3 Denio, N.Y., 101, 45 Am. Dec. 449.
GAMING TABLE. Any table that may be used for playing games of chance for money or property. State v. Leaver, 171 Mo.App. 371, 157 S.W. 821, 822; Everhart v. People, 54 Colo. 272, 130 P. 1076, 1080.
GANANCIAL FROPERTY. In Spanish law, a species of community in property enjoyed by hus-band and wife, the property being divisible be-tween them equally on a dissolution of the mar-riage. 1 Burge, Confl.Law, 418. Cartwright v. Cartwright, 18 Tex. 634; Cutter v. Waddingham, 22 Mo. 254. See Community.
GANANCIALES. A Spanish term, used as either a noun or adjective, and applied to property ac-quired during marriage. Discussed in Sanchez v. Bowers, C.C.A.N.Y., 70 F.2d 715, 716. See Ganancial Property, supra.
GANANCIAS. In Spanish law, gains oi profits.
GANG. Any company of persons who go about to-gether or act in concert, in modern use mainly for criminal purposes. State v. Gaynor, 119 N.J.L. 582, 197 A. 360, 362.
GANG–WEEK. The time when the bounds of the parish are lustrated or gone over by the parish officers,—rogation week. Enc.Lond.
GANGIATORI. Officers in ancient times whose business it was to examine weights and measures. Skene.
GANGSTER. A member of a gang of roughs, hireling criminals, thieves, or the like. State v. Gaynor, 119 N.J.L. 582, 197 A. 360, 362.
GANSER SYNDROME. A state in which ques-tions are given nonsensical answers from which a hidden relevancy may be inferred. This is ob-served in prisoners who wish to gain leniency by simulating mental clouding.
GANTELOPE (pronounced "gauntlett.") A mili-tary punishment, in which the criminal running between the ranks receives a lash from each man. Enc.Lond. This was called "running the gaunt-lett."
GAOL. A prison for temporary confinement; a jail; a place for the confinement of offenders against the law.
As distinguished from "prison," It Is said to be a place for temporary or provisional confinement, or for the pun-ishment of the lighter offenses and, misdemeanors. See, also,

GAOL DELIVERY. In criminal law, the delivery or clearing of a gaol of the prisoners confined therein, by trying them.
In popular speech, the clearing of a gaepl by the escape of the prisoners.
General Gaol Delivery. In English law, at the assizes (q. v.) the judges sit by virtue of five several authorities, one of which is the commission of "general gaol dellvery." This empowers them to try and deliverance make of every prisoner who shall be in the gaol when the judges arrive at the clrcult town, whether an indictment has been pre-ferred at any previous assize or not. 4 Sl.Comm. 270. This is also a part of the title of some American criminal courts, as, in Pennsylvania, the "court of oyer and terminer and general jail delivery."
GAOL LIBERTIES, GAOL LIMITS. A district around a gaol, defined by limits, within which prisoners are allowed to go at large on giving se-curity to return. It is considered a part of the gaol. Singer v. Knott, 237 N.Y. 110, 142 N.E. 435, 436.
GAOLER. A variant of "jailer" (q.
GARAGE. A place in which motor vehicles are stored and cared for. Legum v. Carlin, 168 Md. 191, 177 A. 287, 290, 99 A.L.R. 536.
GARANDIA, or GARANTIA. A warranty. Spel-man.
GARANTIE. In French law, this word corre-sponds to warranty or covenants for title in Eng-lish law. In the case of a sale this garantie ex-tends to two things: (1) Peaceful possession of the thing sold; and (2) absence of undisclosed de-fects, (défauts cachés.) Brown.
GARATHINX. In old Lombardic law, a gift; a free or absolute gift; a gift of the whole of a thing. Spelman.
GARAUNTOR. L. Fr. In old English law, a warrantor of land; a vouchee; one bound by a warranty to defend the title and seisin of his alienee, or, on default thereof, and on eviction of the tenant, to give him other lands of equal val-ue. Britt. c. 75.
GARBA. In old English law, a bundle or sheaf. Blada in garbis, corn or grain in sheaves. Reg. Orig. 96; Bract. fol. 209.
GARBA SAGITTARUM. A sheaf of arrows, con-taining twenty-four. Otherwise called "schaffa sagittarum." Skene.
GARBALES DECIMM. In Scotch law, tithes of corn, (grain.) Bell.
GARBLE. In English statutes, to sort or cull out the good from the bad in spices, drugs, etc. Cow-ell.
GARBLER OF SPICES. An ancient officer in the city of London, who might enter into any shop, warehouse, etc., to view and search drugs and spices, and garble and make clean the same, or see that it be done. Mozley & Whiteley.

GARCIO STOLIE. "Groom of the stole" (q. y.).
GARCIONES. Servants who follow a camp. Wals. 242.
GARD, or GARDE. L. Fr. Wardship; care; custody; also the ward of a city.
GARDEIN. A keeper; a guardian.
GARDEN. A small piece of land, appropriated to the cultivation of herbs, fruits, fiowers, or vege-tables. People v. Greenburgh, 57 N.Y. 550; Ferry v. Livingston, 115 U.S. 542, 6 S.Ct. 175, 29 L.Ed. 489; Hubel v. McAdon, 190 Iowa 677, 180 N.W. 994, 995.
GARDEN SEEDS. Seeds for kitchen gardens. Ross & Co. v. U. S., 9 Ct.Cust.App. 235.
CARDEN TOOLS. Instruments or devices mov-able in character and operated by hand, or possibly by other motiye power in the performance of work in the garden or on the farm. Murphy v. Conti-nental Ins. Co., 178 Iowa 375, 157 N.W. 855, 857, L.R.A.1917B, 934.
GARDIA. L. Fr. Custody; wardship.
GARDIANUS. In old English law, a guardian, defender, or protector. In feudal law, gardio. Spelman.
A warden. Gardianus ecclesice, a churchwarden. Gardianus quin que portuum, warden of the Cin-que Ports. Spelman.
GARDINUM. In old English law, a garden. Reg. Orig. lb, 2.
GARENE. L. Fr. A warren; a privileged place for keepirig animals.1
GARNESTURA. In old English law, victuals, arms, and other implements of war, necessary for the defense of a town or castle. Mat.Par. 1250.
GARNISH, n. In English law, money paid by a prisoner to his fellow•prisoners on his entrance into prison.
GARNISH, v. To warn or summon.
To issue process of garnishment against a per-son.
GARNISHEE. One garnished; a person against whom process of garnishment is issued; one who has money or property in his possession belong-ing to a defendant, or who owes the defendant a debt, which money, property, or debt is attached in his hands, with notice to him not to deliver or pay it over until the result of the suit be ascertained. Welsh v. Blackwell, 14 N.J.L. 348; Smith v. Miln, 22 Fed.Cas. 606; Edwards v. Stein, 94 N.J.Eq. 251, 119 A. 504, 505.
GARNISHMENT. A warning to a person in whose hands the effects of another are attached, not to pay the money or deliver the property of the de-fendant in his hands to him, but to appear and answer the plaintiff’s suit. Drake, Attachm. § 451; National Bank of Wilmington v. Furtick, 2 Mary.,

Del., 35, 42 A. 479, 44 L.R.A. 115, 69 Am.St.Rep. 99; Jeary v. American Exch. Bank, 2 Neb. (Unof.) 657, 89 N.W. 772.
A statutory proceeding whereby person’s prop-erty, money, or credits in possession or under control of, or owing by, another are applied to payment of former’s debt to third person by prop-er statutory process against debtor and garnishee. Beggs v. Fite, 130 Tex. 46, 106 S.W.2d 1039, 1042.
it is an Incident to or an auxlllary of judgment rendered In principal action, and is resorted to as a means of obtain-ing satisfaction of judgment by reaching credits or prop-erty of judgment debtor in hands of garnishee. Graber v. Ft. Dearborn Casualty Underwriters of Chicago, III., Mo. App., 35 S.W.2d 933, 934. Or by reaching goods, moneys, or effects of debtor in possession of another, or by applying on a judgment, debts or credits due to debtor by another. Nacy v. Le Page, 341 Mo. 1039, 111 S.W.2d 25, 114 A.L.R. 259.
Also a warning to any one for his appearance, in a cause in which he is not a party, for the in-formation of the court and explaining a cause. Cowell; Crawford State Bank of Crawford v. Murphy, 142 Neb. 795, 7 N.W.2d 762, 763.
Equitable garnishment, is sometimes applted to the stat-utory proceedings authorized In some states, upon the return of an execution unsatisfled, whereby an action some-thing like a Bill of discovery may be maintained against the judgment debtor and any third person, to compel the dis-closure of any money or property or chose in action belong-Ing to the debtor or held In trust for Mm by such third person, and to procure satisfaction of the judgment out of such property. Gelst v. St. Louis, 156 Mo. 643, 57 S.W. 766, 79 Am.St.Rep. 545. See St. Louis v. O’Neil Lymber Co., 114 Mo. 74, 21 S.W. 484.
Execution. See Execution.
GARNISTURA. In old English law, garniture; whatever is necessary for the fortification of a city or camp, or for the ornament of a thing. 8 Rymer, 328; Du Cange; Cowell; Blount.
GARRISON. The permanent home of the army in time of peace, where soldiers are given proper training with a view of having them prepared for the intelligent performance of duty in évent of conflict. Hines v. Mikell, C.C.A.S.C., 259 F. 28, 31.
GARROTING. A method of inflicting the death penalty on convicted criminals practiced in Spain, Portugal, and some Spanish-American countries, consisting in strangulation by means of an iron collar which is mechanically tightened about the neck of the sufferer, sometimes with the variation that a sharpened screw is made to advance from the back of the apparatus and pierce the base of the brain. Also, popularly, any form of stran-gling resorted to to overcome resistance or induce unconsciousness, especially as a concomitant to highway robbery.
GARSUMME. In old English law, an amercia-ment or fine. Cowell.
GARTER. A string or ribbon by which the stock-ing is held upon the leg.
The mark of the highest order of English knighthood, ranking next after the nobility.
This military order of knighthood is said to have been first instituted by Richard I., at the siege of Acre, where he caused twenty-six knIghts who rmly stood by hlra to wear thongs of blue leather about their legs. It ls also sald to have been perfected by Edward III. and to have recelved some alterations, which were afterwards laid aside, from Edward VI. The badge of the order le the Image of St. George, called the "George," and the motto is "Honi soit qui mal y pense." Wharton.
This order called "Knights ot the Garter" le otherwlse called "Knights of the Order of St. George." They form the highest order of knights.
GARTH. In English law, a yard; a little close or homestead in the north of England. Cowell; Blount.
A dam or wear in a river, for the catching of fish.
GARYTOUR. In old Scotch law, warder. 1 Pitc. Crim. Tr. pt. 1, p. 8.
GAS. An aeriform fluid. Lamar v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Ass’n, 216 Iowa 371, 249 N.W. 149, 92 A.L.R. 159. That gas used for illuminating purposes and for fuel. Birss v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 109 Neb. 226, 190 N.W. 486, 487.
Casing-head gas Is gas which flows from oil wells, coming between casing and tubing. Humble Oil & Reflning Co. v. Poe, Tex.Com.App., 29 S.W.2d 1019, 1020.
Natural gas Is the gas obtained from wells in coal and oil regions, and used for lighting and heating. Dry natural gas is natural gas which does not contain an appreciable amount of readily condensible gasoline; it is usually not intimately assoclated with petroleum. Wet natural gas Is natural gas from whlch a gasoline can be extracted in stiffi-cient quantities to warrant the installation of a plant, or natural gas which contains readily condensible gasoline. Mussellem v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 107 Okl. 183, 231 P. 526, 530.
It is a colorless Inflammable fluid, the first and highest distillant of crude petroleum. Being the most volatile com-ponent of petroleum, it readily separates from it, and, in the process of distillation, is the oil drawn off at the lowest temperature. Locke v. Russell, 75 W.Va. 602, 84 S.E. 948, 949; Ilammett Oil Co. v. Gypsy Oil Co., 95 Okl. 235, 218 P. 501, 504, 34 A.L.R. 275.
GASOLINE. A volatile, inflammable hydrocar-bon mixture used as a fuel, especially for intern-al combustion engines. Coleman v. United States, Ct.Cl., 37 F.Supp. 273, 277.
GAST. L. Fr. Waste. See the letter "G," supra.
GASTALDUS. A temporary governor of the country. Blount. A bailiff or steward. Spelman.
GASTEL. L. Fr. Wastel; wastel bread; the fin-est sort of wheat bread. Britt. c. 30: Kelhani.
GASTINE. L. Fr. Waste or uncultivated ground. Britt. c. 57.
GATE (Sax. geat), at the end of narres of places, signifies way or path. Cunningham, Law Dict.
In the words beast-gate and cattle-gate, it means a right of pasture.
In modern railroad practice, movable barriers which close entrance through which public is per-mitted to enter upon, pass over, and leave prop-erty of railway company inclosed within its right of way fences. Jeffery v. Kewaunee, G. B. & W. Ry. Co., 189 Wis. 207, 207 N.W. 283, 284.
These rights are local to Suffolk and Yorkshire respec-tively; they are cOnsidered as corporeal hereditaments, for which ejectment will lie; 2 Stra. 1084, 1 Term 137; and are entirely distinct from right of common. The right is sometimes connected with the duty of repairing the gatea of the pasture; and perhaps the name comes from this.
GAUDIES. A term used in the English universi-des to denote double commons.
GAUGE. The measure of width of a railway, fix-
ed, with some exceptions, at 4 feet inches in Great Britain and America, and 5 feet 3 inches in Ireland.
GAUGEATOR. A gauger. Lowell.
GAUGER. A surveying officer under the cus-toms, excise, and internal revenue laws, appoint-ed to examine all tuns, pipes, hogsheads, barreis and tierces of wine, oil, and other liquids, and to give them a mark of allowance, as containing law-ful measure. There are also private gaugers in large seaport towns, who are licensed by govern-ment to perform the same duties. Rapal. & L.
GAUGETUM. A gauge or gauging; a measure of the contents of any vessel.
GAVEL. In English law, custom; tribute; toll; yearly rent; payment of revenue; of which there were anciently several sorts; as gavel-corn, gavel-wat, oat-gavel, gavel-fodder, etc. Termes de la Ley; Cowell; Co.Litt. 142a.
GAVEL—MAN. A tenant Hable to the payment of gavel or tribute. Somn. Gavelkind, 23.
GAVELBRED. Rent reserved in bread, corn, or provision; rent payable in kind. Cowell.
GAVELCESTER. A certain measure of rent-ale. Cowell.
GAVELET. An obsolete writ. An ancient and special kind of cessavit, used in Kent and London for the recovery of rent. The statute of gavelet is 10 Edw. II. 2 Reeve, Eng.Law, c. 12, p. 298. See Emig v. Cunningham, 62 Md. 460.
GAVELGELD. That which yields annual profit or toll. The tribute or toll itself. Cowell; Du Cange.
GAVELIIERTE. A service of plowing performed by a customary tenant. Cowell; Du Cange.
GAVELING MEN. Tenants who paid a reserved rent, besides some customary duties to be done by them. Cowell.
GAVELKIND. A species of socage tenure com-mon in Kent, in England, where the lands descend to all the sons, or heirs of the nearest degree, to-gether; may be disposed of by will; do not es-cheat for felony; may be aliened by the heir at the age of fifteen; and dower and curtesy is giv-en of half the land. Stim.Law Gloss.
GAVELLA. See Gabella.
GAVELLER. An officer of the English crown having the general management of the mines, pits, and quarries in the Forest of Dean and Hundred of St. Briavel’s, subject, in some respects, to the control of the commissioners of woods and forests. He grants gales to free miners in their proper or-der, accepts surrenders of gales, and keeps the registers required by the acts. There is a deputy-gaveller, who appears to exercise most of the gay-eller’s functions. Sweet.
GAVELMED. A customary service of mowing meadow-land or cutting grass (consuetucto fal-candi). Blount.
GAVELREP. Bedreap or bidreap; the duty of reaping at the bid or command of the lord. Somn. Gavelkind, 19, 21; Cowell.
GAVELWERK. A customary service, either vnanuopera, by the person of the tenant, or carro-pera, by his carts or carriages. Blount; Somn. Gavelkind, 24; Du Cange.
GAZETTE. The oficial publication of the Eng-lish government, also called the "London Gazette." It is evidence of acts of state, and of everything done by the king In his political capacity. Orders of adjudication in
bankruptcy are required to be published therein; and the production of a copy of the "Gazette," containing a copy of the order of adjudication, is evidence of the fact. Moz-ley & Whitley.
GDN. Equivalent to guardian. National Surety Co. v. McNeill’s Guardian, 251 Ky. 509, 65 S.W.2d 721.
GEBOCCED. An Anglo-Saxon term, meaning "conveyed."
GEBOCIAN. In Saxon law, to convey; to trans-fer boc land, (book-land or land held by charter.) The grantor was said to gebocian the alienee. See 1 Reeve, Eng.Law, 10.
GEBRAUCHSIVIUSTER. Issued in accordance with law of Germany, it is a patent. Permutit Co. v. Graver Corporation, D.C.Ill., 37 F.2d 385, 390.
GEBUR (Sax.). A boor.
His services varied in different places—to work for his lord two or more days a week; to pay gafols in money, barley, etc.; to pay hearth money, etc. He was a tenant with a house and a yard land or virgate or two oxen. Maitl. Domesday and Beyond 37.
GEBURSCRIPT. In old English law, neighbor-hood or adjoining district. Cowell.
GEBURUS. In old English law, a country neigh-bor; an inhabitant of the same geburscript, or village. Cowell.
GELD. In Saxon law, money or tribute. A mulct, compensation, value, price.
Angela was the single value of a thing; twigeld, double value, etc. So, weregeld was the value of a man slain; orfgeld, that of a beast. Brown. A land tax of so much per hide or carucate. Maitl. Domesday Book 120. The compensation for a crlme.
GELDABILIS. In old English law, taxable; geldable.
GELDABLE. Liable to pay geld; Hable to be tax-ed. Kelham.GELDING. A horse that has been castrated, and which is thus distinguished from the horse in his natural and unaltered condition. A "ridgling" (a half-castrated horse) is not a gelding, but a horse, within the denomination of animals in the stat-utes. Brisco v. State, 4 Tex.App. 219, 30 Am.Rep. 162.
GELT. As a verb, an alternative form of the past tense of "geld," commonly "gelded." See Gelding.
As a noun, used incorrectly for geld (q. v.). Webster, New Int. Dict.
GEMMA. Lat. In the civil law, a gem; a preci-ous stone. Gems were distinguished by their transparency; such as emeralds, chrysolites, ame-thysts. Dig. 34, 2, 19, 17.
GEMOT. In Saxon law, a meeting or moot; a convention; a public assemblage.
These were of several sorts, such as the witena-gemot, or meeting of the wise men; the folc-gemot, or general assem-bly of the people; the shire-gemot, or county court; the burg-gemot, or borough court; the hundred-gemot, or hun-dred court; the hali-gemot, or court-baron; the habinote, a convention of citizens in their public hall; the holy-mote, or holy court; the swein-gemote, or forest court; the ward-mote, or ward court. Wharton; Cunningham.
GENEALOGY. The summary history or table of a family, showing how the persons there named are connected together.
GENEARCH. The head of a family.
GENEATIL In Saxon law, a villein, or agricul-tura) tenant, (villanus villicus;) a hind or far-mer, (firmartius rusticus.) Spelman.
GENER. Lat. In the civil law, a son-in-law; a daughter’s husband. (Filice vir.) Dig. 38, 10, 4, 6.
GENERAL. From Latin word genus. It relates to the whole kind, class, or order. Leuthold v. Brandjord, 100 Mont. 96, 47 P.2d 41, 45. Pertaining to or designating the genus or class, as distin-guished from that which characterizes the species or individual; universal, not particularized, as opposed to special; principal or central, as op-posed to local; open or available to all, as opposed to select; obtaining commonly, or recognized uni-versally, as opposed to particular; universal or un-bounded, as opposed to limited; comprehending the whole or directed to the whole, as distinguish-ed from anything applying to or designed for a portion only. Board of Sup’rs of Attala County v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 186 Miss. 294, 190 So. 241. Extensive or common to many. Record v. Ellis, 97 Kan. 754, 156 P. 712, 713, L.R.A.1916E, 654, Ann. Cas.1917C, 822; McNeill v. McNeill, 166 Iowa, 680, 148 N.W. 643. 651.
As a notan, the word is the title of a principal Officer in the army, usually one who commands a whole army, division, corps, or brigade. In the United States army, the rank of "general" is one of the highest, next to the commander in chief, and is only occasionally created. The omcers next in rank are lieutenant general, major general, and brigadier general.
As to general "Acceptance," "Administration of Estates," "Agent," "Appearance," "Assign-ment," "Average," "Benefit," "Challenge," "Char-acter," "Charge," "Covenant," "Creditor," "Cus-tom," "Damages," "Demurrer," "Denial," "Depos-it," "Device," "Election," "Finding," "Franchise," "Fund," "Gaol Delivery," "Guardian," "Guaranty," "Imparlance," "Insurance," "Intent," "Issue," "Legacy," "Letter of Credit," "Malice," "Meeting," "Monition," "Mortgage," "Occupant," "Orders," "Owner," "Partnership," "Power," "Property," "Replication," "Restraint of Trade," "Retainer," "Return Day," "Rules," "Sessions," "Ship," "Stat. ute," "Tall," "Tenancy," "Term," "Traverse," "Us-age," "Verdict," "Warrant," and "Warranty," see those titles.
GENERAL AGENCY BUSINESS. One engaged in such general agency business is one not engag-ed as agent for single firm or person, but holding himself out to public as being engaged in business of being agent. Comer v. State Tax Commission of New Mexico, 41 N.M. 403, 69 P.2d 936, 939.
GENERAL ASSEMBLY. State Senate and House of Representatives. Pirtle v. Brown, C.C.A.Tenn., 118 F.2d 218, 220.
The policy making body of the United Nations. It is composed of from one to five delegates from each member nation, although each member na-tion has but one vote.
The highest "judicatory" of the Presbyterian church, representing in one body all of the par-ticular churches of the denomination. Trustees of Pencader Presbyterian Church in Pencader Hun-dred v. Gibson, 26 Del.Ch. 375, 22 A.2d 782, 788.
GENERAL ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS. A transfer of legal and equitable title to all debtor’s property to trustee, with au-thority to liquidate debtor’s affairs and distribute proceeds equitably to creditors. Central Fibre Products Co. v. Hardin, C.C.A.Tex., 82 F.2d 692, 694.
GENERAL ASSUMPSIT. An action of assumpsit brought upon the promise or contract implied by law in certain cases. Holcomb v. Kentucky Union Co., 262 Ky. 192, 90 S.W.2d 25, 28.
GENERAL AVERAGE CONTRIBUTION. A con-tribution by all parties in a sea adventure to make good loss sustained by one of their number on ac-count of sacrifices voluntarily made of part of ship or cargo to save residue and lives of those on board from an impending peril or for extraordina-ry expenses necessarily incurred by one or more of the parties for the general benefit of all the in-terests embarked in the enterprise. Pacific Freighters Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., C.C.A.Cal., 109 F.2d 310, 312.
GENERAL AVERAGE STATEMENT. State-ment of account and admission on shipowner’s part as to amount due cargo owner. Kohler & Chase v. United American Unes, D.C.N.Y., 60 F. 2d 530, 533.
GENERAL BEQUEST. One not segregated or withdrawn from estate under terms of will but to be paid in money or property as latter directs. In re McDougald’s Estate, 149 Fla. 468, 6 So.2d 274.
GENERAL BOARD OF THE NAVY. A general advisory board to the Secretary of the Navy as to the preparation, maintenance and distribution of the fieet, plans of campaign, number and types of vessels, etc., number and ranks of officers and number and ratings of enlisted men, etc.
GENERAL BUILDING SCHEME. One under which owner of large tract of land divides it into building lots, to be sold to different persons for separate occupancy by deeds which contain uni-form covenants restricting the use which the sev-eral grantees may make of their premises. Besch v. Hyman, 221 App.Div. 455, 223 N.Y.S. 231, 233.
GENERAL CIRCULATION. That of a general newspaper only, as distinguished from one of a special or limited character; 1 Lack.Leg.N., Pa., 114. It is not determined by number of subscrib-ers but by the diversity of subscribers. Eisenberg v. Wabash, 355 III. 495, 189 N.E. 301, 302.
GENERAL COUNCIL. (1) A council consisting of members of the Roman Catholic Church from most parts of the world, but not from every part, as an ecumenical council. (2) One of the names of the English parliament.
GENERAL COURT. The name given to the leg-islature of Massachusetts and of New Hampshire, in colonial times, and subsequently by their con-stitutions; so called because the colonial legisla-ture of Massachusetts grew out of the general court or meeting of the Massachusetts Company. Cent.Dict. See Citizens’ Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 666, 22 L.Ed. 455.
GENERAL CREDIT. The character of a witness as one generally worthy, of credit. A distinction is sometimes insisted upon between this and "par-ticular credit," which may be affected by proof of particular facts relating to the particular ac-tion. See Bemis v. Kyle, 5 Abb.Prac.,N.S., N.Y., 233.
GENERAL ESTATE. Customarily, the entire es-tate held by a person in his individual capacity. In re Shipley’s Estaté, 337 Pa. 580, 12 A.2d 347, 348.
In wIll requIrIng estate taxes to be pald out of general estate, "general estate" referred to "residuary estate-remalning after gift of personalty and uae of realty to testator’s wife, and hence gift to wife wa.3 exempt from contribution to estate taxes and lnterest thereon. In re Chambers’ Estate, Sur., 54 N.Y.S.2d 88, 90.
GENERAL EXCEPTION. General exception is an objection to a pleading, or any part thereof, for want of substance, while a special exception is an objection to the form in which a cause of action is stated. Cochran v. People’s Nat. Bank, Tex.Civ.App., 271 S.W. 433, 434.GENERAL EXECUTION. A writ commanding an officer to satisfy a judgment out of any per-sonal property of the defendant. If authorizing him to levy only on certain specified property, the writ is sometimes called a "special" execution. Pracht v. Pister, 30 Kan. 568, 1 P. 638.
GENERAL EXECUTOR. One whole power is not limited either territorially or as to the dura-tion or subject of his trust. One who is to have charge of the whole estate, wherever found, and administer it to a final settlement.
GENERAL FEE CONDITIONAL. A grant to a person and heirs of his body. Blume v. Pearcy, 204 S.C. 409, 29 S.E.2d 673, 674.
GENERAL FIELD. Several distinct lots or piec-es of land inclosed and fenced in as one common field. Mansfield v. Hawkes, 14 Mass. 440.
GENERAL IMPROVEMENT. Where primary purpose and effect of improvement is to benefit public generally, though it may incidentally bene-fit property owners in particular locality. Hin-man v. Temple, 133 Neb. 268, 274 N.W. 605, 608, 111 A.L.R. 1217.
GENERAL INCLOSURE ACT. The statute 41 Geo. III, c. 109, which oonsolídates a number of regulations as to the inclosure of common fields and waste lands.
GENERAL INSTRUCTION. An explanation of legal terms specifically provided for by statute. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Owings, Tex.Civ. App., 128 S.W.2d 67, 76.
GENERAL INTEREST. In regard to admissibil-ity of hearsay evidence, a distinction has been tak-en between "public" and "general" interest, the term "public" being strictly applied to that which concerns every member of the state, and the term "general" being confined to a lesser, though still a considerable, portion of the community. Tayl. Ev. § 609.
GENERAL JURISDICTION. Such as extends to all controversies that may be brought before a court within the legal bounds of rights and rem-edies; as opposed to special or limi.ted jurisdic-tion, which covers only a particular class of cases, or cases where the amount in controversy is be-low a prescribed sum, or which is subject to spe-ciflc exceptions. The terms "general" and "spe-cial," applied to jurisdiction, indicate the differ-ence between a legal authority extending to the whole of a particular subject and one limited to a part; and, when applied to the terms of court, the occasion upon which these powers can be re-spectively exercised. Grade v. Freeland, 1 N.Y. 232.
GENERAL LAND OFFICE. Formerly an office of the United States government, being a division of the Department of the Interior, having charge of all executive action relating to the public lands, including their survey, sale or other disposition, and patenting; originally constituted by Act of Congress in 1812. The General Land Office and the U. S. Grazing Service were consolidated into the Bureau of Land Management under the De-partment of the Interior by 1946 Reorganization Plan No. 3, § 403. See notes to 43 U.S.C.A. § 1.
GENERAL LAW. A law that affects the com-munity at large. A general law as contradistin-guished from one that is special or local, is a law that embraces a class of subjects or places, and does not omit any subject or plaée naturally be-longing to such class. Van Riper v. Parsons, 40 N.J.Law, 1; Mathis v. Jones, 84 Ga. 804, 11 S.E. 1018; Brooks v. Hyde, 37 Cal. 376; Arms v. Ayer, 192 III. 601, 61 N.E. 851, 58 L.R.A. 277, 85 Am.St. Rep. 357.
A law, framed in general terms, restricted to no locality, and operating equally upon all of a group of objects, which, having regard to the purposes of the legislation, are dlstin-guished by characteristics sufficiently marked and impor-tant to make them a class by themselves, is not a special or local law, but a general law. Jones v. Power County, 27 Idaho, 656, 150 P. 35, 37; Scarbrough v. Wooten, 23 N.M. 616, 170 P. 743; Toombs v. Shárkey, 140 Miss. 676, 106 So. 273, 275; Van Riper v. Parsons, 40 N.J.L. 123, 29 Am.Rep. 210.
GENERAL LIEN. A general lien is a right to detain a chattel, etc., until payment be made, not only of any debt due in respect of the particular chattel, but of any balance that may be due on general account in the same line of business. A general lien, being against the ordinary rule of law, depends entirely upon contract, express or implied, from the special usage of dealing between the parties. Wharton. Crommelin v. Railroad Co., 10 Bosw., N.Y., 80; McKenzie v. Nevius, 22 Me. 150, 38 Am.Dec. 291; Brooks v. Bryce, 21 Wend., N.Y., 16; 3 B. & P. 494.
GENERAL MANAGER. One having general di-rection and control of corporation’s affairs, and who may do everything which corporation could do in transaction of its business. Continental Sup-ply Co. v. Forrest E. Gilmore Co. of Texas, Tex. Civ.App., 55 S.W.2d 622. A manager for all gen-eral purposes of the corporation. Phoenix Finance Corporation v. Iowa-Wisconsin Bridge Co., 2 Terry 130, 16 A.2d 789, 793.
GENERAL PO’WER OF APPOINTMENT. One exercisable in favor of any person the donee may select. Johnstone v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.9, 76 F.2d 55, 57.
GENERAL TAXES. Those imposed by and paid to state as a state which return taxpayer no spe-cial benefit other than the protection afforded him and his property by government, and promotion of schemes which have for their benefit the wel-fare of all. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Sacra-mento Municipal Utility Dist., D.C.Cal., 17 F.Supp.
685, 686. A tax, imposed solely or primarily for purpose of raising revenue and merely granting
person taxed right to conduct business or profes-sion. American Can Co. v. City of Tampa, 152 Fla. 798, 14 So.2d 203, 210.
GENERAL WORDS. Such words of a descriptive character as are used in conveyances in order to convey, not only the specific property described,

but also all kinds of easements, privileges, and appurtenances which may possibly belong to the property conveyed.
Such words are in general unnecessary; but are properly used when there are any easements or privileges reputed to belong to the property not legally appurtenant to it.
Such words are rendered unnecessary by the English conveyancing act of 1881, under which they are presumed to be included.
See, as to the effect of such words in deeds, 4 M. & S. 423; in a will; 1 P.Wms. 302; In a lease; 2 Moo. 592; in a release; 3 Mod. 277; ion a covenant; 3 Moo. 703; in a statute; 1 Bla.Com. 88; 2 Co. 46.
GENERALE. The usual commons in a religious house, distinguished from pietantice, which on ex-traordinary occasions were allowed beyond the commons. Cowell.
GENERALE DICTUM GENERALITER EST IN-TERPRETANDUM. A general expression is to be interpreted generally-. 8 Coke, 116a.
GENERALE NIHIL CERTUM IMPLICAT. A gen-eral expression implies nothing certain. 2 Coke, 34b. A general recital in a deed has not the effect of an estoppel. Best, Ev. p. 408, § 370.
GENERALE TANTUM VALET IN GENER4LI-BUS, QUANTUM SINGULARE IN SINGULIS. What is general is of as much force among gen-eral things as what is particular is among things particular. 11 Coke, 59b.
GENERALIA PRPECEDUNT, SPECIALIA SE-QUUNT1UR. Things general precede, things spe-cial follow. Reg.Brev.; Branch, Princ.
GENERALIA SPECIALIBUS NON DEROGANT. Jenk.Cent. 120, cited L.R. 4 Exch. 226. General words do not derogate from special.
GENERALIA SUNT PRZEPONENDA SINGU-LARIBUS. Branch, Princ. General things are to precede particular things.
GENERALIA VERBA SUNT GENERALITER IN-TELLIGENDA. General words are to be under-stood generally, or in a general sense. 3 Inst. 76; Broom, Max. 647.
GENERALIBUS SPECIALIA DEROGANT. Spe-cial things take from generals. Halk.Lat.Max. 5L
GENERALIS CLAUSULA NON PORRIGITUR AD EA QUPEANTEA SPECIALITER SUNT COM-PREHENSA. A general clause does not extend to those things which are previously provided for specially. 8 Coke, 154b. Therefore, where a deed at the first contains special words, and af ter-wards concludes in general words, both words, as well general as special, shall stand.
GENERALIS REGULA GENERALITER EST IN-TELLIGENDA. A general rule is to be understood generally. 6 Coke, 65.
GENERALS OF ORDERS. Chiefs of the several orders of monks, friars, and other religious so-cieties.GENERATIO. The issue or offspring of a mother-monastery. Cowell.
GENERATION. May mean either a degree of removal in computing descents, or a single succes-sion of living beings in natural descent. McMillan v. School Committee, 107 N.C. 609, 12 S.E. 330, 10 L.R.A. 823.
GENEROSA. Gentlewoman. Cowell; 2 Inst. 668.
GENEROSI FILIUS. The son of a gentleman. Generally abbreviated "gen. fil."
GENEROSOS. Lat. Gentleman; a gentleman. Spelman.
GENICULUM. A degree of consanguinity. Spel-man.
GENOESE LOTTERY. Also known as the "nu-merical" lottery. As distinguished from the "class" lottery (see the title Dutch Lottery), it is a scheme by which, out of 90 consecutive num-bers, five are to be selected or drawn by lot. The players have fixed on certain numbers, wagering that one, two, or more of them will be drawn among the five, or that they will appear in a cer-tain order. Fleming v. Bills. 3 Or. 286.
GENS. Lat. In Roman law, a tribe or clan; a group of families, connected by common descent and bearing the same name, being all free-born and
of free ancestors, and in possession of full civic rights.
GENS DE JUSTICE. In French law, officers of a court.
GENTES. Lat. People. Contra omnes gentes, against all people. Bract. fol. 37b. Words used in the clause of warranty in old deed.
GENTILES. In Roman law, the members of a gens or common tribe.
GENTLEMAN. Refers to a man of birth, but not noble; a man raised aboye the vulgar by his char-acter or past. Bramblett v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 182 Ga. 87, 185 S.E. 72, 76. In English law. A person of superior birth.
Under the denomination of "gentlemen" are comprised all aboye yeoman; whereby noblemen are truly called "gentlemen." Smith de Rep. Ang. lib. 1, cc. 20, 21.
A "gentleman" Is defined to be one who, without any title, bears a coat of arms, or whose ancestors have been freemen; and, by the coat that a gentleman giveth, he is known to be, or not to be, descended from those oí his name that lived many hundred years since. Jacob. See Cressen v. Cresson, 6 Fed.Cas. 809.
GENTLEMAN USHER. One who holds a post at court to usher others to the presence, etc.
GENTLEWOMAN. The word is a relative one without any legal significance. It refers to a wo-man of the same rank or status as that of a "gen-tleman." Bramblett v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 182 Ga. 87, 185 S.E. 72, 76. A woman of birth aboye the common, or equal to that of a gentleman; an addition of a woman’s state or degree.
GENTOO LAW. See Hindu Law.GENUINE. As applied to notes, bonds, and other written instruments, this term means that they are truly what they purport to be, and that they are not false, forged, fictitious, simulated, spuri-ous, or counterfeit. Baldwin v. Van Deusen, 37 N.Y. 492; Smeltzer v. White, 92 U.S. 392, 23 L.Ed. 508; Krug v. Sinclaire, 57 Cal.App. 563, 207 P. 696, 697. A will that has been revoked by later instru-ment and not revived by republication is not "gen-uine," within Surrogate’s Court Act, § 144. In re Kiltz’s Will, 125 Misc. 475, 211 N.Y.S. 450, 461.
GENUS. In the civil law, a general class or divi-sion, comprising several species. In toto jure generi per speciem derogatur, et illud potissimum habetur quod ad speciem directum est, through-out the law, the species takes from the genus, and that is most particularly regarded which refers to the species. Dig. 50, 17, 80.
A man’s lineage, or direct descendants.
In Logic, it is the first of the universal ideas, and is when the idea is so common that it extends to other ideas which are also universal; e. g., in-corporeal hereditament is genus with respect to a rent, which is species. Woolley, Introd. Log. 45; 1 Mill, Log. 133.
GEORGE-NOBLE. An English gold coin, value 6s. 8d.
GERECHTSBODE. In old New York law, a court messenger or contable. O’Callaghan, New Neth. 322.
GEREFA. In Saxon law, Breve, reve, or reeve; a ministerial officer of high antiquity in England; answering to the grave or graf (grafio) of the early continental nations. The term was applied to various grades of officers, from the scyre-gerefa, shire-grefe, or shire-reve, who had charge of the county, (and, whose title and office have been per-petuated in the modern "sheriff,") down to the tungerefa, or town-reeve, and lower. Burrill.
GERENS. Bearing. Gerens datum, bearing date. 1 Ld. Raym. 336; Hob. 19.
GERMAN. Whole, full, or own, in respect to re-lationship or descent. Brothers-german, as op-posed to half-brothers, are those who have both the same father and mother. Cousins-german are "first" cousins; that is, children of brothers or sisters.
GERMANE. In close relationship, appropriate, relative, pertinent. State ex rel. Riley v. District Court of Second Judicial Dist. in and for Silver Bow County, 103 Mont. 576, 64 P.2d 115, 119.
GERMANUS. Lat. Descended of the same stock, or from the same couple of ancestors; of the whole or full blood. Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 145.
GERMEN TERR1E. Lat. A sprout of the earth. A young tree, so called.
GERONTOCOMI. In the civil law, officers ap-pointed to manage hostaitals for the aged poor.GERONTOCOMIUM. In the civil law, an institu-tion or hospital for taking tare of the old. Cod. 1, 3, 46, 1; Calvin.
GERRYMANDER. A name given to the process of dividing a state or other territory into the au-thorized civil or political divisions, but with such a geographical arrangement as to accomplish a sinister or unlawful purpose, as, for instance, to secure a majority for a given political party in districts where the result would be otherwise if they were divided according to obvious natural lines, or to arrange school districts so that children of certain religions or nationalities shall be brought within the district and those of a different religion or nationality in another district. State v. Whitford, 54 Wis. 150, 11 N.W. 424.
GERSUMARIUS. In old English law, finable; hable to be amerced at the discretion of the lord of a manor. Cowell.
GERSUME. In old English law, expense; reward; compensation; wealth. It is also used for a fine or compensation for an offense. 2 Mon.Angl. 973.
GEST. In Saxon law, a guest. A name given to a stranger on the second night of his entertain-ment in another’s house. Twanight gest.
GESTATION. The time during which a woman carries a fetus in her womb, from conception to birth. But, as used in all medical authorities, this phrase does not mean the actual number of days from conception to birth. Dazey v. Dazey, 50 Cal. App.2d 15, 122 P.2d 308, 309.
GESTIO. In the civil law, behavior or conduct.
Management or transaction. Negotiorum ges-tio, the doing of another’s business; an interfer-ence in the affairs of another in his absence, from benevolente or friendship, and without authority. Dig. 3, 5, 45; Id. 46, 3, 12, 4; 2 Kent, Comm. 616, note.
GESTIO PRO HEREDE. Behavior as heir.
This expresslon was used in the Roman law, and adopted la the civil law and Scotch law, to denote conduct on the part of a person appointed heir to a deceased person, or otherwise entitied to succeed as heir, which indicates an intention to enter upon the inheritance, and to hold hlmself out as heir to creditors of the deceased; as by receivIng the renta due to the deceased, or by taking possesslon of his tltle-deeds, etc. Such acts will render the heir hable to the debts o1 his ancestor. Mozley & Whitley.
GESTOR. In the civil law, one who acts for an-other, or transacts another’s business. Calvin.
GESTU ET FAMA. An ancient and obsolete writ resorted to when a person’s good behavior was impeached. Lamb.Eir. 1. 4, c. 14.
GESTUM. Lat. In Roman law, a deed or act; a thing done. Some writers affected to make a dis. tinction between "gestum" and "factura." But the best authorities pronounced this subtile and inde-fensible. Dig. 50, 16, 58.
GET, n. Under Hebraic law, evidente of the granting of a divorce. Kopit v. Zilberszmidt, Sup., 35 N.Y.S.2d 558, 560. A bill of divorce among the Jews which is drawn in the Aramaic language, uniformly worded and carefully written by a prop-er scribe, and after proper ceremonies and ques-tionings by the rabbi, especially as to whether both parties agree to the divorce, the husband hands to the wife in the presence of ten witness-es. Shilman v. Shilman, 105 Misc. 461, 174 N.Y.S. 385, 386.
GEVILLOURIS. In oíd Scotch law. Gaolers. 1 Pitc.Crim.Tr. pt. 2, p. 234.
GEWINEDA. In Saxon law, the ancient conven-tion of the people to decide a cause.
GEWITNESSA. In Saxon and oíd English law, the giving of evidence.
GEWRITE. In Saxon law, deeds or charters; writings. 1 Reeve, Eng.Law 10.
GIBBET. A gallows; the post on which malefac-tors are hanged, or on which their bodies are ex-posed. It differs from a common gallows, in that it consists of one perpendicular post, from the top of which proceeds one arm, except it be a double gibbet, which is formed in the shape of the Roman capital T. Enc.Lond.
GIBBET LAW. Lynch law; in particular a cus• tom anciently prevailing in the parish of Halifax, England, by which the free burghers held a sum-mary trial of any one accused of petit larceny, and, if they found him guilty, ordered him to be de-capitated.
GIFT. A voluntary transfer of personal property without consideration. Gordon v. Barr, Cal.App., 82 P.2d 955, 956, 957. A parting by owner with property without pecuniary consideration. Hays’ Adm’rs v. Patrick, 266 Ky. 713, 99 S.W.2d 805, 809. A voluntary conveyance of land, or transfer of goods, from one person to another, made gratui-tously, and not upon any consideration of blood or money. 2 Bl.Comm. 440; 2 Steph.Comm. 102; 2 Kent, Comm. 437. Ingram v. Colgan, 106 Cal. 113, 38 P. 315, 28 L.R.A. 187, 46 Am.St.Rep. 221; Gray v. Barton, 55 N.Y. 72, 14 Am.Rep. 181; Hynes v. White, 47 Cal.App. 549, 190 P. 836, 838; In re Van Alstyne, 207 N.Y. 298, 100 N.E. 802, 804.
Essentlal requisites of "gift" are capaclty of donor, intention of donor to make gift, completed delivery to or for donee, and acceptance of gift by donee. In re Green-berg’s Will, 286 N.Y.S. 56, 58, 158 Mlsc. 446.
In popular language, a voluntary conveyance or assign-ment is called a "deed of gift."
An "advancement" is a gift made with the intention that it shall be charged to the donee in the distribution of the donor’s estate, while a "gift" is made without any purpose that it shall be thereafter accounted for. Ron v. Connelly, 253 Ky. 181, 69 S.W.2d 23.
An absolute gift, or gift inter vivos, as distinguished from a testamentary gift, or one made in contemplation of death, is one by which the donee becomes in the lifetime of the donor the absolute owner of the thing given, whereas a donatio mortis causa leaves the whole title in the donor, unless the event occurs (the death of the donor) which is to divest him. Buecker v. Carr, 60 N.J.Eq. 300, 47 A. 34; Goodan v. Goodan, 184 Ky. 79, 211 S.W. 423, 424; Baker v. Baker, 123 Md. 32, 90 A. 776, 779; McCoy v. Shawnee Building & Loan Ass’n, 122 Kan. 38, 251 P. 194, 195, 49 A.L.R. 1441; First Nat. Bank v. Liberty Trust Co., 151 Md. 241, 134 A. 210, 213, 47 A.L.R. 730; Starks v. Lincoln, 316 Mo. 483, 291 S.W. 132, 134.
As distinguished from a gift in trust, it is one where not only the legal title but the beneficia’ ownership as well is vested in the donee. Watkins v. Bigelow, 93 Minn. 210, 100 N.W. 1104; Allen v. Hendrick, 104 Or. 202, 206 P. 733, 740.
The only important difference between a "gift" and a "voluntary trust" Is that in the case of a gift the thing ltself passes to the donee, while in the case of a trust the actual, beneflcial, or equitable title passes to the cestui que trust, while the legal title is transferred to a third person, or retained by the person creating it. In re Alberts’ Estate, 38 Cal.App.2d 42, 100 P.2d 538, 540.
In English law, a conveyance of lands in tail; a conveyance of an estate tail in which the op-erative words are "I give," or "I have given." 2 Bl.Comm. 316; 1 Steph.Comm. 473.
-Gift in Default of Appointment. One implied on failure of donee to exercise a power of appoint-ment where it was his duty to do so or where do-nor expresses an intention to make a legal gift to members of class in default of appointment. Re-statement, Real Property, vol. 3, Topic 9, § 367.
GIFT CAUSA MORTIS. A gift of personalty made in expectation of death, then imminent, on an essential condition that property shall belong fully to donee in case donor dies as anticipated, leaving donee surviving him, and gift is not in meantime revoked. Flint v. Varney, 220 Iowa 1241, 264 N.W. 277, 278, 279.
GIFT DEED. A deed for a nominal sum. Bertel-sen v. Bertelson, 49 Cal.App.2d 479, 122 P.2d 130, 133.
GIFT ENTERPRISE. A scheme for the division or distribution of articles to be determined by chance amongst those who have taken shares in the scheme. City of Oxford v. Ritz Theatre, Miss., 180 So. 88, 89; State v. Shugart, 138 Ala. 86, 35 So. 28, 100 Am.St.Rep. 17; Winston v. Beeson, 135 N.C. 271, 47 S.E. 457, 65 L.R.A. 167.
A sporting artífice by which, for example, a merchant or tradesman sells his wares for thelr market value, but, by way of Inducement, gives to such purchaser a ticket which entitles him to a chance to win certain prizes to be deter-mined after the manner of a lottery. Code 1933, § 26-6501. Barker v. State, 56 Ga.App. 705, 193 S.E. 605, 607, 609.
GIFTS INTER VIVOS. Gifts between the living, which are perfected and become absolute during lifetime of donor and donee. Neal v. Neal, 194 Ark. 226, 106 S.W.2d 595, 600.
GIFT OVER. A gift to one for life, and from and after his deceased to another, created a "gift over." In re Feeney’s Estate, 293 Pa. 273, 142 A. 284, 289.
GIFT TO A CLASS. A gift of aggregate sum to body of persons uncertain in number at time of gift, to be ascertained at future time, who are all to take in equal shares, or some other definite pro-portion; share of each being dependent for its amount upon ultimate number taking. In re Mur-phy’s Estate, 99 Mont. 114, 43 P.2d 233, 236; Wess-borg v. Merrill, 195 Mich. 556, 162 N.W. 102, 106, L.R.A.1918E, 1074; Blackstone v. Althouse, 278 m. 481, 116 N.E. 154, 157, L.R.A.1918B, 230.GIFTA AQUIE. The stream of water to a mili. Mon.Angl. tom. 3.
GIFTOMAN. In Swedish law, the right to dis-pose of a woman in marriage, or the person pos-sessing such right,—her father, if living, or, if he be dead, the mother.
GILD. In Saxon law, a tax or tribute. Spelman.
A fine, mulct, or amerciament; a satisfaction or compensation for an injury.
A fraternity, society, or company of persons combined together, under certain regulations, and with the king’s license, and so called because its expenses were defrayed by the contributions (geld, gild) of its members. Spelman. In other words, a corporation; called, in Latin, "societas," "col-legium," "fratria," "fraternitas," "sodalitium," "adunatio;" and, in foreign law, "gildonia." Spel-man. There were various kinds of these gilds, as merchant or commercial gilds, religious gilds, and others. 3 Turn.Anglo Sax. 98; 3 Steph.Comm. 173, note u. See Gilda Mercatoria.
A friborg, or decennary; called, by the Saxons, "gyldscipes," and" its members, "gildones" and "congildones." Spelman.
GILD-HALL. See Guildhall.
GILD-RENT. Certain payments to the crown from any gild or fraternity.
GILDA MERCATORIA. A gild merchant, or mer-chant gild; a gild, corporation, or company of merchants. 10 Coke, 30.
GILDABLE. In old English law, taxable, tribu-tary, or contributory; Hable to pay tax or tribute. Cowell; Blount.
GILDO. In Saxon law, members of a gild or de-cennary. Oftener spelled "congi/do." Du Cange; Spelman.
GILL. A measure of capacity, equal to one-fourth of a pint.
GILOUR. L. Fr. A cheat or deceiver. Applied in Britton to those who sold false or spurious things for good, as pewter for silver or laten for gold. Britt. c. 15.
GILT EDGE. As applied to commercial paper, a colloquialism, meaning of the best quality or high-est price, first class, and not implying that a note which is not gilt edge is not collectible, or that the maker is irresponsible. Martin v. Moreland, 93 Or. 61, 180 P. 933, 934.
GIN MEN. In mining. Men employed in coal mines who have no speciflc work to do, but are hired to do general work, or any kind of work they are directed to do. The word "gin" in this expression is apparently a contraction of the word "general." Smith v. North Jellico Coal Co., 114 S.W. 785, 786, 131 Ky. 196, 28 L.R.A.N.S. 1266.
GINNING ADVANCES. Include cost to grower of picking crop, wages of weigher, rent of sleeping tents for pickers, and cost of trucking cotton from field to gin and other such expenses. Schumann v. California Cotton Credit Corporation, 105 Cal. App. 136, 286 P. 1068, 1070.
GIRANTE. An Italian word, which signifies the drawer of a bill. It is derived from "girare," to draw.
GIRDLE, v. To "girdle" a tree for the purpose of obtaining crude turpentine is to cut off a ring of bark around the trunk. Howard v. State, 17 Ala.App. 9, 81 So. 345, 346.
GIRTH. In Saxon and old English law, a measure of length, equal to one yard, derived from the girth or circumference of a man’s body.
GIRTH AND SANCTUARY. In old Scotch law, an asylum given to murderers, where the murder was committed without any previous design, and in chaude mella, or heat of passion. Bell.
GISEMENT. L. Fr. Agistment; cattle taken in to graze at a certain price; also the money re-ceived for grazing cattle.
GISER. L. Fr. To he. Gist en le bouche, it lies in the mouth. Le action bien gist, the action well lies. Gisant, lying.
GISETAKER. An agister; a person who takes cattle to graze.
GISLE. In Saxon law, a pledge. Fredgisle, a pledge of peace. Gislebert, an illustrious pledge.
GIST. In pleading, the essential ground or object of the action in point of law, without which there would be no cause of action. Gould, Pl. c. 4, § 12.
The cause for which an action will lie, the ground or foundation of a suit, without which it would not be maintainable, the essential ground or object of the suit without which there is no cause of action. Casavalo v. D’Auria, 12 N.J. Misc. 81, 169 A. 520.
GIVE. To transfer ownership or possession with-out compensation. University of Vermont v. Wil-bur’s Estate, 105 Vt. 147, 163 A. 572, 575. To be-stow upon another gratuitously or without consid-eration. Neblett v. Smith, 142 Va. 840, 128 S.E. 247, 251.
To transfer or yield to, or bestow upon, another. One of the operativo words in deeds of conveyance of real prop-erty, importing at common law, a warranty or covenant for qulet enjoyment during the lifetime of the grantor. Mack v. Patchin, 29 How.Prac., N.Y., 23; Young v. Hargrave, 7 Ohio, 69, pt. 2; Dow v. Lewis, 4 Gray, Mass., 473.
GIVE AND BEQUEATH. These words, in a will, import a benefit in point of right, to take effect up-on the decease of the testator and proof of the will, unless it is made in terms to depend upon some contingency or condition precedent. Eldridge v. Eldridge, 9 Cush., Mass., 519.
GIVE BAIL. To furnish or put in ball or security for one’s appearance.
GIVE COLOR. To admit an apparent or colorable right in the opposite party. Under the ancient system a plea of confession and avold-anee must give color to the afftrmative averments oí the cornplaint, or it would be fatally defective. The "glving color" was simply the absence of any denials, and the express or silent admission that the declaration, as far as it went, told the truth. Smith v. Marley, 39 Idaho, 779, 230 P. 769, 770. See Color.
GIVE JUDGMENT. To render, pronounce, or de-clare the judgment of the court in an action at law; not spoken of a judgment obtained by con-fession. Schuster v. Rader, 13 Colo. 329, 22 P. 505.
GIVE NOTICE. To communicate to another, in any proper or permissible legal manner, informa-tion or warning of an existing fact or state of facts or (more usually) of some intended future action. O’Neil v. Dickson, 11 Ind. 254; In re Devlin, 7 Fed.Cas. 564; St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. Co. v. Hicks, Tex.Civ.App., 158 S.W. 192, 194.
GIVE TIME. Extending the period at which, by the contract between them, the principal debtor was originally hable to pay the creditor. Buffalo Forge Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 142 Misc. 647, 256 N.Y.S. 329, 334.
GIVE WAY. In the rules of navigation, one ves-sel is said to "give way" to another when she de-viates from her course in such a manner and to such an extent as to allow the other to pass with-out altering her course. See Lockwood v. Lashell, 19 Pa. 350.
GIVER. A donor; he who makes a gift.
GIVING IN PAYMENT. In Louisiana law, a phrase (translating the Fr. "dation en paiement") which signifies the delivery and acceptance of real or personal property in satisfaction of a debt, instead of a payment in money. See Civil Code La. art. 265.
GIVING RINGS. A ceremony anciently perform-ed in England by serjeants at law at the time of their appointment. The rings were inscribed with a motto, generally in Latin.
GLADIOLUS. A little sword or dagger; a kind of sedge. Mat. Paris.
GLADIUS. Lat. A sword. An ancient emblem of defense. Hence the ancient earls or comites (the king’s attendants, advisers, and associates in his government) were made by being girt with swords, (gladio succincti.)
The emblem of the executory power of the law in punishing crimes. 4 Bl.Comm. 177.
In old Latin authors, and in the Norman laws, this word was used to signify supreme jurisdic-tion, (jus gladii.)
GLAIVE. A sword, lance, or horseman’s staff. One of the weapons allowed in a trial by combat.
GLANS. In the civil law, acorns or nuts of the oak or other trees. In a larger sense, all fruits of trees.
GLASS—MEN. A term used in St. 1 Jac. I, c. 7, for wandering rogues or vagrants.GLAVEA. A hand dart. Cowell.
GLEANING. The gathering of grain after reap-ers, or of grain left ungathered by reapers. Held not to be a right at common law. 1 H.B1. 51.
GLEBA. A turf, sod, or clod of earth. The soil or ground; cultivated land in generala Church land (solum et dos ecclesice). Spelman. See Glebe.
GLEB/E ASCRIPTITIL Villein-socmen, who could not be removed from the land while they did the service due. Bract. c. 7; 1 Reeve, Eng. Law, 269.
GLEBARIIE. Turfs dug out of the ground. Cowell.
GLEBE. In Ecclesiastical law, the land possessed as part of the endowment or revenue of a church or ecclesiastical benefice.
In Roman law, a clod; turf; soil. Hence, the soil of an inheritance; an agrarian estate. Servi addicti glebce were serfs attached to and passing with the estate. Cod. 11, 47, 7, 21; Nov. 54, 1.
GLIDER. A forro of aircraft similar to an air-plane but without any engine. Spychala v. Metro-politan Life Ins. Co., 339 Pa. 237, 13 A.2d 32, 33.
GLIDING. Art of flying a glider. Spychala v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 339 Pa. 237, 13 A.2d 32, 33.
GLISCYWA. In Saxon law, a fraternity.
GLOBE DOCTRINE. That where the National Labor Relations Board could conclude that either a craft or a plant unit would be appropriate for collective bargaining purposes and where either contention if unopposed would be adopted by the Board, it normally gives paramount weight to the wishes of the employees within the craft unit. International Ass’n of Machinists, Tool and Die Makers’ Lodge No. 35 v. National Labor Relations Board, 71 App.D.C. 175, 110 F.2d 29, 45.
GLOMERELLS. Commissioners appointed to de-termine differences between scholars in a school or university and the townsmen of the place. Jacob.
GLOS. Lat. In the civil law, a husband’s sister. Dig. 38, 10, 4, 6.
GLOSS. An interpretation, consisting of one or more words, interlinear or marginal; an annota-tion, explanation, or comment on any passage in the text of a work, for purposes of elucidation or amplification. Particularly applied to the com-ments on the Corpus Juris.
GLOSSA. Lat. A gloss, explanation, or inter-pretation.
The glossce of the Roman law are brief Illustrative com-ments or annotations on the text of Justinian’s collections, made by the professors who taught or lectured on them about the twelfth century, (especially at the law school of Bologna,) and were hence called "glossators." These glosses were at first inserted in the text with the words to which they referred, and were called "glossw interiine-ares," but afterwards they were placed In the margin, partly at the slde, and partly under the text, and called "glossce marginales." A selection of them was made by Accursius, between A. D. 1220 and 1260, under the titie of "glossa Ordinaria," which is of the greatest authorlty. Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 90.
GLOSSA VIPERINA EST QUM CORRODIT VIS-CERA TEXTUS. 11 Coke, 34. It is a poisonous gloss which corrupts the essence of the text.
GLOSSATOR. In the civil law, a commentator or annotator. A terrn applied to the professors and teachers of the Roman law in the twelfth century, at the head of whom was Irnerius. Mac-keld. Rom. Law, § 90.
GLOUCESTER, STATUTE OF. The statute is the 6 Edw. I, c. 1, A.D. 1278. It takes its name from the place of its enactment, and was the first statute giving costs in actions.
GLOVE SILVER. Extraordinary rewards former-ly given to officers of courts, etc.; money formerly given by the sheriff of a county in which no of-fenders are left for execution to the clerk of as-size and judges’ officers. Jacob.
GLOVES. It was an ancient custom on a maiden assize, when there was no offender to be tried, for the sheriff to present the judge with a pair of white gloves. It is an immemorial custom to re-move the glove from the right hand on taking oath. Wharton.
GLYN. A hollow between two mountains; a val-ley or glen. Co.Litt. 5b.
GO. To be dismissed from a court. To issue from a court. "The court said a mandamos must go." 1 W.B1. 50. "Let a supersedeas go." 5 Mod. 421. "The writ may go." 18 C.B. 35.
GO RAIL. To assume the responsibility of a surety on a bail-bond.
GO FIFTY—FIFTY. Division into halves of some-thing under discussion by the parties at the time. Boyer v. Bowles, 310 Mass. 134, 37 N.E.2d 489, 493.
GO HENCE. To depart from the court; with the further implication that a suitor who is directed to "go hence" is dismissed from further attend-ance upon the court in respect to the suit or pro-ceeding which brought him there, and that he is finally denied the relief which he sought, or, as the case may be, absolved from the liability sought to be imposed upon him. See Hiatt v. Kinkaid, 40 Neb. 178, 58 N.W. 700.
GO TO. In a statute, will, or other instrument, a direction that property shall "go to" a designated person rneans that it shall pass or proceed to such person, vest in and belong to him. In re Hitchins’ Estate, 43 Misc. 485, 89 N.Y.S. 472; Plass v. Plass, 121 Cal. 131, 53 P. 448.
GO TO PROTEST. Commercial paper is said to "go to protest" when it is dishonored by non-payment or non-acceptance and is handed to a no-tary for protest.GO WITHOUT DAY. Words used to denote that a party is dismissed the court. He is said to go without day, because there is no day appointed for him to appear again.
GOAF. In coal mining a space from which ma-terial has been removed or the waste left in old work. Harlan Ridgeway Mining Co. v. Jackson, 278 Ky. 767, 129 S.W.2d 585, 586.
GOAT, GOTE. In old English law, a contrivance or structure for draining waters out of the land in-to the sea. Callis describes goats as "usual en-gines erected and built with portcullises and doors of timber and stone or brick, invented first in Low-er Germany." Callis, Sewers, (91), 112, 113. Cow-ell defines "gote," a ditch, sewer, or gutter.
GOB. In coal mining a space from which mate-rial has been removed or the waste left in old work. Harlan Ridgeway Mining Co. v. Jackson, 278 Ky. 767, 129 S.W.2d 585, 586. Space between face of coal and where props had been set by ma-chine operators on previous trip. New Union Coal Co. v. Sult, 172 Ark. 753, 290 S.W. 580, 581.
GOD AND MY COUNTRY. The answer made by a prisoner, when arraigned, in answer to the question, "How will you be tried?"
In the ancient practice he had the choice (as appears by the question) whether to submit to the trial by ordeal (by God) or to be traed by a jury, (by the country;) and it is probable that the original form of the answer was, "By God or my country," whereby the prisoner averred his Innocence by declining neither of the modes of trial.
GOD—BOTE. An ecclesiastical or church fine paid for crimes and offenses committed against God. Cowell.
GOD—GILD. That which is offered to God or his service. Jacob.
GOD’S PENNY. In old English law, earnest-mon-ey; money given as evidente of the completion of a bargain. This name is probably derived from the fact that such money was given to the church or distributed in alms.
GOGING—STOLE. An old form of the word "cuck-ing-stool" (q. v.). Cowell.
GOING. In various compound phrases (as those which follow) this terco implies either motion, progress, active operation, or present and continu-ous validity and efficacy.
GOING AND dOMING RULE. Declares that em-ployees while going to or returning from their places of employment are not within the scope of their employment. Robinson v. George, 16 Cal. 2d 238, 105 P.2d 914, 917, 918.
GOING BEFORE THE WIND. In the language of marinen and in the rules of navigation, a ves-sel is said to be going "bef ore the wind" when the wind is free as respects her course, that is, comes from behind the vessel or over the stern, so that her yards may be braced square across. She is said to be "going off large" when she has the wind free on either tack, that is, when it blows from some point abaft the beam or from the quarter. Hall v. The Buffalo, 11 Fed.Cas. 216; Ward v. The Fashion, 29 Fed.Cas. 188.
GOING CONCERN. An enterprise which is be-ing carried on as a whole, and with some particu-lar object in view. The terco refers to an exist-ing solvent business, which is being copducted in the usual and ordinary way for which it was or-ganizad. When applied to a corporation, it means that it continues to transact its ordinary business. State ex rel. Sorensen v. Lincoln Hail Ins. Co., 133 Neb. 496, 276 N.W. 169, 174. A firm or cor-poration which, though embarrassed or even in-solvent, continues to transact its ordinary busi-ness. White, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Pettes Importing Co., C.C.Mo., 30 F. 865; Corey v. Wadsworth, 99 Ala. 68, 11 So. 350, 23 L.R.A. 618, 42 Am.St.Rep. 55; Pioneer Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. State, 64 Okl. 304, 167 P. 995, 1000, L.R.A.1918C, 138; City and County of Denver v. Denver Union Wa-ter Co., 246 U.S. 178, 38 S.Ct. 278, 62 L.Ed. 649.
GOING CONCERN VALDE. The value which in-heres in a plant where its business is established, as distinguished from one which has yet to estab-lish its business. East Bay Water Co. v. Mc-Laughlin, D.C.Cal., 24 F.Supp. 222, 226.
GOING INTO EFFECT OF ACT. Becoming oper-ative as a law. State ex rel. Bishop v. Board of Education of Mt. Orab Village School Dist., Brown County, 139 Ohio St. 427, 40 N.E.2d 913, 919.
GOING OFF LARGE. See "Going Bef ore the Wind," supra.
GOING PRICE. The prevalent price; the cur-rent market value of the article in question at the time and place of sale. Kelsea v. Haines, 41 N.H. 254; Hoff v. Lodi Canning Co., 51 Cal.App. 299, 196 P. 779, 780.
GOING THROUGH THE BAR. The act of the chief of an English common-law court in demand-ing of every member of the bar, in order of sen-iority, if he has anything to move.
This was done at the sitting of the court each day 1n term, except special paper days, crown paper days In the queen’s bench, and revenue paper days in the exchequer. On the last day of term this order is reversed, the first and second time round. In the exchequer the postman and tub-man are first called on. Wharton.
GOING TO THE COUNTRY. When a party, un-der the common-law system of pleading, finished his pleading by the words "and of this he puts himself upon the country," this was called "going to the country." It was the essential termination of a pleading which took issue upon a material fact in the preceding pleading. Wharton.
GOING VALDE. A value or asset which arises from having an established or going business. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Louis-iana Public Service Commission, 187 La. 137, 174 So. 180, 195. Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Railroad Commission of Wisconsin, 161 Wis. 122, 152 N.W. 859, 861, L.R.A.1916F, 592; Public Service Gas Co. v. Board of Public Utility Com’rs, 84 N.J.L. 463, 87 A. 651, 657, L.R.A.1918A, 421.GOING WITNESS. One who is about to take his departure from the jurisdiction of the court, although only into a state or country under the general sovereignty; as from one to another of the United States, or from England to Scotland.
GOLD BOND. One payable in gold coin or its equivalent, which means any money acceptable to United States government in payment of debts due it. Huron Lodge No. 444, B. P. O. E. v. Mc-Namara, 53 S.D. 153, 220 N.W. 468, 470.
GOLDA. A mine. Blount. A sink or passage for water. Cowell.
GOLDSMITHS’ NOTES. Bankers’ cash notes (i. e., promissory notes given by a banker to his customers as acknowledgments of the receipt of money) were originally called in London "gold-smiths’ notes," from the circumstance that all the banking business in England was originally trans-acted by goldsmiths. Wharton.
GOLDWIT. A mulct or fine in gold.
GOLIARDUS. L. Lat. A jester, buffoon, or juggler. Spelman, voc. "Goliardensis."
GOIVIASIITAIL In Hindu law, an agent; a stew-ard; a confidential factor; a representative.
GONORRIKEA. In medical jurisprudence, a ven-ereal disease, characterized by a purulent infiam-mation of the urethra in the male and the vagina in the female. Vulgarly called "clap." Sally v. Brown, 220 Ky. 576, 295 S.W. 890, 891.
GOOD. Valid; sufficient in law; effectual; unob-jectionable; sound. Morrison v. Farmers’ & Traders’ State Bank, 70 Mont. 146, 225 P. 123, 125; McNabb v. Juergens (Iowa) 180 N.W. 758, 761; Raney & Hamon v. Hamilton & White, Tex.Civ. App., 234 S.W. 229, 230.
Responsible; solvent; able to pay an amount specified.
Of a value corresponding with its terms; col-lectible. A note is said to be "good" when the payment of it at maturity may be relied on. Cur-tis v. Smallman, 14 Wend., N.Y., 232; Cooke v. Nathan, 16 Barb., N.Y., 344; In re Parker Bros. & Johnson, D.C.N.C., 279 F. 425, 428.
Writing the word "Good" across the faca of a check is the customary mode in which bankers at the present day certif y that the drawer has funds to meet it, and that it will be paid on presentation for that purpose. Merchants’ Nat. Bank v. State Nat. Bank, 10 Wall. 645, 19 L.Ed. 1008; Irving Bank v. Wetherald, 36 N.Y. 335.
Public good. Under a statute providing that the Public Service Commission shall make an order permittIng a trans-fer of the property of a public utility, when it is for the public good, such transfer is for the public good whenever it is not contrary to law and is reasonable, since it is not for the public good that such utilities be unreasonably restrained of their liberties. Grafton County Electric Light & Power Co. v. State, 77 N.H. 539, 94 A. 193, 194.
GOOD ABEARING. See Abearance.
GOOD AND CLEAR RECORD TITILE, FREE FROM ALL INCUMBRANCES. A title which on the record itself can be again sold as free from obvious defects and substantial doubts, and differs from a "good, marketable title," which is an ac-tual title, but which may be established by evi-dence independently of the record. O’Meara v. Gleason, 246 Mass. 136, 140 N.E. 426, 427.
GOOD AND LAVVFUL MEN. Those qualified for service on juries. Bonds v. State, Mart. & Y., Tenn. 146, 17 Am.Dec. 795; Turner v. State, 128 Tenn. 27, 157 S.W. 67, 68, Ann.Cas.1914D, 693.
GOOD AND SUBSTA1NTIAL DEPOT. A depot suitable to take care of both passenger and freight business. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Letcher Coun-ty Coal & Improvement Co., 195 Ky. 29, 243 S.W. 45, 48.
GOOD AND SUFFICIENT BRAKES. Brakes adequate to promptly check and slacken speed of motor vehicle and bring it to complete stop (Comp. St.1922, § 8395). Ziskovsky v. Miller, 120 Neb. 255, 231 N.W. 809, 811.
GOOD AND VALID. Reliable, sufflcient, and un-impeachable in law; adequate; responsible.
GOOD AND WORKMANLIKE MANNER. In a manner generally considered skillful by those ca-pable of judging such work in the community of the performance. Burnett & Bean v. Miller, 205 Ala. 606, 88 So. 871, 872; Morris v. Fox, 79 Ind. App. 389, 135 N.E. 663, 664.
GOOD BEHAVIOR. Orderly and lawful conduct; behavior such as is proper for a peaceable and law-abiding citizen. Huyser v. Com., 25 Ky.L. Rep. 608, 76 S.W. 175; In re Spenser, 22 Fed.Cas. 921. "Good behavior," as used in an order sus-pending sentence upon a defendant during good behavior, means merely conduct conformable to law, or to the particular law theretofore breached. Ex parte Hamm, 24 N.M. 33, 172 P. 190, 191, L.R. A.1918D, 694; Baker v. Commonwealth, 181 Ky. 437, 205 S.W. 399, 401.
GOOD CAUSE. Substantial reason, one that af-f ords a legal excuse. Pines v. District Court in and for Woodbury County, 233 Iowa 1284, 10 N. W.2d 574, 580, 583. Legally sufficient ground or reason. Jackson v. U. S., C.C.A.Ariz., 295 F. 620, 622; Lockwood v. Lockwood, 19 Ariz. 215, 168 P. 501, 502.
As respects discharging employees in classified service, "good cause" includes any ground which is put forward by authorities in good faith and which is not arbitrary, irra– tional, unreasonable or irrelevant to the duties with which such authorities are charged, and is not limited to some form of inefficiency or of misconduct on the part of the person dismissed. Nephew v. Wills, 298 Mich. 187, 298 N.W. 376, 377, 135 A.L.R. 1340.
As respects Industrial Accident Commission’s rescinding its decision, "good cause" included a mistake of law, unless the award had been sustained on appeal. Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Vanover, 262 Ky. 808, 91 S.W.2d 518.
"Good cause" for extension of time in which to serve bill of exceptions exists if delay was for good reason, or that there was justification or excuse for the delay. Kisten v. Kisten, 229 Wis. 479, 282 N.W. 629, 632.
GOOD CONSIDERATION. "Good consideration" and "valuable consideration" are synonymous terms, although technically "good consideration" was defined as consideration of blood, or natural love and affection; that founded on motives of generosity, prudence, and natural duty. Belknap v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 108 Vt. 421, 188 A. 897, 899.
GOOD COUNTRY. In Scotch law, good men of the country. A name given to a jury.
GOOD FAITIL Honesty of intention, and free-dom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. Siano v. Helvering, D.C.N.J., 13 F.Supp. 776, 780. An hon-est intention to abstain from taking any uncon-scientious advantage of another, even through technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render transaction unconscientious. War-field Natural Gas Co. v. Allen, 248 Ky. 646, 59 S. W.2d 534, 91 A.L.R. 890; Crouch v. First Nat. Bank, 156 III. 342, 40 N.E. 974; Waugh v. Prince, 121 Me. 67, 115 A. 612, 614.
GOOD HEALTH. "Good health," as employed in insurance contract, ordinarily means a reasonably good state of health. Kroon v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., 290 Ill.App. 35, 7 N.E.2d 935, 937. It means that the applicant has no grave, important, or ser-ious disease, and is free from any ailment that seriously affects the general soundness and health-fulness of the system. Mincy v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 130 Pa.Super. 285, 196 A. 893, 897. Not mere temporary indisposition not tending to weak-en or undermine constitution. Zogg v. Bankers’ Life Co. of Des Moines, Iowa, C.C.A.W.Va., 62 F. 2d 575, 578. It does not mean a condition of per-fect health. White v. Sovereign Camp, W. O. W., 184 S.C. 215, 192 S.E. 161, 165.
GOOD JURY. A jury of which the members are selected from the list of special jurors. See L.R. 5 C.P. 155.
GOOD, MERCHANTABLE ABSTRACT OF TI-TLE. An abstract showing a good title, clear from incumbrances, and not merely an abstract of matters of record affecting the title, made by one engaged in the business of making abstracts in such form as is customary, as passing current among persons buying and selling real estate and examining titles. Geithman v. Eichler, 265 Ill. 579, 107 N.E. 180, 182.
GOOD OF SERVICE. Discharge of a civil serv-ice employee for "good of the service" or "for cause" implies some personal misconduct, or fact, rendering incumbent’s further tenure harmful to the public interest. State ex rel. Eckles v. Kansas City, Mo.App., 257 S.W. 197, 200.
GOOD RECORD TITLE. A "good record title," without words of limitation, means that the prop-er records shall show an unincumbered, fee-simple title, the legal estate in fee, free and clear of all valid claims, liens, and incumbrances. Riggins v. Post, Tex.Civ.App., 172 S.W. 210, 211.
GOOD REPUTE. An expression, synonymous with and meaning only "of good reputation." State v. Wheeler, 108 Mo. 658, 665, 18 S.W. 924.

GOOD SAMARITAN DOCTRINE. One who sees a person in imminent and serious peril through negligence of another cannot be charged with con-tributory negligence, as a matter of law, in risk-ing his own life or serious injury in attempting to effect a rescue, provided the attempt is not recklessly or rashly made. Jobst v. Butler Well Servicing, Inc., 372 P.2d 55, 59, 190 Kan. 86. Un-der doctrine, negligence of a volunteer rescuer must worsen position of person in distress before liability will be imposed. U. S. v. DeVane, C.A. Fla., 306 F.2d 182, 186.
GOOD TITLE. One free from reasonable doubt, that is, not only a valid title in fact, but one that can again be sold to a reasonable purchaser or mortgaged to a person of reasonable prudence. Langford v. Berry, 68 Ga.App. 193, 22 S.E.2d 349, 351, a title free from litigation, palpable defects and grave doubts. Collins v. Martin, Tex.Civ. App., 6 S.W.2d 126, 128; Williams v. Hefner, 89 Mont. 361, 297 P. 492, 496.
GOOD WILL. The favor which the management of a business wins from the public. Seneca Ho-tel Co. v. U. S., Ct.Cl., 42 F.2d 343, 344. The fixed and favorable consideration of customers arising from established and well-conducted business. Colton v. Duvall, 254 Mich. 346, 237 S.W.2d 48, 49. The favorable consideration shown by the pur-chasing public to goods known to emanate from a particular source. White Tower System v. White Castle System of Eating Houses Corpora-tion, C.C.A.Mich., 90 F.2d 67, 69. Something in business which gives reasonable expectancy of preference in race of competition. In re Witkind’s Estate, 167 Misc. 885, 4 N.Y.S.2d 933, 947. The cus-tom or patronage of any established trade or busi-ness; the benefit or advantage of having estab-lished a business and secured its patronage by the public. The advantage or benefit which is ac-quired by an establishment, beyond the mere value of the capital, stocks, funds, or property employed therein, in consequence of the general public pat-ronage and encouragement which it receives from constant or habitual customers, on account of its local position, or common celebrity, or rep-utation for skill or affiuence or punctuality, or from other accidental circumstances or necessi-ties, or even from ancient partialities or preju-dices. Story, Partn. § 99; Haverly v. Elliott, 39 Neb. 201, 57 N.W. 1010. And as property inci-dent to business sold, favor vendor has won from public, and probability that all customers will continue their patronage. Nye Odorless Incin-erator Corporation v. Felton, 5 W.W.Harr. 236, 162 A. 504, 511. It means every advantage, every positive advantage, that has been acquired by a proprietor in carrying on his business, whether connected with the premises in which the business is conductecl, or with the name under which it is managed, or with any other matter carrying with it the benefit of the business. Glen & Hall Mf g. Co. v. Hall, 61 N.Y. 226, 19 Am.Rep. 278; In re Ball’s Estate, 161 App.Div. 79, 146 N.Y.S. 499, 501; Whittle v. Davie, 116 Va. 575, 82 S.E. 724. 726; Acme, Palmers & De Mooy Foundry Co. v. Weiss, D.C.Ohio, 21 F.2d 492, 493.
GOODRIGHT, GOODTITLE. The fictitious plain-tiff in the old action of ejectment, most fre-quently called "John Doe," was sometimes called "Goodright" or "Goodtitle."
GOODS. A term of variable content. It may include every species of personal property or it may be given a very restricted meaning. Cate v. Merrill, 116 Me. 235, 102 A. 235, 236, 237; Can-ales v. Earl, Mun.Ct.N.Y., 168 N.Y.S. 726, 727.
In contracts, the term "goods" is not so wide as "chattels," for it applies to inanimate objects, and does not include animals or chattels real, as a Tease for years of house or land, which "chattels" does include. Co. Litt. 118; St. Joseph Hydraulic Co. v. Wilson, 133 Ind. 465, 33 N.E. 113; Putnam v. Westcott, 19 Johns, N.Y., 76.
In wills, "goods" is nomen generalissimum, and, if there is nothing to limit it, will comprehend all the personal estate of the testator, as stocks, bonds, notes, money, plate, furniture, etc. Ken-dall v. Kendall, 4 Russ. 370; Chamberlain v. West-ern Transp. Co., 44 N.Y. 310, 4 Am.Rep. 681; Key-ser v. School Dist., 35 N.H. 483.
GOODS AND CHATTELS. This phrase is a gen-eral denomination of personal property, as dis-tinguished from real property; the term "chat-tels" having the effect of extending its scope to any objects of that nature which would not prop-erly be included by the term "goods" alone, e. g., living animals, emblements, and fruits, and terms under leases for years. Larson v. Judd, 200 III. App. 420. The general phrase also embraces choses in action, as well as personalty in posses-sion. In wills. The term "goods and chattels" will, unless restrained by the context, pass all the personal estate, including leases for years, cattle, corn, debts, and the like. Ward, Leg. 208, 211.
GOODS SOLD AND DELIVERED. A phrase fre-quently used in the action of assumpsit, when the sale and delivery of goods furnish the cause.
GOODS, WARES, AND MERCHANDISE. A gen-eral and comprehensive designation of such chat-tels as are ordinarily the subject of traffic and sale. The phrase is used in the statute of frauds, and is frequently found in pleadings and other instruments. As to its scope, see State v. Brooks, 4 Conn. 449; French v. Schoonmaker, 69 N.J.L. 6, 54 A. 225; Sewall v. Allen, 6 Wend., N.Y., 355; Smith v. Wilcox, 24 N.Y. 358, 82 Am.Dec. 302; Banta v. Chicago, 172 III. 204, 50 N.E. 233, 40 L. R.A. 611; Basset v. City of Boston, 226 Mass. 64, 114 N.E. 1035; Culp v. Holbrook, 76 Ind.App. 272, 129 N.E. 278, 280.
GOOLE. In old English law, a breach in a bank or sea wall, or a passage worn by the flux and re-flux of the sea. St. 16 & 17 Car. II. c. 11.
GOPHER HOLING. The " `gopher hole’ method of blasting" consists in boring holes, horizontally into the bank of earth and inserting therein charg-es of powder, the explosion of which dislodges the bank. Bartnes v. Pittsburg Iron Ore Co., 123 Minn. 131, 143 N.W. 117.
GORCE, or GORS. A wear, pool, or pit of water. Termes de la Ley.
GORE. In old English law, a small, narrow slip of ground. Cowell. In modern land law, a small triangular piece of land, such as may be left be-tween surveys which do not close. In some of the New England states (as Maine and Vermont) the term is applied to a subdivision of a county, hav-ing a scanty population and for that reason not organized as a town.
GORGE. A defile between hills or mountains, that is a narrow throat or outlet from a region of country. Gibbs v. Williams, 25 Kan. 214, 37 Am.Rep. 241.
GOSSIPRED. In canon law, compaternity; spir-itual affinity.
GOUT. In medical jurisprudence, an inflamma-tion of the fibrous and ligamentous parts of the joints, characterized or caused by an excess of uric acid in the blood; usually, but not invariably, occurring in the joints of the feet, and then specifically called "podagra."
GOVERN. To direct and control the actions or conduct of, either by established laws or by ar-bitrary will; to direct and control, rule, or regu-late, by authority. Tucker v. State, 218 Ind. 614, 35 N.E.2d 270, 291. To be a rule, precedent, law or deciding principie for. Asnon v. Foley, 105 Cal.App. 624, 288 P. 792, 795.
GOVERNMENT. From the Latin gubernaculum. Signifies the instrument, the helm, whereby the ship to which the state was compared, was guided on its course by the "gubernator" or helmsman, and in that view, the government is but an agency of the state, distinguished as it must be in accur-ate thought from its scheme and machinery of government. State v. Chase, 175 Minn. 259, 220 N.W. 951, 953.
The system of polity in a state; that form of fundamental rules and principies by which a na-tion or state is governed, or by which individual members of a body politic are to regulate their social actions; a constitution, either written or unwritten, by which the rights and duties of citi-zens and public officers are prescribed and de-fined, as a monarchical government, a republican government, etc. Webster.
An empire, kingdom, state or independent politi-cal community; as in the phrase, "Compacts be-tween independent governments."
The sovereign or supreme power in a state or nation.
The machinery by which the sovereign power in a state expresses its will and exercises its func-tions; or the framework of political institutions, departments, and offices, by means of which the executive, judicial, legislative, and administrati ve business of the state is carried on.The whole class or body of office-holders or functionaries considered in the aggregate, upon whom devolves the executive, judicial, legislative, and administrative business of the state. Stokes v. United States, C.C.A.Mo., 264 F. 18, 22.
In a colloquial sense, the United States or its representatives, considered as the prosecutor in a criminal action; as in the phrase, "the govern-ment objects to the witness."
The regulation, restraint, supervision, or con-trol which is exercised upon the individual mem-bers of an organized jural society by those in-vested with authority; or the act of exercising supreme political power or control. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. School Dist. No. 1 in Yuma County, 63 Colo. 159, 165 P. 260, 263.
Federal government. The government of the United States of America, as distinguished from the governments of the several states.
Local government. The government or admin-istration of a particular locality; especially, the governmental authority of a municipal corpora-tion, as a city or county, over its local and in-dividual affairs, exercised in virtue of power del-egated to it for that purpose by the general gov-ernment of the state or nation.
Mixed government. A form of government combining some of the features of two or all of the three primary forms, viz., monarchy, aristoc-racy, and democracy.
Republican government. One in which the pow-ers of sovereignty are vested in the people and are exercised by the people, either directly, or through representatives chosen by the people, to whom those powers are specially delegated. Black, Const. Law (3d Ed.) 309; In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 11 S.Ct. 573, 35 L.Ed. 219; Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 175, 22 L.Ed. 627.
GOVERNMENT ANNUITIES SOCIETIES. So-cieties formed in England under 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 14, 7 & 8 Vict. c. 83, 16 & 17 Vict. c. 45, and 27 & 28 Vict. c. 43, to enable the industrious classes to make provisions for themselves by purchasing, on advantageous terms, a government annuity for Life or term of years. Wharton.
GOVERNMENT DE FACTO. A government of fact. A government actually exercising power and control in the state, as opposed to the true and lawful government; a government not es-tablished according to the constitution of the state, or not lawfully entitled to recognition or suprem-acy, but which has nevertheless supplanted or displaced the government de jure. A government deemed unlawful, or deemed wrongful or unjust, which, nevertheless, receives presently habitual obediente from the bulk of the community. Aust. Jur. 324.
There are several degrees of what Is called "de facto gov-ernment." Such a government, in its highest degree, assumes a character very closely resembling that of a law-ful government. This la when the usurping government expeis the regular authorities from thelr customary seats and functlons, and establishes itself In their place, and so becomes the actual government of a country. The dist/1- guishing characteristic of such a government is that adher-ents to it in war against the government de jure do not incur the penalties of treason; and, under certain limita-tions, obligations assumed by it in behalf of the country or otherwise will, in general, be respected by the government de jure when restored.
Such a government mlght be more aptly denominated a "government of paramount force," being maintained by active mllitary power agatnst the rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and obeyed in civil matters by prívate citizens. They are usually administered directly by military authority, but they may be adminis-tered, also, by civil authority, supported more or less by milltary force. Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall. 8, 9, 19 L.Ed. 361.
GOVERNMENT DE JURE. A government of right; the true and lawful government; a gov-ernment established according to the constitution of the state, and lawfully entitled to recognition and supremacy and the administration of the state, but which is actually cut off from power or control. A government deemed lawful, or deemed rightful or just, which, nevertheless, has been supplanted or displaced; that is to say, which receives not presently (although it received form-erly) habitual obediente from the bulk of the community. Aust. Jur. 324.
GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITY DOC-TRINE. The doctrine that government instru-mentalities are tax exempt.
The dominion exercised over the estate of deceased full-blood restricted Creek Indian, would not vent in the gov-ernment a control sufficlent to exempt the estate from estate taxes under the "government instrumentality doc-trine". Landman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.10, 123 F.2d 787, 789.
One owning and operating trucks under contract with federal government for transportation of mail held not entitled to have trucks exempted from state motor vehicle registration tax, on ground that trucks were immune from state taxation as agencies and instrumentalities of United States government. Moody v. Louwein, Tex.Civ.App., 300 S.W. 957, 958.
GOVERNMENTAL. Of, pertaining to, or pro-ceeding from government.
Generally, what are purely governmental duties of a city can be settled only by the particular facts. City of Waco v. Thompson, Tex.Civ.App., 127 S.W.2d 223, 225.
GOVERNMENTAL ACT. An act in exercise of police power or in exercise of legislative, discre-tionary, or judicial powers conferred on munici-pality for benefit of public. Broome v. City of Charlotte, 208 N.C. 729, 182 S.E. 325. Any act a state may lawfully perform or authorize and, as applied to the federal government, it is its ev-ery action within its constitutional power. Orme v. Atlas Gas & Oil Co., 217 Minn. 27, 13 N.W.2d 757, 762. A step physically talen by persons capable of exercising the sovereign authority of the foreign nation. Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, C.C.A.N.Y., 114 F.2d 438, 444.
GOVERNMENTAL ACTION. Any action of the federal government within its constitutional pow-er. Graves v. People of State of New York ex rel. O’Keefe, N.Y., 306 U.S. 466, 59 S.Ct. 595, 596, 83 L.Ed. 927, 120 A.L.R. 1466; Chapman v. State, 179 Miss. 507, 176 So. 391, 392. GOVERNMENTAL ACTIVITY. A function government in providing for its own support or in providing services to the public. For example taxation and the collection of taxes, Goble v. Zo-lot, 144 Neb. 70, 12 N.W.2d 311, 312; maintenance of firehouse property, Haynes v. City of New York, 259 App.Div. 837, 19 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165.
Generally when a municipallty’s activity is for advantage of state as a whole, or is in performance of a duty Impesed by sovereign power, activity is "public" and "govern-mental." Department of Treasury v. City of Evansvllle, Ind., 223 Ind. 435, 60 N.E.2d 952, 955.
GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. A subordinate creature of the sovereign created to carry out a governmental function. Frequently, a political subdivision or corporation. Hence a charitable hospital which cared for free patients.sent to it by city, Jewish Hospital of Brooklyn v. Doe, 252 App.Div. 581, 300 N.Y.S. 1111, 1117; city fira de-partment, Ring v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 173 Minn. 265, 217 N.W. 130, 131; county, Jefferson County ex rel. Grauman v. Jefferson County Fis-cal Court, 274 Ky. 91, 118 S.W.2d 181, 184; county water district, Laguna Beach County Water Dist. v. Orange County, 30 Cal.App.2d 740, 87 P.2d 46, 48; irrigation district, Outlook Irr. Dist. v. Fels, 176 Wash. 211, 28 P.2d 996, 998; municipal cor-poration, Town of Falls Church v. Arlington County Board, 166 Va. 192, 184 S.E. 459, 463; Mil-lar v. Town of Wilson, 222 N.C. 340, 23 S.E.2d 42, 44; National Guard, Lind v. Nebraska National Guard, 144 Neb. 122, 12 N.W.2d 652, 656, 150 A.L. R. 1449; poor district, Managers for Relief and Employment of Poor of Germantown Tp. v. Wit-kin, 329 Pa. 410, 196 A. 837, 840; school district, State ex rel. Klimek v. School Dist. No. 70, Otter Tall County, 204 Minn. 279, 283 N.W. 397, 399; Tennessee Valley Authority, Posey v. Tennessee Valley Authority, C.C.A.Ala., 93 F.2d 726, 727; and every agency which Congress can constitutionally create. Graves v. People of State of New York ex rel. O’Keefe, N.Y., 306 U.S. 466, 59 S.Ct. 595, 597, 83 L.Ed. 927, 120 A.L.R. 1466.
GOVERNMENTAL AGENTS. Those performing duties of a public character for benefit of all citi-zens of community. The term includes firemen and policemen. Miller v. City of Albany, 158 Misc. 720, 287 N.Y.S. 889, 891.
GOVERNMENTAL BODY. See Governmental Agency.
GOVERNMENTAL CAPACITY. In its "govern-mental capacity," a municipality acts mainly as an arm of the state for convenient administra-tion of government in incorporated territory, for public good on behalf of the state rather than for itself. Public Service Co. of Oklahoma v. City of Tulsa, 174 Okl. 58, 50 P.2d 166, 168; Okla-homa Natural Gas Corporation v. City of Enid, 179 Okl. 283, 65 P.2d 440, 442.
GOVERNMENTAL CHARACTER. See Govern-mental Capacity.
GOVERNMENTAL DUTIES. Those duties of a municipality have reference to some part or ele-rnent of the state’s sovereignty granted it to be ex-ercised for the benefit of the public, and all other duties are "proprietary". City of Miami v. Oates, 152 Fla. 21, 10 So.2d 721, 723.
Those duties that the framers of the Constitu-tion intended each member of the union of states would assume in order adequately to function un-der the form of government guaranteed by the Constitution. First State Bank of Gainesville v. Thomas, D.C.Tex., 38 F.Supp. 849, 851.
GOVERNMENTAL ENTERPRISE. A project or undertaking by the government of a more or less permanent nature, such as a drainage district. Rorick v. United States Sugar Corporation, C.C.A. Fla., 120 F.2d 418, 421.
GOVERNMENTAL EXPENDITURE OR EX-PENSE. One made in preserving health, good order, and peace of community (Const. art. 8, § 10). Town of Amherst v. Erie County, 236 App. Div. 58, 258 N.Y.S. 76, 81; keeping and dieting of prisone~s and taking care of jail, Breathitt Coun-ty v. Cockrell, 250 Ky. 743, 63 S.W.2d 920, 92 A.L. R. 626.
GOVERNMENTAL FACILITY. A building or in. stitution provided by the government to care for a specifled need, such as a court house or county jail. Haney .v. Town of Rainelle, 125 W.Va. 397, 25 S.E.2d 207, 211.
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION. Duties imposed by state on municipal corporation, which latter must perform at peril. Seafeldt v. Port of As-toria, 141 Or. 418, 16 P.2d 943, 945. Where duty involves general public benefit not in nature of corporate or business undertaking for corporate benefit and interest of municipality, function is "governmental," whether duty be directly imposed or voluntarily assumed. Gebhardt v. Village of La Grange Park, 354 III. 234, 188 N.E. 372, 374. Those conferred upon municipality as local agency of prescribed and limited jurisdiction to be em-ployed in administering the affairs of the state and promoting the public welfare generally. State ex rel. Gebhardt v. City Council of Helena, 102 Mont. 27, 55 P.2d 671, 673, 675.
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY. A doctrine of implied limitation of the power of the federal government to tax a state or any of its instrumen-talities, and of power of state to tax federal gov-ernment or any of its instrumentalities, and is applicable only to taxing relations of federal and state governments, and does not apply to state and municipalities therein. Marson v. City of Philadel-phia, 342 Pa. 369, 21 A.2d 228, 229, 230. See, also, Sovereign Immunity of State from Liability.
GOVERNMENTAL INSTRUMENTALITY. Any agency constitutionally created by Congress. Un-employment Compensation Commission of North Carolina v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 215 N.C. 491, 2 S.E.2d 592, 595, 596; Home Owners’ Loan Corporation v. Hardie & Caudle, 171 Tenn. 43, 100 S.W.2d 238, 239, 108 A.L.R. 702; Indian oil lease, Barnsdall Refineries v. Oklahoma Tax Commis-sion, 171 Okl. 140, 41 P.2d 918; liquor control commission, Pacific Fruit & Produce Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission, D.C.Or., 41 F.Supp. 175, 179.
GOVERNMENTAL POWERS. Those pertaining to making and enforcing by a city of police regu-lations to prevent crime, preserve public health, prevent fires, care for the poor, and educate the young. Huffman v. City of Columbus, Ohio App., 51 N.E.2d 410, 412.
Powers exercised by city as agency of state. State ex rel. Gebhardt v. City Council of Helena, 102 Mont. 27, 55 P.2d 671, 673.
GOVERNMENTAL PURPOSE. One which has for its objective the promotion of the public health, safety, morals, general welfare, security, pros-perity and contentment of the inhabitants of a given political division. Green v. Frazier, 44 N.D. 395, 176 N.W. 11, 17.
It has been held that, if an electric plant is used by a city for furnishing light and power for its own use and the use of its inhabitants, it is a "governmental purpose". Chadwick v. City of Crawfordsville, 216 Ind. 399, 24 N.E.2d 937, 941, 129 A.L.R. 469; State v. Lincoln County Power Dist. No. 1, 60 Nev. 401, 111 P.2d 528, 531.
A lot purchased for jan but actually used to store cord-wood used in county buildIngs and to store county road machinery, was prima facie used for "governmental pur-poses". Security State Bank v. Dent County, 345 Mo. 1050, 137 S.W.2d 960, 964.
Some courts distinguish between public purpose and governmental purpose. Spalding v. United States, D.C.Cal., 17 F.Supp. 957, 961.
GOVERNMENTAL SUBDIVISION. An agency created to carry out a governmental purpose or function. It has been held to include a public corporation authorized to use waters of natural stream for irrigation and for development of elec-tric power, Platte Valley Public Power and Irri-gation Dist. v. Lincoln County, 144 Neb. 584, 14 N.W.2d 202, 206, 155 A.L.R. 412; and a housing au-thority, Lennox v. Housing Authority of City of Omaha, 137 Neb. 582, 290 N.W. 451, 459; but not to include the Mortgage Commission Service Cor-poration, In re Batter, 257 App.Div. 546, 14 N.Y.S. 2d 42, 44; or a receiver operating for the account of the United States. The Southern Cross, C.C.A. N.Y., 120 F.2d 466, 468.
GOVERNOR. The chief executive official of a state in the United States, State ex rel. Martin v. Heil, 242 Wis. 41, 7 N.W.2d 375, 380; and terri-tories of the United States; and also of the chief magistrate of some colonies, provinces, and de-pendencies of other nations.
GRABBOTS. Oilmill motes, composed of small particles of refuse cotton, detached from, but left with, the seed in the first ginning process and generally separated and recovered by a process of reginning. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Cleve-land, 61 Okl. 64, 160 P. 328, 330.
GRACE. A favor or indulgence as distinguished from a right. State v. Boston, Iowa, 234 Iowa 1047, 14 N.W.2d 676, 679. Thus, in St. 22 Edw. III., the lord chancellor was instructed to take cogniz-equity jurisdiction as were exclusively matters of equity. Brown.
A faculty, license, or dispensation; also general and free pardon by act of parliament. See Act of Grace.
For Of Grace, see that title.
GRACE, DAYS OF. Time of indulgente granted to an acceptor or maker for the payment of his bill of exchange or note. It was originally a gra-tuitous favor, (hence the name,) but custom has rendered it a legal right.
GRACE PERIOD. In Insurance Law. A period beyond the due date of premium during which insurance is continued in force and during which payment may be made to keep policy in good standing. The grace period for payment of prem-ium does not contemplate free insurance or oper-ate to continue the policy in force after it expires by agreement of the parties. Miller v. Travelers Ins. Co., 143 Pa.Super. 270, 17 A.2d 907, 909.
GRADATIM. In old English law, by degrees or steps; step by step; from one degree to another. Bract. fol. 64.
GRADE, v. To establish a level by mathematical points and unes, and then to bring the surface of the street or highway to the level by the eleva-tion or depression of the natural surface to the fine fixed. Gas & Electric Securities Co. v. Man-hattan & Queens Traction Corporation, C.C.A.N.Y., 266 F. 625, 639; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. State, 137 Tenn. 341, 193 S.W. 113; Giles v. City of Olym-pia, 115 Wash. 428, 197 P. 631, 633, 16 A.L.R. 493. To bring property to the level of an abutting high-way. Nassau County v. O’Connell, Sup., 37 N.Y.S. 2d 1009, 1012.
GRADE, n. Used in reference to streets: (1) The line of the street’s inclination from the hori-zontal; (2) a part of a street inclined from the horizontal. Cent. Dict. The hypothetical line to which the work is to be constructed. Musto-Keen-an Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 139 Cal.App. 506, 34 P.2d 506, 509. The street wrought to the line; Little Rock v. Ry. Co., 56 Ark. 28, 19 S.W. 17; Austin v. Tillamook City, 121 Or. 385, 254 P. 819, 824.
"Grades of crime" in legal parlance are under-stood as higher or lower in grade or degree, ac-cording to the measure of punishment attached and meted out on conviction and the consequences resulting to the party convicted. State v. Doucet, 202 La. 1074, 13 So.2d 353, 361.
Quality, value, relative position, rank, status, or standing. Mossman v. Chicago & Southern Air Lines, 236 Mo.App. 282, 153 S.W.2d 799, 801, 802.
GRADE CROSSING. A place where a railroad is crossed at grade by a public or private road, or by another railroad, or where one highway cross-es another. Armour & Co. v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 41 R.I. 361, 103 A. 1031, 1033.GRADED OFFENSE. One for which offender is subject to a more severe penalty for a higher grade than for a lower grade of offense according to terms of statute. State v. Doucet, 202 La. 1074, 13 So.2d 353, 361.
GRADUATE. One who has taken a degree in a college or university. State v. Ins. Co., 40 La. Ann. 463, 4 So. 504; Valentine v. Independent School District of Casey, 191 Iowa 1100, 183 N.W. 434, 437.
GRADUS. In the civil and old English law, a measure of space. A degree of relationship.
A step or degree generally; e. g., gradus honor-um, degrees of honor. Vicat. A pulpit; a year; a generation. Du Cange.
A port; any place where a vessel can be brought to land. Du Cange.
GRADUS PARENTEUE. A pedigree; a table of relationship.
GRAFFARIUS. In old English law, a graffer, notary, or scrivener. St. 5 Hen. VIII. c. 1.
GRAFFER. A notary or scrivener. See St. 5 Hen. VIII, c. 1. The word is a corruption of the French "greffier," (q. v.)
GRAFFIUM. A writing-book, register, or cartu-lary of deeds and evidences. Cowell.
GRAFIO. A baron, inferior to a count. A fiscal judge. An advocate. Spelman; Cowell.
GRAFT. The popular meaning is the fraudulent obtaining of public money unlawfully by the cor-ruption of public officers. Smith v. Pure Oil Co., 278 Ky. 430, 128 S.W.2d 931, 933.
A term used in equity to denote the confirma-tion, by relation back, of the right of a mortgagee in premises to which, at the making of the mort-gage, the mortgagor had only an imperfect title, but to which the latter has since acquired a good title.
Advantage or personal gain received because of peculiar position or superior influence of one holding position of trust and confidente without rendering compensatory serv-ices, or dishonest transaction in relation to public or official acts, and sometimes implies theft, corruption, dishonesty, fraud, or swindle, and always want of integrity. Mount v. Welsh, 118 Or. 568, 247 P. 815, 822; Cooper v. Romney, 49 Mont. 119, 141 P. 289, 291; Gill v. Ruggles, 95 S.C. 90, 78 S.E. 536, 540.
GRAIN. In Troy weight, the twenty-1 ourth part of a pennyweight. Any kind of corn sown in the ground.
GRAIN RENT. A payment for the use of land in grain or other crops; the return to the land-lord paid by croppers or persons working the land on shares. Railroad Co. v. Bates, 40 Neb. 381, 58 N.W. 963.
GRAINAGE. An ancient duty in London under which the twentieth part of salt imported by aliens was taken.
GRAMMAR SCHOOL. In England, this term des-ignates a school in which such instruction is given as will prepare the student to enter a college or university, and in this sense the phrase was used in the Massachusetts colonial act of 1647, requiring every town containing a hundred house-holders to set up a "grammar school." Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass. 97. But in modern American usage the term denotes a school, intermediate Be-tween the primary school and the high school, in which English grammar and other studies of that grade are taught.
GRAIIDIATICA FALSA NON VITIAT CHAR-TAM. 9 Coke, 48. False grammar does not vi-tiate a deed.
GRAMMATOPITYLACIUM. (Greco-Lat.) In the civil law, a place for keeping writings or records. Dig. 48, 19, 9, 6.
GRAMME. The unit of weight in the metric sys-tem. The gramme is the weight of a cubic centi-meter of distilled water at the temperature of 4° C. It is equal to 15.4341 grains troy, or 5.6481 drachms avoirdupois.
GRANATARIUS. In old English law, an offlcer having charge of a granary. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 82, § 1; Id. c. 84.
GRAND, n. In cant of gangsters, thieves, and underworld, one thousand dollars.
As to grand "Assize," "Bill of Sale," "Cape," "Distress," "Jury," "Larceny," and "Serjeanty," cee those titles.
GRAND COUTUMIER. A collection of customs, laws, and forms of procedure in use in early times in France. See Coutumier.
GRAND DAYS. In English practice, certain days in the terms, which are solemnly kept in the inns of court and chancery, viz., Candlemas day in Hilary term, Ascension day in Easter, St. John the Baptist day in Trinity, and All Saints in Michaelmas; which are dies non juridici. Termes de la Ley; Cowell; Blount. They are clays set apart for peculiar festivity; the members of the respective inns being on such occasions regaled at their dinner in the hall, with more than usual sumptuousness. Holthouse.
GRAND REMONSTRANCE. A constitutional document passed by the British House of Com-mons in November, 1641.
It was in the nature of an appeal to the country, setting forth political grievances. It consisted of a preamble of 20 clauses and the body of the remonstrance with 206 clauses, each of which was voted separately. Its first remedial measure was against papists: its second demanded that all illegal grievances and exactions should be presented and punished at the sessions and assizes and that judgés and justices should be sworn to the due execution of the Peti-tion of Rights and other laws. The third was a series of precautlons to prevent the employment of evil councillors. See Taswell-Langmead, Engl.Const.Hist. 464; Forsher, Grand Remonstrance. The text will be found in History for Ready Reference, II, 833.
GRAND—STAND PLAY. In baseball, etc., a play made more showily than necessary in order to draw the applause of those in the grand stand;ment of the federal constitution against the taking by the states of prívate property without due process of law. A text wrlter, who was at that time a member of the court, says of these cases: "But these decisions left undecided the question how far this legislative power of regulation belonged to the States, and how lar it was in the congress of the United States"; Miller, Const.U.S. 397.
GRANGIA. A grange. Co. Litt. 5a.
GRANT. To bestow; to confer, Traylor v. State, 117 Tex.Cr.R. 323, 36 S.W.2d 506, 507; upon some one other than the person or entity which makes the grant. Porto Rico Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Colom, C.C.A.Puerto Rico, 106 F.2d 345, 354.
Deed. Walker v. Deppe, 346 Mo. 354, 141 S.W. 2d 783, 785. A conveyance. Dearing v. Brush Creek Coal Co., 182 Tenn. 302, 186 S.W.2d 329, 331. Transfer of property real or personal by deed or writing. Commissioner of Internal Rev-enue v. Plestcheeff, C.C.A.9, 100 F.2d 62, 64, 65.
A generic term applicable to all transfers of real property, 3 Washb. Real Prop. 181, 353; in-cluding transfers by operation of law as well as voluntary transfers. White v. Rosenthal, 140 Cal. App. 184, 35 P.2d 154, •155.
A transfer by deed of that which cannot be passed by livery. Williams, Real Prop. 147, 149; Jordan v. Indianapolis Water Co., 159 Ind. 337, 64 N.E. 680.
An act evidenced by letters patent under the great seal, granting something from the king to a subject. Cruise, Dig. tit. 33, 34; Downs v. Unit-ed States, C.C.A.Md., 113 F. 147, 51 C.C.A. 100.
A technical term made use of in deeds of con-veyance of lands to import a transfer. 3 Washb. Real Prop. 378-380.
As distinguished from a mere license, a grant passes some estate or interest, corporeal or incorporeal, in the lands which it embraces. Jamieson v. Millemann, 3 Duer, N.Y., 255, 258.
The term "grant," in Scotland, is used in reference (1) to original dispositions of land, as when a lord makes grants of land among tenants; (2) to gratuitous deeds. Paterson. In such case, the superior or donor is said to grant the deed; an expression totally unknown in English law. Mozley & Whitley.
By the word "grant," in a treaty, is meant not only a formal grant, but any concession, warrant, order, or per-mission to survey, possess, or settle, whether written or parol, express, or presumed from possession. Such a grant may be made by law, as well as by a patent pursuant to a law. Strother v. Lucas, 12 Pet. 436, 9 L.Ed. 1137; Bryan v. Kennett, 113 U.S. 179, 5 S.Ct. 413, 28 L.Ed. 908; Hast-ings v. Turnpike Co., 9 Pick., Mass., 80; Dudley v. Sum-ner, 5 Mass. 470.
For office grant, see Office.
Private land grant. A grant by a public author-ity vesting title to public land in a private (na-tural) person. United Land Ass’n v. Knight, 85 Cal. 448, 24 P. 818.
Public grant. A grant from the public; a grant of a power, license, privilege, or property, from the state or government to one or more individ-uals, contained in or shown by a record, convey-ance, patent, charter, etc.
GRANT AND DEMISE. In a lease for years these words create an implied warranty of title
and a covenant for quiet enjoyment; Stott v. Rutherford, 92 U.S. 107, 23 L.Ed. 486.
GRANT AND TO FREIGIIT LET. Operative words in a charter party, implying the placing of the vessel at th,e disposition of the charterer for the purposes of the intended voyage, and gen-erally, transferring the possession. See. Christie v. Lewis, 2 Brod. & B. 441.
GRANT, BARGAIN, AND SELL. Operative words in conveyances of real estate. Muller v. Boggs, 25 Cal. 187; Hawk v. McCullough, 21 III. 221.
GRANT OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. A method of transferring personal property, distinguished from a gift by being always founded on some con-sideration or equivalent. 2 Bl. Comm. 440, 441. Its proper legal designation is an "assignment," or "bargain and sale." 2 Steph. Comm. 102.
GRANT TO USES. The common grant with uses superadded, which has become the favorite mode of transferring realty in England. Wharton.
GRANTEE. One to whom a grant is made. Com-missioner of Internal Revenue v. Plestcheeff, C.C. A.9, 100 F.2d 62, 65.
GRANTOR. The person by whom a grant is made.
GRANTOR’S LIEN. Lien which exists for pay-ment of purchase money when title is transferred. Kosters v. Hoover, 69 App.D.C. 66, 98 F.2d 595, 596.
GRANTZ. In oid English law, noblemen or gran-dees. Jacob.
GRASS HEARTIL In old records, the grazing or turning up the earth with a plow. The name of a customary service for inferior tenants to bring their plows, and do one day’s work for their lords. Cowell.
GRASS WEEK. Rogation week, so called ancient-ly in the inns of court and chancery.
GRASS WIDOW. A slang term for a woman sep-arated from her husband by abandonment or pro-longed absence; a woman living apart from her husband. Webster. A divorcee.
GRASSON, or GRASSUM. A fine paid upon the transfer of a copyhold estate. See Gressume.
GRATIFICATION. A gratuity; a recompense or reward for services or benefits, given voluntarily, without solicitation or promise.
GRATIS. Without reward or consideration. Highway Department of Georgia v. Bass, 197 Ga. 356, 29 S.E.2d 161, 169. Freely; gratuitously.
GRATIS DICTUM. A voluntary assertion; a statement which a party is not legally bound to make, or in which he is not held to precise accur-acy. 2 Kent, Comm. 486; Medbury v. Watson, 6 Mete., Mass., 260, 39 Am.Dec. 726. GRATUITOUS. Without valuable or legal con-sideration. A term applied to deeds. of conveyance and to bailments and other contracta.
In old English law, voluntary; without force, fear, or favor. Bract. fols. 11, 17.
As to gratuitous "Bailment," "Contract," and "Deposit," see those titles.
GRATUITOUS ALLOWANCE. A pension. Mor-an v. Firemen’s and Policemen’s Pension Fund Commission of Jersey City, 20 N.J.Misc. 479, 28 A. 2d 885, 887. State ex rel. Parker v. Board of Edu-cation of City of Topeka, 155 Kan. 754, 129 P.2d 265, 267.
GRATUITOUS GUEST. In automobile law. A person riding at invitation of owner or authorized agent without payment of a consideration or fare. McLain v. Atlantic Ice & Coal Corporation, 54 Ga. App. 103, 187 S.E. 153; Hart v. Hogan, 173 Wash. 598, 24 P.2d 99; Blashfield, Cyc. of Automobile Law and Prac., Perm. Ed., § 2292.
GRATUITOUS LICENSEE. Any licensee other than a business visitor. Smith v. Southwest Mis-souri R. Co., 333 Mo. 314, 62 S.W.2d 761.
GRATUITOUS PASSENGER. See Gratuitous Guest.
GRATUITY. Something acquired without bar-gain or inducement. State ex rel. Stafford v. Fox-Great Falls Theatre Corporation, 114 Mont. 52, 132 P.2d 689, 697. Something given freely or without recompense; a gift; something voluntarily given in return for a favor or especially a service, hence, a bounty; a tip; a bribe. McCook v. Long, 193 Ga. 299, 18 S.E.2d 488, 490.
GRAVA. In old English law, a grove; a small wood; a coppice or thicket. Co. Litt. 4b.
A thick wood of high trees. Blount.
GRAVAMEN. The material part of a grievance, ,charge, etc. Williamson v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 67 Cal.App.2d 250, 153 P.2d 990, 991. The burden or gist of a charge; the grievance or in-jury specially complained of.
In English Ecclesiastical law, a grievance com-plained of by the clergy before the bishops in con-vocation.
GRAVATIO. In old English law, an accusation or impeachment. Leg. Ethel. c. 19.
GRAVE. An excavation in earth in which a dead body is or is to be buried, or place for interment of a corpse, such as a tomb, or a sepulcher. Leap-hart v. Harmon, 186 S.C. 362, 195 S.E. 628, 629.
GRAVEL. Small stones, or fragments of stone often intermixed with particles of sand. Fellows v. Dorsey, 171 Mo.App. 289, 157 S.W. 995, 1000.
GRAVEL PIT. An excavation from which gravel is removed. Walker v. Dwelle, 187 Iowa 1384, 175 N.W. 957, 964.
GRAVEN DOCK. A "graven dock" is distinguish-ed from a "floating dock," in that it is permanently attached to, and in that manner is, a part of land. Butler v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 240 N.Y. 23, 147 N.E. 235; Manufacturers’ Liability Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 129 Misc. 665, 222 N.Y.S. 394.
GRAVEYARD. A cemetery; a place for the in-terment of dead bodies; sometimes defined in statutes as a place where a minimum number of persons (as "six or more") are buried. See Stock-ton v. Weber, 98 Cal. 433, 33 P. 332; Gray v. Craig, 103 Kan. 100, 172 P. 1004, 1005.
GRAVEYARD INSURANCE. A term applied to insurances fraudulently obtained (as, by false personation or other means) on the lives of in-fants, very aged persons, or those in the last stag-es of disease. Also occasionally applied to an in-surance company which writes wager policies, takes extra-hazardous risks, or otherwise exceeds the limits of prudent and legitimate business. See McCarty’s Appeal, 110 Pa. 379, 4 A. 925.
GRAVIS. Grievous; great. Ad grave damnum, to the grievous damage. 11 Coke, 40.
GRAVIUS. A graf; a chief magistrate or officer. A term derived from the more ancient "grafio," and used in combination with various other words, as an official title in Germany; as Margravius, Rheingravius, Landgravius, etc. Spelman.
GRAVIUS EST DIVINAM QUAM TEMPORALEM WEDERE MAJESTATEM. It is more serious to hurt divine than temporal majesty. 11 Coke, 29.
GRAY’S INN. An inn of court. See Inns of Court.
GREAT. Considerable in magnitude, power, in-tensity or degree. Thompson v. Anderson, 107 Utah 331, 153 P.2d 665, 666. As used in various compound legal tercos, this word generally means extraordinary, that is, exceeding the common or ordinary measure or standard, in respect to physi-cal size, or importante, dignity, etc. Gulf, etc., R. Co. y. Smith, 87 Tex. 348, 28 S.W. 520; San Chris-tina Inv. Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 167 Cal. 762, 141 P. 384, 388, 52 L.R.A.,N.S., 676; American Express Co. v. Terry, 126 Md. 254, 94 A. 1026, 1030, Ann.Cas.1917C, 650.
For presumption great, see Proof.
As to great "Care," "Ponds," "Seal," "Tithes," see those titles.
GREAT CATTLE. All manner of beasts except sheep and yearlings. 2 Rolle, 173.
GREAT CHARTER. Magna Charta (q. v.).
GREAT—GRANDCHILDREN. Children of one’s grandchildren. Jenkins v. Harris, 135 Miss. 457, 100 So. 280.
GREAT LAW, THE, or "The Body of Laws of the Province of Pennsylvania and Territories there-unto belonging, Past at an Assembly held at Chester alias Upland, the 7th day of the tenth month, called ‘December,’ 1682." This was the first code of laws established in Pennsylvania, and
830
is justly celebrated for the provision in its first chapter for liberty of consciente.
GREAT TITHES. In ecclesiastical law, the more valuable tithes: as, corn, hay, and wood. 3 Burn, Eccl. Law, 680, 681; 3 Steph. Comm. 127. See Tithes.
GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY. The writ of "ha-beas corpus and subjiciendum", issuing at com-mon law out of courts of Chancery, King’s Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer. Ex parte Kelly, 123 N.J.Eq. 489, 198 A. 203, 207.
GREE. Satisfaction for an offense committed or injury done. Cowell.
GREEK CROSS. See Cross.
GREEK KALENDS. A cólloquial expression to signify a time indefinitely remote, there being no such division of time known to the Greeks.
GREEN CLOTH. In English law, a board or court of justice held in the countinghouse of the king’s (or queen’s) household, and composed of the lord steward and inferior officers. It takes its name from the green cloth spread over the board at which it is held. Wharton; Cowell.
GREEN SILVER. A feudal custom in the manor of Writtel, in Essex, where every tenant whose front door opens to Greenbury shall pay a half-penny yearly to the lord, by the name of "green silver" or "rent." Cowell.
GREEN WAX. In English law, the name of the estreats in the exchequer, delivered to the sheriff under the seal of that court which was Impressed upon green wax.
GREENBACK. The popular and almost exclusive name applied to all United States treasury issues. Hickey v. State, 23 Ind. 23; U. S. v. Howell, D.C. Cal., 64 F. 114.
GREENHEW. In forest law, the same as vert (q. v.). Termes de la Ley.
b In French law, registrars, or clerks of the courts.
They are officials attached to the courts to assist the judges In their duties. They keep the minutes, write out the judgments, orders, and other declslons given by the tribunals, and deliver copies thereof to appllcants.
GREGORIAN CODE. The code or collection of constitutions made by the Roman jurist Gregor-ius. See Codex Gregorianos.
GREGORIAN EPOCH. The time from which the Gregorian calendar or computation dates; i. e., from the year 1582.
GREMIO. In Spanish law, a guild; an associa-tion of workmen, artificers, or merchants follow-ing the same trade or business; designed to pro-tect and further the interests of their craft.
GROCER
be in gremio Zegis; that is, in the protection oT keeping of the law.
GRENVILLE ACT. The statute 10 Geo. III. c-16, by which the jurisdiction over parliamentary election petitions was transferred from the whole house of commons to select committees. Repeal-ed by 9 Geo. IV. c. 22, § 1.
GRESSU1IE. In English law, a customary fine’ due from a copyhold tenant on the death of the’ lord. 1 Strange, 654; 1 Crabb, Real Prop. p. 615, § 778. Spelled also "grassum," "grossome," and "gressame."
In Scotland grassum is a fine paid for the mak-ing or renewing of a lease. Paterson.
GRETNA GREEN MARRIAGE. A marriage cel-ebrated at Gretna, in Dumfries, (bordering on the county of Cumberland,) in Scotland.
By the law of Scotland a valid marriage may be con’-tracted by consent alone, wlthout any other formality. When the marriage act (26 Geo. II. c. 33) rendered the publication of banns, or a license, necessary In England, It becarne usual for persons who wished to marry clandes-tinely to go to Gretna Green, the nearest part of Scotland, and marry according to the Scotch law; so a sort of chapel was built at Gretna Green, in which the Engllsh marriage service was performed by the village blacksmlth. Wharton.
GREVA. In oid records, the sea shore, sand, or beach. 2 Mon. Angl. 625; Cowell.
GREVE. A word of power or authority. Cowell.
GRIEVANCE. An injury, injustice or wrong-which gives ground for complaint because it is unjust and oppressive. In re Borough of North Braddock, 126 Pa.Super. 53, 190 A. 357, 361.
GRIEVED. Aggrieved. 3 East, 22.
GRIEVOUS. Causing grief or sorrow, painful„ afflictive, hard to bear, offensive, harmful. State v. Bowers, 178 Minn. 589, 228 N.W. 164, 165.
GRIFF. A word said to have a definite meaning in Louisiana, indicating the offspring of a Negro, and a mulatto; a person too black to be a mulatto and too pale in color to be readily identified as a Negro. State v. Treadaway, 52 So. 500, 508, 126 La. 300, 139 Am.St.Rep. 514, 20 Ann.Cas. 1297. Also spelled griff e, and applied to a person of mixed Negro and American Indian blood. Web-ster, New Int. Dict.
GRITIL In Saxon law, peace; protection.
GRITFIBRECIL or GRITHBRECHE. Breacn or the peace. Cowell.
GRITHSTOLE. A place of sanctuary. Cowell.
GROAT. An English silver coin (value four pence) issued from the fourteenth to the seven-teenth century. See Reg. v. Connell, 1 Car. & K. 191.
GREMIUM. Lat. The bosom or breast; hence, derivatively, safeguard or protection. In Eng-lish law, an estate which is in abeyance is said to
GROCER. In oid English law, a trader who engrossed all vendible an engrosser. St. 37 Edw. III. c. 5. er.
merchant or merchandise; See Engross

with that form of insurance known as term in-surance. Watkins v. Metropolitan Life Ins., Co., La.App., 174 So. 885, 888.
GROWING CROP. A crop must be considered and treated as a growing crop from the time the seed is deposited in the ground, as at that time the seed loses the qualities of a chattel, and be-comes a part of the freehold, and passes with a sale of it. Wilkinson v. Ketler, 69 Ala. 435. Things commonly planted, cultivated, and harvest-ed for use or profit of husbandman. Pelham v. State, 20 Ala.App. 359, 102 So. 462, 463.
GROWTH HALF—PENNY. A rate paid in some places for the tithe of every fat beast, ox, or other unfruitful cattle. Clayt. 92.
GRUARII. The principal officers of a forest.
GRUB STAKE. In mining law, a contract be-tween two parties by which one undertakes to furnish the necéssary provisions, tools, and other supplies, and the other to prospect for and locate mineral lands and stake out mining claims there-on, the interest in the property thus acquired in-uring to the benefit of both parties, either equally or in such proportion as their agreement may fix. Berry v. Woodburn, 107 Cal. 512, 40 P. 804; Hart-ney v. Gosling, 10 Wyo. 346, 68 P. 1118, 98 Am.St. Rep. 1005; Mattocks v. Gibbons, 94 Wash. 44, 162 P. 19, 22.
GUADALUPE HIDALGO, TREATY OF. A treaty between the United States and Mexico, terminat-ing the Mexican War, dated February 2, 1848. See Gadsden Purchase.
GUADIA. In old European law, a pledge. Spel-man; Calvin. A custom. Spelman. Spelled also "wadia."
GUARANTEE. One to whom a guaranty is made. Dallas v. Wagner, 204 N.C. 517, 168 S.E. 838, 839. This word is also used, as a noun, to denote the contract of guaranty or the obligation of a guar-antor, and, as a verb, to denote the action of as-suming the responsibilities of a guarantor.
GUARANTEE STOCK. "Guarantee stock" of a building and loan association is a fixed non-with-drawal investment which guarantees to all other investors in the association a fixed rate of divi-dend or interest. Stumph v. Wheat Belt Building & Loan Ass’n of Pratt, 148 Kan. 25, 79 P.2d 896, 899.
GUARANTIED STOCK. See Stock.
GUARANTOR. He who makes a guaranty. In re Ford, D.C.Wash., 14 F.2d 848, 849.
GUARANTY, v. To undertake collaterally to answer for the payment of another’s debt or the performance of another’s duty, liability, or obliga-tion; to assume the responsibility of a guarantor; to warrant. See Guaranty, n.
GUARANTY, n. A collateral agreement for per-formance of another’s undertaking. Kelly-Spring-field Tire Co. v. Hamilton, 230 Mo.App. 430, 91
Black’s Law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed.-53
S.W.2d 193. A promise to answer for payment of debt or performance of obligation if person hable in first instance fails to make payment or per-form obligation. McGee v. F. W. Poe Mfg. Co., 176 S.C. 288, 180 S.E. 48, 51, 99 A.L.R. 1468. An undertaking by one person to be answerable for the payment of some debt, or the due performance of some contract or duty, by another person, who himself remains Hable to pay or perform the same. Story, Prom. Notes, § 457. A promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another person. Civil Code Cal. § 2787.
A guaranty is a contract that some particular thing shall be done exactly as it is agreed to be done, whether it is to be done by one person or another, and whether there be a prior or principal contractor or not. Redfield v. Haight, 27 Conn. 31.
The definition of a "guaranty," by text-writers, is an undertaking by one person that another shall perform his contract or fulfill his obligation, or that, if he does not,. the guarantor will do it for him. A guarantor of a bill or note is said to be one who engages that ,the note shall be paid, but is not an indorser or surety. Grldley v. Capen, 72 In. 13.
Synonyms
The terms guaranty and suretyship are sometimes used interchangeably; but they should not be confounded. The contract of a guarantor is his own separate contract. It is in the nature of a warranty by him that the thing guar-antied to be done by the principal shall be done. not merely an engagement jointly with the principal to do the thing. The original contract of the principal is not his contract, and he is not bound to take notice of its non-performance. Durham v. Manrow, 2 N.Y. 548; Nading v. McGregor, 121 Ind. 465, 23 N.E. 283, 6 L.R.A. 686; Hoosier Brlck Co. v. Floyd Count) Bank, 64 Ind.App. 445, 116 N.E. 87, 90; W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Salter, 31 Ga.App. 329, 120 S.E. 679, 681.
Guaranty and warranty are derived from the same root, and are in fact etymologically the same word, the "g" of the Norman French being interchangeable with the English "w." They are often used colloquially and in commercial transactions as having the same signification, as where a piece of machinery or the produce of an estate is "guar-antied" for a term of years, "warranted" being the more appropriate term in such a.case. Accumulator Co. v. Dubu-que St. R. Co., Iowa, 64 F. 70, 12 C.C.A. 37; Martinez v. Earnshaw, 36 Wkiy.Notes Cas., Pa., 502. A distinction is also sometimes made in commercial usage, by which the term "guaranty" is understood as a collateral warranty (often a conditional one) against some default or event in the future, while the term "warranty" is taken as meaning an absolute undertaking in prcesenti, against the defect, or for the quantity or quality contemplated by the parties in the subject-matter of the contract. Sturges v. Bank of Circleville, 11 Ohio St. 169, 78 Am. Dec. 296. But in strict legal usage the two terms are widely distinguished in this, that a warranty is an absolute undertaking or liability on the part of the warrantor, and the contract is void unless it is strictly and literally performed, while a guaranty is a promise, entirely collateral to the original contract, and not imposing any primary liability on the guarantor, but binding him to be answerable for the failure or default of another. Masons’ Union L. Ins. Ass’n v. Brockman, 20 Ind. App. 206, 50 N.E. 493.
Absolute guaranty. An unconditional undertaking by a guarantor that debtor will pay debt or perform the obliga-tion. An unconditional promise of payment or perform-ance of principal contract on default of principal debtor or obligor. Robey v. Walton Lumber Co., 17 Wash.2d 242, 135 P.2d 95, 102, 145 A.L.R. 924.
Collaterca guaranty. A contract by which the guarantor undertakes, in case the principal fans to do what he has promised or undertaken to do, to pay damages for such failure; distinguished from an engagement of suretyship in this respect, that a surety undertakes to do the very thing which the principal has promised to do, in case the latter defaults. Woody v. Haworth, 24 Ind.App. 634, 57 N.E. 272; Nading v. McGregor, 121 Ind. 470, 23 N.E. 283, 6 L.R.A. 686.

Conditionai guaranty. One which depends upon some extraneous event, beyond the mere default of the principal, and generally upon notice of the guaranty, notice of the principal’s default, and reasonable diligence in exhausting proper remedies against the principal. Yager v. Títle Co., 112 Ky. 932, 66 S.W. 1027; Tobacco Co. v. Held, D.C. Alaska, 62 F. 962; Wall v. Eccles, 61 Utah, 247, 211 P. 702, 703.
Continuing guaranty. One relating to a future liability of the principal, under successlve transactions, which either continue his liability or from time to time renew it after it has been natisfled. Sewing Mach. Co. v. Courtney, 141 Cal. 674, 75 P. 296; Buck v. Burk, 18 N.Y. 340; German Sav. Bank v. Drake, Iowa, 79 N.W. 121; Glaser, Kohn Co. v. U. S., C.C.A.I11., 224 F. 84, 86; Hirning v. Jacob-sen, 51 S.D. 270, 213 N.W. 505, 507.
Special guaranty. A guaranty which is available only to the particular person to whom it is offered or addressed; as distinguished from a general guaranty, which will op-erate In favor of any person who may accept it. Everson v. Gere, 40 Hun, N.Y., 250; Tidioute Sav. Bank v. Libbey, 101 Wis. 193, 77 N.W. 182, 70 Am.St.Rep. 907; Sobes v. Miller, 201 Mo.App. 45, 209 S.W. 549, 550.
Guaranty company. A corporation authorized to trans-act tLe business of entering int° contracts of guaranty and suretyship; as, one which, for fixed premiums, becomes surety on judicial bonds, fidelity bonds, and the like. See FEtna L. Ins. Co. v. Coulter, 25 Ky.L.Rep. 193, 74 S.W. 1050.
GUARANTY FUND. Statutes have made provi-sion for depositors’ guaranty funds to be raised, in whole or in part, by assessments on banks and to be used to pay the depositors of an insolvent bank. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 31 S.Ct. 186, 55 L.Ed. 112, 32 L.R.A.,N.S., 1062, Ann. Cas.1912A, 487; Shallenberger v. Bank, 219 U.S. 114, 31 S.Ct. 189, 55 L.Ed. 117; Assaria State Bank v. Dolley, 219 U.S. 121, 31 S.Ct. 189, 55 L.Ed. 123; Abilene Nat. Bank v. Dolley, 228 U.S. 1, 33 S.Ct. 409, 57 L.Ed. 707.
GUARANTY INSURANCE. See Insurance. GUARDAGE. A state of wardship.
GUARDIAN. A guardian is a person lawfully invested with the power, and charged with the duty, of taking care of the person and managing the property and rights of another person, who, for some peculiarity of status, or defect of age, understanding, or self-control, is considered in-capable of administering his own affairs. Bass v. Cook, 4 Port., Ala., 392; Spa.rhawk v. Allen, 21 N.H. 27; Burger v. Frakes, 67 Iowa, 460, 23 N.W. 746; Fleming v. Leibe, 95 N.J.Eq. 129, 122 A. 616.
One who legally has the care and management of the person, or the estate, or both, of a child during its minority. Reeve, Dom. Rel. 311.
This term might be appropriately used to designate the person charged with the care and control of idiots, lunatics, habitual drunkards, spendthrifts, and the like; but such person is, under many of the statutory systems authorizing the appointment, styled V.committee," and in common
us-
age the name "guardian" is applied only to one having the care and management of a minor.
Classification
A testamentary guardian is one appointed by the deed or last will of the child’s father; while a guardian by election is one chosen by the infant himself in a case where he would otherwise be without one.
A general guardian is one who has the general care and control of the person and estate of his ward; while a special guardian is one who has spe,:lel nr limited powers and duties with respect to his ward, e. g., a guardian who
has the custody of the estate but not of the person, or vise versa, or a guardian ad litem.
A domestic guardian is one appointed at the place where the ward is legally domiciled; while a foreign guardian de-rives his authority from appointment by the courts of an-other state, and generally has charge only of such property as may be hicated within the jurisdiction of the power ap-pointing him.
A guardian ad litem is a guardian appointed by a court of justice to prosecute or defend for an infant in any suit to which he may be a party, 2 Steph.Comm. 342; Crawford v. Amusement Syndicate Co., Mo., 37 S.W.2d 581, 584. Most commonly appointed for infant defendants, infant plaintiffs generally suing by next friend. This kind of guárdian has no right to interfere with the infant’s person or property. 2 Steph.Comm. 343; Richter v. Leiby, 107 Wis. 404, 83 N.W. 694; Morris v. Standard 011 Co., 192 Cal. 343, 219 P. 998, 1000, 30 A.L.R. 1103.
A guardian by appointment of court has custody of the infant until the attainment of full age. 2 Steph.Comm. 341; 2 Kent, Comm. 226.
A guardian by natura is the father, and„on rus death, the mother, of a child. 1 Bl.Comm. 461; 2 Kent, Comm. 219; Daniels v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 135 Pa.Super. 450, 5 A.2d 608, 611. This guardianship extends only to the custody of the person of the child to the age of twenty-one years. Sometimes called "natural guardian," but this is rather a popular than a technical mode of expression. 2 Steph.Comm. 337; Kline v. Beebe, 6 Conn. 500; Mauro v. Ritchie, 16 Fed.Cas. 1171.
A guardian by statute is a guardian appointed for a child by the deed or last will of the father, and who has the custody both of his person and estate until the attain-ment of full age. This kind of guardianship is founded on the statute of 12 Car. II. c. 24, and,has been pretty exten-sively adopted in this country. 1 BI.Comm. 462; 2 Steph. Comm. 339, 340; 2 Kent, Comm. 224-226; Huson v. Green, 88 Ga. 722, 16 S.E. 255.
A guardian for nurture is the father, or, at his desease, the mother, of a child. This kind of guardianship extends only to the person, and determines when the infant arrives at the age of fourteen. 2 Kent, Comm. 221; 1 Bl.Comm. 461; 2 Steph.Comm. 338; Mauro v. Ritchie, 16 Fed.Cas. 1171; Arthurs’ Appeal, 1 Grant Cas., Pa., 56.
Guardian in chivalry. In the tenure by kntght’s service, in the feudal law, If the heir of the feud was under the age of twenty-one, being a male, or fourteen, being a female, the lord was entitled to the wardship (and marriagel of the heir, and was called the "guardian in chivalry." This wardship consisted in having the custody of the body and lands of such heir, without any account of the profits. 2 Bl.Comm. 67.
Guardian in socage. At the common law, this was a specíes of guardian who had the custody of lands coming to the infant by descent, as also of the infant’s person, until the latter reached the age of fourteen. Such guard-ian was always "the next of kin to whom the inheritance cannot possibly descend." 1 Bl.Comm. 461; 2 Steph.Comm. 338; Byrne v. Van Hoesen, 5 Johns., N.Y., 67; Combs v. Jackson, 2 Wend., N.Y., 157, 19 Am.Dec. 568.
Natural guardian. The father of a child, or the mother it the father be dead.
"Guardian de son tort," sometimes described as "quasi guardian" or "guardian by estoppel," is one who assumes to act as guardian without valid authority. Rear v. Olson, 219 Wis. 322, 263 N.W. 357.
GUARDIAN DE L’EGLISE. A church-warden.
GUARDIAN DE L’ESTEMARY. The warden of the stannaries or mines in Cornwall, etc.
GUARDIAN OF THE PEACE. A warden or con-servator of the peace.
GUARDIAN OF THE POOR. In English law, a person elected by the ratepayers of a parish to have the charge and management of the parish work-house or union. See 3 Steph. Comm. 203, 215.GUARDIAN OF THE SPIRITUALITIES. The person to whom the spiritual jurisdiction of any diocese is committed during the vacancy of the see.
GUARDIAN OF THE TEMPORALITIES. The person to whose custody a vacant see or abbey was committed by the crown.
GUARDIAN OR WARDEN, OF THE CINQUE PORTS. A magistrate who has the jurisdiction of the ports or havens which are called the "Cinque Ports," (q. v.). This office was first cre-ated in England, in imitation of the Roman policy, to strengthen the sea-coasts against enemies, etc.
GUARDIANSHIP. The office, duty, or authority of a guardian. Also the relation subsisting be-tween guardian and ward.
GUARDIANUS. A guardian, warden, or keeper. Spelman.
GUARENTIGIO. In Spanish law, a written au-thorization to a court to enforce the performance of an agreement in the same manner as if it had been decreed upon regular legal proceedings.
GUARNIMENTUM. In oíd European law, a pro-vision of necessary things. Spelman. A furnish-ing or garnishment.
GUASTALD. One who had the custody of the royal mansions.
GUBERNATOR. Lat. In Roman law, the pilot or steersman of a ship.
GUERILLA PARTY. In military law, an inde-pendent body of marauders or armed men, not regularly or organically connected with the arm-ies of either belligerent, who carry on a species of irregular war, chiefly by depredation and mas-sacre.
GUERPI, GUERPY. L. Fr. Abandoned; left; deserted. Britt. c. 33.
GUERRA, GUERRE. War. Spelman.
GUEST. A person entertained for pay at inn, tavern, or hotel on general undertaking of keeper thereof. Murray v. Hagens, La.App., 143 So. 505, 506, 507. A traveler who lodges at an inn or tav-ern with the consent of the keeper. Bac. Abr. "Inns," C, 5; 8 Coke, 32; McDaniels v. Robinson, 26 Vt. 316, 62 Am.Dec. 574.
A guest, as distinguished from a boarder, 1s bound for no stipulated time. He stops at the inn for a short or as long time as he picases, paying, while he remains, the cus-tomary charge. Stewart v. McCready, 24 How.Prac. N.Y. 62; McIntosh v. Schops, 92 Or. 307, 180 P. 593, 595; Good-year Tire & Rubber Co. v. Altamont Springs Hotel Co., 206 Ky. 494, 267 S.W. 555, 557.
A "guest" in an automobile is one who takes ride in automobile driven by another person, mere-ly for his own pleasure or on his own business, and without making any return or conferring any benefit on automobile driver. Elliott v. Camper, 8 W.W.Harr. 504, 194 A. 130, 133; Blashfield, Cyc. of Artomobile Law and Prac., Perm. Ed., § 2291.
GUEST-TAKER. An agister; one who took cat-tle in to feed in the royal forests. Cowell.
GUET. In oíd French law, watch. Ord. Mar. liv. 4, tit. 6.
GUIA. In Spanish law, a right of way for nar-row carts. White, New Recop. 1. 2, c. 6, § 1.
GUIDAGE. In oíd English law, that which was given for safe conduct through a strange terri-tory, or another’s territory. Cowell.
The office of guiding of travelers through dan-gerous and unknown ways. 2 Inst. 526.
GUIDE-PLATE. An iron or steel píate to be at-tached to a rail for the purpose of guiding to their place on the rail wheels thrown off the track. Pub. St. Mass. 1882, p. 1291.
GUIDON DE LA MER. The name of a treatise on maritime law, by an unknown author, supposed to have been written about 1671 at Rouen, and con-sidered, in continental Europe, as a work of high authority.
GUILD. A voluntary association of persons pur-suing the same trade, art, profession, or business, such as printers, goldsmiths, wool merchants, etc.. united under a distinct organization of their own, analogous to that of a corporation, regulating the affairs of their trade or business by their own laws and rules, and aiming, by co-operation and organ-ization, to protect and promote the interests of their common vocation.
In medieval history these fraternities or guilds played an important part in the government of some states; as at Florence, in the thirteenth and following centuries, where they chose the council of government of the city. The word is said to be derived from the Anglo-Saxon "gild" or "geld," a tax or tribute, because each member of the soci-ety was required to pay a tax towards its support.
GUILD RENTS. Rents payable to the crown by any guild, or such as formerly belonged to relig-ious guilds, and carne to the crown at the general dissolution of the monasteries. Tomlins.
GlUILDHALL. The hall or place of meeting of a guild, or gild.
The place of meeting of a municipal corpora-tion. 3 Steph. Comm. 173, note. The mercantile or commercial gilds of the Saxons are supposed to have given rise to the present municipal cor-porations of England, whose place of meeting is still called the "Guildhall."
GUILDIIALL SITTINGS. The sittings held in the Guildhall of the city of London for city of Lon-don causes.
GUILLOTINE. An instrument for decapitation, used in France for the infliction of the death pen-alty on convicted criminals, consisting, essentially, of a heavy and weighted knife-blade moving per-pendicularly between grooved posts, which is made to fall from a considerable height upon the neck of the sufferer, immovably fixed in position to receive the impact.

GUILT. In criminal law, that quality which im-parts crimínality to a motive or act, and renders the person amenable to punishment by the law.
That disposition to violate the law which has manifested itself by some act already done. The opposite of Innocence. See Ruth. Inst. b. 1, c. 18, § 10.
GUILTY. Having committed a crime or tort; the word used by a prisoner in pleading to an in-dictment when he confesses the crime of which he is charged, and by the jury in convicting. Com. v. Walter, 83 Pa. 108, 24 Am.Rep. 154; Jessie v. State, 28 Miss. 103; State v. White, 25 Wis. 359. Responsible for a delinquency, crime, or sin, and the connotation of such word is "evil", "wrong-doing", or "culpability". Hilkert v. Canning, 58 Ariz. 290, 119 P.2d 233, 236.
GUINEA. A coin formerly issued by the English mint, but all these coins were called in the time of Wm. IV. The word now means only the sum of £1 18., in which denomination the fees of coun-sel are always given.
GULA—THING. A collection of Scandinavian customs in force in the southern part of Norway. The Frosta-thing was in force in the more north-erly division of Dronheim. They are said to help to an understanding of the law prevailing in the northern part of England, where the Danish in-fiuence was strongest. 2 Holdsw. Hist. E. L. 23.
GULE OF AUGUST. The first of August, being
the day of Peter ad Vincula.
GULES. The heraldic name of the color usually called "red." The word is derived from the Arabic word "guíe," a rose, and was probably introduced by the Crusaders. Gules is denoted in engravings by numerous perpendicular lines. Heralds who blazoned by planets and jewels called it "Mars," and "ruby." Wharton.
GUN. A firearm for throwing a projectile with gunpowder. Highsaw v. Creech, 17 Tenn.App. 573, 69 S.W.2d 249. A portable firearm such as a rifle, shotgun, carbine, etc. Henderson v. State, 75 Fla. 464, 78 So. 427, 428. A pistol or revolver. State v. Christ, 189 Iowa, 474, 177 N.W. 54, 57.
GURGES. Lat. Properly a whirlpool, but in old English law and conveyancing, a deep pit filled with water, distinguished from "stagnum," which was a shallow pool or pond. Co. Litt. 5; Johnson v. Rayner, 6 Gray, Mass., 107.
GURGITES. Wears. Jacob.
GUST. See Gest.
GUTI. Jutes; one of the three nations who mi-grated from Germany to Britain at an early per-iod. According to Spelman, they established themselves chiefly in Kent and the Isle of Wight.
GUTTER. The diminutive of a sewer. Callis, Sew. (80,) 100. In modern law, an open ditch or conduit designed to allow the passage of water from one point to another in a certain direction, whether for purposes of drainage, irrigation, or otherwise. Warren v. Henly, 31 Iowa 31; Willis v. State, 27 Neb. 98, 42 N.W. 920.
GWABR MERCHED. Maid’s fee. A British word signifying a customary fine payable to lords of some manors on marriage of the tenant’s daugh-ters, or otherwise on their committing incontin-ente. Cowell.
GWALSTOW. A place of execution. Jacob.
GWAYF. Waif, or waived; that which has been stolen and afterwards dropped in the highway for fear of a discovery. Cowell.
GYLPUT. The name of a court which was held every three weeks in the liberty or hundred of Pathbew in Warwick. Jacob.
GYLTWITE, or GUILTWIT. Sax. Compensa-tion for fraud or trespass. Cowell.
GYNARCRY, or GYNZECOCRACY. Government by a woman; a state in which women are legally capable of the supreme command; e. g., in Great Britain.
GYNECOLOGIST. A physician specializing in diseases of the female organs. Simonet v. Frank F. Pellissier & Sons, 61 Cal.App.2d 41, 141 P.2d 922, 924.
GYNECOLOGY. The science which treats of the structure and diseases of women. Zerr v. Zerr, 188 Ky. 233, 221 S.W. 550, 551.
GYRATION. Movement about a fixed point. Great Western Mfg. Co. v. Lowe, D.C.Mich., 13 F.2d 880, 881.
GYRATORY STONE—CRUSHER. A machine with a shaft or crushing means which, instead of rotating, gyrates or moves in a circular course under the control of an eccentric. Traylor Engi-neering & Mfg. Co. v. Worthington Pump & Ma-chinery Co., C.C.A.Pa., 1 F.2d 833.
GYROVAGI. Wandering monks.
GYVES. Fetters or shackles for the legs.

BLACK ‘S LAW DICTIONARY – Section H

H

H. This letter, as an abbreviation, stands for Henry (a king of that name) in the citation of English statutes. In the Year Books, it is used as an abbreviation for Hilary term. In tax assess-ments and other such official records, "h" may be used as an abbreviation for "house," and the courts will so understand it. Alden v. Newark, 36 N.J.L. 288; Parker v. Elizabeth, 39 N.J.L. 693.
II. A. An abbreviation for hoc auno, this year, in this year.
H. B. An abbreviation for house bill, i. e., a bill in the house of representatives, as distinguished from a senate bill.
H. B. M. An abbreviation for His (or Her) Bri-tannic Majesty.
H. C. An abbreviation for house of commons, or for habeas corpus.
II. H. F. A. Housing and Home Finance Agency.
H. I. H. His (or Her) Imperial Híghness. H. L. An abbreviation for house of lords.
H. R. An abbreviation for house of representa-tives.
II. T. An abbreviation for hoc titulo, this title, under this title; used in references to books.
II. V. An abbreviation for hoc verbo or hac vote, this word, under this word; used in references to dictionaries and other works alphabetically ar-ranged.
HABE, or HAVE. Lat. A form of the salutatory expression "Ave" (hail) in the titles of the con-stitutions of the Theodosian and Justinian Codes. Calvin; Spelman.
HABEAS CORPORA JURATORUM. A writ com-manding the sheriff to bring up the persons of jurors, and, if need were, te distrain them of their lands and goods, in order to insure or compel their attendance in court on the day of trial of a cause. It issued from the Common Pleas, and served the same purpose as a distringas juratores in the King’s Bench. It was abolished by the C. L. P. Act, 1852, § 104. Brown.
HABEAS CORPUS. Lat. (You have the body.) The name given to a variety of writs, (of which these were anciently the emphatic words,) hav-ing for their object to bring a party before a court or judge. In common usage, and whenever these words are used alone, they are understood to mean the habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, (see infra.) Dancy v. Owens, 126 Okl. 37, 258 P. 879, 884; In re McDevitt, 101 Misc. 588, 168 N.Y.S. 433; U. S. v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 44 S.Ct. 54, 57, 68 L.Ed. 221; Payne v. Graham, 20 Ala.App. 439, 102 So. 729, 731.
The sole functIon of the writ is to release from unlaw-ful imprisonment. People ex rel. Luciano v. Murphy, 160
Misc. 573, 290 N.Y.S. 1011. The office of the writ is not to determine prisoner’s gullt or Innocence, and only issue which it presents is whether prisoner is restrained of his liberty by due process. Ex parte Presnell, 58 Okl.Cr. 50, 49 P.2d 232.
HABEAS CORPUS ACT. The English statute of 31 Car. II. c. 2, is the original and prominent ha-beas corpus act. It was amended and supplement-ed by St. 56 Geo. III. c. 100. And similar statutes have been enacted in all the United States. This act is justly regarded as the great constitutional guaranty of personal liberty.
HABEAS CORPUS AD DELIBERANDUM ET RECIPIENDUM. A writ which is issued to re-move, for trial, a person confined in one county to the county or place where the offense of which he is accused was committed. Bac. Abr. "Habeas Corpus," A; 1 Chit. Crim. Law, 132. Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 97. 2 L.Ed. 554. Thus, it has been granted to remove a person in custody for contempt to take his trial for perjury in another county. 1 Tyrw. 185.
HABEAS CORPUS AD FACIENDUM ET RECIP-IENDUM. A writ issuing in civil cases to remove the cause, as also the body of the defendant, from an inferior court to a superior court having juris-diction, there to be disposed of. It is also called "habeas corpus cum causa." Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 97, 2 L.Ed. 554.
HABEAS CORPUS AD PROSEQUENDUM. A writ which issues when it is necessary to remove a prisoner in order to prosecute in the proper jurisdiction wherein the fact was committed. 3 Bl. Comm. 130; State ex rel. Deeb v. Fabisinski, 111 Fla. 454, 152 So. 207, 210.
HABEAS CORPUS AD RESPONDENDUM. A writ which is usually employed in civil cases to remove a person out of the custody of one court into that of another, in order that he may be sued and answer the action in the latter. 2 Sell. Pr. 259; 2 Mod. 198; 3 Bl. Comm. 129; 1 Tidd, Pr. 300.
HABEAS CORPUS AD SATISFACIENDUM. In English practice. A writ which issues when a prisoner has had judgment against him in an ac-tion, and the plaintiff is desirous to bring him up to some superior court, to charge him with process of execution. 3 Bl. Comm. 129, 130; 3 Steph. Comm. 693; 1 Tidd, Pr. 350.
HABEAS CORPUS AD SUBJICIENDUM. A writ directed to the person detaining another, and commanding him to produce the body of the pris-oner, (or person detained,) with the day and cause of his caption and detention, ad faciendum, subjiciendum et recipiendum, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the judge or court awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf. 3 Bl. Comm. 131; 3 Steph. Comm. 695.
This is the well-known remedy for delíverance from 11-legal confinement, called by Sir William Blackstone the most celebrated writ in the English law, and the great and efflcacious writ in all manner of Mega’ contlnement. 3 BI. Comm. 129. The ”great writ of liberty," issuing at com-mon law out of courts of Chancery, King’s Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer. Ex parte Kelly, 123 N.J.Eq. 489, 198 A. 203, 207.
HABEAS CORPUS AD TESTIFICANDUM. At common law, the writ, meaning "you have the body to testify", used to bring up a prisoner de-tained in a jail or prison to give evidente before the court. Hottle v. District Court in and for Clinton County, 233 Iowa 904, 11 N.W.2d 30, 34; 3 Bl. Comm. 130; 2 Tidd, Pr. 809. Ex parte Marma-duke, 91 Mo. 250, 4 S.W. 91, 60 Am.Rep. 250.
HABEAS CORPUS CUM CAUSA. (You have the body, with the cause.) Another name for the writ of habeas corpus ad faciendum et recipiendum, (q. v.) 1 Tidd, Pr. 348, 349.
HABEMUS OPTIMUM TESTEM, CONFITENT-EM REUM. 1 Phil. Ev. 397. We have the best witness,—a confessing defendant. "What is tak-en pro confesso is taken as indubitable truth. The plea of guilty by the party accused shuts out all further inquiry. Habemus con fitentem reum is demonstration, unless indirect motives can be as-signed to it." 2 Hagg. Eccl. 315.
HABENDUM. Lat. Portion of deed beginning with the words "To have and to hold". Bannin v. Peck, 266 App.Div. 209, 41 N.Y.S.2d 668, 670. The clause usually following the granting part of the premises of a deed, which defines the extent of the ownership in the thing granted to be held and enjoyed by the grantee. 3 Washb. Real Prop. 437; New York Indians v. U. S., 170 U.S. 1, 18 S.Ct. 531, 42 L.Ed. 927; Freudenberger Oil Co. v. Simmons, 75 W.Va.. 337, 83 S.E. 995, 997, Ann.Cas.1918A, 873; In re Tamargo, 220 N.Y. 225, 115 N.E. 462, 464.
The °Ince of the "habendum" is properly to determine What estate or interest is granted by the deed, though of-fice may be performed by the premises, in which case the habe,ndum may lessen, enlarge, explain, or qualify, but not totally contradict or be repugnant to, estate granted in the premises. Claridge v. Phelps, Ind.App., 105 Ind. App. 344, 11 N.E.2d 503, 504.
HABENDUM ET TENENDUM. In old convey-ancing, to have and to hold. Formal words in deeds of land from a very early period. Bract. fol. 17b.
HABENTES NOMINES. In old English law, rich men; literally, having men. The same with f Gest-ing-men, (q. v.) Cowell.
HABENTIA. Riches. Mon. Angl. t. 1, 100.
HABERE. Lat. In the civil law, to have. Some-times distinguished from tenere, (to hold,) and possidere, (to possess; ) habere referring to the right, tenere to the fact, and possidere to both. Calvin.
HABERE FACIAS POSSESSIONEM. Lat. That you cause to have possession. The name of the process commonly resorted to by the successful party in an action of ejectment, for the purpose of being placed by the sheriff in the actual pos-
session of the land recovered. It is commonly termed simply "habere facias," or "hab. fa."
HABERE FACIAS SEISINAM. L. Lat. That you cause to have seisin. The writ of execution in real actions, directing the sheriff to cause the de-mandant to have seisin of the lands recovered. It was the proper process for giving seisin of a free hold, as distinguished from a chattel interest in lands.
HABERE FACIAS VISUM. Lat. That you cause to have a view. A writ to cause the sheriff to take a view of lands or tenements.
HABERE LICERE. Lat. In Roman law, to al-low [one] to have [possession.] This phrase de-noted the duty of the seller of property to allow the purchaser to have the possession and enjoy-ment. For a breach of this duty, an actio ex emp-to might be maintained.
HABERGEON. A diminutive of hauberk (q. v.), denoting a short coat of mail without sleeves. Blount.
HABERJECTS. A cloth of a mixed color. Magna Charta, c. 26.
HABETO TIBI RES TUAS. Lat. Have or take your effects to yourself. One of the old Roman forms of divorcing a wife. Calvin.
HABILIS. Lat. Fit; suitable; active; useful, (of a servant.) Proved; authentic, (of Book of Saints.) Fixed; stable, (of authority of the king.) Du Cange.
HABIT. A disposition or condition of the body or mind acquired by custom or a usual repetition of the same act or function. Conner v. Citizens’ St. R. Co., 146 Ind. 430, 45 N.E. 662; State v. Skilli-corn, 104 Iowa, 97, 73 N.W. 503; Com. v. Whitney, 5 Gray, Mass., 85. The customary conduct, to pur-sue which one has acquired a tendency, from fre-quent repetition of the same acts. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. v. Foley, 105 U.S. 350, 26 L.Ed. 1055; National Council of Knights and Ladies of Secur-ity v. Fowler, 66 Okl. 294, 168 P. 914, 915, 6 A.L.R. 591; Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc. v. Reese, 206 Ark. 530, 176 S.W.2d 708, 714.
HABIT AND REPUTE. Applied in Scotch law to a general understanding and belief of some-thing’s having happened: thus, by the law of Scot-land, marriage may be established by "habit and repute" where the parties cohabit and are at the same time held and reputed as man and wife. See Bell. The same rule obtains in some of the United States.
HABITABLE REPAIR. A covenant by a lessee to "put the premises into habitable repair" binds him to put them into such a state that they may be occupied, not only with safety, but with rea-sonable comfort, for the purposes for which they are taken. Miller v. McCardell, 19 R.I. 304, 33 A. 445, 30 L.R.A. 682; 2 Mood. & R. 186.
HABITANCY. That fixed place of abode to which a person intends to return habitually when absent.

Owens v. Huntling, C.C.A.Or., 115 F.2d 160, 162. Settled dwelling in a given place; fixed and ‘per-manent residence there.
This term is more comprehenslve than "domIcile," for one may be domiciled in a given place though he does not spend the greater portion of his time there, or though he may be absent for long periods. It is also more compre-hensive than "residence," for one may reside in a given place only temporarily or for short periods on the occasion of repeated visits. But in neither case could he properly be called an "inhabitant" of that place or be sald to have his "habitancy" there. Atkinson v. Washington & Jefferson College, 54 W.Va. 32, 46 S.E. 253; Hairston v. Hairston, 27 Miss. 711, 61 Am.Dec. 530; Abington v. North Bridge-water, 23 Pick., Masa., 170. And see Domicile; Residence.
It is difilcult to give an exact definition of "habitancy." In general terms, one may be designated as an "Inhabit-ant" of that place which constitutes the principal seat of his residence, of his business, pursults, connections,. at-tachments, and of his political and municipal relations. The term, therefore, embraces the fact of residence at a place, together with the intent to regard it and make it a honre. The act and intent must concur. Lyman v. Fiske, 17 Pick., Mass., 231, 28 Am.Dec. 293.
HABITANT. Fr. In French and Canadian law, a resident tenant; a settler; a tenant who kept hearth and honre on the seigniory. A native of Canada of French descent, particularly of the peasant or farming Class.
HABITATIO. Lat. In the civil law, the right of dwelling; the right of free residence in another’s house. Inst. 2, 5; Dig. 7, 8.
HABITATION.
In the civil law. The right of a person to live in the house of another without preju-dice to the property. It differed from a usu-fruct, in this: that the usufructuary might apply the house to any purpose, as of a store or manu-factory; whereas the party having the right of habitation could only use it for the residence of himself and family. 1 Browne, Civil Law, 184.
In Estates. A dwelling-house; a homestall. 2 Bl.Comm. 4; 4 Bl.Comm. 220; Holmes v. Oregon & C. R. Co., D.C.Or., 5 F. 527; Nowlin v. Scott, 10 Grat., Va., 65; Harvard College v. Gore, 5 Pick., Mass., 372.
In its generic sense, the term denotes a place of abode, but as used in a restrictive building covenant it may be synonymous simply with "dwelling." Goodhue v. Pennell, 164 App. Div. 821, 150 N.Y.S. 435, 436.
HABITUAL. Customary, usual, of the nature of a habit; its synonyms are customary, common, regular; while its antonyms are unusual, unwont-ed, extraordinary, rare. Illinois Bankers Life Ass’n v. Theodore, 47 Ariz. 314, 55 P.2d 806, 811. Formed or acquired by or resulting from hab-it; frequent use or custom. Moore v. State, 111 Tex.Cr.R. 461, 14 S.W.2d 1041. The "habitual" in-dulgence in violent and ungovernable temper as a ground for divorce is not synonymous with "fre-quent." Kellogg v. Kellogg, 93 Fla. 261, 111 So. 637, 638.
HABITUAL CRIMINAL. By statute in several states, one who is convicted of a felony, having been previously convicted of any crime (or twice so convicted), or who is convicted of a misdemean-or and has previously (in New York) been five
HABITUAL
times convicted of a misdemeanor. Crim.Code N.Y. § 510; Rev.St.Utah, 1898, § 4067 (Comp.Laws 1917, § 7907). In a more general sense, one made subject to police surveillance and arrest on sus-picion, on account of his previous criminal record and absence of honest employment.
HABITUAL CRIMINALS ACT. The statute 32 & 33 Vict. c. 99. By this act power was given to ap-prehend on suspicion convicted persons holding license under the penal servitude acts, 1853, 1857, and 1864. The act was repealed and replaced by the prevention of crimes act, 1871, (34 & 35 Vict. c. 112.)
HABITUAL DRUNKARD. One who has a fixed habit of frequently getting drunk, though not oftener drunk than sober, and though sober for weeks at a time. Patton v. Commonwealth, 273 Ky. 307, 116 S.W.2d 652, 653.
One who frequently and repeatedly becomes intoxicated by excessive indulgence in intoxicating liquor so as to acqulre a fixed habit and an involuntary tendency to be-come intoxicated as often as the temptation is presented, even though he remains sober for days or even weeks at a time. Leonard v. Leonard, 221 Iowa 722, 266 N.W. 537, 538.
A person given to lnebriety or the excessive use of In-toxlcating drink, who has lost the power or the will, by frequent indulgence, to control his appetite for it. Lud-wick v. Com., 18 Pa. 174; Gourlay v. Gourlay, 16 R.I. 705, 19 A. 142; McBee v. McBee, 22 Or. 329, 29 P. 887, 29 Am.St. Rep. 613.
It is not necessary that the person shall have lost his will power so that he cannot reslst stimulants, Lester v. Sampson, Mo.App., 180 S.W. 419, 421; or that he be in-toxicated so often as to incapacítate him from attending to his business for a considerable portion of time. Runkle v. Southern Pac. Milling Co., 184 Cal. 714, 195 1′. 398, 400, 16 A.L.R. 275.
In England, defined by the habitual drunkards act, 1879, (42 & 43 Vict. c. 19,) which authorizes confinement In a retreat, upon the party’s own application, as "a person who, not being amenable to any jurisdiction In lunacy, is, notwithstanding, by reason of habitual intemperate drink-ing of intoxicating liquor, at times dangerous to himself, or herself, or others, or Incapable of managing himself or herself, or his or her affairs."
HABITUAL DRUNKENNESS, INTOXICATION, or INTEMPERANCE. The custom or habit of getting drunk; the constant indulgence in stim-ulants, whereby intoxication is produced; not the ordinary use, but the habitual use of them; the habit should be actual and confirmed, but need not be continuous, or even of daily occurrence. Williams v. Goss, 43 La.Ann. 868, 9 So. 750; Short v. Morrison, 159 La. 193, 105 So. 286, 288. As a cause for divorce, the fixed habit of frequently getting drunk; it does not necessarily imply con-tinual drunkenness. Moor v. Moor, 211 Ala. 56, 99 So. 316, 318; Holm v. Holm, 44 Utah, 242, 139 P. 937, 938. That degree of intemperante from the use of intoxicating drinks which disqualifies the person a great portion of the time from properly attending to business, or which would reasonably inflict a course of great mental anguish upon the innocent party. Rev.Codes Idaho, § 2652 (Code 1932, § 31-608). It has no reference to the exces-sive or habitual use of drugs. Hayes v. Hayes, 86 Fla. 350, 98 So. 66, 67; Smith v. Smith, 7 Boyce, Del., 283, 105 A. 833.

HABITUALLY. Customarily; by frequent prac-tice or use. It does not mean entirely or exclusive-ly. Stanton v. French, 91 Cal. 274, 27 P. 657, 25 Am.St.Rep. 174.
HABITUM ET TONSURAM CLERICALEM. Clerical attire and tonsure. 4 Bl.Comm. 367.
HABLE. L. Fr. In old English law, a port or harbor; a station for ships. St. 27 Hen. VI. c. 3.
HACIENDA. In Spanish law, the public domain; the royal estate; the aggregate wealth of the state. The science of administering the national wealth; public economy.
Also an estate or farm belonging to a private person.
A royal estate. Newman & B. Dict.
HACK STAND. A private hack stand is a sta-tion where taxicabs or other vehicles are kept standing to solicit trade from the public indiscrim-inately at all hours. Borland v. Curto, 121 Misc. 336, 201 N.Y.S. 236, 237.
HACKNEY. Let out for hire, or devoted to com-mon use; as, "hackney coaches," "hackney car-riages." State v. Jarvis, 89 Vt. 239, 95 A. 541, 543.
HACKNEY CARRIAGES. Carriages plying for hire in the street. 2 C. 13, 877; Masterson v. Short, 33 How.Pr., N.Y., 481; 17 & 18 Vict. c. 86; Com. v. Matthews, 122 Mass. 60.
HAD. As used in a statute providing that no suit, action or proceeding to foreclose a mortgage or trust deed shall be had or maintained, "had" means commenced or begun. Friel v. Alewel, 318 Mo. 1, 298 S.W. 762, 764.
HADBOTE. In Saxon law, a recompense or sat-isfaction for the violation of holy orders, or vio-lence offered to persons in holy orders. Cowell; Blount.
HADD. In Hindu law, a boundary or limit. A statutory punishment defined by law, and not ar-bitrary. Mozley & Whitley.
HADERUNGA. In old English law, hatred; ill will; prejudice, or partiality. Spelman; Cowell.
Respect or distinction of persons. Jacob.
HADGONEL. In old English law, a tax or mulct. Jacob.
HZEC EST CONVENTIO. Lat. This is an agree-ment. Words with which agreements anciently commenced. Yearb. H. 6 Edw. II. 191.
MEC EST FINALIS CONCORDIA. L. Lat. This is the final agreement. The words with which the foot of a fine commenced. 2 Bl.Comm. 351.
ILEREDA. In Gothic law, a tribunal answering to the English court-leet or hundred court.
HPEREDE ABDUCTO. An ancient writ that lay for the lord, who, having by right the wardship of his tenant under age, could not obtain his per-
son, the same being carried away by another per-son. Old Nat. Brev. 93.
HZEREDE DELIBERANDO ALTERI QUI HABET CUSTODIUM TERME. An ancient writ, directed to the sheriff, to require one that had the body of an heir, being in ward, to deliver him to the person whose ward he was by reason of his land. Reg. Orig. 161.
HEREDE RAPTO. An ancient writ that lay for the ravishment of the lord’s ward. Reg. Orig. 163.
HPEREDEM DEUS FACIT, NON HOMO. God makes the heir, not man. Co. Litt. 7b; Bract. 62b.
HEREDES. Lat. In the civil law, heirs. The plural of hceres (q. y.).
HZEREDES PROXIMI. Nearest or next heirs. The children or descendants of the deceased.
HEREDES REMOTIORES. More remote heirs. The kinsmen other than children or descendants.
ILEREDES SUI ET NECESSARII. In Roman law, own and necessary heirs; i. e., the lineal de-scendants of the estate-leaver. They were called "necessary" heirs, because it was the law that made them heirs, and not the choice of either the decedent or themselves. But since this was also true of slaves (when narned "heirs" in the will) the former class were designated "sui et neces-sarii," by way of distinction, the word "sui" de-noting that the necessity arose from their relation-ship to the decedent. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 733.
ILEREDIPETA. Lat. In old English law, a seek-er of an inheritance; hence, the next heir to lands. Du Cange.
HZEREDIPET2E SUO PROPINQUO VEL EX-TRANEO PERICULOSO SANE CUSTODI NUL-LUS COMMITTATUR. To the next heir, whether a relation or a stranger certainly a dangerous guardian, let no one be committed. Co. Litt. 88b.
ILEREDITAS.
In Roman law. The hcereditas was a universal succession by law to any deceased person, whether . such person had died testate or intestate, and whether in trust (ex fideicommisso) for another or not. The like succession according to Prw-torian law was bonorum possessio.
The hcereditas was called "jacens," until the Fueres took it up, i. e., made his adittio hareditatis; and such fueres, if a suus hceres, had the right to abstain, (potestas ab-stinendi,) and, if an extraneus hceres, had the right to con-sider whether he would accept or decline, (potestas deliber-andi,) the reason for this precaution being that (prior to Justinian’s enactment to the contrary) a hceres atter his aditio was hable to the full extent of the debts of the de-ceased person, and could have no relief therefrom, except in the case of a damnum emergens or damnosa hcereditas, ti. e., an hcereditus which disclosed (alter the aditio) some enormous unsuspected liability. Brown. The theory was that, though the physical person of the deceased had perished, his legal personality survived and descended unimpaired on his heirs in whom bis legal Identity was continuad.
In Old English Law. An estate transmissible by descent; an inheritance. Co. Litt. 9

ILEREDITAS, ALIA CORPORALIS, ALIA IN-CORPORALIS; CORPORALIS EST, QU1E TANGI POTEST ET VIDERI; INCORPORALIS QUIE TANGI NON POTEST NEC VIDERI. Co. Litt. 9. An inheritance is either corporeal or incorporeal. Corporeal is that which can be touched and seen; incorporeal, that which can neither be touched nor seen.
HIEREDITAS DAMNOSA. A burdensome inherit-ance; one which would be a burden instead of a benefit, that is, the debts to be paid by the heir would exceed the assets.
HIEREDITAS EST SUCCESSIO IN UNIVERSUM JUS QUOD DEFUNCTUS HABUERIT. Co. Litt. 237. Inheritance is the succession to every right which the deceased had.
HIEREDITAS JACENS. In civil law, a prostrate or vacant inheritance. The inheritance left to a voluntary heir was so called so long as he had not manifested, either expressly or by silence, his ac-ceptance or refusal of the inheritance. So long as no one had acquired the inheritance, it was termed "hcereditas jacens ;" and this, by a legal fiction, represented the person of the decedent. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 737. The estate of a person deceased, where the owner left no heirs or legatee to take it, called also "caduca;" an escheated estate. Cod. 10, 10, 1; 4 Kent, Comm. 425. The term has also been used in English law to signify an estate in abeyance; that is, after the ancestor’s death, and before assumption of heir. Co. Litt. 342b. An in-heritance without legal owner, and therefore open to the first occupant. 2 Bl.Comm. 259.
HIEREDITAS LEGITIMA. A succession or in-heritance devolving by operation of law (intesta te succession) rather than by the will of the dece-dent. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 654.
HIEREDITAS LUCTUOSA. A sad or mournful in-heritance or succession; as that of a parent to the estate of a child, which was regarded as dis-turbing the natural order of mortality (turbato ordine mortalitatis.) Cod. 6, 25, 9; 4 Kent, Comm. 397. It was sometimes termed tristis successio.
HIEREDITAS NIHIL ALIUD EST, QUAM SUC-CESSIO IN UNIVERSUM JUS, QUOD DEFUNC-TUS HABUERIT. The right of inheritance is nothing else than the faculty of succeeding to all the rights of the deceased. Dig. 50, 17, 62.
HIEREDITAS NUNQUAM ASCENDIT. An in-heritance never ascends. Glanv. lib. 7, c. 1; 2 Bl. Comm. 211. A maxim of feudal origin, and which invariably prevailed in the law of England down to the passage of the statute 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 106, § 6, by which it was abrogated. ,1 Steph.Comm. 378. See Broom, Max. 527, 528.
HIEREDITAS TESTAMENTARIA. Testamen-tary inheritance, that is, succession to an estate under and according to the last will and testament of the decedent. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 654.
ILEREDUM APPELLATIONE VENIUNT MERE-DES HIEREDUM IN INFINITUM. By the title of heirs, come the heirs of heirs to inflnity. Co. Litt. 9.
HIERES.
In Roman Law. The heir, or universal succes-sor in the event of death. The heir is he who actively or passively succeeds to the entire prop-erty of the estate-leaver. He is not only the suc-cessor to the rights and claims, but also to the estate-leaver’s debts, and in relation to his estate is to be regarded as the identical person of the estate-leaver, inasmuch as he represents him in all his active and passive relations to his estate. Mac-keld. Rom. Law, § 651.
The institution of the hceres was the essential eharacter-istic of a testament: if this was not done, the instrument was called a codicillus. Mack.C.L. §§ 632, 650.
It should be remarked that the oftice, powers, and duties of the hceres, in Roman law, were much more closely as-similated to those of a modern executor than to those of an heir at law. Hence "heir" is not at all an accurate trans-lation of "hceres," unless it be understood in a special, technical sense.
In Cornmon Law. An heir; he to whom lands, tenements, or hereditaments by the act of God and right of blood to descend, of some estate of inheritance. Co. Litt. 7b.
HIERES ASTRARIUS. In old English law, an heir in actual possession of the house of his an-cestor. Bract. 85, 267b.
HIERES DE FACTO. In old English law, heir from fact; that is, from the disseisin or other act of his ancestor, without or against right. An heir in fact, as distinguished from an heir de jure, or by law.
HIERES EST ALTER IPSE, ET FILIUS EST PARS PATRIS. An heir is another self, and a son is part of the father. 3 Coke, 12b.
HIERES EST AUT JURE PROPRIETATIS AUT JURE REPRESENTATIONIS. An heir is either by right of property, or right of representation. 3 Coke, 40b.
HIERES EST EADEM PERSONA CUM ANTE-CESSORE. An heir is the same person with his ancestor. Co. Litt. 22; Branch, Princ. See Nov. 48, c. 1, § 1.
HIERES EST NOMEN COLLECTIVUM. "Heir" is a collective name or noun. 1 Vent. 215.
HIERES EST NOMEN JURIS; FILIUS EST NO-MEN NATURPE. "Heir" is a name or term of law; "son" is a name of nature. Bac. Max. 52, in reg. 11.
HIERES EST PARS ANTECESSORIS. An heir is a part of the ancestor. So said because the ances-tor, during his life, bears in his body (in judgment of law) all his heirs. Co. Litt. 22b; Schoonmaker v. Sheely, 3 Hill, N.Y., 165, 167.
HIERES EX ASSE. In the civil law, an heir to the whole estate; a sole heir. Inst. 2, 23, 9.

HIERES EXTRANEUS. In the civil law, a strange or foreign heir; one who was not sub-ject to the power of the testator, or person who made him heir. Qui testatoris juri sub jecti non sant, extranei hceredes appellantur. Inst. 2, 19, 3.
HIERES FACTUS. In the civil law, an heir made by will; a testamentary heir; the person created universal successor by will. Story, Confl. Laws, § 507; 3 Bl.Comm. 224. Otherwise called "hceres ex testamento," and "hceres institutus." Inst. 2, 9, 7; Id. 2, 14.
HIERES FIDEICOMMLSSARIUS. In the civil law, the person for whose benefit an estate was given to another (termed "hceres fiduciarius," q. v.) by will. Inst. 2, 23, 6, 7, 9. Answering near-ly to the cestui que trust of the English law.
II/ERES FIDUCIARIUS. A fiduciary heir, or heir in trust; a person constituted heir by will, in trust for the benefit of another, called the "fideicommis-sarius."
HIERES ILIEREDIS NEI EST MEUS HIERRES. The heir of my heir is my heir. Wharton, Law Dict.
IL1ERES INSTITUTUS. A testamentary heir; one appointed by the will of the decedent.
HIERES LEGITIMUS. A lawful heir; one point-ed out as such by the marriage of his parents.
II/ERES LEGITIMUS EST QUEM NUPTIAE DE-MONSTRANT. He is a lawful heir whom mar-riage points out as such; who is born in wedlock. Co. Litt. 7b; Bract. fol. 88; Fleta, lib. 6, c. 1; Broom, Max. 515; Mirror of Just. 70; Dig. 2, 4, 5. (As to the application of the principie when the marriage is subsequent to the birth of the child, see 2 Cl. & F. 571; 6 Bingh. N. C. 385; 5 Wheat. 226, 262, n., 5 L.Ed. 70.)
HIERES MINOR UNO ET VIGINTI ANNIS NON RESPONDEBIT, NISI IN ‘CASU DOTIS. Moore, 348. An heir under twenty-one years of age is not answerable, except in the matter of dower.
HIERES NATUS. In the civil law, an heir born; one born heir, as distinguished from one made heir, (hceres factus, q. v.;) an heir at law, or by intestacy, (ab intestato;) the next of kin by blood, in cases of intestacy. Story, Confl. Laws, § 507; 3 Bl.Comm. 224. This is the only form of heirship recognized in the English law. Wms. R. P., 6th Am. ed. 96.
NECESSARIUS. In the civil law, a nec-essary or compulsory heir. This name was given to the heir when, being a s’ave, he was named "heir" in the testament, because on the death of the testator, whether he would or not, he at once became free, and was compelled to assume the heirship. Inst. 2, 19, 1.
‘FUERES NON TENETUR IN ANGLIA AD DEBI-TA ANTECESSORIS REDDENDA, NISI PER AN-TECESSOREM AD HOC FUERIT OBLIGATUS, PRMTERQUAM DEBITA REGIS TANTUM. Co. Litt. 386. In England, the heir is not bound to
pay his ancestor’s debts, unless he be bound to it by the ancestor, except debts due to the king. But now, by 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 104, he is hable.
HIERES RECTUS. In old English law, a right heir. Fleta, lib. 6, c. 1, § 11.
HIERES SUUS. In the civil law, a man’s own heir; a decedent’s proper or natural heir. This name was given to the lineal descendants of the deceased. Persons who were in the power of the testator but became sui juris at his death. Inst. 2, 13; 3, 1, 4, 5. Those descendants who were un-der the power of the deceased at the time of his death, and who are most nearly related to him. Calvin.
HIERETARE. In old English law, to give a right of inheritance, or make the donation hereditary to the grantee and his heirs. Cowell.
ILERETICO COMBURENDO. The statute 2 Hen. IV. c. 15, de hceretico comburendo, was the first penal law enacted against heresy, and imposed the penalty of death by burning against all here-tics who relapsed or who refused to abjure their opinions. It was repealed by the statute 29 Car. II. c. 9. Brown. This was also the name of a writ for the purpose indicated. See, also, De Heeretico Comburendo.
HAFNE. A haven or port. Cowell.
HAFNE COURTS. Haven courts; courts ancient-ly held in certain ports in England. Spelman.
HAG. A division of a coppice or wood on which timber was cut annually by the proprietor. Ersk. Pr. 222.
HAGA. A house in a city or borough. Scott. HAGIA. A hedge. Mon. Angl. tom. 2, p. 273.
HAGNE. A little hand-gun. St. 33 Hen. VIII. c. 6.
HAGNEBUT. A hand-gun of a larger description than the hagne. St. 2 & 3 Edw. VI. c. 14; 4 & 5 P. & M. c. 2.
HAGUE TRIBUNAL. The Court of Arbitration established by the Hague Peace Conference of 1899.
The object of the establishment was to facilítate the im-mediate recourse to arbitration for the settlement of Inter-national dlfferences by providing a permanent court, "ac-cessible at all times, and acting, in default of agreement to the contrary between the partles, in accordance with the rules of procedure inserted in the present convention." The court is given jurlsdiction over all arbitration cases, provided the 1:lardes do not agree to institute a special tribunal. An international Bureau was likewise established to serve as a registry for the court and to be the channel of communications relative to the meetings of the court. The court, although called "permanent," is really so only in the fact that there is a permanent list of members from-among whom the arbitrators in a given case are selected. At the Second Hague Conference of 1907, apart from minor chances made in the court, it was provided that, of the two arbitrators appointed by each of the parties, only one should be a national of the appointing state. 1 Scott, 274-318, 423-464.
HAIA. In old Engli,sh law, a park inclosed. A hedge. Cowell.

IIMEBOTE. In old English law, a permission or liberty to take thorns, etc., to make or repair hedges. Blount.
HAILL. In Scotch law, whole; the whole. "Ali and haill" are common words in conveyances. 1 Bell, App.Cas. 499.
HAILWORKFOLK (i. e., holyworkfolk.) Those who formerly held lands by the service of defend-ing or repairing a church or monument. See, al-so, Halywercfolk.
HAIMHALDARE. In old Scotch law, to seek res-titution of one’s own goods and gear, and bring the same home again. Skene de Verb. Sign.
HAIMSUCKEN. In Scotch law, the crime of as-saulting a person in his own house. Bell. See Harnesecken.
HAIR. A capillary outgrowth from the skin. It has been held not to include the bristles of ani-mals. Von Stade v. Arthur, 13 Blatchf. 251, Fed. Cas. No. 16,998.
HAKH. Truth; the true God; a just or legal prescriptive right or claim; a perquisite clairnable under established usage by village officers. Wil-son, Gloss. Ind.
HAKIIDAR. The holder of a right. Moz. & W. See Hakh.
HALAKAR. The realization of the revenue. Wil-son, Gloss. Ind.; Moz. & W.
HALF. One of two equal parts into which any-thing may be divided. Hoyne v. Schneider, 138 Kan. 545, 27 P.2d 558.
A moiety. Prentiss v. Brewer, 17 Wis. 644, 86 Am.Dec. 730.
HALF BLOOD. See Blood.
HALF BROTHER, HALF SISTER. Persons who have the same father, but different mothers; or the same mother, but different fathers. Wood v. Mitcham, 92 N.Y. 379; In re Weiss’ Estate, 1 Montg. Co. Law Rep’r, Pa., 210.
HALF CENT. A copper coin of the United States, of the value of five milis, and of the weight of ninety-four grains. The coinage of these was discontinued in 1857.
HALF CHEST. In connection with tea, a "half chest" is a chest containing 75 to 80 pounds, but the weight varíes according to the kind of tea. Japan Tea Co. v. Franklin MacVeagh & Co., 142 Minn. 152, 171 N.W. 305, 307.
HALF DEFENSE. See Defense.
HALF DIME. A copper-nickel ciad (formerly sil-ver) (now nickel) coin of the United States, of the value of five cents.
HALF DOLLAR. A silver coin of the United States, of the value of fifty cents, or one-half the value of a dollar.
HALF EAGLE. A gold coin of the United States, of the value of five dollars.
HALF ENDEAL OR HALFEN—DEAL. A moiety or half of a thing.
HALF—KINEG. In Saxon law, half-king, (semi-rex.) A title given to the aldermen of all Eng-land. Crabb, Eng. Law, 28; Spelman.
HALF—MARK. A noble, or six shillings and eight pence in English money.
HALF NEPHEW OR HALF NIECE. Son or daughter of a half brother or half sister. Pierson v. National Fire Proofing Corporation, 117 N.J.L. 600, 190 A. 73, 74.
HALF PILOTAGE. Compensation for services which a pilot has put himself in readiness to per-form, by labor, risk, and cost, and has offered to perform, at half the rate he would have received if the services had actually been performed. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 5 S.Ct. 826, 29 L.Ed. 158.
HALF—PROOF. In the civil law, proof by one witness, or a private instrument. Hallifax, Civil Law, b. 3, c. 9, no. 25; 3 Bl.Comm. 370. Or prima facie proof, which yet was not sufficient to found a sentence or decree.
HALF—SEAL. That which was formerly used in the English chancery for sealing of commissions to delegates, upon any appeal to the court of dele-gates, either in ecclesiastical or marine causes. 8 Eliz. c. 3.
HALF SECTION. In American land law. the half of a section of land according to the divisions of the government survey, laid off either by a north-and-south or by an east-and-west line, and contain-ing 320 acres. See Brown v. Hardin, 21 Ark. 324.
HALF—TIMER. A child who, by the operation of the English factory and education acts, is em-ployed for less than the full time in a factory or workshop, in order that he may attend some "recognized efficient school." See factory and workshop act, 1878, § 23; elementary education act, 1876, § 11.
HALF—TONGUE. A jury hall of one tongue or nationality and half of another. See De Medie-tate Linguae.
HALF YEAR. In legal computation, the period of one hundred and eighty-two days; the odd hours being rejected. Co. Litt. 135b; Cro. Jac. 166; Yel. 100; 1 Steph.Comm. 265; Pol. Code Cal. 1903, § 3257.
HALL A man employed in ploughing. Wilson, Gloss. Ind.; Moz. & W.
HALIFAX LAW. A synonym for lynch law, or the summary (and unauthorized) trial of a person accused of crime and the infliction of death upon him; from the narre of the parish of Halifax, in England, where anciently this forro of private justice was practised by the free burghers in the case of persons accused of stealing; also called "gibbet law."

HALIGEMOT, or HALIMOTE. In Saxon law, the meeting of a hall, (conventus aulce,) that is, a lord’s court; a court of a manor, or court-baron. Spelman. So called from the hall, where the ten-ants or freemen met, and justice was adminis-tered. Crabb, Eng. Law, 26.
It was sometimes used to desígnate a convention of cltizens in their public hall and was also called folkmote and hailmote. The word halimote rather signifies the lord’s court or a court baron held in a manor in which the dlfferences between the tenants were determined. Cunn. L.Dict.; Cowell.
"Furthermore, lt seems to have been a common practice for a wealthy abbey to keep a court, known as a halimote, on each of its manors, while in addltion to these manorial courts it kept a central court, a libera curia for all its greater freehoid tenants. And we may now and again meet with courts which are distinctly called courts of hon-ors. The rule then was not merely this, that the lord of a manor may hold a court for the manor; but rather this, that a lord may hold a court for his tenants." 1 Poli. & Maitl. 573.
HALIMAS. In English law, the feast of All Saints, on the lst of November; one of the cross-quarters of the year, was computed from Halimas to Candlemas. Wharton.
HALIWORKFOLK. See Halywercfolk.
HALL. A building or room of considerable size, used as a place for the meeting of public assem-blies, conventions, courts, etc.; as, the city hall, the town hall.
In English law, a name given to many manor-houses because the magistrate’s court was held in the hall of his mansion; a chief mansion-house. Cowell.
Hence, hall day, a court day.
HALL—MARK. An official stamp affixed by the goldsmiths upon articles made of gold or silver as an evidente of genuineness, and hence used to signify any mark of genuineness. "The power of free alienation is the ‘hall-mark’ of a fee-simple absolute." Rand. Em. Dom. § 206.
HALLAGE. In old English law, a fee or toll due for goods or merchandise vended in a hall. Jacob; 6 Co. 62.
A toll due to the lord of a fair or market, for such commodities as were vended in the common hall of the place. Cowell; Blount.
HALLAZCO. In Spanish law, the finding and tak-ing possession of something which previously had no owner, and which thus becomes the property of the first occupant. Las Partidas, 3, 5, 28; 5, 48, 49; 5, 20, 50.
HALLE—GEMOTE. In Saxon law, haligemot (q. v.).
HALLMOOT. See Haligemot.
HALLUCINATION. In medical jurisprudence, a trick or deceit of the senses; a morbid error ei-ther of the sense of sight or that of hearing, or possibly of the other senses; a psychological state, such as would be produced naturally by an act of sense-perception, attributed confidently, but mis-takenly, to something which has no objective exis-
tence; as, when the patient imagines that he sees an object when there is none, or hears a voice or other sound when nothing strikes his ear. See Staples v. Wellington, 58 Me. 459; McNett v. Cooper, C.C.Mich., 13 F. 590; People v. Krist, 168 N.Y. 19, 60 N.E. 1057.
An error, a blunder, a mistake, a fallacy; and when used in describing the condition of a person, does not necessarily carry an imputation of in-sanity. Foster’s Ex’rs v. Dickerson, 64 Vt. 233, 24 A. 253.
The perception by any of the senses of an object which has no existente. The conscious recognition of a sensation of sight, hearing, feeling, taste, or smell which is not due to any impulse received by the perceptive apparatus from without, but crises within the perceptive apparatus itself. A false perception in contradistinction to a delusion or false belief. Wood, Am. Text-Book of Med.
HallucinatIons are tricks of the senses, differing from de-luslons In that hallucinations pass away while deluslons remain. Bensberg v. Washington University, 251 Mo. 641, 158 S.W. 330, 333.
HALMOTE. See Haligemot.
HALYMOTE. A holy or ecclesiastical court.
A court held in London before the lord mayor and sheriffs, for regulating the bakers.
It was anciently held on Sunday next before St. Thomas’ day, and therefore called the "holyrnote," or holy court. Cowell.
HALYWERCFOLK. Sax. In old English law, tenants who held land by the service of repairing or defending a church or monument, whereby they were exempted from feudal and military services. Especially in the county of Durham, those who held by service of defending the corpse of St. Cuthbert. Jacob, Law Dict.
HAM. A place of dwelling; a homeclose; a little narrow. -meadow. Blount. A house or little vil-lage. Cowell.
RAMA. In old English law, a hook; an engine with which a house on fire is pulled down. Yel. 60.
A piece of land.
HAMBLING, or HAMELING. In forest law, the hoxing or hock-sinewing of dogs; an old mode of laming or disabling dogs. Termes de la Ley. Ex-peditation (q. v.).
HAMEL, HAMELETA, or HAMLETA. A hamlet.
HAMESECKEN. In Scotch law, the violent enter-ing finto a man’s house without license or against the peace, and the seeking and assaulting him there. Skene de Verb. Sign.; 2 Forb. Inst. 139.
The crime of housebreaking or burglary. 4 Bl. Comm. 223. Spelled, also, "hamesucken."
The common genus of offences that comes under the name of hamesucken is that which is usually called house-breaking; which sometimes comes under the common appellation of burglary, whether committed in the day or night to the intent to commit felony; so that house-break-ing of this kind is of two natures. 1 Hale, Pl.Cr. 547; Com. v. Hope, 22 Pick., Mass., 4.
See also, Hamsocne.

HAMFARE. (Sax. From ham, a house.) In Saxon law, an assault made in a house; a breach of the peace in a private house. Cowell. This word by some is said to signify the freedom of a man’s house. Holthouse. See, also, Hamsocne.
HAMLET. A small village; a part or member of a vill. It is the diminutive of "ham," a village. Cowell. See Rex v. Morris, 4 Term, 552.
A "village" or "hamlet" in a rural community may be no more than a store, a school, a church, and two or three residentes. Rantoul Rural High School Dist. No. 2, Frank-lin County, v. Davis, 99 Kan. 185, 160 P. 1008, 1009.
HAMMA. A close joining to a house; a croft; a little meadow. Cowell.
RAMMER. Metaphorically, a forced sale or sale at public auction. "To bring to the hammer," to put up for sale at auction. "Sold under the ham-mer," sold by an of cer of the law or by an auc• tioneer.
HAMSOCNE. In Saxon law, the word is various-ly spelled hamsoca, hamsocna, haimsuken, hame-saken, hamsocn. The right of security and priv-acy in a man’s house. Du Cange. The breach of this privilege by a forcible entry of a house is breach of the peace. Anc. Laws & Inst. of Eng. Gloss.; Du Cange; Bracton, lib. 3, tr. 2, c. 2, § 3. The right to entertain jurisdiction of the offence. Spelman; Du Cange. Immunity from punishment for such offence. Du Cange; Fleta, lib. 1, c. 47, § 18. An insult offered in one’s own house (insultus factus in domo). Brompton, p. 957; Du Cange.
Among the Anglo-Saxons it was breaking into a house; perhaps the time of the day was not an element. See 3 Holdsw. Hist. E. L. 293; 2 Poli. & Maitl. 492. See, also, Hamesecken.
HANAPER. A hamper or basket in which were kept the writs of the court of chancery relating to the business of a subject, and their returns; 5 & 6 Vict. c. 113; 10 Ric. II. c. 1; 3 Bl.Comm. 49; equivalent to the Roman fiscus. According to others, the fees accruing on writs, etc., were there kept. Spelman; Du Cange.
HANAPER-OFFICE. An office belonging to the common-law jurisdiction of the court of chancery, so called because all writs relating to the business of a subject, and their returns, were formerly kept in a hamper, in hanaperio. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 103. See Yates v. People, 6 Johns., N.Y., 363.
HAND. A measure of length equal to four inches, used in measuring the height of horses.
A person’s signature. Salazar v. Taylor, 18 Colo. 538, 33 P. 369; 10 Mod. 103.
In anatomical usage the hand, or manus, in-dudes the phalanges, or fingers and thumb; the metacarpus, or hand proper; and the carpus, or wrist; but in popular usage the wrist is often ex-cluded. Champlin Refining Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 153 Okl. 45, 4 P.2d 751, 752. The arm up to but not including the elbow. Gondak v. Wilson Gas Coal Co., 148 Pa.Super. 566, 25 A.2d 854, 855.
In the plural, the terco may be synonymous with "possession"; as, the "hands" of an executor, garnishee, etc. Brownwood Gas Co. v. Belser, Tex. Civ.App., 257 S.W. 605, 607.
In old English law, an oath. For the meaning of the tercos "strong hand" and "clean hands," see those titles.
HAND DOWN. To announce or file an opinion in a cause. Used originally and properly of the opinions of appellate courts transmitted to the court below; but in later usage the term is em-ployed more generally with reference to any de-cision by a court upon a case or point reserved for consideration.
HAND-FASTING. In old English law, betroth-ment.
HAND-GRITH. Peace or protection given by the king with his own hand; used in the laws of Henry I. Tomlin; Cowell; Moz. & W.; Stat. Hen. I. c. 13.
HAND MONEY. Money paid in hand to bind a bargain; earnest money, when it is in cash.
RANDBILL. A written or printed notice dis-played to inform those concerned of something to be done. Kelly v. Board of Trustees of Evarts Common Graded School Dist., 162 Ky. 612, 172 S.W. 1047, 1048; People v. McLaughlin, 33 Misc. 691, 68 N.Y.S. 1108.
HANDBOROW. In Saxon law, a hand pledge; a name given to the nine pledges in a decennary or friborg; the tenth or chief, being called "head-borow," (q. v.). So called as being an inferior pledge to the chief. Spelman.
HANDCUFFS. See Fetters.
HANDLE. To control, direct, to deal with, to act upon, to perform some function with regard to or to have passed through one’s hands, to buy and sell, or to deal or trade in. State ex rel. Bell v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 349 Mo. 360, 160 S.W.2d 764, 769. To manage or operate. The term in-eludes the áct of placing a truck on a depot plat-f orm for the purpose of loading. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Lowery, Tex.Civ.App., 197 S.W. 605, 608.
HANDRABEND, or HAND-HABENDE. In Sax-on law, one having a thing in his hand; that is, a thief found having the stolen goods in his posses-sion. Jurisdiction to try such thief. See Laws of Hen. I. c. 59; Laws of Athelstane § 6; Fleta, lib. 1, c. 38, § 1; Britton p. 72; Du Cange, Handha-benda. See, also, Backberend.
HANDSALE. Anciently, among all the northern nations, shaking of hands was held necessary to bind a bargain,—a custom still retained in verbal contracts. A sale thus made was called "hand-sale," (venditio per mutuam manum complexion-em.) In process of time the same word was used to signify the price or earnest which was given im-mediately after the shaking of hands, or instead thereof. 2 Bl.Comm. 448.

HANDSEL. Handsale, or earnest money.
HANDWRITING. The chirography of a person; the cast or form of writing peculiar to a person, in-cluding the size, shape, and style of letters, tricks of penmanship, and whatever gives individuality to his writing, distinguishing it from that of other persons. In re Hyland’s Will, 1 Gib. 41, 58 St.R. 798, 27 N.Y.S. 961, 963.
Anything written by hand; an instrument writ-ten by the hand of a person, or a specimen of his writing.
Handwriting, considered under the law of evidence, includes not only the ordinary writing of one able to write, but also writing done in a disguised hand, or In cipher, and a mark made by one able or unable to write. 9 Amer. & Eng.Enc.Law, 264. See Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush., Mass., 301, 52 Am.Dec. 711.
Typewriting is not "handwríting" within a statute allow-ing experts’ opinions as to who executed a writing. Wolf v. Gall, 176 Cal. 787, 169 P. 1017, 1019.
HANDY MAN. A man of all work. Sovereign Camp, W. O. W., v. Craft, 208 Ala. 467, 94 So. 831, 834.
HANG. In old practice, to remain undetermined. "It has hung long enough; it is time it were made an end of." Holt, C. J., 1 Show. 77.
Thus, the present participle means pending; dur-ing the pendency. "If the tenant alien, hanging the prcecipe." Co.Litt. 266a. Remaining unde-termined. 1 Show. 77.
HANGED, DRAWN AND QUARTERED. A meth-od of executing traitors in England, said to have been introduced in 1241. The traitor was carried on a sled, or hurdle to the gallows (formerly dragged there tied to the tail of a horse) ; hanged till half dead and then cut down; his entrails cut out and burnt; his head cut off and his body to be divided into quarters, which, with his head, were hung in some public place. In practice the execu-tioner usually cut out the heart and held it up to view. See Andrews, Old Time Punishments; 1 Eng.Rep. 87.
HANGING. In criminal law, suspension by the neck; the mode of capital punishment used in England from time immemorial, and generally adopted in the United States. 4 Bl.Comm. 403.
HANGING IN CHAINS. In atrocious cases it was at one time usual, in England, for the court to direct a murderer, after execution, to be hanged upon a gibbet in chains near the place whert the murder was committed, a practice quite contrary to the Mosaic law. (Deut. xxi. 23.) Its legality was declared by acts in 1751 and 1828. Abolished by 4 & 5 Wm. IV, c. 26. Wharton.
HANGING PAPER. Ordinarily, paper for hang-ing or hangings, or paper which hangs. Within the meaning of the Tariff Act (19 U.S.C.A. § 121), paper used for covering walls, ceiling, etc., wheth-er such paper is tinted or decorative or not;—a more inclusive term than "paper hangings," mean-ing tinted or decorative paper used for the pur-pose mentioned. Downing & Co. v. U. S., 12 Ct. Cust.App. 451, 454.
Merchandise known as grass cloth, made by pasting a fabric of weed bark sewed with cotton thread on a paper backing and dyelng the surface, imported to be used as wall hangings, is dutiable as dyed hanging paper, Down-ing & Co. v. U. S., 12 Ct.Cust.App. 451.
HANGMAN. An executioner. One who executes condemned criminals by hanging.
HANGWITE. In Saxon law, a fine for illegal hanging of a thief, or for allowing him to escape. Irnmunity from such fine. Du Cange.
HANIG. Some customary labor to be performed. Holthouse.
HANSE. An alliance or confederation among mer-chante or cities, for the good ordering and pro-tection of the commerce of its members. An im-position upon merchandise. Du Cange.
HANSE TOWNS. The collective name of certain German cities, including Lübeck, Hamburg, and Bremen, which formed an alliance for the mutual protection and 1 urtherance of their commercial interests, in the twelfth century. The powerful confederacy thus formed was called the "Hanseatic League." The league framed and promulgated a code of maritime law, which was known as the "Laws of the Hanse Towns," or Jus Hanseaticum Maritimum.
The years 1356 to 1377 marked the zenith of the league’s power. The league gradually declined till, in 1669, the last general assem-bly was held and Lübeck, Hamburg and Bremen were left alone to preserve the name and small inheritance of the "Hansa."
HANSE TOWNS, LAWS OF THE. The maritime ordinances of the Hanseatic towns, first published in German at Lübeck, in 1597, and in May, 1614, revised and enlarged.
HANSEATIC. Pertaining to a hance or commer-cial alliance; but, generally, the union of the Hanse towns is the one referred to, as in the ex-pression the "Hanseatic League."
HANSGRAVE. The chief of a company; the head man of a corporation.
HAOLE. White foreign. Refers to rank rather than to race. International Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union v. Ackerman, D.C.Hawaii, 82 F.Supp. 65, 76.
HANTELOD, or HANTELODE. In old European law, an arrest, or attachment. Spelman; Du Cange; Toml.; Holthouse.
HAP. To catch. Thus, "hap the rent," "hap the deed-poll," were formerly used.
HAPPINESS. Comfort, consolation, contentment„ ease, enjoyment, pleasure, satisfaction. NationaI Surety Co. v. Jarrett, 121 S.E. 291, 295, 95 W.Va., 420.
The constitutional right of men to pursue their "happi-ness" means the right to pursue any lawful business or vocation, in any manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, which may increase their prosperity, or develop their faculties, so as to give to them their highest enjoyment.Butchers’ Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 757, 4 .S.Ct. 652, 28 L.Ed. 585; 1 BI.Comm. 41. Eng-lish v. English, 32 N.T.Eq. 750.
RAQUE. In old statutes, a hand-gun, about three-quarters of a yard long.
HARACIUM. In old English law, a race of horses and mares kept for breed; a stud. Spelman.
HARBINGER. In England, an officer of the royal household.
HARBOR, n. A haven, or a space of deep water so sheltered by the adjacent land as to afford a safe anchorage for ships. Rowe v. Smith, 51 Conn. 271, 50 Am.Rep. 16; The Aurania, D.C.N.Y., 29 F. 103; People v. Kirsch, 67 Mich. 539, 35 N.W. 157; The Cuzco, D.C.Wash., 225 F. 169, 176. A port or haven for ships; a sheltered place, natural or arti-ficial, on the coast of a sea, lake, or other body of water. State v. Savidge, 95 Wash. 240, 163 P. 738, 740.
"Port" is a word of larger import than "harbor," since It implies the presence of wharves, or at any rate the means and opportunity of recelvíng and discharging cargo. See 7 M. & G. 870; Martin v. Hilton, 9 Mete., Mass., 371; 2 B. & Ald. 460. Thus, we have the "said harbor, basín, and docks of the port of Hu11." 2 B. & Ald. 60. But they are generally used as synonymous. Webster, Díct.
HARBOR, v. To afford lodging to, to shelter, or to give a refuge to. Hancock v. Finch, 126 Conn. 121, 9 A.2d 811. To clandestinely shelter, succor, and protect improperly admitted aliens. Susnjar v. U. S., C.C.A.Ohio, 27 F.2d 223, 224. To receive clandestinely and without lawful authority a per-son for the purpose of so concealing him that an-other having a right to the lawful custody of such person shall be deprived of the same. Jones v. Van Zandt, 5 How. 215, 227, 12 L.Ed. 122. Or, in a less technical sense, it is the reception of persons improperly. Poll.Torts 275; Wood v. Gale, 14 N.H. 247, 34 Am.Dec. 150; Eells v. People, 4 Scam., III., 498. It may be aptly used to describe the fur-nishing of shelter, lodging, or food clandestinely or with concealment, and under certain circum-stances, may be equally applicable to those acts divested of any accompanying secrecy. U. S. v. Grant, C.C.Or., 55 F. 415.
As used In U. S. Criminal Code, § 42, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1381, the word "harbor" means to lodge, to care for, atter secreting the deserter. Firpo v. U. S., C.C.A.N.Y., 261 F. 850, 853.
To "harbor" a dog ínvolves the Idea of protection, and of treating it as living at one’s house, and undertaking to control its actions. Hagenau v. Millard, 182 Wis. 544, 195 N.W. 718, 719. See, also, Markwood v. McBroom, 110 Wash. 208, 188 P. 521, 522.
IIARBOR AUTHORITY. In England a harbor au-thority is a body of persons, corporate or unincor-porate, being proprietors of, or intrusted with the duty of constructing, improving, managing, or lighting, any harbor. St. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 47.
HARBOR LINE. A fine marking the boundary of a certain part of a public water which is reserved for a harbor. Engs v. Peckham, 11 R.I. 224. The fine beyond which wharves and other structures cannot be extended. Garrison v. Greenleaf John-son Lumber Co., C.C.A.Va., 215 F. 576, 579.
HARD. As applied to liquors, rough; acid; sour. In re Stiller, 161 N.Y.S. 594, 597, 175 App.Div. 211.
HARD CASES. A phrase used to indicate deci-sions which, to meet a case of hardship to a party, are not entirely consonant with the true principie of the law. It is said of such: Hard cases make bad law. Hard cases must not make bad equity any more than bad law; Moore v. Pierson, 6 Iowa 279, 71 Am.Dec. 409. Hard cases are the quicksands of the law. Metropolitan Nat. Bank of Kansas City, Mo. v. Campbell Commission Co., C.C.Mo., 77 F. 705.
HARD CIDER. Cider which has lost its sweet-ness from fermentation—fermented cider possess-ing a stimulating and intoxicating effect, due to its acquisition of a substantial and potent alcoholic content, through fermentation. People v. Em-mons, 178 Mich. 126, 144 N.W. 479, 481, Ann.Cas. 1915D, 425.
HARD LABOR. A punishment, additional to mere imprisonment, sometimes imposed upon convicts sentenced to a penitentiary. But the labor is not, as a rule, any harder than ordinary mechanical labor. Thompson v. State, 19 Ala.App. 328, 97 So. 258, 260. Compulsory labor. In re Danton, 108 Kan. 451, 195 P. 981, 983.
HARD MONEY. Lawful coined money. Henry v. Bank of Salina, 5 Hill (N.Y.) 523, 536.
HARD OF HEARING. A relative term, applied to one that cannot hear as well as one possessing normal faculties of hearing or does not hear as well as the average person. Sharps v. Jones, 100 W.Va. 662, 131 S.E. 463, 464.
HARDHEIDIS. In ¿id Scotch law, lions; coins formerly of the value of three half-pence. 1 Pite. Crim.Tr. pt. 1, p. 64, note.
HARDPAN. Any earth not popularly recognized as rock through which it is hard to dig or to make excavation of any sort. It may be: (1) Semiindu-rated clay, with or without admixture of stony matter; (2) cemented gravel; or (3) clay, with or without admixture of stony matter, which is very tough because of its strong cohesion. Baker v. Multnomah County, 118 Or. 143, 246 P. 352, 355.
HARDSHIP. The severity with which a proposed construction of the law would bear upon a partic-ular case, founding, sometimes, an argument against such construction, which is otherwise termed the "argument ab ineonvenienti." See Hard Cases.
HARIOT. The same as heriot (q. v.) Cowell; Termes de la Ley. Sometimes spelled Harriott. Wms. Seis. 203.
HARMFUL or HARMLESS ERROR. See Error.
HARMONIC PLANE. The zero adopted by the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey of the Department of Commerce upon which its tidal tables, charts, and maps are based. It is an arbi-trary plane, and, in Puget Sound, is the lowest plane of the tide recognized by that department. State v. Scott, 89 Wash. 63, 154 P. 165, 168.
HARMONIZE. Though not strictly synonymous with the word "reconcile," it is not improperly used by a court in instructing the jury that it is their duty to "harmonize" conflicting evidence if pos-sible. Holdridge v. Lee, 3 S.D. 134, 52 N.W. 265.
HARMONY. The phrase "in harmony with" is synonyrnous with "in agreement, conformity, or accordance with." Brown Real Estate Co. v. Lan-caster County, 110 Neb. 665, 194 N.W. 897, 898.
HARNASCA. In old European law, the defensive armor of a man; harness. ‘Spelman.
HARNESS. The defensive armor of a soldier or knight. All warlike instruments. In modern poet-
iéal a suit of armor. Sometimes, the trap- pings of a war-horse.
The tackle or furniture of a ship.
HARO, HARRON. Fr. In Norman and early English law, an outcry, or hue and cry atter felons and malefactors. Cowell. The original of the ciamour de haro comes from the Normans. Moz. & W.
HARRIOTT. The old form of "heriot," (q. y.) Williams, Seis. 203.
HART. A stag or male deer of the forest, gen-erally over five years old.
HARTER ACT. A name commonly applied to the act of congress of February 13, 1893, c. 105, provid-ing: (1 1) that agreements in a bill of lading re-lieving the owner, etc., of a vessel sailing between the United States and foreign ports, from liability for negligente or fault in proper loading, storage, custody, care, or delivery of merchandise, are void (46 U.S.C.A. § 190); (1 2) that no bill of lading shall contain any agreement whereby the obliga-tions of the owner to exercise due diligence, prop-erly equip, man, provision and outfit a vessel and make it seaworthy, and whereby the obligations of the master, etc., carefully to handle, store, care for and deliver the cargo, are in any way lessened, weakened or avoided (46 U.S.C.A. § 191); (1 3) that if the owner shall exercise due diligence to make such vessel in all respects seaworthy and properly manned, equipped and supplied, neither the vessel nor her owners, etc., shall be Hable for loss resulting from faults or errors in navigation or management, nor for losses arising from dan-gers of the sea, acts of God, or public enemies, or the inherent defect of the thing carried, or insuf-ficiency of package, or seizure under legal proc-ess, or any act or omission of the shipper of the goods, or from saving or attempting to save life at sea, or deviation in rendering such service (46 U.S.C.A. § 192).
HARVESTING. The gathering of crops of any kind. Cook v. Massey, 38 Idaho 264, 220 P. 1088, 1091.
HARVESTING EXPENSES. Includes expenses for repairs of machinery used in harvesting the
crop, the rent of live stock, implements, and the cost of labor. Betts v. Orton, 34 Cal.App. 397, 167 P. 1147, 1148.
HASP AND STAPLE. In old Scotch law, the form of entering an heir in a subject situated within a royal borough. It consisted of the heir’s taking hold of the hasp and staple of the door (which was the symbol of possession,) with other formalities. Bell; Burrill. A mode of entry in Scotland by which a bailee declared a person heir on evidence brought before ly,rnself, at the same time deliver-ing the property over to him by the hasp and sta-ple of the door. Bell; Ersk.Pr. 433.
RASPA. In old English law, the hasp of a door; by which livery of seisin might anciently be made, where there was a house on the premises.
HASTA. Lat. A spear. In the Roman law, a spear was the sign of a public sale of goods or sale by auction. Hence the phrase "hastce sub-jicere" (to put under the spear) meant to put up at auction. Calvin.
In feudal law, a spear, the symbol used in mak-ing investiture of a fief. Feud. lib. 2, tit. 2.
HAT MONEY. In maritime law, primage; a small duty paid to the captain and mariners of a ship.
HATCH. A nautical term, generally signifying an opening in the deck of a ship. State v. Arm-strong, 97 Neb. 343, 149 N.W. 786, 788, Ann.Cas. 1917A, 554.
HATCHWAY. Speciflcally, an opening in the deck of a boat; hence any similar opening, as in a floor or sidewalk; a trapdoor. Kelly v. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co., 140 Minn. 371, 168 N.W. 131, 132. The term is inapplicable to the head of a stairway; Peterson v. Shapiro, 171 Minn. 408, 214 N.W. 269, 270; or to basement ways; State v. Armstrong, 97 Neb. 343, 149 N.W. 786, 788, Ann. Cas.1917A, 554.
HAUBER. O. Fr. A high lord; a great baron. Spelman.
HAUBERK. A long coat or tunic of ring or chain mail. Sometimes applied loosely to a habergeon (q. v.).
HAUGH, HOUGH, or HOWGH. Low-lying rich lands, lands which are occasionally overflowed. Encyc.Dict. A green plot in a valley.
HAUL. To pull or draw with force; to drag; to transport by hauling. Denius v. North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Bureau, 68 N.D. 506, 281 N.W. 361, 363.
HAULA. See Aula.
HAULAGE ROYALTY. Damages at a certain amount per ton for coal from adjacent lands hauled through subterranean passageways of les-sor’s land. Quality Excelsior Coal Co. v. Reeves, 206 Ark. 713, 177 S.W.2d 728, 732.
HAULM. See Helm.HAUR. In old English law, hatred. Used in the laws of William the Conqueror. Toml.; Leg.Wm. I. c. 16; Blount.
HAUSTUS. Lat. In the civil law, a species of servitude, consisting in the right to draw water from another’s well or spring, in which the iter, (right of way to the well or spring,) so far as it is necessary, is tacitly included. Dig. 8, 3, 1; Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 318; Fleta, 1. 4, c. 27, § 9.
HAUT CHEMIN. L. Fr. Highway. Yearb. M. 4 Hen. VI. 4.
HAUT ESTRET. L. Fr. High street; highway. Yearb. P. 11 Hen. VI. 2.
HAUTHONER. In old English law, a man armed with a coat of mail. Jacob.
HAVE. Lat. A form of the salutatory expression "Ave," used in the titles of some of the constitu-tions of the Theodosian and Justinian Codes. See Cod. 7, 62, 9; Id. 9, 2, 11.
HAVE. Imports ownership, and has been defined to mean "to keep," "to hold in possession," "to own." Busteed v. Cambridge Sav. Bank, 306 Mass. 9, 26 N.E.2d 983, 986. To bear (children). Nick-erson v. Hoover, 70 Ind.App. 343, 115 N.E. 588, 593. To possess corporally. Walker v. Trollinger, 192 N.C. 744, 135 S.E. 871, 873.
"No one, at common law, was said to have or to be In possesslon of land, unless it were conveyed to him by the llvery of seisin, which gave hlm the corporal investiture and bodily occupation thereof." BI.Law Tracts, 113.
HAVE AND HOLD. A common phrase in con-veyancing, derived from the habendum et tenen-dum of the old common law. See Habendum et Tenendum.
HAVEN. A place of a large receipt and safe rid-ing of ships, so situate and secured by the land circumjacent that the vessels thereby ride and anchor safely, and are protected by the adjacent land from dangerous or violent winds; as Milford Haven, Plymouth Haven, and the like. Hale de Jure Mar. par. 2, c. 2; The Cuzco, D.C.Wash., 225 F. 169, 176; 15 East 304, 305. Lowndes v. Board of Trustees, 14 S.Ct. 758, 153 U.S. 1, 38 L.Ed. 615; De Lovio v. Boit, 7 Fed.Cas. 429.
HAW. A small parcel of land so called in Kent; houses. Co.Litt. 5; Cowell.
HAWBERK, or HAWBERT. A coat or shirt of mail; hence, derivatively (in feudal law) one who held a fief on the duty or service of providing him-self with such armor and standing ready, thus equipped, for military service when called on. Wharton. See Fief d’Haubert.
HAWGH, HOWGH. In old English law, a valley. Co.Litt. 5b. See Haugh.
HAWKER. An itinerant or traveling trader, who carries goods about, in order to sell them, and who actually sells them to purchasers, in contradis-tinction to a trader who has goods for sale and sells them in a fixed place of business. Common-
wealth v. Bergeron, 296 Mass. 60, 5 N.E.2d 31, 32. A peddler who uses beast of burden to carry wares and who cries out merits of wares in street. City of Washington v. Reed, 229 Mo.App. 1195, 70 S.W. 2d 121, 122. See Hawking.
it is perhaps not essential to the idea, but is generally understood from the word, that a hawker is to be one who not only carries goods for sale, but seeks for purchasers, either by outcry, which some lexicographers conceive as intimated by the derivation of the word, or by attracting notice and attention to them, as goods for sale, by an actual exhibition or exposure of them, by placards or labels, or by a conventional signal, like the sound of a horn for the sale of fish. Graffty v. Rushville, 107 Ind. 502, 8 N.E. 609, 57 Am.Rep. 128.
One who goes about a village carryIng samples and tak-Ing orders for a non-resident firm is not a hawker or ped-dler. Village of Cerro Gordo v. Rawlings, 135 III. 36, 25 N.E. 1006.
HAWKING. The act of offering goods for sale on the streets by outcry or by attracting the attention of persons by exposing goods in a public place, or by placards, labels, or signals. Pastorino v. City of Detroit, 182 Mich. 5, 148 N.W. 231, 235, Ann. Cas.1916D, 768.
The business of peddling is distinct from that of a manu-facturer sellIng his own products, and those who ralse or produce what they sell, such as farmers and butchers, are not peddlers. Ex parte Hogg, 70 Tex.Cr.R. 161, 156 S.W. 931, 932. The occupation of a dairyman, going about deliv-ering the milk from his farm to his regular customers according to their previous orders, is not, within the ordi-nary meaning of the term, peddling or hawking. State ex rel. Brittain v. Hayes, 143 La. 39, 78 So. 143, 144.
HAY. Commonly means grasses or seeds which have been harvested. Sandall v. Hoskins, 104 Utah 50, 137 P.2d 819, 823. In statute, term does not apply to the stalks, stems, and other residue, left after bean plants have been threshed and the bean kernel or seeds -removed. State v. Choate, 41 Ida-ho 251, 238 P. 538, 540.
HAY IN STACK. A stack of hay, grain, straw, or the like is a large quantity thereof collected and usually built up in layers in conical, oblong, or rectangular form to a point or ridge at the top so that it will be preserved against the inclemen-cies of the weather. A policy covering "hay in stack" does not cover hay in the mow of a barn. Murphy v. Continental Ins. Co., 178 Iowa 375, 157 N.W. 855, 856, L.R.A.1917B, 934.
HAY—BOTE. Another name for "hedge-bote," be-ing one of the estovers allowed to a tenant for life or years, namely, material for repairing the nec-essary hedges or fences of his grounds, or for making necessary farming utensils. 2 B1.Comm. 35; 1 Washb.Real Prop. 129.
HAYWARD. In old English law, an officer ap-pointed in the lord’s court to keep a common herd of cattle of a town; so called because he was to see that they did not break or injure the hedges of inclosed grounds. His duty was also to impound trespassing cattle, and to guard against pound-breaches. Kitch. 46; Cowell. Adams v. Nichols, 1 Aikens (Vt.) 319.
HAZAR—ZAMIN. A bail or surety for the person-al attendance of another. Moz. & W.

HAZARD. In old English law, an unlawful game at dice, those who play at it being called "hazard-ors." Jacob.
In modern law, any game of chance or wagering. Cheek v. Com., 100 Ky. 1, 37 S.W. 152; Somers v. State, 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 438.
A risk or peril, assumed or involved, whether in connection with contract relation, personal rela-tion, or golf or gambling. State v. Hagan, 44 N.D. 306, 175 N.W. 372, 377. A danger or risk lurking in a situation which by change or fortuity devel-ops finto an active agency of harm. Hough v. Con-tributory Retirement Appeal Board, 309 Mass. 534, 36 N.E.2d 415, 417, 418. Exposure to the chance of loss or injury. Caminetti v. Guaranty Union Life Ins. Co., 52 Cal.App.2d 330, 126 P.2d 159, 163.
A stationary unlighted freight train upon a railroad crossing at nlght. Plante v. Canadian Nat. RYs., 138 Me. 215, 23 A.2d 814, 817. An accldent incidental to or result of an act done while in the cocarse of one’s employment. Tip-ple v. High Street Hotel Co., 70 Ohlo App. 397, 41 N.E.2d 879, 885.
In insurance law, the risk, danger, or probabil-ity that the event insured against may happen, varying with the circumstances of the particular case. See State Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 14 Colo. 499, 24 P. 333, 20 Am.St.Rep. 281.
Moral hazard. In fire insurance, the risk or danger of the destruction of the insured property by fire, as measured by the character and interest of the insured owner, his habits as a prudent and careful man or the reverse, his known integrity or his bad reputation, and the amount of loss he would suffer by the destruction of the property or the gain he would make by suffering it, to burn and collecting the insurance. Davenport v. Fire-men’s Ins. Co. of Newark, N. J., 47 S.D. 426, 199 N.W. 203, 205.
HAZARDOR. In old English law, one who played at a hazard ti. e., an unlawful game of dice. Ja-cob.
HAZARDOUS. Exposed to or involving danger; perilous; risky.
Involving risk of loss. Caminetti v. Guaranty Union Life Iris. Co., 52 Ca1.App.2d 330, 126 P.2d 159, 162, 163.
The terma "hazardous," "extra-hazardous," "specially hazardous," and "not hazardous" are well-understood technical terms in the business of Insurance, having dis-tinct and separate meanings. Although what goods are included in each designatlon may not be so known as to dispense with actual proof, the terms themselves are dis-tinet and known to be so. Russell v. Insurance Co., 50 Minn. 409, 52 N.W. 906.
HAZARDOUS CONTRACT. See Contract.
HAZARDOUS INSURANCE. Insurance effected on property which is in unusual or peculiar dan-ger of destruction by fire, or on the life of a man whose occupation expones’ him to special or un-usual peras.
HAZARDOUS NEGLIGENCE. See Negligence.
HE. Properly a pronoun of the masculine gender, but commonly construed in statutes to include both sexes as well as corporations. Dickson v.
Strickland, 114 Tex. 176, 265 S:W. 1012, 1021; City of Janesville v. Tweedell, 217 Wis. 395, 258 N.W. 437. May be read "they". Buono v. Yankee Maid Dress Corporation, C.C.A.N.Y., 77 F.2d 274, 278.
HE WHO COMES INTO A COURT OF EQUITY MUST COME WITH CLEAN }LANDS.
HE WHO HAS COMMITTED INIQUITY SHALL NOT HAVE EQUITY. Francis, Max.
HE WHO IS SILENT WHEN CONSCIENCE RE-QUIRES HIM TO SPEAK SHALL BE DEBAR-RED FROM SPEAKING WHEN CONSCIENCE REQUIRES HIM TO BE SILENT.
HE WHO SEEKS EQUITY MUST DO EQUITY. This expression means that the party asking the aid of an equity court must stand in a conscien-tious relation toward his adversary and the trans-action from which his claim arises must be fair and just and the relief must not be harsh and op-pressive upon defendant. Jacklich v. Baer, 57 Cal. App.2d 684, 135 P.2d 179, 184. And that court will not confer equitable relief on party seeking its aid, unless he has acknowledged and conceded or will admit and provide for all equitable rights, claims, and demands justly belonging to adverse party and growing out of or necessarily involved in sub-ject matter of controversy. Bates v. Dana, 345 Mo. 311, 133 S.W.2d 326, 329. It is in pursuance of this maxim that equity enforces the right of the wife’s equity to a settlernent. Snell, Eq. (5th Ed.) 374. Drake v. Sherman, 67 Ill.App. 440.
HE WHO WILL HAVE EQUITY DONE TO HIM MUST DO EQUITY TO THE SAME PERSON. 4 Bouv.Inst. 3723.
HEAD. Chief; leading; principal; the upper part or principal source of a stream.
The principal person or chief of any organiza-tion, corporation, or firm.
HEAD MONEY. A sum of money reckoned at a fixed amount for each head (person) in a desig-nated class.
Particularly (1) a capitation or poli tax. (2) A bounty offered by the laws of the United States for each person on board an enemy’s ship or vessel, at the commencement of a naval engagement, which shall be sunk or destroyed by a ship or vessel of the United States of equal or inferior force, the same to be divided among the officers and crew in the same manner as prize money. In re Farragut, 7 D.C. 97. A similar reward is offered by the British statutes. (3) The tax or duty imposed by act of congress of Aug, 3, 1882, on owners of steamships and sailing vessels for every Imml-grant brought finto the United States. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 5 Sup.Ct. 247, 28 L.Ed. 798. (4) A bounty or reward pald to one who pursues and kills a bandit or out-law and produces his head as evidence; the offer of such a reward being popularly called "putting a price on his head."
HEAD OF A FAMILY. An individual who actu-ally supports and maintains in one household one or more individuals who are closely connected with him by blood relationship, relationship by marriage, or by adoption, and whose right to exer-cise family control and provide for the dependent individuals is based upon some moral or legal ob-ligation. Miller v. Glenn, D.C.Ky., 47 F.Supp. 794, 796, 797.

A term used ín homestead and exemption laws to desíg-nate a person who maintains a family; a householder. Not necessarily a husband or father, but any person who has charge of, supervises, and manages the affalrs of the house-hold or the collective body of persons residing together and constituting the family. Armstrong-McClenahan Co. v. Rhoads, 180 Iowa, 710, 163 N.W. 356, 357; The term may thus include an abandoned wife maintaining minor chil-dren, Mennell v. Wells, 51 Mont. 141, 149 P. 954, 955; and also a widow, Wilkey v. Wilkey, 130 Tenn. 430, 171 S.W. 78; Burrell Tp. v. Pittsburg Guardians of Poor, 62 Pa. 475, 1 Am.Rep. 441.
There must be at least two persons who live together in relation of one family. Whidden v. Abbott, 124 Fla. 293, 168 So. 253, 254.
To be the head of a family, one must either have a responsibility (i. e., at least a natural or moral obligation) to support, or have parental authority over, another mem-ber of the family. Whyte v. Grant, 142 La. 822, 77 So. 643. "Head of family," within exemption laws, must be under some obligation to support other members, and the other members must be dependent on the head. Lena v. Clinken-beard, 172 Okl. 6, 44 P.2d 2, 4, (but see In re Taylor, D.C., 282 F. 315, 316).
HEAD OF CREEK. This term means the source of the longest branch, unless general reputation has given the appellation to another. Davis v. Bryant, 2 Bibb. (Ky.) 110.
READ OF DEPARTMENT. One of the members of the president’s cabinet, and not a mere bureau head. Brooks v. United States, D.C.N.Y., 33 F. Supp. 68, 69.
The expression "head of any department of the state government" is one of varled and therefore of equivocal meaning, construed in one statute as having been employed in a narrow, restricted sense, and in another to have been used in its general popular sense, depending on effectuation of the legislative objective as the controlling element. Ralney v. Malone, Tex.Civ.App., 141 S.W.2d 713, 715.
HEAD OF STREAM. The highest point on the stream which furnishes a continuous stream of water, not necessarily the longest fork or prong. Uhl v. Reynolds, 64 S.W. 498, 23 Ky.Law Rep. 759; State v. Coleman, 13 N.J.Law, 104.
HEAD OF WATER. In hydraulic engineering, mining, etc., the effective force of a body or vol-ume of water, expressed in terms of the vertical distante from the level of the water in the pond, reservoir, dam, or other source of supply, to the point where it is to be mechanically applied, or ex-pressed in terms of the pressure of the water per square inch at the latter point. Shearer v. Mid-dleton, 88 Mich. 621, 50 N.W. 737.
HEADBOROUGH. In Saxon law, the head or chief of cer of a borough; chief of the frank-pledge tithing or decennary. This office was aft-erwards, when the petty constableship was creat-ed, aited with that office.
HEAD-COURTS. Certain tribunals in Scotland, abolished by 20 Geo. II. c. 50. Ersk. 1, 4, 5.
HEADERS. In mining, a "cap" is a square piece of plank or block wedged between the top of posts and the roof to better hold the roof, and "headers" are longer pieces of plank supported by a prop at each end and supporting a larger area of the roof with fewer posts. Big Branch Coal Co. v. Wrenchie, 160 Ky. 668, 170 S.W. 14, 16.
HEADLAND. In old English law, a narrow piece of unplowed land left at the end of a plowed field for the turning of the 4low. Called, also, "Butt.’ 2 Leon. 70, case 93; 1 Lltt. 13.
HEAD-NOTE. A syllabus to a reported case; a summary of the points decided in the case, which is placed at the head or beginning of the report.
HEAD-PENCE. An exaction of 40d. or more, col-lected by the sheriff of Northumberland from the people of that county twice in every seven years, without account to the king. Abolished by 23 Hen. VI. c. 6, in 1444. Cowell.
HEADRIGHT. Under the Allotment Act (Act Cong. June 28, 1906 [34 Stat. 539] ), creating a trust fund from all tribal funds which included funds from sale of tribal lands, funds allowed on claims against the United States and received from tribal oil, gas, and mineral rights, each allottee owned his pro rata share of the trust fund, and this pro rata beneficial interest is commonly call-ed a "headright." Cook v. First Nat. Bank, 145 Okl. 5, 291 P. 43, 46.
HEADRIGHT CERTIFICATE. In the laws of the republic of Texas, a certificate issued under au-thority of an act of 1839, which provided that every person immigrating to the republic between October 1, 1837, and January 1, 1840, who was the head of a family and actually resided within the government with his or her family should be en-titled to a grant of 640 acres of land, to be held under such a certificate for three years, and then conveyed by absolute deed to the settler, if in the meantime he had resided permanently within the republic and performed all the duties requir-ed of citizens. Cannon v. Vaughan, 12 Tex. 401.
HEAD-SILVER. A name sometimes given to a Common Fine (q. v.). By a payment of a certain sum of money to the lord, litigants might try their suits nearer home. Blount.
HEAFODWEARD. In old English law, one of the services to be rendered by a thane, or a geneath or villein, the precise nature of which is unknown. Anc.Eng.Inst.
HEALER. One who heals or cures; specifically, one who professes to cure bodily diseases without medicine or any material means, according to the tenets and practices of so-called "Christian Science," whose beliefs and practices, being f ound-ed on their religious convictions, are not per se proof of insanity. In re Brush’s Will, 72 N.Y.S. 425, 35 Misc. 689.
HEALGEMOTE. In Saxon law, a court-baror ; an ecclesiastical court; Haligemot (q. v.).
HEALING ACT. Another name for a curative act or statute. See Lockhart v. Troy, 48 Ala. 584.
HEALSFANG. In Saxon law, a sort of pillory, by which the head of the culprit was caught be-tween two Boards, as feet are caught in a pair of stocks. Cowell. It was very early disused, no mention of it occurring in the laws of the Saxon

kíngs. Anc.Laws & Inst. oí Eng. Gloss.; Spel-man, Gloss.
HEALTH. State of being hale, sound, or whole in body, mind or soul, well being. Venable v. Gulf Taxi Line, 105 W.Va. 156, 141 S.E. 622, 624. Freedom from pain or sickness; the most perfect state of animal life. Not synonymous with "sani-tation." Black v. Lambert, Tex.Civ.App., 235 S.W. 704, 706. The right to the enjoyment of health is a subdivision of the right of personal security, one of the absolute rights of persons. 1 Bl.Comm. 129, 134. As to injuries affecting health, see 3 Bl. Comm. 122.
Bill o! health. See Bill.
Board of health. See Board.
Health laws. Laws prescribing sanitary meas-ures, and designed to promote or preserve the health of the community.
Health officer. The officer charged with the execution and enforcement of health laws. The powers and duties of health of lcers are regulated by local laws.
Public health. As one of the objects of the po-llee powér of the state, the "public health" mean the prevailingly healthful or sanitary condition of the general body of people or the community in mass, and the absence of any general or wide-spread disease or cause of mortality. The whole-some sanitary condition of the community at large. State ex rel. Pollock v. Becker, 289 Mo. 660, 233 S.W. 641, 649.
Sound Health. See "Sound."
HEALTHY. Free from disease or bodily ailment, or any state of the system peculiarly susceptible or hable to disease or bodily ailment. Bell v. Jeff-reys, 35 N.C. 356.
REARING. Proceeding of relative formality, generally public, with definite issues of fact or of law to be tried, in which parties proceeded against have right to be heard, and is much the same as a trial and may termínate in final order. In re Se-curities and Exchange Commission, D.C.N.Y., 14 F.Supp. 417, 419. Synonymous with trial, and in-,cludes reception of evidence and arguments there-on. Grant v. Michaels, 94 Mont. 452, 23 P.2d 266. It ís frequently used in a broader and more popu-lar significance to describe whatever takes place before magistrates clothed with judicial functions and sitting without jury at any stage of the pro, .ceedings subsequent to its inception, and may in-elude proceedings before an auditor. Menard v. Bowman Dairy Co., 296 Ill.App. 323, 15 N.E.2d 1014, 1015.
In equity practico. The trial of the case, in–cluding introductioil of evidence, argument of counsel, and decree of court. Wolfe v. Wolfe, 144 Neb. 55, 12 N.W.2d 368, 369.
The words "final hearing" have long been used to desíg-nate the trial of an equity case upon the merits, as distin-,guished from the hearing of any preliminary questions
arising in the cause, which are termed "Interlocutory." Akerly v. Viles, 24 Wis. 171, 1 Am.Rep. 166.
The term is broad enough to include judicial examina-tion of issue between the parties whether of law or of fact. Keown v. Keown, 231 Mass. 404, 121 N.E. 153, 154.
In criminal law. The examination of a prison-er charged with a crime or misdemeanor, and of the witnesses for the accused.
Fair hearing. See Fair Hearing. Final hearing. See Final.
Preliminary examination. The examination of a person charged with crime, before a magistrate. Van Buren v. State, 65 Neb. 223, 91 N.W. 201.
Preliminary hearing. In criminal law. Synony-mous with "preliminary examination." State v. Rogers, 31 N.M. 485, 247 P. 828, 833.
The hearing given to a person accused of crime, by a magistrate or judge, exercising the functions of a committing magistrate, to ascertain whether there is evidence to warrant and require the com-mitment and holding to ball of the person accused. See Bish. New Cr.L. §§ 32, 225.
It II; in no sense a trial for the determination of accused’s guilt or Innocence, but slmply a course of procedure whereby a possible abuse of power may beprevented, and accused discharged or held to answer, as the facts warrant. State v. Langford, 293 Mo. 436, 240 S.W. 167, 168.
Unfair hearing. See that title.
HEARING DE NOVO. Generally, a new hearing or a hearing for the second time, contemplating an entire trial in same manner in which matter was originally heard and a review of previous hearing. On hearing "de novo" court hears mat-ter as court of original and not appellate jurisdic-tion. Collier & Wallis v. Astor, 9 Ca1.2d 202, 70 P.2d 171, 173.
HEARSAY. Evidence not proceeding from the personal knowledge of the witness, but from the mere repetition of what he has heard others say. That which does not derive its value solely from the credit of the witness, but rests mainly on the veracity and competency of other persons. The very nature of the evidence shows its weakness, and it is admitted only in specifled cases from ne-cesslty. State v. Ah Lee, 18 Or. 540, 23 P. 424, 425. Young v. Stewart, 191 N.C. 297, 131 S.E. 735, 737.
It 15 second-hand evidence, as distinguished from original evidence; it is the repetition at second-hand of what would be original evidence if given by the person who originally made the statement. Literaily, it is what the witness saya he heard another person say. Stockton v. Williams, 1 Doug., Mich., 546, 570 (ening 1 Starkie, Ev. 229). Evidence, oral or written, is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part on the competency and credíbility of a person other than the witness. State v. Kluttz, 206 N.C. 726, 804, 175 S.E. 81. Hearsay 1s a statement made by a person not called as a witness, received in evidence on the trial. People v. Kraft, 36 N.Y.S. 1034, 1035, 91 Hun, 474. The term is sometimes used synonymously with "report", State v. Vettere, 76 Mont. 574, 248 P. 179, 183; and with "rumor".
HEARTH MONEY. A tax levied in England by St. 14 Car. II. c. 10, consisting of two shillings on every hearth or stove hl the kingdom. It was ex-tremely unpopular, and was abolished by 1 W. & M. St. 1, c. 10. This tax was otherwise called "chimney money."
HEARTH SILVER. In English law, a species of modus or composition for tithes; Anstr. 323, 326; viz.: a prescription for cutting down and using for fuel the tithe of wood. 2 Burn, Eccl.Law 304.
HEAT OF PASSION. In criminal law, a state of violent and uncontrollable rage engendered by a blow or certain other provocation given, which will reduce a homicide from the grade of murder to that of manslaughter. Disney v. State, 72 Fla. 492, 73 So. 598, 601.
Passion or anger suddenly aroused at the time by some immediate and reasonable provocation, by words or acts of one at the time. State v. Seaton, 106 Mo. 198, 17 S.W. 169.
HEAT PROSTRATION. Sunstroke. U. S. Fidel-ity & Guaranty Co. v. Hoflinger, Ark., 45 S.W.2d 866, 867.
HEAT STROKE. Sunstroke. A sudden prostra-tion resulting from exposure to excessive heat re-gardless of the source from which the heat eman-ates. Herbert v. State, 124 Neb. 312, 246 N.W. 454. A depression of the vital powers; due to ex-posure to excessive heat, and manifesting itself as prostration with syncope, etc. (heat exhaustion), as prostration with insensibility, fever, etc. (true sunstroke), or rarely as acute meningitis; sun-stroke or insolation (in the wider sense). Smith v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., 211 Ky. 454, 277 S. W. 806, 807.
HEAVE TO. In maritime parlance and admiralty law, to stop a sailing vessel’s headway by bringing her head "into the wind," that is, in the direction from which the wind blows. A steamer is said to be "hoye to" when held in such a position that she takes the heaviest seas upon her quarter. The Hugo, D.C.N.Y., 57 Fed. 411.
HEBBERMAN. An unlawful fisher in the Thames below London bridge; so called because they generally fished at ebbing tide or water. 4 Hen. VII, c. 15; Jacob.
HEBBERTHEF. In Saxon law, the privilege of having the goods of a thief, and the trial of him, within a certain liberty. Cowell.
HEBBING-VVEARS. A device for catching fish in ebbing water. St. 23 Hen. VIII, c. 5.
HEBDOMAD. A week; a space of seven days.
HEBDOMADIUS. A week’s man; the canon or prebendary in a cathedral church, who had the pe-culiar tare of the choir and the offices of it for his own week. Cowell.
REBOTE. The king’s edict commanding his sub-jects into the field.
HEBREW. Not the same as Yiddish. U. S. ex rel. Engel v. Tod, C.C.A.N.Y., 294 F. 820, 822. See Yiddish.
HECCAGIUM. In feudal law, rent paid to a lord of the fee for a liberty to use the engines called "hecks."
HECK. An engine to take fish in the river Ouse. 23 Hen. VIII. c. 18.
HECK DAY. See Hoke Day.
HEDA. A small haven, wharf, or landing place.
HEDAGIUM. Toll or customary dues at the hithe or wharf, for landing goods, etc., from which ex-emption was granted by the crown to some par-ticular persons and societies. Wharton; Cowell.
HEDGE. A purchase of grain to protect against loss due to fluctuations in price. Aberdeen Farm-ers’ Equity Exchange v. Sand, 53 S.D. 574, 221 N. W. 597. See Hedging.
To safeguard one’s self from loss on a bet or speculation by making compensatory arrange-ments on the other side. Whorley v. Patton-Kjose Co., 90 Mont. 461, 5 P.2d 210, 214.
HEDGE—BOTE. An allowance of wood for re-pairing hedges or fences, which a tenant or lessee has a right to take off the land let or demised to him. 2 Bl.Comm. 35; Livingston v. Ten Broeck, 16 Johns. (N.Y.) 15, 8 Am.Dec. 287.
HEDGE—PRIEST. A vagabond priest in olden time.
A hedge-parson; specifically, in Ireland, former-ly, a priest who has been admitted to orders di-rectly from a hedge-school, without preparation in theological studies at a regular college. Cent. Dict.
HEDGING. ‘A means by which collectors and ex-porters of grain or other products, and manufac-turers, who make contracts in advance for the sale of their goods, secure themselves against the fluc-tuations of the market by counter contracts for the purchase or sale of an equal quantity of the product or of the material of manufacture. Whor-ley v. Patton-Kj ose Co., 90 Mont. 461, 5 P.2d 210, 214. The action of one who buys commodities in selling an equal amount of such commodities on exchange for the purpose of insurance against fluctuations in price. Fraser v. Farmers’ Co-op. Co., 167 Minn. 369, 209 N.W. 33, 36.
The term "hedge," as used in the mllling business, means when the miller enters into a contract for the delivery of Hour at a future date, he buys wheat on the stock exchange for future delivery, and when he purchases wheat for actual delivery from the grain elevator to fulfill the con-tract which he had previously made to furnIsh Hour, he sells the wheat which he has bought on the stock exchange. Bluefield Milling Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 104 W.Va. 150, 139 S.E. 638, 55 A.L.R. 636.
HEEDLESS. It is almost as strong as word "reckless" and includes the element of disregard of the rights of others. State v. Sullivan, 58 N.D. 732, 227 N.W. 230, 232. Careless. Bordonaro Senk, 109 Conn. 428, 147 A. 136, 137.
HEEL BLANK. Several heel lifts cemented to-gether, forming the height of the heel minus the rand and a bottom or finishing lift. Brockton Heel Co. v. International Shoe Co., D.C.N.H., 19 F.2d 145.
HEEL LOG. Succession of heel lifts coated with an adhesive, piled one upon the other, to which pressure has been applied, making a log of some indeterminate length. Brockton Heel Co. v. In-ternational Shoe Co., D.C.N.H., 19 F.2d 145.
HEEL LOG SECTION. A portion of a heel log of any convenient length. Brockton Heel Co. v. International Shoe Co., D.C.N.H., 19 F.2d 145.
HEELER. An opprobrious term, meaning in com-mon acceptation a person who is the lackey or hangeron of another, and in a political sense an unscrupulous and disreputable person. Winns-boro Cotton Oil Co. v. Carson, Tex.Civ.App., 185 S.W. 1002, 1008.
HEGEMONY. The leadership of one among sev-eral independent confederate states.
HEGIRA. The epoch or account of time used by the Arabians and the Turks, who begin the Mo-hammedan era and computation from the day that Mohammed was compelled to escape from Mecca to Medina which happened on the night of Thurs-day, July 15, A.D. 622, under the reign of the Em-peror Heraclius. Townsend, Dict. Dates; Wilson, Gloss. The era begins July 16. The word is sometimes spelled hejira but the former is the ordinary usage. It is derived from hijrah, in one forro or another, an oriental term denoting
departure.
The flight of Mohammed from Mecca. Webster, Dict.
HEGUMENOS. The leader of the monks in the Greek Church.
HEIFER. A young cow; a cow that has not had a calf. Fletcher v. State, 198 Ark. 376, 128 S.W. 2d 997, 999.
HEIR. At common law. The person appointed by law to succeed to the estate in case of intesta-cy. 2 Bla.Comm. 201; Dukes v. Faulk, 37 S.C. 255, 16 S.E. 122, 34 Am.St.Rep. 745.
One who inherits property, whether real or personal. Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Law-rence, 106 Conn. 178, 138 A. 159, 160.
A person who succeeds, by the rules of law, to an estate in lands, tenements, or hereditaments, upon the death of his ancestor, by descent and right of relationship. Hoover v. Smith, 96 Md. 393, 54 A. 102. Sewall v. Roberts, 115 Mass. 268. He who is born or begotten in lawful wedlock, and upon whom the law casts the inheritance immediately upon the death of his ancestor. Moffett v. Conley, 63 Okl. 3, 163 P. 118, 120.
One who would receive his estate under statute of descent and distribution. Faulkner’s Guardian v. Faulkner, 237 Ky. 147, 35 S.W.2d 6, 7.
Moreover, the term is frequently used in a pop-ular sense to designate a successor to property either by will or by law. Wallace v. Privett, 198 Cal. 746, 247 P. 906, 907.
According to many authorities, heir may be nomen collectivum, as well in a deed as in a will, and operate in both in the same manner as the word heirs. 1 Rolle, Abr. 253; Ambl. 453; Cro. Eliz. 313; 1 Burr. 38. But see 2 Prest.Est. 9, 10.
The word must be construed according to tes-tator’s intention as gathered from whole will. Fadler v. Gabbert, 333 Mo. 851, 63 S.W.2d 121.
See, also, Heirs.
In the civil law. A universal successor in the event of death. He who actively or passively suc-ceeds to the entire property or estate, rights and obligations, of a decedent, and occupies his place.
The term is indiscriminately applied to all persons who are called to the succession, whether by the act of the party or by operation of law. The person who is created uni-versal successor by a will is called the "testamentary heir;" and the next of kin by blood is, in cases of intes-tacy, called the "heir at law," or "heir by intestacy." The executor of the common law in many respects corresponds to the testamentary heir of the civil law. Again, the administrator in many respects corresponds with the heir by intestacy. By the common law, executors and adminis-trators have no right except to the personal estate of the deceased; whereas the heir by the civil law Is authorlzed to administer both the personal and real estate. Story, Confl.Laws, §§ 57, 508; 1 Brown, Civ.Law, 344.
The term "heir" has several significatians. Sometimes it refers to one who has formally accepted a succession and taken possession thereof ; sometimes to one who is called to succeed, but still retains the faculty of accepting or renouncing, and it is frequently used as applied to one who has formally renounced. Mumford v. Bowman, 26 La.Ann. 417.
In Scotch law. The person who succeeds to the heritage or heritable rights of one deceased. 1 Forb.Inst. pt. 3, p. 75. The word has a more ex-tended signification than in English law, compre-hending not only those who succeed to lands, but successors to personal property also. Wharton.
Right heir. This term was formerly used, in the case of estates tail, to distinguish the prefer-red heir, to whom the estate was limited, from the heirs in general, to whom, on the failure of the preferred heir and his fine, the remainder over was usually finally limited. With the abolition of estates tafi, the term has fallen into desuetude,. but when still used, in modern law, it has no oth-er meaning than "heir at law." Brown v. Wads-worth, 168 N.Y. 225, 61 N.E. 250.
HEIR APPARENT. An heir whose right of in-heritance is indefeasible, provided he outlive the ancestor; as in England the eldest son, or his is-sue, who must, by the course of the common law, be heir to the father whenever he happens to die.. 2 Bl.Comm. 208; 1 Steph.Comm. 358; Jones v. Fleming, 37 Hun. (N.Y.) 230. One who, before the death of the ancestor, is next in the line of succession, provided he be heir to the ancestor whenever he happens to die. Reese v. Stires, 87 N.J.Eq. 32, 103 A. 679. See, also, Apparent Heir.
HEIR AT LAW. He who, alter his ancestor dies intestate, has a right to all lands, tenements, and hereditaments which belonged to him or of which he was seised. The same as "heir general." For– rest v. Porch, 100 Tenn. 391, 45 S.W. 676.The heir at common law is that person who succeeds to the real estate in case of intestacy.. Walker v. Walker, 283 Ill. 11, 118 N.E. 1014, 1019. In its strict sense and technical import, the person or persons appointed by law to succeed to the estate in case of intestacy. Albright v. Albright, 116 Ohio St. 668, 157 N.E. 760, 762. In a comprehensive and popular sense, one who inherits either real or personal property: Gross v. Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co., 100 Conn. 332, 123 A. 907, 908. Next of kin, Meeker v. Forbes, 84 N.J.Eq. 271, 93 A. 887, 888.
In the term "heir at law," as used in will, suffix "at law" .adds merely expectant feature of one’s statutory position toward an ancestor or source of title who is considered as still living, whereas word "heir" alone denotes that ances-tor has already died. In re Ward’s Estate, 297 N.Y.S. 16, 19, 162 Misc. 855.
A deceased person’s "heirs at law" are those who succeed to his estate of inheritance under statutes of descent and ‘distribution, in absence of testamentary disposition, and not necessarily his_heirs at common law, who are persons succeeding to deceased’s realty in case of his intestacy. In re Towndrow’s Will, 47 N.M. 173, 138 P.2d 1001, 1003.
MEIRS AT LAW SHALL NOT BE DISINHERIT-ED BY CONJECTURE, BUT ONLY BY EXPRESS WORDS OR NECESSARY IMPLICATION. Schoul. Wills § 479.
HEIR BENEFICIARY. In the civil law, one who has accepted the succession under the benefit of an inventory regularly made.
Ileirs are divided into two classes, according to the man-ner in which they accept the successions lett to them, to-wit, unconditional and beneficiary heirs. Unconditional heirs are those who inherit without any reservation, or without making an inventory, whether their acceptance be express or tacit. Beneficiary heirs are those who have accepted the succession under the benefit of an inventory regularly made. Civ.Code La. art. 883. Ii the heir appre-hend that the succession will be burdened with debts beyond íts value, he accepts with benefit of inventory, and in that case he is responsíble only for the value of the suc-cessipn.
HEIR BY ADOPTION. An adopted child, "who is in a limited sense made an heir, not by the law, but by the contract evidenced by the deed of adop-tion." In re Sessions’ Estate, 70 Mich.. 297, 38 N. W. 249, 14 Am.St.Rep. 500.
HEIR BY CUSTOM. In English law, one whose right of inheritance depends upon a particular and local custom, such as gavelkind, or borough Eng-lish. Co.Litt. 140.
HEIR BY DEVISE. One to whom lands are de-vised by will; a devisee of lands. Answering to the keres factus (q. v.) of the civil law.
HEIR COLLATERAL. One who is not lineally related to the decedent, but is of collateral kin; e. g., his uncle, cousin, brother, nephew.
MEIR CONVENTIONAL. In the civil law, one who takes a succession by virtue of a contract or settlement entitling him thereto.
HEIR EXPECTANT. One whose parents were living, as respects lots to which parents had title. Adams v. Adams, 348 Mo. 1041, 156 S.W.2d 610, 616.
HEIR, FORCED. One who cannot be disinherit-ed. See Forced Heirs.
HEIR GENERAL. An heir at law. The ordinary heir by blood, succeeding to all the lands. For-rest V. Porch, 100 Tenn. 391, 45 S.W. 676.
HEIR INSTITUTE. In Scotch law, one to whom the right of succession is ascertained by disposi-tion or express deed of the deceased. 1 Forb.Inst. pt. 3, p. 75.
HEIR, IRREGULAR. In Louisiana, irregular heirs are those who are neither testamentary nor legal, and who have been established by law to take the succession. See Civ.Code La. art. 878. When there are no direct or collateral relatives surviving the decedent, and the succession conse-quently devolves upon the surviving husband or wife, or illegitimate children, or the state, it is called an "irregular succession."
HEIR, LEGAL. In the civil law, a legal heir is one who takes the succession by relationship to the decedent and by force of law.
This ís different from a testamentary or conventional heir, who takes the succession in virtue of the disposítion of man. See Civ.Code La. arts. 877, 879. The term is also used in Anglo-American law in substantlally the same sense, that is, the person to whom the law would give the decedent’s property, real and personal, íf he should dle intestate. Waller v. Martín, 106 Tenn. 341, 61 S.W. 73, 82 Am.St.Rep. 882. In legal strictness, the terco signifles one who would inherit real estate, but it is also used to indi-cate one who would take under the statute of distrIbutIon. Morse v. Ward, 92 Conn. 408, 103 A. 119, 120.
HEIR, MALE. In Scotch law, an heir institute, who, though not next in blood to the deceased, is his nearest male relation that can succeed to him. 1 Forb.Inst. pt. 3, p. 76. In English law, the near-est male blood-relation of the decedent, unless further limited by the words "of his body," which restrict th’e inheritance to sons, grandsons, and other male descendants in the right line. Jordan v. Adams, 6 C.B.,N.S., 764; Goodtitle v. Herring, 1 East, 275; Ewan v. Cox, 9 N.J.Law, 14.
HEIR OF CONQUEST. In Scotch law, one who succeeds to the deceased in conquest, i. e., lands or other heritable rights to which the deceased neither did nor could succeed as heir to his pre-decessor.
HEIR OF LINE. In Scotch law, one who succeeds lineally by right of blood; one who succeeds to the deceased in his heritage; i. e., lands and other heritable rights derived to him by succession as heir to his predecessor. 1 Forb.Inst. pt. 3, p. 77.
HEIR OF PROVISION. In Scotch law, one who succeeds as heir by virtue of a particular provi-sion in a deed or instrument.
HEIR OF TAILZIE. In Scotch law, he on whom an estate is settled that would not have fallen to him by legal succession. 1 Forb.Inst. pt. 3, p. 75.
HEIR OF THE BLOOD. An inheritor who suc-ceeds to the estate by virtue of consanguinity with the decedent, either in the ascending or descend-ing line, including illegitimate children, but ex-cluding husbands, wives, and adopted children. Hayden v. Barrett, 172 Mass. 472, 52 N.E. 530, 70 Am.St.Rep. 295.
HEIR OF THE BODY. An heir begotten or borne by the person referred to, or a child of such heir; any lineal descendant of the decedent, excluding a surviving husband or wife, adopted children, and collateral relations; bodily heir. Ratliffe v. Ratliffe, 182 Ky. 230, 206 S.W. 478, 479. Clarkson v. Hatton, 143 Mo. 47, 44 S.W. 761, 39 L.R.A. 748, 65 Am.St.Rep. 635.
May be used in either of two senses: In their unrestrict-ed sense, as meaning the persons who from generation to generation become entítled by descent under the entail; and in the sense of heirs at law, or those persons who are descendants of him whom the statute of descent appoints to take íntestate estate. Bunn v. Butler, 300 III. 269, 133 N.E. 246, 247. Unless the will dlscloses an intention to the contrary, the term "heirs of thé body" is not synonymous with children. Clark v. Cammack, 216 Ala. 346, 113 So. 270, 271. And ordinarily, such words are words of limitation and not of purchase. Kirby v. Hulette, 174 Ky. 257, 192 S.W. 63, 65; contra: Owen v. Trail, 302 Mo. 292, 258 S.W. 699, 701. The words are sometimes deemed equivalent to "issue" or "descendants"; Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Bridgham, 42 R.I. 161, 106 A. 149, 152, 5 A.L.R. 185; and sometimes not; In re English’s Estate, 270 Pa. 1, 112 A. 913, 914.
HEIR PRESUMPTIVE. The person who, if the ancestor should die immediately, would, in the present circumstances of things, be his heir, but whose right of inheritance may be defeated by the contingency of some nearer heir being born; as a brother or nephew, Whose presumptive suc-cession may be destroyed by the birth of a child. 2 BI.Comm. 208; 1 Steph.Comm. 358; Jones v. Fleming, 37 Hun., N.Y., 230.
In Louísiana, the presumptive heir is he who is the near-est relation of the deceased capable of inheriting. This quality is given to him before the decease of the person from whom he is to inherit, as well as after the opening of the succession, until he has accepted or renounced it. La. Civ.Code, art. 880.
HEIR SPECIAL. In English law, the issue in tail, who claims per formam doni; by the form of the gift.
HEIR SUBSTITUTE, IN A BOND. In Scotch law, he to whom a bond is payable expressly in case of the creditor’s decease, or after his death. 1 Forb.Inst. pt. 3, p. 76.
HEIR TESTAMENTARY. In the civil law, one who is named and appointed heir in the testament of the decedent. This name distinguishes him from a legal heir, (one upon whom the law casts the succession,) and from a conventional heir, (one who takes it by virtue of a previous contract or settlement.)
REIR UNCONDITIONAL. In the civil law and in Louisiana, one who inherits without any reserva-tion, or without making an inventory, whether his acceptance be express or tacit. Distinguished from heir beneficiary. La.Civ.Code, art. 882.
HEIRDOM. Succession by inheritance.
HEIRESS. A female heir to a person having an estate of inheritance. When there are more than one, they are called "co-heiresses," or "co-heirs."
HEIRLOOMS. Such goods and chattels as, con-trary to the nature of chattels, shall go by special custom to the heir along with the inheritance, and not to the executor. The termination "Zoom" (Sax.) signifies a limb or member; so that an heirloom is nothing else but a limb or member of
the inheritance. They are generally such things as cannot be taken away without damaging or dis-membering the freehold; such as deer in a park, doves in a cote, deeds and charters, etc. 2 Bl. Comm. 427.
This word seems to be compounded of heir, and Zoom, that is, a Trame, viz. to weave in. Some derive the word loom from the Saxon loma, or geloma, which signifies utensils or vessels generally. However, this may be, the word Zoom, by time, ís drawn to a more general significa-tion than it bore at the first, comprehending all imple-ments of household, as tables, presses, cupboards, bed-steads, wainscots, and which, by the custom of some coun-tries, having belonged to a house are never inventoried after the decease of the owner as chattels, but accrue to the heir with the house itself. Minshew; 2 Poli. &
361.
HEIRS. Technically, those persons designated by law to succeed to the estate in case of intestacy. Potter v. Potter, 306 III. 37, 137 N.E. 425, 426. See, also, Heir.
A word used in deeds of conveyance, (either solely, or in connection with others,) where it is intended to pass a lee.
It is generally a word of limitation, and is not to be con-strued as a word of purchase unless there are other control-ling words showing such intention by the person using McKnight v. Black, 240 Ky. 818, 43 S.W.2d 53, 54.
In the word is comprehended heirs of heirs in infinitum. Co.Litt. 7b, 9a; Larew v. Larew, 146 Va. 134, 135 S.E. 819, 820.
It may have different meanings, just as under the Eng-lish law the singular form, "heir," might have different meanings, but, if there is no context, the word "heirs" must be held to indicate the indefinite succession by inheri-tance. ./Etna Life Ins. Co. v. Hoppin, C.C.A., 214 F. 928, 932. Under the terms of particular wills, however, or under statutes abolishing the rule in Shelley’s Case, Men-ard v. Campbell, 180 Mich. 583, 147 N.W. 556, 558, Ann.Cas. 1916A, 802; it may be a word of purchase, and is fre-quently deemed synonymous with "children," Cultice v. Milis, 97 Ohio St. 112, 119 N.E. 200, 201; Williams y. J. C. Armiger & Bro., 129 Md. 222, 98 A. 542, 544.
A devise or bequest to "heirs" primarily means those who are heirs at the testator’s death, and it is only when a contrary intention appears that this presumption fans. In re Bump’s Will, 234 N.Y. 60, 136 N.E. 295, 296.
Bodily heirs. In a technical sense, the same as "heirs of the body." Hartman v. Flynn, 189 N.C. 452, 127 S.E. 517, 519.
Normally, words of limitation, not of purchase. Stamey v. McGinnis, 145 Ga. 226, 88 S.E. 935, 936. But they may be used synonymously with "children." Scott v. Scott, 172 Ky. 658, 190 S.W. 143.
Joint heirs. Co-heirs. The term is also applied to those who are or will be heirs to both of two designated persons at the death of the survivor of them, the word "joint" being here applied to the ancestors rather than the heirs. See Gardiner v. Fay, 182 Mass. 492, 65 N.E. 825.
Lawful heirs. The same as "heirs." In re Irish’s Estate, 89 Vt. 56, 94 A. 173, 174, Ann.Cas. 1917C, 1154. In a general sense, those whom the law recognizes as the heirs of a decedent, but in a special and technical sense, lineal descendants only. Abbott v. Essex Co., 18 How. 215, 15 L.Ed. 352.
Legitimate heirs. Children born in lawful wed-lock and their descendants, not including collateral heirs or issue in indefinite succession. Lytie v.Beveridge, 58 N.Y. 605; Prindle v. Beveridge, 7 Lans., N.Y., 231. Sometimes synonymous with "lawful" heir. Corison v. Williams, 58 Cal.App. 282, 208 P. 331, 334.
Lineal heir. See Lineal Heir.
Living heirs. Technically words of description instead of purchase. Johnson v. Coler, 187 Iowa, 734, 174 N.W. 654, 655.
Under a will giving the testator’s wlfe an estate for life, at her death all the property to be equally divided between "our living children or to their living heirs," the words "living heirs" should be given their technical meaning as Including all the legal heirs of the deceased children of testator that died after the death of testator. Potter v. Potter, 306 III. 37, 137 N.E. 425, 427.
Natural heirs. Heirs by consanguinity as dis-tinguished from heirs by adoption, and also as dis-tinguished from collateral heirs. Smith v. Pen-dell, 19 Conn. 112, 48 Am.Dec. 146; children; heirs of the body, Maynard v. Henderson, 117 Ark. 24, 173 S.W. 831, 832, Ann.Cas.1917A, 1157. Yarring-ton v. Freeman, 201 Ky. 135, 255 S.W. 1034, 1035.
HEIRS AND ASSIGNS. Ordinarily words of lim-itation and not of purchase. In re Knapp’s Will, 6 N.Y.S.2d 100, 168 Misc. 487. At common law, the words were essential to conveyance granting title in fee simple, and though they are unnecessary for that or any purpose under statute when used in wills or deeds, words still have that meaning. In re Denari’s Will, 300 N.Y.S. 1279, 165 Misc. 450.
HEIRSHIP. The quality or condition of being heir, or the relation between the heir and his an-cestor. It is a legal right, regulated by law, to be enjoyed subject to the provisions of the statute. Winke v. Olson, 164 Wis. 427, 160 N.W. 164, 166.
HEIRSHIP MOVABLES. In Scotch law. The movables which go to the heir, and not to the executor, that the land may not go to the heir completely dismantled, such as the best of furni-ture, horses, cows, etc., but not fungibles. Er-skine, Inst. 3. 8. 13-17.
HELD. In reference to the decision of a court, decided. See, also, Hold.
HELL. The name formerly given to a place un-der the exchequer chamber, where the king’s debt-ors were confined. Rich.Dict.
HELM. Thatch or straw; a covering for the head in war; a coat of arms bearing a crest; the tiller or handle of the rudder of a ship.
HELOWE-WALL. The end-wall covering and de-fending the rest of the building. Paroch. Antiq. 573.
HELSING. A Saxon brass coin, of the value of a half-penny.
HEMIPLEGIA. In medical jurisprudence. Uni-lateral paralysis; paralysis of one side of the body, commonly due to a lesion in the brain, but some-times originating from the spinal cord, as in "Brown-Sequard’s paralysis," unilateral paralysis with crossed ancesthesia. In the cerebral form,
the hemiplegia is sometimes "alternate" or cross-ed, that is, occurring on the opposite side of the body from the initial lesion.
Paralysls of half of the body, as of both legs or of both arms, or an arm and leg. Gray v. United States, C.C.A. Ark., 109 F.2d 728 729. If the disease comes on rapldly or suddenly, It is called "quick" hemiplegtia; if slowly or gradually, "chronic." The former variety 1s more apt to affect the mental faculties than the ]atter; but, where hemiplegia is complete, the operations of the mind are gen-erally much impaired. Baughman v. Baughman, 32 Kan. 538, 4 P. 1003.
HEMOLDBORH, or HELMELBORCIL A title to possession. The admission of this old Norse term into the laws of the Conqueror is difficult to be accounted for; it is not found in any Anglo-Saxon law extant. Wharton.
HENCEFORTH. A word of futurity, which, as employed in legal documents, statutes, and the like, always imports a continuity of action or con-dition from the present time forward, but excludes all the past. Thomson v. American Surety Co., 170 N.Y. 109, 62 N.E. 1073.
HENCHMAN. A page; an attendant; servant; a herald. See Barnes v. State, 88 Md. 347, 41 A. 781. A footman; one who holds himself at the bidding of another. It has come to mean here a political follower; used in a rather bad sense. Gates v. State, 140 Tex.Cr.R. 228, 143 S.W.2d 780, 783, 784.
HENEDPENNY. A customary payment of mon-ey instead of hens at Christmas; a composition for eggs. Cowell.
HENFARE. A fine for flight on account of mur-der. Domesday Book.
HENGHEN. In Saxon law. A prison, a goal, or house of correction.
HENGWYTE. Sax. In old English law. An ac-quittance from a fine for hanging a thief. Fleta, lib. 1, c. 47, § 17.
HENRICUS VETUS. Henry the Old, or Elder. King Henry I. is so called in ancient English chron-icles and charters, to distinguish him from the subsequent kings of that name. Spelman.
HEORDFIETE, or HUDEF1EST. In Saxon law. A master of a family, keeping house, distinguish-ed from a lower class of freemen, viz., folgeras, (folgarii,) who had no habitations of their own, but were house-retainers of their lords.
HEORDPENNY. Péter-pence (q. v.).
HEORDWERCH. In Saxon law. The service of herdsmen, done at the will of their lord.
HEPBURN ACT. The name commonly given to an act of Congress, June 29, 1906, amending §§ 1, 6, 14, 15, 16 and 20 of the Interstate Commerce Act, Feb. 4, 1887. (49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 6, 11, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20).
HEPTARCHY. A government exercised by seven persons, or a nation divided into seven govern-ments. In the year 560, seven different monarchies had been formed in England by the German tribes, namely, that of Kent by the Jutes; those of Sus-sex, Wessex, and Essex by the Saxons; and those of East Anglia, Bernicia, and Deira by the Angles. To these were added, about the year 586, an eighth, called the "Kingdom of Mercia," also founded by the Angles, and comprehending nearly the whole of the heart of the kingdom. These states formed what has been designated the "Anglo-Saxon Oc-tarchy," or more commonly, though not so cor-rectly, the "Anglo-Saxon Heptarchy," from the cus-tom of speaking of Deira and Bernicia under the single appellation of the "Kingdom of N orthum-berland." Wharton.
HERALD. In ancient law, a herald was a dip-lomatic messenger who carried messages between kings or states, and especially proclamations of war, peace, or truce. In English law, a herald is an officer whose duty is to keep genealogical lists and tables, adjust armorial bearings, and regu-late the ceremonies at royal coronations and fun-erals.
HERALDRY. The art, office, or science of her-alds. Also an old and obsolete abuse of buying and selling precedente in the paper of causes for hearing.
HERALDS’ COLLEGE. In England. An ancient royal corporation, first instituted by Richard
in 1483. It comprises three kings of arms, six heralds, and four marshals or pursuivants of arms, together with the earl marshal and a sec-retary. The heralds’ books, compiled when prog-resses were solemnly and regularly made into every part of the kingdom, to inquire into the state of families, and to register such marriages and descents as were verified to them upon oath, are allowed to be good evidence of pedigrees. The heralds’ office is still allowed to make grants of arms and to permit change of names. 3 Starkie, Ev. 843; Wharton.
HERBAGE. In English law. An easement or liberty, which consists in the right to pasture cat-tle on another’s ground.
Feed for cattle in fields and pastures. Bract. fol. 222; Co.Litt. 46; Steph.Touch. 97. A right to herbage does not include a right to cut grass, or dig potatoes, or pick apples. Simpson v. Coe, 4 N.H. 303.
HERBAGIUM ANTERIUS. The first crop of grass or hay, in opposition to aftermath or second cutting. Paroch.Antiq. 459.
HERBENGER, or HARBINGER. An officer in the royal house, who goes before and allots the noblemen and those of the household their lodg-ings; also an innkeeper.
HERBERGAGIUM. Lodgings to receive guests in the way of hospitality. Cowell.
HERBERGARE. To harbor; to entertain.
HERBERGATUS. Harbored or entertained in an inn. Covvell.
HERBERY, or HERBERY. An inn. Cowell. HERCIA. A harrow. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 77. HERCIARE. To harrow. 4 Inst. 270.
HERCIATURA. In old English law. Harrowing; work with a harrow. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 82, § 2.
HERCISCUNDA. In the civil law. To be divided. Familia herciscunda, an inheritance to be divided. Actio familice herciscundce, an action for dividing an inheritance. Erciscunda is more commonly used in the civil law. Dig. 10, 2; Inst. 3, 28, 4; Id. 4, 6, 20.
RERD, n. An indefinite number, more than a few, of cattle, sheep, horses, or other animals of the larger sorts, assembled and kept together as one drove and under one care and management. Bo-land v. Cecil, 65 Cal.App.2d Supp. 832, 150 P.2d 819, 822.
HERD, v. To tend, take care of, manage, and con-trol a herd of cattle or other animals, implying something more than merely driving them from place to place. Phipps v. Grover, 9 Idaho 415, 75 P. 65.
HERDER. One who herds or has charge of a herd of cattle, in the senses aboye defined. Hooker v. McAllister, 12 Wash. 46, 40 P. 617.
HERDEWICH. A grange or place for cattle or husbandry. Mon.Angl. pt. 3.
HERDWERCH, HEORDWERCH. Herdsmen’s work, or customary labor, done by shepherds and inferior tenants, at the will of the lord. Cowell.
REREAFTER. A word of futurity, always used in statutes and legal documents as indicative of fu-ture time, excluding both the present and the past. Tremont & S. Milis v. Lowell, 165 Mass. 265, 42 N.E. 1134.
HEREBANNUM. In old English law. A procla-mation summoning the army into the field. A mulct or fine for not joining the army when sum-moned. Spelman. A tax or tribute for the sup-port of the army. Du Cange.
HEREBOTE. The royal edict summoning the people to the field. Cowell.
HEREDAD. In Spanish law. A piece of land un-der cultivation; a cultivated farm, real estate; an inheritance or heirship.
HEREDAD YACENTE. From Lat. "Hcereditas ja-cens," (q. y.) In Spanish law. An inheritance not yet entered upon or appropriated. White, New Recop. b. 2, tit. 19, c. 2, § 8.
HEREDERO. In Spanish law. Heir; he who, by legal or testamentary disposition, succeeds to the property of a deceased person. "Hceres censeatur cum defuncto una eademque persona." Las Par-tidas, 7, 9, 13. Emeric v. Alvarado, 64 Cal. 529, 2 P. 433.HEREDITAGI1UM. In Sicilian and Neapolitan law. That which is held by hereditary right; the same with hereditamentum (hereditament) in English law. Spelman.
HEREDITAMENTS. Things capable of being in-herited, be it corporeal or incorporeal, real, per-sonal, or mixed, and including not only lands and everything thereon, but also heirlooms, and certain furniture which, by custom, may descend to the heir together with the land. Co.Litt. 5b; 2 )31. Comm. 17; Nellis v. Munson, 108 N.Y. 453, 15 N.E. 739. Sox v. Miracle, 35 N.D. 458, 160 N.W. 716, 719.
Things which may be directly inherited, as contrasted with things which go to the personal representative of a deceased. Denver Joint Stock Land, Bank of Denver v. Dixon, 57 Wyo. 523, 122 P.2d 842, 846, 140 A.L.R. 1270.
At common law corporeal hereditaments were physlcal objects, comprehended under the term land, and were said to lie in livery, while incorporeal hereditaments existed only in contemplation of law, were said to lie in grant and were affiliated with chattel interests. National Supply Co. v. McLeod, 116 Kan. 477, 227 P. 350.
The term includes a few rights unconnected with land, but it ís generally used as the widest expression for real property of all kInds, and is therefore employed in con-veyances after the words "lands" and "tenements," to include everything of the nature of realty which they do not cover. Sweet.
Corporeal Hereditaments. Substantial perma-nent objects which may be inherited. The term "land" will include all such. 2 Bl.Comm. 17; Sox v. Miracle, 35 N.D. 458, 160 N.W. 716, 719.
Ineorporeal Hereditaments. Anything, the sub-ject of property, which is inheritable and not tan-gible or visible. 2 Woodd.Lect. 4.
A right issuing out of a thing corporate (whether real or personal) or concerning or annexed to or exercisable within the same. 2 BI.Comm. 20; 1 Washb.Real Prop. 10. A right growing out of, or concerning, or annexed to, a cor-poreal thing, but not the substance of the thing itself. Huston v. Cox, 103 Kan. 73, 172 P. 992.
HEREDITARY. That which is the subject of in-heritance.
HEREDITARY DISEASE. Physical ailment trans-mitted or transmissible from parent to child in con-sequence of the infection of the former or the pres-ence of the disease in his system, and without ex-posure of the latter to any fresh source of infec-tion or contagion. South Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Hurt’s Adm’x, 115 Va. 398, 79 S.E. 401, 404.
HEREDITARY RIGHT TO THE CROWN. The crown of England, by the positive constitution of the kingdom, has ever been descendible, and so continues, in a course peculiar to itself, yet subject to limitation by parliament; but, notwithstanding sut•h limitation, the crown retains its descendible quality, and becomes hereditary in the prince to whom it is limited. 1 Bl.Comm. 191.
HEREDITARY SUCCESSION. Inheritance by law; title by descent; the title whereby a person, on the death of his ancestor, acquires his estate by right of representation as his heir at law. In re Yahola’s Heirship, 142 Okl. 79, 285 P. 946.
HEREDITY. That biological law by which all liv ing beings tend to repeat themselves in their de-scendants. Prewitt v. State, 106 Miss. 82, 63 So. 330, 331, 6 A.L.R. 1476.
HEREFARE. Sax. A going into or with an army; a going out to war, (profectio militaris;) an expe-dition. Spelman.
HEREGEAT. A heriot, (q. v.)
HEREGELD. Sax. In old English law. A trib-ute or tax levied for the maintenance of an army. Spelman.
HEREMITORIUM. Aplace of retirement for her-mits. Mon.Angl. tom. 3, p. 18.
HEREMONES. Followers of an army. HERENACH. An archdeacon. Cowell.
HERES. Heir; an heir. A form of hceres, very common in the civil law. See Heeres.
HERESCHIP. In old Scotch law. Theft or rob-bery. 1 Pitc.Crim.Tr. pt. 2, pp. 26, 89.
HERESLITA, HERESSA, HERESSIZ. A hired sol-dier who departs without license. 4 Inst. 128.
HERESY. In English law. An offense against religion, consisting not in a total denial of Chris-tianity, but of some of its essential doctrines, pub-licly and obstinately avowed. 4 Bl.Comm. 44, 45. An opinion on divine subjects devised by human reason, openly taught, and obstinately maintained. 1 Hale, P.C. 384.
This offense is now subject only to ecclesiastical correction, and is no longer punishable by the secu-lar law. 4 Steph.Comm. 233.
HERETOCH. A general, leader, or commander; also a baron of the realm. Du Fresne.
HERETOFORE. This word simply denotes time past, in distinction from time present or time f u-ture, and has no definite and precise signification beyond this. Andrews v. Thayer, 40 Conn. 157; Millers’ Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Austin, Tex. Civ.App., 210 S.W. 825, 827.
HERETUM. In old records. A court or yard for drawing up guards or military retinue. Cowell.
HEREZELD. In Scotch law. A gift or present made or left by a tenant to his lord as a token of reverence. Skene.
HERGE. In Saxon law. Offenders who joined in a body of more than thirty-five to commit depreda-tions.
HERIGALDS. In old English law. A sort of gar-ment. Cowell.
HERIOT. In English law. A customary tribute of goods and chattels, payable to the lord of the fee on the decease of the owner of the land.
Heriots are divided into heriot service and heriot custom. The former expression denotes such as are due upon a special reservation in a grant or lease of lands, and there-fore amount to little more than a mere rent; the latter %irise upon no special reservation whatever, but depend solely upon immemorial usage and custom. 2 Bl.Comm. 422. See Adams v. Morse, 51 Me. 501.
HERISCHILD. In old English law. A species of military service, or knight’s fee. Cowell.
HERISCHULDA. In old Scotch law. A fine or penalty for not obeying the proclamation made for warfare. Skene.
HERISCINDIUM. A division of household goods. Blount.
HERISLIT. Laying down of arms. Blount. De-sertion from the army. Spelman.
HERISTAL. The station of an army; the place where a camp is pitched. Spelman.
HERITABLE. Capable of being taken by descent. A term chiefiy used in Scotch law, where it enters into seVeral phrases.
HERITABLE BOND. A bond for a sum of money to which is added, for further security of the cred-itor, a conveyance of land or heritage to be held by the creditor as pledge. 1 Ross, Conv. 76; 2 Ross, Conv. 324.
HERITABLE JURISDICTIONS. Grants of crimi-nal jurisdiction formerly bestowed on great fami-lies in Scotland, to facilitate the administration of justice. Whishaw. Abolished in effect by St. 20 Geo. II. c. 50. Tomlins.
HERITABLE OBLIGATION. In Louisiana. An obligation is heritable when the heirs and assigns of one party may enforce the performance against the heirs of the other. Civ.Code La. art. 1997.
HERITABLE RIGHTS. In Scotch law. Rights of the heir; all rights to land or whatever is con-nected with land, as milis, fishings, tithes, etc.
HERITABLE SECURITY. Security constituted by heritable property. Encyc. Dict.
HERITAGE. In the civil law. Every species of immovable which can be the subject of property; such as lands, houses, orchards, woods, marshes, ponds, etc., in whatever mode they may have been acquired, either by descent or purchase. 3 Toul-lier, No. 472.
In Scotch law. Land, and all property connected with land; real estate, as distinguished from mov-ables, or personal estate. Bell.
HERITOR. In Scotch law. A proprietor of land. 1 Kames, Eq.Pref.
HERMANDAD. In Spanish law. A fraternity formed among different towns and villages to pre-vent the commission of crimes, and to prevent the abuses and vexations to which they were subjected by men ‘in power. Bouvier.
HERMAPHRODITE. In medical jurisprudence. A person of doubtful or double sex; one possess-ing, really or apparently, and in more or less de-veloped form, some or all of the genital organs of both sexes.
HERMAPHRODITUS TAM MASCULO QUAM FCEMINIE COMPARATUR, SECUNDUM PRZEV-ALENTIAM SEXUS INCALESCENTIS. An her-maphrodite is to be considered male or female ac-cording to the predominance of the exciting sex. Co.Litt. 8; Bract. fol. 5.
KERMENEUTICS. The science or art of con-struction and interpretation. By the phrase "legal hermeneutics" is understood the systematic body
rules which are recognized as applicable to the construction and interpretation of legal writings.
HERMER. A great lord. Jacob.
HERMOGENIAN CODE. See Codex Hermogeni-anus.
HERNESCUS. A heron. Cowell.
HERNESIUM, or HERNESIUM. Household goods; implements of trade or husbandry; the rig-ging or tackle of a ship. Cowell.
HERNIA. A protrusion of any organ through an abnormal opening in wall of the containing cavity; rupture. In re Frihauf, 135 P.2d 427, 430, 58 Wyo. 479; Stoddard v. Mason’s Blue Link Stores, 55 Idaho 609, 45 P.2d 597, 600.
HEROUD, HEROUD. L. Fr. A herald. HERPEX. A harrow. Spelman.
HERPICATIO. In old English law. A day’s work with a harrow. Spelman.
HERRING SILVER. This was a composition in money for the custom of supplying herrings for the provision of a religious house. Wharton.
HERSHIP. The crime, in Scotland, of carrying off cattle by force; it is described as "the master-ful driving off of cattle from a proprietor’s grounds." Bell.
HERUS. Lat. A master. Servus facit ut herus det, the servant does [the work] in order that the master may give [him the wages agreed on.] Herus dat ut servus f acit, the master gives [or agrees to give, the wages,] in consideration of, or with a view to, the servant’s doing [the work.] 2 Bl.Comm. 445.
HESIA. An easement. Du Cange.
HEST CORN. In old records. Corn or grain giv-en or devoted to religious persons or purposes. 2 Mon.Angl. 367b; Cowell.
RESTA, or HESTHA. A little loaf of bread. A capon or young cockerel.
RETIERARCHA. The head of a religious house; the head of a college; the warden of a corpora-tion.
HETeERIA. In Roman law. A company, society, or college.
HEUVELBORII. Sax. In old English law. surety, (warrantus.)HEYLODE. In old records. A customary burden upon inferior tenants, for mending or repairing hays or hedges.
HEYMECTUS. A hay-net; a net for catching conies. Cowell.
HIBERNAGIUM. The season for sowing winter corn. Cowell.
HIDAGE. An extraordinary tax formerly pay-able to the crown for every hide of land. This taxation was levied, not in money, but provision of armor, etc. Cowell.
HIDALGO. In Spanish law. A noble; a person entitled to the rights of nobility. By hidalgos are understood men chosen from good situations in lile, (de buenos lugures,) and possessed of proper-ty, (algo.) White, New Recop. b. 1, tlt. 5, c. 1.
HIDALGITIA. In Spanish law. Nobility by de-scent or lineage. White, New Recop. b. 1, tit. 5, c. 3, § 4.
NIDE. In old English law. A measure of land, being as much as could be worked with one plow. It is variously estimated at from 60 to 100 acres, but was probably determined by local usage. An-other meaning was as much land as would support one family or the dwellers in a mansion-house. Also a house; a dwelling-house. A hide was an-ciently employed as a unit of taxation. 1 Poll. & Maitl. 347, such tax being called hidegild.
WIDE AND GAIN. In English law. A term an-ciently applied to arable land. Co.Litt. 85b.
IIIDE LANDS. In Saxon law. Lands belonging to a hide; that is, a house or mansion. Spelman.
HIDEL. In old English law. A place of protec-tion; a sanctuary. St. 1 Hen. VII. cc. 5, 6; Cow-ell.
HIDGILD. A sum of money paid by a villein or servant to save himself from a whipping. Fleta, 1.1, c. 47, § 20.
HIERARCHY. Originally, government by a body of priests. Now, the body of offlcers in any church or ecclesiastical institution, considered as form-ing an ascending series of ranks or degrees of power and authority, with the correlative subjec-tion, each to the one next aboye. Derivatively, any body of men, taken in their public capacity, and considered as forming a chain of power, as aboye described.
HIGH. This term, as used in various compound legal phrases, is sometimes merely an addition of dignity, not importing a comparison; but more generally it means exalted, either in rank or lo-cation, or occupying a position of superiority, and in a few instantes it implies superiority in respect to importante, size, or frequency or publicity of use, e. g., "high seas," "highway."
As to high "Bailiff," "Constable," "Crimes," "Justice," "Justiciar," "License," "Prerogative
writ," "Probability rule," "School," "Sea," "Sher-iff," "Tide," "Treason," and "Water-Mark," see those titles.
HIGH COMMISSION COURT. See Court of High Commission.
HIGH COURT OF ADMIRALTY. See Court of Admiralty.
HIGH COURT OF DELEGATES. See Court of Delegates.
HIGH COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS. See Court of Errors and Appeals.
HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE. See Supreme Court of Judicature.
HIGA COURT OF PARLIAMENT. See Parlia-ment.
HIGH DEGREE OF CARE AND DILIGENCE. See Care.
HIGHBINDER. A rough, one of a Chinese secret society composed of blackmailers. People v. Ho Kim You, 24 Cal.App. 451, 141 P. 950, 956.
HIGHER AND LOWER SCALE. In the prac-tice of the English supreme court of judicature there are two scales regulating the fees of the court and the fees which solicitors are entitled to charge. The lower scale applies (unless the court otherwise orders) to the following cases: All causes and matters assigned by the judicature acts to the king’s bench, or the probate, divorce, and admiralty divisions; all actions of debt, con-tract, or tort; and in almost all causes and mat-ters assigned by the acts to the chancery division in which the amount in litigation is under £1,000. The higher scale applies in all other causes and matters, and also in actions falling under one of the aboye classes, but in which the principal re-lief sought to be obtained is an injunction. Sweet.
HIGHEST DEGREE OF CABE. A standard of care exacted in some jurisdictions of common car-riers of passengers. The standard is relative, not absoluto, and is sometimes regarded as no more than reasonable care measured by the circum-stances. See Blashfield, Cyc. of Automobile Law and Prac., Perm. Ed., § 2151.
HIGHEST PROVED VALUE. In an action of trover the amount which the jury from a consid-eration of all the evidente, may find to be the highest value of the property during the period between the conversion and the trial. Durden v. Durden, 58 Ga.App. 46, 197 S.E. 493, 494.
HIGHGRADING. The practice of stealing ore, in mining vernacular. People v. Siderius, 29 Cal. App.2d 361, 84 P.2d 545, 547.
HIGH—JACKER. Hi-jacker. Another name for robber. State v. One Certain Buick Sedan, 209 Iowa, 791, 229 N.W. 173, 176.
HIGHNESS. A title of honor given to princes. The kings of England, before the time of James I, were not usually saluted with the title of "Majes-ty," but with that of "Highness." The children of crowned heads generally receive the style of "Highness." Wharton.
HIGHWAY. An easement acquired by the public in the use of a road or way for thoroughfare. Bo-lender v. Southern Michigan Telephone Co., 182 Mich. 646, 148 N.W. 697, 700.
A free and public roadway, or street; one which every person has the right to use. Abbott v. Du-luth, C.C.Minn., 104 F. 837. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Bennett, C.C.A.Miss., 296 F. 436, 437. Its prime essentials are the right of common enjoyment on the one hand and the duty of public maintenance on the other. Hildebrand v. Southern Bell Tele-phone & Telegraph Co., 219 N.C. 402, 14 S.E.2d 252, 254, 255.
The generic name for all kinds of public ways, whether carriage-ways, bridle-ways, foot-ways, bridges, turnpike roads, railroads, canals, ferries or navigable rivers; 6 Mod. 255; Angollighw. c. 1; 3 Kent 432; City of St. Louis v. Bell Place Realty Co., 259 Mo. 126, 168 S.W. 721, 722. As to streets and alleys, Iowa Telephone Co. v. City of Keo-kuk, D.C., 226 F. 82, 87; Burns v. Kendall, 96 S.C. 385, 80 S.E. 621, 622. Every public thoroughfare. Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Pfost, 53 Idaho 559, 27 P.2d 877. It refers to roadway or street which can be used for travel, as dis-tinguished from way upon which road can be or is being constructed. Allen v. Jones, 47 S.D. 603, 201 N.W. 353.
There is a difference in the shade of meaning conveyed by two uses of the word. Sometimes it signifies right of free passage, in the abstract, not importing anything about the character or construction of the way. Thus, a river is called a "highway;" and it has been not unusual for congress, in granting a privilege of building a bridge, to declare that it shall be a public highway. Again, it has reference to some system of law authorizing the taking a strip of land, and preparing and devoting it to the use of travelers. In this use it ,imports a roadway upon the soil, constructed under the authority of these laws. Abbott.
Commissioners of Highways. Public officers appointed in the several counties and municipali-ties, in many states, to take charge of the open-ing, altering, repair, and vacating of highways within their respective jurisdictions.
Common highway. A road to be used by the community at large for any purpose of transit or trafflc. Ham. N. P. 239; Railway Co. v. State, 23 Fla. 546, 3 So. 158, 11 Am.St.Rep. 395.
Highway Acts, or Laws. The body or system of laws governing the laying out, repair, and use of highways.
Highway Crossing. A place where the track of a railroad crosses the line of a highway.
Highway-rate. In English law. A tax for the maintenance and repair of highways, chargeable upon the same property that is Hable to the poor-rate.
Highway Robbery. See Robbery.
Highway Tax. A tax for and applicable to the making and repair of highways. Stone v. Bean, 15 Gray (Mass.) 44.
Public Highway. One under the control of and kept by the public, established by regular proceed-ings for the purpose, or generally used by the pub-
lic for twenty years, or dedicated by the owner of the soil and accepted by the proper authorities and for the maintenance of which they are responsible. State v. Gross, 119 N.C. 868, 26 S.E. 91.
It includes roads, streets, alleys, lanes, courts, places, trails, and bridges, laid out or erected as such by the pub-lic, or, if laid out and erected by others, dedicated or aban-doned to the public, or made such in actions for the parti-tion of real property. Patterson v. Munyan, 93 Cal. 128, 29 P. 250.
It has been said that if the word "highway" is given its customary meaning, the phrase "public highway" is an example of tautology—the needless or useless repetition of the same idea, of which the law seems to furnish so many illustrations. See Galloway v. Wyatt Metal & Boiler Works, 181 So. 187, 189 La. 837; Blashfield, Cyc. of Auto-mobile Law and Prac., Perm. Ed., § 3.
Boyal Highways. There were four royal high-ways in Yorkshire, three by land and one by wa-ter, where the king claimed all forfeitures. Maitl. Domesd. Book and Beyond 87.
HIGHVVAYMAN. A bandit; one who robs trav-elers upon the highway. Anderson v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 77 Cal.App. 641, 247 P. 507, 510.
HIGLER. In English law. A hawker or peddler. A person who carries from door to door, and sells by retail, small articles of provisions, and the like.
HIGUELA. In Spanish law. A receipt given by an heir of a decedent, setting forth what property he has received from the estate.
HIIS TESTIBUS. Words formerly used in deeds, signifying these being witness. They have been disused since Henry VIII. Co.Litt.; Cowell.
HI—JACKER. High-Jacker. See that title.
HIKENILD STREET. One of the four great Roman roads of Britain. More commonly called "Ikenild Street."
HILARY RULES. A collection of orders and forms extensively modifying the pleading and practice in the English superior courts of common law, established in Hilary term, 1834. Stimson.
HILARY TERM. In English law. A term of court, beginning on the llth and ending on the 31st of January in each year. Superseded (1875) by Hilary sittings, which begin January 11th, and end on the Wednesday before Easter.
HINDENI HOMINES. A society of men. The Saxons ranked men into three classes, and valued them, as to satisfaction for injuries, etc., accord-ing to their class. The highest class were valued at 1,200s., and were called "twelf hindmen;" the middle class at 600s., and called "sexhindmen;" the lowest at 200s., called "twyhindmen." Their wives were termed "hindas." Brompt. Leg. Al-fred. c. 12.
HINDER AND DELAY. A phrase used to signi-fy’ an act amounting to an attempt to defraud, rather than a successful fraud; to put some ob-stacle in the path of, or interpose some time, unjus-tifiably, before a creditor can realize what is owed out of his debtor’s property. Walker v. Say-ers, 5 Bush., Ky., 582.
HINDU LAW. The system of native law prevail-ing among the Gentoos, and administered by the government 6f British India. It is not the law of India or of any defined region. It is the law of castes, class, orders and even families which the Hindus carry. about with them. 17 L.Q.R. 209. Bryce, Extension of Law in 1 Sel. Essays in Ang-lo-Amer. Leg. Hist. 597.
RINE, or HIND. In old English law. A husband-ry servant.
HINEFARE. In old English law. The loss or departure of a servant from his master. Domes-day.
HINEGELD. A ransom for an offense committed by a servant. Cowell.
HIPOTECA. In Spanish law. A mortgage of real property.
HIRCISCUNDA. See Herciscunda.
HIRE, v. To purchase the temporary use of a thing, or to stipulate for the labor or services of another. See Hiring.
For definitions of the various species of this class of contracts, under their Latin names, see Locatio and following titles.
To engage in service for a stipulated reward, as to hire a servant for a year, or laborers by the day or month; to engage a man to temporary service for wages. To "em-play" is a word oí more enlarged signification. A man hired to labor is employed, but a man may be employed in a work who Is not hired. Ozark Minerals Co. v. Murphy, 384 III. 94, 51 N.E.2d 197, 201.
HIRE, n. Compensation for the use of a thing, or for labor or services. State v. Kenyon, Inc., Tex.Civ.App., 153 S.W.2d 195, 197.
A bailment in which compensation is to be giv-en for the use of a thing, or for labor and services about it. 2 Kent 456; Story, Bailm. § 359. The divisions of this species of contract are denoted by Latin names.
HIREMAN. A subject. Du Cange.
HIRER. One who hires a thing, or the labor or services of another person. Turner v. Cross, 83 Tex. 218, 18 S.W. 578, 15 L.R.A. 262.
HIRING. A contract by which one person grants to another either the enjoyment of a thing or the use of the labor and industry, either of himself or his servant, during a certain time, for a stipulat-ed compensation, or by which one contracts for the labor or services of another about a thing bail-ed to him for a specified purpose.
A contract by which one gives to another the temporary possession and use of property, other than money, for reward, and the latter agrees to return the same to the former at a future time.
Synonyms
"Hiring" and "borrowing" are both contracts by which a qualified property may be transferred to the hirer or bor-rower, and they differ only in this, that hiring Is always
for a price, stipend, or recompense, while borrowing is merely gratultous. 2 Bl.Cornm. 453; Neel v. State, 33 Tex. Cr.R. 408, 26 S.W. 726.
HIRING AT VVILL. A general or indefinite hir-ing. Long v. Forbes, 58 Wyo. 533, 136 }’.2d 242, 246.
HIRST, HURST. In old English law, A wood. Co.Litt. 4b.
HIS. This pronoun, generically used, me y refer to a person of either sex. Danforth v. Emmons, 124 Me. 156, 126 A. 821, 823; Wilmette v. Brachle, 110 Ill.App. 356.
Its use in a written lnstrument, In referring to a person whose Christian name Is designated therein by a mere ini-tial, is not concluslve that the person referred to is a malea it may be shown by parol that the person Intended is a female. Berniaud v. Beecher, 71 Cal. 38, 11 P. 802.
BIS EXCELLENCY. In English law. The title of a viceroy, governor general, ambassador, or commander in chief.
In American law. This title is given to the governor of Massachusetts by the constitution of that state; and it is commonly given, as a title of honor and courtesy, to the governors of the other states and to the president of the United States. It is also customarily used by foreign ministers in addressing the secretary of state in written communications.
HIS HONOR. A title given by the constitution of Massachusetts to the lieutenant governor of that commonwealth. Mass. Const. part 2, c. 2, § 2, art. 1. It is also customarily given to some in-ferior magistratés, as the mayor of a city.
HIS TESTIBUS. Lat. These being witnesses. The attestation clause in old deeds and charters. See Hiis Testibus.
HISSA. A lot or- portion; a share of revenue or rent. Wilson’s Gloss. Ind.
HITHERTO. In legal use, this term always re-stricts the matter in connection with which it is employed to a period of time already passed. Ma-son v. Jones, 13 Barb. (N.Y.) 479.
HIWISC. In old English law. A hide of land. According to Maitland (Domesday Book 359), a household.
RLAF ZETA. Sax. A servant fed at his master’s cost.
HLAFORD. Sax. A lord. 1 Spence, Ch. 36.
HLAFORDSOCNA. Sax. A lord’s protection. Du Cange.
HLAFORDSWICE. Sax. In Saxon law. The crime of betraying one’s lord, (proditio dominti;) treason. Crabb, Eng.Law, 59, 301.
HLASOCNA. Sax. The benefit of the law. Du Cange.
HLOTHBOTE. In Saxon law. A fine for being present at an unlawful assembly. Spelman.HLOTHE. In Saxon law. An unlawful assembly from eight to thirty-five, inclusive. Cowell.
HOASTMEN. In English law. An ancient gild or fraternity at Newcastle-upon-Tyne, who dealt in sea coal. St. 21 Jac. I. c. 3.
HOBBIT. A measure of weight in use in Wales, equal to 168 pounds, being made up of four Welsh pecks of 42 pounds each. Hughes v. Humphreys, 26 Eng. L. & Eq. 132.
HOBBLERS. In old English law. Light horse-men or bowmen; also certain tenants, bound by their tenure to maintain a little light horse for giving notice of any invasion, or such like peril, towards the seaside. Camden, Brit.
HOC. Lat. This. Hoc intuitu, with this expecta-tion. Hoc loco, in this place. Hoc nomine, in this name. Hoc titulo, under this title. Hoc voce, un-der this word.
HOC PARATUS EST VERIFICARE. Lat. This he is ready to verify.
HOC QUIDEM PERQUAM DURUM EST, SED ITA LEX SCRIPTA EST. Lat. This indeed is ex-ceedingly hard, but so the law is written; such is the written or positive law. An observation quoted by Blackstone as used by Ulpian in the civil law; and applied to cases where courts of equity have no power to abate the rigor of the law. Dig. 40, 9, 12, 1; 3 Bi. Comm. 430.
HOC SERVABITUR QUOD INITIO CONVENIT. This shall be preserved which is useful in the beginning. Dig. 50, 17, 23; Bract. 73b.
HOCCUS SALTIS. A hoke, hole, or lesser pit of salt. Cowell.
ROCK DAY. See Hock-Tuesday Money, infra.
ROCK-TUESDAY MONEY. This was a duty giv-en to the landlord that his tenants and bondmen might solemnize the day on which the English conquered the Danes, being the second Tuesday after Easter week. Cowell. See Hoke Day, infra.
HOCKETTOR, or HOCQUETEUR. A knight of the post; a decayed man; a basket carrier. Cow-ell.
HODGE-PODGE ACT. A name applied to a stat-ute which comprises a medley of incongruous sub-jects.
HOG. This word may include a sow; Shubrick
v. State, 2 S.C. 21; a pig; Lavender v. State, 60 Ala. 60; Washington v. State, 58 Ala. 355; and may refer to dead as well as a living animal; Whitson v. Culbertson, 7 Ind. 195; Hunt v. State, 55 Ala. 140; Reed v. State, 16 Fla. 564; contra, State v. Hedrick, 272 Mo. 502, 199 S.W. 192, L.R.A. 1918C, 574; and it is synonymous with swine; Rivers v. State, 10 Tex.App. 177.
HOGA. In old English law. A hill or mountain. In old English, a how. Grene hoya, Grenehow. Domesday; Spelman.
HOGASTER. In old English law. A shc2p of the second year. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 79, §§ 4, 12. A young hog. Cowell.
HOGGUS, or HOGIETUS. A hog or swine. Cow-ell.
HOGBEENHYNE. In Saxon law. A house-servant. Any stranger who lodged three nights or more at a man’s house in a decennary was called "hog-henhyne," and his host became responsible for his acts as for those of his servant.
HOGSHEAD. A measure of a capacity containing the fourth part of a tun, or sixty-three gallons. Cowell. A large cast, of indefinite contents, but usually containing from one hundred to one hun-dred and forty gallons. Webster.
HOKE DAY (Heck Day). A day of feasting or mirth kept formerly in England on the second or third Tuesday after Easter; Cent. Dict.; or, as a recent writer concludes, the first Sunday after Eas-ter; 28 L.Q.Rev. 283, where it is suggested that it was originally the great spring festival of the pre-Rornan British. See Hock-Tuesday Money, supra.
HOLD, v. 1. To possess in virtue of a lawful title; as in the expression, common in grants, "to have and to hold," or in that applied to notes, "the owner and holder." Chicago Home for Giris v. Carr, 300 III. 478, 133 N.E. 344, 346.
2. To be the grantee or tenant of another; to take or have an estate from another. Properly, to have an estate on condition of paying rent, or performing service.
3. To adjudge or decide, spoken of a court, par-ticularly to declare the conclusion of law reached by the court as to the legal effect of the facts dis-closed.
4. To maintain or sustain; to be under the ne-cessity or duty of sustaining or proving; as when it is said that a party "holds the affirmative" or negative of an issue in a cause.
5. To bind or obligate; to restrain or con-strain; to keep in custody or under an obligation; as in the phrases "hold to bail," "hold for court," "held and firmly bound," etc.
6. To administer; to conduct or preside at; to convoke, open, and direct the operations of; as to hold a court, hold pleas, etc. Smith v. People, 47 N.Y. 334.
7. To prosecute; to direct and bring about of-ficially; to conduct according to law; as to hold an election.
8. To possess; to occupy; to be in possession and administration of; as to hold office.
9. To keep; to retain; to maintain possession of or authority over. Dimock State Bank v. Boeh-nen, 46 S.D. 50, 190 N.W. 485.
Hold over. To retain possession as tenant of property leased, after the end of the term. To con-tinue in possession of an office and continue to ex-ercise its functions, after the end of the officer’s lawful term. State v. Simon, 20 Or. 365, 26 P. 174.
Hold picas. To hear or try causes. 3 Bl.Comm. 35, 298.
HOLD, n. In old law. Tenure. A word con-stantly occurring in conjunction with others, as freehold, leasehold, copyhold, etc., but rarely met with in the separate form.
HOLDER. The holder of a bill of exchange, prom-issory note, or check is the person who has legally acquired possession of the same, by indorsement or delivery, and who is entitled to receive payment of the instrument. Crocker-Woolworth Nat. Bank v. Nevada Bank, 139 Cal. 564, 73 P. 456, 63 L.R.A. 245, 96 Am.St.Rep. 169.
HOLDER IN DIJE COURSE. A holder who has taken a bill of exchange (check or note) complete and regular on the face of it, under the following conditions, namely: (a) That he became the hold-er of it before it was overdlie, and without notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact. (b) That he took the bill (check or note) in good faith and for value, and that at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any defect in the title of the person who nego-tiated it. Uniform Negotiable Instrument Act, § 52; Peoples Loan & Finance Co. v. Ledbetter, 69 Ga.App. 729, 26 S.E.2d 671, 674.
HOLDES. Sax. In Saxon law. A military com-mander. Spelman.
HOLDING. In English law. A piece of land held under a lease or similar tenancy for agricultural, pastoral, or similar purposes.
In Scotch law. The tenure or nature of the right given by the superior to the vassal. Bell.

General

Holding over. See Hold, v.
Holding up the hand. In criminal practice. A formality observed in the arraignment of pris-oners. Held to be not absolutely necessary. 1 W. Bl. 3, 4.
HOLDING COMPANY. A super-corporation which owns or at least controls such a dominant in-terest in one or more other corporations that it is enabled to dictate their policies through voting power; a corporation organized to hold the stock of other corporations; any company, incorporated or unincorporated, which is in a position to control or materially influence the management of one or more other companies by virtue, in part at least, of its ownership or securities in the other com-pany or companies. Cities Service Co. v. Koeneke, 137 Kan. 7, 20 P.2d 460, 469, 87 A.L.R. 16; Kelley, Glover & Vale v. Heitman, 220 Ind. 625, 44 N.E.2d 981, 985.
HOLIDAY. A religious festival; a day set apart for commemorating some important event in his-tory; a day of exemption from labor. Webster; Lamberti v. City of Stamford, 131 Conn. 396, 40
Black’s Law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed.-55
A.2d 190, 192. A day upon which the usual opera-tions of business are suspended and the courts closed, and, generally, no legal process is served. United Cigar Stores Co. v. Worth-Gyles Grain Co., 212 Ill.App. 26.
Legal holiday. See Legal Holiday. Public holiday. A legal holiday.
HOLM. An island in a river or the sea. Spel-man. Plain grassy gróund upon water sides or in the water. Blount. Low ground intersected with streams. Spelman.
HOLOGRAFO. In Spanish law. A holograph. An instrument (particularly a will) wholly in the handwriting of the person executing it; or which, to be valid, must be so written by his own hand.
HOLOGRAPH. A will or deed written entirely by the testator or grantor with his own hand. Estate of Billings, 64 Cal. 427, 1 P. 701; In re Irvine’s Estate, 114 Mont. 577, 139 P.2d 489, 147 A.L.R. 882.
HOLT. Sax. In old English law. A wood or grove. Spelman; Cowell; Co. Litt. 4b.
HOLY ORDERS. In ecclesiastical law. The or-ders of bishops, (including archbishops,) priests, and deacons in the Church of England. The Ro-man canonists had the orders of bishop, (in which the pope and archbishops were included,) priest, deacon, subdeacon, psalmist, acolyte, exorcist, reader, ostiarius. 3 Steph.Comm. 55, and note a.
HOMAGE. In feudal law. A service (or the cere-mony of rendering it) which a tenant was bound to perform to his lord on receiving investiture of a fee, or succeeding to it as heir, in acknowledg-ment of the tenure. It is described by Littleton as the most honorable service of reverence that a free tenant might do to his lord. The ceremony was as follows: The tenant, being ungirt and with bare head, knelt before the lord, the latter sitting, and held his hands extended and joined between the hands of the lord, and said: "I become your man [homo] from this day forward, of life and limb and earthly honor, and to you will be faith-ful and loyal, and bear you faith, for the tene-ments that I claim to hold of you, saving the faith that I owe unto our sovereign lord the king, so help me God." The tenant then received a kiss from the lord. Homage could be done only to the lord himself. Litt. § 85; Glanv. lib. 9, c. 1;1′ Bract. fols. 77b, 78-80; Wharton.
"Homage" is to be distinguished from "fealty," another incident of feudalism, and which consisted In the solemn oath of fldelity made by the vassal to the lord, whereas homage was merely an acknowledgment oí tenure. If the homage was Intended to Include fealty, it was called "liege homage;" but otherwlse it was called "simple homage." Brown.
HOMAGE ANCESTRAL. In feudal law. Homage was called by this name where a man and his ancestors had immemorially held of another and his ancestors by the service of homage, which bound the lord to warrant the title, and also to hold the tenant clear of all services to superior HOMAGE
lords. If the tenant aliened in fee, his alienee was a tenant by homage, but not by homage ancestral. Litt. § 143; 2 Bl.Comm. 300.
HOMAGE JUEY. A jury in a court-baron, con-sisting of tenants that do homage, who are to inquire and make presentments of the death of tenants, surrenders, admittances, and the like.
HOMAGE LIEGE. That kind of homage which was due to the sovereign alone as supreme lord, and which was done without any saving or excep-tion of the rights of other lords. Spelman.
HOMAGER. One who does or is bound to do homage. Cowell.
HOMAGIO RESPECTUANDO. A writ to the es-cheator commanding him to deliver seisin of lands to the heir of the king’s tenant, notwithstanding his homage not done. Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 269.
HOMAGIUM. L. Lat. Homage (q. v.).
HOMAGIUM LIGIUM. Liege homage; that kind of homage which was due to the sovereign alone as supreme lord, and which was done without any saving or exception of the rights of other lords. Spelman. So called from ligando, (binding,) be-cause it could not be renounced like other kinds of homage.
HOMAGIUM, NON PER PROCURATORES NEC PER LITERAS FIERI POTUIT, SED IN .PRO-PRIA PERSONA TAM DOMINI QUAM TENEN-TIS CAPI DEBET ET FIERI. Co. Litt. 68. Hom-age cannot be done by proxy, nor by letters, but must be paid and received in the proper person, as well of the lord as the tenant.
HOMAGIUM PLANUM. In feudal law. Plain homage; a species of homage which bound him who did it to nothing more than fidelity, without any obligation either of military service or atten-dance in the courts of his superior. 1 Robertson’s Car. V., Appendix, note 8.
HOMAGIUM REDDERE. To renounce homage. This was when a vassal made a solemn declara-tion of disowning and defying his lord; for which there was a set form and method prescribed by the feudal laws. Bract. 1. 2, c. 35, § 35.
HQMAGIUM SIMPLEX. In feudal law. Simple homage; that kind of homage which was merely an acknowledgment of tenure, with a saving of the rights of other lords. Harg. Co. Litt. note 18, lib. 2.
HOMBRE BUENO. In Spanish law. The judge of a district. Also an arbitrator chosen by the parties to a suit. Also a man in good standing; one who is competent to testify in a suit.
HOME. One’s own dwelling place; the house in which one lives; especially the house in which one lives with his family; the habitual abode of one’s family; a dwelling house. Mann v. Haines, 146 Kan. 988, 73 P.2d 1066, 1072. That place in which one in fact resides with the intention of res-idence, or in which he has so resided, and with
regard to which he retains residence or to which he intends to return. Dicey, Corifi. L. 81; Lang-hammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 31 A. 300, 27 L.R. A. 330.
Home Is not synonymous with domicil, as used in Inter-national law, but has a more restricted meaning, Inhabi-tants of Jefferson v. Washington, 19 Me. 293.
Home includes place where one eats, bathes, reads, vlsits and rests, as well as sleeping place, Jakeway v. John V. Bauer Co., 218 N.Y.S. 193, 195, 218 App.Div. 302; and, as used in deed or will may lnclude tare or right of mainte-nance, Gwinn v. Hobbs, 83 Ind.App. 263, 141 N.E. 812, 818; In re Burr’s Estate, 144 N.Y.S. 926, 927, 83 Misc. 240.
HOME BREW. An intoxicating home made beer. Jones v. State, 31 Ala.App. 378, 17 So.2d 545.
HOME OFFICE. The department of state through which the English sovereign administers most of the internal affairs of the kingdom, especially the pollee, and communicates with the judicial functionaries. As applied to a corporation, its prin-cipal office within the state or country where it was incorporated or formed.
HOME PORT. In maritime law, the home port of a vessel is either the port where she is regis-tered or enrolled, or the port at or nearest to which her owner usually resides, or, if there be more than one owner, the port at or nearest to which the husband, or acting and managing owner resides. Com. v. Ayer & Lord Tie Co., 77 S.W. 688, 25 Ky.T_,aw Rep. 1068. But for some purposes any port v’here the owner happens at the time to be with bis vessel is its home port. Lever Transp. Co. v. 011inger, 205 Ala. 22, 87 So. 597, 598.
HOME RULE. In constitutional and statutory law, local self-government, or the right thereof. Attorney General v. Lowrey, 131 Mich. 639, 92 N. W. 289. In British politics, a programme or plan (or a more or less definitely formulated demand) for the right of local self-government for Ireland under the lead of an Irish national parliament. Lemaire v. Crockett, 116 Me. 263, 101 A. 302, 303.
HOME, or HOMME. L. Fr. Man; a man.
HOME NE SERA PUNY PUR SUER DES BRIEF-ES EN COURT LE ROY, SOIT IL A DROIT OU A TORT. A man shall not be punished for suing out writs in the king’s court, whether he be right or wrong. 2 Inst. 228.
HOMESOKEN, HOMSOKEN. See Hamesecken.
HOMESTALL. A mansion-house. Dickinson v. Mayer, 11 Hei.sk. (Tenn.) 521.
HOMESTEAD. The home, the house and the ad-joining land where the head of the family dwells; the home farm. The fixed residence of the head of a family, with the land and buildings surround-ing the main house. Oliver v. Snowden, 18 Fla. 825, 43 Am.Rep. 338.
Technically, and under the modern homestead laws, an artificial estate in land, devised to pro-tect the possession and enjoyment of the owner against the claims of his creditors, by withdrawing the property from execution and forced sale, so long as the land is occupied as a home. Buckingham v. Buckingham, 81 Mich. 89, 45 N.W. 504. For "Family," see that title.
Business Homestead. In Texas, a place or prop-erty (distinct from the home of a family) used and occupied by the head of a family. as a place to exercise his calling or business, which is exempt by law. Spence v. State Nat. Bank of El Paso, Tex.Civ.App., 294 S.W. 618, 623. A curious mis-nomer, the word "homestead" in this phrase hav-ing lost entirely its original meaning, and being retained apparently only for the sake of its re-mote and derivative association with the idea of an exemption.
Homestead Corporations. Corporations organ-izad for the purpose of acquiring lands in large tracts, paying off incumbrances thereon, improv-ing and subdividing them into homestead lots or parcels, and distributing them among the share-holders, and for the accumulation of a fund for such purposes. Civ. Code Cal. § 557.
Homestead Entry. See Entry.
Homestead Exemption Laws. Laws passed in most of the states allowing a householder or head of a family to designate a house and land as his homestead, and exempting the same homestead from execution for his general debts.
Homestead Right. The personal right to the beneficial, peaceful and uninterrupted use of the home property free from claims of creditors. Hill v. Fir§t Nat. Bank, 79 Fla. 391, 84 So. 190, 192, 20 A.L.R. 270.
Probate Homestead. A homestead set apart by the court for the use of a surviving husband or wife and the minor children out of the common property, or out of the real estate belonging to the deceased. In re Noah’s Estate, 73 Cal. 590, 15 P. 290, 2 Am.St.Rep. 834.
Rural Homestead. See Urban Homestead, infra.
Urban Homestead. The residence or dwelling place of a family in a city, claimed or set apart as a homestead, including the principal house and lot, and such lots as are used in connection there-with, contributing to its enjoyment, comfort, and convenience. Harris v. Matthews, 36 Tex. 424, 81 S.W. 1204. Nevertheless, property may be located within the corporate limits of a town or city, and still constitute a "rural homestead," or it may be without the corporate limits, and constitute an "urban homestead." Boerner v. Cicero Smith Lumber Co., Tex.Civ.App., 293 S.W. 632, 636.
HOMICIDAL. Pertaining to homicide; relating to homicide, impelling to homicide; as a homi-cidal mania. (See Insanity.)
HOMICIDE. The killing of any hurnan creature, 4 Bl.Comm. 177. The killing of one human being by the act, procurement, or omission of another. Pen. Code N. Y. § 179. The act of a human being iría taking away the life of another human being. Sanders v. State, 113 Ga. 267, 38 S.E. 842. Hogan v. State, 127 Tex.Cr.R. 182, 74 S.W.2d 988, 994.
Homicide Is not necessarily a crime. It 1s a necessary ingredient of the crimes of murder and manslaughter, but there are other cases in which homicíde may be committed
without criminal intent and without criminal consequences, as, where it is done in the lawful execution of a judicial sentence, in self-defense, or as the only possible means of arresting an escaping felon. The term "homicide" Is neutral; while it describes the act, it pronounces no judg-ment on its moral or legal quality. People v. Connors, 35 N.Y.S. 475, 13 Mlsc. 582.

Classification

Homicida is ordinarily classified as "justifiable," "excus-able," and "felonious." For the definitions of these terms, and of some other compound terms, see infra.

Culpable homicide

Described as a crime varying from the very lowest culpa-bility, up to the very verge of murder. Lord Moncrieff, Arkley, 72.

Excusable homicida

The killing of a human being, either by misadventure or In self-defense. U. S. v. Ring, C.C.N.Y., 34 F. 306. The narre itself imports some fault, error, or omission, so triv-ial, however, that the law excuses it from guilt of felony, though in strictness it judges it deserving of some little degree of punishment. 4 Bl.Comm. 182. It is of two sorts, —either per infortunium, by misadventure, or se dejen-deudo, upon a sudden affray. Homicide per infortunium is where a man, doing a lawful act, without any intention of hurt, unfortunately kills another; but, if death ensue from any unlawful act, the offense is manslaughter, and not mis-adventure. Homicide se defendendo is where a man kills another upon a sudden affray, merely in his own defense, or in defense of his wife, child, parent, or servant, and not from any vindictive feeling. 4 BI.Comm. 182.

Felonious homicide

The wrongful killing of a human being, of any age or either sex, without justification or excuse in law; of which offense there are two degrees, manslaughter and murder. 4 Bl.Comm. 190; 4 Steph.Comm. 111.

Homicide by misadventure.

The accidental killing of another, where the slayer is dolng a lawful act, unaccompanied by any criminally care-less or reckless conduct. Commonwealth v. Flax, 331 Pa. 145, 200 A. 632, 637. The same as "homicida per in/1:yr/, unium." State v. Disalvo, Del., 2 W.W.Harr. 232, 121 A. 661, 663.

Homicide by necessity

A species of justifiable homicide, because it anises from some unavoidable necessity, without any will, intention, or desire, and without any inadvertence or negligence in the party killing, and therefore without any shadow of blame. As, for instance, by virtue of such an office as obliges one, in the execution of public justice, to put a malefactor to death who has forfeited his life to the laws of his country. But the law mus

Homicide per infortunium

Homicide by misfortune, or accidental homicide; as where a man doing a lawful act, without any intention of hurt, unfortunately kills another; a species of excusable homicide. 4 BI.Comm. 182; 4 Steph.Comm. 101.

Homicida se defendendo

Homicide in self-defense; the killing of a person in self-defense upon a sudden affray, where the slayer had no other possible (or, at least, probable) means of escaping from his assailant. 4 B1.Comm. 183-186; 4 Steph.Comm. 103-105. A species of excusable homicide. Id.; 1 Russ. Crimes, 660.

Justifiable homicidaV

Such as is committed intentionally, but without any evil design, and under such circumstances of necessity or duty as render the act proper, and relieve the party from any shadow of blame; as where a sheriff lawfully executes a sentence of death upon a malefactor, or where the killing takes place in the endeavor to prevent the commission of felony which could not be otherwise avoided. Moran v. People, 163 III. 382, 45 N.E. 230. "Justifiable homicide" is the taking of a human life under circumstances of justifica-tion, as a matter of right, such as self-defense or other causes set out in the statute. Gaunce v. State, 22 Okl.Cr.

361, 211 P. 517, 518. "Justifiable homicide" is the killing of a human being by commandment of the law in execution of public justice; by permission of the law in advance-ment of public justice; in self-defense; or in defense of habitation, property or person, against one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony on either. Paramore v. State, 161 Ga. 166, 129 S.E. 772, 778.
Negligent homicide
In Texas, the act of causing the death of another by neg-ligence and carelessness in the performance of a lawful act. Anderson v. State, 27 Tex.App. 177, 11 S.W. 33, 3 L.R.A. 644, 11 Am.St.Rep. 189.
HOMICIDIUM. Lat. Homicide (q. v.). Homicidium ex casu, homicide by accident.
Homicidium ex justitia, homicide in the adminis-tration of justice, or in the execution of the sen-tence of the law.
Homicidium ex necessitate, homicide from in-evitable necessity, as for the protection of one’s person or property.
Homicidium ex voluntate, voluntary or willful homicide. Bract. fols. 120b, 121.
HOMINATIO. The mustering of men; the doing of homage.
NOMINE CAPTO IN WITHERNAMIUM. A writ to take him that had taken any bond man or wo-man, and led him or her out of the country, so that he or she could not be replevied according to law. Reg. Orig. 79.
NOMINE ELIGENDO. In old English law. A writ directed to a corporation, requiring the mem-bers to make choice of a man to keep one part of the seal appointed for statutes merchant, when a former is dead, according to the statute of Ac-ton Burnell. Reg. Orig. 178; Wharton.
NOMINE REPLEGIANDO. In English law. A writ which lay to replevy a man out of prison, or out of the custody of any private person, in the same manner that chattels taken in distress may be replevied. Brown.
NOMINES. Lat. In feudal law. Men; feudatory tenants who claimed a privilege of having their causes, etc., tried only in their lord’s court. Paroch. Antiq. 15.
NOMINES LIGII. Liege men; feudal tenants or vassals, especially those who held immediately of the sovereign. 1 Bl.Comm. 367.
HOMINUM CAUSA JUS CONSTITUTUM EST. Law is established for the benefit of man.
HOMIPLAGIUM. In old English law. The maim-ing of a man. Blount.
HOMME. Fr. Man; a man. The term "man" as sometimes used may include a woman or wo-men. This is expressly stated in Civ. Code La. art. 3556, No. 1.
HOM:IVIES DE FIEF. Fr. In feudal law. Men of the fief; feudal tenants; the peers in the lords’ courts. Montesq., Esprit des Lois, liv. 28, c. 27.
HOMMES FEODAUX. Fr. In feudal law. Feu-dal tenants; the same with hommes de fief (q. v.). Montesq., Esprit des Lois, liv. 28, c. 36.
HOMO. Lat. A man; a human being, male or female; a vassal, or feudal tenant; a retainer, dependent, or servant.
HOMO CHARTULARIUS. A slave manumitted by charter.
HOMO COMMENDATUS. In feudal law. One who surrendered himself into the power of anoth-er for the sake of protection or support. See Com« mendation.
HOMO ECCLESIASTICUS. A church vassal; one who was bound to serve a church, especially to do service of an agricultural character. Spel-man.
HOMO EXERCITALIS. A man of the army, (ex-ercitus;) a soldier.
HOMO FEODALIS. A vassal or tenant; one who held a fee, (feodum,) or part of a fee. Spelman.
HOMO FISCALIS, or FISCALINUS. A servant or vassal belonging to the treasury or fiscus.
HOMO FRANCUS. In old English law. A free-man. A Frenchman.
HOMO INGENUUS. A freeman. A free and law-ful man. A yeoman.
HOMO LIBER. A free man; a freeman lawfully competent to act as juror. Ld. Raym. 417; Kebi. 563. An allodial proprietor, as distinguished from a vassal or feudatory. This was the sense of the term in the laws of the barbarous nations of Eur-ope. Calvinus, Lex. Alode.
HOMO LIGIUS. A liege man; a subject; a king’s vassal. The vassal of a subject.
HOMO NOVUS. In feudal law. A new tenant or vassal; one who was invested with a new fee. Spelman. Also one who, after conviction of a crime, had been pardoned, thus "making a new man of him."
HOMO PERTINENS. In feudal law. A feudal bondman or vassal; one who belonged to the soil, (qui glebce adscribitur.)
HOMO POTEST ESSE HABILIS ET INHABILIS DIVERSIS TEMPORIBUS. 5 Coke, 98. A man may be capable and incapable at different times.
HOMO REGIUS. A king’s vassal.
HOMO ROMANUS. A Roman. An appellation given to the old inhabitants of Gaul and other Roman provinces, and retained in the laws of the barbarous nations. Spelman.
HOMO TRIUM LITTERARUM. A man of the three letters; that is, the three letters, "4" "u," "r;" the Latin word fur meaning "thief."

HOMO VOCABULUM EST NATURJE; PER-SONA JURIS CIVILIS. Man (horno) is a term of nature; person (persona) of civil law. Cal-vin.
HOMOLOGACION. In Spanish law. The tacit consent and approval inferred by law from the omission of the parties, for the space of ten days, to complain of the sentences of arbitrators, ap-pointment of syndics, or assignees of insolvents, settlements of successions, etc. Also the approval given by the judge of certain acts and agreements for the purpose of rendering them more binding and executory. Escriche.
HOMOLOGARE. In the civil law. To confirm or approve; to consent or assent; to confess. Cal-vin.
HOMOLOGATE. In modern civil law. To ap-prove; to confirm; as a court homologates a pro-ceeding. See Homologation. Literally, to use the same words with another; to say the like. Viales v. Gardenier, 9 Mart. O. S. (La.) 324. To assent to what another says or writes.
HOMOLOGATION. In the Civil law. Approba-tion; confirmation by a court of justice; a judg-ment which orders the execution of some act. Merl. Répert. The term is also used in Louisiana. Hecker v. Brown, 104 La. 524, 29 So. 232.
In English law. An estoppel in pais. L.R. 3 App.Cas. 1026.
In Scotch law. An act by which a person ap-proves of a deed. The effect of which is to render that deed, though in itself defective, binding upon the person by whom it is homologated. Bell. Confirmation of a voidable deed.
HOMONYMLE. A term applied in the civil law to cases where a law was repeated, or laid down in the same terms or to the same effect, more than once. Cases of iteration and repetition. 2 Kent, Comm. 489, note.
HONDHABEND. Sax. Having in hand. See Handhabend.
HONESTE VIVERE. Lat. To live honorably, creditably, or virtuously. One of the three general precepts to which Justinian reduced the whole doc-trine of the law, (Inst. 1, 1, 3; Bract. fols. 3, 3b,) the others being alterum non lcedere, (not to in-jure others,) and suum cuique tribuere, (to ren-der to every man his due.)
HONESTUS. Lat. Of good character or stand-ing. Coram duobus vel pluribus viris legalibus et honestis, before two or more lawful and good men. Bract. fol. 61.
HONI. See Hony.
HONOR, v. To accept a bill of exchange, or to pay a note, check, or acceptcd bill, at maturity and according to its tenor. Peterson v. Hubbard, 28 Mich. 199; Clarke v. Cock, 4 East, 72; Lucas v. Groning, 7 Taunt. 168.
HONOR, n. In English law, a seigniory sev-
eral manors held under one baron or lord para-mount. Also those dignities or privileges, degrees of nobility, knighthood, and other titles, which flow from the crown as the fountain of honor. Wharton.
In American law. The customary title of cour-tesy given to judges of the higher courts, and oc-casionally to some other officers; as "his honor," "your honor."
Act of honor. When a bill has been protested, and a third person wishes to take it up, or accept it, for the "honor" (credit) of one or more of the parties, the notary draws up an instrument, evi-dencing the transaction, which is called by this name.
Honor courts. Tribunals held within honors or seigniories.
Office of honor. As used in constitutional and statutory provisions, this term denotes a public office of considerable dignity and importance, to which important public trusts or interests are confided, but which is not compensated by any salary or fees, being thus contrasted with an "of-fice of profit." See Dickson v. People, 17 III. 193.
HONORABLE. A title of courtesy given in Eng-land to the younger children of earls, and the chil-dren of viscounts and barons; and, collectively, to the house of commons. In America, the word is used as a title of courtesy for various classes of officials, but without any clear Unes of distinction.
HONORABLE DISCHARGE. A formal final judg-ment passed by the government upon the entire military record of á soldier, and an authoritative declaration by the government that he has left the service in a status of honor. Parker v. An-derson, 112.Vt. 371, 25 A.2d 41, 44, Zearing v. John-son, 10 Cál.App.2d 654, 52 P.2d 1019, 1020.
HONORARIUM. In the civil law. An honorary or free gift; a gratuitous payment, as distinguish-ed from hire or compensation for service; a law-yer’s or counsellor’s fee. Dig. 50, 13, 1, 10-12.
A voluntary reward for that for which no remuneration could be collected by law. Cunninghan-. v. Commissioner of internal Revenue, C.C.A., 67 F.2d 205. A voluntary dona-tion, in consideration of services which admit of no com-pensation in money; in particular, to advocates at law, deemed to practice for honor or influence, and not for fees. McDonald v. Napier, 14 Ga. 89.
HONORARIUM JUS. Lat. In Roman law. The law of the prmtors and the edicts of the &diles.
HONORARY. As applied to public offices and other positions of responsibility or trust, this term means either that the office or title is bestowed upon the incumbent as a mark of honor or com-pliment, without intending to charge him with the active discharge of the duties of the place, or else that he is to receive no salary or other com-pensation in money, the honor conferred by the incumbency of the office being his only reward. Haswell v. New York, 81 N.Y. 258. In other con-nections, it means attached to or growing out of some honor or dignity’ or honorable offtce, or else it imports an obligation or duty growing out of honor or trust only, as distinguished from legal accountability.
HONORARY CANONS. Those without emolu-ment. 3 & 4 Vict. c. 113, § 23.
HONORARY FEUDS. Tales of nobility, descend-ible to the eldest son, in exclusion of all the rest. 2 Bl. Comm. 56.
HONORARY SERVICES. In feudal law. Special services to be rendered to the king in person, characteristic of the tenure by grand serjeanty; such as to can-y his banner, his sword, or the like or to be his butler, champion, or other officer, at his coronation. Litt. § 153; 2 Bl. Comm. 73.
HONORARY TRUSTEES Trustees to preserve contingent remainders, so called because they are bound, in honor only, to decide on the most proper and prudential course. Lewin, Trusts, 408.
HONORIS RESPECTUM. By reason of honor or privilege. See Challenge.
HONTFONGENETHEF. In Saxon law. A thief taken with hondhabend; i, e., having the thing stolen in his hand. Cowell.
HONY. L. Fr. Shame; evil; disgrace. Hony soit qui mal y pense, evil be to him who evil thinks. Preferably written honi. See Garter.
HOO. In old English law. A hill. Co. Litt. 5b. HOOKLAND. Land plowed and sown every year.
HOOTCH. Intoxicating liquor illicitly distilled for beverage purposes. State v. Cook, 318 Mo. 1233, 3 S.W.2d 365, 369.
HOPCON. In old English law. A valley. Cowell.
HOPE, n. In old English law. A valley. Co. Litt. 4b.
HOPE, v. As used in a will, this term is a preca-tory word, rather than mandatory or dispositive, but it is sufficient, in proper cases, to create a trust in or in respect to the property spoken of. Curd v. Field, 103 Ky. 293, 45 S.W. 92.
HOPPO. A Chinese term for a collector; an over-seer of commerce.
HORA. Lat. An hour; the hour.
HORA AURORIE. In old English law. The morn-ing bell, as ignitegium or coverfeu (curfew) was the evening beli.
HORA NON EST MULTUM DE SUBSTANTIA NEGOTII, LICET IN APPELLO DE EA ALI-QUANDO FIAT MENTIO. The hour is not of much consequence as to the substance of busi-ness, although in appeal it is sometimes men-tioned. 1 Bulst. 82.
HORIE JURIDICiE or JUDICLE. Hours during which the judges sat in court to attend to judicial business.
HORCA. In Spanish law. A gallows; the pun-ishment of hanging. White, New Recop. b. 2, tit. 19, c. 4, § 1.
HORDA. In old records. A cow in calf.
HORDERA. In old English law. A treasurer. Du Cange.
HORDERIUM. In old English law. A hoard; a treasure, or repository. Cowell.
HORDEUM. In old records. Barley. Hordeum palmale, beer barley, as distinguished from com-mon barley, which was called "hordeum quad-ragesimale." Blount.
HORIZONTAL PRICE—FIXING CONTRACTS. Contracts between producers or between whole-salers or between retailers as to sale or resale prices. Seagram-Distillers Corporation v. Old Dearborn Distributing Co., 363 III. 610, 2 N.E.2d 940, 942.
HORN. In old Scotch practice. A kind of trum-pet used in denouncing contumacious persons reb-els and outlaws, which was done with three blasts of the horn by the king’s sergeant. This was called "putting to the horn;" and the party so de-nounced was raid to be "at the horn." Bell. See Horning.
HORN—BOOK. A primer; a book explaining the rudiments of any science or branch of knowledge. The phrase "horn-book law" is a colloquial desig-nation of the rudiments or most familiar princi-pies of law.
ROEN TENURE. In old English law. Tenure by cornage; that is, by the service of winding a horn when the Scots or other enemies entered the land, in order to warn the king’s subjects. This was a species of grand serjeanty. Litt. § 156; 2 Bl. Comm. 74.
HORN WITH HORN, or HORN UNDER HORN. The promiscuous feeding of bulls and cows or all horned beasts that are allowed to run together upon the same common. Spelman.
HORNER. A narcotic addict who inhales or snuffs heroin rather than one who takes it by injection. People v. Carner, 255 P.2d 835, 836, 117 C.A.2d 362.
HORNGELD. Sax. In old English law. A tax within a forest, paid for horned beasts. Cowell; Blount.
HORNING. In Scotch law. "Letters of horning" is the name given to a judicial process issuing on the decree of a court, by which the debtor is sum-moned to perform his obligation in terms of the decree, the consequence of his failure to do so being liability to arrest and imprisonment. It was anciently the custom to proclaim a debtor who had failed to obey such process a rebel or outlaw, which was done by three blasts of the horn by the king’s sergeant in a public place. This was called "putting to the horn," whence the name.HORNSVVOGGLE. To triumph over; overcome; beat; bedevil. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Rochester, Tex.Civ.App., 281 S.W. 306, 314.
HORREUM. Lat. A place for keeping grain; a granary. A place for keeping fruits, wines, and goods generally; a store-house. Calvin.; Bract. fol. 48.
HORS. L. Fr. Out; out of; without.
HORS DE SON FEE. Out of his fee. In old pleading, this was the name of a plea in an action for rent or services, by which the defendant al-leged that the land in question was out of the com-pass of the plaintiff’s fee. Mather v. Wood, 12 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 4.
HORS PRIS. Except. Literally translated by the Scotch "out taken."
HORS WEALII. In old English law. The wealh, or Briton who had care of the king’s horses.
HORS WEARD. In old English law. A service or corvée, consisting in watching the horses of the lord. Anc. Inst. Eng.
HORSE. An animal of the genus equus and spe-cies caballus. In a narrow and strict sense, the term is applied only to the male, and only to males of four years old or thereabouts, younger horses being called "colts." But even in this sense the term includes both stallions and geldings. In a wider sense, and as generally used in statutes, the word is taken as nomen generalissimum, and includes not only horses strictly so called, but also colts, mares and fillies, and mules and asses. Pullen v. State, 11 Tex.App. 91; Ex parte Hancock, 61 Okl.Cr. 167, 66 P.2d 954, 955.
HORSE GUARDS. The directing power of the military forces of the kingdom of Great Britain. The commander in chief, or general commanding the forces, is at the head of this department. It is subordinate to the war office, but the relations between them are complicated. Wharton.
HORSE POWER. A unit of power capable of lifting 33,000 pounds a foot a minute. Foltz Gro-cery & Baking Co. v. Brown, 111 Ohio St. 646; 146 N.E. 97, 99.

Net Horse Power

Actually available horse power as distinguished from theoretical horse power. Kimberly-Clark Co. v. Patten Paper Co., 153 Wis. 69, 140 N.W. 1066, 1073.
HORTUS. Lat. In the civil law. A garden. Dig. 32, 91, 5.
HOSPES. Lat. A guest. 8 Coke, 32.
HOSPES GENERALIS. A great chamberlain.
HOSPITAL. An institution for the reception and care of sick, wounded, infirm, or aged persons; generally incorporated, and then of the class of corporations called "eleemosynary" or "charita-ble." Also the building used for such purpose. In re Curtiss (Sur.) 7 N.Y.S. 207; Noble v. First Nat. Bank of Anniston, 241 Ala. 85, 1 So.2d 289, 290.
Base Hospital
One established at a definite military or naval base of operations.
Field Hospital
One set up near the field of operations. It is generally equipped to care for emergency cases and can be moved readily.
Public Hospitals
Hospitals which appeal to the public for volun-tary contributions, or those which are supported by compulsory contributions in the form of a rate.
HOSPITALIZATION. Placing a sick person in a hospital. Edwards v. West Texas Hospital, Tex. Civ.App., 89 S.W.2d 801, 815.
HOSPITALLERS. The knights of a religious or-der, so called because they built a hospital at Jerusalem, wherein pilgrims were received. All their lands and goods in England were given to the sovereign by 32 Hen. VIII. c. 24.
HOSPITATOR. A host or entertainer.
Hospitator communis. An innkeeper. 8 Coke, 32.
Hospitator magnos. The marshal of a camp.
HOSPITIA. Inns. Hospitia communia, common inns. Reg. Orig. 105. Hospitia curice, inns of court. Hospitict cancellarice, inns of chancery. Crabb, Eng. Law, 428, 429; 4 Reeve, Eng. Law, 120.
HOSPITICIDE. One that kilts his guest or host.
HOSPITIUM. An inn; a household. Cromwell v. Stephens, 2 Daly (N.Y.) 17.
HOSPODAR. A Turkish governor in Moldavia or Wallachia.
HOST. L. Fr. An army. Britt. c. 22. A mili-tary expedition; war. Kelham.
HOSTAGE. A person who is given into the pos-session of the enemy, in a public war, his freedom (or life) to stand as security for the performance of some contract or promise made by the bellig-erent power giving the hostage with the other.
HOSTELAGIUM. In old records. A right to re-ceive lodging and entertainment, anciently re-served by lords in the houses of their tenants. Cowell.
HOSTELER. See Hostler.
HOSTES. Lat. Enemies. Hostes humani gen-cris, enemies of the human race; i. e., pirates.
HOSTES SUNT QUI NOBIS VEL QUIBUS NOS BELLUM DECERNIMUS; Ce,ETERI PRODI-TORES VEL PR,EDONES SUNT. 7 Coke, 24. Enemies are those with whom we declare war, or who declare it against us; all others are traitors or pirates.

HOSTIA. In old records. The hostbread, or con-secrated wafer, in the eucharist. CowelL
HOSTICIDE. One who kills an enemy.
HOSTILARIA, HOSPITALARIA. A place or room in religious houses used for the reception of guests and strangers.
HOSTILE. Having the character of an enemy; standing in the relation of an enemy. 1 Kent, Comm. c. 4.
HOSTILE EMBARGO. One laid upon the vessels of an actual or prospective enemy.
HOSTILE FIRE. One which becomes uncontrol-lable or breaks out from where it was intended to be and becomes hostile element. Swerling v. Con-necticut Fire Ins. Co., 55 R.I. 252, 180 A. 343. Re-liance Ins. Co. v. Naman, 6 S.W.2d 743, 744, 118 Tex. 21.
HOSTILE POSSESSION. See Possession.
HOSTILE WITNESS. A witness who manifests so much hostility or prejudice under examination in chief that the party who has called him, or his representative, is allowed to cross-examine him, i. e., to treat him as though he had been called by the opposite party. Wharton.
HOSTILITY. In the law of nations. A state of open war. "At the breakhig out of hostility." An act of open war. "When hostilities have com-menced." 1 Kent, Comm. 56, 60.
A hostile character. "Hostility may attach only to the person." 1 Kent, Comm. 56.
HOSTLER. In Norman and old English law, this was the title of the officer in a monastery charged with the entertainment of guests. It was also ap-plied (until about the time of Queen Elizabeth) to an irmkeeper, and afterwards, when the keeping of horses at livery became a distinct occupation, to the keeper of a livery stable, and then (under the modern form "ostler") to the groom in charge of the stables of an inn. Cromwell v. Stephens, 2 Daly (N.Y.) 20.
In the language of railroading, an "ostler" or "hostler" at a roundhouse is one whose duty it is to receive locomotives as they come in from the road, care for them in the roundhouse, and have them cleaned and ready for departure when want-ed. Louisville and N. R. Co. v. McCoy, 270 Ky. 603, 110 S.W.2d 433, 435.
HOTCHPOT. The blending and mixing property belonging to different persons, in order to divide it equally. 2 BI. Comm. 190.
Anciently applied to the mixing and blending of lands given to one daughter in frank marriage, with those descending to her and her sisters in fee-simple, for the pur-pose of dividing the whole equally among them; without which the daughter who held in frank marriage could have no share in the lands in fee-simple. Litt. §1 267, 268; Co. Litt. 177a; 2 Bl.Comm. 190.
Hotchpot, or the putting in hotchpot, is applied In mod-ern law to the throwing the amount of an advancement made to a particular child, in real or personal estate, into the common stock, for the purpose of a more equal divi-

sion, or of equalizing the shares of all the children. 2 Kent, Comm. 421, 422; In re Howlett’s Estate, 275 Mich. 596, 267 N.W. 743, 744. This answers to or resembles the collatio bonorum, or collation of the civil law. Law v. Smith, 2 R.I. 249; In re Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 168 N.Y.S. 952, 959, 181 App.Div. 642.
HOTEL. An inn; a public house or tavern; a house which is held out to well-behaved members of the traveling public, who are willing to pay rea-sonable rates for accommodations, as a place where they will be received and entertained as guests for compensation, and will be furnished with food, drink, and lodging, and everything which they have occasion for while on their way. City of St. Louis v. Siegrist, 46 Mo. 593; People v. Gold, Sp.Sess., 6 N.Y.S.2d 264, 267. For "Family Hotel", see that title.

Synonynkv

In law, there is no difference whatever between the terms "hotel," "inn," and "tavern," except that in some states a statutory definition has been given to the word "hotel," especially with reference to the grant of licenses to sell liquor, as, that it shall contain a certain number of sepa-rate rooms for the entertainment of guests, or the like. But none of the three terms mentioned will include a boarding house (because that is a place kept for the enter-tainment of permanent boarders, while a hotel or inn is for travelers and transient guests), nor a lodging house (because the keeper thereof does not furnish food for guests, which is one of the requisites of a hotel or inn), nor a restaurant or eating-house, which furnishes food only and not lodging. Martin v. State Ins. Co., 44 N.J.Law, 485, 43 Arn.Rep. 397; Debenham v. Short, Tex.Civ.App., 199 S.W. 1147.
HOT—WATER ORDEAL. In old English law. This was a test, in cases of accusation, by hot water; the party accused and suspected being ap-pointed by the judge to put his arms up to the elbows in seething hot water, which, after sundry prayers and invocations, he did, and was, by the effect which followed, judged guilty or innocent. Wharton.
HOUGIL A valley. Co. Litt. 5b. See Haugh.
HOUR. The twenty-fourth part of a natural day; sixty minutes of time.
Hour of cause. In Scotch practice. The hour when a court is met. 3 How. State Tr. 603.
Office hours. See Office.
HOUSE. A dwelling; a building designed for the habitation and residence of men. Satterthwait v. Gibbs, 288 Pa. 428, 135 A. 862, 863.
"House" means, presumptively, a dwelling house: a building divided into floors and apartments, with four walls, a roof, and doors and chimneys; but it does not necessarily mean precisely this. Surman v. Darley, 14 Mees. & W. 183. It may mean any sort of structure or part thereof, whether used for human habitation or not. Dennis v. State, 71 Tex.Cr.R. 162, 158 S.W. 1008; Walker v. Ter-reil, Tex.Civ.App., 189 S.W. 75, 78.
"House" is not synonymous with "dwelling house." While the former le used in a broader and more compre-hensive sense than the latter, it has a narrower and more restricted meaning than the word "building." State v. Garity, 46 N.H. 61.
A legislative assembly, or (where the bicameral system obtains) one of the two branches of the legislature; as the "house of lords," "house of representatives." Also a quorum of a legislative body. State of Ohio v. Cox, D.C. Ohio, 257 F. 334, 346.

The name "house" is also given to some collec-tions of men other than legislative bodies, to some public institutions, and (colloquially) to mercan-tile firms or joint-stock companies.
Ancient House. One which has stood long enough to acquire an easement of support against the adjoining land or building. 3 Kent Comm. 437.
Bawdy House. A brothel; a house maintained for purposes of prostitution.
Beer House. See Beer.
Boarding House. See that title.
Duplex House. A double house. Kenwood Land Co. v. Hancock Inv. Co., 169 Mo.App. 715, 155 S.W. 861, 864.
Dwelling House. See that title.
House-bote. A species of estovers, belonging to a tenant for life or years, consisting in the right to take from the woods of the lessor or owner such timber as may be necessary for making repairs upon the house. Co.Litt. 41b.
House-burning. See Arson.
House-duty. A tax on inhabited houses imposed by 14 & 15 Vict. c. 36, in lieu of window-duty, which was abolished.
House of Commons. One of the constituent houses of the British parliament, composed of representatives of the counties, cities, and bor-oughs. The lower house, so called because the commons of the realm, that is, the knights, citi-zens, and burgesses returned to parliament, repre-senting the whole body of the commons, sit there.
House of Correction. A reformatory. A place for the imprisonment of juvenile offenders, or those who have committed crimes of lesser magni-tude. Ex parte Moon Fook, 72 Cal. 10, 12 P. 804.
House of Delegates. The official title of the lower branch of the legislative assembly of sev-eral of the American states, e. g., Maryland and Virginia.
House of Ill Fame. A bawdy house; a brothel; a dwelling allowed by its chief occupant to be used as a resort of persons desiring unlawful sexual intercourse. People v. Lee, 307 Mich. 743, 12 N.W.2d 418, 421.
The authorlties are conflicting as to whether and in what circumstances a house used solely by one woman for illicit lntercourse is a house of ill fame. Fisher v. City of Para-gould, 127 Ark. 268, 192 S.W. 219, 220.
House of Keys. The name of the lower branch of the legislative assembly or parliament of the Isle of Man, consisting of twenty-four representa-tives chosen by popular election.
House of Lords. The upper chamber of the British parliament. It comprises the archbishops and bishops, (called "Lords Spiritual,") the Eng-lish peers sitting by virtue of hereditary right, six-teen Scotch peers elected to represent the Scotch
HOUSEHOLD
peerage under the act of union, and twenty-eight Irish peers elected under similar provisions. The house of lords, as a judicial body, has ultimate appellate jurisdiction, and may sit as a court for the trial of impeachments.
House of Refuge. A prison for juvenile delín-quents. A house of correction or reformatory.
House of Representatives. The name of the body forming the more popular and numerous branch of the congress of the United States; also of the similar branch in many of the state legis-latures.
House of Worship. A building or place set apart for and devoted to the holding of religious services or exercises or public worship; a church or chapel or place similarly used. Old South Soc. v. Boston, 127 Mass. 379.
Inner House, Outer House. See those titles. Mansion House. See Mansion.
Public House. An inn or tavern; a house for the entertainment of the public, or for the entertain-ment of all who come lawfully and pay regularly. Whatley v. State, 68 So. 491, 492, 12 Ala.App. 201. A place of public resort, particularly for purposes of drinking or gaming. In a more general sense, any house made public by the occupation carried on in it and the implied invitation to the public to enter, such as inns, taverns, drinking saloons, gambling houses, and perhaps also shops and stores. Cole v. State, 28 Tex.App. 536, 13 S.W. 859, 19 Am.St.Rep. 856.
Tippling House. A place where intoxicating liq-uors are sold in drams or small quantities to be drunk on the premises, and where men resort for drinking purposes.
HOUSEAGE. A fee paid for housing goods by a carrier, or at a wharf, etc.
HOUSEBREAKING. In criminal law. Breaking and entering a dwelling-house with intent to com-mit any felony therein. If done by night, it comes under the definition of "burglary."
Under statute housebreaking may consist in "breaking out" of a house after access had been gained without breaking. Lawson v. Common-wealth, 160 Ky. 180, 169 S.W. 587, 588, L.R.A. 1915 D, 972.
HOUSEHOLD, adj. Belonging to the house and family; domestic. Webster.
HOUSEHOLD, n. A family living together. Schurler v. Industrial Commission, 86 Utah, 284, 43 P.2d 696, 699, 100 A.L.R. 1085. Those who dwell under the same roof and compose a family. Web-ster. A man’s family living together constitutes his household, though he may have gone to an-other state.
For "Family," see that title.
Synonymous with "family," but broader, In that it includes servants or attendants; all who are under one domestic head. Engebretson v. Austvold, 199 Minn. 399, 271 N.W. 809, 810.

HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE. See Furniture.
HOUSEHOLD SERVANTS AND HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYEES. Those employed in the mansion house, and do not embrace those who work out of doors upon the honre place, and not regularly employed to do work within the curtilage. Raines v. Osborne, 184 N.C. 599, 114 S.E. 849.
HOUSEHOLD STUFF. This phrase, in a will, includes everything which may be used for the conveniente of the house, as tables, chairs, bed-ding, and the like. But apparel, books, weapons, tools for artificers, cattle, victuals, and choses in action will not pass by those words, unless the context of the will clearly show a contrary in-tention. 1 Rop. Leg. 206. See Appeal of Hoopes, 60 Pa. 227, 100 Am.Dec. 562.
HOUSEHOLDER. The occupier of a house. Brande. More correctly, one who keeps house with his family; the head or master of a family. Webster; 18 Johns. 302. Berghean v. Berghean, 113 Ind.App. 412, 48 N.E.2d 1001, 1003. One who has a household; the head of a household. Gom-ez v. State, 75 Tex.Cr.R. 239, 170 S.W. 711, 713.
HOUSEKEEPER. One who is in actual posses-sion of and who occupies a house, as distinguished from a "boarder," "lodger," or "guest." See Bell v. Keach, 80 Ky. 45. Head of a family. January v. Marler, 274 Mo. 543, 203 S.W. 817.
HOUSE LAW. A peculiar type of regulatory code, now largely obsolete, promulgated by the head of a royal or noble family, or of a prominent pri-vate family, governing intra-family relationships and acts with respect to policies of marriage, dis-position of property, inheritance and the like. Usually these codes had no legal authority but were enforced within the family by sufficient personal and economic sanctions.
HOVEL. A place used by husbandmen to set their plows, carts, and other farming utensils out of the rain and sun. A shed; a cottage; a mean house.
HOWE. In old English law. A hill. Co. Litt. 5b. HOWGH. See Haugh.
HOY. A small coasting vessel, usually sloop-rigged, used in conveying passengers and goods from place to place, or as a tender to larger ves-sels in port. Webster.
HOYMAN. The master or captain of a hoy.
RUCKSTER. A petty dealer and retailer of small articles of provisions, particularly farm and Bar-den produce; a hawker; peddler. Hughes v. City of Detroit, 217 Mich. 567, 187 N.W. 530, 531.
HUCUSQUE. In old pleading. Hitherto. 2 Mod. 24.
HUDE—GELD. In old English law. An acquit-tance for an assault upon a trespassing servant. Supposed to be a mistake or misprint in Fleta for "hinegeld." Fleta, lib. 1, c. 47, § 20. Also the price
of one’s skin, or the money paid by a servant to save himself from a whipping. Du Cange.
HUE AND CRY. In old English law. A loud outcry with which felons (such as robbers, burg-lars, and murderers) were anciently pursued, and which all who heard it were bound to take up, and join in the pursuit, until the malefactor was taken. Bract. fois. 115b, 124; 4 Bl. Comm. 293. A written proclamation issued on the escape of a felon from prison, requiring all officers and people to assist in retaking him. 3 How. State Tr. 386.
HUEBRAS. In Spanish law. A measure of land equal to as much as a yoke of oxen can plow in one day. 2 White, Recop. (38), 49; Strother v. Lucas, 12 Pet. 443, 9 L.Ed. 1137.
HUI. Under the law of Hawaii. An association of persons in the ownership of land, members of which ordinarily hold the property as tenants in common. De Fries v. Scott, C.C.A.Hawaii, 268 F. 952, 959.
HUIS. L. Fr. A door. "Al huis del esglise," at the door of the church. Bendloe, 133.
HUISSERIUM. A ship used to transport horses. Also termed "uffer."
HUISSIERS. In French law. Marshals; ushers; process-servers; sheriff’s officers. Ministerial of-ficers attached to the courts, to effect legal service of process required by law in actions, to issue exe-cutions, etc., and to maintain order during the sitting of the courts.
HULKA. In old records. A hulk or small vessel. Cowell.
HULKS. A place of punishment for convicts in England, abandoned with the reform in the pun-ishment of convicts which began in England about 1840.
HULL. In a statute, 33 U.S.C.A. § 319, requiring ships of a certain size to carry lights, etc., it in-eludes the forecastle deck. The Europe, 190 Fed. 475, 111 C.C.A. 307.
HULLUS. In old records. A hill. 2 Mon. Angl. 292; Cowell.
HUMAGIUM. A moist place. Mon. AngL
HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE. Another name for the doctrine of the Last clear chance. See Last.
HUNDRED. Under the Saxon organization of England, each county or shire comprised an in-definite number of hundreds, each hundred con-taining ten tithings, or groups of ten families of freeholders or frankpledges. The hundred was governed by a high constable, and had its own court; but its most remarkable feature was the corporate responsibility of the whole for the crimes or defaults of the individual members. The introduction of this plan of organization into Eng-land is commonly ascribed to Alfred, but the idea, as well of the collective liability as of the division,

was probably known to the ancient German peo-ples, as we find the same thing established in the Frankish kingdom under Clothaire, and in Den-mark. See 1 Bl. Comm. 115; 4 Bl. Comm. 411.
HUNDRED COURT. In English law. A larger court-baron, being held for all the inhabitants of a particular hundred, instead of a manor. The free suitors are the judges, and the steward the registrar, as in the case of a court-baron. It is not a court of record, and resembles a court-baron in all respects except that in point of territory it is of greater jurisdiction. These courts have long since fallen into desuetude. 3 Bl. Comm. 34, 35; 3 Steph. Comm. 394, 395.
HUNDRED GEMOTE. Among the Saxons, a meeting or court of the freeholders of a hundred, which assembled, originally, twelve times a year, and possessed civil and criminal jurisdiction and ecclesiastical powers. 1 Reeve, Eng. Law, 7.
HUNDRED LAGH. The law of the hundred, or hundred court; liability to attend the hundred court. Spelman.
HUNDRED PENNY. In old English law. A tax collected from the hundred, by the sheriff or lord of the hundred.
HUNDRED ROLLS. Rolls embodying the result of investigations made by the commissioners in 1274 as to usurpations of the royal rights. 1 Holdsw. Hist. E. L. 48.
HUNDRED SECTA. The performance of suit and service at the hundred court.
HUNDRED SETENA. In Saxon law. The dwell-ers or inhabitants of a hundred. Cowell; Blount. Spelman suggests the reading of sceatena from Sax. "sceat," a tax.
HUNDRED-FECTA. The performance of suit and service at the hundred court. Wharton.
HUNDREDARIUS. In old English law. A hun-dredary or hundredor. A name given to the chief officer of a hundred, as well as to the freeholders who composed it. Spel. voc. "Hundredus."
HUNDREDARY. The chief or presiding officer of a hundred.
HUNDREDES EARLpOR, or HUNDREDES MAN. The presiding officer in the hundred court. Anc. Inst. Eng.
HUNDREDORS. In English law. The inhabi-tants or freeholders of a hundred, anciently the suitors or judges of the hundred court. Persons impaneled or fit to be impaneled upon juries, dwelling within the hundred where the cause of action arose. Cromp. Jur. 217. It was formerly necessary to have some of these upon every panel of jurors. 3 Bl. Comm. 359, 360; 4 Steph. Comm. 370. The term "hundredor" was also used to sig-nify the officer who had the jurisdiction of a hun-dred, and held the hundred court, and sometimes the bailiff of a hundred. Termes de la Ley; Cow-ell.
HUNDREDWEIGHT. A denomination of weight containing, according to the. English system, 112 pounds; but in this country, generally, it consists of 100 pounds avoirdupois.
RUNG JURY. A jury so irreconcilably divided in opinion that they cannot agree upon any ver-dict.
HUNGER. The desire to eat. Hunger is no ex-cuse for larceny; 1 Hale, Pl. Cr. 54; 4 Bla. Comm. 31. As to death from hunger, see Death.
HUNTING. The act of pursuing and taking wild anirnals; the chase. Commonwealth v. Bailey, 97 S.E. 774, 124 Va. 800. Robinson v. State, 76 S.E. 1061, 11 Ga.App. 847.
HURDEREFERST. A domestic; one of a family.
HURDLE. In English criminal law. A kind of sledge, on which convicted felons were drawn to the place of execution. See Draw, v.
HURRICANE. A storm of great violence or in-tensity, of which the particular characteristic is the high velocity of the wind. There is naturally no exact measure to distinguish between an or-dinary storm and a hurricane, but the wind should reach a velocity of at least 50 or 60 miles an hour to be called by the latter name, or, as expressed in some of the cases, it should be sufficient to "throw down buildings." A hurricane is properly a circular storm in the nature of a cyclone. Pel-ican Ins. Co. v. Troy Co-op. Ass’n, 13 S.W. 980, 77 Tex. 225; Queen Ins. Co. v. Hudnut Co., 8 Ind.App. 22, 35 N.E. 397; George A. Hoagland and Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 131 Neb. 105, 267 N.W. 239, 241.
HURST, HYRST, HERST, or HIRST. A wood or grove of trees. Co. Litt. 4b.
HURT. In such phrases as "to the hurt or annoy-ance of another," or "hurt, molested, or restrained in his person or estate," this word is not restricted to physical injuries, but includes also mental pain, as well as discomfort or annoyance. Thurston v. Whitney, 2 Cush., Mass., 110.
HURTARDUS, or HURTUS. A ram or wether.
HURTO. In Spanish law. Theft. White, New Recop. b. 2, tit. 20.
HUSBAND. A married man; one who has a law-ful wife living. The correlative of "wife." People v. Snyder, 353 III. 184, 187 N.E. 158, 160, 88 A.L.R. 1012.
Etymologically, the word signified the "house bond;" the man who, according to Saxon ideas and institutions, held around him the family, for whom he was in law responsible.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. One of the great do-mestic relationships; being that of a man and woman lawfully joined in marriage, by which, at common law, the legal existente of a wife is in-corporated with that of her husband.

HUSBAND LAND. In old Scotch law. A quantity of land containing commonly six acres. Skene.
HUSBAND OF A SHIP. See. Ship’s Husband.
HUSBANDMAN. A farmer; a cultivator or tiller of the ground. The word "farmer" is colloquially used as synonymous with "husbandman," but or-iginally meant a tenant who cultivates leased ground.
HUSBANDRIA. In old English law. Husbandry. Dyer, (Fr. Ed.) 35b.
HUSBANDRY. Agriculture; cultivation of the soil for food; farming, in the sense of operating land to raise provisions. Simons v. Lovell, 7 Heisk. (Tenn.) 516; State ex rel. Boynton v. Wheat Farming Co., 137 Kan. 697, 22 P.2d 1093.
HUSBREC. In Saxon law. The crime of house-breaking or burglary. Crabb, Eng. Law, 59, 308.
HUSCARLE. In old English law. A house serv-ant or domestic; a man of the household. Spel-man. A king’s vassal, thane, or baron; an earl’s man or vassal. A term of frequent occurrence in Domesday Book.
HUSFASTNE. He who holds house and land. Bract. L 3, t. 2, c. 10.
HUSGABLUM. In old records. House rent; or a tax or tribute laid upon a house. Cowell; Blount.
HUSH-MONEY. A colloquial expression to desig-nate a bribe to hinder information; pay to secure silente.
HUSTINGS. Council; court; tribunal. Appar-ently so called from being held within a building, at a time when other courts were held in the open air. It was a local court. The county court in the city of London bore this name. There were hust-ings at York, Winchester, Lincoln, and in other places similar to the London hustings. Also the raised place from which candidates for seats in parliament address the constituency, on the occa-sion of their nomination. Wharton.
In Virginia, some of the local courts are called "hust, Ings," as in the city of Richmond. Smith v. Com., 6 Grat. Va., 696. The municipal courts established (in Virginia) in any city of over 5,000 irxhabitants were at one time called kustings courts. Cent.Dict.
HUTESIUM ET CLAMOR. Hue and cry. See Hue and Cry.
RUTILAN. Taxes. Mon. Angl. L 586.
HWATA, HWATUNG. In old English law. Au-gury; divination.
HYBERNAGIUM. In old English law. The sea-son for sowing winter grain, between Michael-mas and Christmas. The land on which such grain was sown. The grain itself; winter grain or winter corn. CowelL
HYBRED. A mongrel; an animal formed of the union of different species, or different genera;
also (metaphorlcally) a human being born of the union of persons of different races.
HYD. In old English law. Hide; skin. A mea-sure of land, containing according to some, a hun-dred acres, which quantity is also assigned to it in the Dialogus de Scaccario. It seems, however, that the hide varied in clifferlent parts of the king-dom.
HYDAGE. See Hidage.
HYDROMETER. An instrument for measuring the density of fluids. Being immersed in fluids, as in water, brine, beer, brandy, etc., it determines the proportion of their density, or their specific gravity, and thence their quality. See Rey. St. U. S. § 2918 (19 U.S.C.A. § 390).
HYDROSTATIC TEST. A method of detennining whether or not a deceased infant was born alive, involving the removal of the lungs and the plac-í/1g of them in a vessel of water; if the infant had breathed, the air in the lungs will cause them to float, though they may also float if decomposi-tion has set in and gas has formed in the body. Morgan v. State, 256 S.W. 433, 148 Tenn. 417. Called, also, "docimasia pulmonum."
HYEMS, HIEMS. Lat. In the civil law. Winter. Dig. 43, 20, 4, 34. Written, in some of the old books, "uems." Fleta, lib. 2, c. 73, §§ 16, 18.
HYGIENE. A system of principies or rules de-signed for the promotion of health. Lunn v. City of Auburn, 110 Me. 241, 85 A. 893, 894.
HYPNOTIC OR SOMNIFACIENT DRUGS. Drugs that produce sleep. State v. Jordan, 171 So.2d 650, 653, 247 La. 367.
HYPNOTISM. A condition, artificially produced, in which the person hypnotized, apparently asleep, acts in obedience to will of operator. Louis v. State, 24 Ala.App. 120, 130 So. 904, 905.
HYPOBOLUM. In the civil law. The name of the bequest or legacy given by the husband to his wif e, at his death, aboye her dowry.
HYPOCHONDRIA; HYPOMANIA,. See Insanity.
HYPOSTASIS. In medical jurisprudence. (1) The morbid deposition of a sediment of any kind in the body. (2) A congestion or flushing of the blood vessels, as in varicose veins. Post-mortem hypostasis, a peculiar lividity of the cadaver.
HYPOTHEC. In Scotland, the term "hypothec" is used to signify the landlord’s right which, in-dependently of any stipulation, he has over the crop and stocking of his tenant. It gives a secur-ity to the landlord over the crop of each year for the rent of that year, and over the cattle and stocking on the farm for the current year’s rent, which last confirmes for three months after the last conventional term for the payrnent of the rent. Bell.
HYPOTHECA. "Hypotheca" was a term of the Roman "law, and denoted a piedge or mortgage. As distinguished from the term "pignus," in the same law, it denoted a mortgage, whether of lands or of goods, in which the subject in piedge
mained in the possession of the mortgagor or debtor; whereas in the pignus the mortgagee or credi tor was in the possession. Such an hypotheca might be either express or implied; express, where the parties upon the occasion of a loan entered into express agreement to that effect; or implied, as, e. g., in the case of the stock and utensils of a farmer, which were subject to the landlord’s right as a creditor for rent; whence the Scotch law of hypothec.
The word has suggested the term "hypothecate," as used in the mercantile and maritime law of England. Thus, under the factor’s act, goods are frequently said to be "hypothecated;" and a cap-tain is said to have a right to hypothecate his vessel for necessary repairs. Brown. See Mac-keld. Rom. Law, §§ 334-359.
HYPOTHECARIA ACTIO. Lat. In the civil law. An hypothecary action; an action for the enforce-ment of an hypotheca, or right of mortgage; or to obtain the surrender of the thing mortgaged. Inst. 4, 6, 7; Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 356. Adopted in the Civil Code of Louisiana, under the name of "l’action hypothécarie," (translated, "action of mortgage.") Civ. Code La. arts. 1433-4443; Code Prac. La. art. 61.
HYPOTHECARII CREDITORES. Lat. In the civil law. Hypothecary creditors; those who loaned money on the security of an hypotheca, (q. v.) Calvin.
HYPOTHECARY ACTION. The name of an ac-tion allowed under the civil law for the enforce-ment of the claims of a creditor by the contract of hypotheca. Lovell v. Cragin, 136 U.S. 130, 10 Sup.Ct. 1024, 34 L.Ed. 372.
An hypothecary action is a real action, which the creditor brings against the property which has been hypothecated to him by his debtor, in order to have it seized and sold for the payment of his debt. Code Prac.La. art. 61. In the hypothecary action proper, there is no pursuit of the per-son; the thing mortgaged is the debtor, and the action is directed against it. In this sense, the action is real. Wis-dom v. Parker, 31 La.Ann. 52.
HYPOTHECATE. To pledge a thing without de-livering the possession of it to the pledgee. "The master, when abroad, and in the absence of the owner, may hypothecate the ship, freight, and cargo, to raise money requisite for the completion of the voyage." 3 Kent, Comm. 171. Ogden v. Lathrop, 31 N.Y.Super.Ct. 651.
HYPOTHECATION. The term borrowed from the civil law. In so far as it is naturalized in English and American law, it means a contract of mort-gage or pledge in which the subject-matter is not delivered into the possession of the pledgee or pawnee; or, conversely, a conventional right ex-isting in one person over specific property of an-other, which consists in the power to cause a sale of the same, though it be not in his possession, in order that a specific claim of the creditor may be satisfied out of the proceeds. Whitney v. Peay, 24 Ark. 27.
The term is frequently used in our textbooks and reports, particularly upon the law of bottomry and maritime Rens; thus a vessel is said to be hypothecated for the demand of one who has advanced money for supplies.
In the common law, there are but few, if any, cases of hypothecation, in the strict sense of the civil law; that is, a pledge without possession by the pledgee. The nearest approaches, perhaps, are cases of bottomry bonds and claims of materialmen, and of seamen for wages; but there are llena and privilegés, rather than hypothecations: Story, Ballm. § 288.
HYPOTHECATION BOND. A bond given in the contract of bottomry or respondentia.
HYPOTHÉQUE. In French law. Hypothecation; a mortgage on real property; the right vested in a creditor by the assignment to him of real es-tate as security for the payment of his debt, whe-ther or not it be accompanied by possession. See Civ. Code La. art. 3397.
It corresponds to the mortgage of real property in Eng-lish law, and is a real charge, foliowing the property into whosesoever hands it comes. It may be légale, as in the case of the charge which the state has over the lands of its accountants, or which a married woman has over those of her husband; judiciaire, when it is the result of a judg-ment of a court of justice; and conventtionelle, when it is the result of an agreement of the parties. Brown.
HYPOTHESIS. A supposition, assumption, or theory; a theory set up by the prosecution, on a criminal trial, or by the defense, as an explana-tion of the facts in evidente, and a ground for inferring guilt or Innocence, as the case may be, or as indicating a probable or possible motive for the crime.
HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION. A combination of assumed or proved facts and circumstances, stat-ed in such form as to constitute a coherent and specific situation or state of facts, upon which the opinion of an expert is asked, by way of evi-dence on a trial. Howard v. People, 185 Ill. 552, 57 N.E. 441; State v. Smoak, 213 N.C. 79, 195 S.E. 72, 81.
It should be so framed as to recite all the facts in evi-dence which are relevant to the formation of an opinion and then, assumíng the facts recited to be true, the witness should be asked whether he is able to form an opinion therefrom and if so to state his opinion. McMurrey v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 439, 168 S.W.2d 858, 860.
HYPOTHETICAL YEARLY TENANCY. The bas-is, in England, of rating lands and hereditaments to the poor-rate, and to other rates and taxes that are expressed to be leviable or assessable in like «manner as the poor-rate.
HYRNES. In old English law. A parish.
HYSTERIA. A paroxysmal disease or disorder of the nervous system, more common in females than males, not originating in any anatomical lesion, due to psychic rather than physical causes, and attended, in the acute or convulsive form, by ex-traordinary manifestations of secondary effects of extreme nervousness.
Hysteria is a state in which ideas control the body and produce morbid changes in its functions. Mcebius. A special psychic state, characterized by symptoms which can also be produced or reproduced by suggestíon, and which can be treated by psychotherapy or persuasion, hysteric and hypnotic states being practically equivalent to each other. Babinski. A purely psychic or mental disorder due to heredítary predisposition. Charcot. A state result-ing from a psychic lesion or nervous shock, leading to repression or aberratlon of the sexual instinct. Freud. Hysteria is much more common in women than in men, and was formerly thought to be due to some disorder of the uterus or sexual system; but 1t 1s now known that it may occur in men, in children, and la very aged persona of either sex.
In the convulsive form of hysteria, commonly called "hysterics" or "a fit of hysterics," there 1s nervestorm characterized by loss or abandonment of self-control in the expression of the emotlons, particularly, grjef, by parox-ysms of tears or laughter or both together, sensations of constriction as of a ball rising in the throat (globus hys-tericus), convulsive movements in the chest, pelvis, and abdomen, sometlrnes leading to a fall with apparent uncon-sciousness, followed by a relapse finto semiunconsclousness or catalepsy. In the noh-convulsive forms, all kinds of organic paralyses may be simulated, as well as muscular contractions and spasms, tremor, loss of sensation (onces-thes4a) or exaggerated sensation (hypercesthesia), disturb-ances of respiration, disordered appetite, accelerated pulse, hemorrhages in the skin (stionata), pain, swelling, or even dIslocation of the joints, and great amenability to sugges-tion.
HYSTERO—EPILEPSY. See Epilepsy.
HYSTEROPOTMOL Those who, having been thought dead, had, after a long absence in for-eign countries, returned safely home; or those who, having been thought dead in battle, had af-terwards unexpectedly escaped from their enemies and returned home. These, among the Romans, were not permitted to enter their own houses at the door, but were received at a passage opened in the roof. Enc. Lond.
HYSTEROTOMY. The CEesarean operation. See Ccesarean Section.
HYTHE. In English law. A port, wharf, or small haven to embark or land merchandise at. Cowell; Blount.

BLACK ‘S LAW DICTIONARY – Section I

I

I. The initial letter of the word `Instituía," used by some civilians in citing the Institutes of Jus-tinian. Tayl. Civil Law, 24.
I. C. C. Interstate Commerce Commission; In-dian Claims Commission.
I—CTUS. An abbreviation for "jurisconsultus," one learned in the law; a jurisconsult.
I. E. An abbreviation for "id est," that is; that is to say.
I O U. A memorandum of debt, consisting of these letters, ("I owe you,") a sum of money, and the debtor’s signature, is termed an "I 0 U." Kinney v. Flynn, 2 R.I. 329.
L R. S. Internal Revenue Service.
IBERNAGIUM. In old English law. The season for sowing winter corn. Also spelled "hiberna-gium" and "hybernagium" (q. vi.
IBI SEMPER DEBET FIERI TRIATIO UBI JURA-TORÉS MELIOREM POSSUNT HABERE NOTI-TIAM. 7 Coke, lb. A trial should always be had where the jurors can be the best informed.
IBIDEM. Lat. In the same place; in the same book; on the same page, etc. Abbreviated to "ibid." or "ib."
ICENI. The ancient name for the people of Suf-folk, Norfolk, Cambridgeshire, and Huntingdon-shire, in England.
ICONA. An image, figure, or representation of a thing. Du Cange.
ICTUS. In old English law. A stroke or blow from a club or stone; a bruise, contusion, or swell-ing produced by a blow from a club or stone, as distinguished from "plaga," (a wound.) Fleta, lib. 1, c. 41, § 3.
ICTUS ORBIS. In medical jurisprudence. A maim, a bruise, or swelling; any hurt without cutting the skin. When the skin is cut, the in-jury is called a "wound." Bract. lib. 2, tr. 2, cc. 5, 24.
ID CERTUM EST QUOD CERTUM REDDI PO-TEST. That is certain which can be made cer-tain. 2 Bl.Comm. 143; 1 Bl.Comm. 78; 4 Kent, Comm. 462; Broom, Max. 624.
ID CERTUM EST QUOD CERTUM REDDI PO-TEST, SED ID MAGIS CERTUM EST QUOD DE SEMETIPSO EST CERTUM. That is certain which can be made certain, but that is more cer-tain which is certain of itself. 9 Coke, 47a.
ID EST. Lat. That is. Commonly abbreviated
ID PERFECTUM EST QUOD EX OMNIBUS SUIS PARTIBUS CONSTAT. That is perfect which consists of all its parts. 9 Coke 9.
ID POSSUMUS QUOD DE JURE POSSUMUS. Lane, 116. We may do only that which by law we are allowed to do.

ID QUOD EST MAGIS REMOTUM, NON TRAIIIT AD SE QUOD EST MAGIS JUNCTUM, SED E CONTRARIO IN OMNI CASU. That which is more remote does not draw to itself that which is nearer, but the contrary in every case. Co. Litt. 164.
ID QUOD NOSTRUM EST SINE FACTO NOSTRO AD ALIUM TRANSFERRI NON POTEST. That which is ours cannot be transferred to another without our act. Dig. 50, 17, 11.
ID SOLUM NOSTRUM QUOD DEBITIS DEDUC-TIS NOSTRUM EST. That only is ours which remains to us af ter deduction of debts. Tray. Lat. Max. 227.
IDEM. Lat. The same. According to Lord Coke, "idem" has two significations, sc., idem syllabis seu verbis, (the same in syllabus or words,) and idem re et sensu, (the same in substance and in sense.) 10 Coke, 124a.
In Old Practice. The said, or aforesaid; said, aforesaid. Distinguished from "prcedictus" in old entries, though having the same general significa-tion. Townsh. Pl. 15, 16.
IDEM AGENS ET PATIENS ESSE NON POTEST. Jenk. Cent. 40. The same person cannot be both agent and patient; i. e., the doer and person to whom the thing is done.
IDEM EST FACERE, ET NON PROHIBERE CUM POSSIS; ET QUI NON PROHIBIT, CUM PRO-HIBERE POSSIT, IN CULPA EST, (AUT JUBET.) 3 Inst. 158. To commit, and not to prohibit when in your power, is the same thing ; and he who does not prohibit when he can prohibit is in fault, or does the same as ordering it to be done.
IDEM EST NIHIL DICERE, ET INSUFFICIEN-TER DICERE. It is the same thing to say noth-ing, and to say a thing insufficiently. To say a thing in an insufficient manner is the same as not to say it at all. Applied to the plea of a prisoner. 2 Inst. 178.
IDEM EST NON ESSE, ET NON APPARERE. It is the same thing not to be as not to appear. Jenk. Cent. 207. Not to appear is the same thing as not to be. Broom, Max. 165.
IDEM EST NON PROBARI ET NON ESSE; NON DEFICIT JUS, SED PROBATIO. What is not proved and what does not exist are the same; it is not a defect of the law, but of proof.
IDEM EST SCIRE AUT SCIRE DEBERE AUT POTUISSE. To be bound to know or to be able to know is the same as to know.
IDEM PER IDEM. The same for the same. An illustration of a kind that really adds no additional element to the consideration of the question.

IDEM SEMPER ANTECEDENTI PROXIMO RE-FERTUR. Co. Litt. 685. "The same" is always referred to its next antecedent.
IDEM SONANS. Sounding the same or alike; having the same sound. A term applied to names which are substantially the same, though slightly varied in the spelling, as "Lawrence" and "Lawr-ance," and the like. 1 Cromp. & M. 806; 3 Chit. Gen. Pr. 171; Golson v. State, 15 Ala.App. 420, 73 So. 753.
Two names are said to be "idem sonantes" if the atten-tive ear finds difficulty in distinguishing them when pro-nounced, or if common and long-continued usage has by corruption or abbreviation made them identical In pro-nunciation. State v. Criffie, 118 Mo. 188, 23 S.W. 878. The rule of "idem sonaras" is that absolute accuracy in spelling names is not required in a legal document or proceedings elther civil or criminal; that if the name, as spelled in the document, though different from the correct spelling thereof, conveys to the ear, when pronounced according to the commonly accepted methods, a sound practically iden-tical with the correct name as commonly pronounced, the name thus given is a suffIcient identification of the individ-ual referred to, and no advantage can be taken of the cleri-cal error. State v. Hattaway, 180 La. 12, 156 So. 159. But the doctrine of "idem sonaras" has been much enlarged by modem decIsions, to conform to the growing rule that a variante, to be material, must be such as has misled the opposite party to his prejudice.
IDENTICAL. Exactly the same for all practical purposes. Carn v. Moore, 74 Fla. 77, 76 So. 337, 340.
IDENTIFICATION. Proof of identity; the prov-ing that a person, subject, or article before the court is the very same that he or it is alleged, charged, or reputed to be; as where a witness recognizes the prisoner at the bar as the same person whom he saw committing the crime; or where handwriting, stolen goods, counterfeit coin, etc., are recognized as the same which once passed under the observation of the person identifying them. Hall v. Cotton, 167 Ky. 464, 180 S.W. 779, 781, L.R.A.1916C, 1124.
IDENTITAS VERA COLLIGITUR EX MULTITU-BINE SIGNORUM. True Identity is collected from a multitude of signs. Bac. Max.
IDENTITATE NOMINIS. In English law. An an-cient writ (now obsolete) which lay for one taken and arrested in any personal action, and commit-ted to prison, by mistake for another man of the same name. Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 267.
IDENTITY. In the Law of Evidente. Sameness; the fact that a subject, person, or thing before a court is the same as it is represented, claimed, or charged to be. Burrill, Circ. Ev. 382, 453, 631, 644.
In Patent Law. Such sameness between two designs, inventions, combinations, etc., as will con-stitute the one an infringement of the patent granted for the other.
To constitute "Identity of invention," and therefore infringement, not only must the result obtained be the same, but, in case the means used for its attainment is a combination of known elements, thr, elements combined in both cases must be the same, and combined in the same way, so that each element shall perform the same function: provlded that thé differences alleged are not merely color-able according to the rule forbiddlng the use of known equlvalents. Electric Railroad Signal Co. v. Hall Railroad Signal Co., 114 U.S. 87, 5 Sup.Ct. 1069, 29 L.Ed. 96; Latta v. Shawk, 14 Fed.Cas. 1188. "Identity of design" means sameness of appearance. or, in other words, sameness of effect upon the eye,—not the eye of an expert, but of an ordinary intelligent observer. Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U.S. 674, 13 Sup.Ct. 768, 37 L.Ed. 606.
IDEO. Lat. Therefore. Calvin.
IDEO CONSIDERATUM EST. Lat. Therefore it is considered. These were the words used at the beginning of the entry of judgment in an action, when the forms were in Latin. They are also used as a name for that portion of the record.
IDEOT. An old form for idiot (q. y.).
IDES. A division of time among the Romans. In March, May, July, and October, the Ides were on the 15th of the month; in the remaining months, on the 13th. This method of reckoning is still retained in the chancery of Rome, and in the calendar of the breviary. Wharton.
Under the word "Ides" in Bouvier’s Law Dict., Rawle’s 3d Rev., p. 1486, will be found a complete table of the calends, nones, and ides.
IDIOCHIRA. Grmco-Lat. In the civil law. An instrufnent privately executed, as distinguished from such as were executed before a public officer. Cod. 8, 18, 11; Calvin.
IDIOCY, IDIOPATHIC INSANITY. See Insanity.
IDIOPATHIC DISEASE. A morbid state or con-dition not preceded or occasioned by any other disease. Christ v. Pacific Mutual Life Iras. Co., 231 Ill.App, 439.
IDIOT. A person who has been without under-standing from his nativity, and whom the la.w, therefore, presumes never likely to attain any. Shelf. Lun. 2. See Insanity. State v. Haner, 186, Iowa, 1259, 173 N.W. 225; Jones v. Commonwealth, 154 Ky. 752, 159 S.W. 568, 569.
IDIOTA. In the Civil Law. An unlearned,
liii-
terate, or simple person. Calvin. A private man; one not in office.
In Common Law. An idiot or fool.
IDIOTA INQUIRENDO, WRIT DE. This is the name of an old writ which directs the sheriff to inquire whether a man be an idiot or not. The inquisition is to be made by a jury of twelve men. Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 232. And, if the man were found an idiot, the profits of his lands and the custody of his person might be granted by the king to any subject who had interest enough to obtain them. 1 Bl.Comm. 303.
IDONEUM SE FACERE; IDONEARE SE. To purge one’s self by oath of a crime of which one is accused.
IDONEUS. Lat. In the civil and common law. Sufficient; competent; fit or proper; responsible; unimpeachable. Idoneus homo, a responsible or solvent person; a good and lawful man. Suffi-cient; adequate; satisfactory. Idonea cautio, suf-ficient security.
IDONIETAS. In old English law. Ability or Fit-ness (of a parson). Artic. Cleri, c. 13.

IF. In deeds and wills, this word, as a rule, im-plies a condition precedent, unless it be controlled by other words. 2 Crabb, Real Prop. p. 809, § 2152; Sutton v. West, 77 N.C. 431. Hughes v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 297 N.Y.S. 116, 122, 163 Misc. 31.
IFUNGIA. In old English law. The finest white bread, formerly called "cocked bread." Blount.
IGLISE. L. Fr. A church. Kelham. Another forro of "eglise."
IGNIS JUDICIUM. Lat. The old judicial trial by fire. Blount.
IGNITEGIUM. In old English law. The curfew, or evening bell. Cowell. See Curfew.
IGNOMINY. Public disgrace; infamy; reproach; dishonor. Ignominy is the opposite of esteem. Wolff, § 145. See Brown v. Kingsley, 38 Iowa 220.
IGNORAMOS. Lat. "We are ignorant;" "We ignore it." Formerly the grand jury used to write this word on bilis of indictment when, after hav-ing heard the evidente, they thought the accusa-tion against the prisoner was groundless, intimat-ing that, though the facts might possibly be true, the truth did not appear to them; but now they usually write in English the words "Not a true bill," or "Not found," if that is their verdict; but they are still said to ignore the bill. Brown.
IGNORANCE. The want or absence of knowl-edge.
Ignorance of law is want of knowledge or acquaintance with the laws of the land in so far as they apply to the act, relation, duty, or matter under consideration. Ignorance of fact is want of knowledge of some fact or facts constitut-ing or relating to the subject-matter in hand. Marshall v. Coleman, 187 Ill. 556, 58 N.E. 628.
Ignorance is not a state of the mind in the sense in which sanity and insanity are. When the mind is ignorant of a fact, its condition still remains sound; the power of thinking, of judging, of wIlling, is just as complete before communication of the fact as after; the essence or texture, so to speak, of the mind, le not, as in the case of insanity, affected or impaired. Ignorance of a particular fact con-sIsts In this: that the mind, although sound and capable of healthy action, has never acted upon the fact in question, because the subject has never been brought to the notice of the perceptive faculties. Meeker v. Boylan, 28 N.J.Law, 274.

Synonyms

"Ignorance" and "error" or "mistake" are not convertible terms. The former is a lack of infor-mation or absence of knowledge; the latter, a misapprehension or confusion of information, or a mistaken supposition of the possession of knowl-edge. Error as to a fact may imply ignorance of the truth; but ignorance does not necessarily imply error. Culbreath v. Culbreath, 7 Ga. 70, 50 Am.Dec. 375.

General

Culpable ignorance is that which results from a failure to exercise ordinary care to acquire knowledge, and knowledge which could be ac-quired by the exercise of ordinary care is by law imputed to the person and he is held to have constructive knowledge. Luck v. Buffalo Lakes, Tex. Civ.App., 144 S.W.2d 672, 676.
Essential ignorance is ignorance in relation to some essential circumstance so intimately con-nected with the matter in question, and which so influences the parties, that it induces them to act in the business. Poth. Vente, nn. 3, 4; 2 Kent, Comm. 367.
Nonessential or accidental ignorance is that which has not of itself any necessary connection with the business in question, and which is not the true consideration for entering into the contract.
Involuntary ignorance is that which does not proceed from choice, and which cannot be over-come by the use of any means of knowledge known to a person and within his power; as the ignorance of a law which has not yet been prom-ulgated.
Voluntary ignorance exists when a party might, by taking reasonable pains, have acquired the necessary knowledge. For example, every man might acquire a knowledge of the laws which have been promulgated. Doct. & Stud. 1, 46; Plowd. 343.
IGNORANTIA. Lat. Ignorance; want of knowl-edge. Distinguished from mistake, (error,) or wrong conception. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 178; Dig. 22, 6. Divided by Lord Coke into ignorantia facti (ignorance of fact) and ignorantia juris (ignorance of law). And the former, he adds, is twofold—lectionis et linquce (ignorance of reading and ignorance of language). 2 Coke, 3b.
IGNORANTIA EORUM QU’E QUIS SCIRE TENE-TUR NON EXCUSAT. Ignorance of those things which one is bound to know excuses not. Hale, P. C. 42; Broom, Max. 267.
IGNORANTIA FACTI EXCUSAT. Ignorance of fact excuses or is a ground of relief. 2 Coke, 3b. Acts done and contracts made under mistake or ignorance of a material fact are voidable and re-lievable in law and equity. 2 Kent, Comm. 491, and notes.
IGNORANTIA FACTI EXCUSAT, IGNORANTIA JURIS NON EXCUSAT. Ignorance of the fact excuses; ignorance of the law excuses not. Every man must be taken to be cognizant of the law; otherwise there is no saying to what extent the excuse of ignorance may not be carried. 1 Coke, 177; Broom, Max. 253.
IGNORANTIA JURIS QUOD QUISQUE TENE-TUR SCIRE, NEMINEM EXCUSAT. Ignorance of the [or a] law, which every one is bound to know, excuses no man. A mistake in point of law is, in criminal cases, no sort of defense. 4 Bl. Comm. 27; 4 Steph.Comm. 81; Broom, Max. 253; 7 Car. & P. 456. And, in civil cases, ignorance of the law, with a full knowledge of the facts, furnishes no ground, either in law or equity, to rescind agreements, or reclaim money paid, or set aside solemn acts of the parties. 2 Kent, Comm. 491, and note.IGNORANTIA JURIS SUI NON PRAEJUDICAT JUR’. Ignorance of one’s right does not preju-dice the right. Lofft, 552.
IGNORANTIA LEGIS NEMINEM EXCUSAT. Ignorance of law excu r..s no one. 4 Bouv. Inst. no. 3828; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. I 111; 7 Watts, 374.
IGNORANTIA PRJESUMITUR UBI SCIENTIA NON PRGBAT1UR. Ignorance is presumed where knowledge is not proved. Bouvier.
IGNORARE LEGIS EST LATA CULPA. To be ignorant of the law 1s gross neglect. Bouvier.
IGNORATIO ELENCO. Lat. A term of logic, sometimes applied to pleadings and to arguments on appeal, which signifies a mistake of the ques-tion, that is, the mistake of one who, failing to discern the real question which he is to meet and answer, addresses his allegations or arguments to a collateral matter or something beside the point. Case upon the Statute for Distribution, Wythe Va. 309.
IGNORATIS TERMINIS ARTIS, IGNORATUR ET ARS. Where the terms of an art are unknown, the art itself is unknown also. Co. Litt. 2a.
IGNORE. To be ignorant of, or unacquainted with. To disregard willfully; to refuse to rec-ognize; to decline to take notice of. Cleburne County v. Morton, 69 Ark. 48, 60 S.W. 307.
To reject as groundless, false or unsupported by evidente; as when a grand jury ignores a bill of indictment.
IGNOSCITUR El QUI SANGUINEM SUUM QUALITER REDEMPTUM VOLUIT. The law holds him excused from obligation who chose to redeem his blood (or lif e) upon any terms. What-ever a man may do under the fear of losing his Life or limbs will not bé held binding upon him in law. 1 B1.Comm. 131.
IKBAL. Acceptance (of a bond, etc.). Wilson’s Gloss. Ind.
IKBAL DAWA. Confession of judgment. Wil-son’s Gloss. Ind.
IKENILD STREET. One of the four great Roman roads in Britain; supposed to be so called from the Iceni.
IKRAH. Compulsion; especially constraint exer-cised by one person over another to do an illegal act, or to act contrary to his inclination. Wilson’s Gloss. Ind.
IKRAR. Agreement, assent, or ratification. Wil-son’s Gloss. Ind.
IKRAR NAMA. A deed of assent and acknowl-edgment. Wilson’s Gloss. Ind.
ILL. In old pleading. Bad; defective in law; null; naught; the opposite of good or valid.
ILL FAME. Evil repute; notorious bad character. Houses of prostitution, gaming houses, and other
such disorderly places are called "houses of ill fame," and a person who frequents them is a per-son of ill fame. See Boles v. State, 46 Ala. 206.
ILLATA ET INVECTA. Lat. Things brought in-to the house for use by the tenant were so called, and were hable to the jus hypothecce of Roman law, just as they are to the landlord’s right of distress at common law.
ILLEGAL. Not authorized by law; illicit; un-lawful; contrary to law; Protest of Downing, 164 Okl. 181, 23 P.2d 173.
Sometimes this term means merely that whlch lacks authority of or support from law; but more frequently it imports a violation. Etymologically, the word seems to convey the negatíve meaning only. But In ordinary use it has a severer, stronger signification; the Idea of censure or condemnation for breaking law is usually presented. But the law impiled in ilegal is not necessarily an express stat-ute. Things are called "illegal" for a violation of common-law principies. And the term does not imply that the act spoken of Is immoral or wicked; it implies only a breach of the law. Tiedt v. Carstensen, 61 Iowa, 334, 16 N.W. 214.
ILLEGAL CONDITIONS. All those that are im-possible, or contrary to law, immoral, or repug-nant to the nature of the transaction.
ILLEGAL CONTRACT. An agreement with un-lawful object and not merely lacking in valid sub-ject-matter, but made for positively invalid pur-pose. American•LaFrance & Foamite Industries v. Arlington County, 169 Va. 1, 192 S.E. 758, 761.
ILLEGAL INTEREST. Usury; interest at a high-er rate than the law allows. Parsons v. Babcock, 40 Neb. 119, 58 N.W. 726.
ILLEGAL TRADE. Such traffie or commerce as is carried on in violation of the municipal law, or contrary to the law of nations. See Illicit.
ILLEGALITY. That which is contrary to the principies of law, as contradistinguished from mere rules of procedure. It denotes a complete defect in the proceedings. Ex parte Davis, 118 Or. 693, 247 P. 809, 811.
ILLEGITIMACY. The condition before the law, or the social status, of a bastard; the state or condition of one whose parents were not inter-married at the time of his birth.
ILLEGITIMATE. That which is contrary to l’aw; it is usually applied to bastards, or children born out of lawful wedlock.
The Louisiana Code divided Illegitímate children into two classes: (1) Those born from two person who, at the moment when such children were conceived, could have lawfully intermarried; and (2) those who are born from persons to whose marriage there existes} at the time some legal ímpediment. Both classes, however, could be acknowledged and take by del/se. Compton v. Prescott, 12 Rob., La., 56.
ILLEVIABLE. Not leviable; that cannot or ought not to be levied. Cowell.
ILLICENCIATUS. In old English law. Without license. Fleta, lib. 3, c. 5, 3 12.
ILLICIT. Not permitted or allowed; prohibited; unlawful; as an illicit trade; illicit intercourse. State v. Miller, 60 Vt. 90, 12 A. 526.

ILLICIT CONNECTION. Unlawful sexual inter-course. State v. King, 9 S.D. 628, 70 N.W. 1046.
ILLICIT COHABITATION. The living together as man and wife of two persons who are not law-fully married, with the implication that they ha-bitually practice fornication. Thomas v. United States, D.C.Mass., 14 F.2d 228, 229.
ILLICIT DISTILLERY. One carried on without a compliance with the provisions of the laws of the United States relating to the taxation of spir-ituous liquor. U. S. v. Johnson, C.C.Ga., 26 F. 684.
ILLICIT TRADE. Policies of marine insurance usually contain a covenant of warranty against "il-licit trade," meaning thereby trade which is for-bidden, or declared unlawful, by the laws of the country where the cargo is to be delivered. 1 Pars. Mar. Ins. 614.
"it is not the same with ‘contraband trade,’ although the words are sometimes used as synonymous. Illicit or pro-hibited trade is one which cannot be carried on without a distinct violation of some positive law of the country where the transaction is to take place."
ILLICITE. Lat. Unlawfully. This word has a technical meaning, and is requisite in an indict-ment where the act charged is unlawful; as in the case of a riot. 2 Hawk. P. C. c. 25, § 96.
ILLICITUM COLLEGIUM. Lat. An ilegal cor-poration.
ILLITERATE. Unlettered; ignorant; unlearned. Generally used of one who cannot read and write. In re Succession of Carroll, 28 La.Ann. 388.
ILLNESS. In insurance law. A disease or ail-ment of such a character as to affect the general soundness and healthfulness of the system ser-iously, and not a mere temporary indisposition which does not tend to undermine or weaken the constitution of the insured. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Sellers, 54 Ind.App. 326, 102 N.E. 894, 897. Zogg v. Bankers’ Life Co. of Des Moines, Iowa, C.C.A.W.Va., 62 F.2d 575, 578.
ILLOCABLE. Incapable of being placed out or hired.
ILLUD. Lat. That.
ILLUD, QUOD ALIAS LICITUM NON EST, NECESSITAS FACIT LICITUM; ET NECESSI-TAS INDUCIT PRIVILEGIUM QUOAD JURA PRIVATA. Bac. Max. That which is otherwise not permitted, necessity permits; and necessity makes a privilege as to private rights.
ILLUD, QUOD ALTERI UNITUR, EXTINGUI-TUR, NEQUE AMPLIUS PER SE VACARE LI-CET. Godol. Ecc. Law, 169. That which is united to another is extinguished, nor can it be any more independent.
ILLUSION. In medical jurisprudence. An image or impression in the mind, excited by some ex-ternal object addressing itself to one or more of the senses, but which, instead of corresponding
with the reality, is perverted, distorted, or whol• ly mistaken, the error being attributable to the imagination of the observer, not to any defect in the organs of sense. See Hallucination, and see "Delusion," under Insanity.
ILLUSORY. Deceiving by false appearances; nominal, as distinguished from substantial; falla-cious; illusive. Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381, 390.
ILLUSORY APPOINTMENT. Formerly the ap-pointment of a merely nominal share of the prop-erty to one of the objects of a power, in order to escape the rule that an exclusive appointment could not be made unless it was authorized by the instrument creating the power, was considered
il-lusory and void in equity. But this rule has been abolished in England. (1 Wm. IV. c. 46; 37 & 38 Vict. c. 37.) Sweet. Brown v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 126 N.J.Eq. 406, 9 A.2d 322.
ILLUSORY APPOINTMENT ACT. The statute 1 Wm. IV. c. 46. This statute enacts that no ap-pointment made after its passing, (July 16, 1830,) in exercise of a power to appoint property, real or personal, among several objects, shall be in-valid, or impeached in equity, on the ground that an unsubstantial, illusory, or nominal share only was thereby appointed, or left unappointed, to de-volve upon any one or more of the objects of such power; but that the appointment shall be valid in equity, as at law. See, too, 37 & 38 Vict. c. 37. Wharton.
ILLUSTRIOUS. The prefix to the title of a prince of the blood in England.
IMAGINE. In English law. In cases of treason the law makes it a crime to imagine the death of the king. But, in order to complete the crime, this act of the mind must be demonstrated by some overt act. The terms "imagining" and "com-passing" are in this connection synonymous. 4 Bl. Comm. 78.
IMAN, IMAM, or IMAUM. A Mohammedan prince having supreme spiritual as well as tem-poral power; a regular priest of the mosque.
IMBARGO. An old form of "embargo," (q. v.) St. 18 Car. II. c. 5.
IMBASING OF MONEY. The act of mixing the specie with an alloy below the standard of sterling. 1 Hale, P. C. 102.
IMBECILITY. See Insanity.
IMBEZZLE. An occasional or obsolete form of "embezzle" (q. v.).
IMBLADARE. In old English law. To plant or sow grain. Bract. fol. 176b.
IMBRACERY. See Embracery.
IMBROCUS. A brook, gutter, or water-passage. Cowell.

IMITATION. The making of one thing in the similitude or likeness of another; as, counterfeit coin is said to be made "in imitation" of the gen-uine. Wagner v. Daly, 67 Hun. 477, 22 N.Y.S. 493.
An imitation of a trade-mark Is that whlch so far resem-bles the genuine trade-mark as to be likely to induce the belief that it is genuine, whether by the use of words or letters similar in appearance or in sound, or by any sign, device, or other means.
The test of "colorable imitation" Is, not whether a dlf-ference may be recognized between the names of two com-peting articles when placed side by side, but whether the difference will be recognized by the purchaser with no opportunity for comparison. The Best Foods v. Hemphill Packing Co., D.C.Del., 5 F.2d 355, 357.
IMMATERIAL. Not material, essential, or nec-essary; not important or pertinent; not decisive; of no substantial consequence; without weight; of no significance. State v. Cordaro, 211 Iowa 224, 233 N.W. 51, 53.
IMMATERIAL AVERMENT. An averment alleg-ing with needless particularity or unnecessary cir-cumstances what is material and necessary, and which might properly have been stated more gen-erally, and without such circumstances and par-ticulars; or, in other words, a statement of un-necessary particulars in connection with and as descriptive of what is material. Dunlap v. Kelly, 105 Mo.App. 1, 78 S.W. 664; Bulova v. E. L. Bar-nett, Inc., 111 Misc. 150, 181 N.Y.S. 247, 250.
IMMATERIAL FACTS. Those which are not es-sential to the right of action or defense.
IMMATERIAL ISSUE. In pleading. An issue taken on an immaterial point; that is, a point not proper to decide the action. Steph. Pl. 99, 130; 2 Tidd, Pr. 921.
IMMATERIAL VARIANCE. Discrepancy be-tween the pleading and proof of a character so slight that the adverse party cannot say that he was misled thereby. E. B. Ryan Co. v. Russell, 52 Mont. 596, 161 P. 307, 308.
IMMEDIATE. Present; at once; without delay; not deferred by any interval of time.. In this sense, the word, without any very precise signifi-cation, denotes that action is or must be taken either instantly or without any considerable loss of time. A reasonable time in view of particular facts and circumstances of case under considera-tion. Mullins v. Masonic Protective Ass’n, 181 Mo. App. 394, 168 S.W. 843, 844. George v. Aetna Cas-ualty and Surety Co., 121 Neb. 647, 238 N.W. 36, 38. Next in line or relation; directly connected; not secondary or remote. Bunner v. Patti, 343 Mo. 274, 121 S.W.2d 153, 155. Not separated in respect to place; not separated by the interven-tion of any intermediate object, cause, relation, or right. Thus we speak of an action as prosecuted for the "immediate benefit" of A., of a devise as made to the "immediate issue" of B., etc.
IMMEDIATE CAUSE. The last of a series or chain of causes tending to a given result, and which, of itself, and without the intervention of any further cause, .directly produces the result or event. Deisenrieter v. Kraus-Merkel Malting Co.,
72 N.W. 735, 97 Wis. 279; Longabaugh v. Rail-road Co., 9 Nev. 271. See, also, Proximate.
A cause may be immediate in this sense, and yet not "proximate;" and conversely, the proximate cause (that which directly and efliciently brings about the result) may not be immediate. The familiar illustration Is that of a drunken man falling into the water and drowning. His intoxication is the proximate cause of his death, If it can be said that he would not have fallen into the water when sober; but the immediate cause of death is suftocation by drowning.
IMMEDIATE CONTROL (of motor vehicle upon approaching or traversing railroad crossing). Such constant control as would enable driver to instantly govern vehicle’s movements, including the power to stop within a distance in which such a vehicle, in good mechanical condition, driven by a reasonably skillful driver, and traveling at a *lawful rate of speed, could be stopped. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Burton, 125 S.E. 868, 33 Ga. App. 199.
IMMEDIATE DESCENT. See Descent.
IMMEDIATE NOTICE. As required by policy as for proof of loss means within a reasonable time. Lydon v. New York Life Ins. Co., C.C.A.Mo., 89 F.2d 78, 82.
IMMEDIATELY. Without interval of time, with-out delay, straightway, or without any delay or lapse of time. Drumbar v. Jeddo-Highland Coal Co., 155 Pa.Super. 57, 37 A.2d 25, 27.
The words, "immediately" and "forthwith" have the same meaning. They are stronger than the expression "within a reasonable time" and imply prompt, vigorous ac-tion without any delay. Alsam Holding Co. v. Consolidat-ed Taxpayers’ Mut. Ino. Co., 4 N.Y.S.2d 498, 505, 167 Mrsc. 732.
INMEMORIAL. Beyond human memory; time out of mind.
INMEMORIAL POSSESSION. In Louisiana. Possession of which no man living has seer the beginning, and the existence of which he has learned from his elders. Civ.Code La. art. 766.
IMMEMORIAL USAGE. A practice which has existed time out of mind; custom; prescription. Miller v. Garlock, 8 Barb. (N.Y.) 154.
IMMEUBLES. Fr. These are, in French law, the immovables of English law. Things are immeu-bles from any one of three causes: (1) From their own nature, e. g., lands and houses; (2) from their destination, e. g., animals and instru-ments of agriculture when supplied by the land-lord; or (3) by the object to which they are an-nexed, e. g., easements. Brown.
IMMIGRATION. The coming hito a country of foreigners for purposes of permanent residente. The correlative term "emigration" denotes the act of such persons in leaving their former country.
IMMINENT. Near at hand; mediate rather than immediate; close rather than touching; impend-ing; on the point of happening; threatening; menacing; perilous. Furlow v. State, 72 Fla. 464,
73 So. 362; Jaroniec v. C. O. Hasselbarth, Inc., 228 N.Y.S. 302, 304, 223 App.Div. 182.

IMMINENT DANGER. In relation to homicide in self-defense, this term means immediate dan-ger, such as must be instantly met, such as cannot be guarded against by calling for the assistance of others or the protection of the law. State v. Smith, 43 Or. 109, 71 P. 973. Or, as otherwise de-fined, such an appearance of threatened and im-pending injury as would put a reasonable and prudent man to his instant defense. State v. Fon-tenot, 50 La.Ann. 537, 23 So. 634, 69 Am.St.Rep. 455.
IMMINENTLY DANGEROUS ARTICLE. One that is reasonably certain to place life or limb in peril. Employers’ Liability Assur. Corporation v. Columbus McKinnon Chain Co., D.C.N.Y., 13 F.2d 128.
IMMISCERE. Lat. In the civil law. To mix or mingle with; to meddle with; to join with. Cal-vin.
IMM1TTERE. Lat. In the Civil Law. To put or let finto, as a beam hito a wall. Calvin.; Dig. 50, 17, 242, 1.
In old English law, to put cattle on a common. Fleta, lib. 4, c. 20, § 7.
1MMOBILIA SITUM SEQUUNTUR. Immovable things follow their site or position; are governed by the law of the place where they are fixed. 2 Kent, Comm. 67. Cf. Mobilia Sequuntur Per-sonam.
IMMOBILIS. Lat. Immovable. Immobilia or res immobiles, immovable things, such as lands and buildings. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 160.
IMMODERATE. Exceeding just, usual, or suit-able bounds; not within reasonable limits. Unit-ed States v. Oglesby Grocery Co., D.C.Ga., 264 F. 691, 695; People v. McMurchy, 249 Mich. 147, 228 N.W. 723, 726.
IMMORAL. Contrary to good morals; inconsist-ent with the rules and principies of morality; inimical to public welfare according to the stand-ards of a given community, as expressed in law or otherwise. Exchange Nat. Bank of Fitzgerald v. Henderson, 139 Ga. 260, 77 S.E. 36, 37, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 549. Morally evil; impure; unprincipled; vicious; or dissolute. U. S. v. One Book, Entitled "Contraception," by Marie C. Stopes, D.C.N.Y., 51 F.2d 525, 527.
IMMORAL CONDUCT. Within rules authorizing disbarment of attorney is that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinions of the good and respectable members of the community. Warken-tin v. Kleinwachter, 166 Okl. 218, 27 P.2d 160.
IMMORAL CONSIDERATION. One contrary to good morals, and theref ore invalid. Contracts based upon an immoral consideration are general-ly void.
IMMORAL CONTRACTS. Contracts founded up-on considerations contra bonos ‘Mores are void.
nrmoRALrry. That which is contra bonos mor-es. See Immoral.
IMMOVABLES. In the civil law. Property which, from its nature, destination, or the object to which it is applied, cannot move itself, or be removed. Breaux v. Ganucheau, 3 La.App. 481, 482; Scott v. Brennan, 3 La.App. 452, 453.
Immovable things are, In general, such as cannot either move themselves or be removed from one place to another. But thls definitlon, strictly speaking, 1s applicable only to such things as are immovable by their own nature, and not to such as are so only by the disposition of the law.
IMMUNITY. Exemption, as from serving in an office, or performing duties which the law general-ly requires other citizens to perform. Ex parte Levy, 43 Ark. 54, 51 Am.Rep. 550. Freedom from duty or penalty. Leatherwood v. Hill, 10 Ariz. 243, 89 P. 521, 523. The term aptly describes an exemption from taxation. Buchanan v. Knoxville & O. R. Co., C.C.A.Tenn., 71 F. 324, 334, 18 C.C.A. 122. A particular privilege. Webster, Dict.; Sac-ramento Orphanage, etc., Home v. Chambers, 25 Cal.App. 536, 144 P. 317, 319.
IMPAIR. To weaken, to make worse, to lessen in power, diminish, or relax, or otherwise affect in an injurious manner. Davey v. .ZEtna L. Ins. Co., C.C.N.J., 20 F. 482; State ex rel. Woman’s Ben. Ass’n v. Port of Palm Beach Dist., 121 Fla. 746, 164 So. 851, 856.
IMPAIRING THE OBLIGATION OF CON-TRACTS. A law which impairs the obligation of a contract is one which renders the contract in it-self less valuable or less enforceable, whether by changing its terms and stipulations, its legal qual-ities and conditions, or by regulating the remedy for its enforcement. City of Indianapolis v. Robi-son, 186 Ind. 660, 117 N.E. 861.
To "impair the obligation of a contract" within Const. U.S. art. 1, § 10, is to weaken it, lessen its value, or make it worse In any respect or in any degree, and any law which changes the Intention and legal effect of the parties, giving to one a greater and to the other a less interest or benefit, or which imposes conditions not included in the contract or dispenses with the performance of those included, impairs the obligation of the contract. O’Connor v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 97 Conn. 8, 115 A. 484, 486.
A statute "impairs the obligation of a contract" when by Its terms it nullifies or materially changes existing con-tract obligations. Oil Fork Development Co. v. Huddle-ston, 202 Ky. 261, 259 S.W. 334, 335; McNee v. Wall, D.C.Fla., 4 F.Supp. 496, 498.
The word "impair" means, according to the standard writers in our language, simply "to diminish; to injure; to make worse," etc. It is remarkable that in framing the provision of the federal Constitution providing that no law should be passed, "impairing the obligation of any con-tract," the convention did not use the term "lessen" or "decrease" or "destray," but one more comprehensive, which prohibited making worse in any respect a contract legitímate in Its creation. The object, then, of its provi-sion, may have been to establish an important principie, and that was the entire inviolability of contracts. Blair v. Williams, 14 Ky. (4 Litt.) 34, 35; Lapsley v. Brashears, 14 Ky. (4 Lin.) 47, 69.
See 2 Story, Const. §§ 1374-1399; 1 Kent, Comm. 413-422; Pom. Const. Law; Black, Const. Law (3d Ed.) p. 720 et seo.
IMPALARE. To impound. Du Cange.

IMPANEL. In English practice. To impanel a jury signifies the entering by the sheriff upon a piece of parchment, termed a "panel," the names of the jurors who have been summoned to appear in court on a certain day to form a jury of the country to hear such matters as may be brought before them. Brown.
In American practice. Besides the meaning aboye given, "impanel" signifies the act of the clerk of the court in making up a list of the jur-ors who have been selected for the trial of a par-ticular cause. All the steps of ascertaining who shall be the proper jurors to sit in the trial of a particular case up to the final formation. People v. Poole, 284 III. 39, 119 N.E. 916.
Impaneling has nothing to do with drawing, selecting, or swearing jurors, but means simply making the list of those who have been selected. Portar v. People, 7 How.Prac. (N.Y.) 441; State ex rel. Green v. Pearson, 153 Fla. 314, 14 So.2d 565, 567.
IMPARCARE. In old English law. To impound. Reg. Orig. 92b. To shut up, or confine in prison. Inducti sant in carcerem et imparcati, they were carried to prison and shut up. Bract. fol. 124.
IMPARGAMENTUM. The right of impounding cattle.
IMPARL. To have license to settle a litigation amicably; to obtain delay for adjustment.
IMPARLANCE. In early practice, imparlance meant time given to either of the parties to an action to answer the pleading of the other. It thus amounted to a continuance of the action to a fur-ther day. Literally the term signified leave given to the parties to talk together; i. e., with a view to settling their differences amicably. But in modem practice it denotes a time given to the defendant to plead.
A general imparlance is the entry of a general prayer and allowance of time to plead t111 the next term, without reserving to the defendant the benefit of any exception; so that after such an imparlance the defendant cannot object to the jurisdiction of the court, or picad any matter in abatement. This kind of imparlance is always from one term to another. Colby v. Knapp, 13 N.H. 175; Mack Lewis, 67 Vt. 383, 31 Atl. 888.
A general special imparlance contalns a saving of all exceptions whatsoever, so that the defendant after this may plead not only in abatement, but he may also plead a plea which affects the jurisdiction of the court, as privilege. He cannot, however, plead a tender, and that he was always ready to pay, because by craving time, he admits that he is not ready, and so falsifies his plea.
A special imparlance reserves to the defendant all excep-tions to the writ, bill, or eount; and therefore after it the defendant may plead in abatement, though not to the juris-diction of the court. 1 Tidd, Pr. 462, 463.
IMPARSONEE. L. Fr. In ecclesiastical law. One who is inducted and in possession of a bene-fice. Parson imparsonee (persona impersonata). Cowell; Dyer, 40.
IMPARTIAL. Favoring neither; disinterested; treating all alike; unbiased; equitable, fair, and just. Evans v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County, 107 Cal.App. 372, 290 P. 662, 666.
The provision of the Bill of Rights requiring that the accused shall have a fair trial by an impartial jury, means
that the jury must be not partial, not favoring one party more than another, unprejudiced, distinterested, equitable, and just, and that the merits of the case shall not be pre-judged. Duncan v. State, 79 Tex.Cr.R. 206, 184 S.W. 195, 196.
IMPARTIAL JURY. Within constitutional pro-vision is one which is of impartial Trame of mind at beginning of trial, is influenced only by legal and competent evidence produced during trial, and bases its verdict upon evidence connecting defend-ant with the commission of the crime charged. Const.U.S. Amend. 6. Durham v. State, 182 Tenn. 577, 188 S.W.2d 555, 558, 160 A.L.R. 746.
For "Fair and Impartial Jury," and "Fair and Impartial Trial," see those titles.
IMPARTIBLE FEUD. See Feudum Individuum.
IMPATRONIZATION. In ecclesiastical law. The act of putting into full possession of a benefice.
IMPEACH. To accuse; to charge a liability upon; to sue. To dispute, disparage, deny, or contradict; as, to impeach a judgment or decree; or as used in the rule that a jury cannot "impeach their ver-dict." Wolfgram v. Schoepke, 123 Wis. 19, 100 N. W. 1056. To proceed against a public officer for crime or misfeasance, before a proper court, by the presentation of a written accusation called "articles of impeachment."
In the Law of Evidence. To call in question the veracity of a witness, by meáns of evidence ad-duced for that purpose, or the adducing of proof that a witness is unworthy of belief. Johnston v. Belk-McKnight Co. of Newberry, 188 S.C. 149, 198 S.E. 395, 399.
IMPEACHMENT. A criminal proceeding against a public officer, before a quasi political court, in-stituted by a written accusation called "articles of impeachment;" for example, a written accusa-tion by the house of representatives of the United States to the senate of the United States against an officer.
"Impeachment" of the Governor, within the meaning of section 16, art. 6, of the Constitution, is the adoption of articles of impeachment by the House of Representatives, and the presentation thereof to the Senate, and the indica-tion by that body that the same are accepted for the pur-pose of permitting prosecution thereof, and the impeach-ment of the Governor operates to suspend him; the duties and emoluments of the office automatically devolving upon the Lieutenant Governor for the remainder of the term or until the disability is removed by the acquittal of the Gov-ernor of the charges preferred against him. State v. Chatn-bers, 96 Okl. 78, 220 P. 890, 891, 30 A.L.R. 1144; People ex rel. Robin v. Hayes, 143 N.Y.S. 325, 329, 82 Misc. 165.
In England, a prosecution by the house of commons before the house of lords of a commoner for treason, or other high crimen and misdemeanors, or of a peer for any crime.
Evidence
The adducing of proof that a witness is un-worthy of belief. State v. Roybal, 33 N.M. 540, 273 P. 919, 922.

General

Collateral impeachment. See Collateral attack.
Impeachment of annuity. A term sometimes used in English law to denote anything that op-erates as a hindrance, impediment or obstruction of the making of the profits out of which the an-nuity is to arise. Pitt v. Williams, 4 Adol. & El. 885.
Impeachment of waste. Liability for waste com-mitted; or a demand or suit for compensation for waste committed upon lands or tenements by a tenant thereof who, having only a leasehold or particular estate, had no right to commit waste. 2 Bl. Comm. 283; Sanderson v. Jones, 6 Fla. 480, 63 Am.Dec. 217.
Impeachment of witness. Adducing proof that a witness who has testified in a cause is unworthy of credit. White v. Railroad Co., 142 Ind. 648, 42 N.E. 456.
IMPECHIARE. To impeach, to accuse, or prose-cute for felony or treason.
IMPEDE. To obstruct; hinder; check; delay. Eric R. Co. v. Board of Public Utility Com’rs, 98 A. 13, 19, 89 N.J.L. 57.
IMPEDIATUS. Disabled from mischief by ex-peditation (q. v.). Cowell.
LIYIPEDIENS. In old practice. One who hinders; an impedient. The defendant or deforciant in a fine was sometimes so called. Cowell; Blount.
IMPEDIMENTO. In Spanish law. A prohibition to contract marriage, established by law between certain persons.
IMPEDLVIENTS. Disabilities, or hindrances to the making of contracts, such as coverture, in-fancy, want of reason, etc.
In the Civil Law. Bars to marriage.
Absoluto impediments are those which prevent the person subject to them from marrying at all, without either the nullity of marriage or its being punishable. Dirimant impediments are those which render a marriage void; as where one of the contracting parties is unable to marry by rea-son of a prior undissolved marriage. Prohibitive impediments are those which do not render the marriage null, but subject the parties to a punish-ment. Relativo impediments are those which re-gard only certain persons with respect to each other; as between two particular persons who are related within the prohibited degrees. Bowyer, Mod. Civil Law, 44, 45.
IMPEDITOR. In old English law. A disturber in the action of quare impedit. St. Marlb. c. 12.
IMPENS/E. Lat. In the civil law. Expenses; outlays. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 168; Calvin. Di-vided into necessary, (necessariw,) useful, (util-es,) and tasteful or ornamental, (voluptuarice.) Dig. 50, 16, 79. See Id. 25, 1.
IMPERATIVE. Mandatory. See Directory.
IMPERATOR. Emperor. The title of the Roman emperors, and also of the Kings of England be-fore the Norman conquest. Cod. 1, 14, 12; 1 BL Comm. 242. See Emperor.
IMPERFECT. As used in various legal compound tercos, this word means detective or incomplete; wanting in some legal or formal requisite; want-ing in legal sanction or effectiveness; as in speak-ing of imperfect "obligations," "ownership," "rights," "title," "usufruct," or "war." See those nouns.
IMPERH MAJESTAS EST TUTEL2E SALUS. Co. Litt. 64. The majesty of the empire is the safety of its protection.
IMPERITIA. Lat. Unskillfulness; want of skill.
IMPERITIA CULPE ADNUMERATUR. Want of skill is reckoned as culpa; that is, as blamable conduct or neglect. Dig. 50, 17, 132.
IMPERITIA EST MAXIMA MECHANICORUM PLENA. Unskillfulness is the greatest punish-ment of mechanics; [that is, from its effect in making them Hable to those by whom they are em-ployed.] 11 Coke, 54a. The word "pcena" in some translations is erroneously rendered "fault."
IMPERIUM. The right to command, which in-dudes the right to employ the force of the state to enforce the laws. This is one of the principal attributes of the power of the executive. 1 Toul-lier, no. 58.
IMPERSONALITAS. Lat. Impersonality. A mode of expression where no reference is made to any person, such as the expression "ut dicitur," (as is said.) Co. Litt. 352b.
IMPERSONALITAS NON CONCLUDIT NEC LIGAT. Co. Litt. 352 b. Impersonality neither concludes nor binds.
IMPERTINENCE. Irrelevancy; the fault of not properly pertaining to the issue or proceeding. The introduction of any matters into a bill, an-swer, or other pleading or proceeding in a suit, which are not properly before the court for de-cision, at any particular stage of the suit. Story, Eq. Pl. § 266; Harrison v. Perea, 18 S.Ct. 129, 168 U.S. 311, 42 L.Ed. 478.
In Practice. A question propounded to a wit-ness, or evidence offered or sought to be elicited, is called "impertinent" when it has no logical bear-ing upon the issue, is not necessarily connected with it, or does not belong to the matter in hand. 1 Whart. Ev. § 20.
On the distinction between pertinency and relevancy, we may quote the foliowing remark of Dr. Wharton: "Rele-vancy is that which conduces to the proof of a pertinent hypothesis; a pertinent hypothesis being one which, 1f sustained, would loglcally influence the issue.-
IMPERTINENT. In Equity Pleading. That which does not belong to a pleading, interrogatory, or other proceeding; out of place; superfiuous; irrelevant. Chew v. Eagan, 87 N.J.Eq. 80, 99 A. 611; Sean v. Central Maine Power Co., 133 Me. 9, 173 A. 498, 501.

At Law. A term applied to matter not neces-sary to constitute the cause of action or ground of defense. Cowp. 683; 5 East, 275; Tucker v. Randall, 2 Mass. 283. It constitutes surplusage, (which see.)
IMPESCARE. In old records. To impeach or ac-cuse. Impescatus, impeached. Blount.
IMPETITIO VASTI. Impeachment of waste, (q. v.)
IMPETRARE. In old English practice. To ób-tain by request, as a writ or privilege. Bract. fols. 57, 172b. This application of the word seems to be derived from the civil law. Calvin.
IMPETRATION. In old English law. The obtain-ing anything by petition or entreaty. Particularly, the obtaining of a benefice from Rome by solicita-tion, which benefice belonged to the disposal of the king or other lay patron. Webster; Cowell.
IMPIER. Umpire (q. y.).
IMPIERMENT. Impairing or prejudicing. Jacob.
IMPIGNORATA. Pledged; given in pledge, (pig-nori data;) mortgaged. A term applied in Brac-ton to land. Bract. fol. 20.
IMPIGNORATION. The act of pawning or put-ting to pledge.
IMPIUS ET CRUDELIS JUDICANDUS EST QUI LIBERTATI NON FAVET. He is to be judged impious and cruel who does not favor liberty. Co. Litt. 124.
IMPLACITARE. Lat. To implead; to sue.
IMPLEAD. In practice. To sue or prosecute by due course of law. People v. Clarke, 9 N.Y. 368.
IMPLEADED. Sued or prosecuted; used partic-ularly in the titles of causes where there are sev-eral defendants; as "A. B., impleaded with C. D."
IMPLEMENTS. Such things as are used or em-ployed for a trade, or furniture of a house. What-ever may supply wants; particularly applied to tools, utensils, vessels, instruments of labor; as, the implements of trade or of husbandry. God-dard v. Chaffee, 2 Allen (Mass.) 395, 79 Am.Dec. 796. Mississippi Road Supply Co. v. Hester, 185 Miss. 839, 188 So. 281, 287, 124 A.L.R. 574.
IMPLICATA. A term used in mercantile law, de-rived from the Italian. In order to avoid the risk of making fruitless voyages, merchants have been in the habit of receiving small adventures, on freight, at so much per tent, to which they are entitled at all events, even if the adventure be lost; and this is called "implicata." Wharton.
IMPLICATION. Intendment or inference, as dis-tinguished from the actual expression of a thing in words. In a will, an estate may pass by mere implication, without any express words to direct its course. 2 Bl. Comm. 381.
An inference of something not dlrectly declared, but arising from what is admitted or expressed.In construlng a will conjecture must not be taken for implication; but necessary implication means, not natural necessity, but so strong a probability of intention that an intention contrary to that which is imputed to the testator cannot be supposed. 1 Ves. & a 466.
"Implication" is also used in the sense of "in-ference;" i. e., where the existence of an inten-tion is inferred from acts not done for the sole purpose of communicating it, but for some other purpose. Sweet.

Necessary implication

In construing a will, necessary implication means not natural necessity, but so strong a probability of intention that an intention contrary to that which is imputed to the testator cannot be supposed. Wilkinson v. Adam, 1 Ves. & B. 466; Gilbert v. Craddock, 67 Kan. 346, 72 P. 869.
IMPLIED. This word is used in law as contrasted with "express;" i. e., where the intention in re-gard to the subject-matter is not manifested by explicit and direct words, but is gathered by im-plication or necessary deduction from the circum-stances, the general language, or the conduct of the parties.
As to implied "Abrogation," "Agreement," "As-sumpsit," "Condition," "Confession," "Consent," "Consideration," "Contract," "Covenant," "Dedica-tion," "Easement," "Invitation," "Mance," "No-tice," "Obligation," "Powers," "Trust," "Use," "Waiver," and "Warranty," see those titles.
DIPORTATION. The act of bringing goods and merchandise into a country from a foreign coun-try. Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, 43 S.Ct. 504, 262 U.S. 100, 67 L.Ed. 894, 27 A.L.R. 1306.
IMPORTED. This word, in general, has the same meaning in the tariff laws that its etymology shows, in porto, to carry in. To "import" is to bear or carry into. An "imported" article is one brought or carried into a country from abroad. The Conqueror, 49 Fed. 99. See Imports.
IMPORTS. Importations; goods or other prop-erty imported or brought into the country from a foreign country.
DIPORTUNITY. Pressing solicitation; urgent request; application for a claim or favor which is urged with troublesome frequency or pertinacity. Webster.
IMPOSE. To levy or exact as by authority; to lay as a burden, tax, duty or charge. State v. Nickerson, 97 Neb. 837, 151 N.W. 981, 982.
IMPOSITION. An impost; tax; contribution. Paterson v. Society, 24 N.J.L. 400; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Heppenheimer, 58 N.J.L. 633, 34 A. 1061, 32 L. R.A. 643; Town of Brandon v. Harvey, 105 Vt.. 435, 168 A. 708, 710.
JMPOSSIBILITY. That which, in the constitution and course of nature or the law, no man can do or perform. Klauber v. San Diego Street-Car Co., 95 Cal. 353, 30 P. 555.
Impossibility of performance of contracta absolving party from liabillty for nonperformance, means not only strict impossibility, but knpracticability because oí extreme and unreasonable diflículty, expense, lnjury or loss involved.

Fisher v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 313 III. App. 66, 39 N.E.2d 67, 70; Transbay Const. Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, D.C.Cal., 35 F.Supp. 433, 436.
impossible contract. One which the law will not hold binding upon the parties, because of the natural or legal impossibility of the performance by one party of that which is the consideration for the promise of the other. 7 Wait, Act. & Def. 124.
Impossible contracta, which will be deemed void in the eye of the law, or of which the performance will be excused, are such contracts as cannot be performed, either because of the nature of the obligation undertaken. or because of some supervening event which renders the per-formance of the obligation either physically or legally impossible. 10 Amer. & Eng.Enc.Law, 176.
Impossibility is of the following several sorts:
An act is physically impossible when it is con-trary to the course of nature. Such an impossi-bility may be either absolute, i. e., impossible in any case, (e. g., to stop earth rotation) or rela-tive, (sometimes called "impossibility in fact,") i. e., arising from the circumstances of the case, (e. g., for A. to make a payment to B., he being a deceased person.) To the latter class belongs what is sometimes called "practical impossibili-ty," which exists when the act can be done, but only at an excessive or unreasonable cost. An act is legally or juridically impossible when a rule of law makes it impossible to do it; e. g., for A. to make a valid will before his majority. This class of acts must not be confounded with those which are possible, although forbidden by law, as to commit a theft. An act is logically impossible when it is contrary to the nature of the transac-tion, as where A. gives property to B. expressly for his own benefit, on condition that he transfers it to C. Sweet.
IMPOSSIBILIUM NULLA OBLIGATIO EST. There is no obligation to do impossible things. Dig. 50, 17, 185; Broom, Max. 249.
IMPOSTS. Taxes, duties, or impositions levied for divers reasons. Crew Levick Co. v. Common-wealth of Pennsylvania, 38 S.Ct. 126, 245 U.S. 292, 62 L.Ed. 295.
/mpost is a tax received by the prince for such merchan-dises as are brought into any haven within his dbrninions from foreign nations. It may in some sort be distinguished from customs, because customs are rather that profit the prince maketh of wares shipped out; yet they are fre-quently confounded. Cowell.
IMPOTENCE. In medical jurisprudence. In-ability to copulate. Properly used of the male; but it has also been used synonymously with "sterility." Smith v. Smith, 206 Mo.App. 646, 229 S.W. 398; Heinemann v. Heinemann, 118 Or. 178, 245 P. 1082, 1083.
Impotency as a ground for divorce means want of poten-tla copulandl or incapacity to consummate the marriage, and not merely incapacity for procreation. Reed v. Reed, 26 Tenn.App. 690, 177 S.W.2d 26, 27.
IMPOTENTIA EXCUSAT LEGEM. Co.Litt. 29. The impossibility of doing what is required by the law excuses from the performance.
IMPOTENTIAM, PROPERTY PROPTER. A qualified property, which may subsist in animals f ene naturce on account of their inability, as where hawks, herons, or other birds build in a
IMPRISONMENT
person’s trees, or comes, etc., make their nests or burrows in a person’s land, and have young there, such person has a qualified property in them till they can fiy or run away, and then such property expires. 2 Steph.Comm. (7th Ed.) 8.
IMPOUND. To shut up stray animals or distrain-ed goods in a pound. Chenango County Humane Soc. v. Polmatier, 177 N.Y.S. 101, 103, 188 App.Div. 419. To take into the custody of the law or of a court. Thus, a court will sometimes impound a suspicious document produced at a trial.
IMPRESCRIPTIBILITY. The state or quality of being incapable of prescription; .not of such a character that a right to it can be gained by pre-scription.
IMPRESCRIPTIBLE RIGHTS. Such rights as a person may use or not, at pleasure, since they cannot be lost to hilas by the claims of another founded on prescription.
IMPRESSION, CASE OF FIRST. One without a precedent; one presenting a wholly new state of facts; one involving a question never before de-termined.
IMPRESS1V1ENT. A power possessed by the Eng-lish crovvn of taking persons or property to aid in the defense of the country, with or without the consent of the persons concerned. It is usually exercised to obtain hands for the royal ships in time of war, by taking seamen engaged in mer-chant vessels, (1 Bl.Comm. 420; Maud & P. Shipp. 123;) but in former times impressment of mer-chant ships was also practiced. The admiralty is-sues protections against impressment in certain cases, either under statutes passed in favor of cer-tain callings (e. g., persons employed in the Green-land fisheries) or voluntarily. Sweet.
IMPREST MONEY. Money paid on enlisting or impressing soldiers or sailors.
IMPRETIABILIS. Lat. Beyond price; invalu-able.
IMPRIMATUR. Lat. Let it be printed. A li-cense or allowance, granted by the constituted au-thorities, giving permission to print and publish a book. This allowance was formerly necessary, in England, before any book could lawfully be print-ed, and in some other countries is still required.
IMPRIMERE. To press upon; to impress or
press; to imprint print.
IMPRIMERY. In some of the ancient English statutes this word is used to signify a printing-offlce, the art of printing, a print or impression.
IMPRIMIS. Lat. In the first place; first of all.
IMPRISON. To put in a prison; to put in a place of confinement. To confine a person, or restrain his liberty, in any way.
IMPRISONMENT. The act of putting or confin-ing a man in prison; the restraint of a man’s per-sonal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person

to prevent the free exercise of his powers of lo-comotion. State v. Shaw, 73 Vt. 149, 50 A. 863.
It is not a necessary part of the definition that the con-finement should be in a place usually appropriated to that purpose; it may be in a locality used only for the speclfic occaslon; or it may take place without the actual applica-tion of any physical agencies of restraint, (such as locks or bars,) but by verbal compulsion and the display of avail-able force. Pike v. Hanson, 9 N.H. 491. Every confinement of the person is an "imprisonment," whether it be in a common prison, or in a prívate house, or in the stocks, or even by forcibly detaining one in the public streets. Nor-ton v. Mathers, 222 Iowa 1170, 271 N.W. 321, 324.

False dmprisonment

The unlawful arrest or detention of a person without warrant, or by an ¡Ilegal warrant, or a warrant illegally executed, and either in a prison or a place used temporarily for that purpose, or by force and constraint without con-finement. Eberling v. State, 136 Ind. 117, 35 N.E. 1023. False imprisonment consists in the unlawful detention of the person of another, for any length of time, whereby he is deprived of bis personal llberty. Mahan v. Adam, 144 Md. 355, 124 A. 901, 904. The unlawful detention of the occupant of an automobile may be accomplished by driv-ing so rapidly that he cannot alight. Blashfleld, Cyc. of Automoblle Law and Prac., Perm.Ed., § 5528.26.
The term is also used as the name of the action which líes for this specles of injury. 3 Bl.Comm. 138; Buttrey v. Wilhite, 208 Ala 573. 94 So. 585; Christ v. McDonald, 152 Or. 494, 52 P.2d 655, 658.
IMPRISTI. Adherents; followers. Those who side with or take the part of another, either in his defense or otherwise.
IMPROBABLE. Unlikely to be true, or to occur, not to be readily believed. Johnson v. Tregle, La. App., 8 So.2d 755, 758.
IMPROBATION. In Scotch law. An action brought for the purpose of having some instru-ment declared false and forged. 1 Forb.Inst. pt. 4, p. 161. The verb "improve" (q. y.) was used in the same sense.
IMPROPER. Not suitable; unfit; not suited to the character, time, and place. Godbey v. Godbey, 70 Ohio App. 455, 44 N.E.2d 810, 813.
IMPROPER CUMULATION OF ACTIONS. An attempt to join in one proceeding inconsistent causes of action. Toms v. Nugent, La.App., 12 So.2d 713, 715.
IMPROPER FEUDS. These were derivative feuds; as, for instante, those that were original-ly bartered and sold to the feudatory for a price, or were held upon base or less honorable services, or upon a rent in lieu of military service, or were themselves alienable, without mutual license, or descended indifferently to males or females. Wharton.
IMPROPER INFLUENCE. Undue influence (q. v.) Millican v. Millican, 24 Tex. 446.
IMPROPER NAVIGATION. Anything improper-ly done with the ship or part of the ship in the course of the voyage. L.R. 6 C.P. 563. See, also, 53 Law J.P.D. 65.
IMPROPRIATION. In ecclesiastical law. The annexing an ecclesiastical benefice to the use of a lay person, whether individual or corporate, in the same way as appropriation is the annexing of any such benefice to the proper and perpetual use of some spiritual corporation, whether sole or ag-gregate, to enjoy forever. Brown.
IMPROPRIATE RECTOR. In ecclesiastical law. Commonly signifies a lay rector as opposed to a spiritual rector; just as impropriate tithes are tithes in the hands of a lay owner, as opposed to appropriate tithes, which are tithes in the hands of a spiritual owner. Brown.
IMPROVE. In Scotch law. To disprove; to in-validate or impeach; to prove false or forged. 1 Forb. Inst. pt. 4, p. 162.
To improve a lease means to grant a lease of unusual duration to encourage a tenant, when the soil is exhausted, etc. Bell; Stair, Inst. p. 676, 23.
To meliorate, make better, to increase the value or good qualities of, mend, repair, as to "improve" a street by grading, parking, curbing, paving, etc. State ex rel. County of Ramsey v. Babcock, 186 Minn. 132, 242 N.W. 474, 476.
IMPROVED. Improved land is such as has been reclaimed, is used for the purpose of husbandry, and is cultivated as such, whether the appropria-tion is for tillage, meadow, or pasture. "Improve" is synonymous with "cultivate." Clark v. Phelps, 4 Cow. (N.Y.) 190.
IMPROVEMENT. A valuable addition made to property (usually real estate) or an amelioration in its condition, amounting to more than mere re-pairs or replacement of waste, costing labor or capital, and intended to enhance its value, beauty or utility or to adapt it for new or further pur-poses. Spencer v. Tobey, 22 Barb., N.Y., 269; Al-len v. McKay, 120 Cal. 332, 52 P. 828.
In American land law. An act by which a loca-tor or settler expresses his intention to cultivate or clear certain land; an act expressive of the ac-tual possession of land; as by erecting a cabin, planting a corn-field, deadening trees in a forest; or by merely marking trees, or even by piling up a brush-heap. Burrill. In re Leet Tp. Road, 159 Pa. 72, 28 A. 238.
An "improvement," under our land system, does not mean a general enhancement of the value of the tract from the occupant’s operations. It has a more limited meaning, which has in view the population of our forests, and the increase of agricultural products. All works which are directed to the creation of homes for families, or are sub-stantial steps towards bringing lands into cultivation, have In their results the special character of "improvements," and, under the land laws of the United States and of the several states, are encouraged. Sometimes their minimum extent is defined as requisite to convey rights. In other cases not. But tlse test. which runs through all the cases is always this: Are they real, and made bona fide, in accordance with the policy of the law, or are they only colorable, and made for the purpose of fraud and specula-tion? Simpson v. Robinson, 37 Ark. 137.
In the law of patents. An addition to, or mod-ification of, a previous invention or discovery, in-tended or claimed to increase its utility or value. 2 Kent, Comm. 366-372. Steiner Sales Co. v. Schwartz Sales Co., C.C.A.Utah, 98 F.2d 999, 1010.It includes two necessary ideas: the idea of a complete and practical operative art or instru-ment and the idea of some change in such art or instrument not affecting its essential character but enabling it to produce its appropriate results in a more perfect or economical manner. Rob. Pat. § 210.
Local improvement. See Local Improvement.
IMPROVEMENTS. A term used in leases, of doubtful meaning. It would seem to apply prin-cipally to buildings, though generally it extends to the amelioration of every description of prop-erty, whether real or personal; but, when con-tained in any document, its meaning is generally explained by other words. 1 Chit. Gen. Pr. 174.
IMPROVIDENCE. As used in a statute exclud-ing one found incompetent to execute the duties of an administrator by reason of improvidence, means that want of tare and foresight in the man-agement of property which would be likely to ren-der the estate and effects of the intestate unsafe, and Hable to be lost or diminished in value, in case the administration should be committed to the improvident person. In re Fulper’s Estate, 99 N. J.Eq. 293, 132 A. 834, 843.
IMPROVIDENTLY. A judgment, decree, rule, injunction, etc., when given or rendered without adequate consideration by the court, or without proper information as to all the circumstances af-fecting it, or based upon a mistaken assumption or misleading information or advice, is sometimes said to have been "improvidently" given or issued.
IMPRUIARE. In old records. To improve land. Impruiamentum, the improvement so made of it. Cowell.
IMPUBES. Lat. In the civil law. A minor un-der the age of puberty; a male under fourteen years of age; a female under twelve. Calvin.; Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 138.
IMPULSE. As to "irresistible" or "uncontrol-lable" impulse, see Insanity.
IMPUNITAS CONTINUUM AFFECTUM TRIBU-IT DELINQUENDI. 4 Coke, 45. Impunity con-°firms the disposition to commit crime.
IMPUNITIES SEMPER AD DETERIORA IN-VITAT. 5 Coke, 109. Impunity always invites to greater crimes.
IMPUNITY. Exemption or protection from pen-alty or punishment. Dillon v. Rogers, 36 Tex. 153.
IMPUTATIO. Lat. In the civil law. Legal Ha-bility.
IMPUTATION OF PAYMENT. In the civil law. The application of a payment made by a debtor to his creditor.
IMPUTED. As used in legal phrases, this word means attributed vicariously; that is, an act, fact, or quality is said to be "imputed" to a person when it is ascribed or charged to him, not because
he is personally cognizant of it or responsible for it, but because another person is, over whom he has control or for whose acts or knowledge he is responsible.
IMPUTED KNOWLEDGE. This phrase is some-times used as equivalent to "implied notice," i. e., knowledge attributed or charged to a person (of-ten contrary to the fact) because the facts in ques-tion were open to his discovery and it was his duty to inform himself as to them. Roche v. Llewellyn Iron Works Co., 140 Cal. 563, 74 P. 147.
IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE. Negligence which is not directly attributable to the person himself, but which is the negligente of a person who is in priv-ity with him, and with whose fault he is charge-able. Smith v. Railroad Co., 38 N.Y.S. 666, 4 App. Div. 493.
IMPUTED NOTICE. Information as to a given fact or circumstance charged or attributed to a person, and affecting his rights or conduct on the ground that actual notice was given to some per-son whose duty was to report it to the person to be affected, as, his agent or his attorney of record.
IN. In the law of real estate, this preposition has always been used to denote the fact of seisin, ti-tle, or possession, and apparently serves as an elliptical expression for some such phrase as "in possession," or as an abbreviation for "intitled" or "invested with title." Thus, in the old books, a tenant is said to be "in by lease of his lessor." Litt. § 82.
An elastic preposition in other cases, expressing relation of presence, existence, situation, inclu-sion, action, etc.; inclosed or surrounded by limits, as in a room; also meaning for, in and about, on, within, etc., according to context. Ex parte Perry, 71 Fla. 250, 71 So. 174, 176. Rester v. Moody & Stewart, 172 La. 510, 134 So. 690, 692.
IN ACTION. Attainable or recoverable by action; not in possession. A term applied to property of which a party has not the possession, but only a right to recover it by action. Things in action are rights of personal things, which nevertheless are not in possession. See Chose in Action.
IN ADVERSUM. Against an adverse, unvvilling, or resisting party. "A decree not by consent, but in adversunt." 3 Story, 318.
IN PEDIFICIIS LAPIS MALE POSITUS NON EST REMOVENDUS. 11 Coke, 69. A stone bad-ly placed in buildings is not to be removed.
IN ZEQUA MANU. In equal hand. Fleta, lib. 3, c. 14, § 2.
IN JEQUALI JURE. In equal right; on an equal-ity in point of right.
IN IEQUALI JURE MELIOR EST CONDITIO POSSIDENTIS. In [a case ofl equal right the condition of the party in possession is the better Plowd. 296; Broom, Max. 713.

IN ZEQUALI MANU. In equal hand; held equal-ly or indifferently between two parties. Where an instrument was deposited by the parties to it in the hands of a third person, to keep on certain conditions, it was said to be held in cequali maitu. Reg. Orig. 28.
IN ALIENO SOLO. In another’s land. 2 Steph. Comm. 20.
IN ALIO LOCO. In another place.
IN ALTA PRODITIONE NULLUS POTEST ESSE ACCESSORIUS SED PRINCIPALIS SOLUMMO-DO. 3 Inst. 138. In high treason no one can be an accessary but only principal.
IN ALTERNATIVIS ELECTIO EST DEBITORIS. In alternatives the debtor has the election.
IN AMBIGUA VOCE LEGIS EA POTIUS ACCI-PIENDA EST SIGNIFICATIO QU’E VITIO CARET, PRZESERTIM CUM ETIAM VOLUNTAS LEGIS EX HOC COLLIGI POSSIT. In an am-biguous expression of law, that signification is to be preferred which is consonant with equity, es-pecially when the spirit of the law can be collected from that. Dig. 1, 3, 19; Broom, Max. 576.
IN AMBIGUIS CASIBUS SEMPER PRXSUMI-TUE PRO REGE. In doubtful cases the presump-tion is always in favor of the king.
IN AMBIGUIS ORATIONIBUS MAXIME SEN-TENTIA SPECTANDA EST EJUS QUI EAS PRO-TULISSET. In ambiguous expressions, the inten-tion of the persa using them is chiefly to be re-garded. Dig. 50, 17, 96; Broom, Max. 567.
IN AMBIGUO. In doubt.
IN AMBIGUO SERMONE NON UTRUMQUE DI-CIMUS SED ID DUNTAXAT QUOD VOLUMUS. When the language we use is ambiguous, we do not use it in a double sense, but in the sense in which we mean it. Dig. 34. 5. 3; 2 De G. M. & G. 313.
IN ANGLIA NON EST INTERREGNUM. In Eng-land there is no interregnum. Jenk. Cent. 205; Broom, Max. 50.
IN APERTA LUCE. In open daylight; in the day-time. 9 Coke, 65b.
IN APICIBUS JURIS. Among the subtleties or extreme doctrines of the law. 1 Kames, Eq. 190. See Apex Juris.
IN ARBITRIUM JUDICIS. At the pleasure of the judge.
IN ARCTA ET SALVA CUSTODIA. In close and safe custody. 3 B1.Comm. 415.
IN ARTICULO. In a moment; immediately. Cod. 1, 34, 2.
IN ARTICULO MORTIS. In the article of death; at the point of death. Jackson v. Vredenbergh, 1 Johns. (N.Y.) 159.
IN ATROCIORIBUS DELICTIS PUNITUR AF-FECTUS LICET NON SEQUATUR EFFECTUS. 2 Rolle R. 82. In more atrocious crimes the in-tent is punished, though an effect does not follow.
IN AUTRE DROIT. L. Fr. In another’s right. As represehting another. An, executor, adminis-trator, or trustee sues in autre droit.
IN BANCO. In bank; in the bench. A term ap-plied to proceedings in the court in bank, as dis-tinguished from the proceedings at nisi prius. Also, in the English court of common bench.
IN BEING. In existence or life at a given mo-ment of time, as, in the phrase "life or lives in being" in the rule against perpetuities. An unborn child may, in some circumstances be considered as "in being." Phillips v. Herron, 55 Ohio St. 478, 45 N.E. 720.
IN BLANK. A term applied to the indorsement of a bill or note where it consists merely of the indorser’s name, without restriction to any parti-cular indorsee. 2 Steph.Comm. 164.
IN BONIS. Among the goods or property; in actual possession. Inst. 4, 2, 2. In bonis defuncti, among the goods of the deceased.
IN BULK. As a whole; as an entirety, without division into items or physical separation in pack-ages or parcels. Standard Oil Co. v. Com, 119 Ky. 75, 82 S.W. 1022.
IN CAHOOTS. Jointly interested in property, or common participants in enterprise. Clark v. State, 154 Miss. 457, 122 So. 534.
IN CAMERA. In chambers; in private. A cause is said to be heard in camera either when the hearing is had before the judge in his private room or when all spectators are excluded from the courtroom.
IN CAPITA. To the heads; by heads or polis. Persons succeed to an inheritance in capita when they individually take equal shares. So challenges to individual jurors are challenges in capita, as distinguished from challenges to the array.
IN CAPITE. In chief. 2 Bl.Comm. 60. Tenure in ca pite was a holding directly from the king.
IN CASE. If, in the event. Barmore v. Darragh, Tex.Civ.App., 231 S.W. 472, 478.
IN CASU EXTREWE NECESSITATIS OMNIA SUNT COMMUNIA. Hale, P. C. 54. In cases of extreme necessity, everything is in common.
IN CASU PROVISO. In a (or the) case provided. In tali casa editum et provisum, in such case made and provided. Townsh. Pl. 164, 165.
IN CAUSA. In the cause, as distinguished from in initialibus (q. v.) A term in Scotch practice. 1 Brown, Ch. 252.
EN CHARGE OF. Means in the tare or custody of, or intrusted to the management or direction.of. Sky v. Keystone Mut. Casualty Co., 150 Pa. Super. 613, 29 A.2d 230, 232.
IN CHIEF. Principal; primary; directly ob-tained. A term applied to the evidence obtained from a witness upon his examination in court by the party producing him.
Tenure in chief, or in capite, is a holding di-rectly of the king or chief lord.
IN CIVIIIBUS MINISTERIUM EXCUSAT, IN CRIMINALIBUS NON ITEM. In civil matters agency (or service) excuses, but not so in criminal matters. Lofft, 228; Tray. Lat. Max. 243.
IN CLARIS NON EST LOCUS CONJECTURIS. In things obvious there is no room for conjecture.
IN COMMENDAM. In commendation; as a com-mended living. 1 Bl.Comm. 393. See Commenda.
A term applied in Louisiana to a limited part-nership, answering to the French "en eomman-dite." Civil Code La. art. 2810.
IN COMMODATO IfseEC PACTIO, NE DOLUS PRZESTETUR, RATA NON EST. In the contract of loan, a stipulation not to be hable for fraud is not valid. Dig. 13, 7, 17, pr.
IN COMMON. Shared in respect to title, use, or enjoyment, without apportionment or division into individual parts; held by several for the equal advantage, use, or enjoyment of all. Hewit v. Jewell, 59 Iowa 37, 12 N.W. 738.
IN COMMUNL In common. Fleta, lib. 3, c. 4, § 2.
IN CONJUNCTION WITH. In association with. Blaisdell v. Inhabitants of Town of York, 110 Me. 500, 87 A. 361, 370.
IN CONJUNCTIVIS, OPORTET UTRAMQUE PARTEM ESSE VE’RAM. In conjunctives it is necessary that each part be true. Wing, Max. 13, max. 9. In a condition consisting of divers parts in the copulative, both parts must be performed.
IN CONSIDERATIONE INDE. In consideration thereof. 3 Salk. 64, pl. 5.
IN CONSIDERATIONE LEGIS. In consideration or contemplation of law; in abeyance. Dyer, 102b.
IN CONSIDERATIONE PILEMISSOR1UM. In consideration of the premises. 1 Strange, 535.
IN CONSIMILI CASU. See Consimili Casu.
IN CONSIMILI CASU, CONSIMILE DEBET ESSE REMEDIUM. Hardr. 65. In a similar case the remedy should be similar.
IN CONSPECTU EJUS. In his sight or view. 12 Mod. 95.
IN CONSUETUDINIBUS, NON DIUTURNITAS TEMPORIS SED SOLIDITAS RATIONIS EST CONSIDERANDA. In customs, not length of time, but solidity of reason, is to be considered. Co. Litt. 141a. The antiquity of a custom is to be less regarded than its reasonableness.
IN CONTINENTI. Immediately; without any in-terval or intermission. Calvin. Sometimes writ-ten as one word "incontinenti."
IN CONTRACTIBUS, BENIGNA; IN TESTA-MENTIS, BENIGNIOR; IN RESTITUTIONIBUS, BENIGNISSIMA INTERPRETATIO FACIENDA EST. Co. Litt. 112. In contracts, the interpreta-tion is to be liberal; in wills, more liberal; in restitutions, most liberal.
IN CONTRACTIBUS, REI VERITAS POTIUS QUAM SCRIPTURA PERSPICI DEBET. In con-tracts, the truth of the matter ought to be regard-ed rather than the writing. Cod. 4, 22, 1.
IN CONTRACTIBUS, TACITE INSUNT [VEN-IUNT] QU’E SUNT MORIS ET CONSUETUD-INIS. In contracts, matters of custom and usage are tacitly implied. A contract is understood to contain the customary clauses, although they are not expressed. Story, Bills, § 143; 3 Kent, Comm. 260, note; Broom, Max. 842.
IN CONTRAHENDA VENDITIONE, AMBIGUUM PACTUM CONTRA VENDITOREM INTERPRE-TANDUM EST. In the contract of sale, an am-biguous agreement is to be interpreted against the seller. Dig. 50, 17, 172. See Id. 18, 1, 21.
IN CONVENTIONIBUS, CONTRAIIENTIUM VOLUNTAS POTIUS QUAM VERBA SPECTARI PLACUIT. In agreements, the intention of the contracting parties, rather tiran the words used, should be regarded. Broom, Max. 551; Jackson v. Wilkinson, 17 Johns. (N.Y.) 150.
IN CORPORE. In body or substance; in a mater-ial thing or object.
IN CRASTINO. On the morrow. In crastino Ani-marum, on the morrow of All Souls. 1 Bl.Comm. 342.
IN CRIMINALIBUS, PROBATIONES DEBENT ESSE LUCE CLARIORES. In criminal cases, the proofs ought to be clearer than light. 3 Inst. 210.
IN CRIMINALIBUS, SUFFICIT GENERALIS MALITIA INTENTIONIS, CUM FACTO PARIS GRADUS. In criminal matters or cases, a general matice of intention is sufficient, [if united] with an act of equal or corresponding degree. Bac. Max. p. 65, reg. 15; Broom, Max. 323.
IN CRIMINALIBUS, VOLUNTAS REPUTABITUR PRO FACTO. In criminal acts, the will will be taken for the deed. 3 Inst. 106.
IN CUJUS REI TESTIMONIUM. In testimony whereof. The initial words of the concluding clause of ancient deeds in Latin, literally trans-lated in the English forms.
IN CUSTODIA LEGIS. In the custody or keeping of the law. 2 Steph.Comm. 74.
IN DELICTO. In fault. See In Pari Delicto, etc.
IN DIEM. For a day; for the space of a day.

IN DISJUNCTIVIS SUFFICIT ALTERAM PAR-TEM ESSE VERAM. In disjunctives it is suffi-cient that either part be true. Where a condition is in the disjunctive, it is sufficient if either part be performed. Wing. Max. 13, max. 9; Broom, Max. 592; 7 East, 272.
IN DOMINICO. In demesne. In dominico suo ut de feodo, in his demesne as of fee.
IN DORSO. On the back. 2 Bl.Comm. 468; 2 Steph.Comm. 164. In dorso recordi, on the back of the record. 5 Coke, 45. Hence the English in-dorse, indorsement, etc.
IN DUBIIS, BENIGNIORA PR1EFERENDA SUNT. In doubtful cases, the more favorable views are to be preferred; the more liberal inter-pretation is to be followed. Dig. 50, 17, 56; 2 Kent, Comm. 557.
IN DUBIIS, MAGIS DIGNUM EST ACCIPIEN-DUM. Branch, Princ. In doubtful cases, the more worthy is to be accepted.
IN DUBHS, NON PRZESUMITUR PRO TESTA-MENTO. In cases of doubt, the presumption is not in favor of a will. Branch, Princ. But see Cro. Car. 51.
IN DUBIO. In doubt; in a state of uncertainty, or in a doubtful case.
IN DUBIO, MEC LEGIS CONSTRUCTIO QUAM VERBA OSTENDUNT. In a case of doubt, that is the construction of the law which the words indi-cate. Branch, Princ.
IN DUBIO, PARS MITIOR EST SEQ1UENDA. In doubt, the mílder course is to be followed.
IN DUBIO, PRO LEGE FORI. In a doubtful case, the law of the forum is to be preferred. "A false maxim." Meili, Int. L. 151.
IN DUBIO, SEQUENDUM QUOD TUTIUS EST. In doubt, the safer course is to be adopted.
IN DUPLO. In double. Damna in duplo, double damages. Fleta, lib. 4, c. 10, § 1.
IN EADEM CAUSA. In the same state or condi-tion. Calvin.
IN EMULATIONEM VICINI. In envy or hatred of a neighbor. Where an act is done, or action brought, solely to hurt or distress another, it is said to be in emulationem vicini. 1 Kames, Eq. 56.
IN E0 QUOD PLUS SIT, SEMPER INEST ET MINUS. In the greater is always included the less also. Dig. 50, 17, 110.
IN EQUITY. In a court of equity, as distinguish-ed from a court of law; in the purview, consid-eration, or contemplation of equity; according to the doctrines of equity.
IN ESSE. In being. Actually existing. Disting-uished from in posse, which means "that which is not, but may be." A child before birth is in posse; alter birth, in esse.
IN EST DE JURE. (Lat.) It is implied of right or by law.
IN EVIDENCE. Included in the evidence already adduced. The "facts in evidence" are such as have already been proved in the cause.
IN EXCAMBIO. In exchange. Formal words in old deeds of exchange.
IN EXECUTION AND PURSUANCE OF. Words used to express the fact that the instrument is intended to carry into effect some other instru-ment, as in case of a deed in execution of a power. They are said to be synonymous with "to effect the object of;" U. S. v. Nunnemacher, 7 Biss. 129, Fed. Cas. No. 15,903.
IN EXITU. In issue. De materia in exitu, of the matter in issue. 12 Mod. 372.
IN EXPOSITIONE INSTRUMENTORUM, MALA GRAMMATICA, QUOD FIERI POTEST, VITAN-DA EST. In the construction of instruments, bad grammar is to be avoided as much as possible. 6 Coke, 39; 2 Pars. Cont. 26.
IN EXTENSO. In extension; at full length; from beginning to end, leaving out nothing.
IN EXTREMIS. In extremity; in the last ex-tremity; in the last illness. 2 Bl.Comm. 375, 500; Prince v. Hazleton, 20 Johns. (N.Y.) 502, 11 Am. Dec. 307. Agens in extremis, being in extremity. Bract. fol. 373b. Declarations in extremis, dying declarations. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 156; State v. Burton, 111 S.C. 526, 98 S.E. 856, 863. In extremis does not always mean in articulo mortis. In re Mal-lery’s Will, 127 Misc. 784, 217 N.Y.S. 489, 492.
IN FACIE CURVE. In the face of the court. Dyer, 28.
IN FACIE ECCLESLzE. In the face of the church. A term applied in the law of England to mar-riages, which are required to be solemnized in a parish church or public chapel, unless by dispen-sation or license. 1 Bl.Comm. 439; 2 Steph.Comm. 288, 289. Applied in Bracton to the old mode of conferring dower. Bract. fol. 92; 2 Bl.Comm. 133.
IN FACIENDO. In doing; in feasance; in the performance of an act. 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1308.
IN FACT. Actual, real; as distinguished from implied or inferred. Resulting from the acts of parties, instead of from the act or intendment of law.
IN FACTO. In fact; in deed. In facto dicit, in fact says. 1 Salk. 22, pl. 1.
IN FACTO QUOD SE HABET AD BONUM ET MALUM, MAGIS DE BONO QUAM DE MALO LEX INTENDIT. In an act or deed which admits of being considered as both good and bad, the law intends more from the good than from the bad; the law makes the more favorable construction. Co. Litt. 78b.

IN FAVORABILIBUS MAGIS ATTENDITUR QUOD PRODEST QUAM QUOD NOCET. In things favored, what profits is more regarded than what prejudices. Bac. Max. p. 57, in reg. 12.
IN FAVOREM LIBERTATIS. In favor of liberty. IN FAVOREM VITAE. In favor of life.
IN FAVOREM VITAE, LIBERTATIS, ET INNO-CENTIPE, OMNIA PRZESUMUNTUR. In favor of life, liberty, and innocence, every presumption is made. Lofft, 125.
IN FEODO. In fee. Bract. fol. 207; Fleta, lib. 2, c. 64, § 15. Seisitus in feodo, seised in fee. Fleta, lib. 3, c. 7, § 1.
IN FICTIONE JURIS SEMPER AEQUITAS EX-ISTIT. In the fiction of law there is always equi-ty; a legal fiction is always consistent with equity. 11 Coke 51a; Broom, Max. 127, 130.
IN FIERI. In being made; in process of forma-tion or development; hence, incomplete or in-choate. Legal proceedings are described as in fieri until judgment is entered.
IN FINE. Lat. At the end. Used, in references, to indicate that the passage cited is at the end of a book, chapter, section, etc.
IN FORMA PAUPERIS. In the character or man-ner of a pauper. Describes permission given to a poor person to sue without liability for costs.
IN FORO. In a (or the) forum, court, or tribunal.
IN FORO CONSCIENTLZE. In the tribunal of conscience; conscientiously; considered from a moral, rather than a legal, point of view.
IN FORO CONTENTIOSO. In the forum of con-tention or litigation.
IN FORO ECCLESIASTICO. In an ecclesiastical forum; in the ecciesiastical court. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 57, § 13.
IN FORO SPECULAR!. In a secular forum or court. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 57, § 14; 1 Bl.Comm. 20.
IN FRAUDEM CREDITORUM. In fraud of credi-tors; with intent to defraud creditors. Inst. 1, 6, pr. 3.
IN FRAUDEM LEGIS. In fraud of the law. 3 Bl.Comm. 94. With the intent or view of evading the law. Jackson v. Jackson, 1 Johns. (N. Y.) 424, 432.
IN FULL. Relating to the whole or full amount; as a receipt in full. Complete; giving all de-tails. Bard v. Wood, 3 Metc. (Mass.) 75.
IN FULL LIFE. Continuing in both physical and civil existence; that is, neither actually dead nor civiliter mortuus.
IN FUTURO. In future; at a future time; the opposite of in prcesenti. 2 Bl.Comm. 166, 175.
IN GENERAL! PASSAGIO. In the general pas-sage; that is, on the journey to Palestine with the general company or body of Crusaders. This term was of frequent occurrence in the old law of essoins, as a means of accounting for the ab-sence of the party, and was distinguished from simplex passagium, which meant that he was per-forming a pilgrimage to the Holy Land alone.
IN GENERALIBUS VERSATUR ERROR. Error dwells in general expressions. Pitman v. Hooper, 3 Sumn. 290, Fed. Cas. No. 11,186; Underwood v. Carney, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 292.
IN GENERE. In kind; in the same genus or class; the same in quantity and quality, but not individually the same. In the Roman law, things which may be given or restored in genere are dis-tinguished from such as must be given or restored in specie; that is, identically. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 161.
IN GREMIO LEGIS. In the bosom of the law; in the protection of the law; in abeyance. 1 Coke, 131a; T. Raym. 319; Hooper v. Farmers’ Union Warehouse Co., 21 Ala.App. 91, 105 So. 725, 726.
IN GROSS. In a large quantity or sum; without division or particulars; by wholesale. Green v. Taylor, 10 Fed.Cas.No.1,126. At large; not an-nexed to or dependent upon another thing. Com-mon in gross is such as is neither appendant nor appurtenant to land, but is annexed to a man’s person. 2 Bl.Cornm. 34.
IN HAC PARTE. In this behalf ; on this side.
IN HAEC VERBA. In these words; in the same words.
IN HAEREDES NON SOLENT TRANSIRE AC-TIONES QUIE PANALES EX MALEFICIO SUNT. 2 Inst. 442. Penal actions arising from anything of a criminal nature do not pass to heirs.
IN HIS ENIM QU’E SUNT FAVORABILIA ANI-MAE, QUAMVIS SUNT DAMNOSA REBUS, FIAT ALIQUANDO EXTENTIO STATUTI. In things that are favorable to the spirit, though injurious to property, an extension of the statute should sometimes be made. 10 Coke, 101.
IN HIS QUAE DE JURE COMMUNI OMNIBUS CONCEDUNTUR, CONSUETUDO ALICUJUS PATRUE VEL LOCI NON EST ALLEGENDA. 11 Coke, 85. In those things which by common right are conceded to all, the custom of a particular dis-trict or place is not to be alleged.
IN 110C. In this; in respect to this.
IN IIS QU’E SUNT MERAS FACULTATIS NUN-QUAM PRiESCRIBITUR. Prescription does not run against a mere power or faculty to act. Tray. Leg. Max.
IN IISDEM TERMINIS. In the same terms. 9 East, 487.
IN INDIVIDUO. In the distinct, identical, or in-dividual form; in specie. Story, Bailm. § 97.

IN INFINITUM. Infinitely; indefinitely. Im-ports indefinite succession or continuance.
IN INITIALIBUS. In the preliminaries. A term in Scotch practice, applied to the preliminary ex-amination of a witness as to the following points: Whether he knows the parties, or bears ill will to either of them, or has received any reward or promise of reward for what he may say, or can lose or gain by the cause, or has been told by any person what to say. If the witness answer these questions satisfactorily, he is then examined in causa, in the cause. Bell, Dict. "Evidence."
IN INITIO. In or at the beginning. In initio litis, at the beginning, or in the first stage of the suit. Bract. fol. 400.
IN INTEGRUM. To the original or former state. Calvin.
IN INVIDIAM. To excite a prej udice.
IN INVITUM. Against an unwilling party; against one not assenting. A term applied to pro-ceedings against an adverse party, to which he does not consent.
IN IPSIS FAUCIBUS. In the very throat or en-trance. In ipsis faucibus of a port, actually enter-ing a port. 1 C.Rob.Adm. 233, 234.
IN ITINERE. In eyre; on a journey or circuit. In old English law, the justices in itinere (or in eyre) were those who made a circuit through the kingdom once in seven years for the purposes of trying causes. 3 Bl.Comm. 58. In course of trans-portation; on the way; not delivered to the ven-dee. In this sense the, phrase is equivalent to "in transitu."
IN JUDGMENT. In a court of justice; in a seat of judgment. Lord Hale is called "one of the greatest and best men who ever sat in judgment." 1 East, 306.
IN JUDICHS, MINORI .XTATI SUCCURRITUR. In courts or judicial proceedings, infancy is aided or favored. Jenk.Cent. 46, case 89.
IN JUDICIO. In Roman law. In the course of an actual trial; before a judge, (judex.) A cause, during its preparatory stages, conducted before the prwtor, was said to be in jure; in its second stage, after it had been sent to a judex for trial, it was said to be in judicio.
IN JUDICIO NON CREDITUR NISI JURATIS. Cro.Car. 64. In a trial, credence is given only to those who are sworn.
IN JURE. In law; according to law.
In the Roman practice, the procedure in an action was divided into two stages. The first was said to be in jure; it took place before the pralor, and included the formal and introductory part and the settlement of questions of law. The second stage was committed to the judex, and comprised the investigation and trial of the facts; this was said to be in judicio.
IN JURE ALTERIUS. In another’s right. Hale, Anal. § 26.
IN JURE, NON REMOTA CAUSA SED PROXIMA SPECTATUR. Bac.Max. reg. 1. In law, the proxi-mate, and not the remote, cause is regarded.
IN JURE PROPRIO. In one’s own right. Hale, Anal. § 26.
IN JUS VOCARE. To call, cite, or summon to court. Inst. 4, 16, 3; Calvin. In jus votando, sum-moning to court. 3 Bl.Comm. 279.
IN KIND. In the same kind, class, or genus. A loan is returned "in kind" when not the identical article, but one corresponding and equivalent to it, is given to the lender. See In Genere.
The agreement that a collector of taxes was to receive his commission "in kind" means the same kind of funds in which the tax is collected; Wilson v. State, 51 Ark. 213, 10 S.W. 491.
IN LAW. In the intendment, contemplation, or inference of the law; implied or inferred by law; existing in law or by force of law. See In Fact.
IN LECTO MORTAL!. On the deathbed. Fleta, lib. 5, c. 28, § 12.
IN LIBERAM ELEMOSINAM. In free alms. Land given for a charitable motive was said to be so given. See Frankalmoin.
IN LIEU OF. Instead of; in place of; in substitu-tion of. State v. Escalade, 91 So. 135, 136, 150 La. 638; Joiner v. Joiner, 117 Miss. 507, 78 So. 369, 370.
IN LIMINE. On or at the threshold; at the very beginning; preliminarily.
IN LITEM. For a suit; to the suit. Greenl.Ev. § 348.
IN LOCO. In place; in lieu; instead; in the place or stead. Townsh.P1. 38.
IN LOCO PARENTIS. In the place of a parent; instead of a parent; charged, factitiously, with a parent’s rights, duties, and responsibilities. Weth-erby v. Dixon, 19 Ves. 412; Brinkerhoff v. Merselis, 24 N.J.L. 683; Howard v. United States, D.C.Ky., 2 F.2d 170, 174; Meisner v. United States, D.C.Mo., 295 F. 866, 868.
IN MAJORE SUMMA CONTINETUR MINOR. 5 Coke, 115. In the greater sum is contained the less.
IN MAJOREM CAUTELAM. For greater securi-ty. 1 Strange, 105, arg.
IN MALAM PARTEM. In a bad sense, so as to wear an evil appearance.
IN MALEFICIIS VOLUNTAS SPECTATUR, NON EXITUS. In evil deeds regard must be had to the intention, and not to the result. Dig. 48, 8, 14; Broom, Max. 324.
IN MALEFICIO, RATIHABITIO MANDATO COMPARATUR. In a case of malfeasance, rati-fication is equivalent to command. Dig. 50, 17, 152, 2.

IN MAXIMA POTENTIA MINIMA LICENTIA. In the greatest power there is the least freedom. Hob. 159.
IN MEDIAS RES. Into the heart of the subject, without preface or introduction. •
IN MEDIO. Intermediate. A term applied, in Scotch practice, to a fund held between parties litigant.
IN MERCIBUS ILLICITIS NON SIT COMMER-CIUM. There should be no commerce in illicit or prohibited goods. 3 Kent, Comm. 262, note.
IN MERCY. To be in merey is to be at the discre-tion of the king, lord, or judge in respect to the im-position of a fine or other punishment.
IN MISERICORDIA. The entry on the record where a party was in merey was, "Ideo in miseri-cordia," etc. Sometimes "misericordia" means the being quit of all amercements.
IN MITIORI SENSU. In the milder sense; in the less aggravated acceptation.
In actions of slander, it was formerly the rule that, 1f the words alleged would admit of two constructions, they should be taken in the less injurious and defamatory sense, or in mitiori sensu.
IN MODUM ASSISM. In the manner or form of an assize. Bract. fol. 183b. In modum juratce, in manner of a jury. Id. fol. 181b.
IN MORA. In default; literally, in delay. In the civil law, a borrower who omits or refuses to re-turn the thing loaned at the proper time is said to be in mora. Story, Bailm. §§ 254, 259.
In Scotch law. A creditor who has begun with-out completing diligence necessary for attaching the property of his debtor is said to be in mora. Bell.
IN MORTUA MANU. Property owned by reli-gious societies was said to be held in nortua manu, or in mortmain, since religious men were civiliter mortui. 1 Bl.Comm. 479; Tayl.Gloss.
IN NOMINE DEI, AMEN. In the name of God, Amen. A solemn introduction, anciently used in wills and many other instruments. The transla-tion is obten used in wills at the present day.
IN NOTIS. In the notes.
IN NOVO CASU, NOVUM REMEDIUM APPO-NENDLTM EST. 2 Inst. 3. A new remedy is to be applied to a new case.
IN NUBIBUS. In the clouds; in abeyance; in cus-tody of law. In nubibus, in mare, in terrd, vel in custodia- legis, in the air, sea, or earth, or in the custody of the law. Tayl.Gloss. In case of abey-anee, the inheritance is figuratively said to rest in nubibus, or in gremio legis.
IN NULLIUS BONIS. Among the goods or prop-erty of no person; belonging to no person, as treasure-trove and wreck were anciently consid-ered.
Black’s law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed —57
IN NULLO EST ERRAT1UM. In nothing is there error. The name of the common plea or joinder in error, denying the existente of error in the rec-ord or proceedings; which is in the nature of a de-murrer, and at once refers the matter of law aris-ing thereon to the judgment of the court. 2 Tidd, Pr. 1173; Booth v. Com., 7 Mete. (Mass.) 285, 287.
IN OBSCURA VOLUNTATE MANUMITTENTIS, FAVENDUM EST LIBERTATI. Where the ex-pression of the will of one who seeks to manumit a slave is ambiguous, liberty is to be favored. Dig. 50, 17, 179.
IN OBSCURIS, INSPICI SOLERE QUOD VERI-SIMILIUS EST, AUT QUOD PLERUMQUE FIERI SOLET. In obscure cases, we usually look at what is most probable, or what most commonly happens. Dig. 50, 17, 114.
IN OBSCURIS, QUOD MINIMUM EST SEQUI-MUR. In obscure or doubtful cases, we follow that which is the least. Dig. 50, 17, 9; 2 Kent, Comm. 557.
IN ODIUM SPOLIATORIS. In hatred of a de-spoiler, robber, or wrong-doer. The Saratoga, 1 Gall. 174, Fed.Cas.No.12,355; Arthur v. The Cas-sius, 2 Story, 99, Fed.Cas.No.564. 1 Greenl.Ev. § 348.
IN ODIUM SPOLIATORIS 0111N1A PRFESUM-UNTUR. To the prejudice (in condemnation) of a despoiler all things are presumed; every pre-sumption is made against a wrongdoer. 1 Vern. 452.
IN OMNI ACTIONE UBI DU2E CONCURRUNT DISTRICTIONES, VIDELICET, IN REM ET IN PERSONAM, ILLA DISTRICTIO TENENDA EST QUIE MAGIS TIMETUR ET MAGIS LIGAT. In every action where two distresses concur, that is, in rem and in personam, that is to be chosen which is most dreaded, and which binds most firmly. Bract. fol. 372; Fleta, 1. 6, c. 14, § 28.
IN OMNI RE NASCITUR RES QU../E IPSAM REM EXTERMINAT. In everything there arises a thing which destroys the thing itself. Every-thing contains the element of its own destruction. 2 Inst. 15.
IN OMNIBUS. In all things; on all points. "A case parallel in omnibus." 10 Mod. 104.
IN OMNIBUS CONTRACTIBUS, SIVE NOMINA-TIS SIVE INNOMINATIS, PERMUTATIO CON-TINETUR. In all contracts, whether nominate or innominate, an exchange [of value, i. e., a consid-erationl is implied. Gravin. lib. 2, § 12; 2 Bl. Comm. 444, note.
IN OMNIBUS OBLIGATIONIBUS IN QUIBUS DIES NON PONITUR, PRirESENTI DIE DEBET-UR. In all obligations in which a date is not put, the debt is due on the present day; the liability accrues immediately. Dig. 50, 17, 14.IN OMNIBUS [FERE] PCENALIBUS JUDICHS, ET 1ETATL ET IMPRUDENTLE SUCCURRI-TUR. In nearly all penal judgments, immaturity of age and imbecility of mind are favored. Dig. 50, 17, 108; Broom, Max. 314.
IN OMNIBUS QUIDEM, MAXIME TAMEN IN JURE, "IEQUITAS SPECTANDA SIT. In all things, but especially in law, equity is to be re-garded. Dig. 50, 17, 90; Story, Bailm. § 257.
IN PACATO SOLO. In a country which is at peace.
IN PACE DEI ET REGIS. In the peace of God and the king. Fleta, lib. 1, c. 31, § 6. Formal words in old appeals of murder.
IN PAIS. This phrase, as applied to a legal trans-action, primarily means that it has taken place without legal proceedings. Thus a widow was said to make a request in pais for her dower when she simply applied to the heir without issuing a writ. (Co. Litt. 32b.) So conveyances are divid-ed finto those by matter of record and those by matter in pais. In some cases, however, "mat-ters in pais" are opposed not only to "matters of record," but also to "matters in writing," i. e., deeds, as where estoppel by deed is distinguish-ed from estoppel by matter in pais. Id. 352a.) Sweet. See, also, Pais.
IN PAIS, ESTOPPEL IN. An estoppel not aris-ing from deed or record or written contract. Steph.P1. 197; Duke v. Griffith, 9 Utah 476, 35 P. 512. The doctrine is that a persoli may be pre-cluded by his act or conduct or silente, when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had. Marshall v. Wil-son, 175 Or. 506, 154 P.2d 547, 551. The effect of a party’s voluntary conduct whereby he is pre-cluded from asserting rights as against another person who has in good faith relied upon such con-duct and has been led thereby to change his con-dition for the worse and who acquires some cor-responding right of property or contract. Oswego Falls Corporation v. City of Fulton, 265 N.Y.S. 436, 148 Misc. 170.
Elements or fundamentals of "estoppel In pais" Include admission, statement, or act inconslstent with claim after-wards asserted, National Match Co. v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 227 Mo.App. 1115, 58 S.W.2d 797; Peyrefitte v. Union Homestead Ass’n, La.App., 185 So. 693, 697; change of position to loss or injury of party claiming estoppel, Personal Finance Co. of Providente v. Henley-Kimball Co., 61 R.I. 402, 1 A.2d 121, 125, 117 A.L.R. 1476; Malloy v. City of Chicago, 369 III. 97, 15 N.E.2d 861, 865; circum-stances such that party estopped knew or should have known facts to be otherwise or pretended to know facts which he did not know, Briscoe v. O’Connor, 119 N.J.Eq. 378, 182 A. 855; false representation or concealment of material facts, Pickens v. Maryland Casualty Co., 141 Neb. 105, 2 N.W.2d 593, 596; Inducement to alter position, Has-chenberger v. Dennis, 118 Neb. 411, 225 N.W. 25, 26, 63 A.L.R. 493; Wollenberger v. Hoover, 346 III. 511, 179 N.E. 42, 67; intention that false representation or concealment be acted on, Malloy v. City of Chicago, 369 III. 97, 15 N.E.2d 861, 865; Peterson v. City of Parsons, 139 Kan. 701, 33 P.2d 715, 720; knowledge of facts, by party to be estopped, Darling Stores v. Fidellty-Bankers Trust Co., 178 Tenn. 165, 156 S.W.2d 419, 424; Peterson v. City of Persone, 139 Kan. 701, 33 P.2d 715, 720; lack of knowledge or means of knowledge of party claiming estoppel, TrIplex Shoe Co. v. Rice & Hutchins, 17 Det.Ch. 356, 152 A. 342,
350, 72 A.L.R. 932; SInclair Refining Co. v. JenkIns Petro-leum Procese Co., C.C.A.Me., 99 F.2d 9, 13, 14; misleading of one person by another person to his prejudice or injury, Garmon v. Davis, 63 Ga.App. 815, 12 S.E.2d 209, 211; Cur-rent News Features v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., C.C.A.Mo., 81 F.2d 288, 292; prejudice or lose or injury to party claiming es-toppel, City of St. Louis v. Mississippi River Fuel Corpora-tion, D.C.Mo., 57 F.Supp. 549. 554; In re Bremer’s Estate, 141 Neb. 251, 3 N.W.2d 411, 413, 414; reliance by one party on belief induced by other party, Clover v. Peterson, 203 Minn. 337, 281 N.W. 275, 278; Strand v. State, 16 Wash.2d 107, 132 P.2d 1011, 1016.
Ratification Is distinguishable In that the substance of "ratification" is confirmation of the unauthorized act or contract af ter It has been done or made, whereas substance of "estoppel" is the principal’s inducement to another to act to his prejudice. Harvey v. J. P. Mo;gan & Co., Mun.Ct., 2 N.Y.S.2d 520, 531, 166 Misc. 455.
Silence when one should speak may be the basis of es-toppel, Thomas v. Conyers, 198 N.C. 229, 151 S.E. 270, 273; waiver is distinguishable in that it Is not essential to waiv-er that the opposite party do anything on the strength of the statement relied upon, Langley v. Norris, Tex.Civ.App., 167 S.W.2d 603, 613; waiver designates act or consequence of act of one person only; it is voluntary act and Implies abandonment of right or privilege. McDanels v. General Ins. Co. of America, 1 Cal.App.2d 454, 36 P.2d 829, 832.
See, also, Equitable Estoppel.
IN PAPER. A term formerly applied to the pro-ceedings in a cause before the record was made up. 3 B1.Comm. 406; 2 Burrows, 1098. Probably from the circumstance of the record being always on parchment. The opposite of "on record." 1 Burrows, 322.
IN PARI CAUSA. In an equal cause. In a cause where the parties on each side have equal rights.
IN PARI CAUSA POSSESSOR POTIOR HAB-ERL DEBET. In an equal cause he who has the possession should be preferred. Dig. 50, 17, 128, 1.
IN PARI DELICTO. In equal fault; equally cul-pable or criminal; in a case of equal fault or guilt. Rozell v. Vansyckle, 11 Wash. 79, 39 Pac. 270.
A person who Is in pari delicto with another dtffers from a particeps criminis in This, that the former term always includes the latter, but the latter does not always include the former. 8 East, 381.
IN PARI DELICTO POTIOR EST CONDITIO POSSIDENTIS, [DEFENDENTIS.] In a case of equal or mutual fault [between two parties] the condition of the party in possession [or defend-ingi is the better one. 2 Burrows, 926.
Where each party is equally In fault, the law favors hico who le actually in possession. Broom, Max. 290, 729. Where the fault is mutual, the law will leave the case as it ftnds it. Story, Ag. § 195; Reaves Lumber Co. v. Cain-Hurley Lumber Co., 152 Tenn. 339, 279 S.W. 257, 258.
IN PARI MATERIA. Upon the same matter or subject. Statutes in pari materia are to be con-strued together. State v. Gerhardt, 145 Ind. 439, 44 N.E. 469, 33 L.R.A. 313.
IN PATIENDO. In suffering, permitting, or al-lowing.
IN PECTORE JUDICIS. In the breast of the judge. Latch, 180. A phrase applied to a judg-ment.

IN PEJOREM PARTEM. In the worst part; on the worst side. Latch, 159, 160.
IN PERPETUAM REI MEMORIAM. In perpetu-al memory of a matter; for preserving a record of a matter. Applied to depositions taken in or-der to preserve the testimony of the deponent.
IN PERPETUITY. Endless duration; forever. Central R. Co. of New Jersey v. New York Tele-phone Co., 101 N.J.L. 353, 128 A. 160, 161.
IN PERPETUUM REI TESTIMONIUM. In per-petual testimony ‘of a matter; for the purpose of declaring and settling a thing forever. 1 Bl. Comm. 86.
IN PERSON. A party, plaintiff or defendant, who sues out a writ or other process, or appears to conduct his case in court himself, instead of through a solicitor or counsel, is said to act and appear in person.
IN PERSONAM, IN REM. In the Roman law, from which they are taken, the expressions "in rem" and "in personam" were always opposed to one another, an act or proceeding in personara be-ing one done or directed against or with reference to a specific person, while an act or proceeding in rem was one done or directed with reference to no specific person, and consequently against or with reference to all whom it might concern, or "all the world." The phrases were especially ap-plied to actions; an actio in personam being the remedy where a claim against a specific person arose out of an obligation, whether ex contractu or ex maleficio, while an actio in rem was one brought for the assertion of a right of property, easement, status, etc., against one who denied or infringed it. See Inst. 4, 6, 1; Gaius, 4, 1, 1-10.
From this use of the terms, they have come to be ap-plied to signify the antithesis of "available against a par-ticular person," and "available against the world at large." Thus, jura in personam are rights primarily available against specific persons ; jura in rem, rights only available against the world at large. Hook v. Hoffman, 147 P. 722, 727, 16 Ariz. 540; Beck v. Natalie Oil Co., 143 La. 153, 78 So. 430.
So a judgment or decree is said to be in rem when it binds third persons. Such is the sentence of a court of admiralty on a question of prize, or a decree of nullity or dissolution of marriage, or a decree of a court in a foreign country as to the status of a person domiciled there.
Lastly, the terms are sometimes used to signify that a judicial proceeding operates on a thing or a person. Thus, it is said of the court of chancery that it acts in personam, and not in rem, meaning that its decrees operate by corn-pelling defendants to do what they are ordered to do, and not by producing the effect directly. Sweet. See Cross v. Armstrong, 44 Ohio St. 613, 10 N.E. 160.

Judgment in Personam

See that titie.
IN PERSONAM ACTIO EST, QUA CUM EO AGI-MUS QUI OBLIGATUS EST NOBIS AD FACIEN-DUM ALIQUID VEL DANDUM. The action in personam is that by which we sue him who is under obligation to us to do something or give something. Dig. 44, 7, 25; Bract. 101b.
IN PIOS USUS. For pious uses; for religious purposes. 2 Bl.Comm. 505.

IN PLACE. In mining law, rock or mineralized matter is "in place" when remaining as nature placed it, that is, unsevered from the circumjacent rock, or which is fixed solid and immovable in the form of a vein or lode. Williams v. Gibson, 84 Ala. 228, 4 So. 350, 5 Am.St.Rep. 368.
IN PLENA VITA. In full life. Yearb. P. 18 Hen. VI. 2.
IN PLENO COMITATU. In full county court. 3 Bl.Comm. 36.
IN PLENO LUMINE. In public; in common knowledge; in the light of day.
IN PCENALIBUS CAUSIS BENIGNIUS INTER-PRETANDUM EST. In penal causes or cases, the more favorable interpretation should be adopt-ed. Dig. 50, 17, (197), 155, 2; Plowd. 86b, 124; 2 Hale, P.C. 365.
IN POSSE. In possibility; not in actual exist-ence. See In Esse.
IN POTESTATE PARENTIS. In the power of a parent. Inst. 1, 8, pr.; Id. 1, 9; 2 B1.Comm. 498.
IN PRAEMISSORUM FIDEM. In confirmation or attestation of the premises. A notarial phrase.
IN PILEPARATORIIS AD JUDICIUM FAVETUR ACTOR!. 2 Inst. 57. In things preceding judg-ment the plaintiff is favored.
IN PRIESENTI. At the present time. 2 Bl. Comm. 166. Used in oppositioa to in futuro. Van Wyck v. Knevals, 1 S.Ct. 336, 106 U.S. 360, 27 L. Ed. 201.
IN PRMSENTIA MAJORIS POTESTATIS, MIN-OR POTESTAS CESSAT. In the presence of the superior power, the inferior power ceases. Jenk. Cent. 214, c. 53. The less authority is merged in the greater. Broom, Max. 111.
IN PRENDER. L. Fr. In taking. A term ap-plied to such incorporeal hereditaments as a party entitled to them was to take for himself; such as common. 2 Steph.Comm. 23; 3 B1.Comm. 15. See In Render.
IN PRETIO EMPTIONIS ET VENDITIONIS, NA-TURALITER LICET CONTRAHENTIBUS SE CIRCUMVENIRE. In the price of buying and selling, it is naturally allowed to the contracting parties to overreach each other. 1 Story, Cont. 606.
IN PRIMIS. In the first place. A phrase used in argument.
IN PRINCIPIO. At the beginn ing.
IN PROMPTU. In readiness; at hand. Usually written impromptu.
IN PROPRIA CAUSA NEMO JUDEX. No one can be judge in his own cause. 12 Code, 13.
one’s own yroper
IN PROPRIA PERSONA. In person.

It is a rule in pleading that pleas to the jurisdiction of the court must be plead in proprio persona, because if pleaded by attorney they admit the jurisdiction, as an at-torney Is an offIcer of the court, and he is presumed to plead af ter having obtalned leave, which admits the juris-diction. Lawes, P1. 91.
In some jurisdiction, however, this rule is no longer rec-ognized. 1 C.J. 255.
IN QUO QUIS DELINQUIT, IN E0 DE JURE EST PUNIENDUS. In whatever thing one of-fends, in that is he rightfully to be punished. Co. Litt. 233b; Wing. Max. 204, max. 58. The punish-ment shall have relation to the nature of the of-fense.
IN RE. In the affair; in the matter of; concern-ing; re. This is the usual method of entitling a judicial proceeding in which there are not adver-sary parties, but merely some res concerning which judicial action is to be taken, such as a bankrupt’s estate, an estate in the probate court, a proposed public highway, etc. It is also some-times used as a designation of a proceeding where one party makes an application on his own be-half, but such proceedings are more usually enti-
tled "Ex parte .91
IN RE COMMUNI MELIOR EST CONDITIO PROHIBENTIS. In common property the con-dition of the one prohibiting is the better. In oth-er words, either co-owner has a right of veto against the acts of the other. Gulf Refining Co. of Louisiana v. Carroll, 145 La. 299, 82 So. 277, 279.
IN RE COMMUNI NEMINEM DOMINORUM JURE FACERE QUICQUAM, INVITO ALTERO, POSSE. One co-proprietor can exercise no au-thority over the common property against the will of the other. Dig. 10, 3, 28. In other words, eith-er co-owner has a right of veto against the acts of the other. Gulf Refining Co. of Louisiana v. Carroll, 145 La. 299, 82 So.. 277, 279.
IN RE COMMUNI POTIOR EST CONDITIO PRO-HIBENTIS. In a partnership the condition of one who forbids is the more favorable.
IN RE DUBIA, BENIGNIOREM INTERPRETA-TIONEM SEQUI, NON MINUS JUSTIUS EST QUAM TUTIUS. In a doubtful matter, to follow the more liberal interpretation is not less the juster than the safer course. Dig. 50, 17, 192, 1.
IN RE DUBIA, MAGIS INFICIATIO QUAM AF-FIRMATIO INTELLIGENDA. In a doubtful mat-ter, the denial or negative is to be understood, [or regarded,] rather than the affirmative. Godb. 37.
IN RE LUPANAR!, TESTES LUPANARES AD-MITTENTUR. In a matter concerning a brothel, prostitutes are admitted as witnesses. Van Epps v. Van Epps, 6 Barb. (N.Y.) 320, 324.
IN RE PARI POTIOREM CAUSAM ESSE PRO-HIBENTIS CONSTAT. In a thing equally shar-ed [by severall it is clear that the party refusing [to permit the use of it] has the better cause. Dig. 10, 3, 28. A maxim applied to partnerships, where one partner has a right to withhold his as-sent to the acts of his copartner. 3 Kent.Comm. 45.
IN RE PROPRIA INIQUUM ADMODUM EST AL-ICUI LICENTIAM TRIBUERE SENTENTIIE. It is extremely unjust that any one should be judge in his own cause.
IN REBUS (Lat.) In things, cases, or matters.
IN REBUS MANIFESTIS, ERRAT QUI AUC-TORITATES LEGUM ALLEGAT; QUIA PER-SPICUA VERA NON SUNT PROBANDA. In clear cases, he mistakes who cites legal authori-ties; for obvious truths are not to be proved. 5 Coke, 67a. Applied to cases too plain to require the support of authority; "because," says the re-
port, "he who endeavors to prove them obscures them."
IN REBUS QU’E SUNT FAVORABILIA ANIMX, QUAMVIS SUNT DAMNOSA REBUS, FIAT
ALI-QUANDO EXTENSIO STATUTI. 10 Coke, 101. In things that are favorable to the spirit, though injurious to things, an extension of a statute should sometimes be malle.
IN REGARD TO. Concerning; relating to; in respect of; with respect to; about. Hart v. Hart, 181 Iowa 527, 164 N.W. 849, 850.
IN REM. A technical term used to designate pro-ceedings or actions instituted against the thing, in contradistinction to personal actions, which are said to be in personam. See In Personam.
It is true that, In a strict sense, a proceeding in rem Is one taken directly against property, and has for its object the disposition of property, without reference to the title of individual claimants: but, in a larger and more general sense, the terms are applied to actions between parties, where the direct object is to reach and dispose of property owned by them, or of some interest thereln. Such are cases commenced by attachment against the property of debtors, or instituted to partition real estate. foreclose a mortgage, or enforce a lien. So far as they affect property in this state, they are substantially proceedings in rem ln the broader sense which we have mentioned. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 734, 24 L.Ed. 565; Continental Gin Co. v. Arnold, 66 Okl. 132, 167 P. 613, 617, L.R.A.1918B, 511.
In the strict sense of the term, a proceeding "In rem" is one which is taken directly against property or one which is brought to enforce a right in the thing itself. Austin v. Rosal League, 316 III. 188, 147 N.E. 106, 109.
A divorce suit is a "suit in rem," the essential character-istic of which is found in the power of the state through the decree or judgment of its court to dispose of the sub-ject-matter of the suit, the res, in accordance with the ob-ject of the suit, whether that subject-matter be physical property or the status of one or both of the parties litigant, which decree operates immediately and absolutely upoh the status of the suitor which is the res in the suit with-out the necessity of execution, attachment, or contempt proceedings to enforce it. Lister v. Lister, 86 N.J.Eq. 30, 97 A. 170, 173.
A proceeding "in rem" is in effect a proceeding against the owner, as well as a proceeding against the goods, for it is his breach of the law which has to be proven to estab-Iish the forfeiture, and it is his property which is sought to be forfeited. Mack v. Westbrook, 148 Ga. 690, 98 S.E. 339, 343.
Judgment m rem. See that title.
Quasi in rem. A term applied to proceedings which are not strictly and purely in rem, but are brought against the defendant personally, though the real object is to deal with particular property or subject property to the discharge of claims as-serted; for example, foreign attachment, or proceedings to foreclose a mortgage, remove a cloud from title, or effect a partition. Freeman v. Al-derson, 7 S.Ct. 165, 119 U.S. 187, 30 L.Ed. 372; Hill v. Henry, 66 N.J.Eq. 150, 57 A. 555.
IN REM ACTIO EST PER QUAM REM NOS-TRAM QUE AB ALIO POSSIDETUR PETIMUS, ET SEMPER ADVERSUS EUM EST QUI REM POSSIDET. The action in rem is that by which we seek our property which is possessed by an-other, and is always against him who possesses the property. Dig. 44, 7, 25; Bract. fol. 102.
IN RENDER. A thing is said to He in render when it must be rendered or given by the tenant; as rent. It is said to lie in prender when it con-sists in the right in the lord or other person to take something. See In Prender.
IN REPUBLICA MAXIME CONSERVANDA SUNT JURA BELLI. In a state the laws of war are to be especially upheld. 2 Inst. 58.
IN RERUM NATURA. In the nature of things; in the realm of actuality; in existence. In a dila-tory plea, an allegation that the plaintiff is not in rerum natura is equivalent to averring that the person named is fictitious. 3 B1.Comm. 301.
In civil law, this phrase is applied to things. Inst. Z 20, 7. It is a broader term than in rebus humanis: e. g. before quickening, an infant is in rerum natura, but not in rebus humanis; after quickening, he is in rebus humanis as well as in rerum natura. Calvinus, Lex.
IN RESTITUTIONEM, NON IN PCENAM FUER-ES SUCCEDIT. The heir succeeds to the restitu-tion, not to the penalty. An heir may be compel-led to make restitution of a sum unlawfully appro-priated by the ancestor, but is not answerable criminally, as for a penalty. 2 Inst. 198.
IN RESTITUTIONIBUS BENIGNISSIMA INTER-PRETATIO FACIENDA EST. Co.Litt. 112. The most benignant interpretation is to be made in restitutions.
IN SATISFACTIONIBUS NON PERMITTITUR AMPLIUS FIERI QUAM SEMEL FACTUM EST. In payments, more must not be received than has been received once for all. 9 Coke, 53.
IN SCRINIO JUDICIS. In the writing-case of the judge; among the judge’s papers. "That is a thing that rests in scrinio judicis, and does not ap-pear in the body of the decree." Hardr. 51.
IN SEPARALI. In several; in severalty. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 54, § 20.
IN SIMILI MATERIA. Dealing with the same or a kindred subject-matter.
IN SINIPLICI PEREGRINATIONE. In simple pilgrimage. Bract. fol. 338. A phrase in the old law of essoins. See In Generali Passagio.
IN SOLIDO. In the civil law. For the whole; as a whole. An obligation in solido is one where each of the several obligors is liable for the whole;
that is, it is joint and several. Henderson v. Wadsworth, 6 S.Ct. 140, 115 U.S. 264, 29 L.Ed. 377. Possession in solidum is exclusive posses-sion.
When several persons oblígate themselves to the obligee by the terms "in solido," or use any other expressions which clearly show that they intend that each one shall be separately bound to perform the whole of the obligation. it is called an "obligation in solido" on the part of the ob-ligors. Civ.Code La. art. 2082.
IN SOLIDUM. For the whole. Si plures sint fidejussores, quotquot erunt numero, singuli in solidum tenentur, if there be several sureties, however numerous they may be, they are indivi-dually bound for the whole debt. Inst. 3, 21, 4. In parte sive in solidum, for a part or for the whole. Id. 4, 1, 16. See Id. 4, 6, 20; Id. 4, 7, 2.
IN SOLO. In the soil or ground. In solo alieno, in another’s ground. In solo proprio, in one’s own ground. 2 Steph.Comm. 20.
IN SPECIE. Specific; specifically. Thus, to de-cree performance in specie is to decree specific performance. In kind; in the same or like form. A thing is said to exist in specie when it retains its existence as a distinct individual of a particu-lar class.
IN STATU QUO. In the condition in which it was. See Status Quo. McReynolds v. Harrigfeld, 26 Idaho 26, 140 P. 1096, 1098.
IN STIPULATIONIBUS CUM QUZERITUR QUID ACTUM SIT VERBA CONTRA STIPULATOREM INTERPRETANDA SUNT. In the construction of agreements words are interpreted against the person using them. Thus, the construction of the stipulatio is against the stipulator, and the con-struction of the promissio against the promissor. Dig. 45, 1, 38, 18; Broom, Max. 599.
IN STIPULATIONIBUS, ID TEMPUS SPECTA-TUR QUO CONTRAHIMUS. In stipulations, the time when we contract is regarded. Dig. 50, 17, 144, 1.
IN STIRPES. In the law of intestate succession. According to the roots or stocks; by representa-tion; as distinguished from succession per capita. See Per Stirpes; Per Capita.
IN SUBSIDIUM. In aid.
IN SUO QUISQUE NEGOTIO IIEBETIOR EST QUAM IN ALIENO. Every one is more dull in his own business than in another’s.
IN TALI CASU EDITUM ET PROVISUM. See In Casu Proviso.
IN TANTUM. In so much; so much; so far; so greatly. Reg. Orig. 97, 106.
IN TERMINIS TERMINANTIBUS. In terms of determination; exactly in point. 11 Coke, 40b. In express or determinate terms. 1 Leon. 93.
IN TERROREM. In terror or warning; by way of threat. Applied to legacies given upon condi-tion that the recipient shall not dispute the validity or the dispositions of the will; such a condi-tion being usually regarded as a mere threat.
IN TERROREM POPULI. Lat. To the terror of the people. A technical phrase necessary in in-dictments for riots. 4 Car. & P. 373.
IN. TESTAMENTIS PLENIUS TESTATORIS IN-TENTIONEM SCRUTAMUR. In wills we more especially seek out the intention of the testator. 3 Bulst. 103; Broom, Max. 555.
IN TESTAMENTIS PLENIUS VOLUNTATES TESTANTIUM INTERPRETANTUR. Dig. 50, 17, 12. In wills the intention of testators is more es-pecially regarded. "That is to say," says Mr. Broom, (Max., 568,) "a will will receive a more liberal construction than its strict meaning, if alone considered, would permit."
IN TESTAMENTIS RATIO TACITA NON DE-BET CONSIDERAR!, SED VERBA SOLUM SPECTARI DEBENT; ADEO PER DIVINATION-EM MENTIS A VERBIS RECEDERE DURUM EST. In wills an unexpressed meaning ought not to be considered, but the words alone ought to be looked to; so hard is it to recede from the words by guessing at the intention.
IN TESTIMONIUM. Lat. In witness; in evi-dence whereof.
IN THE FIELD. Any place, on land or water, apart from permanent cantonments or fortifica-tions where military operations are being con-ducted. Hines v. Mikell, C.C.A., 259 F. 28, 30.
IN THE PEACE OF THE STATE. In definition of murder as unlawful and felonious killing of hu-man being "in the peace of the state," the quoted phrase means the same as "in the king’s peace" under the English common law, and negatives the idea that deceased was actually engaged in wag-ing war against the state. State v. Corneille, 153 La. 929, 96 So. 813, 817.
IN TOTIDEM VERBIS. In so many words; in precisely the same words; word for word.
IN TOTO. In the whole; wholly; completely; as the award is void in teto.
IN TOTO ET PARS CONTINETUR. In the whole the part also is contained. Dig. 50, 17, 113.
IN TRADITIONIBUS SCRIPTORUM, NON QUOD DICTUM EST, SED QUOD GESTUM EST, IN-SPICITUR. In the delivery of writings, not what is said, but what is done, is looked to. 9 Coke, 137a.
IN TRAJECTU. In the passage over; on the voy-age over. Sir William Scott, 3 C.Rob.Adm. 141.
IN TRANSITU. In transit; on the way or pas-sage; while passing from one person or place to another. 2 Kent.Comm. 540-552. Amory Mfg. Co. v. Gulf, etc., R. Co., 89 Tex. 419, 37 S.W. 856, 59 Am.St.Rep. 65. On the voyage. 1 C.Rob.Adm. 338.IN UTROQUE JURE. In both laws; á. e., the civil and canon law.
IN VACUO. Without object; without concoma-ants or coherente.
IN VADIO. In gage or pledge. 2 Bl.Comm. 157.
IN VENTRE SA MERE. L. Fr. In his mother’s womb; spoken of an unborn child.
IN VERAM QUANTITATEM FIDEJUSSOR TEN-EATUR, NISI PRO CERTA QUANTITATE AC-CESSIT. Let the surety be holden for the true quantity, unless he agree for a certain quantity, Bean v. Parker, 17 Mass. 597.
IN VERBIS, NON VERBA, SED RES ET RATIO, QUiERENDA EST. Jenk. Cent. 132. In the con-struction of words, not the mere words, but the thing and the meaning, are to be inquired after.
IN VINCULIS. In chains; in actual custody. Gilb. Forum Rom. 97.
Applied also, figuratively, to the condition of a person who is compelled to submit to terms which oppression and his necessities impose on him. 1 Story, Eq.Jur. § 302.
IN VIRIDI OBSERVANTIA. Present to the minds of men, and in full force and operation.
IN VOCIBUS VIDENDUM NON A QUO SED AD QUID SUMATUR. In discourses, it is to be con-sidered not from what, but to what, it is advanced. Ellesmere, Postn. 62.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. The initial words of the concluding clause in deeds: "In witness where-of the said parties have hereunto set their hands," etc. A translation of the Latin phrase "in cujus rei testimonium."
INADEQUATE. Insufficient; disproportionate; lacking in effectiveness or in conformity to a pre-scribed standard or measure.
INADEQUATE CONSIDERATION. One not ade-quate or equal in value to the thing conveyed. Farrell v. Third Nat. Bank, 20 Tenn.App. 540, 101 S.W.2d 158, 163.
INADEQUATE DAMAGES. See Damages.
INADEQUATE PRICE. A term applied to indi-cate the want of a sufficient consideration for a thing soid, or such a price as would ordinarily be entirely incommensurate with its intrinsic value. State v. Purcell, 131 Mo. 312, 33 S.W. 13.
INADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW. Within the meaning of the rule that equity will not entertain a suit if there is an adequate remedy at law, this does not mean that there must be a failure to col-lect money or damages at law, but the remedy is considered inadequate if it is, in its nature and character, unfitted or not adapted to the end in View, as, for instance, when the relief sought is preventive rather than compensatory. Cruick-shank v. Bidwell, 20 S.Ct. 280, 176 U.S. 73, 44 L. Ed. 377.INADMISSIBLE. That which, under the estab-lished rules of law, cannot be admitted or receiv-ed; e. g., parol evidence to contradict a written contract.
INADVERTENCE. Heedlessness; lack of atten-tion; want of tare; carelessness; failure of a per-son to pay careful and prudent attention to the progress of a negotiation or a proceeding in court by which his rights may be affected. Used chiefly in statutory enumerations of the grounds on which a judgment or decree may be vacated or set aside; as, "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Skinner v. Terry, 107 N.C. 103, 12 S.E. 118. State ex rel. Regis v. District Court of Sec-ond Judicial Dist. in and for Silver Bow County, 102 Mont. 74, 55 P.2d 1295, 1298.
INAEDIFICATIO. Lat. In the civil law. Build-ing on another’s land with one’s own materials, or on one’s own land with another’s materials.
INALIENABLE. Not subject to alienation; the characteristic of those things which cannot be bought or sold or transferred from one person to another, such as rivers and public highways, and certain personal rights; e. g., liberty.
INAUGURATION. The act of installing or in-ducting jato office with formal ceremonies, as the coronation of a sovereign, the inauguration of a president or governor, or the consecration of a prelate. A word applied by the Romans to the ceremony of dedicating a temple, or raising a man to the priesthood, af ter the augurs had been con-sulted.
INBLAURA. In old records. Profit or product of ground. Cowell.
INBOARD. In maritime law, and particularly with reference to the stowage of cargo, this term is contrasted with "outboard." It does not neces-sarily mean under deck, but is applied to a cargo so piled or stowed that it does not project over the "board" (side or rail) of the vessel. Allen v. St. Louis Ins. Co., 46 N.Y.Super.Ct. 181.
INBORIL In Saxon law. A security, pledge, or hypotheca, consisting of the chattels of a person unable to obtain a personal "borg," or surety.
INBOROW. A forecourt or gate-house. A cer-tain barony was inborow and outborow between England and Scotland. Cowell.
INBOUND COMMON. An uninclosed common, marked out, however, by boundaries.
INC. Incorporated. Goldberg, Bowen & Co. v. Dimick, 169 Cal. 187, 146 P. 672, 673; Norwood Bldg. v. Jackson, • Tex.Civ.App., 175 S.W.2d 262, 265.
INCAPACITY. Want of capacity; want of pow-er or ability to take or dispose; want of legal abil-ity to act. Ellicott v. Ellicott, 90 Md. 321, 45 A. 183, 48 L.R.A. 58. Inefficiency; incompetency; lack of adequate power. Travelers’ Ins. Co. v. Richmond, Tex.Com.App., 291 S.W. 1085, 1087.

Legal Incapacity

This expression Implies that the person in vlew has the right vested in him, but is prevented by some impediment from exercising it; as in the case of minors, femes covert, lunatics, etc. An administrator has no right until letters are issued to him. Therefore he cannot benefit (as respects the time before obtaining letters) by a saving clause in a statute of limitations in favor of persons under a legal In-capacity to sue. Cates v. Brattle, 1 Root (Conn.) 187.

Total incapacity

In Workmen’s Compensation Acts, such disqualification from performing the usual tasks of a workman that he can-not procure and retain employment. Western Indemnity Co. v. Corder, Tex.Civ.App., 249 S.W. 316, 317; Georgia Casualty Co. v. Ginn, Tex.Civ.App., 272 S.W. 601, 603; Moore v. Peet Bros. Mfg. Co., 99 Kan. 443, 162 P. 295, 296. Incapacity for work is total not only so long as the injured employee is unable to do any work of any char-acter, but also while he remains unable, as a result of his injury, either to resume his former occupation or to pro-cure remunerative employment at a different occupation suitable to his impaired capacity. Such period of total In-capacity may be followed by a period of partial incapacity, during which the injured employee is able both to procure and to perforen work at some occupation suitable to bis then-existing capacity, but less remunerative than the work in which he was engaged at the time of bis injury. That situation constitutes "partial incapacity." Austin Bros. Bridge Co. v. Whitmire, 121 S.E. 345, 346, 31 Ga.App. 560. Synonymous with "total disability." Consolidation Coal Co. v. Crislip, 289 S. W. 270, 273, 217 Ky. 371. See Disabili-ty.
INCARCERATION. Imprisonment; confinement in a jail or penitentiary. See Imprisonment.
This term is seldom used in law, though found occasion-ally in statutes. When so used, it appears always to mean confinement by competent public authority or under due legal process, whereas "imprisonment" may be effected by a private person without warrant of law. and if unjustifi-able is called "false imprisonment." No occurrence of such a phrase as "falso incarceration" has been noted.
INCASTELLARE. To make a building serve as a castle. Jacob.
INCAUSTUM, or ENCAUSTUM. Ink. Fleta, 1, 2, c. 27, § 5.
INCAUTE FACTUM PRO NON FACTO HABE-TUR. A thing done unwarily (or unadvisedly) will be taken as not done. Dig. 28, 4, 1.
INCENDIARY. A house-burner; one guilty of arson; one who maliciously and willfully sets an-other person’s building on fire.
INCENDIUM 1:ERE ALIENO NON EXUIT DEBI-TOREM. Cod. 4, 2, 11. A fire does not release a debtor from his debt.
INCEPTION. Commencement; opening; initia-tion. The beginning of the operation of a contract or will, or of a note, mortgage, lien, etc.; the be-ginning of a cause or suit in court. Oriental Hotel Co. v. Griffiths, 88 Tex. 574, 33 S.W. 652, 30 L.R.A. 765, 53 Am.St.Rep. 790.
INCERTA PRO NULLIS HABENTUR. Uncer-tain things are held for nothing. Dav.Ir.K.B. 33.
INCERTA QUANTITAS VITIAT ACTUAL 1 Rolle R. 465. An uncertain quantity vitiates the act.
INCERTiE PERSONAS. Uncertain persons, as posthumous heirs, a corporation, the poor, a juristic person, or persons who cannot be ascertain-ed until after the execution of a will. Sohm.Inst. Rom.L.104, 458.
INCEST. The crime of sexual intercourse or co-habitation between a man and woman who are re-lated to each other within the degrees wherein marriage is prohibited by law. People v. Strat-ton, 141 Cal. 604, 75 P. 166. Signs v. State, 35 Okl. Cr. 340, 250 P. 938, 940.
INCESTUOSL Those offspring incestuously be-gotten. Mack.Rom.L. § 143.
INCESTUOUS ADULTERY. The elements of this offense are that defendant, being married to one person, has had sexual intercourse with an-other related to the defendant within the prohib-ited degrees. Cook v. State, 11 Ga. 53, 56 Am.Dec. 410.
INCESTUOUS BASTARDS. Incestuous bastards are those who are produced by the illegal connec-tion of two persons who are relations within the degrees prohibited by law. Civ.Code La. art. 183.
INCH. A measure of length, containing one-twelfth part of a foot; originally supposed equal to three barleycorns.
Inch of candle. A mode of sale at one time in use among merchants. A notice is first given upon the exchange, or other public place, as to the time of sale. The goods to be sold are divided into lots, printed papers of which, and the condi-tions of sale, are published. When the sale takes place, a small piece of candle, about an inch long is kept burning, and the last bidder, when the candle goes out, is entitled to the lot or parcel for which he bids. Wharton.
Inch of water. The unit for the measure-ment of a volume of water or of hydraulic power, being the quantity of water which, under a given constant head or pressure, will escape through an orifice one inch square (or a circular orifice hav-ing a diameter of one inch) in a vertical plane. Jackson Milling Co. v. Chandos, 82 Wis. 437, 52 N. W. 759.
Miner’s inch. The quantity of water which will escape from a ditch or reservoir through an ori-fice in its side one inch square, the center of the orífice being six inches below the constant level of the water, equivalent to about 1.6 cubic feet of water per minute. Defined by statute in Colorado as "an inch-square orifice under a five-inch pres-sure, a five-inch pressure being from the top of the orifice of the box put into the banks of the ditch to the surface of water." Mills’ Ann.St.Colo. § 4643 (Comp.Laws 1921, § 4111). See Longmire v. Smith, 26 Wash. 439, 67 P. 246, 58 L.R.A. 308. The standard miner’s inch of water, as fixed by St.Ca1.1901, p. 660, is the equivalent of 11/2 cubic feet of water per minute measured through any aperture or orifice, making it equivalent to one-f ortieth of a second foot. Lillis v. Silver Creek & Panoche Land & Water Co., 32 Cal.App. 668, 163 P. 1040, 1043.
INCHARTARE. To give, or grant, and assure anything by a written instrument.
INCHOATE. Imperfect; partial; unfinished; be-gun, but not completed; as a contract not execut-ed by all the parties. Good v. Crist, 23 Ohio App. 484, 156 N.E. 146, 148. Pacific Freight Lines v. Pioneer Express Co., 39 Cal.App.2d 609, 103 P.2d 1056, 1058.
INCHOATE DOWER. A wife’s interest in the lands of her husband during his life, which may become a right of dower upon his death. Smith v. Shaw, 150 Mass. 297, 22 N.E. 924.
A contingent clalm or possibility of acquIring dower by outliving husband and arises, not out of contract, but as an institution of law constituting a mere chose in action incapable of transfer by separate grant but susceptible of extinguishment, which is effected by wlfe joining with husband in deed, which operates as release or satisfactlon of interest and not as conveyance. Auerbach v. Chase Nat. Bank of City of New York, 296 N.Y.S. 487, 489, 251 App. Div. 543.
INCHOATE INSTRUIVIENT. Instruments which the law requires to be registered or recorded are said to be "inchoate" prior to registration, in that they are then good only between the parties and privies and as to persons having notice. Wilkins v. McCorkle, 112 Tenn. 688, 80 S.W. 834.
INCHOATE INTEREST. An interest in real es-tate which is not a present interest, but which may ripen into a vested estate, if not barred, ex-tinguished, or divested. Rupe v. Hadley, 113 Ind. 416, 16 N.E. 391.
INCHOATE LIEN. The lien of a judgment, from the day of its entry, subject to be defeated by its vacation, becoming a consummate lien if the mo-tion for a new trial is thereafter overruled; such lien then relating back to the original entry of the judgment. Sterling v. Parker-Washington Co., 185 Mo.App. 192, 170 S.W. 1156, 1159.
INCHOATE RIGHT. In patent law. The right of an inventor to his invention while his applica-tion is pending which matures as "property" when the patent issues. Mullins Mfg. Co. v. Booth, C. C.A.Mich., 125 F.2d 660, 664.
INCIDENT. Used both substantively and adjec-tively of a thing which, either usually or natural-ly and inseparably, depends upon, appertains to, or follows another that is more worthy. Watts v. Copeland, 170 S.C. 449, 170 S.E. 780, 783. Used as a noun, it denotes anything which inseparably belongs to, or is connected with, or inherent in, another thing, called the "principal." In this sense, a court-baron is incident to a manor. Also, less strictly, it denotes anything which is usually con-nected with another, or connected for some pur-poses, though not inseparably. Thus, the right of alienation is incident to an estate in fee-simple, though separable in equity. Cromwell v. Phipps, Sur., 1 N.Y.S. 278; Mount Carmel Fruit Co. v. Webster, 140 Cal. 183, 73 P. 826.
INCIDENTAL. Depending upon or appertaining to something else as primary; something neces-sary, appertaining to, or depending upon another which is termed the principal; something inci-dental to the main purpose. The Robin Goodfel-low, D.C.Wash., 20 F.2d 924, 925.
The term "incidental powers," within the rule that a corporation possesses only those powers which its charter confers upon rt, either expressly or as Incidental to its ex-istence, means such powers as ‘are directly and immediately appropriate to the execution of the powers expressly grant-ed and exist only to enable the corporation to carry out the purpose of its creation. State ex inf. Harvey v. Mis-souri Athletic Club, 261 Mo. 576, 170 S.W. 904. 909, L.R.A. 1915C, 876, Ann.Cas.1916D, 931; State ex rel. Barrett v. First Nat. Bank, 297 Mo. 397, 249 S.W. 619, 622, 30 A.L.R. 918.
INCIDENTAL TO EMPLOYMENT. A risk is "incidental to employment" within Workmen’s Compensation Act, when it belongs to or is con-nected with what a workman has to do in fulfill-ing his contract of service. Barresse v. Standard Silk Dyeing Co., 10 N.J.Misc. 892, 161 A. 653, 654.
INCIDERE. Lat. In the civil and old English law. To fall into; to fall out; to happen; to come tu pass. Calvin. To fall upon or under; to become subject or hable to. Incidere in legem, to incur the penalty of a law. Brissonius.
INCILE. Lat. In the civil law. A trench. A place sunk by the side of a stream, so called be-cause it is cut (incidatur) into or through the stone or earth. Dig. 43, 21, 1, 5. The term seems to have included ditches (fossce) and wells, (pu-tei.)
INCINERATION. Burning to ashes; destruction of a substance by fire, as, the corpse of a murder-ed person.
INCIPITUR. Lat. It is begun; it begins. In old practice, when the pleadings in an action at law, instead of being recited at large on the issue-roll, were set out merely by their commencements, this was described as entering the incipitur; i. e., the beginning.
INCISED WOUND. In medical jurisprudence. A cut or incision on a human body; a wound made by a cutting instrument, such as a razor. Burrill, Circ.Ev. 693; Whart. & S. Med. Jur. § 808.
INCITE. To arouse; urge; provoke; encourage; spur on; goad; stir up; instigate; set in motion; as, to "incite" a riot. Also, generally, in criminal law to instigate, persuade, or move another to commit a crime; in this sense nearly synonymous with "abet." Long v. State, 23 Neb. 33, 36 N.W. 310; United States v. Ault, D.C.Wash., 263 F. 800, 810; Commonwealth v. Egan, 113 Pa.Super. 375, 173 A. 764, 766.
INCIVILE. Lat. Irregular; improper; out of the due course of law.
INCIVILE EST, NISI TOTA LEGE PERSPECTA, UNA ALIQUA PARTICULA EJUS PROPOSITA, JUDICARE, VEL RESPONDERE. It is improp-er, without looking at the whole of a law, to give judgment or advice, upon a view of any une clause of it. Dig. 1, 3, 24.

INCIVILE EST. NISI TOTA SENTENTIA IN-SPECTA, DE ALIQUA PARTE JUDICARE. It is irregular, or legally improper, to pass an opinion upon any part of a sentence, without examining the whole. Hob. 171a.
INCIVISM. Unfriendliness to the state or gov-ernment of which one is a citizen.
INCLAUSA. In old records. A home close or inclosure near the house. Paroch. Antiq. 31; Cowell.
INCLOSE. To surround; to encompass; to bound; fence, or hem in, on all sides. White Chapel Mem-orial Ass’n v. Willson, 260 Mich. 238, 244 N.W. 460. To shut up. "To inclose a jury," in Scotch prac-tice, is to shut them up in a room by themselves. Bell. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Harris, 28 Kan. 210; Campbell v. Gilbert, 57 Ala. 569.
INCLOSED LANDS. Lands which are actually inclosed and surrounded with fences. Kimball v. Carter, 95 Va. 77, 27 S.E. 823, 38 L.R.A. 570.
INCLOSURE. In English law. Act of freeing land from rights of common, commonable rights, and generally all rights which obstruct cultivation and the productive employment of labor on the soil.
Land surrounded by some visible obstruction. Whittet v. Bertsch, 39 R.I. 31, 97 A. 18, 19, L.R.A. 1916E, 710. An artificial fence around one’s estate. See Close.
INCLOSURE ACTS. English statutes regulating the subject of inclosure. The most notable was that of 1801.
INCLOSURE COMMISSION ACT, 1845. The statute 8 and 9 Vict. c. 118, establishing a board of commissioners for England and Wales and em-powering them, on the application of persons in-terested to the amount of one-third of the value of the land, and provided the consent of persons in-terested to the amount of two-thirds of the land and of the lord of the manor (in case the land be waste of a manor) be ultimately obtained, to in-quire into the case and to report to parliament as to the expediency of making the inclosure. 1 Steph.Com. 655.
INCLUDE. (Lat. inclaudere, to shut in, keep within). To confine within, hold as in an inclo-sure, take in, attain, shut up, contain, inclose, comprise, comprehend, embrace, involve. Includ-ing may, according to context, express an en-largement and have the meaning of and or in ad-dition to, or merely specify a particular thing al-ready included within general words theretofore used. Miller v. Johnston, 173 N.C. 62, 91 S.E. 593. Prairie Oil and Gas Co. v. Motter, D.C.Kan., 1 F.Supp. 464, 468; Decorated Metal Mf g. Co. v. U. S., 12 Ct.Cust.App. 140; In re Sheppard’s Es-tate, 179 N.Y.S. 409, 412, 189 App.Div. 370; Rose v. State, 184 S.W. 60, 61, 122 Ark. 509; United States ex rel. Lyons v. Hines, 103 F.2d 737, 740, 70 App.D.C. 36, 122 A.L.R. 674.

INCLUSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS. The inclusion of one is the exclusion of another. The certain designation of one person is an ab. solute exclusion of all others. 11 Coke, 58b; Bur-gin v. Forbes, 293 Ky. 456, 169 S.W.2d 321, 325.
INCLUSIVE. Embraced; comprehended; com-prehending the stated limits or extremes. Oppos-ed to "exclusive."
INCLUSIVE SURVEY. In land law, one which includes within its boundaries prior claims except-ed from the computation of the area within such boundaries and excepted in the grant. Stockton v. Morris, 19 S.E. 531, 39 W.Va. 432.
INCOLA. Lat. In the civil law. An inhabitant; a dweller or resident. Properly, one who has transferred his domicile to any country.
INCOLAS DOMICILIUM FACIT. Residence creates domicile. Arnold v. United Ins. Co., 1 Johns. Cas., N.Y., 363, 366.
INCOME. The return in money from one’s busi-ness, labor, or capital invested; gains, profits, or private revenue. In re Slocum, 169 N.Y. 153, 62 N.E. 130.
The gain derived from capital, from labor or effort, or both combined, including proflt or gain through sale or conversion of capital; income is not a gain accruing to capital or a growth in the value of the investment, but is a gain, a proflt, something of exchangeable value, proceed-ing from the property, severed from the capital, however invested or employed, and coming in, being derived, that is, received or drawn by the recipient for his separate use, benefit, and disposal. Goodrich v. Edwards, 41 S.Ct. 390, 255 U.S. 527, 65 L.Ed. 758. The true increase in amount of wealth which comes to a person during a stated period of time. Commissioner of Corporation and Taxation v. Filoon, 310 Mass. 374, 38 N.E.2d 693, 700.
INCOME TAX. A tax relating to the product or income from property or from business pursuits; a tax on the yearly profits arising from property, professions, trades, or offices; a tax on a person’s income, emoluments, profits, and the like, or the excess thereof over a certain amount. Interstate Bond Co. v. State Revenue Commission of Georgia, 50 Ga.App. 744, 179 S.E. 559.
An income tax Is not levied upon property, funds, or profits, but upon the right of an individual or corporation to receive income or profits. Paine v. City of Oshkosh, 190 Wis. 69, 208 N.W. 790, 791. Under various constitutional and statutory provisions, a tax on incomes is sometimes said to be an excise tax and not a tax on property, Hatties-burg Grocery Co. v. Robertson, 126 Miss. 34, 88 So. 4, 5, 25 A.L.R. 748; nor on business, but a tax on the proceeds arising therefrom, Young v. Illinois Athletic Club, 310 III. 75, 141 N.E. 369, 371, 30 A.L.R. 985. But in other cases an income tax ís said to be a property and not a personal or excise tax: Commonwealth v. P. Horillard Co., 129 Va. 74, 105 S.E. 683, 684; Kennedy v. Commissioner of Corpora-tions & Taxation, 256 Mass. 426, 152 N.E. 747, 748.
An "excise tax" is an indirect charge for the prívilege of following an occupation or trade, or carrying on a busi-ness; while an "income tax" is a direct tax imposed upon income, and ís as directly imposed as is a tax on land. United States v. Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co., D.C.Pa., 262 F. 188, 190.
INCOME TAX DEFICIENCY. Exists whenever taxpayer has failed to make adequate return of income, notwithstanding lack of determination by commissioner or his agents. Moore v. Cleveland Ry. Co., C.C.A.Ohio, 108 F.2d 656, 659.

INCOMMODUM NON SOLVIT ARGUMENTUM. An inconveniente does not destroy an argument.
INCOMMUNICATION. In Spanish law. The condition of a prisoner who is not permitted to see or to speak with any person visiting him dur-ing his confinement. A person accused cannot be subjected to this treatment unless it be expressly ordered by the judge, for some grave offense, and it cannot be continued for a longer period than is absolutely necessary. This precaution is resorted to for the purpose of preventing the accused from knowing beforehand the testimony of the witness-es, or from attempting to corrupt them and con-cert such measures as will efface the traces of his guilt. As soon, therefore, as the danger of his doing so has ceased, the interdiction ceases like-wise. Escriche.
INCONMUTABLE. Not capable of or entitled to be commuted. See Commutation.
INCOMPATIBILITY. Incapability of existing or being exercised together.
Thus the relations of landlord and of tenant cannot exist in one man at the same time In reference to the same land. "Incompatíbility" which at common law operates to vacate one office by reason of incumbency of another exists when the character and nature of offices or relation to each other are such that one person should not hold both because of the contrariety and antagonism which would result toward incumbent of one office in attempt to discharge dutles of other office faithfully and impartially. It is apparent when the holder of one office is subordínate to or has supervísion over the other, or has the power of appotntment, removal, or punishment of that other, or the audit of his accounts, or the regulation of his compensation. State ex rel. Schenck v. Barrett, 121 Conn. 237, 184 A. 379, 381.
INCOMPATIBLE. Not compatible, incapable of harmonizing or agreeing, mutually repelling, in-congruous. And two or more relations, offices, functions, or rights which cannot naturally, or may not legally, exist in or be exercised by the same person at the same time, are said to be incompati-ble. People v. Green, 46 How.Prac., N.Y., 170; Com. v. Sheriff, 4 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 276; State v. Johnson, 37 N.M. 280, 21 P.2d 813, 89 A.L.R. 1368. See, also, Incompatibility.
INCOMPETENCY. Lack of ability, legal quali-fication, or fitness to discharge the required duty. In re Leonard’s Estate, 95 Mich. 295, 54 N.W. 1082.
In New York, the word "incompetency" Is used to desíg-nate the condition or legal status of a person who is unable or unfitted to manage his own affairs by reason of Insanity, imbecility, or feeble-mindedness, and for whom, therefore, a committee may be appointed; and such a person ís desIg-nated and "Incompetent." In re Palestine’s Estate, 270 N. Y.S. 844, 151 Misc. 100.
In French law. Inability or insufficiency of a judge to try a cause brought before him, proceed-ing from lack of jurisdiction.
INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE. Evidente which is not admissible under the established rules of evi-dence; evidence which the law does not permit to be presented at all, or in relation to the particular matter, on account of lack of originality or of some defect in the witness, the document, or the nature of the evidence itself. Texas Brewing Co. v. Dickey, Tex.Civ.App., 43 S.W. 578; Bell v. Bumstead, 14 N.Y.S. 697, 60 Hun. 580.

As applied to evIdence, the word -incompetent" means not proper to be received; inadmissible, as distinguished from that which the court should admit for the considera-tion of the jury, though they may not find it worthy of credence.
INCONCLUSIVE. That which may be disproved or rebutted; not shutting out further proof or consideration. Applied to evidente ami presump-tions.
INCONSISTENT. Mutually repugnant or contra-dictory; contrary, the one to the other, so that both cannot- stand, but the acceptance or establish-ment of the one implies the abrogation or aban-donment of the other; as, in speaking of "incon-sistent defenses," or the repeal by a statute of "all laws inconsistent herewith." Borough of Oakland v. Board of Conservation and Develop-ment, 98 N.J.L. 99, 118 A. 787, 788. Berry v. City of Fort Worth, Tex.Civ.App., 110 S.W.2d 95, 103.
INCONSULTO. Lat. In the civil law. Unadvis-edly; unintentionally. Dig. 28, 4, 1.
INCONTESTABILITY CLAUSE. In life policy means that within the limits of the coverage, the policy shall stand unaffected by any defense that it was invalíd in its inception or thereafter became invalid by reason of a condition broken by insured. Berkshire Life Ins. Co. v. Weinig, 290 N.Y. 6, 47 N.E.2d 418, 421. Jolley v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 199 N.C. 269, 154 S.E. 400, 402.
INCONTINENCE. Want of chastity; indulgente in unlawful carnal connection. State v. Hewlin, 128 N.C. 571, 37 S.E. 952.
INCONTINENTI. See In Continenti.
INCONVENIENCE. In the rule that statutes should be so construed as to avoid "inconveni-ente," this means, as applied to the public, the sac-rifice or jeoparding of important public interests or hampering the legitimate activities of govern-ment or the transaction of public business, and, as applied to individuals, serious hardship or in-justice. Black, Interp.Laws, 102; Betts v. U. S., C.C.A.Mass., 132 F. 237, 65 C.C.A. 452.
INCOPOLITUS. A proctor or vicar.
INCORPORALIA BELLO NON ADQUIRUNTUR. Incorporeal things are not acquired by war. 6 Maule & S. 104.
INCORPORAMUS. We incorporate. One of the words by which a corporation may be created in England. 1 Bl.Comm. 473; 3 Steph.Comm. 173.
INCORPORATE. To create a corporation; to confer a corporate franchise upon determinate persons.
To declare that another document shall be tak-en as part of the document in which the declara-tion is made as much as if it were set out at length therein. Railroad Co. v. Cupp, 8 Ind.App. 388, 35 N.E. 703.
INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY. A society of attorneys and solicitors whose function it is to carry out the acts of parliament and orders of
court with reference to articled clerks; to keep an alphabetical roll of solicitors; to issue certifi-cates to persons cluly admitted and enrolled, and to exercise a general control over the conduct of solicitors in practice, and to bring cases of mis-conduct before the judges. 3 Steph. Com. 217.
INCORPORATION. The act or process of form-ing or creating a corporation; the formation of a legal or political body, with the quality of per-petual existence and succession, unless limited by the act of incorporation. Abbott v. Limited Mut. Compensation Ins. Co., 30 Cal.App.2d 157, 85 P.2d 961, 964.
The method of making one document of any kind become a part of another separate document by referring to the former in the latter, and de-claring that the former shall be taken and con-sidered as a part of the latter the same as if it were fully set out therein. This is more fully described as "incorporation by reference." If the one document is copied at length in the other, it is called "actual incorporation."
In the civil law. The union of one domain to another.
INCORPOREAL. Without body; not of material nature; the opposite of "corporeal," (q. v.).
INCORPOREAL CHATTELS. A class of incor-poreal rights growing out of or incident to things personal; such as patent-rights and copyrights. 2 Steph.Comm. 72. See Boreel v. New York, 2 Sandf. (N.Y.) 559.
INCORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS. See Here-ditaments.
INCORPOREAL PROPERTY. In the civil law. That which consists in legal right merely. The same as choses in action at common law.
INCORPOREAL THINGS. In the civil law. Things which can neither be seen nor touched, such as consist in rights only, such as the mind alone can perceive. Inst. 2, 2; Civ. Code La. art. 460; Sullivan v. Richardson, 33 Fla. 1, 14 So. 692.
INCORRIGIBLE. Incapable of being corrected, amended, or improved; with respect to juvenile offenders, unmanageable by parents or guardians. People v. Purcell, 70 Colo. 399, 201 P. 881. Shinn v. Barrow, Tex.Civ.App., 121 S.W.2d 450, 451.
INCORRIGIBLE ROGUE. A species of rogue or offender, described in the statutes 5 Geo. IV. c. 83, and 1 & 2 Vict. c. 38. 4 Steph.Comm. 309.
INCORRUPTIBLE. That which cannot be affect-ed by immoral or debasing influences, such as bribery or the hope of gain or advancement.
INCREASE. Enlargement, growth, development, increment, addition, accession, extension, produc-tion, profit, interest, issue. Heitzig v. Goetten, 347 Ill. 619, 180 N.E. 428, 433. The produce of land; the offspring of animals. Sorrells v. Sigel-Cam-pion Live Stock Commission Co., 27 Colo.App. 154, 148 P. 279, 280.

INCREASE, AFFIDAVIT OF. Affidavit of pay-ment of increased costs, produced on taxation.
INCREASE, COSTS OF. In English law. It was formerly a practice with the jury to award to the successful party in an action the nominal sum of 40s. only for his costs; and the court assessed by their owñ officer the actual amount of the success-ful party’s costs; and the amount so assessed, over and aboye the nominal sum awarded by the jury, was thence called "costs of increase." Lush, Com. Law Pr. 775. The practice has now wholly ceased. Rapal. & Law.
INCREMENT. An increasing, growth in bulk, quantity, number, value, etc.; enlargement, in-crease. That which is gained or added; the act or process of increasing, augmenting, or growing; enlargement, that which is added; increase; op-posed to decrement. In re Corning’s Will, 289 N. Y.S. 1101, 1103, 160 Misc. 434.
INCREMENTUM. Lat. Increase or improve-ment, opposed to decrementum or abatement.
INCRIMINATE. To charge with crime; to ex-pose to an accusation or charge of crime; to in-volve oneself or another in a criminal prosecution or the danger thereof; as, in the rule that a witness is not bound to give testimony which would tend to incriminate him. In re Dendy, Tex. Civ.App., 175 S.W.2d 297, 302.
INCRIMINATING ADMISSION. An acknowledg ment of facts tending to establish guilt. People v. Gibbs, 349 Ill. 83, 181 N.E. 628, 630.
INCRIMINATING CLRCUMSTANCE. A fact or circumstance, collateral to the fact of the commis-sion of a crime, which tends to show either that such a crime has been committed or that some particular person committed it. Davis v. State, 51 Neb. 301, 70 N.W. 984.
INCRIMINATORY STATEMENT. A statement which tends to establish guilt of the accused or from which, with other facts, his guilt may be in-ferred, or which tends to disprove some defense. Shellman v. State, 157 Ga. 788, 122 S.E. 205, 207.
INCROACHMENT. An unlawful gaining upon the right or possession of another. See Encroach-ment.
INCULPATE. To impute blame or guilt; to ac-cuse ; to involve in guilt or crime.
INCULPATORY. In the law of evidence. Going or tending to establish guilt; intended to estab-lish guilt; criminative. Burra Circ. Ev. 251, 252; People v. White, 35 Cal.App.2d 61, 94 P.2d 617, 621.
INCUMBENT. A person who is in present posses-sion of an office; one who is legal]y authorized to discharge the duties of an office. State v. Blake-more, 15 S.W. 960, 1Q4 Mo,. 340.
In ecclesiastical law, the term signifies a clergy-man who is in possession of a benefice.
/NCUMBER. To incumber land is to make it sub-ject to a charge or liability; e. g., by mortgaging
it. Incumbrances include not only mortgages and other voluntary charges, but also liens, lites pen-dentes, registered judgments, and writs of execu-ton, etc. Sweet; Newhall v. Insurance Co., 52 Me. 181.
INCUMBRANCE. Any right to, or interest in, land which may subsist in another to the dirninu-tion of its value, but consistent with the passing of the fee. Huyck v. Andrews, 113 N.Y. 81, 20 N. E. 581, 3 L.R.A. 789, 10 Am.St.Rep. 432; Miller v. Schwinn, Inc., 113 F.2d 748, 751, 752, 753, 72 App. D.C. 282.
A claim, lien, charge, or liability attached to and binding real property. Harrison v. Railroad Co., 91 Iowa, 114, 58 N.W. 1081; Johnson v. Bridge, 60 Cal.App. 629, 213 P. 512, 513. An incumbrance may be a mortgage, Funk v. Voneida, 11 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 112, 14 Am.Dec. 617; a judgment lien, Bowman v. Franklin Ins. Co., 40 Md. 631; an at-tachment, Kelsey v. Remer, 43 Conn. 129, 21 Am. Rep. 638; an inchoate right of dower, Bigelow v. Hubbard, 97 Mass. 195; a mechanic’s lien, Redmon v. Insurance Co., 51 Wis. 293, 8 N.W. 226, 37 Am. Rep. 830; a lease, Shunk v. Fuller, 118 Kan. 682, 236 P. 449, 451; Estep v. Bailey, 94 Or. 59, 185 P. 227, 229; restriction in deed, Hyman v. Boyle, 239 Mich. 357, 214 N.W. 163, 164; encroachment of a building, Gamorsil Realty Corporation v. Graef, 220 N.Y.S. 221, 222, 128 Misc. 596; an easement or right of way, Krotzer v. Clark, 178 Cal. 736, 174 P. 657, 658; Thackeray v. Knight, 57 Utah, 21, 192 P. 263, 265; accrued and unpaid taxes, Ex parte Helm, 209 Ala. 1, 95 So. 546; the statutory right of redemption, Roy v. F. M. Martin & Son, 16 Ala.App. 650, 81 So. 142, 143.
The term "incumbrance" is sometimes used to denote a burden or charge on personal property as e. g. a chattel mortgage on a stock of goods. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Jones, 31 Ariz. 8, 250 P. 248, 251.
INCUMBRANCER. The holder of an incum-brance, e. g., a mortgage, on the estate of another. De Voe v. Rundle, 33 Wash. 604, 74 P. 836.
INCUMBRANCES, COVENANT AGAINST. See Covenant.
INCUR. To have liabilities cast upon one by act or operation of law, as distinguished from con-tract, where the party acts arlirmatively. Beek-man v. Van Dolsen, 70 Hun, 288, 24 N.Y.S. 414. Boise Development Co. v. City of Boise, 26 Idaho 347, 143 P. 531, 534.
INCURABLE DISEASE. Any disease which has reached an incurable stage in the patient affficted therewith, according to general state of knowl-edge of the medical profession. Freeman v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 54 Okl. 531, 154 P. 56, 57, L.R.A.1916D, 436; State Board of Medical Examiners v. Jordan, 92 Wash. 234, 158 P. 982, 985.
INCURRAMENTUM. L. Lat. The liability to a fine, penalty, or amercement. Cowell.
INDE. Lat. Thence; thenceforth; thereof; thereupon; for that cause.

INDE DATiE LEGES NE FORTIOR OMNIA POS-SET. Laws are made to prevent the stronger from having the power to do everything. Dav. Ir. K. B. 36.
INDEBITATUS. Lat. Indebted. Nunquam in-debitatus, never indebted. The title of the plea substituted in England for nil debet.
INDEBITATUS ASSUMPSIT. Lat. Being indebt-ed, he promised or undertook. That form of the action of assumpsit in which the declaration al-leges a debt or obligation to be due from the de-fendant, and then avers that, in consideration thereof, he promised to pay or discharge the same.
This form of action is brought to recover in damages the amount of the debt or demand and upon the trial the jury will, according to evidence, give verdict for whole or part of that sum; 3 Bla.Com. 155; Selw.N.P. 68; whereas debt and covenant proceed directly for the debt, and dam-ages are given only for the detention of the debt.
INDEBITI SOLUTIO. Lat. In the civil and Scotch law. A payment of what is not due. When made through ignorance or by mistake, the amount paid might ,be recovered back by an ac-tion termed "conditio indebiti." (Dig. 12, 6.) Bell.
INDEBITUM. In the civil law. Not due or owing. (Dig. 12, 6.) Calvin.
INDEBTEDNESS. The state of being in debt, without regard to the a.bility or inability of the party to pay the same. 1 Story, Eq. Jur. 343; Jewell v. Nuhn, 173 Iowa 112, 155 N.W. 174, 177, Ann.Cas.1918D, 356. The owing of a sum of mon-ey upon a certain and express agreement. City of Perry v. Johnson, 233 P. 679, 680, 106 Okl. 32.
Strlctly the word implies an. absolute or complete lia-blity. McCrea v. First Nat. Bank, 162 Minn. 455, 203 N.W. 220; West Florida Grocery Co. v. Teutonia Fire Ins. Co., 74 Fla. 220, 77 So. 209, 211, L.R.A.1918B, 968. A contingent liability, such as that of a surety before the principal has made default, does not constitute indebtedness. On the other hand, the money need not be immediately payable. Obligations yet to become due constitute indebtedness, as well as those already due. St. Louis Perpetual Ins. Co. v. Goodfellow, 9 Mo. 149. And in a broad sense and in com-mon understanding the word may mean anything that is due and owing. Tones v. Heinzle, 75 Ind.App. 431, 130 N.E. 815, 816.
Involuntary indebtedness. Of a county, a lia-bility imposed by law, which the county is not privileged to evade or postpone. Dexter Horton Trust & Savings Bank v. Clearwater County, D.C. Idaho, 235 F. 743, 756; Wingate v. Clatsop Coun-ty, 71 Or. 94, 142 P. 561, 562.
Voluntary indebtedness. One which a county is at liberty to evade or postpone until means are provided for the payment of the expenses in-cident thereto; opposed to involuntary indebted-ness. Wingate v. Clatsop County, 71 Or. 94, 142 P. 561, 562.
INDECENCY. An act against good behavior and a just delicacy. Timmons v. U. S., C.C.A.Ohio, 85 F. 205, 30 C.C.A. 74.
This is scarcely a technlcal term of the law, and is not susceptible of exact deflnition or description in lts juridical uses. The question whether or not a given act, publica-tion, etc., is indecent is for the court and jury in the par-ticular case.
INDECENT. Offensive to common propriety; of-fending against modesty or delicacy; grossly vulgar; obscene; lewd; unseemly; unbecoming; indecorous; unfit to be seen or heard. Hutcheson v. State, 24 Ga.App. 54, 99 S.E. 715; Wood v. State, 45 Ga.App. 783, 165 S.E. 908.
Indecent assault. The act of a male person taking indecent liberties with the person of a female. Martin v. Jansen, 113 Wash. 290, 193 P. 674, 675; Commonwealth v. Gregory, 132 Pa.Super. 507, 1 A.2d 501, without her consent and against her will, but with no intent to commit the crime of rape.
Indecent exhibition. Any exhibition contra bonos mores, as the taking a dead body for the purpose of dissection or public exhibition. 2 T.R. 734.
Indecent exposure. Exposure to sight of the private parts of the body in a lewd or indecent manner in a public place. It is an indictable of-fense at common law, and by statute in many of the states. Commonwealth v. Broadland, 315 Mass. 20, 51 N.E.2d 961, 962. See, further, Ex-posure of Person.
Indecent liberties. In the statutory offense of "taking indecent liberties with the person of a female child," this phrase means such liberties as the common sense of society would regard as in-decent and improper. According to some author-ities, it involves an assault or attempt at sexual intercourse, (State v. Kunz, 90 Minn. 526, 97 N. W. 131,) but according to others, it is not neces-sary that the liberties or familiarities should have related to the private parts of the child, (People v. Hicks, 98 Mich. 86, 56 N.W. 1102.)
Indecent publications. Such as are offensive to modesty and delicacy; obscene; lewd; tending to the corruption of morals. Dunlop v. U. S., 17 S. Ct. 375, 165 U.S. 486, 41 L.Ed. 799.
Public indecency. This phrase has no fixed le-gal meaning, is vague and indefinite, and cannot, in itself, imply a definite offense. The courts, by a kind of judicial legislation, in England and the United States, have usually limited the operation of the term to public displays of the naked person, the publication, sale, or exhibition of obscene books and prints, or the exhibition of a monster, —acts which have a direct bearing on public mor-als, and affect the body of society. Irven v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 368, 136 S.W.2d 608, 609.
INDECIMABLE. In old English law. That which is not titheable, or hable to pay tithe. 2 hist. 490.
INDEFEASIBLE. That which cannot be defeat-ed, revoked, or made void. This term is usually applied to an estate or right which cannot be de-feated.
INDEFENSUS. Lat. In old English practice. Undefended; undenied by pleading. A defendant who makes no defense or plea. Blount.

INDEFINITE. Without fixed boundaries or dis-tinguishing characteristics; not definite, determín-ate, or precise. In re Knoll’s Estate, 262 N.Y.S. 619, 146 Misc. 613.
INDEFINITE FAILURE OF ISSUE. A failure of issue not merely at the death of the party whose issue are referred to, but at any subsequent period, however remote. 1 Steph.Comm. 562. A failure of issue whenever it shall happen, sooner or later, without any fixed, certain, or definite pe-riod within which it must happen. 4 Kent.Comm. 274. Anderson v. Jackson, 16 Johns. (N.Y.) 399, 8 Am.Dec. 330.
INDEFINITE LEGACY. See Legacy.
INDEFINITE NUMBER. A number which may be increased or diminished at pleasure.
INDEFINITE PAYMENT. In Scotch law. Pay-ment without specification. Indefinite payment is where a debtor, owing several debts to one cred-itor, makes a payment to the creditor, without specifying to which of the debts he means the pay-ment to be applied. See Bell.
INDEFINITUM AEQUIPOLLET UNIVERSALL The undefined is equivalent to the whole. 1 Vent. 368.
INDEFINITUM SUPPLET LOCUM UNIVERSAL-IS. The undefined or general supplies the place of the whole. Branch. Princ. 4 Co. 77.
INDEMNIFICATUS. Lat. Indemnified. See In-demnif y.
INDEMNIFY. To save harmless; to secure against loss or damage; to give security for the reimbursement of a person in case of an anticipat-ed loss falling upon him. Hasbrouck v. Carr, 19 N.M. 586, 145 P. 133, 136.
To make good; to compensate; to make reim-bursement to one of a loss already incurred by him. Cousins v. Paxton & Gallagher Co., 98 N. W. 277, 122 Iowa 465; U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Williams, 148 Md. 289, 129 A. 660, 664.
INDEMNIS. Lat. Without hurt, harm, or dam-age; harmless.
INDEMNITEE. The person who, in a contract of indemnity, is to be indemnified or protected by the other. Hasbrouck v. Carr, 19 N.M. 586, 145 P. 133, 136.
INDEMNITOR. The person who is bound, by an indemnity contract, to indemnify or protect the other. Hasbrouck v. Carr, 19 N.M. 586, 145 P. 133, 136.
INDEMNITY. A collateral contract or assurance, by which one person engages to secure another against an anticipated loss or to prevent him from being damnified by the legal consequences of an act or f orbearance on the part of one of the par-ties or of some third person. National Bank of Tif ton v. Smith, 142 Ga. 663, 83 S.E. 526, 528, L. R.A.1915B, 1116.
The term is also used to denote a compensa-tion given to make the person whole from a loss already sustained; as where the government gives indemnity for private property taken by it for public use. Proctor v. Dillon, 235 Mass. 538, 129 N.E. 265, 269. It means, also, restitution or reim-bursement. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 51 Ga.App. 579, 181 S.E. 111.
A legislative act, assuring a general dispensa-tion from punishment or exemption from prosecu-tion to persons involved in offenses, omissions of official duty, or acts in excess of authority, is call-ed an indemnity; strictly it is an act of indemnity. Loss. See Loss.
Thus, insurance is a contract of indemnity. So an indemnifying bond is given to a sherlff who fears to pro-ceed under an execution where the property is claimed by a stranger.
INDEMNITY AGAINST LIABILITY. A con-tract to indemnify when liability of person indem-nified arises, irrespective of whether person indem-nified has suffered actual loss. Indemnity against loss, on the other hand, does not render indemnitor Hable until person indemnified makes payment or sustains loss. City of Topeka v. Ritchie, 102 Kan. 384, 170 P. 1003, 1004.
INDEMNITY BOND. A bond for the payment of a penal sum conditioned to be void if the obligor shall indemnify and save harmless the obligee against some anticipated loss.
INDEMNITY CONTRACT. A contract between two parties whereby the one undertakes and agrees to indemnify the other against loss or dam-age arising from some contemplated act on the part of the indemnitor, or from some responsibil-ity assumed by the indemnitee, or from the claim or demand of a third person, that is, to make good to him such pecuniary damage as he may suffer. See Wicker v. Hoppock, 6 Wall. 99, 18 L.Ed. 752.
INDEMNITY LANDS. Lands granted to rail-roads, in aid of their construction, being portions of the public domain, to be selected in lieu of other parcels embraced within the original grant, but which were lost to the railroad by previous dis-position or by reservation for other purposes. Altschul v. Clark, 39 Or. 315, 65 P. 991.
INDEMNITY POLICY. As distinguished from general liability policy, a policy on which no action can be maintained except to indemnify for money actually paid. Most v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., Mo.App., 196 S.W. 1064, 1065.
See Indemnity insurance and Liability insurance under Insurance.
INDEMPNIS. The old form of writing indemnis. Townsh. Pl. 19. So, indempnificatus for indemni-ficatus.
INDENIZATION. The act of making a denizen, or of naturalizing.
INDENT, n. In American law. A certificate or indented certificate issued by the government of the United States at the close of the Revolution,

for the principal or interest of the public debt. Webster; U. S. v. Irwin, 26 Fed.Cas. 546.
INDENT, v. To cut in a serrated or waiving line. In old conveyancing, if a deed was made by more parties than one, it was usual to make as many copies of it as there were parties, and each was cut or indented (either in acute angles, like the teeth of a saw, or in a waving line) at the top or side, to tally or correspond with the others, and the deed so made was called an "indenture." An-ciently, both parts were written on the same piece of parchment, with some word or letters written between them through which the parchment was cut, but afterwards, the word or letters being omitted, ihdenting carne into use, the idea of which was that the genuineness of each part might be proved by its fitting into the angles cut in the other. But at length even this was discontinued, and at present the term serves only, to give narre to the species of deed executed by two or more parties, as opposed to a deed-poli (q. v.) 2 Bl. Comm. 295.
To bind by indentures; to apprentice; as to in-dent a young man to a shoe-maker. Webster.
DTDENTURE. A deed to which two or more per-sons are parties, and in which these enter into reciprocal and corresponding grants or obligations towards each other; whereas a deed-poll is prop-erly one in which only the party making it exe-cutes it, or binds himself by it as a deed, though the grantors or grantees therein may be several in number. 3 Washb. Real Prop. 311. See In-dent, v.
INDENTURE OF A FINE. Indentures made and engrossed at the chirographer’s office and deliv-ered to the cognizor and the cognizee, usually be-ginning with the words: "Hcec est finolis con-cordia." And then reciting the whole proceed-ings at length. 2 Bla. Com. 351.
INDENTURE OF APPRENTICESHIP. A con-tract in two parts, by which a person, generally a minor, is bound to serve another in his trade, art, or occupation for a stated time, on condition of being instructed in the same.
INDEPENDENCE. The state or condition of be-íng free from dependence, subjection, or control. A state of perfect irresponsibility. Political in-dependence is the attribute of a nation or state which is entirely autonomous, and not subject to the government, control, or dictation of any exterior power.
INDEPENDENT. Not dependent; not subject to control, restriction, modification, or limitation from a given outside source.
INDEPENDENT ADJUSTER. A person, firm or corporation who holds himself or itself out for employment to more than one insurance company, ís not a regular employee of the company, does not work exclusively for one company and is paid in each case assigned for time consumed and ex-penses incurred. Cole v. State, 37 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1006, 179 Misc. 172.
INDEX
INDEPENDENT ADVICE. Concerning a trust deed or will which must be shown where a fidu-eihry relationship exists, means that the donor had the preliminary benefit of conferring fully and pri-vately upon the subject of his intended gift with a person who was not °ni? competent to inform him correctly as to its legal effect, but who was, fur-thermore, so disassociated from the interests of the donee as to be in a position to advise with the donor impartially and confidentially as to the consequences to himself of his proposed benefac-tion. Madden v. Glathart, 125 Kan. 466, 265 P. 42, 45.
INDEPENDENT CONTRACT. See Contract.
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR. One who, exer-cising an independent employment, contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods and without being subject to the control of his employer except as te the result of the work. Peo-ple v. Orange County Road Const. Co., 175 N.Y. 84, 67 N.E. 129, 65 L.R.A. 33. Fox v. Dunning, 124 Okl. 228, 255 P. 582, 584; Bell v. State, 153 Md. 333, 138 A. 227, 228, 58 A.L.R. 1051.
One who exercises an independent employment and con-tracts to do a piece of work according to his own judgment and methods, and without being subject to his employer except as to the results of the work, and who has the right to employ and direct the action of the workmen, independ-ently of such employer and freed from any superior author-ity in him to say how the specified work shall be done, or what the laborers shall do as it progresses. Johnson v. Asheville Hosiery Co., 199 N.C. 38, 153 S.E. 591, 593. It is very generally held that the right of control as to the mode of doing the work contracted for is the principal considera-tion in determining whether one employed is an "independ-ent contractor" or servant. Thompson v. Twiss, 90 Conn. 444. 97 A. 328. 330, L.R.A.1916E, 506. If the employee is merely subject to the control or direction of the employer as to the result to be obtained, he is an independent con-tractor: if he is subject to the control of the employer as to the means to he employed, he is not an independent con-tractor. Culf Reftning Co. v. Wilkinson, 94 Fla. 664, 114 So. 503. Nettleship v. Shipman, 161 Wash. 292, 296 P. 1056, 1057.
INDEPENDENT COVENANT. See Covenant.
INDEPENDENTER SE HABET ASSECURATIO A VIAGGIO NAVIS. The voyage insured is an indenendent or distinct thing from the voyage of the ship. 3 Kent, Comm.,318, note.
INDETERMINATE. That which is uncertain, or not particularly designated; as if I sell you one hundred bushels of wheat, without stating what wheat. 1 Bouv. Inst. no. 950.
INDETERMINATE OBLIGATION. See Obliga-tion.
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE. A sentence to imprisonment for the maximum period defined by law, subject to termination by the parole board or other agency at any time after service of the mini-mum period. Such a sentence is invalid unless specifically authorized by statute. 24 C.J.S. p. 1217.
INDEX. A book containing references, alphabeti-cally arranged, to the contents of a series or col-lection of volumes; or an addition to a single volume or set of volumes containing such refer-ences to its contents.

INDEX ANIMI SERMO. Language is the expo-nent of the intention. The language of a statute or instrument is the best guide to the intention. Broom, Max. 622.
INDIAN COUNTRY. As the term is used in the federal statutes, is a country to which the Indians retained the right of use and occupancy, involving under certain restrictions freedom of action and of enjoyment in their capacity as a distinct people, and ceases to be such when their title is extin-guished, unless by virtue of some reservation ex-pressed at the time and clearly appearing. Schaap v. United States, C.C.A.Ark., 210 F. 853, 855; Royal Brewing Co. v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., D.C.Kan., 217 F. 146, 148. This term does not necessarily im-port territory owned and occupied by Indians, but it means all those portions of the United States designated by this name in the legislation of con-gress. Waters v. Campbell, 4 Sawy. 121, Fed.Cas. No.17,264.
INDIAN DEPREDATIONS ACTS. As early as May 19, 1796, an act was passed by congress, pro-viding an eventual indemnification to citizens of the United States for depredations committed by Indians in taking or destroying their property; 1 St.L. 472. Other acts of a similar character were passed from time to time. By the act of March 3, 1891, congress conferred on the court of claims ju-risdiction of claims for property taken and de-stroyed by Indians.
INDIAN RESERVATION. A part of public do-main set aside by proper authority for use and occupation of tribe or tribes of Indians. Peters v. Pauma School Dist. of San Diego County, 91 Cal. App. 792, 267 P. 576, 577; United States v. Parton, D.C.N.C., 46 F.Supp. 843, 844.
INDIAN TITLE. Claim of Indian tribes of right, because of immemorial occupancy, to roam certain territory to exclusion of any other lndians. North-western Bands of Shoshone Indians v. U. S., Ct. Cl., 65 S.Ct. 690, 692, 324 U.S. 335, 89 L.Ed. 985.
INDIAN TRIBE. A separate and distinct com-munity or body of the aboriginal Indian race of men found in the United States. Montoya v. U. S., 21 S.Ct. 358, 180 U.S. 261, 45 L.Ed. 52L
INDIANS. The aboriginal inhabitants of North America. Frazee v. Spokane County, 29 Wash. 278, 69 P. 782.
INDICARE. Lat. In the civil law. To show or discover. To fix or tell the price of a thing. Cal-vin. To inform against; to accuse.
INDICATIF. An abolished writ by which a pros-ecution was in some cases removed from a court-christian to the queen’s bench. Enc. Lond.
INDICATION. In the law of evidence. A sign or token; a fact pointing to some inference or conclusion. Burrill, Circ. .Ev. 251, 252, 263, 275.
INDICATIVE EVIDENCE. This is not evidence properly so called, but the mere suggestion of evi-dence proper, which may possibly be procured if the suggestion is followed up. Brown.
INDICAVIT. In English practice. A writ of pro-hibition that lies for a patron of a church, whose clerk is sued in the spiritual court by the clerk of another patron, for tithes amounting to a fourth part of the value of the living. 3 Bl.Comm. 91; 3 Steph.Comm. 711. So termed from the emphatic word of the Latin form. Reg.Orig. 35b, 36.
IN DICIA. Signs; indications. Circumstances which point to the existence of a given fact as probable, but not certain. For example, "indicia of partnership" are any circumstances which would induce the belief that a given person was in reali-ty, though not ostensibly, a member of a given firm.
The term is much used in the civil law in a sense nearly or entirely synonymous with circumstantial evidence. It denotes facts which give rise to in-ferences, rather than the inferences themselves. Graham Ice Cream Co. v. Petros, 127 Neb. 172, 254 N.W. 869.
INDICIUM. In the civil law. A sign or mark. A species of proof, answering very near ly to the circumstantial evidence of the common law. Best, Pres. p. 13, § 11, note; Wills, Circ. Ev. 34.
INDICT. See Indictment.
INDICTABLE. Proper or necessary to be prose-cuted by process of indictment. Indictable offenses embrace common-law offenses or statutory of-fenses the punishments for which are infamous. Lakes v, Goodloe, 195 Ky. 240, 242 S.W. 632, 639.
INDICTED. Charged in an indictment with a criminal offense. See Indictment.
INDICTEE. A person indicted.
INDICTIO. In old public law. A declaration; a proclamation. Indictio belli, a declaration or in-diction of war. An indictment.
INDICTION, CYCLE OF. A mode of computing time by the space of fifteen years, instituted by Cbnstantine the Great; originally the period for the payment of certain taxes. Some of the char-ters of King Edgar and Henry III. are dated by indictions. Wharton.
INDICTMENT. An accusation in writing found and presented by a grand jury, legally convoked and sworn, to the court in which it is impaneled, charging that a person therein named has done some act, or been guilty of some omission, which, by law, is a public offense, punishable on indict-ment. Kennedy v. State, 86 Tex.Cr.R. 450, 216 S.W. 1086; State v. Engler, 217 Iowa 138, 251 N.W. 88.
A presentment differs from an indictment In that It is an accusation made by a grand jury of theír own motion, either upon theír own observation and knowledge, or upon evidence before them; while an indictment Is preferred at the suit of the government, and Is usually framed In the first instance by the prosecuting offlcer of the government, and by hím laid before, the grand jury, to be found or ignored. An information resembles in Its form and sub-stance an indictment, but is Med at the mere discretion of the proper law officer of the government, without the inter-vention or approval of a grand jury, and an afIldavit Is a charge made and preferred by an individual. 2 Story,Const. §§ 1784, 1786; People v. Foster, 198 Cal. 112, 243 P. 667, 670.
In Scotch law. The form of process by which a criminal is brought to trial at the instante of the lord advocate. Where a private party is a princi-pal prosecutor, he brings his charge in what is termed the "form of criminal letters."

Joint Indictment

When several offenders are joined in the same indictment, as when principals in the first and second degree, and accessaries before and after the fact, are all joined in the same indictment. 2 Hale, P.C. 173; Brown.
INDICTMENT DE FELONY EST CONTRA PA-CEM DOMINI REGIS, CORONAM ET DIGNITA-TEM SUAM, IN GENERE ET NON IN INDI-VIDUO; QUIA IN ANGLIA NON EST INTER-REGNUM. Jenk. Cent. 205. Indictment for fel-ony is against the peace of our lord the king, his crown and dignity in general, and not against his individual person; because in England there is no interregnum.
INDICTOR. He who causes another to be indicted. The latter is sometimes called the "indictee."
INDIFFERENT. Impartial; unbiased; disinter-ested. People v. Vermilyea, 7 Cow. (N.Y.) 122; Fox v. Hills, 1 Conn. 307.
INDIGENA. In old English law. A subject born; one born within the realm, or naturalized by act of parliament. Co.Litt. 8a. The opposite of "a/i-enigena," (q. v.).
INDIGENT. In a general sense, one who is needy and poor, or one who has not sufficient property to furnish him a living nor anyone able to support him to whom he is entitled to look for support. Storrs Agricultural School v. Whitney, 54 Conn. 342, 8 A. 141.
INDIGENT INSANE PERSON. An insane per-son with insufficient estate to pay for his mainte-nance in the hospital, after providing for those who could claim his support. Massachusetts Gen eral Hospital v. Inhabitants of Belmont, 233 Mass. 190, 124 N.E. 21, 23.
INDIGNITY. In the law of divorce, a species of cruelty addressed to the mind, sensibilities, self-respect, or personal honor of the subject, rather than to the body, and defined as "unmerited con-temptuous conduct towards another; any action towards another which manifests contempt for him; contumely, incivility, or injury accompanied with insult." Goodman v. Goodman, 80 Mo.App. 281; 1 Bish. Mar. & Div. § 826; O’Hern v. O’Hern, 206 Mo.App. 651, 228 S.W. 533, 536.
The phrase "Indignities to the person," as used in stat-utes, has reference to bodily indignities, as distinguished from such as may be offered to the mind, sensibilities, or reputation. Kurtz v. Kurtz, 38 Ark. 123. But compare Mil-ler v. Miller, 78 N.C. 105.

not related in the natural way. Runyon v. West-ern & Southern Life Ins. Co., 48 Ohio App. 251, 192 N.E. 882, 883. Almost always used in law in opposition to "direct," though not the only anti-thesis of the latter word, as the terms "collateral" and "cross" are sometimes used in contrast with "direct."
As to indirect "Attack," "Confession," "Con-tempt," and "Tax," see those titles.
INDIRECT EVIDENCE. Is that which only tends to establish the issue by proof of various facts sustaining by their consistency the hypothesis claimed. It consists of both inferences and pre-sumptions. _Lake County v. Neilon, 44 Or. 14, 74 P. 212, 214.
See, also, Circumstantial Evidence; Inference; Presumption.
INDIRECT TAX. A tax upon some right or priv-ilege or corporate franchise. Madison Suburban Utility Dist. of Davidson County v. Carson, 232 S.W.2d 277, 280, 191 Tenn. 300; a tax laid upon the happening of an event as distinguished from its tangible fruits. Chickering v. Commissioner of Interna’ Revenue, C.C.A.1, 118 F.2d 254, 258.
INDISPENSABLE. That which cannot be spared, omitted, or dispensed with.
INDISPENSABLE EVIDENCE. That without which a particular fact cannot be proved. Ball-inger’s Ann. Codes & St. Or. 1901, § 689 (Code 1930, § 9-113).
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES. In a suit in equity, those who not only have an interest in the sub-ject-matter of the controversy, but an interest of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting their interests or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final de-termination may be wholly inconsistent with equi-ty and good consciente. Kendig v. Dean, 97 U.S. 425, 24 L.Ed. 1061. State of Washington v. United States, C.C.A.Or. & Wash., 87 F.2d 421, 426, 427, 429, 431.
INDISTANTER. Forthwith; without delay.
INDITEE. L. Fr. In old English law. A per-son indicted. Mirr. c. 1, § 3; 9 Coke, pref.
INDIVIDUAL. As a noun, this term denotes a single person as distinguished from a group or class, and also, very commonly, a private or nat-ural person as distinguished from a partnership, corporation, or association; but it is said that this restrictive signification is not necessarily in-herent in the word, and that it may, in proper cas-es, include artificial persons. State v. Bell Tele-phone Co., 36 Ohio St. 310, 38 Am.Rep. 583.
As an adjective, "individual" means pertaining or belonging to, or characteristic of, one single person, either in opposition to a firm, association, or corporation, or considered in his relation there-to.
INDIVIDUAL ASSETS. In the law of partner-
INDIRECT. Not direct in relation or connection: ship, property belonging to a member of a part-not having an immediate bearing or application; nership as his separate and private Fortune, apart from the assets or property belonging to the firm as such or the partner’s interest therein.
INDIVIDUAL DEBTS. Such as are due from a member of a partnership in his private or per-sonal capacity, as distinguished from those due from the firm or partnership. Goddard v. Hap-good, 25 Vt. 360, 60 Am.Dec. 272.
INDIVIDUAL SYSTEM OF LOCATION. A term formerly used in Pennsylvania to designate the location of public lands by surveys, in which the land called for by each warrant was separately surveyed. Ferguson v. Bloom, 144 Pa. 549, 23 A. 49.
INDIVIDUALLY. Separately and personally, as distinguished from jointly or officially, and as opposed to collective or associate action or com• mon interest. Southern Distributing Co. v. Car-raway, 189 N.C. 420, 127 S.E. 427, 428.
INDIVIDUlUM. Lat. In the civil law. That can-not be divided. Calvin.
INDIVISIBLE. Not susceptible of division or ap-portionment; inseparable; entire. Thus, a con-tract, covenant, consideration, etc., may be divisi-ble or indivisible; i. e., separable or entire. Garon v. Credit Foncier Canadien, 37 R.I. 273, 92 A. 561, 564. See, also, Contract.
INDIVISUM. Lat. That which two or more per-sons hold in common without partition; undivided.
INDORSAT. In old Scotch law. Indorsed. 2 Pite. Crim. Tr. 41.
INDORSE. To write a name on the back of a paper or document. Bills of exchange and prom-issory notes are indorsed by a party’s writing his name on the back. Hartwell v. Hemmenway, Pick. (Mass.) 117.
"Indorse" is a technical term, having sufficient legal certainty without words of more particular description. Brooks v. Edson, 7 Vt. 351.
See In Dorso.
INDORSEE. The person to whom a bill of ex-change, promissory note, bill of lading, etc., is assigned by indorsement.
INDORSEE IN DIJE COURSE. An indorsee in due course is one who, in good faith, in the or-dinary course of business, and for value, before its apparent maturity or presumptive dishonor, and without knowledge of its actual dishonor, acquires a negotiable instrument duly indorsed to him, or indorsed generally, or payable to the bearer. More v. Finger, 128 Cal. 313, 60 P. 933.
INDORSEMENT. The act of a payee, drawee, accommodation indorser, or holder of a bill, note, check, or other negotiable instrument, in writing his name upon the back of the same, with or with-out further or qualifying words, whereby the property in the same is assigned and transferred to another.
That which is so written upon the back of a negotiable instrument. State v. Hearn, 115 Ohio St. 340, 154 N.E. 244, 245.
In the law of negotiable instruments, a new and substan-tive contract by which title to the instrument ls transferred and by which indorser becomes a party to the instrument and is fiable, on certain conditions for its payment. John-son v. Belckey, 64 Utah, 43, 228 P. 189, 191. In thls respect indorsement differs from a common-law assignment. Jones County Trust & Savings Bank v. Kurt, 192 Iowa, 965, 182 N.W. 409, 413.
One who writes his name upon a negotiable instrument, otherwise than as a maker or acceptor, and delivers it, with his name thereon, to another person, is called an "indors-er," and his act is called "indorsement."
The word "indorsement" is also used with reference to writs, insurance policies, certificates of stock, etc. The term as used in the Uniform Stock Transfer Act contem-plates a writing passing or attemptIng to pass ene or an interest. Stoltz v. Carroll, 99 Ohio St. 289, 124 N.E. 226, 231. As applied to a writ or warrant "indorsement" 1s an entry made on the back thereof. Gondas v. Gondas, 99 N.J.Eq. 473, 134 A. 615, 617.

Accommodation indorsement

In the law of negotiable instruments, one made by a third person without any consideration, but merely for the benefit of the holder of the instrument, or to enable the maker to obtain money or credit on it. Unless otherwise explained, it is understood to be a loan of the indorser’s credit without restriction. Young v. Exchange Bank of Kentucky, 152 Ky. 293, 153 S.W. 444, 445, Ann.Cas.1915B, 148.

Blank indorsement

One made by the mere writing of the indorser’s name on the back of the note or bill, without mention of the name of any person in whose favor the indorsement is made, but with the implied understanding that any lawful holder may fill in his own name aboye the indorsement if he so chooses. Northern Trading Co. v. Drexel State Bank of Chicago, 37 N.D. 521, 164 N.W. 151, 154; Aufderheide v. Moeller, 221 Mo.App. 442, 281 S.W. 965, 967.

Conditiona/ indorsement

One by which the indorser annexes some condition (other than the failure of prior parties to pay) to bis llabillty. The condition may be either precedent or subsequent. 1 Daniel, Neg.Inst. § 697.

Fun indorsement

One by which the indorser orders the money to be paid to some particular person by name; it difiera from a blank indorsement, which consists merely in the name of the indorser written on the back of the instrument. Kilpatrick v. Heaton, 3 Brev., S.C., 92; Lee v. Clfillicothe Branch of State Bank, 15 Fed.Cas. 153.

Irregular indorsement

One made by a third person before delivery of the note to the payee; an indorsement in blank by a third person aboye the name of the payee, or when the payee does not Indorse at all. Bank of Bellows Falls v. Dorset Marble Co., 61 Vt. 106, 17 Atl. 43; Metropolitan Bank v. Muller, 50 La.Ann. 1278, 24 South. 295, 69 Am.St.Rep. 475.

Pro per indorsementB

Such indorsement as the law merchant requires to authorize payment to the holder oí the instrument. Secu-rity State Bank v. State Bank of Brantford, N. D., 31 N.D. 454, 154 N.W. 282, 283.

Qualified indorsement

One which restrains or limits, or qualifles or enlarges, the liability of the indorser, in any manner different from what the law generally imports as bis true liability, deduc-ible from the nature of the instrument. Chitty, Bilis, 261; Stover Bank v. Welpman, Mo.App., 284 S.W. 177, 180. A transfer of a bill of exchange or promissory note to an indorsee, without any liability to the indorser. The words usually employed for this purpose are "sana recours," with-out recourse. 1 Bouv.inst. No. 1138.

Regular indorsement

An indorsement in blank by a third person under the name of the payee or after delivery of the note to him. Bank of Bellows Falls v. Dorset Marble Co., 61 Vt. 106, 17 Atl. 42.

Restrictive indorsement

One which stops the negotiability of the instrument, or which contains such a definite direction as to the payment as to preclude the indorsee from making any further trans-fer of the instrument. People’s Bank v. Jefferson County Sav. Bank, 106 Ala. 524, 17 So. 728, 54 Am.St.Rep. 59. Defined by statute in some states as an indorsement which either prohibits the further negotiation of the instrument, or constitutes the indorsee the agent of the indorser, or vests the title in the indorsee in trust for or to the use of some other person. Negotiable Instruments Law N. D. § 36 (Comp.Laws 1913, § 6921); Bates’ Ann.St.Ohio 1904, § 3172h (Gen.Code, § 8141).

Special indorsement

An indorsement in ft/U, which specifically names the indorsee. Carolina Sav. Bank v. Florence Tobacco Co., 45 S.C. 373, 23 S.E. 139.

Special indorsement of writ

In English practice. The writ of summons in an action may, under Order iii. 6, be indorsed with the particulars of the amount sought to be recovered in the action, after giving credit for any payment or set-off ; and this special indorsement (as it is called) of the writ is applicable in all actions where the plaintiff seeks merely to recover a debt or liquidated demand in money payable by the defendant, with or without interest, arising upon a contract, express or implied, as, for instance, on a Bill of exchange, promis-sory note, check, or other simple contract debt, or on a bond or contract under seal for payment of a liquidated amount of money, or on a statute where the sum sought to be recovered is a fixed sum of money or in the nature of a debt, or on a guaranty, whether under seal or not. Brown.
INDORSER. He who indorses; i. e., being the payee or holder, writes his name on the back of a bill of exchange, etc.
INDUBITABLE PROOF. Evidence which is not only found credible, but is of such weight and directness as to make out the facts alleged beyond a doubt. Jermyn v. McClure, 195 Pa. 245, 45 A. 938.
INDUCE. To bring on or about, to affect, cause, to influence to an act or course of conduct, lead by persuasion or reasoning, incite by motives, prevail on. State v. Stratford, 55 Idaho 65, 37 P.2d 681, 682.
INDUCEMENT. In Contracts. The benefit or advantage which the promisor is to receive from a contract is the inducement for making it. Col-lins v. Harris, 130 Wash. 394, 227 P. 508, 509.
In Criminal Evidence. Motive; that which leads or tempts to the commission of crime. Burrill, Circ. Ev. 283.
In Pleading. That portion of a declaration or of any subsequent pleading in an action which is brought forward by way of explanatory introduc-tion to the main allegations. Brown. Houston v. Tyler, 140 Mo. 252, 36 S.W. 654.
INDUCL2E. In International Law. A truce; a suspension of hostilities; an agreement during war to abstain for a time from warlike acts.

In Old Maritime Law. A period of twenty days after the sale arrival of a vessel under bottomry, to dispose of the cargo, and raise the money to pay the creditor, with interest.
In Old English Practice. Delay or indulgence allowed a party to an action; further time to ap-pear in a cause. Bract. fol. 352b; Fleta, lib. 4, c. 5, § 8.
In Scotch Practice. Time allowed for the per-formance of an act. Time to appear to a citation. Time to collect evidence or prepare a defense.
Inducia legales. In Scotch law. The days be-tween the citation of the defendant and the day of appearance; the days between the test day and day of return of the writ.
INDUCT. To put in enjoyment or possession, es-pecially to introduce into possession of an office or benefice, with customary ceremonies, to bring in, initiate, to be put formally in possession, in-augúrate or install. State ex rel. Slattery v. Raupp, 303 Mo. 684, 263 S.W. 834, 835.
INDUCTI SUNT IN CARCEREM ET LVIPAR-CATI. See Imparcare.
INDUCTIO. Lat. In the civil law. Obliteration, by drawing the pen or stylus over the writing. Dig. 28, 4; Calvin.
INDUCTION. In ecclesiastical law. The cere-mony by which an incumbent who has been in-stituted to a benefice is vested with full posses-sion of all the profits belonging to the church, so that he becomes seised of the temporalities of the church, and is then complete incumbent. It is performed by virtue of a mandate of induction di-rected by the bishop to the arch-deacon, who either performs it in person, or directs his precept to one or more other clergymen to do it. Phillim-Ecc. Law, 477.
In military law. Induction is complete where a man successfully passes the physical examination and is accepted by the army for training and serv-ice, and all the steps prescribed by statute and regulations having the force of law have been taken, whether he takes the oath administered to him or not. United States ex rel. Diamond v. Smith, D.C.Mass., 47 F.Supp. 607, 609.
INDULGENCE. In the Roman Catholic Church. A remission of the punishment due to sins, granted by the pope or church, and supposed to save the sinner from purgatory. Its abuse led to the Re-formation in Germany. Wharton. Forbearance,. (q. v.)
INDULTO. In Ecclesiastical law. A dispensa-tion granted by the pope to do or obtain something contrary to the common law.
In Spanish Law. The condonation or remission of the punishment imposed on a criminal for his offense. This power is exclusively vested in the king.

INDUSTRIAL AND PROVIDENT SOCIETIES. Societies formed in England for carrying on any labor, trade, or handicraft, whether wholesale or retail, including the buying and selling of land and also (but subject to certain restrictions) the business of banking.
INDUSTRIAL SCHOOLS. Schools (established by voluntary contribution) in which industrial training is provided, and in which children are lodged, clothed, and fed, as well as taught.
INDUSTRIAL TRACK. One connecting with main line track and used and equipped for mov-ing freight in carloads to or from one or more industries thereby reached and served, in inciden-tal services such as loading, reloading, or storing, and in incidental switching or yard movements. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Texas & P. R. Co., C.C.A. Tex., 4 F.2d 904, 906, 907; Miller Engineering Co. v. Louisiana Ry. & Nav. Co., 144 La. 786, 81, So. 314, 317.
INDUSTRIAM, PER. Lat. A qualified property in animals ferce naturce may be acquired per in-dustriam, i. e., by a man’s reclaiming and mak-ing them tame by art, industry, and education; or by So confining them within his own immediate power that they cannot escape and use their nat-ural liberty. 2 Steph.Comm. 5.
INDUSTRY. Any department or branch of art, occupation, or business conducted as a means of livelihood or for profit; especially, one which employs much labor and capital and is a dístinct branch of trade. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. State, 83 Okl. 161, 201 P. 260, 264; Dessen v. De-partment of Labor and Industries of Washington, 190 Wash. 69, 66 P.2d 867, 869.
INEBRIATE. A person addicted to the use of intoxicating liquors; an habitual drunkard. Tay-lor v. Koenigstein, 128 Neb. 809, 260 N.W. 544. Maher v. Brown, 225 Iowa 341, 280 N.W. 553, 554.
INE, CODE OF. A code of the West Saxons dat-íng from 688 to 695. Adopted by Alford, probably with alterations. Seebohm, Tribal Customs, 386.
INEFFICIENCY. Quality of being incapable or indisposed to do the things required of an officer. Holmes v. Osborn, 57 Ariz. 522, 115 P.2d 775, 783.
INELIGIBILITY. Disqualification or legal inca-pacity to be elected to an office. Thus, an alien or naturalized citizen is ineligible to be elected president of the United States. Carroll v. Green, 148 Ind. 362, 47 N.E. 223.
This incapacity arises from varlous causes; and a person may be incapable of being elected to one office who may be elected to another; the incapacity may also be perpetual or temporary.
INELIGIBLE. Disqualified to be elected to an office; also disqualified to hold an office if elected or appointed to it. State v. Murray, 28 Wis. 99, 9 Arn.Rep. 489; State ex rel. Graham v. Hall, 73 N. D. 428, 15 N.W.2d 736, 739.

INESSE POTEST DONATIONI, MODUS, CONDI-TIO SIVE CAUSA; UT MODUS EST; SI CON-DITIO; QUIA CAUSA. In a gift there may be manner, condition, and cause; as Cut] introduces a manner; if, [si,] a condition; because, [quia,] a cause. Dyer, 138.
INESCAPABLE PERIL. Within last clear chance doctrine, means peril which the plaintiff is help-less to avoid by his own efforts, but which re-quires action on part of defendant to avert it. Melenson v. Howell, 344 Mo. 1137, 130 S.W.2d 555, 560.
INEST DE JURE. Lat. It is implied of right; it is implied by law.
INEVITABLE. Incapable of being avoided; for-tuitous; transcending the power of human care, foresight, or exertion to avoid or prevent, and theref ore suspending legal relations so far as to excuse from the performance of contract obliga-tions, or from liability for. consequent loss.
INEVITABLE ACCIDENT. An unavoidable acci-dent; one produced by an irresistible physical cause; an accident which cannot be prevented by human skill or foresight, but results from natural causes, such as lightning or storms, perils of the sea, inundations or earthquakes, or sudden death or illness. By irresistible force is meant an in-terposition of hurnan agency, from its nature and power absolutely uncontrollable. Brousseau v. The Hudson, 11 La.Ann. 428; Leland v. Empire Engineering Co., 108 A. 570, 575, 135 Md. 208.
An accident is "inevitable", so as to preclude recovery on ground of negligence, it person by whom it occurs neither has nor is legally bound to have sufficient power to avoid it or prevent its injuring another. Stephens v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 184 Va. 94, 34 S.E.2d 374, 377.
Inevitable accident occurs where a vessel is pursuing a lawful avocation in a lawful manner, using the proper pre-cautions agalnst danger, and an accident occurs. The hlghest degree of caution that can be used is not required. It is enough that it is reasonable under the clrcumstances; such as is usual in similar cases, and has been found by long experience to be sufficient to answer the end In view,– the safety of life and property. The Grace Girdler, 7 Wall. 196, 19 L.Ed. 113. Inevitable accident is only when the dis-aster happens from natural causes, without negligence or fault on either side, and when both parties have endeav-ored, by every means in their power, with due care and caution, and with a proper display of nautical skill, to pre-vent the occurrence of the accident. The Phillp J. Kenny, C.C. A.N. J., 60 F.2d 457, 458.
INEWARDUS. A guard; a watchman. Domes-day.
INFALISTATUS. In old English law. Exposed upon the sands, or seashore. A species of punish-ment mentioned in Hengham. Cowell.
INFAMIA. Lat. Infamy; ignominy or disgrace.
By infamia juris is meant infamy established by law as the consequence of crime; infamia facti is where the party is supposed to be guilty of such crime, hut it has not been judlcially proved. Comm. v. Green, 17 Mass. 515, 541.
INFAMIS. Lat. In Roman law. A person whose right of reputation was diminished (involving the loss of some of the rights of citizenship) either on account of his infamous avocation or because of conviction for crime. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 135.
INFAMOUS. Shameful or disgraceful. Stevens v. Wilber, 136 Or. 599, 300 P. 329, 330.
INFAMOUS CRIME. See Crime.
INFAMOUS PUNISIIMENT. See Punishment.
INFAMY. A qualification of a man’s legal status produced by his conviction of an infamous crime and the consequent loss of honor and credit, which, at common law, rendered him incompetent as a witness, and by statute in some jurisdictions en-tails other disabilities. State v. Clark, 60 Kan. 450, 56 P. 767.
INFANCY. Minority; the state of a person who is under the age of legal majority,—at common law, twenty-one years. According to the sense in which this term is used, it may denote the condi-tion of the person merely with reference to his years, or the contractual disabilities which non-age entails, or his status with regard to other powers or relations. Keating v. Railroad Co., 94 Mich. 219, 53 N.W. 1053.
Natural infancy. A period of non-responsible life, which ends with the seventh year. Wharton.
INFANGENTREF. In old English law. A privi-lege of lords of certain manors to judge any thief taken within their fee. See Outfangthef.
INFANS. Lat. In the civil law. A child under the age of seven years; so called "quasi impos fandi," (as not having the faculty of speech.) Cod. Theodos, 8, 18, 8.
INFANS NON MULTUM A FURIOSO DISTAT. An infant does not differ much from a lunatic. Bract. 1. 3, c. 2, § 8; Dig. 50, 17, 5, 40; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 223, 224, 242.
INFANT. A person within age, not of age, or not of full age; a person under the age of twenty-one years; a minor. Co. Litt. 171b; 1 Bl.Comm. 463-466; 2 Kent, Comm. 233. Beavers v. Southern Ry. Co., 212 Ala. 600, 103 So. 887, 889.
INFANTIA. Lat. In the civil law. The period of infancy between birth and the age of seven years. Calvin.
INFANTICIDE. The murder or killing of an in-fant soon after its birth. The fact of the birth distinguishes this act from "feticide" or "procur-ing abortion," which terms denote the destruction of the fetus in the womb. See, also, Prolicide.
INFANTS’ MARRIAGE ACT. The statute 18 & 19 Vict. c. 43. By virtue of this act every infant, (if a male, of twenty, or, if a female, of seventeen, years,—section 4,) upon or in contemplation of marriage, may, with the sanction of the chancery division of the high court, make a valid settle-ment or contract for a settlement of property. Wharton.

INFANZON. In Spanish law. A person of noble birth, who exercises within his domains and in-heritance no other rights and privileges than those conceded to him. Escriche.
INFECTION. In medical jurisprudence. The transmission of disease or disease germs from one person to another, either directly by contact with morbidly affected surfaces, or more remotely through inhalation, absorption of food or liquid tainted with excrementa’ matter, contact with con-taminated clothing or bedding, or other agencies.
A distinction is sometimes made between "infection" and "contagion," by restricting the latter term to the communi-cation of disease by direct contact. Grayson v. Lynch, 163 U.S. 468, 16 S.Ct. 1064, 41 L.Ed. 230. But "infection" Is the wider term and in proper use includes "contaglon," and is frequently extended so as to include the local inauguration of disease from other than human sources, as from mias-mas, poisonous plants, etc. In another, and perhaps more accurate sense, contagion Is the entrance or lodgment of pathogenic germs in the system as a result of direct con-tact; infection is their flication in the system or the In-auguration of disease as a consequence. In this meaning, infection does not aiways result from contagion, and on the other hand it may result from the introductIon of dis-ease germs into the system otherwise than by contaglon.
Auto-infection. The communication of disease from one part of the body to another by mechani-cal transmission of virus from a diseased to a healthy part.
Infectious disease. One capable of being trans-mitted or communicated by means of infection.
INFEFT. In Scotch law. To give seisin or pos-session of Lands; to invest or enfeoff. 1 Kames, Eq. 215.
INFEFTMENT. In Old Scotch law. Investiture or infeudation, including both charter and seisin. 1 Forb. Inst. pt. 2, p. 110.
In Later law. Saisine, or the instrument of possession. Bell.
INFENSARE CURIAM. Lat. An expression ap-plied to a court when it suggested to an advocate something which he had omitted through mistake or ignorance. Spelman.
INFEOFFMENT. The act or instrument of feoff-ment. In Scotland it is synonymous with "sai-sine," meaning the instrument of possession. For-merly it was synonymous with "investiture." Bell.
INFERENCE. In the law of evidence. A truth or proposition drawn from another which is sup-posed or admitted to be true. A process of rea-soning by which a fact or proposition sought to be established is deduced as a logical consequence from other facts, or a state of facts, already proved or admitted. Whitehouse v. Bolster, 95 Me. 458, 50 A. 240; Joske v. Irvine, 91 Tex. 574, 44 S.W. 1059.
A deduction which the reason of the jury makes from the facts proved, without an express direction of law to that effect. Puget Sound Electric Ry. v. Benson, C.C.A. Wash., 253 F. 710, 714.
A "presumption" and an "inference" are not the same thing, a presumption being a deduction which the law requires a trier of facts to make, an inference being a deduction which the trier may or may not make, according to his own concluslons; a presumption Ls mandatory, an inference, permissible. Cross v. Passumpsic Fiber Leather Co., 90 Vt. 397, 98 A. 1010, 1014; Joyce v. Missouri & Kan-sas Telephone Co., Mo.App., 211 S.W. 900, 901.
INFERENCE ON INFERENCE, RULE OF. Means that one presumption or inference may not be based upon another. McManimen v. Public Serv-ice Co. of Northern Illinois, 317 I1l.App. 649, 47 N.E.2d 385.
INFERENTIAL. In the law of evidence. Operat-ing in the way of inference; argumentative. Pre-sumptive evidence is sometimes termed "inferen-tial." Com. v. Harman, 4 Pa. 272.
INFERENTIAL FACTS. Such as are established not directly by testimony or other evidence, but by inferences or conclusions drawn from the evi-dence. Railway Co. v. Miller, 141 Ind. 533, 37 N.E. 343.
INFERIOR. One who, in relation to another, has less power and is below him; one who is bound to obey another. He who makes the law is the superior; he who is bound to obey it, the inferior. 1 Bouv. Inst. no. 8.
INFERIOR COURT. This term may denote any court subordinate to the chief appellate tribunal in the particular judicial system; but it is com-monly used as the designation of a court of spe-cial, limited, or statutory jurisdiction, whose rec-ord must show the existente and attaching of jurisdiction in any given case, in order to give presumptive validity to its judgment. In re Heard’s Guardianship, 174 Miss. 37, 163 So. 685, 687.
The English courts of judicature are classed generally under two heads,—the superior courts and the inferior courts; the former division comprising the courts at West-minster, the latter comprising all the other courts in gen-eral, many of which, however, are far from being of inferior importance in the common acceptation of the word. Brown.
INFEUDATION; The placing in possession of a freehold estate; also the granting of tithes to lay-men.
INFICIARI. Lat. In the civil law. To deny; to deny one’s liability; to refuse to pay a debt or restore a pledge; to deny the allegation of a plain-tiff; to deny the charge of an accuser. Calvin.
INFICIATIO. Lat. In the civil law. Denial; the denial of a debt or liability; the denial of the claim or allegation of a party plaintiff. Calvin.
INFIDEL. One who does not believe in the exis-tence of a God who will reward or punish in this world or that which is to come. Hale v. Everett, 53 N.H. 54, 16 Am.Rep. 82. One who professes no religion that can bind his consciente to speak the truth. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 368. One who does not recognize the inspiration or obligation of the Holy Scriptures, or generally recognized features of the Christian religion. Gibson v. Ins. Co., 37 N.Y. 580.
INFIDELIS. In Old English law. An infidel or heathen.
In Feudal law. One who violated fealty.INFIDELITAS. In feudal law. Infidelity; faith-lessness to one’s feudal oath. Spelman.
INFIDUCIARE. In old European law. To pledge property. Spelman.
INFIHT. Sax. An assault made on a person in-habiting the same dwelling.
INFINITUM IN ,JURE REPROBATUR. That which is endless is reprobated in law. 12 Coke, 24. Applied to litigation.
INFIRM. Weak, feeble. The testimony of an "infirm" witness may be taken de bene esse in some circumstances. 1 P. Wms. 117.
INFIRMATIVE. In the law of evidence. Having the quality of diminishing force; Having a ten-dency to weaken or render infirm. 3 Benth. Jud. Ev. 14; Best, Pres. § 217. Exculpatory is used by some authors as synonymous. Wills, Circ. Ev. 120; Best, Pres. § 217.
INFIRMATIVE CONSIDERATION. In the law of evidence. A consideration, supposition, or hy-pothesis of which the criminative facts of a case admit. and which tends to weaken the inference or presumption of guilt deducible from them. Burrill, Circ. Ev. 153-155.
INFIRMATIVE FACT. In the law of evidence. A fact set up, proved, or even supposed, in opposi-tion to the criminative facts of a case, the tend-ency of which is to weaken the force of the in-ference of guilt deducible from them. 3 Benth. Jud. Ev. 14; Best, Pres. § 217, et seq.
INFIRMATIVE HYPOTHESIS. A term some-times used in criminal evidence to denote an hy-pothesis or theory of the case which assumes the defendant’s innocence, and explains the crimina-tive evidence in a manner consistent with that as-sumption.
INFIRMITY. In an application for insurance an ailment or disease of a substantial character, which apparently in some material degree impairs the physical condition and health of the applicant and increases the chance of his death or sickness and which if known, would have been likely
to-deter the insurance company from issing the poli-cy. Eastern Dist. Piece Dye Works v. Travelers" Ins. Co., 234 N.Y. 441, 138 N.E. 401, 404, 26 A.L.R. 1505.
INFLUENCE. See Undue Influence.
INFORMAL. Deficient in legal form; inartificial-ly drawn up.
INFORMALITY. Want of legal form. State v. Gallimon, 24 N.C. 377; Franklin v. Mackey, 16• Serg. & R. (Pa.) 118; Hunt v. Curry, 37 Ark. 108.
INFORMATION. An accusation exhibited against a person for some criminal offense, without an in-dictment. 4 Bl.Comm. 308. An accusation in the• nature of an indictment, from which it differs only in being presented by a competent public officer on bis oath of office, instead of a grand jury on their oath. 1 Bish. Crim. Proc. § 141; People v. Sponsler, 46 N.W. 459, 1 Dak. 289; Howard v. State, 143 Tenn. 539, 227 S.W. 36. A written ac-cusation sworn to before a magistrate, upon which an indictment is afterwards founded. Common-wealth v. Cooke, 55 Pa.Super.Ct. 435, 439.
The word is also frequently used in the law in its sense of communicated knowledge. Masline v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. 95 Com 702, 112 A. 639, 640. And affidavits are frequently made, and pleadings and other documents verified, on "information and belief."
In French Law. The act or instrument which contains the depositions of witnesses against the accused. Poth. Proc.Civil, § 2, art. 5.
Criminal information. A formal accusation of crime, differing from an indtetment only in that it is preferred by a prosecuting officer instead of by a grand jury. People v. Gahagan, 368 III. 475, 14 N.E.2d 838, 839.
Information in the nature of a quo warranto. A proceeding against the usurper of a franchise or office. Tarman v. Mason, 102 Okl. 278, 229 P. 459, 460. See Quo Warranto.
Information of intrusion. A proceeding insti-tuted by the state prosecuting officer against in-truders upon the public domain. Gen. St. Mass. c. 141 (Gen. Laws, c. 245) ; Com. v. Hite, 6 Leigh (Va.) 588, 29 Am.Dec. 226.
INFORMATUS NON SUM. In practice. I am not informéd. A formal answer made by the defend-ant’s attorney in court to the effect that he has not been advised of any defense to be made to the action. Thereupon judgment by default passes.
INFORMER. A person who informs or prefers an accusation against another, whom he suspects of the violation of some penal statute.
Common informer. A common prosecutor. A person who habitually ferrets out crimes and of-fenses and lays information thereof before the ministers of justice, in order to set a prosecution on foot, not because of his office or any special duty in the matter, but for the sake of the share of the fine or penalty which the law allots to the informer in certain cases. Also used in a lens in-vidious sense, as designating persons who were authorized and empowered to bring action for penalties. U. S. v. Stocking, D.C.Mont., 87 F. 861; In re Barker, 56 Vt. 20.
INFORTIATUM. The name given by the glossa-tors to the second of the three parts or volumes hito which the Pandects were divided. It com-menees with the third title of the twenty-fourth book and ends with the thirty-eighth book. The glossators at Bologna had at first only two parts, the first called "Digestum V etus," (the old Digest,) and the Last called "Digestum Novum," (the New Digest.) When they afterwards received the mid-dle or second part, they separated from the Diges-tum Novum the beginning it had then, and added it to the second part, from which enlargement the latter received the name "Infortiatum." Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 110.INFORTUNIUM, HOMICIDE PER. Where a man doing a lawful act, without intention of hurt, un-fortunately kills another.
INFRA. (Lat.) Below, under, beneath, under-neath. The opposite of supra, aboye. Thus, we say, primo gradu est—supra, pater, maten, infra, filius, filia: in the first degree of kindred in the ascending line, aboye is the father and the mother, below, in the descending Ene, son and daughter. Inst. 3. 6. 1.
In another sense, this word signifies within: as, infra corpus civitatis, within the body of the coun-try; infra prcesidia, within the guards. So of time, during: infra furorem, during the madness. This use is not classical. The use of infra for intra seems to have sprung up among the bar-barians after the fall of the Roman empire.
INFRA iETATEM. Under age; not of age. Ap-plied to minors.
INFRA ANNOS NÚBILES. Under marriageable years; not yet of marriageable age.
INFRA ANNUM. Under or within a year. Bract. fol. 7.
INFRA ANNUM LUCTÜS. (Within the year of mourning.) The phrase is used in reference to the marriage of a widow within a year after her husband’s death, which was prohibited by the civil law.
INFRA BRACHIA. Within her arms. Used of a husband de jure, as well as de facto. 2 Inst. 317. Also inter brachia. Bract. fol. 148b. It was in this sense that a woman could only have an appeal for murder of her husband inter brachia sua.
INFRA CIVITATEM. Within the state. 1 Camp. 23, 24.
INFRA CORPUS COMITATUS. Within the body (territorial limits) of a county. In English law, waters which are infra corpus comitatus are ex-empt from the jurisdiction of the admiralty. War-ing v. Clarke, 5 How. 441, 451, 12 L.Ed. 226.
INFRA DIGNITATEM CURIA. Beneath the dig-nity of the court; unworthy of the consideration of the court. Where a bill in equity is brought up-on a matter too trifiing to deserve the attention of the court, it is demurrable, as being infra dig-nitatem curias. Smets v. Williams, 4 Paige, Ch. (N.Y.) 364.
INFRA FURORÉM. During madness; while in a state of insanity. Bract. fol. 19b.
INFRA HOSPITIUM. Within the inn. When a traveler’s baggage comes infra hospitium, i. e., in the care and under the custody of the innkeeper, the latter’s liability attaches. Davidson v. Mad-ison Corporation, 247 N.Y.S. 789, 795, 231 App. Div. 421.
INFRA JURISDICTIONEM. Within the jurisdic-tion. 2 Strange, 827.INFRA LIGEANTIAM REGIS. Within the king’s ligeance. Comb. 212.
INFRA METAS. Within the bounds or limits. Infra metas forestce, within the bounds of the Forest. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 41, § 12. Infra metas hos-pitii, within the limits of the household; within the verge. Id. lib. 2, c. 2, § 2.
INFRA PRMSIDIA. Within the protection; within the defenses. In international law, when a prize, or other captured property, is brought into a port of the captors, or within their lines, or otherwise under their complete custody, so that the chance of rescue is lost, it is said to be infra prcesidia.
INFRA QUATUOR MARIA. Within the four seas; within the kingdom of England; within the j urisdiction.
INFRA QUATUOR PARIETES. Within four walls. 2 Crabb, Real Prop. p. 106, § 1089.
INFRA REGNUM. Within the realm.
INFRA SEX ANNOS. Within sir, years. Used in the Latin form of the plea of the statute of lim-itations.
INFRA TRIDUUM. Within three days. Formal words in old appeals. Fleta, lib. 1, c. 31, § 6; Id. c. 35, § 3.
INFRACTION. A breach, violation, or infringe-ment; as of a law, a contract, a right or duty.
In French law, this term is used as a general designation of all punishable actions.
INFRINGEMENT. A breaking into; a trespass or encroachment upon; a violation of a law, reg-ulation, contract, or right. Used especially of in-vasions of the rights secured by patents, copy-rights, and trademarks. Goodyear Shoe Machin-ery Co. v. Jackson, C.C.A.Mass., 112 F. 146, 50 C.C. A. 159, 55 L.R.A. 692.
Infringement of patent. The unauthorized mak-ing, using, or selling for practical use, or for profit, of an invention covered by a valid claim of a pat-ent during the life of the patent. It may involve any one or all of the acts of making, using, and selling. Johnston v. Davenport Brick & Tile Co., D.C.Iowa, 237 F. 668, 671. Celluloid Mfg. Co. v. American Zylonite Co., C.C.N.Y., 30 F. 437.
To constitute infringement of a patent claim there must be present in the infringing device or combination every element of such claim or its equivalent, so combined as to produce sub-stantially the same result operating in substan-tially the same way. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. v. Gould Coupler Co., D.C.N.Y., 230 F. 848, 851; Montgomery Ward and Co. v. Clair, C.C.A.Mo., 123 F.2d 878, 881.
There is "infringement" where the departure Is merely cobrable. E. H. Bardes Range & Foundry Co. v. American Engineering Co., C.C.A.Ohio, 109 F.2d 696, 698; United States Rubber Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., C.C.A. Ohio, 128 F.2d 104, 108, 109: Swan Carburetor Co. v. Gen-eral Motors Corporation, D.C.Ohio, 43 F.Supp. 499, 504.

Contributory infringement. The Intentional

of one person by another in the unlawful mak-ing or selling of a patented invention; usually done by making or selling one part of the patented invention, or one element of the combination, with the intent and purpose of so aiding. Thom-son-Houston Electric Co. v. Specialty Co., C.C. Conn., 72 F. 1016; Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. v. Gould Coupler Co., D.C.N.Y., 229 F. 429, 439.
Infringement of copyright. A copy, more or less servile, of a copyrighted work. Mere likeness is insufficient, and an original treatment of a sub-ject, open alike to treatment by the copyright holder and others does not constitute infringe-ment. Pellegrini v. Allegrini, D.C.Pa., 2 F.2d 610, 612. There must be appropriation of substantial portions of the copyright matter. Roe-Lawton v. Hal E. Roach Studios, D.C.Cal., 18 F.2d 126, 127; Eggers v. Sun Sales Corporation, C.C.A.2, 263 F. 373, 375. But intention to infringe is not essential. Chappell & Co. v. Costa, D.C.N.Y., 45 F.Supp. 554, 555, 556; Towle v. Ross, D.C.Or., 32 F.Supp. 125, 127.
Under 17 U.S.C.A. § 1, one transmitting unauthorized per-formance of copyrighted musical composition by radio from a broadcasting station maintained and operated to stimulate sale of radio products is an "infringer," and is liable therefor. Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. General Elec-tric Co., D.C.N.Y., 16 F.2d 829.
Infringement of trademark. The unauthorized use or cobrable imitation of the mark already ap-propriated by another, on goods of a similar class. Block v. Jung Arch Brace Co., C.C.A.Ohio, 300 F. 308, 309. Weiss v. Tucker, 222 N.Y.S. 487, 488, 129 Misc. 648; Northam Warren Corporation v. Uni-versal Cosmetic Co., C.C.A.I11., 18 F.2d 774, 775. It exists if words or designs used by defendant are identical with or so similar to plaintiff’s that they are likely to cause confusion, or deceive or mis-lead others. McGraw-Hill Pub. Co. v. American Aviation Associates, 117 F.2d 293, 294, 73 App.D.C. 131; Seattle Street Railway & Municipal Employ-ees Relief Ass’n v. Amalgamated Ass’n of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees of America, 101 P.2d 338, 344, 3 Wash.2d 520; Cal-ifornia Fruit Growers Exchange v. Windsor Bev-erages, C.C.A.I11., 118 F.2d 149, 152.
INFRINGER. One who appropriates another’s patented invention. Stebler v. Riverside Heights Orange Growers’ Ass’n, C.C.A.Cal., 205 F. 735, 739. One who affixes the trademark of another to sim-ilar articles in such way that his use of it is fiable to cause confusion in the trade, or is cal-culated to mislead purchasers and induce them to buy infringer’s articles as goods of the other thus depriving the latter of the full benefit of his prop-erty. James Heddon’s Sons v. Millsite Steel & Wire Works, C.C.A.Mich., 128 F.2d 6, 8.
INFUGARE. Lat. To put to flight. INFULA. A coif, or a cassock. Jacob.
INFUSION. In medical jurisprudence. The pro. cess of steeping in liquor; an operation by which the medicinal qualities of a substance may be ex-tracted by a liquor without boiling. Also the product of this operation. "Infusion" and "decoc-tion," though not identical, are ejusdem genertis in law. 3 Campa 74. Decoction. A pharmaceu-tical operation, which consists in pouring a hot (Ir cold fiuid upon a substanee whose medical prop-erties it is desired to extract. The product of this operation.
INGE. Meadow, or pasture. Jacob.
INGENIUM. (1) Artifice, trick, fraud; (2) an engine or device. Spelman. (3) A net or hook. (4) A machine, Spelman, Gloss., especially for warlike purposes; also, for navigation of a ship. Du Cange.
INGENUITAS. Lát. Freedom; liberty; the state or condition of one who is free. Also liberty given to a servant by manumission.
INGENUITAS REGNI. In old English law. The freemen, yeomanry, or commonalty of the king-dom. Cowell. Applied sometimes also to the bar-ons.
INGENUITY. Acuteness of understanding. Tol-free v. Wetzler, D.C.N.J., 22 F.2d.214.
INGENUUS. In Roman law. A person who, im-mediately that he was born, was a free person. He was opposed to libertinus, or libertus, who, having been born a slave, was afterwards manu-mitted or made free. It is not the same as the English law term "generosos," which denoted a person not merely free, but of good family. There were no distinctions among ingenui; but among libertini there were (prior to Justinian’s abolition of the distinctions) three varieties, namely: Those of the highest rank, called "Cives Romani ;" those of the second rank, called "Latini Juniani;" and those of the lowest rank, called "Dediticii." Brown.
INGRATITUDE. In Roman law, ingratitude was accounted a sufficient cause for revoking a gift or recalling the liberty of a freedman. Such is also the law of France, with respect to the first case. But the English law has left the matter en-tirely to the moral sense.
INGRESS, EGRESS, AND REGRESS. These words express the right of a lessee to enter, go upon, and return from the lands in question.
INGRESSU. In English law. An ancient writ of entry, by which the plaintiff or complainant sougnt an entry into his lands. Abolished in 1833.
INGRESSUS. In oid English law. Ingress; en-try. The relief paid by an heir to the lord was sometimes so called. Cowell.
INGROSSATOR. An engrosser. Ingrossator magni rotuli, engrosser of the great roil; atter-wards called "clerk of the pipe." Spelman; Cow-ell.
INGROSSING. The act of making a fair and per-fect copy of any document from a rough draft of it, in order that it may be executed or put to its final purpose.
INGUINAL. A term referring to the groin. Cav-alier v. Chevrolet Motor Co. of New York, 178 N.Y.S. 489, 490, 189 App.Div. 412.
INHABIT. Synonymous with dwell, live, sojourn, stay, rest. MacLeod v. Stelle, 43 Idaho, 64, 249 P. 254, 256.
INHABITANT. One who resides actually and permanently in a given place, and has his domicile there. Ex parte Shaw, 12 S.Ct. 935, 145 U.S. 444, 36 L.Ed. 768; The Pizarro, 2 Wheat. 245, 4 L.Ed. 226.
"The words ‘inhabltant,"citlzen,’ and ‘resident,’ as employed in different constitutions to define the qualiffca-tions of electors, mean substantially the same thing; and one is an inhabitant, resident, or citizen at the place where he has his domicile or honre." Cooley, Const.Lim. .600; State ex rel. Sathre v. Moodie, 65 N.D. 340, 258 N.W. 558, 564. But the terms "resident" and "inhabitant" have also been heid not synonymous, the latter implying a more fixed and permanent abode than the former, and importing pri’vi-leges and duties to which a mere resident would not be subject. Tazewell County v. Davenport, 40 III. 197; State, to Use of Knox County Collector, v. Bunce, 187 Mo.App. 607, 173 S.W. 101, 102.
When relating to municipal rights, powers, or duties, the word inhabitant is almost universal]y used as signifying precisely the same as domiciled; Borland v. City of Boston, 132 Muss. 98, 42 Am.Rep. 424.
A corporation can be an inhabitant only in the state of its incorporation. Sperry Products v. Association of Amer-ican Railroads, C.C.A.N.Y., 132 F.2d 408, 411; Vogel v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., D.C.IVId., 36 F.Supp. 74, 75; Inter-national Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers v. Ten-nessee Copper Co., D.C.Tenn., 31 F.Supp. 1015, 1017; Deutsch v. Times Pub. Corporation, D.C.N.Y., 33 F.Supp. 957, 958.
INHABITED HOUSE DUTY. A tax assessed in England on inhabited dwelling houses, according to their annual value, (St. 14 & 15 Vict. c. 36; 32 & 33 Vict. c. 14, § 11,) which is payable by the oc-cupier, the landiord being deemed the occupier where the house is let to several persons. (St. 48 Geo. III. c. 55, Schedule B.) Houses occupied solely for business purposes are exempt from duty, although a care-taker may dwell therein, and houses partially occupied for business purposes are to that extent exempt. Sweet.
INHERE. To exist in and inseparable from some-thing else; to stick fast. Majestic Theater Co. v. Lutz, 210 Ky. 92, 275 S.W. 16, 20.
INHERENT POWER. An authority possessed without its being derived from another. A right, ability, or faculty of doing a thing, without re-ceiving that right, ability, or faculty from another. See, also, "Power."
INHERENT POWERS OF A COURT. Those rea-sonably necessary for administration of justice. State ex rel. Gentry v. Becker, 351 Mo. 769, 174 S. W.2d 181, 183. Ex parte Wetzel, 243 Ala. 130, 8 So.2d 824, 825.
INHERENTLY DANGEROUS. Danger inhering in instrumentality or condition itself at all times, so as to require special precautions to prevent in-jury, not danger arising from mere casual or col-lateral negligence of others with respect thereto under particular circumstances. Brown v. City of Craig, 350 Mo. 836, 1.68 S.W.2d 1080, 1082; Emery v. Thompson, 347 Mo. 494, 148 S.W.2d 479, 480; Hull v. Gillioz, 344 Mo. 1227, 130 S.W.2d 623, 628; Street v. W. E. Callahan Cónst. Co., Mo.App., 147 S.W.2d 153, 155.
INHERETRIX. The old term for "heiress." Co. Litt. 13a.
INHERIT. To take by inheritance; to take as heir on death of ancestor; to take by descent from ancestor; to take or receive, as right or title, by law from ancestor at his decease. Condren v. Marlin, 113 Okl. 259, 241 P. 826, 827. In re Buell’s Estate, 167 Or. 295, 117 P.2d 832, 836. "To inherit to" a person is a common expression in the books. 2 Bl. Comm. 254, 255; 3 Coke, 41.
The word is also used in its popular sense, as the equivalent of to take or receive. Manchester v. Loomis, 191 Iowa 554, 181. N.W. 415, 442.
INHERITABLE BLOOD. Blood which has the purity (freedom from attainder) and legitimacy necessary to give its possessor the character of a lawful heir; that which is capable of being the medium for the transmission of an inheritance.
INHERITANCE. An estate in things real, de-scending to the heir. 2 Bl. Comm. 201; Rountree v. Pursell, 39 N.E. 747, 11 Ind.App. 522. Such an estate in lands or tenements or other things as may be inherited by the heir. Termes de la Ley. An estate or property which a man has by descent, as heir to another, or which he may transmit to another, as his heir. Litt. § 9.
A perpetuity in lands or tenements to a man and his heirs. Cowell; Blount. The method by which children or relatives take property from another at his death. Priddy v. Green, Tex.Civ.App., 220 S.W. 243, 248; Horner v. Web-ster, 33 N.J.L. 413.
Though "inheritance" in its restricted sense means some-thing obtained through laves of descent and distribution from an intestate, in its popular use it includes property obtained by devise or descent. Pacheco v. Fernandez. Tex. Civ.App., 277 S.W. 197, 198; Higby v. Martin, 167 Okl. 10, 28 P.2d 1097, 1102.
"Inheritance" is also used in the old books where "here-ditament" is now commonly employed. Thus, Coke divides inheritances into corporeal and incorporeal, into real, per-sonal, and mixed, and into entire and several.

Civil Law

The succession of the heir to all the rights and property of the estate-leaver. It is either testa-mentary, where the heir is created by will, or ab intestato, where it arises merely by operation of law. Heinec. § 484.

In General

Estate of inheritance. See Estate.
Inheritance act. The English statute of 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 106, by which the law of inheritance or descent was considerably modified. 1 Steph. Comm. 359, 500.
Inheritance tax. A tax on the transfer or pass-ing of estates or property by legacy, devise, or in-testate succession; not a tax on the property it-self, but on the right to acquire it by descent or testamentary gift. In re Gihon’s Estate, 169 N.Y.
443; First Nat. Bank v. Commissioner of Corpora-tions and Taxation, 258 Mass. 253, 154 N.E. 844, 845. A tax on the succession to, or transfer of, property occasioned by death. Waddell v. Dough-ton, 194 N.C. 537, 140 S.E. 160.
"Estate taxes" are based on the power to transmit or the transmission from the dead to the living, whlle "legacy taxes," or "inheritance taxes," are based on the transmis-sion or right to receive the property. Frick v. Lewellyn, D.C.Pa., 298 F. 803, 810.
INHIBITION. In Ecciesiastical law. A writ is-suing from a superior ecciesiastical court, forbid-ding an inferior judge to proceed further in a cause pending before him. In this sense it is closely analogous to the writ of prohibition at common law. Also the command of a bishop or ec-clesiastical judge that a clergyman shall tease from taking any duty.
In English law. The name of a writ which for-bids a judge from further proceeding in a cause depending before him; it is in the nature of a prohibition. Termes de la Ley; Fitzh. N. B. 39.
In Scotch law. A species of diligente or process by which a debtor is prohibited from contracting any debt which may become a burden on his her-itable property, in competition with the creditor at whose instante the inhibition is taken out; and from granting any deed of alienation, etc., to the prejudice of the creditor. Brande.
In the Civil law. A prohibition which the law makes or a judge ordains to an individual. Halli-fax, Civil Law, p. 126.
INHIBITION AGAINST A WIFE. In Scotch law. A writ in the sovereign’s name, passing the sig-net, which prohibits all and sundry from having transactions with a wife or giving her credit. Bell; Ersk. Inst. 1, 6, 26.
INHOC. In old records. A nook or comer of a common or fallow field, inclosed and cultivated. Kennett, Par. Antiq. 297, 298; Cowell.
INHONESTUS. In old English law. Unseemly; not in due order. Fleta, lib. 1, c. 31, § 8.
INHUMAN TREATMENT. In the law of divorce. Such barbarous cruelty or severity as endangers the life or health of the party to whom it is ad-dressed, or creates a well-founded apprehension of such danger. Whaley v. Whaley, 68 Iowa 647, 27 N.W. 809; Cole v. Cole, 23 Iowa 433. The phrase commonly employed in statutes is "cruel and inhuman treatment," from which it may be in-ferred that "inhumanity" is an extreme or ag-gravated "cruelty."
INIQUISSIMA PAX EST ANTEPONENDA JUS-TISSIMO BELLO. The most unjust peace is to be preferred to the justest war. Root v. Stuy-vesant, 18 Wend. (N.Y.) 257, 305.
INIQUITY. In Scotch practice. A technical ex-pression applied to the decision of an inferior judge who has decided contrary to law; he is said to have committed iniquity. F3e11.

INIQUUM EST ALIOS PERMITTERE, ALIOS INHIBERE MERCATURAM. It is inequitable to permit some to trade and to prohibit others. 3 Inst. 181.
INIQUUM EST ALIQUEM REI SUI ESSE JUDI-CEM. It is wrong for a man to be a judge in his own cause. Branch, Princ.; 12 Coke, 113.
INIQUUM EST INGENUIS HOMINIBUS NON ESSE LIBERAM RERUM SUARUM ALIENA-TIONEM. It is unjust that freemen should not have the free disposal of their own property. Co. Litt. 223a; 4 Kent, Comm. 131; Hob. 87.
INITIAL. That which begins or stands at the be-ginning. The first letter of a man’s name. El-berson v. Richards, 42 N.J.L. 70.
INITIAL CARRIER. In the law of bailments. The carrier who first receives the goods and begins the process of their transportation, afterwards de-livering them to another carrier for the further prosecution or completion of their journey. See Beard v. Railway Co., 79 Iowa• 527, 44 N.W. 803.
But it has also been defined as the one contracting with the shipper, and not necessarily the one whose line consti-tutes the first link in transportation. Knapp v. Minneapo-lis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 33 N.D. 291, 156 N.W. 1019, 1023.
INITIALIA TESTIMONII. In Scotch law. Pre-liminaries of testimony. The preliminary exam-ination of a witness, before examining him in chief, answering to the voir dire of the English law, though taking a somewhat wider range. Wharton.
INITIATE. Commenced; inchoate. Curtesy in-itiate is the interest which a husband has in the wife’s lands after a child is born who may inherit, but before the wife dies.
To propose for approval—as schedule of rates. Idaho Power Co. v. Thompson, D.C.Idaho, 19 F.2d 547, 579.
INITIATION FEE. The sum paid on joining an organization for privileges of membership. Derby v. U. S., D.C.Mass., 17 F.2d 119, 120.
INITIAT1VE. The power of the people to pro-pose bilis and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polis, independent of legislative assembly. City of Litchfield v. Hart, 306 Ill.App. 621, 29 N.E. 2d 678, 679.
In French law. The name given to the impor-tant prerogative conferred by the charte constitu-tionnelle, article 16, on the king to propose through his ministers projects of laws. 1 Toul-lier, no. 39.
INIURCOLLEGUIA. A body of Soviet lawyers in Moscow organized and constituted pursuant to statute under jurisdiction and control of the U. S. S. R. Ministry of Justice for the purpose of exclusive representation of Soviet nationals in foreign legal matters. In re Mitzkel’s Estate, 233 N.Y.S.2d 519, 524, 36 Misc.2d 671; in re Kapocius’ Estate, 234 N.Y.S.2d 346, 348, 36 Misc.2d 1087.
INJUNCTION. A prohibitive writ issued by a court of equity, at the suit of a party complainant, directed to a party defendant in the action, or to a party made a defendant for that pur-pose, forbidding the latter to do some act, or to permit his servants or agents to do some act, which he is threatening or attempting to commit, or restraining him in the continuance thereof, such act being unjust and inequitable, injurious to the plaintiff, and not such as can be adequately re-dressed by an action at law. Dupre v. Anderson, 45 La.Ann. 1134, 13 So. 743; City of Alma v. Loehr, 42 Kan. 368, 22 P. 424. A judicial process oper-ating in personam, and requiring person to whom it is directed to do or refrain from doing a par-ticular thing. Gainsburg v. Dodge, 193 Ark. 473, 101 S.W.2d 178, 180.

Final injunction

One granted when the rights of the parties are deter-mined; distinguished from a preliminary injunction. Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Oakland, C.C.Cal., 58 F. 54.

Interlocutory injunction

One granted prior to the final hearing and determination of the matter in issue, and which is to continue until answer, or until the final hearing, or until the further order of the court. Gas & Electric Securities Co. v. Man-hattan & Queens Traction Corporation. C.C.A.N.Y., 266 F. 625, 632

Mandatory injunction

One which (1) commands the defendant to do some posi-tive act or particular thing; (2) prohibits him from refus-ing (or persisting in a refusal) to do or permit some act to which the plaintiff has a legal right; or (3) restrains the defendant from permitting his previous wrongful act to continue operative, thus virtually compelling him to undo it. Bailey v. Schnitzius, 45 N.J.Eq. 178. 16 A. 680.

fermanent injunction

One intended to remain in force until the final termina-tion of the particular suit. Riggins v. Thompson, 96 Tex. 154, 71 S.W. 14.

PerPetual injunction

An injunethlt which finally desposes of the suit, and is indefinne in noint of time. Riggins v. Thompson, 96 Tex. 151, 71 5.1V. 11.

Preliminary injunction

An injunction granted at the institution of a sun, to restrain the defendant from doing or continuing some act, the right to which is in dispute, and which may either be discharged or made perpetual, according to the result of the controversy, as soon as the rights of the parties are determined. Darlington Oil Co. v. Pec Dee Oil Co., 62 S.C. 19G, 40 S.E. 169: Appeal of Mammoth Vein Consol. Coal Co.. 54 Pa. 158.

Preventiva injunction

One which prohibits the defendant from doing a particu-lar act or commands him to refrain from it. Leaksville Woolen Milis v. Spray Water Power & Land Co., 183 N.C. 511, 112 S.E. 24, 25.

Provisional injunction

Another name for a preliminary or temporary injunction or an injunction pendente lite.

Special injunction

An injunction obtained only on motion and petition, tisually with notice to thP other party. Aldrich v. Kirk-land, 6 ltich.Law S.C. 340: 4 Steph.Comm. 12, note z.

Temporary injunction

A preliminary or provisional injunction, or one granted pendente lite; as opposed to a final or perpetual injunction.

Jesse French Plano Co. v. Porter, 134 Ala. 302, 32 So. 678, 92 Am.St.Rep. 31.
INJURE. To violate the legal right of another or inflict an actionable wrong. Krom v. Antigo Gas Co., 154 Wis. 528, 143 N.W. 163, 164. To do harm to; to hurt; damage; impair; to hurt or wound, as the person; to impair the soundness of, as health. Ziolkowski v. Continental Casualty Co., 284 Ill.App. 505, 1 N.E.2d 410, 412. As applied to a building, "injure" means to materially impair or destroy any part of the existing structure. F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Nelson, 204 Ala. 172, 85 So. 449, 451, 13 A.L.R. 820.
INJURES GRAVES. Fr. In French law. Griev-ous insults or injuries, including personal insults and reproachful language, constituting a just cause of divorce. Butler v. Butler, 1 Pars. Eq. Cas. (Pa.) 344.
INJURIA. Lat. Injury; wrong; the privation or violation of right. 3 Bl. Comm. 2; J. A. & C. E. Bennett v. Winston-Salem Southbound R. Co., 170 N.C. 389, 87 S.E. 133, 134, L.R.A. 1916D, 1074.
INJURIA ABSQUE DAMNO. Injury or wrong without damage. A wrong done, but from which no loss or damage results, and which, therefore, will not sustain an action.
INJURIA FIT El CUI CONVICIUM DICTUM EST, VEL DE E0 FACTUM CARMEN FAMOS-UM. An injury is done to him of whom a re-proachful thing is said, or concerning whom an infamous song is made. 9 Coke, 60.
INJURIA ILLATA JUDICI, SEU LOCUM TEN-ENTI REGIS, VIDETUR IPSI REGI ILLATA MAXIME SI FIAT IN EXERCENTEM OFFICI-UM. 3 Inst. 1. An injury offered to a judge, or person representing the king, is considered as offered to the king himself, especially if it be done in the exercise of his office.
INJURIA NON EXCUSAT INJURIAM. One wrong does not justify another. Broom, Max. 395. See 6 El. & Bl. 47.
INJURIA NON PRIESUMITUR. Injury is not presumed. Co. Litt. 232. Cruel, oppressive, or tortious conduct will not be presumed. Best. Ev. p. 336, § 298.
INJURIA SERVI DOMINUM PERTINGIT. The master is hable for injury done by his servant. Lofft, 229.
INJURIA PROPRIA NON CADET IN BENEFI-CIUM FACIENTIS. One’s own wrong shall not fall to the advantage of him that does it. A man will not be allowed to derive benefit from his own wrongful act. Branch, Princ.
INJURIOUS WORDS. In Louisiana. Slander, or libelous words. Civil Code La. art. 3501.
INJURY. Any wrong or damage done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation, or proper-ty. Woodruff v. Mining Co., C.C.Cal., 18 F. 781; Hitch v. Edgecombe County, 132 N.C. 573, 44 S.E.

30. An act which damages, harms, or hurts. Ritchie v. Standard Surety & Casualty Co. of New York, 13 N.Y.S.2d 1022, 1023, 257 App.Div. 545.
The words "damage," "loss," and "injury" are used interchangeably, and, within legislative meaning and judi-cial interpretation, import the same thing. In re City of Pittsburgh, 90 A. 329, 331, 243 Pa. 392, 52 L.R.A.,N.S., 262.
The term "injury," used to describe an error for which a reversas may be had, means an error which affects the result. Ryan v. State, 8 Okl.Cr. 623, 129 P. 685, 687.

Civil Law

A delict committed in contempt or outrage of any one, whereby his body, his dignity, or his rep-utation is maliciously injured. Voet, Com. ad Pand. 47, t. 10, no. 1.

In General

Absolute injuries. Injuries to those rights which a person possesses as being a member of society.

Absolute injuries. Injuries to those rights which a person possesses as being a member of society.
Accidental injury. A bodily injury by accident. Ideal Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 298 III. 463, 131 N.E. 649, 650.
Within the Workmen’s Compensation Act, one which occurs in the course oí the employment, unexpectedly, and without the affirmative act or design of the employé: it being something which is unforeseen and not expected by the person to whom ít happens. Jakub v. Industrial Com-mission, 288 In. 87, 123 N.E. 263, 264. Any injury to an employee in the course of his employrnent due to any occurrence referable to a definite time, and of the happen-ing of which he can give notice to his employer, regardless of whether the injury is a visible hurt from external force, or disease or infection induced by sudden and castastrophic exposure. Lerner v. Rump Bros., 209 N.Y.S. 698, 701, 212 App.Div. 747. The term is to receive a bread and liberal construction with a view to compensating injured employés where injury resulted through some accidental means, was unexpected and undesigned and may be the result of mere mischance or miscalculation as to effect of voluntary action. Thomas v. Ford Motor Co., 114 Okl. 3, 242 P. 765, 766. It includes an accident causing injury to the physical struc-ture of the body, notwithstanding a natural weakness pre-disposing to injury. Wilkins v. Ben’s Home Oil Co., 166 Minn. 41, 207 N.W. 183. The words indicate, not so much the existente of an accident, but rather the idea that the injury was unexpected or unintended. Victory Sparkler & Specialty Co. v. Francks, 147 Md. 368, 128 A. 635, 639, 44 A.L.R. 363.
Civil injury. Injuries to person or property, resulting from a breach of contract, delict, or criminal offense, which may be redressed by means of a civil action. Cullinan v. Burkhard, 41 Misc.Rep. 321, 84 N.Y.S. 825.
An infringement or privation of the civil rights which belong to individuals, considered merely as individuals. State v. Magee Pub. Co., 29 N.M. 455, 224 1′. 1028, 38 A.L.R. 142.
Irreparable injury. This phrase does not mean such an injury as is beyond the possibility of re-pair, or beyond possible compensation in damages, or necessarily great damage, but includes an in-jury, whether great or small, which ought not to be submitted to, on the one hand, or inflicted, on the other; and which, because it is so large or so small, or is of such constant and frequent occur-rence, or because no certain pecuniary standard exists for the measurement of dqmages, cannot receive reasonable redress in a court of law.Sanderlin v. Baxter, 76 Va. 306, 44 Am.Rep. 165. Wrongs of a repeated and continuing character, or which occasion damages that are estimated only by conjecture, and not by any accurate stand-ard, are included. Johnson v. Kier, 3 Pittsb. R. (Pa.) 204; Scherman v. Stern, 117 A. 631, 633, 93 N.J.Eq. 626; Birchfield v. Bourland, Tex.Civ.App., 187 S.W. 422, 423.
Personal injury. A hurt or damage done to a man’s person, such as a cut or bruise, a broken limb, or the like, as distinguished from an injury to his property or his reputation. The phrase is chiefly used in connection with actions of tort for negligence. Norris v. Grove, 100 Mich. 256, 58 N.W. 1006; State v. Clayborne, 14 Wash. 622, 45 P. 303. But the term is also used (chiefly in statutes) in a much wider sense, and as including any injury which is an invasion of personal rights, and in this signification it may include such in-juries as libel or slander, criminal conversation with a wife, seduction of a daughter, and mental suffering. McDonald v. Brown, 23 R.I. 546, 51 A. 213, 58 L.R.A. 768, 91 Am.St.Rep. 659.
In Workmen’s Compensation Acts, "personal injury" means any harm or damage to the health of an employee, however caused, whether by accident, disease, or otherwise, which arises in the course of and out of his employment, and incapacitates him in whole or in part. Hines v. Nor-walk Lcck Co., 100 Conn. 533, 124 A. 17, 20; Lane v. Horn & Hardart Baking Co., 261 Pa. 329, 104 A. 615, 616, 13 A.L.R. 963; Hanson v. DIckinson, 188 Iowa, 728, 176 N.W. 823, 824. A disease of mind or body which arises in the course of employment with nothing more is not within the Massachusetts act, but it must come from or by an injury, although that injury need not be a single definite act, but may extend over a continuous period of time. In re Mag-gelet, 228 Mass. 57, 116 N.E. 972, 973, L.R.A.1918F, 864; Taylor v. Swift & Co., 114 Kan. 431, 219 P. 516, 519. A "personal injury," as that term is used in the Workmen’s Compensation Act, refers not to some break in some part of the body, or some wound thereon, or the like, but rather to the consequence or disability that results therefrom. Indian Creek Coal & Mining Co. v. Calvert, 68 Ind.App. 474, 119 N.E. 519, 525.
Permanent injury. An injury that, according to every reasonable probability, will continue throughout the remainder of one’s lile. Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Taylor, 196 Ala. 37, 71 So. 676, 678.
Private injuries. Infringements of the private or civil rights belonging to individuals considered as individuals.
Public injuries. Breaches and violations of rights and duties which affect the whole com-munity as a community.
Real injury. A real injury is inflicted by any act by which a person’s honor or dignity is af-fected.
Relative injuries. Injuries to those rights which a person possesses in relation to the person who is immediately affected by the wrongful act done.
Reparable injury. The general principie is that an injury, the damage from which is merely in the nature of pecuniary loss, and can be exactly and fully repaired by compensation in money, is a "reparable injury" for which a bond of sufficient
amount and properly secured may afford an ade-quate indemnity. Barrow v. Duplantis, 148 La. 149, 86 So. 718, 723.
Verbal injury. A verbal injury, when directed against a private person, consists in the uttering contumelious words, which tend to injure his rep-utation by making him little or ridiculous.
INJUSTICE. The withholding or denial of jus-tice. In law, almost invariably applied to the act, fault, or omission of a court, as distinguished from that of an individual. Holton v. Olcott, 58 N.H. 598; In re Moulton, 50 N.H. 532.
"Fraud" is deception practised by the party; "injustice" 1s the fault or error of the court. They are not equivalent words in substance, or in a statute authorizing a new trial ce a showing of fraud or injustice. Fraud is always the result of contrivance and deception; injustice may be done by the negligence, mistake, or omission of the court itself. Silvey v. U. S., 7 Ct.C1. 324.
INJUSTUM EST, NISI TOTA LEGE INSPECTA, DE UNA ALIQUA EJUS PARTICULA PROPO-SITA JUDICARE VEL RESPONDERE. 8 Coke, 117b. It is unjust to decide or respond as to any particular part of a law without examining the whole of the law.
INLAGARE. In old English law. To restore to protection of law. To restore a man from the condítion of outlawry. Opposed to utlagare. Bract. lib. 3, tr. 2, c. 14, § 1; Du Cange.
INLAGATION. Restoration to the protection of law. Restoration from a condition of outlawry.
INLAGH. A person within the law’s protection; contrary to utlagh, an outlaw. Cowell.
INLAND. Within a country, state or territory; within the same country.
In old English law, inland was used for the demesne (q. v.) of a manor; that part which lay next or most convenient for the lord’s mansion-house, as within the view thereof, and which, therefore, he kept in his own hands for support of his family and for hospitality; in distinction from outland or utland, which was the portion let out to tenants. Cowell; Kennett; Spelman.
INLAND BILL OF EXCHANGE. A bill of which both the drawer and drawee reside within the same state or country. Otherwise called a "dom-estic bill," and distinguished from a "foreign bill." Buckner v. Finley, 2 Pet. 589, 7 L.Ed. 528; Lons-dale v. Brown, 15 Fed.Cas. 857; Strawbridge v. Robinson, 10 Ill. 472, 50 Am.Dec. 420.
See Bill.
INLAND NAVIGATION. Within the meaning of the legislation of congress upon the subject, this phrase means navigation upon the rivers of the country, but not upon the great lakes. Moore v. American Transp. Co., 24 How. 38, 16 L.Ed. 674.
INLAND TRADE. Trade wholly carried on at home; as distinguished from commerce. See commerce.WATERS. Such waters as canals, lakes, rivers, water-courses, inlets and bays, exclusive of the open sea, though the water in question may open or empty into the ocean. United States v. Steam Vessels of War, 1 S.Ct. 539, 106 U.S. 607, 27 L.Ed. 286; The Cotton Plant, 10 Wall. 581, 19 L.Ed. 983; Cogswell v. Chubb, 36 N.Y.S. 1076, 1 App.Div. 93.
INLANTAL, INLANTALE. Demesne or inland, opposed to delantal, or land tenanted. Cowell.
INLAUGHE. Sax. In old English law. Under the law, (sub lege,) in a frank-pledge, or decen-nary. Bract. fol. 125b.
INLAW. To place under the protection of the law. "Swearing obedience to the king in a leet, which doth inlaw the subject." Bacon.
INLEASED. In oid English law. Entangled, or ensnared. 2 Inst. 247; Cowell; Blount.
INLIGARE. In old European law. To confed-erate; to join in a league, (in ligam coire.) Spel-man.
INMATE. A person who lodges or dwells in the same house with another, occupying different rooms, but using the same door for passing in and out of the house. Webster; Jacob.
INMATE OF HOUSE OF PROSTITUTION. Those words apply only to the woman who goes there more or less regularly and who. plies her trade there, and do not include a man found there-in who has gone there for the purpose of illicit sexual intercourse. People v. Anonymous, 292 N. Y.S. 282, 285, 161 Misc. 379.
INN. An inn is a house where a traveler is fur-nished with everything which he has occasion for while on his way. Waitt Const. Co. y. Chase, 188 N.Y.S. 589, 592, 197 App.Div. 327. A house where all who conduct themselves properly, and who are able and ready to pay for their entertainment, are received, if there is accommodation for them, and who, without any stipulated engagement as to the duration of their stay, or as to the rate of compensation, are, while there, supplied at a rea-sonable charge with their meals, their lodging, and such services and attention as are necessarily in-cident to the use of the house as a temporary home. Ford v. Waldorf System, 57 R.I. 131, 188 A. 633, 635. A place where the public Will be re-ceived and accommodations provided to guests for compensation. Edwards v. City of Los An-geles, 48 Ca1.App.2d 62, 119 P.2d 370, 373, 374.
Under the term "inn" the law includes all tav-erns, hotels, and houses of public general enter-tainment for guests. Code Ga. 1882, § 2114 (Civ. Code 1910, § 3505).
See, also Hotel.
The words "inn," "tavern," and "hotel" are uscd synon-ymously to designate what is ordinarily and popularly known as an "inn" or "tavern," or place for the entertain-ment of travelers, and where all their wants can he sup-plied. A restaurant where meals only are furnished is not an inn or tavern. Carpenter v. Taylor, 1 Hilt., N.Y., 193. An inn is distinguished from a private boarding-house
mainly in this: that the keeper of the latter is at liberty to choose his guests, while the innkeeper is obliged to entertain and furnish all travelers of good conduct and means of payment with what they may have occasion for, as such travelers, while on their way. Pinkerton v. Wood-ward, 33 Cal. 557, 91 Am.Dec. 657. Another distinction is that in a boarding-house the guest is under an express con-tract for a certain time at a certain rate, whereaá, in an inn the guest is entertained from day to day upen an implied contract. Willard v. Reinhardt, 2 E.D.Smith, N.Y., 148. A lodging house does not become an "inn" because a register is kept. Roberts v. Case Hotel Co., 175 N.Y.S. 123, 127, 106 Misc. 481.
Common Inn. A house for the entertainment of travelers and passengers, in which lodging and necessaries are provided for them and for their horses and attendants. Cromwell v. Stephens, 2 Daly (N.Y.) 15. The word "common," in this connection, does not appear to add anything to the common-law definition of an inn, except in so far as it lays stress on the fact that the house is for the entertainment of the general public or for all suitable persons who apply for accommodations.
INNAMIUM. In oid English law. A pledge.
INNAVIGABILITY. In insurance law. The con-dition of being innavigable, (q. v.) The foreign writers distinguish "innavigability" from "ship-wreck." 3 Kent, Comm. 323, and note. The term is also applied to the condition of streams which are not large enough or deep enough, or are other-wise unsuited, for navigation.
INNAVIGABLE. As applied to streams, not cap-able of or suitable for navigation; impassable by ships or vessels.
As applied to vessels in the law of marine in-surance, it means unfit for navigation; so dam-aged by misadventures at sea as to be no longer capable of making a voyage. See 3 Kent, Comm. 323, note.
INNER BARRISTER. A serjeant or king’s coun-sel, in England, who is admitted to plead within the bar.
INNER HOUSE. The name given to the chambers in which the first and second divisions of the court of session in Scotland hold their sittings. See Outer House.
INNINGS. In old records. Lands recovered from the sea by draining and banking. Cowell.
INNKEEPER. One who keeps an inn or house for the lodging and entertainment of travelers. The keeper of a common inn for the lodging and entertainment of travelers and passengers, their horses and attendants, for a reasonable compensa-tion. Story, Bailm. § 475. One who keeps a tavern or coffeehouse in which lodging is provided. 2 Steph. Comm. 133. See Inn.
One who receives as guests all who choose to visit his house, without any previous agreeincnt as to the time of their stay, or the tercas. His liability as innkeeper ceases when his guest pays his Bill. and leaves the house with the declared intention of not returning, notwithstanding the guest leaves his baggage behind him. Wintermute v. Clark, 5 Sandf., N.Y., 242.
The words "innkeeper" and "hotel keeper" are synon-ymous, but each is distinct from a "boarding house keep-er," in that the innkeeper has no right to select his guests,

receive every one applying for accommodatton who conducts himself in a proper manner, etc., while the keeper of a boarding house is one who maintains a house for the accommodation of those who enter under contract for entertaMment at a cértatn rate for a certain period at an agreed compensation. McClaugherty v. Cline, 128 Tenn. 605, 163 S.W. 801. One who entertains strangers occasion-ally, although he may receive compensation for it, is not an innkeeper.
INNOCENCE. The absence of guilt.
INNOCENT. Free from guilt; acting in good faith and without knowledge of incriminatory circumstances, or of defects or objections.
INNOCENT AGENT. In criminal law. One who, being ignorant of any unlawful intent on the part of his principal, is merely the instrument of the guilty party in committing an offense; one who does an unlawful act at the solicitation or request of another, but who, from defect of understand-ing or ignorante of the inculpatory facts, incurs no legal guilt. Smith v. State, 21 Tex.App. 107, 17 S.W. 552; State v. Carr, 28 Or. 389, 42 P. 215.
INNOCENT CONVEYANCES. A technical term of the English law of conveyancing, used to desig-nate such conveyances as may be made by a lease-hold tenant without working a forfeiture. These are said to be lease and re-lease, bargain and sale, and, in case of a life-tenant, a covenant to stand seised. 1 Chit. Pr. 243.
INNOCENT PURCHASER. One who, by an hon-est contract or agreement, purchases property or acquires an interest therein, without knowledge, or means of knowledge sufficient to charge him in law with knowledge, of any infirmity in the title of the seller. Republic Power and Service Co. v. Continental Credit Corporation, 178 Ark. 966, 12 S.W.2d 906, 908.
INNOCENT TRESPASS. A trespass to land, committed, not recklessly, but through inadver-tence or mistake, or in good faith, under an honest belief that the trespasser was acting within his legal rights. Elk Garden Big Vein Mining Co. v. Gerstell, 100 W.Va. 472, 131 S.E. 152, 153.
INNOCENT TRESPASSER. One who enters an-other’s land unlawfully, but inadvertently or un-intentionally, or in the honest, reasonable belief of his own right so to do, and removes sand or other material therefrom, is an "innocent trespasser." American Sand & Gravel Co. v. Spencer, 55 Ind. App. 523, 103 N.E. 426, 427.
INNOCENT WOMAN. One who has never had illicit intercourse with a man. State v. Cline, 170 N.C. 751, 87 S.E. 106, 107.
INNOIVIINATE. In the civil law. Not named or classed; belonging to no specific Class; ranking under a general head. A term applied to those contracts for which no certain or precise remedy was appointed, but a general action on the case only. Dig. 2, 1, 4, 7, 2; Id. 19, 4, 5.
INNOMINATE CONTRACTS, literally, are the "unclassified" contracts of Roman law. They are contracts which are neither re, verbis, literis, nor
consenso simply, but some mixture of or variation upon two or more of such contracts. They are principally the contracts of permutatio, de (estima-to, precarium, and transactio. Brown.
INNONIA. In old English law. A close or in-closure, (clausum, inclausura.) Spelman.
INNOTESCIMUS. Lat. We make known. A term formerly applied to letters patent, derived from the emphatic word at the conclusion of the Latin forms. It was a species of exemplification of charters of feoffment or other instruments not of record. 5 Coke, 54a.
INNOVATION. In Scotch law. The exchange of one obligation for another, so as to make the sec-ond obligation come in the place of the first, and be the only subsisting obligation against the debt-or. Bell. The same with "novation," (q. v.)
INNOXIARE. In old English law. To purge one of a fault and make him innocent.
INNS OF CHANCERY. So called because an-ciently inhabited by such clerks as chiefly studied the framing of writs, which regularly belonged to the cursitors, who were ofilcers of the court of chancery. There are vine of them,—Clement’s, Clifford’s, and Lyon’s Inn; Furnival’s, Thavies’, and Symond’s Inn; New Inn; and Barnard’s and Staples’ Inn. These were formerly preparatory colleges for students, and many entered them be-fore they were admitted into the inns of court. They consist chiefly of solicitors, and possess cor-porate property, hall, chambers, etc., but Perform no public functions like the inns of court. Whar-ton.
INNS OF COURT. These are certain private un-incorporated associations, in the nature of col-legiate houses, located in London, and invested with the exclusive privilege of calling men to the bar; that is, conferring the rank or degree of a barrister. They were founded orobably about the beginning of the fourteenth century. The princi-pal inns of court are the Inner Temple, Middle Temple, Lincoln’s Inn, and Gray’s Inn. (The two former originally belonged to the Knights Temp-lar; the two latter to the earls of Lincoln and Gray respectively.) These bodies now have a "common council of legal education," for giving lectures and holding examinations. The inns of chancery, dis-tinguishable from the foregoing, but generally classed with them under the general name, are the buildings known as "Clifford’s Inn," "Clement’s Inn," "New Inn," "Staples’ Inn," and "Barnard’s Inn." They were formerly a sort of collegiate houses in which law students learned the elements of law before being admitted into the inns of court, but they have long ceased to occupy that position.
INNUENDO. This Latin word (commonly trans-lated "meaning") was the technical beginning of that clause in a declaration or indictment for slander or libel in which the meaning of the al-leged libelous words was explained, or the applica-tion of the language charged to the plaintiff was out. Hence it gave its name to the whole clause; and this usage is still retained, although an equivalent English word is now substituted. Thus, it may be charged that the defendant said "he (meaning the said plaintiff) is a perjurer."
An "innuendo" in pleading in libel action is a statement by plaintiff of construction which he puts upon words which are alleged to be libelous and which meaning he will induce jury to adopt at trial. Burr v. Winnett Times Pub. Co., 80 Mont. 70, 258 P. 242, 244.
The word is also used, (though more rarely,) in other species of pleadings, to introduce an ex-planation of a preceding word, charge, or ayer-ment. Guide Pub. Co. v. Futrell, 175 Va. 77, 7 S,E.2d 133, 138.
It la said to mean no more than the words "id est," "scilieet," or "meaning," or "aforesaid," as explanatory of a subject-matter sufnciently expressed before; as "such a one, meaning the defendant," or "such a subject, mean-ing the subject in question." Cowp. 683. It is only explan-atory of some matter already expressed. It serves to point out where there is precedent matter, but never for a new charge. It may apply what is already expressed, but can-not add to or enlarge or change the sense of the previous words. See Grand v. Dreyfus, 122 Cal. 58, 54 P. 389; Kee v. Armstrong, Byrd & Co., 75 Oki. 84, 182 P. 494, 498, 5 A.L.R. 1349. The office of an "innuendo" is to explain the words published. and to give to them their true meaning, and it cannot introduce new matter, add to or enlarge the sense of those words, or impute to them a meaning not warranted by the publication, when taken alone, or read in connection with the inducement and colloquium. Bowie v. Evening News, 148 Md. 569, 129 A. 797, 800; Drebin v. Jewish World Pub. Co., 262 Pa. 169, 105 A. 58, 59. Its office is to set a meaning upon words or language of doubtful or ambiguous import which alone would not be actionable. Rail v. National Newspaper Ass’n, 198 Mo.App. 463, 192 S.W. 129, 134.
INOFFICIOSUM. In the civil law. Inofficious; contrary to natural duty or affection. Used of a Will of a parent which disinherited a child without just cause, or that of a child which disinherited a parent, and which could be contested by querela inofficiosi testamenti. Dig. 2, 5, 3, 13; Paulus, lib. 4, tit. 5, § 1.
INOFFICIOUS TESTAMENT. A will not in ac-cordance with the testator’s natural affection and moral duties. In re Willford’s Will (N.J.) 51 A. 502. But particularly, in the civil law, a will which deprives the heirs of that portion of the estate to which the law entitles them, and of which they cannot legally be disinherited. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 714; Civ. Code La. art. 3556, subd. 16. A testament contrary to the natural duty of the parent, because it totally disinherited the child, without expressly giving the reason therefor.
INOFICIOCIDAD. In Spanish law. Every thing done contrary to a duty or obligation assumed, as well as in opposition to the piety and affection dictated by nature: inofficiosum dicitur id omne quod contra pietatis officium factum est. The term applies especially to testaments, donations, dower, etc., which may be either revoked or re-duced when they affect injuriously the rights of creditors or heirs.
INOPS CONSILII. Lat. Destitute of counsel; without legal counsel. A term applied to the acts
or condition of one acting without legal advice, as a testator drafting his own
INORDLNATUS. An intestate.
INPENY and OUTPENY. In old English law. A customary payment of a penny on entering into and going out of a tenancy, (pro exitu de tenura, et pro ingressu.) Spelman.
INQUEST. A body of men appointed by law to inquire into certain matters. The grand jury is sometimes called the "grand inquest." The judicial inquiry made by a jury summoned for the purpose is called an "inquest." The finding of such men, upon an investigation, is also called an "inquest." People v. Coombs, 55 N.Y.S. 276, 36 App.Div. 284; Davis v. Bibb County, 116 Ga. 23, 42 S.E. 403.
The inquiry by a coroner, termed a "coroner’s inquest," into the manner of the death of any one who has been slain, or has died suddenly or in prison.
This name is also given to a species of pro-ceeding under the New York practice, allowable where the defendant in a civil action has not filed an affidavit of merits nor verified his answer. In such case the issue may be taken up, out of its regular order, on plaintiff’s motion, and tried with-out the admission of any affirmative defense.
An inquest is a trial of an issue of fact where the plain-tiff alone introduces testimony. The defendant Is entltled to appear at the taking of the inquest, and to cross-examine the plaintiff’s witnesses; and, if he do appear, the inquest must be taken before a jury, unless a jury be expressly waived by him. Haines v. Davis, 6 How.Prac., N.Y., 118.
The term "Inquest," as applied to Surrogates’ Courts, Is a term of larger signiflcation than as applied to proceedings at common law, and includes the exercise of the surrogate’s function to determine all the circumstances concerning the genuineness of a will offered for probate, and the validity of its execution, without reference to whether there Is a contest or not; his judicial power arising only after he has determined that the will is genuine and validly executed. In re Hermann’s Will, 145 N.Y.S. 291, 297, 83 Misc. 283.

General

Coroner’s inquest. See Coronen. Inquest, arrest of. See Arrest.
Inquest of lunacy. See Inquisition (or Inquest) of Lunacy.
Inquest of office. In English practice. An in-quiry made by the king’s (or the queen’s) officer, his sheriff, coroner, or escheator, virtute ojficii, or by writ sent to them for that purpose, or by com-missioners specially appointed, concerning any matter that entitles the king to the possession of lands or tenements, goods or chattels; as to in-quire whether the king’s tenant for life died seised, whereby the reversion accrues to the king; whether A., who held immediately of the crown, died without heir, in which case the lands belong to the king by escheat; whether B. be attainted of treason, whereby his estate is forfeited to the crown; whether C.; who has purchased land, be an alien, which is another cause of forfeiture, etc. 3 Bl. Comm. 258. These inquests of office were frequent in practice during the continuance of the military tenures than at present; and were devised by law as an authentic means to give the king his right by solemn matter of record. Id. 258, 259; 4 Steph. Comm. 40, 41. Sometimes sim-ply termed "office," as in the phrase "office found," (q. v.). Atlantic & P. R. Co. v. Mingus, 17 S.Ct. 348, 165 U.S. 413, 41 L.Ed. 770; Baker v. Shy, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 89.
Inquest of sheriffs. An inquest which directs a general inquiry as to the methods in which the sheriffs had been conducting the local government of the country (1170). 1 Holdsw. H. E. L. 21.
INQUILINUS. In Roman law. A tenant; one who hires and occupies another’s house; but par-ticularly, a tenant of a hired house in a city, as distinguished from colonus, the hirer of a house or estate in the country. Calvin.
INQUIRENDO. An authority given to some of-ficial person to institute an inquiry concerning the crown’s interests.
INQUIRY, WRIT OF. A writ sued out by a plain-tiff in a case where the defendant has let the Pro-ceedings go by default, and an interlocutory judg-ment has been given for damages generally, where the damages do not admit of calculation. It issues to the sheriff of the county in which the vence is laid, and commands him to inquire, by a jury of twelve men, concerning the amount of dam-ages. The sheriff thereupon tries the cause in his sheriff’s court, and some amount must always be returned to the court. But the return of the in-quest merely informs the court, which may, if it choose, in all cases assess damages and thereupon give final judgment. 2 Archb. Pr., Waterman ed. 952; 3 Bla. Com. 398; 3 Chitty, Stat. 495, 497.
INQUISITIO. In old English law. An inquisition or inquest. Inquisitio post mortem, an inquisition after death. An inquest of office held, during the continuance of the military tenures, upon the death of every one of the king’s tenants, to in-quire of what lands he died seised, who was his heir, and of what age, in order to entitle the king to his marriage, wardship, relief, primer seisin, or other advantages, as the circumstances of the case might turn out. 3 Bl. Comm. 258. Inquisitio pat-rice, the inquisition of the country; the ordinary jury, as distinguished from the grand assise. Bract. fol. 15b.
INQUISITION. In practice. An inquiry or in-quest; particularly, an investigation of certain facts made by a sheriff, together with a jury im-paneled by him for the purpose. The instrument of writing on which their decision is made is also called an inquisition.
In its broadest sense, "inquisition," includes any judicial inquiry. Phillips v. Vessells, 2 W.W.Harr. (Del.) 490, 126 A. 51.
INQUISITION AFTER DEATH. See Inquisitio.
INQUISITION (or INQUEST) OF LUNACY. A quasi-judicial examination into the sanity or in-
Black’s Law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed.-59
INSANITY
sanity of a given person, ordered by a court hav-ing jurisdiction, on a proper application and suf-ficient preliminary showing of facts, held by the sheriff (or marshal, or a magistrate, or the court itself, according to the local practice) with the as-sistance of a special jury, usually of six men, who are to hear evidence and render a verdict in ac-cordance with the facts. This is the usual founda-tion for an order appointing a guardian or con-servator for a person adjudged to be insane, or for committing him to an insane asylum. See Hughes v. Jones, 116 N.Y. 67, 22 N.E. 446, 5 L.R.A. 637, 15 Am.St.Rep. 386; Hadaway v. Smith, 71 Md. 319, 18 A. 589.
INQUISITOR. A designation of sheriffs, coroners super visum corporis, and the like, whc have pow-er to inquire into certain matters.
In Ecclesiastical law. The narre of an officer who is authorized to inquire into heresies, and the like, and to punish them. A judge.
INROLL. A form of "enroll," used in the old books. 3 Rep. Ch. 63, 73; 3 East, 410.
INROLLMENT. See Enrollment.
INSANE. Unsound in mind; of unsound mind; deranged, disordered, or diseased in mind. Vio-lently deranged; mad.
INSANITY. Unsoundness of mind; madness; mental alienation or derangement; a morbid psy-chic condition resulting from iisorder of the brain, whether arising from malformation or defective organization or morbid processes affecting the brain primarily or diseased states of the general system implicating it secondarily, which involves the intellect, the emotions, the will, and the moral sense, or some of these faculties, and which is characterized especially by their non-development, derangement, or perversion, and is manifested, in most forms, by delusions, incapacity to reason or to judge, or by uncontrollable impulses. In law, such a want of reason, memory, and intelligence as prevents a man from comprehending the nature and consequences of his acts or from distinguish-ing between right and wrong conduct. Crosswell v. People, 13 Mich. 427, 87 Am.Dec. 774; Johnson v. Insurance Co., 83 Me. 182, 22 A. 107; Frazer v. Frazer, 2 Del.Ch. 263.
"Insanity" does not include certain states of transitory mental disorder, such as trances, epi-lepsy, hysteria, and delirium. Martin v. Fraternal Reserve Life Ass’n, 200 III. App. 359, 364, and from both the pathologic and the legal definitions are to be excluded temporary mental aberrations caused by or accompanying alcoholic or other in-toxication and the delirium of fever.
The distinction between the medical and the legal idea of insanity has, perhaps, not been better stated than by Ray, who is quoted by Ordronaux, and again by Witthaus
Becker : "Insanity in medicine has to do with a pro-longed departure of the individual from his natural mental state arising from bodily disease." "Insanity in law covers nothing more than the relation of the person and the par-ticular act which is the subject of judicial investigation. The legal problem must resolve itself into the inquiry, whether there was mental capacity and moral Freedom to abstain from doing the particular act." 1 Whitth. & Beck.Med.Jur. 181; U. S. v. Faulkner, D.C.Tex., 35 F. 730.

Other definitionsB

1s a manifestation of disease of the brain, char-acterized by a general or partial derangement of one or more faculties of the mind, ‘.nd in which, while conscious-ness Is not abolished, mental freedom is perverted, weak-ened, or destroyed. Hammond, Nervous System, 332. The prolonged departure, without any adequate cause, from the states of feeling and modes of thinking usual to the individ-ual in health. Bouvier. By insanity is not meant (in law) a total deprivation of reason, but only an inability, from defect of perception, memory, and judgment, to do the act in question, [with an intelligent apprehension of its nature and consequences.] So, by a lucid interval is not meant a perfect restoration to reason, but a restoration so far as to be able, beyond doubt, to comprehend and to do the act with such reason, memory, and judgment as to make it a legal act. Frazer v. Frazer, 2 Del.Ch. 263.
Eccentricities and idiosyncracies, however gross, do not constitute "Insanity." In re Hansen’s Will, 50 Utah, 207, 167 P. 256, 261. And drunkenness is not Insanity, nor does it answer to what Is termed an unsound mind, unless the derangement which it causes becomes fixed and continued by the drunkenness .being habitual, or by chronie aleo-holism, and thereby rendering the party incapable of dis-tinguishing between right and wrong, the same as Insanity produced by any other cause. Rucker v. State, 119 Ohio St. 189, 162 N.E. 802, 805

Synonyms

Delusion is sometimes loosely used as synony-mous with insanity. But this is incorrect. De-lusion is not the substance but the evidence of in-sanity. Ryan v. People, 60 Cok). 425, 153 P. 756, 757, L.R.A. 1917F, 646, Ann.Cas.1917C, 605.
The presence of an insane delusion is a recognized test of insanity in all cases except amentia and imbeellity, and where there is no frenzy or raving madness; and in this sense e.n insane delusion is a fixed belief in the mind of the patient of the existence of a fact which has no objective existence but Is purely the flgment of his imagination, and which Is so extravagant that no sane person would believe it under the clrcumstances of the case, the belief, neverthe-less, being so unchangeable that the patient is incapable of being permanently disabused by argument or proof. Walk-er v. Struthers, 273 III. 387, 112 N.E. 961, 966. The charac-terlstic which distinguishes an "insane" delusion from oth-er mistaken beliefs Is that it is not a product of the reason but of the imagination, that is, not a mistake of fact in-duced by deception, fraud, insufficient evidence, or errone-ous reasoning, but the spontaneous conception of a pervert-ed imagination, having no basis whatever in reason or evi-dence. Riggs v. Missionary Soc., 35 Hun, N.Y., 658; Bu-chanan v. Plerie, 205 Pa. 123, 54 AtI. 583, 97 Am.St.Rep. 725. An "insane delusion" Is an idea or belief which springs spontaneously from a diseased or perverted mind without reason or without foundation in fact. It is distinguishable from a belief which is founded upon prejudice or aversion, no matter how unreasonable or unfounded the prejudice or aversion may be, and if it is the product of a reasoning mind, no matter how slight the evidence on which it is based, it cannot be classed as an insane delusion. Coffey v. Miller, 160 Ky. 415, 169 S.W. 852, 854, Ann.Cas.1916C, 30.
As to the distinctions between "Delusion" and "Illusion" and "Hallucination," see those titles.
Derangement. This term includes all forms of mental unsoundness, except of the natural born idiot. Hiett v. Shull, 36 W.Va. 563, 15 S.E. 147.
Idiocy is congenital amentia, that is, a want of reason and intelligence existing from birth and due to structural defect or malformation of the brain. It is a congenital obliteration of the chief mental powers, and is defined in law as that con-dition in which the patient has never had, from his birth, even the least glimmering of reason; for a man is not legaily an "idiot" if he can tell

his parents, his age, or other like common matters. This is not the condition of a deranged mind, but that of a total absence of mind, so that, while idiocy is generally classed under the general des-ignation of "insanity," it is rather to be regarded as a natural defect than as a disease or as the result of a disease. It differs from "lunacy," be-cause there are no lucid intervals or periods of ordinary intelligence. In re Beaumont, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 53, 29 Am.Dec. 33; Clark v. Robinson, 88 Ill. 502.
Imbecility. A more or less advanced decay and feebleness of the intellectual faculties; that weak-ness of mind which, without depriving the person entirely of the use of his reason, leaves only the faculty of conceiving the most common and or-dinary ideas and such as relate almost always to physical wants and habits. It varíes in shades and degrees from merely excessive folly and ec-centricity to an almost total vacuity of mind or amentia, and the test of legal capacity, in this condition, is the stage to which the weakness of mind has advanced, as measured by the degree of reason, judgment, and memory remaining. It may proceed from paresis or general paralysis, from senile decay, or from the advanced stages of any of the ordinary forms of insanity; and the term is rather descriptive of the consequences of insanity than of any particular type of the dis-ease. Campbell v. Campbell, 130 III. 466, 22 N.E. 620, 6 L.R.A. 167.
Mere imbecility or weakness of mind, however great, Is not "insanity." There must be a total want of understand-ing. Johnson v. Mlllard, 110 Neb. 830, 195 N.W. 485, 487.
Lunacy. At the common law, was a term used to describe the state of one who, by sickness, grief, or other accident, has wholly lost his memory and understanding. Co. Litt. 246b, 247a; Com. v. Has-kell, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 496. It is distinguished from idiocy, an idiot being one who from his birth has had no memory or understanding, while lunacy implies the possession and subsequent loss of mental powers. Bicknell v. Spear, 77 N.Y.S. 920, 38 Misc. Rep. 389. On the other hand, lunacy is a total deprivation or suspension of the ordinary powers of the mind, and is to be distinguished from imbecility, where there is a more or less ad-vanced decay and feebleness of the intellectual faculties. In re Vanauken, 10 N.J.Eq. 186, 195; Odell v. Buck, 21 Wend. (N.Y.) 142. As to all other forms of insanity, lunacy was originally distinguished by the occurrence of lucid intervals, and hence might be described as a periodical or recurrent insanity. In re Anderson, 132 N.C. 243, 43 S.E. 649. But while these distinctions are still observed in some jurisdictions, they are more gen-erally disregarded; so that, at present, in inquisi-tions of lunacy and other such proceedings, the term "lunacy" has almost everywhere come to be synonymous with "insanity," Smith v. Hicken-bottom, 57 Iowa, 733, 11 N.W. 664, 667, and is used as a general description of all forms of derange-ment or mental unsoundness, this rule being es-tablished by statute in many states and by judicial decisions in others, In re Clark, 175 N.Y. 139, 67 N. E. 212.

arrested mental development would come within the deflnition of lunacy, that is, where the patient was born with a normal brain, but the cessation of mental growth occurred in infancy or so near it that he never acquired any greater intelligence or discretion than belongs to a nor-mally healthy child. Such a subject might be scientifIcally denominated an "idiot," but not legally, for in law the lat-ter term is applicable only to =genital amentia. The term "lucid interval" means not an apparent tranquility or seeming repose, or cessation of the violent symptoms of the disorder, or a simple diminution or remission of the dis-ease, but a temporary cure—an intermission so clearly marked that it perfectly resembles a return of health; and it must be such a restoration of the faculties as enables the patient beyond doubt to comprehend the nature of his acts and transact his affairs as usual; and it must be continued for a length of time sufficient to give certainty to the tem-porary restoration of reason. Godden v. Burke, 35 La.Ann. 160,.173; Frazer v. Frazer, 2 Del.Ch. 260.
Non compos mentis. Lat. Not of sound mind. A generic term applicable to all insane persons, of whatsoever specific type the insanity may be and from whatever cause arising, provided there be an entir9 loss of reason, as distinguished from mere weakness of mind. Somers v. Pumphrey, 24 Ind. 244. Potts v. House, 6 Ga. 350, 50 Am. Dec. 329.
Forms and Varieties of Insanity
Without attempting a scientific classification of the numerous types and forms of insanity, (as to which it may be said that there is as yet no final agreement among psychologists and alienists ei-ther as to analysis or nomenclature,) definitions and explanations will here be appended of the com-pound and descriptive terms most commonly met with in medica’ jurisprudence. And, first, as to the origins or causes of the disease:
Choreic insanity is insanity arising from chorea, the latter being a nervous disease, more common-ly attacking children than adults, characterized by irregular and involuntary twitchings of the mus-cles of the limbs and lace, popularly called "St. Vitus’ dance."
Congenital insanity is that which exists from the birth of the patient, and is (in law) properly called "idiocy." See supra.
Cretinism is a form of imperfect or arrested mental development, which may amount to idiocy, with physical degeneracy or deformity or lack of development; endemic in Switzerland and some other parts of Europe, but the term is applied to similar states occurring elsewhere.
Delirium tremens. A disease of the nervous system, induced by the excessive and protracted use of intoxicating liquors. /Etna Life Ins. Co. v. Deming, 123 Ind. 384, 24 N.E. 86, 87, usually oc-curring in habitual drinkers after a few days’ total abstinence from liquors, but sometimes resulting directly and immediately from drunkenness, Erwin v. State, 10 Tex.App. 700, 702; Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. v. Foley, 105 U.S. 350, 354, 26 L.Ed. 1055; Evers v. State, 31 Tex.Cr.R. 318, 20 S.W. 744, 748, 18 L.R.A. 421, 37 Am.St.Rep. ni; and affecting the brain so as to produce incoherente and lack of con-tinuity in the intellectual processes, a suspension or perversion of the power of volition, and delu-

sions, particularly of a terrifying nature, but not generally prompting to violente except in the ef-fort to escape from imaginary dangers. It is recognized in law as a form of insanity, and may be of such a nature or intensity as to render the patient legally incapable of committing a crime. United States v. McGlue, 1 Curt. 1, 26 Fed.Cas. 1093; Insurance Co. v. Deming, 123 Ind. 384, 24 N.E. 86; Maconnehey v. State, 5 Ohio St. 77; Er-win v. State, 10 Tex.App. 700.
In some states the insanity of alcoholic intoxication is classed as "temporary," where induced by the voluntary recent use of ardent spirits and carried to such a degree that the person becomes incapable of judging the conse-quences or the moral aspect of his acts, and "settled," where the condition is that of delirium tremens. Settled insanity, in this sense, excuses from civil or criminal responsibility; temporary insanity does not. The ground of the distinction is that the former is a remote effect of imbibing alcoholic liquors and is not voluntarily incurred, while the latter is a direct result voluntarily sought for. Evers v. State, 31 Tex.Cr.R. 318, 20 S.W. 744, 18 L.R.A. 421, 37 Am.St.Rep. 811; State v. Kidwell, 62 W.Va. 466, 59 S.E. 494, 495, 13 L.R.A.,N.S., 1024,
Folie brightique. A French term sometimes used to designate an access of insanity resulting from nephritis or "Bright’s disease." In re Mc-Kean’s Will, 66 N.Y.S. 44, 31 Misc. 703.
Idiopathic insanity is such as results from a dis-ease of the brain itself, lesions of the cortex, cere-bral anemia, etc.
Paranoia. A form of mental distress known as delusionary insanity, and a person afflicted with it has delusions which dominate, but do not destroy, the mental capacity, and, though sane as to other subjects, as to the delusion and its direct conse-quences the person is insane. Mounger v. Gandy, 110 Miss. 133, 69 So. 817, 818.
It is sometimes characterized as logical perverslon, and is said to have "misplaced the antiquated term monomania, which not only implied that the delusion was restricted to one subject, but was otherwise insufflcient and misleading." The memory, emotions, judgment, and conceptions are in most cases unimpaired, though each of these mental divi-sions may be involved. 2 Clevenger, Med.Jur. 860. It is characterized by systematized delusions, the term taking the place of "monomania" or "partial insanity". Taylor v. McClintock, 87 Ark. 243, 112 S.W. 405.
Pellagrous insanity. Insanity caused by or de-rived from pellagra, which is an endemic disease of southern Europe, (though not confined to that re-gion,) characterized •by erythema, digestive de-rangement, and nervous affections. (Cent. Dict.)
Polyneuritic insanity. Insanity arising from an inflammation of the nerves, of the kind called "polyneuritis" or "multiple neuritis" because it involves several nerves at the same time. This is often preceded by tuberculosis and almost always by alcoholism, and is characterized specially by de-lusions and falsification of the memory. It is oth-erwise called "Korssakoff’s disease." (Kraepelin.)
Puerperal insanity. A mental derangement oc-curring in women at the time of child-birth or im-mediately after; it is also called "eclampsia par-turientium."
Syphilitie insanity. A paresis or progressive im-becility resulting from the infection of syphilis.

dementia. A form of mental derange-ment or insanity complicated with "tabes dorsalis" or locomotor ataxia, which generally precedes, or sometimes follows, the mental attack. As to in• sanity resulting from cerebral embolism, see Em-bolism; from epilepsy, see Epilepsy. As to chron-ic alcoholism as a form of insanity, see Alcohol-ism.
Traumatic insanity is such as results from a wound or injury, particularly to the head or brain, such as fracture of the skull or concussion of the brain.
General Descriptive and Clinical Terma
Affective insanity. A modern comprehensive term descriptive of all those forms of insanity which affect or relate to the feelings and emo-tions and hence to the ethical and social relations of the individual.
Circular insanity. Another name for maniacal-depressive insanity, which see.
"Emotional insanity" or manda transitoria ap-pites to the case of one in the possession of his ordinary reasoning faculties who allows his pas-sions to convert him hito a temporary maniac. Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Terry, 15 Wall. 580, 583, 21 L.Ed. 236.
In a criminal case the law rejects the doctrine of what is called emotional insanity, which begins on the eve of the criminal act, and leaves off when it is committed. People v. Kernaghan, 72- Cal. 609, 14 P. 566, 568; Graves v. State, 45 N.J.L. (16 Vroom) 347, 350, 46 Am.Rep. 778.
Folie circulaire. The French name for circular insanity or maniacal-depressive insanity.
General paralysis. Dementia paralytica or pa-resis.
Habitual insanity. Such insanity as is, in its nature, continuous and chronic. Wright v. Mar-ket Bank, Tenn.Ch.App., 60 S.W. 623, 624.
Involutional insanity. That which sometimes ac-companies the "involution" of the physical struc-ture and physiology of the individual, the reverse of their "evolution," hence practically equivalent to the imbecility of old age or senile dementia.
Katatonia. A form of insanity distinguished by periods of acute manía and melancholia and es-pecially by cataleptic states or conditions; the "insanity of rigidity." (Kahlbaum.) A type of insanity characterized particularly by "stereotyp-ism," an instinctive inclination to purposeless repetition of the same expressions of the will, and "negativism," a senseless resistance against every outward infiuence. (Kraepelin.)
Legal insanity. Legal insanity is a disorder of the intellect, and is distinguished from "moral in-sanity," which is a disorder of the feelings and propensities. In re Forman’s Will, 54 Barb. 274, 291; Bensberg v. Washington University, 251 Mo.
641, 158 S.W. 330, 336. A disease of the brain, ren-dering a person incapable of distinguishing be-tween right and wrong with respect to the offense charged. State v. Privitt, 175 Mo. 207, 75 S.W. 457, 459.
Maniacal-depressive insanity. A form of insani-ty characterized by alternating periods of high maniacal excitement and of depressed and stu-porous conditions in the nature of or resembling melancholia, often occurring as a series or cycle of isolated attacks, with more or less complete re-storation to health in the intervals. (Kraepelin.) This is otherwise called "circular insanity" or "cir-cular stupor."
Moral insanity. A morbid perversion of the feel-ings, affections, or propensities, but without any illusions or derangement of the intellectual facul-ties; irresistible impulse or an incapacity to resist the prompting of the passions, though accompa-nied by the power of discerning the moral or im-moral character of the act. Moral insanity is not admitted as a bar to civil or criminal responsibility for the patient’s acts, unless there is also shown to be intellectual disturbance, as manifested by in-sane delusions or the other recognized criteria of legal insanity. Taylor v. McClintock, 87 Ark. 243, 112 S.W. 405, 412; Bensberg v. Washington Uni-versity, 251 Mo. 641, 158 S.W. 330, 336.
In a very few of the states where moral insanity is recog-nized as a defense, it mean an lncapacity of resistance, as where there was an entire destruction of the freedom of the will, although the person perceived the moral or immoral character of the act. State v. Leehman, 2 S.D. 171, 49 N.W. 3, 5.
Partial insanity, as a legal term, may mean ei-ther monomania (see infra) or an intermediate stage in the development of mental derangement. In the former sense, it does not relieve the patient from responsibility for his acts, except where in-stigated directly by his particular delusion or ob-session; Trich v. Trich, 165 Pa. 586, 30 A. 1053. In the latter sense, it denotes a clouding or weaken-ing of the mind, not inconsistent with some meas-ure of memory, reason, and judgment. But the term, in this sense, does not convey any very defi-nite meaning, since it may range from mere fee-ble-mindedness to almost the last stages of im-becility. Appeal of Dunham, 27 Conn. 205; State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 383, 9 Am.Rep. 242.
Psychoneurosis. Mental disease without recog-nizable anatomical lesion, and without evidente and history of preceding chronic mental degenera-tion. Under this head come melancholia, mana, primary acute dementia, and mafia hallucina-toria. Cent. Dict.
"Neurosis," in its broadest sense, may 1nclude any dis-ease or disorder of the mind, and hence all the forms of insanity proper. But the term "psychoneurosis" Is now employed by Freud and other European specialists to describe that class of exaggerated individual peculiarIties or idiosyncrasies of thought towards special objects or top-ics which are absent from the perfectly normal mind, and which yet have so little influence upon the patient’s conduct or his general modes of thought that they cannot properly be described as "insanity" or as any form of "mana," especially because ordinarily unaccompanied by any kind of delusions. At most, they lie on the debatable border-land between sanity and insanity. These idiosyncrasies or obses-

arise from superstltion, from a real incident in the patient’s past history upon which he has brooded until it has assumed an unreal Importante or signiflcance, or from general neurasthenic conditions. Such, for example, are a terrified shrinking from certain kinds of animals, unreasonable dread of being shut up in some enclosed place or of being alone in a crowd, excessive fear of being poi-sioned, groundless conviction of irredeemable sinfulness, and countless other prepossessions, which may range from mere weak-minded superstition to actual monomania.
Recurrent insanity. Insanity which returns from time to time, hence equivalent to "lunacy" (see supra) in its common-law sense, as a mental disorder broken by lucid intervals. There is no presumption that fitful and exceptional attacks of insanity are continuous. Leache v. State, 22 Tex. App. 279, 3 S.W. 538, 58 Am.Rep. 638.
Settled insanity. The term applied to delirium tremens, which is a kind of insanity produced by alcoholism, caused by the breaking down of the person’s system by long-continued or habitual drunkenness, and brought on by abstinence from drink. It is thus termed, to distinguish it from "temporary insanity," or drunkenness directly re-sulting from drink. Evers v. State, 31 Tex.Cr. R. 318, 20 S.W. 744, 748, 18 L.R.A. 421, 37 Am.St. Rep. 811.
Temporary delusion. The word implies un-soundness or derangement of mind or intellect, not a mere temporary or slight delusion, which might be occasioned by fever or accident. Karow v. New York Continental Ins. Co., 57 Wis. 56, 15 N.W. 27, 31, 46 Am.Rep. 17.

Other Forms of Insanity

Amentia, dementia, and mafia. The classitica-ton of insanity into these three types or forms, though once common, has of late given way to a more scientific nomenclature, based chiefly on the origin or cause of the disease in the particular pa-tient and its clinical history. These terms, how-ever, are still occasionally encountered in medical jurisprudence, and the names of some of their subdivisions are in constant use.
Amentia. A total lack of intelligence, reason, or mental capacity. Sometimes so used as to cov-er imbecility or dotage, or even as applicable to all forms of insanity; but properly restricted to a lack of mental capacity due to original defective organization of the brain (idiocy) or arrested cere-bral development, as distinguished from the degen-eration of intellectual faculties which once were normal.
Dementia. A form of insanity resulting from degeneration or disorder of the brain (idiopathic or traumatic, but not congenital) and characterized by general mental weakness and decrepitude, for-getfulness, loss of coherente, and total inability to reason, but not accompanied by delusions or un-controllable impulses. Dennett v. Dennett, 44 N.H. 531, 84 Am.Dec. 97; People v. Lake, 2 Parker, Cr.R. (N.Y.) 218; Graham v. Deuterman, 91 N:E. 61, 62, 244 Ill. 124; Hibbard v. Baker, 104 N.W. 399, 400, 141 Mich. 124.Among the sub-divislons of dementia should be noticed the following: Acute primary dementia is a form of tem-porary dementia, though often extreme In its intensity, and occurring in young people or adolescents, accompanied by general physical debility or exhaustion and induced by con-ditions likely to produce that state, as malnutrition, over-work, dissipation, or too rapid growth. Dementia paraly-tica is a progressive form of insanity, beginning with slight degeneration of the physical, intellectual, and moral pow-ers, and leading to complete loss of mentality, or imbecil-ity, with general paralysis. Also called paresis, paretic dementia, or cirrhosis of the brain, or (popularly) ”soften-ing of the brain." Dementia prcecox. A term applicable either to the early stages of dementia or to the dementia of adolescente, but more commonly applied to the latter. It is of ten (but not invariably) attributable to onanism or self-abuse, and is characterized by mental and moral stu-pidity, absence of any strong feeling of the impressions of lite or interest in its events, blunting or obscuration of the moral sense, weakness of judgrnent, flightiness of thought, senseless laughter without mirth, automatic obedi-ente, and apathetic despondency. (Kraepelin.) Senile dementia. Dementia occurring in persons of advanced age, and characterized by slowness and weakness of the mental processes and general physical degeneration, verging on or passing into imbecility, indicating the breaking down of the mental powers in advance of bodily decay. Hiett v. Shull, 36 W.Va. 563, 15 S.E. 146. Toxic «mentid. Weakness of mind or feeble cerebral activity, approaching imbecili-ty, resulting from continued administration or use of slow poisons or of the mere active polsons in repeated smail doses, as in cases of lead poisoning and In some cases of addiction to such drugs as opium or alcohol.
Dementia praecox paranoid. A medical term in-dicating that form of dementia in which the pa-tient exhibits ideas of persecution and has delu-sions. Rasmussen v. George Benz & Sons, 168-Minn. 319, 210 N.W. 75, 76.
Dipsomania. An irresistible impulse to indulge in intoxication, either alcohol or other drugs-opiums. This mania, or dipsomania, is classed as one of the minor forms of insanity. Repeated intoxication for a number of years, which is en-tirely voluntary, is not dipsomania. One having the power to refrain from the use of intoxicants, and who becomes intoxicated voluntarily, is not affected with dipsomania. Ballard v. State, 19 Neb. 609, 28 N.W. 271, 273. State v. Reidell, 14 A. 550, 9 Houst. (Del.) 470.
Erotomania. A form of mania similar to nym-phomania, except that the present term is applied to patients of both sexes, and that (according to some authorities) it is applicable to all cases of excessive sexual craving irrespective of origin; while nymphomania is restricted to cases where the disease is caused by a local disorder of the sexual organs reacting on the brain. In eroto-mania, there is of ten an absence of any lesion of the intellectual powers. Krafft-Ebing, Psycopathia Sexualis, Chaddock’s ed. And it is to be observed that the term "erotomania" is now often used, especially by French writers, to describe a morbid propensity for "falling in love" or an exaggerated and excited condition of amativeness or love-sick-ness, which may affect the general physical health, but is not necessarily correlated with any sexual craving, and which, though it may unnaturally color the imagination and distort the subject’s view of life and affairs, does not at all amount to insanity, and should not be so considered when it leads to crimes of violente, as in the common case of a rejected lover who kifis his mistress.mania. A fit of mania includes a tern-porary depression or aberration of the mind, which sometimes accompanies or follows intoxica-tion, and is often accompanied by delusions, hallu-cinations, and illusions. Gunter v. State, 3 So. 600, 607, 83 Ala. 96.
Homicida! mania. A form of mania in which the morbid state of the mind manifests itself in an irresistible inclination or impulse to commit homicide, prompted usually by an insane delusion either as to the necessity- of self-defense or the avenging of injuries, or as to the patient being the appointed instrument of a superhuman justice. Com. v. Sayre, 5 Wkly. Notes Cas. (Pa.) 425.
Hypomania. A mild or slightly developed form or type of mania.
Kleptomania. See Kleptomania.
Mania. That form of insanity in which the pa-tient is subject to hallucinations and illusions, ac-companied by a high state of general mental ex-citement, sometimes amounting to fury. Hall v. Unger, 2 Abb. U. S. 510, 11 Fed.Cas. 261; People v. Lake, 2 Parker Cr.R., N.Y., 218.
In the case first aboye cited, the following description is given by Justice Field: "Manía is that form of insanity where the mental derangement is accompanied with more or less of excitement. Sometimes the excitement amounts to a fury. The individual in such cases is subject to hal-lucinations and illusions. He is impressed with the reality of events which have never occurred, and of things which do not exist, and acts more or less in conformity with his belief in these particulars. The mania may be general, and affect all or most of the operations of the mind; or it may be partial, and be confined to particular subjects. In the latter case It is generaliy termed ‘monomania.’ " In a more popular but less scientific sense, "mafia" denotes a morbid or unnatural or excessive craving, issuing in im-pulses of such fixity and intensity that they cannot be resisted by the patient in the enfeebled state of the will and blurred moral concepts which accompany the disease. It is used in thls sense in such compounds as "homicidal ma-nta," "dipsomanía," and the like.
Manis a potu. Delirium tremens, or a species of temporary insanity resulting as a secondary effect produced by the excessive and protracted in-dulgence in intoxicating liquors. See State v. Hur-ley, Houst.Cr.Cas. (Del.) 28, 35.
Manita fanatica. A form of insanity character-ized by a morbid state of religious feeling. Ekin v. McCracken, 11 Phila., Pa. 540.
Mania transitoria. The term applies to the case of one in the possession of his ordinary reasoning faculties, who allows his passions to convert him into a temporary maniac. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Terry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 580, 583, 21 L.Ed. 236.
Megalomanía. The so-called "delirium of gran-deur" or "folie de grandeur;" a form of mania in which the besetting delusion of the patient is that he is some person of great celebrity or exalted rank, historical or contemporary.
Melancholia. A form of insanity the characteris-tics of which are extreme mental depression, with delusions and hallucinations, the latter relating es-pecially to the financial or social position of the patient or to impending or threatened dangers to
his person, property, or reputation, or issuing in distorted conceptions of his relations to society or his family or of his rights and duties in general. State v. Reidell, 9 Houst., Del., 470, 14 A. 551; Peo-ple v. Krist, 168 N.Y. 19, 60 N.E. 1057. Hypochon-dria or hypochondriasis. A form of melancholia in which the patient has exaggerated or causeless fears concerning his health or suffers from imag-inary disease. Toxiphobia. Morbid dread of be-ing poisoned; a form of insanity manifesting it-self by an excessive and unfounded apprehension of death by poison.
Methomania. An irresistible craving for alcohol-ic or other intoxicating liquors, manifested by the periodical recurrente of drunken debauches. State v. Savage, 89 Ala. 1, 7 So. 183, 7 L.R.A. 426.
Monomania. A perversion of the understanding in regard to a single object or a small number of objects, with the predominance of mental excite-ment, as distinguished from "mafia," which means a condition in which the perversion of the understanding embraces all kinds of objects, and is accompanied with general mental excitement. State v. John, 30 N.C. 330, 337, 49 Am.Dec. 396; Freed v. Brown, 55 Ind. 310, 317; People v. Lake, 2 Parker, Cr.R. (N.Y.) 215, 218. A perversion or derangement of the reason or understanding with reference to a single subject or small class of subjects, with considerable mental excitement and delusions, while, as to all matters outside the range of the peculiar infirmity, the intellectual faculties remain unimpaired and function normal-ly. Hopps v. People, 31 III. 390, 83 Am.Dec. 231; Bohler v. Hicks, 120 Ga. 800, 48 S.E. 306, 307.
Necrophilism. A form of affective insanity manifesting itself in an unnatural and revolting fondness for corpses, the patient desiring to be in their presence, to caress them, to exhume them, or sometimes to mutilate them, and even (in a form of sexual perversion) to violate them.
Nymphomania. A form of mania characterized by a morbid, excessive, and uncontrollable craving for sexual intercourse. This term is applied only to women. The term for a corresponding mania in men is "satyriasis."
Oikei mania. A form of insanity manifesting itself in a morbid state of the domestic affections, as an unreasonable dislike of wife or child without cause or provocation. Ekin v. McCracken, 11 Phila. (Pa.) 540.
Paranoia. Monomania in general, or the obses-sion of a delusion or system of delusions which dominate without destroying the mental capacity, leaving the patient sane as to all matters outside their particular range, though subject to perverted ideas, false beliefs, and uncontrollable impulses within that range; and particularly, the farm of monomania where the delusion is as to wrongs, in-juries, or persecution inflicted upon the patient and his consequently justifiabie resentment or re-venge. Winters v. State, 61 N.J.L. 613, 41 Atl. 220; People v. Braun, 158 N.Y. 558, 53 N.E. 529. Para-noia is called by Kraepelin "progressive systema-insanity," because the delusions of being wronged or of persecution and of excessive self-esteem develop quite slowly, without independent disturbances of emotional life or of the will be-coming prominent, and because there occurs regu-larly a mental working up of the delusion to form a delusionary view of the world,-in fact, a sys-tem,-leading to a derangement of the stand-point which the patient takes up towards the events of Life.
Pyromania. Incendiarism; a form of affective insanity in which the mana takes the form of an irresistable impulse to burn or set fire to things.
Sebastomania. Religious insanity; demono-mania.
Toxicomania. An excessive addiction to the use of toxic or poisonous drugs or other substances; a form of mana or affective insanity character-ized by an irresistible impulse to indulgence in opium, cocaine, chloral, alcohol, etc.
Specilic Dellnitions and Applications in Law
There are numerous legal proceedings where insanity may be shown, and the rule for establish-ing mental capacity or the want of it varíes ac-cording to the object or purpose of the proceeding. Among these may be enumerated the following: A criminal prosecution where insanity is alleged as a defense; a proceeding to defeat a will on the ground of the insanity of the testator; a suit to avoid a contract (including that of marriage) for similar reasons; a proceeding to secure the com-mitment of a person alleged to be insane to an asylum; a proceeding to appoint a guardian or conservator for an alleged lunatic; a plea or pro-ceeding to avoid the effect of the statute of limita-tions on account of insanity. What might be re-garded as insanity in one of such cases would not necessarily be so regarded in another. No definite rule can be laid down which would apply to all cases alike. Snyder v. Snyder, 142 III. 60, 31 N.E. 303; Clarke v. Irwin, 63 Neb. 539, 88 N.W. 783. But the following rules or tests for specific cases have been generally accepted and approved:
In criminal law and as a defense to an accusa-tion of crime, insanity means such a perverted and deranged condition of the mental and moral faculties as to render the person incapable of dis-tinguishing between right and wrong, or to render him at the time unconscious of the nature of the act he is committing, or such that, though he may be conscious of it and also of its normal quality, so as to know that the act in question is wrong, yet his will or volition has been (otherwise than voluntarily) so completely destroyed that his ac-tions are not subject to it but are beyond his con-trol. Or, as otherwise stated, insanity is such a state of mental derangement that the subject is incompetent of having a criminal intent, or incap-able of so controlling his will as to avoid doing the act in question. Davis v. U. S., 17 S.Ct. 360, 165 U.S. 373, 41 L.Ed. 750; Doherty v. State, 50 A. 1113, 73 Vt. 380; Butler v. State, 102 Wis. 364, 78 N.W. 590.
An insane person cannot be legally. charged with a criminal intent; State v. Brown, 36 Utah, 46, 102 P. 641, 24 L.R.A.,N.S., 545.
In Coleman’s case, in New York it was heid that the "test of the responsibility for criminal acta, when insanity is asserted, is the capacity of the accused to distinguish between right and wrong at the time and with respect to the act which is the subject of inquiry." 1 N.Y.Cr.Rep. 1. With variations of expresslon this is the prevailing doctrine of the American courts. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Terry, 15 Wall. 590, 21 L.Ed. 236.
The capacity to distinguish between right and wrong has been heid not to be a sale test in all cases. State v. Felter, 25 Iowa 67, per DIllon, C. J. See also Brown v. Com., 78 Pa. 122.
Insane delusion is of no avail as a defense unless, if true, the facts supposed to exist would have excused the crime. Thurman v. State, 32 Neb. 224, 49 N.W. 338; Smith v. State, 55 Ark. 259, 18 S.W. 237. Irresistible impulse to commit a crime is deflned as that uncontrollable impulse produced by a disease of the mind, when that disease is suflicient to override judgment and obliterate the sense of right as to the acta done, and deprives the accused of power to choose between them. It was recognized as a defense in Stevens v. State, 31 Ind. 485, 99 Am. Dec. 634. But it is heid that no impulse, however irresistible, is a defense, where there is a knowledge as to the particular act between right and wrong. State v. Brandon, 53 N.C. 463; State v. Miller, 141. Mo. 542, 20 S.W. 243, and that it was a crime morally, and punishable by the laws of the country; State v. Alex-ander, 30 S.C. 74, 8 S.E. 440, 14 Am.St.Rep. 879; Williams v. State, 50 Ark. 511, 9 S.W. 5.
Mere frenzy or ungovernable passion which controls the will and motives is not insanity sufficient to excuse crime. Garner v. State, 112 Miss. 317, 73 So. 50, 51.
What is sometimes called moral insanity, as distinguished from mental unsoundness, is not a defense to a charge of crime. Flanagan v. People, 52 N.Y. 467, 11 Am.Rep. 731: Andersen v. State, 43 Conn. 514, 21 Am.Rep. 669; St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Graves, 6 Bush, Ky., 268.
Testamentary capacity includes an intelligent understanding of the testator’s property, its extent and items, and of the nature of the act he is about to perform, together with a clear understanding and purpose as to the manner of its distribution and the persons who are to receive it. Lacking these, he is not mentally competent. The presence of insane delusions is not inconsistent with tes-tamentary capacity, if they are of such a nature that they cannot reasonably be supposed to have affected the dispositions made by the will; and the same is true of the various forms of mono-mania and of all kinds of eccentricity and personal idiosyncrasy. But imbecility, senile dementia, and all forms of systematized mana which affect the understanding and judgment generally disable the patient from making a valid will. Harrison v. Rowan, 3 Wash. C. C. 585, Fed. Cas. No. 6,141; Wilson v. Mitchell, 101 Pa. 495; Trustees of Ep-worth Memorial Methodist Church v. Overman, 185 Ky. 773, 215 S.W. 942, 944. To constitute "se-nile dementia," incapacitating one to make a will, there must be such a failure of the mind as to deprive the testator of intelligent action. Gates v. Cole, 137 Iowa 613, 115 N.W. 236, 237, 238.
As a ground for avoiding or annulling a contract or conveyance, insanity does not mean a total de-privation of reason, but an inability, from defect of perception, memory, and judgment, to do the act in question or to understand its nature and consequences. Frazer v. Frazer, 2 Del. Ch. 260; Durrett v. McWhorter, 161 Ga. 179, 129 S.E. 870, 874. The insanity must have entered ínto and inthe particular contract or conveyance; it must appear that it was not the act of the free and untrammeled mind, and that on account of the diseased condition of the mind the person en-tered into a contract or made a conveyance which he would not have made if he had been in the pos-session of his reason. Dewey v. Allgire, 37 Neb. 6, 55 N.W. 276, 40 Am.St.Rep. 468.
Insanity sufficient to justify the annulment of a marriage means such a want of understanding at the time of the marriage as to render the party incapable of assenting to the contract of marriage. The morbid propensity to steal, called "klepto-mania," does not answer this description. Lewis v. Lewis, 44 Minn. 124, 46 N.W. 323, ‘9 L.R.A. 505, 20 Am.St.Rep. 559. The marriage of a person insane was held void in Inhabitants of Middlebor-ough v. Inhabitants of Rochester, 12 Mass. 363. Powell v. Powell, 18 Kan. 371, 26 Am.Rep. 774; Waymire v. Jetmore, 22 Ohio St. 271. A marriage contracted while one party was insane from de-lirium tremens was held void, but mere weakness of mind not amounting to derangement is not sufficient. Rawdon v. Rawdon, 28 Ala. 565; and fqr that merely, or intoxication, a court has no power to declare a marriage null and void. The same degree of mental capacity which enables a person to make a valid deed or will is sufficient to enable him to marry; Inhabitants of Atkinson v. Inhabitants of Medford, 46 Me. 510.
Tnsanity is not a defense in an action of tort; but damages are compensatory and not punitive; McIntyre v. Sholty, 121 III. 660, 13 N.E. 239, 2 Am. St.Rep. 140. Williams v. Hays, 143 N.Y. 442, 38 N. E. 449, 26 L.R.A. 153, 42 Am.St.Rep. 743.
One is "insane," so as to make self-destruction an accident, within the meaning of an insurance policy compensating death by accident, where he is so mentally diseased as to be incapable of un-derstanding the nature of the act and unable to distinguish between right and wrong. London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Officer, 78 Colo. 441, 242 P. 989, 991.
As a ground for restraining the personal liberty of the patient, it may be said in general that the form of insanity from which he suffers should be such as to make his going at large a source of danger to himself or to others, though this matter is largely regulated by statute, and in many plac-es the law permits the commitment to insane asy-lums and hospitals of persons whose insanity does not manifest itself in homicidal or other destruc-tive forms of mana, but who are incapable of caring for themselves and their property or who are simply flt subjects for treatment in hospitals and other institutions specially designed for the care of such patients.
To constitute insanity such as will authorize the appointment of a guardian or conservator for the patient, there must be such a deprivation of rea-son and judgment as to render him incapable of understanding and acting with discretion in the ordinary affairs of lif e; a want of sufficient men-tal capacity to transact ordinary business and totake care of and manage his property and affairs. See Snyder v. Snyder, 142 III. 60, 31 N.E. 303.
Insanity as a plea or proceeding to avoid the effect of the statute of limitations means prac-tically the same thing as in relation to the appoint-ment of a guardian. On the one hand, it does not require a total deprivation of reason or absence of understanding. On the other hand, it does not include mere weakness of mind short of imbecility. It means such a degree of derangement as renders the subject incapable of understanding the nature of the particular affair and his rights and reme-dies in regard to it and incapable of taking dis-creet and intelligent action. Burnham v. Mitchell, 34 Wis. 134. The time of sanity required in order to allow the statute to begin to run is such as will enable the party to examine his affairs and insti-tute an action, and is for the jury.
There are a few other legal rights or relations into which the question of insanity enters, such as the capacity of a witness or of a voter; but they are governed by the same general principies. The test is capacity to understand and appreciate the nature of the particular act and to exercise intelligence in its performance. A witness must understand the nature and purpose of an oath and have enough intelligence and memory to relate correctly the facts within his knowledge. So a voter must understand the nature of the act to be performed and be able to make an intelligent choice of candidates. In either case, eccentricity, "crankiness," feeble-mindedness not amounting to imbecility, or insane delusions which do not affect the matter in hand, do not disqualif y. See Dis-trict of Columbia v. Armes, 2 S.Ct. 840, 107 U.S. 521, 27 L.Ed. 618.
INSANUS EST QUI, ABJECTA RATIONE, OM-NIA CUM IMPETU ET FURORE FACIT. He is insane who, reason being thrown away, does everything with violente and rage. 4 Coke, 128.
INSCRIBERE. Lat. In the civil law. To sub-scribe an accusation. To bind one’s self, in case of failure to prove an accusation, to suffer the same punishment which the accused would have suffered had he been proved guilty. Calvin.
INSCRIPTIO. Lat. In the civil law. A written accusation in which the accuser undertakes to suf-fer the punishment appropriate to the offense charged, if the accused is able to clear himself of the accusation. Calvin; Cod. 9, 1, 10; Id. 9, 2, 16, 17.
INSCRIPTION. In Evidence. Anything written or engraved upon a metallic or other solid sub-stance, intended for great durability; as upon a tombstone, pillar, tablet, medal, ring, etc.
In Civil law. An engagement which a person who makes a solemn accusation of a crime against another enters into that he will suffer the same punishment, if he has accused the other falsely, which would have been inflicted upon him had he been guilty. Code, 9. 1. 10; 9. 2. 16 and 17.
In Modern Civil law. The entry of a mortgage, líen, or other document at large in a book of pub- INSCRIPTIONES. The name given by the old English law to any written instrument by which anything was granted. Blount.
INSECT POWDER. "Insect powder" is a dry powder used to kill or expel insects; an insecti-cide or insectifuge. Parke, Davis & Co. v. U. S., C.C.A.La., 255 F. 933, 935.
INSECURE. Unsafe and dangerous. Sabol v. St. Louis Cooperage Co., 313 Mo. 527, 282 S.W. 425, 430.
INSENSIBLE. In pleading. Unintelligible; with-out sense or meaning, from the omission of ma-terial words, etc. Steph. Pl. 377. See Union Sew-er Pipe Co. v. Olson, 82 Minn. 187, 84 N.W. 756.
INSETENA. In old records. An inditch; an in-terior ditch; one made within another, for greater security. Spelman.
INSIDIATOR. Lat. A soldier lying in ambush. Hence, one who lies in wait, a lurker, waylayer (rare). Harpers’ Lat. Dict.
INSIDIATORES VIARUM. Lat. Highwaymen; persons who lie in wait in order to commit Some felony or other misdemeanor.
INSIGNIA. Ensigns or arms; distinctive marks; badges; indicia; characteristics.
INSILIARIUS. An evil counsellor. Cowell. INSILIUM. Evil advice or counsel. Cowell.
INSIMUL. Lat. Together; jointly. Townsh. Pl. 44.
INSIMUL COMPUTASSENT. They accounted to-gether. The name of the count in assumpsit upon an account stated; it being averred that the par-tes had settled their accounts together, and de-fendant engaged to pay plaintiff the balance. Fraley v. Bispham, 10 Pa. 325, 51 Am.Dec. 486; Loventhal v. Morris, 103 Ala. 332, 15 So. 672.
INSIMUL TENUIT. One species of the writ of formedon brought against a stranger by a copar-cener on the possession of the ancestor, etc. Ja-cob.
INSINUACION. In Spanish law. The presenta-tion of a public document to a competent judge, in order to obtain his approbation and sanction of the same, and thereby give it judicial authenticity. Escriche.
INSINUARE. Lat. In the civil law. To put finto; to deposit a writing in court, answering nearly to the modern expression "to file." Si non manda-tum actis insinuatum est, if the power or authority be not deposited among the records of the court. Inst. 4, 11, 3. To declare or acknowledge before a judicial officer; to give an act an official form.
INSINUATIO. Lat. In old English law. Infor-mation or suggestion. Ex insinuatione, on the in-formation. Reg. Jud. 25, 50.
INSINUATION. In the civil law. The transcrip-tion of an act on the public registers like our recording of deeds. It was not necessary in any other alienation but that appropriated to the pur-pose of donation. Inst. 2, 7, 2.
INSINUATION OF A WILL. In the civil law. The first production of a will, or the leaving it with the registrar, in order to its probate. Cowell; Blount.
INSOLATION. In medical jurisprudence. Sun-stroke or heat-stroke; heat prostration.
INSOLVENCY. The condition of a person who is insolvent; inability to pay one’s debts; lack of means to pay one’s debts. Such a relative condi-tion of a man’s assets and liabilities that the form-er, if all made immediately available, would not be sufficient to discharge the latter. Or the con-dition of a person who is unable to pay his debts as they fall due, or in the usual course of trade and business. Dewey v. St. Albans Trust Co., 56 Vt. 475, 48 Am.Rep. 803; Toof v. Martin, 13 Wall. 47, 20 L.Ed. 481; Frank v. Stearns, 111 Neb. 101, 195 N.W. 949, 951.
Independent of statute, it may generally be said that insolvency, when applied to a person, firm, or corporation engaged in trade, means inability to pay debts as they become due in the usual course of business. Parker v. First Nat. Bank, 96 ukl. 70, 220 P. 39; Bushman v. Bushman, 311 Mo. 551, 279 S.W. 122, 126. The mere fact that a corlo-ration or an individual is unable to pay its debts upon a particular day does not constitute "insolvency." Wiggins Co. v. McMinnville Motor Car Co., 111 Or. 123, 225 P. 314, 317, and a bank is not "insolvent" if its assets are sufficient to meet its obligations within a reasonable time, although it did not have cash sufficient for its daily needs. Dunlap v. Seattle Nat. Bank, 93 Wash. 568, 161 P. 364, 368.
A man may be fully able to pay his debts, if he will, and yet in the eye of the law he is insolvent, if his property is so situated that it cannot be reached by process of law, and subjected, without his consent, to the payment of bis debts. Pelham v. Chattahoochee Grocery Co., 156 Ala. 500, 47 So. 172.
Under Bankr.Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 1, cl. 19, as amended, (formerly 15), 30 Stat. 544 (11 U.S.C.A. § 1), and section 3a, cl. 4, as amended, (11 U.S.C.A. § 44), a person shall be deemed insolvent within the provisions of the act whenever the aggregate of his property, exclusive of any property which he may have conveyed, transferred, con-cealed, removed, or permltted to be concealed or removed, with intent to defraud, hinder, or delay his creditors, shall not at a fair valuation be sufficient in amount to pay his debts. In re Wm. S. Butler Co., C.C.A.Mass., 207 F. 705, 709; Anderson v. Myers, C.C.A.Fla., 296 F. 101, 103; Moun-tain States Power Co. v. A. L. Jordan Lumber Co., C.C.A. Mont., 293 F. 502, 507.
As to the distinction between bankruptcy and insolvency, see Bankruptcy.
Commercial Insolvency. See that title.
Insolvency fund. In English law. A fund, con-sisting of moneys and securities, which, at the time of the passing of the bankruptcy act, 1861, stood, in the Bank of England, to the credit of the com-missioners of the insolvent debtors’ court, and was, by the twenty-sixth section of that act, di-rected to be carried by the bank to the account of the accountant in bankruptcy. Provision has now been made for its transfer to the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt. Robs. Bankr. 20, 56. INSOLVENCY
Insolvency laws. Insolvency laws are generally statutory provisions by which the property of the debtor is surrendered for his debts; and upon this condition, and the assent of a certain proportion of his creditors, he is discharged from all further liabilities; Bartlet v. Prince, 9 Mass. 431; Otis v. Warren, 16 Mass. 53; 2 Kent 321; Ingr. Insolv. 9. Insolvency, according to some of the state statutes, may be of two kinds, voluntary and in-voluntary. Voluntary insolvency is the case in which the debtor institutes the proceedings, and is desirous of availing himself of the insolvent laws, and petitions for that purpose whereas involun-tary insolvency is where the proceedings are in-stituted by the creditors in invitum, and so the debtor forced into insolvency.
Open insolvency. The condition of one who has no property, within the reach of the law, applica-ble to the payment of any debt. Hardesty v. Kin-worthy, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 305; Somerby v. Brown, 73 Ind. 356.
INSOLVENT. (Lat. in, privative, solvo, to pay). The condition of a person who is unable to pay his debts. 2 Bla.Com. 285, 471; Brouwer v. Har-beck, 9 N.Y. 589. One who cannot or does not pay; one who is unable to pay his debts; one who is not solvent; one who has not means or property suf-ficient to pay his debts. One who is unable to pay commercial paper in the due course of business. Warren v. Nat. Bank, 10 Blatchf. 493, Fed. Cas. No. 17,202; Clarke v. Mott, 4 Cal.Unrep.Cas. 80, 33 P. 884. See, also, Insolvency.

Other definitions

is unable to pay his debts as they fall due In the usual course of trade or business, 2 Kent 389; 1 M. & S. 338; Lee v. Kllbourn, 3 Gray, Mass., 600; Mitchell v. Brad-street Co., 116 Mo. 226, 22 S.W. 358, 724, 20 L.R.A. 138, 38 Am.St.Rep. 592; although his assets in value exceed the amount of his liabllity, In re Ramazzina, 110 Cal. 488, 42 P. 970; or the embarrassment is only temporary, Langham v. Lanier, 7 Tex.Civ.App. 4, 26 S.W. 255; but it ls held that mere inability to pay debts promptly as they mature is not conclusive, MensIng v. Atchison, Tex.C1v.App., 26 S.W. 509; and that one who has suflicient property subject to legal process to satisfy all legal demands is not insolvent. Smith v. Collins, 94 Ala. 394, 10 So. 334. A corporation is insolvent when its assets are insuilicient for the payment of its debts, and it has ceased to do business, or has taken, or is in the act of taking, a step which will practícally inca-pacitate it from conducting the corporate enterprise with reasonable prospect of success, or its embarrassments are such that early suspension and fallure must ensue. Corey v. Wadsworth, 99 Ala. 68, 11 So. 350, 23 L.R.A. 618, 42 Am.St.Rep. 29. A bank is insolvent when the cash value of its assets realizable in a reasonable time is not equal to its liabilities exclusive of stock liabilities. Bilis v. State, 138 Wis. 513, 119 N.W. 1110, 20 L.R.A.,N.S., 444, 131 Am.St.Rep. 1022.
INSOLVENT LAW. See Insolvency Laws.
INSPECT. To look, to view or oversee for the purpose of ascertaining the quality or condition of the thing or for purpose of examination. U. S. v. A. Bentley & Sons Co., D.C.Ohio, 293 F. 229, 239; O’Hare v. Peacock Dairies, 26 Cal.App.2d 753, 79 P.2d 433, 438.
INSPECTATOR. A prosecutor or adversary.
INSPECTION. A critical examination, close or careful scrutiny, a strict or prying examination,
or an investigation. In re Becker, 192 N.Y.S. 754, 756, 200 App.Div. 178. An examination or testing of food, fluids, or other articles made subject by law to such examination, to ascertain their fitness for use or commerce. People of the State of New York v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, C. C.N.Y., 10 F. 361; Id., 2 S.Ct. 87, 107 U.S. 59, 27 L. Ed. 383; Turner v. Maryland, 2 S.Ct. 44, 107 U.S. 38, 27 L.Ed. 370. An examination by a private person of public records and documents; or of the books and papers of his opponent in an action, for the purpose of better preparing his own case for trial.
Reasonable inspection. As relates to duty of employer to provide employee with proper instru-mentalities with which to work, does not mean such an inspection as would necessarily or infal-libly disclose a defect if one existed, but only such inspection as reasonably prudent man, in the ex-ercise of ordinary care, would make. Alabama & V. R. Co. v. Fountain, 145 Miss. 515, 111 So. 153, 154.
INSPECTION LAWS. Laws authorizing and di-recting the inspection and examination of various kinds of merchandise intended for sale, especially food, with a view to ascertaining its fitness for use, and excluding unwholesome or unmarketable goods from sale, and directing the appointment of official inspectors for that purpose. Const.U.S. art. 1, § 10, cl. 2; Story, Const. § 1017, et seq.
Gib-bons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 202, 6 L.Ed. 23; Clints-man v. Northrop, 8 Cow. (N.Y.) 45; Patapsco Guano Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 18 S.Ct. 862,171 U.S. 345, 41 L.Ed. 191; Turner v. State, 55 Md. 263.
INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS. This phrase re-fers to the right of a party, in a civil action, to inspect and make copies of documents which are essential or material to the maintenance of his cause, and which are either in the custody of an officer of the law or in the possession of the ad-verse party.
INSPECTION, TRIAL BY. A mode of trial for-merly in use in Engiand, by which the judges of a court decided a point in dispute, upon the tes-timony of their own senses, without the interven-tion of a jury. This took place in cases where the fact upon which issue was taken must, from its nature, be evident to the court from ocular dem-onstration, or other irrefragable proof; and was adopted for the greater expedition of a cause. 3 Bl.Comm. 331.
INSPECTOR. The name given to certain officers whose duties are to examine and inspect things over which they have jurisdiction. Officers whose duty it is to examine the quality of certain articles of merchandise, food, weights and measures, etc.
INSPECTORSHIP, DEED OF. In English law. An instrument entered into between an insolvent debtor and his creditors, appointing one or more persons to inspect and oversee the winding up of such insolvent’s affairs on behalf of the creditors.

INSPEXIMUS (Lat.). We have seen. A word sometimes used in letters patent, reciting a grant, inspeximus such f ormer grant, and so reciting it verbatim; it then grants such further privi-leges as are thought convenient. 5 Co. 54.
INSTALL. To place in a seat, give a place to, to set, place, or instate in an office, rank, or order, etc. State ex rel. Slattery v. Raupp, 303 Mo. 684, 263 S.W. 834, 835. To set up or fix in position for use or service. King v. Elliott, 197 N.C. 93, 147 S.E. 701, 704.
INSTALLATION. The ceremony of inducting or investing with any charge, office, or rank, as the placing a bishop into his see, a dean or prebendary into his stall or seat, or a knight into his order. Wharton. The act by which an officer is put in public possession of the place he is to fill. The president of the United States, or a governor, is installed into office, by being sworn agreeably to the constitution and laws.
Installation of machinery means to place in position where it will reasonably accompllsh purposes for which it is set up. Long v. Ulmer Machinery Co., 77 Cal.App. 66, 246 P. 113, 116.
INSTALLMENTS. Different portions of the same debt payable at different successive periods as agreed. Brown. Partial payments on account of a debt due. Kenney v. Los Feliz Inv. Co., 121 Cal.App. 378, 9 P.2d 225, 228.
INSTANCE. In pleading and practice. Solicita-tion, properly of an earnest or urgent kind. An act is often said to be done at a party’s "special instance and request." Miller v. Mutual Grocery Co., 214 Ala. 62, 106 So. 396.
"Instante" does not imply the same degree of obligation to obey as does "command." Feore v. Trammel, 213 Ala. 293, 104 So. 808, 813.
In the civil and French law. A general term, designating all sorts of actions and judicial de-mands. Dig. 44, 7, 58.
In ecclesiastical law. Causes of instance are those proceeded in at the solicitation of some party, as opposed to causes of Office, which run in the name of the judge. Hallifax, Civil Law, p. 156.
In Scotch law. That which may be insisted on at one diet or course of probation. Wharton.
INSTANCE COURT. In English law. That divi-sion or department of the court of admiralty which exercises all the ordinary admiralty juris-diction, with the single exception of prize cases, the latter belonging to the branch called the "Prize Court." The term is sometimes used in American law for purposes of explanation, but has no proper application to admiralty courts in the United States, where the powers of both in-stance and prize courts are conferred without any distinction. 3 Kent, Comm. 355, 378; The Betsey, 3 Dall. 6, 1 L.Ed. 485; The Emulous, 1 Gall. 563, Fed.Cas.No.4,479.
INSTANCIA. In Spanish law. The institution and prosecution of a suit from its commencement
until definitive judgment. The first instance, "primera instancia," is the prosecution of the suit before the judge competent to take cognizance of it at its inception; the second instance, "secunda instancia," is the exercise of the same action be-fore the court of appellate jurisdiction; and the third instance, "tercera instancia," is the prosecu-tion of the same suit, either by an application of revision before the appellate tribunal that has al-ready decided the cause, or before some higher tribunal, having jurisdiction of the same. Es-criche.
INSTANS EST FINIS UNIUS TEMPORIS ET PRINCIPIUM ALTERIUS. An instant is the end of one time and the beginning of another. Co. Litt. 185.
INSTANT. Present, current, as instant case. Webster, Dict.
INSTANTANEOUS. An "instantaneous" crime is one which is fully consummated or completed in and by a single act (such as arson or murder) as distinguished from one which involves a series or repetition of acts. U. S. v. Owen, D.C.Or., 32 F. 537.
A death resulting within a few moments from a continu-ing injury 1s "instantaneous" within a statute respecting right of action for death. Beach v. City of St. Joseph, 192 Mich. 296, 158 N.W. 1045, 1046.
INSTANTER. Immediately; instantly; forth-with; without delay. Trial instanter was had where a prisoner between attainder and execution pleaded that he was not the same who was at-tainted.
When a party is ordered to plead instanter, he must plead the same day. The term is usually un-derstood to mean within twenty-four hours. l’ent-ress v. State, 16 Tex.App. 83; Champlin v. Champ-lin, 2 Edw.Ch., N.Y., 329.
INSTANTLY. Immediately; directly; without de-lay; at once.
INSTAR. Lat. Likeness; the likeness, size, or equivalent of a thing. Instar dentium, like teeth. 2 Bl.Comm. 295. Instar omnium, equivalent or tantamount to all. Id. 146; 3 Bl.Comm. 231.
INSTAURUM. In old English deeds. A stock or store of cattle, and other things; the whole stock upon a farm, including cattle, wagons, plows, and al’ other implements of husbandry. 1 Mon. Angl. 548b; Fleta, lib. 2, c. 72, § 7. Terra instaura-ta, land ready stocked.
INSTIGATE. To stimulate or goad to an action, especially a bad action; one of its synonyms is "abet". Hughes v. Van Bruggen, 44 N.M. 534, 105 P.2d 494, 499.
INSTIGATION. Incitation; urging; solicitation. The act by which one incites another to do some-thing, as to col/una some crime or to commence a suit. State v. Fraker, 148 Mo. 143, 49 S.W. 1017.
INSTIRPARE. To plant or establish.
INSTITOR. Lat. In the civil law. A clerk in a store; an agent.

INSTITORIA ACTIO. Lat. In the civil law. The name of an action given to those who had con-tracted with an institor (q. y.) to compel the prin-cipal to performance. Inst. 4, 7, 2; Dig. 14, 3, 1; Story, Ag. § 426.
INSTITORIAL POWER. The charge given to a clerk to manage a shop or store. 1 Bell, Comm. 506, 507.
INSTITUTE, v. To inaugurate or commence; as to institute an action. Post v. U. S., 16 S.Ct. 611, 161 U.S. 583, 40 L.Ed. 816; Ballard v. Cash, 191 Ky. 312, 230 S.W. 48, 49; Latham v. Latham, 178 N.C. 12, 100 S.E. 131, 132. To set up, to originate, to introduce. Brown v. City of Portland, 97 Or. 600, 190 P. 722, 724.
To nominate, constitute, or appoint; as to in-stitute an heir by testament. Dig. 28, 5, 65.
INSTITUTE, n. In the civil law. A person named in the will as heir, but with a direction that he shall pass over the estate to another designated person, called the "substitute."
In Scotch law. The person to whom an estate is first given by destination or limitation; the others, or the heirs of tailzie, are called "substi-tutes."
INSTITUTED EXECUTOR. An instituted execu-tor is one who is appointed by the testator without any condition.
INSTITUTES. A name sometimes given to text-books containing the elementary principies of jurisprudence, arranged in an orderly and sys-tematic manner. For example, the Institutes of Justinian, of Gaius, of Lord Coke.
Institutes oí Gaius. An elementary work of the Roman jurist Gaius; important as having formed the foundation of the Institutes of Justinian, (q. v.). These Institutes were discovered by Nie-buhr in 1816, in a codex rescriptus of the library of the cathedral chapter at Verona, and were first published at Berlin in 1820. Two editions have since appeared. Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 54.
Institutes of Justinian. One of the four compo-nent parts or principal divisions of the Corpus Ju-ris Civilis, behn an elementary treatise on the Roman law, in four books. This work was com-piled from earlier sources, (resting principally on the Institutes of Gaius,) by a commission com-posed of Tribonian and two others, by command and under direction of the emperor Justinian, and was first published November 21, A. D. 533.
Institutes of Lord Coke. The name of four vol-umes by Lord Coke, published A. D. 1628. The first is an extensive comment upon a treatise on tenures, compiled by Littleton, a judge of the common pleas, teme. Edward IV. This comment is a rich mine of valuable common-law learning, collected and heaped together from the ancient re-ports and Year Books, but greatly defective in method. It is usually cited by the name of "Co. Litt," or as "1 Inst." The second volume is a comment upon old acts of parliament, without
systematic order; the third a more methodical treatise on the pleas of the crown; and the fourth an account of the several species of courts. These are cited as 2, 3, or 4 "Inst.," without any author’s name. Wharton.
Theophilus’ Institutes. A paraphrase of Justini-an, made, it is believed, soon after A. D. 533. This paraphrase maintained itself as a manual of law until the eighth or tenth century. This text was used in the time of Hexabiblos of Harmenipu-lus, the last of the Greek jurists. It is also con-jectured that Theophilus was not the editor of his own paraphrase, but that it was drawn up by some of his pupils after his explanations and lectures, in-asmuch as it contains certain barbarous phrases, and the texts of the manuscripts vary greatly from each other.
INSTITUTIO H.zEREDIS. Lat. In Roman law. The appointment of the ;meres in the will. It cor-responds very nearly to the nomination of an ex-ecutor in English law. Without such an appoint-ment the will was void at law, but the prcetor (i. e., equity) would, under certain circumstances, carry out the intentions of the testator. Brown.
INSTITUTION. The commencement or inaugura-tion of anything. The first establishment of a law, rule, rite, etc. Any custom, system, organization, etc., firmly established. An elementary rule or principie.
An establishment, specially one of public charac-ter or one affecting a community. State v. Clau-sen, 85 Wash. 260, 148 P. 28, 32, Ann.Cas.1916B, 810. An established or organized society or corpora-tion. It may be private in its character, designed for profit to those composing the organization, or public and charitable in its purposes. In re Pea-body’s Estate, 21 Cal.App.2d 690, 70 P.2d 249, 250. A foundation; as, a literary or charitable institu-tion. Prescott Courier v. Board of Sup’rs of Yaya-pai County, 49 Ariz. 423, 67 P.2d 483, 486.
The term "institution" 1s sometimes used as descrlptive of an establishment or place where the business or opera-tions of a society or association ts carried on; at other times it is used to designate the organized body. Benjamin Rose Institute v. Myers, 92 Ohio St. 252, 110 N.E. 924, 926, 927, L.R.A.1916D, 1170; Bartling v. Wait, 96 Neb. 532, 148 N.W. 507, 509.

Ecelesiastical Law

A kind of investiture of the spiritual part of the benefice, as induction is of the temporal; for by institution the tare of the souls of the parish is committed to the charge of the clerk. Brown.

Civil Law

The appointment of an heir; the act by which a testator nominates one or more persons to suc-ceed him in all his rights active and passive. Hali-fax, Anal. 39; Pothier, Tr. des Donations testa-mentaires, c. 2, s. 1, § 1; La Civ.Code, art. 1598 (Civ.Code, art. 1605) ; Dig. 28. 5; 1, 1; 28. 6. 1, 2, § 4.

Jurisprudence

plural form of this word ("institutions") is sometimes used as the equivalent of "institutes," to denote an elementary textbook of the law.

Practice

commencement of an action or prosecution; as, A. B. has instituted a suit against C. D. to re-cover damages for trespass.

Political Law

rite, or ceremony enjoined by authority as a permanent rule of conduct or of government. Webster. An organized society, established either by law or the authority of individuals, for promot-ing any object, public or social. Dodge v. Wil-liams, 46 Wis. 70, 1 N.W. 92, 50 N.W. 1103; State v. Edmondson, 88 Ohio St. 625, 106 N.E. 41, 44.
A system or body of usages, laws, or regula-tions, of extensive and recurring operation, con-taining within itself an organism by which it ef-fects its own independent action, continuance, and generally its own further development. Its object is to generate, effect, regulate, or sanction a suc-cession of acts, transactions, or productions of a peculiar kind or class. We are likewise in the hab-it of calling single laws or usages "institutions," if their operation is of vital importante and vast scope, and if their continuance is in a high degree independent of any interfering power. Lieb. Civil

General

institution. One which is created and exists by law or public authority, e. g., an asylum, charity, college, university, schoolhouse, etc. Hen-derson v. Shreveport Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., 134 La. 39, 63 So. 616, 618, 51 L.R.A.,N.S., 448.
INSTITUTIONES. Lat. Works containing the elements of any science; institutions or institutes. One of Justinian’s principal law collections, and a similar work of the Roman jurist Gaius, are so entitled. See Institutes.
INSTRUCT. To convey information as a client to an attorney, or as an attorney to a counsel; to authorize one to appear as advocate; to give a case in charge to the jury.
INSTRUCTION. In French criminal law. The first process of a criminal prosecution. It includes the examination of the accused, the preliminary in-terrogation of witnesses, collateral investigations, the gathering of evidence, the reduction of the whole to order, and the preparation of a document containing a detailed statement of the case, to serve as a brief for the prosecuting officers, and to furnish material for the indictment.
Juges d’instruction. In French law. Officers subject to the procureur impérial or général, who receive in cases of criminal offenses the com-plaints of the parties injured, and who summon and examine witnesses upon oath, and, after com-munication with the procureur impérial, draw up
the forms of accusation. They have also the right, subject to the approval of the same superior offi-cer, to admit the accused to bail. They are ap-pointed for three years, but are re-eligible for a further period of office. They are usually chosen from among the regular judges. Brown.
Common Law
Order given by a principal to his agent in rela-tion to the business of his agency.
Practico
A detailed statement of the facts and circum-stances constituting a cause of action made by a client to his attorney for the purpose of enabling the latter to draw a proper declaration or procure it to be done by a pleader.
Trial Practico
A direction given by the judge to the jury con-cerning the law of the case; a statement made by the judge to the jury informing them of the law applicable to the case in general or some aspect of it; an exposition of the rules or principies of law applicable to the case or some branch or phase of it, which the jury are bound to accept and apply. Lehman v. Hawks, 121 Ind. 541, 23 N.E. 670; Boggs v. U. S., 10 Okl. 424, 63 P. 969; Lawler v. McPheeters, 73 Ind. 579; Davis v. State, 155 Ark. 245, 244 S.W. 750, 752; Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 P. 575, 583.
The generally accepted meaning of the word in-struction, when applied to courts, means a direc-tion that is to be obeyed. State v. Downing, 23 Idaho, 540, 130 P. 461, 462.
Peremptory instruction. An instruction given by a court to a jury which the latter must obey im-plicitly; as an instruction to return a verdict for the defendant, or for the plaintiff, as the case may be.
INSTRUMENT. A written document; a formal or legal document in writing, such as a contract, deed, will, bond, or lease. State v. Phillips, 157 Ind. 481, 62 N.E. 12; Cardenas v. Miller, 108 Cal. 250, 39 P. 783, 49 Am.St.Rep. 84.
Anything reduced to writing, a document of a formal or solemn character, a writing given as a means of affording evidence. Smith v. Smith, Ind. App., 110 N.E. 1013, 1014. A document or writing which gives formal expression to a legal act or agreement, for the purpose of creating, securing, modifying, or terminating a right; a writing executed and delivered as the evidence of an act or agreement. Moore v. Diamond Dry Goods Co., 47 Ariz. 128, 54 P.2d 553, 554.
In the law of evidence. Anything which may be presented as evidence to the senses of the adj udi-cating tribunal. 1 Whart.Ev. § 615.
INSTRUMENT OF APPEAL. The document by which an appeal is brought in an English matri-monial cause from the president of the probate, divorce, and admiralty division to the full court. It is analogous to a petition. Browne, Div. 322.

INSTRUMENT OF EVIDENCE. Instruments of evidence are the media through which the evidence of facts, either disputed or required to be proved, is conveyed to the mind of a judicial tribunal; and they comprise persons and living things as well as writings. Best, Ev. § 123, 1 Whart.Ev. § 615.
INSTRUMENT OF SAISINE. An instrument in Scotland by which the delivery of "saisine" (i. e., seisin, or the feudal possession of land) is attest-ed. It is subscribed by a notary, in the presence of witnesses, and is executed in pursuance of a "precept of saisine," whereby the "grantor of the deed" desires "any notary Public to whom these presents may be presented" to give saisine to the intended grantee or grantees. It must be entered and recorded in the registers of saisines. Mozley & Whiteley.
INSTRUMENTA. Lat. That kind of evidence which consists of writings not under seal; as court-rolls, accounts, and the like. 3 Co.Litt. 487.
INSTRUMENTAL. Serviceable, helpful. Culp v. Browne, Tex.Civ.App., 235 S.W. 675, 678.
INSTRUMENTALITY RULE. Under this rule, corporate existence will be disregarded where a corporation (subsidiary) is so organized and con-trolled and its affairs so conducted as to make it only an adjunct and instrumentality of another corporation (parent corporation). Jenkins Petro-leum Process Co. v. Western Oil Corporation, D.C. Del., 21 F.Supp. 550, 551; and parent corporation will be responsible for the obligations of its sub-sidiary. Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., C.C.A.Okl., 96 F.2d 693, 704.
INSUBORDINATION. State of being insubordi-nate; disobedience to constituted authority. Unit-ed States v. Krafft, C.C.A.N.J., 249 F. 919, 925, L.R.A.1918F, 402. Refusal to obey some order which a superior officer is entitled to give and have obeyed. Garvin v. Chambers, 195 Cal. 212, 232 P. 696, 701; Sheehan v. Board of Police Com’rs of City and County of San Francisco, 197 Cal. 70, 239 P. 844, 847. Not synonymous with incompetency. Cafferty v. Southern Tier Pub. Co., 173 N.Y.S. 774, 186 App.Div. 136.
"Insubordination" by a servant lmports a willful disre-gard of express or implied dlrectlons of the employer and refusal to obey reasonable orders. MacIntosh v. Abbot, 231 Mass. 180, 120 N.E. 383.
INSUCKEN MULTURES. A quantity of corn paid by those who are thirled to a mili. See Thirlage.
INSUFFICIENT. Not sufficient; inadequate to some need, purpose, or use; wanting in needful value, ability, or fitness; incompetent; unfit; as insufficient food; insufficient means. It is the antonym of "sufficient." Nissen v. Miller, 44 N.M. 487, 105 P.2d 324, 325.
INSUFFICIENCY. In equity pleading. The legal inadequacy of an answer in equity which does not fully and specifically reply to some one or more of the material allegations, charges, or interroga-tories set forth in the bill. White v. Joy, 13 N.Y.
89; Haughton v. Townsend, 8 How.Prac. (N.Y.) 446; Hill v. Fair Haven & W. R. Co., 75 Conn. 177, 52 A. 725.
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT VERDICT. This phrase in a motion for new trial means that there is some evidence, but not enough in light of the evidence to the contrary to support a verdict. Arnold v. Haskins, 347 Mo. 320, 147 S. W.2d 469, 472. It means that there is no evidence which ought reasonably to satisfy jury that fact to be proved is established. Shtevelan v. Metropoli-tan Life Ins. Co., 295 N.Y.S. 735, 736, 162 Misc. 835.
INSULA. Lat. An island; a house not connected with other houses, but separated by a surrounding space of ground. Calvin.
INSULATE. To separate from conducting bodies by means of nonconductors, as to prevent the transfer of electricity or heat. Mauney v. Electric Const. Co., 210 Ala. 554, 98 So. 874, 877.
INSUPER. Lat. Moreover; over and aboye.
An old exchequer term, applied to a charge made upon a person in his account. Blount.
INSURABLE. Capable of being insured against loss, damage, death, etc.; proper to be insured; affording a sufficient ground for insurance. Green-berg v. Continental Casualty Co., 24 Cal.App.2d 506, 75 P.2d 644, 649.
INSURABLE INTEREST. Such a real and sub-stantial interest in specific property as will prevent a contract to indemnify the person interested against its loss from being a mere wager policy. Mutual F. Ins. Co. v. Wagner, Pa., 7 A. 104; Insur-ance Co. v. Brooks, 131 Ala. 614, 30 So. 876; Berry v. Insurance Co., 132 N.Y. 49, 30 N.E. 254, 28 Am. St.Rep. 548; Strong v. Insurance Co., 10 Pick. (Mass.) 43, 20 Am.Dec. 507; Insurance Co. v. Winsmore, 124 Pa. 61, 16 A. 516. Such an interest as will make the loss of the property of pecuniary damage to the insured; a right, benefit, or advan-tage arising out of the property or dependent thereon, or any liability in respect thereof, or any relation thereto or concern therein, of such a na-ture that it might be so affected by the contemplat-ed peril as to directly damnify the insured. 2 Joyce, Ins. §§ 887, 888. German Ins. Co. v. Hyman, 34 Neb. 704, 52 N.W. 401, 402. Tischendorf v. Lynn Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 190 Wis. 33, 208 N.W. 917, 919, 45 A.L.R. 856; Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Bolling, 176 Va. 182, 10 S.E.2d 518, 521.
Every interest in property, or any relation thereto, or liability in respect thereof, of such a nature that a con-templated peril might directly damnify the insured, is an insurable interest.
In the case of life insurance, a reasonable expec-tation of pecuniary benefit from the continued life of another; also, a reasonable ground, founded upon the relation of the parties to each other, either pecuniary or of blood or affinity, to expect some benefit or advantage from the continuance of the life of the assured. Insurance Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 460, 24 L.Ed. 251; National Life & Acci-Co. v. Ball, 157 Miss. 163, 127 So. 268; Colgrove v. Lowe, 343 Ill. 360, 175 N.E. 569, 572. Essential thing being that policy be obtained in good faith, not for purpose of speculating on haz-ard of life in which insured has no interest. Alex-ander v. Griffith Brokerage Co., 228 Mo.App. 773, 73 S.W.2d 418, 423.
INSURANCE. A contract whereby, for a stipu-lated consideration, one party undertakes to com-pensate the other for loss on a specified subject by specified perils. The party agreeing to make the compensation is usually called the "insurer" or "underwriter;" the other, the "insured" or "as-sured;" the agreed consideration, the "premium;" the written contract, a "policy;" the events in-sured against, "risks" or "perils;" and the subject, right, or interest to be protected, the "insurable in-terest." 1 Phil.Ins. §§ 1-5. A contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another against loss, damage, or liability arising from an unknown or contingent event and is applicable only to some contingency or act to occur in future. Com. v. Provident Bicycle Ass’n, 178 Pa. 636, 36 A. 197, 36 L.R.A. 589; Commonwealth v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 254 Pa. 5W, 98 A. 1072, 1073; and is ap-plicable only to some contingency or act to occur in future. Clardy v. Grand Lodge of Oklahoma, A. O. U. W., 132 Okl. 165, 269 P. 1065, 1066. For "Family," see that title.
An agreement by which one party for a consideration promises to pay money or its equivalent or to do an act valuable to other party upon destruction, loss, or Injury of something in which other party has an interest. Commis-sIoner of Banking and Insurance v. Community Health Service, 129 N.J.L. 427, 30 A.2d 44, 46.

Classification

Accident insurance is that form of insurance which undertakes to indemnify the assured against expense, loss of time, and suffering resulting from accidents causing him physical injury, usually by payment at a fixed rate per week while the con-sequent disability lasts, and sometimes including the payment of a fixed sum to his heirs in case of his death by accident within the term of the poli-cy. Employers’ Liability Assur. Corp. v. Merrill, L55 Mass. 404, 29 N.E. 529.Automobile insurance may embrace insurance against loss of or damage to a motor vehicle caused by fire, windstorm, theft, collision, or oth-er insurable hazards, and also against legal lia-bility for personal injuries or damage to property resulting from operation of the vehicle. 44 C.J.S. p. 492; Blashfield, Cyc. of Automobile Law and Prac., Perm. Ed., § 3461.
Burglary insurance. Insurance against loss of property by the depredations of burglars and thieves.
Casualty insurance. This term is generally used as equivalent to "accident" insurance. State v. Federal Inv. Co., 48 Minn. 110, 50 N.W. 1028. But in some states it means insurance against acci-dental injuries to property, as distinguished from accidents resulting in bodily injury or death. Em-
ployers’ Liability Assur. Corp. v. Merrill, 155 Mass. 404, 29 N.E. 529.
Commercial insurance is a term applied to in-demnity agreements, in the form of insurance bonds or policies, whereby parties to commercial contracts are to a designated extent guarantied against loss by reason of a breach of contractual obligations on the part of the other contracting party; to this class belong policies of contract credit and title insurance. Cowles v. Guarani Co., 32 Wash. 120, 72 Pac. 1032, 98 Am.St.Rep. 838.
Employers’ insurance. Employers’ insurance policies are of two sorts, the "liability" contract, which obligates the insurer to pay the loss without first requiring that the assured do so, and the "indemnity" contract, which obligates the insurer to reimburse only after the employer has paid the debt to the injured employee. Davies v. Maryland Casualty Co., 89 Wash. 571, 154 P. 1116, 1117, L.R.A.1916D, 395, 398.
Employer’s liability insurance. In this form of insurance the risk insured against is the liability of the assured to make compensation or pay dam-ages for an accident, injury, or death occurring to a servant or other employee in the course of his employment, either at common law or under stat-utes imposing such liability on employers.
Fidelity insurance is that form of insurance in which the insurer undertakes to guaranty the fidel-ity of an officer, agent, or employee of the assured, or rather to indemnify the latter for losses caused by dishonesty or a want of fidelity on the part of such a person. People v. Rose, 174 III. 310, 51 N.E. 246, 44 L.R.A. 124.
Fire insurance. A contract of insurance by which the underwriter, in consideration .of the premium, undertakes to indemnify the insured against all losses in his houses, buildings, furni-ture, ships in port, or merchandise, !by means of accidental fire happening within a prescribed peri-od. 3 Kent, Comm. 370; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Allen, 138 Mass. 27, 52 Am.Rep. 245; ; Durham v. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., C.C.Or., 22 F. 470.
Fraternal insurance. The form of life or acci-dent insurance furnished by a fraternal beneficial association, consisting in the undertaking to pay to a member, or his heirs in case of death, a stip-ulated sum of money, out of funds raised for that purpose by the payment of dues or assessments by all the members of the association.
Guaranty or fidelity insurance is a contract whereby one, for a consideration, agrees to indem-nify another against loss arising from the want of integrity or fidelity of employees and persons hold-ing positions of trust, or embezzlements by them, or against the insolvency of debtors, losses in trade, loss by non-payment of notes, or against breaches of contract. People v. Rose, 174 III. 310, 51 N.E. 246, 44 L.R.A. 124; Cowles v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 32 Wash. 120, 72 P. 1032.Indemnity insurance. This term has come to have a well defined and recognized meaning in insurance parlante, and is applied to contracts which provide indemnity against loss, and not the contracts which provide for indemnity against lia-bility. The ‘atter are known as liability contracts or policies, and the former as indemnity contracts or policies. 44 C.J.S. pp. 480, 482. As applied to motor vehicles, the distinctions between the two types of policies are discussed in Blashfield, Cyc. of Automobile Law and Prac., Perm. Ed., §§ 4011-4015.
Industrial insurance. Small policies issued in consideration of weekly premium payments. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. King, 137 Tenn. 685, 195 S.W. 585, 588.
Liability insurance is that form of insurance which indemnifies against liability on account of injuries to the person or property of another. It is distinguished from "indemnity insurance" (see that title, supra), and may be issued to cover the liability of, for example, carriers, contractors, em-ployers, landlords, manufacturers, owners, and railroads. Liability insurance may extend to au-tomobiles, elevators, fly wheels, libel, theaters, and vessels. 44 C.J.S. p. 481.
Life insurance. That kind of insurance in which the risk contemplated is the death of a particular person; upon which event (if it occurs within a prescribed term, or, according to the contract, whenever it occurs) the insurer engages to pay a stipulated sum to the legal representatives of such person, or to a third person having an in-surable interest in the life of such person.
Straight life insurance or whole lile insurance 1s insur-ance for which premiums are collected so long as the insured may live, whereas, terco insurance is insurance which promíses payment only within a stipulated number of years. Doty v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 350 Mo. 192, 165 S.W.2d 862, 869, 143 A.L.R. 1062.
Live-stock insurance. Insurance upon the lives, health, and good condition of domestic animals of the useful kinds, such as horses and cows.
Marine insurance. A contract whereby, for a consideration stipulated to be paid by one inter-ested in a ship, freight, or cargo, subject to the risks of marine navigation, another undertakes to indemnify him against some or all of those risks during a certain period or voyage. 1 Phil.Ins. 1. A contract whereby one party, for a stipulated pre-mium, undertakes to indemnify the other against certain perils or sea-risks to which his ship, freight, and cargo, or some of them, may be ex-posed during a certain voyage, or a fixed period of time. An insurance against risks connected with navigation, to which a ship, cargo, freightage, profits, or other insurable interest in movable prop-erty may be exposed during a certain voyage or a tixed period of time. Civ.Code Cal. § 2655.
Motor vehicle insurance. See Automobile in-surance, supra.
Old line life insurance. Insurance on a level or fíat rate plan where, for a fixed premium payable
without condition at stated intervals, a certain sum is to be paid upon death without condition. Mattero v. Central Life Ins. Co., 202 Mo.App. 293, 215 S.W. 750, 751.
Plate-glass insurance. Insurance against loss from the accidental breaking of plate-glass in win-dows, doors, show-cases, etc.
Steam boiler insurance. Insurance against the destruction of steam boilers by their explosion, sometimes including indemnity against injuries to other property resulting from such explosion.
Title insurance. Insurance against loss or dam-age resulting from defects or failure of title to a particular parcel of realty, or from the enforce-ment of liens existing against it at the time of the insurance. This form of insurance is taken out by a purchaser of the property or one loaning money on mortgage, and is furnished by companies spe-cially organized for the purpose, and which keep complete sets of abstracts or duplicates of the rec-ords, employ expert title-examiners, and prepare conveyances and transfers of all sorts. A "certifi-cate of title" furnished by such a company is mere-ly the formally expressed professional opinion of the company’s examiner that the title is complete and perfect (or otherwise, as stated), and the company is Hable only for a want of care, skill, or diligence on the part of its examiner; whereas an "insurance of title" warrants the validity of the ti-tle in any and all events. It is not always easy to distinguish between such insurance and a "guar-anty of title" given by such a company, except that in the former case the maximum limit of liability is fixed by the policy, while in the latter case the undertaking is to make good any and all loss re-sulting from defect or failure of the title.
Tornado insurance. Insurance against injuries to crops, timber, houses, farm buildings, and other property from the effects of tornadoes, hurricanes, and cyclones.
Other Compound and Descriptive Termo
Additional insurance. To constitute prohibited "additional insurance" both policies must be on same subject-matter and on same interest therein. Clower v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. of New York, 220 Mo.App. 1112, 296 S.W. 257, 260; Hurst Home Ins. Co. v. Deatley, 175 Ky. 728, 194 S.W. 910, 911, L.R.A.1917E, 750.
Assessment Hfe insurance policy. A contract by which payments to insured are not unalterably fixed, but dependent on collection of assessments necessary to pay amounts insured, while an "old-lMe policy" unalterably fixes premiums and defi-nitely and unchangeably fixes insurer’s liability. Clark v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 126 Me. 7, 135 A. 357, 358.
Comprehensive coverage. A simple and con-venient form of indemnity now commonly avail-able in contracts of automobile insurance. It in-eludes not only the conventional coverages against loss caused by fire, theft, wind, water, or malicious mischief, but is generally designed to protect damage to the insured vehicle except by collision or upset. Blashfield, Cyc. of Automobile Law and Prac., Perm. Ed., § 3653. Among losses commonly incurred and paid under comprehensive policies are those caused by lighted cigarettes. Other examples of such losses include scratching of the finish by matches, thorns, or dust storms; damage to the upholstery caused by a child’s loss of control of the urinary f unction, and by the clawing or chewing of the upholstery by a pet dog; and damage to the fenders resulting when a goat mistook them for hors d’oeuvres. Appleman, Ins. Law and Prac., § 3222.
Concurrent insurance. That which to any extent insures the same interest against the same casual-ty, at the same time, as the primary insurance, on such terms that the insurers would bear propor-tionately the loss happening within the provisions of both policies. Rubber Co. v. Assur. Co., 64 N.J. L. 580, 46 A. 777; Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Union Mercantile Co., 161 Ky. 718, 171 S.W. 407, 409; Camden Fire Ins. Ass’n v. Sutherland, Tex. Civ.App., 278 S.W. 907, 914.
Double insurance. See Double.
Excess insurance. See Excess Insurance.
General and special insurance. In marine in-surance a general insurance is effected when the perils insured against are such as the law would imply from the nature of the contract considered in itself and supposing none to be specified in the policy; in the case of special insurance, further perils (in addition to implied perils) are expressed in the policy. Vandenheuvel v. United Ins. Co., 2 Johns.Cas. (N.Y.) 127.
Loss. See Loss.
Insurance adjuster. One undertaking to ascer-tain and report the actual loss to the subject-mat-ter of insurance due to the peril insured against. Laws Wash.1911, p. 163, § 2; Jensen v. Lincoln Hail Ins. Co., 125 Neb. 87, 249 N.W. 94.
Insurance agent. Person authorized to represent insurer in dealing with third parties in matters re-lating to insurance. American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pa., v. Ricas, 179 Md. 627, 22 A.2d 484, 487. An agent employed by an insurance company to solicit risks and effect insurances. Agents of in-surance companies are called "general agents" when clothed with the general oversight of the companies’ business in a state or large section of country, and "local agents" when their functions are limited and confined to some particular locali-ty. McKinney v. Alton, 41 Ill.App. 512; State v. Accident Ass’n, 67 Wis. 624, 31 N.W. 229. See, also, Insurance broker, infra.
Insurance broker. One who acts as middleman between insured and company, and who solicits in-surance from public under no employment from any special company and places order of insur-ance with company selected by insurer or, in ab-sence of any selection, with company selected by such broker. Broker is agent for insured though at same time for some purposes he may be agent
Black’s Law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed.-60
for insurer, and his acts and representations with-in scope of his authority as such agent are binding on insured. Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 163 Va. 349, 175 S.E. 763.
An "Insurance agent" is tied to his company, whereas an "insurance broker" is an independent middleman not tied to a particular company. Osborn v. Ozlin, Va., 310 U.S. 53, 60 S.Ct. 758, 761, 84 L.Ed. 1074.
Insurance commissioner. A public officer in sev-eral of the states, whose duty is to supervise the business of insurance as conducted in the state by foreign and domestic companies, for the protection and benefit of policy-holders, and especially to issue licenses, make periodical examinations into the condition of such companies, or receive, file, and publish periodical statements of their business as furnished by them.
Insurance company. A corporation or associa-tion whose business is to make contracts of insur-ance. They are either mutual companies or stock companies. A "mutual" insurance company is one whose fund for the payment of losses consists not of capital subscribed or furnished by outside parties, but of premiums mutually coritributed by the parties insured, or in other words, one in which all persons insured become members of the as-sociation and contribute either cash or assessable premium notes, or both, to a common fund, out of which each is entitled to indemnity in case of loss. Mygatt v. Insurance Co., 21 N.Y. 65; Insurance Co. v. Hoge, 21 How. 35, 16 L.Ed. 61; Given v. Rettew, 162 Pa. 638, 29 A. 703. A "stock" company is one organized according to the usual form of business corporations, having a capital stock divided into shares, which, with current income and accumu-lated surplus, constitutes the fund for the payment of losses, policy-holders paying fixed premiums and not being members of the association unless they also happen to be stockholders.
Insurance policy. See Policy.
Insurance premium. The consideration paid by insured to insurer for insurance protection. Alyea-Nichols Co. v. U. S., D.C.I11., 12 F.2d 998, 1005. See Premium.
Insurance trust. An agreement between in-sured and trustee, whereby proceeds of policy are paid directly to trustee for investment and dis-tribution to designated beneficiaries in manner and at such time as insured has directed in trust agreement. In re Reynolds’ Estate, 131 Neb. 557, 268 N.W. 480, 486, 487.
Interinsurance is insurance system whereby sev-eral individuals, partnerships, or corporations, through common attorney in fact, underwrite one another’s risks against loss under agreement that underwriters act separately and severally. Wy-song v. Automobile Underwriters, 204 Ind. 493, 184 N.E. 783, 785, 94 A.L.R. 826; Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 63 S.Ct. 602, 604, 318 U.S. 313, 87 L.Ed. 777, 145 A.L.R. 1113.
It is distinguishable from all other forms of insurance, in that every insured is interinsurer, and every insurer is insured. Underwriters’ Ex-v. Indianapolis St. Ry. Co., 204 Ind. 676, 185 N.E. 504, 506.
Mutual insurance. That form of insurance pro-vided by mutual companies. An essential char-acteristic of a mutual insurance company is col-lective and entire ownership and control by its members, all of whom must be policyholders. A mutual company may collect cash premiums from members in advance or it may assess members to pay losses and overhead. An insurance company can be mutual even though policyholders are not subject to assessment. To be a mutual insurance company, it is also essential that the company provide insurance to its members substantially at cost. Ohio Farmers indemnity Co. v. Commission-er of Internal Revenue, 108 F.2d 665; Union Ins. Co. v. Hoge, 62 U.S. 35, 16 L.Ed. 61; Mutual Fire Ins. Co. of Germantown v. United States, 142 F.2d 344.
Over-insurance. Insurance effected upon prop-erty, either in one or several companies, to an amount which, separately or in the aggregate, exceeds the actual value of the property.
Reinsurance. Insurance of an insurer; a con-tract by which an insurer procures a third person (usually another insurance company) to insure him against loss or liability by reason of the orig-inal insurance. Civ.Code Cal. § 2646; Insurance Co. v.• Insurance Co., 38 Ohio St. 15, 43 Am.Rep. 413.
Specifle Insurance. That provided by a policy under the terms of which the insurance in the event of loss is to be distributed among the sev-eral items of property, a specific amount to each item. Wilson & Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 300 Mo. 1, 254 S.W. 266, 282.
Term insurance. Insurance for a fixed time. Gilley v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 116 Tex. 43, 285 S.W. 807. Insurance covering only losses occurring before expiration of stated term. 2Etna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Commercial State Bank of Rantoul, D.C.I11., 13 F.2d 474, 476.
INSURE. To make sure or secure, to guarantee, as, to insure safety to any one. State v. Mutual Mortuary Ass’n, 166 Tenn. 260, 61 S.W.2d 664, To engage to indemnify a person against pecuniary loss from specified perils. To act as an insurer. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Williams, 148 Md. 289,129 A. 660, 664.
INSURED. The person who obtains insurance on his property, or upon whose life an insurance is effected. Kierce v. Lumbermen’s Ins. Co. of Phila-delphia, 162 Minn. 277, 202 N.W. 730; 731; Healy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, Sup., 140 N.Y.S. 505, 506; Thompson v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 161 Iowa 446, 143 N.W. 518.
INSURER. The underwriter or insurance compa-ny with whom a contract of insurance is made.
INSURGENT. One who participates in an insur-rection; one who opposes the execution of law by force of arms, or who rises in revolt against the constituted authorities. Hearon v. Calus, 178 S.C. 381, 183 S.E. 13. 20.
r A distinetion is of ten taken between "insurgent" and "rebel," in this: that the former term is not necessarily to be taken in a bad sense, inasmuch as an insurrection, though extralegal, may be just and timely In itself; as where it is undertaken for the overthrow of tyranny or the reform of gross abuses.
INSURRECTION. A rebellion, or rising of citi-zens or subjects in resistance to their government.
See Insurgent.
Insurrection shall consist in any combined resistance to the lawful authority of the state, with intent to the dental thereof, when the same is manifested, or intended to be manifested, by acts of violente. Allegheny County v. Gib-son. 90 Pa. 417, 35 Am.Rep. 670,
INTAKERS. In old English law. kind of
thieves inhabiting Redesdale, on the extreme northern border of England; so called because they took in or received such booties of ca ale and other things as their accomplices, who were called "out-parters," brought in to them from the bord-ers of Scotland. Spelman; Cowell.
INTAKES. Temporary inclosures made by cus-tomary tenants of a manor under a special cus-tom authorizing them to inclose part of the waste until one or more crops have been raised on it. Elton, Common, 277.
INTANGIBLE ASSET. Such values as accrue to a going business as good will, trademarks, copy-rights, franchises, or the like. It exists only in connection with something else, as the good will of a business. In re Armour’s Estate, 94 A. 284, 294, 11 N.J. 257.
INTANGIBLE PROPERTY. Used chiefly in the law of taxation, this term means such property as has no intrinsic and marketable value, but is mere-ly the representative or evidente of value, such as certificates of stock, bonds, promissory notes, and franchises. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Nor-man, C.C.Ky., 77 F. 26; In re Hanson’s Estate, 195 N.Y.S. 255, 119 Mich. 100; City of Richmond v. Drewry-Hughes Co., 122 Va, 178, 90 S.E. 635.
INTEGER. Lat. Whole; untouched. Res integra means a question which is new and undecided. 2 Kent, Comm. 177.
INTEGRATED. An agreement is integrated where the parties thereto adopt the writing or writings as the final and complete expression of the agreement and an "integrador" is the writing or writings so adopted. Wilson v. Viking Corpora-tion, 134 Pa.Super. 153, 3 A.2d 180, 183.
INTEGRATED BAR. See Integration, infra.
INTEGRATION. The act or process of making whole or entire. Webster.
The writing or writings adopted by the parties to an agreement as the final and complete ex-pression of the agreement. Restatement, Con-tracts, § 228; Pettett v. Cooper, 62 Ohio App. 377, .24 N.E.2d 299, 302.
The act of organizing the bar of a state into an association, membership in which is a condi-don precedent to the right to practice law. In-tegration is accomplished by enactment of detailed statutes, by enactment of a short statute con-ferring authority upon the highest court of the integrate the bar, or by rule of court in the exercise of its inherent power. Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 11 N.W.2d 604, 608, 151 A.L.R. 586, rehearing denied 244 Wis. 8, 12 N.W. 2d 699; In re Integration of State Bar of Okla-homa, 185 Okl. 505, 95 P.2d 113.

Integrated Bar

Integrated bar movement was initiated in this country about 35 years ago [1. e., about 1914] by the American Judicature Society and since that time at least 27 States have adopted it. None of them have returned to the old system of voluntary organization, but all commend the integrated bar highly. * * * When we say the bar is integrated we mean that every lawyer with-in a given area has membership in a cohesive organiza-tion. An organization of less than all the members of the bar in a given area would not be an Integrated bar. The area may be the state, the county, or the city. The integrated bar has also been defined as the process by which every member of the bar is given an opportunity to do his part in performing the public service expected of him, and by which each member is obliged to bear his portion of the responsibility. * * * The integrated bar of California has promulgated the best pattern for an In-tegrated bar program to which our attention has been directed." Terrell, J., writing for a majority of the Su-preme Court of Florida on the Petition of Florida State Bar Ass’n (1949), 40 So.2d 902, 904.
INTEGRITY. As occasionally used in statutes pre-scribing the qualifications of public officers, trus-tees, etc., this term means soundness of moral principie and character, as shown by one person dealing with others in the making and perform-ance of contracts, and fidelity and honesty in the discharge of trusts; it is synonymous with "pro-bity," "honesty," and "uprightness." In re Bau-quier’s Estate, 88 Cal. 302, 26 Pac. 178; In re Gor-don’s Estate, 142 Cal. 125, 75 Pac. 672.
INTELLIGIBILITY. In pleading. The statement of matters of fact directly (excluding the necessity of inference or argument to arrive at the mean-ing) and in such appropriate terms, so arranged, as to be comprehensible by a person of common or ordinary understanding. Davis v. Trump, 43 W.Va. 191, 27 S.E. 397, 64 Am.St.Rep. 849.
INTEMPERANCE. Habitual intemperance is that degree of intemperance from the use of intoxicat-ing drinks which disqualifies the person a great portion of the time from properly attending to business, or which would reasonably inflict a course of great mental anguish upon an innocent party. Hope v. The Maccabees, 91 N.J.L. 148, 102 A. 689, 691, 1 A.L.R. 455; Andrews v. United States Casualty Co., 154 Wis. 82, 142, N.W. 487, 490.
INTEND. To design, resolve, purpose. To apply a rule of law in the nature of presumption; to discern and follow the probabilities of like cases.
INTENDANT. One who has the charge, manage-ment, or direction of some office, department, or public business.
Used in the constitutional and statutory law of some European governments to designate a prin-cipal Officer of state corresponding to the cabinet ministers or secretaries of the various depart-ments of the United States government, as, "in-tendant of marine," "intendant of finance."
The term was also used in Alabama to designate the chief executive officer of a city or town, hav-ing practically the same duties and functions as a mayor. Const. Ala. 1901, 176; Intendant and Council of Greensboro v. Mullins, 13 Ala. 341.
INTENDED TO BE RECORDED. This phrase is frequently used in conveyances, when reciting some other conveyance which has not yet been recorded, but which forms a link in the chain of title. In Pennsylvania, it has been construed to be a covenant, on the part of the grantor, to procure the deed to be recorded in a reasonable time. Penn v. Preston, 2 Rawle (Pa.) 14.
INTENDED WIFE. Betrothed. Mace v. Grand Lodge, A. O. U. W. of Massachusetts, 234 Mass. 299, 125 N.E. 569.
INTENDENTE. In Spanish law. The immediate agent of the minister of finance, or the chief and principal director of the different branches of the revenue, appointed in the various departments in each of the provinces into which the Spanish monarchy is divided. Escriche.
INTENDMENT OF LAW. The true meaning, the correct understanding or intention of the law; a presumption or inference made by the courts. Co. Litt. 78.
Common intendment. The natural and usual sense; the common meaning or understanding; the plain meaning of any writing as apparent on its face without straining or distorting the con-struction.
INTENT. Design, resolve, or determination with which person acts. Witters y. United States, 106 F.2d 837, 840, 70 App.D.C. 316, 125 A.L.R. 1031; being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but must ordinarily be inferred from the facts. State v. Walker, 109 W.Va. 351, 154 S. E. 866, 867. It presupposes knowledge. Reinhard v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 41 Cal.App.2d 741, 107 P.2d 501, 504.
"Intent" and "motive" are not in law one and the same thing. State v. Logan, 344 Mo. 351, 126 S.W.2d 256, 260, 122 A.L.R. 417. "Intent" in legal sense is purpose to use particular means to effect certain result; whereas, "mo-tive" is reason which leads minds to desire that result. United Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. Adair, Tex.Civ.App., 29 S.W.2d 940, 943.
"Intent" expresses mental action at its most advanced point, or as it actually accompanies an outward, corporal act which has been determined on. Intent shows the pres-ence of wil/ in the act which consummates a crime. It is the exercise of intelligent will, the mind being fully aware of the nature and consequences of the act which is about to be done, and with such knowledge, and with full liberty of action, willing and electing to do it. Burrill, Circ.Ev. 284, and notes.
General intent. An intention, purpose, or design, either without specific plan or particular object, or without refer-ence to such plan or object.
Meaning; purpose; signification; intendment; applied to words or language. See Certainty.
Common intent. The natural sense given to words.
Estoppel. See Estoppel. INTENTIO. Lat.
In the Civil law. The formal complaint or claim of a plaintiff before the pretor.English law. A count or declaration in a real action (narratio). Bract. lib. 4, tr. 2, c. 2; Fleta, lib. 4, c. 7; Du Cange.
INTENTIO CECA MALA. A blind or obscure meaning is bad or ineffectual. 2 Bulst. 179. Said of a testator’s intention.
INTENTIO INSERVIRE DEBET LEGIBUS, NON LEGES INTENTIONI. The intention [of a party] ought to be subservient to [or in accordance with] the laws, not the laws to the intention. Co. Litt. 314a, 314b.
INTENTIO MEA LIIPONIT NOMEN OPERI MEO. Hob. 123. My intent gives a name to my act.
INTENTION. Determination to act in a certain way or to do a certain thing. State ex reí. Verbon v. County of St. Louis, 216 Minn. 140, 12 N.W.2d 193, 196; In re McCafferty’s Will, 254 N.Y.S. 789, 795, 142 Misc. 371. Meaning; will; purpose; de-sign. 4 Kent, Comm. 534.
"Intention," when used with reference to the construc-tion of wills and other documents, means the sense and meaning of it, as gathered from the words used therein. Parol evidente Is not ordinarily admissible to explain this. When used with reference to civil and criminal responsi-bility, a person who contemplates any result, as not unlikely to follow from a deliberate act of his own, may be sald to intend that result, whether he desire it or not. Thus, if a man should, for a wager, dlscharge a gun among a muititude of people, and any should be killed, he would be deemed gulity of intending the death of such person; for every man Is presumed to intend the natural conse-quence of his own actions. Intention is often confounded with motive, as when we speak of a man’s "gond inten-tIons." Mozley & Whitley.
INTENTIONAL. Willful. Jackson v. Edwards, 144 Fla. 187, 197 So. 833, 835.
INTENTIONE. A writ that lay against him who entered into lands alter the death of a tenant in dower, or for life, etc., and held out to him in re-version or remainder. Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 203.
INTER. Lat. Among; between.
INTER ALIA. Among other things. A term an-ciently used in pleading, especially in reciting stat-utes, where the whole statute was not set forth at length. Inter alía enactatum fuit, among other things it was enacted. Plowd. 65.
INTER ALIAS CAUSAS ACQUISITIONIS, MAG-NA, CELEBRIS, ET FAMOSA EST CAUSA DO-NATIONIS. Among other methods of acquiring property, a great, much-used, and celebrated me-thod is that of gift. Bract. fol. 11.
INTER ALIOS. Between other persons; between those who are strangers to a matter in question.
INTER ALTOS RES GESTAS ALIOS NON POSSE PRZEJUDICIUM FACERE SZEPE CONSTITU-TUM EST. It has been often settled that things which took place between other parties cannot prejudice. Code 7, 60, 1, 2.
INTER APICES JURIS. Among the subtleties of the law. See Apex Juris.
INTER ARMA SILENT LEGES. In time of war the laws are silent. Cicero, pro Milone. It applies as between the state and its external enemies; and also in cases of civil disturbance where extra-judicial force may supersede the ordinary process of law. Salmond, Jurispr. 641.
INTER BRACIHA. Between her arms. Fleta, lib. 1, c. 35, §§ 1, 2. See infra, Brachia.
INTER CJETEROS. Among others; in a general clause; not by name (nominatim). A term ap-plied in the civil law to clauses of disinheritance in a will. Inst. 2, 13, 1; Id. 2, 13, 3.
INTER CANEM ET LUPUM. (Lat. Between the dog and the wolf.) The twilight; because then the dog seeks his rest, and the wolf his prey. 3 Inst. 63.
INTER CONJUGES. Between husband and wife.
INTER CONJUNCTAS PERSONAS. Between conjunct persons. By the act 1621, c. 18, all con-veyances or alienations between conjunct persons, unless granted for onerous causes, are declared, as in a question with creditors, to be null and of no avail. Conjunct persons are those standing in a certain degree of relationship to each other; such, for example, as brothers, sisters, sons, uncles, etc. These were formerly excluded as witnesses, on account of their relationship; but this, as a ground of exclusion, has been abolished. Tray. Lat. Max.
INTER FAUCES TERIVE. (Between the jaws of the land.) A term used to describe a roadstead or arm of the sea enclosed between promontories or projecting headlands.
INTER PARES. Between peers; between those who stand on a level or equality, as respects dili-gence, opportunity, responsibility, etc.
INTER PARTES. Between parties. Instruments in which two persons unite, each making convey-ance to, or engagement with, the other, are called "papers inter partes." Smith v. Emery, 12 N.J. Law, 60.
Judgment Inter Partes See Judgment in Personam.
INTER QUATUOR PARIETES. Between four walls. Fleta, lib. 6, c. 55, § 4.
INTER REGALIA. In English law. Among the things belonging to the sovereign. Among these are rights of salmon fishing, mines of gold and silver, forests, forfeitures, casualties of superior-ity, etc., which are called "regalía minora," and may be conveyed to a subject. The regalía ma-jora include the several branches of the royal prerogative, which are inseparable from the per-son of the sovereign. Tray. Lat. Max.
INTER RUSTICOS. Among the illiterate or un-learned.
INTER SE, INTER SESE. Among themselves. Story, Partn. § 405.VIRUM ET UXOREM. Between husband and wife.
INTER VIVOS. Between the living; from one living person to another. Where property passes by conveyance, the transaction is said to be inter vivos, to distinguish it from a case of succession or devise. So an ordinary gift from one person to another is called a "gift inter vivos," to distin-guish it from a donation made in contemplation of death, (mortis causa.)
INTERCALARE. Lat. In the civil law. To in-troduce or insert among or between others; to introduce a day or month into the calendar; to intercalate. Dig. 50, 16, 98, pr.
INTERCEDERE. Lat. In the civil law. To be-come bound for another’s debt.
INTERCEPTION. Within Federal Communica-tions Act, prohibiting interception of communica-tion by wire or radio, indicates taking or seizure by the way or before arrival at destined place, and does not ordinarily connote obtaining of what is to be sent before, or at the moment, it leaves the possession of the proposed sender, or after, or at the moment, it comes into possession of in-tended receiver. Communications Act of 1934, § 605, 47 U.S.C.A. §.605; Goldman v. United States, N.Y., 62 S.Ct. 993, 995, 316 U.S. 129, 86 L.Ed. 1322.
INTERCHANGEABLY. By way of exchange or interchange. This term properly denotes the method of signing deeds, leases, contracts, etc., executed in duplicate, where each party signs the copy which he delivers to the other. Roose-velt v. Smith, 40 N.Y.S. 381, 17 Misc.Rep. 323.
INTERCOMMON. To enjoy a common mutually or promiscuously with the inhabitants or tenants of a contiguous township, vill, or manor. 2 Bl. Comm. 33; 1 Crabb, Real Prop. p. 271, § 290.
INTERCOMMUNING. Letters of intercommun-ing were Letters from the Scotch privy council passing (on their act) in the king’s name, charg-ing the lieges not to reset, supply, or intercom-mune with the persons thereby denounced; or to furnish them with meat, drink, house, harbor, or any other things useful or comí ortable; or to have any intercourse with them whatever,—under pain of being reputed art and part in their crimes, and dealt with accordingly; and desiring all sher-iffs, bailies, etc., to apprehend and commit such rebels to prison. Bell.
INTERCOURSE. Communication; literally, a running or passing between persons or places; commerce. As applied to two persons, the word standing alone, and without a descriptive or qual-ifying word, does not import sexual connection. People v. Howard, 143 Cal. 316, 76 P. 1116.
INTERDICT. In Roman law. A decree of the prtetor by means of which, in certain cases de-termined by the edict, he himself directly com-manded what should be done or omitted, partic-ularly in causes involving the right of possession or a quasi possession. In the modern civil law,
interdicts are regarded precisely the same as ac-tions, though they give rise to a summary pro-ceeding. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 258.
Interdicts are either prohibitory, restorative, or exhibitory; the first being a prohibition, the sec-ond a decree for restoring possession lost by force, the third a decree for the exhibiting of accounts, etc. Heinec. § 1206.
An interdict was distinguished from an "action," (actio,) properly so called, by the circumstance that the pretor himself decided In the first instance, (principaliter,) on the application of the plaintiff, without previously appointing a judex, by issuing a decree commanding what should be done, or left undone. Gaius, 4, 139. It might be adopted as a remedy in various cases where a regular action could not be maintained, and hence interdicts were at one time more extensively used than were the actiones themselves. Afterwards, however, they fell finto disuse, and in the time of Justinian were generally dispensed with. Mackeld. Rom.Law, § 258; Inst. 4, 15, 8.
In Ecclesiastical law. An ecclesiastical censure, by which divine services are prohibited to be ad-ministered either to particular persons or in par-ticular places.
In Scotch law. An order of the court of session or of an inferior court, pronounced on cause shown, for stopping any act or proceedings com-plained of as illegal or wrongful. It may be re-sorted to as a remedy against any encroachment either on property or possession, and is a protec-tion against any unlawful proceeding. Bell.
INTERDICTION. In French law. Every person who, on account of insanity, has become incapable of controlling his own interests, can be put under the control of a guardian, who shall administer his affairs with the same effect as he might him-self. Such a person is said to be "interdit," and his status is described as "interdiction." Arg. Fr. Merc. Law, 562.
In the Civil law. A judicial decree, by which a person is deprived of the exercise of his civil rights.
In French-Canadian law. A proceeding institut-ed for the purpose of obtaining a curator of the person and property, and includes the ealling of a family council and a petition to the court or its prothonotary, followed by a hearing. In re Meth-ot’s Will, 98 A. 839, 840, 87 N.J.Eq. 256.
In International law. An "interdiction of com-mercial intercourse" between two countries is a governmental prohibition of commercial inter-course, intended to bring about an entire cessa-tion for the time being of all trade whatever. The Edward, 1 Wheat. 272, 4 L.Ed. 86.
INTERDICTION OF FIRE AND WATER.. Ban-ishment by an order that no man should supply the person banished with fire or water, the two necessaries of life.
INTERDICTUM SALVIAN1UM. Lat. In Roman law. The Salvian interdict. A process which Lay for the owner of a farm to obtain possession of the goods of his tenant who had pledged them to him for the rent of the land. Inst. 4, 15, 3.

INTERDUM EVENIT UT EXCEPTIO QUIE PRIMA FACIE JUSTA VIDETUR, TAMEN IN-IQUE NOCEAT. It sometimes happens that a plea which seems prima facie just, nevertheless is injurious and unequal. Inst. 4, 14, 1, 2.
INTERESSE. Lat. Interest. The interest of money; also an interest in lands.
Interesse termini. An interest in a term. That species of interest or property which a lessee for years acquires in the lands demised to him, before he has actually become possessed of those lands; as distinguished from that property or interest vested in him by the demise, and also reduced into possession by an actual entry upon the lands and the assumption of ownership therein, and which is then termed an "estate for years." Brown.
Pro interesse suo. For his own interest; ac-cording to, or to the extent of, his individual in-terest. Used (in practice) to describe the inter-vention of a party who comes into a suit for the purpose of protecting interests of his own which may be involved in the dispute between the prin-cipal parties or which may be affected by the settlement of their contention.

Property

most general term that can be employed to denote a property in lands or chattels. In its ap-plication to lands or things real, it is frequently used in connection with the terms "estate," "right," and "title," and, according to Lord Coke, it properly includes them all. Co. Litt. 345b. State v. McKellop, 40 Mo. 185; Loventhal v. Home Ins. Co., 20 So. 419, 112 Ala. 116, 33 L.R.A. 258, 57 Am.St.Rep. 17.
More particularly it means a right to have the advantage accruing from anything; any right in the nature of property, but less than title; a par-tial or undivided right; a title to a share.
The terms "interest" and "title" are not synonymous. A mortgagor in possession, and a purchaser holding under a deed defectively executed, have, both of them, absoluto as well as insurable interests in the property, though neither of them has the legal title. Hough v. City F. Ins. Co., 29 Conn. 20, 76 Am.Dec. 581.
Absolute or conditional. That is an absolute in-terest in property which is so completely vested in the individual that he can by no contingency be deprived of it without his own consent. So, too, he is the owner of such absolute interest who must necessarily sustain the loss if the property is destroyed. The terms "interest" and "title" are not synonymous. A mortgagor in possession, and a purchaser holding under a deed defectively exe-cuted, have, both of them, absolute, as well as in-surable, interests in the property, though neither of there has the legal title. "Absolute" is here synonymous with "vested," and is used in contra-distinction to contingent or conditional. Hough v. City F. Ins. Co., 29 Cónn. 10, 76 Am.Dec. 581; Garver v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., 69 Iowa 202, 28 N. W. 555; Washington F. Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 32 Md. 421, 431, 3 Am.Rep. 149; Elliott v. Ashland Mut. F. Iris. Co., 12 A. 676, 117 Pa. 548, 2 Am.St.Rep. 703.

Insurance

Interest or no interest. These words, inserted in an insurance policy, mean that the question whether the insured has or has not an insurable interest in the subject-matter is waived, and the policy is to be good irrespective of such interest. The effect of such a clause is to make it a wager policy.
Interest policy. One which actually, or prima facie, covers a substantial and insurable interest; as opposed to a wager policy.

English Law

Interest suit. An action in the probate branch of the high court of justice, in which the question in dispute is as to which party is entitled to a grant of letters of administration of the estate of a deceased person. Wharton.

General

Joint interest. One owned by several persons in equal shares by a title created by a single will or transfer, when expressly declared in the will or transfer to be a joint tenancy, or when granted or devised to executors or trustees as joint tenants. Civ. Code Cal. § 683.

Law of Evidente

"Interest," in a statute that no witness shall be excluded by interest in the event of the suit, means "concern," "advantage," "good," "share," "por-tion," "part," or "participation." Morgan v. John-son, 87 Ga. 382, 13 S.E. 710.
A relation to the matter in controversy, or to the issue of the suit, in the nature of a prospective gain or loss, which actually does, or presumably might, create a bias or prejudice in the mind, in-clining the person to favor one side or the other.

For Money

Interest is the compensation allowed by law or fixed by the parties for the use or forbearance or detention of money. Beach v. Peabody, 188 III. 75, 58 N.E. 680, Shealy v. U. S., D.C.S.C., 37 F.2d 918, 919.
Conventional interest is interest at the rate agreed upon and fixed by the parties themselves, as distinguished from that which the law would prescribe in the absence of an explicit agreement. Fowler v. Smith, 2 Cal. 568; Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. art. 5069.
Legal interest. See Legal Interest.
Simple interest is that which is paid for the-principal or sum lent, at a certain rate or allow-ance, made by law or agreement of parties.
Compound interest is interest upon interest, where accrued interest is added to the principal sum, and the whole treated as a new principal, for the calculation of the interest for the next period.
Ex-interest. In the language of stock exchang-es, a bond or other interest-bearing security is sold "ex-interest" when the vendor re-serves to himself the interest already accrued and payable (if any) or the interest accruing up to the next interest day.
Interest, maritime. See Maritime Interest. Interest upon interest. Compound interest.
INTEREST REIPUBLICZE NE MALEFICIA RE-MANEANT IMPUNITA. It concerns the state that crimes remain not unpunished. Jenk. Cent. pp. 30, 31, case 59; Wing. Max. 501.
INTEREST REIPUBLICIE NE SUA QUIS MALE UTATUR. It concerns the state that persons do not misuse their property. 6 Coke, 36a.
INTEREST REIPUBLICIE QUOD HOMINES CONSERVENTUR. It concerns the state that [the lives of] men be preserved. 12 Coke, 62.
INTEREST REIPUBLICZE RES JUDICATAS NON RESCINDL It concerns the state that things adjudicated be not rescinded. 2 Inst. 360. It is matter of public concern that solemn adjudi-cations of the courts should not be disturbed. Best, Ev. p. 41, § 44.
INTEREST REIPUBLIC7E SUPREMA HOMIN-UM TESTAMENTA RATA HABERI. It concerns the state that men’s last wills be held valid, [or allowed to stand.] Co. Litt. 236b.
INTEREST REIPUBLIC7E UT CARCERES SINT IN TUTO. It concerns the state that prisons be safe places of confinement. 2 Inst. 589.
INTEREST (IMPRIMIS) REIPUBLICJE UT PAX IN REGNO CONSERVETUR, ET QUIEClUNQUE PACI ADVERSENTUR PROVIDE DECLINEN-TUR. It especially concerns the state that peace be preserved in the kingdom, and that whatever things are against peace be prudently avoided. 2 Inst. 158.
INTEREST REIPUBLICIE UT QUILIBET RE SUA BENE UTATUR. It is the concern of the state that every one uses his property properly.
INTEREST REIPUBLICIE irr SIT FINIS LIT-IUM. It concerns the state that there be an end of lawsuits. Co. Litt. 303. It is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation. Broom, Max. 331, 343.
INTERFERE. To check; hamper; hinder; dis-turb; intervene; intermeddle; interpose; to enter into, or to take part in, the concerns of others. State v. Estes, 185 N.C. 752, 117 S.E. 581, 582; Conger v. Italian Vineyard Co., 186 Cal. 404, 199 P. 503. People ex rel. Benefit Ass’n of Railway Employees v. Miner, 387 III. 393, 56 N.E.2d 353, 356.
INTERFERENCE. In patent law, this term des-ignates a collision between rights claimed or grant-ed; that is, where a person claims a patent for the whole or any integral part of the ground al-ready covered by an existing patent or by a pend-ing application. Milton v. Kingsley, 7 App.D.C.
540; Dederick v. Fox, C.C.Pa., 56 F. 717; Nathan Mf g. Co. v. Craig, C.C.Mass., 49 F. 370.
Strictly speaking, an "Interference" is declared to exist by the patent office whenever lt is decided by the properly constituted authority in that bureau that •two pending applications (or a patent and a pending application), in their claims or essence, cover the same discovery or inven-Mon, so as to render necessary an investigation into the question of priority of invention between the two applica-tions or the application and the patent, as the case may be. Lowrey v. Cowles Electric Smelting, etc., Co., C.C.Ohio, 68 F. 372.
INTERIM. Lat. In the meantime; meanwhile. An assignee ad interim is one appointed between the time of bankruptcy and appointment of the regular assignee. 2 Bell, Comm. 355.
INTERIM COMMITTITUR. "In the meantime, let him be committed." An order of court (or the docket-entry noting it) by which a prisoner is committed to prison and directed to be kept there until some further action can be taken, or until the time arrives for the execution of his sentence.
INTERIM CURATOR. In English law. A person appointed by justices of the peace to take care of the property of a felon convict, until the appoint-ment by the crown of an administrator or admin-istrators for the same purpose. Mozley & White-ley.
INTERIM FACTOR. In Scotch law. A judicial officer elected or appointed under the bankruptcy law to take charge of and preserve the estate until a fit person shall be elected trustee. 2 Bell, Comm. 357.
INTERIM OFFICER. One appointed to fill the
office during a temporary vacancy, or during an interval caused by the absence or incapacity of the regular incumbent.
INTERIM ORDER. One made in the meantime, and until something is done.
INTERIM RECEIPT. A receipt for money paid by way of premium for a contract of insurance for which application is made. If the risk is re-jected, the money is refunded, less the pro rata premium.
INTERINSURANCE EXCHANGE. Reciprocal
exchange. See that title.
INTERLAQUEARE. In old practice. To link together, or interchangeably. Writs were called "interlaqueata" where several were issued against several parties residing in different counties, each party being summoned by a separate writ to war-rant the tenant, together with the other warran-tors. Fleta, lib. 5, c. 4, § 2.
INTERLINEATION. The act of writing between
the lines of an instrument; also what is written between lines. Morris v. Vanderen, 1 Dall. 67, 1 L.Ed. 38; Russell v. Eubanks, 84 Mo. 88.
INTERLOCUTOR. In Scotch practice. An order
or decree of court; an order made in open court. 2 Swint. 362; Arkley, 32.

INTERLOCUTOR OF RELEVANCY. In Scotch practice. A decree as to the relevancy of a libel or indictment in a criminal case. 2 Alis. Crim. Pr. 373.
INTERLOCUTORY. Provisional; temporary; not final. Something intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit which de-cides some point or matter, but is not a final de-cision of the whole controversy. Mora v. Sun Mut. Ins. Co., 13 Abb. Frac. (N.Y.) 310.
As to interlocutory "Costs," "Decree," "Judg-ment," "Order," and "Sentence," see those titles.
INTERLOPERS. Persons who run into business to which they have no right, or who interfere wrongfully; persons who enter a country or place to trade without license. Webster.
INTERMARRIAGE. In the popular sense, this term denotes the contracting of a marriage rela-tion between two persons considered as members of different nations, tribes, families, etc., as, be-tween the sovereigns of two different countries, between an American and an alien, between In-dians of different tribes, between the scions of different clans or families. But, in law, it is some-times used (and with propriety) to emphasize the mutuality of the marriage contract and as import-ing a reciprocal engagement by which each of the parties "marries" the other. Thus, in a pleading, instead of averring that "the plaintiff was mar-ried to the defendant," it would be proper to al-lege that "the parties intermarried" at such a time and place.
INTERMEDDLE. To interfere with property or the conduct of business affairs officiously or with-out right or title. In re Shinn’s Estate, 166 Pa. 121, 30 A. 1026, 45 Am.St.Rep. 656. Not a technical legal term, but sometimes used with reference to the acts of an executor de son tort or a nego-tiorum gestor in the civil law.
INTERMEDIARY. In modern civil law. A brok-er; one who is employed to negotiate a matter between two parties, and who for that reason is considered as the mandatary (agent) of both. Civ. Code La. art. 3016.
INTERMEDIATE. Intervening; interposed dur-ing the progress of a suit, proceeding, business, etc., or between its beginning and end.
INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNT. In probate law. An account of an executor, administrator, or guardian filed subsequent to his first or initial account and before his final account. Specifically in New York, an account filed with the surrogate for the purpose of disclosing the acts of the per-son accounting and the state or condition of the fund in his hands, and not made the subject of a judicial settlement. Code Civ.Proc. N.Y. 1899, § 2514, subd. 9 (Surrogate’s Court Act, § 314, subd. 9).
INTERMEDIATE ORDER. An order made be-tween the commencement of the action and its final determination, incident to and during its
progress, which does not determine the cause but only some intervening matter relating thereto; one that is not directly appealable. Miami Copper Co. v. Strohl, 14 Ariz. 410, 130 P. 605, 608. People v. Priori, 163 N.Y. 99, 57 N.E. 85; Boyce v. Wa-bash Ry. Co., 63 Iowa 70, 18 N.W. 673, 50 Am.Rep. 730; State v. O’Brien, 18 Mont. 1, 43 P. 1091; Hymes v. Van Cleef, 61 Hun 618, 15 N.Y.S. 341.
INTERMEDIATE TOLL. Toll for travel on a toll road, paid or to be collected from persons who pass thereon at points between the toll gates, such persons not passing by, through, or around the toll gates. Hollingworth v. State, 29 Ohio St. 552.
INTERMITTENT EASEMENT. See Easement.
INTERMIXTURE. OF GOODS. Confusion of goods; the confusing or mingling together of goods belonging to different owners in such a way that the pitbperty of neither owner can be separately identified or extracted from the mass. Smith v. Sanborn, 6 Gray (Mass.) 134. And see Confusion of Goods.
INTERN. To restrict or shut up a person, as a political prisoner, within a limited territory.
INTERNAL. Relating to the interior; comprised within boundary Hnes; of interior concern or in-terest; domestic, as opposed to foreign.
INTERNAL COMMERCE. See Commerce.
INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS. With reference to governmental policy and constitutional provi-sions restricting taxation or the contracting of public debts, this term means works of general public utility or advantage, designed to promote facility of intercommunication, trade, and com-merce, the transportation of persons and prop-erty, or the development of the natural resources of the state, such as railroads, public highways, turnpikes, and canals, bridges, the improvement of rivers and harbors, systems of artificial irriga-tion, and the improvement of water powers; but it does not include the building and maintenance of state institutions. State v. Froehlich, 115 Wis. 32, 91 N.W. 115, 58 L.R.A. 757, 95 Am.St.Rep. 894. State v. Knapp, 99 Kan. 852, 163 P. 181, 182, L.R.A. 1917C, 1034; State v. Donald, 160 Wis. 21, 151 N.W. 331, 346.
INTERNAL POLICE. A term sometimes applied to the police power, or power to enact laws in the interest of the public safety, health, and morality, which is inherent in the legislative authority of each state, is to be exercised with reference only to its domes tic affairs and its own citizens, and is not surrendered to the federal government. Che-boygan Lumber Co. v. Delta Transp. Co., 100 Mich. 16, 58 N.W. 630.
INTERNAL REVENUE. In the legislation and fiscal administration of the United States, reve-nue raised by the imposition of taxes and excises on domestic products or manufactures, and on domestic business and occupations, inheritanee taxes, and stamp taxes; as broadly distinguished customs duties," i, e., duties or taxes on foreign commerce or on goods imported. Rev.St. U.S. tit. 35, § 3140 et seq.
INTERNAL WATERS. Such as lie wholly within the body of the particular state or country. The Garden City, D.C.N.Y., 26 F. 773.
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE. See Com-merce.
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. An agency of the United Nations. It has jurisdiction to give advisory opinions on matters of law and treaty construction when requested by the Gen-eral Assembly, Security Council or any other In-ternational agency authorized by the General As-sembly to petition for such opinion. It has j uris-diction, also, to settle legal disputes between na-tions when voluntarily submitted to it. Its judg-ments may be enforced by the Security Council.
Every member of the United Nations is auto-matically a member of the court.
INTERNATIONAL LAW. The law which reg-ulates the intercourse of nations; the law of na-tions. 1 Kent, Comm. 1, 4. The customary law which determines the rights and regulates the intercourse of independent states in peace and war. 1 Wildm. Int. Law, 1.
Public International law is the body of rules which con-trol the conduct of independent states in their relatlons with each other.
Private International law is that branch of municipal law which determines before the courts of what nation a par-ticular action or sult should be brought. and by the law of what nation it should be determined.
INTERNUNCIO. A minister of a second order, charged with the affairs of the papal court in countries where that court has no nuncio.
INTERNUNCIUS. A messenger between two par-ties; a go-between. Applied to a broker, as the agent of both parties. 4 C. Rob. Adm. 204.
INTERPELLATE. To address with a question, especially when formal and public; originally used with respect to proceedings in the French legislature; used in reference to questions by the court to counsel during an argument.
INTERPELLATION. In the civil law. The act by which, in consequence of an agreement, the party bound declares that he will not be bound beyond a certain time. Wolff, Inst. Nat. § 752.
INTERPLEA. A plea by which a person sued in respect to property disclaims any interest in it and demands that rival claimants shall litigate their titles between themselves and relieve him from responsibility. Bennett v. Wolverton, 24 Kan. 286. See Interpleader.
In Missouri, a statutory proceeding, serving as a substituta for the action of replevin, by which a third person intervenes in an action of attachinent, sets up his own title to the specific property at-tached, and seeks to recover the possession of it. Rice v. Salle. 176 Mo. 107. 75 S.W. 398; Spooner
v. Ross, 24 Mo.App. 603; State v. Barker, 26 Mo. App. 491; Brownwell, etc., Car. Co. v. Barnard, 139 Mo. 142, 40 S.W. 762.
INTERPLEADER. When two or more persons claim the same thing (or fund) of a third, and he, laying no claim to it himself, is ignorant which of them has a right to it, and fears he may be prejudiced by their proceeding against him to re-cover it, he may file a bill in equity against them, the object of which is to make them litigate their title between themselves, instead of litigating it with him, and such a bill is called a "bill of inter-pleader." Brown; Hall v. San Jacinto State Bank, Tex.Civ.App., 255 S.W. 506, 509; Alton & Peters v. Merritt, 145 Minn. 426, 177 N.W. 770, 771.
By the statute 1 & 2 Wm. IV. c. 58, summary proceedings at law were provided for the same purpose, in actions of assumpsit, debt, detinue, and trover. And the same remedy is known, in one form or the other, in most or all of the United States.
INTERPOLATE. To insert words in a complete document.
INTERPOLATION. The act of interpolating; the words interpolated.
INTERPOSITION. The doctrine that a state, in the exercise of its sovereignty, may reject a man-date of the federal government deemed to be un-constitutional or to exceed the powers delegated to the federal government. The doctrine denies constitutional obligation of states to respect Su-premo Court decisions with which they do not agree. Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., D.C.La., 188 F.Supp. 916.
The concept is based on the 10th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States reserving to the states powers not delegated to the United States. Historically, the doctrine emanated from Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dallas 419, wherein the state of Georgia, when sued in the Supreme Court by a private citizen of another state, entered a remonstrance and declined to recognize the court’s jurisdiction. Amendment 11 validated Georgia’s position.
Implementation of the doctrine may be peace-able, as by resolution, remonstrance or legislation, or may proceed ultimately to nullification, with forcible resistance.
The Constitution does contemplate and provide for the contingency of adversa .state interposition or legislation to annul or defeat the execution of national laws. In re Charge to Grand Jury, Fed. Cas.No.18,274 [2 Spr. 292].
INTERPRET. To construe; to seek out the mean-ing of language; to translate orally from one tongue to another.
INTERPRETARE ET CONCORDARE LEGES LEGIBUS, EST OPTIMUS INTERPRETANDI MODUS. To interpret, and [in such a way as] to harmonize laws with laws, is the best mode of interpretation. 8 Coke, 169a.INTERPRETATIO CHARTARUM BENIGNE FA-CIENDA EST, UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT. The interpretation of deeds is to be liberal, that the thing may rather have effect than fail. Broom, Max. 543.
INTERPRETATIO FIENDA EST UT RES MAG-IS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT. Jenk. Cent. 198. Such an interpretation is to be adopted that the thing may rather stand than fall.
INTERPRETATIO TALIS IN AlVIBIGUIS SEM-PER FIENDA EST UT EVITETUR INCONVEN-IENS ET ABSURDUM. In cases of ambiguity, such an interpretation should always be made that what is inconvenient and absurd may be avoided. 4 Inst. 328.
INTERPRETATION. The art or process ot dis-covering and expounding the meaning of a stat-ute, will, contract, or other written document. People v. Com’rs of Taxes, 95 N.Y. 559; Rome v. Knox, 14 How. Prac., N.Y., 272; Ming v. Pratt, 22 Mont. 262, 56 P. 279; Tallman v. Tallman, 3 Misc. 465, 23 N.Y.S. 734; Roberts v. Portland Wa-ter Dist., 124 Me. 63, 126 A. 162, 163; Cohn-I-Iall-Marx Co. v. Vanosdall, 25 Ohio App. 360, 157 N.E. 908, 909.
The discovery and representation of the true meaning of any signs used to convey ideas. Lieb. Herm.
"Construction" is a term of wider scope than "interpre-tation;" for, while the latter is concerned only with ascer-taining the sense and meaning of the subject-matter, the former may also be directed to explaining the legal effects and consequences of the instrument in question. Hence interpretation precedes construction, but stops at the writ-ten text.
Interpretation and construction of written instrumente are not the same. A rule of construction is one which either governs the effect of an ascertained intention, or points out what the court should do in the absence of express or implied intention, while a rule of interpretation is one which governs the ascertainment of the meaning of the maker of the instrument. In re Union Trust Co., 151 N.Y.S. 246, 249, 89 Misc. 69.
Close interpretation (interpretatio restricta) is adopted if just reasons, connected with the for-mation and character of the text, induce us to take the words in their narrowest meaning. This species of interpretation has generally been called "literal," but the term is inadmissible. Lieb. Herm. 54.
Extensive interpretation (interpretatio exten-siva, called, also, "liberal interpretation") adopts a more comprehensive signification of the ∎vord. Lieb. Herm. 58.
Extravagant interpretation (interpretatio ex-cedens) is that which substitutes a meaning evi-dently beyond the true one. It is therefore not germine interpretation. Lieb. Herm. 59.
Free or unrestricted interpretation (interpreta-tio soluta) proceeds simply on the general prin-ciples of interpretation in good faith, not bound by any specific or superior principie. Lieb. Herm. 59.
Limited or restricted interpretation (interpre-tatio limitata) is when we are influenced by other
principies than the strictly hermeneutic mes.. Lieb. Herm. 60.
Predestined interpretation (interpretatio pre-destinata) takes place if the interpreter, laboring under a strong bias of mind, makes the text sub-servient to his preconceived views or desires. This includes artful interpretation, (interpretatic vafer,) by which the interpreter seeks to give a meaning to the text other than the one he knows to have been intended. Lieb. Herm. 60.
It is said to be either "legal," which rests on the same authority as the law itself, or "doctrinal," which rests upon its intrinsic reasonableness. Le-gal interpretation may be either "authentic," when it is expressly provided by the legislator, or "us-ual," when it is derived from unwritten practice. Doctrinal interpretation may turn on the meaning of words and sentences, when it is called "gram-matical," or on the intention of the legislator, when it is described as "logical." When logical in-terpretation stretches the words of a statute to cover its obvious meaning, it is called "extensive;" when, on the other hand, it avoids giving full meaning to the words, in order not to go beyond the intention of the legislator, it is called "restric-tiva." Holl. Jur. 344.
As to strict and liberal interpretation, see Con-struction.
In the civil law, authentic interpretation of laws is that given by the legislator himself, which is obligatory on the courts. Customary interpreta-tion (also called "usual") is that which arises from successive or concurrent decisions of the-court on the same subject-matter, having regard to the spirit of the law, jurisprudence, usages, and equity; as distinguished from "authentic" in-terpretation, which is that given by the legislator himself. Houston v. Robertson, 2 Tex. 26.
INTERPRETATION CLAUSE. A section of a statute which defines the meaning of certain words occurring frequently in the other sections.
INTERPRETER. A person sworn at a trial to interpret the evidence of a foreigner or a deaf and dumb person to the court. Amory v. Feliowes, 5 Mass. 226; People v. Lem Deo, 132 Cal. 199, 64 P. 266.
INTERREGNIUIII. An interval between reigns. The period which elapses between the death of a sovereign and the election of another. The va-caney which occurs when there is no government.
INTERROGATOIRE. In French law. An act which contains the interrogatories made by the judge to the person accused, on the facts which are the object of the accusation, and the answers of the accused. Poth. Proc. Crim. c. 4, art. 2, § 1.
INTERROGATORIES. A set or series of written questions drawn up for the purpose of being pro-pounded to a party in equity, a garnishee, or a witness whose testimony is taken on deposition; a series of formal written questions used in the judicial examination of a party or a witness. In taking evidence on depositions, the interrogatories prepared and settled by counsel, and reduced to writing in advance of the examination.
Written questions propounded by one party and served on adversary, who must serve written an-swers thereto under oath. Neske v. Burns, 8 N.J. Misc. 160, 149 A. 761.
Interrogatorles are either direct or cross, the former being those which are put on behalf of the party calling a witness; the latter are those which are interposed by the adverse party.
INTERRUPTIO. Lat. Interruption. A term used both in the civil and common law of pre-scription. Calvin.
INTERRUPTIO MULTIPLEX NON TOLLIT PRMSCRIPTIONEM SEMEL OBTENTAM. 2 Inst. 654. Frequent interruption does not take away a prescription once secured.
INTERRUPTION. The occurrence of some act or fact, during the period of prescription, which is sufficient to arrest the running of the statute of limitations. It is said to be either "natural" or "civil," the former being caused by the act of the party; the latter by the legal effect or operation of some fact or circumstance. Innerarity v. Mims, 1 Ala. 674; Carr v. Foster, 3 Q.B. 588; Flight v. Thomas, 2 Adol. & El. 701.
Interruption of the possesslon is where the right 1s not enjoyed or exercised continuously; Interruption of the right is where the person having or claiming the right ceases the exercise of it in such a manner as to show that he does not claim to be entitled to exercise it.
In Scotch law. The true proprietor’s claiming his right during the course of prescription. Bell.
INTERSECTION. As applied to a street or high-way means the space occupied by two streets at the point where they cross each other. Rodgers v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 237 Ala. 301, 186 So. 684, 686. Space common to both streets or highways, formed by continuing the curb lines. Western Unión Tel. Co. v. Dickson, 27 Tenn.App. 74, 173 S.W.2d 714, 718.
Point of intersection of two roads is the point where their middle lines intersect. In re Springfield Road, 73 Pa. 127. But the term may also mean the point which each of two approaching vehicles will reach at the same mo-ment. Blashtleld, Cyc. of Automobile Law and Prac., Perm.Ed., § 983.
"Intersection" may apply where street or highway runs into but without crossing another. Thrush v. Lingo Lum-
ber Co., Te \-.Civ App., 262 S.W. 551, 553; Pangborn v.
John Widdicomb Co., 223 Mich. 181, 193 N.W. 817, 31
A.L.R. 485; McCaa v. Thomas, 207 Ala. 211, 92 So. 414, 416; Mitchell e. Raymond, 181 Wis. 591, 195 N.W. 855, 857, 35
A.L.R. 1115; Rohde v. Knock, 101 Conn. 439,
126
A.
335,
336;
Lawrence v. Goodwill. 44 Cal.App. 440,
186
P.
781,
783;
York Ice Machinery Corporation v. Sachs,
167
Md.
113,
173 A. 240, 243.
INTERSTATE. Between two or more states; be-tween places or persons in different states; con-cerning or affecting two or more states politically or territorially.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE. Traffic, intercourse, commercial trading, or the transportation of per-sons or property between or among the several states of the Union, or from or between points in one state and points in another state; com-
merce between two states, or between places ly-ing in different states. Gibbons v Ogden, 9 Wheat. 194, 6 L.Ed. 23; Wabash, etc. R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 7 S.Ct. 4, 30 L.Ed. 244; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Railroad Com’rs, C.C.Tenn., 19 F. 701; Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Lucker, 128 Minn. 171, 150 N.W. 790, 791; State v. Knights of Ku Klux Klan, 117 Kan. 564, 232 P. 254, 260, 37 A.L.R. 1267; Kirmeyer v. State of Kansas, 236 U.S. 568, 35 S.Ct. 419, 59 L.Ed. 721; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105, 38 S.Ct. 438, 439, 62 L.Ed. 1006, 1 A.L.R. 1278. It comprehends all the com-ponent parts of commercial intercourse between different states. Furst v. Brewster, 282 U.S. 493, 51 S.Ct. 295, 296, 75 L.Ed. 478.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT. The act of congress of February 4, 1887 (49 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.), designed to regulate commerce between the states, and particularly the transportation of per-sons and property, by carriers, between interstate points, prescribing that charges for such trans-portation shall be reasonable ind just, prohibiting unjust discrimination, rebates, draw-backs, prefer-ences, pooling of freights, etc., requiring sched-ules of rates to be published, establishing a com-mission to carry out the measures enacted, and prescribing the powers and duties of such com• mission and the procedure before it.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. A commission created by the interstate commerce act (q. v.) to carry out the measures therein en-acted, composed of eleven persons, appointed by the President, empowered to inquire into the business of the carriers affected, to enforce the law, to re-ceive, investigate, and determine complaints made to them of any violation of the act, make annual reports, hold stated sessions, etc. 49 U.S.C.A. § 11.
INTERSTATE EXTRADITION. The reclamation and surrender, according to due legal proceedings, of a person who, having committed a crime in one of the states of the Union, has fled into another state to evade justice or escape prosecution.
INTERSTATE LAW. That branch of private In-ternational law which affords rules and principies for the determination of controversies between citizens of different states in respect to mutual rights or obligations, in so far as the same are affected by the diversity of their citizenship or by diversity in the laws or institutions of the several states.
INTERVENING ACT. Of third person in order to break chain of causation and obviate liability for original breach of duty must be a superseding cause and one which original wrongdoer was not bound to anticipate as the natural or ordinary re-sult of his acts. Frazier v. Ayres, La.App., 20 So. 2d 754, 759; Littell v. Argus Production Co., C.C.A. Kan., 78 F.2d 955, 957.
INTERVENING AGENCY. To render an original wrong a remote cause, an "intervening agency," must be independent of such wrong, adequate to produce the injury, so interrupting the natural sequence of events as to produce a result different what would have been produced, and one that could not have been reasonably expected from the original wrong. Lemos v. Madden, 28 Wyo. 1, 200 P. 791, 795.
An independent "intervening agency" which will protect the original wrongdoer must be the efficient cause of the injury of which complaint is made, and not a negligent act or omission of such agency concurring with or succeeding the original negligente permitted by the original wrong-doer to continue and which in the natural course of events resulte in such injury. In short, the result prevented by the intervening agency must be the injury complained of, and not the requital for that injury. Swanson v. Siagal, 212 Ind. 394, 8 N.E.2d 993, 1000.
An "intervening efficient cause" is a new and independ-ent force which breaks the causal connection between the original wrong and injury, and itself becomes direct and immediate cause of injury. Phillabaum v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co., 315 III. 131, 145 N.E. 806, 808.
INTERVENING CAUSE. The "intervening cause," which will relieve of liability for an injury, is an independent cause which intervenes between the original wrongful act or omission and the injury, turns aside the natural sequence of events, and produces a result which would not otherwise have followed and which could not have been reason-ably anticipated. Hartman v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 94 Kan. 184, 146 P. 335, 336, L.R.A. 1915D, 563. An act of an independent agency which de-stroys the causal connection between the negli-gent act of the defendant and the wrongful injury; the independent act being the immediate cause, in which case damages are not recoverable be-cause the original wrongful act is not the proxi-mate cause. Davenport v. McClellan, 88 N.J.L. 653, 96 A. 921.
INTERVENING DAMAGES. See Damages.
INTERVENING FORCE. One which actively op-erates in producing harm to another alter the actor’s negligent act or omission has been commit-ted. Walborn v. Epley, 148 Pa.Super. 417, 24 A.2d 668, 671; American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Buckley & Co., C.C.A.Pa., 117 F.2d 845, 847.
INTERVENOR. An intervenor is a person who voluntarily interposes in an action or other pro-ceeding with the leave of the court. Ladue v. Goodhead, 181 Misc. 807, 44 N.Y.S.2d 783, 787.
INTERVENTION. In international law. Inter• vention is such an interferente between two or more states as may (according to the event) re-sult in a resort to force; while mediation always is, and is intended to be and to continue, peaceful only. Intervention between a sovereign and his own subjects is not justified by anything in inter-national law; but a remonstrance may be ad-dressed to the sovereign in a proper case. Brown.
In English ecclesiastical law. The proceeding of a third person, who, not being originally a party to the suit or proceeding, but claiming an interest in the subject-matter in dispute, in order the better to protect such interest, interposes his claim. 2 Chit. Pr. 492; 3 Chit. Commer. Law, 633; 2 Hagg. Const. 137; 3 Phillim. Ecc. Law, 586; Stillwell Hotel Co. v. Anderson, 16 Ca1.App.2d 636, 61 P.2d 7], 72.
In the civil law. The act by which a third party demands to be received as a party in a suit pend-ing between other persons. Stillwell Hotel Co. v. Anderson, 16 Cal.App.2d 636, 61 P.2d 71, 73.
The intervention is made either for the purpose of being joined to the plaintiff, and to claim the same thing he does, or some other thing connected with it; or to join the defendant, and with him to oppose the claim of the plaintiff, which it is his interest to defeat. Poth. Proc. Civile, pt. 1, c. 2, § 7, no. 3.
In practice. A proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining the plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with the defendant in resisting the claims of the plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of them. Logan v. Greenlaw, C.C.Tenn., 12 F. 16; Fischer v. Hanna, 8 Colo.App. 471, 47 P. 303; Gale v. Frazier, 4 Dak. 196, 30 N.W. 138; Reay v. Butler, Cal., 7 P. 671; Gorham v. Hall, 172 Ark. 744, 290 S.W. 357, 358; Adler v. Seaman, C.C. A.Mo., 266 F. 828, 832; In re Prouty’s Estate, 107 Vt. 496, 181 A. 134.
INTESTABILIS. Lat. A witness incompetent to testify. Calvin.
INTESTABLE. One who has not testamentary capacity; e. g., an infant, lunatic, or person civilly dead.
INTESTACY. The state or condition o! dying without having made a valid will, or without hav-ing disposed by will of a part of his property. In re Shestack’s Estate, 267 Pa. 115, 110 A. 166; Brown v. Mugway, 15 N.J.L. 331.
Besides the strict meaning of the word as aboye given, there is also a sense in which lntestacy may be partial; that is, where a man leaves a will which does not dispone of his whole estate, he is said to "die intestate" as to the property so omitted.
INTESTATE. Without making a will. A person is said to die intestate when he dies without mak-ing a will, or dies without leaving anything to test-ify what his wishes were with respect to the dis-posal of his property after his death. The word is also of ten used to signify the person himself. Thus, in speaking of the property of a person who died intestate, it is common to say "the intestate’s property;" i. e., the property of the person dying in an intestate condition. Brown. In re Camer-on’s Estate, 47 App.Div. 120, 62 N.Y.S. 187; Mess-mann v. Egenberger, 46 App.Div. 46, 61 N.Y.S. 556; Code Civ.Proc.N.Y. 1899, § 2514, subd. 1 (Sur-rogate’s Court Act, § 314, subd. 1).
INTESTATE LAWS. Statutes which provide and prescribe the devolution of estates of persons who die without disposing of their estates by law, will or testament. Fullbright v. Boardman, 159 Ga. 162, 125 S.E. 44, 46, 37 A.L.R. 532; In re Rogers’ Estate, Mo.Sup., 250 S.W. 576, 578; Ford v. U. S., C.C.A.N.Y., 205 F. 130, 134.
INTESTATE SUCCESSION. A succession is called "intestate" when the deceased has left no will, or when his will has been revoked or annulled Therefore the heirs to whom a suc-cession has fallen by the effects of law only are called "heirs ab intestato." Civ. Code La. art. 1096.
INTESTATO. Lat. In the civil law. Intestate; without a will. Calvin.
INTESTATUS. Lat. In the civil and old English law. An intestate; one who dies without a will. Dig. 50, 17, 7.
INTESTATUS DECEDIT, QUI AUT OMNIO TESTAMENTUM NON FECIT; AUT NON JURE FECIT; AUT ID QUOD FECERAT RUPTUM IR-RITUMVE FACTUM EST; AUT NEMO EX EO II/ERES EXSTITIT. A person dies intestate who either has made no testament at all or has made one not legally valid; or if the testament he has made be revoked, or made useless; or if no one becomes heir under it. Inst. 3, 1, pr.
INTIMACY. As generally applied to persons, it is understood to mean a proper, friendly relation of the parties, but it is frequently used to convey the idea of an improper relation; an intimacy at least disreputable and degrading. Collins v. Pub. Co., 152 Pa. 187, 25 A. 546, 34 Am.St.Rep. 636. See McCarty v. Coffin, 157 Mass. 478, 32 N.E. 649.
INTIMATE. Close in friendship or acquaintance, familiar, confidential; also near, close, direct, thorough, complete. Atkins Corporation v. Tour-ny, 6 Ca1.2d 206, 57 P.2d 480, 484.
INTIMATION. In the civil law. A notification to a party that some step in a legal proceeding is asked or will be taken. Particularly, a notice giv-en by the party taking an appeal, to the other party, that the court aboye will hear the appeal.
In Scotch law. A formal written notice, drawn by a notary, to be served on a party against whom a stranger has acquired a right or claim; e. g., the assignee of a debt must serve such a notice on the debtor, otherwise a payment to the original creditor will be good.
INTIMIDATION. Unlawful coercion; duress; putting in fear. Michaels v. Hillman, 112 Misc. 395, 183 N.Y.S. 195, 200; Kayser v. Fitzgerald, 109 Misc. 27, 178 N.Y.S. 130, 134; Burns v. Lackey, 171 Ky. 21, 186 S.W. 909, 913; Southwick v. State, 126 Ark. 188, 189 S.W. 843, 844; Shehany v. Lowry, 170 Ga. 70, 152 S.E. 114, 115.
INTIMIDATION OF VOTERS. This, by statute in several of the states, is made a criminal of-fense. Under an carly Pennsylvania act, it was held that, to constitute the offense of intimidation of voters, there must be a preconceived intention for the purpose of intimidating the officers or in-terrupting the election. Respublica v. Gibbs, 3 Yeates, Pa.. 429.
INTITLE. An old form of "entitle." 6 Mod. 304.
INTO. A preposition signifying to the inside of; within. It expresses entrance, or a passage from
the outside of a thing to its interior, and follows verbs expressing motion. It has been held equiva-lent to, or synonymous with, "at," "inside of," and "to," and has been distinguished from the words "from" and "through." 48 C.J.S. p. 120.
INTOL and UTTOL. In old records. Toll or cus-tom paid for things imported and exported, or bought in and sold out. Cowell.
INTOLERABLE CRUELTY. In the law of di-vorce, this term denotes extreme cruelty, cruel and inhuman treatment, barbarous, savage, and inhuman conduct, and is equivalent to any of those phrases. Shaw v. Shaw, 17 Conn. 193; Morehouse v. Morehouse, 70 Conn. 420, 39 A. 516; Blain v. Blain, 45 Vt. 544.
INTOXICATED. Affected by an intoxieant, un-der the influence of an intoxicating liquor. Tay-lor v. Joyce, 4 Cal.App.2d 612, 41 P.2d 967, 968.
INTOXICATING LIQUOR. Any liquor used as a beverage, and which, when so used in sufficient quantities, ordinarily or commonly produces entire or partial intoxication; any liquor intended for use as a beverage or capable of being so used, which contains alcohol, either obtained by fermen-tation or by the additional process of distillation, in such proportion that it will produce intoxication when imbibed in such quantities as may practical-ly be drunk. Intoxicating Liquor Cases, 25 Kan. 767, 37 Am.Rep. 284; Com’rs v. Taylor, 21 N.Y. 173; People v. Hawley, 3 Mich. 339; State v. Ol-iver, 26 W.Va. 431, 53 Am.Rep. 79; Frisvold v. Leahy, 15 Cal.App.2d 752, 60 P.2d 151, 153; Wor-ley v. Spurgeon, 38 Iowa 465. See, also, Alcoholic Liquors.
INTOXICATION. The state of being poisoned; the condition produced by the administration or introduction into the human system of a poison. But in its popular use this term is restricted to alcoholic intoxication, that is, drunkenness or in-ebriety, or the mental and physical condition in-duced by drinking excessive quantities of alcoholic liquors, and this is its meaning as used in statutes, indictments, etc. Sapp v. State, 116 Ga. 182, 42 S.E. 410; State v. Pierce, 65 Iowa 85, 21 N.W. 195; Wadsworth v. Dunnam, 98 Ala. 610, 13 So. 599; Ring v. Ring, 112 Ga. 854, 38 S.E. 330; State v. Kelley, 47 Vt. 296; Com. v. Whitney, 11 Cush., Mass., 477.
INTOXIMETER. A trade name for scientific breath testing device that operates on assumption that concentration of blood alcohol bears fixed re-lation to concentration of alcohol in the deep lung, or alveolar air. City of Sioux Falls v. Kohler, S.D., 118 N.W.2d 14.
INTRA. Lat. In; near; within. "Infra" or "inter" has taken the place of "intra" in many of the more modern Latin phrases.
INTRA ANNI SPATIUM. Within the space of a year. Cod. 5, 9, 2. Intra annale tempus. Id. 6, 30, 19.
INTRA FIDEM. Within belief; credible. Calvin. LUCTUS TEMPUS. Within the time of mourning. Cod. 9, 1, auth.
INTRA MCENIA. Within the walls (of a house.) A term applied to domestic or menial servants. 1 Bl. Comm. 425.
INTRA PARIETES. Between walls; among friends; out of court; without litigation. Calvin.
INTRA PRJESIDIA. Within the defenses. See Infra Prwsidia.
INTRA QUATUOR MARIA. Within the four seas. Shep. Touch. 378.
INTRA VIRES. An act is said to be intra vires ("within the power") of a person or corporation when it is within the scope of his or its nowers or authority. It is the opposite of ultra vires, (q. v.). Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Dodd, 115 Ky. 176, 72 S.W. 827.
INTRALIMINAL. In mining law, the term "in-traliminal rights" denotes the right to mine, take, and possess all such bodies or deposits of ore as lie within the four planes formed by the vertical extension downward of the boundary unes of the claim; as distinguished from "extraliminal," or more commonly "extralateral," rights. Jefferson Min. Co. v. Anchoria-Leland Mill. & Min. Co., 32 Colo. 176, 75 P. 1073, 64 L.R.A. 925.
INTRAMURAL. Within the walls. The powers of a municipal corporation are "intramural" and "extramural" ; the one being the powers exercised within the corporate limits, and the other being those exercised without. State v. Port of Astoria, 79 Or. 1, 154 P. 399, 404.
INTRARE MARISCUM. L. Lat. To drain a marsh or low ground, and convert it into herbage or pasture.
INTRASTATE COMMERCE. See Commerce.
INTRINSECUM SERVITIUM. Lat. Common and ordinary duties with the lord’s court.
INTRINSIC EVIDENCE is that which is derived from a document without anything to explain it.
INTRODUCTION. The part of a writing which sets forth preliminary matter, or facts tending to explain the subject.
INTROMISSION. In Scotch law. The assumption of authority over another’s property, either legally or illegally. The irregular intermeddling with the effects of a deceased person, which subjects the party to the whole debts of the deceased, is called "vitious intromission." Kames, Eq. b. 3, c. 8, § 2.
Necessary Intromission. That kind of intromission or interference where a husband or wife continues in posses-sion of the other’s goods after their decease, for preserva-tion. Wharton.
In English law. Dealings in stock, goods, or cash of a principal coming into the hands of his agent, to be accounted for by the agent to his prin-cipal. Stewart v. McKean, 29 Eng.Law & Eq. 391.
INTRONISATION. In French ecclesiastical law. Enthronement. The installation of a bishop in his episcopal see.
INTRUDER. One who enters upon land without either right of possession or color of title. Miller v. McCullough, 104 Pa. 630; Russel v. Chambers, 43 Ga. 479. In a more restricted sense, a stranger who, on the death of the ancestor, enters on the land, unlawfully, before the heir can enter. Wil-liams v. Alt, 226 N.Y. 283, 123 N.E. 499, 500. Also one who intrudes on office and assumes to exercise its functions without legal title or color of right thereto. State ex rel. City of Republic v. Smith, 345 Mo. 1158, 139 S.W.2d 929, 933; Alleger v. School Dist. No. 16, Newton County, Mo.App., 142 S.W.2d 660, 663.
INTRUSION. A species of injury by ouster or amotion of possession from the freehold, being an entry of a stranger, after a particular estate of freehold is determined, before him in remainder or reversion. Hulick v. Scovil, 9 Ill. 170; Boylan v. Deinzer, 45 N.J.Eq. 485, 18 A. 121.
The name of a writ brought by the owner of a fee-simple, etc., against an intruder. New Nat. Brev. 453. Abolished by 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 57.
INTRUST. To confer a trust upon; to deliver to another something in trust or to commit some-thing to another with a certain confidence regard-ing his care, use or disposal of it. State v. Ug-land, 48 N.D. 841, 187 N.W. 237, 239.
INTUITUS. Lat. A view; regard; contempla-tion. Diverso intuitu, (q. v.,) with a different view.
INUNDATION. The overflow of waters by com-ing out of their bed. See, also, Dam; Backwater; Irrigation; Waters; Water Course.
Inundations may arise from three causes: from public necessity, as in defence of a place it may he necessary to dam the current of a stream, which will cause an inunda-tion to the upper lands; they may be occasioned by an invincible force, as by the accidental fall of a rock in the stream, or by a natural flood or freshet; or they may result from the erection of works on the stream. In the first case, the injury caused by the inundation is to be com-pensated as other injuries done in war; in the second, as there was no fault of any one, the loss is to be borne by the unfortunate owner of the estate; in the Last, when the riparian proprietor is injured by such works as alter the level of the water where it enters or where it leaves the property on which they are erected, the person injured may recover damages for the injury thus caused to his property by the inundation, 9 Co. 59; 1 B. & Ald. 258: Sumner v. Tileston, 7 Pick., Mass., 198; Balley v. City of New York, 3 Hill, N.Y., 531, 38 Am.Dec. 669; Tillotson v. Smith, 32 N.B. 90, 64 Am.Dec. 355; Merritt v. Parker, 1 N.J.L. 460; Williams v. Gale, 3 Har. & J., Md., 231; Ohio & M. R. Co, v. Nuetzel, 43 Ill.App. 108.
INURE. To take effect; to result. Cedar. Rapids Water Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 118 Iowa 234, 91 N.W. 1081; Hinson v. Booth, 39 Fla. 333, 22 So. 687; Holmes v. Tallada, 125 Pa. 133, 17 A. 238, 3 L.R.A. 219, 11 Am.St.Rep. 880; Salyer v. Jackson, 105 Okl. 212, 232 P. 412, 414; Malachowski v. Varro, 76 Cal.App. 207, 244 P. 936, 938.
INUREMENT. Use; user; service to the use or benefit of a person. Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 583, 25 L.Ed. 618.LABOR ET SINE FRUCTU NON EST EFFECTUS LEGIS. Useless and fruitless labor is not the effect of law. Co. Litt. 127b. The law for-bids such recoveries whose ends are vain, charge-ablé, and unprofitabie. Id.; Wing. Max. p. 110, max. 38.
INVADIA_RE. To pledge or mortgage lands. INVADIATIO. A pledge or mortgage.
INVADIATUS. One who is under pledge; one who has had sureties or piedges given for hico. Spelman.
INVALID. Vain; inadequate to its purpose; not of binding force or legal efficacy; lacking in au-thority or obligation. Hood v. Perry, 75 Ga. 312; State v. Casteel, 110 Ind. 174, 11• N.E. 219; Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. v. Winne, 20 Mont. 20, 49 P. 446; Avery & Co. v. Sorrell, 157 Ga. 476, 121 S.E. 828, 829; Dreidlein v. Manger, 69 Mont. 155, 220 P. 1107, 1108; Columbian Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. Dixie Co-op. Mail Order House, Tex.Civ.App., 261 S.W. 174, 179.
INVASION. An encroachrnent upon the rights of another; the incursion of an army for conquest or plunder. Webster. See JEtna Ins. Co. v. Boon, 95 U.S. 129, 24 L.Ed. 395.
INVASIONES. The inquisition of serjeanties and knights’ fees. Cowell.
INVECTA ET ILLATA. Lat. In the civil law. Things carried in and brought in. Articles brought into a hired tenement by the hirer or tenant, and which became or were pledged to the lessor as security for the rent. Dig. 2, 14, 4, pr. The phrase is adopted in Scotch law. See Bell.
INVENIENS LIBELLUM FAMOSUM ET NON CORRUMPENS PUNITUR. He who finds a iibel and does not destroy it is punished. Moore, 813.
INVENT. To find out something new; to devise, contrive, and produce something not previously known or existing, by the exercise of independent investigation and experiment; particularly applied to machines, mechanical appliances, compositions, and patentable inventions of every sort. To create. E. W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 37, 39 S. Ct. 42, 43, 63 L.Ed. 112.
INVENTIO. In the Civil law. Finding; ene of the modes of acquiring title to property by occu-pancy. Heinecc. lib. 2, tit. 1, § 350.
In Old English law. A thing found; as goods or treasure-trove. Cowell. The plural, "inven-tiones," is also used.
INVENTION. In patent law. The act or opera-tion of finding out something new; the process of contriving and producing something not pre-viously known or existing, by the exercise of inde-pendent investigation and experiment. Also the article or contrivance or composition so invented. Leidersdorf v. Flint, 15 Fed.Cas. 260; Smith v. Nichols, 21 Wall. 118, 22 L.Ed. 566; Hollister v. Manufacturing Co., 5 S.Ct. 717, 113 U.S. 72, 28 L.
Ed. 901; Murphy Mfg. Co. v. Excelsior Car Roof Co., C.C.Mo., 70 F. 495.
A concept or thing evolved from the mind, "Invention" 1s not a revelation of something which existed and was unknown, but the creation of something which did not exist before, and possessing elements of novelty and utility in kind and measure different from, and greater than, what the art might expect from skilled workers. Pyrene Mfg. Co. v. Boyce, C.C.A.N.J., 292 F. 480, 481. The finding out–the contriving, the creating of something which did not exist, and was not known before, and which can be made useful and advantageous in the pursults of life, or which can add to the enjoyment of mankind. Conover v. Roach, 4 Fish. 12. Fed.Cas.No.3,125. Not every improvement is invention; but to entitle a thing to protection it must be the product of some exercise of the Inventive faculties. and it must involve something more than what is obvious to persons ‘skilled in the art to which it relates. Rosenwasser v. Berry, C.C.Me., 22 F. 841. Mere adaptation of known process to clearly analogous use is not Invention. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. U, S. Rubber Co., C.C.A.Ohio, 79 F.2d 948. 952. 953.
"Invention" invol ves the exercise of the creative mind. Aeolian Co. v. Wanamaker, D.C., 221 F. 666, 668.
Inventive skill has been defined as that Intultive faculty of the mlnd Fut forth in the search for new results, or new methods, creating what had not before existed, or bringing to light what lay hidden from vision; it differs from a suggestlon of that common experience which arose spon-taneously and by a necessity of human reasoning in the minds of those who had become acquainted with the dr-cumstances with which they had to deal. Hollister v. Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 72, 5 S.Ct. 717, 28 L.Ed. 901. .Invention, In the nature of improvements, 1s the double mental act of discerning, in existing machines, processes or articles, some deficiency, and pointing out the means of overcoming it. General Electric Co. v. Electric Co., III., 174 F. 246, 98 C.C.A. 154.
An "Invention" differs from a "discovery." The former term is properly applicable to the contrivance and produc-tion of something that did not before exist; while dis-covery denotes the bringing into knowledge and use of something which, although it existed, was before unknown. Thus, we speak of the "discovery" of the properties of light, electricity, etc., while the telescope and the electric motor are the resulta of the process of "Invention."
For "Examination of invention", see Examina-tion.
INVENTIONES. See Inventio.
INVENTOR. One who finds out or contrives some new thing; one who devises some new art, manu-facture, mechanical appliance, or process; one who invents a patentable contrivance. Sparkman v. Higgins, 22 Fed.Cas. 879; Henderson v. Tomp-kins, C.C.Mass., 60 F. 764.
INVENTORY. A detailed list of articles of prop-erty; a list or schedule of property, containing a designation or description of each specific ar-ticle; an itemized list of the various articles con-stituting a collection, estate, stock in trade, etc., with their estimated or actual values. In law, the term is particularly applied to such a list made by an executor, administrator, or assignee in bank-ruptcy. See Silver Bow Min. Co. v. Lowry, 5 Mont. 618, 6 P. 62; Lloyd v. Wyckoff, 11 N.J.Law, 224; Roberts, etc., Co. v. Sun Mut. L. Ins. Co., 48 S.W. 559, 19 Tex.Civ.App. 338; Southern F. Ins. Co. v. Knight, 111 Ga. 622, 36 S.E. 821, 52 L.R.A. 70, 78 Am.St.Rep. 216.
INVENTUS. Lat. Found. Thesaurus inventos, treasure-trove. Non est inventus, [he] is not found.INVERITARE. To make proof of a thing. Jacob.
INVERSE ORDER OF ALIENATION DOCTRINE. Under this doctrine, mortgagee or other lienor, where land subject to lien has been aliened in sep-arate parcels successively, shall satisfy his lien out of land remaining in grantor or original own-er if possible, and, if that be insufficient, he shall resort to parcels aliened in inverse order of their alienation. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., C.C.A.N.C., 74 F.2d 881, 884.
INVEST. To loan money upon securities of a more or less permanent nature, or to place it in business ventures or real estate, or otherwise lay it out, so that it may produce a revenue or income. Drake v. Crane, 127 Mo. 85, 29 S.W. 990, 27 L.R.A. 653; Stramann v. Scheeren, 7 Colo.App. 1, 42 P. 191; Una v. Dodd, 39 N.J.Eq. 186.
To clothe one with the possession of a fief or benefice. See Investiture.
INVESTIGATION. To follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation; to trace or track mentally; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by care-ful inquisition; examination; the taking of evi-dence; a legal inquiry. Lukert v. Eldridge, 49 Mont. 46, 139 P. 999, 1001; People ex rel. Fennell v. Wilmot, 217 N.Y.S. 477, 479, 127 Misc. 791. Ap-plication of Gilchrist, 130 Misc. 456, 224 N.Y.S. 210, 219.
INVESTITIVE FACT. The fact by means of which a right comes into existence; e. g., a grant of a monopoly, the death of one’s ancestor. Holl. Jur. 132.
INVESTITURE. A ceremony which accompanied the grant of lands in the feudal ages, and con-sisted in the open and notorious delivery of pos-session in the presence of the other vassals, which perpetuated among them the cera of their new ac-quisition at the time when the art of writing was very little known; and thus the evidence of the property was reposed in the memory of the neigh-borhood, who, in case of disputed title, were after-wards called upon to decide upon it. Brown.
In Ecclesiastical law. Investiture is one of the formalities by which the election of a bishop is confirmed by the archbishop. See Phillim. Ecc. Law, 42, et seq.
INVESTMENT. The placing of capital or laying out of money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its employment. Securities & Ex-change Commission v. Wickham, D.C.Minn., 12 F. Supp. 245, 247.
INVIOLABILITY. The attribute of being secured against violation. The persons of ambassadors are inviolable.
INVITATION. In the law of negligence, and with reference to trespasses on realty, invitation is the act of one who solicits or incites others to enter upon, remain in, or make use of, his property or structures thereon, or who so arranges the prop-
erty or the means of access to it or of transit over it as to induce the reasonable belief that he ex-pects and intends that others shall come upon it or pass over it. Sweeney v. Old Colony & N. R. Co., 10 Allen, Mass., 373, 87 Am.Dec. 644; Wilson v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 18 R.I. 491, 29 A. 258; Wright v. Boston & A. R. Co., 142 Mass. 300, 7 N.E. 866.
Thus the proprietor of a store, theatre or amusement park "invites’ the public to come upon his premises for such purposes as are conaected with its intended use. Again, the fact that safety gatos at a railroad crossing, which should be closed in case of danger, are left standing open, is an "invitation" to the traveler on the highway to cross. Roberts v. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 177 Pa. 183, 35 A. 723. So, bringing a passenger train on a railroad to a full stop at a regular station is an "invitation to alíght."

License distinguished

.A license Is a passive permission on the part of the owner of premises, with reference to other persons enter-ing upon or using them, while an invitation implies a request, solicitation or desire that they should do so. An invitation may be inferred where there is a common inter-est or mutual advantage; while a license will be inferred where the object is the mere pleasure or benefit of the per-son using it. Bennett v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 102 U.S. 580, 26 L.Ed. 235; Weidon v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co., 2 Pennewill, Del., 1, 43 A. 159; Babcock and Wilcox Co. v. Nolton, 58 Nev. 131, 71 P.20 1051, 1053. An owner owes to a licensee no duty as to the condition of the premises (unless imposed by statute) save that he should not know-ingly let him run upon a hidden per11 or willfully cause him harm; whlle to one invited he is under the obligation to maintain the premises in a reasonably sate and secure condition. Beehler v. Daniels, 18 R.I. 563, 29 A. 6, 27 L.R.A. 512, 49 Am.St.Rep. 790.

Express and implied

An invitation may be express, when the owner or occu-pier of the land by words invites another to come upon it or make use of it or of something thereon; or it may be implied when such owner or occuoier by acts or conduct leads another to believe that the land or something thereon was intended to be used as he uses them, and that such use is not only acquiesced in by the owner or occupier, but is in accordance with the intention or design for which the way or place or thing was adapted and prepared and allowed to be used. Turess v. New York, S. & W. R. Co., 61 N.J.L. 314, 40 A. 614; Furey v. New York Cent. R. Co., 67 N.J.L. 270, 51 A. 505; Lepnick v. Gaddis, 72 Miss. 200, 16 So. 213, 26 L.R.A. 686, 48 Am.St.Rep. 547; Plummer v.
156 Mass. 426, 31 N.E. 128, 32 Am.St.Rep. 463; Wil-mes v. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co., 175 Iowa, 101, 156 N.W. 877, 880, L.R.A.1917F, 1024; Gasch v. Rounds, 93 Wash. 317, 160 P. 962, 964; Coburn v. Village of Swanton, 95 Vt. 320, 115 A. 153, 156; Bush v. Weed Lumber Co., 63 Cal.App. 426, 218 P. 618, 620; Polluck v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 44 S.D. 249, 183 N.W. 859, 862.

INVITED ERROR. See Error.
INVITEE. One who is at a place upon the invi-tation of another. Crossgrove v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 30 Ga.App. 462, 118 S.E. 694, 695; Carr v. Wallace Laundry Co., 31 Idaho 266, 170 P. 107; Fleckenstein v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 91 N.J.L. 145, 102 A. 700, L.R.A.1918C, 179; Crossgrove v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 30 Ga. App. 462, 118 S.E. 694; Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370, 214 N.W. 374, 375, 53 A.L.R. 771; Moohr v. Victoria IIw. Co., 144 Wash. 387, 258 P. 43, 46; Holm v. Investment & Securities Co., 195 Wash. 52, 79 P.2d 708, 711.
INVITO. Lat. Being unwilling. Against or with-out the assent or consent.

Ab invito
By or from an unwilling party. A transfer ab invito is a compulsory transfer.
Invito debitore
Against the will of the debtor.
Invito domino
The owner being unwilling; against the will of the owner; without the owner’s consent. In order to consii-tute larceny, the property must be taken invito domino.
INVITO BENEFICIUM NON DATUR. A benefit is not conferred on one who is unwilling to re-ceive it; that is to say, no one can be compelled to accept a benefit. Dig. 50, 17, 69; Broom, Max. 699, note.
L.NVOICE. In commercial law. A list or account of goods or merchandise sent by merchants to their correspondents at home or abroad, in which the marks of each package, with other particulars, are set forth. Marsh. Ins. 408; Jac. Sea Laws, 302; Dane Abr.; Merchants’ Exch. Co. v. Weis-man, 132 Mich. 353, 93 N.W. 870; Southern Exp. Co. v. Hess, 53 Ala. 22; Cramer v. Oppenstein, 16 Colo. 495, 27 P. 713; Stone v. First Nat. Bank, 100 Or. 528, 198 P. 244. Written itemized accounts sent to a purchaser by the seller of merchandise. Cobb & Seal Shoe Store v. 4zEtna Ins. Co., 78 S.C. 388, 58 S.E. 1099; Garner Mfg. Co. v. Cornelius Lumber Co., 165 Ark. 119, 262 S.W. 1011, 1014; Wilmot v. Minneapolis Automobile Trade Ass’n, 169 Minn. 140, 210 N.W. 861, 862; Larkin Co. v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co., 98 Misc. 446, 162 N.Y. S. 870, 871. A list sent to a purchaser, factor, con-signee, etc., containing the items, together with the prices and charges of merchandise sent or to be sent to him. State v. Standard Oil Co. of In-diana, 222 Iowa 1209, 271 N.W. 185, 187. A writing made on behalf of an importer, specifying the merchandise imported, and its true cost or value. And. Rev. Law, § 294.
INVOICE BOOK. A book in which invoices are copied.
INVOICE PRICE of goods means the prime cost. Le Roy v. United Ins. Co., 7 Johns., N.Y., 343. The cost or value of property at the shipping point. State v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, 222 Iowa 1209, 271 N.W. 185, 188.
In sale of retal! stock of goods, this term ordinarily means wholesale cost at time goods were purchased by seller. Hamilton v. O’Rear, 224 Ala. 625, 141 So. 565, 567.
INVOLUNTARY. Without will or power of choice; opposed to volition or desire. Curry v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 221 Mo.App. 626, 287 S.W. 1053, 1056. An involuntary act is that which is performed with constraint (q. v.) or with repugnance, or without the will to do it. An action is involuntary, then, which is performed under duress. Wolff Inst. Nat. § 5.
As to involuntary "Bankruptcy," "Indebtedness," "Nonsuit," and "Trust," see those titles.
INVOLUNTARY DEPOSIT. In the law of bail-ments, one made by the accidental leaving or plac-
Black’s Law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed.-61
ing of personal property in the possession of an-other, without negligence on the part of the owner, or, in cases of fire, shipwreck, inundation, riot, insurrection, or the like extraordinary emergen-cies, by the owner of personal property commit-ting it out of necessity to the care of any person. Civ. Code S. D. 1903, § 1354 (Rev. Codes 1919, § 971).
INVOLUNTARY DISCONTINUANCE. In prac-tice. A discontinuance is involuntary where, in consequence of technical omission, mispleading, or the like, the suit is regarded as out of court, as where the parties undertake to refer a suit that is not referable, or omit to enter proper continu-ances. Hunt v. Griffin, 49 Miss. 748.
INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER. The unlaw-ful killing of a human being in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to felony, or in the commission of a lawful act which might pro-duce death in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection. State v. Goodwin, 189 La. 443, 179 So. 591, 602; Salyer v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 744, 181 S.E. 435, 436.
INVOLUNTARY PAYMENT. One obtained by fraud, oppression, or extortion, or to avoid the use of force to coerce it, or to obtain the release of the person or property from detention. Parch, er v. Marathon County, 52 Wis. 388, 9 N.W. 23, 38 Am.Rep. 745; Wolfe v. Marshal, 52 Mo. 168; Corkle v. Maxwell, 6 Fed.Cas. 555.
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE. The condition of one who is compelled by force, coercion, or im-prisonment, and against his will, to labor for an-other, whether he is paid or not. See State v. West, 42 Minn. 147, 43 N.W. 845; Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 5 S.Ct. 935, 29 L.Ed. 89; Thompson v. Benton, 117 Mo. 83, 22 S.W. 863, 20 L.R.A. 462; In re Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 69, 21 L.Ed. 394; Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 17 S.Ct. 326, 41 L.Ed. 715.
IOTA. The minutest quantity possible. Iota is the smallest Greek letter. The word "jot" is de-rived therefrom.
IPSkrE LEGES CUPIUNT UT JURE REGANTUR. Co. Litt. 174. The laves themselves require that they should be governed by right.
IPSE. Lat. He himself ; the same; the very person.
IPSE DIXIT. He himself said it; a bare assertion resting on the authority of an individual.
IPSISSIMIS VERBIS. In the identical words; op-posed to "substantially." Townsend v. Jemison, 7 How. 719, 12 L.Ed. 880; Summons v. State, 5 Ohio St. 346.
IPSO FACTO. By the fact itself ; by the mere fact. By the mere effect of an act or a fact. Bar-ber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Hayward, 248 Mo. 280, 154 S.W. 140, 141.
In Engiish ecclestiastical law. A censure of excommunl-cation in the eccleslastical court, immediately ineurred for divers offenses, after lawful.

JURE. By the law itself; by the mere op-eration of law. Calvin.
IPSWICH, DOMESDAY OF. The earliest extant record of any borough court with elective officers sitting regularly and administering a customary law of the sea. Black Book of Admiralty, Vol. II. It was abolished by 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 76. Its twelve "capital portmen" were elected from the most fit, wealthy and discreet of the judges.
IRA FUROR BREVIS EST. Anger is a short in-sanity. Beardsley v. Maynard, 4 Wend., N.Y., 336, 355.
IRA MOTUS. Lat. Moved or excited by anger or passion. A term sometimes formerly used in the plea of son assault demesne. 1 Tidd, Pr. 645.
IRADE. A decree of the Sultan.
IRE AD LARGUM. Lat. To go at large; to es-cape; to be set at liberty.
IRENARCIIA. In Roman law. An officer whose duties are described in Dig. 5, 4, 18, 7. See Id. 48, 3, 6; Cod. 10, 75. Literally, a peace-officer or mag-istrate.
IRON—SAFE CLAUSE. A common clause in poli-cies of fire insurance, requiring the insured to preserve his books and inventory in an iron or fireproof safe, or in some secure place not ex-posed to a fire which would destroy the building. This provision casts on the insured the responsi-bility for the ]oss of books and records if due to the wrongful act or negligence of himself or his employees in failing to comply with the require-ment. 45 C.J.S. p. 358.
IRRATIONAL. Unreasonable, foolish, absurd; a person may be írrational in such sense, and still not be insane in the legal sense. Lee v. State, 30 Okl.Cr. 14, 234 P. 654, 655.
IRRECUSABLE. A term used to indicate a cer-tain class of contractual obligations recognized by the law which are imposed upon a person without his consent and without regard to any act of his own. They are distinguished from recusable ob-ligations which are the result of a voluntary act on the part of a person on whom they are imposed by law. A clear example of an irrecusable obli-gation is the obligation imposed on every man not to strike another without some lawful excuse. A recusable obligation is based upon some act of a person bound, which is a condition precedent to the genesis of the obliga tion. These terms were first suggested by Prof. Wigmore in 8 Harv. Law Rev. 200. See Harr. Contr. 6.
IRREGULAR. Not according to rule; improper or insufficient, by reason of departure from the prescribed course.
As to irregular "Deposit," "Indorsement," "pro-cess," and "Succession," see those titles.
IRREGULAR JUDGMENT. One rendered con-trary to the course and practice of the court. Duplin County v. Ezzell, 223 N.C. 531, 27 S.E.2d 448, 450.
IRREGULARITY. The doing or not doing that, in the conduct of a suit at law, which, conforma-bly with the practice of the court, ought or ought not to be done. Doe ex dem. Cooper v. Harter, 2 Ind. 252. Violation or nonobservance of estab-lished rules and practices. The want of adher-ence to some prescribed rule or mode of proceed-ing; consisting either in omitting to do something that is necessary for the due and orderly conduct-ing of a suit, or doing it in an unseasonable time or improper manner. Coulter v. Board of Com’rs of Bernalillo County, 22 N.M. 24, 158 P. 1086; Ex parte Davis, 118 Or. 693, 247 P. 809, 811; Emeric v. Alvarado, 64 Cal. 529, 2 P. 418; Hall v. Mung-er, 5 Lans., N.Y., 113; Corn Exch. Bank v. Blye, 119 N.Y. 414, 23 N.E. 805; Salter v. Hilgen, 40 Wis. 365; Turrill v. Walker, 4 Mich. 183. The technical term for every defect in practical proceedings, or the mode of conducting an action or defense, as distinguishable from defects in pleadings. 3 Chit. Gen. Pr. 509.
Not synonymous with illegality. City of Tampa v. Pal-mer. 89 Fla. 514, 105 So. 115, 117. "Irregularity" is a want of adherente to some prescribed rule or mode of proceed-ing, while "illegality" denotes a radical defect. United States v. Salomon, D.C.La., 2.31 F. 461, 463: U. S. v. Rich-mond, C.C.A.Pa., 17 F.2d 28, 32. "Illegality" in the assess-ment of a tax is a substantial defect contrary to law and leaving the proceeding with nothing to stand on, while an "irregularity" is a formal defect contrary only to the prac-tice authorized by law, and relating rather to the manner of doing the act than to the act itself. Bunten v. Rock Springs Grating Ass’n, 29 Wyo. 461, 215 P. 244, 254.
Under statutes authorizing the modification or setting aside of judgments, "irregularity" is some departure from the prescribed procedure in the trial, or in the determina-tion of the action, not evidenced by a ruling or an order. Duncan v. Wilkins. 103 Okl. 221, 229 P. 801, 802; American Nat. Bank of Tucumcari v. Tarpley 31 N.M. 667, 250 P. 18, 20. But under a statute providing for relief against arc irregularity in obtaining a judgment, the term has no fixed legal meaning, and in every instante the question is one of fact, dependent upon the circumstances of each case. Nation v. Savely, 127 Okl. 117, 260 P. 32, 34.
Irregularity in the proceedings of £he court, as used in a California statute pertaining to new trials, relates to matters occurring during the trial, and not after it. Diamond v. Superior Court of California in and for City and County of San Francisco, 189 Cal. 732, 210 P. 36, 37.
In Canon law. Any impediment which pre-vents a man from taking holy orders.

General

Legal Irregularity. An irregularity occurring in the course of some legal proceeding. A defect or informality which, in the technical view of the law, is to be accounted an irregularity.
IRRELEVANCY. The absence of the quality of relevancy, as in evidence or pleadings. The quali-ty or state of being inapplicable or impertinent to a fact or argument.
Irrelevancy, in an answer, consists in statements which are not material to the decislon of the case; such as do not form or tender any material issue. People v. McCum-ber, 18 N.Y. 321, 72 Am.Dec. 515; Walker v. Hewitt, 11 How.Prac., N.Y., 398; Carpenter v. Bell, 1 Rob., N.Y., 715: Smith v. Smith, 50 S.C. 54, 27 S.E. 545. See, also, Irrelevant.IRRELEVANT. Not relevant; not relating or applicable to the matter in issue; not supporting the issue. Crump v. Lanham, 67 Okl. 33, 168 P. 43, 44. Evidente is irrelevant where it has no tend-ency to prove or disprove any issue involved. Malone v. State, 16 Ala.App. 185, 76 So. 469, 470.
IRRELEVANT ALLEGATION. One which has no substantial relation to the controversy between the parties to the suit, and which cannot affect the decision of the court. Wayte v. Bowker Chemical Co., 196 App.Div. 665, 187 N.Y.S. 276, 277; Com-mander Milling Co. v. Westinghouse Electric and Mfg. Co., C.C.A.Minn., 70 F.2d 469, 472; The test of any allegation being whether it tends to consti-tute a cause of action or a defense, Isaacs v. Solomon, 159 App.Div. 675, 144 N.Y.S. 876, 877.
An allegation is irrelevant, where the issue made by its dental has no effect upon the cause of action or no connec-tion with the allegation. Germofert Mfg. Co. v. Castles, 97 S.C. 389, 81 S.E. 665, 666. In this connection, "redun-dant" is almost a synonym for "irrelevant." Plank v. Hopkins, 35 S.D. 243, 151 N.W. 1017, 1019.
IRRELEVANT ANSWER. See Answer.
IRREMOVABILITY. The status of a pauper in England, who cannot be legally removed from the parish or union in which he is receiving relief, notwithstanding that he has not acquired a settle-ment there. 3 Steph.Comm. 60. Thus a pauper who has resided in a parish during the whole of the preceding year is irremovable, in view of Stat. 28 and 29 Vict. c. 79, § 8.
IRREPARABLE DAMAGES. See Damages. IRREPARABLE INJURY. See Injury.
IRREPLEVIABLE. That cannot be replevied or delivered on sureties. Spelled, also, "irreplevisa-ble." Co. Litt. 145 ; 13 Edw. I. c. 2.
IRRESISTIBLE FORCE. A term applied to such an interposition of human agency as is, from its nature and power, absolutely uncontrollable; as the inroads of a hostile army. Story, Bailm. § 25; Noel Bros. v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 16 La.App. 622, 133 So. 830, 832.
IRRESISTIBLE IMPULSE. Used chiefly in crim-inal law, this term means an impulse to commit an unlawful or criminal act which cannot be re-sisted or overcome by the patient because insanity or mental disease has destroyed the freedom of his will and his power of self-control and of choice as to his actions. McCarty v. Com., 114 Ky. 620, 71 S.W. 658; State v. Knight, 95 Me. 467, 50 A. 276, 55 L.R.A. 373; Leache v. State, 22 Tex.App. 279, 3 S.W. 539, 58 Am.Rep. 638; State v. Peel, 23 Mont. 358, 59 P. 169, 75 Am.St.Rep. 529. And see Insanity.
IRREVOCABLE. Which cannot be revoked or recalled. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Strong Mfg. Co., C.C.A.6, 124 F.2d 360, 363.
IRREVOCABLE LETTER. A confirmed irrevoca-ble letter of credit, irrevocable letter, or a con-firmed credit is a contract to pay on compliance with its terms, and needs no formal acknowledg-
ment or acceptance other than is therein stated. Lamborn v. National Park Bank of New York, 240 N.Y. 520, 148 N.E. 664, 665.
IRRIGATION. The operation of watering lands for agricultural purposes by artificial means. In its primary sense, a sprinkling or watering; spe-cifically, the application of water to lands for the raising of agricultural crops and other products of the soil. Platte Water Co. v. Irrigation Co., 12 Colo. 529, 21 P. 711; City and County of Denver v. Brown, 56 Colo. 216, 138 P. 44, 49.
IRRIGATION COMPANY. A private corporation, authorized and regulated by statute in several states, having for its object to acquire exclusive rights to the water of certain streams or other sources of supply, and to convey it by means of ditches or canals through a region where it can be beneficially used for agricultural purposes, and either dividing the water among stockholders, or making contracts with consumers, or furnishing a supply to all who apply at fixed rates.
IRRIGATION DISTRICT. A public and quasi-municipal corporation authorized by law in several states, comprising a defined region or area of land which is susceptible of one mode of irrigation from a common source and by the same system of works. These districts are created by proceedings in the nature of an election under the supervision of a court, and are authorized to purchase or con-demn the lands and waters necessary for the sys-tem of irrigation proposed and to construct nec-cessary canals and other works, and the water is apportioned ratably among the landowners of the district. Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Briggs, 27 Idaho 84, 147 P. 75, 82.
IRRITANCY. In Scotch law. The happening of a condition or event by which a charter, contract, or other deed, to which a clause irritant is an-nexed, becomes void.
IRRITANT. In Scotch law. Avoiding or making void; as an irritant clause. See Irritancy.
IRRITANT CLAUSE. In Scotch law. A provision by which certain prohibited acts specified in a deed are, if committed, déclared to be null and void. A resolutiva clause dissolves and puts an end to the right of a proprietor on his committing the acts so declared void.
IRROGARE. Lat. In the civil law. To impose or set upon, as a fine. Calvin. To inflict, as a punishment. To make or ordain, as a law.
IRROTULATIO. L. Lat. An enrolling; a record.
IS. This word, although normally referring to the present, Cunningham v. Moser, 91 Okl. 44, 215 P. 758, 759; Jenkins v. First Nat. Bank, 73 Mont. 110, 236 P. 1085, 1087; often has a Future meaning, but is not synonymous with "shall have been." State v. Jorgenson, 25 N.D. 539, 142 N.W. 450, 462, 49 L.R.A.,N.S., 67. It may have, however, a past signification, as in the sense of "has been." 48 C.J.S. p. 774.COGNOSCIT. Lat. The cognizor in a fine. Is cui cognoscitur, the cognizee.
ISH. In Scotch law. The period of the termina-tion of a tack or lease. 1 Bligh, 522.
ISLAND. A piece of land surrounded by water. Webber v. Pere Marquette Boom Co., 62 Mich. 626, 30 N.W. 469; Goff v. Cougle, 118 Mich. 307, 76 N.W. 489, 42 L.R.A. 161.
An island that arises in the bed of a stream usually first presents itself as a sand bar, Cox v. Arnold, 129 Mo. 337, 31 S.W. 592, 50 Am.St.Rep. 450; Glassell v. Hansen, 135 Cal. 547, 67 P. 964; Holman v. Hodges, 112 Iowa, 714, 84 N.W. 950, 58 L.R.A. 673, 84 Am.St.Rep. 367; a bar, before it will support vegetation of any kind, may become valu-able for fishing, hunting, as a shooting park, for the har-vest of ice, for pumping sand, etc. If further deposits of alluvion upon lt would make it more valuable, the law of accretion should still apply, Fowler v. Wood, 73 Kan. 511, 85 P. 763, 6 L.R.A.,N.S., 162, 117 Am.St.Rep. 534. Land In a navigable stream which is surrounded by water only in times of high water Is not an island within the rule that the state takes tltle to newly formed islands in navigable streams. Payne v. Hall, 192 Iowa, 780, 185 N.W. 912, 915.
ISOLATED TRANSACTION. This term, in con-nection with the rule that single or isolated trans-actions do not violate a statute prohibiting foreign corporations from doing business within a state without first filing a copy of their charter, may be inapplicable to a single transaction consummat-ed in furtherance of a corporation’s business, where it is shown that’ the corporation in question is a foreign corporation, with its principal office in a town in a sister state near the state line, and that it has solicited business generally in trib-utary territory within the adjoining state. Dahl Implement & Lumber Co. v. Campbell, 45 N.D. 239, 178 N.W. 197, 198.
ISSEI. Jap. A term used to describe alien Jap-anese residing in the United States. 1945 Report of the Tenney Joint Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities to the California Legisla-ture p. 48.
ISSINT. A law French term, meaning "thus," "so," giving its name to part of a plea in debt. A term formerly used to introduce a statement that special matter already pleaded amounts to a denial.
An example of this form of plea, which Is sometimes called the special general issue, occurs in Bauer v. Roth, 4 Rawle, Pa., 83.
ISSUABLE. In practice. Leading or tending to, or producing, an issue; relating to an issue or issues. See Colquitt v. Mercer, 44 Ga. 433.
ISSUABLE DEFENSE. A technical expression meaning á plea to the merits, properly setting forth a legal defense, as distinguished from a plea in abatement, or any plea going only to delay the case. Adamson v. Reagin, 143 Ga. 306, 84 S. E. 965.
ISSUABLE PLEA. A plea to the merits; a tra-versable plea. A plea such that the adverse par-ty can join issue upon it and go to trial. It is true a plea in abatement is a plea, and, if it be properly pleaded, issues may be found on it. In the ordinary meaning of the word "plea," and of
the word "issuable," such pleas may be called "issuable pleas," but, when these two words are used together, "issuable plea," or "issuable de-fense," they have a technical meaning, to-wit, pleas to the merits. Colquitt v. Mercer, 44 Ga. 434.
ISSUABLE TERMS. In the former practice of the English courts, Hilary term and Trinity term were called "issuable terms," because the issues to be tried at the assizes were made up at those terms. 3 Bl.Comm. 353. But the distinction is superseded by the provisions of the judicature acts of 1873 and 1875.
ISSUE, v. To send forth; to emit; to promulgate; as, an officer issues orders, process issues from a court. To put into circulation; as, the treasury issues notes. To send out, to send out officially; to deliver, for use, or authoritatively; to go forth as authoritative or binding. Stokes v. Paschall, Tex.Civ.App., 243 S.W. 611, 614; Blythe v. Doheny, C.C.A.Cal., 73 F.2d 799, 803.
A writ is "issued" when it is delivered to an officer, with the intent to have it served, Wilkins v. Worthen, 62 Ark. 401, 36 S.W. 21; Michigan Ins. Bk. v. Eldred, 130 U.S. 693, 9 S.Ct. 690, 32 L.Ed. 1080; Webster v. Sharpe, 116 N.C. 466, 21 S.E. 91.2; Ferguson v. Estes & Alexander, Tex.Civ. App., 214 S.W. 465, 466.
When used with reference to a writ of error, State v. Brown, 103 N.J.L. 519, 138 A. 370; a writ of scire facias, In re Johns’ Estate, 253 Pa. 532, 98 A. 719, 720; a writ of attachment, McMaster v. Ruby, 80 Or. 476, 157 P. 782, 784; corporate stock, Cattlemen’s Trust Co. of Fort Worth v. Turner, Tex.Civ.App., 182 S.W. 438, 441; a bond, Klutts v. Jones, 20 N.M. 230, 148 P. 494, 499; Travis v. First Nat Bank, 210 Ala. 620, 98 So. 890, 891; Steinbruck v. Mllford Tp., 100 Kan. 93, 163 P. 647; State v. School Board of Tecumseh Rural High School Dist. No. 4, 110 Kan. 779, 204 P. 742, 744: a deed, Wyman v. Hageman, 318 III. 64, 148 N.E. 852, 855; a note, Foster v. Security Bank & Trust Co., Tex.Com.App., 288 S.W. 438, 440; an insurance pollcy, Coleman v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 236 Mass. 552, 129 N.E. 288. 289; National Liberty Ins. Co. v. Norman, C.C.A.N.C., 11 F.2d 59, 61; and the like, the term is ordi-narily construed as importing delivery to the proper per-son, or to the proper officer for service, etc. But it does not Invariably have such a meaning. Estabrook & Co. v. Consolidated Gas, Electric Light & Power Co. of Baltimore, 122 Md. 643, 90 A. 523, 524.
In financial parlante the term "issue" seems to have two phases of meaning. "Date of issue" when applied to notes, bonds, etc., of a series, usually means the arbitrary date fixed as the beginning of the term for which they run, without reference to the precise time when conveniente or the state of the market may permit of their sale or deliv-ery. When the bonds are delivered to the purchaser, they will be "issued" to him, which is the other meaning of the term. Turner v. Roseberry Irr. Dist., 33 Idaho, 746, 198 P. 465, 467. See, also, Anderson v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 164 Cal. 712, 130 P. 726, 727, Ann.Cas.1914B, 903.
ISSUE, n. The act of issuing, sending forth, emit-ting or promulgating; the giving a thing its first inception; as the issue of an order or a writ.

Pleading

A single, certain, and material point, deduced by the pleadings of the parties, which is affirmed on the one side and denied on the other. Whitney v. Borough of Jersey Shore, 266 Pa. 537, 109 A. 767, 769; Village of Oak Park v. Eldred, 265 III. 605, 107 N.E. 145, 146. A single certain and material point arising out of the allegations of the parties, and it should generally be made up of an affirma-tive and a negative. Cowen Co. v. Houck Mfg. Co.,249 F. 285, 287; Simmons v. Hagner, 140 Md. 248, 117 A. 759, 760. A fact put in con-troversy by the pleadings. Shea v. Hillsborough Mills, 78 N.H. 57, 96 A. 293, 294.
The disputed polnt or question to which the parties in an action have narrowed their several allegations, and upon which they are desirous of obtaining the decision of the proper tribunal. When the plaintiff and defendant have "arrived at some speciflc point or matter affirmed on the one side, and denled on the other, they are said to be at issue. Knaggs v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., C.C.A.Ohio, 287 F. 314, 316; First Nat. Bank v. District Court of Har-din County, 193 Iowa, 561, 187 N.W. 457, 458. (But as used in a rule of court, a case is not "at issue" where nothing but a demurrer has been Oled, presentIng no issue except a question of law as to the sufficiency of the complaint. Arnett v. Hardwick, 27 Arlz. 179, 231 P. 922, 923.) The question so set apart is called the "issue," and is desig-nated, according to its nature, as an "issue in fact" or ah "issue In law " Brown; Martín v. City of Columbus, 101 Ohio St. 1, 127 N.E. 411, 413.
Issues arise upon the pleadings, when a fact or conclu-sion of law is maintained by the one party and contro-verted by the other. They are of two kinds: (1) of law; and (2) of fact. Rev.Code Iowa 1880, § 2737 (Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 176); Code Civ.Proc.Cal. § 588; Comp.St. Wyo.1910, § 4451 (Rev.St.1931, § 89-1202) ; Berglar v. Uni-versity City, Mo.App., 190 S.W. 620, 622: General Electric Co. v. Sapulpa & I. Ry. Co., 49 Okl. 376, 153 P. 189, 193.
The entry of the pleadings. 1 Chitty, Pl. 630.
Issues are classified and distinguished as fol-lows:
General and special. The former is a plea which traverses and denies, briefly and in general and summary terms, the whole declaration, indictment, or complaint, without tendering new or special matter. Steph. Pl. 155; Tilden v. E. A. Stevenson & Co., 3 W.W.Harr. 151, 132 A. 739, 740; McAllis-ter v. State, 94 Md. 290, 50 A. 1046; Standard Loan & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 97 Tenn. 1, 40 S.W. 136. Examples of the general issue are "not guil-ty," "non assumpsit," "nil debet," "non est fac-tum." The latter is formed when the defendant chooses one single material point, which he tra-verses, and rests his whole case upon its deter-mination.
Identical. Issues determined by same ques-tions of fact and of law. Allbee v. Elms, 93 N.H. 202, 37 A.2d 790, 791.
Material and immaterial. They are so described according as they do or do not bring up some ma-terial point or question which, when determined by the verdict, will dispose of the whole merits of the case, and leave no uncertainty as to the judg-ment. Pearson v. Pearson, 104 Misc. 675, 173 N.Y. S. 563, 565.
Formal and informal. The former species of is-sue is one framed in strict accordance with the technical rules of pleading. The latter arises when the material allegations of the declaration are traversed, but in an inartificial or untechnical mode. In the latter case, the defect is cured by verdict, by the statute 32 Hen. VIII. c. 30.
A collateral issue is an issue taken upon matter aside from the intrinsic merits of the action, as upon a plea in abatement; or aside from the di-rect and regular order of the pleadings, as on a demurrer. 2 Archb. Pr. K. B. 1, 6, bk. 2, pts. 1, 2; Strickland v. Maddox, 4 Ga. 394. The term "col-
lateral" Is also applied in England to an issue raised upon a plea of diversity of person, pleaded by a criminal who has been tried and convicted, in bar of execution, viz., that he is not the same person who was attainted, and the like. 4 Bl. Comm. 396. Matters collateral to the main issue are those which do not constitute an essential ele-ment of the offense embraced within the charge. State v. English, 308 Mo. 695, 274 S.W. 470, 474.
Real or feigned. A real or actual issue is one formed in a regular manner in a regular suit for the purpose of determining an actual controversy. A feigned issue is one made up by direction of the court, upon a supposed case, for the purpose of obtaining the verdict of a jury upon some question of fact collaterally involved in the cause. Such issues are generally ordered by a court of equity, to ascertain the truth of a disputed fact. They are also used in courts of law, by the consent of the parties, to determine some disputed rights without the formality of pleading; and by this practice much time and expense are saved in the decision of a cause. 3 Bla.Comm. 452. The name is a misnomer, inasmuch as the issue itself is upon a real, material point in question between the par-ties, and the circumstances only are fictitious.
Common issue is the name given to the issue raised by the plea of non est factum to an action for breach of covenant.
Ultimate issue signifies either such an issue as within itself is sufficient and final for the disposi-tion of the entire case or one which in connection with other issues will serve such end. First State Bank of Seminole v. Dillard, Tex.Civ.App., 71 S. W.2d 407, 410.
This is so called because It denles the deed only, and not the breach, and does not put the whole declaration In issue, and because there is no general issue to this form of action. 1 Chitty, Pl. 482; Gould, Pl. c. 6, pt. 1, § 7.

Realty Law

Descendants. All persons who have descended from a common ancestor. Edmundson v. Leigh, 189 N.C. 196, 126 S.E. 497, 499, Offspring; progeny; descent; lineage; lineal descendants. Gardner v. Anderson, 114 Kan. 778, 227 P. 743, 747; In re Schuster’s Will, 111 Misc. 534, 181 N.Y.S. 500, 503; Wilkins v. Rowan, 107 Neb. 180, 185 N.W. 437, 439; Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Bridgham, 42 R.I. 161, 106 A. 149, 153, 5 A.L.R. 185; Hoadley v. Beardsley, 89 Conn. 270, 93 A. 535, 538; Turner v. Monteiro, 127 Va. 537, 103 S.E. 572, 575, 13 A.L.R. 383; In re Book’s Will, 89 N.J.Eq. 509, 105 A. 878, 879; 3 Ves. 257; 17 Ves. 481; 19 Ves. 547; 1 Rop. Leg. 90.
In this sense, the word Includes not only a chlld or chil-dren, but all other descendants in whatever degree; and it Is so construed generally in deeds. But, when used In wills, It is, of course, subject to the rule of construction that the intention of the testator, as ascertained from the will, is to have effect, rather than the technical meaning of the language used by him; and hence issue may, in such a connection, be restricted to children, or to descendants liv-ing at the death of the testator, where such an intention c]early appears. Abbott; Sibley v. Perry, 7 Ves.Jun. 523, 529; Ralph v. Carrick, 11 Ch.D. 873, 883; Barmore v. Dar-ragh, Tex.Civ.App., 231 S.W. 472, 479; Newcomb v. New-comb, 197 Ky. 801, 248 S.W. 198, 200; Horner y Haase, 177 158 N.W. 548, 549; In re Rynear’s. Estate, 224 N.Y.S. 606, 607, 130 Misc. 804.
The word "issue" in a will is generally a word of limita-tion, In re Packer’s Estate, 246 Pa. 116, 92 A. 70, 74; Bax-ter v. Early, 131 S.C. 374, 127 S.E. 607; Bonnycastle v. Lilly, 153 Ky. 834, 156 S.W. 874, L.R.A.1916B, 1076; and when so used, is sometimes said to be equivalent to "heirs of the body" ; Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Bridg-ham, 42 R.I. 161, 106 A. 149, 152, 5 A.L.R. 185; Parrish v. Hodges, 178 N.C. 133, 100 S.E. 256; Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, 96 Conn. 61, 112 A. 689, 690. But it has been pointed out in other cases that this word is not as strong a word of limitation as the words "heirs of the body," Adams v. Verner, 102 S.C. 7, 86 S.E. 211, 214; City Nat. Bank v. Slocum, C.C.A.Ohio, 272 F. 11, 18; and yields readily to a context indicating its use as a word of pur-chase, Stout v. Good, 245 Pa. 383, 91 A. 613, 615; Evers-meyer v. McCollum, 171 Ark. 117, 283 S.W. 379, 382; Ford v. McBrayer, 171 N.C. 420, 88 S.E. 736, 737; Yarrington v. Freeman, 201 Ky. 135, 255 S.W. 1034.
The word is commonly held to include- only legitimate issue. Page v. Roddie, 92 Okl. 236, 218 P. 1092, 1.095; King v. Thissell, 222 Mass. 140, 109 N.E. 880; Hardesty v. Mitch-ell, 302 ni. 369, 134 N.E. 745, 746, 24 A.L.R. 565; Love v. Love, 179 N.C. 115, 101 S.E. 562, 563; contra: Eaton v. Eaton, 88 Conn. 286, 91 A. 196, 198.

Business Law

or series of bonds, debentures, etc., com-prising all that are emitted at one and the same time.
ISSUE IN FACT. In pleading. An issue taken upon or consisting of matter of fact, the fact only, and not the law, being disputed, and which is to be tried by a jury. 3 B1.Comm. 314, 315; Co. Litt. 126a; 3 Steph.Comm. 572. An issue which arises upon a denial in the answer of a material allega-tion of the Complaint or in the reply of a material allegation in the answer. Rev. Codes, Mont. § 6793 (Rev. Code 1921, § 9395). See, also, Code Civ. Proc. Cal. § 590; Comp. St. Wyo. 1910, § 4452 (Rey. St. 1931, § 89-1203).
The "issues of fact" which, if presented by the pleadings and supported by evidence, must be submitted to the jury, where requested, are only the independent ultimate facts which go to make up plaintiff’s cause of action and defend-ant’s ground of defense. Texas City Transp. Co. v. Wiri-ters, Tex.Com.App., 222 S.W. 541, 542.
ISSUE IN LAW. In pleading. An issue upon matter of law, or consisting of matter of law, be-ing produced by a demurrer on the one side, and a joinder in demurrer on the other. 3 B1.Comm. 314; 3 Steph.Comm. 572, 580; Code Civ. Proc. Cal. § 589. The term "issue" may be so used as to in-elude one of law raised by demurrer to the cern-plaint, as well as one raised by answer. Fruth v. Bolt, 39 S.D. 371, 164 N.W. 270, 271.
ISSUE ROLL. In English practice. A roll upon which the issue in actions at law was formerly required to be entered, the roll being entitled of the term in which the issue was joined. 2 Tidd Pr. 733. It was not, however, the practice to enter the issue at full length, if triable by the country, until after the trial, but only to make an incipitur on the roll. Id. 734. It was abolished by the rules of Hilary Term, 1834. Moz. & W. Dict.
ISSUES. In English law. The goods and profits of the lands of a defendant against whom a writ of distringas or distress in/inite has been issued,

taken by virtue of such writ. 3 Bl.Comm. 280; 1 Chit. Crim. Law, 351.
ISSUES AND PROFITS, as applied to real estate, comprehend every available return therefrom, whether it arise aboye or below the surface. Minner v. Minner, 84 W.Va. 679, 100 S.E. 509, 510.
ISSUES ON SIIERIFFS. Fines and amercements intlicted on sheriffs for neglects and defaults, lev-ied out of the issues and profits of their lands. Toml.
ISTIMRAR. Continuance; perpetuity; especially a farm or lease granted in perpetuity by govern-ment or a zemindar (q. v.). Wilson’s Gloss; Ind.
ISTIMRARDAR. The holder of a perpetual lease. Moz. & W.
ITA EST. Lat. So it is; so it stands% In modem civil law, this phrase is a form of attestation added to exemplifications from a notary’s register when the same are made by the successor in office of the notary who made the original entries.
ITA LEX SCRIPTA EST. Lat. So the law is written. Dig. 40, 9, 12; Allen v. Cook, 26 Barb., N.Y., 374, 380; Hemphill’s Appeal, 18 Pa. 306; Monson v. Chester, 22 Pick., Mass., 389. The law must be obeyed notwithstanding the apparent rigor of its application. 3 Bl.Comm. 430. We must be content with the law as it stands, without in-quiring into its reasons. 1 Bl.Comm. 32.
ITA QUOD. Lat. In Old Practice. So that. For-mal words in writs. Ita quod habeas corpus, so that you have the body. 2 Mod. 180. The name of the stipulation in a submission to arbitration which begins with the words "so as Uta quod] the award be made of and upon the premises."
In Old Conveyancing. So that. An expression which, when used in a deed, formerly made an es-tate upon condition. Litt. § 329. Sheppard enu-merates it among the three words that are most proper to make an estate conditional. Shep. Touch. 121, 122.
ITA SEMPER FIAT RELATIO UT VALEAT DIS-POSITIO. 6 Coke, 76. Let the interpretation be always such that the disposition may prevail.
ITA TE DEUS ADJUVET. Lat. So help you God. The old form of administering an oath in England, generally in connection with other words, thus: Ita te Deus adjuvet, et sacrosancta Dei Evangelia, So helpr you God, and God’s holy Evangelists. Ita te Deus adjuvet et omnes sancti, So help you God and all the saints. Willes, 338.
ITA UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Use your own property and your own rights in such a way that you will not hurt your neighbor, or prevent him from enjoying his. Frequently written, "Sic utere tuo," etc. (q.
ITEM. Also; likewise; in like manner; again; a second time. This word was formerly used to mark the beginning of a new paragraph or divi-sion after the first, whence is derived the common

application of it to denote a separate or distinct particular of an account or bill. Horwitz v. Non ris, 60 Pa. 282; Baldwin v. Morgan, 73 Miss. 276, 18 So. 919; Callaghan v. Boyce, 17 Ariz. 433, 153 P. 773, 782; Innis, Pearce & Co. v. G. H. Poppen-berg, Inc., 210 N.Y.S. 761, 762, 213 App.Div. 789, One of the portions, equal or unequal, into which anything is divided, or regarded as divided; some-thing less than a whole; a number, quantity, mass, or the like, regarded as going to make up, with others or another, a larger number, quantity, mass, etc., whether actually separate or not; a piece, fragment, fraction, member, or constituent. State ex rel. Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Henry, 218 Wis. 302, 260 N.W. 486, 99 A.L.R. 1267. An ar-ticle; a single detail of any kind. Board of Edu-cation of Prince George’s County v. County Com’rs of Prince George’s County, 131 Md. 658, 102 A. 1007, 1010. A separate entry in an account or a schedule, or a separate particular in an enumera-tion of a total. People v. Brady, 277 III. 124, 115 N.E. 204, 206.
The word is sometimes used as a verb. "The whole [costs] In this case that was thus itemed to counsel." Bunb. p. 164, case 233.
An "item" in an appropriation bill is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose. Commonwealth v. Dodson, 176 Va. 281, 11 S.E.2d 120, 124, 125, 127, 130, 131.
ITEMIZE. To set down by items. People v. Low-den, 285 Ill. 618, 121 N.E. 188. To state each item or articie separately. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Walker, Tex.Civ.App., 153 S.W. 398, 400. Used almost entirely with reference to accounts. J. F. Rappell Co. v. City of Manitowoc, 182 Wis. 141, 195 N.W. 399, 401; Banner Oil & Gas Co. v. Gordon, Tex.Civ.App., 235 S.W. 945, 948; Dorough v. Re-liance Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 289 S.W. 703, 704; Board of Education of Prince George’s County v. County Com’rs of Prince George’s County, 131 Md. 658, 102 A. 1007, 1010; Lewis v. National Fire Ins. Underwriters, 136 Miss. 576, 101 So. 296, 297.
ITER. Lat.
In the Civil law. A way; a right of way belong-ing as a servitude to an estate in the country, (proedium rusticum.) The right of way was of three kinds: (1) iter, a right to walk, or ride on horseback, or in a litter; (2) actus, a right to drive a beast or vehicie; (3) vía, a full right of way, comprising right to walk or ride, or drive beast or carriage. Heinec. § 408. Or, as some think, they were distinguished by the width of the objects which could be rightfully carried over the way; e. g., via, 8 feet; actus, 4 feet, etc. Mackeld.
Rom. Law, § 290; Bract. fol. 232; 4 Bell, H. L. Sc. 390.
In old English law. A journey, especially a cir-cuit made by a justice in eyre, or itinerant jus-tice, to try causes according to his own mission. Du Cange; Bract. lib. 3, cc. 11, 12, 13.
In Maritime law. A way or route. The route or direction of a voyage; the route or way that is taken to make the voyage assured. Distinguished from the voyage itself.
ITER EST JUS EUNDI, AMBULANDI HOMINIS; NON ETIAM JUMENTUM AGENDI VEL
A.way is the right of going or walking, and does not include the right of driving a beast of burden or a carriage. Co. Litt. 56a; Inst. 2, 3, pr.; Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 318.
ITERATIO. Lat. Repetition. In the Roman law, a bonitary owner might liberate a slave, and the quiritary owner’s repetition (iteratio) of the pro-cess effected a complete manumission. Brown.
ITINERA. Eyres, or circuits. 1 Reeve, Eng. Law, 52.
ITINERANT. Wandering; traveling; applied to justices who make circuits. Also applied in var-ious statutory and municipal laws (in the sense of traveling from place to place) to certain classes of merchants, traders, and salesmen. Shiff v. State, 84 Ala. 454, 4 So. 419; Twining v. Elgin, 38 Ill.App. 357; Rev.Laws Mass. 1902, p. 595, c. 65, § 1 (Gen. Laws, c. 101, § 1) ; West v. Mt. Ster-ling, Ky., 65 S.W. 122.
ITINERANT PEDDLING. The going about of a merchant from place to place, meeting and deal-ing with his customers where he finds them. Good Humor Corporation v. City of New York, 264 App.Div. 620, 36 N.Y.S.2d 85, 91.
ITINERANT VENDOR. This term is variously defined in statutes; e. g., a person engaged in transient business either in one locality or in trav-eling from place to place selling goods, who, for the purpose of carrying on such business, sells goods at retail from a car. Rev. St. Me. c. 45, § 15 (Rev.St.1930, c. 46, § 25). See, also, Laws Mont. 1911, c. 110, § 1; St. Cal. 1903, p. 284, § 3.
ITS. This term does not necessarily import legal ownership, but may signify merely possession, or the temporary use of. Campbell v. Canadian Northern Ry. Co., 124 Minn. 245, 144 N.W. 772, 77$.
IULE. In old English law. Christmas.

BLACK ‘S LAW DICTIONARY – Section J

J

J. The initial letter of the words "judge" and "justice," for which it frequently stands as an abbreviation. Thus, "J. A.," judge advocate; "J. J.," junior judge; "L. J.," law judge; "P. J.," president judge; "F. J.," first judge; "A. J.," as-sociate judge; "C. J.," chief justice or judge; "J. P.," justice of the peace; "JJ.," judges or justices; "J. C. P.," justice of the common pleas; "J. K. B.," justice of the king’s bench; "J. Q. B.," justice of the queen’s bench; "J. U. B.," justice of the up-per bench.
This letter is sometimes used for "I," as the initial letter of "Institutiones," in referentes to the Institutes of Justinian.
JAC. An abbreviation for "Jacobus," the Latin form of the name James; used principally in citing statutes enacted in the reigns of the English kings of that name; e. g., "St. 1 Jac. II." Used al-so in citing the second part of Croke’s reports; thus, "Cro. Jac." denotes "Croke’s reports of cases in the time of James I."
JACENS. Lat. Lying in abeyance, as in the phrase "hcereditas Jacens," which is an inheri-tance or estate lying vacant or in abeyance prior to the ascertainment of the heir or his assumption of the succession.
JACENS 1LEREDITAS. See limreditas Jacens.
JACET IN ORE. Lat. In old English law. It lies in the mouth. Fleta, lib. 5, c. 5, § 49.
JACK. A kind of defensive coat-armor worn by horsemen in war; not made of solid iron, but of many plhtes fastened together. Some tenants were bound by their tenure to find it upon inva-sion. Cowell.
JACOB’S LADDER. A ladder with sides of rope and with wooden steps, frequently used on ship-board. Maloney v. Cunard S. S. Co., 217 N.Y. 278, 111 N.E. 835, 836.
JACOBUS. A gold coin an inch and three-eighths in diameter, in value about twenty-five shillings, so called from James I., in whose reign it was first coined. It was also called broad, laurel, and broad-piece. Its value is sometimes put at twenty-four shillings, but Macaulay speaks of a salary of eight thousand Jacobuses as equivalent to ten thousand pounds sterling. Hist. Eng. ch. xv.
JACTITATION. Boasting of something which is challenged by another. Moz. & W. A false boast-ing; a false claim; assertions repeated to the prejudice of another’s right.
The species of defamation or disparagement of another’s title to real estate known at common law as "siander of title" comes under the head of jac-titation, and in some jurisdictions (as in Louisi-ana) a remedy for this injury is provided under the name of an "action of jactitation."
The action in jactitation of title is governed by the rules prescribed by the Code of Practice, under the title, "Pos-sessory Action," and differs materially from the common-law action of siander of title. Bill v. Saunders, 139 La. 1037, 72 So. 727, 729.
In medical jurisprudence. Involuntary convul-sive muscular movement; restless agitation or tossing of the body to and fro. Leman v. Insur-ance Co., 46 La.Ann. 1189, 15 So. 388, 24 L.R.A. 589.
Jactitation of a right to a church sitting appears to be the boasting by a man that he has a right or title to a pew or sitting in a church to which he has legally no title.
Jactitation of marriage. In English ecclesiasti-cal law. The boasting or giving out by a party that he or she is married to some other, whereby a common reputation of their matrimony may en-sue. To defeat that result, the person may be put to a proof of the actual marriage, failing which proof, he or she is put to silence about it. 3 Bl. Comm. 93. The Scotch suit of a declarator of put-ting to silence is equivalent to jactitation of mar-riage.
Jactitation of tithes is the boasting by a man that he is entitled to certain tithes, to which he has legally no title. Rog. Ecc. L. 482.
JACTIVUS. Lost by default; tossed away. Cow-ell.
JACTURA. In the civil law. A throwing of goods overboard in a storm; jettison. Loss from such a cause. Calvin.
JACTUS. A throwing goods overboard to lighten or save the vessel, in which case the goods so sacrificed are a proper subject for general average. Dig. 14, 2, "de lege Rhodia de Jactu;" Barnard v. Adams, 10 How. 303, 13 L.Ed. 417.
JACTUS LAPILLL The throwing down of a stone. One of the modes, under the civil law, of interrupting prescription. Where one person was building on another’s ground, and in this way acquiring a right by usucapio, the true owner challenged the intrusion and interrupted the pre-scriptive right by throwing down one of the stones of the building before witnesses called for the purpose. Tray. Lat. Max.
JAIL. A gaol; a prison; a building designated by law, or regularly used, for the confinement of persons held in lawful custody. State v. Bryan, 89 N.C. 534; Adle v. Herald Co., Sup., 36 N.Y.S.2d 905, 907. See Gaol.
A "jan" is therefore distinguishable both In /aw and In common understandIng from a temporary place of deten-tion, like a pollee station or lockup. People ex rel. Murphy v. Holcomb, 181 N.Y.S. 780, 783, 111 Misc. 460. While the primary function of a "jail" is a place of detention for persons committed thereto,

under sentence of a court, lt is also the proper and usual place where persons under arrest or awaiting trial are kept until they appear in court and

the charge is disposed or. Grab v. Lucas, 156 Wis. 504, 146 N.W. 504, 505.
JAIL DELIVERY. See Gaol. JAIL LIBERTIES. See Gaol.
JAILER. A keeper or warden of a prison or jail. Lefman v. Schuler, 317 Mo. 671, 296 S.W. 808, 814.
JAKE. A low colloquialism applied to liquor re-puted to be componed of a mixture of Jamaica ginger and some other beverage or beverages. Skelton v. State, 31 Okl.Cr. 343, 239 P. 189, 190.
JAME. A side post or side of a doorway, window, opening, or fire place; a side or vertical piece of any opening or aperture in a wall which helps to bear an overhead member. Superior Skylight Co. v. Zerbe Const. Co., D.C.N.Y., 5 F.2d 982, 986.
JAMBEAUX. In old English and feudal law. Leg-armor. Blount.
JAMMA, JUMMA. In Hindu law. Total amount; collection; assembly. The total of a territorial assignment.
JAMMABUNDY, JUMMABUNDY. In Hindu law. A written schedule of the whole of an assessment.
JAMMUNDLING. See Jamunlingi.
JAMPNUM. Furze, or grass, or ground where furze grows; as distinguished from "arable," "pasture," or the like. Co. Litt. 5a.
JAMUNLINGI, JAMUNDILINGL Freemen who delivered themselves and property to the protec-tion of a more powerful person, in order to avoid military service and other burdens. Spelman. Al-so a species of serfs among the Germans. Du Cange. The same as commendati.
JANITOR. In old English law. A door-keeper. Fleta, lib. 2, c. 24.
Tn modern law. A person employed to take charge of rooms or buildings, to see that they are kept clean and in order, to lock and unlock them, and generally to tare for them. Fagan v. New York, 84 N.Y. 352; Kramer v. Industrial Acc. Commission of State of California, 31 Cal.App. 673, 161 P. 278.
JANUS-FACED. An argument lookíng in both directions at the same time, e. g., urging jurors not to be swayed by sympathy, but adding that any sympathy should be in favor of the arguing counsel’s client. Davis v. Franson, 296 P.2d 600, 606, 141 Cal.App.2d 263.
JAQUES. In old English law. Small money.
JASON CLAUSE. Clause in bilis of lading which obligates cargo owners to contribute in general average in cases of danger, damage, or disaster resulting from faults or errors in navigation or in management of vessel, her machinery or ap-purtenances, provided that ship owner shall have exercised due diligente to make vessel in all re-spects seaworthy, and to have her properly manned, equipped, and supplied. Merklen v. John-son & Higgins, D.C.N.Y., 3 F.Supp. 897, 898.
JAVELIN—MEN. Yeomen retained by the sheriff to escort the judge of assize.
JAVELOUR. In Scotch law. Jailer or gaoler. 1 Pite. Crim. Tr. pt. 1, p. 33.
JAY WALKING. Proceeding diagonally across a street intersection. Gett v. Pacific Gas & Elec-tric Co., 192 Cal. 621, 221 P. 376, 378.
Also, crossing a street between intersections, or at a place other than a crosswalk.
JEDBURGH JUSTICE. Summary justice inflicted upon a marauder or felon without a regular trial, equivalent to "lynch law." So called from a Scotch town, near the English border, where raid-ers and cattle lifters were often summarily hung. Also written "Jeddart" or "Jedwood" justice.
JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES. A religious sect whose members profess allegiance to a visionary heavenly kingdom and disclaim all duties of citi-zenship which they deem in conflict with such heavenly allegiance. U. S. ex rel. Hoce v. Mc-Ginnis, D.C.W.Va., 56 F.Supp. 668.
JEMAN. In old records. Yeoman. Cowell; Blount.
JENNY. With names of animals, often used to denote a female; also short for "jenny ass," "jen-ny wren," etc. Likewise short for "spinning jen-ny." Webster, Dict.; O’Rear v. Richardson, 17 Ala.App. 87, 81 So. 865, 866.
JEOFAILE. L. Fr. I have failed; I am in error. An error or oversight in pleading.
Certain statutes are called "statutes of amendments and jeofailes" because, where a pleader perceives any slip in the forro of his proceedings, and acknowledges the error, (jeofaile,) he 1s at liberty, by those statutes, to amend it.
1U.Comm. 107: -1 S•aumi. p. 221. no. 1.
Jeofaile is when tne parties to any sult in pleading have proceeded so far that they have joined issue which shall be tried or is tried by a jury or inquest, and this pleading or lssue is so badly pleaded or joined that it will be error if they proceed. Then some of the said parties may, by their counsel, show it to the court, as well after verdict given and before judgment as before the jury ls charged. And the counsel shall say: "This inquest ye ought not to take." And if it be after verdict, then he may say: "To judgment you ()Light not to go " Termes de la Ley.
JEOPARDY. Danger; hazard; peril.
The danger of conviction and punishment which the defendant in a criminal action incurs when a valid indictment has been found, and a petit jury has been impaneled and sworn to try the case and give a verdict in a court of competent jurisdiction. State v. Nelson, 26 Ind. 368; State v. Emery, 55 Vt. 84, 7 A. 129; People v. Terrill, 132 Cal. 497, 64 P. 894; Mitchell v. State, 42 Ohio St. 383; Grogan v. State, 44 Ala. 9; Ex parte Glenn, C.C.W.Va., 111 F. 258; State v. McKee, 1 Bail., S.C., 655, 21 Am. Dec. 499; State v. Yokum, 155 La. 846, 99 So. 621, 631.
The peril in which a prisoner is put when he is regularly charged with a crime before a tribunal properly organtzed and competent to try him. Com. v. Fltzpatrick, 121 Pa. 109, 15 A. 466, 1 L.R.A. 451; Peavey v. State, 153 Ga. 119,

111 S.E. 420. The situation of á defendant when the jury is impaneled and sworn and the issues presented on a valid indictment or information In a court of competent juris-diction. State v. Thompson, 58 Utah 291, 199 P. 161, 163, 38 A.L.R. 697. The condition of a person when he is put upon trial, before a court of competent jurisdiction, upon an indictment or information which is sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and a jury has been charged with his deliverance. Allen v. State, 13 Okl.Cr. 533, 165 P. 745, 748, L.R.A.1917E, 1085; State v. Runyon, 100 W.Va. 647, 131 S.E. 466, 467; Commonwealth v. Grey, 249 Ky. 36, 60 S.W.2d 133.
Defendant is not in "jeopardy" untll jury has been duly impaneled and charged with his deliverance, but convic-tion or acquittal by any competent tribunal, whether after jury trial or not, satisfies requirement of jeopardy. Pepin v. State ex rel. Chambers, 217 Wis. 568, 259 N.W. 410.
The terms "jeopardy of life and liberty for the same offense," "jeopardy of life or limb," "jeopar-dy for the same offense," "in jeopardy of punish-ment," and other similar provisions used in the various Constitutions, are to be construed as meaning substantially the same thing. Stout v. State, 130 P. 553, 556, 36 Okl. 744, 45 L.R.A.,N.S., 884, Ann.Cas.1916E, 858.
JERGUER. In English law. An officer of the custom-house who oversees the waiters. Techn. Dict.
JERK. A sharply arrested pull, thrust, push, mo-tion, a sudden movement or lurch;—"lurch" being used, however, with specific reference to sidewise movements. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Farris, Tex.Civ.App., 166 S.W. 463; Tritle v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 140 Kan. 671, 37 P.2d 996.
The ordinary jerks and jolts of a motorbus in starting or stopping are among the usual incidente of travel, and for injuries to passengers resulting from them the motor carrier is not fiable. Blashfield, Cyc. of Automobile Law and Prac., Perm. Ed., § 2156.
JESSE. A, large brass candlestick, usually hung tne middle at a church or choir. Cowell.
JET. Fr. In French law. Jettison. Ord. Mar. liv. 3, tit. 8; Emerig. Traité des Assur. c. 12, § 40.
JETSAM. Goods which, by the act of the owner, have been voluntarily cast overboard from a ves-sel, in a storm or other emergency, to lighten the ship. 1 C.B. 113.
Jetsam is where goods are cast into the sea, and there sink and remain under water. 1 Bl.Comm. 292.
The sense of ”goods thrown overboard and sunk at sea" is an error arising apparently in the attempt to distinguish "jetsam" from "flotsam," the latter being properly wreck-age of a ship or its cargo found floating on the sea. Web-ster, Dict.
JETTISON. The act of throwing overboard from a vessei part of the cargo, in case of extreme dan-ger, to lighten the ship. The thing or things so cast out; jetsam. Gray v. Waln, 2 Serg. & R., Pa., 254, 7 Am.Dec. 642; Butler v. Wildman, 3 Barn. & Ald. 326; Barnard v. Adams, 10 How. 303, 13 L.Ed. 417.
A carrier by water may, when in case of extreme peril it 15 necessary for the safety of the shlp or cargo, throw overboard, or otherwise sacrifice, any or all of the cargo or appurtenances of the ship. Throwing property over-board for such purpose is called "Jettison," and the loes incurred thereby Is called a "general average loss." Civil
Code Cal. § 2148; Civil Code Dak. § 1245 (Comp. Laws 1913, N.D. § 6225; Rev.Code 1919, S.D. § 1147).
JETTY. A projection of stone or other material serving as a protection against the waves. Storm v. Town of Wrightsville Beach, 189 N.C. 679, 128 S.E. 17, 19.
JEUX DE BOURSE. Fr. In French law. Specu-lation in the public funds or in stocks; gambling speculations on the stock exchange; dealings in "options" and "futures."
A kind of gambling or speculation, which consiste of sales and parchases which bind neither of the parties to deliver the things which are the object of the sale, and which are settled by paying the difference in the value of the things sold between the day of the sale and that ap-pointed for delivery of such things. 1 Pardessus, Droit Com. n. 162.
JEWEL. An ornament of the person, such as ear-rings, pearls, diamonds, etc., prepared to be worn. Com. v. Stephens, 14 Pick., Mass., 373; Robbins v. Robertson, C.C.N.Y., 33 F. 710; Cav-endish v. Cavendish, 1 Brown Ch. 409; Ramaley v. Leland, 43 N.Y. 541, 3 Am.Rep. 728; Gile v. Libby, 36 Barb., N.Y., 77. An ornament made of precious metal or a precious stone. Wagner v. Congress Square Hotel Co., 115 Me. 190, 98 A. 660, 662.
JEWELR,Y. Jewels collectively. Wagner v. Con-gress Square Hotel Co., 115 Me. 190, 98 A. 66Q, 662.
JEVVISR SABBATH. A period which begins at sundown Friday night and ends at sundown Sat-urday night, and does not conform to a full statu-tory day according to the Christian calendar. Co-hen v. Webb, 175 Ky. 1, 192 S.W. 828, 829.
JIGGER BOSS. In mining parlante, a "pusher" or kind of foreman engaged for the purpose of en-couraging or hastening the men. Ryan v. Man-hattan Big Four Mining Co., 38 Nev. 92, 145 P. 907, 908.
JITNEY. A self-propelled vehicle, other than a street car, traversing the public streets between certain definite points or termini, and, as a com-mon carrier, conveying passengers at a five-cent or some small fare, between such termini and intermediate points, and so held out, advertised, or announced. City of Memphis v. State, 133 Tenn. 83, 179 S.W. 631, 634, L.R.A.1916B, 1151, Ann.Cas. 1917C, 1056. A motor vehicle carrying passengers for fare. Ft. Lee, etc., Transp. Co. v. Borough of Edgewater, 99 N.J.Eq. 850, 133 A. 424, 425. Also called "jitney bus." Huston v. City of Des Moines, 176 Iowa 455, 156 N.W. 883, 888.
JOB. The whole of a thing which is to be done. "To build by plot, or to work by the job, is to undertake a building for a certain stipulated price." Civ.Code La. art. 2727 (Civ.Code, art. 2756).
JOBBER. One who buys and sells goods for oth-ers; one who buys or sells on the stock exchange; a dealer in stocks, shares, or securities. One who buys and sells articles in bulk and resells them to dealers. A merchant buying and selling in job lots. Wasserstrom v. Cohen, Frank & Co., 165

App.Div. 171, 150 N.Y.S. 638, 639. A sort of mid-dleman. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 227 F. 46, 47.
JOBMASTER. In English law, one who canjes on the business of letting out carriages and horses or other vehicles. with drivers for hire; a livery stable keeper. Hyman v. Nye, 6 Queen’s Bench, 685.
JOCALIA. In old English law. Jewels. This term was formerly more properly applied to those ornaments which women, although married, call their own. When these »cocha are not suitable to her degree, they are assets for the payment of debts. 1 Rolle, Abr. 911.
JOCELET. A little manor or farm. Cowell.
JOCKEY CLUB. An association of persons for the purpose of regulating all matters connected with horse racing. See Corrigan v. Jockey Club, 2 Misc. 512, 22 N.Y.S. 394.
JOCUS. In old English law. A game of hazard. Reg. Orig. 290.
JOCUS PARTITUS. In old English practice. A divided game, risk, or hazard. An arrangement which the parties to a suit were anciently some-times allowed to make by mutual agreement upon a certain hazard, as that one should lose if the case turned out in a certain way, and, if it did not, that the other should gain. Bract. fols. 211b„ 379b, 432, 434, 200b.
JOHN DOE. A fictitious name frequently used to indicate a person for the purpose of argument or illustration, or in the course of enforcing a fiction in the law. The name which was usually given to the fictitious lessee of the plaintiff in the mixed action of ejectment. He was sometimes called "Goodtitle." So the Romans had their fictitious personages in law proceedings, as Titius, Seius.
The name "John Doe" is, and for some centuries has been, used in legal proceedings as a fictitious name to des-ignate a party until his real name can be ascertained. State v. Rossignol, 22 Wash.2d 19, 153 P.2d 882, 885.
JOIN. To unite; to come together; to combine or unite in time, effort, action; to enter into an al-liance. Lowery v. Westheimer, 58 Okl. 560, 160 P. 496, 500.
JOINDER. Joining or coupling together; unit-ing two or more constituents or elements in one; uniting with another person in some legal step or proceeding; union; concurrente,
Joinder in demurrer. When a defendant in an action tenders an issue of law, (called a "demur-rer,") the plaintiff, if he means to maintain his action, must accept it, and this acceptance of the defendant’s tender, signified by the plaintiff in a set form of words, is called a "joinder in demurr-er." Brown; Co. Litt. 71 b; Thompson v. Goude-lock, 10 Rich., S.C., 49.
Joinder in issue. In pleading. A formula by which one of the parties to a suit joins in or ac-cepts an issue in fact tendered by the opposite
party. Steph. P1. 57, 236. More commonly termed a "similiter." (q. v.)
Joinder in pleading. Accepting the issue, and mode of trial tendered, either by demurrer, error, or issue, in fact, by the opposite party.
Joinder of actions. This expression signifies the uniting of two or more demands or rights of ac-tion in one action; the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. Sickler v. City of Broken Bow, 143 Neb. 542, 10 N.W.2d 462, 464.
Joinder of error. In proceedings on a writ of error in criminal cases, the joinder of error is a written denial of the errors alleged in the assign-ment of errors. It answers to a joinder of issue in an action.
Joinder of issue. The act by which the parties to a cause arrive at that stage of it in their plead-ings, that one asserts a fact to be so, and the oth-er denies it.
Joinder of offenses. The uniting of several dis-tinct charges of crime in the same indictment or prosecution.
Joinder of parties. The uniting of two or more persons as co-plaintiffs or as co-defendants in one suit.
Misjoinder. The improper joining together of parties to a suit, as plaintiffs or defendants, or of different causes of action. Burstall v. Beyfus, 53 L.J.Ch. 567; Phenix Iron Foundry v. Lockwood, 21 R.I. 556, 45 A. 546.
Misjoinder of actions is the joining several de-mands which the law does not permit to be joined, to enforce by one proceeding several distinct, sub-stantive rights of recovery. Gould, Pl. c. 4, § 98; Archb. Civ. Pl. 61; Dane, Abr. In equity, it is the joinder of different and distinct claims against one defendant; Adams, Eq. 309; 7 Sim. 241; New-land v. Rogers, 3 Barb. Ch., N.Y., 432.
Misjoinder of parties is the joining, as plain-tiffs or defendants, parties who have not a joint interest. Billy v. McGill, 113 Okl. 153, 240 P. 119, 121; Gagle v. Besser, 162 Iowa 227, 144 N.W. 3, 4.
Misjoinder in a criminal prosecution is the charging in separate counts of separate and dis-tinct offenses arising out of wholly different trans-actions having no connection or relation with each other. Optner v. U. S., C.C.A.Mich., 13 F.2d 11, 13.
Nonjoinder. The omission to join some person as party to a suit, whether as plaintiff or defend-ant, who ought to have been so joined, according to the rules of pleading and practice. Bardock Iron & Steel Co. v. Tenenbaum, 136 Va. 163, 118 S.E. 502, 505.
JOINT. United; combined; undivided; done by or against two or more unitedly; shared by or Be-tween two or more; coupled together in interest or liability.
The term is used to express a common property interest enjoyed or a common liability incurred by two or more persona. Thus, ft is one in which the obligors (being two or more in number) bind themselves jointly but not sever-ally, and which must therefore be prosecuted in a joint action against them all;-distinguished from "joint and several" obligation.
A place of meeting or resort for persons engaged in evil and secret practices of any kind, as a tramps’ joint, an "opium joint," or, generally speaking, a rendezvous for persona of evil habits and practices. State v. Shoaf, 179 N.C. 744, 102 S.E. 705, 706, 9 A.L.R. 426.
In masonry, the permanent meeting surface of two bodies, as stones or bricks, held together by cement or otherwlse, and, in paving blocks, the space between the side faces of the blocks brought together or nearly in touch. Central Union Stock Yarda Co. v. Ualde Asphalt Paving Co., 82 N.J.Eq. 246, 87 A. 235, 239.
As used In income tax statute authorizing flling of joint return by spouses, means that both spouses should be li-able for resulting tax. Moore v. United States, Ct.Cl., 37 F.Supp. 136, 140.
As to joint "Adventure," "Ballot," "Committee," "Contract," "Covenant," "Creditor," "Fiat," "Fine," "Indictment," "Obligation," "Obligee," "Obligor," "Owner," "Rate," "Resolution," "Session," "Ten-ancy," "Tenants," "Tortfeasor," "Trespass," "Tres-passers," "Trustees," and "Will," see those titles. As to joint-stock banks, see Bank; joint-stock company, see Company; joint-stock corporation, see Corporation.
JOINT ACCOUNT. An account in two or more names. Harbour v. Harbour, 207 Ark. 551, 181 S.W.2d 805, 807.
In order to bank that "my checking account be made joint" with another "for him to check on only in case of my death," means that other person should take as survivor as joint tenant. First Nat. Bank v. Mulich, 83 Colo. 518, 266 P. 1110, 1111.
JOINT ACTION. An action brought by two or more as plaintiffs or against two or more as de-fendants.
JOINT AND SEVERAL. A liability is said to be joint and several when the creditor may sue one or more of the parties to such liability separately, or all of them together at his option. Dicey, Par-ties 230.
A joint and several bond or note is one In which the obligors or makers bind themselves both jointly and in-dividually to the obligee or payee, so that all may be sued together for its enforcement, or the creditor may select one or more as the object of his suit. See Mitchell v. Dar-ricott, 3 Brev., S.C., 145; Rice v. Gove, 22 Pick., Mass., 158, 33 Arn. Dec. 724.
JOINT AUTHORSHIP. As to literary property, where there exists a common design to the exe-cution of which several persons contribute. Mere alterations, additions or improvements, whether with or without the sanction of the author, will not entitle the person making them to claim to be a joint author of the work. 18 C.J.S., Copyright and Literary Property, § 11, p. 145.
Joint labor in furtherance of a common design. Edward B. Marks Music Corporation v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 140 F.2d 266, 267.
JOINT CAUSE OF ACTION. This term, as used in Equity Rule 26 (see Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 18, 20, 82, 28 U.S.C.A.), does not mean a technical legal privity, such as a joint contract;
but the rule will be satisfied where there is a single question of law and fact common to all the complainants, as where in a suit to quiet title they claim separate parcels of land under a common source of title. Commodores Point Terminal Co. v. Hudnall, D.C.Fla., 283 F. 150, 171.
JOINT DEBTORS. Persons united in a joint lia-bility or indebtedness. Two or more persons joint-ly hable for the same debt. See Robertson v. Smith, 18 Johns., N.Y., 459, 9 Am.Dec. 227; Ex parte Zeigler, 83 S.C. 78, 64 S.E. 513, 916, 21 L.R.A., N.S., 1005.
JOINT DEBTORS’ ACTS. Statutes enacted in many of the states, which provide that judgment may be given for or against one or more of sev-eral plaintiffs, and for or against one or more of several defendants, and that, "in an action against several defendants, the court may, in its discre-tion, render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others, whenever a several judgment is proper." The name is also given to statutes providing that where an action is instituted against two or more defendants upon an alleged joint liability, and some of them are served with process, but juris-diction is not obtained over the others, the plaintiff may still proceed to trial against those who are be-fore the court, and, if he recovers, may have judg-ment against all of the defendants whom he shows to be jointly hable. 1 Black, Judgm. §§ 208, 235. And see Hall v. Lanning, 91 U.S. 168, 23 L.Ed. 271.
JOINT ENTERPRISE. Also called "common en-terprise." The joint prosecution of common pur-pose under such circumstances that each has authority express or implied to act for all in re-spect to the control, means or agencies em-ployed to execute such common purpose. Hines v. Welch, Tex.Civ.App., 229 S.W. 681, 683. Green-well’s Adm’r v. Burba, 298 Ky. 255, 182 S.W.2d 436, 441; Illingworth v. Madden, 135 Me. 159, 192 A. 273, 276, 110 A.L.R. 1090. An enterprise par-ticipated in by associates acting together. How-ard v. Zimmerman, 120 Kan. 77, 242 P. 131, 132. There must be a community of interests in the objects or purposes of the undertaking, and an equal right to direct and govern the movements and conduct of each other with respect thereto; each must have some voice and right to be heard in its control or management. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Bell, 58 Okl. 84, 159 P. 336, 337, L.R.A. 1917A, 543; Trumpfeller v. Crandall, 130 Me. 279, 155 A. 646, 650; Murphy v. Keating, 204 Minn. 269, 283 N.W. 389, 392, 393; Bloom v. Leech, 120 Ohio St. 239, 166 N.E. 137, 138.
JOINT ESTATE. "Joint estate" involves unity of interest, unity of title, unity of time, and unity of possession, and joint tenants must have the same interest accruing under the same conveyance, commencing at the same time, and held under the same undivided possession. Deslauriers v. Senes-ac, 331 III. 437, 163 N.E. 327, 329, 62 A.L.R. 511.
At common law, estates in which there were a plurality of tenants were described as "joint-estates" which designa-tion Includes estates in coparcenary, tenancles In common and joint tenancles, within which class are included tenancles by the entlrety but the terms Is not synonymcrus with "joint tenancies". Mosser v. Dolsay, 132 N.J.Eq. 121, 27 A.2d 155, 157.
JOINT EXECUTORS. Co-executors; two or more who are joined in the execution of a will. See, also, Coexecutor.
JOINT FEASORS IN PARI DELICTO. Phrase means as between persons who by concert of ac-tion intentionally commit the wrong complained of; there is no right of contribution. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Leonard, 210 Ark. 575, 196 S.W.2d 919, 920.
JOINT INDUSTRY OF HUSBAND AND WIFE. This phrase, as applied in Oklahoma statutes to property passing by descent, means the industry of a husband and wife each, in his or her recog-nized sphere of marital activity, and not that both must pursue jointly the same business or calling. In re Stone’s Estate, 86 Okl. 33, 206 P. 246, 247. See, also, Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 121 Okl. 145, 247 P. 684, 687.
JOINT INTEREST. This term within federal rule requiring persons having a joint interest to be made parties, refers to parties designated as necessary or indispensable under former practice, and means an interest which must be directly af-fected by adjudication in the case. Platte County v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., D.C.Neb., 6 F.R.D. 475, 482.
JOINT INVENTIONS. These are made when two or more persons jointly work or collaborate. in de-vising and putting into practical form the subject-matter of patent. Altoona Publix Theatres v. American Tri-Ergon Corporation, C.C.A.Pa., 72 F. 2d 53, 56.
JOINT LIABILITY. One wherein joint obligor has right to insist that co-obligor be joined as a codefendant with him, that is, that they be sued jointly. Schram v. Perkins, D.C.Mich., 38 F.Supp. 404, 407.
JOINT LIVES. This expression is used to desig-nate the duration of an estate or right which is granted to two or more persons to be enjoyed so long as they both (or all) shall live. As soon as one dies, the interest determines. See Highley v. Allen, 3 Mo.App. 524.
JOINT NEGLIGENCE. In case of "joint negli-gence" of several people, proximately causing ac-cident, they act together in concert and either do something together which they should not do or fail to do something which they are together ob-ligated to do under circumstances. Russo v. Au-ooin, La.App., 7 So.2d 744, 747.
.JOINT OFFENSE. One offense committed by two or more persons jointly. Jacoby v. State, 212 Ind. 465, 8 N.E.2d 978, 979; State ex rel. Flaherty v. Ermston, 209 Ind. 117, 197 N.E. 908, 911.
JOINT POLICY. Insurance on lives of spouses, for benefit of survivor. O’Boyle v. Home Life Ins. Co. of America, D.C.Pa., 20 F.Supp. 33, 36; Ken-
sington Nat. Bank of Philadelphia v. Sampson, 149 Pa.Super. 43, 26 A.2d 115, 118.
JOINT STOCK INSURANCE COMPANY. An in surance company having a subscribed capital and policyholders having nothing to do with manage-ment. Ohio Farmers Indemnity Co. v. Commis-sioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.6, 108 F.2d 665, 667.
JOINT TORT. Where two or more persons owe to another the same duty and by their common neglect such other is injured, the tort is "joint." Boyd v. Maxwell, 190 S.C. 103, 2 S.E.2d 395, 397; Leishman v. Brady, 9 W.W.Harr. 559, 3 A.2d 118, 120; Walder v. Manahan, 21 N.J.Misc. 1, 29 A.2d 395, 396.
JOINT VENTURE. See Adventure.
JOINTIST. A person established in a definite place of business, for the purpose of illegally sell-ing intoxicants. Scriven v. City of Lebanon, 99 Kan. 602, 162 P. 307, 309, L.R.A.1917C, 460. One who opens up, conducts, or maintains any place for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors. Rem. Comp.Stat.Wash. § 7328; State v. Pistona, 127 Wash. 171, 219 P. 859, 860.
JOINTLY. Unitedly, combined or joined together in unity of interest or liability. Soderberg v. At-lantic Lighterage Corporation, D.C.N.Y., 15 F.2d 209. In a joint manner; in concert; not separate-ly; in conjunction. Reclamation Dist. v. Parvin, 67 Cal. 501, 8 P. 43; Case v. Owen, 139 Ind. 22, 38 N.E. 395, 47 Am.St.Rep. 253; White v. Powell, 246 Ala. 356, 20 So.2d 467, 469. To be or become Fiable to a joint obligation; Arndt v. Brockhausen, 332 Pa. 416, 3 A.2d 384, 386; Kaspar American State Bank v. Oul Homestead Ass’n, 301 Ill.App. 326, 22 N.E.2d 785, 786; Creighton v. Continental Roll & Steel Foundry Co., 155 Pa.Super. 165, 38 A.2d 337, 342. Participated in or used by two or more, held or shared in common. Wunderlich v. Bleyle, 96 N. J.Eq. 135, 125 A. 386, 388. These are the non-technical meanings of the word, which it frequent-ly has in wills, as opposed to its technical significa-tion creating a joint tenancy. Overheiser v. Lack-ey, 207 N.Y. 229, 100 N.E. 738, Ann.Cas.1914C, 229.
Persons are "jointly bound" In a bond or note when both or all must be sued in one action for its enforcement, not either one at the election of the creditor.
JOINTLY ACQUIRED PROPERTY. Property accumulated by joint industry of husband and wife during marriage. Tobin v. Tobin, 89 Okl. 12, 213 P. 884; Bruce v. Bruce, 141 Okl. 160, 285 P. 30, 36.
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY. See Joint and Sev-eral.
JOINTRESS, JOINTURESS. A woman ‘who has an estate settled on her by her husband, to hold during her Life, if she survive him. Co.Litt. 46.
JOINTURE. A freehold estate in lands or tene-ments secured to the wife, and to take effect on the decease of the husband, and to continue dur-ing her lile at the least, unless shé be herself the cause of its determination. Vance v. Vance, 21 Me. 369..A competent livelihood of freehold for the wife, of lands and tenements, to take effect, in profit or possession, presently after the death of the hus-band, for the life of the wife at least. Comstock v. Comstock, 146 Ark. 266, 225 S.W. 621, 622; Co. Litt. 36b; 2 Bl.Comm. 137; Gercke v. Gercke, 331 III. 413, 163 N.E. 323, 325. A competent live-lihood for the wife in the husband’s property to take effect after his death; it is an estate con-veyed or devised to the wife in lieu of dower and it must be in satisfaction of it. Maynard’s Adm’r v. Maynard, 285 Ky. 75, 146 S.W.2d 343, 344.
A jointure strictly signifles a joint estate limited to both husband and wife, and such was its original form; but, in its more usual form, it is a sole estate limited to the wife only, expectant upon a life-estate in the husband. 2 BI. Comm. 137; 1 Steph.Comm. 255.
In England, before the time of Henry VIII, in order to Rrotect a wife who was deprived of dower by conveyances to uses, it was the usual custom of the husband before marriage to take an estate from his feoffees and limit it to himself and his intended wife for their lives in joint tenancy or jointure to protect the wife in case of his death, and St. 27 Henry VIII prohibited the widow from having both dower and jointure, which has been continued as part of law by Acts Va. 1785, c. 65 (1 Hening’s St. at Large, p. 162), Rev. Code 1819, c. 107, and Code 1849, c. 110 (Code 1930, § 5117 et seq.). Jacobs v. Jacobs, 100 W. Va. 585, 131 S.E. 449, 453.
JOKER. In political usage, a clause in legisla-tion that is ambiguous or apparently immaterial, inserted to render it inoperative or uncertain with-out arousing opposition at the time of passage. Bennet v. Commercial Advertiser Ass’n, 230 N.Y. 125, 129 N.E. 343, 344.
JOLT. A sudden shock or jerk; a jolting motion, as in a vehicle moving over a rough street or highway; the effect produced by a sudden start or quick increase in the speed of a vehicle. 48 C.J.S. p. 939. See Jerk, supra.
JONCARIA, or JONCARIA. In old English law. Land where rushes grow. Co.Litt. 5a.
JORNALE. In old English law. As much land as could be plowed in one day. Spelman.
JOSH. To ridicule or tease, or make fun of in a joke, to lure or tease by misrepresenting the facts. State v. Powers, 181 Iowa 452, 164 N.W. 856, 861.
JOSTLE. To push or crowd in passing. Baker v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 327 Mo. 986, 39 S.W.2d 535, 543.
JOUIR. A French word, meaning to enjoy; to have enjoyment of; or to possess. Allison v. Maroun, 193 La. 286, 190 So. 408, 411.
JOUR. A French word, signifying "day."
It is used in our old law-books; as "tont jours," for-ever. It is also frequently employed in the composition of words: as, journal, a daybook; journey-man, a man who works by the day; journeys account.
JOUR EN BANC. A day in banc. Distinguished from "jour en pays," (a day in the country,) oth-erwise called "jour en nisi prius."
JOUR IN COURT. In old practice. Day in court; day to appear in court; appearance day. "Every process gives the defendant a day in court." Hale, Anal. § 8.
JOURNAL. A daily book; a book in which en-tries are made or events recorded from day to day.
In maritime law, the journal (otherwise called "log" or "log-book") is a book kept on every vessei, which con. tains a brief record of the events and occurrences of each day of a voyage, with the nautical observations, course of the ship, account of the weather, etc. In the system of double-entry bookkeeping, the journal is an account-book into which are transcribed, daily or at other intervals, the items entered upon the day-book, for more convenient posting into the ledger. In the usage of legislative bodies, the journal is a daily record of the proceedings of either house. It is kept by the clerk, and in it are entered the appointments and actions of committees, introduction of bilis, motions, votes, resolutions, etc., in the order of their occurrence. See Montgomery Beer Bottling Works v. Gas-ton, 126 Ala. 425, 28 So. 497, 51 L.R.A. 396, 85 AmSt.Rep. 42.
The daily printed pamphlets which contain the record of the proceedings of each house of the Legislature are the "journals" of the respective houses. Amos v. Moseley, 74 Fla. 555, 77 So. 619, 621, L.R.A.1918C, 482.
A ”journal" is a permanent record, and the daily min-utes kept by the secretary of the Senate or the journal clerk from which the permanent record is flnally made up, does not constitute a part of the journal. Niven v. Road Improvement Dist. No. 14 of Jefferson County, 132 Ark. 240, 200 S.W. 997, 998.
JOURNAL ENTRY RULE. Regularity of enact-ment of statute may be inquired into by examin-ing legislative journals. Freeman v. Goff, 206 Minn. 49, 287 N.W. 238, 240.
JOURNEY. Originally, a day’s travel. The word is now applied to a travel by land from place to place, without restriction of time. But, when thus applied, it is employed to designate a travel which is without the ordinary habits, business, or duties of the person, to a distance from his honre, and be-yond the circle of his friends or acquaintances. Gholson v. State, 53 Ala. 521, 25 Am.Rep. 652.
JOURNEY—HOPPERS. In English law. Regra-tors of yarn. 8 Hen. VI. c. 5.
JOURNEYMAN. A workman hired by the day, or other given time. Hart v. Aldridge, 1 Cowp. 56; Butler v. Clark, 46 Ga. 468.
JOURNEYS ACCOUNT. In English practice. A new writ which the plaintiff was permitted to sue out within a reasonable time after the abatement, without his fault, of the first writ. This time was computed with reference to the number of days which the plaintiff must spend in journeying to reach the court; hence the name of journeys ac-count, that is, journeys accomptes or counted. Co.Litt. fol. 9b; English v. T. H. Rogers Lumber Co., 68 Okl. 238, 173 P. 1046, 1048.
This mode of proceeding has fallen into disuse, the prac-tice now being to permit that writ to be quashed, and to sue out another. See Termes de la Ley; Bacon, Abr. Abatement (Q): 14 Viner, Abr. 558; 4 Com.Dig. 714; 7 M. & G. 762; Richards v. Ins. Co., 8 Cranch, 84, 3 L.Ed. 496.
JOUSTS. See Justs.
JUBERE. Lat. In the civil law. To order, di-rect, or command. Calvin. The word jubeo (I or-den) in a will, was called a "word of direction,"

as distinguished from "precatory words." Cod. 6, 43, 2.
To assure or promise. To decree or pass a law.
JUBILACION. In Spanish law. The privilege of a public officer to be retired, on account of in-firmity or disability, retaining the rank and pay of his office (or part of the same) after twenty years of public service, and on reaching the age of fifty.
JUDIEUS, JUDEUS. Lat. A Jew.
JUDAISMUS. The religion and rites of the Jews. Du Cange. A quarter set apart for residence of Jews. Du Cange. A usurious rate of interest. 1 Mon.Angl. 839; 2 Mon.Angl. 10,665. Sex marcos sterlingorum ad acquietandam terram prcedictum de Judaismo, in quo fuit impignorata. Du Cange. An income anciently accruing to the king from the Jews. Blount.
JUDEX. Lat.
In Roman law. A private person appointed by the pretor, with the consent of the parties, to try and decide a cause of action commenced before him. He received from the pretor a written for-mula instructing him as to the legal principies ac-cording to which the action was to be judged. Calvin. Hence the proceedings before him were said to be in judicio, as those before the pretor were said to be in jure. A judge who conducted the trial from beginning to end; magistratus.
The practice of calling in judices was disused before Justinlan’s time: therefore, in the Code, Institutes, and Novels, judex means judge In its modern sense. Heinec-chis, Elem. Jur.Civ. § 1327. The term judex is used with very different signitIcations at different periods of Roman law.
In later and modern Civil law. A judge in the modern sense of the term.
In old English law. A juror. A judge, in modern sense, especially—as opposed to justiciarius, i. e., a common-law judge—to denote an ecclesiastical judge. Bract. fols. 401, 402.
JUDEX A QUO. In modern civil law. The judge from whom, as judex ad quem is the judge to whom, an appeal is made or taken. Halifax, Civ-il Law, b. 3, c. 11, no. 34.
JUDEX AD QUEM. A judge to whom an appeal is taken.
JUDEX 7EQUITATEM SEMPER SPECTARE DE-BET. A judge ought always to regard equity. Jenk. Cent. p. 45, case 85.
JUDEX ANTE OCULOS /EQUITATEM SEMPER HABERE DEBET. A judge ought always to have equity before his eyes. Jenk. Cent. p. 58.
.JUDEX BONUS NIHIL EX ARBITRIO SUO FA-CIAT, NEO PROPOSITO DONIESTIGE VOLUN-TATIS, SED JUXTA LEGES ET JURA PRONUN-CIET. A good judge should do nothing of his own arbitrary will, nor on the dictate of his per-sonal inclination, but should decide according to law and justice. 7 Coke, 27a.
JUDEX DAMNATUR CUM NOCENS ABSOLVI-TUR. The judge is condemned when a guilty person escapes punishment.
JUDEX DATUS. In Roman law. A judge given, that is, assigned or appointed, by the pretor to try a cause.
JUDEX DEBET JUDICARE SECUNDUM ALLE-GATA ET PROBATA. The judge ought to de-cide according to the allegations and the proofs.
JUDEX DELEGATUS. A delegated judge; a spe-cial j udge.
JUDEX EST LEX LOQUENS. A judge is the law speaking, [the mouth of the law.] 7 Coke, 4a.
JUDEX FISCALIS. A fiscal judge; one having cognizance of matters relating to the fiscus, (q. v.).
JUDEX HABERE DEBET DUOS SALES,—SAL-EM SAPIENTI2E, NE SIT INSIPIDUS; ET SAL-EM CONSCIENTLE, NE SIT DIABOLUS. A judge should have two salts,—the salt of wisdom, lest he be insipid [or foolish]; and the salt of consciente, lest he be devilish. 3 Inst. 147; Bart. Max. 189.
JUDEX NON POTEST ESSE TESTIS IN PRO-FRIA CAUSA. A judge cannot be a witness in his own cause. 4 Inst. 279.
JUDEX NON POTEST INJURIAM SIBI DATAM PUNIRE. A judge cannot punish a wrong done to himself. See 12 Coke, 114.
JUDEX NON REDDIT PLUS QUAM QUOD PET-ENS IPSE REQUIRIT. A judge does not give more than what the complaining party himself demands. 2 Inst. 286.
JUDEX ORDINARIUS. In the civil law. An or-dinary judge; one who had the right of hearing and determining causes as a matter of his own proper jurisdiction, (ex propria jurisdictione,) and not by virtue of a delegated authority. Calvin. According to Blackstone judices ordinaril deter-mined only questions of fact. 3 Bl.Comm. 315.
JUDEX PEDANEUS. In Roman law. Inferior judge; deuuty judge. The judge who was com-missioned by the pretor to hear a cause was so-called, from the low seat which he anciently oc-cupied at the foot of the pretor’s tribunal.
JUDEX QUiESTIONIS. A magistrate who de-cided the law of a criminal case, when the prcetor himself did not sit as a magistrate. Morey, Rom. L. 88. The director of the criminal court under the presidency of the prcetor. Harper’s Lat. Dict.; Cic. Brut. 76, 264.
JUDEX SELECTUS. A select or selected judex or judge. The judges in criminal suits selected by the prcetor. Harper’s Lat.Dict.; Cic.Verr. 2, 2, 13, § 32. These judices selecti were used in criminal causes, and between them and modern jurors many points of resemblance have been no-ticed; 3 Bla.Comm. 366.

JUDGE. An officer so named in his commission, who presides in some court; a public officer, ap-pointed to preside and to administer the law in a court of justice; the chief member of a court, and charged with the control of proceedings and the decision of questions of law or discretion. Todd v. U. S., 15 S.Ct. 889, 158 U.S. 278, 39 L.Ed. 982; Foot v. Stiles, 57 N.Y. 405; State v. Le Blond, 108 Ohio Si. 126, 140 N.E. 510, 512. A public of-ficer who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority. State ex rel. Mayer v. City of Cincinnati, 60 Ohio App. 119, 19 N.E.2d 902. Pre-siding officer of court. State v. Horn, 336 Mo. 524, 79 S.W.2d 1044, 1045. Any officer authorized to function as or for judge in doing specified acts. In re Roberts’ Estate, 49 Cal.App.2d 71, 120 P.2d 933, 937.
The term is sometimes held to include all officers ap-pointed to decide litigated questions while acting In that capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors who are judges of the facts; Com. v. Dallas, 4 Dall. 229, 1 L.Ed. 812; In re Hess, 20 N.J.Misc. 12, 23 A.2d 298, 300, 301; Webster v. Boyer, 81 Or. 485, 159 P. 1166, Ann.Cas. 1918D, 988; but see, contra, Alcorn v. Fellows, 102 Conn. 22, 127 A. 911, 915; Vollmer v. Board of Com’rs of Dubois County, 53 Ind.App. 149, 101 N.E. 321, 322. In ordinary legal use, however, the term is limited to the sense of the first of the definitions here given, People v. Wilson, 15 III. 388; and it has been held that a surrogate Is not a "judge" within a statute providing for addltional compensation to a judge for his services in drawing jurors, People ex rel. Noble v. Mitchel, 170 App.Div. 379, 155 N.Y.S. 660, 662; nor are United States commissioners judges, although they at times act in a (lilas’ judicial capacity and exercise the power of a court, In so far as an act of Congress has con-ferred specific authority or imposed the performance of a special duty, United States v. Jones, D.C.N.Y., 230 F. 262, 264.
As used in Chandler Act, means the judge of court of bankruptcy. London v. O’Dougherty, C.C.A.2, 102 F.2d 524, 525; Dickinson Industrial Site v. Cowan, III., 309 U.S. 382, 60 S.Ct. 595, 597, 84 L.Ed. 819. As used in statute authorizing introduction in criminal proceeding of a writ-Ing written for purpose of comparison under supervision of a judge, means judge of a court of record, and does not include a justice. State v. Shade, 119 W.Va. 600, 195 S.E. 338.
"Judge" and "court"- are often synonymous or Inter-changeable. In re Slattery, 310 Mich. 458. 17 N.W.2d 251, 259; Commonwealth v. Shawell, 325 Pa. 497, 191 A. 17, 19, but see holding that a judge is not a court, State ex rel. Mayer v. City of Cincinnati, 60 Ghia App. 119, 19 N.E.2d 902.
"Judge" and "justice" (q. v.) are often used in sub-stantially the same sense.
JUDGE ADVOCATE. An officer of a court-mar-tial, whose duty is to swear in the other members of the court, to advise the court, and to act as the public prosecutor; but he is also so far the counsel for the prisoner as to be bound to protect him from the necessity of answering criminating questions, and to object to leading questions when propounded to other witnesses.
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL. The adviser of the government in reference to courts-martial and other matters of military law. In England, he is generally a member of the house of commons and of the government for the time being.
JUDGE DE FACTO. One who holds and exer-cises the office of a judge under color of lawful authority and by a title valid on its face, though he has not full right to the office, as where he was
appointed under an unconstitutional statute, or by an usurper of the appointing power, or has not taken the oath of office. State v. Miller, 111 Mo. 542, 20 S.W. 243; Walcott v. Wells, 21 Nev. 47, 24 P. 367, 9 L.R.A. 59, 37 Am.St.Rep. 478; Dredla v. Baache, 60 Neb. 655, 83 N.W. 916; Caldwell v. Bar-rett, 71 Ark. 310, 74 S.W. 748.
In Missouri, a special judge is a "judge de facto". State ex rel. McGaughey v. Grayston, 349 Mo. 700, 163 S.W.2d 335, 337.
JUDGE-MADE LAW. A phrase used to indicate judicial decisions which construe away the mean-ing of statutes, or find meanings in them the leg-islature never intended. It is sometimes used as meaning, simply, the law established by judicial precedent. Cooley, Const.Lim., 4th ed. 70, note.
JUDGE ORDINARY. By St. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, § 9, the judge of the court of probate was made judge of the court for divorce and matrimonial causes created by that act, under the name of the "judge ordinary."
In Scotland, the tItle "judge ordinary" is applied to all those judges, whether supreme or inferior, who, by the nature of their office, have a fixed and determinate juris-diction In all actions of the same general nature, as con-tradistinguished from the old Scotch privy council, or from those judges to whom some special matter is com-mitted; such as commissioners for taking proofs, and messengers at arras. Bell.
JUDGE PRO TEMPORE. One appointed for the term or some part thereof, during which time he exercises all the functions of the regular judge. State ex rel. Hodshire v. Bingham, 218 Ind. 490, 33 N.E.2d 771, 134 A.L.R. 1126.
JUDGER. A Cheshire juryman. Jacob.
JUDGE’S CERTIFICATE. In English practice. A certificate, signed by the judge who presided at the trial of a cause, that the party applying is en-titled to costs. In some cases, this is a necessary preliminary to the taxing of costs for such party. A statement of the opinion of the court, signed by the judges, upon a question of law submitted to them by the chancellor for their decision. See 3 Bl.Comm. 453.
JUDGE’S MINUTES, OR NOTES. Memoranda usually taken by a judge, while a trial is proceed-ing, of the testimony of witnesses, of documents offered or admitted in evidente, of offers of evi-dence, and whether it has been received or reject-ed, and the like matters.
JUDGE’S ORDER. An order made by a judge at chambers, or out of court.
JUDGMENT. A sense of knowledge sufficient to comprehend nature of transaction. Thomas v. Young, 57 App.D.C. 282, 22 F.2d 588, 590.
An opinion or estimate. McClung Const. Co. v. Muncy, Tex.Civ.App., 65 S.W.2d 786, 790.
The conclusion in a syllogism having for its major and minor premises issues raised by the pleadings and the proofs thereon. Barlow v. Scott, Mo.Sup., 85. S.W.2d 504, 517.
The formation of an opinion or notion concern-ing some thing by exercising the mirad upon it.

Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. Humphrys, C.C.A. Ohio, 97 F.2d 849, 857.
The official and authentic decision of a court of justice upon the respective rights and claims of the parties to an action or ‘sult therein litigated and submitted to its determination. People v. He• bel, 19 Colo.App. 523, 76 P. 550; Bullock v. Bul-lock, 52 N.J.Eq. 561, 30 A. 676, 27 L.R.A. 213, 46 Am.St.Rep. 528; State v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 18 R.I. 16, 25 A. 246, 17 L.R.A. 856.
Also It Is, or may mean, adjudication, Horner v. Nerling-er, 304 Mich. 225, 7 N.W.2d 281, 284; Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., v. United Artists Corporation, C.C.A.Del., 113 F.2d 703, 706; Sutton v. Rhodes, 205 Iowa 227, 217 N.W. 626, 628; aflirmance by court of compensation award. Lenon v. Standard Oil Co., 134 Kan. 289, 5 P.2d 853, 854; con-clusion of law upon facts found or admitted by the parties or upon their default in the course of the suit. Tidd.Pr. 930; Ross v. C. D. Mallory Corporation, 37 A.2d 766, 768, 132 N.J.L. 1; Bell v. State Industrial Accident Commis-sion, 157 Or. 653, 74 P.2d 55, 57; Siddall v. Jansen, 143 III. 537, 32 N.E. 384; conclusion that naturally follows from the premisas of law and fact. Branch v. Branch, 5 Fla. 450; In re Sedgely Ave., 88 Pa. 513; debt which a court of law flnds to be due and orders to be paid, Truscon Steel Co. of Canada, Limited, v. Biegler, 306 Ill.App. 180, 28 N.E.2d 623, 625; decision or determination on issues in any proceeding at law, Schmeizl v. Schmeizl, 184 Md. 584, 42 A.2d 106, 112; decision or sentence of the law, given by a court of justice or other competent tribunal, as the result of proceedIngs instituted therein, 3 Bla.Com. 395; Aetna Co. v. Swift, 12 Minn. 327 (Gil. 326); Allegheny Coun-ty v. Maryland Casualty Co., C.C.A.Pa., 132 F.2d 894, 897; State v. Siglea, 196 Wash. 283, 82 P.2d 583, 584; decision or sentence of the law pronounced by the court and entered upon its docket, minutes or record, Clerk v. State, 72 Ga. App. 603, 34 S.E.2d 608, 613; decision or sentence of the law pronounced by court or other competent tribunal upon the matter in record, Reed v. Howbert, C.C.A.Colo., 77 F. 2d 227, 228; Commonwealth ex rel. Kelley v. Brown, 527 Pa. 136, 193 A. 258, 260; determination of a court of com-petent jurisdiction upon matters submitted to it. State ex rel. Curran v. Brookes, 142 Ohio St. 107, 50 N.E.2d 995, 998; determination or sentence of the law, pronounced by a competent judge or court, as the result of an action or pro-ceeding instituted in such court, affirming that, upon the matters submitted for its decision, a legal duty or liabílity does or does not exist, 1 Black, Judgm. § 1; Gunter v. Earnest, 68 Ark. 180, 56 S.W. 876; Danner v. Walker-Smith Co. Tex.Civ.App., 154 S.W. 295, 298; State v. King, 18 Wash.2d 747, 140 P.2d 283, 286; final determination of "any action or proceeding", Dahmen v. Gregory, 184 Misc. 724, 55 N.Y.S.2d 311, 313; final determination of rights of the parties in an action or proceeding, State v. McN1chols, 62 Idaho 616, 115 P.2d 104, 107; California Machinery & Supply Co. v. University City Syndicate, Inc., 3 Cal.App.2d 425, 39 P.2d 853; Elliott v. Elliott, 154 Kan. 145, 114 P.2d 823, 825; final determination or action of the court. El Centro Grain Co. v. Bank of Italy Nat. Trust & Savings Ass’n, 123 Cal.App. 564, 11 P.2d 650, 651; Jackson v. Slaughter, Tex.Civ.App., 185 S.W.2d 759, 761; State ex rel. McDonald v. Lollis, 326 Mo. 644, 33 S.W.2d 98, 100; first order containing all necessary recitals which with finality dispose of cause, In re McLeod’s Estate, 143 Or. 233, 21 P. 2d 1084; formal expression and evidence of the actual de-cision of a lawsuit, Gossman v. Gossman, 52 Cal.App.2d 184, 126 P.2d 178, 185; judicial determination of guilt based upon a verdict or a plea of guilty, People v. La Sasso, 182 Misc. 538, 44 N.Y.S.2d 93, 97; judicial determination or sentence of the court upon a matter within its jurisdiction, United States v. Hark, Mass., 320 U.S. 531, 64 S.Ct. 359, 360, 361, 88 L.Ed. 290; Schmeizl v. Schmeizl, 184 Md. 584, 42 A.2d 106, 112; law’s last word in a judicial controversy, Pierce v. Pierce, 97 Colo. 39, 46 P.2d 748, 749; People ex rel. Toman v. Crane, 372 III. 228, 23 N.E.2d 337, 339; ob-ligation especially of a debt created by decision or decree of court, Truscon Steel Co. of Canada, Limíted, v. Biegler, 306 Ill.App. 180, 28 N.E.2d 623, 625; pronouncement by court from the bench, Walden v. Hudspeth, C.C.A.Kan., 115 F.2d 558, 559; pronouncement of judge, Bell Grocery v. Booth, 250 Ky. 1, 61 S.W.2d 879; Wilson v. Bell, C.C.A. Tenn., 137 F.2d 716, 720; record in the book, not the in-Black’s Law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed.-62
strument typewritten and signed by the clerk, Groth v. Nesa, 65 N.D. 580, 2.60 N.W. 700; sentence In criminal case, Attorney General ex rel, O’Hara v. Montgomery, 275 Mich. 504, 267 N.W. 550, 554; Moore v. Thorn, 154 Misc, 136, 277 N.Y.S, 544; Commonwealth v. Trunk, 320 Pa. 270, 182 A. 540, 541; sentence of the law on ultímate facts admitted by pleadinga or proved by evidence, Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Anthony, 142 Kan. 670, 52 P.2d 1208, 1211, 104 A.L.R. 364; what the court pronounces, Corbett v. Rankin Inde-pendent School Dist., Tex.Civ.App., 100 S.W.2d 113, 115; De Leon v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass’n, Tex.Civ.App., 159 S.W.2d 574, 575.
The term "judgment" is also used to denote the reason which the court gives for its decision; but thls la more properly denominated an "opinion."
A decree is a judgment. Fuller v. Fuller, 49 R.I. 45, 139 A. 662, 663; Knettle v. Knettle, 190 Wash. 395, 68 P.2d 218, 220; Spartan Mills v. Law, 186 S.C. 61, 194 S.E. 653, 655; National Surety Co. v. Mulligan, 105 N.J.L. 336, 146 A. 372, 375. As used in some statutes, judgi,,ent and de-cree are synonymous. Finnell v. Finnell, 113 Okl. 269, 230 P. 912, 913; Kline v. Murray, 79 Mont. 530, 257 P. 465, 467; Weeden v. Weeden, 116 Ohio St. 524, 156 N.E. 908, 909.
An allowance or disallowance of a claim may be a judg-ment. United States v. Paisley, D.C.I11., 26 F.Supp. 237, 238; In re HIller’s Estate, 171 Or. 428, 137 P.2d 828, 830; State ex rel. Spellman v. Commercial State Bank of Omaha, 143 Neb. 490, 10 N.W.2d 268.
An award may be in the nature of, or equivalent of, a judgment. Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Baker, Tex.Civ. App., 111 S.W.2d 837, 839, 840; Holliday v. Salling, 54 Ariz. 496, 97 P.2d 221, 223, 126 A.L.R. 145; Wisconsin Compensation Bureau v. Mortensen, 227 Wis. 335, 277 N.W. 679, 684; Detroit Trust Co. v. Van Wagoner, 295 Mich. 449, 295 N.W. 222, 223.
An entry on court record may constitute a judgment. Nichols v. Chandler, Ohio App., 61 N.E.2d 239, 240.
An order may be a judgment: Compensation proceed-ing. Truax-Traer Coal Co. v. Compensation Com’r, 123 W. Va. 621, 17 S.E.2d 330, 334; Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Baker, Tex.Civ.App., 111 S.W.2d 837, 839, 840; State v. Thierfelder, 114 Mont. 104, 132 P.2d 1035, 1037; State v. McNichols, 62 Idaho 552, 115 P.2d 104, 107; Baumgartner v. United States, C.C.A.Mo., 138 F.2d 29, 33.
Commitment to institution, etc., as a judgment, People ex rel. McCarthy v. Snyder, Sup., 54 N.Y.S.2d 40, 41; Ex parte Herrera, 143 P.2d 345, 349, 23 Ca1.2d 206.
The words "decision" and "judgment" may be used in-terchangeably. Smith v. State, 196 Ga. 595, 27 S.E.2d 369, 373; Gutierrez v. Brady, 45 N.M. 209, 113 P.2d 585, 537; but in a different context may not be synonymous. Men-nel Milling Co. v. Slosser, 140 Ohio St. 445, 45 N.E.2d 306, 308. They are not the same thing under federal rules. Winkelman v. General Motors Corporation, D.C.N.Y., 48 F.Supp. 490, 494. A written decision that flnally deter-mines rights of parties is a "judgment". Zbikowski v. Straz, 236 Wis. 161, 294 N.W. 541, 543. Decisions by Secretary of the Interior on matters relating to public lands are equiva-lent of a "judgment" of a court. Elliott v. Thompson, 63 Idaho 395, 120 P.2d 1014, 1022. Decisions of administra-tiva boards are not "judgments". Dal Maso v. Board of Com’rs of Prince George’s County, 182 Md. 200, 34 A.2d 464, 466. The decision of the court, when filed, amounts to rendition of judgment. Lind v. Baker, 48 Cal.App.2d 234, 119 P.2d 806, 812.
To constitute act of bankruptcy, "judgment" suffered by debtor must be one that has become hen and, as such, a legal preference. Elkay Reflector Corporation v. Savory, Inc., C.C.A.N.Y., 57 F.2d 161, 162.
Judgments, considered with regard to the meth-od of obtaining them, may be classified as follows.
Admission of facts by the parties, leaving only issues of law to be determined. Such judgments are: judgment upon a demurrer; judgment on a case stated; judgment on a general verdict sub-ject to a special case; judgment on a special verAdmissions or confessions of one only of the parties; judgments based on. Such judgments when for defendant upon the admissions of the plaintiff are: judgment of nolle prosequi; judg-ment of retraxit; judgment on leave of court to discontinue; a stet proc.ssus. Judgments for the plaintiff upon facts admitted by the defendant are: judgment by cognovit actionem; cognovit or con-fession.
Trial of an issue of fact. judgments upon facts found are: Judgment of nul tiel record; judgment upon verdict; judgment non obstante veredicto; judgment of repleader.
Alternative judgment. One that by its terms might be satisfied by doing either of several acts at the election of the party or parties against whom the judgment is rendered and from whom performance is by the judgment required. Hen-derson v. Arkansas, 71 Okl. 253, 176 P. 751, 754. A judgment for one thing or another which does not specifically and in a definitive manner deter-mine the rights of the parties. State v. Wilson, 216 N.C. 130, 4 S.E.2d 440, 442.
Assets in futuro, judgment of. One against an executor or heir, who holds at the time no prop-erty on which it can operate. See Quando Acci-derint.
Case stated, judgment on. It sometimes hap-pens that though the adverse parties are agreed as to the facts, and only differ as to the law aris-ing out of them, still these facts do not so clearly appear on the pleadings as to enable them to ob-tain the opinion of the court by way of demurrer; for on demurrer the court can look at nothing whatever except the pleadings. In such circum-stances the statute 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, § 25, which has been imitated in most of the states, al-lows them after issue joined, and on obtaining the consent of a single judge, to state the facts in a special case for the opinion of the court, and agree that a judgment shall be entered for the plaintiff or defendant by confession or nolle pro-sequi immediately after the decision of the case; and judgment is entered accordingly, called judg-ment on a case stated.
Cassetur breve or billa, judgment of (that the writ or bill be quashed) is a judgment rendered in favor of a party pleading in abatement to a writ or action. Steph.P1. 130, 131.
Cognovit. See Cognovit.
Cognovit actionem. See Cognovit Actionem.
Conditional judgment. One whose force de-pends upon the performance of certain acts to be done in the future by one of the parties; as, one which may become of no effect if the defendant appears and pleads according to its terms, or one which orders the sale of mortgaged property in a foreclosure proceeding unless the mortgagor shall pay the amount decreed within the time limited. Mahoney v. New South Building & Loan Ass’n, C.C.Va., 70 F. 513; Simmons v. Jones, 118 N.C. 472, 24 S.E. 114.
Confession. At common law, judgment enter-ed where defendant, instead of entering plea, con-fessed action, or withdrew plea and confessed ac-tion. Information Buying Co. v. Miller, 173 Ga. 786, 161 S.E. 617, 618. Judgment where a defend-ant gives the plaintiff a cognovit or written con-fession of the action by virtue of which the plain-tiff enters judgment. The act of a debtor in per-mitting judgment to be entered against him by his creditor, for a stipulated sum, by a written state-ment to that effect or by warrant of attorney, with-out the institution of legal proceedings of any kind; voluntary submission to court’s jurisdiction.
O’Hara v. Manley, 140 Pa.Super. 39, 12 A.2d 820, 822.
Consent judgment. A judgment, the provisions and terms of which are settled and agreed to by the parties to the action. Hargis v. Hargis, 252 Ky. 198, 66 S.W.2d 59; Andrews v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 55 R.I. 341, 181 A. 403;
Matthews v. Looney, 132 Tex. 313, 123 S.W.2d 871, 872.
It is not the judgment of the court, it is the agreement of the parties, entered upon the record with the sanction and approval of the court, and is their act rather than that of the court. Andrews v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 55 R.I. 341, 181 A. 403; Cason v. Shutte, 211 N. C. 195, 189 S.E. 494, 495.
Consent judgments are, in effect, merely contracts ac-knowledged in open court and ordered to be recorded, but as such they bind the parties as fully as do other judg-ments. Prince v. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co., Tex.Civ. App., 250 S.W. 785, 789; Belcher v. Cobb, 169 N.C. 689, 86 S.E. 600, 602.
Contradictory judgment. A judgment which has been given after the parties have been heard, either in support of their claims or in their de-fense. Cox’s Ex’rs v. Thomas, 11 La. 366.
It is used in Louisiana to distinguish such judgments from those rendered by default.
De melioribus damnis. See De Melioribus Damnis.
Default and inquiry, judgment by. It estab-lishes right of action of kind properly pleaded in complaint, determines right of plaintiff to recover at least nominal damages and costs, and precludes defendant from offering any evidence on execution of inquiry to show that plaintiff has no right of action. De Hoff v. Black, 206 N.C. 687, 175 S.E. 179.
Default final, judgment by. It establishes al-legations of complaint and concludes by way of estoppel. De Hoff V. Black, 206 N.C. 687, 175 S.E. 179.
Default judgment. A judgment rendered in consequence of the non-appearance of the defend-ant. Beard v. Sovereign Lodge, W. O. W., 184 N.C. 154, 113 S.E. 661; In re Smith, 38 Idaho, 746, 225 P. 495, 496; Brame v. Nolen, 139 Va. 413, 124 S.E. 299, 301. One entered upon the failure of a party to appear or plead at the appointed time. The term is also applied to judgments entered un-der statutes or rules of court, for want of affldavit of defense, plea, answer, and the like, or for fail-ure to take some required step in the cause.Judgments rendered on defendant’s default are: Judg-ment bu default; judgment by non sum informatus; judgment ntil dicit. Judgments rendered on plaintiff’s de-fault are: Judgment of non pros. (from non prosequitur) and judgment of nonsuit (from non sequitur, or no suit Vas).
Deficiency judgment. See Deficiency.
Demurrer„judgment on. Concludes party de-murring, because by demurring, a party admits the facts alleged in the pleadings of his adversary and relies on their insufficiency in law. See De-murrer.
Discontinuance. A "judgment of discontinuance" is one of dismissal of plaintiff’s action based on interruption in proceedings occasioned by failure of plaintiff to continue suit regularly from time to time as he ought. Steele v. Beaty, 215 N.C. 680, 2 S.E.2d 854, 855.
A plaintiff sornetimes, when he finds he has miscon-ceived his action, obtains leave from the court to discon-tinue, on which there is a judgment against him and he has to pay costs; but he may commence a new action for the same cause.
Dismissal, judgment of. See Dismissal.
Domestic judgment. A judgment is domestic in the courts of the same state or country where it was originally rendered; in other states or countries it is called foreign. The federal court sitting for the state is a domestic court, and its judgments within the scope of its jurisdiction are domestic judgments. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Tal-ly, 203 Ala. 370, 83 So. 114, 117.
Dormant judgment. One which has not been sat-isfied or extinguished by lapse of time, but which has remained so long unexecuted that execution cannot now be issued upon it without first reviv-ing the judgment. Draper v. Nixon, 93 Ala. 436, 8 So. 489; General Electric Co. v. Hurd, C.C.Or., 171 F. 984; Burlington State Bank v. Marlin Nat. Bank, Tex.Civ.App., 207 S.W. 954, 956. Or one which has lost its lien on land from the failure to issue execution on it or take other steps to en-force it within the time limited by statute. 1 Black, Judgm. (2d Ed.) § 462.
Error, judgment in. A judgment rendered by a court of error on a record sent up from an in-ferior court.
it is either in affirmance of the former judgment; in recall of it for error in fact; in reversal of it for error in law; that the plaintiff be barred of his writ of error, where a plea of release of errors or of the statute of limi-tations is found for the defendant; or that there be a venire facies de novo, which is an award of a new trial.
Execution of judgment. See Execution of Judg-ment or Decree.
Face of judgment. See Face of Judgment.
Final judgment. One which puts an end to a suit or action.
One which puts an end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has not entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for. 3 B1.Comm. 398; Frank P. Miller Paper Co. v. Keystone Coal & Coke Co., 275 Pa. 40, 118 A. 565, 566. So distinguished from interlocutory judg-ments, which merely establish the right of the plaintiff to
recover, In general tercos. Id. 397. A judgment which determines a particular cause. Bostwlck v. Brinkerhoff, 106 U.S. 3, 1 S.Ct. 15, 27 L.Ed. 73; Pfelffer v. Crane, 89 Ind. 487; Nelson v. Brown, 59 Vt. 601, 10 A. 721. A judg-ment which cannot be appealed from, which is perfectly conclusive upon the matter adjudicated. SneIl v. Cotton Gin Mfg. Co., 24 Pick., Mass., 300; Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 294, 7 L.Ed. 415; Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. 201, 12 L.Ed. 404; State v. Harmon, 87 Ohio St. 364, 101 N.E. 286, 288. A judgment which disposes of the subject-matter of the controversy or determines the litigation as to alI partles on lts rnerits. Lamberton v. McCarthy, 30 Idaho, 707, 168 P. 11; Sandcrs v. May, 173 N.C. 47, 91 S.E. 526, 527; France & Canada S. S. Co. v. French Republlc, C.C.A. N.Y., 285 F. 290, 294; Judson Lumber Co. v. Patterson, 68 Fla. 100, 66 So. 727, 728; Miller v. Farmers State Bank & Trust Ce., Tex.Civ.App., 241 S.W. 540, 541. A judgment which terminates all litigation on the same right. For meaning of "final judgment", in the judiciary act of 1789, § 25, see 1 Kent., Comm. 316; Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 494, 7 L.Ed. 481; Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. 201, 209, 12 L.Ed. 404.
Foreign judgment. One rendered by the courts of a state or country politically and judicially distinct from that where the judgment or its ef-f ect is brought in question. One pronounced by a tribunal of a foreign country, or of a sister state. Karns v. Kunkle, 2 Minn. 313, Gil. 268; Gulick v. Loder, 13 N.J.L. 68, 23 Am.Dec. 711; Grover & B. Sewing Mach. Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287, 11 S. Ct. 92, 34 L.Ed. 670.
General verdict subject to a special case, judg-ment on. Where at the trial the parties agree on the facts and the only question is one of law and a verdict pro forma is taken and the jury find for the plaintiff generally but subject to the opinion of the court on a special case.
In personam or inter partes. See Judgment in Personam or Inter Partes.
In rem. See Judgment in Rem.
Interlocutory judgment. One given in the pro-gress of a cause upon some plea, proceeding, or default which is only intermediate and does not finally determine or complete the suit. 3 Bl.Comm. 396. One which determines some preliminary or subordinate point or plea, or settles some step, question, or default arising in the progress of the cause, but does not adjudícate the ultimate rights of the parties, or finally put the case out of court. Thus, a judgment or order passed upon any pro-visional or accessory claim or contention is, in general, merely interlocutory, although it may finally dispose of that particular matter. 1 Black, Judgm. § 21; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. McDonald, 177 Ky. 838, 198 S.W. 225, 226; Frank P. Miller Paper Co. v. Keystone Coal & Coke Co., 275 Pa. 40, 118 A. 565, 566.
Junior judgment. One which was rendered or entered after the rendition or entry of another judgment, on a different claim, against the same defendant.
Merits, judgment on. One rendered after argu-ment and investigation, and when it is determined which party is in the right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point, or by default and without trial. Bell Grocery Co. v. Booth, 250 Ky. 21, 61 S.W.2d 879; State ex rel. National Lead Co. v. Smith, Mo.App., 134 S.W.2d 1061, 1068.
Money judgment. One which adjudges the pay-ment of a sum of money, as distinguished from one directing an act to be done or property to be restored or transferred. Fuller v. Aylesworth, Mich., 75 F. 694, 21 C.C.A. 505; Pendleton v. Cline, 85 Cal. 142, 24 P. 659.
Ordinary "judgment for money" merely determines amount due. State ex rel. Lang v. Superior Court for King County, 176 Wash. 472, 30 P.2d 237, 239.
Narr and cognovit, judgment on. Summons is unnecessary because maker of note authorizes appearance and waives summons. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 366 Ill. 247, 8 N.E.2d 668, 670, 112 A.L.R. 325.
Nihil dicit. See Nihil Dicit.
Nil capiat per breve or per billa (that he take nothing by his writ, or by his bill). A judgment in favor of the defendant upon an issue raised upon a declaration or peremptory plea.
Nil dicit, judgment by. One rendered where defendant fails to plead, or where, having pleaded, plea is stricken, withdrawn, or abandoned and no further defense is made. Grand Lodge Bro-therhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Ware, Tex.Civ. App., 73 S.W.2d 1076, 1077; Reliance Equipment Co. v. Montgomery, 27 Ala.App. 539, 175 So. 703.
At common law, it may be taken against defendant who omits to plead or answer whole or any separable substan-tial portion of declaration. Clonts v. Spurway, 104 Fla. 340, 139 So. 896, 897. It amounts to judgment by confes-sion with reference to cause of action stated, Grand Lodge Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Ware, Tex.Civ.App., 73 S.W.2d 1076, 1077. For judgment nihil dicit, see Nihil Dicit. Judgment rendered on plea of guilty is not judg-ment nil dicit, which Is substantialiy identical with de-fault judgment Stevens v. State, 100 Vt. 214, 136 A. 387.
Nisi. At common law, judgment nisi was a judgment entered on the return of the nisi prius record, which, according to the terms of the postea indorsed thereon was to become absolute unless otherwise ordered by the court within the first four clays of the next succeeding term. See U. S. v. Winstead, D.C.N.C., 12 F. 51; Young v. McPher-son, 3 N.J.L. 897.
Nolle prosequi, judgment of. One entered against plaintiff when, after appearance and be-fore judgment, he declares that he will not fur-ther prosecute his suit. Steph. Pl., Andr. Ed. § 97; Merchants Mut. Casualty Co. v. Kiley, 92 N.H. 323, 30 A.2d 681, 683.
Non obstante veredicto. See Non Obstante Vere-dicto.
Non pros (non prosequitur [he does not follow up, or pursue]). See Non Prosequitur.
Non sum informatus. See Non Sum Informa-tus.
Nonsult. See Nonsuit.
Nunc pro tune. One entered on a day subse-quent to the time at which it should have been entered, as of the latter date. See Nunc Pro Tune.
Personal judgment. One imposing on the de-fendant a personal liability to pay it, and which may therefore be satisfied out of any of his prop-erty which is within the reach of process, as dis-tinguished from one which may be satisfied only out of a particular fund or the proceeds of parti-cular property.
Thus, in a mortgage foreclosure suit, there may be a personal judgment against the mortgagor for any de-ficiency that may remain after the sale of the mortgaged premises. See Bardwell v. Collins, 44 Minn. 97, 46 N.W. 315, 9 L.R.A. 152.
Pocket judgment. A statute-merchant which was enforceable at any time after non-payment on the day assigned, without further procealings. Wharton.
Pro retorno habendo. A judgment that the par-ty have a return of the goods.
Quando acciderint. See Quando Acciderint. Quod computet. See Quod Computet.
Quod partes replacitent. See Quod Partes Re-placitent.
Quod partido fiat. Interlocutory judgment in a writ of partition, that partition be made.
Quod recuperet. See Quod Recuperet.
Relicta verificatione. See Relicta Verificatione. Repleader, judgment of. See Repleader.
Respondeat ouster. When the issue in law aris-es on a dilatory plea, and is determined for the plaintiff, the judgment is only that the defendant "do answer over," called a judgment of respondeat ouster; it is interlocutory only.
Retraxit. See Retraxit.
Special verdict, judgment on. Where at the trial the parties find that they agree on the facts and the only question is one of law and a verdict pro forma is taken, and the jury state the facts as they find them, concluding that the opinion of the court shall decide in whose favor the verdict shall be, and that they assess the damages accord-ingly.
Stet Processus. See Stet Processus.
Verdict, judgment on. The most usual of the judgments upon facts found, and is for the party obtaining the verdict.
Warrant of attorney. See Warrant.
JUDGMENT—BOOK. A book required to be kept by the clerk, among the records of the court, for the entry of judgments. In re Weber, 4 N.D. 119, 59 N.W. 523, 28 L.R.A. 621.
Nul fiel record. See Nul Tiel Record.
JUDGMENT CREDITOR. One who has obtained a judgment against his debtor, under which he can enrorce execution. King v. Fraser, 23 S.C. 548; Baxter v. Moses, 77 Me. 465, 1 A. 350, 52 Am. Rep. 783; Chalmers & Williams v. Surprise, 70 Ind.App. 646, 123 N.E. 841, 844. Code Civ.Proc. N.Y.1899, § 3343 (Civ.Prac. Act, § 7). The owner of an unsatisfied j udgment.
JUDGMENT DEBT. One which is evidenced by matter of record. Colonial Building-Loan Ass’n
v. Mongiello Bros., 120 N.J.Eq. 270, 184 A. 635, 637. A debt, whether on simple contract or by specialty, for the recovery of which judgment has been en-tered up, either upon a cognovit or upon a war-rant of attorney or as the result of a successful action. Brown.
JUDGMENT DEBTOR. A person against whom judgment has been recovered, and which remains unsatisfied. The term has been construed to in-elude a judgment debtor’s successors in interest. Bateman v. Kellogg, 59 Cal.App. 464, 211 P. 46, 51; but see, contra, Northwest Trust & Sale Deposit Co. v. Butcher, 98 Wash. 158, 167 P. 46, 47.
JUDGMENT DEBTOR SUMMONS. Under the English bankruptcy act, 1861, §§ 76-85, these sum-monses might be issued against both traders and non-traders, and, in default of payment of, or se-curity or agreed composition for, the debt, the debtors might be adjudicated bankrupt. This act was repealed by 32 & 33 Vict. c. 83, § 20. The 32 & 33 Vict. c. 71, however, (bankruptcy act, 1869,) provides (section 7) for the granting of a "debt-or’s summons," at the instance of creditors, and, in the event of failure to pay or compound, a pe-tition for adjudication may be presented, unless in the events provided for by that section. Wharton.
JUDGMENT DOCKET. A list or docket of the judgments entered in a given court, methodically kept by the clerk or other proper officer, open to public inspection, and intended to afford official notice to interested parties of the existence or lien of judgments.
JUDGMENT, ESTOPPEL BY. The estoppel raised by the rendition of a valid judgment by a court having jurisdiction. 2 Bl.Judgm. § 504; State v. Torinus, 28 Minn. 175, 9 N.W. 725. See, also, Ver-dict, Judgment By.
Final adjudlcation of any Issue by court of competent jurisdiction binds parties and privies in any subsequent proceeding, irrespective of difference in forms or causes of action. Citizens’ Loan & Trust Co. of Washington, Ind.
v. Sanders, 99 Ind.App. 77, 187 N.E. 396, 398.
The essence of estoppel by judgment is that there has been a judicial determination of a fact. Price v. Clement, 187 Okl. 304, 102 P.2d 595, 597; Monteith Bros. Co. v. U. S., D.C.Ind., 48 F.Supp. 210, 212. It arises where a par-ty litigant attempts to assume inconsistent and contradic-tory positions with respect to same matter. Elfman v. Glaser, 313 Mass. 370, 47 N.E.2d 925, 929. It rests upon principies forbidding one to relitigate matter in dispute between parties which has been determined by competent court, on ground that record of judgment imports absolute verity. Cauble v. Cauble, Tex.Civ.App., 2 S.W.2d 967, 970.
The doctrine extends to matters actually adjudicated, Hamlin v. Johns, 41 Ga.App. 91, 151 S.E. 815, 817; Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Childs, 189 Ga. 835, 7 S.E.2d 907; actually and necessarily included in judgment, MacDonnell
v. Capital Co., C.C.A.Cal., 130 F.2d 311, 318; Partos v. Great Western Packing Co., Cal.App., 126 P.2d 889, 892;
expressly or by necessary ImplIcation adjudicated, McKee v. Producers’ & Refiners’ Corporation, 170 Okl. 559, 41 P.2d 466, 469; necessarily adjudicated, Capps v. Toccoa Falls Light & Power Co., 46 Ga.App. 268, 167 S.E. 530, 532; Humble 011 & Refining Co. v. Webb• Tex.Civ.App., 177 S. W.2d 218, 223. It extends only to facts in issue as they existed at time judgment was rendered, Fort Worth Stock-yards Co. v. Brown, Tex.Civ.App., 161 S.W.2d 549, 555. It extends• to matters which might have been litigated in former case. Paine & Williams Co. v. Baldwin Rubber Co., C.C.A.Mich., 113 F.2d 840, 842, 843; Knabb v. Duner, 143 Fia. 92, 196 So. 456, 460. But it has been held that the doctrine does not apply where polnt at lssue was not con-troverted in prior action but might have been. Haumesser v. Woodrich, 315 Ill.App. 475, 43 N.E.2d 193, 196; the es-toppel does not extend to matter not directly in issue though it arose in case collaterally. Morrison v. Bank of Mount Hope, 124 W.Va. 478, 20 S.E.2d 790, 794.
Ordinarily, "estoppel" d judgment does not extencrtb matters not expressly adjudicated, Sonken-Galamba Cor-poration v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., C.C.A.Mo., 124 F.2d 952, 956; and a judgment or decree without prejudice does not work an "estoppel". In re McDermott, C.C.A. III., 115 F.2d 582, 584.
Elements or essentials are or may include former judg-ment between same parties or their privies. Postelneck v. Edbro Realty Co., 228 App.D1v. 105, 239 N.Y.S. 173, 175; former judgment must relate to same question and must clearly decide it, First Nat. Bank of Atlantb v. Williams, 62 Ga.App. 203, 8 S.E.2d 562, 564, 565; former judgment on the merits, Stowers v. Harris, 194 Ga. 636, 22 S.E.2d 405, 408; Postelneck v. Edbro Realty Co., 228 App.Div. 105, 239 N.Y.S. 173, 175; Identity of parties sulng in same ca-pacity, Ford v. Denla Lumber & Supply Co., 150 Fla. 435, 7 So.2d ‘594, 595; material facts necessary in arrlving at conclusion must be properly in issue, Paine & Williams Co. v. Baldwin Rubber Co., C.C.A.Mich., 113 F.2d 840, 842, 843; matters litigated and determined in prior case must have been within scope of the pleadings, Slaughter v. Slaughter, 190 Ga. 229, 9 S.E.2d 70, 71, 129 A.L.R. 156; mutuality of estoppel, Stewart v. City of Springfield, 350 Mo. 234, 165 S.W.2d 626, 630; Elder v. New York & Pennsylvania Motor Express, 284 N.Y. 350, 31 N.E.2d 188, 189, 133 A.L.R. 176; precise facts or questions must have been determined by former judgment, Skolnik v. Petella, 376, Ill. 500, 34 N.E.2d 825, 826; Flint v. Kimbrough, 45 N.M. 342, 115 P.2d 84, 86; subsequent suit must be between same parties or their privies. Harris v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 67 Ga.App. 759, 21 S.E.2d 537, 541; Woods v. Duval, 151 Kan. 472, 99 P.2d 804, 808; substantial Identity of parties, Curtís v. Mary-land Baptist Union Ass’n, 176 Md. 430, 5 A.26 836, 839, 121 A.L.R. 1516.
The estoppel may be based on consent judgment, Le Bire v. Department of Labor and Industries, 14 Wash.2d 407, 128 P.2d 308, 313; declaratory judgment, In re Pat-ton’s Estate, 170 Or. 186, 132 P.2d 402, 406; default judg-ment, Lawhorn v. Wellford, 179 Tenn. 625, 168 S.W.2d 790, 792; erroneous judgment regularly entered by court, Ex parte Young, 222 N.C. 708, 24 S.E.2d 539, 540; fina: judgment, Ramsey Tp., McCook County v. Lake County,
68 S.D. 67, 298 N.W. 356; final judgment in a criminal prosecution or proceeding, Ex parte Lewis, 152 Kan. 193, 102 P.2d 981, 982; judgment in rem, or quasi in rem, Saunders v. King, 69 Ohio App. 31.3, 37 N.E.2d 92, 93; judgment upon stipulation, Tillman v. National City Bank of New York, C.C.A.N.Y., 118 F.2d 631, 633, 634, 635; judgment upon the merits, Smith v. C. I. T. Corporation,
69 Ga.App. 516, 26 S.E.2d 146, 148; Fightmaster v. Tauber, 43 Ohio App. 266, 183 N.E. 116, 117.
When causes of action or claims or demands in prior and subsequent sults are different the estoppel exists with respect to matters actually decided and essential to or necessarily involved in judgment, Balcom v. -Cain, Tex. Civ.App., 81 S.W.2d 827, 829; actually litigated, American Trust Co. v. Butler, C.C.A.Fla., 47 F.2d 482, 483; Vaughn’s Adm’r v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 297 Ky. 309, 179 S.W.2d 441, 444, 152 A.L.R. 1060; common to both causes of ac-tion, McKee v. Producers’ & Refiners’ Corporation, 170 Okl. 559, 41 P.2d 466, 469; Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. International Trust Co., 144 Misc. 127, 258 N.Y.S. 465; necessarily adjudicated, Bassick Mfg. Co. v. Larkin Auto-motive Parts Co., D.C.I11., 23 F.2d 92, 94; McDowell v. Harris, Tex.Civ.App., 107 S.W.2d 647, 652.JUDGMENT, ESTOPPEL BY
Where subsequent proceeding Is on same cause of ac-tion between same parties a former adjudication is conclu-sive. Klmpton v. Spellman, 351 Mo. 674, 173 S.W.2d 886, 891.
JUDGMENT EXECUTION. In the judgment on which it issues, it is a species of execution process, but as to the garnishee who becomes a party de-fendant therein it is an original process-a sum• mons commanding him to appear and show cause, if any he has, why judgment in favor of the plain-tiff should not be levied on the goods and effects of defendant in his hands. Shane v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., D.C.Pa., 48 F.Supp. 151, 156.
JUDGMENT IN PERSONAM OR INTER PAR-TES. A judgment against a particular person, as distinguished from a judgment against a thing or a right or status.
Judgments of the former class, though conclusive even against strangers, as to the fact of their rendition and the resultant legal consequences, are not binding as to the is-sues involved, except upon the parties and their privies. while judgments of the latter class are conclusive upon all the world. City of Huntsville v. Goodenrath, 13 Ala.App. 579, 68 So. 676, 680. See the title Judgment In Rem.
Decrees of divorce of other states recovered upon service by publication are not judgments in personam. Ball v. Cross, 106 Misc. 184, 174 N.Y.S. 259, 260.
JUDGMENT IN REM. An adjudication pro-nounced upon the status of some particular thing or subject matter. Perry v. Edmonds, 59 Nev. 60, 84 P.2d 711, 713; Consolidated Flour Milis Co. of Kansas v. Sayre Wholesale Grocer Co., 176 Okl. 482, 56 P.2d 781, 784; by a tribunal having com-petent authority. Booth v. Copley, 283 Ky. 23, 140 S.W.2d 662, 666. It is founded on proceeding instituted against or on some thing or subject mat-ter whose status or condition is to be determined, McCormick v. Blaine, 345 III. 461, 178 N.E. 195, 197, 77 A.L.R. 1215; Eureka Building & Loan Ass’n v. Shultz, 139 Kan. 435, 32 P.2d 477, 480; or one brought to enforce a right in the thing itself, Fed-eral Land Bank of Omaha v. Jefferson, 229 Iowa 1054, 295 N.W. 855, 857; Hobbs v. Lenon, 191 Ark. 509, 87 S.W.2d 6, 11. It operates directly upon the property. Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Jeffer-son, 229 Iowa 1054, 295 N.W. 855, 857, 132 A.L.R. 1282; Hobbs v. Lenon, 191 Ark. 509, 87 S.W.2d 6, 11; Guild v. Wallis, 150 Or. 69, 40 P.2d 737, 742. It is a solemn declaration of the status of some person or thing. Jones v. Teat, Tex.Civ.App., 57 S.W.2d 617, 620. It is binding upon all persons in so far as their interests in the property are con-cerned. Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Jefferson, 229 Iowa 1054, 295 N.W. 855, 857, 132 A.L.R. 1282. It is binding upon the world. Booth v. Copley, 283 Ky. 23, 140 S.W.2d 662, 666; Hobbs v. Lenon, 191 Ark. 509, 87 S.W.2d 6, 11.
Various definitions have been elven of a judgment in rem, but all are criticised as either incomplete or com-prehending too much.
"A very able writer says: ‘The distinguishing charac-teristic of judgments in rem is that, wherever their obliga-tlon is recognized and enforced as against any person, it is equally recognized and enforced as against a// persons.’ It seems to us that the true definition of a ‘judgment in rem’ is ‘an adjudication’ against some person or thing, or upon the status of some subject-matter; which, wherever and whenever binding upon any person, is equally binding upon all persons." Bartero v. Real Estate Savings Bank, 10 Mo.App. 78.
In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 734, 24 L.Ed. 565, the court said: "It is true that, In a strict sense, a proceeding in rem is one taken directly against property, and has for lts object the disposition of property, without reference to the title of individual claimants; but, in a larger and more general sense, the terms are applied to actions between parties, where the direct object is to reach and dlspose of property owned by them, or of some lnterest therein. Such are cases commenced by attachment against the prop-erty of debtors, or instituted to partition real estate, fore-close a mortgage, or enforce a lien. So far as they affect property in this state, they are substantially proceedings in rem in the broader sense which we have mentioned."
JUDGMENT IN RETRAXIT. A "judgment" which is usually based upon and follows a settlement out of court, and like a judgment on the merits is a bar and estops plaintiff from again proceeding in another suit on same cause of action. Steele v. Beaty, 215 N.C. 680, 2 S.E.2d 854, 856, 857.
See Retraxit.
JUDGMENT LIEN. A lien binding the real estate of a judgment debtor, in favor of the holder of the judgment, and giving the latter a right to levy on the land for the satisfaction of his judgment to the exclusion of other adverse interests subsequent to the judgment. Ashton v. Slater, 19 Minn. 351 ( Gil. 300) ; Shirk v. Thomas, 121 Ind. 147, 22 N.E. 976, 16 Am.St.Rep. 381; Jones v. Hall, 177 Va. 658, 15 S.E.2d 108, 111; right to subject land of judgment debtor to satisfaction of judgment, Jones v. Hall, 177 Va. 658, 15 S.E.2d 108, 110, 111.
JUDGMENT NOTE. A promissory note, embody-ing an authorization to any attorney, or to a des-ignated attorney, or to the holder, or the clerk of the court, to enter an appearance for the maker and confess a judgment against him for a sum therein named, upon default of payment of the note. Sweeney v. Thickstun, 77 Pa. 131.
JUDGMENT OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS. Deter-mination by corporate action. Du Bois v. Century Cement Products Co., 119 N.J.Eq. 472, 183 A. 188, 191.
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION. Sentence in crim-inal case, entered in court’s minutes. People v. Mellon, 261 App.Div. 400, 25 N.Y.S.2d 650, 651.
JUDGMENT OF HIS PEERS. A term of expres-sion borrowed from Magna Charta and means trial by jury. Ex parte Wagner, 58 Okl.Cr. 161, 50 P.2d 1135, 1139. A trial by a jury of twelve men ac-cording to the course of the common law. Fetter v. Wilt, 46 Pa. 460; State v. Simons, 61 Kan. 752, 60 P. 1052; Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill. 382.
JUDGMENT PAPER. In English practice. A sheet of paper containing an incipitur of the plead-ings in an action at law, upon which final judg-ment is signed by the master. 2 Tidd, Pr. 930.
JUDGMENT RECORD. In English practice. A. parchment roll, on which are transcribed the whole proceedings in the cause, deposited and filed of rec-ord in the treasury of the court, alter signing oí" judgment. 3 Steph.Comm. 632. In American prac-• tice, the record is signed, filed, and docketed by the• clerk.Findings of fact and conclusions of law held part of "judgment record;" the phrases "judgment ron," "judg-ment record," and "face of the record" are synonymous. Permian 011 Co. v. Smith, 129 Tex. 413, 107 S.W.2d 564, 566, 111 A.L.R. 1152.
JUDGMENT ROLL. See Roll.
JUDGMENT RECOVERED. A plea by a defend-ant that the plaintiff has already recovere4 that which he seeks to obtain by his action. This was formerly a species of sham plea, often put in for the purpose of delaying a plaintiff’s action.
JUDGMENT VOID ON ITS FACE. A judgment or order is "void on its face" when its invalidity is apparent upon inspection of judgment roll. Ap-plication of Behymer, 130 Cal.App. 200, 19 P.2d 829, 830.
JUDICANDUM EST LEGIBUS, NON EXEMP-LIS. Judgment is to be given according to the laws, not according to examples or precedents. 4 Coke, 33b; 4 B1.Comm. 405.
JUDICARE. Lat. In the civil and old English law. To judge; to decide or determine judicially; to give judgment or sentence.
JUDICATIO. Lat. In the civil law. Judging; the pronouncing of sentence after hearing a cause. Hallifax, Civil Law, b. 3, c. 8, no. 7.
JUDICATORES TERRARUM. Lat. Certain ten-ants in the county palatine of Chester, who were bound by their tenores to perform judicial func-tions.
In case of an erroneous judgment being given by them, the party aggrieved might obtain a writ of error out of Chancery, directing them to reform it. They then had ‘a month to consider of the rnatter. If they declined to re-form their judgment, the matter carne on writ of error be-fore the king’s bench; and if the court of king’s bench heid the judgment to be erroneous they forfeited f100 to -the crown by custom. Jenk.Cent. 71.
JUDICATORLES. The term as used designates that department of government which it was in-tended should interpret and administer the laws. In re Opinion of the Justices, 86 N.H. 597, 166 A. 640, 646.
JUDICATURE. The state or profession of those officers who are employed in administering justice; the judiciary.
A judicatory, tribunal, or court of justice.
Jurisdiction; the right of judicial action; the scope or extent of jurisdiction.
JUDICATURE ACTS (ENGLAND). The acts under which the present system of courts in Eng-land was organized and is continued.
The statutes of 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, and 38 & 39 Vict. c. 77, which went into force November 1, 1875, with amendments in 1877, 40 & 41 Vict. c. 9; 1879, 42 & 43 Vict. c. 78; aria 1881, 44 & 45 Vict. c. 68,—made most important changes in the organization of, and methods of procedure in, the superior courts of England, consolidating them together so as to constitute one supreme court of judicature, con-sisting of two divisions,—her majesty’s high court of jus-tice, having chiefly original jurisdiction; and her ma-jesty’s court of appeal, whose jurisdiction is chiefly appel-late.
JUDICATURE ACTS (IRELAND). The art of 40 & 41 Vict. c. 57, which went into operation Jan. 1, 1878, established a supreme court of judicature in Ireland, under which acts and subsequent ones a system essentially similar in its constitution to that in England is in force.
JUDICES. Lat. Judges. See Judex.
JUDICES NON TENENTUR EXPRIMERE CAUS-AM SENTENTUE SU/E. Judges are not bound to explain the reason of their sentence. Jenk.Cent. 75.
JUDICES ORDINARII. Lat. Plural of judex or-dinarius (q. v.).
JUDICES PEDANEI. Lat. Plural of judex pe-daneus (q. v.).
JUDICES SELECTI. Lat. Plural of judex se-lectus (q. y.).
JUDICI OFFICIUM SUUM EXCEDENTI NON PARETUR. A judge exceeding his office (or juris-diction) is not to be obeyed. Jenk.Cent. p. 139, case 84. Said of void judgments.
JUDICI SATIS PCENA EST, QUOD DEUM HAB-ET ULTOREM. It is punishment enough for a judge that he has God as his avenger. 1 Leon. 295.
JUDICIA; JUDICIA PUBLICA. Lat. In Reman law. Judicial proceedings; trials. Judicia publica, criminal trials. Dig. 48, 1. See, also, Judicium.
JUDICIA IN CURIA REGIS NON ADNIHILEN-TUR, SED STENT IN ROBORE SUO QUOUSQUE PER ERROREM AUT ATTINCTUM ADNULLEN-TUR. Judgments in the king’s court are not to be annihilated, but to remain in force until annulled by error or attaint. 2 Inst. 539.
JUDICIA IN DELIBERATIONIBUS CREBRO MATURESCUNT, IN ACCELERATO PROCESSU NUNQUAM. Judgments frequently become ma-tured by deliberations, never by hurried process or precipitation. 3 Inst. 210.
JUDICIA POSTERIORA SUNT IN LEGE FOR-TIORA. The later decisions are the stronger in law. 8 Coke, 97.
JUDICIA SUNT TANQUAM JURIS DICTA, ET PRO VERITATE ACCIPIUNTUR. Judgments are, as it were, the sayings of the law, and are received as truth. 2 Inst. 537.
JUDICIAL. Belonging to the office of a judge; . as judicial authority.
Relating to or connected with the administration of justice; as a judicial officer.
Having the character of judgment or formal le-gal procedure; as a judicial act.
Proceeding from a court of justice; as a judi-cial writ, a judicial determination.
Involving the exercise of judgment or discretion; as distinguished from ministerial.

Of or pertaining or appropriate to the adminis-tration of justice, or courts of justice, or a judge thereof, or the proceedings therein; as, judicial power, judicial proceedings. ,State v. Freitag, 53 Idaho 726, 27 P.2d 68.
As to judicial "Confession," "Day," "Discretion," "Documents," "Estoppel," "Evidence," "Factor," "Mortgage," "Notice," "Process," "Record," "Sale," "Sequestration," and "Writ," see those titles.
As to quasi judicial, see Quasi Judicial.
JUDICIAL ACT. An act which involves exercise of discretion or judgment. State ex rel. Allen v. Rose, 123 Fla. 544, 167 So. 21, 24; In re McGarry, 380 III. 359, 44 N.E.2d 7, 10; Wicksel v. Cohen, 262 N.Y. 446, 187 N.E. 634, 635; Dovel v. Bertram, 184 Va. 19, 34 S.E.2d 369, 370.
It is also defined as an act by court or magistrate touch-ing rights of parties or property brought before it or him by voluntary appearance, or by prior action of ministerial officers, Flournoy v. Jeffersonville, 17 Ind. 173, 79 Am.Dec. 468; Union Pac. R. Co. v. U. S., 99 U.S. 700, 761, 25 L.Ed. 496; United States v. Ward, C.C.A.Okl., 257 F. 372, 377; Board of Com’rs of Atoka County v. Cypert, 65 Okl. 168, 166 P. 195, 198; an act by member of judicial department in construing law or applying it to a particular state of facts, State ex rel. Tharel v. Board of Com’rs of Creek County, 188 Okl. 184, 107 P.2d 542, 549; an act of adminis-trative board if ít goes to determination of some right, protection of which is peculiar °Ince of courts, Belk’s Dept. Store v. Guilford County, 222 N.C. 441, 23 S.E.2d 897, 902; an act which imposes burdens or confers priv-ileges according to finding of some person or body wheth-er a general rule is applicable or according to discretion-ary judgment as to propriety, Stevens ex rel. Kuberski v. Haussermann, 113 N.J.L. 162, 172 A. 738, 741; an act which undertakes to determine a question of right or obligation or of property as foundation on which it proceeds, Pear-son v. Reed, 6 Ca1.App.2d 277, 44 P.2d 592, 597; determina-tion of what the law is and what rights of parties are with reference to transactions already had or thing already done or happened, Nider v. Honran, 32 Cal.App.2d 11, 89 P.2d 136, 139; Nash v. Brooks, 251 App.Div. 616, 297 N.Y. S. 853, 855; State v. Ramírez, 34 Idaho 623, 203 P. 279, 282, 29 Q.L.R. 297; the action of judge in trying a cause and rendering a decision, Application of Glelt, 178 Misc. 198, 33 N.Y.S.2d 629, 630, 631.
The act of an administrative or ministerial offl-cer does not become judicial simply because it requires some discretion and judgment, but be-comes judicial only when there is opportunity to be heard, and the production and weighing of evi-dence and a decision thereon. People ex rel. Argus Co. v. Hugo, 101 Misc. 48, 168 N.Y.S. 25, 27; Swee-ney v. Young, 82 N.H. 159, 131 A. 155, 157, 42 A. L.R. 757.
Rendition or pronouncement of a judgment is a judicial act and entry thereof a ministerial act. Peoples Electric Co-op. v. Broughton, 191 Okl. 229, 127 P.2d 850, 853; O’Brien v. New York Edison Co., D.C.N.Y., 26 F.Supp. 290, 291; Bailer v. Dowd, 219 Ind. 624, 40 N.E.2d 325, 327. But if there are matters requiring exercise of court’s dis-cretion,,entry of decree is judicial act. Stewart v. Superior Court lb and for Los Angeles County, 3 Cal.App.2d 702, 40 P.2d 529.
JUDICIAL ACTION. An adjudication upon rights of parties who in general appear or are brought before tribunal by notice or process, and upon whose claims some decision or judgment is ren-dered. Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 181 Ga. 75, 181 S.E. 834, 102 A.L.R. 517. Action of a court upon a cause, by hearing it, and determining what shall be adjudged or decreed between the parties, and with
which is the right of the case. Rhode /sland v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 718, 9 L.Ed. 1233; Kerosene Lamp Heater Co. v. Monitor Oil Stove Co., 41 Ohio St. 293. When an inferior officer or board is charged with an administrative act, the per-formance of which depends upon and requires the existence or ascertainment of facts, the investiga-tion and determination of such facts is so-called judicial action. Austin v. Eddy, 41 S.D. 640, 172 N.W. 517, 518.
Every judicial action involves primary right of plaintlff and corresponding duty devolving on defendant, breach of such duty by defendant, remedial right and duty, and remedy itself. Vinson v. Graham, C.C.A.Okl., 44 F.2d 772, 777; Brice v. Glenn, 165 S.C. 509, 164 S.E. 302, 303; Rad-osevich v. Engle, 111 Mont. 504, 111 P.2d 299, 303.
JUDICIAL ADMISSION. See Admissions.
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY. The power and authori-ty appertaining to the office of a judge; jurisdic-tion; the official right to hear and determine ques-tions in controversy.
JUDICIAL BUSINESS. Such as involves the ex-ercise of judicial power, or the application of the mind and authority of a court to some contested matter, or the conduct of judicial proceedings, as distinguished from such ministerial and other acts, incident to the progress of a cause, as may be performed by the parties, counsel, or officers of the court without application to the court or judge. See Heisen v. Smith, 138 Cal. 216, 71 P. 180, 94 Am.St.Rep. 39; Merchants’ Nat. Bank v. Jaffray, 36 Neb. 218, 54 N.W. 258, 19 L.R.A. 316; State v. Cal-ifornia MM. Co., 13 Nev. 214.
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT. As used in a state constitu-tion, a term referring to the subdivisions of the state to each of which one judge shall be assigned to exercise therein the judicial power conferred by the constitution upon circuit courts. State v. But-ler, 70 Fla. 102, 69 So. 771, 779.
JUDICIAL COGNIZANCE. Judicial notice, or knowledge upon which a judge is bound to act without having it proved in evidence.
JUDICIAL COMITY. Principie in accordance with which courts of one state or jurisdiction give effect to laws and judicial decisions of another state out of deference and respect, not obligation. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. City of Thomasville, 100 Fla. 748, 130 So. 7, 8.
JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUN-CIL. In English law. A tribunal established in 1833, composed of members of the privy council, being judges or retired judges, which acts as the king’s adviser in matters of law referred to it, and exercises a certain appellate jurisdiction, though its power in this respect was curtailed by the ju-dicature act of 1873.
It consists of the Lord Chancellor, the six Lords of Ap-peal, if Privy Councillors, and such other members of the Privy Council as have held any high judicial cace in the United Kingdom, India, or the colonies. It is the court ot final appeal from the ecciesiastical courts, from the courts of India, the colonies, dominions, etc., the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, administering all the different systems of law of the countries under its appellate juris-dlction, and exercising a notable lnfluence on the tenor and course of law in some of those jurisdiCtions, especlally Indlan law.
JUDICIAL CONVENTION. An agreement entered hito in consequence of an order of court; as, for example, entering into a bond on taking out a writ of sequestration. Penniman v. Barrymore, 6 Mart. N.S., La., 494.
JUDICIAL CY PRES.
Doctrine of "judicial cy pres" is a principie of construction based on a judicial finding of donor’s intention as applied to new conditions. Rohlff v. German Old People’s Home, 143 Neb. 636, 10 N.W.2d 686, 691.
When only minor features of a trust for charity become lmpossible or impracticable of performance and It cannot properly be said that general scheme of testator has failed, doctrine of "judicial cy pres" operates to avoid failure of charity. Noel v. Olds, 78 U.S.App.D.C. 155, 138 F.2d 581, 586, 587.
JUDICIAL DECISION. An opinion or determina-tion of the judges in causes before Chem, particu-larly in appellate courts. Le Blanc v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 73 Miss. 463, 19 So. 211. Application by a court or tribunal exercising judicial authority of competent jurisdiction of the law to a state of facts proved, or admitted to be true, and a declaration of the consequences which follow. In re Knofler’s Estate, 73 Ohio App. 383, 52 N.E.2d 667, 668.
JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF LAW. A rule adopted as the basis of decision of issues involved. Trustees of Phillips Exeter Academy v. Exeter, 90 N.H. 472, 27 A.2d 569, 577.
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT. The branch of gov-ernment which is intended to interpret, construe and apply the law. Board of Com’rs of Wyan-dotte County v. General Securities Corporation, 157 Kan. 64, 138 P.2d 479, 487.
JUDICIAL DICTUM. A dictum made by a court or judge in the course of a judicial decision or opinion. Com. v. Paine, 207 Pa. 45, 56 A. 317. See Dictum.
JUDICIAL DISTRICT. One of the circuits or precincts into which a state is commonly divided for judicial purposes, a court of general original jurisdiction being usually provided in each of such districts, and the boundaries of the district mark-ing the territorial limits of its authority; or the district may include two or more counties, having separate and independent county courts, but in that case they are presided over by the same judge. See Ex parte Gardner, 22 Nev. 280, 39 P. 570; Lindsley v. Coahoma County Sup’rs, 69 Miss. 815, 11 So. 336; Com. v. Hoar, 121 Mass. 377; Consolidated Flour Milis Co. v. Muegge, 127 Okl. 295, 260 P. 745, 752.
JUDICIAL DIVORCE. One granted by the sen-tence of a court of justice; pursuant to general law. Maclay v. Maclay, 147 Fla. 77, 2 So.2d 361, 363.
JUDICIAL DUTY. One that requires exercise of judgment or choice of alternatives in its perforrn-
anee. Board of Education of Nebo School Dist. v. Jeppson, 74 Utah 576, 280 P. 1065, 1069. One that requires exercise of judgment or decision of a question of fact. State ex rel. Coast Holding Co. v. Ekwall, 144 Or. 672, 26 P.2d 52. One that re-quires use of discretion or examination of evidente and decision of questions of law and fact. Taylor County Farm Bureau v. Board of Sup’rs of Tay-lor County, 218 Iowa 937, 252 N.W. 498. One that legitimately pertains to an officer in judicial de-partment. Harding v. McCullough, 236 Iowa 556, 19 N.W.2d 613, 617; Ex parte Lewis, 328 Mo. 843, 42 S.W.2d 21, 22.
JUDICIAL ERRORS. Errors into which the court itself falls are "judicial errors." An error of this character occurs when the judgment rendered is erroneous in some particular, requiring it to be changed. Connecticut Mortgage & Title Guaranty Co. v. Di Francesco, 112 Conn. 673, 151 A. 491, 492.
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL. Arises from sworn statements made in course of judicial proceedings. Clarke v. Ripley Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 27 Tenn. App. 387, 181 S.W.2d 386, 389; Helfer v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass’n, 170 Tenn. 630, 96 S.W.2d 1103, 1105, 113 A.L.R. 921. The doctrine of "judicial estoppel" is the doctrine of the conclu-siveness of the judgments. State v. Ohio Oil Co., Tex.Civ.App., 173 S.W.2d 470, 478, 479.
it is based on bad falth, and cannot be asserted unless sworn statement was made knowingly, or with degree of negligence authorizing Imputation of knowledge. Broyles v. Scottish Union & National Ins. Co., 16 Tenn.App. 331, 64 S.W. 517.
The rule may be invoked only where the prior and sub-sequent litigation involves the same parties and where one party has relied on the former testimony and changed his position by reason of it. Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v. Openshaw Inv. Co., 102 Utah 509, 132 P.2d 388, 390, 391. But see holding that judicial estoppel is based on pabilo policy and not on prejudice to adverse party. Sartain v. Dixie Coal & Iron Co,, 150 Tenn. 633, 266 S.W. 313, 316.
JUDICIAL EVIDENCE is the means, sanctioned by law, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a question.
JUDICIAL FUNCTION. The exercise of the ju-dicial faculty or office. The capacity to act in the specific way which appertains to the judicial Pow-er, as one of the powers of government.
The term is used to describe generally those modes of action which appertain to the judiciary as a department of organized government, and through and by means of which it accomplishes its purposes and exercises its peculiar powers. See State v. Kelly, 27 N.M. 412, 202 P. 524, 528, 21 A.L.R. 156; Lyon v. City of Payette, 38 Idaho 705, 224 P. 793, 794; People v. ‘Jersey, 69 Colo. 492, 196 P. 180, 181, 14 A.L.R. 631; Sauskelonis v. Herting, 89 Conn. 298, 94 A. 368, 369. While ordinarily a case or judicial controversy within the meaning of Const. art. 3, § 2, results in a judg-ment requiring award of process of execution to carry it into effect, such relief is not an indispensable adjunct to the exercise of the ”judicial function." Fidelity Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Kansas City v. Swope, 274 U.S. 123, 47 S.Ct. 511, 514, 71 L.Ed. 959.
JUDICIAL INQUIRY. Such inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Wilson & Co. of Oklahoma, C.C.A.Okl., 54 F.2d 596, 598; In re Turnock’s Estate, 238 Wis. 438, 300 N.W. 155, 156.
JUDICIAL KNOWLEDGE. Knowledge of that which is so notorious that everybody, including judges, knows it, and hence need not be proved. Ex parte Ferguson, 112 Tex.Cr.R. 152, 15 S.W.2d 650, 652.
JUDICIAL LEGISLATION. See Judge-Made Law.
JUDICIAL NOTICE. The act by which a court, in conducting a trial, or framing its decision, will, of its own motion, and without the production of evidence, recognize the existence and truth of certain facts, having a bearing on the controversy at bar, which, from their nature, are not properly the subject of testimony, or which are universal-ly regarded as established by common notoriety, e. g., the laws of the state, international law, his-torical events, the constitution and course of na-ture, main geographical features, etc. North Hempstead v. Gregory, 53 App.Div. 350, 65 N.Y.S. 867; State v. Main, 69 Conn. 123, 37 A. 80, 36 L.R. A. 623, 61 Am.St.Rep. 30. The cognizance of cer-tain facts which judges and jurors may properly take and act upon without proof, because they al-ready know them. United States v. Hammers, D. C.Fla., 241 F. 542, 543.
The true conception of what is "judicially known" is that of something which is not, or rather need not be, unless the tribunal wishes it, the subject of either evidence or argument. Chiulla de Luce v. Board of Park Com’rs of City of Hartford, 94 Conn. 7, 107 A. 611, 612. The limita of "judicial notice" cannot be prescribed with exactness, but notoriety is, generally speaking, the ultimate test of facts sought to be brought within the realm of judicial notice; in general, it covers matters so notorious that a production of evidence would be unnecessary, matters which the ju-dicial function supposes the judge to be acquainted with actually or theoretically, and matters not strictly includea under either of such heads. Gottstein v. Lister, 88 Wash. 462, 153 P. 595, 602, Ann.Cas.1917D, 1008.
JUDICIAL OATH. See Oath.
JUDICIAL OFFICE. Offices which relate to the administration of justice; Waldo v. Wallace, 12 Ind. 569; and which should be exercised by per-sons of sufficient skill and experience in the duties which appertain to them. A general term includ-ing courts of record and courts not of record. Buckley v. Holmes, 259 Pa. 176, 102 A. 497, 500.
A. term used in 34 & 35 Vict. c. 91, to define qualifications of additional members of the judicial committee of the Privy Council.
JUDICIAL OFFICER. The term, in the popular sense, applies generally to an officer of a court, but in the strictly legal sense applies only to an officer who determines causes between parties or renders decision in a judicial capacity. Hitt v. State, 182 Miss. 184, 181 So. 331; Alexander v. Holmes, 180 Ga. 397, 179 S.E. 77, 78. One who ex-ercises judicial function. Adams v. State, 214 Ind. 603, 17 N.E.2d 84, 118 A.L.R. 1095. A person in whom is vested authority to decide causes or exer-cise powers appropriate to a court. Settle v. Van Evrea, 49 N.Y. 284; People v. Wells, 2 Cal. 203; Reid v. Hood, 2 Nott & McC., S.C., 170, 10 Am. Dec. 582.
JUDICIAL OPINION. A term synonymous with what has been adjudged or decreed and final in its character. Alleghany Corporation v. Aldebar-an Corporation, 173 Md. 472, 196 A. 418, 421. See, also, Opinion.
JUDICIAL ORDER. One which involves exercise
of judicial discretion and affects final result of litigation. Happy Coal Co. v. Brashear, 263 Ky. 257, 92 S.W.2d 23, 27. See, also, Order.
JUDICIAL POWER. The authority exercised by that department of government which is charged with declaration of what law is and its construc-tion. People v. Bruner, 343 III. 146, 175 N.E. 400, 404. The authority vested in courts and judges, as distinguished from the executive and legisla-tive power. Gilbert v. Priest, 65 Barb., N.Y., 448; State ex rel. Jamison v. Denny, 118 Ind. 382, 21 N.E. 252, 4 L.R.A. 79.
it is a power that cannot be brought within ring fence of a definition, Batty v. Arizona State Dental Board, 57 Ariz. 239, 112 P.2d 870, 873. A power involving exercise of judgment and discretion in determination of questions of right in specific cases affecting interests of person or property, as distinguished from ministerial power involv-ing no discretion, Stanton v. State Tax Commission, 114 Ohio St. 658, 151 N.E. 760, 764; Ward v. Board of Com’rs of Osfuskee County, 114 Okl. 246, 246 P. 376, 378; inherent authority not only to decide, but to ,make binding orders or judgments, Fewel v. Fewel, 23 Ca1.2d 431, 144 P.2d 592, 594; power to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between persons and parties who bring a case before court for decision, Miller, Const. U. S. 314; Stuart v. Norviel, 26 Ariz. 493, 266 P. 908, 909; Shea v. North-Butte Mining Co., 55 Mont. 522, 179 P. 499, 503; Rohde v. City of Newport, 246 Ky. 476, 55 S.W.2d 368, 87 A.L.R. 701; power to declare what law is or has been, Gorham v. Robinson, 57 R.I. 1, 186 A. 832, 842; State v. Leuders, 214 N.C. 558, 200 S.E. 22, 23; power to determine constitutionality and validity of legislative acts, Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 5 L.Ed. 257; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137, 2 L.Ed. 60; Wilentz v. Hendrickson, 133 N. J.Eq. 447, 33 A.2d 366, 390; although this is still sometimes challenged, power to determine what is the law applicable to a case, to apply that law to the case. and to render judgment accordingly, Kuhnert v. United States: D.C.Mo., 36 F.Supp. 798, 800; power to hear and determine, contro-versies between adverse parties and questions in litigation, In re Sanderson, 289 Mich. 165, 286 N.W. 198, 199; Citi-zen’s Club v. Welling, 83 Utah 81, 27 P.2d 23; contro-versies between public officers, state, counties, cities, and other municipal corporations, subdivisions of state and state bonding board, Laverty v. Cochran, 132 Neb. 118, 271 N.W. 354; matters which affect the life, liberty, or prop-erty of the cltizens of the state, Nash v. Brooks, 297 N.Y.S. 853, 856, 251 App.Div, 616; rights of persons or property, or the propriety of doing an act, In re McGarry, 44 N.E.2d 7, 10, 380 III. 359; Geauga Lake Improvement Ass’n v. Lozier, 182 N.E. 489, 491, 125 Ohio St. 565. Power that adjudicates upon and protects the rights and interests of persons or property, and to that end declares, construes and applies the law, In re Hunstlger, 130 Minn. 474, 153 N.W. 869, 870; People ex rel. Rusch v. White, 334 III. 465, 166 N.E. 100, 106, 64 A.L.R. 1006; In re Assessment of Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 168 Okl. 495, 33 P.2d 772, 775; power that determines whether rules of action pre-scribed by the legislature have been transgressed in par-ticular case, In re Manufacturer’s Freight Forwarding Co., 294 Mich. 57, 292 N.W. 678, 680.
Power vested in a subordinate body to determine a question of fact is a "judicial power." Sheils v. Flynn, 164 Misc. 302, 299 N.Y.S. 64, 80.
JUDICIAL PROCEEDING. Any proceeding wherein judicial action is invoked and taken. Man-nix v. Portland Telegram, 144 Or. 172, 23 P.2d 138, 90 A.L.R. 55. Any proceeding to obtain such remedy as the law allows. Treloar v. Harris, 66 Ind.App. 59, 117 N.E. 975, 978. Any step taken in a court of justice in the prosecution or defense of an action. National Homestead Ass’n v. Gra-ham, 176 La. 1062, 147 So. 348, 352.
A general term for proceedings relating to, practiced in, or proceeding from, a court of justice; or the course pre-scribed to be taken in varlous cases for the determination of a controversy or for legal redress or relief. See Martín v. Simpkins, 20 Colo. 438, 38 P. 1092; Mullen v. Reed, 64 Conn. 240, 29 A. 478, 24 L.R.A. 664, 42 Am.St.Rep. 174; Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn. 386, 10 Am.Dec. 151. A pro-ceeding in a legally constituted court. Garrett v. State, 18 Ga.App. 360, 89 S.E. 380. A proceeding wherein there are parties, who have opportunity to be heard, and wherern the tribunal proceeds either to a determination of facts upon evidence or of law upon proved or conceded facts. Mitchel v. Cropsey, 177 App.Div. 663, 164 N.Y.S. 336, 339.
JUDICIAL QUESTION. One proper for the deter-mination of a court of justice, as distinguished from such questions as belong to the decision of the legislative or executive departments of govern-ment and with which the courts will not interfere, called "political" or "legislative" questions. See Patton v. Chattanooga, 108 Tenn. 197, 65 S.W. 414.
JUDICIAL REMEDY. Such as is administered by the courts of justice, or by judicial officers em-powered for that purpose by the constitution and laws of the state. Code Civ.Proc.Cal. § 20; Code Civ.Proc.Mont.1895, § 3469 (Rev.Codes 1921, § 8995).
JUDICIAL SEPARATION. A separation of man and wife by decree of court, less complete than an absolute divorce. A "limited divorce" or a "di-vorce a mensa et thoro," Maclay v. Maclay, 147 Fla. 77, 2 So.2d 361, 363.
JUDICIAL STATISTICS. In English law. Statis-tics, published by authority, of the civil and crim-inal business of the United Kingdom, and matters appertaining thereto. Annual reports are pub-lished separately for England and Wales, for Ire-land, and for Scotland.
JUDICIARY, adj. Pertaining or relating to the courts of justice, to the judicial department of government, or to the administration of justice.
JUDICIARY, n. That branch of government in-vested with the judicial power; the system of courts in a country; the body of judges; the bench. That branch of government which is in-tended to interpret, construe and apply the law. Board of Com’rs of Wyandotte County v. General Securities Corporation, 157 Kan. 64, 138 P.2d 479, 487.
JUDICIARY ACT. The name commonly given to the act of congress of September 24, 1789, (1 St. at Large. 73,) by which the system of federal courts was organized, and their powers and juris-diction defined.
JUDICHS POSTERIORIBUS VIDES EST AMIE BENDA. Faith or credit is to be given to the later judgments. 13 Coke, 14.
JUDICIO SISTI. Lat. A caution, or security, given in Scotch courts for the defendant to abide judgment within the jurisdiction. Stim.Law Gloss.
JUDICIOUSLY. Directed by sound judgment. Shivers v. Stovall, Tex.Civ.App., 75 S.W.2d 276, 279.
JUDICIS EST IN PRONUNTIANDO SEQUI REG-ULAM, EXCEPTIONE NON PROBATA. The judge in his decision ought to follow the rule, when the exception is not proved.
JUDICIS EST JUDICARE SECUNDUM ALLEGA-TA ET PROBATA. Dyer, 12. It is the duty of a judge to decide according to facts alleged and proved.
JUDICIS EST JUS DICERE, NON DARE. It is the province of a judge to declare the law, not to give it. Lofft, Append. 42.
JUDICIS OFFICIUM EST OPUS DEEI IN DIE SUO PERFICERE. It is the duty of a judge to finish the work of each day within that day. Dyer, 12.
JUDICIS OFFICIUM EST UT RES, ITA TEM-PORA RERUM, QUiEBERE. It is the duty of a judge to inquire into the times of things, as well as into things themselves. Co.Litt. 171.
JUDICIUM. Lat. Judicial authority or jurisdic-tion; a court or tribunal; a judicial hearing or other proceeding; a verdict or judgment; a pro-ceeding before a judex or judge. State v. Whit-ford, 54 Wis. 150, 11 N.W. 424.
JUDICIUM A NON SUO JUDICE DATUM NUL-LIUS EST MOMENTI. 10 Coke, 70. A judgment given by one who is not the proper judge is of no force.
JUDICIUM CAPITALE. In old English law. Judgment of death; capital judgment. Fleta, lib. 1, c. 39, § 2. Called, also, "judicium vitce amission-is," judgment of loss of life. Id. lib. 2, c. 1, § 5.
JUDICIUM DEI. In old English and European law. The judgment Qf God; otherwise called "di-vinum judicium," the "divine judgment."
A term particularly applied to the ordeals by fire or hot iron and water, and also to the trials by the cross, the eucharist, and the corsned, and the duellum or trial by bat-tie, (q. v.,) it being supposed that the interposition of heaven was directly manifest, in these cases, in behalf of the innocent. Spelman; Burrill.
JUDICIUM EST QUASI JURIS DICTUM. Judg-ment is, as it were, a declaration of law.
JUDICIUM NON DEBET ESSE ILLUSORIUM; SUUM EFFECTUM HABERE DEBET. A judg-ment ought not to be illusory; it ought to have its proper effect. 2 Inst. 341.
JUDICIUM PARIUM. In old English law. Judg-ment of the peers; judgment of one’s peers: trial by jury. Magna Charta, c. 39.
JUDICIUM REDDITUR IN INVITUM. Co.Litt. 248b. Judgment is given against one, whether he will or not.JUDICIUM (SEMPER) PRO VERITATE AC-CIPITUR. A judgment is always taken for truth [that is, as long as it stands in force it cannot be contradicted]. 2 Inst. 380; Co.Litt. 39a, 168a.
JUG. In old English law. A watery place. Domesday; Cowell.
JUGE. In French law. A judge.
JUGE DE PAIX. An inferior judicial function-ary, appointed to decide summarily controversies of minor importante, especially such as turn main-ly on questions of fact. He has also the func-tions of a police magistrate. Ferriére.
JUGE D’INSTRUCTION. See Instruction.
JUGERUM. An acre. Co.Litt. 5b. As much as a yoke (jugum) of oxen could plow in one day.
JUGULATOR. In old records. A cutthroat or murderer. Cowell.
JUGUM. Lat. In the civil law. A yoke; a meas-ure of land; as much land as a yoke of oxen could plow in a day. Nov. 17, c. 8.
JUGUM TERR2E. In old English law. A yoke of land; half a plow-land. Domesday; Co.Litt. 5a; Cowell.
JUICIO. In Spanish law. A trial or suit. White, New Recop. b. 3, tit. 4, c. 1.
JUICIO DE APEO. The decree of a competent tribunal directing the determining and marking the boundaries of lands or estates.
JUICIO DE CONCURSO DE ACREEDORES. The judgment granted for a debtor who has various creditors, or for such creditors, to the effect that their claims be satisfied according to their respec-tive form and rank, when the debtor’s estate is not sufficient to discharge them all in full. Escriche.
JULIAN LAW. See Lex Julia.
JUMENT. In old Scotch law. An ox used for til-lage. 1 Pitc.Crim.Tr. pt. 2, p. 89.
JUMENTA. In the civil law. Beasts of burden; animals used for carrying burdens. This word did not include "oxen." Dig. 32, 65, 5.
JUMMABUNDY. See Jammabundy.
JUMP BAIL. To abscond, withdraw, or secrete one’s self, in violation of the obligation of a bail-bond.
The expression is colloquial, and is applled only to the act of the principal.
JUNCARIA. In old English law. The soil where rushes grow. Co.Litt. 5a; Cowell.
JUNCTA JUVANT. United they aid. A portion of the maxim, "Quce non valeant singula juncta juvant," (q. v.,) frequently cited. 3 Man. & G. 99.
JUNGERE DUELLUM. In old English law. To join the duellum; to engage in the combat. Fleta, lib. 1, c. 21, § 10.
JUNIOR. Younger.
This has been held to be no part of a man’s name, but an addition by use, and a convenient distinction between a father and son of the same name. Cobb v. Lucas, 15 Pick., Mass., 9; Padgett v. Lawrence, 10 Paige, N.Y,, 177, 40 Am. Dec. 232; Prentiss v. Blake, 34 Vt. 460; Maxwell v. State, 65 So. 732, 734, 11 Ala.App. 53.
As to junior "Barrister," "Counsel," "Creditor," "Judgrnent," and "Writ," see those titles.
JUNIOR EXECUTION. One which was issued efter the issuance of another execution, on a dif-ferent judgment, against the same defendant.
JUNIOR RIGHT. A custom prevalent in some parts of England (also at some places on the con-tinent) by which an estate descended to the young-est son in preference to his older brothers; the same as "Borough-English."
JUNIPERUS SABINA. In medical jurisprudence. This plant is commonly called "savin."
JUNK. Worn out and discarded material in gen-eral that may be turned to some use; especially old rope, chain, iron, copper, parts of machinery and bottles gathered or bought up by tradesmen called junk dealers; hence rubbish of any kind; odds and ends. City of Chicago v. Iroquois Steel & Iron Co., 284 Ill.App. 561, 1 N.E.2d 241, 243; Ex parte Scott, 130 Tex.Cr.R. 29, 91 S.W.2d 748, 749.
Articles that have outlived their usefulness in their orig-inal form, and are commonly gathered up and sold to be converted into another product, either of the same or of a different kind, City of Watseka v. Blatt, 320 Ill.App. 191, 50 N.E.2d 589, 594; old Iron, or other base metals, old rope, rags, waste paper, etc., and empty bottles, and all articles discarded or no longer used as a manufactured article composed of any one or more of the materials men-tioned. Beskin v. City of Chicago, 341 III. 489, 173 N.E. 364, 367.
JUNK—SHOP. A shop where old cordage and ships’ tackle, old iron, rags, bottles, paper, etc., are kept and sold. A place or shop where odds and ends are purchased and sold. Charleston City Council v. Goldsmith, 12 Rich.Law (S.C.) 470; Grace Iron & Steel Corporation v. Ackerman, 123 N.J.L. 54, 7 A.2d 820, 821.
JUNTA, or JUNTO. A select council for taking cognizance of affairs of great consequence requir-ing secrecy; a cabal or faction.
This was a popular nickname applied to the Whig ministry in England, between 1693-1696. They clung to each other for mutual protection against the attacks of the so-called "Reactlonist Stuart Party." In this sense, more properly called "junto."
JURA. Lat. Plural of "jus." Rights; laws. 1 Bl.Comm. 123. See Jus.
JURA ECCLESIASTICA LIMITATA SUNT
IN-
FRA LIMITES SEPARATOS. Ecclesiastical laws are limited within separate bounds. 3 Bulst. 53.
JURA EODEM MODO DESTITUUNTUR QUO CONSTITUUNTUR. Laws are abrogated by the same means [authority] by which they are made. Broom, Max. 878.
JURA FISCALIA. In English law. Fiscal rights; rights of the exchequer. 3 Bl.Comm. 45.JURA IN RE. In the civil law. Rights in a thing; rights which, being separated from the dominium, or right of property, exist independently of it, and are enjoyed by some other person than him who has the dominium. Mackeld. Rom.Law, § 237.
JURA MAJESTATIS. Rights of sovereignty or majesty; a term used in the civil law to designate certain rights which belong to each and every sovereignty and which are deemed essential to its existence. Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 250.
JURA MIXTI DOMINII. In old English law. Rights of mixed dominion. The king’s right or power of jurisdiction was so termed. Hale, Anal. § 6.
JURA NATURIE SUNT IMMUTABILIA. The laws of nature are unchangeable. Branch, Princ.
JURA PERSONARUM. Rights of persons; the rights of persons. Rights which concern and are annexed to the persons of men. 1 Bl.Comm. 122.
JURA PRIEDIORUM. In the civil law. The rights of estates. Dig. 50, 16, 86.
JURA PUBLICA ANTEFERENDA PRIVATIS. Public rights are to be preferred to private. Co. Litt. 130a. Applied to protections.
JURA PUBLICA EX PRIVATO [PRIVATIS] PROMISCUE DECIDI NON DEBENT. Public rights ought not to be decided promiscuously with private. Co. Litt. 130a, 181b.
JURA REGALIA. In English law. Royal rights or privileges. 1 Bl.Comm. 117, 119; 3 Bl.Comm. 44.
JURA REGIA. In English law. Royal rights; the prerogatives of the crown. Crabb, Com.Law, 174.
JURA REGIS SPECIALIA NON CONCEDUN-TUR PER GENERALIA VERBA. The special rights of the king are not granted by general words. Jenk. Cent. p. 103.
JURA RERUM. Rights of things; the rights of things; rights which a man may acquire over ex-ternal objects or things, unconnected with his per-son. 1 Bl.Comm. 122; 2 Bl.Comm. 1.
JURA SANGUINIS NULLO JURE CIVILI DIR-IMI POSSUNT. The right of blood and kindred cannot be destroyed by any civil law. Dig. 50, 17, 9; Bac.Max. reg. 11; Broom, Max. 533; Jackson
v. Phillips, 14 Allen (Mass.) 562.
JURA SUMMI IMPERIL Rights of supreme do-minion; rights of sovereignty. 1 BI.Comm. 49; 1 Kent, Comm. 211.
JURAL. 1. Pertaining to natural or positive right, or to the doctrines of rights and obligations; as "jural relafions."
2. Of or pertaining to jurisprudence; juristic; j uridical.
3. Recogmized or sanctioned by positive law; embraced within, or covered by, the rules and en-actments of positive law.
4. Founded in law; organized upon the basis of a fundamental law, and existing for the recog-nition and protection of rights.
The "jural sphere" 1s to be distinguished from the "moral sphere;" the latter denoting the whole scope or range of ethics or the science of conduct, the former em-bracing only such portions of the same as have been made the subject of legal sanction or recognition.
The term "jural society" is used as the synonym of "state" or ”organized political community."
JURAMENTZE CORPORALES. Lat. Corporal oaths, q. v.
JURAMENTUM. Lat. In the civililaw. An oath.
JURAMENTUM CALUMNIE. In the civil and canon law. The oath of calumny.
An oath imposed upon both parties to a suít, as a pre-liminary to its trial, to the effect that they are not In-fluenced by mance or any sinister motives in prosecuting or defending the same, but by a belief in the justice of their cause. It was also required of the attorneys and proctors.
JURAMENTUM CORPORALIS. A corporal oath. See Corporal Oath.
JURAMENTUM EST INDIVISIBILE; ET NON EST ADMITTENDUM IN PARTE VERUM ET IN PARTE FALSUM. An oath is indivisible; it is not to be held partly true and partly false. 4 Inst. 274.
JURAMENTUM IN LITEM. In the civil law. An assessment oath; an oath, taken by the plaintiff in an action, that the extent of the damages he has suffered, estimated in money, amounts to a cer-tain sum, which oath, in certain cases, is accepted in lieu of other proof. Mackeld. Rom.Law, § 376.
JURAMENTUM JUDICIALE. In the civil law. An oath which the judge, of his own accord, de-fers to either of the parties.
It is of two kinds: First, that which the judge defers for the decision of the cause, and which 1s understood by the general name "juramentum judiciale," and is some-times called "suppletory oath," juramentum suppletorium; second, that which the judge defers in order to fix and de-termine the amount of the condemnation which he ought to pronounce, and which is called "juramentum in litem." Poth. ObI. p. 4, c. 3, § 3, art. 3.
JURAMENTUM NECESSARIUM. In Roman law. A compulsory oath.
A dlsclosure under oath, which the pretor compelled one of the parties to a suit to make, when the other, ap-plying for such an appeal, agreed to abide by what his ad-versary should swear. 1 Whart. Ev. § 458: Dig. 12, 2, 5, 2.
JURAMENTUM VOLUNTARIUM. In Roman law. A voluntary oath.
A species of appeal to conscience, by which one of the parties to a suit, ínstead of proving his case, offered to abide by what his adversary should answer under oath. 1 Whart. Ev. § 458; Dig. 12, 2, 34, 6.
JURARE. Lat. To swear; to take an oath.
JURARE EST DEUM IN TESTEM VOCARE, ET EST ACTUS DIVINI CULTUS. 3 Inst. 165. To swear is to call God to witness, and is an act of religion.JURAT. Certificate of Officer or person before whom writing was sworn to. Murphy v. State, 103 S.W.2d 765, 766, 132 Tex.Cr.R. 202; Gossard v. Vawter, 215 Ind. 581, 21 N.E.2d 416, 417. The clause written at the foot pf an affidavit, stating when, where, and before whom such affidavit was sworn. See U. S. v. McDermott, 140 U.S. 151, 11 S.Ct. 746, 35 L.Ed. 391; U. S. v. Julian, 162 U.S. 324, 16 S.Ct. 801, 40 L.Ed. 984; Lutz v. Kinney, 46 P. 257, 23 Nev. 279.
JURATA. In old English law. A jury of twelve men sworn. Especially, a jury of the-common law, as distinguished from the assisa.
The jury clause in a nisi prius record, so called from the emphatic words of the old forms: "Jur-ata ponitur in respectum," the jury is put in re-spite. Townsh.P1. 487.
Also a jurat, (which see.)
JURATION. The act of swearing; the adminis-tration of an oath.
JURATO CREDITUR IN JUDICIO. He who makes oath is to be believed in judgment. 3 Inst. 79.
JURATOR. A juror; a compurgator, (q. v.).
JURATORES DEBENT ESSE VICINI, SUFFICI-ENTES, ET MINUS SUSPECTI. Jurors ought to be neighbors of sufficient estate, and free from suspicion. Jenk. Cent. 141.
JURATORES SUNT JUDICES FACTL Jenk. Cent. 61. Juries are the judges of fact.
JURATORY CAUTION. • In Scotch law. A de-scription of caution (security) sometimes offered in a suspension or advocation where the complain-er is not in circumstances to offer any better. 13e11.
JURATS. In English law. Officers in the nature of aldermen, sworn for the government of many corporations. The twelve assistants of the bailiff in Jersey are called "jurats."
JURE. Lat. By right; in right; by the law.
JURE BELLI. By the right or law of war. 1 Kent, Comm. 126; 1 C.Rob.Adm. 289.
JURE CIVIL!. By the civil law. Inst. 1, 3, 4; 1 B1.Comm. 423.
JURE CORON/E. In right of the crown.
JURE DIVINO. By divine right. 1 Bl.Comm. 191.
JURE ECCLESLE. In right of the church. 1 Bl.Comm. 401.
JURE EMPHYTEUTICO. By the right or law of emphyteusis. 3 B1.Comm. 232. See Emphy-teusis.
JURE GENTIUM. By the law of nations. Inst. 1, 3, 4; 1 Bl.Comm. 423.
JURE NATUILE ZEQUUM EST NEMINEM CUM ALTERIUS DETRIMENTO ET INJURIA FIERI LOCUPLETIOREM. By the lave of nature it is not just that any one should be enriched by the detriment or injury of another. Dig. 50, 17, 206.
JURE PROPINQUITATIS. By right of propin-quity or nearness. 2 Crabb, Real Prop. p. 1019, § 2398.
JURE REPRESENTATIONIS. By right of repre-sentation; in the right of another person. 2 Bl. Comm. 224, 517; 2 Crabb, Real Prop. p. 1019, § 2398.
JURE UXORIS. In right of a wife. 3 Bl.Comm. 210.
JURI NON EST CONSONUM QUOD ALIQUIS ACCESSORIUS IN CURIA REGIS CONVINCA-TUR ANTEQUAM ALIQUIS DE FACTO FUERIT ATTINCTUS. It is not consonant to justice that any accessary should be convicted in the king’s court before any one has been attainted of the fact. 2 Inst. 183.
JURIDICAL. Relating to administration of jus-tice, or office of a judge.
Regular; done in conformity to the laws of the country and the practice which is there ob-served.
JURIDICAL DAY. Day on which court is in ses-sion. Black v. National Bank of Kentucky, 226 Ky. 152, 10 S.W.2d 629, 630.
JURIDICUS. Lat. Relating to the courts or to the administration of justice; juridical; lawful.
JURIS. Lat. Of right; of law.
JURIS AFFECTUS IN EXECUTIONE CONSIST. IT. The effect of the law consists in the execu-tion. Co. Litt. 289b.
JURIS ET DE JURE. Of law and of right.
A presumption juris et de jure, or an irrebutable pre-sumption, is one which the law will not suffer to be re-butted by any counter-evidence, but establishes as conclu-sive: while a presumption juris tantum is one which holds good in the absence of evidence to the contrary, but may be rebutted.
JURIS ET SEISINZE CONJUNCTIO. The union of seisin or possession and the right of possession, forming a complete title. 2 B1.Comm. 199, 311.
JURIS IGNORANTIA EST CUM JUS NOSTRUM IGNORAMUS. It is ignorance of the law when we do not know our own rights. Haven v. Foster, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 130, 19 Am.Dec. 353.
JURIS POSITIVI. Of positive law; a regulation or requirement of positive law, as distinguished from natural or divine law. 1 Bl.Comm. 439; 2 Steph.Comm. 286.
JURIS PRIECEPTA SUNT HZEC: HONESTE VI-VERE; ALTERUM NON LMDERE; SUUM CU-IQUE TRIBUERE. These are the precepts of the law: To live honorably; to hurt nobody; to render to every one his due. Inst. 1, 1, 3; 1 Bl. Comm. 40.JURIS PRIVATI. Of private right; subjects of private property. Hale, Anal. § 23.
JURIS PUBLICI. Of common right; of common or public use; such things as, at least in their own use, are common to all the king’s subjects; as common highways, common bridges, common rivers, and common ports. Hale, Anal. § 23.
JURIS UTRUM. In English law. An abolished writ which lay for the parson of a church whose predecessor had alienated the lands and tenements thereof. Fitzh. Nat. Brev. 48.
JURISCONSULT. A jurista a person skilled in the science of law, particularly of international or public law.
JURISCONSULTUS. Lat. In Roman law. An expert in juridical science; a person thoroughly versed in the laws, who was habitually resorted to, for information and advice, both by private persons as his clients, and also by the magistrates, advocates, and others employed in administering justice. Abbreviated i-ctus.
JURISDICTIO EST POTESTAS DE PUBLICO IN-TRODUCTA, CUM NECESSITATE JURIS DI-CENDI. Jurisdiction is a power introduced for the public good, on account of the necessity of dis-pensing justice. 10 Coke, 73a.
JURISDICTION. The word is a term of large and comprehensive import, and embraces every kind of judicial action. Federal Land Bank of Louisville, Ky., v. Crombie, 258 Ky. 383, 80 S.W.2d 39, 40; McGowin v. McGowin, 122 Fla. 394, 165 So. 274, 275, 276. It is the authority by which courts and judicial officers take cognizance of and decide cases. Board of Trustees of Firemen’s Re-lief and Pension Fund of City of Marietta v. Brooks, 179 Okl. 600, 67 P.2d 4, 6; Morrow v. Con bin, 122 Tex. 553, 62 S.W.2d 641; State v. Barnett, 110 Vt. 221, 3 A.2d 521, 526; the legal right by which judges exercise their authority. Max Ams, Inc. v. Barker, 293 Ky. 698, 170 S.W.2d 45, 48; It exists when court has cognizance of class of cases involved, proper parties are present, and point to be decided is within issues. Noxon Chemical Pro-ducts Co. v. Leckie, C.C.A.N.J., 39 F.2d 318, 319; United Cemeteries Co. v. Strother, 342 Mo. 1155, 119 S.W.2d 762, 765; Harder v. Johnson, 147 Kan. 440, 76 P.2d 763, 764.
It is the authority, capacity, power or right to act, Cernir bell v. City of Plymouth, 293 Mich. 84, 291 N.W. 231, 232; Industrial Addition Ass’n v. Commissioner of Internal Rev-enue, Tenn., 323 U.S. 310, 65 S.Ct. 289, 291, 292, 89 L.Ed. 260; adjudicate, Morrow v. Corbin, 122 Tex. 553, 62 S.W. 2d 641; Iselin v. La Coste, C.C.A.La., 147 F.2d 791, 795; Sheldon v. Powell, 99 Fla. 782, 128 So. 258, 263; Broduer v. Broduer, 53 R.I. 450, 167 A. 104, 106; carry into execu-
•tion or enforce sentence, judgment or decree, Morrow v. Corbin, 122 Tex. 553, 62 S.W.2d 641; U. S. v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691, 8 L.Ed. 547; Johnson v. Jones, 2 Neb. 135; Federal Land Bank of Louisville, Ky. v. Cromble, 258 Ky. 383, 80 S.W.2d 39, 40; compel parties to come before court or body, Great Lakes Stages v. Public Utilities Commis-sion of Ohio, 120 Ohio St. 491, 166 N.E. 404, 406; deal with general abstract question, Thompson v. Terminal Shares, C.C.A.Mo., 89 F.2d 652, 655; deal with subject matter, U. S. v. Sanders, D.C.Tex., 42 F.Supp. 436, 439, 440; decide, Gossett v. Hensley, Tex.Civ.App., 94 S.W.2d 903, 906; Klancher v. Anderson, 113 Colo. 478, 158 P.2d 923, 925;
Máttice v. Kingston Trust Co., 33 N.Y.S.2d 799, 801, 178 Misc. 256; including questions of law as well as of fact, Schlosser v. Welsh, D.C.S.D., 5 F.Supp. 993, 996; Atwood v. Cox, 88 Utah 437, 55 P.2d 377, 381; May Coal & Graln Co. v. Kansas City, Mo., C.C.A.Mo., 73 F.2d 345, 348; declare, expound, administer or apply the law, Long Flame Coal Co. v. State Compensation Com’r, 111 W.Va. 409, 163 S.E. 16, 19; Svitojus v. Kurant, 293 Mich. 291, 292 N.W. 637. 645; Johnson v. Harvey, 261 Ky. 522, 88 S.W.2d 42, 46; Max Ams, Inc., v. Barker, 293 Ky. 698, 170 S.W.2d 45, 48: Rasmusson v. Schmalenberger, 60 N.D. 527, 235 N.W. 496. 499: State ex rel. Moser v. District Court of Ninth Judicial Dist. in and for Pondera County, Mont., 116 Mont. 305, 151 P.2d 1002, 1006; determine action, contro-versy, or question, Fooks’ Ex’rs v. Ghingter. 172 Mcl. 612, 192 A. 782, 786; U. S. v. Crittenden, D.C.N.Y., 24 F.Supp. 84. 88; Hawk v. Hollowell, D.C.Iowa, 1 F.Supp. 885, 887: People ex rel. Carlstrom v. Shurtleff. 355 III. 210, 189 N.E. 291: dispose of cause, Stewart v. Sampson, 285 Ky. 447. 148 S.W.2d 278. 280, 281; do justice, In re McMurray, D.C. Iowa, 8 F.Supp. 449, 452; Svitojus v. Kurant. 293 Mich. 291. 292 N.W. 637, 645; enter on inquiry, Berkman v. Levy, Tex.Civ.App., 129 S.W.2d 397. 398: American Co-cm. Serum Ass’n v. Anchor Serum Co., D.C.III., 38 F.Supp. 313, 315; Janssen v. Tusha, 68 S.D. 639, 5 N.W.2d 684, 686; enter order, judgment, or decree, Harrison v. Barngrover, Tex.Civ.App., 72 S.W.2d 971, 975: People ex rel. Sokoll v. Municipal Court of Chicago, 359 Ill. 102, 194 N.E. 242; entertain sun or controversy, Walling v. Miller, C.C.A. Minn., 138 F.2d 629. 631, 633: In re Trustees of Milwaukee County Orphans’ Board, 218 Wis. 518, 261 N.W. 676, 680: Mann v. Morrison, 106 Utah 15, 144 P.2d 543, 545; examine whetber court has power to hear and determine contro-versy, Acedia Land Co. v. Horuff, C.C.A.La., 110 F.2d 354, 355; exercise judicial authority or power, Howe v. Lisbon Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 111 Vt. 201, 14 A.2d 3, 5: Thomp-son v. Short, 6 Wash.2d 71, 106 P.2d 720. 726, 728; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657. 717, 9 L.Ed. 1233; govern, People v. Pierce, 41 N.Y.S. 858, 860,, 18 Misc. 83; hear and determine. Abbott; Ex parte Meisner, 30 Cal. App.2d 290, 86 P.2d 124, 125; State v. Hampson, 9 Wash.2d 278, 114 P.2d 992. 993: Roddy v. Fitzgerald’s Estate, 113 Vt. 472, 35 A.2d 668. 670: hear without determining, Gray v. Hall, 203 Cal. 306. 265 P. 246. 251: inquire into facts, Rasmusson v. Schmalenberger, 60 N.D. 527. 235 N.W. 496, 499; McGowin v. McGowin, 122 Fla. 394. 165 So. 274, 275, 276; Arganbright v. Good, 46 Cal.App.2d Supp. 877, 116 P.2d 186; make laws. People v. Pierce, 41 N.Y.S. 858, 860, 18 Misc. 83; litigate controversy between parties, Morrow v. Corbin, 122 Tex. 553. 62 S.W.2d 641; pronounce sentence of law or award remedies provided by law, 1 Black, Judgm. § 215. State v. Barnett, 110 Vt. 221, 3 A.2d 521, 526; put wheels of justice in motion and to proceed to determination of cause. Employers Reinsurance Corpora-tion v. Bryant, Tex., 299 U.S. 374, 57 S.Ct. 273, 277, 81 L.Ed. 289; render, declare or make judgment, order or decree, High v. Pearce, 220 N.C. 266. 17 S.E.2d 108. 112: McGowin v. McGowin, 122 Fla. 394, 165 So. 274, 275. 276: Reed v. Woodmen of the World, 94 Mont. 374. 22 P.2d 819; Thayer v. Village of Downers Grove, 3G9 III. 334, 16 N.E.2d 717, 719; take cognizance, Dailey v. Brennan, 123 W.Va. 261, 14 S.E.2d 617, 618; Western Grocer Co. v. Glenn, 226 Iowa 1374, 286 N.W. 441, 442; try, Robinette v. Price, 214 Minn. 521, 8 N.W.2d 800, 804; try dispute as to right to possession of property in replevin, Universal Credit Co. v. Antonsen, 374 III. 194, 29 N.E.2d 96, 99, 130 A.L.R. 626.
It is the power of him who has the right of judgine, Gliptis v. Fifteen Oil Co., 204 La. 896, 16 So.2d 471, 477; the power of judicatories and courts. McGowin v. Mp. Gowin, 122 Fla. 394, 165 So. 274, 275, 276; •Arganbright v. Good, 46 Cal.App.2d Supp. 877, 116 P.2d 186; Shaffer v. Bank, 201 N.C. 415, 160 S.E. 481, 482. It is power con-ferred by the Constitution or by law, Corby v. Dooley, 313 Ill.App. 509, 40 N.E.2d 581, 584; National Life Co. v. Rice, 140 Tex. 315, 167 S.W.2d 1021, 1024; State ex rel. Andrews v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 39 Ariz. 242, 5 P. 2d 192, 194.
It is of three kinds, of the subject-matter, of the person, and to render particular judgment which was given. City of Phcenix v. Rodgers, 44 Ariz. 40, 34 P.2d 385, 388. The word may include or refer to jurisdiction of particular case, Brown v. State, 219 Ind. 251, 37 N.E.2d 73, 78, 137 A.L.R. 679; or jurlsdiction of subject matter, Manning v. Baxter, 281 Ky. 659, 136 S.W.2d 1074, 1076; jurlsdiction of subject matter and of the person, Stewart v. Sampson, 285

Ky. 447, 148 S.W.2d 278, 280, 281; Moffatt v. Cassimus, 28 Ala.App. 582, 190 So. 297, 298; State Board of Dental Examiners v. Savelle; 90 Colo. 177, 8 P.2d 693, 695; juris-diction of subject matter, of the person, and to render the particular judgment which was given, Wall v. Superior Court of Yavapai County, 53 Ariz. 344, 89 P.2d 624, 628. Or It may mean only venue, Fiolat v. Minnesota-Atlantic Transit Co., D.C.Minn., 31 F.Supp. 219, 220. It does not depend either upon the regularity of exercise of power to hear and determine or upon correctness or rightfulness of decision made, Mattice v. Kingston Trust Co., 33 N.Y.S.2d 799, 801, 178 Misc. 256; Thompson v. Terminal Shares, C.C.A.Mo., 89 F.2d 652, 655; Klancher v. Anderson, 113 Colo. 478, 158 P.2d 923, 925; or on the ability of the judge to reason correctly or to act incorruptibly, In re Gardl-ner’s Estate, 45 Cal.App.2d 559, 114 P.2d 643, 645.
The amount claimed in good faith Is the test of jurisdic-tion, Gray v. Blight, C.C.A.Colo., 112 F.2d 696, 700; Schwartz v. California Claim Service, 52 Cal.App.2d 47, 125 P.2d 883, 889.
"Jurisdiction of subject-matter" means jurisdiction of class of cases to which particular case belongs. Honea v. Graham, Tex.Civ.App., 66 S.W.2d 802, 804; McFarlin v. McFarlin, 384 Ill. 428, 51 N.E.2d 520, 521; Ferree v. Fer-ree, 285 Ky. 825, 149 S.W.2d 719, 721; the nature of the cause of action and relief sought, Mid-City Bank & Trust Co. v. Myers, 343 Pa. 465, 23 A.2d 420, 423; Wilson v. State Highway Commissioner, 174 Va. 82, 4 S.E.2d 746, 751; or the amount for which a court of limited jurisdiction is authorized to enter judgment, Moffatt v. Cassimus, 28 Ala. App. 582, 190 So. 297, 298. It is power to: adjudge con-cerning general question involved, Parker Bros. v. Fagan, C.C.A.Fla., 68 F.2d 616, 617; Balzer v. Pyles, 350 III. 344, 183 N.E. 215, 217; In re Gibson’s Will, Sur., 40 N.Y.S.2d 727, 733; adjudge whether facts make proper case for jurisdictional consideration by judge, Behee v. Beem, 156 Kan. 115, 131 P.2d 675, 677; Montgomery v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., C.C.A.I11., 83 F.2d 758, 761; deal with general abstract question, to hear particular facts in any case relating to such question, and to determine whether they are sufficient to invoke exercise of power, Melton v. Jenkins, 50 Ga.App. 615, 178 S.E. 754; State ex rel. Camp-bell v. Chapman, 145 Fla. 647, 1 So.2d 278, 281; City of Phoenix v. Greer, 43 Ariz. 214, 29 P.2d 1062, 1064; decide rightly or wrongly, Montgomery v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., C.C.A.III., 83 F.2d 758, 761; determine every justiciable issue involved, Spencer v. Gypsy Oil Co., C.C.A. Okl., 142 F.2d 935, 937; hear and determine cases of gen-eral class to which proceeding belongs, Noxon Chemical Products Co. v. Leckie, C.C.A.N.J., 39 F.2d 318, 320; Brown v. Jacobs, 367 III. 545, 12 N.E.2d 10, 12.
"Jurisdiction of the person" is power to subject parties in a particular case to decisions and rulings made in such case, Collins v. Powell, 224 Iowa 1015, 277 N.W. 477, 481.
For "Appellate Jurisdiction," "Concurrent Juris-diction," "Contentious Jurisdiction," "Co-Ordinate Jurisdiction," "Criminal Jurisdiction," "Excess of Jurisdiction," "Exclusive Jurisdiction," "Foreign Jurisdiction," "General Jurisdiction," "Limited Ju-risdiction," "Pendent Jurisdiction," "Probate Juris-diction," "Special Jurisdiction," "Summary Juris-diction," "Territorial Jurisdiction," and "Voluntary Jurisdiction," see those titles. For equity jurisdic-
tion, see "Equity." For original jurisdiction, see "Original."
JURISDICTION CLAUSE. In equity practice. That part of a bill which is intended to give juris-diction of the suit to the court, by a general ayer-ment that the acts complained of are contrary to equity, and tend to the injury of the complainant, and that he has no remedy, or not a complete remedy, without the assistance of a court of equity, is called the "jurisdiction clause." Mitf. Eq.P1. 43.
JURISDICTIONAL. Pertaining or relating to ju-risdiction; conferring jurisdiction; showing or
disclosing jurisdiction; defining or limiting juris-diction; essential to jurisdiction.
JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT. Amount involved in the particular case, Shabotzky v. Massachu-setts Mut. Life Ins. Co., D.C.N.Y., 21 F.Supp. 166, 167; sum of all claims that are properly joined, Gray v. Blight, C.C.A.Colo., 112 F.2d 696, 700; value of the object sought to be attained in the litigation, Mountain States Power Co. v. City of Forsyth, D.C.Mont., 41 F.Supp. 389, 390; Ronzio v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., C.C.A.Utah, 116 F.2d 604, 606.
JURISDICTIONAL FACTS. Those matters of fact which must exist before the court can properly take jurisdiction of the particular case, as, that the defendant has been properly served with process, that the amount in controversy exceeds a certain sum, that the parties are citizens of different states, etc. Noble v. Railroad Co., 147 U.S. 165, 13 S.Ct. 271, 37 L.Ed. 123.
JURISDICTIONAL PLEA. While all dilatory pleas are sometimes referred to as "jurisdictional pleas," yet, strictly speaking, only those pleas to the jurisdiction of the court are "jurisdiction-al." Howe v. Lisbon Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 111 Vt. 201, 14 A.2d 3, 10.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT. A statement in appellant’s brief that concisely and clearly in-forms the Supreme Court of the exáct ground on which the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is claimed to rest, and refers briefly to the constitutional pro-visions and decided cases sustaining such claim of jurisdiction. Andrew County v. Maxwell, 347 Mo. 156, 146 S.W.2d 621, 623.
JURISINCEPTOR. Lat. A student of the civil law.
J1URISPERITUS. Lat. Skilled or learned in the law.
JURISPRUDENCE. The philosophy of law, or the science which treats of the principies of positive law and legal relations.
"The tem is wrongly applied to actual systems of law, or to current views of law, or to suggestlons for its amend-ment, but is the name of a science. This science is a for-mal, or analytical, rather than a material, one. It is the science of actual or positive law. It is wrongly divided into ‘general’ and ‘particular,’ or into ‘philosophicar and ‘historical.’ It may therefore be defined as the formal science of positive law." Holl.Jur. 12.
In the proper sense of the word, "jurisprudence" Is the science of law, namely, that science which has for its function to ascertain the principies on which legal rules are based, so as not only to classify those rules in their proper order, and show the relation in which they stand to one another, but also to settle the manner in which new or doubtful cases should be brought under the appropriate rules. Jurisprudence is more a formal than a material science. It has no direct concern with questions of moral or political policy, for they fall under the province of ethics and legislation; but, when a new or doubtful case arises to which two different rules seem, when taken lit-erally, to be equally applicable, it may be, and often is, the function of jurisprudence to consider the ultímate effect which would be produced If each rule were applied to an indefinite number of similar cases, and to choose that rule which, when so applied, will produce the greatest advantage to the communtty. Sweet.For "Comparative Jurisprudence" and "Medical Jurisprudence," see those titles. For equity juris-prudence, see "Equity."
JURISPRUDENTIA. Lat. In the civil and com-mon law. Jurisprudence, or legal science.
JURISPRUDENTIA EST DIVINARUM ATQUE KUMANARUM RERUM NOTITIA, JUSTI ATQUE INJUSTI SCIFNTIA. Jurisprudence is the knowl-edge of things divine and human, the science of what is right and what is wrong. Dig. 1, 1, 10, 2; Inst. 1, 1, 1. This definition is adopted by Bracton, word for word. Bract. fol. 3.
JURISPRUDENTIA LEGIS COMMUNIS AN-GLIM EST SCIENTIA SOCIALIS ET COPIOSA. The jurisprudence of the common law of England is a science social and comprehensive. 7 Coke, 28a.
JURIST. One who is versed or skilled in law; an-swering to the Latin "jurisperitus," (q. v.).
One who is skilled in the civil law, or law of na-tions. The term is now usually applied to those who have distinguished themselves by their writ-ings on legal subjects.
JURISTIC. Pertaining or belonging to, or charac-teristic of, jurisprudence, or a jurist, or the legal profession.
JURISTIC ACT. One designed to have a legal el-fect, and capable thereof.
An act of a private individual directed to the ori-gin, termination, or alteration of a right. Webster, Dict., citing T. E. Holland.
JURNEDUM. In old English law. A journey; a day’s traveling. Cowell.
JURO. In Spanish law. A certain perpetual pen-sion, granted by the king on the public revenues, and more especially on the salt-works, by favor, either in consideration of meritorious services, or in return for money loaned the government, or obtained by it through forced loans. Escriche.
JUROR. One member of a jury.
The term is not inflexible, and besides a person who has been accepted and sworn to try a cause "juror" may also mean a person selected for jury service. Green v. Smlther, Ky., 199 S.W. 1056; People v. Newmark, 312 III. 625, 144 N.E. 338, 340. The term may apply to special jurors as well as members of regular panel. Beavers v. State, 187 Ark. 722, 61 S.W.2d 1113. Sometimes, one who takes an oath; as in the term "non-juror," a person who refuses certain oaths.
JUROR DESIGNATE. A juror who has been drawn as a juror. Summers v. State ex rel. Boy-kin, 66 Ga.App. 648, 19 S.E.2d 28, 31.
JUROR’S BOOK. A list of persons qualified to serve on juries.
JURY. In practice. A certain number of men, selected according to law, and sworn ( jurati) to inquire of certain matters of fact, and declare the truth upon evidence to be laid before them. This definition embraces the various subdivisions of juries ; as grand jury, petit jury, common jury, special jury, coroner’s jury, sheriffs jury, (q. v.)
Black’s Law Dictionary Revisad 4th Ed.-63
A jury is a body of men temporarlly selected from the cltlzens of a particular dlstrict, and invested with power to present or indict a person for a public offense, or to a questIon of fact. Code Civil Proc.Cal. § 190.
As understood at common law and as used in constitu-tional provision, "jury" imports body of twelve men. State v. Dalton, 206 N.C. 507, 174 S.E. 422, 424; People ex rel. Cooley v. Wilder, 255 N.Y.S. 218, 222, 234 App.Dtv. 256: Hall v. Brown, 129 Kan. 859, 284 P. 396.
"Jury trial" is not merely a trial by twelve men, but by twelve men selected by law, with judge who passes on many legal questions and has limited supervision over trial. Universal Truck Loading Co. v. Taylor, 178 Miss. 143, 172 So. 756, 757.
The right to "jury trial" guaranteed by Federal Consti-tution is the right of trial by jury as it existed at common law. Diederich v. American News Co., C.C.A.Okl., 128 F.2d 144, 145, 146.
The right to "jury trial" of controverted issues implies a trial by an impartial and qualifled jury. Alexander v. R. D. Crier & Sons Co., 181 Md. 415, 30 A.2d 757, 759.
The "jury trial" guaranteed by Federal Constitution means trial by jury of 12 men in presence and under superintendente of judge empowered to lnstruct them on the law and advise them on the facts and, except on acqult-tal of criminal charge, to set aside their verdict if in judge’s opinion it is contrary to law or evidence. Died-erich v. American News Co., C.C.A.Okl., 128 F.2d 144, 145, 146.
The terms "jury" and "trial by jury," as used in the constitution, mean twelve competent men, distnterested and impartial, not of kin, nor personal dependents of either of the parties, having their homes within the’juris-dictional limas of the court, drawn and selected by offlcers free from all bias in favor of or against either party, duly impaneled and sworn to render a true verdict according to the law and the evidence. State v. McClear, 11 Nev. 39; H. Wagman & Co. v. Schafer Motor Freight Service, 4 N.Y.S.2d 526, 529, 167 Misc. 681.

Common Jury

In practice. The ordinary kind of jury by which issues of fact are generally tried, as distinguished from a special jury, (q. v.).

Fair and Impartial Jury

See Fair and Impartial Jury.

Foreign Jury

A jury obtained from a county other than that in which issue was joined.

Grand Jury

A jury of inquiry who are summoned and re-turned by the sheriff to each session of the crim-inal courts, and whose duty is to receive com-plaints and accusations in criminal cases, hear the evidence adduced on the part of the state, and find bilis of indictment in cases where they are satis-fied a trial ought to be had. They are first sworn, and instructed by the court.
This is called a "grand jury" because it comprises a greater number of jurors than the ordinary trial jury or "petit jury." At common law, a grand jury consisted of not less than twelve nor more than twenty-three men, and this is still the rule in many of the states, though in some the number is otherwise flxed by statute; thus in Oregon and Utah, the grand jury is composed of seven men; in South Dakota, not leso than six nor more than eight; in Texas, twelve; in Idaho, sixteen; in Washington, twelve to seventeen; in North Dakota, sixteen to twenty-three; in California, nineteen; in New Mexico, twenty-one. See Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 7 S.Ct. 781, 30 L.Ed. 849; In re Gardiner, 64 N.Y.S. 760, 31 Alise. 364; Finley v. State, 61

Ala. 204; People v. Duff, 65 How.Prac., N.Y., 365; Eng-lish V. State, 31 Fla. 340, 12 So. 689; Jones v. McClaughry, 169 Iowa, 281, 151 N.W. 210, 216.

Mixed Jury

A bilingual jury; a•jury of the half-tongue. See De Medietatm Linguae. Also a jury composed partly of negroes and partly of white men.

Petit Jury

The ordinary jury of twelve men for the trial of a civil or criminal action. So called to distin-guish it from the grand jury.
A petit jury is a body of twelve men impaneled and sworn in a district court, to try and determine, by a true and unanimous verdict, any question or issue of fact, In any civil or criminal action or proceeding, according to law and the evidente as given them in the court. Gen.St. Minn.1878, c. 71, § 1 (M.S.A. § 593.01).

Special Jury

jury ordered by the court, on the motion of either party, in cases of unusual importance or intricacy. Called, from the manner in which it is constituted, a "struck jury." 3 Bl.Comm. 357. A jury composed of persons aboye the rank of ordinary freeholders; usually summoned to try questions of greater importance than those usually submitted to common juries. Brown.

Struck Jury

The jury participating in the trial of a given, case; or a jury summoned and impaneled for the trial of a case, and in this sense a petit jury as dis-tinguished from a grand jury.
A. body of men returned from the citizens of a particular district before a court or officer of competent jurisdiction, and sworn to try and determine, by verdict, a question of fact. Code Civ.Proc.Cal. § 193.

JURY ACTION. What was before adoption of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure an action at law is a "jury action". Ryan Distributing Corporation
v. Caley, D.C.Pa., 51 F.Supp. 377, 379; Ransom v. Staso Milling Co., D.C.Vt., 2 F.R.D. 128, 131.
JURY-,BOX. The place in court (strictly an in-closed place) where the jury sit during the trial of a cause. 1 Archb.Pr.K.B. 208; 1 Burrill, Pr. 455.
JURY COMMISSIONER. An officer charged with the duty of selecting the names to be put finto the jury wheel, or of drawing the panel of jurors for a particular term of court.
JURY-LIST. A paper containing the names of jurors impaneled to try a cause, or it contains the names of all the jurors summoned to attend court.
JURY OF GOOD AND LAWFUL MEN. A jury of 12 good and lawful men. State v. Emery, 224 N.C. 581, 31 S.E.2d 858, 861.
JUEY OF MATRONS. See Matrons, Jury Of.
JURY PROCESS. The process by which a jury is summoned in a cause, and by which their attend-ance is enforced.
JURY WHEEL. A machine containing the names of persons qualified to serve as grand and .petit jurors, from which, in an order determined by the hazárd of its revolutions, are drawn a sufficient number of such names to make up the panels for a given term of court.
JURYMAN. A juror; one who is impaneled on a jury.
JURYWOMAN. One member of a jury of ma-trons ; a woman juror.
JUS. Lat. In Roman law. Right; justice; law; the whole body of law; also a right. The term is used in two meanings:
1. "Jus" means "law," considered in the abstract; that is, as distinguished from any specific enactment, the science or department of learning, or quasi personifled factor in human history or conduct or social development, which we call, in a general sense, "the law." Or it means the law taken as a system, an aggregate, a whole; "the sum total of a number of individual laws taken together." Or it may designate some one particular system or body of particular laws; as in the phrases "jus civile," "jus gen-tium," "jus prcetorium."
2. In a second sense, "jus" signifles "a right;" that is, a power, privilege, faculty, or demand inherent in one per-son and incident upon another; or a capacity residing in one person of controlling, with the assent and assistance of the state, the actions of another. This is its meaning in the expresslons "jus in rem," "jus accrescendi," "jus pos-sessionis."
It is thus seen to possess the same ambiguity as the words "droit," "recht," and "right," (which see.)
Within the meaning of the maxim that "ignorantia juris non excusat" (ignorance of the law is no excuse), the word "jus" is used to denote the general law or ordinary law of the land, and not a private right. Churchill v. Bradiey, 58 Vt. 403, 5 A. 189, 56 Am.Rep. 563; Cooper v. Fibbs, L.R. 2 H.L. 149; Freichnecht v. Meyer, 39 N.J.Eq. 561.
The continental jurlsts seek to avoid thls ambiguity in the use of the word "jus," by calling its former significa-tion "objective," and the latter meaning "subjective." Thus Mackeldey (Rom.Law, § 2) says: "The laws of the first kind [compulsory or positive laws] form law [jus] in its objective sense, [jus est norma agendi, law is a rule of conduct.] The possibility resulting from law in this sense to do or require another to do is law in its subjective sense, [jus est facultas agendi, law is a license to act.] The voluntary action of man in conformity with the pre-cepts of law is called ‘justice,’ [justitia.]"
Some further meanings of the word are:
An action. Bract. fol. 3. Or, rather, those proceedings in the Roman action which were conducted before the pretor.
Power or authority. Sui juris, in one’s own power; independent. Inst. 1, 8, pr.; Bract. fol. 3. Alieni juris, under another’s power. Inst. 1, 8, pr.
The profession (ars) or practice of .the law. Jus ponitur pro ipsa arte. Bract. fol. 2b.
A court or judicial tribunal, (locus in quo redditur jus.) Id. fol. 3.
JUS ABSTINENDI. The right of renunciation; the right of an heir, under the Roman law, to re-nounce or decline the inheritance, as, for example, where his acceptance, in consequence of the ne-cessity of paying the debts, would make it a bur-den to him. See Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 733.

JUS ABUTENDI. The right to abuse. By this phrase is understood the right to do exactly as one likes with property, or having full dominion over property. 3 Toullier, no. 86.
JUS ACCRESCENDI. The right of survivorship. In re Brogan’s Estate, 165 Misc. 111, 300 N.Y.S. 447, 455. The right of the survivor or survivors of two or more joint tenants to the tenancy or estate, upon the death of one or more of the joint tenants. In re Capria’s Estate, 89 Misc. 101, 151 N.Y.S. 385, 386.
JUS ACCRESCENDI INTER MERCATORES, PRO BENEFICIO COMMERCII, LOCUM NON HABET. The right of survivorship has no place between merchants, for the benefit of commerce. Co.Litt. 182a; 2 Story, Eq.Jur. § 1207; Broom, Max. 455. There is no survivorship in cases of partnership, as there is in joint-tenancy. Story, Partn. § 90.
JUS ACCRESCENDI PRIEFERTUR ONERIBUS. The right of survivorship is preferred to incum-brances. Co.Litt. 185a. Hence no dower or cur-tesy can be claimed out of a joint estate. 1 Steph. Comm. 316.
JUS ACCRESCENDI PRIEFERTUR ULTInzE VOLUNTATI. The right of survivorship is pre-ferred to the last will. Co.Litt. 185b. A devise of one’s share of a joint estate, by will, is no sever-ance of the jointure; for no testament takes ef-fect till af ter the death of the testator, and by such death the right of the survivor (which accrued at the original creation of the estate, and has therefore a priority to the other) is already vest-ed. 2 Bl.Comm. 186; 3 Steph.Comm. 316.
JUS ACTUS. In Roman law. A rural servitude giving to a person a passage for carriages, or for cattle.
JUS AD REM. A term of the civil law, meaning "a right to a thing;" that is, a right txercisable by one person over a particular article of property in virtue of a contract or obligation incurred by an-other person in respect to it, and which is en-forceable only against or through such other person. It is thus distinguished from jus in re, which is a complete and absolute dominion over a thing available against all persons.
The disposition of modem writers Is to use the term "jus ad rem" as descriptive of a right without possession, and "jus in re" as descriptive of a right accompanied by pos-session. Or, in a somewhat wider sense, the former denotes an inchoate or incomplete right to a thing; the latter, a complete and perfect right to a thing. See The Carlos F. Roses, 177 U.S. 655, 20 S.Ct. 803, 44 L.Ed. 929; The Young Mechanic, 30 Fed.Cas. 873.
In canon law. A right to a thing. An inchoate and imperfect right, such as is gained by nomina-tion and institution; as distinguished from jus in re, or complete and full right, such as is ac-quired by corporal possession. 2 Bl.Comm. 312.
JUS ;ELIAN1UM. A body of laws drawn up by Sextus 21Elius, and consisting of three parts, where-in were explained, respectively: (1) The laws of the Twelve Tables; (2) the interpretation of and
decisions upon such laws; and (3) the forms of procedure. In date, it was subsequent to the jus Flavianum, (q. v.). Brown.
JUS 1EQUUM. Equitable law. A term used by the Romans to express the adaptation of the law to the circumstances of the individual case as op-posed to jus strictum (q. v.).
JUS IESNECI1E. The right of primogeniture (q. v.).
JUS ALBINATUS. The droit d’aubaine (q. See Albinatus Jus.
JUS ANGARLE. See Angaria; Angary, Right of.
JUS ANGLORUM. The laws and customs of the West Saxons, in the time of the Heptarchy, by which the people were for a long time governed, and which were preferred before all others. Whar-ton.
JUS AQUJE HAUSTUS. In Roman law. A rural servitude giving to a person a right of watering cattle on another’s field, or of drawing water from another’s well.
JUS AQWEDUCTUS. In the civil law. The name of a servitude which gives to the owner of land the right to bring down water through or from the land of another.
JUS BANCI. In old English law. The right of bench.
The right or privilege of having elevated and separate
seat of judgment, anciently allowed only to the king’s judges, who hence were said to administer high justice, (summam administrant justitiam.) Blount.
JUS BELLI. The law of war. The law of nations as applied to a state of war, defining in particular the rights and duties of the belligerent powers themselves, and of neutral nations.
The right of war; that which may be done with-out injustice with regard to an enemy. Gro. de Jure B. lib. 1, c. 1, § 3.
JUS BELLUM DICENDI. The right of proclaim-ing war.
JUS CANONICUM. The canon law.
JUS CIVILE. Civil law. The system of law pe-culiar to one state or people. Inst. 1, 2, 1. Partic-ularly, in Roman law, the civil law of the Roman people, as distinguished from the jus gentium. The term is also applied to the body of law called, emphatically, the "civil law."
The jus civile and the jus gentium are distinguished in this way. AH people ruled by statutes and customs use a law partly peculiar to themselves, partly common to all men. The law each people has settled for itself is peculiar to the state itself, and is called "jus civile," as being peculiar to that very state. The law, again, that natural reason has settled among all men,—the law that is guarded among all peoples quite alike,—is called the "jus gen-tium," and all nations use it as if law. The Roman people, therefore, use a law that Is partly peculiar tó itself, partly common to all men. Hunter, Rom.Law, 38.
But this is not the only, or even the general, use of the words. What the Roman jurists had clilefly in view, when
they spoke of "jus was not local as opposed to cosmopolitan law, but the old law of the city as contrasted with the newer law introduced by the prwtor, (jus proe-torium, jus honorarium.) Largely, no doubt, the jus gen-tium corresponds with the jus prcetorium; but the cor-respondence is not perfect. Id. 39.
JUS CIVILE EST QUOD SIBI POPULUS CON-STITUIT. The civil law is what a people estab-lishes for itself. Inst. 1, 2, 1; Jackson v. Jackson, 1 Johns., N.Y., 424, 426.
JUS CIVITATUS. The right of citizenship; the freedom of the city of Rorne. It differs from jus quiritium, which comprehended all the privileges of a free native of Rome. The difference is much the same as between "denization" and "naturaliza-tion" with us. Wharton.
JUS CLOACZE. In the civil law. The right of sewerage or drainage. An easement consisting in the right of having a sewer, or of conducting surface water, through the house or over the ground of one’s neighbor. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 317.
JUS COMMUNE.
In the Civil law. Common right; the common and natural rule of right, as opposed to jus singu-lare, (q. v.). Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 196.
In English law. The common law, answering to the Saxon "folcright." 1 Bl.Comm. 67.
JUS CONSTITUI OPORTET IN HIS QUirE UT PLURIMUM ACCIDUNT NON QU’E EX INOP-INATO. Laws ought to be made with a view to those cases which happen most frequently, and not to those which are of rare or accidental oc-currence. Dig. 1, 3, 3; Broom, Max. 43.
JUS CORON.2E. In English law. The right of the crown, or to the crown; the right of succes-sion to the throne. 1 Bl.Comm. 191; 2 Steph.. Comm. 434.
JUS CUDENDM MONETZE. In old English law. The right of coining money. 2 How. State Tr. 118.
JUS CURIALITATIS. In English law. The right of curtesy. Spelman.
JUS DARE. To give or to make the law; the func-tion and prerogative of the legislative department.
JUS DELIBERANDI. In the civil law. The right of deliberating.
A term granted by the proper officer at the request of hlm who is called to the inheritance, (the heir,) within which he has the right to investígate its condition and to consider whether he will accept or reject it. Mackeld.Rom. Law, § 742; Civ.Code La. art. 1026 (Civ.Code, art. 1033).
JUS DESCENDIT, ET NON TERRA. A right descends, not the land. Co. Litt. 345.
JUS DEVOLUTUM. The right of the church of presenting a minister to a vacant parish, in case the patron shall neglect to exercise his right with-in the time limited by law.
JUS DICERE. To declare the law; to say what the law is. The province of a court or judge. 2 Eden, 29; 3 P.Wms. 485.
JUS DICERE, ET NON JUS DARE. To declare the law, not to make it. 7 Term 696; Arg. Barry v. Mandell, 10 Johns., N.Y., 563, 566; 7 Exch. 543; 2 Eden 29; 4 C.B. 560, 561; Broom, Max. 140.
JUS DISPONENDI. The right of disposing.
An expression used either generally to sIgnify the right of alienation, as when we speak of depriving a married woman of the jus disponendi over her separate estate, or specially in the law relating to sales of goods, where it is often a question whether the vendor of goods has the intention of reserving to himself the jus disponendi; i. e., of preventing the ownership from passing to the pur-chaser, notwithstanding that he (the vendor) has parted with the possession of the goods. Sweet.
JUS DISTRAHENDI. The right of sale of goods pledged in case of non-payment. See Pledge; Dis-tress.
JUS DIVIDENDI. The right of disposing of real-ty by will. Du Cange.
JUS DUPLICATUM. A double right; the right of possession united with the right of property; oth-erwise called "droit-droit." 2 Bl.Comm. 199.
JUS EDICERE, JUS EDICENDI. The right to issue edicts. It belonged to all the higher magis-trates, but special interest is attached to the pre-torian edicts in connection with the history of Roman law. See Pretor.
JUS EST ARS BONI ET ZEQUI. Law is the science of what is good and just. Dig. 1, 1, 1, 1; Bract. fol. 2b.
JUS EST NORMA RECTI; ET QUICQUID EST CONTRA NORMAM RECTI EST INJURIA. Law is a rule of right; and whatever is contrary to the rule of right is an injury. 3 Bulst. 313.
JUS ET FRAUS NUNQUAM COHABITANT. Right and fraud never dwell together. 10 Coke, 45a. Applied to the title of a statute. Id.; Best, Ev. p. 250, § 205.
JUS EX INJURIA NON ORITUR. A right does (or can) not rise ,out of a wrong. Broom, Max. 738, note; 4 Bing. 639.
JUS EX NON SCRIPTO. Law constituted by cus-tom or such usage as indicates the tacit consent of the community.
JUS FALCANDI. The right of mowing or cutting. Fleta, lib. 4, c. 27, § 1. The right of cutting wood. Bract. fol. 231.
JUS FECIALE. In Roman law. The law of arms, or of heralds. A rudimentary species of Interna-tional law founded on the rites and religious cere-monies of the different peoples.
JUS FIDUCIARIUM. In the civil law. A right in trust; as distinguished from jus legitimum, a legal right. 2 Bl.Comm. 328.
JUS FLAVIANUM. In old Roman law. A body of laws drawn up by Cneius Flavius, a clerk of Appius Claudius, from the materials to which he had access. It was a popularization of the laws. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 39.JUS FLUMINUM. In the civil- law. The right to the use of rivers. Locc. de Jure Mar. lib. 1, c. 6.
JUS FODIENDI. In the civil and old English law. A right of digging on another’s land. Inst. 2, 3, 2; Bract. fol. 222.
JUS FUTURUM. In the civil law. A future right; an inchoate, incipient, or expectant right, not yet fully vested.
It may be either "jus de/atum," when the subsequent acquisition or vesting of ít depends merely on the will of the person in whom it is to vest, or "jus nondum dela-tum," when it depends on the future occurrence of other circumstances or conditions. Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 191.
JUS GENTIUM. The law of nations. That law which natural reason has established among all men is equally observed among all nations, and is called the "law of nations," as being the law which all nations use. Inst. 1, 2, 1; Dig. 1, 1, 9; 1
Bl.Comm. 43; 1 Kent, Comm. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 125.
Although this phrase had a meaning in the Roman law which may be rendered by our expression "law of nations," It must not be understood as equivalent to what we now cal] "international law," its scope being much wider. It was originally a system of law, or more properly equity, gathered by the early Roman lawyers and magis-trates from the common íngredients in the customs of the old Italian trabes,—those being the nations, gentes, whom they had opportunities of observing,—to be used in cases where the jus civile did not apply; that is, in cases between foreigners or between a Roman citizen and a for-eigner. The principie upon which they proceeded was that any rule of law which was common to all the nations they knew oí must be intrinsically consonant to right reason, and therefore fundamentally valid ami just. From this it was an easy transition to the converse principie, viz., that any rule which instinctively commended itself to their sense of justice and reason must be a part of the jus gen-tium. And so the ]atter term carne eventually to be about synonymous with "equity," (as the Romans understood it,) or the system of prwtorian law.
Modern jurista frequently employ the term "jus gentium privatum" to denote prívate International law, or that sub-ject which is otherwise styled the "conflict of laws;" and "jus gentiurn publicum" for public International law, or the system of rules governing the intercourse of nations with each other as persons.
JUS GLADII. The right of the sword; the exe-cutory power of the law; the right, power, or pre-rogative of punishing for crime. 4 Bl.Comm. 177.
JUS HABENDI. The right to have a thing. The right to be put in actual possession of property. Lewin, Trusts, 585.
JUS HABENDI ET RETINENDI. A right to have and to retain the profits, tithes, and offerings, etc., of a rectory or parsonage.
JUS ILIEREDITATIS. The right of inheritance.
JUS HAURIENDI. In the civil and old English law. The right of drawing water. Fleta, lib. 4, c. 27, § 1.
JUS HONORARIUM. The body of Roman law, which was made up of edicts of the supreme mag-istrates, particularly the pintors.
JUS HONORUM. In Roman law. The right of holding offices. See Jus Suffragii.
JUS IMAGINIS. In Roman law. The right to use or display pictures or statues of ancestors; somewhat analogous to the right, in English law, to bear a coat of arms.
JUS IMMUNITATIS. In the civil law. The law of immunity or exemption from the burden of public office. Dig. 50, 6.
JUS IN PERSONAM. A right against a person; a right which gives its possessor a power to oblige another person to give or procure, to do or not to do, something.
JUS IN RE. A right in a thing. Denver Joint Stock Land Bank of Denver v. Dixon, 57 Wyo. 523, 122 P.2d 842, 847, 140 A.L.R. 1270. A right exist-ing in a person with respect to an article or sub-ject of property, inherent in his relation to it, implying complete ownership with possession, and available against all the world. See Jus ad Rem.
JUS IN RE ALIENA. An easement on servitude, or right in, or arising out of, the property of an-other.
JUS IN RE INHPERIT OSSIBUS USUFRUC-TUARII. A right in the thing cleaves to the per-son of the usufructuary.
JUS IN RE PROPRIA. The right of enjoyment which is incident to full ownership or property, and is often used to denote the full ownership or property itself. It is distinguished from jus in re alienó, which is a mere easement or right in or over the property of another.
JUS INCOGNITUM. An unknown law. This term is applied by the civilians to obsolete laws. Bowyer, Mod.Civil Law, 33.
JUS INDIVIDUUM. An individual or indivisible right; a right incapable of division. 36 Eng.Law & Eq. 25.
JUS ITALICUM. A term of the Roman law de-scriptive of the aggregate of rights, privileges, and franchises possessed by the cities and inhabi-tants of Italy, outside of the city of Rome, and afterwards extended to some of the colonies and provinces of the empire, consisting principally in the right to have a free constitution, to be exempt from the land tax, and to have the title to the land regarded as Quiritarian property. See Gib-bon, Rom.Emp. c. xvii; Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 43.
JUS ITINERIS. In Roman law. A rural servi-tude giving to a Person the right to pass over an adjoining field, on foot or horseback.
JUS JURANDI FORMA VERBIS DIFFERT, RE CONVENIT; HUNC ENIM SENSUM HABERE DEBET: UT DEUS -INVOCETUR. Grot. de Jur. B., 1. 2, c. 13, § 10. The forro of taking an oath differs in language, agrees in meaning; for it ought to have this sense: that the Deity is invok-ed.
JUS LATII. In Roman law. The right of Latium or of the Latins.
The principal priVilege of the Latins seems to have been the use of their own laws, and their not being subject to the edlcts of the pretor, and that they had occasional access to the freedom of Rome, and a participation in her sacred rites. Butl.Hor.Jur. 41.
.TUS LATIUM. In Roman law. A rule of law ap-plicable to magistra tes in Latium.
It was either majus Latium or minus Latium,—the majus Latium raising to the dignity of Roman citizen not only the magistrate himself, but also his wife and children; the minus Latium raising to that dignity only the magistrate himself. Brown.
JUS LEGITIMUM. A legal right. In the civil law. A right which was enforceable in the ordinary course of law. 2 Bl.Comm. 328.
JUS LIBERORUM. In Roman law. The privi-lege conferred upon a woman who had three or Tour children.
Another author defines this privilege as one by which exemption was given from all troublesome offices. Brown, L.Dict.
In order that she should be able to take all the property given her by will, she must have had this privilege con-ferred upon her. Sohm, Inst.Rom.L. § 86. In the time of Hadrian, a decree was made conferring upon a mother, as such, who, being an ingenua, had the jus trium liberorum, or being a libertina, the jus quatuor liberorum, a civil law right to succeed her intestate children; id. § 98.
JUS MA.RITI. The right of a husband; especial-ly the right which a husband acquires to his wife’s movable estate by virtue of the marriage. 1 Forb. Inst. pt. 1, p. 63.
JUS MERUM. In old English law. Mere or bare right; the mere right of property in lands, with-out either possession or even the right of posses-sion. 2 Bl.Comm. 197; Bract. fol. 23.
JUS MORIBUS CONSTITUTUM. See Jus Ex Non Scripto.
JUS NATURZE. The la w of nature. See Jus Naturale.
JUS NATURALE. The natural law, or law of na-ture; law, or legal principies, supposed to be dis-coverable by the light of nature or abstract rea-soning, or to be taught by nature to all nations and men alike; or law supposed to govern men and peoples in a state of nature, i. e., in advance of organized governments or enacted laws.
This concept originated with the philosophical jurists of Rome, and was gradually extended until the phrase carne to denote a supposed basis or substratum common to all systems of positive law, and hence to be found, in greater or less purity, in the laws of all nations. And, conversely, they held that if any rule or principie of law was observed in common by all peoples with whose systems they were aqquainted, it must be a part of the jus naturale, or derived from it. Thus the phrases "jus naturale" and "jus gentium" carne to be used interchangeably.
JUS NATURALE EST QUOD APUD HOMINES EANDEM HABET POTENTIAM. Natural right is that which has the same force among all man-kind. 7 Coke, 12.
JUS NAVIGANDI. The right of navigating or navigation; the right of commerce by ships or by sea. Locc. de Jure Mar. lib. 1, c. 3.
JUS NECIS. In Roman law. The right of death, or of putting to death. A right which a father an-ciently had over his children.
See Jus Vita’ Necisque.
JUS NON HABENTI TUTE NON PARETUR. One who has no right cannot be safely obeyed. Hob. 146.
JUS NON PATITUR UT IDEM BIS SOLVATUR. Law does not suffer that the same thing be twice paid.
JUS NON SACRUM. In Roman law. That por-tion of the jus publicum which regulated the du-ties of magistrates.
Non-sacred law; that which dealt with the du ties of civil magistrates, the preservation of Pub-lic order, and the rights and duties of persons in their relation to the state. Morey, Rom.L. 223. It was analogous to that which would now be call-ed the police power.
JUS NON SCRIPTUM. The unwritten law. 1 Bl. Comm. 64.
JUS OFFERENDI. In Roman law, the right of subrogation, that is, the right of succeeding to the lien and, priority of an elder creditor on tender-ing or paying into court the amount due to him. See Mackeld. Rom.Law, § 355.
JUS ONERIS FERENDL An urban servitude in the Roman Law, the owner of which had the right of supporting and building upon the house wall of another.
JUS PAPIRIANUM. The civil law of Papirius.
The title of the earliest collection of Roman legas curia-tee, said to have been made in the time of Tarquin, the Last of the kings, by a pontifex maximus of the name of Sextus or Publius Papirius. Very few fragments of this collection now remain, and the authenticity of these has been doubted. Mackeld.Rom.Law, § 21.
JUS PASCENDL In the civil and old English law. The right of pasturing cattle. Inst. 2, 3, 2; Bract. fois. 53b, 222.
JUS PATRONATUS. In English ecclesiastical law. The right of patronage; the right of pre-senting a clerk to a benefice. Blount.
A commission from the bishop, where two pres-entations are offered upon the same avoidance, di-rected usually to his chancellor and others of competent learning, who are to summon a jury of six clergymen and six laymen to inquire into and examine who is the rightful patron. 3 Bl.Comm. 246; 3 Steph.Comm. 517.
JUS PERSONARUM. Rights of persons. Those rights which, in the civil law, belong to persons as such, or in their different characters and rela-tions; as parents and children, masters and serv-ants, etc.
JUS P(ENITENDI. In Roman law, the right of rescission or revocation of an executory contract on failure of the other party to fulfill his part of the agreement. See Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 444.JUS PORTUS. In maritime law. The right of port or harbor.
JUS POSSESSIONIS. The right of possession.
JUS POSSIDENDI. The right of possessing, which is the legal consequence of ownership. It is to be distinguished from the jus possessionis (q. v.), which is a right to possess which may ex-ist without ownership.
JUS POSTLIMINII. In the Civil law. The right of postliminy; the right or claim of a person who had been restored to the possession of a thing, or to a former condition, to be considered as though he had never been deprived of it. Dig. 49, 15, 5; 3 BI.Comm. 107, 210.
In International law. The right by which property taken by an enemy, and recaptured or rescued from him by the fellow-subjects or allies of the original owner, is restored to the latter upon cer-tain terms. 1 Kent, Comm. 108.
JUS PRFESENS. In the civil law. A present or vested right; a right already completely acquired. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 191.
JUS PRIETORIUM. In the civil law. The discre-tion of the pretor, as distinct from the leges, or standing laws. 3 Bl.Comm. 49. That kind of law which the preetors introduced for the purpose of aiding, supplying, or correcting the civil law, for the public benefit. Dig. 1, 1, 7. Called, also, "jus honorarium," (q. v.).
JUS PRECARIU11L In the civil law. A right to a thing held for another, for which there was no remedy by legal action, but only by entreaty or request. 2 Bl.Comm. 328.
JUS PRESENTATIONIS. The right of presenta-tion.
JUS PRIVATUM. Private law; the law regulat-ing the rights, conduct, and affairs of individuals, as distinguished from "public" law, which relates to the constitution and functions of government and the administration of criminal justice. See Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 124.
Also private ownership, or the right, title, or dominion of a private owner, as distinguished from "jus publicum," which denotes public ownership, or the ownership of prop-erty by the government, either as a matter of territorial sovereignty or in trust for the benefit and advantage of the general public. In this sense, a state may have a double right in given property, e. g., lands covered by navigable waters within its boundaries, including both "jus publicum," a sovereign or political title, and "jus privatum," a proprietary ownership. See Oakland v. Oak-land Water Front Co., 118 Cal. 160, 50 P. 277; G. L. Web-ster Co. v. Steelman, 172 Va. 342, 1 S.E.2d 305, 311.
JUS PROJICIENDI. In the civil law. The name of a servitude which consists in the right to build a projection, such as a balcony or gallery, from one’s house in the open space belonging to one’s neighbor, but without resting on his house. Dig. 50, 16, 242; Id. 8, 2, 2; Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 317.
JUS PROPRIETATIS. The right of property, as distinguished from the jus possessionis or right of possession. Bract. fol. 3. Called by Bracton "jus
merum," the mere right. Id.; 2 BI.Comm. 197; 3 BI.Comm. 19, 176.
JUS PROTEGENDI. In the civil law. The name of a servitude. It is a right by which a part of the roof or tiling of one house is made to extend over the adjoining house. Dig. 50, 16, 242, 1; Id. 8, 2, 25; Id. 8, 5, 8, 5.
JUS PROTIMESEOS. The right of pre-emption of a landlord in case the tenant wishes to dispose of his rights as a perpetual lessee. Sohm. Inst. Rom.L. § 5.7. Pactum protimeseos was the right of pre-emption to the seller; ti. e. in case the buyer
should sell, he must sell to the former seller. Hunter. Rom. L., 503.
JUS PROVINCIARUM. A franchise conferred upon provincials much more limited than that conferred upon the people of Italy.
It has been described as "equivalent to the jus italicum minus the freedom from land taxation which the latter right involved. In short, the provincials possessed no status as Roman citizens; and even their capacity of ownership in their own land was qualified by their tribu-tary obligations to Rome. The civil incapacity of the provincials had reference, however, merely to their exclu-sion from the strictly legal rights sanctioned by the jus civtile." Morey, Rom. L. 55.
JUS PUBLICUM. Public law, or the law relating to the constitution and functions of government and its officers and the administration of criminal justice. Also public ownership, or the paramount or sovereign territorial right or title of the state or government. See Jus Privatum.
It implies a right in a sovereign or public capacity to be exercised for the interest or benefit of the state or the public, as distinguished from the exercise in a proprietary capacity of a right of the sovereign or a right possessed by an individual in common with the public. G. L. Web-ster Co. v. Steelman, 172 Va. 342, 1 S.E.2d 305, 311.
Sovereign’s right of jurisdiction and dominion for gov-ernmental purposes over all lands and waters within its territorial limits, including tidal waters and their bottoms, is sometimes termed "jus publicum." Commonwealth v. City of Newport News, 158 Va. 521, 164 S.E. 689, 696.
JUS PUBLICUM ET PRIVATUM QUOD EX NA-TURALIBUS PRAECEPTIS AUT GENTIUM AUT CIVILIBUS EST COLLECTUM; ET QUOD IN JURE SCRIPTO JUS APPELLATUR, ID IN LEGE ANGLIM RECTUM ESSE DICITUR. Co. Litt. 185. Public and private law is that which is collected from natural principies, either of nations or in states; and that which in the civil law is called "jus," in the law of England is said to be "right."
JUS PUBLICUM PRIVATORUM PACTIS MUTA-RI NON POTEST. A public law or right cannot be altered by the agreements of private persons.
JUS QU’ESITUM. A right to ask or recover; for example, in an obligation there is a binding of the obligor, and a jus qucesitum in the obligee. 1 Bell, Comm. 323.
JUS QUIRITIUM. The old law of Rome, that was applicabte originally to patricians only, and, under the Twelve Tables, to the entire Roman peo-ple, was so called, in contradistinction to the jus prcetorium, (q. v.,) or equity. Brown.JUS QUO UNIVERSITATES UTUNT1UR EST ID-EM QUOD HABENT PRIVATI. The law which governs corporations is the same which governs individuals. Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 265, 8 Am.Dec. 135.
JUS RECUPERANDI. The right of recovering [lands.]
JUS RELICT/E. In Scotch law. The right of a relict; the right or claim of a relict or widow to her share of her husband’s estate, particularly the movables. 2 Kames, Eq. 340; 1 Forb, Inst. pt. 1, p. 67.
JUS REPRESENTATIONIS. The right of repre-senting or standing in the place of another, or of being represented by another.
JUS RERUM. The law of things. The law regu-lating the rights and powers of persons over things; how property is acquired, enjoyed, and transferred.
JUS RESPICIT ZEQUITATEM. Law regards equity. Co. Litt. 24b; Broom, Max. 151.
JUS SACRUM. In Roman law. That portion of the public law which was concerned with matters relating to public worship and including the regu-lation of sacrifices and the appointment of priests. There was a general division of the jus publicum into jus sacrum and jus non sacrum (q. v.).
JUS SANGUINIS. The right of blood. See Jus Soli.
JUS SCRIPTUM. In English law. Written law, or statute law, otherwise called "lex scripta," as distinguished from the common law, "lex non scripta." 1 Bl.Comm. 62.
In Roman law. Written law. Inst. 1, 2, 3. All law that was actually committed to writing, whether it had originated by enactment or by cus-tom, in contradistinction to such parts of the law of custom as were not committed to writing. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 126.
After stating that the Roman law was written and unwritten just as it was among the Greeks, Justinian adds: "The written part consists of laws, plebiscita, senatus-consulta, enactments of emperors, edicts of magistrates, and answers of jurisprudents." Sand.Inst.Just. 1, 2, 3. See Jus Ex Non Scripto.
JUS SINGULARE. In the civil law. A peculiar or individual rule, differing from the jus commune, or common rule of right, and established for some special reason. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 196.
JUS SOL!. The law of the place of one’s birth as contrasted with jus sanguinis, the law of the place of one’s descent or parentage. It is of feud-al origin. Hershey, Int. L. 237.
JUS SPATIANDI. A right of way over land by the public by uses merely for the purposes of rec-reation and instruction.
It is usually limited to the cases of highways, parks, and squares. The public were denied any right in the grounds containing the ancient druidical monuments at Stonehenge; Attorney-General V. Antrobus, [1905] 2 Ch. 188. See 19
Harv.L.Rev. 55. See Du Cange, Glossarlum, for a defini-tIon under the word spatiare.
JUS STAPULZE. In old European law. The law of staple; the right of staple. A right or privi-lege of certain towns of stopping imported mer-chandise, and compelling it to be offered for sale in their own markets. Locc. de Jure Mar. lib. 1, c. 10.
JUS STILLICIDII VEL FLUMINIS RECIPIEN-DL In Roman law. An urban servitude giving the owner a right to project his roof over the land of another or to open a house drain upon it.
JUS STRICTUM. Strict law; law interpreted without any modification, and in its utmost rigor.
JUS SUFFRAGII. In Roman law. The right of voting. This and the jus honorum (q. v.) were the public rights of the Roman citizen.
JUS SUPERVENIENS AUCTORI ACCRESCIT SUCCESSORI. A right growing to a possessor accrues to the successor. Halk. Lat. Max. 76.
JUS TERTII. The right of a third party.
A tenant, bailee, etc., who pleads that the title Is In some person other than his landlord, baílor, etc., Is said to set up a jus tertii. Dempsey 011 & Gas Co. v. Cítizens’ Nat. Bank, 110 OkI. 39, 235 P. 1104, 1107.
JUS TESTAMENTORUM PERTINET ORDINAR-IO. Y. B. 4 Hen. VII., 13b. The right of testa-ments belongs to the ordinary.
JUS TIGNI IMMITTENDI. In Roman law. An urban servitude which gave the right of inserting a beam into the wall of another.
JUS TRIPERTITUM. In Roman law. A narre applied to the Roman law of wills, in the time of Justinian, on account of its three-fold derivation, viz., from the prwtorian edict, from the civil law, and from the imperial constitutions. Maine, Anc. Law, 207.
JUS TRIPLEX EST,—PROPIETATIS, POSSES-SIONIS, ET POSSIBILITATIS. Right is three-fold,—of property, of possession, and of possibil-ity.
JUS TRIUM LIBERORUM. In Roman law. A right or privilege allowed to the parent of three or more children. 2 Kent, Comm. 85; 2 Bl.Comm. 247. These privileges were an exemption from the trouble of guardianship, priority in bearing offices, and a treble proportion of corn. Adams, Rom. Ant. (Am. Ed.) 227.
JUS UTENDI. The right to use property without destroying its substance. It is employed in con-tradistinction to the jus abutendi. 3 Toullier, no. 86.
JUS VENANDI ET PISCANDL The right of hunting and fishing.
JUS VENDIT QUOD USUS APPROBAVIT. El-lesm. Postn. 35. The law dispenses what use has approved.JUS VITiE NECISQUE. In Roman law. The right of life and death.
Originally a father, or his pater-familins if he was him-self In domestic subjection, could decide-not arbitrarily, but judicially-whether or not to rear his child; and while this right became subject to certain restrictions, yet when the child had Brown up, the father, in the exercise of his domestic jurisdiction, might visit his son’s misconduct, both in private and public life, with such punishment as he though fit, even banishment, slavery, or death. In the early Empire these rights became relaxed, and they dis-appeared in the Justlnian law. Murihead, Roman Law, 28, 346, 417. See Patria Potestas.
JUSJURANDI FORMA VERBIS DIFFERT, RE CONVENIT; HUNC ENIM SENSUM HABERE DEBET, UT DEUS INVOCETUR. The form of taking an oath differs in language, agrees in mean-ing; for it ought to have this sense, that the Deity is invoked. Grotius, b. 2, c. 13, s. 10.
JUSJURANDUM. Lat. An oath.
JUSJURANDUM INTER ALIOS FACTUM NEC NOCERE NEO PRODESSE DEBET. An oath made between others ought neither to hurt nor profit. 4 Inst. 279.
JUST. In the sense of "joust," see Justs, infra.
JUST. Conf orming to or consonant with, what is legal or lawful, legally right, lawful. National Surety Corporation v. Mullins, 262 Ky. 465, 90 S. W.2d 707, 708. Correct, true, due. Wisdom v. Board of Sup’rs of Polk County, 236 Iowa 669, 19 N.W.2d 602, 606. Equitable. Carter v. Carter, 181 Okl. 204, 73 P.2d 404, 405. Reasonable. National Surety Corporation v. Mullins, 262 Ky. 465, 90 S.W.2d 707, 708; Wisdom v. Board of Sup’rs of Polk County, 236 Iowa 669, 19 N.W.2d 602, 606. Right; in accordance with law and justice. Mc-Keon v. National Casualty Co., 216 Mo.App. 507, 270 S.W. 707, 712; New Haven Water Co. v. City of New Haven, 106 Conn. 562, 139 A. 99, 105; Lake Hancock & C. R. Co. v. Stinson, 77 Fla. 333, 81 So. 512.
"The words ‘just’ and ‘justly’ do not always mean ‘just’ and ‘justly’ In a moral sense, but they not unfrequently, in their connection with other words in a sentence, bear a very different signification. It is evident, however, that the word ‘just’ in the statute [requiring an affidavit for an attachment to state that plaintiff’s claim is just] means ‘just’ in a moral sense; and from its isolation, being made a separate subdivision of the section, it is intended to mean ‘morally just’ in the most emphatic terms. The claim must be morally just, as well as legally just, in order to entitle a party to an attachment." Robinson v. Burton, 5 Kan. 300.
JUST BEYOND. Will directing erection of chap-el "just beyond" the basin means barely beyond, scarcely beyond, or closely beyond, with the least practical space between it and the basin. Carroll v. Cave Hill Cemetery Co., 172 Ky. 204, 189 S.W. 186, 189.
JUST CAUSE. A cause outside legal cause, which must be based on reasonable grounds, and there must be a fair and honest cause or reason, regu-lated by good faith. Dubois v. Gentry, 182 Tenn. 103, 184 S.W.2d 369, 371; Quick v. Southern Churchman Co., 171 Va. 403, 199 S.E. 489, 494, 495. Fair, adequate, reasonable cause. In re Municipal Garage in and for City of Utica, 141 Misc. 15, 252
N.Y.S. 18, 32. Legitimate cause; legal or lawful ground for action; such reasons as will suffice in law to justify the action taken. State v. Langford, 90 Or. 251, 176 P. 197, 202; State v. Donzi, 133 La. 925, 63 So. 405, 406; State v. Wohlfort, 123 Kan. 62, 254 P. 317, 320; Boston Elevated Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth, 310 Mass. 528, 39 N.E.2d 87, 112, 124.
Under provision that no license shall be revoked without "just cause," the words imply that charges should be made and notice of hearing elven and an opportunity to be heard afforded, Carroll v. California Horse Racing Board, 16 Ca1.2d 164, 105 P.2d 110, 111.
JUST CAUSE OF PROVOCATION. That which will constitute the homicide murder in the second degree, as distinguished from a lawful provoca-tion, which will reduce it to manslaughter. State v. McCracken, 341 Mo. 697, 108 S.W.2d 372, 376.
JUST COMPENSATION. As regards property taken for public use, the term is comprehensive and includes all elements. Jacobs v. U. S., Ala., 290 U.S. 13, 54 S.Ct. 26, 78 L.Ed. 142, 96 A.L.R. 1; Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern Cali-fornia v. Adams, 16 Ca1.2d 676, 107 P.2d 618, 621. But does not exceed market value. Sigurd City v. State, 105 Utah 278, 142 P.2d 154, 158; U. S. v. Waterhouse, C.C.A.Hawaii, 132 F.2d 699, 703. It means a settlement which leaves one no poorer or richer than he was before the proper-ty was taken. U. S. ex rel. Tennessee Valley Au-thority v. Indian Creek Marble Co., D.C.Tenn., 40 F.Supp. 811, 818, 819; adequate compensation, State v. Hale, Tex.Civ.App., 96 S.W.2d 135, 141; In re Board of Sup’rs of Chenango County, Co. Ct., 6 N.Y.S.2d 732, 739; fair market value, Cam-eron Development Co. v. United States, C.C.A.Fla., 145 F.2d 209, 210; U. S. ex rel. and for. Use of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Davis, D.C.Tenn., 41 F.Supp. 595, 597, 598; United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in City of Baltimore, Parcel No. 12, D.C.Md., 43 F.Supp. 687, 689. Full and perfect equivalent of the property taken. Housing Au-thority of Shreveport v. Green, 200 La. 463, 8 So.2d 295, 298; U. S. v. 2.4 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Lake County, Ill., C.C.A.I11., 138 F.2d 295, 297. It is the value of property taken at time of taking. United States v. 813.96 Acres of Land in Ouachita County, Ark., D.C.Ark., 45 F. Supp. 535, 538; Danforth v. U. S., Mo., 308 U.S. 271, 60 S.Ct. 231, 236, 84 L.Ed. 240; plus compensa-tion for delay in payment. Kieselbach v. Com-missioner of Internal Revenue, 317 U.S. 399, 63 S. Ct. 303, 305, 87 L.Ed. 358; or consequential dam-ages to the owner. In re Board of Water Supply of City of New York, 277 N.Y. 452, 14 N.E.2d 789; or value of use of property from date of taking possession to date of judgment if possession is taken by condemnor prior to judgment. Los An-geles County Flood Control Dist. v. Hansen, 48 Cal.App.2d 314, 119 P.2d 734, 735. It requires that the owner be put in as good position pecuniarily as he would otherwise have been. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A.8, 52 F.2d 372, 379; In re Gratiot Ave., City of Detroit, 294 Mich. 569, 293 N.W. 755, 757; U. S. ex rel. and for Use of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Powelson, C.C.A.4, 118 F.2d 79, 87.

To arrive at fair indemnity, the lnterests of the public and of the owner, and a 11 the circumstances of the particu-lar appropriation, should be taken finto consideration. Lewis, Em.Dom. § 462. And see Butler Hard Rubber Co. v. Newark, 61 N.J.L. 32, 40 A. 224; Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 17 S.Ct. 966, 42 L.Ed. 270; Newman v. Metropoli-tan El. R. Co., 118 N.Y. 623, 23 N.E. 901, 7 L.R.A. 289. Evidence of reproduction cost of structures affected by con-demnation, leSs depreciation, improvements made on the property, consequential damage to portions not appropri-ated, and the fair market value of the property taken as of the date of the appropriation, may be relevant in deter-mining "just compensation," according to the situation in a Particular case. In re Board of Water Supply of City of New York, 277 N.Y. 452, 14 N.E.2d 789.
"Just compensation" is synonymous with "due process of law." Simms v. Dillon, 119 W.Va. 284, 193 S.E. 331, 337, 113 A.L.R. 787.
As regards public utility, just compensation is fair return on value of property. Fort Worth Gas Co. v. City of Fort Worth, D.C.Tex., 35 F.2d 743, 747; New York Edison Co. v. Maltbie, 150 Misc. 200, 270 N.Y.S. 409; State v. Tri-State Tele-phone & Telegraph Co., 204 Minn. 516, 284 N.W. 294, 306.
On government’s cancellation of contract, "just compensation" recoverable consists of such sum as in court’s judgment will fairly compensate con-tractor, Enright v. U. S., Ct.C1., 54 F.2d 182, 190; it is the value of contract at time of cancellation, not profits which it would have produced. De Laval Steam Turbine Co. v. U. S., Ct.C1., 284 U.S. 61, 52 S.Ct. 78, 79, 76 L.Ed. 168.
JUST DEBTS. As used in a will or a statute, this term means legal, valid, and incontestable obligations, not including such as are barred by the statute of limitations or voidable at the elec-tion of the party. See Burke v. Jones, 2 Ves. & B. 275; Peck v. Botsford, 7 Conn. 176, 18 Am.Dec. 92; Collamore v. Wilder, 19 Kan. 82; Smith v. Mayo, 9 Mass. 63, 6 Am.Dec. 28; Jones’ Ex’r v. Jones, 275 Ky. 753, 122 S.W.2d 779, 780.
JUST PRIOR. "Immediately preceding", "just before", without appreciable lapse of time before. Jackson v. McCrary, Tex.Civ.App., 148 S.W.2d 942, 944. It means before the time and connotes near-ness in point of time. Salmons v. Dun & Brad-street, Mo.App., 153 S.W.2d 556, 562, modified on other grounds 349 Mo. 498, 162 S.W.2d 245, 141 A.L.R. 674. It means some period of time before. Hoelzel v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 337 Mo. 61, 85 S.W.2d 126, 129.
JUST TITLE. By the term "just title," in cases of prescription, is meant a title which the posses-sor may have received from any person whom he honestly believed to be the real owner, provided the title were such as to transfer the ownership of the property. Civ.Code La. art. 3484; Davis v. Gaines, 104 U.S. 400, 26 L.Ed. 757; Johnson v. Sugar, 163 La. 785, 112 So. 721, 722; B. Fernandez & Bros. v. Ayllon, 266 U.S. 144, 45 S.Ct. 52, 69 L. Ed. 209. One good against all the world. Vir-ginia & West Virginia Coal Co. v. Charles, C.C.A. Va., 254, F. 379, 387.
JUST VALUE. In taxation, the fair, honest, and reasonable value of property, -without exaggera-tion or depreciation; its actual market value.
State v. Smith, 158 Ind. 543, 63 N.E. 214, 63 L.R.A. 116; Winnipiseogee Lake, etc., Co. v. Gilford, 67 N.H. 514, 35 A. 945. Correct, honest and true val-ue. Fruit Growers Express Co. v. Brett, 94 Mont. 281, 22 P.2d 171.
JUSTA. In old English law. A certain measure of liquor, being as much as was sufficient to drink at once. Mon. Angl. t. 1, c. 149.
JUSTA CAUSA. In the civil law. A just cause; a lawful ground; a legal transaction of some kind. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 283.
JUSTICE, v. In old English practice. To do jus-tice, to see justice done; to summon one to do justice.
JUSTICE, n. In common law. The title given in England to the judges of the king’s bench and the common pleas, and in America to the judges of the supreme court of the United States and of the appellate courts of many of the states.
It is said that this word in its Latin form (justitia) was properly applicable only to the judges of common-law courts, while the term "judex" designated the judges of ecclesiastical and other courts. See Leg.Hen. I, §§ 24, 63; Co.Litt. 71b.
The same title is also applied to some oí the judicial officers of the lowest rank and jurisdiction, such as pollee justices and justices of the peace.
A term used in the United States and England to desig-nate judicial officers and magistrates of every grade. School Dist. No. 18 v. Grubbs Special School Dist., 184 Ark. 863, 43 S.W.2d 765, 766.
In Feudal law. Jurisdiction; judicial cognizance of causes or offenses.
High justice was the jurisdiction or right of trying crimes of every kind, even the highest. This was a privi-lege claimed and exercised by the great lords or barons of the middle ages. 1 Robertson’s Car. V., appendix, note 23. Low justice was jurisdiction of petty offénses.
In Jurisprudence. The constant and perpetual disposition to render every man his due. Inst. 1, 1, pr.; 2 Inst. 56. See Borden v. State, 11 Ark. 528, 44 Am.Dec. 217; Collier v. Lindley, 203 Cal. 641, 266 P. 526, 530; The John E. Mulford, D.C. N.Y., 18 F. 455. The conformity of our actions and our will to the law. Toull. Droit Civil Fr. tit. prél. no. 5; Livingston Oil Corporation v. Henson, 90 Okl. 76, 215 P. 1057, 1059.
Commutative justice is that which should govern con-tracta. It consists in rendering to every man the exact measure of his dues, without regard to his personal worth or merits, 1. e., placing all men on an equality. Distribu-tiva justice is that which should govern the distribution of rewards and punishments. It assigns to each the rewards which his personal merit or services deserve, or the proper punishment for his crimes. It does not con-sider all men as equally deserving or equally blameworthy, but discriminates between them, observing a just propor-tion and comparison. This distinction originated with Aristotle. (Eth.Nic. V.) See Fonbl.Eq. 3; Toull.Droit Civil Fr. tit. prél. no. 7.
In the most extensive sense of the word "justice" differs little from "virtue;" for it includes within itself the whole circie of virtues. Yet the common distinction between them is that that- which, considered positively and in itself, is called "virtue," when considered relatively and with respect to others has the name of "justice." But "justice," being in itself a part of "virtue," is confined to things simply good or evil, and consists in a man’s taking such a proportion of them as he ought. Bouvier.

"Equity" and "Justice" are substantially equlvalent tercos, 1f not synonymous. In re Lessig’s Estate, 6 N.Y. S.2d 720, 721, 168 Misc. 889.
Under constitutional provision guaranteeing right to obtain justice, the "justice" to be administered by courts is not an abstract justice as conceived of by the judge but justice according to law or, as it is phrased in the con-stitution, "conformably to the laws". State ex rel. Depart-ment of Agriculture v. McCarthy, 238 Wis. 258, 299 N.W. 58, 64.
In Norman French. Amenable to justice. Kel-ham.
JUSTICE AYRES (or AIRES). In Scotch law. Circuits made by the judges of the justiciary courts, through the country, for the distribution of justice. Bell.
JUSTICE IN EYRE. From the old French word "eire," i. e., a journey. Those justices who in an-cient times were sent by commission into various counties, to hear more especially such causes as were termed "pleas of the crown," were called "justices in eyre."
They differed from justices In oyer and terminer, Inas-much as the latter were sent to one place, and for the purpose of trying only a limited number of special causes; whereas the justices in eyre were sent through the various counties, with a more indeflnite and general commission. In some respects they resembled our present justices of assize, although their authority and manner of proceeding differed much from them. Brown.
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE. In American law. A judicial officer of inferior rank having (usually) civil jurisdiction limited to that prescribed by stat-ute in civil cases and in criminal proceedings, prosecutions and commitments of offenders. See Com. v. Frank, 21 Pa.Co.Ct.R. 120; Weikel v. Cate, 58 Md. 110; Smith v. Abbott, 17 N.J.L. 366; Peo-ple v. Mann, 97 N.Y. 530, 49 Am.Rep. 556; Com-monwealth, for Use and Benefit of Warren Coun-ty, v. Cox’s Adm’r, 264 Ky. 327, 94 S.W.2d 632.
In English law. Judges of record appointed by the crown to be justices within a certain district, (e. g., a county or borough,) for the conservation of the peace, and for the execution of divers things, comprehended within their commission and with-in divers statutes, committed to their charge. Stone, J. Pr. 2.
JUSTICE SEAT. In English law. The principal court of the forest, held before the chief justice in eyre, or chief itinerant judge or his deputy; to hear and determine all trespasses within the forest, and all claims of franchises, liberties, and privileges, and all pleas and causes whatsoever therein arising. 3 Bl. Comm. 72; 4 Inst. 291; 3 Steph. Comm. 440.
JUSTICEMENTS. An old general term for all things appertaining to justice.
JUSTICER. The old form of justice. Blount.
JUSTICE’S CLERK. An amanuensis of the jus-tice. A justice of the peace is regarded as his own clerk, and, in making entries on his docket, he acts in a ministerial capacity. State ex rel. Morris Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Brown, 228 Mo.App. 760, 72 S.W.2d 859, 862.
JUSTICE’S COURTS. Inferior tribunais, not of record, with limited jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, held by justices of the peace. There are courts so called in many of the states. See Searl v. Shanks, 9 N.D. 204, 82 N.W. 734; Brown-field v. Thompson, 96 Mo.App. 340, 70 S.W. 378.
JUSTICES OF APPEAL. The title given to the ordinary judges of the English court of appeal. The first of such ordinary judges are the two former lords justices of appeal in chancery, and one other judge appointed by the crown by Let-ters patent.
JUSTICES OF ASSIZE. These justices, or, as they are sometimes called, "justices of nisi prius," are judges of the superior Engliáh courts, who go on circuit into the various counties of England and Wales for the purpose of disposing of such causes as are ready for trial at the assizes. See Assize.
JUSTICES OF GAOL DELIVERY. Those justices who are sent with a commission to hear and de-termine all causes appertaining to persons, who, for any offense, have been cast into gaol.
Part of their authority was to punish those who let to mainprise those prisoners who were not bailable by law, and they seem formerly to have been sent into the country upon this exclusive occasion, but afterwards had the same authority given them as the justices of assize. Brown.
JUSTICES OF LABORERS. In old English law. Justices appointed to redress the frowardness of laboring men, who would either be idle or have unreasonable wages. Blount.
JUSTICES OF NISI PRIUS. In English law. This title is now usually coupled with that of justices of assize; the judges of the superior courts act-ing on their circuits in both these capacities. 3 Bl. Comm. 58, 59.
JUSTICES OF OYER AND TERMINER. Certain persons appointed by the king’s commission, among whom were usually two judges of the courts at Westminster, and who went twice in every year to every county of the kingdom, (ex-cept London and Middlesex,) and, at what was usually called the "assizes," heard and determined all treasons, felonies, and misdemeanors. Brown.
JUSTICES OF THE BENCH. The justices of the court of common bench or common pleas.
JUSTICES OF THE FOREST. In old English law. Officers who had jurisdiction over all of-fenses committed within the forest against vert or venison. The court wherein these justices sat and determined such causes was called the "jus-tice seat of the forest." They were also some-times called the "justices in eyre of the forest." Brown.
JUSTICES OF THE HUNDRED. Hundredors; lords of the hundreds; they who had the jurisdic-tion of hundreds and held the hundred courts.
JUSTICES OF THE JEWS. Justices appointed by Richard I. to carry into effect the laws and or-ders which he had made for regulating the money contracts of the Jews. Brown.

JUSTICES OF THE PAVILION. In old English law. Judges of a pyepowder court, of a most transcendant jurisdiction, anciently authorized by the bishop of Winchester, at a fair held on St. Giles’ Hills near that city. Cowell; Blount.
JUSTICES OF THE QUORUM. See Quorum.
JUSTICES OF TRAIL—BASTON. See Trail-Bas-ton.
JUSTICESHIP. Rank or office of a justice.
JUSTICIABLE. Proper to be examined in courts of justice. bubject to action of court of justice. International Harvest Hat Co. v. Caradine Hat Co., D.C.Mo., 17 F.Supp. 79, 80.
JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY. A controversy in which a claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it. State ex rel. La Follette v. Dammann, 230 Wis. 17, 264 N.W. 627, 629, 103 A.L.R. 1089. A question as may properly come before a tribunal for decision. Du-art Mfg. Co. v. Philad Co., D.C.Del., 30 F.Supp. 777, 779, 780.
JUSTICIAR. In old English law. A judge or justice. One of several persons learned in the law, who sat in the aula regis, and formed a kind of court of appeal in cases of difficulty. Also spelled justicien.

High Justicier

In old French and Canadian law. A feudal lord who exercised the right called "high justice." Guyot, Inst. Feod. c. 26.
JUSTICIARII ITINERANTES. In English law. Justices in eyre, who formerly went from county to county to administer justice. They were so called to distinguish them from justices residing at Westminster, who were called "justicii resi-dentes." Co. Litt. 293.
JUSTICIARII RESIDENTES. In English law. Justices or judges who usually resided in West-minster. They were so called to distinguish them from justices in eyre. Co. Litt. 293.
JUSTICIARY. An old name for a judge or jus-tice. The word is formed on the analogy of the Latin "justiciarius" and French "justicien" and is a variant of justiciar (q. v.).
JUSTICIARY COURT. The chief criminal court of Scotland, consisting of five lords of session, added to the justice general and justice clerk; of whom the justice general, and in his absence, the justice clerk, is president. This court has a juris-diction over all crimes, and over the whole of Scot-land. Bell.
JUSTICIATUS. Judicature; prerogative.
The proceeding by which bail establish their ability to perform the undertaking of the bond or recognizance.
JUSTICIER. Fr. See Justiciar.
JUSTICIES. In English law. A writ directed to the sheriff, empowering him, for the sake of dis-patch, to try an action in his county court for a larger amount than he has the ordinary power to do. It is so called because it is a commission to the sheriff to do the party justice, the word
itself meaning, "You may do justice to 3 B1.Comm. 36; 4 Inst. 266.
JUSTIFIABLE. Rightful; defensible; warranted or sanctioned by law; that which can be shown to be sustained by law; as justifiable homicide. See Homicide.
JUSTIFIABLE CAUSE. "Justifiable cause" for prosecution is well-founded belief of person of ordinary caution, prudente, and judgment in ex-istence of facts essential to prosecution. Dicker-son v. Atlantic Refining Co., 201 N.C. 90, 159 S.E. 446, 449.
JUSTIFICATION. A maintaining or showing a sutficient reason in court why the defendant did what he is called upon to answer, particularly in an action of libel.
A defense of justification 1s a defense showing the libe! to be true, or in an action of assault showing the violente to have been necessary. See Steph.P1. 184. A sufficient lawful reason for acting or failing to act. Mercardo v. State, 86 Tex.Cr.R. 559, 218 S.W. 491, 492; State v. Rlsh, 104 S.C. 250, 88 S.E. 531, 534; Townsend v. U. S., 68 App. D.C. 223, 95 F.2d 352, 358.
Just cause or excuse. State v. Williams, 166 S.C. 63, 164 S.E. 415, 424. Just, lawful excuse for act. Louis Kamm, Inc., v. Flink, 113 N.J.L. 582, 175 A. 62, 67, 99 A.L.R. 1. Reasonable excuse. State v. Mueller, 208 Wis. 543, 243 N.W. 478, 479.
JUSTIFICATORS. A kind of compurgators, (q. or those who by oath justified the innocence or oaths of others; as in the case of wager of law.
JUSTIFIED. Done on adequate reasons sufficient-ly supported by credible evidence, when weighed by unprejudiced mind, guided by common sense and by correct rules of law. Selectmen of Wake-field v. Judge of First Dist. Court of Eastern Mid-dlesex, 262 Mass. 477, 160 N.E. 427, 430.
JUSTIFYING RAIL consists in proving the suffi-ciency of bail or sureties in point of property, etc.
The production of bail in court, who there justi-fy themselves against the exception of the plain-tiff.
JUSTINIANIST. A civilian; one who studies the civil law.
JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES. See Institutes.
JUSTITIA. Lat. Justice. A jurisdiction, or the office of a judge.
JUSTITIA DEBET ESSE LIBERA, QUIA NIHIL INIQUIUS VENALI JUSTITIA; PLENA, QUIA JUSTITIA NON DEBET CLAUDICARE; ET CELERIS, QUIA DILATIO EST QU1EDAM NE-GATIO. Justice ought to be free, because noth-ing is more iniquitous than venal justice; full, because justice ought not to halt; and speedy, be-cause delay is a kind of denial. 2 Inst. 56.

JUSTITIA EST CONSTANS ET PERPETUA VOLUNTAS JUS SUUM CUIQUE TRIBUENDI. Justice is a steady and unceasing disposition to render to every man his due. Inst. 1, 1, pr.; Dig. 1, 1, 10.
JUSTITIA EST DUPLEX, VIZ., SEVERE FUN-IENS ET VERE PR2EVENIENS. 3 Inst. Epil. Justice is double; punishing severely, and truly preventing.
JUSTITIA EST VIRTUS EXCELLENS ET AL-TISSIMO COMPLACENS. 4 Inst. 58. Justice is excellent virtue and pleasing to the Most High.
JUSTITIA FIRMATUR SOLIUM. 3 Inst. 140. By justice the throne is established.
JUSTITIA NEMINI NEGANDA EST. Jenk. Cent. 178. Justice is to be denied to none.
JUSTITIA NON EST NEGANDA NON DIFFER-ENDA. Jenk. Cent. 93. Justice is neither to be denied nor delayed.
JUSTITIA NON NOVIT PATREM NEC MAT-REM; SOLAR VERITATEM SPECTAT JUSTI-TIA. Justice knows not father nor mother; jus-tice looks at truth alone. 1 Bulst. 199.
JUSTITIA PIEPOUDROUS. Speedy justice. Bract. 333b.
JUSTITIUM. Lat. In the civil law. A suspen-sion or intermission of the administration of j us-tice in courts;- vacation time. Calvin.
JUSTIZA. In Spanish law. The name anciently given to a high judicial magistrate, or supreme judge, who was the ultimate interpreter of the laws, and possessed other high powers.
JUSTNESS. Conformity to truth, propriety, ac-curacy, or the like. John W. Masury & Son v. Bisbee Lumber Co., 49 Ariz. 443, 68 P.2d 679, 693.
As used in statute providing for acknowledgment of "justness" of claim to remove bar of limitations, refers to moral obligation. John W. Masury & Son v. Bisbee Lum-ber Co., 49 Ariz. 443, 68 P.2d 679, 693.
JUSTS, or JOUSTS. Exercises between martial men and persons of honor, with spears, on horse-back; different from tournaments, which were military exercises between many men in troops. 24 Hen. VIII. c. 13.
JUSTUM NON EST ALIQUEM ANTENATUM MORTUUM FACERE BASTARDUM, QUI PRO TOTA VITA SUA PRO LEGITIMO ILABETUR. It is not just to make a bastard after his death one elder born who all his Life has been accounted legitimate. 8 Coke, 101.
JUVENILE COURTS. A court having special ju-risdiction, of a paternal nature, over delinquent and neglected children. Bryant v. Brown, 151 Miss. 398, 118 So. 184, 188, 60 A.L.R. 1325.
JUXTA. Lat. Near; following; according to.
JUXTA CONVENTIONEM. According to the cov-enant. Fleta lib. 4, c. 16, § 6.
JUXTA FORMAM STATUTI. According to the form of the statute.
JUXTA RATAM. At or after the rate. Dyer, 82.
JUXTA TENOREM SEQUENTEM. According to the tenor following. 2 Salk. 417. A phrase used in the old Books when the very words themselves referred to were set forth. Id.; 1 Ld. Raym. 415.
JUXTAPOSITION. A placing or being placed in nearness or contiguity; or side by side; as a juxtaposition of words. Brown v. State, 126 Tex. Cr.R. 449, 72 S.W.2d 269, 270.
In patent law, "juxtaposition" le the English equlvalent of "aggregation." Mesta Mach. Co. v. Federal Machine & Welder Co., C.C.A.Pa., 110 F.2d 479, 481.
JUZGADO. In Spanish law. The judiciary; the body of judges; the judges who concur in a de-cree.

BLACK ‘S LAW DICTIONARY – Section K

K

K. B. An abbreviation for "King’s Bench," (q. v.). K. C. An abbreviation for "King’s Counsel."
KABANI. A person who, in oriental states, sup-plies the place of our notary public.
KABOOLEAT. In Hindu law. A written agree-ment, especially one signifying assent, as the counterpart of a revenue lease, or the document in which a payer of revenue, whether to the gov-ernment, the zamindar, or the farmer, expresses his consent to pay the amount assessed upon his land. Wils. Ind. Gloss.
KAHAKAI. Hawaiian. The junction or edge of the sea and land. See Andrew’s Hawaiian Dic-tionary. Seashore, the sand of the beach, the re-gion of country bordering on the sea. The word comes from kaha meaning scratch or mark and kai meaning sea or salt water.
KAHAWAI. Hawaiian. The flowing stream. It may include the bed or channel of the stream and may, also, include the portion of such channel cov-ered only in times of high water or of freshets.
KAIA. A key, kay, or quay. Spelman. KAIAGE, or KAIAGIUM. A wharfage-due.
KAIN. In Scotch law. Poultry renderable by a vassal to his superior, reserved in the lease as the whole or a part of the rent. Bell.
KALALCONNA. A duty paid by shopkeepers in Hindostan, who retail spirituous liquors; also the place where spirituous liquors are sold. Wharton.
KALENDZE. In English ecclesiastical law. Rural chapters, or conventions of the rural deans and parochial clergy, which were formerly held on the calends of every month; hence the narre. Paroch. Antiq. 604

KALENDAR. An account of time, exhibiting the days of the week and month, the seasons, etc. More commonly spelled "calendar."
KALENDARIUM. In the civil law. A calendar; a book of accounts, memorandum-book, or debt-book; a book in which accounts were kept of mon-eys loaned out on interest. Dig. 32, 64. So called because the Romans used to let out their money and receive the interest on the calends of each month. Calvin.
KALENDS. See Calends.
KARL. In Saxon and oid English law. A man; a serving man. Buskarl, a seaman. Huskarl, a house servant. Spelman.
KARRATA. In old records. A cart-load. Cowell; Blount.
KAST. In Swedish law. Jettison; a literal trans-lation of the Latin "jactas."
KAST—GELD. Contribution for a jettison; av-erage.
KATATONIA. See Insanity. KAY. A quay, or key.
KAYAGE. See Cayagium.
KAZY. A Mohammedan judge or magistrate in the East Indies, appointed originally by the court at Delhi, to administer justice according to their written law.
KEELAGE. The right to demand money for the privilege of anchoring a vessel in a harbor; also the money so paid.
KEELHALE, KEELHAUL. To drag a person un-der the keel of a ship by means of ropes from the yard-arms, a punishment formerly practiced in the British navy. Enc. Lond.
KEELS. This word is applied, in England, to ves-sels employed in the carriage of coals. Jacob.
KEEP, n. A strong tower or hold in the middle of any castle or fortification, wherein the besieged make their last efforts of defense, was formerly, in England, called a "keep;" and the inner pile within the castle of Dover, erected by King Henry II. about the year 1153, was termed the "King’s Keep;" so at Windsor, etc. It seems to be some-thing of the same nature with what is called abroad a "citadel." Jacob.
KEEP, v. To continue. People v. Roseberry, 23 Cal.App.2d 13, 71 P.2d 944; Briggs v. U. S., C.C.A. Mich., 45 F.2d 479, 480.
To have or retain in one’s power or possession; not to lose or part with; to preserve or retain. Deans v. Gay, 132 N.C. 227, 43 S.E. 643.
To maintain, carry on, conduct, or manage; as, to "keep" a liquor saloon, bawdy house, garn-ing table, nuisance, inn, hotel or • policy game. State v. Irvin, 117 Iowa 469, 91 N.W. 760; State v. Cox, 52 Vt. 474; State v. Cieri, 128 Conn. 149, 20 A.2d 733, 734.
To maintain, tend, harbor, feed, and shelter; as, to "keep" a dangerous animal, to "keep" a horse at livery, to "keep" a dog. Allen v. Ham, 63 Me. 536; Skinner v. Caughey, 64 Minn. 375, 67 N.W. 203; Elender v. White, La.App., 14 So.2d 280.
To maintain continuously and methodically for the purposes of a record; as, to "keep" books. See Backus v. Richardson, 5 Johns., N.Y., 483; Hammond v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 92 Kan. 851, 142 P. 936, 937. Thus to "keep" records of court means, not only to preserve the manual possession of the records, books, and papers, but to correctly

transcribe therein the proceedings of the court. Myers v. Colquitt, Tex.Civ.App., 173 S.W. 993, 997.
To maintain continuously and without stoppage or variation; as, when a vessel is said to "keep her course," that is, continue in motion in the same general direction in which she was previous-ly sailing. See The Britannia, 153 U.S. 130, 14 S.Ct. 795, 38 L.Ed. 660; to maintain, to cause to con-tinue without essential change of condition. Ar den v. Boone, Tex.Com.App., 221 S.W. 265, 266.
To take care of and to preserve from danger, harm, or loss. Tannenbaum v. Seacoast Trust Co. of Asbury Park, 16 N.J.Misc. 234, 198 A. 855, 869.
A place where liquor is "possessed" is subject to abate-ment as place where liquor is "kept". Butler Hotel Co. v. U. S., C.C.A.Wash., 35 F.211 76.
As applied to school refers to conduct of school activities. Borchers v. Taylor, 83 N.H. 564, 145 A. 666, 668, 63 A.L.R. 874.
As used in commitment order commanding marshal "to take and keep and safely deliver" prisoner to custody of penitentlary warden means to keep prisoner In local jail until time to take train for penitentlary. Smith v. Swope, C.C.A.Wash., 91 F.2d 260, 261.
As used in statute concerning voting by persons "kept" at public or charitable lnstitutions, the word implies being beneficiarles of charlty. Rathbun v. Smith, 23 N.Y. S.2d 95, 97, 175 Misc. 246.
As used in statute declaring it unlawful to keep a gam-ing house, implies duration. State v. Cleri, 128 Conn. 149, 20 A.2d 733, 734.
As used In statute that vehicles.shall keep to right side of center of road or highway, means that drivers should get on right side of highway as quickly as possible and remain there. Mahoning Savings & Trust Co. v. Kellner, 131 Ohio St. 69, 1 N.E.2d 616, 619.
The word "kept" in policies providIng that gasoline shall not be "kept, used, or allowed" on premises implies some degree of permanente of storage thereof, Bouchard v. Dirigo Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 113 Me. 17, 92 A. 899, 900, L.R. A.1915D, 187; D. L Felsenthal Co. v. Northern Assur. Co., Limited, of London, 284 III. 343, 120 N.E. 268, 271, 1 A.L.R. 602; Home Ins. Co. of New York v. Bridges, 172 Ky. 161, 189 S.W. 6, 7, L.R.A.1917C, 276; while ”keeping in posses-sion" contraband liquors means to have habitually in pos-session, State v. Burns, 133 S.C. 238, 130 S.E. 641, 642. Within statutory provision defining common nuisance the word means kept for sale or barter or other commercial purposes. Burner v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 503, 125 S.E. 324, 325; Singer v. U. S., C.C.A.N.J., 288 F. 695, 696; Ayers v. U. S., C.C.A.Ark., 58 F.2d 607, 610; Cuttera v. U. S., C.C.A.La., 31 F.2d 439. Within statute relating to slot machine for gaming, means holding the machine in readiness for purpose of obtaining bettors, or for gaming. Mooney v. State, 146 Tex.Cr.R. 64, 171 S.W.2d 494, 495.
KEEP DOWN INTEREST. The payment of in-terest periodically as it becomes due; it does not include the payment of all arrears of interest which may have become due on any security from the time when it was executed. 4 El. & Bl. 211.
KEEP HOUSE. As used in English bankrupt laws the phrase denotes an act of bankruptcy.
It is committed when a trader absents himself from his place of business and retires to his prívate residence to evade the importunity of creditors. The usual evidente of "keeping house" is refusal to see a creditor who has called on the debtor at his house for money. Robs.Bankr. 119.
KEEP IN REPAIR. When a lessee is bound to keep the premises in repair, he must have them in repair at all times during the term; and, if they are at any time out of repair, he is guilty of a breach of the covenant. 1 Barn. & Ald. 585.
KEEP OPEN. To allow general access to one’s shop, for purposes of traffic, is a violation of a statute forbidding him to "keep open" his shop on the Lord’s day, although the outer entrantes are closed. Com. v. Harrison, 11 Gray, Mass., 308.
To "keep open," in the sense of such a law, im-plies a readiness to carry on the usual business in the store, shop, saloon, etc. Lynch v. People, 16 Mich. 472.
KEEPER. A custodian, manager, or superintend-ent; one who has the care, custody, or manage. ment of any thing or place; one who has or holds possession of anything. Schultz v. State, 32 Ohio St. 281; State v. Rozum, 8 N.D. 548, 80 N.W. 481; Fishell v. Morris, 57 Conn. 547, 18 A. 717, 6 L.R.A. 82; Stevens v. People, 67 Ill. 590; Janssen v. Voss, 189 Wis. 222, 207 N.W. 279, 280; State v. Weston, 235 Iowa 148, 15 N.W.2d 922, 923; People v. Du-binsky, Sp.Sess., 31 N.Y.S.2d 234, 238.
KEEPER OF DOG. A harborer of a dog. Elend-er v. White, La.App., 14 So.2d 280, 282. Any per-son, other than owner, harboring or having in his possession any dog. Hancock v. Finch, 9 A.2d 811, 126 Conn. 121. One who, either with or with-out owner’s permission, undertakes to manage, control, or care for it as dog owners in general are accustomed to do. Raymond v. Bujold, 89 N. H. 380, 199 A. 91, 92.
KEEPER OF A BAWDY HOUSE or HOUSE OF ILL FAME. A person who has control, proprietor-ship, or management of the house in question. Jones v. State, 10 Okl.Cr. 79, 133 P. 1134, 1135; Gregg v. People, 65 Colo. 390, 176 P. 483, 485; State v. Weston, 235 Iowa 148, 15 N.W.2d 922, 923.
KEEPER OF THE FOREST. In old English law. An officer (called also chief warden of the forest) who had the principal government of all things relating to the forest, and the control of all of-ficers belonging to the same. Cowell; Blount.
KEEPER OF THE GREAT SEAL. In English law. A high officer of state, through whose hands pass all charters, grants, and commissions of the king under the great seal.
He is styled "lord keeper of the great seal," and this office and that of lord chancellor are united under one per-son; for the authorlty of the lord keeper and that of the lord chancellor were, by St. 5 Eliz. c. 18, declared to be exactly the same; and, like the lord chancellor, the lord keeper at the present day is created by the mere delivery of the king’s great seal into his custody. Brown.
KEEPER OF THE KING’S CONSCIENCE. A name sometimes applied to the chancellor of Eng-land, as being formerly an ecclesiastic and pre-siding over the royal chapel. 3 Bl. Comm. 48.
KEEPER OF THE PRIVY SEAL. In English law. An officer through whose hands pass all charters signed by the king before they come to the great seal. He is a privy councillor, and was anciently called "clerk of the privy seal," but is now general-ly called the "lord privy seal." Brown.
KEEPER OF THE TOUCH. The master of the assay in the English mint. 12 Hen. VI. c. 14.

KEEPING A GAMBLING HOUSE OR PLACE. A proprietor is guilty if with his knowledge, ac-quiescence, and consent, express or implied, gam-bling is carried on upon premises in his posses-sion as owner or lessee, or under his management or control, by his associates or subordinates who are likewise guilty if they are present aiding and assisting in carrying on such gambling operations for him. Commonwealth v. Pinkenson, 138 Pa. Super. 485, 11 A.2d 176, 179. A proprietor of a place not kept for the purpose of gambling is guilty if he allows gambling to be carried on and participates in it or receives a benefit from it in some way. People v. Dubinsky, Sp.Sess., 31 N.Y. S.2d 234, 238.
KEEPING A GAMBLING TABLE OR BANK. If one has possession or custody of a gaming table, and authority over its use, and supervises the gaming, he is guilty. Smith v. State, 29 Ala.App. 302, 196 So. 132, 133.
KEEPING A LOOKOUT. Being watchful of movements of driver’s own vehicle, as well as those of the thing seen by him. Rebma.nn v. Heesch, 227 Iowa 566, 288 N.W. 695, 701.
KEEPING BOOKS. Preserving an intelligent rec-ord of a merchant’s or tradesman’s affairs with such reasonable accuracy and care as may prop-erly be expected from a man in that business.
KEEPING TERM. In English law. A duty per-formed by students of law, consisting in eating a sufficient number of dinners in hall to make the term count for the purpose of being called to the bar. Moz. & W.
KEEPING THE PEACE. Avoiding a breach of the peace; dissuading or preventing others from breaking the peace.
KEIKI. Hawaiian. Popular meaning is child, but the meaning of that word in any particular in-stance depends on context in which it is used, and it can mean "descendant of any generation." In re Kanoa’s Trust Estate, 393 P.2d 753, 760, 47 Haw. 610; Kalakaua v. Parke, 8 Haw. 620, 621.
KELP—SHORE. The land between high and low water mark. Stroud. Jud. Dict.
KENILWORTH EDICT. An edict or award be-tween Henry III. and those who had been in arms against him; so called because made at Kenil-worth Castle, in Warwickshire, anno 51 Hen. III., A. D. 1266. It contained a composition of those who had forfeited their estates in that rebellion, which composition was five years’ rent of the es-tates forfeited. Wharton.
KENNING TO THE TERCE. In Scotch law. The ascertainrnent by a sheriff of the just proportion of the husband’s lands which belongs to the widow in virtue of her terce or third. An assignment of dower by sheriff. Erskine, Inst. 11. 9. 50; Bell, Dict.
KENTLAGE. In maritime law. A permanent ballast, consisting usually of pigs of iron, cast in a particular form, or other weighty material, which, on account of its superior cleanliness, and the small space occupied by it, is frequently pre-ferred to ordinary ballast. Abb. Shipp. 5.
KENTREF. The division of a county; a hundred in Wales. See Cantred.
KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS. A series of resolu-tions drawn un by Jefferson, and adopted by the legislature of Kentucky in 1799, protesting against tne "alien and sedition laws," declaring their
11-legality, announcing the strict constructionist the-ory of the federal government, and declaring "null-ification" to be "the rightful remedy."
KERF. The jagged end of a stick of wood made by the cutting. Pub. St. Mass. 1882, p. 1292.
KERHERE. A customary cart-way; also a com-mutation for a customary carriage-duty. Cowell.
KERNELLATUS. Fortified or embattled. Co. Litt. 5a.
KERNES. In English law. Idlers; vagabonds.
KEROSENE. A rock or earth oil. Morse v. Iris. Co., 30 Wis. 534, 11 Am.Rep. 587.
It is, in a commercial sense, a refined coal or earth oil, and is embraced within those terms as used in an insurance policy. Bennett v. Ins. Co., 81 N.Y. 273, 37 Am.Rep. 501. It is not petroleum, but made from the latter by a process of a distilla-tion and refinement. Bennett v. Ins. Co., 81 N.Y. 273, 37 Am.Rep. 501.
Oil having a specific gravity of 34.2 degrees. Grosjean v. Chalmette Petroleum Corporation, La. App., 182 So. 142. 143.
KEY. A wharf for the lading and unlading of merchandise from vessels. More commonly spelled "quay."
An instrument for fastening and opening a lock.
Any descriptive words in a land contract which lead unerringly to the land. Blumberg v. Nathan, 190 Ga. 64, 8 S.E.2d 374, 375. Reference to some-thing more definite by which an indefinite descrip-tion of property is made certain. Erwin v. Hardin, 187 Ga. 275, 200 S.E. 159, 162.
KEYAGE. A toll paid for loading and unloading merchandise at a key or wharf. Rowan v. Port-land, 8 B. Mon., Ky., 253.
KEYS, in the Isle of Man, are the twenty-tour chief commoners, who form the local legislature. 1 Steph. Comm. 99.
In old English law. A guardian, warden, or keep-er.
KEYS OF COURT. In old Scotch law. Certain officers of courts. See Claves Curia’.
KEYUS. A guardian, warden, or keeper. Mon. Angl. tom. 2, p. 71.

KHALSA. In Hindu law. An office of govern-ment in which the business of the revenue depart-ment was transacted under the Mohammedan gov-ernment, and during the early period of British rule. Khalsa lands are lands, the revenue of which is paid finto the exchequer. Wharton.
KIBEI. Jap. A person born in the United States of Japanese parents and who has returned to Japan for education and training. 1945 Report of the Tenney Joint Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities to the California Legislature, p. 48; Reader’s Guide to Periodical Literature.
KIDDER. In English law. An engrosser of corn to enhance its price. Also a huckster.
KIDDLE. In old English law. A dam or open wear in a river, with a loop or narrow cut in it, accommodated for the laying of engines to catch fish. 2 Inst 38; Blount.
KIDNAPPING. At common law, the forcible ab-duction or stealing and carrying away of a per-son from own country to another. 4 Bl.Comm. 219, Collier v. Vaccaro, C.C.A.Md., 51 F.2d 17, 19; State v. Berry, 200 Wash. 495, 93 P.2d 782, 787, 792; Commonwealth v. Cartusciello, 100 Pa.Super. 473, 478; Doss v. State, 220 Ala. 30, 123 So. 231, 232, 60 A.L.R. 712; the unlawful seizure and re-moval of person from own country or state against his will, State v. Olsen, 76 Utah 181, 289 P. 92, 93. In American law, the intent to send the victim out of the country does not constitute a necessary part of the offense. The term includes false im-prisonment plus the removal of the person to some other place. 2 Bish. Crim. Law, § 671. See State v. Rollins, 8 N.H. 567; State v. Sutton, 116 Ind. 527, 19 N.E. 602; Samson v. State, 37 Ohio App. 79, 174 N.E. 162, 163; People v. Fick, 89 Cal. 144, 26 P. 759; Furlong v. German-American Press Ass’n, Mo.Sup., 189 S.W. 385, 389.
It is the abduction and detention of person, to exact money or for other unlawful end. In re Dubroca y Pania-gua, D.C.Pa., 33 F.2d 181, 182; asportation of victim, with-out authority of law, with intent of detaining victim, State v. Taylor, 70 N.D. 201, 293 N.W. 219, 223, 224; Keith v. State, 120 Fla. 847, 163 So. 136; carrying away person from bis place of residente, forcibly or fradulently. Ex parte Kelsey, 19 N.J.Misc. 488, 21 A.2d 676, 678; inten-cional taking of person and compelling him to be detained against his will, State v. Taylor, 70 N.D. 201, 293 N.W. 219, 223, 224; restralnt of victim with intent to cause him to be secretly confined or imprisoned against his will, or to be sent out of the state against his will, State v. Berry, 200 Wash. 495, 93 P.2d 782, 787; unlawful and forcible con-finement of person with intent to cause him to be secretly confined, or imprisoned involuntarily or sent out of state against his will, Doss v. State, 23 Ala.App. 168, 123 So. 237, 241; unlawful detention or imprisonment regardless of purpose. State v. Berry, 200 Wash. 495, 93 P.2d 782, 787, 792; willful and unlawful seizing of person against his will with intent to cause him to be confined, imprisoned, or detained, People v. Weiss, 300 N.Y.S. 249, 254, 252 App. Dlv. 463. The essence of offense is the unlawful secret imprisonment. State v. Berry, 200 Wash. 495, 93 P.2d 782, 787, 792. Under the statutes of many states, one who en-tera another’s automoblle and, without lawful authority, compels the driver against his will to drive to some other place, is guilty of kidnapping. Blashfleld, Cyc. of Auto-mobile Law and Prac., Perm. Ed., § 5528.42.
KILDERKIN. A measure of eighteen gallons.
KINDRED
KILKETIL An ancient servile payment made by tenants in husbandry. Cowell.
KILL, v. To deprive of life; to destroy the life of an animal or person. The word "homicide" expresses the killing of a human being. See Car-roll v. White, 33 Barb., N.Y., 620; Porter v. Hugh-ey, 2 Bibb., Ky., 232; Com. v. Clarke, 162 Mass. 495, 39 N.E. 280; Fisher v. State, 109 Ark. 456, 160 S.W. 210, 213.
The word "kill" contains no implication of crime. Pilcher v. State, 16 Ala.App. 237, 77 So. 75.
KILL, n. A Dutch word, signifying a channel or bed of the river, and hence the river or stream itself. It is found used in this sense in descrip-tions of land in old conveyances. French v. Car-hart, 1 N.Y. 96.
KILLED. The passive verb "to be killed" must generally impart to every one a meaning of some kind of external violente. City of Fort Smith v. Hairston, 196 Ark. 1005, 120 S.W.2d 689, 691.
KILLED INSTANTLY, in collision, may mean that death was instantaneous but not precisely coincidental with the impact. Cash v. Addington, 46 N.M. 451, 131 P.2d 265, 266; Justin v. Ketcham, 297 Mich. 592, 298 N.W. 294, 295.
KILLING BY MISADVENTURE. Accidental kill-ing of a person where the slayer is doing a lawful act, unaccompanied by any criminal carelessness or reckless conduct, State v. Dean, 2 W.W.Harr., Del., 290, 122 A. 448, 449; excusable homicide oc-curring where one engaged in doing lawful act, without intention to do harm and, with proper pre-caution to avoid danger, unfortunately kills anoth-er. State v. Phillips, 7 W.W.Harr. 544, 187 A. 108, 111.
KILLYTH-STALLION. A custom by which lords of manors were bound to provide a stallion for the use of their tenants’ mares. Spelman.
KIN. Relation or relationship by blood or con-sanguinity. "The nearness of kin is computed according to the civil law." 2 Kent, Comm. 413. See Keniston v. Mayhew, 169 Mass. 166, 47 N.E. 612; Lusby v. Cobb, 80 Miss. 715, 32 So. 6; State v. Bielman, 86 Wash. 460, 150 P. 1194; Poff v. Pennsylvania R. Co., D.C.N.Y., 57 F.Supp. 625, 626. As to "next of kin," see Next.
The primary and ordinary meaning of the word "kin" is related by ties of consanguinity, but the word "kin" is sometimes used in a general sense to include relationship by blood or by marriage. State v. Hooper, 140 Kan. 481, 37 P.2d 52.
KIND. Class, grade, or sort. City of St. Louis v. James Braudis Coal Co., Mo.App., 137 S.W.2d 668, 670. Genus; generic class; description. See In Kind.
KINDRED. Relation by birth or consanguinity. Relatives by blood. Next of kin. "Kindred of the whole blood, preferred to kindred of the half blood." 4 Kent, Comm. 404, notes. See In re Carroll’s Estate, 153 Misc. 649, 275 N.Y.S. 911; Butler v. Elyton Land Co., 84 Ala. 384, 4 So. 675;

Wetter v. Walker, 62 Ga. 144; O’Connell v. Powers, 291 Mass. 153, 197 N.E. 162, 163; Frank v. Frank, 180 Tenn. 114, 172 S.W.2d 804, 806.
KING. The sovereign, ruler, or chief executive magistrate of a state or nation whose constitution is of the kind called "monarchical" is thus named if a man; if it be a woman, she is called "queen."
The word expresses the idea of one who rules singly over a whole people or has the highest executive power; but the office may be either hereditary or elective, and the sovereignty of the king may or may not be absolute, according to the constitution of the country.
See Emperor.
KING CAN DO NO WRONG. This maxim means that the king is not responsible legally for aught he may please to do, or for any omission. Aust. Jur. sect. VI.
It does not mean that everything done by the govern-ment is just and lawful, but that whatever is exception-able in the conduct of public affairs is not to be imputed to the king, 2 Steph.Com., llth ed. 486.
KING—CRAFT. The art of governing.
KINGDOM. A country where an officer called a "king" exercises the powers of government, wheth-er the same be absolute or limited. Wolff, Inst. Nat. § 994. In some kingdoms, the executive of-ficer may be a woman, who is called a "queen."
KING—GELD. A royal aid; an escuage (q. v.).
KING’S ADVOCATE. An English advocate who holds, in the courts in which the rules of the canon and civil law prevail, a similar position to that which the attorney general holds in the ordi-nary courts, i. e., he acts as counsel for the crown in ecclesiastical, admiralty, and probate cases, and advises the crown on questions of international law. In order of precedente it seems that he ranks after the attorney general. 3 Steph. Comm. 275n.
KINGS—AT—ARMS. The principal herald of Eng-land was of old designated "king of the heralds," a title which seems to have been exchanged for "king-at-arms" about the reign of Henry IV.
The kings-at-arms at present existing in England are three—Garter, Clarencieux, and Norroy, besides Bath, who is not a member of the college. Scotland is placed under an offlcer called "Lyon King-at-Arms," and Ireland is the province of one named "Ulster." Wharton.
KING’S BENCH. The supreme court of common law in England, being so called because the king used formerly to sit there in person, the style of the court being "coram ipso rege."
It was called the "queen’s bench" in the reign of a queen, and during the protectorate of Cromwell lt was styled the "upper bench." It consisted of a chief justice and three puisne justices, who were by their office the sovereign conservators of the peace and supreme coroners of the land. It was a remnant of the aula regis, and was not orlginally fixed to any certain place, but might follow the king’s person, though for some centuries past it usu-ally sat at Westminster. It had a very extended jurisdic-tlon both in criminal and civil causes; the former in what was called the "crown side" or "crown office," the latter in the "plea side," of the court. Its civil jurisdiction was gradually enlarged until it embraced all species of personal actlons. Slnce the judicature acts, this court constitutes the "king’s bench division" of the "high court 01 justice." See 3 Bl.Comm. 41-43.
KING’S CHAMBERS. Those portions °I the seas, adjacent to the coasts of Great Britain, which are inclosed within headlands so as to be cut off from the open sea by imaginary straight lines drawn from one promontory to another.
KING’S CORONER AND ATTORNEY. An of-ficer of the court of king’s bench, usually called "the master of the crown office," whose duty it is to file informations at the suit of a private sub-ject by direction of the court. 4 Bl. Comm. 308, 309; 4 Steph. Comm. 374, 378.
KING’S COUNSEL. Barristers or serjeants who have been called within the bar and selected to be the king’s counsel. They answer in some meas-ure to the advocati fisci, or advocates of the rev-enue, among the Romans. They must not be em-ployed against the crown without special leave, which is, however, always granted, at a cost of about vine pounds. 3 Bl. Comm. 27.
KING’S EVIDENCE. When several persons are charged with a crime, and one of them gives evi-dence against his accomplices, on the promise of being granted a pardon, he is said to be admitted king’s or (in America) state’s evidente. 4 Steph. Comm. 395; Sweet.
KING’S PROCTOR. A proctor or solicitor repre-senting the crown in the former practice of the courts of probate and divorce.
In petitions for dissolution of marriage, or for declara-tions of nullIty of marriage, the king’s proctor may, under the direction of the attorney general, and by leave of the court, intervene in the suit for the purpose of proving col-lusion between the parties. Mozley & Whitley.
KING’S REMEMBRANCER. An officer of the central office of the English supreme court.
Formerly he was an officer of the exchequer, and had im-portant duties to perform in protectlng the rights of the crown; e. g., by instituting proceedings for the recovery of land by wrlts of intrusion, (q. v.,) and for the recovery of legacy and succession dutles; but of late years ad-ministrative changes have lessened the duties of the office. Sweet.
He was at the head of the department which had charge of all revenue sults, and of matters pertaining to the office of sheriff. He attended as the officer of the king’s bench when the lord mayor made his appearance on November 9th, and as representing the old court of exchequer when the city of London did suit and service in discharge of qult-rents for certain lands anciently heid under the crown. He presided at the Trial of the Pyx, the assaying and weighing of the colns of the realm. See Remembrances of Sir F. Pollock.
KING’S SILVER. In old English practice. A fine due the king pro licentia concordandi, (for leave to agree,) in the process of levying a fine. 5 Coke, 39, 43; 2 Inst. 511; 2 Bl. Comm. 350.
KING’S WIDOW. In feudal law. A widow of thé king’s tenant in chief, who was obliged to take oath in chancery that she would not marry with-out the king’s leave.
KINSFOLK. Relations; those who are of the same family.
KINSHOTE. In Saxon law. A composition or satisfaction paid for killing a kinsman. Spelman.

KINSMAN. A man of the same race or family. Wood v. Mitcham, 92 N.Y. 379.
KINSWOMAN. A female relation.
KINTAL, or KINTLE. A hundred pounds in weight. See Quintal.
KINTLIDGE. A ship’s ballast. See Kentlage.
KIPPER—TIME. In old English law. The space of time between the 3d of May and the Epiphany, in which fishing for salmon in the Thames, be-tween Gravesend and Henley-on-Thames, was for-bidden. Rot. Parl. 50 Edw. III.
KIRBY’S QUEST. In English law. An ancient record remaining with the remembrancer of the exchequer, being an inquisition or survey of all the lands in England, taken in the reign of Edward I. by John de Kirby, his treasurer. Blount; Cow-ell.
KIRK. In Scotch law. A church; the church; the established church of Scotland.
KIRK—MOTE. A meeting of parishioners on church affairs.
KIRK—OFFICER. The beadle of a church in Scot-land.
KIRK—SESSION. A parochial church court in Scotland, consisting of the ministers and elders of each parish.
KISSING THE BOOK. The ceremony of touching the lips to a copy of the Bible, used in administer-ing oaths. It is the external symbol of the wit-ness’ acknowledgment of the obligation of the oath.
KIST. In Hindu law. A stated payment; install-ment of rent.
KLEPTOMANIA. In medical jurisprudence. A species (or symptom) of mania, consisting in an irresistible propensity to steal. Looney v. State, 10 Tex.App. 525, 38 Am.Rep. 646; State v. Reidell, 9 Houst., Del., 470, 14 A. 550; Lowe v. State, 70 S.W. 206, 44 Tex.Cr.R. 224 (citing Hurst v. State, 40 Tex.Cr.R. 378, 46 S.W. 635, 50 S.W. 719).
It is said to be often shown in cases of women, laboring under their peculiar diseases or of those fax advanced in pregnancy. A sharp distinction is made between kleptoma-nia and the tendency to steal so commonly observed in the well defined forms of lnsanity; the farmer is a defective mental characteristic approaching the confines of Insan-ity on one subject alone, while the individual, on all other subjects, is perfectly sane. It differs from shoplifting in that the shoplifter steals for a purpose, and only those articles which are of value, while the kleptomaniac takes goods of any description, often of no use to herself and with no motive for their possesslon; 4 Am.Lawy. 533.
KNACKER. One who slaughters useless or dis-eased animals or deals in such. Cent. Dict. A regular occupation in London and other large cit-ies, regulated by act of parliament August 18, 1911.
KNAVE. A rascal; a false, tricky, or deceitful person. The word originally meant a boy, attend-ant, or servant, but long-continued usage has giv-en it its present signification.
KNAVESHLP. A portion of grain given to a mill-servant from tenants who were bound to grind their grain at such mill.
KNEEL. To bend the knees in worship without resting on them is to kneel. 36 L.J.Ecc. 10.
KNIGHT. In English law. The next personal dignity after the nobility.
Of knights there are several orders and degrees. The first in rank are knights of the Garter, instituted by Richard I. and improved by Edward III. in 1344; next follows’ a knight banneret; then come knights of the Bath, Institut-ed by Henry IV., and revived by George L ; and they were so called from a ceremony of bathing the night be-fore their creation. The last order are knights bachelors, who, though the lowest, are yet the most ancient, order of knighthood; for we find that King Alfred conferred this order upon his son Athelstan. 1 BI.Comm. 403.
KNIGHTENGUILD. An ancient guild or society formed by King Edgar.
KNIGHTHOOD. The rank, order, character, or dignity of a knight.
KNIGHT—MARSHAL. In English law. An officer in the royal household who has jurisdiction and cognizance of offenses committed within the house-hold and verge, and of all contracts made therein, a member of the household being one of the par-ties. Wharton.
KNIGHTS BACHELORS. In English law. The most ancient, though lowest, order of knighthood. 1 Bl. Comm. 404.
KNIGHTS BANNERET. In English law. Those created by the sovereign in person on the field of battle. They rank, generally, after knights of the Garter. 1 Bl. Comm. 403.
KNIGHT’S FEE. The determinate quantity of land, (held by an estate of inheritance,) or of an-nual income therefrom, which was sufficient to maintain a knight.
In the time of Henry II. the estate was estimated at f20 a year; but Lord Coke in his time it to be an estate of 680 acres. See 1 BI.Comm. 404, 410; 2 BI.Comm. 62; Co.Litt. 69a; 1 Poll. & Maitl. 232.
KNIGHTS OF ST. MICHAEL AND ST. GEORGE. An English order of knighthood, instituted in 1818.
KNIGHTS OF ST. PATRICK. Instituted in Ire-land by George III., A. D. 1763. They have no rank in England.
KNIGHTS OF THE BATE An order supposed to have been instituted by Henry IV., and revived by George I. in 1725 to consist of the sovereign, a grand master and 36 knights companions. In 1815 the order was instituted in three classes. In 1847 the civil knights, commanders and compan-ions were added. They are so called from the ceremony formerly observed of bathing the night before their creation.
KNIGHTS OF THE CHAMBER. Those created in the sovereign’s chamber in time of peace, not in the field. 2 Inst. 666.
KNIGHTS OF THE GARTER. See Garter.

KNIGHTS OF THE POST. A term for hireling witnesses.
KNIGHTS OF THE SHIRE. In English law. Members of parliament representing counties or shires, in contradistinction to citizens or burgesses, who represent boroughs or corporations.
A knight of the shire is so called, because, as the terms of the writ for election still require, it was formerly neces-sary that he should be a knight. This restrIction was coeval with the tenure of knight-service, when every man who received a knight’s fee immediately of the crown was constrained to be a knight; but at present any person may be chosen to 1111 the Office who is not an alíen. The money .qualification is abolished by 21 Vict. c. 26. Wharton.
KNIGHTS OF THE THISTLE. A Scottish order of knighthood.
This order Is said to have been instituted by Achaius, king of Scotland, A. D. 819. The better opinion, however, is that it was instituted by James V. In 1534, was revived by James VII. (James II. of England) in 1687, and reestab-lisbed by Queen Anne in 1703. They have no rank in England. Wharton.
KNIGHT’S SERVICE. Upon the Norman con-quest, all the lands in England were divided into knight’s fees, in number aboye sixty thousand.
For every knight’s fee, a knight was bound to attend the -king in his wars forty days in• a year, In which space of time a campaign was generally flnished. If a man only held half a knight’s fee, he was only bound to attend twenty days; and so in proportion. But this personal service, in process of time, grew into pecuniary commuta-tions, or alds; until at last, with the military part of the feudal system, it was abolished at the restoration, by the statute of 12 Car. II. e. 24. 1 Bla.Com. 410; 2 id. 62; Will. Real Pr. 144; 1 Poll. & Maitl. 230.
KNOCK DOWN. To assign to a bidder at an auc-tion by a knock or blow of the hammer.
Property 1s said to be "knocked down" when the auc-tioneer, by the fall of his hammer, or by any other audible or visible announcement, signifies to the bidder that he 1s entitled to the property on paying the amount of his bid, accordIng to the terms of the sale. "Knocked down" and "struck off" are synonymous terms. Sherwood v. Reade, 7 Hill, N.Y., 439.
KNOT. In seamen’s language, a "knot" is a divi-sion of the log-line serving to measure the rate of the vessel’s motion.
The number of knots which run off from the reel in half a minute shows the number of miles the vessel satis in an hour. Hence when a ship goes 8 nautical miles an hour she is said to go "S knots." Webster.
KNOW. To have knowledge; to possess informa-tion, instruction, or wisdom. State v. Ransberger, 106 Mo. 135, 17 S.W. 290. Horne v. Lewis, 160 Ga. 824, 129 S.E. 95; To perceive or apprehend, to un-derstand. International-Great Northern R. Co. v. Pence, Tex.Civ.App., 113 S.W.2d 206, 210.
The word "familiar" is equivalent. Smiley v. Lenane, 363 III. 66, 1 N.E.2d 213, 216.
KNOW ALL MEN. In conveyancing. A form of public address, of great antiquity, and with which many written instruments, such as bonds, letters of attorney, etc., still commence.
KNOWINGLY. With knowledge; consciously; in-telligently; willfully; intentionally. Atkinson v. State, 133 Ark. 341, 202 S.W. 709, 710; People v. Calvert, 93 Cal.App. 568, 269 P. 969, 971; Hutch-man v. State, 61 Okl.Cr. 117, 66 P.2d 99, 102; Gott-
lieb v. Commonwealth, 126 Va. 807, 101 S.E. 872, 873; Cheffer v. Eagle Discount Stamp Co., 348 Mo. 1023, 156 S.W.2d 591, 595; and knowledge must be actual, not merely constructive, Parsons v. Rinard Grain Co., 186 Iowa 1017, 173 N.W. 276, 280.
The word imports a perception of facts requisite to make up crime, Commonwealth v. Altenhaus, 317 Mass. 270, 57 N.E.2d 921, 922; knowledge of set or thing done as well as evil intent or bad purpose, Erby v. State, 181 Tenn. 647, 184 S.W.2d 14, 16; a knowledge that facts exist which bring act or omission within provisions of Code. People v. Forbath, 5 Ca1.App.2d Supp. 767, 42 P.2d 108, 109.
The use of the word in an indictment is equivalent to an averment that the defendant knew what he was about to do, and, with such knowledge, proceeded to do the act charged. U. S. v. Claypool, D.C.Mo., 14 F. 128; State
Wilson, 41 Idaho 598, 242 P. 787, 788.
KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY. This phrase, in reference to vioiation of a statute, means con-sciously and intentionally. U. S. v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., C.C.A.N.J., 204 F. 705, 708; Oregon-Wash-ington R. & Nav. Co. v. U. S., C.C.A.Idaho, 205 F. 337, 339; U. S. v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co., D.C. Pa., 238 F. 428, 430.
KNOVVLEDGE. Acquaintance with fact or truth, United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Smith, 231 Ala. 169, 164 So. 70, 82, 103 A.L.R. 1468; People v. Henry, 23 Ca1.App.2d 155, 72 P.2d 915, 921.
It has also been deflned as act or state of knowing or understanding, Witters v. U. S., 70 App.D.C. 316. 106 F.2d 837, 840, 125 A.L.R. 1031: People v. Henry, 72 P.2d 915, 921, 23 Cal.App.2d 155; actual knowledge, notice or in-formation, New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Central Union Bank of South Carolina, C.C.A.S.C.. 65 F.2d 738, 739; Howard v. Whittaker, 250 Ky. 836, 64 S.W.2d 173: C000er v. Independent Transfer & Storage Co., 19 P.2d 1057, 1058, 52 Idaho 747; assurance of fact or proposition founded on perception by senses, or Intuition, Brooks v. Sessoms, 47 Ga.App. 554, 171 S.E. 222, 224; clear perception of that which exists, or of truth, fact or duty, People v. Steele, 179 Misc. 587, 37 N.Y.S.2d 199, 200; United States Flre Ins. Co. v. Smith, 231 Ala. 169, 164 So. 70, 82, 103 A.L.R. 1468; credible or rellable Information, Sackett v. Farmers’ State Bank of Boone, 209 Iowa 487, 228 N.W. 51, 54; Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Weiser, Sup., 51 N.Y.S.2d 771, 773; flrm belief, Witters v. U. S., 70 App.D.C. 316, 106 F. 2d 837, 840, 125 A.L.R. 1031; guilty knowledge, Golds-worthy v. Anderson, 92 Colo. 446, 21 P.2d 718, 87 A.L.R. 1396; information of fact, Green v. Stewart, 106 Cal.App. 518, 289 P. 940, 944; means of mental impression, Howard v. Whittaker, 250 Ky. 836, 64 S.W.2d 173; mIscellaneous information and circumstances which engender belief to moral certainty or induce state of mind that one con-sidera that he knows, Merritt v. American Stevedores, 15 N.J.MIsc. .710, 195 A. 382; notice, Lally v. Cronen, 247 N. Y. 58, 159 N.E. 723, 725; Wise v. Curdes, 219 Ind. 606, 40 N.E.2d 122, 126; notice or knowledge suflicient to excite attention and put person on guard and call for lnquiry, Iberville Land Co. v. Amerada Petroleum Corporation, C. C.A.La., 141 F.2d 384, 389; Hayward Lumber & Invest-ment Co. v. Orondo Mines, 34 Cal.App.2d 697, 94 P.2d 380, 382, 383; Reynolds v. Moseley, C.C.A.Ark., 32 F.2d 979, 981; personal cognizance or knowledge or means of knowl-edge, The Chickie, D.C.Pa., 54 F.Supp. 19, 20; Taylor v.
d.
Moore, 87 Utah 493, 51 P.2222, 229; In re Eastern Transo. Co., D.C.Md., 37 F.2d 355, 363; state of being or having become aware of fact or truth; United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Smith, 231 Ala. 169, 164 So. 70, 82, 103 A.L.R. 1468; Howard v. Whittaker, 250 Ky. 836, 64 S.W.2d 173.
"Knowledge" consists in the perception of the truth of affirmatIve or negative propositions, while "belief" admits of all degrees, from the slightest suspicion to the fullest assurance. State v. Godette, 188 N.C. 497, 125 S.E. 24, 28; Franken v. State, 190 Wls. 424, 209 N.W. 766, 769. The dlfference between them Is ordinarily merely in the degree, to be judged of by the court, when addressed to the court; by the jury, when addressed to the jury. Hatch v. Carpenter, 9 Gray, Masa., 271. See Utley v. Hill, 155 Mol

232, 55 S.W. 1091, 49 L.R.A. 323, 78 Am.St.Rep..569; Ohio Valley Coffin Co. v. Goble, 28 Ind.App. 362, 62 N.E. 1025.
Knowledge may be imputed, when the means of knowl-edge exists, known and accessible to the party, and capable of communicating positive information. Smith v. Indus-trial Acc. Commission of California, 174 Cal. 199, 162 P. 636, 637; Scheckells v. Ice Plant Mining Co., Mo.App., 180 S.W. 12, 15; Hopkins v. McCarthy, 121 Me. 27, 115 A.. 513, 515. However closely actual notice may, in many in-stances, approximate knowledge, and constructive notice may be its equivalent in effect, there may be actual notice without knowledge; and, when constructive notice is made the test to determine priorities of right, it may fall far short of knowledge. Cleveland Woolen Mills v. Sibert, 81 Ala. 140, 1 So. 773; Dodge v. Grain Shippers’ Mut. Fire Ins. Ass’n, 176 Iowa 316, 157 N.W. 955, 961; Stanton v. Hawkins, 41 R.I. 501, 103 A. 229, 230. Thus, oral notIce to employer by employé of injury is not "knowledge" of the injury, excusing employé’s failure to give notice of injury required by Workmen’s Compensation Act. In re Brown, 228 Mass. 31, 116 N.E. 897, 898; In re Simmons, 117 Me. 175, 103 A. 68.
"Knowledge" of contents of an instrument must include understanding of its actual contents. Mitchell v. Slye, 137 Md. 89, 111 A. 814, 819.
Law regards as "knowledge" reckless misrepresentation, with intent to deceive, about that which party pretended to know but knew nothing. Holt v. Gloer, 44 Ga.App. 685, 162 S.E. 663, 664.
Carnal knowledge. See Carnal Knowledge.
Knowledge of another’s peril. One has "knowl-edge of peril of another," within doctrine of dis-covered peril, whenever it reasonably appears from the known facts and circumstances that the latter is pursuing a course which will probably terminate in serious bodily injury to him, and that he probably will pursue it to the end. Gal-veston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Wagner, Tex.Com. App., 298 S.W. 552, 554.
Knowledge of law includes knowledge of the decisions of the courts, which are part of the law. Spitzer v. Board of Trustees for Regina Public School Dist. No. 4, of Saskatchewan, C.C.A.Ohio, 267 F. 121, 126.
Personal knowledge. Knowledge of the truth in regard to a particular fact or allegation, which is original, and does not depend on information or hearsay. Personal knowledge of an allegation in an answer is personal knowledge of its truth or falsity; and if the allegation is a negative one,
this necessarily includes a knowledge of the truth or falsity of the allegation denied. West v. Home Ins. Co., C.C.Or., 18 F. 622.
KNOWN. Familiar; perceived; recognized; un-derstood; especially, when used absolutely, famil-iar to all; generally understood or perceived, and term may, according to context, refer to both ac-tual and constructive knowledge. Wolf v. Mallinc-krodt Chemical Works, 336 Mo. 746, 81 S.W.2d 323, 333; In a statute relating to the sale of property of unknown heirs, it has been held to mean those persons who are known, and whose right to inherit, or the extent of whose right, to inherit, is dependent on the non-existence of other persons nearer or as near as the ancestor in the une of descent. People v. Ryder, 65 Hun 175, 19 N.Y.S. 977.
KNOWN-MEN. A title formerly given to the Lollards. Cowell.
KORAN. The Mohammedan book of faith. It contains both ecclesiastical and secular laws.
KOSHUBA. The Jewish "Koshuba" is a marriage contract or marriage settlement. Hurwitz v. Hur-witz, 216 App.Div. 362, 215 N.Y.S. 184, 185.
KULEANA. The Hawaiian term "kuleana" means a small area of land, such as were awarded in fee by the Hawaiian monarch, about the year 1850, to all Hawaiians who made application therefor. De Fries v. Scott, C.C.A.Hawaii, 268 F. 952, 953.
KUT-ItUBALA. In Hindu law. A mortgage-deed or deed of conditional sale, being one of the cus-tomary deeds or instruments of security in India as declared by regulation of 1806, which regulates the legal proceedings to be taken to enforce such a security. It is also called "Byebil-Wuffa." Wharton.
KYMORTHA. A Welsh term for a waster, rhym-er, minstrel, or other vagabond who makes assem-blies and collections. Barring. Ob. St. 360.
KYTH. Sax. Kin or kindred.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “free” as not subject to legal constraint of another. Also, having power to follow dictates of own will; not subject to the dominion of another. Not compelled to involuntary servitude…enjoying full civic rights. Prominent under the word “freedom” is self-determination; absence of restraint and the power of acting, in the character of a moral personality, according to the dictates of the will, without other check, hindrance, or prohibition than such as may be imposed by just and necessary laws and the duties of social life.

BLACK LAW DICTIONARY LINKS

LawGuru.com Legal Links – virtual law library Legal Definitions black law dictionary online FindLaw: Legal Associations and Organizations: National and Specialty Legal See Featured Listings: law+dictionary, law+dictionary sites A Dictionary of Law (1893)

OTHER KNOWLEDGE WE NEED TO KNOW

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The Fair Credit Reporting Act – part I

This version of the FCRA is complete as of July 1999. It includes the amendments to the FCRA set forth in the Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-208, the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Title II, Subtitle D, Chapter 1), Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-107), and the Consumer Reporting Employment Clarification Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-347).

1) § 601 Short title
§ 602 Congressional findings and statement of purpose
§ 603 Definitions; rules of construction
§ 604 Permissible purposes of consumer reports
§ 605 Requirements relating to information contained in consumer reports
§ 606 Disclosure of investigative consumer reports
§ 607 Compliance procedures
§ 608 Disclosures to governmental agencies
§ 609 Disclosures to consumers
§ 610 Conditions and form of disclosure to consumers

§ 601. Short title

This title may be cited as the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

§ 602. Congressional findings and statement of purpose[15 U.S.C. § 1681]

(a) Accuracy and fairness of credit reporting. The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The banking system is dependent upon fair and accurate credit reporting. Inaccurate credit reports directly impair the efficiency of the banking system, and unfair credit reporting methods undermine the public confidence which is essential to the continued functioning of the banking system.

(2) An elaborate mechanism has been developed for investigating and evaluating the credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, and general reputation of consumers.

(3) Consumer reporting agencies have assumed a vital role in assembling and evaluating consumer credit and other information on consumers.

(4) There is a need to insure that consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer’s right to privacy.

(b) Reasonable procedures. It is the purpose of this title to require that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information in accordance with the requirements of this title.

§ 603. Definitions; rules of construction[15 U.S.C. § 1681a]

(a) Definitions and rules of construction set forth in this section are applicable for the purposes of this title.

(b) The term “person” means any individual, partnership, corporation, trust, estate, cooperative, association, government or governmental subdivision or agency, or other entity.

(d) Consumer report.

(1) In general. The term “consumer report” means any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for

(A) credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes;

(B) employment purposes; or

(2) Exclusions. The term “consumer report” does not include

(A) any

(i) report containing information solely as to transactions or experiences between the consumer and the person making the report;

(ii) communication of that information among persons related by common ownership or affiliated by corporate control; or

(iii) communication of other information among persons related by common ownership or affiliated by corporate control, if it is clearly and conspicuously disclosed to the consumer that the information may be communicated among such persons and the consumer is given the opportunity, before the time that the information is initially communicated, to direct that such information not be communicated among such persons;

(B) any authorization or approval of a specific extension of credit directly or indirectly by the issuer of a credit card or similar device;

(C) any report in which a person who has been requested by a third party to make a specific extension of credit directly or indirectly to a consumer conveys his or her decision with respect to such request, if the third party advises the consumer of the name and address of the person to whom the request was made, and such person makes the disclosures to the consumer required under section 615 [§ 1681m]; or

(D) a communication described in subsection (o).

(e) The term “investigative consumer report” means a consumer report or portion thereof in which information on a consumer’s character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living is obtained through personal interviews with neighbors, friends, or associates of the consumer reported on or with others with whom he is acquainted or who may have knowledge concerning any such items of information. However, such information shall not include specific factual information on a consumer’s credit record obtained directly from a creditor of the consumer or from a consumer reporting agency when such information was obtained directly from a creditor of the consumer or from the consumer.

(f) The term “consumer reporting agency” means any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports.

(g) The term “file,” when used in connection with information on any consumer, means all of the information on that consumer recorded and retained by a consumer reporting agency regardless of how the information is stored.

(h) The term “employment purposes” when used in connection with a consumer report means a report used for the purpose of evaluating a consumer for employment, promotion, reassignment or retention as an employee.

(i) The term “medical information” means information or records obtained, with the consent of the individual to whom it relates, from licensed physicians or medical practitioners, hospitals, clinics, or other medical or medically related facilities.

(j) Definitions relating to child support obligations.

(1) Overdue support. The term “overdue support” has the meaning given to such term in section 666(e) of title 42 [Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 666(e)].

(2) State or local child support enforcement agency. The term “State or local child support enforcement agency” means a State or local agency which administers a State or local program for establishing and enforcing child support obligations.

(k) Adverse action.

(1) Actions included. The term “adverse action”

(A) has the same meaning as in section 701(d)(6) of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act; and

(B) means

(i) a denial or cancellation of, an increase in any charge for, or a reduction or other adverse or unfavorable change in the terms of coverage or amount of, any insurance, existing or applied for, in connection with the underwriting of insurance;

(ii) a denial of employment or any other decision for employment purposes that adversely affects any current or prospective employee;

(iii) a denial or cancellation of, an increase in any charge for, or any other adverse or unfavorable change in the terms of, any license or benefit described in section 604(a)(3)(D) [§ 1681b]; and

(iv) an action taken or determination that is

(I) made in connection with an application that was made by, or a transaction that was initiated by, any consumer, or in connection with a review of an account under section 604(a)(3)(F)(ii)[§ 1681b]; and

(II) adverse to the interests of the consumer.

(2) Applicable findings, decisions, commentary, and orders. For purposes of any determination of whether an action is an adverse action under paragraph (1)(A), all appropriate final findings, decisions, commentary, and orders issued under section 701(d)(6) of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or any court shall apply.

(l) Firm offer of credit or insurance. The term “firm offer of credit or insurance” means any offer of credit or insurance to a consumer that will be honored if the consumer is determined, based on information in a consumer report on the consumer, to meet the specific criteria used to select the consumer for the offer, except that the offer may be further conditioned on one or more of the following:

(1) The consumer being determined, based on information in the consumer’s application for the credit or insurance, to meet specific criteria bearing on credit worthiness or insurability, as applicable, that are established

(A) before selection of the consumer for the offer; and

(B) for the purpose of determining whether to extend credit or insurance pursuant to the offer.

(2) Verification

(A) that the consumer continues to meet the specific criteria used to select the consumer for the offer, by using information in a consumer report on the consumer, information in the consumer’s application for the credit or insurance, or other information bearing on the credit worthiness or insurability of the consumer; or

(B) of the information in the consumer’s application for the credit or insurance, to determine that the consumer meets the specific criteria bearing on credit worthiness or insurability.

(3) The consumer furnishing any collateral that is a requirement for the extension of the credit or insurance that was

(A) established before selection of the consumer for the offer of credit or insurance; and

(B) disclosed to the consumer in the offer of credit or insurance.

(m) Credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer. The term “credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer” does not include the use of a consumer report by a person with which the consumer has an account or insurance policy, for purposes of

(1) reviewing the account or insurance policy; or

(2) collecting the account.

(n) State. The term “State” means any State, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, and any territory or possession of the United States.

(o) Excluded communications. A communication is described in this subsection if it is a communication

(1) that, but for subsection (d)(2)(D), would be an investigative consumer report;

(2) that is made to a prospective employer for the purpose of

(A) procuring an employee for the employer; or

(B) procuring an opportunity for a natural person to work for the employer;

(3) that is made by a person who regularly performs such procurement;

(4) that is not used by any person for any purpose other than a purpose described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (2); and

(5) with respect to which

(A) the consumer who is the subject of the communication

(i) consents orally or in writing to the nature and scope of the communication, before the collection of any information for the purpose of making the communication;

(ii) consents orally or in writing to the making of the communication to a prospective employer, before the making of the communication; and

(iii) in the case of consent under clause (i) or (ii) given orally, is provided written confirmation of that consent by the person making the communication, not later than 3 business days after the receipt of the consent by that person;

(B) the person who makes the communication does not, for the purpose of making the communication, make any inquiry that if made by a prospective employer of the consumer who is the subject of the communication would violate any applicable Federal or State equal employment opportunity law or regulation; and

(i) discloses in writing to the consumer who is the subject of the communication, not later than 5 business days after receiving any request from the consumer for such disclosure, the nature and substance of all information in the consumer’s file at the time of the request, except that the sources of any information that is acquired solely for use in making the communication and is actually used for no other purpose, need not be disclosed other than under appropriate discovery procedures in any court of competent jurisdiction in which an action is brought; and

(ii) notifies the consumer who is the subject of the communication, in writing, of the consumer’s right to request the information described in clause (i).

(p) Consumer reporting agency that compiles and maintains files on consumers on a nationwide basis. The term “consumer reporting agency that compiles and maintains files on consumers on a nationwide basis” means a consumer reporting agency that regularly engages in the practice of assembling or evaluating, and maintaining, for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, or credit capacity, each of the following regarding consumers residing nationwide:

(1) Public record information.

(2) Credit account information from persons who furnish that information regularly and in the ordinary course of business.

§ 604. Permissible purposes of consumer reports[15 U.S.C. § 1681b]

(a) In general. Subject to subsection (c), any consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report under the following circumstances and no other:

(1) In response to the order of a court having jurisdiction to issue such an order, or a subpoena issued in connection with proceedings before a Federal grand jury.

(2) In accordance with the written instructions of the consumer to whom it relates.

(3) To a person which it has reason to believe

(A) intends to use the information in connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the information is to be furnished and involving the extension of credit to, or review or collection of an account of, the consumer; or

(B) intends to use the information for employment purposes; or

(D) intends to use the information in connection with a determination of the consumer’s eligibility for a license or other benefit granted by a governmental instrumentality required by law to consider an applicant’s financial responsibility or status; or

(E) intends to use the information, as a potential investor or servicer, or current insurer, in connection with a valuation of, or an assessment of the credit or prepayment risks associated with, an existing credit obligation; or

(F) otherwise has a legitimate business need for the information

(i) in connection with a business transaction that is initiated by the consumer; or

(ii) to review an account to determine whether the consumer continues to meet the terms of the account.

(4) In response to a request by the head of a State or local child support enforcement agency (or a State or local government official authorized by the head of such an agency), if the person making the request certifies to the consumer reporting agency that

(A) the consumer report is needed for the purpose of establishing an individual’s capacity to make child support payments or determining the appropriate level of such payments;

(B) the paternity of the consumer for the child to which the obligation relates has been established or acknowledged by the consumer in accordance with State laws under which the obligation arises (if required by those laws);

(C) the person has provided at least 10 days’ prior notice to the consumer whose report is requested, by certified or registered mail to the last known address of the consumer, that the report will be requested; and

(D) the consumer report will be kept confidential, will be used solely for a purpose described in subparagraph (A), and will not be used in connection with any other civil, administrative, or criminal proceeding, or for any other purpose.

(5) To an agency administering a State plan under Section 454 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 654) for use to set an initial or modified child support award.

(b) Conditions for furnishing and using consumer reports for employment purposes.

(1) Certification from user. A consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report for employment purposes only if

(A) the person who obtains such report from the agency certifies to the agency that

(i) the person has complied with paragraph (2) with respect to the consumer report, and the person will comply with paragraph (3) with respect to the consumer report if paragraph (3) becomes applicable; and

(ii) information from the consumer report will not be used in violation of any applicable Federal or State equal employment opportunity law or regulation; and

(B) the consumer reporting agency provides with the report, or has previously provided, a summary of the consumer’s rights under this title, as prescribed by the Federal Trade Commission under section 609(c)(3) [§ 1681g].

(2) Disclosure to consumer.

(A) In general. Except as provided in subparagraph (B), a person may not procure a consumer report, or cause a consumer report to be procured, for employment purposes with respect to any consumer, unless–

(i) a clear and conspicuous disclosure has been made in writing to the consumer at any time before the report is procured or caused to be procured, in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes; and

(ii) the consumer has authorized in writing (which authorization may be made on the document referred to in clause (i)) the procurement of the report by that person.

(B) Application by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means. If a consumer described in subparagraph (C) applies for employment by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means, at any time before a consumer report is procured or caused to be procured in connection with that application–

(i) the person who procures the consumer report on the consumer for employment purposes shall provide to the consumer, by oral, written, or electronic means, notice that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes, and a summary of the consumer’s rights under section 615(a)(3); and

(ii) the consumer shall have consented, orally, in writing, or electronically to the procurement of the report by that person.

(C) Scope. Subparagraph (B) shall apply to a person procuring a consumer report on a consumer in connection with the consumer’s application for employment only if–

(i) the consumer is applying for a position over which the Secretary of Transportation has the power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 31502 of title 49, or a position subject to safety regulation by a State transportation agency; and

(ii) as of the time at which the person procures the report or causes the report to be procured the only interaction between the consumer and the person in connection with that employment application has been by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means.

(3) Conditions on use for adverse actions.

(A) In general. Except as provided in subparagraph (B), in using a consumer report for employment purposes, before taking any adverse action based in whole or in part on the report, the person intending to take such adverse action shall provide to the consumer to whom the report relates–

(i) a copy of the report; and

(ii) a description in writing of the rights of the consumer under this title, as prescribed by the Federal Trade Commission under section 609(c)(3).

(B) Application by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means.

(i) If a consumer described in subparagraph (C) applies for employment by mail, telephone, computer, or other similar means, and if a person who has procured a consumer report on the consumer for employment purposes takes adverse action on the employment application based in whole or in part on the report, then the person must provide to the consumer to whom the report relates, in lieu of the notices required under subparagraph (A) of this section and under section 615(a), within 3 business days of taking such action, an oral, written or electronic notification–

(I) that adverse action has been taken based in whole or in part on a consumer report received from a consumer reporting agency;

(II) of the name, address and telephone number of the consumer reporting agency that furnished the consumer report (including a toll-free telephone number established by the agency if the agency compiles and maintains files on consumers on a nationwide basis);

(III) that the consumer reporting agency did not make the decision to take the adverse action and is unable to provide to the consumer the specific reasons why the adverse action was taken; and

(IV) that the consumer may, upon providing proper identification, request a free copy of a report and may dispute with the consumer reporting agency the accuracy or completeness of any information in a report.

(ii) If, under clause (B)(i)(IV), the consumer requests a copy of a consumer report from the person who procured the report, then, within 3 business days of receiving the consumer’s request, together with proper identification, the person must send or provide to the consumer a copy of a report and a copy of the consumer’s rights as prescribed by the Federal Trade Commission under section 609(c)(3).

(C) Scope. Subparagraph (B) shall apply to a person procuring a consumer report on a consumer in connection with the consumer’s application for employment only if–

(4) Exception for national security investigations.

(A) In general. In the case of an agency or department of the United States Government which seeks to obtain and use a consumer report for employment purposes, paragraph (3) shall not apply to any adverse action by such agency or department which is based in part on such consumer report, if the head of such agency or department makes a written finding that–

(i) the consumer report is relevant to a national security investigation of such agency or department;

(ii) the investigation is within the jurisdiction of such agency or department;

(iii) there is reason to believe that compliance with paragraph (3) will–

(I) endanger the life or physical safety of any person;

(II) result in flight from prosecution;

(III) result in the destruction of, or tampering with, evidence relevant to the investigation;

(IV) result in the intimidation of a potential witness relevant to the investigation;

(V) result in the compromise of classified information; or

(VI) otherwise seriously jeopardize or unduly delay the investigation or another official proceeding.

(B) Notification of consumer upon conclusion of investigation. Upon the conclusion of a national security investigation described in subparagraph (A), or upon the determination that the exception under subparagraph (A) is no longer required for the reasons set forth in such subparagraph, the official exercising the authority in such subparagraph shall provide to the consumer who is the subject of the consumer report with regard to which such finding was made–

(i) a copy of such consumer report with any classified information redacted as necessary;

(ii) notice of any adverse action which is based, in part, on the consumer report; and

(iii) the identification with reasonable specificity of the nature of the investigation for which the consumer report was sought.

(C) Delegation by head of agency or department. For purposes of subparagraphs (A) and (B), the head of any agency or department of the United States Government may delegate his or her authorities under this paragraph to an official of such agency or department who has personnel security responsibilities and is a member of the Senior Executive Service or equivalent civilian or military rank.

(D) Report to the congress. Not later than January 31 of each year, the head of each agency and department of the United States Government that exercised authority under this paragraph during the preceding year shall submit a report to the Congress on the number of times the department or agency exercised such authority during the year.

(E) Definitions. For purposes of this paragraph, the following definitions shall apply:

(i) Classified information. The term `classified information’ means information that is protected from unauthorized disclosure under Executive Order No. 12958 or successor orders.

(ii) National security investigation. The term ‘national security investigation’ means any official inquiry by an agency or department of the United States Government to determine the eligibility of a consumer to receive access or continued access to classified information or to determine whether classified information has been lost or compromised.

(1) In general. A consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report relating to any consumer pursuant to subparagraph (A) or (C) of subsection (a)(3) in connection with any credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer only if

(A) the consumer authorizes the agency to provide such report to such person; or

(B) (i) the transaction consists of a firm offer of credit or insurance;

(ii) the consumer reporting agency has complied with subsection (e); and

(iii) there is not in effect an election by the consumer, made in accordance with subsection (e), to have the consumer’s name and address excluded from lists of names provided by the agency pursuant to this paragraph.

(2) Limits on information received under paragraph (1)(B). A person may receive pursuant to paragraph (1)(B) only

(A) the name and address of a consumer;

(B) an identifier that is not unique to the consumer and that is used by the person solely for the purpose of verifying the identity of the consumer; and

(C) other information pertaining to a consumer that does not identify the relationship or experience of the consumer with respect to a particular creditor or other entity.

(3) Information regarding inquiries. Except as provided in section 609(a)(5) [§ 1681g], a consumer reporting agency shall not furnish to any person a record of inquiries in connection with a credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by a consumer.

(d) Reserved.

(e) Election of consumer to be excluded from lists.

(1) In general. A consumer may elect to have the consumer’s name and address excluded from any list provided by a consumer reporting agency under subsection (c)(1)(B) in connection with a credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer, by notifying the agency in accordance with paragraph (2) that the consumer does not consent to any use of a consumer report relating to the consumer in connection with any credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer.

(2) Manner of notification. A consumer shall notify a consumer reporting agency under paragraph (1)

(A) through the notification system maintained by the agency under paragraph (5); or

(B) by submitting to the agency a signed notice of election form issued by the agency for purposes of this subparagraph.

(3) Response of agency after notification through system. Upon receipt of notification of the election of a consumer under paragraph (1) through the notification system maintained by the agency under paragraph (5), a consumer reporting agency shall

(A) inform the consumer that the election is effective only for the 2-year period following the election if the consumer does not submit to the agency a signed notice of election form issued by the agency for purposes of paragraph (2)(B); and

(B) provide to the consumer a notice of election form, if requested by the consumer, not later than 5 business days after receipt of the notification of the election through the system established under paragraph (5), in the case of a request made at the time the consumer provides notification through the system.

(4) Effectiveness of election. An election of a consumer under paragraph (1)

(A) shall be effective with respect to a consumer reporting agency beginning 5 business days after the date on which the consumer notifies the agency in accordance with paragraph (2);

(B) shall be effective with respect to a consumer reporting agency

(i) subject to subparagraph (C), during the 2-year period beginning 5 business days after the date on which the consumer notifies the agency of the election, in the case of an election for which a consumer notifies the agency only in accordance with paragraph (2)(A); or

(ii) until the consumer notifies the agency under subparagraph (C), in the case of an election for which a consumer notifies the agency in accordance with paragraph (2)(B);

(C) shall not be effective after the date on which the consumer notifies the agency, through the notification system established by the agency under paragraph (5), that the election is no longer effective; and

(D) shall be effective with respect to each affiliate of the agency.

(5) Notification system.

(A) In general. Each consumer reporting agency that, under subsection (c)(1)(B), furnishes a consumer report in connection with a credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by a consumer, shall

(i) establish and maintain a notification system, including a toll-free telephone number, which permits any consumer whose consumer report is maintained by the agency to notify the agency, with appropriate identification, of the consumer’s election to have the consumer’s name and address excluded from any such list of names and addresses provided by the agency for such a transaction; and

(ii) publish by not later than 365 days after the date of enactment of the Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996, and not less than annually thereafter, in a publication of general circulation in the area served by the agency

(I) a notification that information in consumer files maintained by the agency may be used in connection with such transactions; and

(II) the address and toll-free telephone number for consumers to use to notify the agency of the consumer’s election under clause (I).

(B) Establishment and maintenance as compliance. Establishment and maintenance of a notification system (including a toll-free telephone number) and publication by a consumer reporting agency on the agency’s own behalf and on behalf of any of its affiliates in accordance with this paragraph is deemed to be compliance with this paragraph by each of those affiliates.

(6) Notification system by agencies that operate nationwide. Each consumer reporting agency that compiles and maintains files on consumers on a nationwide basis shall establish and maintain a notification system for purposes of paragraph (5) jointly with other such consumer reporting agencies.

(f) Certain use or obtaining of information prohibited. A person shall not use or obtain a consumer report for any purpose unless

(1) the consumer report is obtained for a purpose for which the consumer report is authorized to be furnished under this section; and

(2) the purpose is certified in accordance with section 607 [§ 1681e] by a prospective user of the report through a general or specific certification.

(g) Furnishing reports containing medical information. A consumer reporting agency shall not furnish for employment purposes, or in connection with a credit or insurance transaction, a consumer report that contains medical information about a consumer, unless the consumer consents to the furnishing of the report.

§ 605. Requirements relating to information contained in consumer reports[15 U.S.C. § 1681c]

(a) Information excluded from consumer reports. Except as authorized under subsection (b) of this section, no consumer reporting agency may make any consumer report containing any of the following items of information:

(1) Cases under title 11 [United States Code] or under the Bankruptcy Act that, from the date of entry of the order for relief or the date of adjudication, as the case may be, antedate the report by more than 10 years.

(2) Civil suits, civil judgments, and records of arrest that from date of entry, antedate the report by more than seven years or until the governing statute of limitations has expired, whichever is the longer period.

(3) Paid tax liens which, from date of payment, antedate the report by more than seven years.

(4) Accounts placed for collection or charged to profit and loss which antedate the report by more than seven years.(1)

(5) Any other adverse item of information, other than records of convictions of crimes which antedates the report by more than seven years.1

(b) Exempted cases. The provisions of subsection (a) of this section are not applicable in the case of any consumer credit report to be used in connection with

(1) a credit transaction involving, or which may reasonably be expected to involve, a principal amount of $150,000 or more;

(2) the underwriting of life insurance involving, or which may reasonably be expected to involve, a face amount of $150,000 or more; or

(3) the employment of any individual at an annual salary which equals, or which may reasonably be expected to equal $75,000, or more.

(1) In general. The 7-year period referred to in paragraphs (4) and (6) ** of subsection (a) shall begin, with respect to any delinquent account that is placed for collection (internally or by referral to a third party, whichever is earlier), charged to profit and loss, or subjected to any similar action, upon the expiration of the 180-day period beginning on the date of the commencement of the delinquency which immediately preceded the collection activity, charge to profit and loss, or similar action.

(2) Effective date. Paragraph (1) shall apply only to items of information added to the file of a consumer on or after the date that is 455 days after the date of enactment of the Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996.

(d) Information required to be disclosed. Any consumer reporting agency that furnishes a consumer report that contains information regarding any case involving the consumer that arises under title 11, United States Code, shall include in the report an identification of the chapter of such title 11 under which such case arises if provided by the source of the information. If any case arising or filed under title 11, United States Code, is withdrawn by the consumer before a final judgment, the consumer reporting agency shall include in the report that such case or filing was withdrawn upon receipt of documentation certifying such withdrawal.

(e) Indication of closure of account by consumer. If a consumer reporting agency is notified pursuant to section 623(a)(4) [§ 1681s-2] that a credit account of a consumer was voluntarily closed by the consumer, the agency shall indicate that fact in any consumer report that includes information related to the account.

(f) Indication of dispute by consumer. If a consumer reporting agency is notified pursuant to section 623(a)(3) [§ 1681s-2] that information regarding a consumer who was furnished to the agency is disputed by the consumer, the agency shall indicate that fact in each consumer report that includes the disputed information.

§ 606. Disclosure of investigative consumer reports [15 U.S.C. § 1681d]

(a) Disclosure of fact of preparation. A person may not procure or cause to be prepared an investigative consumer report on any consumer unless

(1) it is clearly and accurately disclosed to the consumer that an investigative consumer report including information as to his character, general reputation, personal characteristics and mode of living, whichever are applicable, may be made, and such disclosure

(A) is made in a writing mailed, or otherwise delivered, to the consumer, not later than three days after the date on which the report was first requested, and

(B) includes a statement informing the consumer of his right to request the additional disclosures provided for under subsection (b) of this section and the written summary of the rights of the consumer prepared pursuant to section 609(c) [§ 1681g]; and

(2) the person certifies or has certified to the consumer reporting agency that

(A) the person has made the disclosures to the consumer required by paragraph (1); and

(B) the person will comply with subsection (b).

(b) Disclosure on request of nature and scope of investigation. Any person who procures or causes to be prepared an investigative consumer report on any consumer shall, upon written request made by the consumer within a reasonable period of time after the receipt by him of the disclosure required by subsection (a)(1) of this section, make a complete and accurate disclosure of the nature and scope of the investigation requested. This disclosure shall be made in a writing mailed, or otherwise delivered, to the consumer not later than five days after the date on which the request for such disclosure was received from the consumer or such report was first requested, whichever is the later.

(c) Limitation on liability upon showing of reasonable procedures for compliance with provisions. No person may be held liable for any violation of subsection (a) or (b) of this section if he shows by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time of the violation he maintained reasonable procedures to assure compliance with subsection (a) or (b) of this section.

(d) Prohibitions.

(1) Certification. A consumer reporting agency shall not prepare or furnish investigative consumer report unless the agency has received a certification under subsection (a)(2) from the person who requested the report.

(2) Inquiries. A consumer reporting agency shall not make an inquiry for the purpose of preparing an investigative consumer report on a consumer for employment purposes if the making of the inquiry by an employer or prospective employer of the consumer would violate any applicable Federal or State equal employment opportunity law or regulation.

(3) Certain public record information. Except as otherwise provided in section 613 [§ 1681k], a consumer reporting agency shall not furnish an investigative consumer report that includes information that is a matter of public record and that relates to an arrest, indictment, conviction, civil judicial action, tax lien, or outstanding judgment, unless the agency has verified the accuracy of the information during the 30-day period ending on the date on which the report is furnished.

(4) Certain adverse information. A consumer reporting agency shall not prepare or furnish an investigative consumer report on a consumer that contains information that is adverse to the interest of the consumer and that is obtained through a personal interview with a neighbor, friend, or associate of the consumer or with another person with whom the consumer is acquainted or who has knowledge of such item of information, unless

(A) the agency has followed reasonable procedures to obtain confirmation of the information, from an additional source that has independent and direct knowledge of the information; or

(B) the person interviewed is the best possible source of the information.

§ 607. Compliance procedures[15 U.S.C. § 1681e]

(a) Identity and purposes of credit users. Every consumer reporting agency shall maintain reasonable procedures designed to avoid violations of section 605 [§ 1681c] and to limit the furnishing of consumer reports to the purposes listed under section 604 [§ 1681b] of this title. These procedures shall require that prospective users of the information identify themselves, certify the purposes for which the information is sought, and certify that the information will be used for no other purpose. Every consumer reporting agency shall make a reasonable effort to verify the identity of a new prospective user and the uses certified by such prospective user prior to furnishing such user a consumer report. No consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report to any person if it has reasonable grounds for believing that the consumer report will not be used for a purpose listed in section 604 [§ 1681b] of this title.

(b) Accuracy of report. Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.

(c) Disclosure of consumer reports by users allowed. A consumer reporting agency may not prohibit a user of a consumer report furnished by the agency on a consumer from disclosing the contents of the report to the consumer, if adverse action against the consumer has been taken by the user based in whole or in part on the report.

(d) Notice to users and furnishers of information.

(1) Notice requirement. A consumer reporting agency shall provide to any person

(A) who regularly and in the ordinary course of business furnishes information to the agency with respect to any consumer; or

(B) to whom a consumer report is provided by the agency;

a notice of such person’s responsibilities under this title.

(2) Content of notice. The Federal Trade Commission shall prescribe the content of notices under paragraph (1), and a consumer reporting agency shall be in compliance with this subsection if it provides a notice under paragraph (1) that is substantially similar to the Federal Trade Commission prescription under this paragraph.

(e) Procurement of consumer report for resale.

(1) Disclosure. A person may not procure a consumer report for purposes of reselling the report (or any information in the report) unless the person discloses to the consumer reporting agency that originally furnishes the report

(A) the identity of the end-user of the report (or information); and

(B) each permissible purpose under section 604 [§ 1681b] for which the report is furnished to the end-user of the report (or information).

(2) Responsibilities of procurers for resale. A person who procures a consumer report for purposes of reselling the report (or any information in the report) shall

(A) establish and comply with reasonable procedures designed to ensure that the report (or information) is resold by the person only for a purpose for which the report may be furnished under section 604 [§ 1681b], including by requiring that each person to which the report (or information) is resold and that resells or provides the report (or information) to any other person

(i) identifies each end user of the resold report (or information);

(ii) certifies each purpose for which the report (or information) will be used; and

(iii) certifies that the report (or information) will be used for no other purpose; and

(B) before reselling the report, make reasonable efforts to verify the identifications and certifications made under subparagraph (A).

(3) Resale of consumer report to a federal agency or department. Notwithstanding paragraph (1) or (2), a person who procures a consumer report for purposes of reselling the report (or any information in the report) shall not disclose the identity of the end-user of the report under paragraph (1) or (2) if —

(A) the end user is an agency or department of the United States Government which procures the report from the person for purposes of determining the eligibility of the consumer concerned to receive access or continued access to classified information (as defined in section 604(b)(4)(E)(i)); and

(B) the agency or department certifies in writing to the person reselling the report that nondisclosure is necessary to protect classified information or the safety of persons employed by or contracting with, or undergoing investigation for work or contracting with the agency or department.

§ 608. Disclosures to governmental agencies[15 U.S.C. § 1681f]

Notwithstanding the provisions of section 604 [§ 1681b] of this title, a consumer reporting agency may furnish identifying information respecting any consumer, limited to his name, address, former addresses, places of employment, or former places of employment, to a governmental agency.

§ 609. Disclosures to consumers[15 U.S.C. § 1681g]

(a) Information on file; sources; report recipients. Every consumer reporting agency shall, upon request, and subject to 610(a)(1) [§ 1681h], clearly and accurately disclose to the consumer:

(1) All information in the consumer’s file at the time of the request, except that nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to require a consumer reporting agency to disclose to a consumer any information concerning credit scores or any other risk scores or predictors relating to the consumer.

(2) The sources of the information; except that the sources of information acquired solely for use in preparing an investigative consumer report and actually used for no other purpose need not be disclosed: Provided, That in the event an action is brought under this title, such sources shall be available to the plaintiff under appropriate discovery procedures in the court in which the action is brought.

(3) (A) Identification of each person (including each end-user identified under section 607(e)(1) [§ 1681e]) that procured a consumer report

(i) for employment purposes, during the 2-year period preceding the date on which the request is made; or

(ii) for any other purpose, during the 1-year period preceding the date on which the request is made.

(B) An identification of a person under subparagraph (A) shall include

(i) the name of the person or, if applicable, the trade name (written in full) under which such person conducts business; and

(ii) upon request of the consumer, the address and telephone number of the person.

(i) the end user is an agency or department of the United States Government that procures the report from the person for purposes of determining the eligibility of the consumer to whom the report relates to receive access or continued access to classified information (as defined in section 604(b)(4)(E)(i)); and

(ii) the head of the agency or department makes a written finding as prescribed under section 604(b)(4)(A).

(4) The dates, original payees, and amounts of any checks upon which is based any adverse characterization of the consumer, included in the file at the time of the disclosure.

(5) A record of all inquiries received by the agency during the 1-year period preceding the request that identified the consumer in connection with a credit or insurance transaction that was not initiated by the consumer.

(b) Exempt information. The requirements of subsection (a) of this section respecting the disclosure of sources of information and the recipients of consumer reports do not apply to information received or consumer reports furnished prior to the effective date of this title except to the extent that the matter involved is contained in the files of the consumer reporting agency on that date.

(1) Summary of rights. A consumer reporting agency shall provide to a consumer, with each written disclosure by the agency to the consumer under this section

(A) a written summary of all of the rights that the consumer has under this title; and

(B) in the case of a consumer reporting agency that compiles and maintains files on consumers on a nationwide basis, a toll-free telephone number established by the agency, at which personnel are accessible to consumers during normal business hours.

(2) Specific items required to be included. The summary of rights required under paragraph (1) shall include

(A) a brief description of this title and all rights of consumers under this title;

(B) an explanation of how the consumer may exercise the rights of the consumer under this title;

(C) a list of all Federal agencies responsible for enforcing any provision of this title and the address and any appropriate phone number of each such agency, in a form that will assist the consumer in selecting the appropriate agency;

(D) a statement that the consumer may have additional rights under State law and that the consumer may wish to contact a State or local consumer protection agency or a State attorney general to learn of those rights; and

(E) a statement that a consumer reporting agency is not required to remove accurate derogatory information from a consumer’s file, unless the information is outdated under section 605 [§ 1681c] or cannot be verified.

(3) Form of summary of rights. For purposes of this subsection and any disclosure by a consumer reporting agency required under this title with respect to consumers’ rights, the Federal Trade Commission (after consultation with each Federal agency referred to in section 621(b) [§ 1681s]) shall prescribe the form and content of any such disclosure of the rights of consumers required under this title. A consumer reporting agency shall be in compliance with this subsection if it provides disclosures under paragraph (1) that are substantially similar to the Federal Trade Commission prescription under this paragraph.

(4) Effectiveness. No disclosures shall be required under this subsection until the date on which the Federal Trade Commission prescribes the form and content of such disclosures under paragraph (3).

§ 610. Conditions and form of disclosure to consumers[15 U.S.C. § 1681h]

(a) In general.

(1) Proper identification. A consumer reporting agency shall require, as a condition of making the disclosures required under section 609 [§ 1681g], that the consumer furnish proper identification.

(2) Disclosure in writing. Except as provided in subsection (b), the disclosures required to be made under section 609 [§ 1681g] shall be provided under that section in writing.

(b) Other forms of disclosure.

(1) In general. If authorized by a consumer, a consumer reporting agency may make the disclosures required under 609 [§ 1681g]

(A) other than in writing; and

(B) in such form as may be

(i) specified by the consumer in accordance with paragraph (2); and

(ii) available from the agency.

(2) Form. A consumer may specify pursuant to paragraph (1) that disclosures under section 609 [§ 1681g] shall be made

(A) in person, upon the appearance of the consumer at the place of business of the consumer reporting agency where disclosures are regularly provided, during normal business hours, and on reasonable notice;

(B) by telephone, if the consumer has made a written request for disclosure by telephone;

(D) by any other reasonable means that is available from the agency.

(c) Trained personnel. Any consumer reporting agency shall provide trained personnel to explain to the consumer any information furnished to him pursuant to section 609 [§ 1681g] of this title.

(d) Persons accompanying consumer. The consumer shall be permitted to be accompanied by one other person of his choosing, who shall furnish reasonable identification. A consumer reporting agency may require the consumer to furnish a written statement granting permission to the consumer reporting agency to discuss the consumer’s file in such person’s presence.

(e) Limitation of liability. Except as provided in sections 616 and 617 [§§ 1681n and 1681o] of this title, no consumer may bring any action or proceeding in the nature of defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence with respect to the reporting of information against any consumer reporting agency, any user of information, or any person who furnishes information to a consumer reporting agency, based on information disclosed pursuant to section 609, 610, or 615 [§§ 1681g, 1681h, or 1681m] of this title or based on information disclosed by a user of a consumer report to or for a consumer against whom the user has taken adverse action, based in whole or in part on the report, except as to false information furnished with malice or willful intent to injure such consumer.

The Fair Credit Reporting Act – part II

Table of Contents

§ 611 Procedure in case of disputed accuracy
§ 612 Charges for certain disclosures
§ 613 Public record information for employment purposes
§ 614 Restrictions on investigative consumer reports
§ 615 Requirements on users of consumer reports
§ 616 Civil liability for willful noncompliance
§ 617 Civil liability for negligent noncompliance
§ 618 Jurisdiction of courts; limitation of actions
§ 619 Obtaining information under false pretenses
§ 620 Unauthorized disclosures by officers or employees
§ 621 Administrative enforcement
§ 622 Information on overdue child support obligations
§ 623 Responsibilities of furnishers of information to consumer reporting agencies
§ 624 Relation to State laws
§ 625 Disclosures to FBI for counterintelligence purposes

§ 611. Procedure in case of disputed accuracy[15 U.S.C. § 1681i]

(a) Reinvestigations of disputed information.

(1) Reinvestigation required.

(A) In general. If the completeness or accuracy of any item of information contained in a consumer’s file at a consumer reporting agency is disputed by the consumer and the consumer notifies the agency directly of such dispute, the agency shall reinvestigate free of charge and record the current status of the disputed information, or delete the item from the file in accordance with paragraph (5), before the end of the 30-day period beginning on the date on which the agency receives the notice of the dispute from the consumer.

(B) Extension of period to reinvestigate. Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the 30-day period described in subparagraph (A) may be extended for not more than 15 additional days if the consumer reporting agency receives information from the consumer during that 30-day period that is relevant to the reinvestigation.

(C) Limitations on extension of period to reinvestigate. Subparagraph (B) shall not apply to any reinvestigation in which, during the 30-day period described in subparagraph (A), the information that is the subject of the reinvestigation is found to be inaccurate or incomplete or the consumer reporting agency determines that the information cannot be verified.

(2) Prompt notice of dispute to furnisher of information.

(A) In general. Before the expiration of the 5-business-day period beginning on the date on which a consumer reporting agency receives notice of a dispute from any consumer in accordance with paragraph (1), the agency shall provide notification of the dispute to any person who provided any item of information in dispute, at the address and in the manner established with the person. The notice shall include all relevant information regarding the dispute that the agency has received from the consumer.

(B) Provision of other information from consumer. The consumer reporting agency shall promptly provide to the person who provided the information in dispute all relevant information regarding the dispute that is received by the agency from the consumer after the period referred to in subparagraph (A) and before the end of the period referred to in paragraph (1)(A).

(3) Determination that dispute is frivolous or irrelevant.

(A) In general. Notwithstanding paragraph (1), a consumer reporting agency may terminate a reinvestigation of information disputed by a consumer under that paragraph if the agency reasonably determines that the dispute by the consumer is frivolous or irrelevant, including by reason of a failure by a consumer to provide sufficient information to investigate the disputed information.

(B) Notice of determination. Upon making any determination in accordance with subparagraph (A) that a dispute is frivolous or irrelevant, a consumer reporting agency shall notify the consumer of such determination not later than 5 business days after making such determination, by mail or, if authorized by the consumer for that purpose, by any other means available to the agency.

(i) the reasons for the determination under subparagraph (A); and

(ii) identification of any information required to investigate the disputed information, which may consist of a standardized form describing the general nature of such information.

(4) Consideration of consumer information. In conducting any reinvestigation under paragraph (1) with respect to disputed information in the file of any consumer, the consumer reporting agency shall review and consider all relevant information submitted by the consumer in the period described in paragraph (1)(A) with respect to such disputed information.

(5) Treatment of inaccurate or unverifiable information.

(A) In general. If, after any reinvestigation under paragraph (1) of any information disputed by a consumer, an item of the information is found to be inaccurate or incomplete or cannot be verified, the consumer reporting agency shall promptly delete that item of information from the consumer’s file or modify that item of information, as appropriate, based on the results of the reinvestigation.

(B) Requirements relating to reinsertion of previously deleted material.

(i) Certification of accuracy of information. If any information is deleted from a consumer’s file pursuant to subparagraph (A), the information may not be reinserted in the file by the consumer reporting agency unless the person who furnishes the information certifies that the information is complete and accurate.

(ii) Notice to consumer. If any information that has been deleted from a consumer’s file pursuant to subparagraph (A) is reinserted in the file, the consumer reporting agency shall notify the consumer of the reinsertion in writing not later than 5 business days after the reinsertion or, if authorized by the consumer for that purpose, by any other means available to the agency.

(iii) Additional information. As part of, or in addition to, the notice under clause (ii), a consumer reporting agency shall provide to a consumer in writing not later than 5 business days after the date of the reinsertion

(I) a statement that the disputed information has been reinserted;

(II) the business name and address of any furnisher of information contacted and the telephone number of such furnisher, if reasonably available, or of any furnisher of information that contacted the consumer reporting agency, in connection with the reinsertion of such information; and

(III) a notice that the consumer has the right to add a statement to the consumer’s file disputing the accuracy or completeness of the disputed information.

(C) Procedures to prevent reappearance. A consumer reporting agency shall maintain reasonable procedures designed to prevent the reappearance in a consumer’s file, and in consumer reports on the consumer, of information that is deleted pursuant to this paragraph (other than information that is reinserted in accordance with subparagraph (B)(i)).

(D) Automated reinvestigation system. Any consumer reporting agency that compiles and maintains files on consumers on a nationwide basis shall implement an automated system through which furnishers of information to that consumer reporting agency may report the results of a reinvestigation that finds incomplete or inaccurate information in a consumer’s file to other such consumer reporting agencies.

(6) Notice of results of reinvestigation.

(A) In general. A consumer reporting agency shall provide written notice to a consumer of the results of a reinvestigation under this subsection not later than 5 business days after the completion of the reinvestigation, by mail or, if authorized by the consumer for that purpose, by other means available to the agency.

(B) Contents. As part of, or in addition to, the notice under subparagraph (A), a consumer reporting agency shall provide to a consumer in writing before the expiration of the 5-day period referred to in subparagraph (A)

(i) a statement that the reinvestigation is completed;

(ii) a consumer report that is based upon the consumer’s file as that file is revised as a result of the reinvestigation;

(iii) a notice that, if requested by the consumer, a description of the procedure used to determine the accuracy and completeness of the information shall be provided to the consumer by the agency, including the business name and address of any furnisher of information contacted in connection with such information and the telephone number of such furnisher, if reasonably available;

(iv) a notice that the consumer has the right to add a statement to the consumer’s file disputing the accuracy or completeness of the information; and

(v) a notice that the consumer has the right to request under subsection (d) that the consumer reporting agency furnish notifications under that subsection.

(7) Description of reinvestigation procedure. A consumer reporting agency shall provide to a consumer a description referred to in paragraph (6)(B)(iii) by not later than 15 days after receiving a request from the consumer for that description.

(8) Expedited dispute resolution. If a dispute regarding an item of information in a consumer’s file at a consumer reporting agency is resolved in accordance with paragraph (5)(A) by the deletion of the disputed information by not later than 3 business days after the date on which the agency receives notice of the dispute from the consumer in accordance with paragraph (1)(A), then the agency shall not be required to comply with paragraphs (2), (6), and (7) with respect to that dispute if the agency

(A) provides prompt notice of the deletion to the consumer by telephone;

(B) includes in that notice, or in a written notice that accompanies a confirmation and consumer report provided in accordance with subparagraph (C), a statement of the consumer’s right to request under subsection (d) that the agency furnish notifications under that subsection; and

(C) provides written confirmation of the deletion and a copy of a consumer report on the consumer that is based on the consumer’s file after the deletion, not later than 5 business days after making the deletion.

(b) Statement of dispute. If the reinvestigation does not resolve the dispute, the consumer may file a brief statement setting forth the nature of the dispute. The consumer reporting agency may limit such statements to not more than one hundred words if it provides the consumer with assistance in writing a clear summary of the dispute.

(c) Notification of consumer dispute in subsequent consumer reports. Whenever a statement of a dispute is filed, unless there is reasonable grounds to believe that it is frivolous or irrelevant, the consumer reporting agency shall, in any subsequent consumer report containing the information in question, clearly note that it is disputed by the consumer and provide either the consumer’s statement or a clear and accurate codification or summary thereof.

(d) Notification of deletion of disputed information. Following any deletion of information which is found to be inaccurate or whose accuracy can no longer be verified or any notation as to disputed information, the consumer reporting agency shall, at the request of the consumer, furnish notification that the item has been deleted or the statement, codification or summary pursuant to subsection (b) or (c) of this section to any person specifically designated by the consumer who has within two years prior thereto received a consumer report for employment purposes, or within six months prior thereto received a consumer report for any other purpose, which contained the deleted or disputed information.

§ 612. Charges for certain disclosures[15 U.S.C. § 1681j]

(a) Reasonable charges allowed for certain disclosures.

(1) In general. Except as provided in subsections (b), (c), and (d), a consumer reporting agency may impose a reasonable charge on a consumer

(A) for making a disclosure to the consumer pursuant to section 609 [§ 1681g], which charge

(i) shall not exceed $8; and

(ii) shall be indicated to the consumer before making the disclosure; and

(B) for furnishing, pursuant to 611(d) [§ 1681i], following a reinvestigation under section 611(a) [§ 1681i], a statement, codification, or summary to a person designated by the consumer under that section after the 30-day period beginning on the date of notification of the consumer under paragraph (6) or (8) of section 611(a) [§ 1681i] with respect to the reinvestigation, which charge

(i) shall not exceed the charge that the agency would impose on each designated recipient for a consumer report; and

(ii) shall be indicated to the consumer before furnishing such information.

(2) Modification of amount. The Federal Trade Commission shall increase the amount referred to in paragraph (1)(A)(I) on January 1 of each year, based proportionally on changes in the Consumer Price Index, with fractional changes rounded to the nearest fifty cents.

(b) Free disclosure after adverse notice to consumer. Each consumer reporting agency that maintains a file on a consumer shall make all disclosures pursuant to section 609 [§ 1681g] without charge to the consumer if, not later than 60 days after receipt by such consumer of a notification pursuant to section 615 [§ 1681m], or of a notification from a debt collection agency affiliated with that consumer reporting agency stating that the consumer’s credit rating may be or has been adversely affected, the consumer makes a request under section 609 [§ 1681g].

(c) Free disclosure under certain other circumstances. Upon the request of the consumer, a consumer reporting agency shall make all disclosures pursuant to section 609 [§ 1681g] once during any 12-month period without charge to that consumer if the consumer certifies in writing that the consumer

(1) is unemployed and intends to apply for employment in the 60-day period beginning on the date on which the certification is made;

(2) is a recipient of public welfare assistance; or

(3) has reason to believe that the file on the consumer at the agency contains inaccurate information due to fraud.

(d) Other charges prohibited. A consumer reporting agency shall not impose any charge on a consumer for providing any notification required by this title or making any disclosure required by this title, except as authorized by subsection (a).

§ 613. Public record information for employment purposes[15 U.S.C. § 1681k]

(a) In general. A consumer reporting agency which furnishes a consumer report for employment purposes and which for that purpose compiles and reports items of information on consumers which are matters of public record and are likely to have an adverse effect upon a consumer’s ability to obtain employment shall

(1) at the time such public record information is reported to the user of such consumer report, notify the consumer of the fact that public record information is being reported by the consumer reporting agency, together with the name and address of the person to whom such information is being reported; or

(2) maintain strict procedures designed to insure that whenever public record information which is likely to have an adverse effect on a consumer’s ability to obtain employment is reported it is complete and up to date. For purposes of this paragraph, items of public record relating to arrests, indictments, convictions, suits, tax liens, and outstanding judgments shall be considered up to date if the current public record status of the item at the time of the report is reported.

(b) Exemption for national security investigations. Subsection (a) does not apply in the case of an agency or department of the United States Government that seeks to obtain and use a consumer report for employment purposes, if the head of the agency or department makes a written finding as prescribed under section 604(b)(4)(A).

§ 614. Restrictions on investigative consumer reports[15 U.S.C. § 1681l]

Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares an investigative consumer report, no adverse information in the consumer report (other than information which is a matter of public record) may be included in a subsequent consumer report unless such adverse information has been verified in the process of making such subsequent consumer report, or the adverse information was received within the three-month period preceding the date the subsequent report is furnished.

§ 615. Requirements on users of consumer reports[15 U.S.C. § 1681m]

(a) Duties of users taking adverse actions on the basis of information contained in consumer reports. If any person takes any adverse action with respect to any consumer that is based in whole or in part on any information contained in a consumer report, the person shall

(1) provide oral, written, or electronic notice of the adverse action to the consumer;

(2) provide to the consumer orally, in writing, or electronically

(A) the name, address, and telephone number of the consumer reporting agency (including a toll-free telephone number established by the agency if the agency compiles and maintains files on consumers on a nationwide basis) that furnished the report to the person; and

(B) a statement that the consumer reporting agency did not make the decision to take the adverse action and is unable to provide the consumer the specific reasons why the adverse action was taken; and

(3) provide to the consumer an oral, written, or electronic notice of the consumer’s right

(A) to obtain, under section 612 [§ 1681j], a free copy of a consumer report on the consumer from the consumer reporting agency referred to in paragraph (2), which notice shall include an indication of the 60-day period under that section for obtaining such a copy; and

(B) to dispute, under section 611 [§ 1681i], with a consumer reporting agency the accuracy or completeness of any information in a consumer report furnished by the agency.

(b) Adverse action based on information obtained from third parties other than consumer reporting agencies.

(1) In general. Whenever credit for personal, family, or household purposes involving a consumer is denied or the charge for such credit is increased either wholly or partly because of information obtained from a person other than a consumer reporting agency bearing upon the consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living, the user of such information shall, within a reasonable period of time, upon the consumer’s written request for the reasons for such adverse action received within sixty days after learning of such adverse action, disclose the nature of the information to the consumer. The user of such information shall clearly and accurately disclose to the consumer his right to make such written request at the time such adverse action is communicated to the consumer.

(2) Duties of person taking certain actions based on information provided by affiliate.

(A) Duties, generally. If a person takes an action described in subparagraph (B) with respect to a consumer, based in whole or in part on information described in subparagraph (C), the person shall

(i) notify the consumer of the action, including a statement that the consumer may obtain the information in accordance with clause (ii); and

(ii) upon a written request from the consumer received within 60 days after transmittal of the notice required by clause (I), disclose to the consumer the nature of the information upon which the action is based by not later than 30 days after receipt of the request.

(B) Action described. An action referred to in subparagraph (A) is an adverse action described in section 603(k)(1)(A) [§ 1681a], taken in connection with a transaction initiated by the consumer, or any adverse action described in clause (i) or (ii) of section 603(k)(1)(B) [§ 1681a].

(i) except as provided in clause (ii), is information that

(I) is furnished to the person taking the action by a person related by common ownership or affiliated by common corporate control to the person taking the action; and

(II) bears on the credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living of the consumer; and

(ii) does not include

(I) information solely as to transactions or experiences between the consumer and the person furnishing the information; or

(II) information in a consumer report.

(c) Reasonable procedures to assure compliance. No person shall be held liable for any violation of this section if he shows by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time of the alleged violation he maintained reasonable procedures to assure compliance with the provisions of this section.

(d) Duties of users making written credit or insurance solicitations on the basis of information contained in consumer files.

(1) In general. Any person who uses a consumer report on any consumer in connection with any credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer, that is provided to that person under section 604(c)(1)(B) [§ 1681b], shall provide with each written solicitation made to the consumer regarding the transaction a clear and conspicuous statement that

(A) information contained in the consumer’s consumer report was used in connection with the transaction;

(B) the consumer received the offer of credit or insurance because the consumer satisfied the criteria for credit worthiness or insurability under which the consumer was selected for the offer;

(C) if applicable, the credit or insurance may not be extended if, after the consumer responds to the offer, the consumer does not meet the criteria used to select the consumer for the offer or any applicable criteria bearing on credit worthiness or insurability or does not furnish any required collateral;

(D) the consumer has a right to prohibit information contained in the consumer’s file with any consumer reporting agency from being used in connection with any credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer; and

(E) the consumer may exercise the right referred to in subparagraph (D) by notifying a notification system established under section 604(e) [§ 1681b].

(2) Disclosure of address and telephone number. A statement under paragraph (1) shall include the address and toll-free telephone number of the appropriate notification system established under section 604(e) [§ 1681b].

(3) Maintaining criteria on file. A person who makes an offer of credit or insurance to a consumer under a credit or insurance transaction described in paragraph (1) shall maintain on file the criteria used to select the consumer to receive the offer, all criteria bearing on credit worthiness or insurability, as applicable, that are the basis for determining whether or not to extend credit or insurance pursuant to the offer, and any requirement for the furnishing of collateral as a condition of the extension of credit or insurance, until the expiration of the 3-year period beginning on the date on which the offer is made to the consumer.

(4) Authority of federal agencies regarding unfair or deceptive acts or practices not affected. This section is not intended to affect the authority of any Federal or State agency to enforce a prohibition against unfair or deceptive acts or practices, including the making of false or misleading statements in connection with a credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer.

§ 616. Civil liability for willful noncompliance [15 U.S.C. § 1681n]

(a) In general. Any person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this title with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equal to the sum of

(1) (A) any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure or damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000; or

(B) in the case of liability of a natural person for obtaining a consumer report under false pretenses or knowingly without a permissible purpose, actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure or $1,000, whichever is greater;

(2) such amount of punitive damages as the court may allow; and

(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce any liability under this section, the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney’s fees as determined by the court.

(b) Civil liability for knowing noncompliance. Any person who obtains a consumer report from a consumer reporting agency under false pretenses or knowingly without a permissible purpose shall be liable to the consumer reporting agency for actual damages sustained by the consumer reporting agency or $1,000, whichever is greater.

(c) Attorney’s fees. Upon a finding by the court that an unsuccessful pleading, motion, or other paper filed in connection with an action under this section was filed in bad faith or for purposes of harassment, the court shall award to the prevailing party attorney’s fees reasonable in relation to the work expended in responding to the pleading, motion, or other paper.

§ 617. Civil liability for negligent noncompliance [15 U.S.C. § 1681o]

(a) In general. Any person who is negligent in failing to comply with any requirement imposed under this title with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equal to the sum of

(1) any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure;

(2) in the case of any successful action to enforce any liability under this section, the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney’s fees as determined by the court.

(b) Attorney’s fees. On a finding by the court that an unsuccessful pleading, motion, or other paper filed in connection with an action under this section was filed in bad faith or for purposes of harassment, the court shall award to the prevailing party attorney’s fees reasonable in relation to the work expended in responding to the pleading, motion, or other paper.

§ 618. Jurisdiction of courts; limitation of actions[15 U.S.C. § 1681p]

An action to enforce any liability created under this title may be brought in any appropriate United States district court without regard to the amount in controversy, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within two years from the date on which the liability arises, except that where a defendant has materially and willfully misrepresented any information required under this title to be disclosed to an individual and the information so misrepresented is material to the establishment of the defendant’s liability to that individual under this title, the action may be brought at any time within two years after discovery by the individual of the misrepresentation.

§ 619. Obtaining information under false pretenses[15 U.S.C. § 1681q]

Any person who knowingly and willfully obtains information on a consumer from a consumer reporting agency under false pretenses shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned for not more than 2 years, or both.

§ 620. Unauthorized disclosures by officers or employees[15 U.S.C. § 1681r]

Any officer or employee of a consumer reporting agency who knowingly and willfully provides information concerning an individual from the agency’s files to a person not authorized to receive that information shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned for not more than 2 years, or both.

§ 621. Administrative enforcement[15 U.S.C. § 1681s]

(a) (1) Enforcement by Federal Trade Commission. Compliance with the requirements imposed under this title shall be enforced under the Federal Trade Commission Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et seq.] by the Federal Trade Commission with respect to consumer reporting agencies and all other persons subject thereto, except to the extent that enforcement of the requirements imposed under this title is specifically committed to some other government agency under subsection (b) hereof. For the purpose of the exercise by the Federal Trade Commission of its functions and powers under the Federal Trade Commission Act, a violation of any requirement or prohibition imposed under this title shall constitute an unfair or deceptive act or practice in commerce in violation of section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act [15 U.S.C. § 45(a)] and shall be subject to enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission under section 5(b) thereof [15 U.S.C. § 45(b)] with respect to any consumer reporting agency or person subject to enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission pursuant to this subsection, irrespective of whether that person is engaged in commerce or meets any other jurisdictional tests in the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Federal Trade Commission shall have such procedural, investigative, and enforcement powers, including the power to issue procedural rules in enforcing compliance with the requirements imposed under this title and to require the filing of reports, the production of documents, and the appearance of witnesses as though the applicable terms and conditions of the Federal Trade Commission Act were part of this title. Any person violating any of the provisions of this title shall be subject to the penalties and entitled to the privileges and immunities provided in the Federal Trade Commission Act as though the applicable terms and provisions thereof were part of this title.

2) (A) In the event of a knowing violation, which constitutes a pattern or practice of violations of this title, the Commission may commence a civil action to recover a civil penalty in a district court of the United States against any person that violates this title. In such action, such person shall be liable for a civil penalty of not more than $2,500 per violation.

(B) In determining the amount of a civil penalty under subparagraph (A), the court shall take into account the degree of culpability, any history of prior such conduct, ability to pay, effect on ability to continue to do business, and such other matters as justice may require.

(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (2), a court may not impose any civil penalty on a person for a violation of section 623(a)(1) [§ 1681s-2] unless the person has been enjoined from committing the violation, or ordered not to commit the violation, in an action or proceeding brought by or on behalf of the Federal Trade Commission, and has violated the injunction or order, and the court may not impose any civil penalty for any violation occurring before the date of the violation of the injunction or order.

(4) Neither the Commission nor any other agency referred to in subsection (b) may prescribe trade regulation rules or other regulations with respect to this title.

(b) Enforcement by other agencies. Compliance with the requirements imposed under this title with respect to consumer reporting agencies, persons who use consumer reports from such agencies, persons who furnish information to such agencies, and users of information that are subject to subsection (d) of section 615 [§ 1681m] shall be enforced under

(1) section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act [12 U.S.C. § 1818], in the case of

(A) national banks, and Federal branches and Federal agencies of foreign banks, by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency;

(B) member banks of the Federal Reserve System (other than national banks), branches and agencies of foreign banks (other than Federal branches, Federal agencies, and insured State branches of foreign banks), commercial lending companies owned or controlled by foreign banks, and organizations operating under section 25 or 25(a) [25A] of the Federal Reserve Act [12 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq., §§ 611 et seq], by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and

(C) banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (other than members of the Federal Reserve System) and insured State branches of foreign banks, by the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation;

(2) section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act [12 U.S.C. § 1818], by the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, in the case of a savings association the deposits of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation;

(3) the Federal Credit Union Act [12 U.S.C. §§ 1751 et seq.], by the Administrator of the National Credit Union Administration [National Credit Union Administration Board] with respect to any Federal credit union;

(4) subtitle IV of title 49 [49 U.S.C. §§ 10101 et seq.], by the Secretary of Transportation, with respect to all carriers subject to the jurisdiction of the Surface Transportation Board;

(5) the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 [49 U.S.C. Appx §§ 1301 et seq.], by the Secretary of Transportation with respect to any air carrier or foreign air carrier subject to that Act [49 U.S.C. Appx §§ 1301 et seq.]; and

(6) the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921 [7 U.S.C. §§ 181 et seq.] (except as provided in section 406 of that Act [7 U.S.C. §§ 226 and 227]), by the Secretary of Agriculture with respect to any activities subject to that Act.

The terms used in paragraph (1) that are not defined in this title or otherwise defined in section 3(s) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. § 1813(s)) shall have the meaning given to them in section 1(b) of the International Banking Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. § 3101).

(1) Authority of states. In addition to such other remedies as are provided under State law, if the chief law enforcement officer of a State, or an official or agency designated by a State, has reason to believe that any person has violated or is violating this title, the State

(A) may bring an action to enjoin such violation in any appropriate United States district court or in any other court of competent jurisdiction;

(B) subject to paragraph (5), may bring an action on behalf of the residents of the State to recover

(i) damages for which the person is liable to such residents under sections 616 and 617 [§§ 1681n and 1681o] as a result of the violation;

(ii) in the case of a violation of section 623(a) [§ 1681s-2], damages for which the person would, but for section 623(c) [§ 1681s-2], be liable to such residents as a result of the violation; or

(iii) damages of not more than $1,000 for each willful or negligent violation; and

(C) in the case of any successful action under subparagraph (A) or (B), shall be awarded the costs of the action and reasonable attorney fees as determined by the court.

(2) Rights of federal regulators. The State shall serve prior written notice of any action under paragraph (1) upon the Federal Trade Commission or the appropriate Federal regulator determined under subsection (b) and provide the Commission or appropriate Federal regulator with a copy of its complaint, except in any case in which such prior notice is not feasible, in which case the State shall serve such notice immediately upon instituting such action. The Federal Trade Commission or appropriate Federal regulator shall have the right

(A) to intervene in the action;

(B) upon so intervening, to be heard on all matters arising therein;

(D) to file petitions for appeal.

(3) Investigatory powers. For purposes of bringing any action under this subsection, nothing in this subsection shall prevent the chief law enforcement officer, or an official or agency designated by a State, from exercising the powers conferred on the chief law enforcement officer or such official by the laws of such State to conduct investigations or to administer oaths or affirmations or to compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of documentary and other evidence.

(4) Limitation on state action while federal action pending. If the Federal Trade Commission or the appropriate Federal regulator has instituted a civil action or an administrative action under section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act for a violation of this title, no State may, during the pendency of such action, bring an action under this section against any defendant named in the complaint of the Commission or the appropriate Federal regulator for any violation of this title that is alleged in that complaint.

(5) Limitations on state actions for violation of section 623(a)(1) [§ 1681s-2].

(A) Violation of injunction required. A State may not bring an action against a person under paragraph (1)(B) for a violation of section 623(a)(1) [§ 1681s-2], unless

(i) the person has been enjoined from committing the violation, in an action brought by the State under paragraph (1)(A); and

(ii) the person has violated the injunction.

(B) Limitation on damages recoverable. In an action against a person under paragraph (1)(B) for a violation of section 623(a)(1) [§ 1681s-2], a State may not recover any damages incurred before the date of the violation of an injunction on which the action is based.

(d) Enforcement under other authority. For the purpose of the exercise by any agency referred to in subsection (b) of this section of its powers under any Act referred to in that subsection, a violation of any requirement imposed under this title shall be deemed to be a violation of a requirement imposed under that Act. In addition to its powers under any provision of law specifically referred to in subsection (b) of this section, each of the agencies referred to in that subsection may exercise, for the purpose of enforcing compliance with any requirement imposed under this title any other authority conferred on it by law. Notwithstanding the preceding, no agency referred to in subsection (b) may conduct an examination of a bank, savings association, or credit union regarding compliance with the provisions of this title, except in response to a complaint (or if the agency otherwise has knowledge) that the bank, savings association, or credit union has violated a provision of this title, in which case, the agency may conduct an examination as necessary to investigate the complaint. If an agency determines during an investigation in response to a complaint that a violation of this title has occurred, the agency may, during its next 2 regularly scheduled examinations of the bank, savings association, or credit union, examine for compliance with this title.

(e) Interpretive authority. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may issue interpretations of any provision of this title as such provision may apply to any persons identified under paragraph (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (b), or to the holding companies and affiliates of such persons, in consultation with Federal agencies identified in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (b).

§ 622. Information on overdue child support obligations[15 U.S.C. § 1681s-1]

Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, a consumer reporting agency shall include in any consumer report furnished by the agency in accordance with section 604 [§ 1681b] of this title, any information on the failure of the consumer to pay overdue support which

(1) is provided

(A) to the consumer reporting agency by a State or local child support enforcement agency; or

(B) to the consumer reporting agency and verified by any local, State, or Federal government agency; and

(2) antedates the report by 7 years or less.

§ 623. Responsibilities of furnishers of information to consumer reporting agencies[15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2]

(a) Duty of furnishers of information to provide accurate information.

(1) Prohibition.

(A) Reporting information with actual knowledge of errors. A person shall not furnish any information relating to a consumer to any consumer reporting agency if the person knows or consciously avoids knowing that the information is inaccurate.

(B) Reporting information after notice and confirmation of errors. A person shall not furnish information relating to a consumer to any consumer reporting agency if

(i) the person has been notified by the consumer, at the address specified by the person for such notices, that specific information is inaccurate; and

(ii) the information is, in fact, inaccurate.

(C) No address requirement. A person who clearly and conspicuously specifies to the consumer an address for notices referred to in subparagraph (B) shall not be subject to subparagraph (A); however, nothing in subparagraph (B) shall require a person to specify such an address.

(2) Duty to correct and update information. A person who

(A) regularly and in the ordinary course of business furnishes information to one or more consumer reporting agencies about the person’s transactions or experiences with any consumer; and

(B) has furnished to a consumer reporting agency information that the person determines is not complete or accurate,

shall promptly notify the consumer reporting agency of that determination and provide to the agency any corrections to that information, or any additional information, that is necessary to make the information provided by the person to the agency complete and accurate, and shall not thereafter furnish to the agency any of the information that remains not complete or accurate.

(3) Duty to provide notice of dispute. If the completeness or accuracy of any information furnished by any person to any consumer reporting agency is disputed to such person by a consumer, the person may not furnish the information to any consumer reporting agency without notice that such information is disputed by the consumer.

(4) Duty to provide notice of closed accounts. A person who regularly and in the ordinary course of business furnishes information to a consumer reporting agency regarding a consumer who has a credit account with that person shall notify the agency of the voluntary closure of the account by the consumer, in information regularly furnished for the period in which the account is closed.

(5) Duty to provide notice of delinquency of accounts. A person who furnishes information to a consumer reporting agency regarding a delinquent account being placed for collection, charged to profit or loss, or subjected to any similar action shall, not later than 90 days after furnishing the information, notify the agency of the month and year of the commencement of the delinquency that immediately preceded the action.

(b) Duties of furnishers of information upon notice of dispute.

(1) In general. After receiving notice pursuant to section 611(a)(2) [§ 1681i] of a dispute with regard to the completeness or accuracy of any information provided by a person to a consumer reporting agency, the person shall

(A) conduct an investigation with respect to the disputed information;

(B) review all relevant information provided by the consumer reporting agency pursuant to section 611(a)(2) [§ 1681i];

(D) if the investigation finds that the information is incomplete or inaccurate, report those results to all other consumer reporting agencies to which the person furnished the information and that compile and maintain files on consumers on a nationwide basis.

(2) Deadline. A person shall complete all investigations, reviews, and reports required under paragraph (1) regarding information provided by the person to a consumer reporting agency, before the expiration of the period under section 611(a)(1) [§ 1681i] within which the consumer reporting agency is required to complete actions required by that section regarding that information.

(c) Limitation on liability. Sections 616 and 617 [§§ 1681n and 1681o] do not apply to any failure to comply with subsection (a), except as provided in section 621(c)(1)(B) [§ 1681s].

(d) Limitation on enforcement. Subsection (a) shall be enforced exclusively under section 621 [§ 1681s] by the Federal agencies and officials and the State officials identified in that section.

§ 624. Relation to State laws[15 U.S.C. § 1681t]

(a) In general. Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), this title does not annul, alter, affect, or exempt any person subject to the provisions of this title from complying with the laws of any State with respect to the collection, distribution, or use of any information on consumers, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with any provision of this title, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency.

(b) General exceptions. No requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any State

(1) with respect to any subject matter regulated under

(A) subsection (c) or (e) of section 604 [§ 1681b], relating to the prescreening of consumer reports;

(B) section 611 [§ 1681i], relating to the time by which a consumer reporting agency must take any action, including the provision of notification to a consumer or other person, in any procedure related to the disputed accuracy of information in a consumer’s file, except that this subparagraph shall not apply to any State law in effect on the date of enactment of the Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996;

(C) subsections (a) and (b) of section 615 [§ 1681m], relating to the duties of a person who takes any adverse action with respect to a consumer;

(D) section 615(d) [§ 1681m], relating to the duties of persons who use a consumer report of a consumer in connection with any credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer and that consists of a firm offer of credit or insurance;

(E) section 605 [§ 1681c], relating to information contained in consumer reports, except that this subparagraph shall not apply to any State law in effect on the date of enactment of the Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996; or

(F) section 623 [§ 1681s-2], relating to the responsibilities of persons who furnish information to consumer reporting agencies, except that this paragraph shall not apply

(i) with respect to section 54A(a) of chapter 93 of the Massachusetts Annotated Laws (as in effect on the date of enactment of the Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996); or

(ii) with respect to section 1785.25(a) of the California Civil Code (as in effect on the date of enactment of the Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996);

(2) with respect to the exchange of information among persons affiliated by common ownership or common corporate control, except that this paragraph shall not apply with respect to subsection (a) or (c)(1) of section 2480e of title 9, Vermont Statutes Annotated (as in effect on the date of enactment of the Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996); or

(3) with respect to the form and content of any disclosure required to be made under section 609(c) [§ 1681g].

(c) Definition of firm offer of credit or insurance. Notwithstanding any definition of the term “firm offer of credit or insurance” (or any equivalent term) under the laws of any State, the definition of that term contained in section 603(l) [§ 1681a] shall be construed to apply in the enforcement and interpretation of the laws of any State governing consumer reports.

(d) Limitations. Subsections (b) and (c)

(1) do not affect any settlement, agreement, or consent judgment between any State Attorney General and any consumer reporting agency in effect on the date of enactment of the Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996; and

(2) do not apply to any provision of State law (including any provision of a State constitution) that

(A) is enacted after January 1, 2004;

(B) states explicitly that the provision is intended to supplement this title; and

§ 625. Disclosures to FBI for counterintelligence purposes[15 U.S.C. § 1681u]

(a) Identity of financial institutions. Notwithstanding section 604 [§ 1681b] or any other provision of this title, a consumer reporting agency shall furnish to the Federal Bureau of Investigation the names and addresses of all financial institutions (as that term is defined in section 1101 of the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 [12 U.S.C. § 3401]) at which a consumer maintains or has maintained an account, to the extent that information is in the files of the agency, when presented with a written request for that information, signed by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or the Director’s designee, which certifies compliance with this section. The Director or the Director’s designee may make such a certification only if the Director or the Director’s designee has determined in writing that

(1) such information is necessary for the conduct of an authorized foreign counterintelligence investigation; and

(2) there are specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the consumer

(A) is a foreign power (as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 [50 U.S.C. § 1801]) or a person who is not a United States person (as defined in such section 101) and is an official of a foreign power; or

(B) is an agent of a foreign power and is engaging or has engaged in an act of international terrorism (as that term is defined in section 101(c) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 [50 U.S.C. § 1801(c)]) or clandestine intelligence activities that involve or may involve a violation of criminal statutes of the United States.

(b) Identifying information. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 604 [§ 1681b] or any other provision of this title, a consumer reporting agency shall furnish identifying information respecting a consumer, limited to name, address, former addresses, places of employment, or former places of employment, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation when presented with a written request, signed by the Director or the Director’s designee, which certifies compliance with this subsection. The Director or the Director’s designee may make such a certification only if the Director or the Director’s designee has determined in writing that

(1) such information is necessary to the conduct of an authorized counterintelligence investigation; and

(2) there is information giving reason to believe that the consumer has been, or is about to be, in contact with a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power (as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 [50 U.S.C. § 1801]).

(c) Court order for disclosure of consumer reports. Notwithstanding section 604 [§ 1681b] or any other provision of this title, if requested in writing by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or a designee of the Director, a court may issue an order ex parte directing a consumer reporting agency to furnish a consumer report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, upon a showing in camera that

(1) the consumer report is necessary for the conduct of an authorized foreign counterintelligence investigation; and

(2) there are specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the consumer whose consumer report is sought

(A) is an agent of a foreign power, and

(B) is engaging or has engaged in an act of international terrorism (as that term is defined in section 101(c) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 [50 U.S.C. § 1801(c)]) or clandestine intelligence activities that involve or may involve a violation of criminal statutes of the United States.

The terms of an order issued under this subsection shall not disclose that the order is issued for purposes of a counterintelligence investigation.

(d) Confidentiality. No consumer reporting agency or officer, employee, or agent of a consumer reporting agency shall disclose to any person, other than those officers, employees, or agents of a consumer reporting agency necessary to fulfill the requirement to disclose information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation under this section, that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained the identity of financial institutions or a consumer report respecting any consumer under subsection (a), (b), or (c), and no consumer reporting agency or officer, employee, or agent of a consumer reporting agency shall include in any consumer report any information that would indicate that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained such information or a consumer report.

(e) Payment of fees. The Federal Bureau of Investigation shall, subject to the availability of appropriations, pay to the consumer reporting agency assembling or providing report or information in accordance with procedures established under this section a fee for reimbursement for such costs as are reasonably necessary and which have been directly incurred in searching, reproducing, or transporting books, papers, records, or other data required or requested to be produced under this section.

(f) Limit on dissemination. The Federal Bureau of Investigation may not disseminate information obtained pursuant to this section outside of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, except to other Federal agencies as may be necessary for the approval or conduct of a foreign counterintelligence investigation, or, where the information concerns a person subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, to appropriate investigative authorities within the military department concerned as may be necessary for the conduct of a joint foreign counterintelligence investigation.

(g) Rules of construction. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit information from being furnished by the Federal Bureau of Investigation pursuant to a subpoena or court order, in connection with a judicial or administrative proceeding to enforce the provisions of this Act. Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize or permit the withholding of information from the Congress.

(h) Reports to Congress. On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General shall fully inform the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate concerning all requests made pursuant to subsections (a), (b), and (c).

(i) Damages. Any agency or department of the United States obtaining or disclosing any consumer reports, records, or information contained therein in violation of this section is liable to the consumer to whom such consumer reports, records, or information relate in an amount equal to the sum of

(1) $100, without regard to the volume of consumer reports, records, or information involved;

(2) any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the disclosure;

(3) if the violation is found to have been willful or intentional, such punitive damages as a court may allow; and

(4) in the case of any successful action to enforce liability under this subsection, the costs of the action, together with reasonable attorney fees, as determined by the court.

(j) Disciplinary actions for violations. If a court determines that any agency or department of the United States has violated any provision of this section and the court finds that the circumstances surrounding the violation raise questions of whether or not an officer or employee of the agency or department acted willfully or intentionally with respect to the violation, the agency or department shall promptly initiate a proceeding to determine whether or not disciplinary action is warranted against the officer or employee who was responsible for the violation.

(k) Good-faith exception. Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, any consumer reporting agency or agent or employee thereof making disclosure of consumer reports or identifying information pursuant to this subsection in good-faith reliance upon a certification of the Federal Bureau of Investigation pursuant to provisions of this section shall not be liable to any person for such disclosure under this title, the constitution of any State, or any law or regulation of any State or any political subdivision of any State.

(l) Limitation of remedies. Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, the remedies and sanctions set forth in this section shall be the only judicial remedies and sanctions for violation of this section.

(m) Injunctive relief. In addition to any other remedy contained in this section, injunctive relief shall be available to require compliance with the procedures of this section. In the event of any successful action under this subsection, costs together with reasonable attorney fees, as determined by the court, may be recovered.

Legislative History

House Reports: No. 91-975 (Comm. on Banking and Currency) and No. 91-1587 (Comm. of Conference)

Senate Reports: No. 91-1139 accompanying S. 3678 (Comm. on Banking and Currency)

Congressional Record, Vol. 116 (1970)

May 25, considered and passed House.
Sept. 18, considered and passed Senate, amended.
Oct. 9, Senate agreed to conference report.
Oct. 13, House agreed to conference report.

Enactment:

Public Law No. 91-508 (October 26, 1970):

Amendments: Public Law Nos.

95-473 (October 17, 1978)

95-598 (November 6, 1978)

98-443 (October 4, 1984)

101-73 (August 9, 1989)

102-242 (December 19, 1991)

102-537 (October 27, 1992)

102-550 (October 28, 1992)

103-325 (September 23, 1994)

104-88 (December 29, 1995)

104-93 (January 6, 1996)

104-193 (August 22, 1996)

104-208 (September 30, 1996)

105-107 (November 20, 1997)

105-347 (November 2, 1998)

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

As amended by Public Law 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (Sept. 30, 1996)

To amend the Consumer Credit Protection Act to prohibit abusive practices by debt collectors.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Consumer Credit Protection Act (15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new title:

TITLE VIII – DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES [Fair Debt Collection Practices Act]

Sec.
801. Short Title
802. Congressional findings and declaration of purpose
803. Definitions
804. Acquisition of location information
805. Communication in connection with debt collection
806. Harassment or abuse
807. False or misleading representations
808. Unfair practice
809. Validation of debts
810. Multiple debts
811. Legal actions by debt collectors
812. Furnishing certain deceptive forms
813. Civil liability
814. Administrative enforcement
815. Reports to Congress by the Commission
816. Relation to State laws
817. Exemption for State regulation
818. Effective date

§ 801. Short Title [15 USC 1601 note]

This title may be cited as the “Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.”

§ 802. Congressional findings and declarations of purpose [15 USC 1692]

(a) There is abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors. Abusive debt collection practices contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.

(b) Existing laws and procedures for redressing these injuries are inadequate to protect consumers.

(c) Means other than misrepresentation or other abusive debt collection practices are available for the effective collection of debts.

(d) Abusive debt collection practices are carried on to a substantial extent in interstate commerce and through means and instrumentalities of such commerce. Even where abusive debt collection practices are purely intrastate in character, they nevertheless directly affect interstate commerce.

(e) It is the purpose of this title to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.

§ 803. Definitions [15 USC 1692a]

As used in this title —

(1) The term “Commission” means the Federal Trade Commission.

(2) The term “communication” means the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.

(3) The term “consumer” means any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.

(4) The term “creditor” means any person who offers or extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed, but such term does not include any person to the extent that he receives an assignment or transfer of a debt in default solely for the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for another.

(5) The term “debt” means any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment.

(6) The term “debt collector” means any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. Notwithstanding the exclusion provided by clause (F) of the last sentence of this paragraph, the term includes any creditor who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts. For the purpose of section 808(6), such term also includes any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests. The term does not include —

(A) any officer or employee of a creditor while, in the name of the creditor, collecting debts for such creditor;

(B) any person while acting as a debt collector for another person, both of whom are related by common ownership or affiliated by corporate control, if the person acting as a debt collector does so only for persons to whom it is so related or affiliated and if the principal business of such person is not the collection of debts;

(C) any officer or employee of the United States or any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties;

(D) any person while serving or attempting to serve legal process on any other person in connection with the judicial enforcement of any debt;

(E) any nonprofit organization which, at the request of consumers, performs bona fide consumer credit counseling and assists consumers in the liquidation of their debts by receiving payments from such consumers and distributing such amounts to creditors; and

(F) any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity (i) is incidental to a bona fide fiduciary obligation or a bona fide escrow arrangement; (ii) concerns a debt which was originated by such person; (iii) concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person; or (iv) concerns a debt obtained by such person as a secured party in a commercial credit transaction involving the creditor.

(7) The term “location information” means a consumer’s place of abode and his telephone number at such place, or his place of employment.

(8) The term “State” means any State, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing.

§ 804. Acquisition of location information [15 USC 1692b]

Any debt collector communicating with any person other than the consumer for the purpose of acquiring location information about the consumer shall —

(1) identify himself, state that he is confirming or correcting location information concerning the consumer, and, only if expressly requested, identify his employer;

(2) not state that such consumer owes any debt;

(3) not communicate with any such person more than once unless requested to do so by such person or unless the debt collector reasonably believes that the earlier response of such person is erroneous or incomplete and that such person now has correct or complete location information;

(4) not communicate by post card;

(5) not use any language or symbol on any envelope or in the contents of any communication effected by the mails or telegram that indicates that the debt collector is in the debt collection business or that the communication relates to the collection of a debt; and

(6) after the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney with regard to the subject debt and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such attorney’s name and address, not communicate with any person other than that attorney, unless the attorney fails to respond within a reasonable period of time to the communication from the debt collector.

§ 805. Communication in connection with debt collection [15 USC 1692c]

(a) COMMUNICATION WITH THE CONSUMER GENERALLY. Without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, a debt collector may not communicate with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt —

(1) at any unusual time or place or a time or place known or which should be known to be inconvenient to the consumer. In the absence of knowledge of circumstances to the contrary, a debt collector shall assume that the convenient time for communicating with a consumer is after 8 o’clock antimeridian and before 9 o’clock postmeridian, local time at the consumer’s location;

(2) if the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such attorney’s name and address, unless the attorney fails to respond within a reasonable period of time to a communication from the debt collector or unless the attorney consents to direct communication with the consumer; or

(3) at the consumer’s place of employment if the debt collector knows or has reason to know that the consumer’s employer prohibits the consumer from receiving such communication.

(b) COMMUNICATION WITH THIRD PARTIES. Except as provided in section 804, without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a postjudgment judicial remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than a consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.

(c) CEASING COMMUNICATION. If a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing that the consumer refuses to pay a debt or that the consumer wishes the debt collector to cease further communication with the consumer, the debt collector shall not communicate further with the consumer with respect to such debt, except —

(1) to advise the consumer that the debt collector’s further efforts are being terminated;

(2) to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor may invoke specified remedies which are ordinarily invoked by such debt collector or creditor; or

(3) where applicable, to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor intends to invoke a specified remedy.

If such notice from the consumer is made by mail, notification shall be complete upon receipt.

(d) For the purpose of this section, the term “consumer” includes the consumer’s spouse, parent (if the consumer is a minor), guardian, executor, or administrator.

§ 806. Harassment or abuse [15 USC 1692d]

A debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section:

(1) The use or threat of use of violence or other criminal means to harm the physical person, reputation, or property of any person.

(2) The use of obscene or profane language or language the natural consequence of which is to abuse the hearer or reader.

(3) The publication of a list of consumers who allegedly refuse to pay debts, except to a consumer reporting agency or to persons meeting the requirements of section 603(f) or 604(3)1 of this Act.

(4) The advertisement for sale of any debt to coerce payment of the debt.

(5) Causing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number.

(6) Except as provided in section 804, the placement of telephone calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity.

§ 807. False or misleading representations [15 USC 1962e]

A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section:

(1) The false representation or implication that the debt collector is vouched for, bonded by, or affiliated with the United States or any State, including the use of any badge, uniform, or facsimile thereof.

(2) The false representation of —

(A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; or

(B) any services rendered or compensation which may be lawfully received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt.

(3) The false representation or implication that any individual is an attorney or that any communication is from an attorney.

(4) The representation or implication that nonpayment of any debt will result in the arrest or imprisonment of any person or the seizure, garnishment, attachment, or sale of any property or wages of any person unless such action is lawful and the debt collector or creditor intends to take such action.

(5) The threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.

(6) The false representation or implication that a sale, referral, or other transfer of any interest in a debt shall cause the consumer to —

(A) lose any claim or defense to payment of the debt; or

(B) become subject to any practice prohibited by this title.

(7) The false representation or implication that the consumer committed any crime or other conduct in order to disgrace the consumer.

(8) Communicating or threatening to communicate to any person credit information which is known or which should be known to be false, including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed.

(9) The use or distribution of any written communication which simulates or is falsely represented to be a document authorized, issued, or approved by any court, official, or agency of the United States or any State, or which creates a false impression as to its source, authorization, or approval.

(10) The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.

(11) The failure to disclose in the initial written communication with the consumer and, in addition, if the initial communication with the consumer is oral, in that initial oral communication, that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose, and the failure to disclose in subsequent communications that the communication is from a debt collector, except that this paragraph shall not apply to a formal pleading made in connection with a legal action.

(12) The false representation or implication that accounts have been turned over to innocent purchasers for value.

(13) The false representation or implication that documents are legal process.

(14) The use of any business, company, or organization name other than the true name of the debt collector’s business, company, or organization.

(15) The false representation or implication that documents are not legal process forms or do not require action by the consumer.

(16) The false representation or implication that a debt collector operates or is employed by a consumer reporting agency as defined by section 603(f) of this Act.

§ 808. Unfair practices [15 USC 1692f]

A debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section:

(1) The collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.

(2) The acceptance by a debt collector from any person of a check or other payment instrument postdated by more than five days unless such person is notified in writing of the debt collector’s intent to deposit such check or instrument not more than ten nor less than three business days prior to such deposit.

(3) The solicitation by a debt collector of any postdated check or other postdated payment instrument for the purpose of threatening or instituting criminal prosecution.

(4) Depositing or threatening to deposit any postdated check or other postdated payment instrument prior to the date on such check or instrument.

(5) Causing charges to be made to any person for communications by concealment of the true propose of the communication. Such charges include, but are not limited to, collect telephone calls and telegram fees.

(6) Taking or threatening to take any nonjudicial action to effect dispossession or disablement of property if —

(A) there is no present right to possession of the property claimed as collateral through an enforceable security interest;

(B) there is no present intention to take possession of the property; or

(7) Communicating with a consumer regarding a debt by post card.

(8) Using any language or symbol, other than the debt collector’s address, on any envelope when communicating with a consumer by use of the mails or by telegram, except that a debt collector may use his business name if such name does not indicate that he is in the debt collection business.

§ 809. Validation of debts [15 USC 1692g]

(a) Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing —

(1) the amount of the debt;

(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;

(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector;

(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and

(5) a statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor.

(b) If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period described in subsection (a) that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, or that the consumer requests the name and address of the original creditor, the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt or any copy of a judgment, or the name and address of the original creditor, and a copy of such verification or judgment, or name and address of the original creditor, is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.

(c) The failure of a consumer to dispute the validity of a debt under this section may not be construed by any court as an admission of liability by the consumer.

§ 810. Multiple debts [15 USC 1692h]

If any consumer owes multiple debts and makes any single payment to any debt collector with respect to such debts, such debt collector may not apply such payment to any debt which is disputed by the consumer and, where applicable, shall apply such payment in accordance with the consumer’s directions.

§ 811. Legal actions by debt collectors [15 USC 1692i]

(a) Any debt collector who brings any legal action on a debt against any consumer shall —

(1) in the case of an action to enforce an interest in real property securing the consumer’s obligation, bring such action only in a judicial district or similar legal entity in which such real property is located; or

(2) in the case of an action not described in paragraph (1), bring such action only in the judicial district or similar legal entity —

(A) in which such consumer signed the contract sued upon; or

(B) in which such consumer resides at the commencement of the action.

(b) Nothing in this title shall be construed to authorize the bringing of legal actions by debt collectors.

§ 812. Furnishing certain deceptive forms [15 USC 1692j]

(a) It is unlawful to design, compile, and furnish any form knowing that such form would be used to create the false belief in a consumer that a person other than the creditor of such consumer is participating in the collection of or in an attempt to collect a debt such consumer allegedly owes such creditor, when in fact such person is not so participating.

(b) Any person who violates this section shall be liable to the same extent and in the same manner as a debt collector is liable under section 813 for failure to comply with a provision of this title.

§ 813. Civil liability [15 USC 1692k]

(a) Except as otherwise provided by this section, any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this title with respect to any person is liable to such person in an amount equal to the sum of —

(1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of such failure;

(2) (A) in the case of any action by an individual, such additional damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000; or

(B) in the case of a class action, (i) such amount for each named plaintiff as could be recovered under subparagraph (A), and (ii) such amount as the court may allow for all other class members, without regard to a minimum individual recovery, not to exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the debt collector; and

(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court. On a finding by the court that an action under this section was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the court may award to the defendant attorney’s fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and costs.

(b) In determining the amount of liability in any action under subsection (a), the court shall consider, among other relevant factors —

(1) in any individual action under subsection (a)(2)(A), the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, and the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional; or

(2) in any class action under subsection (a)(2)(B), the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, the resources of the debt collector, the number of persons adversely affected, and the extent to which the debt collector’s noncompliance was intentional.

(c) A debt collector may not be held liable in any action brought under this title if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.

(d) An action to enforce any liability created by this title may be brought in any appropriate United States district court without regard to the amount in controversy, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.

(e) No provision of this section imposing any liability shall apply to any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any advisory opinion of the Commission, notwithstanding that after such act or omission has occurred, such opinion is amended, rescinded, or determined by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any reason.

§ 814. Administrative enforcement [15 USC 1692l]

(a) Compliance with this title shall be enforced by the Commission, except to the extend that enforcement of the requirements imposed under this title is specifically committed to another agency under subsection (b). For purpose of the exercise by the Commission of its functions and powers under the Federal Trade Commission Act, a violation of this title shall be deemed an unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation of that Act. All of the functions and powers of the Commission under the Federal Trade Commission Act are available to the Commission to enforce compliance by any person with this title, irrespective of whether that person is engaged in commerce or meets any other jurisdictional tests in the Federal Trade Commission Act, including the power to enforce the provisions of this title in the same manner as if the violation had been a violation of a Federal Trade Commission trade regulation rule.

(b) Compliance with any requirements imposed under this title shall be enforced under —

(1) section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, in the case of —

(A) national banks, by the Comptroller of the Currency;

(B) member banks of the Federal Reserve System (other than national banks), by the Federal Reserve Board; and

(C) banks the deposits or accounts of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (other than members of the Federal Reserve System), by the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation;

(2) section 5(d) of the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933, section 407 of the National Housing Act, and sections 6(i) and 17 of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (acting directing or through the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation), in the case of any institution subject to any of those provisions;

(3) the Federal Credit Union Act, by the Administrator of the National Credit Union Administration with respect to any Federal credit union;

(4) subtitle IV of Title 49, by the Interstate Commerce Commission with respect to any common carrier subject to such subtitle;

(5) the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, by the Secretary of Transportation with respect to any air carrier or any foreign air carrier subject to that Act; and

(6) the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921 (except as provided in section 406 of that Act), by the Secretary of Agriculture with respect to any activities subject to that Act.

(c) For the purpose of the exercise by any agency referred to in subsection (b) of its powers under any Act referred to in that subsection, a violation of any requirement imposed under this title shall be deemed to be a violation of a requirement imposed under that Act. In addition to its powers under any provision of law specifically referred to in subsection (b), each of the agencies referred to in that subsection may exercise, for the purpose of enforcing compliance with any requirement imposed under this title any other authority conferred on it by law, except as provided in subsection (d).

(d) Neither the Commission nor any other agency referred to in subsection (b) may promulgate trade regulation rules or other regulations with respect to the collection of debts by debt collectors as defined in this title.

§ 815. Reports to Congress by the Commission [15 USC 1692m]

(a) Not later than one year after the effective date of this title and at one-year intervals thereafter, the Commission shall make reports to the Congress concerning the administration of its functions under this title, including such recommendations as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate. In addition, each report of the Commission shall include its assessment of the extent to which compliance with this title is being achieved and a summary of the enforcement actions taken by the Commission under section 814 of this title.

(b) In the exercise of its functions under this title, the Commission may obtain upon request the views of any other Federal agency which exercises enforcement functions under section 814 of this title.

§ 816. Relation to State laws [15 USC 1692n]

This title does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any person subject to the provisions of this title from complying with the laws of any State with respect to debt collection practices, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with any provision of this title, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency. For purposes of this section, a State law is not inconsistent with this title if the protection such law affords any consumer is greater than the protection provided by this title.

§ 817. Exemption for State regulation [15 USC 1692o]

The Commission shall by regulation exempt from the requirements of this title any class of debt collection practices within any State if the Commission determines that under the law of that State that class of debt collection practices is subject to requirements substantially similar to those imposed by this title, and that there is adequate provision for enforcement.

§ 818. Effective date [15 USC 1692 note]

This title takes effect upon the expiration of six months after the date of its enactment, but section 809 shall apply only with respect to debts for which the initial attempt to collect occurs after such effective date.

Approved September 20, 1977

ENDNOTES

1. So in original; however, should read “604(a)(3).”

1. The reporting periods have been lengthened for certain adverse information pertaining to U.S. Government insured or guaranteed student loans, or pertaining to national direct student loans. See sections 430A(f) and 463(c)(3) of the Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. 1080a(f) and 20 U.S.C. 1087cc(c)(3), respectively.

** Should read “paragraphs (4) and (5) …” Prior Section 605(a)(6) was amended and redesignated as Section 605(a)(5) in November 1998.

__________________________

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

Public Law 95-109 [H.R. 5294]

HOUSE REPORT No. 95-131 (Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs).

SENATE REPORT No. 95-382 (Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs).

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 123 (1977):

Apr. 4, considered and passed House.

Aug. 5, considered and passed Senate, amended.

Sept. 8, House agreed to Senate amendment.

WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Vol. 13, No. 39:

Sept. 20, Presidential statement.

AMENDMENTS:

SECTION 621, SUBSECTIONS (b)(3), (b)(4) and (b)(5) were amended to transfer certain administrative enforcement responsibilities, pursuant to Pub. L. 95-473, § 3(b), Oct. 17, 1978. 92 Stat. 166; Pub. L. 95-630, Title V. § 501, November 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 3680; Pub. L. 98-443, § 9(h), Oct. 4, 1984, 98 Stat. 708.

SECTION 803, SUBSECTION (6), defining “debt collector,” was amended to repeal the attorney at law exemption at former Section (6)(F) and to redesignate Section 803(6)(G) pursuant to Pub. L. 99-361, July 9, 1986, 100 Stat. 768. For legislative history, see H.R. 237, HOUSE REPORT No. 99-405 (Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs). CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: Vol. 131 (1985): Dec. 2, considered and passed House. Vol. 132 (1986): June 26, considered and passed Senate.

SECTION 807, SUBSECTION (11), was amended to affect when debt collectors must state (a) that they are attempting to collect a debt and (b) that information obtained will be used for that purpose, pursuant to Pub. L. 104-208 § 2305, 110 Stat. 3009 (Sept. 30, 1996).

CASES IN LAW

ELLEN R. VAN VALKENBURG

ALBERT BROWN.

STATUS OF CITIZENSHIP NOT CONFERRED BY RECENT AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.
No white person born within the limits of the United States and subject to their jurisdiction, or born without those limits and subsequently naturalized under their laws, owes his status of citizenship to the recent amendments to the Federal Constitution.
PURPOSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States was to confer the status of citizenship upon a numerous class of persons domiciled within the limits of the United States who could not be brought within the operation of the naturalization laws because native born, and whose birth, though native, had at the same time left them without the status of citizenship. Such persons were not white persons, but in the main were of African blood, who had been held in slavery in this country, or having themselves never been held in slavery, were the native-born descendants of slaves.
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF CITIZENSHIP
Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States are guaranteed and protected in every State beyond the operation of State laws.
THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE NOT AN IMMUNITY OF CITIZENSHIP.
The elective franchise is not one of the immunities or privileges intended in the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
POWER OF STATE TO DETERMINE WHO MAY VOTE NOT CURTAILED.
The mere power of the State to determine the class of inhabitants who may vote within her limits, is not curtailed in the Fourteenth Amendment.
FEMALES NOT MADE VOTERS BY THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT.
The Fifteenth Amendment took away the authority of the State to discriminate against citizens of the United States on account of either race, color, or previous condition of servitude; but the power of exclusion upon all other grounds, including that of sex, remains intact.
*44 APPEAL from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, County of Santa Cruz.
The facts are stated in the opinion.

Albert Hagan, for Appellant.
The office of the Fourteenth Amendment is not to simply secure to all persons equal capacities before the law, but it grants to all persons who are citizens the broadest rights which attach themselves to every citizen of the Republic. (Live Stock Association v. Crescent City, 1 Abbott, 396.)
Suffrage is a fundamental right–one of the privileges of the citizen by virtue of citizenship in a free government. As soon as one is raised to the dignity of a citizen he can claim the right of suffrage as one inherent in a Republic and fundamental in its nature. (Abbott v. Bailey, 2 Kent, Sec. 72; Corfield v. Correll, 6 Pick. 42.)
California yet retains the word “white” in her organic law prescribing the qualifications of electors, yet the negro votes here by virtue of the Constitution of the United States. If the right of suffrage belongs to every citizen, by virtue of the organic law of the Union, then no State can prohibit *45 any citizen from voting. It needs no prohibition in the Constitution of the United States to prevent States from disfranchising any citizen, for, if once invested with the fundamental right to vote, no State can destroy, no Legislature can abolish it.
To say that the Fifteenth Amendment goes far to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment and to thereby grant or imply that the States may restrict the right of suffrage as to other than male citizens, is an admission that the Fourteenth Amendment by its terms does away with the right of the several States to any restriction over the right to vote. States may regulate the manner of voting, but cannot take away the right to vote, if the latter is conceded to be a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.

Albert Heath, for Respondent.
The respondent admits that the appellant is a citizen of the United States, over the age of twenty-one years, but denies that under and by virtue of the laws of the State of California, the Clerk of Santa Cruz County is authorized to place upon the Great Register of said county the name of a female, and refers the Court to the following authorities, viz: Sec. 1, Art. II, of the Constitution of the State of California; Sec. 2 of the Registry Act, and the amendments thereto, approved March 30th, 1868.

By the Court, WALLACE, C. J.:
The plaintiff applied to the Court below for a writ of mandamus against the defendant, who is the County Clerk of the County of Santa Cruz, to compel him to inscribe her name in the Great Register, and enroll her as a legal voter of said county. Judgment having been rendered refusing the writ, she brings this appeal.
*46 It appears that she is “a white female resident and citizen of the United States and of the State of California, over the age of twenty-one years, and for more than one year last past a resident of Santa Cruz County,” and was born within the limits and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
The Court below held that by reason of her sex she was disqualified to exercise the elective franchise; and it is admitted that if her claim in that respect is to be determined alone by the Constitution and laws of this State, excluding, as they do, persons of her sex from the exercise of the elective franchise, the judgment below is correct, and should be affirmed here.
But it is claimed that she is entitled to registration as a voter by reason of the first section of the recent amendment to the Federal Constitution of July 20th, 1868, known as the Fourteenth Amendment. That section is in the following words:
“Article 14, Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
1. It is claimed that the plaintiff is a citizen of the United States and of this State. Undoubtedly she is. It is argued that she became such by force of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, already recited. This, however, is a mistake. It could as well be claimed that she became free by the effect of the Thirteenth Amendment, by which slavery was abolished; for she was no less a citizen *47 than she was free before the adoption of either of these amendments. No white person born within the limits of the United States, and subject to their jurisdiction, or born without those limits, and subsequently naturalized under their laws, owes the status of citizenship to the recent amendments to the Federal Constitution. The history and aim of the Fourteenth Amendment is well known, and the purpose had in view in its adoption well understood. That purpose was to confer the status of citizenship upon a numerous class of persons domiciled within the limits of the United States, who could not be brought within the operation of the naturalization laws because native born, and whose birth, though native, had at the same time left them without the status of citizenship. These persons were not white persons, but were, in the main, persons of African descent, who had been held in slavery in this country, or, if having themselves never been held in slavery, were the native-born descendants of slaves. Prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment it was settled that neither slaves, nor those who had been such, nor the descendants of these, though native and free born, were capable of becoming citizens of the United States. (Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393.) The Thirteenth Amendment, though conferring the boon of freedom upon native-born persons of African blood, had yet left them under an insuperable bar as to citizenship; and it was mainly to remedy this condition that the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.
This is recent history–familiar to all.
2. It is next claimed that, by whatever means the plaintiff became a citizen of the United States, her privileges and immunities as such citizen cannot be abridged by State laws; and this is true. The purpose and the effect of the amendment, in this respect, is to place the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States beyond the operation of State legislation. Those immunities and privileges, whatever *48 they may be, are guaranteed and protected in every State by this clause in the Federal Constitution.
3. It is urged that, among these privileges and immunities, is included the privilege of the plaintiff to exercise the elective franchise within the limits of this State, even in disregard of the Constitution and laws of the State, which unquestionably exclude persons of her sex. And this brings us to inquire what is meant by the phrase “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,” as used in this amendment.
This phraseology was known in our history anterior to the formation of the present Federal Union. In the articles of confederation between the American States it was provided “that the free inhabitants of each of these States (paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted) shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens of the several States, and the people of each State shall, in every other, enjoy all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively,” etc. (Art. IV.) The term “privileges and immunities” was therefore not a new one when, in the second section of the fourth article of the Federal Constitution, as originally ratified, it was declared that “the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.” The words “privileges and immunities” had at that time acquired a distinctive meaning and a well-known signification. They comprehended the enjoyment of life and liberty, and the right to acquire and possess property, and to demand and receive the protection of the Government in aid of these. They included the right to sue and defend in the Courts, to have the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus, and an exemption from higher taxes or heavier impositions than were to be borne by other persons under like conditions and circumstances.
*49 The Federal Constitution went into operation in March, 1789, and within a few years thereafter–in 1797–a question came before the General Court in Maryland in respect to the meaning of the words “privileges and immunities” as thus employed in that instrument. The question was argued by the most eminent counsel in the State, and among them was the celebrated Luther Martin, then Attorney General. Upon this point the Court said: “Privilege and immunity are synonymous, or nearly so. Privilege signifies a peculiar advantage, exemption, immunity; immunity signifies exemption, privilege. The peculiar advantages and exemptions contemplated under this part of the Constitution may be ascertained, if not with precision and accuracy, yet satisfactorily. By taking a retrospective view of our situation antecedent to the formation of the first General Government, or the Confederation, in which the same clause is used verbatim, one of the great objects must occur to every person, which was the enabling of the citizens of the several States to acquire and hold real property in any of the States, and deemed necessary, as each State was a sovereign and independent State, and the States had confederated only for the purposes of general defense and security, and to promote the general welfare. It seems agreed from the manner of expounding or defining the words ‘immunities and privileges’ by the counsel on both sides, that a particular and limited operation is to be given to those words, and not a full and comprehensive one. It is agreed it does not mean the right of election, the right of holding office, the right of being elected. The Court are of opinion it means that the citizens of all the States shall have the peculiar advantage of acquiring and holding real as well as personal property, and that such property shall be protected and secured by the laws of the State in the same manner as the property of the citizens *50 of the State is protected,” etc. (Campbell v. Morris, 3 Harr. & McH. 554.)
The expression, “privileges and immunities,” had been found in the Constitution for a period of nearly eighty years prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and had never been supposed to include the right to the exercise of the elective franchise. Notwithstanding the citizens of each State were, during all that time, entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, it was never supposed that the citizen of any State might, upon his removal into any other State, lawfully claim to vote there because he had exercised that privilege in the State from which he had just emigrated.
In point of fact the States have generally conferred the privilege of the elective franchise upon such of their male inhabitants as had become citizens of the United States, if of the requisite age, etc. This circumstance has given rise to a notion in some quarters that the privilege of voting and the status of citizenship are necessarily connected in some way–so that the existence of the one argues that of the other. But the history of the country shows that there was never any foundation for such a view. Thus citizens of the United States, resident in the State of Virginia, were prevented by State law from voting there, unless seized of a freehold estate; and citizens of the United States, resident in Massachusetts, were by the laws of that State denied the privileges of the elective franchise, unless owners of personal property to a designated amount. While the privilege of voting was thus, by State laws, withheld in those States from persons who were citizens of the United States, the elective franchise was in other States of the Union conferred by State laws upon persons who were not citizens. In New York and North Carolina, for instance, at an early day the privilege of voting was conferred upon negroes, persons of African descent, under certain conditions. These were not *51 citizens of the United States, nor then even capable of becoming such. In Wisconsin and Michigan, though negroes were excluded, persons of the Indian blood were admitted; and in Indiana, Illinois, Minnesota, and other States, unnaturalized foreigners were by State laws allowed to vote–following in this respect the early policy of the Federal Government, who, in the ordinance of 1787, for the government of the Northwestern Territory, had permitted the elective franchise to the unnaturalized French and Canadians, of whom the population of that Territory was then largely composed. It will be found that from the earliest periods of our history the State laws regulated the privilege of the elective franchise within their respective limits, and that these laws were exactly such as local interests, peculiar conditions, or supposed policy dictated, and that it was never asserted that the exclusion of any class of inhabitants from the privilege of voting amounted to an interference with the privileges of the excluded class as citizens. As was well said by Judge MILLS, of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky: “The mistake on the subject arises from not attending to a sensible distinction between political and civil rights. The latter constitute the citizen, while the former are not necessary ingredients. A State may deny all her political rights to an individual, and yet he may be a citizen. The rights of office and suffrage are political purely, and are denied by some or all the States to part of their population, who are still citizens. A citizen, then, is one who owes the Government allegiance, service, and money by way of taxation, and to whom the Government, in turn, grants and guarantees liberty of person and of conscience, the right of acquiring and possessing property, of marriage and the social relations, of suit and defense, and security of person, estate, and reputation. These, with some others which might be enumerated, being guaranteed and secured by Government, constitute a citizen. To aliens we *52 extend these privileges by courtesy; to others we secure them–to male as well as female–to the infant as well as the person of hoary hairs.” (1 Litt. R. 342.)
4. But the language of the second section of the Fourteenth Amendment itself demonstrates that the elective franchise is not one of the “privileges or immunities” mentioned in the first section, and as such not to be abridged or taken away by State laws.
The second section of the amendment (so far as material upon this point) is in the following words:
“Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States, according to their respective numbers. But when the right to vote * * * is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States * * * the basis of representation therein shall be reduced” * * * etc.
It will thus be seen that by this second section of the Fourteenth Amendment it is expressly provided that if the State law shall deny the elective franchise to the citizens of the United States therein mentioned, the basis of Federal representation to which such State would otherwise be entitled shall be thereupon and in consequence of such denial readjusted and reduced in a designated ratio. If the power of the State to deny the elective franchise to a citizen of the United States had been absolutely taken away by the first section, then a State law enacted for that purpose would necessarily be absolutely void–as a bill of attainder passed or ex post facto law enacted, would be void, as being in contravention of the inhibitions of Article I, Section 10, of the Federal Constitution. But by the second section of the amendment under consideration it is provided that the action of the State authority denying the right of citizens of the United States to vote, so far from being null and void, shall *53 furnish a new basis of Federal numbers in the State, upon which a new apportionment of representation in Congress is to follow. It is inconceivable that such constitutional consequences are to follow the doing of an act which the Constition had just forbidden to be done at all.
5. The Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution was adopted nearly two years after the Fourteenth. It provides that the right of a citizen of the United States to vote shall not be denied on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. If, under the Fourteenth Amendment already adopted, the right of a citizen to vote was not to be denied upon any ground whatsoever, what necessity or propriety in subsequently providing that it should not be denied upon either of three enumerated grounds? It will be seen that the construction claimed for the Fourteenth Amendment by the counsel for the plaintiff would leave nothing for the Fifteenth to operate upon.
Many other and hardly less cogent reasons might be mentioned going to show that the elective franchise is not one of the immunities or privileges secured by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment. The mere power of the State to determine the class of inhabitants who may vote within her limits was not curtailed in the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Fifteenth Amendment took away her authority to discriminate against citizens of the United States on account of either race, color, or previous condition of servitude; but the power of exclusion upon all other grounds, including that of sex, remains intact.
Judgment affirmed.
Cal. 1872.
ELLEN R. VAN VALKENBURG v. ALBERT BROWN.
END OF DOCUMENT

Copr. (C) Bancroft-Whitney and West Group 1998

Dred Scott Supreme Court Decision

Robert’s Rules of Order Revised

by General Henry M. Robert

1915 Version, Public Domain

[Editor’s Note: The copyright on the original 1915 version has expired. However, the modifications and enhancements to this work are Copyright © 1996 Constitution Society. Permission is hereby granted to any person to copy and use this material on a non-profit basis with attribution, and in particular, with the retention of links to the site of the Constitution Society or its successors on the World Wide Web. One of the modifications made to the original document is the substitution for page numbers of section and paragraph numbers, using the format mm:nn, where mm is the section number and nn the paragraph number. Footnotes have been numbered and moved to the end of sections. The Order of Precedence of Motions and the Table of Rules Relating to Motions have also been reformatted and revised to adapt them to the needs of an online document.]
To purchase a hard copy of the 10th Edition of RROR click on A.

Order of Precedence of Motions. (OPM)

Table of Rules Relating to Motions. (TRM)

Preface. (PRE)

Introduction. (INT)

Parliamentary Law (PAR)

Plan of the Work (WRK)

Definitions (DEF)

Part I.- Rules of Order.

Art. I.– How Business is Conducted in Deliberative Assemblies.

Order of Precedence of Motions. (OPM)

Table of Rules Relating to Motions. (TRM)

Preface. (PRE)

Introduction. (INT)

Parliamentary Law (PAR)
Plan of the Work (WRK)
Definitions (DEF)

Part I.- Rules of Order.

Art. I.– How Business is Conducted in Deliberative Assemblies.

1. Introduction of Business
2. What Precedes Debate
3. Obtaining the Floor
4. Motions and Resolutions
5. Seconding Motions
6. Stating the Question
7. Debate
8. Secondary Motions
9. Putting the Question and Announcing the Vote
10. Proper Motions to Use to Accomplish Certain Objects

Art. II.– General Classification of Motions.

11. Main or Principal Motions
12. Subsidiary Motions
13. Incidental Motions
14. Privileged Motions
15. Some Main and Unclassified Motions

Art. III.– Privileged Motions.

16. Fix the Time to which the Assembly shall Adjourn
17. Adjourn
18. Take a Recess
19. Questions of Privilege
20. General and Special Orders and a Call for the Orders of the Day

Art. IV.– Incidental Motions.

21. Questions of Order and Appeal
22. Suspension of the Rules
23. Objection to the Consideration of a Question
24. Division of a Question, and Consideration by Paragraph or Seriatim
25. Division of the Assembly, and Motions relating to Methods of Voting, or to Closing or Reopening the Polls
26. Motions relating to Methods of Making, or to Closing or to Reopening Nominations
27. Requests growing out of Business Pending or that has just been pending, as, a Parliamentary Inquiry, a Request for Information, for Leave to Withdraw a Motion to Read Papers, to be Excused from a Duty, or for any other Privilege

Art. V.– Subsidiary Motions.

28. Lay on the Table
29. The Previous Question
30. Limit or Extend Limits of Debate
31. Postpone Definitely, or to a Certain Time
32. Commit or Refer, or Recommit
33. Amend
34. Postpone Indefinitely

Art. VI.– Some Main and Unclassified Motions.

35. Take from the Table
36. Reconsider
37. Rescind
38. Renewal of a Motion
39. Ratify
40. Dilatory, Absurd, or Frivolous Motions
41. Call of the House

Art. VII.– Debate.

42. Debate
43. Decorum in Debate
44. Closing and Preventing Debate
45. Principles of Debate and Undebatable Motions

Art. VIII.– Vote.

46. Voting
47. Votes that are Null and Void even if Unanimous
48. Motions requiring more than a Majority Vote

Art. IX.– Committees and Boards.

49. Committees Classified
50. Boards of Managers, etc., and Executive Committees
51. Ex-Officio Members of Boards and Committees
52. Committees, Special and Standing
53. Reception of Reports
54. Adoption or Acceptance of Reports
55. Committee of the Whole
56. As if in Committee of the Whole
57. Informal Consideration

Art. X.– The Officers and the Minutes.

58. Chairman or President
59. Secretary or Clerk
60. The Minutes
61. Executive Secretary
62. Treasurer

Art. XI.– Miscellaneous.

63. Session
64. Quorum
65. Order of Business
66. Nominations and Elections
67. Constitutions, By-laws, Rules of Order, and Standing Rules
68. Amendments of Constitutions, By-laws, and Rules of Order

Part II.- Organization, Meetings, and Legal Rights of Assemblies.

Art. XII.– Organization and Meetings.

69. An Occasional or Mass Meeting

(a) Organization
(b) Adoption of Resolutions
(c) Committee to draft Resolutions
(d) Semi-Permanent Mass Meeting

70. A Permanent Society.

(a) First Meeting
(b) Second Meeting
(c) Regular Meeting

71. Meeting of a Convention.

(a) An Organized Convention
(b) A Convention not yet Organized

Art. XIII.– Legal Rights of Assemblies and Trial of Their Members.

72. Right of an Assembly to Punish its Members
73. Right of an Assembly to Eject any one from its Place of Meeting
74. Rights of Ecclesiastical Tribunals
75. Trial of Members of Societies

Plan for Study of Parliamentary Law. (PLN)

Introduction
Lesson Outlines (LES)

Index (NDX)

Home >>References

Original URL:http://www.constitution.org/rror/rror-00.htm

Maintained:

Jon Roland of the
Constitution Society

Original date: 1996 September 3 — Updated: 2004 January 9

PART II.

Organization, Meetings, and Legal Rights of Assemblies.

Art. XII. Organization and Meetings.

69. An Occasional or Mass Meeting.

(a) Organization
(b) Adoption of Resolutions
(c) Committee to Draft Resolutions
(d) Semi-Permanent Mass Meeting

70. A Permanent Society

(a) First Meeting
(b) Second Meeting
(c) Regular Meeting

71. Meeting of a Convention.

(a) An Organized Convention
(b) A Convention not yet Organized

69. An Occasional or Mass Meeting. (a) Organization. Before calling a meeting that is not one of an Organized society, the following Preliminary Steps should be taken: Those who are responsible for the call should consult together and agree upon the place and time of the meeting, how the notice shall be given, who shall call the meeting to order and nominate the chairman, who shall be nominated for chairman, and who shall explain the object of the meeting. It is also good policy sometimes to have a set of resolutions drafted in advance to submit to the meeting.

It is not customary to call mass meetings to order promptly at the appointed time, but to wait ten or fifteen minutes, when the one chosen for the purpose steps to the front and says: “The meeting will please come to order; I move that Mr. A act as [or I nominate Mr. A for] chairman of this meeting.” Some, one else says, “I second the motion [or nomination].” The first member then puts the question to vote, by saying, “It has been moved and seconded that Mr. A act as [or Mr. A has been nominated for] chairman of this meeting; those in favor of the motion [or nomination] say aye;” and then the affirmative vote is taken, he says, “Those opposed say no.” If the majority vote is in the affirmative, he says, “The ayes have it, and Mr. A is elected chairman. He will please take the chair.” if the motion is lost he announces that fact, and calls for the nomination of some one else for chairman, and proceeds with the new nomination as in the first case.

The member who calls the meeting to order, instead of making the motion himself, may act as temporary chairman, and say, “The meeting will please come to order; will some one nominate a chairman?” He puts the question to vote on the nomination as described above, or as below, in case of the secretary. This is dangerous, however, in large meetings, where an incompetent person may be nominated and elected chairman. In large assemblies, the member who nominates, with one other member, frequently conducts the presiding officer to the chair, and the chairman makes a short speech, thanking the assembly for the honor conferred on him.

When the chairman takes the chair he says, “The first business in order is the election of a secretary.” Some one then makes a motion as just described, or he says, “I nominate Mr. B,” when the chairman puts the question as below. Sometimes several names are called out, and the chairman, as he hears them, says, “Mr. B is nominated; Mr. C is nominated,” etc.; he then takes the vote on the first one he heard, putting the question in a form similar to this: “As many as are in favor of Mr. B for secretary say aye; those opposed say no. The chair is in doubt: those in favor of Mr. B for secretary will rise; those opposed will rise. The negative has it and the motion is lost. As many as are in favor of Mr. C for secretary say aye; those opposed say no. The ayes have it, and Mr. C is elected secretary. He will please take his place at the desk.” If Mr. C fails of election the vote is taken on the next nominee, and so on until one is elected. The secretary should take his seat near the chairman, and keep a record of the proceedings, as described in 59. The chairman should always stand in putting the question to vote, and in large assemblies it is better f or him to stand while stating the question. During debate he should be seated, and pay attention to the discussion. When nominations are made it is optional whether they are seconded or not. They are usually not debated, though sometimes the one making the nomination and the one seconding it say a few words at the time in favor of their nominee. A nomination cannot be amended. If additional officers are desired, they may be elected in the same manner as the secretary.

(b) Adoption of Resolutions. These two officers are all that are usually necessary, so as soon as the secretary is elected, the chairman directs the secretary to read the call for the meeting and then calls on the person most familiar with the question to explain the object of the meeting more fully, or he may do this himself. This explanation should be immediately followed by some one’s offering a series of resolutions previously prepared, or by his moving the appointment of a committee to prepare resolutions upon the subject In the first case he rises and says, “Mr. Chairman;” the chairman responds, “Mr. C.” Mr. C, having thus obtained the floor, says, “I move the adoption of the following resolutions,” which he reads and hands to the chairman. Some one else says, “I second the motion.” The chairman then says, “It has been moved and seconded to adopt the following resolutions,” which he reads, or directs the secretary to read, and then says, “The question is on the adoption of the resolutions.” If no one rises at once, he asks, “Are you ready for the question?” The resolutions are now open to debate and amendment. They may be referred to a committee, or may have any other subsidiary motion applied to them. When the debate appears to be finished, the chair again asks, “Are you ready for the question?” If no one then rises, he says, “As many as are in favor of the adoption of the resolutions say aye;” after the ayes have voted, he says, “As many as are of a contrary opinion [or are opposed] say no;” he then announces the result of the vote as follows: “The ayes have it [or the motion is carried] and the resolutions are adopted.” If the debate has lasted any length of time, he should, before taking the vote, have the resolutions again read.

It is the practice, in legislative bodies, to send to the clerk’s desk all resolutions, bills, etc., the title of the bill and the name of the member introducing it being indorsed on each. In such bodies, however, there are several clerks and only one chairman. In most assemblies there is but one clerk or secretary, and as he has to keep the minutes, there is no reason for his being constantly interrupted to read every resolution offered. In such assemblies, unless there is a rule or established custom to the contrary, it is usually much better to hand all resolutions, reports, etc., directly to the chairman. If they were read by the member introducing them, and no one calls for another reading, the chairman may omit reading them when he thinks they are fully understood. [For the manner of reading and stating the question when the resolution contains several paragraphs, see 24.]

Dividing Resolutions. If the committee reports several independent resolutions relating to different subjects, the chair must state the question separately on the resolution, or resolutions, relating to each subject, on the request of a single member. If the resolutions relate to a single subject and yet each one is capable of standing alone if all the rest are rejected, they may be divided by a majority vote on a motion to divide the question, as explained in 24, If the resolutions are so connected that they cannot stand alone, then the proper way to secure a separate vote on any objectionable resolution is to move to strike it out. When the chair states the question on striking it out, the resolution is open to amendments of the second degree, so as to perfect it, before the vote is taken on striking it out. [See 33:6.]

Amending a Resolution. If it is desired to amend a pending resolution, that is, a resolution that the chair has stated as before the assembly for action, a member rises and obtains the floor as already described, and offers, or moves, his amendment, thus: “I move to insert the words ‘with asphalt’ after the word ‘paved.'” If the motion is not at once seconded, the chair asks if the motion is seconded. In a large assembly he should repeat the motion before making this inquiry, as members who would be willing to second the motion may not have heard it. In fact, the chair must usually assume that some members do not hear what is said from the floor, and therefore that he must always repeat motions and the result of votes. The motion being seconded, the chair states the question thus: “It is moved and seconded to amend the resolution by inserting the words ‘with asphalt’ after the word ‘paved.’ Are you ready for the question?” The question is now open to debate and amendment,which must be confined, however, to the amendment, as it has superseded the resolution and has become what is termed the immediately pending question. If no one rises to claim the floor, the chair puts the question thus: “As many as are in favor of the amendment [or motion] say aye; those opposed say no. The ayes have it, and the amendment is adopted. The question is now on the resolution as amended, which is as follows [repeat the amended resolution]. Are you ready for the question?” The resolution is again open to debate and amendment, as it has again become the immediately pending question. When the chair thinks the debate ended, he asks, “Are you ready for the question?” If no one rises to claim the floor, he puts the question on the resolution, thus: “The question is on adopting the following resolution: “Resolved, That ………………. Those in favor of the motion [or, of adopting the resolution] say aye; those opposed say no. The ayes have it, and the resolution is adopted.”

(c) Committee to Draft Resolutions. If it is preferred to appoint a committee to draft resolutions, a member, after he has addressed the chair and has been recognized, says: “I move that a committee of five be appointed by the chair to draft resolutions expressive of the sense of this meeting on,” etc., adding the subject for which the meeting was called. The motion being seconded, the chairman states the question thus: “It has been moved and seconded that a committee of five be appointed by the chair to draft resolutions, etc. [repeat the motion]. Are you ready for the question?” If no one rises he may put the question thus: “As many as are in favor of the motion say aye; those opposed say no. The ayes have it and the motion is adopted.” Or, it may be put thus: “The question is, ‘Shall a committee of five be appointed by the chair to draft resolutions, etc. [repeating the motion]?’ As many as are of the affirmative will raise their right hands. As many as are of the negative will signify it in the same way. The affirmative has it and the motion is adopted. The chair will appoint Messrs. A, B, C, D, and E as the committee on resolutions. The committee will withdraw and prepare the resolutions as quickly as possible. What is the further pleasure of the meeting?”

In a mass meeting, or in any very large assembly, it is safer to have all committees appointed by the chair. If the assembly, however, prefers a different method, the procedure is as described in 32; or the following method may be adopted: A member moves, “That a committee be appointed to draft resolutions,” etc. This motion being adopted, the chair asks: “Of how many shall the committee consist?” If only one number is suggested, he announces that the committee will consist of that number; if several numbers are suggested, he states the different ones, and then takes a vote on each, beginning with the largest, until one number is selected. He then inquires: “How shall the committee be appointed?” This is usually decided without the formality of a vote. The committee may be “appointed” by the chair, in which case the chairman names the committee, and no vote is taken; or the committee may be “nominated” by the chair, or by members of the assembly (no member naming more than one, except by unanimous consent), and then the assembly votes on their appointment. When the chairman nominates, after stating the names, he puts one question on the entire committee, thus: “As many as are in favor of these gentlemen constituting the committee say aye,” etc. If nominations are made by I members of the assembly, and more names are mentioned than the number of the committee, a separate vote must be taken on each name, in the order of nomination, until the committee is filled.

When the committee is appointed, it should at once retire and agree upon a report, which should be written out as described in 52. During its absence other business may be attended to, or the time may be occupied with hearing addresses. If the chairman sees the committee return to the room, he should announce, as soon as the pending business is disposed of, or the member speaking closes, that the assembly will now hear the report of the committee on resolutions: or, before this announcement he may ask if the committee is prepared to report. If the chairman does not notice the return of the committee, its chairman avails himself of the first opportunity to obtain the floor, when he says: “The committee appointed to draft resolutions is prepared to report.” The chairman tells him that the assembly will now hear the report, which is then read by the chairman of the committee, who immediately moves its adoption, and then hands it to the presiding officer, upon which the committee is dissolved without any action of the assembly. The chairman then proceeds as stated above when the resolutions were offered by a member. If it is not desired immediately to adopt the resolutions, they may be debated, modified, their consideration postponed, etc., as explained in 10.

When through with the business for which the assembly was convened, or when from any other cause it is desired to close the meeting, some one moves “to adjourn.” If no time has been appointed for another meeting, this motion may be amended and debated as any other main motion. If the motion is carried, and no other time for meeting has been appointed, the chairman, in case the ayes and noes are nearly equal, says: “The ayes seem to have it, the ayes have it, the motion is adopted, and we stand adjourned without day (sine die).” If the vote is overwhelmingly in the affirmative, the expression, “The ayes seem to have it,” should be omitted. If a time for an adjourned meeting has been appointed, the chair declares the
assembly “adjourned to 8 o’clock next Wednesday evening,” or whatever is the appointed time. Before declaring the adjournment, or even taking a vote on adjourning, the chair should satisfy himself that all required notices are given.

(d) Semi-Permanent Mass Meetings. Sometimes it is desirable to continue the mass meetings until a certain object is accomplished, and in such case the assembly may prefer to make a temporary organization at first, and then make their semi-permanent organization with more deliberation. If so, the assembly would be organized as just described, only adding “pro tem.” to the title of the officers, thus, “chairman pro tem.” The “pro tem.” is never used in addressing the officers. As soon as the secretary pro tem,. is elected, a committee is usually appointed to nominate the semi-permanent officers, as in the case of a convention. A committee on rules should also be appointed, which should recommend a few rules providing for the time and place for holding the meetings, for some authority on parliamentary law, and for the number and length of speeches allowed, if two speeches not to exceed ten minutes each is not; satisfactory.

Frequently the presiding officer is called the President, and sometimes there is a large number of Vice Presidents appointed for merely complimentary purposes. The Vice Presidents in large formal meetings sit on the platform beside the President, and in his absence, or when he vacates the chair, the first on the list that is present should take the chair.

70. A Permanent Society. (a) First Meeting. When it is desired to form a permanent society, those interested in it should consult together and carefully lay their plans before calling a meeting to organize the society. They should also be careful in calling the meeting to see to it that there is a majority in sympathy with their plans. By neglect of this, and giving a newspaper invitation to all interested in the object to attend the meeting, those who originated the work have found themselves in the minority and not in sympathy with the constitution which was adopted, so that they did not care to join the society after it was organized. Having taken all the preliminary steps, then, as described in case of a mass meeting [69], they invite those who they have reason to think are in sympathy with their general plans to meet at a certain time and place to consider the question of organizing a society for a certain purpose. As one of their preliminary steps they should procure copies of the constitutions and by-laws of several similar societies for the use of the committee in drafting their own.

It is not usual in meetings called to organize a society, or in mass meetings, to commence until ten or fifteen minutes after the appointed time, when the person previously selected for the purpose steps forward and says: “The meeting will please come to order; I move that Mr. A act as chairman of this meeting.” Some one “seconds the motion,” when the one who made the motion puts it to vote (or, as it is called, “puts the question”), as already described under a “mass meeting” [69]; and, as in that case, when the chairman is elected he takes the chair and announces, as the first business in order, the election of a secretary.

After the secretary is elected, the chairman calls on the member who is most interested in forming the society to state the object of the meeting. When this member rises he says, “Mr. Chairman.” The chairman then announces his name, when the member proceeds to state the object of the meeting. Having finished his remarks, the chairman may call on other members to give their opinions on the subject, and sometimes a particular speaker is called out by members who wish to hear him. The chairman should observe the wishes of the assembly, and, while being careful not to be too strict, he must not permit any one to occupy too much time and weary the assembly.

When a sufficient time has been spent in this informal way, some one should offer a resolution, so that definite action can be taken. Those interested in arranging for the meeting, if it is to be a large one, should have previously agreed upon what is to be done, and be prepared, at the proper time, to offer a suitable resolution, which may be in form similar to this: “Resolved, That it is the sense of this meeting that a society for (state the object of the society) should now be formed in this city.” This resolution, when seconded and stated by the chair, is open to debate and amendment, and is treated as already described [69]. his preliminary motion could have been offered at the commencement of the meeting, and if the meeting is a very large one this is generally better than to have the informal discussion.

After this preliminary motion has been voted on, or even without waiting for such a motion to be made, one like this may be offered: “I move that a committee of five be appointed by the chair to draft a constitution and by-laws for a society for (here state the object), and that it report at an adjourned meeting of this assembly.” This motion can be amended by striking out and adding words, etc., and it is debatable.

When this committee is appointed, the chairman may inquire; “Is there any other business to be attended to?” or, “What is the further pleasure of the assembly [or club, or convention, etc.]?” When all business is finished, a motion may be made to adjourn to meet at a certain place and time, which, when seconded and stated by the chair, is open to debate and amendment. It is usually better to fix the time of the next meeting at an earlier stage of the meeting; and then, when it is desired to close the meeting, move simply “to adjourn,” which cannot be amended or debated. When this motion is carried, the chairman says, “This meeting stands adjourned to meet at,” etc., specifying the time and place of the next meeting.

(b) Second Meeting. At the next meeting the officers of the previous meeting, if present, serve until the permanent officers are elected. When the hour arrives for the meeting, the chairman, standing, says, “The meeting will please come to order;” as soon as the assembly is seated, he says. “The secretary will read the minutes of the last meeting,” and then takes his seat. If any one notices an error in the minutes, he should state the fact as soon as the secretary finishes reading them; if there is no objection, without waiting for a motion, the chairman directs the secretary to make the correction. The chairman then says, “There being no [further] corrections, the minutes stand approved as read [or as corrected].”

The chair then announces, as the next business in order, the hearing of the report of the committee on the constitution and by-laws. The chairman of the committee, after addressing “Mr. Chairman” and being recognized, says something like this: “The committee appointed to draft a constitution and by-laws has agreed upon the following, and has directed me to report the same and move their adoption.” He then reads them, moves their adoption, and hands them to the chair. The motion being seconded, the chair says: “It has been moved and seconded to adopt the constitution and by-laws reported by the committee. The question is on the adoption of the constitution, which will now be read.” The constitution is then read from the platform by the secretary, or by the chairman of the committee, as the chair directs. This reading may be dispensed with by general consent, as it has already been read. He then reads, or has read, the first paragraph, and asks if there are any amendments proposed to this paragraph. When through with amending it he says, “There being no [further] amendments to this paragraph, the next will be read.” No vote should be taken on adopting the separate paragraphs. He thus proceeds through the entire constitution, and then says the whole constitution is now open to amendment. This is the time to insert additional paragraphs, or make any amendments to the earlier paragraphs rendered necessary by changes made in the later ones.

When the chairman thinks the constitution has been modified to suit the wishes of the assembly, he inquires: “Are you ready for the question?” If no one wishes to speak, he puts the question: “As many as are in favor of adopting the constitution as amended say aye;” and then, “As many as are opposed say no.” He distinctly announces the result of the vote. This should never be omitted. Only a majority vote is required to adopt a constitution of a new society, or to amend it before it is adopted.

The chairman now states that the constitution having been adopted, it will be necessary for those wishing to become members to sign it (and pay the initiation fee, if required by the constitution), and, if the assembly is a large one, suggests that a recess be taken for the purpose. A motion is then made to take a recess for, say, ten minutes, or until the constitution is signed. The constitution being signed, no one is permitted to vote excepting those who have signed it, and thus have joined the society. While the payment of the initiation fee is strictly a prerequisite to the right to vote, it should be waived at this meeting with those who are unprepared to make the payment.

The recess having expired, the chairman calls the meeting to order, and says, “The secretary will read the roll of members.” This is necessary in order that all may know who are entitled to take part in the future proceedings. After the roll has been read, the chair says, “The question before the assembly is on the adoption of the by-laws reported by the committee. The secretary will please read them.” He then proceeds exactly as in the case of the constitution. The motion to adopt the constitution and by-laws reported by the committee having been made when the committee made its report, no further motion is necessary.

When the by-laws are adopted, the chair says, “The next business in order is the election of the permanent officers of the society.” The by-laws should prescribe the method of nomination and election of the officers. and they should be strictly complied with. If the by-laws do not prescribe the method of nomination, the chair asks, “How shall the officers be nominated?” Some one may at once move that a committee be appointed by the chair to nominate the permanent officers of the society. This motion being adopted, the chair appoints the committee, which retires and agrees upon a ticket. During the absence of the committee the assembly may transact any business it pleases, or it may take a recess. When the committee returns to the hall, as soon as pending business is disposed of, the chair calls on the chairman of the committee for the report. The chairman of the committee reads the list of nominations, and hands it to the chair. The chair reads the list, and then asks, “Are there any further nominations?” Any member may now rise and, after addressing the chair, nominate any one else for any office, or he may nominate one person for each office, thus proposing a new ticket. The chair announces the nominations as made, and when he thinks that no more names will be proposed, he asks, “Are there any more nominations?” If there is no response, and if the by-laws prescribe that the election shall be by ballot, as they usually should, he appoints tellers and directs them to distribute blank ballots, upon which each member writes the name of each office and the person for whom he votes to fill that office. When the ballots are filled out, the chair directs the tellers to collect the ballots, which they do, in any convenient receptacle. The chair then inquires if all have voted who wish to, so as to be sure that the tellers have not missed any members. When all have voted that wish, he announces that “the polls are closed,” and the tellers count the ballots, and the first one appointed reports the vote, as described on page 196, under Voting by Ballot. The chair then announces as elected all the candidates who received a majority vote, and the temporary officers are immediately replaced by the permanent ones elected. If the president is elected on this first ballot he immediately takes the chair. In case any of the offices remain unfilled, the chair immediately orders the tellers to distribute blank ballots, and directs the assembly to prepare ballots for these offices. Balloting is continued until all the offices are filled. the voting is not limited to the nominees, as every member is at liberty to vote for any member who is not declared ineligible by the by-laws.

After the offices are filled, if there is business that the chair knows requires immediate attention, he should mention it. Committees should probably be appointed for various purposes, as described in the by-laws, and the place of meeting should be determined. It is possible that an adjourned meeting may be necessary in order to complete the organization before beginning the regular work of the society. When the work is completed, or when an adjourned meeting has been provided for, and the lateness of the hour requires an adjournment, some one should move to adjourn. If the motion is carried, the chair announces the vote and declares the assembly adjourned. If there can be any question as to where and when the next meeting is to be held, he should mention the place and time, though this is not necessary afterwards when the place and time are regularly established and known.

If the society is one that expects to own real estate, it should be incorporated according to the laws of the state in which it is situated, and for this purpose some member of the committee on the constitution should consult a lawyer before this second meeting, so that the constitution may conform to the laws of the state. In this case the trustees, or managers, or directors, are usually instructed to take the proper measures to have the society incorporated.

(c) Regular Meetings of a Society. After a society is properly organized, its regular business meetings are conducted as follows: When the hour fixed for the meeting to begin arrives, the presiding officer takes the chair and calls the meeting to order and directs the secretary to read the minutes of the last meeting. When they are read, he asks, “Are there any corrections to the minutes?” If none are suggested, he adds, “There being none, the minutes stand approved as read.” If any corrections are suggested, the secretary makes them, unless there is opposition. If there is difference of opinion, some one moves to amend the minutes, or the chair, without waiting for a motion, may put the question on the amendment that has been suggested. When this has been settled, the chair asks, “Are there any further corrections (or amendments) to the minutes?” If there is no response, he adds, “There being none, the minutes stand approved as corrected.” He then announces the next business in order, following the order of business prescribed by the rules of the society.

If the order of business is the same as given in 65, as soon as the minutes are read and approved, the chair says, “The next business in order is hearing the reports of the standing committees.” He may then call upon each committee in its order for a report, thus: “Has the committee on applications for membership any report to make?” In this case the committee may report as shown above, or some member of it reply that it has no report to make. Or, when the chairman knows that there are but few, if any, reports to be made, it is better, after making the announcement of the business, for him to ask, “Have these committees any reports to make?” After a short pause, if no one rises to report, he states, “There being no reports from the standing committees, the next business in order is hearing the reports of special committees,” when he will act the same as in the case of the standing committees. The chairman should always have a list of the committees, to enable him to call upon them, as well as to guide him in the appointment of new committees.

Having attended to the reports of committees, the chair announces the next business in order, and so on until the business of the meeting has been disposed of, when some one moves to adjourn. If this motion is carried, the chair announces the vote and declares the assembly adjourned.

The meetings of different societies vary greatly, and they should be managed differently in order to obtain the best results. Some societies require a strict enforcement of parliamentary rules, while with others the best results will be obtained by being informal. It is important that the presiding officer have tact and common sense, especially with a very intelligent assembly.

71. Meeting of a Convention or Assembly of Delegates.(a) An Organized Convention. If a convention is an organized body (that is, if when convened it has a constitution and by-laws and officers), a committee on credentials, or registration, and one on program, should have been appointed previous to the meeting. These committees may have been appointed at the previous convention, or by the executive board, or by the president, as prescribed by the by-laws. The committee on credentials, or registration, should be on hand somewhat before the time of the meeting, in some cases the day before, so as to be prepared to submit its report immediately after the opening addresses. It should furnish each delegate, when he registers, with a badge or card as evidence of his being a delegate and having the right of admission to the hall. The committee on program should in most cases have the programs printed in advance. In many cases it is better that the constituent bodies be furnished in advance with copies of the program. This should always be done when there is difficulty in getting full delegations to attend. In addition to these two committees there are a number of local committees usually appointed by the local society, as on entertainment, etc. One of the general officers usually performs the duty of a committee on transportation, to obtain reductions in railroad fares, etc.

When the hour appointed for the meeting arrives, the president, as the permanent presiding officer of a convention is usually called, stands at the desk, and, striking it with the gavel to attract attention, says, “The convention will come to order.” In large conventions there is usually much confusion and noise at the opening, and it requires self-control, firmness, and tact on the part of the presiding officer to preserve proper order so that all members may hear and be heard. It is a mistake for the chairman to try to stop the noise by pounding with the gavel and talking so loud as to be heard in spite of conversation on the floor. It is better for him to set the example of being quiet, and to stop all business while the noise is such that members cannot hear. Members should be equired to be seated and to refrain from talking except when addressing the chair.

When the convention has come to order it is customary to have some opening exercises, the nature of which depends upon the character of the convention. In the majority of cases the convention is opened with prayer, an address of welcome, and a response. The program, however, is the president’s guide as to the order of business, even though it has not yet been adopted by the convention. It should provide for hearing the report of the credential committee as soon as the opening exercises are concluded, so that it may be known who are entitled to vote. This committee’s report usually consists merely of a list of the delegates and their alternates, if any, whose credentials have been found correct, and of the ex-officio members of the convention, no one being on the list, however, who has not registered as present. The constitution should always provide that such as are present of the officers of the convention, the members of the Board of Managers, and the chairmen of the committees that are required to report at the convention, shall be ex-officio members of the convention.

When this report of the credential committee is presented it is read either by the chairman of the committee or by the reading secretary, or official reader, if there is one. In all cases, it, and all other reports, should be read from the platform. When the chairman of a committee cannot read so as to be heard, the report should be read by a reading secretary, or official reader, who should be appointed in every large convention, solely for the purpose of reading resolutions, reports, etc. If there is a case of contest between two sets of delegates and there is serious doubt as to which is entitled to recognition, the committee should omit both from the list and report the fact of the contest. If the committee, however, thinks the contest not justified, it should ignore it and enter on the list the names of the legitimate delegates. A motion should. be made to accept or adopt the report, which, after it is stated by the chair, is open to debate and amendment. No one can vote whose name is not on the list of delegates reported by the committee. Upon the motion to substitute one delegation for another, neither one can vote. So upon a motion to strike out the names of a delegation whose seats are contested they cannot vote. But upon the main motion to accept the report, all persons whose names are on the list of members as reported by the committee and amended by the convention are entitled to vote, and they alone. When this report has been adopted, the president should immediately call upon the program committee for a report. The chairman of that committee submits the printed program and moves, or some one else moves, its adoption. This is open to debate and amendment, and when once adopted by a majority vote can not be deviated from except by a two-thirds vote of those voting, or by a majority vote of the enrolled membership.

The membership of the convention and the program having been decided, the convention is ready for its business as laid down in the program. The two committees, though they have made their reports, are continued through the session, as supplementary reports may be required from them. Additional delegates may arrive, and speakers on the program may be sick or unable to be present, or for other reasons a change in the program may be necessary. These two committees should be allowed at any time to make additional reports. The business is conducted as described in the preceding section, but, of course, the program must be followed. Boards and standing committees and the treasurer are always required to submit annual reports, and sometimes reports are required from various other officers. Generally officers and the board of managers, etc., are elected annually; but some constitutions make the term of office two years, and some provide, in addition, that only about half the officers shall be elected at any one annual meeting. In most organizations it is better to have the term of office begin at the close of the convention, so that the same officers will serve throughout the meetings. At the beginning of the first meeting each day the minutes of the preceding day are read and approved. At the close of the convention, if there is not time to read the minutes of the last day, a motion should be adopted authorizing the board, or some committee, to approve the minutes of that day. As the proceedings of a convention are usually published, a publishing committee should be appointed, which should have the power to edit the proceedings. When through with its business the convention adjourns sine die.

(b) A Convention not yet Organized. Such a convention is similar to a mass meeting, already described in 69, in that when called to order it has no constitution, by-laws, or officers. It has the added difficulty of determining who are entitled to vote. In the mass meeting every one may vote, but in the convention none but properly appointed delegates may vote, and sometimes this is a very difficult question to determine justly. The convention must have been called by some committee, or body of men, who should have secured the hall and made the preliminary arrangements for the meeting. If the convention is a very large one, so that it is necessary to reserve the main floor of the hall for the delegates, the committee should allow only those to enter who have prima facie evidence of their right to membership, and in contested cases both sides should be admitted. The chairman of the committee should call the convention to order, and either he or some one the committee has selected for the purpose should nominate a temporary chairman and a temporary secretary. Next should come the appointment of a committee on credentials, whose duty it is to examine all credentials and report a list of all the delegates who are entitled to seats in the convention. When alternates have been appointed they should be reported also. While the committee on credentials is out, committees may be appointed on nominations of officers, on rules, and on order of business or program. In a large convention of this kind all committees should be appointed by the chair, and no one whose right to a seat is questioned should be placed on a committee until the convention has acted favorably on his case. Until the committee on credentials has reported, no business can be done except to authorize the chair to appoint the above mentioned committees. While waiting for the committee on credentials to report, the time is usually spent in listening to speeches. When the committee reports, the procedure is the same as just described in an organized convention. When that report has been adopted, the convention proceeds to its permanent organization, acting upon the reports of the other three committees previously appointed, taking them in such order as the convention pleases. When these reports have been acted upon, the convention is organized, with members, officers, rules, and program, and its business is transacted as in other organized deliberative assemblies. If the convention adopts rules only for the session, the committee on rules need recommend only a few rules as to the hours for beginning the meetings, the length of the speeches, etc., and a rule adopting some standard rules of order, where not in conflict with its other rules. if it is not intended to make a permanent organization, the organization just described is all that is necessary.

If the convention is called to make a permanent organization, the committee on nominations is not appointed until after the by-laws are adopted, and the committee on rules should report a constitution and by-laws as in the case of a permanent society [70]. The committee in such case is more usually called the committee on constitution and by-laws. When a convention of this kind is composed of delegates away from their homes it is practically impossible to ave them assemble more frequently than once a year, and, therefore, before the convention meets, a constitution and by-laws should be carefully drafted by those interested in calling the convention. Those who drew up the by-laws should be appointed on the committee, in order to avoid delay in reporting them.

After the committee has reported a constitution and by-laws the procedure is the same as already described in the previous section in case of acting on a constitution and by-laws for a permanent society [70(b)]. When the by-laws are adopted, the officers are elected and committees are appointed as prescribed by the by-laws, and the convention is prepared for its work as already described.

Art. XIII. Legal Rights of Assemblies and Trial of Their Members.

72. Right of an Assembly to Punish
its Members
73. Right of an Assembly to Eject
any one from its Place of Meeting
74. Rights of Ecclesiastical
Tribunals
75. Trial of Members of Societies

72. The Right of a Deliberative Assembly to Punish its Members. A deliberative assembly has the inherent right to make and enforce its own laws and punish an offender, the extreme penalty, however, being expulsion from its own body. When expelled, if the assembly is a permanent society, it has the right, for its own protection, to give public notice that the person has ceased to be a member of that society.

But it has no right to go beyond what is necessary for self-protection and publish the charges against the member. In a case where a member of a society was expelled, and an officer of the society published, by its order, a statement of the grave charges upon which he had been found guilty, the expelled member recovered damages from the officer in a suit for libel, the court holding that the truth of the charges did not affect the case.

73. Right of an Assembly to Eject any one from its Place of Meeting. Every deliberative assembly has the right to decide who may be present during its session; and when the assembly, either by a rule or by a vote, decides that a certain person shall not remain in the room, it is the duty of the chairman to enforce the rule of order, using whatever force is necessary to eject the party.

The chairman can detail members to remove the person, without calling upon the police. If, however, in enforcing the order, any one uses harsher measures than is necessary to remove the person, the courts have held that he, and he alone, is liable for damages, just the same as a policeman would be under similar circumstances. However badly the man may be abused while being removed from the room, neither the chairman nor the society is liable for damages, as, in ordering his removal, they did not exceed their legal rights.

74. Rights of Ecclesiastical Tribunals. Many of our deliberative assemblies are ecclesiastical bodies, and it is important to know how much respect will be paid to their decisions by the civil courts.

A church became divided, and each party claimed to be the church, and therefore entitled to the church property. The case was taken into the civil courts, and finally, on appeal, to the U.S. Supreme Court, which, after holding the case under advisement for a year, sustained the decision of the U.S. Circuit Court. The Supreme Court, in rendering its decision, laid down the broad principle that when a local church is but a part of a large and more general organization or denomination, the court will accept as final the decision of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal to which the case has been carried within that general church organization, on all questions of discipline, faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law, and will not inquire into the justice or injustice of its decree as between the parties before it. The officers, the ministers, the members, or the church body which the highest judiciary of the denomination recognizes, the court will recognize. Whom that body expels or cuts off, the court will hold to be no longer members of that church. The court laid down the following principles:¹

“Where a church is of a strictly congregational or independent organization, and the property held by it has no trust attached to it, its right to the use of the property must be determined by the ordinary principles which govern ordinary associations.

“Where the local congregation is itself a member of a much larger and more important religious organization and is under its government and control and is bound by its orders and judgments, its decisions are final and binding on legal tribunals.

“Courts having no ecclesiastical jurisdiction, cannot revise or question ordinary acts of church discipline; their only judicial power arises from the conflicting claims of the parties to the church property and the use of it.”

But while the civil courts have no ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and cannot revise or question ordinary acts of church discipline, they do have jurisdiction where there are conflicting claims to church property. An independent church by an almost unanimous vote decided to unite with another independent church. A very small minority, less than ten per cent, did not wish to unite with the other church, so they were voted letters of dismission to any other church of like faith and order, against their protest. The majority then directed the trustees to transfer their property to the other church and voted themselves a letter of dismission to unite with that church. The church then voted to disband. The majority presented their letters and were received into the other church. The minority would not use their letters, but took the matter into the courts, which, of course, decided that they were the church and owned the property. According to the practice of churches of the same denomination, no member can be forced out of the church unless for neglect of his duties as a member. Letters of dismission are granted only on the request of members, and as a general rule the membership does not terminate until the letter has been used. The church could not terminate the membership of the minority, against whom there were no charges, by voting them letters without their consent. By not using their letters they soon constituted the entire membership and rescinded the order to the trustees to transfer the property to the other church. By the hasty, ill-advised action of almost the entire church the majority lost their property. In cases where property is involved, churches cannot be too careful, and it is usually best to act under legal advice.

____

1. Watson Vs. Jones, 13 Wallace U.S. Supreme Court Reports, p. 679. This case was decided April 15, 1872.

75. Trial of Members of Societies. Every deliberative assembly, having the right to purify its own body, must therefore have the right to investigate the character of its members. It can require any of them to testify in the case, under pain of expulsion if they refuse.

When the charge is against the member’s character, it is usually referred to a committee of investigation or discipline, or to some standing committee, to report upon. Some societies have standing committees whose duty it is to report cases for discipline whenever any are known to them.

In either case, the committee investigates the matter and reports to the society. This report need not go into details, but should contain its recommendations as to what action the society should take, and should usually close with resolutions covering the case, so that there is no need for any one to offer any additional resolutions upon it. The ordinary resolutions, where the member is recommended to be expelled, are (1) to fix the time to which the society shall adjourn; and (2) to instruct the clerk to cite the member to appear before the society at this adjourned meeting to show cause why he should not be expelled, upon the following charges which should then be given.

After charges are preferred against a member, and the assembly has ordered that he be cited to appear for trial, he is theoretically under arrest, and is deprived of all the rights of membership until his case is disposed of. Without his consent no member should be tried at the same meeting at which the charges are preferred, excepting when the charges relate to something done at that meeting.

The clerk should send the accused a written notice to appear before the society at the time appointed, and should at the same time furnish him with a copy of the charges. A failure to obey the summons is generally cause enough for summary expulsion.

At the appointed meeting what may be called the trial takes place. Frequently the only evidence required against the member is the report of the committee. After it has been read and any additional evidence offered that the committee may see fit to introduce, the accused should be allowed to make an explanation and introduce witnesses, if he so desires. Either party should be allowed to cross-examine the other’s witnesses and introduce rebutting testimony. When the evidence is all in, the accused should retire from the room, and the society deliberate upon the question, and finally act by a vote upon the question of expulsion, or other punishment proposed. No member should be expelled by less than a two-thirds¹ vote, a quorum voting. The vote should be by ballot, except by general consent. The members of the committee preferring the charges vote the same as other members.

In acting upon the case, it must be borne in mind that there is a vast distinction between the evidence necessary to convict in a civil court and that required to convict in an ordinary society or ecclesiastical body. A notorious pickpocket could not even be arrested, much less convicted by a civil court, simply on the ground of being commonly known as a pickpocket; while such evidence would convict and expel him from any ordinary society.

The moral conviction of the truth of the charge is all that is necessary in an ecclesiastical or other deliberative body to find the accused guilty of the charges.

If the trial is liable to be long and troublesome, or of a very delicate nature, the member is frequently cited to appear before a committee, instead of the society, for trial. In this case the committee reports to the society the result of its trial of the case, with resolutions covering the punishment which it recommends the society to adopt. When the committee’s report is read, the accused should be permitted to make his statement of the case, the committee being allowed to reply. The accused then retires from the room, and the society acts upon the resolutions submitted by the committee. The members of the committee should vote upon the case the same as other members.

If the accused wishes counsel at his trial, it is usual to allow it, provided the counsel is a member of the society in good standing. Should the counsel be guilty of improper conduct during the trial, the society can refuse to hear him, and can also punish him.

____

1. The U.S. Constitution [Art. I, Sec. 5]
provides that each House of Congress may “with the concurrence of
two-thirds, expel a member.”

COMMON LAW 1 Our American Common Law Common Law Trademarks, Etc – Common Law Information
Common law – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

common law: Characteristic Features of Common Law

The History of the Common Law of England by Matthew Hale 1713 I.
Constitutional Law – MegaLaw.com

National Journal of Constitutional Law. Human Rights Research

Native American Constitution and Law Digitization Project

FindLaw: International Resources

The Law for Dummies

What is the Law?

GUIDE TO LAW ONLINE: United States Constitution

Know the Law

Researching Constitutional Law on the Internet: World

Human & Constitutional Rights

International Constitutional Law

American Lawyer Media’s Law.com

Constitutional Law Research Links

CHAPTER IV. OF THE RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES, AND IMMUNITEES

CITIZENSHIP

www.blacklaws19.4t.com

The Agenda of the Earth’s Oldest Aboriginal Indigenous Nation

JURISDICTIONS OF LAW: Local [county/municipal], State, National, International
A jurisdiction is a geographical or fictitious contractual area where laws, statutes, codes and ordinances are enforced. The enforcing of all law is based on jurisdiction. The local jurisdiction that you are in geographically and/or contractually is the most powerful. Anyone with an Indigenous Status that is based on Treaties, Private Citizenship, or any other contractual status must document that status on record in their National community or personal filing system and in the records of the local [county/municipal] jurisdiction. After this is done, the local jurisdiction wil recognize the documents that are officially filed for record. The documents can then be forwarded to the Secretary of State on the State and National Level to be authenticated in those Jurisdictions.

International Indigenous Council
Black People in America have proven to be the oldest and most ancient lineage in America and throughout the earth. The Ancient Indigenous Moors, whose origins go back beyond Pre-Dynastic Egypt, who regained Egypt in Egypt’s 18th Dynasty called ‘AMaRna'[The Family of Amraan in the 3rd Surah of the Qur’aan] and ruled Africa, India, China, and North and South America during all of the ages and practiced a Culture of Peace called’Maat’ and ‘Islam’ are the Earth’s oldest recorded Peoples. This lineage of Black People were in the Americas long before the present so-called ‘Indian’ or European ‘Caucasians’. The United Nations has a Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. The Earth’s oldest Indigenous Civilization is not even properly represented on the Council. Why? Learn more about the Indigenous Heritage of Our People. The United Nations cannot properly serve the Interests of the Indigenous Peoples of the Earth. We need this agenda:

The institutionalization of an Indigenous Forum independent of the United Nations. My NGO lays a platform for this to come into existence. It is called I.S.I.S.[International Society of Indigenous Sovereigns].

The International Secretariat is the International States of Indigenous Sovereigns [I.S.I.S.]This will establish a separate secretariat. We cannot depend on the World Bank, World Health Organization, or the International Monetary Fund all of whom have the Indigenous Nations Colonized, in Debt, and sick through Experimentation to assist us to total Freedom.

Through this means we can secure adequate funds and develop a strategy for Our Independent International Government and Secretariat.

Through this means we have a Developing Mechanism to address social, economic, political, and spiritual development of indigenous peoples world wide.

As we galvanize more unity amongst our Nation, Nationally and Internationally, this step [membership on the Independent Indigenous International Circuit is a foundation that cannot be stopped.Indigenous Nations must reacquire their National standing and work towards repairing Indigenous History, Culture, and Self-Government.
webmaster@blacklaws19.4t.com

What and Who is Indigenous?

Indigenous: The term “Indigenous” means ‘In born by genetic lineage’. Indigenous means any people not introduced directly or indirectly according to historical record or scientific analysis into a particular land or region or environment unaturally or illegally from the outside; originating or developing or produced naturally or by nature in a particular land or region or environment,coming from the Latin word “Indigena.” The difference between “Indigenous” and “Native” is that Native refers to contractual rights documented in written form as a claim for an area or region while Indigenous refers directly to scientific lineage, proved through Blood Type, which both can be merged in the case of the Aboriginal Indiggenous Nations of the Earth, as reported in the Indigenous Book of Natural Law, the Sacred Qur’an Sharrieff. The Jews, so-called Native Americans, and Moroccan Moors have stolen Our Birthrights and documented Place in History. These groups are the result of grafting. They are not Original? .
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Black Law Dictionary

Black Law Dictionary

BLACK ‘S LAW DICTIONARY

PREFACE REVISED FOURTH EDITION

GUIDE TO PRONUNCIATION

A NOTE ON PRONUNCIATION OF LATIN

KEY TO PRONUNCIATION

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

With Amendments to March 1, 1974

PREAMBLE AND PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

CANON 1

A Lawyer Should Assist in Maintaining the Integrity and Competente of the Legal Profession

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

CANON 2

A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfilling Its Duty to Make Legal Counsel Availabl

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

DISCIPLINARY RULES

CANON 6

A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Competently

DISCIPLINARY RULES

CANON 8

A Lawyer Should Assist in Improving the Legal System

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

EC 8-1 Changes in human affairs and imperfec-tions in human institutions make necessary con-stant efforts to maintain and iniprove our legal system.’ This system should function in a man-

DISCIPLINARY RULES

DR 8-101 Action as a Public Official.

CANON 9

A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

DISCIPLINARY RULES

DEFINITIONS*

As used in the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility: (1) "Differing interests" include every interest that will adversely affect either the judg-

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

CANON 1

A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary

CANON 2

A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All His Activities

CANON 3

A Judge Should Perform the Duties of His Office Impartially and Diligently

CANON 4

A Judge May Engage in Activities to Improve the Law, the Legal System, and the Administration of Justice

CANON 5

A Judge Should Regulate His Extra-Judicial Activities to Minimize the Risk of Conflict with His Judicial Duties

CANON 7

A Judge Should Refrain from Political Activity Inappropriate to His Judicial Office

MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSION TO LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES

BLACK’S DICTIONARY OF LAW FOURTH EDITION

The Spelling of A

A as Indefinite Article

Actions, In General

Children

Compensation Claims

Condemnation Proceedings

Construction Work

Contracts

Copyrights

Crups

Ditches

Office

Oil Wells

Patento

Pleadings

Prescriptive Rights

Privileges

Property

Property for Special Purposes

Railroad Property

Rights in General

Ship and Freight

Act by which shipowner surrenders ship and freight to a trustee for benefit of claimants. See 46 U.S.C.A. § 185; Ohio Transp. Co. v. Davidson S. S. Co., 148 F. 185, 78 C.C.A. 319

Taxing Power

Taxing Power

Delegation of taxing power by legislature to city was not "abandonment of taxing power". Mouledoux v. Maestri, 197 La. 525, 2 So.2d 11, 16.

Trade-marks and Trade Names

Trusts

State aid for hospital, with stipulation for beds for emergency cases, did not establish an "aban-donment of trust". Noble v. First Nat. Bank of Anniston, 241 Ala. 85, 1 So.2d 289, 291.

BLACK ‘S
LAW DICTIONARY

PREFACE
REVISED FOURTH EDITION

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

As used in the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
(1) "Differing interests" include every interest that will adversely affect either the judg-

MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS
FOR ADMISSION TO LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES

BLACK’S
DICTIONARY OF LAW
FOURTH EDITION

Act by which shipowner surrenders ship and freight to a trustee for benefit of claimants. See 46 U.S.C.A. § 185; Ohio Transp. Co. v. Davidson
S. S. Co., 148 F. 185, 78 C.C.A. 319